# IN THE SUPREME COURT O F TEX AS

4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 

## N O



## . 10-0846

4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4



# B R O O K S H IR E 

# B R O T H E R S 

# , L T D



# . , P E T IT IO N E R 

# ,

v

.



# J E R R Y 

# A L D R ID G E 

# , R E S P O N D E N T

4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4



## O N 

## P E T I T I O N F O R 

## R E V I E W F R O M T H E 

## C O U R T O F 

## A P P E A L S F O R T H E 

## T W E L F T H 

## D I S T R I C T O F 

## T E X A S



### 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4



## J U S T I C E 

## G U Z M A N 

## , joined by J U S T I C E 

## D E V I N E 

## and J U S T I C E 

## B R O W N 

## , dissenting.

Courts exis t as a m ec h an i sm for administering justice and arr iving at truth. Spoliation,

whether done neg li gen t l y o r intentionally
, jeopar dizes this essential function and cannot be

condoned. Today
, the Court articula tes a spoliation fra mework that depar ts in signific ant way s from

deca des of spoliation jurisprudenc e as develope d by our capa ble courts of appea ls. I n doing so, the

Court place s substantial limit s on the t rial court’s discretion in cra fting an appropriate r emedy for

acts of spoliation, and articula tes a standard that, as applied by the Court, may permit the destruction

of rele vant evidenc e so long as it is—in name—done in a ccor dance with a stated rete ntion policy

.

Be cause I do not be lieve the Court’s framework provides trial courts with the nece ssary discretion

to appropr iately reme dy the wrong ful dest ru ct i o n of evidenc e in an era wher e limit ed duration

rete ntion policies have be come the nor m, I respe ctfully

dissent.

## I. Background

J err y Aldridg e slipped and fell while shopping at a Br ookshire Br others gro ce ry store on

September 2, 2004. T h o u gh i n i t i ally unawa re of the extent of his injury
, Aldridg e suffe red a

substantial spinal injury as a re s u lt of the fall. He soug ht medical attention later that day

. On

September 7, 2004, Aldridg e returned to the s tore and repor ted h i s i n j u ri es to J on Ty ler, the store

manag er trainee o n duty at the time. Ty ler completed a customer incident repor t documenting

Aldridg e’s f

all.

Additionally
, stor e s u

r v e il lance came ras captur ed footag e of the fall. After Aldridg e repor ted

the incident to Ty ler, Robert Gilmer, the Vice President of Human Resource s and Risk Manag ement

for Br ookshire Br others, instructed Ty ler to view the surveillance video

. De s p i t e notice of the

acc ident and the a

vailability

of footag e cove ring the entire day of Aldridge’ s fall, Gil mer chose t o

copy and save only an eig ht-minute seg ment of footag e, beg inning just befor e Aldridg e enter ed the

store and c oncluding just after his fa ll.

Although Aldridg e had y et to file a lawsuit, he reque sted a copy of the footag e of his fall on

September 13—less than one wee k afte r repor ting his injuries. I n a letter dated September 14, Gina

Sorrell of Br ookshire Brother s’ claims depa rtment wrote to Aldr idge and notified him that “[a]s a

token

. . . for being such a valuable cu s t omer,” Br ookshire Br others ag ree d to pay for Aldridg e’s

“first initial medical aid bill along with a fo l l o w- u p visit and presc riptions for those visits.” I n a

subsequent letter dated September 29, though Sorrell explained that Br ookshir e Br o t hers would

additionally cover the costs of a visit with a neur osurg eon and “ sever al wee ks of phy sical thera py

2

## along with the presc riptions,” she indicated Br ookshire Br others would not comply with Aldridg e’s 1



## reque st for a copy of the footag e of his fall beca use she “only ha[d] one copy at this time.” Shortly

there afte r, Br ookshire Br others allowed the tape containing the entire day ’s worth of footag e, with

the exception of the eig ht-minute seg ment showing Aldridg e’s fall, to automatically era se, rende ring

it unable to comply

with Aldridg e’s r equest whe n he did file suit. 2



## Br ookshire Br others continued to cover Aldridg e’s medical expenses for near ly a y ear until

J une 2005, when Gilmer “re -re viewed th e v ideo rec ording ” and deter mined that Br ookshire Br others

would deny any responsibility with respe ct to Aldridg e’s claim. Aldridg e reta ined an attorney , who

reque sted a copy of the video ref ere nced in Gilmer’s J une 2005 letter declining Aldridg e cover ag e.

Br ookshire Br others provided the eig ht minutes of footag e cover ing the fall. But when Aldridg e’s

attorney reque sted copies of additional surveillance footag e b ey o n d the prese rved eig ht minutes

(spec ifically , from 4:00pm until 6:30pm on the day of the incide nt), Br ookshire B rothers de clined

to provide the footag e. And, rathe r than explaining that the footag e had been automatically rec ordedover pur suant to a standar d and routine pr actice , Gilmer stated:

The video y ou have reque sted does not f ocus on the are a wher e Mr. Aldrig e “fe ll.” Pleas e u n d er s tand t hat s hort of l itigation, I have been reasona bly g ener ous in what

B r o o k s h i r e B r o t h e r s h a s a r o u t i n e p r a c t i c e o f c o v e r i n g t h e c o s t s o f a n i n i t i a l d o c t o r ’ s a p p o i n t m e n t a n d 1

p r e s c r i p t i o n s

. H o w e v e r , t e s t i m o n y a t t r i a l i n d i c a t e d t h a t i t w a s n o t r o u t i n e p r a c t i c e f o r B r o o k s h i r e B r o t h e r s t o p a y f o r t h e c o s t o f a r e f

e r r a l t o a n e u r o s u r g e o n a n d s e v e r a l w e e k s o f p h y s i c a l t h e r a p y , a s t h e S e p t e m b e r 2 9 l e t t e r i n d i c a t e d
B r o o k s h i r e B r o t h e r s w o u l d c o v e r

. T h u s , o n S e p t e m b e r 2 9
, w h e n t h e e n t i r e t y o f t h e S e p t e m b e r 2 f o o t a g e w a s s t i l l

a v a i l a b l e , B r o o k s h i r e B r o t h e r s ’ c l a i m s d e p a r t m e n t h a d a g r e e d t o c o v e r t h e c o s t s o f m o r e t h a n t h e r o u t i n e i n i t i a l d o c t o r ’ s

a p p o i n t m e n t

.

G i l m e r t e s t i f

i e d t h a t B r o o k s h i r e B r o t h e r s ’ s u r v e i l l a n c e c a m e r a s a r e “ o n a c l o c k
, ” a n d t h e f o o t a g e i s r e c o r d e d 2

o v e r e v e r y t h i r t y

- o n e d a y s

. T h u s , t h e e n t i r e t y o f t h e S e p t e m b e r 2 v i d e o f o o t a g e w a s p r e s u m a b l y r e c o r d e d o v e r s o m e t i m e i n t h e b e g i n n i n g o f O c t o b e r , r o u g h l y t h r e e w e e k s a f t e r A l d r i d g e f

i l e d a c u s t o m e r i n c i d e n t r e p o r t w i t h B r o o k s h i r e B r o t h e r s

.



### 3

## I h av e p rovided thus far

. I t is a “slip & fall” case

. Seems we know how thes e

ultimately resolve. I f y ou decide to pursue a leg al action on behalf of y our client, y ou

are well awa

re that we would be obliga ted to furnish cer tain information at that time. We are not going to assist y ou further in helping y

ou build y our ca se.

W h en as k ed at trial why Br ookshire Br others allowed the footag e to be era sed, Gilmer

testified he sa ved the se lected e ight minutes of video simply to verify Aldridg e had a ctually

fallen

and that he “didn’t g et what [he] g ot in anticipation of this trial” beca use “[i] t wasn’t a lawsuit when

it happene d.” But Gilmer also acknow ledg ed his awa rene ss of the fac t that a key issue in slip-andfall case s is whether a store employ ee knew or rea sonably should have known that a substance was

on the floor. I n fac t, at the time of trial, Gilmer testified that he had over four deca des of experience

working in the groc ery store busi ness, eightee n y ear s of which he worked i n the risk manag ement

depar tment overse eing Br ookshire Br others’ litigation. D e s p it e Gilmer’s knowledg e and experience

reg arding slip-and-fa ll litigation, despite Aldridg e’s reque st for a copy of the footag e of his fall less

than two wee ks afte r the fall occur red, and despite Br ookshire Br others’ September 29 authorization

of pay ment for Aldridg e’s medical expenses above and bey ond the company ’s routine prac tice, the

sole rea son Gilmer provided for failing to pr eser ve any more of the video w as that he be lieved the

rest of the footage “wa sn’t rele vant” a nd that he “didn’ t know there was g oing to be a ca se” a t the

time the rest of the footag e wa s automatically era sed. 3

O f c o u r s e , B r o o k s h i r e B r o t h e r s ’ d u t y t o p r e s e r v e t h e f o o t a g e i s n o t l i m i t e d t o w h e t h e r G i l m e r k n e w “ t h e r e w a s 3

g o i n g t o b e a c a s e ; ” r a t h e r , a s w e a r t i c u l a t e d i n W a l

- M a r t S t o r e s , I

n c

. v

. J o h n s o n , t h e r e l e v a n t i n q u i r y i n d e t e r m i n i n g

w h e t h e r t h e r e w a s i n f

a c t a d u t y t o p r e s e r v e e v i d e n c e i s w h e t h e r G i l m e r “ [ k n e w ] o r r e a s o n a b l y s h o u l d [

h a v e k n o w n ]
t h a t t h e r e [ w a s ] a s u b s t a n t i a l c h a n c e t h a t a c l a i m w i l l b e f i l e d a n d t h a t e v i d e n c e i n [ B r o o k s h i r e B r o t h e r s ’ ] p o s s e s s i o n

o r c o n t r o l w i l l b e m a t e r i a l a n d r e l e v a n t t o t h a t c l a i m

. ” 1 0 6 S

. W

. 3 d 7 1 8
, 7 2 2 ( T e x

. 2 0 0 3 ) ( e m p h a s e s a d d e d )

.



### 4

## Arg uing that the additional footag e would have been helpful to the key issue of whether the

substance was on the floor long enoug h for the employ ees of Br ookshire Br others to rea sonably have

discovere d it, Aldridg e moved for a spoliation instruction at trial. The trial court allowed evidenc e 4



## of the spoliation to be admitted at trial and submitt ed an instruction to the jury

. This instruction was

one of the milder spoliation instructions, allowing
, but not requiring
, the jury to presume harm if the

jury found Br ookshire Br others had spoliated evidenc e. The jury returne d a verdic t in fa v o r of 5



## Aldridg e and awa

rded damag es to compensa te Aldridg e for medical expenses an d lost ear ning

capa city

. The c ourt of appe als aff irmed. 6



## II. A Sign if

icant Depart ure from “Broad Discret ion”

Today
, the Court eliminates a core component of our spoliation ju ri s p rudence: the trial

court’s broad discretion in c onstructing an eff ective reme dy

. I n Trevino v. Ortega
, we specific ally

n o t ed “ther e is no one reme dy that is appropr iate for ever y incidence of spoliation; the tr i al co u rt

must respond appropr iately based upon the particula r fac ts of eac h individual case .” 969 S.W .2d

A d d i t i o n a l l y , A l d r i d g e ’ s a t t o r n e y a r g u e d
, a n d G i l m e r a g r e e d
, t h a t “ t h e v i d e o [ B r o o k s h i r e B r o t h e r s ] h a d b e f o r e 4
i t w a s e r a s e d w o u l d h a v e s h o w n s o m e o n e s t a n d i n g a t t h a t a r e a , g e t t i n g s o m e h e l p , a n d c l e a n i n g u p [ t h e ] c h i c k e n g r e a s e

. ” T h o u g h i t i s u n d i s p u t e d t h e v i e w o f t h e f l o o r i t s e l f w a s o b s c u r e d b y a t a b l e i n t h e v i d e o , s u r v e i l l a n c e f o o t a g e o f t h e c l e a n

u p p r o c e s s c o u l d h a v e p r o v i d e d e v i d e n c e o f t h e s i z e o f t h e s p i l l b y r e v e a l i n g , f o r e x a m p l e , t h e n u m b e r o f e m p l o y e e s a n d

t h e a m o u n t o f t i m e i t t o o k t o c l e a n u p t h e s p i l l

.

S p e c i f i c a l l y , t h e t r i a l c o u r t i n s t r u c t e d t h e j u r y : 5

I f y o u f i n d t h a t B r o o k s h i r e B r o t h e r s k n e w o r r e a s o n a b l y s h o u l d h a v e k n o w n t h a t s u c h p o r t i o n s o f t h e

s t o r e v i d e o n o t p r e s e r v e d c o n t a i n e d r e l e v a n t e v i d e n c e t o t h e i s s u e s i n t h i s c a s e , a n d i t s n o n

p r e s e r v a t i o n h a s n o t b e e n s a t i s f a c t o r i l y e x p l a i n e d
, t h e n y o u a r e i n s t r u c t e d t h a t y o u m a y c o n s i d e r s u c h

e v i d e n c e w o u l d h a v e b e e n u n f a v o r a b l e t o B r o o k s h i r e B r o t h e r s

.

N o t a b l y , t h e j u r y a w a r d e d d a m a g e s s o l e l y t o c o m p e n s a t e A l d r i d g e f o r p a s t a n d f

u t u r e m e d i c a l e x p e n s e s a n d 6

p a s t a n d f

u t u r e l o s s o f e a r n i n g c a p a c i t y

. I t d i d n o t a w a r d A l d r i d g e d a m a g e s f o r p h y s i c a l p a i n a n d s u f f e r i n g , m e n t a l

a n g u i s h
, o r p h y s i c a l i m p a i r m e n t

— s o

- c a l l e d “ s o f t ” d a m a g e s

— c a s t i n g d o u b t o n t h e C o u r t ’ s p r e s u m p t i o n t h a t t h e j u r y w a s

u n f a i r l y p r e j u d i c e d o r i n f

l a m e d b y t h e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h e s p o l i a t i o n i s s u e

.



### 5

## 950, 953 (Tex. 1998). And in W al-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Johns o n , we likewise explained “[a] trial

judge should have discretio n t o fa s h i o n an appropr iate reme dy to restore the parties to a roug h

approximation of their positions if all evidenc e wer e available .” 106 S.W .3d 718, 721 (Tex. 2003).

Be fore today ’s decision, trial courts did possess the discretion to eff ectively cra ft spoliation r emedies

befitting of the pa

rticular f acts a nd circ umstances of

eac h individual case.

Trial courts have had the ability to addre ss the spoliation of evidenc e in a varie ty of

circ umstances prec isely beca use the spoliation reme dies at a trial court’s disposal vary in sever ity

.

For instance, the court might allow rec overy of the fee s and expenses resulting from the spoliation,

exclude evidenc e adduc ed fr om spoliated evidenc e, or hold a party in c ontempt. See T E X



## . R. C I V



## .

P. 215.2; Trevino
, 969 S.W .2d at 959 (B aker
, J
., concur ring ). I n particula

rly eg reg ious case s of

spoliation, the court may even strike pleading s or dismiss claims or defe nses. Trevino
, 969 S.W .2d

at 959. And, before today
, a trial court also had the option of allowing discussion of spol iation at

trial, Lively v. Blackwell
, 51 S.W .3d 637, 641 (Tex. App.—Ty ler 2001, pet. denied)
, or submitt ing

any one of the following varie ties of jury instructions:

(1) The jury may

presume evidence is harmful if it finds intentional spoliation, Ordonez v.

M.W

. McCurdy & Co.
, 984 S.W .2d 264, 273 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, no pet.);

(2 ) The jury must presume evidenc e is harmful if it finds intentional spoliation, W al-Mart

Stores , 106 S.W .3d at 721;

(3) That intentional spoliation has o cc u rr ed, and the jury may presume the evidenc e is

harmful, id .; or

6

## (4) That intentional spoliation has occur red, and the jury must presu m e t h e evidence is

harmful, Trevino , 969 S.W .2d at 952.

Thoug h the Court purports to “enunc iate wit h gre at er clarity

. . . the para meters of a trial

court’s discr etion to impose a reme dy upon a finding of spoliation,”

__ S.W .3d at __, in eff ect the

Court imposes ne w and signific ant restric tions on the trial court’s discretion to submit a spoliation

instruction to the jury

. I n essenc e, afte r today
, trial courts may submit one, and only one spoliation

instruction to the jury : an instruction that the trial court has found intentional spoliation has occur red,

and there fore the jury must presume the evidenc e is harmful. All “milder” instructions, which permit

the jury to exercise its judgme nt reg arding the potential harm of the lost evidenc e to the spoliator’s

case , would require the jury to w eig h the evidenc e of spoliation. This become s an impossibl e task

afte r the Court ha s conclude d that, beca use of “the tendenc y of such evidenc e to ske w the focus of

the trial from the merits,” such evidenc e of spoliation is inadmissible at trial.

__ S.W .3d at __. At 7



## bottom, the trial court’s discretion is eliminated: it may only issue one instruction (re quiring the jury

to presume harm) and only in rar e circ umstances (whe n the court has found (1) the spoliating party

acte d wi t h specific intent to conce al discovera ble evidenc e and no lesser reme dy will suffice to

overc ome the prejudice the spoliation cause d, or (2) a party neg lige ntly failed to prese rve evidenc e

and the nonspoliating party has been irrepa rably deprive d of any meaning ful opportunity to prese nt

a cla im or defe nse).

T h e C o u r t h e d g e s i t s c o n c l u s i o n r e g a r d i n g t h e a d m i s s i b i l i t y o f e v i d e n c e , e x p l a i n i n g t h a t “ w e r e c o g n i z e t h a t 7

a l l r e f e r e n c e s t o m i s s i n g e v i d e n c e , w h e t h e r l o s t d u e t o a p a r t y ’ s s p o l i a t i o n o r m i s s i n g f o r s o m e o t h e r r e a s o n , c a n n o t a n d

s h o u l d n o t b e f

o r e c l o s e d

. ”

_ _ S

. W

. 3 d a t

_ _ . B u t t h e C o u r t ’ s h o l d i n g s t i l l d e p r i v e s t h e t r i a l c o u r t o f t h e d i s c r e t i o n t o

s u b m i t q u e s t i o n s r e g a r d i n g s p o l i a t i o n i s s u e s t o t h e j u r y a n d c u r t a i l s t h e a b i l i t y o f t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o u t i l i z e t h e R u l e s o f
E v i d e n c e t o e n s u r e j u r i e s a r e n o t e x p o s e d t o u n d u l y p r e j u d i c i a l e v i d e n c e

.



### 7

## This narr owing of the trial court’s discretion stems from the Cou rt ’s co n clusion that

spoliation inst ructions inappropr iately shift the focus of the t rial from the m erits of the ca se to the

spoliation. Thoug h the Court assumes the admission of evidenc e reg arding spoliation will wrong ly

shift the focus of litigation awa y from the merits of a case , it provides no evidenc e that this has been

a signific ant prob l em i n Texas, and cer tainly no evidenc e that the problem is so widespre ad as to

require the displace ment of decade s of Tex as spol iation jurisprudenc e affording trial courts broa d

discretion. And althoug h there is some risk that spoliation issues could shift the focus of litigation

8



## awa y from the merits of the case , the Court fails to indicate how restric ting the trial court’s discretion

would mitigate this risk.

On the contra

ry , Texas alre ady has a fra mework providing g uidance fo r trial courts in

deter mining whether the jury may hear evidenc e of spoliation: the Texas Rules of Evidence

. Despite

the admittedly fac t-specif

ic nature of case s involving spoliation, the Court conclude s that such issues

are better resolved by a blanket rule that spoliation evidenc e is per se inadmissible a t tr ial. But the

Rules of Evidence exis t so that the Court need not eng ag e in developing specific rules of

admissibili ty for eac h ty

pe of evidenc e a trial court m i gh t en co unter, rec og nizi ng the value of

aff ording trial courts flexibi lity in making context-specific evidentiar y ruling s. Und er R u l e 402,

irrele vant evidenc e is inadmissible. T E X



## . R. E V I D



## . 402. And under Rule 403, rele vant evidenc e may

never theless be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweig hed by
, inter alia
, the dang er

A s a r t i c u l a t e d a b o v e , o u r j u r i s p r u d e n c e h a s a l l o w e d t r i a l c o u r t s t o c r a f t s p o l i a t i o n i n s t r u c t i o n s t h a t p e r m i t t h e 8 j u r y t o m a k e c e r t a i n s p o l i a t i o n f i n d i n g s

. S e e W

a l

- M a r t S t o r e s , 1 0 6 S

. W

. 3 d a t 7 2 1 ( “ T h e i n s t r u c t i o n i n f o r m e d t h e j u r y t h a t i t m u s t p r e s u m e t h a t t h e m i s s i n g r e i n d e e r w o u l d h a v e h a r m e d W a l

– M a r t ’ s c a s e i f t h e j u r y c o n c l u d e d t h a t W a l

– M a r t d i s p o s e d o f t h e r e i n d e e r a f t e r i t k n e w o r s h o u l d h a v e k n o w n t h a t t h e y w o u l d b e e v i d e n c e i n t h e c a s e

. S u c h a n i n s t r u c t i o n i s a c o m m o n r e m e d y f

o r s p o l i a t i o n , w i t h r o o t s g o i n g b a c k t o t h e E n g l i s h c o m m o n l a w

. ” ( e m p h a s i s a d d e d ) )

.



### 8

## of unfair prejudice
, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury

. T E X



## . R. E V I D



## . 403. There is no

indication that our trial courts are unable to appropr iately apply Rules 402 and 403 to deter mine the

admissibili ty

of spoliation evidence , and I would not so lightly

displace it.

Despite the benef

its of aff o rd i n g t ri al courts broad discretion and the absenc e of evidenc e

indicating that T exas trial courts are reg ularly abusing that discretion, the Court conclude s that it

must depar

t from this well-e stablished prec edent and signific antly limit such discretion. Now, trial

courts are s t ri pped of their discretion to decide which spoliation instruction is appropr iate and no

longe r have the option of allowing the jury to resolve fac tual disputes conce rni n g s p oliation. 9

T h e C o u r t m a i n t a i n s t h a t i t s f r a m e w o r k i s i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e m a j o r i t y o f f

e d e r a l c o u r t s o f a p p e a l s , b u t t h e 9

m a j o r i t y o f f e d e r a l c i r c u i t s a l s o a f

f o r d d i s t r i c t c o u r t s d i s c r e t i o n a s t o w h e t h e r e v i d e n c e o f s p o l i a t i o n i s a d m i t t e d a t t r i a l

a n d a l l o w f

o r a p e r m i s s i v e ( r a t h e r t h a n m a n d a t o r y ) j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n

. S e e , e

. g

. , F l a g g v

. C i t y o f D e t r o i t , 7 1 5 F

. 3 d 1 6 5
, 1 7 8 ( 6 t h C i r

. 2 0 1 3 ) ( “ W h e t h e r a n a d v e r s e i n f e r e n c e i s p e r m i s s i v e o r m a n d a t o r y i s d e t e r m i n e d o n a c a s e

- b y

- c a s e b a s i s , c o r r e s p o n d i n g i n p a r t t o t h e s a n c t i o n e d p a r t y ’ s d e g r e e o f f a u l t

. ” ) ; J o h n s o n v

. W

e l l s F a r g o H o m e M o r t

g

. , I n c

. , 6 3 5 F

. 3 d 4 0 1
, 4 2 2 ( 9 t h C i r

. 2 0 1 1 ) ( “ [ T ] h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ’ s s a n c t i o n , w h i c h p e r m i t s t h e j u r y t o d e c i d e i f a n y d o c u m e n t s w e r e d e s t r o y e d

. . . s t r i k e s u s a s p r e c i s e l y t h e k i n d o f f l e x i b l e a n d r e s o u r c e f

u l s a n c t i o n o r d e r t h a t d i s t r i c t j u d g e s s h o u l d b e

e n c o u r a g e d t o c r a f

t

. ” ) ; H e n n i n g v

. U n i o n P a c

. R

. R

. C o

. , 5 3 0 F

. 3 d 1 2 0 6
, 1 2 1 9

– 2 0 ( 1 0 t h C i r

. 2 0 0 8 ) ( e x p l a i n i n g t h a t “ [ a ] n

a d v e r s e i n f

e r e n c e i s a p o w e r f

u l s a n c t i o n a s i t

. . . ‘ n e c e s s a r i l y o p e n s t h e d o o r t o a c e r t a i n d e g r e e o f s p e c u l a t i o n b y t h e j u r y , w h i c h i s a d m o n i s h e d t h a t i t m a y i n f e r t h e p r e s e n c e o f

d a m a g i n g i n f

o r m a t i o n i n t h e u n k n o w n c o n t e n t s o f a n e r a s e d

a u d i o t a p e ’ ” ( c i t i n g M o r r i s v

. U n i o n P a c

. R

. R

. , 3 7 3 F

. 3 d 8 9 6
, 9 0 0

– 0 1 ( 8 t h C i r

. 2 0 0 4 ) ) ) ; S t e v e n s o n v

. U n i o n P a c

. R

. R

. C o

. , 3 5 4 F

. 3 d 7 3 9
, 7 4 6

– 4 8 ( 8 t h C i r

. 2 0 0 4 ) ( f i n d i n g n o a b u s e o f d i s c r e t i o n i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ’ s i n s t r u c t i o n t o t h e j u r y t h a t “ [ y ] o u m a y , b u t a r e n o t r e q u i r e d t o , a s s u m e t h a t t h e c o n t e n t s o f t h e v o i c e t a p e a n d t r a c k i n s p e c t i o n r e c o r d s w o u l d h a v e b e e n a d v e r s e , o r d e t r i m e n t a l
, t o t h e d e f e n d a n t ” ) ; U n i t e d S t a t e s v

. W i s e , 2 2 1 F

. 3 d 1 4 0
, 1 5 6 ( 5 t h C i r

. 2 0 0 0 ) ( “ A d i s t r i c t c o u r t h a s d i s c r e t i o n t o a d m i t e v i d e n c e o f s p o l i a t i o n a n d t o i n s t r u c t t h e j u r y o n a d v e r s e i n f e r e n c e s

. ” ) ; B l i n z l e r v

. M a r r i o t t I

n t ’ l

, I n c

. , 8 1 F

. 3 d 1 1 4 8
, 1 1 5 9 ( 1 s t C i r

. 1 9 9 6 ) ( “ T h e d e f e n d a n t a l s o c h a s t i s e s t h e c o u r t f o r a d m i t t i n g e v i d e n c e

o f a n o t h e r m i s s i n g r e c o r d

. . . . O n c e a g a i n , t h e r u l i n g c a n n o t b e f a u l t e d

. T h e d e f

e n d a n t h a d n o g o o d e x p l a n a t i o n f o r t h e m i s s i n g l o g , a n d t h e j u r y w a s e n t i t l e d t o i n f e r t h a t t h e d e f

e n d a n t d e s t r o y e d i t i n b a d f a i t h

. ” ) ; V

o d u s e k v

. B a y l i n e r M a r i n e C o r

p

. , 7 1 F

. 3 d 1 4 8
, 1 5 7 ( 4 t h C i r

. 1 9 9 5 ) ( “ W e c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t a c t e d w i t h i n i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n p e r m i t t i n g t h e j u r y t o d r a w a n a d v e r s e i n f e r e n c e i f i t f

o u n d t h a t V o d u s e k

. . . c a u s e d d e s t r u c t i o n o r l o s s o f r e l e v a n t

e v i d e n c e

. ” ) ; S c h m i d v

. M i l w a u k e e E l e c

. T o o l C o r p

. , 1 3 F

. 3 d 7 6
, 7 8 ( 3 d C i r

. 1 9 9 4 ) ( “ T h e a d m i s s i b i l i t y o f s p o l i a t i o n

e v i d e n c e a n d t h e p r o p r i e t y o f t h e s p o l i a t i o n i n f e r e n c e i s w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d i n m o s t j u r i s d i c t i o n s

. ” ) ; s e e a l s o P e n s i o n C o m m

.
o f U n i v

. o f M o n t r e a l P e n s i o n P l a n v

. B a n c o f A m

. S e c

. , 6 8 5 F

. S u p p

. 2 d 4 5 6
, 4 7 0 ( S

. D

. N

. Y

. 2 0 1 0 )
, a b r o g a t e d o n o t h e r g r o u n d s b y C h i n v

. P o r t A u t h

. o f N

. Y

. & N

. J

. , 6 8 5 F

. 3 d 1 3 5 ( 2 d C i r

. 2 0 1 2 ) ( “ T h e l e a s t h a r s h i n s t r u c t i o n p e r m i t s ( b u t d o e s

n o t r e q u i r e ) a j u r y t o p r e s u m e t h a t t h e l o s t e v i d e n c e i s b o t h r e l e v a n t a n d f a v o r a b l e t o t h e i n n o c e n t p a r t y

. ” )

.



### 9

## Be cause I do not believe the Court has laid the foundation to support this substantial depar ture from

settled spoliation jurisprudence , I cannot join its opinion.

III. Will fu l Bli ndn ess

I n addition to depriving trial courts of the substant i al d iscretion they once exercised in

reme dy ing spoliation, the Court’s fra mework—more specific ally
, the manner in which the Court’s

framework is applied—in eff ect p er m i t s a party to esca pe liability for the destruction of rele vant

evidenc e by simply demonstrating the destruction occur red in acc ordanc e with the party ’s exis ting

document rete ntion policy

. On the contra ry , “whe n a p o l i cy i s at odds with a duty to maintain

rec ords, the policy [shoul d] not excuse the obliga tion to preserv e ev i d en ce .” See Trevino
, 969

S.W .2d at 957 (B aker , J ., concur ring ).

Under the C ourt’s framewor k, a trial cou rt must first make a preliminary deter mination as

to whether spoliation occur red as a matter of law. This involves finding whether (1) the spoliating

party had a duty to prese rve evidenc e, and (2) the party brea ched that duty by failing to prese rve the

evidenc e. I f the trial court finds both duty and brea ch, it must then assess the proper reme dy

. The

trial court may submit a spol iation instruction only in circ umstances whe re the party intentionally

spoli at ed ev i dence and no lesser reme dy will suffice to reme dy the prejudice cause d to the

nonspoliating party (or in the rare inst ance when as a re sult of neglig ent destruction of evidence a

party is “irre para

bly deprive d of any meaning ful opportunity to prese nt a claim o r defe nse”)

.

__
S.W .3d at __. Wit h reg ard to “duty ,” the Court echoe s the standard articula ted in W al-Mart Stores
, namely that the duty to prese rve evidenc e “ar ises only when a p ar t y k n o ws or rea sonably should

know that there is a substantial chanc e that a claim will be filed and that evidenc e in its possession

1 0

## or control will be materia l and rele vant to that claim.” 106 S.W .3d at 722. The Court then expressly

rec og ni z es that “the party seeking a reme dy for spoliation must demonstrate that the other party

brea ched its duty

to preser ve mater ial and re levant evide nce.” __ S.W .3d at __.

Once the trial court deter

mines that a party had the duty to prese rve evidenc e and brea ched

that duty by failing to do so, the Court’s fra mework require s the trial court to assess an appropr iate

reme dy

. For an instruction to be proper , the trial court must find both intentional destruction and 1 0



## prejudice to the nonspoliating party

. The Court corr ectly notes that “intentional” encompa sses the

conce pt of “willful blindness” in which a party does n o t d i rec tly destroy evidenc e known to be

discovera ble, but never

theless “allows for its destruction.”

__ S.W .3d at __. Thus, under the Court’s

definition of “intentional,” a party that is awa re of circ umstances that are likely to g ive rise to future

litigation but fails to take rea sonable steps to ensure the rele vant evidenc e is not destroy ed pursuant

to “routine pra ctice” may be found to ha ve intentionally destroy ed evide nce.

But the Court rende rs this notion of “willful blindness” ineffe ctive, for it never theless

conclude s (assuming wi t h out deciding that Br ookshire Br others brea ched a duty to rea sonably

prese rve evidenc e) “ther e is no evide nce ” that [Brookshire Br others] failed t o p reserve the

surveillance footag e “with the requi site intent to conce al or destroy rele vant evidenc e

. . . .”

__
S.W .3d at

__ (empha sis added)

. Curiously
, the Court rea ches this re sult de spite the fac t tha t at the

time Br ookshire Br others allowed the additional surveillance footag e surrounding Aldridg e’s fall to

automatically era se, Br ookshire Br others (par ti cu l ar l y Gilmer) knew of Aldridg e’s fall, knew

T h e C o u r t ’ s f

r a m e w o r k a l s o a l l o w s f

o r a s p o l i a t i o n i n s t r u c t i o n w h e n e v i d e n c e i s m e r e l y n e g l i g e n t l y d e s t r o y e d
, 10
b u t o n l y u n d e r t h e e x c e p t i o n a l c i r c u m s t a n c e t h a t t h e s p o l i a t i o n i r r e p a r a b l y d e p r i v e s t h e n o n s p o l i a t i n g p a r t y o f a n y

m e a n i n g f

u l a b i l i t y t o p r e s e n t a c l a i m o r d e f e n s e

.



### 1 1

## Aldridg e had filed an incident repor t documenting the fall and reque sted a copy of the footag e, and

had alre ady ag ree d to cover Aldridg e’s medical costs above and bey ond the amounts Br o o k s h ire

cover ed pursuant to its routine practice. I t was Gilmer’ s conscious and intentional choice not to 1 1



## revie w or reta in any more than the eig ht minutes of surveillance footag e captur ing the fall, a choice

he made despite his admitted awa rene ss that a key issue in a slip and fall case is whether employ ees

had actua l or constructive notice that there was a substance on the floor. And this choice inevitably

resulted in the destruction of rele vant evidenc e approximately thirty day s afte r the fall occur red. I f

the conce pt of “willful blindness” is to have any meaning
, these circ umstances must g ive rise to at

least some evidenc e of “will fu l blindness,” and there fore at least some evidenc e that Br ookshire

Br others ac ted with the re quisite intent. But as it stands, the Court’s assura nces tha t its spol iation

framework encompa sses instances of “willful blindness” ring hollow g iven the Court’s application

of the c oncept to the f

acts of this ca se.

As a result of new technolog y and the acc ompany ing exponential incre ase in elec tronically

stored data, document rete ntion policies are now the rule rathe r than the exception. See, e.g. , Arthur

Anderson LLP v. United States
, 544 U.S. 696, 704 (2005). After all, “[n] o company

possibly can,

or should, indefinitely reta in all the documents that it rec eives or g ener ates.” M A R G A R E T 

## M. K O E S E L



## & T R A C E Y 

## L

. T U R N B U L L 

## , S P O L I A T I O N O F 

## E V I D E N C E 

## : S A N C T I O N S A N D 

## R E M E D I E S F O R 

## D E S T R U C T I O N

O F 

## E V I D E N C E I N 

## C I V I L 

## L I T I G A T I O N 

## 25 (2d ed. 2006). Retent ion policies have become a near ly

essential part of the corpor ate landsca pe. And l i m i t ed -dura tion rete ntion policies have become

A g a i n , B r o o k s h i r e B r o t h e r s a g r e e d t o p a y t h e s e a d d i t i o n a l m e d i c a l c o s t s i n a l e t t e r d a t e d S e p t e m b e r 2 9
, 2 0 0 4

. 11
N e v e r t h e l e s s , B r o o k s h i r e B r o t h e r s m a i n t a i n e d i t w a s n o t a w a r e o f c i r c u m s t a n c e s l i k e l y t o g i v e r i s e t o f u t u r e l i t i g a t i o n

.



### 1 2

## commonplace

. See, e.g. , In re W eek ley Homes, L.P.
, 295 S.W .3d 309, 312 (Tex. 2012) (compa ny ’s

th irty -day document rete ntion policy for email resulted in only one responsive email). These limi te d

duration rete ntion policies are desig ned not only to minimi ze the cost of discovery but also to assure

the destruc tion of potentially unfavor able e vidence

. 1 2



## The proliferation of elec tronically stored information an d t h e resulting incre asing relianc e

on rete ntion policies make the conce pt of “willful blindness” all the more acute

. Now more than 1 3



## ever , courts must ensure that companies c a nn o t “ blindly destroy documents and expect to be shielded

by a seeming ly innocuous document rete ntion policy .” See Lewy v. Remington Arms Co.
, 836 F.2d

1104, 1112 (8th Cir. 1988). But the Court’s application of its spoliation fra mework opens the door

for corpor ations to do just that. A party may allow for the destruction of rele vant evidenc e, despite

n o t i ce of circ umstances likely to g ive rise to future litigation, and come awa y unscathe d—an

“adva ntag e” of document rete ntion policies alre ady rec o gn i z ed in the document manag ement

service s industry

. 1 4

F o r e x a m p l e , a p r o m i n e n t d o c u m e n t m a n a g e m e n t s e r v i c e s p r o v i d e r n o t e s t h a t o n e r e a s o n t o d e f i n e a r e t e n t i o n 12

p o l i c y i s “ [ t ] o r e d u c e t h e d a n g e r s o f e D i s c o v e r y

. M i n i m i z i n g t h e a m o u n t o f e l e c t r o n i c m a t e r i a l a n o r g a n i z a t i o n k e e p s

m e a n s i t h a s l e s s m a t e r i a l t o p r o d u c e d u r i n g e D i s c o v e r y

— a n d c o n s e q u e n t l y i t i s l e s s l i k e l y t o h a n d o v e r i n c r i m i n a t i n g

e v i d e n c e

. ” I r o n M o u n t a i n , S e t t i n g R e t e n t i o n P o l i c y f o r E l e c t r o n i c I n

f o r m a t i o n , 2 ( 2 0 1 1 )
, h t t p : / / i m k n o w l e d g e c e n t e r

. c o m /

~ / m e d i a / F i l e s / I r o n % 2 0 M o u n t a i n / K n o w l e d g e % 2 0 C e n t e r / R e f e r e n c e % 2 0 L i b r a r y / W h i t e % 2 0 P a p e r / S / S e t t i n g % 2 0 R e t e n t i o n % 2 0 P o l i c y % 2 0 f o r % 2 0 E l e c t r o n i c % 2 0 I n f o r m a t i o n % 2 0 U S

. p d f

.

I n d e e d
, a s r e c e n t e v e n t s h a v e b r o u g h t t o l i g h t , e v e n s i x

- m o n t h r e t e n t i o n p o l i c i e s c a n h a v e d e v a s t a t i n g e f f e c t s 13

o n t h e p r e s e r v a t i o n o f e v i d e n c e

. T h e I n t e r n a l R e v e n u e S e r v i c e i s c u r r e n t l y u n d e r c o n g r e s s i o n a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n r e g a r d i n g p o t e n t i a l d i s c r i m i n a t i o n i n t h e w a y i t p r o c e s s e d a p p l i c a t i o n s f o r t a x

- e x e m p t s t a t u s

. I t h a s n o w r e v e a l e d t h a t i t “ h a s l o s t

u n t o l d n u m b e r s ” o f e m a i l s r e l e v a n t t o t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n a s a r e s u l t o f c o m p u t e r s c r a s h i n g a n d
, b e c a u s e p u r s u a n t t o I R S
p o l i c y , t h e b a c k u p t a p e s w e r e r e c y c l e d e v e r y s i x m o n t h s

. S e e A S S O C IA T E D P R E S S
, E m a i l s : I R S O f f i c i a l S o u g h t A u d i t

o f G O P S e n a t o r , T H E W A S H IN G T O N P O S T , J u n e 2 5
, 2 0 1 4
, a v a i l a b l e a t h t t p : / / w w w

. w a s h i n g t o n p o s t

. c o m / b u s i n e s s / a r c h i v i s t

- i r s

- d i d n t

- f

o l l o w

- l a w

- w i t h

- l o s t

- e m a i l s / 2 0 1 4 / 0 6 / 2 4 / d 8 e 7 f 7 b e

- f c 0 1

- 1 1 e 3

- b 8 b f

- 5 4 b 8 a f b 5 3 7 b 6

_ s t o r y

. h t m l

.

S e e s u p r a n o t e 1 2

. 14



### 1 3

## Our spoliation fra mework should not allow a party to pre- selec t the evidenc e that wi ll be

available ag ainst it a

nd esca pe liability for the destruction of unfavor able evidenc e under the g uise

of a r etention policy

that prese rves infor

mation for a limit ed time. Unfortunate ly , today ’s holding

potentially provides future litigants with a blueprint for succe ssfully s h i el d i n g themselves from

spoliation liability : simply establish a document rete ntion policy with a limit ed duration. Be cause

I believe the Court’s holding does not provide sufficie nt meaning to the conce pt of willful blindness

g iven the trend toward incre asing relianc e on limit ed-dur ation document rete ntion policies, I cannot

join the Court in it s new spoliation fra mework or

its application to this case.

IV. Rulem akin g
The spoli ation of evidence, as the C ourt notes, is both an evidentiary conce pt, as well as a

particula rized form of discovery abuse. Thus, spoliation issues are particula rly well-suited to redr ess

via the rulemaking proce ss. I ndeed, the Fe dera l Rules Commi ttees have rec og nized this, and as this

Court acknow ledg es, are in the proce ss of amending the Fe dera l Rules to provide district courts with

g uidelines for addre ssing the spoliation of evidenc e. See

__ S.W .3d at

__ n.3. Rather than follow

a simil ar path in Texas
, t h e C o u rt endea vors to cre ate a spoliation fra mework outside of the

rulemaking proce ss unde r the rationale that “the challeng es fac ing Texas courts are just a s acute .”

__ S.W .3d at __. But the Court has done nothing bey ond considering this isolated case to deter mine

what spoliation challeng es are fac ing Texas courts. I n cra ft i n g a spoliation rule outside the

rulemaking proce ss, the C ourt sever ely restric ts the i nput of t he bench, academy
, and bar on what

the contours of

the spoliation rule should be.

1 4

## As sever al former justices have observe d, “[r]a t h er t h an make such chang es by judicial

decr ee, the better practice is to enac t these reforms in conjunction wi th our rulemaking proce dure

. . . . A statute or rule could provide the prec ision that is lacking in the Court’s opinion.” In re Allied

Chem. Corp. , 227 S.W .3d 652, 666 (Tex. 2007) (J eff erson, C.J
., dissenting) ; see also L ehmann v

.

Har-Con Corp.
, 39 S.W .3d 191, 216 (Tex. 2001) (B aker
, J

. , concur ring ); accord State Dep’ t of

Highways & Pub. Transp. v. Payne
, 838 S.W .2d 235, 241 (Tex. 1992) (“[W] e do not revise our rules

by o p i n i o n

. ”). Our rulemaking proce ss is meant for situations such as this. The Constit ution

require s our Court to “promulg ate rules of civil proce dure for all courts not i n consi stent with the

laws of the s tate as may be necessar y for the eff

icient and uniform admini stration of j ustice i n the

various courts.” T E X



## . C O N S T



## . art. V, § 31. To g ather input, we appointed a Supreme Court Advisory

Commi ttee in 1940 to rec ommend rules of administration and proce dure—w hich we continue to rely

on to t h i s day

. Misc. Docke t No. 11-9259 at 1, Supreme Court of Texas, Dec

. 28, 2011. The

committee—composed of fifty -two distinguished judge s, profe ssors, and attorney s—“solicits,

summarizes, and repor

ts to the Court the views of the ba r and public.” Id

. 1 5



## The Court maintains that it need not conce rn itself with the rulemaking proce ss beca use there

is not a curr ent rule in Texas addre ssing spoliation. But the absenc e of a rule does not m ea n we

should de fac to implement a rule without the thoroug h vetting the rulemaking fra mework aff ords.

This is espec ially so beca use rules that impact how lawsuits are tried are best implemented with

input from those that are actua lly try ing case s— t ri al j u dg es and litigators. As “the principal

I n c o n t r a s t , t h i s c a s e h a s r e c e i v e d a t o t a l o f t h r e e a m i c u s b r i e f s , a l l s u p p o r t i n g t h e p e t i t i o n e r

. 15



### 1 5

## mecha

nism for the reg ulation of proce eding s in Texas courts,” t h e ru l emaking proce ss can 1 6



## ultimately y ield clar ity and uniformity not otherwise attainable when this proce ss is es ch ewe d in

favor of judicially -cr afte d rules.

V. Conclusion

As the Court itself ac knowledg es, trial cour ts have nece ssarily enjoy ed broad discretion in

reme dy ing acts of discovery abuse, including evidenc e spoliation. Rather than leave such discretion

intact, the Court displaces the discretion trial courts have proper ly used and in its place establishes

a formulaic proce ss. Fur

ther, though the Court in name embra ces the conce pt of “willful blindness,”

the Court’s application of its formulaic proce ss to the fac ts o f t his case rende rs this conce pt

essentially meaning less. This is particula rly troublesome g iven the incre asing ly common corpor ate

use of limited-dura tion document rete ntion policies. L itigants and our sy stem of justice dese rve a

spoliation framework that fosters the prese rvation of rele vant evidenc e by equipping trial courts with

the discretion to tailor reme dies to the offe nses committed. Until today
, such a fra mework exis ted

in Texas. Bec ause the Court unnece ssarily abolishes it, I respe ctfully dissent.

____________________________________ Eva M. Guzman J ustice

OP INION DELIVERED: J uly 3, 2014

W i l l i a m V

. D o r s a n e o , T h e H i s t o r

y o f T e x a s C i v i l P r o c e d u r e , 6 5 B A Y L O R L

. R E V

. 7 1 3
, 7 1 4 ( 2 0 1 3 )

. 16



### 1 6