In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

____________

No. 08-1850

ROGER CORONADO, JR.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

VALLEYVIEW PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT 365-U, ET AL.,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 08 C 1254—John W. Darrah, Judge.

____________

ARGUED JULY 8, 2008—DECIDED AUGUST 12, 2008

____________

Before BAUER, COFFEY and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. Roger Coronado, Jr., a fifteen-year-old

student at Bolingbrook High School, was involved in a

confrontation between rival gangs in the school cafeteria—for which he received a two-semester expulsion.

Acting through his next friend, Shelley Gilbert, Coronado

sued the school district, a police officer, and various school

officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming, as relevant here,

that his expulsion hearing deprived him of procedural due
2 No. 08-1850

process. Coronado also sought a preliminary injunction

that would lift the expulsion until a second hearing with

“Due Process safeguards” could take place. The district

court denied the motion, however, reasoning that

Coronado had failed to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits, and that the proposed

injunction would harm the public interest. This interlocutory appeal followed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). We affirm.

I.

The following facts are undisputed. During the lunch

hour on February 4, 2008, several boys—some of them

Latin Kings—sat down at Coronado’s table in the school

cafeteria. Within a few minutes, a member of a second

gang, the Gangster Disciples, approached the table and

began to taunt the group. The other boys at Coronado’s

table rose to confront their rival, which attracted additional

Gangster Disciples. Both sides started shouting and

making gang signs. Coronado stood up as well. But before

the situation could escalate further, the bell rang and the

group dispersed at the urging of a security guard. Shortly

thereafter Timothy Gavin, a second security guard in the

cafeteria, filed an incident report in which he wrote, “Roger

was seen by myself posturing with a large group in the

cafeteria who were flashing gang signs at a group of

Gangster Disciples.” Gavin also wrote up the other 12 to 14

students involved in the confrontation.

A few days later Coronado was told to report to the

school’s police substation, where he met Officer Alan

Hampton. Officer Hampton showed Coronado the incident
No. 08-1850 3

report, which Coronado signed below this acknowledgment: “The above offenses have been explained to me and

I have had the opportunity to respond to them; my signature shall not be taken as an admission of guilty [sic] of the

offense(s) alleged.” At Officer Hampton’s invitation,

Coronado telephoned his father to let him know that he

was in trouble. Officer Hampton also demanded that

Coronado complete a “Memorandum of Incident” describing the events in the cafeteria. Coronado’s signed statement reads, “I just got up and try to see if my friends were

goin [sic] to need help or something because there were a

lot of them other guys on the there [sic] side so I got up to

help.” That document also bears the undated signatures of

Coronado’s parents underneath the representation that

they had “seen this statement.” On the basis of this confession, Coronado was suspended for ten days while the

school considered expulsion.

Approximately a week later, Coronado’s father received

a letter from Hearing Officer Steven Prodehl explaining

that the school administration had charged Coronado with

“Subversive Organizations,” had recommended expulsion,

and had appointed Prodehl to review the matter. Prodehl

“requested” that Coronado and his parents attend a

hearing on February 19, 2008, at 11:00 a.m., to discuss

Coronado’s “behavior and said expulsion.” The letter

described the nature of the hearing as well: 

You, and your child, will be given the opportunity to

review the charges made against your child. You may

present evidence at the Hearing, and have counsel

present, if you desire. Information germane to the
4 No. 08-1850

question of expulsion, which you may wish to present

is requested and will be taken into consideration.

Coronado and his parents attended the expulsion

hearing, as did Prodehl and Dean Rob Lathrope. Gavin and

Officer Hampton did not appear. There is no record of the

hearing other than Prodehl’s written summary of the

proceedings. According to that document, Coronado was

charged with a second offense—“Fighting/Mob Action”—at the hearing. And, Prodehl writes, Coronado

admitted to both charges: “Roger stated that he did walk

over and lent support to his table, some of whom he

knows are Latin Kings. . . . Roger stated that he should

have acted differently and what he did was very stupid,

especially when he is not that good of friends with any of

them.” The summary also recounts that Coronado’s father

remarked, in English, that he was “very surprised at his

son” and that he and his wife support the school’s efforts

to prevent gang violence but believed that Coronado had

just “got caught up in the moment and did something

stupid.” Additionally, Coronado’s father related that his

son had never been in trouble before, that the parents hope

that he will attend college, and that the entire family is

involved in coaching and playing team sports. Finally,

Coronado’s father asked that the school authorities “look

at his son as an individual, find that he is a good kid and

not expel him.” Following the hearing, Prodehl proposed

to the Board of Education a two-semester expulsion, which

would encompass the remainder of the spring semester

of 2008 (which has now ended) and the fall semester of

2008. On or around February 25, 2008, Coronado received

notice that the Board had adopted Prodehl’s recommendation; he was not to return to school until 2009.
No. 08-1850 5

Coronado responded by filing in the district court a

sprawling, fifteen-count complaint, naming as defendants

the school district, Prodehl, Gavin, and an assistant

principal at the high school. At the same time Coronado

moved for a preliminary injunction that would lift the

expulsion until a second hearing “with Due Process

safeguards” could take place. As relevant to his request

for a preliminary injunction, Coronado claims that his

expulsion violated his right to due process because the

school district did not provide his parents with a Spanishlanguage interpreter, or allow him to cross-examine Gavin

and Officer Hampton, or create a contemporaneous record

of the hearing before Prodehl. The district court ordered

an evidentiary hearing on the motion.

On March 12, 2008, Coronado, Coronado’s parents,

Prodehl, Gavin, and Officer Hampton, among others,

testified about the events leading up to Coronado’s expulsion. Coronado testified that, contrary to his written

statement and Prodehl’s summary of the expulsion hearing, he did not support or encourage anyone in the

school cafeteria that day. According to Coronado, Gavin

had “flat-out lie[d]” about his role in the incident,

Hampton had intimidated him into falsely confessing,

and Prodehl had misrepresented in his written summary

that he admitted a role in the cafeteria confrontation.

Gavin, Hampton and Prodehl, on the other hand, confirmed the accuracy of their earlier reports and denied any

misrepresentation or intimidation. Notably, Coronado

and his parents acknowledged that they had received

advance notice of the expulsion hearing and the charge

of “Subversive Organizations.” Coronado, moreover,
6 No. 08-1850

conceded that he was offered an opportunity to respond

to the charges and rebut the evidence presented by

school officials, but he declined. The parties agree that

Coronado learned of the second charge, “Fighting/Mob

Action,” at the hearing. Yet Coronado has never maintained that he was surprised by the second charge or that

he asked for more time so that he could respond more

fully to the new charge.

Coronado also testified that his father had called the

school prior to the hearing to request a translator “[b]ut he

left a voicemail and nobody called back.” According to

Coronado, his father made the request at the hearing as

well and Prodehl denied the accommodation. Coronado’s

father also testified, through an interpreter, that “on

the way in he asked the official if he could have an interpreter because he didn’t exactly understand” the proceedings but “was told that he wouldn’t need an interpreter”

because his son was present. Prodehl, meanwhile, testified

that he asked the parents at the outset of the hearing if

they needed an interpreter and was told no.

At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, James

Mitchem, the principal at Bolingbrook High School,

testified that the proposed injunction would have a

pernicious effect on his staff and the other students

involved in the incident:

I think that it would have a negative impact on the

staff morale, I think that it would embolden students

who were involved in this particular rules infraction

to perceive that, in fact, they can violate particular

school rules and not be held accountable. And I believe
No. 08-1850 7

that his presence back in our building, particularly

at this juncture, would do just that.

The district court denied the preliminary injunction. The

court concluded that Coronado had failed to demonstrate

a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits, and that,

in any event, the proposed injunction would harm the

public interest. Due process, the court wrote, requires only

that a student facing expulsion receive notice of the

charges against him, notice of the time of the hearing, and

a full opportunity to be heard. See Remer v. Burlington Area

Sch. Dist., 286 F.3d 1007, 1010-11 (7th Cir. 2002). Coronado

received all three, according to the court, and the evidence

showed that he admitted wrongdoing at the hearing. In

reaching this conclusion the court credited the testimony

of the defendants’ witnesses over the testimony of

Coronado and his father. The court explained, moreover,

that Coronado had no constitutional right to cross-examine

Gavin or Officer Hampton at the expulsion hearing. And,

the court continued, Coronado’s contention that the

school was required to provide an interpreter was

baseless as well because the evidence showed that an

interpreter was not needed: Coronado’s father had asked

questions in English at the expulsion hearing and made

statements “regarding Plaintiff’s education, activities

and future plans as well as his own views of the school’s

efforts to combat gang activity.” Finally, the court rejected

Coronado’s claim that Prodehl’s six-page summary of the

expulsion hearing was inadequate. As for the public

interest, the court reasoned that school administrators

must have “the authority to punish conduct such as that

of Plaintiff if they are to provide a safe school environ-
8 No. 08-1850

ment.” Ordering the school district to readmit Coronado,

the court continued, “would diminish that authority and

could threaten the safety of students.”

II.

A party seeking a preliminary injunction must demonstrate that he is reasonably likely to succeed on the merits,

that he is experiencing irreparable harm that exceeds any

harm his opponent will suffer if the injunction issues,

that he lacks an adequate remedy at law, and that the

injunction would not harm the public interest. Christian

Legal Soc’y v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853, 859 (7th Cir. 2006). “If

the moving party meets this threshold burden, the

district court weighs the factors against one another in a

sliding scale analysis . . . which is to say the district court

must exercise its discretion to determine whether the

balance of harms weighs in favor of the moving party or

whether the nonmoving party or public interest will be

harmed sufficiently that the injunction should be denied.”

Id.; see Joelner v. Vill. of Wash. Park, 378 F.3d 613, 619 (7th

Cir. 2004). In reviewing the denial of a preliminary injunction, this court examines legal conclusions de novo,

findings of fact for clear error, and the balancing of harms

for abuse of discretion. Joelner, 378 F.3d at 620. The scope of

appellate review is, however, limited to the injunction

decision itself and those issues inextricably bound to it. See,

e.g., Shaffer v. Globe Protection, Inc., 721 F.2d 1121, 1124 (7th

Cir. 1983) (“Cases applying § 1292(a)(1) have held that

other incidental orders or issues nonappealable in and of

themselves but in fact interdependent with the order
No. 08-1850 9

Strangely, Coronado construes the district court’s order as a 1

“denial of a permanent injunction” because “there is not a

possibility of a trial on the issue of injunctive relief.” Without

question the district court considered Coronado’s motion to

be one for a preliminary injunction. Regardless, this court

would have jurisdiction over Coronado’s interlocutory appeal

even if the district court had denied a motion for a permanent

injunction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1); Asset Allocation & Mgmt.

Co. v. Western Employers Ins. Co., 892 F.2d 566, 568-69 (7th Cir.

1990) (holding that grant of permanent injunction is appealable

even though it is “an interlocutory order [that] does not wind up

the litigation” and “it is not a temporary or preliminary injunction”). 

granting or denying an injunction may also be reviewed,

but only to the extent that they bear upon and are central

to the grant or denial of the injunction.”).

Coronado asserts on appeal that the district court erred

in denying the preliminary injunction because, Coronado

insists, he has a reasonable likelihood of success on the

merits with respect to his due process claim. The crux of 1

his argument on the merits is that he was entitled to

considerably more process than he received given the

severity of his punishment. In Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565

(1975), the Supreme Court recognized a high-school

student’s “legitimate entitlement to a public education

as a property interest which is protected by the Due

Process Clause and which may not be taken away for

misconduct without adherence to the minimum procedures

required by that Clause.” Id. at 574. That decision outlined

the procedural protections enjoyed by a public-school
10 No. 08-1850

student facing a brief suspension. Id. And in Remer this

court suggested that the same governing safeguards—notice of the charges, notice of the time of the

disciplinary hearing, and a meaningful opportunity to be

heard—apply to a student threatened with a four-year

expulsion. See Remer, 286 F.3d at 1010-11. Due process does

not, however, require “a judicial or quasi-judicial

trial”—with all of the features and safeguards of, e.g., a

delinquency proceeding—before a school may punish

misconduct. Linwood v. Bd. of Educ., 463 F.2d 763, 769-70

(7th Cir. 1972); see Goss, 419 U.S. at 583; Remer, 286 F.3d at

1010-11. Although the Goss court reserved the question

whether more formal procedures might be necessary for

longer suspensions or expulsions, Remer can fairly be

read to stand for the proposition that expulsion does not

require a more elaborate hearing in order to comport with

due process so long as the student receives the “fundamentally fair procedures” set out in Goss. See Remer, 286

F.3d at 1010-11; see also Lamb v. Panhandle Cmty. Unit Sch.

Dist. No. 2, 826 F.2d 526, 528 (7th Cir. 1987) (explaining that

a penalty tantamount to expulsion entitles the student

to some opportunity to present mitigating arguments).

Coronado’s appeal falters because he received notice and

a meaningful opportunity to be heard—and therefore

cannot demonstrate any likelihood of success on the

merits. See Remer, 286 F.3d at 1010-11. Prodehl’s letter

informed Coronado and his parents of the date of the

hearing as well as the charge of “Subversive Organizations.” Moreover, Coronado’s contact with Officer

Hampton—even by Coronado’s account—yielded some

understanding of the charges against him. Coronado does
No. 08-1850 11

not dispute that he had an opportunity to present evidence

at the hearing and respond to the charges. But Coronado

does challenge the school’s failure to inform him in advance

of the hearing of the second charge—“Fighting/Mob

Action.” As this court noted in Smith ex rel. Smith v. Severn,

129 F.3d 419 (7th Cir. 1997), though, same-day notice of

school disciplinary charges passes constitutional muster.

Id. at 428-29 (“As for the timing of the notice, no delay is

necessary between the time notice is given and the time

of the discussion with the student.” (citing Goss, 419 U.S.

at 582)).

Coronado acknowledges Remer but nevertheless argues

that a student facing expulsion is entitled to something

more than notice and an opportunity to be heard. Other

circuits have accepted Coronado’s premise that Goss

provides merely a starting point for due-process analysis

in the expulsion context; those courts have looked to

the balancing test of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319

(1976), to determine whether anything further is required.

See Watson ex rel. Watson v. Beckel, 242 F.3d 1237, 1240 (10th

Cir. 2001); Palmer ex rel. Palmer v. Merluzzi, 868 F.2d 90, 95

(3d Cir. 1989); Newsome v. Batavia Local School Dist., 842 F.2d

920, 923-24 (6th Cir. 1988). Yet none of those decisions

has required any of the accommodations that Coronado

insists he was denied.

Coronado first argues that he had a right to cross-examine Gavin and Officer Hampton—and the denial of that

asserted right promises a reasonable likelihood of success
12 No. 08-1850

For this proposition (and many others) Coronado relies on 2

Colquitt v. Rich Twp. High School Dist. No. 227, 699 N.E.2d 1109

(Ill. App. Ct. 1998), which is not binding precedent on this court.

on the merits. The record contains no evidence that 2

Coronado ever asked that either Gavin or Hampton be

required to appear and give testimony, so it is difficult to

imagine how he was denied the opportunity. In any event,

Coronado provides no federal authority to support his

position, and the only circuit court to decide the

question in the high-school context (that we have found)

reached the opposite conclusion. See Newsome, 842 F.2d

at 925-26.

Similarly, Coronado argues that Prodehl’s written

summary of the expulsion hearing did not comport with

due process because, Coronado contends, it lacks

sufficient detail. Again, there is no evidence in the record

that Coronado asked during the expulsion hearing that a

verbatim record be made. And, at six pages, Prodehl’s

summary provides considerable detail. Coronado insists

that the document is rife with inaccuracies, but he is

grasping at straws. For example, Coronado argues that

Prodehl’s denial of a “First Time Offender Recommendation” was error because, as the parties agree, Coronado

was a first-time offender. But Prodehl testified in the

district court that a “First Time Offender Recommendation”—essentially a recommendation of lenity—is discretionary and is typically reserved for first-time, minor

drug offenders.

Coronado also complains of the absence of an interpreter

at the expulsion hearing. The district court, though, did not
No. 08-1850 13

address whether due process might require an interpreter

because the court concluded that an interpreter was not

needed. In doing so, the court considered the extent of

Coronado’s father’s remarks at the hearing and his

ability to ask questions. On appeal Coronado does not

dispute that his father asked questions at the expulsion

hearing or that he delivered a statement regarding

Coronado’s goals, commended the school’s efforts to

combat gang violence, and requested leniency for

Coronado—all in English. Coronado even concedes in his

brief that his parents can speak “[c]onversational English

or minimally fluent English.” Yet, despite these concessions, Coronado does not explain why an interpreter was

needed, or how the district court could have committed

clear error in finding that an interpreter was not required.

Nor does Coronado provide any specific legal authority—other than vague references to Mathews and

Colquitt—to support his contention that he and his parents

were entitled to an interpreter as a matter of due process.

And we have not found any authority that supports

Coronado’s argument. His legal argument, therefore, is

irrelevant and the district court was correct to avoid it.

Coronado’s remaining arguments are nebulous. He

seems to argue that the district court erred by not explicitly

balancing the harms posed by granting or denying the

injunction. But it is only after the moving party makes a

threshold showing of, among other things, a reasonable

likelihood of success on the merits that the district court is

required to conduct this inquiry. Walker, 453 F.3d at 859;

Joelner, 378 F.3d at 619. Coronado never made it past the

first hurdle. He also contends that he was expelled for
14 No. 08-1850

In his reply brief, Coronado attempts to expand the scope of 3

this appeal yet again. He argues that the school has exculpatory

video footage of the cafeteria incident but concedes that the

district court has not seen the video nor has Coronado. Elsewhere Coronado fashions arguments under the First and Fifth

Amendment concerning his “coerced confession.” Finally,

Coronado asserts that the only school now available to

him—Premier Academy—cannot accommodate his learning

disability. None of these arguments were developed before

the district court, and they have no bearing on his appeal

regarding the denial of the preliminary injunction. 

“posturing,” which he insists is an unconstitutionally

vague “policy.” Posturing is Gavin’s term, though—not

any school policy. Gavin used it to describe Coronado’s

actions in the cafeteria, and he elaborated on its intended

meaning at the hearing: “getting up to essentially back up

his friends, associates, in this—contained in this large

group.” Finally, Coronado argues that the district court

should have considered that he has a learning disability

in weighing whether to grant the preliminary injunction.

Coronado did not raise this argument before the district

court, however, so it is waived on appeal. Metzger v. Ill. 3

State Police, 519 F.3d 677, 681-82 (7th Cir. 2008).

A second problem with Coronado’s appeal is his failure

to confront the district court’s alternative holding, that the

proposed injunction would harm the public interest by

undermining the authority of school officials and threatening the safety of students. To this Coronado offers only

his opinion that Principal Mitchem’s testimony concerning

the need for a safe educational environment “is best
No. 08-1850 15

described as speculative and uninformed.” That response

is woefully inadequate; Coronado needs to do better in

order to prevail on appeal.

CONCLUSION

Coronado feels that he was entitled to “the full panoply”

of due process, something akin to the rights enjoyed by

a criminal defendant. No doubt his two-semester

expulsion was a harsh punishment. But because his

position is not supported by law, and because the district

court did not err in denying his preliminary injunction,

we AFFIRM.

8-12-08