What Participants Said

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Convened This 

Forum

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-533SP.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Ann CalvaresiBarr at (202) 512-4841 or 

calvaresibarra@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-06-533SP. 

March 2006

HIGHLIGHTS OF A GAO FORUM

Managing the Supplier Base in the 21st 

Century 

After discussing at length a range of views on the supplier base issues the 

government faces, participants identified and reached consensus on the top 

five challenges as well as some potential next steps to address them. 

1. Balancing acquisition risks and rewards. Participants noted that 

DOD’s current acquisition policy can discourage small innovative businesses 

and other suppliers from contracting with the government because of 

perceived risks such as fixed profit margins, uncertain government funding, 

and navigating the complex federal acquisition environment. To encourage 

innovation, spur competition, and provide the government with better 

acquisition options, participants recommended several actions, including 

developing a flexible acquisition strategy that distinguishes emerging 

markets from mature ones and providing rewards that incentivize companies 

with emerging technologies to take more risks. 

2. Difficulty managing U.S. government policies in an international 

business environment. According to forum participants, the U.S. 

government has not struck an appropriate balance between the globalizing 

U.S. supplier base and protecting U.S.-based companies. Participants 

explained that DOD and other agencies have not clearly identified U.S. 

industries and technologies to protect. Participants also suggested that the 

U.S. may overly restrict technology transfers to allies, which may discourage 

global suppliers to participate in the U.S. supplier base. To reap the benefits 

from globalization and expand the supplier base while protecting sensitive 

technologies, participants suggested adjusting the U.S. export control 

paradigm to reflect differing national security relationships. 

3. Defining a strategic supplier management policy. Participants noted 

that current supplier policy lacks a comprehensive framework to identify 

and achieve goals. To develop a sound supplier policy, participants 

recommended that the government clearly identify investment targets, key 

technologies to develop, and address differences in managing various types 

of suppliers. 

4. Managing multiple tiers of the supplier base. Participants noted that 

the current lack of visibility into the supply chain complicates efforts to 

maintain a strong supplier base. To better manage the multi-tier supplier 

base, participants suggested that DOD improve efforts to collect data on the 

lower tiers of the supply chain. 

5. Workforce skills development and culture change. Participants 

agreed that the acquisition workforce—a culture resistant to change—is not 

equipped to manage in a new acquisition environment. To ensure the federal 

acquisition workforce has the right skills, forum participants recommended 

that relevant agencies devote attention to identifying and developing the 

capabilities of the acquisition workforce. 

The Department of Defense (DOD) 

and other federal agencies face 

challenges to maintain suppliers 

capable of meeting current and 

future mission requirements. 

Changing security threats, rapidly 

evolving science and technology, 

and budget imbalances have 

created an uncertain acquisition 

environment. As DOD, Department 

of Homeland Security, and others 

seek to fundamentally transform 

operations, they are giving 

contractors increased program 

management responsibilities to 

develop requirements, design 

products, and select major system 

and subsystem contractors. At the 

same time, the government 

workforce that manages and 

oversees these purchases has 

decreased. An increasingly global 

and interconnected defense and 

commercial supplier base also 

poses significant acquisition 

challenges. 

To identify and discuss key 

supplier issues, GAO sponsored a 

1-day forum in October 2005 where 

defense policy experts from federal 

agencies, defense industry, 

nonprofit organizations, and 

academia shared insights into the 

current supplier base environment. 

As agreed with the participants, 

GAO’s goal was to engage in a 

dialog on a non-attribution basis to 

reach consensus on the top 

challenges facing agencies as they 

seek to manage the supplier base. 

This report provides highlights of 

the forum. 
Page i GAO-06-533SP Supplier Base Forum 

Letter 1

Background 4 

Balancing Acquisition Risks and Rewards 6 

Difficulty Managing U.S. Government Policies in an International 

Business Environment 11 

Defining a Strategic Supplier Management Policy 14 

Managing Multiple Tiers of the Supplier Base 16 

Workforce Skills Development and Culture Change 17 

Appendix I—Scope and Methodology 20 

Appendix II—Forum Participants 22 

Appendix III—Forum Agenda 23 

Appendix IV—Supplier Base Forum Slide Presentation 24 

Appendix V—Summary of Lunch Speaker Remarks 31 

Appendix VI—Related GAO Products 32 

Contents 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further 

permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or 

other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to 

reproduce this material separately. 
Page 1 GAO-06-533SP Supplier Base Forum 

March 31, 2006 

The U.S. industrial base has been instrumental in the U.S. ability to 

provide the warfighter with the best weapons in the world and maintain 

military superiority. The Departments of Defense (DOD), Homeland 

Security and other agencies such the National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration have relied on a common supplier base to meet current 

and future mission requirements. However, due in part to a changing 

acquisition environment, these agencies face challenges to maintain and 

manage suppliers. For example, current and new acquisition efforts are 

expected to be the most expensive and complex ever and are intended to 

fundamentally transform military operations. Yet poor outcomes result 

from many of the government’s major system acquisitions. The acquisition 

process slowly delivers systems with cost overruns and seemingly defies 

reform even as the external environment demands an agile and flexible 

process that can quickly deliver cost-effective products and services. In 

addition, DOD and related agencies are increasingly purchasing and 

relying on supplier services to accomplish agency missions and DOD is 

giving contractors increased program management responsibilities to 

develop requirements, design products, and select suppliers. At the same 

time, the government workforce that manages and oversees these 

activities has decreased and may lack necessary skills to ensure proper 

oversight, transparency, and accountability in the acquisition process. 

Recognizing that decision makers can greatly benefit from a better 

understanding of the constraints and challenges DOD and related agencies 

face to manage the supplier base, GAO convened a forum on October 17, 

2005, to identify and discuss key supplier issues. Specifically, GAO’s 

Acquisition and Sourcing Management team sponsored a 1-day forum 

where defense policy experts from federal agencies, defense industry, 

nonprofit organizations, and academia shared insights into the current 

supplier base environment. As agreed with the participants, our goal was 

to engage in a dialog on a non-attribution basis to reach consensus on the 

top challenges facing the management of the supplier base. Accordingly, 

participants identified and discussed key challenges and opportunities 

confronting DOD and related agencies’ management of the supplier base 

and reached consensus on the top five challenges with some potential next 

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 
Page 2 GAO-06-533SP Supplier Base Forum 

steps to address them.1 The forum participants expressed a range of views 

on the challenges facing the supplier base. After a lengthy discussion, the 

following were identified as the most significant challenges: 

• balancing acquisition risks and rewards; 

• difficulty managing U.S. government policies in an international 

 business environment; 

• defining a strategic supplier management policy; 

• managing multiple tiers of the supplier base; and 

• workforce skills development and culture change. 

Convening discussions on these issues is just one step toward 

understanding the challenges faced by the supplier community and 

identifying areas where constructive action may be taken. While GAO and 

others have reported in the past on a number of issues raised by the 

participants, the purpose of this report is to set forth issues that 

participants identified during the forum and the actions they proposed to 

improve management of the supplier base, as well as to increase the body 

of knowledge available on these issues. 

The letter provides highlights of the most significant challenges discussed 

by the participants, as well as subsequent comments we received from 

them on a draft summary of the discussion. Appendix I describes the 

scope and methodology used for the forum, appendix II provides a list of 

the forum participants, and appendix III provides the forum agenda. 

Appendix IV contains a set of slides presented by GAO at the beginning of 

the forum. This presentation was designed to provide background 

information to spur the discussion among forum participants. Appendix V 

summarizes remarks made by Eileen Giglio of the Defense Acquisition 

Performance Assessment task force, who was the forum’s lunch speaker. 

Appendix VI contains recent GAO reports and products related to the 

forum subject matter. 

 1

 Participants used a consensus-building tool called Nominal Group Technique to identify 

the top five challenges as an aggregation of the group’s judgment. 
Page 3 GAO-06-533SP Supplier Base Forum 

For more information about this report, please contact Ann Calvaresi-Barr, 

Director, at 202-512-4841 or calvaresibarra@gao.gov. Other key 

contributors to this report were John Neumann, William Russell, Terry 

Richardson and Karen Sloan. 

Katherine Schinasi, Managing Director 

Acquisition and Sourcing Management 
Page 4 GAO-06-533SP Supplier Base Forum 

In advance of the forum, GAO provided prospective participants the 

following list of trends to provide context for the forum and to illuminate 

thoughts on the top challenges. 

 

Continuing DOD transformation from a platform centric 

acquisition strategy to a more capabilities based, net-centric 

approach. 

• DOD is shifting policy and acquisition approaches to develop systems 

that are network centric—interdependent components that work 

together in the field— with system architecture needs that are defined 

early in programs. These systems are integrated through information 

systems, relying on software for functionality. New DOD capabilities 

are often required to be interoperable across military services and use 

software solutions such as open architectures that increase company 

challenges to maintain proprietary data and knowledge of software. 

• DOD is experimenting with different ways of managing the acquisition 

of network centric warfare. Missile defense programs employ a 

“national team” approach to define the overall architecture. The Future 

Combat System program represents another approach where the lead 

systems integrator is managing the architecture and the systems that 

feed into it. In still other cases, DOD uses a systems integrator to define 

the architecture but manages the acquisition and integration of 

individual systems into this architecture. 

DOD use of and access to commercial products and technologies 

for systems and programs. 

• DOD has access to more nontraditional suppliers using other 

transactions authority to carry out prototype projects directly relevant 

to weapons or weapon systems, intended to address challenges of a 

shrinking industrial base and new threats. 

• Commercial sector leads innovation in telecommunications, software, 

and information systems, increasing the need for DOD to find means to 

access this technology. 

• Commercial firms must consider issues of intellectual property, cost 

data, and complex acquisition rules when providing products and 

services to DOD. 

Shift to purchasing more services for mission performance rather 

than spending on military equipment, supplies, and weapon 

systems. 

Background 

Changing Acquisition 

Environment 
Page 5 GAO-06-533SP Supplier Base Forum 

• Over the last decade, DOD has outsourced functions performed by 

military and civilian personnel to commercial services contractors, 

creating new challenges to establish effective oversight of contractor 

performance. 

Changes in the budget environment. 

• DOD has increased utilization of international cooperative programs to 

develop next generation systems given limited resources. 

• U.S. government funding priorities, such as missile defense programs, 

guide where suppliers can compete for new contracts. 

• Mounting costs for the war on terrorism and military pay and benefits 

force cuts in weapon systems and services contract spending for key 

programs and missions. 

• Striking an affordable balance between current and future needs will 

be an ongoing challenge, particularly with the federal government’s 

current and projected fiscal imbalance. 

Changing global threats require new capabilities, technologies, and 

communications as well as different tactics. 

• Global War on Terror is asymmetric in nature and creating demand for 

different systems such as non-lethal weapons that may be based on 

existing commercial products and technologies. 

• Current operations are creating the need to translate technologies into 

fielded systems rapidly. 

• DOD is expanding technology demonstration products and exploring 

alternate approaches for rapidly developing products based on 

commercial technologies. 

Supplier base consolidation. 

• As the defense supplier base has consolidated into a few prime 

contractors, competition has been reduced. As a result, cost 

containment is more difficult. 

• Single source suppliers are more common for components and 

subsystems. 

• Key contractors are selling off defense divisions or exiting the market 

altogether. 

• It is becoming more common to end production of a system before 

DOD is ready to acquire the follow-on system. When this happens, 

component and subsystem suppliers disappear from the defense 

supplier base. 
Page 6 GAO-06-533SP Supplier Base Forum 

Globalization of suppliers in the defense industrial base. 

• Intensified debate over the use of domestic vs. foreign suppliers. 

• Challenges and debate related to technology transfer policy, 

procedures, and protections. 

• Uncertainty over ability of the United States to maintain military 

superiority in critical technology areas. 

• Lack of DOD transparency into the supplier base and issues of security 

of supply. 

Forum Discussion 

The forum was convened as a springboard to enhance constructive 

discussions among the supplier community. Our goal in sponsoring the 

symposium was to have participants discuss the full range of challenges 

facing the supplier base and come to consensus on the top challenges that 

need to be addressed collaboratively and to offer actions to address them. 

After introductory remarks, a lengthy discussion ensued of the key 

challenges facing the supplier base. At the close of this discussion, 

participants identified the top supplier challenges that need to be 

addressed. The results are as follows: 

Top Five Supplier Base Challenges Identified by Forum Participants 

• Balancing Acquisition Risks and Rewards 

• Difficulty Managing U.S. Government Policies in an International 

Business Environment 

• Defining a Strategic Supplier Management Policy 

• Managing Multiple Tiers of the Supplier Base 

• Workforce Skills Development and Culture Change 

According to forum participants, major actors in the defense supplier 

base—including prime and lower tier contractors—behave according to 

perceived risks of contracting with the government. These risks stem from 

fixed profit margins, uncertain government funding over time, and the 

potentially high costs for navigating the complex federal acquisition 

environment. Participants noted that current DOD acquisition policy does 

not adequately align rewards with market maturity, which can discourage 

suppliers—especially small innovative businesses--- from adopting risks 

associated with emerging technology markets. Participants also cited 

Balancing Acquisition 

Risks and Rewards 
Page 7 GAO-06-533SP Supplier Base Forum 

challenges to ensuring accountability in the acquisition system, which can 

limit the government’s ability to balance risks and rewards for suppliers. 

Participants were concerned that the design of the current acquisition 

system creates an imbalance between risks and rewards, regardless of the 

risk level. They described DOD policy as “one size” that does not fit all 

markets given varying levels of maturity within the defense environment. 

Participants provided research as an example, suggesting that more 

reward is needed to support the research marketplace because more risk 

occurs at the leading edge of research. In the past, contractors accepted 

single-digit profits in research and development in exchange for doubledigit profits in production. However, the relative increase in the cost of 

research and development has depressed the profit margin. Despite the 

growth in research and development costs, government procurement 

policies and strategies have not been adjusted to reflect the increase. And 

while federal acquisition regulations acknowledge greater risks for 

research and development, participants felt that this acknowledgement is 

lost during program implementation. If risks outweigh rewards, suppliers 

may be discouraged from participating in DOD and related agency 

contracts. 

According to participants, second and third-tier contractors significantly 

strengthen the supplier base market and provide supplier competition. 

However, the cumulative effect of insufficient profit margins and the 

challenge of operating in accordance with complex federal acquisition 

regulations discourage small and innovative businesses from partnering 

with the government in emerging markets. As an example, participants 

cited the obstacles DOD and the Department of Homeland Security are 

encountering in their efforts to partner with the biotech industry for biodefense. Biotech companies are finding it difficult to adopt profit margin 

limits, cost accounting standards, and other requirements that traditional 

prime contractors follow. 

Participants noted that the current acquisition environment has distorted 

normal economic incentives. Pervasive fear of failure has discouraged 

government procurement employees from taking the risks necessary to 

maximize quality and minimize cost and has created a mindset that 

considers not failing a measure of success. As an example, participants 

pointed to the considerable press and oversight scrutiny procurement staff 

face if they fail to prevent high supplier profits. This emphasis on limiting 

supplier profit could ultimately result in higher costs to the taxpayer if the 

supplier lacks the incentives to deliver the highest quality product or 

service at the lowest cost. 

Little Distinction in 

Rewards for Emerging and 

Mature Markets, Despite 

Differing Levels of Risk 
Page 8 GAO-06-533SP Supplier Base Forum 

Participants also found suppliers have distorted economic incentives that 

contribute to acquisition risks. For example, suppliers tend to intentionally 

underbid for contracts knowing once a program is established the 

government is not likely to terminate it in response to cost overruns 

because of political considerations. 

Participants were also concerned that as markets develop, late comers and 

smaller companies are forced out in favor of larger, more established 

firms. In addition, participants found that DOD was not effectively 

providing companies with opportunities to compete for contracts once 

programs had started. They suggested methods such as spiral 

development,1

 which seek to keep a platform technologically and 

operationally up to date while it’s being built, to increase competition 

opportunities, reduce risk, remove barriers to competition and innovation, 

and ultimately provide the government with better acquisition options. 

Although participants agreed that the existing acquisition system creates 

an imbalance between risks and rewards, they noted that a lack of 

accountability could thwart efforts to reform the system. Participants have 

observed that accountability for DOD’s acquisitions occurs at the higher 

levels of the organization and is too diffuse to easily hold people 

accountable. The accountability chain from the executive level to the 

program manager is also blurry, and responsibility cannot be adequately 

determined. 

According to participants, the accountability chain becomes clearer at the 

program management level, but participants warned that focusing 

accountability at this level can be risky. Program managers often lack 

complete authority over the project, are under funded, or encounter 

unstable program funding and must accept bad acquisition choices from 

officials throughout the organization. High turnover rates of DOD program 

managers can also undermine accountability because a manager’s actions 

cannot be readily linked to program performance. 

 1

 A spiral development program is defined in section 803 of the Defense Authorization Act 

for Fiscal Year 2003 as a research and development program conducted in discrete phases 

or blocks, each of which will result in the development of fieldable prototypes and will not 

proceed into acquisition until specific performance parameters, including measurable exit 

criteria, have been met. 

Lack of Transparency and 

Accountability in Current 

Acquisition Environment 

Could Undermine Efforts 

to Balance Risks and 

Rewards 
Page 9 GAO-06-533SP Supplier Base Forum 

Participants were also concerned that the federal government may be 

outsourcing program management and other inherently governmental 

functions without oversight. For example, DOD and related agencies have 

provided contractors with more authority to achieve program goals 

through the lead system integrator process. However, participants noted it 

is unclear how oversight and accountability concepts are incorporated to 

the contractor’s expanded role. 

To encourage innovation, spur competition, and provide the government 

with better acquisition options, forum participants recommended the 

following actions: 

• Develop a flexible acquisition strategy for innovative products and 

services. This policy should differentiate between emerging and mature 

markets and provide rewards that incentivize companies engaging in 

research and development efforts to take more risks. Since profit is the 

prime motivation for companies, participants suggested that DOD set 

up incentives that meet the best interests of industry based on the 

maturity of the market and government based on the need for the 

technology and best value for cost. For example, the government could 

allow higher profits to companies that pursue technologies in emerging 

markets that require more risk to develop. In the participants’ view, 

this would provide more incentives for companies to conduct basic 

research. One participant suggested that research and development 

should be a stand-alone business that is profitable for companies. Some 

participants suggested that the Department of Homeland Security 

might offer a good environment for experimentation and reform of old 

government acquisition strategies and practices. 

• Use market maturity to guide expectations regarding competition. 

For instance, in mature markets, a small number of suppliers is typical 

because of obstacles to overcome barriers to entry, such as the 

significant cost required to establish business infrastructure. By 

contrast, in emerging markets DOD and related agencies should expect 

multiple competitors and align incentives to best achieve market 

competition. 

• Target investments into needed emerging technologies and maintain 

open and honest dialogues with companies that produce such 

technologies. An industry participant offered that DOD and other 

stakeholders could target investment in areas of needed technology 

and may consider competing technology to provide incentives to the 

supplier base. One participant offered that partnerships between 

government and industry can help balance risks and rewards. 

Contractors, congressional staff, and program officials need to seek 

stakeholder agreement. One participant added that a non-partisan 

Actions to Address Better 

Balance between 

Acquisition Risks and 

Rewards 
Page 10 GAO-06-533SP Supplier Base Forum 

committee comprised of defense experts would be helpful to identify 

critical technology areas to pursue or preserve. 

• Develop a small business strategy to provide funds for small 

businesses rather than prime contractors. These investments should 

be targeted where technologies are needed. Participants stressed that a 

key to this strategy is monitoring the actual dollars that go to small 

businesses rather than percentages of individual contracts set aside for 

small businesses. Participants explained that by taking a different 

approach to monitoring small business funds, DOD and related 

agencies can adjust strategies to attract innovative companies and 

positively influence company make or buy decisions. 

• Tailor government strategies for acquisition. Participants suggested 

policies to get small innovative companies to join the defense industrial 

base that correspond with acquisition cycle milestones. For instance, 

DOD could improve use of spiral development, which allows suppliers 

entry into existing programs by incorporating new technologies into 

platforms once designed or in production. Spiral development could 

help to minimize risk and establish relationships with new innovative 

small businesses. One participant explained that, while past contractor 

performance needs to be relevant, it should not be a barrier to compete 

for defense contracts. However, some participants expressed a 

personal frustration with using cost as a primary driver for selecting 

contracts. Instead, participates suggested that the government should 

use past performance as the primary selection criterion to help ensure 

that poor performing suppliers are not re-employed simply by 

underbidding other suppliers. As a result, if a supplier fails to perform 

well, it should have to pay some price to enable it to compete in the 

future. 

• Calibrate the acquisition system to accommodate the mutual interest 

of both the government and industry through the use of multiyear 

funding. Participants explained that under multiyear contracts, 

contractors share risk with the government. For example, when the C17 and F-18 programs converted to multiyear funding, each contractor 

received money in advance and shared risk with the government. These 

efforts contribute to agreement between parties in the beginning of the 

acquisition process to reduce unexpected outcomes. 

• Consider contractor capabilities to maintain multiple sources. As 

part of the acquisition framework, the government could identify 

opportunities and use tools to cultivate suppliers and consider 

partnering opportunities to develop flexible capabilities. Components 

of a framework might include greater use of competitive sourcing and 

other measures such as best practices to increase innovation, 

efficiency, and effectiveness. It may also be useful to broaden the 

system to allow each military department to look beyond its individual 
Page 11 GAO-06-533SP Supplier Base Forum 

programs to identify suppliers in other military service programs 

capable of providing similar capabilities in order to maintain multiple 

sources. 

To improve accountability and oversight, participants recommended that 

the following actions be taken: 

• Establish clear lines of authority. 

• Provide more transparency over the outsourcing of inherently 

governmental functions. Greater transparency is needed in program 

management, accountability, and oversight responsibilities. 

• Provide for timely oversight. 

• Balance oversight with mechanisms to achieve government goals.

Create acquisition strategies that increase accountability in the supplier 

base while enabling the government to develop mutually beneficial 

partnerships with contractors to produce higher quality products and 

lower costs. For example, industry associations could create common 

government and industry accountability processes. 

• Establish metrics that assess capabilities delivered and management 

of cost, schedule, and performance issues. While earned value 

management techniques are valuable, other techniques are needed to 

assess program progress. Additional metrics would help DOD and 

related agencies to better evaluate contractor performance when 

considering the award of new contracts. 

According to forum participants, the U.S. government has not struck an 

appropriate balance between the globalizing U.S. supplier base and 

protecting U.S.-based companies and technologies. Participants explained 

that DOD and other agencies have not clearly identified industries and 

technologies to protect. In addition, participants noted that DOD has not 

determined the effectiveness of existing protectionist legislation in 

maintaining the industrial base. Moreover, participants noted that the 

United States may overly restrict technology transfers to allies and 

discourage global suppliers from participating in the U.S. supplier base. 

The concern among participants is that the government’s protectionist 

tendencies are preventing DOD and other agencies from taking advantage 

of global suppliers that can yield greater quality items at lower costs than 

domestic suppliers and, as a result, help strengthen the U.S. supplier base. 

Foreign suppliers have an interest in participating in the U.S. industrial 

base since the U.S. defense budget is by far the largest in the world. 

However, some participants noted that by limiting access to foreign 

suppliers, the U.S. government may be driving international suppliers 

Difficulty Managing 

U.S. Government 

Policies in an 

International Business 

Environment 

Balancing Globalization 

while Protecting U.S. 

Economic Interests 
Page 12 GAO-06-533SP Supplier Base Forum 

away and creating disincentives for foreign governments to use U.S. 

suppliers. For example, one participant noted that U.S. foreign sales help 

keep the industrial base viable by allowing companies to continue to sell 

items once the U.S. military has completed its purchases—as is the case 

with the F-16. Without foreign military sales, F-16 production lines would 

have shut down. One participant asserted that defense spending for 

economic reasons was put in place to maintain a viable domestic 

industrial base, while others questioned whether such policies make sense 

today or are best suited to develop markets for the supplier base. 

Participants also noted that U.S. decisions and legislation on industries to 

protect are not always based on the best research or on complete and 

accurate information to understand the impact of actions. One participant 

indicated that domestic source restrictions such as the Berry Amendment 

have created additional barriers to DOD and related agencies use of 

commercial firms. Second, evaluating the effectiveness of the 

government’s policies to protect industry is difficult as DOD has not been 

able to articulate the causes and effects of these policies. Finally, current 

policy makes it difficult to determine how to define a domestic company. 

As an example, one participant pointed out that his company is Americanowned, but a significant portion of the company’s engineers are located in 

foreign countries. In some cases, communications and operations have 

been hampered by U.S. export controls, which place limits on the types of 

information that can be shared between U.S.-based and foreign-based 

engineers, regardless of whether they are employed by the same company. 

Participants focused on the negative effects of imposing national goals in 

an international economy, citing two areas—technology transfers and 

reliance on foreign industry. A key concern cited by participants is where 

to draw the line between technologies that should be protected and 

technologies that can be exported. One participant observed that the 

United States restricts technology transfers even with our close allies, 

which can hamper cooperation in coalition warfare and limit the 

compatibility of military capabilities. In addition to technology transfer 

concerns, participants agreed that the U.S. government must develop 

policies to prevent it from becoming vulnerable to foreign governments. 

However, they also believe that the government must accept a level of 

dependency on foreign industry, given an increasingly global economy in 

which the United States does not possess a competitive advantage on all 

the goods and materials that it needs. Several participants suggested that 

the U.S. government has not decided what its strategic national and 

industry resources should be and that efforts to do so can be affected by 

the political environment. As a result, the United States may lack 

Challenges in Identifying 

Industries and 

Technologies to Protect 
Page 13 GAO-06-533SP Supplier Base Forum 

information needed to inform decisions on which industries to protect and 

what technology may be transferred. 

To encourage globalization and expand the supplier base while protecting 

sensitive technologies, forum participants recommended the following 

actions: 

• Focus on keeping U.S. products competitive globally instead of 

maintaining and protecting the U.S. industrial base. By tapping into 

foreign suppliers, participants felt that the United States might open new 

avenues for domestic suppliers. One participant noted that many other 

countries have protected their industrial base, but have failed at keeping 

their products competitive in the global market. The key, participants 

thought, is to protect the dynamism of the system, not a particular 

product, company, or industry. One way would be to take a venture 

capitalist approach to invest in the industrial base and provide an 

environment in which companies can compete and access new markets. 

These efforts would need to be based in research to avoid unintended 

consequences and would require more dialogue to inform and educate 

decision makers, such as Congress, on restrictions pertaining to 

technology transfers. 

• Adjust the export control paradigm to reflect differing national security 

relationships. At a minimum, the structure should treat close allies 

differently, with greater dialogue between Congress and provider 

countries. There should be a system in place that capitalizes on the 

coordination and cooperation between trusted allies, enabling foreign 

suppliers from such nations to add a competitive dimension to the supplier 

base from which the government draws. One participant added that the 

United States can learn from the export control programs of other 

countries that have similar characteristics but different laws. 

• Better identify the risks of foreign dependency. Reliance on a foreign 

source does not necessarily result in vulnerability for the United States. 

The United States could balance risks by focusing on key allies that it 

could rely on under most conceivable circumstances. 

• Create a strategy that brings the defense community together to define 

and determine key technologies and capabilities to focus on and then 

collectively take action in those areas. This effort would include assessing 

risks and imposing technology transfer controls where necessary.

• Change the acquisition culture to embrace a global export environment 

and approach the global marketplace more optimistically. A government 

participant stated that, if an ultimate goal is to expand the supplier base, 

the government and suppliers will need to tear down barriers and reach 

beyond their traditional domestic partners to access the global supplier 

market. Spend analyses could help identify where industry could achieve 

Actions to Encourage 

Globalization While 

Protecting Sensitive 

Technologies 
Page 14 GAO-06-533SP Supplier Base Forum 

more efficiencies by relying on a global industrial base, including Canada 

and the United Kingdom. 

• Adjust policies to reflect the ambiguous nationality of emerging 

multinational companies. One participant mentioned that BAE North 

America is a good example of a defense company that is United Kingdomowned but has major operations in the United States. Given the company’s 

operations in both countries, efforts to comply with export control 

restrictions and other technology transfer issues can be burdensome and 

complicated. 

The third challenge identified by forum participants is the lack of a 

strategic policy to manage suppliers. Participants characterized DOD’s 

current policy as a default position that is based on thousands of 

individual contracts and, as such, lacks a comprehensive framework to 

identify and achieve goals. In addition, participants explained that current 

policy does not distinguish between purchasing goods and services. 

Participants also noted DOD difficulties in encouraging companies to 

conduct research and development and cited a lack of consensus on what 

markets to develop. Additional challenges cited include providing clear 

requirements to suppliers and maintaining competition in the supplier 

base. 

With its significant buying power—particularly in the aerospace and 

defense markets—the U.S. government has the ability to shape markets 

based on the way it spends money and awards contracts. Participants 

agreed that, with this power, the government has a responsibility to define 

a supplier management policy that provides suppliers with a roadmap for 

future needs. As regulator, buyer, and financier for suppliers, the 

government needs to set out a framework, but some participants noted 

that the often fragmented U.S. policymaking and procurement processes 

challenge efforts to develop an effective supplier policy. For example, one 

participant noted that the government is too focused on restricting 

industry profit rather than formulating innovative ways to expand the 

supplier base. 

In discussing DOD and related agency supplier management policy, 

participants were concerned that the current acquisition process is 

primarily geared toward acquiring goods not services, despite the 

differences between acquiring goods and services and the increase in 

services contracting. One participant also noted that policymakers are not 

providing coherent policy signals to reflect important trends, such as 

increased buying of services and increased wartime spending. For 

Defining a Strategic 

Supplier Management 

Policy 
Page 15 GAO-06-533SP Supplier Base Forum 

example, policymakers have emphasized buying commercial-off-the-shelf 

goods but have not similarly addressed service trends. 

A lack of consensus on what markets to develop creates challenges in 

defining a coherent supplier management policy. According to 

participants, Congress and DOD lack mechanisms to achieve consensus on 

what markets to develop to best meet supplier needs. DOD policy fails to 

consider the significant differences between mature technology markets 

and research and development markets in managing suppliers. DOD and 

related agencies have not focused on reducing the barriers that prevent 

lower-tier suppliers from entering the defense supplier base, such as 

export controls, the cost of federal acquisition regulation legal expertise, 

and government cost accounting standards. As an example, one 

participant pointed to the difficulty a large defense supplier had in 

complying with federal cost accounting standards. Ultimately, the 

company divided its accounting systems—one for its government clients 

and one for its private-sector clients—to comply with federal standards. 

Participants were concerned that the burden of such a restructuring could 

prevent small businesses from entering the defense market. Even if small 

businesses could weather such burdens, smaller companies tend to be 

edged out by larger, more established firms as markets develop. 

Changes in weapon program requirements also present another significant 

barrier for suppliers. Participants noted that changing requirements 

hamper the ability of small businesses to meet DOD needs. In addition, 

without clear and stable requirements, DOD and related agencies may not 

achieve commonalities across related systems. 

To develop a supplier management policy, forum participants 

recommended the following actions: 

• Develop a single, broad, goal-based supplier management policy. This 

policy should: (1) clearly identify the investments the government wants to 

target and what is to be achieved; (2) include a vetting process to identify 

key technologies to develop; and (3) address differences between 

managing various types of markets, such as products versus services, and 

mature technologies versus research and development. Participants 

agreed that ensuring that the policy is broadly defined and goal-based is 

imperative to avoid limiting options. 

• Provide adequate incentives to experiment with policy alternatives. One 

participant suggested that policymakers work through a range of relevant 

Actions to Develop a 

Sound Supplier 

Management Policy 
Page 16 GAO-06-533SP Supplier Base Forum 

agencies such as the Department of Homeland Security to develop 

supplier management policy rather than forcing policy through DOD. 

• Instill discipline to DOD’s requirements generation process to ensure 

that requirements are properly defined so that contractors can execute 

requirements. Participants observed that DOD’s committee on jointness is 

supposed to be rationalizing requirements, but suggested that the process 

could be improved. One participant added that prime contractors could 

get more involved in DOD’s Small Business Innovative Research program 

to aid in requirements definition and management. 

The fourth challenge identified by forum participants is for DOD and 

relevant agencies to better manage the multiple tiers of the supplier base. 

Participants noted that the current lack of visibility into the supply chain 

complicates efforts to maintain a strong supplier base. 

Participants highlighted the need for greater visibility into the supply chain 

to monitor lower tier suppliers—where most technological innovation 

takes place. According to one participant, an estimated 280,000 companies 

comprise the government’s industrial base, but the focus of defense 

acquisition policy is on a handful of prime contractors. Another participant 

noted that a lack of data prevents prime contractors—a key ally in 

managing the supplier chain—from diversifying and developing lower tiers 

to maintain competition. Another participant suggested the need for 

variability in the supply chain, however without more information on 

lower tier suppliers, variability would be difficult to monitor. 

Finally, participants discussed the importance of promoting competition in 

managing multiple tiers of the supplier base. Participants noted that 

competition drives quality and innovation. However, participants have 

found that while the government acknowledges that the market should be 

as competitive as possible, it has not established an overarching 

framework that outlines competition goals making it difficult to achieve 

robust competition. A significant problem arises in sole sourcing when 

there is no viable alternative to compete and drive up innovation and 

quality, and drive down cost. Other participants noted that joint ventures 

between prime contractors can limit competition and increase risks that 

the government will purchase redundant systems. While the government 

has taken some action toward improving competition through legislative 

measures, it has not devised a policy framework centered on supplier 

competition. For instance, one participant questioned whether the 

government needs to develop two missile defense systems to ensure 

competition or does it simply need a better way to drive competition. 

Managing Multiple 

Tiers of the Supplier 

Base 
Page 17 GAO-06-533SP Supplier Base Forum 

To help small innovative businesses enter and thrive in a multi-tier market 

and stimulate competition, forum participants recommended the following 

actions: 

• Increase government visibility into lower tier suppliers—increase 

investment in them and decrease barriers to their participation in 

government contracts. Participants observed that a first step could be to 

identify the total number of companies in the defense industrial base. 

Participants suggested that DOD develop a reporting system for the 

multiple tiers of the supplier base. Other participants suggested the need 

for the Office of the Secretary of Defense to fund a study on the supplier 

base and provide seed money to small companies to innovate and join 

government procurement. 

• Pool federal and state funds for small businesses to invest in new 

technologies. This effort would provide a valuable source of technological 

innovation for the government and an opportunity for economic gains by 

small businesses. 

• Increase and maintain competition to keep companies viable. To 

increase competition, participants suggested the government compete 

different products that meet similar needs or compete shares of a project’s 

total cost, such as logistics—which is a large portion of DOD’s acquisition, 

technology, and logistics budget. To maintain competition, the government 

could provide a certain level of business to the competitors of the contract 

winner. Awards to losing suppliers could include research and 

development investments or a contract for another product. The 

government should also encourage prime contractors to diversify their 

suppliers and promote competition. 

The fifth challenge identified by forum participants concerns the need to 

further develop the skills of the acquisition workforce to address today’s 

acquisition challenges. Participants agreed that the acquisition workforce 

is not equipped to manage in a new acquisition environment. Participants 

cautioned, however, that implementing reforms would be difficult because 

the acquisition workforce culture is resistant to change. 

The federal government is increasingly outsourcing the production of 

goods and delivery of services to attempt to take advantage of the 

efficiency, effectiveness, and innovation achieved by private companies 

competing in a free market. As the government continues to rely on the 

private sector to conduct its business, the federal acquisition workforce 

must be able to make business judgments and apply critical thinking to 

each contract. The acquisition workforce, however, has not been 

Actions to Better Manage 

the Multiple Tiers of the 

Supplier Base 

Workforce Skills 

Development and 

Culture Change 

Workforce Not Equipped 

to Manage in New 

Acquisition Environment 
Page 18 GAO-06-533SP Supplier Base Forum 

structured or trained to work in a business environment. To competently 

negotiate contracts, the workforce must obtain an understanding of global 

trends and greater business acumen to make business judgments rather 

than relying on acquisition rules and regulations. 

Participants have observed that the current federal acquisition workforce 

significantly lacks the new business skills needed to act as contract 

managers and not as contract processors. Until recently, DOD acquisition 

professionals were not required to have an undergraduate degree. 

Acquisition professionals who buy services suffer from an even greater 

skill gap, due to the emphasis DOD has placed on training staff to 

purchase major goods, such as weapons or vehicles, and the increasing 

sophistication of the services that the government procures. One 

participant described the government contractor of “old times” as 

someone who worked on five different platforms and was highly skilled. 

Now, the government wants someone with business acumen and who is 

adept at risk management. One participant observed that we need to 

rethink who is put into key leadership positions and what traits they need 

to have and suggested these skills might be business-related. Other 

participants stated that there needs to be a shift in talents and skills sought 

toward partnering with and managing private-sector firms. 

Given the rule-bound culture surrounding federal government acquisitions, 

forum participants warned that reform would not be easy. According to 

participants, the combination of penalties for acquisition failures along 

with defining program success as not failing has contributed to a riskaverse culture that is less focused on outcomes. The danger, participants 

pointed out, is that risk aversion leads to distorted economic reasoning, 

causing acquisition officials to seek the lowest profit providers even if they 

do not provide the lowest cost commensurate with quality. Participants 

added that with years of operating in a risk-averse environment, program 

managers and government acquisition officials do not feel empowered to 

take risks and are resistant to change. 

Some participants suggested that DOD’s risk-averse culture has been 

molded by out-of-date acquisition training. Currently, acquisition officers 

and enlisted personnel are taught to identify and avoid risk. Moreover, 

acquisition workforce numbers have been reduced with a trade-off 

occurring between technical and labor experts. Together, these factors 

create significant challenges in creating an environment that encourages 

innovation. 

Changing Current 

Workforce Culture Is 

Difficult 
Page 19 GAO-06-533SP Supplier Base Forum 

To ensure the federal acquisition workforce has the right skills to partner 

with the private sector and to bring about a culture change, forum 

participants recommended the following actions: 

• Devote attention to identifying and developing the capabilities of the 

acquisition workforce. 

• Rotate acquisition professionals from the private-sector into the public 

sector. Public-sector professionals working with private-sector 

professionals can learn more efficient buying practices and serve as 

change agents for the rest of the procurement workforce. 

• Employ acquisition strategies that promote innovation rather than riskaverse approaches currently used. Developing a better understanding of 

profit, the time value of money, and the interface of government and 

industry can help the acquisition workforce to manage programs rather 

than avoid failure. In addition, increasing pressure should be applied to 

acquisition staff to allow integration of new technologies into programs. 

Actions to Develop 

Workforce Skills and 

Effect Reforms 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Page 20 GAO-06-533SP Supplier Base Forum 

We identified and invited 15 experts to participate in a day-long Supplier 

Base Forum on October 17, 2005. Fourteen attended the meeting. 

We conducted extensive literature and internet searches and attended 

conferences of subject matter interest to identify potential experts to 

participate in the forum. Based on these sources as well as meetings with 

subject matter experts on defense supplier issues from GAO, we 

determined that participants should be drawn from eight areas: prime 

defense contractors, second and third tier suppliers, industry groups, nonprofit organizations, academia, relevant government agencies, nontraditional suppliers, and international defense suppliers. We generated a 

potential participant list and considered types and levels of experience, as 

well as whether the participant was recognized in the professional 

community or had professional affiliations. We then examined the 

preliminary list of potential participants and selected a number of experts 

with recognition in the professional community, published work relevant 

to defense supplier issues, current or past employment with a defense 

supplier, relevant government agency, or commercial experience with a 

global supplier base. We subsequently condensed our list and made final 

selections by giving consideration to potential participants who had 

multiple areas of expertise to contribute. 

The overall purpose of this forum was to gain insight into key challenges 

confronting DOD and related agencies to manage the supplier base and to 

reach consensus among a diverse group of experts regarding the top 

challenges and potential next steps to manage them. 

A nominal group approach was used to identify and develop consensus on 

the most important challenges. Time was allocated on the agenda for the 

group, as a whole, to identify and discuss key supplier challenges in 

general with no limit as to the number or types of challenges. More than 60 

items were discussed. Forum participants collapsed these items into eight 

separate challenges. To identify and develop consensus about which were 

the most important challenges, each participant individually ranked the 

five most important challenges from this final list of eight. 

Based on the rank order, each selection was weighted. Specifically, the 

most important challenge received 5 points, the second most important 

received 4 points, the third most important received 3 points, the fourth 

most important received 2 points, and the fifth most important received 1 

point. 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Page 21 GAO-06-533SP Supplier Base Forum 

Points were summed, and through this consensus-building process the list 

of eight challenges was numerically rank ordered from the most important 

to the least important. A natural break occurred between the fourth and 

fifth item. Members were given an opportunity to reflect on the final 

outcome. All participants thought the final result captured the top 

challenges. 
Appendix II: Forum Participants 

Page 22 GAO-06-533SP Supplier Base Forum 

Partner, Sutherland, Asbill, and Brennan; Executive Director, Program on 

Transatlantic Security and Industry at the Center for Transatlantic 

Relations, School for Advanced International Studies, Johns-Hopkins 

University 

Senior Fellow, Director Defense Industrial Initiatives, Center for Strategic 

and International Studies 

President, Association for Enterprise Integration 

Senior Vice President and Counsel, Professional Services Council 

Executive Vice President, General Manager, Government and Industry 

Division, iRobot 

Analyst in National Defense, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, 

Congressional Research Service 

Vice President Research, Director, Center for Public Policy and Private 

Enterprise, University of Maryland 

Vice President, Supplier Management Operations, Boeing Integrated 

Defense Systems 

Corporate Vice President, Global Supply Chain Management, Lockheed 

Martin 

Director Strategic Sourcing, BAE Systems North America 

Executive Director, Missile Defense Agency 

Industry Analyst, Office of Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for 

Industrial Policy 

Director Strategic Sourcing, Department of Homeland Security 

Director General, Defense Procurement, Embassy of Canada 

Appendix II: Forum Participants 

Jeff Bialos 

Pierre Chao

David Chesebrough 

Alan Chvotkin 

Vice Adm. Joe Dyer (USN ret.) 

Daniel Else 

Hon. Jacques Gansler 

Bob Gower 

John N. Hatch 

John Kraynak 

Terry Little 

Sydney Pope 

Al Sligh 

Jennifer Stewart 
Appendix III—Forum Agenda 

Page 23 GAO-06-533SP Supplier Base Forum 

8:30am Check-In/Coffee 

9:00am Welcome—-Katherine Schinasi, Managing Director, Acquisition and 

Sourcing Management Team 

Introductions and Forum Ground Rules—Ann Calvaresi-Barr, Director 

ASM 

9:30am Panel Discussion of Key Challenges—identify key supplier challenges 

10:45am Break 

11:00am Panel Discussion—discussion continued, refinement of issues, reach 

consensus of top challenges (voting) 

12:15pm Lunch, Guest Speaker: Ms. Eileen Giglio, Deputy Director, Defense 

Acquisition Performance Assessment Project, Department of Defense 

1:30pm Panel Discussion—-results of top challenges and identification of next steps

ASM Directors join panel 

3:00pm Adjournment 

Appendix III—Forum Agenda 
Appendix IV: Supplier Base Forum Slide 

Presentation 

Page 24 GAO-06-533SP Supplier Base Forum 

Appendix IV: Supplier Base Forum Slide 

Presentation 

GAO FORUM

Managing the Supplier 

Base in the 21st Century

October 17, 2005
Appendix IV: Supplier Base Forum Slide 

Presentation 

Page 25 GAO-06-533SP Supplier Base Forum 

Acquisition Environment

Budgetary Constraints

Spending as a Share of GDP

Assuming Discretionary spending grows with GDP after 2005

and all expiring tax provisions are extended
Appendix IV: Supplier Base Forum Slide 

Presentation 

Page 26 GAO-06-533SP Supplier Base Forum 

Acquisition Environment

Budgetary Constraints

7%

33%

20%

21%

20%

21%

9%

13%

30% 27%

7%

14%

33% 46%

1964 1984 2004*

Composition of Federal Spending

Defense Social Security

Net interest

Medicare & Medicaid

All other spending

*Current services estimate.

Note: Numbers may not add to 100 percent due to rounding.

Source: Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2005 (February 2004) and Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 

2005, Mid-session Review (July 2004), Office of Management and Budget.
Appendix IV: Supplier Base Forum Slide 

Presentation 

Page 27 GAO-06-533SP Supplier Base Forum 

GAO’s Acquisition and Sourcing 

Management Team

• ASM's mission is to help make the government as effective as possible in 

acquiring the goods and services it needs to carry out government 

operations, meet national security needs, and fulfill social and policy 

objectives.

• To succeed in our mission, we focus our work with the aim of:

• Improving the government’s ability to acquire sophisticated weaponry, 

space systems, and other goods and services in a globalized

economy;

• Minimizing contracting risks faced by government agencies;

• Improving DOD access to efficient suppliers with technologically

superior products;

• Enhancing the efficiency of government operations.
Appendix IV: Supplier Base Forum Slide 

Presentation 

Page 28 GAO-06-533SP Supplier Base Forum 

Selected Issues from GAO’s High Risk 

List 2005

• DOD Weapon Systems Acquisition – 1990

• NASA Contract Management – 1990

• DOD Contract Management – 1992

• Management of Interagency Contracting – 2005
Appendix IV: Supplier Base Forum Slide 

Presentation 

Page 29 GAO-06-533SP Supplier Base Forum 

21st Century Challenges

REEXAMINING THE BASE OF THE FEDERAL 

GOVERNMENT

• National defense

• Do we need new ways to identify and protect critical 

technologies?

• What is the appropriate role for contractors, especially 

in forward deployed and conflict areas?

• Governance

• Should the government’s approach to using the private 

sector be modified to improve results and reduce 

costs?
Appendix IV: Supplier Base Forum Slide 

Presentation 

Page 30 GAO-06-533SP Supplier Base Forum 

Supplier Environment?

• Business of government increasingly performed by private 

sector

• Smaller government workforce to manage and oversee 

government purchases

• Shift to purchasing more services for mission performance 

rather than spending on equipment and supplies

• National Security Dynamics

• Global threats and global suppliers

• Traditional supplier base consolidation

• Relevance of commercial products and technologies
Appendix V: Summary of Lunch Speaker 

Remarks 

Page 31 GAO-06-533SP Supplier Base Forum 

Eileen Giglio, Deputy Director of the Defense Acquisition Performance 

Assessment (DAPA) project, provided an overview of the challenges 

identified in its work and began her comments by noting the similarity of 

issues raised at the forum with findings identified in the DAPA effort. She 

noted that acquisition processes have significant shortcomings leading to 

loss of confidence by Congress and the defense community. She 

summarized a few of the problems as: increased cost overruns, failure to 

establish acquisition priorities and trade-offs, undefined operational 

requirements and performance characteristics, untested and undetermined 

technology risks, and a lack of centralized responsibility and empowered 

authorities. 

Based on the work to date of the DAPA project, she outlined where 

constructive actions may be taken to address acquisition problems. First, 

she highlighted the budget process and asked what can be done differently 

to make the process more lean and simple. In terms of requirements, she 

noted that DOD needs to recover stability and focus on realistic 

capabilities and expectations in step with technological developments. Her 

last point centered on the acquisition process and suggested the need for 

reforms that will resolve cost and schedule overruns and achieve 

transparency and predictability in the process. She also suggested that 

DOD apply lessons learned from past acquisition reviews to adapt to 

changing environments and adjust its acquisition organization. Other 

points included: 

• Workforce - Recover workforce expertise and establish accountability. 

• Industry – Enhance the relationship between the Department and 

Industry partners to build trust and reduce risk. 

• Leadership – Simplify the lines of authority, incentivize performance 

and require accountability across the acquisition community. 

Ms. Giglio concluded her remarks by noting that effective change will only 

result from an ongoing cooperative effort between the government, 

industry, and Congress. 

Appendix V: Summary of Lunch Speaker 

Remarks 
Appendix VI—Related GAO Products 

Page 32 GAO-06-533SP Supplier Base Forum 

Joint Strike Fighter: Management of the Technology Transfer Process. 

GAO-06-364. Washington D.C.: March 14, 2006. 

Defense Acquisitions: DOD Has Paid Billions in Award and Incentive 

Fees Regardless of Acquisition Outcomes. GAO-06-66. Washington, D.C.: 

December 19, 2005. 

Defense Procurement: Air Force Did Not Fully Evaluate Options in 

Waiving Berry Amendment for Selected Aircraft. GAO-05-957. 

Washington D.C.: September 23, 2005. 

Defense Ammunition: DOD Meeting Small and Medium Caliber 

Ammunition Needs, but Additional Actions Are Necessary. GAO-05-687. 

Washington D.C.: July 27, 2005. 

Industrial Security: DOD Cannot Ensure Its Oversight of Contractors 

under Foreign Influence Is Sufficient. GAO-05-681. Washington D.C.: 

July 15, 2005. 

Defense Microelectronics: DOD-Funded Facilities Involved in Research 

Prototyping or Production. GAO-05-278. Washington D.C.: March 11, 

2005. 

Defense Trade: Arms Export Control System in the Post-9/11 

Environment. GAO-05-234. Washington D.C.: February 16, 2005. 

Federal Procurement: International Agreements Result in Waivers of 

Some U.S. Domestic Source Restrictions. GAO-05-188. Washington D.C.: 

January 26, 2005. 

Industrial Security: DOD Cannot Provide Adequate Assurances That Its 

Oversight Ensures the Protection of Classified Information. GAO-04-332. 

Washington D.C.: March 3, 2004. 

Joint Strike Fighter Acquisition: Cooperative Program Needs Greater 

Oversight to Ensure Goals Are Met. GAO-03-775. Washington D.C.: July 21, 

2003. 

Best Practices: Setting Requirements Differently Could Reduce Weapon 

Systems’ Total Ownership Costs. GAO-03-57. Washington, D.C.: February 

11, 2003. 

Appendix VI—Related GAO Products 
Appendix VI—Related GAO Products 

Page 33 GAO-06-533SP Supplier Base Forum 

Defense Acquisitions: DOD Has Implemented Section 845 

Recommendations but Reporting Can Be Enhanced. GAO-03-150. 

Washington D.C.: October 9, 2002. 

Export Controls: Processes for Determining Proper Control of DefenseRelated Items Need Improvement. GAO-02-996. Washington D.C.: 

September 20, 2002. 

Defense Trade: Mitigating National Security Concerns under ExonFlorio Could Be Improved. GAO-02-736. Washington D.C.: September 12, 

2002. 

Best Practices: Capturing Design and Manufacturing Knowledge Early 

Improves Acquisition Outcomes. GAO-02-701. Washington, D.C.: July 15, 

2002. 

Defense Acquisitions: DOD Faces Challenges in Implementing Best 

Practices. GAO-02-469T. Washington, D.C.: February 27, 2002. 

Best Practices: Better Matching of Needs and Resources Will Lead to 

Better Weapon System Outcomes. GAO-01-288. Washington, D.C.: March 8, 

2001. 

Best Practices: A More Constructive Test Approach Is Key to Better 

Weapon System Outcomes. GAO/NSIAD-00-199. Washington, D.C.: July 31, 

2000. 

Defense Acquisition: Employing Best Practices Can Shape Better 

Weapon System Decisions. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-137. Washington, D.C.: April 

26, 2000. 

Best Practices: DOD Training Can Do More to Help Weapon System 

Program Implement Best Practices. GAO/NSIAD-99-206. Washington, 

D.C.: August 16, 1999. 

Best Practices: Better Management of Technology Development Can 

Improve Weapon System Outcomes. GAO/NSIAD-99-162. Washington, 

D.C.: July 30, 1999. 

Defense Acquisitions: Best Commercial Practices Can Improve Program 

Outcomes. GAO/T-NSIAD-99-116. Washington, D.C.: March 17, 1999. 
Appendix VI—Related GAO Products 

Page 34 GAO-06-533SP Supplier Base Forum 

Defense Acquisition: Improved Program Outcomes Are Possible. GAO/TNSIAD-98-123. Washington, D.C.: March 17, 1998. 

Best Practices: DOD Can Help Suppliers Contribute More to Weapon 

System Programs. GAO/NSIAD-98-87. Washington, D.C.: March 17, 1998. 

Defense Trade: Weaknesses Exist in DOD Foreign Subcontract Data. 

GAO/NSIAD-99-8. Washington D.C.: November 13, 1998. 
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