IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. COA23-420

Filed 2 April 2024

Office of Administrative Hearings, No. 17 OSP 08518

JUDITH M. AYERS, Petitioner,

v.

CURRITUCK COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, Respondent.

Appeal by Respondent from final decision entered 31 January 2023 by

Administrative Law Judge Melissa Owens Lassiter in the Office of Administrative 

Hearings. Heard in the Court of Appeals 1 November 2023. 

Hornthal, Riley, Ellis, & Maland, L.L.P., by John D. Leidy, for petitionerappellee.

Teague, Campbell, Dennis & Gorham, L.L.P., by Luke A. West and Jennifer B. 

Milak, and The Twiford Law Firm, P.C., by Courtney Hull, for respondentappellant.

MURPHY, Judge.

For the third time, Respondent-Appellant Currituck County Department of 

Social Services (“DSS”) appeals from an Office of Administrative Hearings (“OAH”)

final decision reversing the dismissal of Petitioner-Appellee Judith Ayers from her 

position as Social Worker Supervisor III for unacceptable personal conduct (“UPC”). 

Having twice remanded, we now affirm. 

A State agency may only discipline a career state employee for just cause. 

N.C.G.S. § 126-34.02 (2023). “Just cause is a flexible concept, embodying notions of 
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equity and fairness, that can only be determined upon an examination of the facts 

and circumstances of each individual case.” Wetherington v. N.C. Dep’t of Pub. Safety

(“Wetherington I”), 368 N.C. 583, 591 (2015) (marks omitted). This requires the 

agency to consider various factors and balance the equities to arrive at the 

appropriate level of discipline. See Wetherington v. NC Dep’t of Pub. Safety 

(“Wetherington II”), 270 N.C. App. 161, 194, disc. rev. denied, 374 N.C. 746 (2020). It 

does not permit the agency to manipulate its inquiry to contrive just cause for a 

preordained level of discipline. See id. at 185-201 (reversing the ALJ’s determination 

of just cause where the agency shoehorned a per se rule into the case’s eponymous 

multifactor just cause analysis). 

An agency’s determination of just cause is subject to both administrative and 

judicial review. See Harris v. N.C. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 252 N.C. App. 94, 98, aff’d 

per curiam, 370 N.C. 386 (2017). At both levels, the tribunal reviews whether the 

facts support the existence of just cause de novo. Id. at 100, 102. However, “the 

[administrative law judge (‘ALJ’)] is the sole fact-finder, and the only tribunal with 

the ability to hear testimony, observe witnesses, and weigh credibility.” Id. at 108.

Where the ALJ concluded the agency lacked just cause based on its findings of 

fact and where those findings were supported by substantial evidence, the agency 

must show the ALJ’s determination was an error of law. In such cases, if the agency 

merely argues how its own version of the facts might have supported a contrary 

conclusion without demonstrating that the ALJ committed errors of law, the agency 
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does not carry its burden of proving it acted with just cause because “we defer to the 

ALJ’s findings of fact [when supported by substantial evidence], even if evidence was 

presented to support contrary findings.” Id.

Here, we hold the ALJ’s findings of fact, to the extent necessary for the

ultimate just cause determination, were supported by substantial evidence in the 

record. We further hold, upon de novo review, that there was no error in the ALJ’s 

determination that DSS lacked just cause to dismiss Ayers for her single instance of 

UPC in light of the facts and circumstances of this case. Accordingly, we affirm the 

ALJ’s final decision to retroactively reinstate Ayers with back pay and attorneys’ fees, 

subject to a two-week suspension without pay and subject to her taking additional

cultural diversity and racial sensitivity training.

BACKGROUND

The facts of Ayers’s UPC and DSS’s initial response are fully set out in the 

initial appeal. Ayers v. Currituck Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. (“Ayers I”), 267 N.C. App. 

513, 514-19 (2019). The facts of the ALJ’s Final Decision on Remand from Ayers I are 

fully set out in the second appeal. Ayers v. Currituck Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. (“Ayers 

II”), 279 N.C. App. 514, 515-19 (2021). Partially borrowing from Ayers II, “we include 

a recitation of the facts and procedural history relevant to the issues currently before 

us”: 

A. Prior to Incident
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. . . Ayers had been employed with DSS from 2007 until the 

incident in 2017. Ayers was the supervisor for the Child 

Protective Services Unit at DSS who reported directly to 

the DSS Director. Neither party contests that Ayers was a 

career State employee.

Ayers consistently received positive work performance 

reviews and had never been disciplined as a DSS employee 

before the incident occurred. Until 30 June 2017, her boss 

was the DSS Director, Kathy Romm, who had hired Ayers; 

Romm had asked Ayers whether she wanted to take her 

position upon Romm’s retirement. Ayers declined to 

pursue the position, and Romm hired another DSS 

employee, Samantha Hurd. Both Ayers and Hurd are 

Caucasian women.

Prior to Hurd’s promotion, she supervised DSS’s Foster 

Care Unit, and she and Ayers had a history of 

disagreements and conflict in their roles. The 

disagreements and conflict continued after Hurd’s 

promotion.

B. Incident

On 3 November 2017, Hurd asked Ayers about a racial 

demarcation–“NR”–that a social worker had included on a 

client intake form; Hurd did not recognize the demarcation, 

asked Ayers what it stood for multiple times, and Ayers 

responded with a racial epithet. Ayers claimed she said 

“nigra rican,” while Hurd claimed Ayers said “[n-----] rican”

(“the N word”). According to testimony from Hurd and 

Ayers, Ayers initially laughed about the comment, but 

became apologetic and embarrassed soon afterward. After 

investigation, Hurd and Ayers discovered the client 

referred to on the form was Caucasian.

C. Disciplinary Action

The incident occurred on Friday, 3 November 2017, and 

Hurd conferred with DSS’s counsel over the following 

weekend. After receiving guidance, Hurd applied a twelve-
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factor test, derived from a guide for North Carolina public 

employers published by the University of North Carolina 

at Chapel Hill Institute of Government, to Ayers’s 

comment and instituted disciplinary proceedings against 

her on Monday, 6 November 2017. . . .

. . . .

After meeting with Ayers, Hurd placed her on 

investigatory status with pay, and subsequently 

terminated her employment with DSS; Ayers appealed, 

and Hurd affirmed her decision. Ayers filed a Petition for 

a Contested Case Hearing with the Office of 

Administrative Hearings.

D. 13 June 2018 ALJ Decision

An ALJ held a contested case hearing on 19 April 2018 and 

reversed Hurd’s termination decision in a Final Decision

filed 13 June 2018 (“First ALJ Order”). Findings of Fact 23 

and 47 in the First ALJ Order described Ayers’s and Hurd’s 

different recollections of the word Ayers used, but the First 

ALJ Order also included the word “negra-rican,” which was 

a third variation of the word. A fourth variation, “negrorican,” appeared in Conclusion of Law 13. The ALJ applied 

the three-prong test from Warren, determined the first 

prong of “whether the employee engaged in the conduct the 

employer alleges[,]” was not met in light of the 

disagreements on verbiage, and reversed Hurd’s 

termination of Ayers. DSS appealed the First ALJ Order.

E. Ayers I

In an opinion filed 1 October 2019, we vacated and 

remanded the First ALJ Order. We noted Finding of Fact 

23 from the First ALJ Order, which included a third and 

incorrect variation of the word used when describing the 

disagreement on epithet verbiage between Ayers and 

Hurd, was the “critical finding driving the ALJ’s analysis”

in its reversal of Hurd’s termination decision. We found,
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the ALJ’s [f]inding is not supported by the 

evidence in the [r]ecord[, particularly Ayers’s 

own testimony]. It is then apparent the ALJ 

carried out the remainder of its analysis 

under the misapprehension of the exact 

phrase used and that the ALJ’s 

understanding of the exact phrase used was 

central to both the rest of the ALJ’s [f]indings 

and its [c]onclusions of [l]aw. Therefore, we 

vacate the [First ALJ Order] in its entirety 

and remand this matter for the ALJ to 

reconsider its factual findings in light of the 

evidence of record and to make new 

conclusions based upon those factual findings.

In addition to noting “the ALJ’s conclusions and 

considerations of the ‘totality of the circumstances’ were 

also grounded in its misapprehension of the evidentiary 

record[,]” we held either “‘n----- rican’ or the variant ‘nigra 

rican’” “constitute[d] a racial epithet[,]” and DSS “met its 

initial burden of proving [Ayers] engaged in the conduct 

alleged under Warren.” In vacating the First ALJ Order, 

we instructed the ALJ to “make new findings of fact 

supported by the evidence in the record and continue its 

analysis under Warren of whether [Ayers] engaged in 

unacceptable conduct constituting just cause for her 

dismissal or for the imposition of other discipline.”

F. ALJ Decision on Remand

On remand, the ALJ entered its Final Decision on Remand

(“Second ALJ Order”) on 5 May 2020, made additional 

findings of fact and conclusions of law, applied the threeprong Warren test, and reversed DSS’s termination of 

Ayers. The ALJ decided the first two prongs of the Warren

test–Ayers engaging in the conduct alleged and the conduct 

constituting unacceptable personal conduct–were met. . . . 

[Specifically, the ALJ concluded Ayers’s conduct was that

for which no reasonable person should expect to receive 

prior warning, a willful violation of DSS’s written 

personnel policy, and conduct unbecoming of an employee.] 
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However, the ALJ concluded the third prong of the Warren

test–whether DSS had just cause for the disciplinary action 

taken under N.C.G.S. § 126-35(a)–was not met. In 

concluding a lesser disciplinary measure was warranted, 

the Second ALJ Order focused on: Ayers’s “ten-year 

employment history with no prior disciplinary actions" and 

high performance reviews; that Hurd “did not think it was 

significant whether anyone heard [Ayers’s] comment”; the 

lack of evidence that this one-time comment was 

harassment of a specific individual or caused actual harm 

to DSS, until DSS revealed the incident to others; and that 

DSS’s decision “was influenced by . . . past philosophical 

differences [between Hurd and Ayers] and their past 

history.” However, the Second ALJ Order also found that 

“[DSS] did not consider if [Ayers’s] . . . comment caused any 

actual harm to the agency’s reputation. [DSS] only 

considered potential harm to the agency.” The Second ALJ 

Order also acknowledged the lack of resolution regarding 

whether anyone other than Hurd heard Ayers’s epithet, 

which the ALJ deemed a “necessary consideration.” 

Despite the lack of resolution of the resulting harm factor 

from Wetherington I, the Second ALJ Order retroactively 

reinstated Ayers with a two-week suspension without pay, 

ordered back pay, and ordered reimbursement of Ayers’s 

attorney fees.

Id. (alterations in original) (citations omitted); (citing Warren v. N.C. Dep’t of Crime 

Control & Pub. Safety (“Warren I”), 221 N.C. App. 376, disc. rev. denied, 366 N.C. 408

(2012)).

G. Ayers II

DSS appealed the Second ALJ Order, arguing “(A) ‘the ALJ made findings of 

fact not supported by substantial evidence’ in its Second ALJ Order; (B) specific 

conclusions of law from the Second ALJ Order are erroneous; and (C) DSS ‘had just 

cause to dismiss [Ayers].’” Id. at 520 (alterations in original). In an opinion filed 5 
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October 2021, we determined we could not meaningfully conduct our appellate review

because, “[f]or us to conduct meaningful appellate review regarding just cause for 

disciplinary action, the ALJ must [have made] complete findings of fact regarding the 

harm to DSS resulting from Ayers’s UPC, including whether any occurred”; but

the ALJ found that Hurd, as DSS’s representative in the 

disciplinary decision regarding Ayers, did not consider the 

necessary resulting harm factor, and thus did not consider 

all of the required factors. 

. . . .

Substantial evidence support[ed] the ALJ’s determination 

that Hurd, and DSS, did not consider a required factor 

under Wetherington I.

Id. at 520, 524-26. Accordingly, we “remand[ed] to the ALJ with instructions to 

remand to DSS to conduct a complete, discretionary review regarding Ayers’s UPC 

and corresponding disciplinary action.” Id. at 526. 

H. DSS’s Investigation on Remand and Final Agency Decision Addendum

Per our instructions, the ALJ further remanded to DSS “to conduct a complete 

disciplinary review[.]” In the course of this investigation, Hurd reviewed the prior 

documentation of the case: the First and Second ALJ Orders; our Ayers I and Ayers 

II opinions; conference and hearing transcripts; termination, reply, and appeal letters 

between Ayers and Hurd; various DSS policies and job descriptions; the North 

Carolina State Administrative Code; and the case file whose incomplete reporting

was the genesis this now-half-decade-long series of appeals and remands. Hurd 
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additionally reviewed DSS’s daily reception logs of visitors and determined a client 

was in the building at the time of Ayers’s UPC but did not further investigate whether 

the client was aware of the incident. Hurd also, for the first time, interviewed Tiffany 

Sutton, a black employee under Ayers’s supervision whom Hurd previously identified

as speculatively having overheard Ayers’s UPC. Sutton had not overheard Ayers’s 

UPC but learned of it at some indeterminable time from gossip surrounding Ayers’s 

absence. Hurd did not interview any other employee as part of this investigation.

Upon concluding her investigation, Hurd issued DSS’s Final Agency Decision 

Addendum (“Addendum”) setting forth Hurd’s and DSS’s bases for resulting and 

potential harm, including:

Harm to the agency’s provision of services 

The ability to perform the essential functions of the Social 

Work Supervisor III position has been irreparably harmed 

as a result of your conduct. Your unacceptable conduct 

caused a complete abrogation of your ability to fulfil 

operational and personnel responsibilities. These duties 

require supervisors to function autonomously with little to

no supervision. Engaging in this conduct altered your 

ability to perform independently in the work environment. 

Further, your ability to testify objectively before any 

tribunal has been called into question. That is a risk I 

cannot accept. Your ability to supervise any program or 

exercise sound judgement [sic] in any dynamic has been 

completely compromised.

You are unable to complete any job task in the agency 

without total supervision. This is a burden the agency 

cannot bear. Your conduct interrupted the normal duties 

of the Director and other supervisory personnel causing 

them to assume your workload, a disruption to the 
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workflow of the agency with no other back-up position 

available. A bias was demonstrated by stereotyping a 

family[.] . . . Bias negatively affects every aspect on the 

continuum of social services programming, including child 

welfare reporting. During the time between the predisciplinary conference and the local appeals hearing you 

submitted contradictory information regarding your 

conduct. . . . This insubordination[1] caused harm to the 

agency, as such undermines the ability to trust your 

judgement [sic], or allow you to complete essential job 

duties autonomously as is required. Thus, I have no 

confidence in your ability to be forthcoming and honest in 

all aspects of your work. You cannot be permitted to 

perform work in any capacity within the agency with 

certitude you will not alter, suppress, or omit material 

facts. Moreover, your conduct has damaged my confidence 

in your ability to serve with integrity as Director’s 

Designee and there was no back up to fulfil that role in your 

absence.

Harm to morale

Your conduct offended a Currituck County employee, the 

Social Services Director. I consider your conduct to be 

highly offensive, vulgar, crude, and discriminatory. It 

further harmed the morale of the agency by creating an 

uncomfortable and untrusting team atmosphere among 

subordinates, colleagues, and your immediate supervisor. 

The authority given to you as a supervisor was undermined 

1 The ALJ found,

Hurd never charged Petitioner with being insubordinate in any 

disciplinary letter or advised Petitioner that she was being terminated 

from employment for being insubordinate. The first time [] Hurd 

determined that Petitioner was engaged in insubordination in 

November 2017, was in Hurd’s [21 March 2022] Final Agency Decision 

Addendum. . . . [T]he evidence presented in these proceedings failed to 

show that Petitioner was insubordinate during the DSS local appeals 

hearing.

DSS challenges this finding but does not argue we should consider Ayers’s alleged insubordination in 

our analysis of just cause.
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by your actions and the conduct destroyed the trust of your 

employer to rely upon you to make fair, objective decisions 

without concern for prejudice.

Harm to agency mission and work of the agency

The conduct violated the following policies: 1.) [DSS’s] Civil 

Rights Action [sic] of 1964 Requirements policy, 2.) The

Currituck County Personnel Policy, . . . and 3.) The . . . 

[DSS] Family Services manual . . . .

Violating policy constitutes harm to the agency because it 

frustrates the purpose of having a policy to follow at all. 

Between the investigatory leave period and the local 

appeals hearing, you failed to demonstrate introspection 

regarding your conduct. This negates any prospect of

rehabilitation without unacceptable risk. The agency 

suffered yet more harm by having to post the position, 

recruit, and train a replacement. In the interim, the 

Director and another supervisor assumed your job duties 

which interfered with the daily business operations of the 

agency.

Harm to agency budget 

. . . . As a result of the lack of cooperation and subsequent 

dismissal, the department was required to retain an 

attorney, incur legal expenses, hire and train a

replacement for the position, and interrupt other personnel 

from their duties to be involved in the litigation process.

Detrimental to state service- social harm

[The Addendum cursorily characterizes Ayers’s UPC as 

hate speech and offensive conduct detrimental to state

services. DSS does not argue we should consider this

‘social harm’ in our just cause analysis.]

Potential harm
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. . . . [T]he Director is accountable to the social services 

board, and is responsible and accountable for the actions, 

conduct and performance of departmental employees. . . . 

The [DSS] Board agrees with my decision to terminate your 

employment. Retaining your employment in any capacity 

within the department after using a racial epithet during 

the course of your governmental duties, would cause the 

board to doubt my ability to effectively administer our 

programming, personnel and distrust my decision making 

and judgement. This would adversely affect the 

relationship between the Director and the board and would

damage the integrity they expect regarding the 

performance of my duties. . . . 

As referenced, your conduct severely violated crucial 

polices [sic] and rules. An employee who cannot be trusted 

to follow rules when in the presence of the Social Services 

Director, cannot be trusted to follow rules when working 

independently. Your continued employment in any 

capacity would make the agency vulnerable to negligent

retention and supervision which would subject the county 

to liability.[2] Additionally, your good faith and credibility 

could be of great concern, thereby damaging your 

testimony in the multiple cases in which you are required 

to testify. Continuing to entrust you with the oversight of 

child welfare cases, or any other matters within the agency 

knowing that you have demonstrated overt racism, bias 

and stereotyping in the course of your work, subjects the 

county to additional liability.

Your conduct violated the agency’s compliance with the 

Civil Rights Act of 1964. The violation could potentially 

affect the agency’s receipt of federal funding. Your actions 

would affect public trust, client confidence, and destroy the 

agency’s credibility in the community if I simply ignored 

your remarks and returned you to any employment.

2 We do not opine on Hurd’s legal conclusions, except to the extent discussed in our analysis

as necessary for our ultimate just cause conclusion. 
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After conducting a thorough investigation and careful 

review of the totality of facts and circumstances, I affirm 

my decision to terminate your employment . . . for 

unacceptable personal conduct. I conclude you are unable 

to complete any of the above duties fairly or independently

without total and continuous supervision. The need and 

frequency of total supervision required to continue your 

employment in a supervisory position or any other position

within the department is an accommodation the 

department is unable to implement. There are no positions 

available within the department of social services that do 

not include interacting with and providing services to the 

public in a fair, non-biased manner. . . .

I. 31 January 2023 ALJ Decision

On 31 January 2023, the ALJ entered its Amended Final Decision on Remand, 

containing additional findings of fact and conclusions of law. The ALJ found the 

Addendum “unreasonable and [] most likely the result of [Hurd’s] bias in favor of 

supporting and justifying her original action in dismissing Petitioner.” She further 

found the Addendum’s bases for actual harm “[were] all either descriptions of 

potential harm or resulted from [] Hurd’s decision to dismiss Petitioner and were not 

caused by or the result of the incident itself” and that “Hurd’s subjective opinion” 

“that Petitioner was not fit to be entrusted with her supervisory or other duties” was 

“unsubstantiated, speculative, [] unreasonable[,] not supported by a preponderance 

of the evidence[,] and [] contrary to other evidence in the record.”

Determining “Petitioner’s unacceptable conduct did not cause Respondent to

experience any actual harm[,]” the ALJ concluded DSS lacked just cause to dismiss 
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Ayers and retroactively reinstated Ayers with back pay and attorney fees, subject to 

a two-week suspension without pay and additional cultural diversity and racial 

sensitivity training.

DSS appeals, again arguing it had just cause to dismiss Ayers and challenging 

specific findings of fact and conclusions of law. On this appeal, DSS additionally 

requests we reverse the ALJ’s award of attorneys’ fees based on its view of the merits. 

ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

“It is well settled that in cases appealed from administrative tribunals, 

questions of law receive de novo review, whereas fact-intensive issues such as 

sufficiency of the evidence to support an agency’s decision are reviewed under the 

whole-record test.” N.C. Dep’t of Env’t & Nat. Res. v. Carroll, 358 N.C. 649, 659 

(2004); see N.C.G.S. § 150B-51(c) (2023). “Under the de novo standard of review, the 

[reviewing] court considers the matter anew and freely substitutes its own judgment 

for the agency’s.” Wetherington II, 270 N.C. App. at 172. In contrast, under the whole

record test,

[the reviewing court] may not substitute its judgment for 

the [ALJ’s] as between two conflicting views, even though 

it could reasonably have reached a different result had it 

reviewed the matter de novo. Rather, a court must 

examine all the record evidence—that which detracts from 

the [ALJ’s] findings and conclusions as well as that which 

tends to support them—to determine whether there is 

substantial evidence to justify the [ALJ’s] decision. 
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Substantial evidence is relevant evidence a reasonable 

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.

We undertake this review with a high degree of deference 

because it is well established that

[i]n an administrative proceeding, it is the prerogative and 

duty of [the ALJ], once all the evidence has been presented 

and considered, to determine the weight and sufficiency of 

the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses, to draw 

inferences from the facts, and to appraise conflicting and 

circumstantial evidence. The credibility of witnesses and 

the probative value of particular testimony are for the 

[ALJ] to determine, and [the ALJ] may accept or reject in 

whole or part the testimony of any witness.

Harris, 252 N.C. App. at 100 (fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth alterations in original) 

(marks and citation omitted); see Carroll, 358 N.C. at 674 (“[T]he ‘whole record’ test 

is not a tool of judicial intrusion; instead, it merely gives a reviewing court the 

capability to determine whether an administrative decision has a rational basis in 

the evidence.”). 

Thus, “we recognize the ALJ is the sole fact-finder, and the only tribunal with 

the ability to hear testimony, observe witnesses, and weigh credibility. As such, we 

defer to the ALJ’s findings of fact, even if evidence was presented to support contrary 

findings.” Harris, 252 N.C. App. at 108. We review the ALJ’s findings of fact and 

conclusions of law based on their substance rather than their label. See Watlington 

v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of Rockingham Cnty, 261 N.C. App. 760, 768 (2018) (quoting In 

re Simpson, 211 N.C. App. 483, 487-88 (2011)) (“When this Court determines that 

findings of fact and conclusions of law have been mislabeled by the trial court, we 
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may reclassify them, where necessary, before applying our standard of review.”). 

“Generally, any determination requiring the exercise of judgment or the application 

of legal principles is more properly classified a conclusion of law. Any determination 

made by logical reasoning from the evidentiary facts, however, is more properly 

classified a finding of fact.” Simpson, 211 N.C. App. at 487. (marks and citation 

omitted).

The ALJ “need not recite all of the evidentiary facts but must find those 

material and ultimate facts from which it can be determined whether the findings 

are supported by the evidence and whether they support the conclusions of law 

reached.” See Rittelmeyer v. Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, 252 N.C. App. 340, 350-51, 

disc. rev. denied, 370 N.C. 67 (2017); see, e.g., Ayers II, 279 N.C. App. at 523-27 

(remanding based on the lack of findings and evidence of the necessary resulting 

harm factor). An ultimate finding is a finding supported by other evidentiary facts 

reached by natural reasoning. In re G.C., 384 N.C. 62 67 (2023). “A . . . finding of an 

ultimate fact is conclusive on appeal if the evidentiary facts reasonably support the

[tribunal’s] ultimate finding.” State v. Fuller, 376 N.C. 862, 864 (2021). Likewise, 

evidentiary facts are conclusive on appeal if supported by substantial evidence in the 

record or unchallenged by the parties. In re Berman, 245 N.C. 612, 616-17 (1957) 

(“The administrative findings of fact . . . if supported by competent, material and 

substantial evidence in view of the entire record, are conclusive upon a reviewing 

court, and not within the scope of its reviewing powers.”); Brewington, 254 N.C. App. 
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1, 17 (2017), disc. rev. denied, 371 N.C. 343 (2018) (quoting Koufman v. Koufman, 330 

N.C. 93, 97 (1991)) (“Where no exception is taken to a finding of fact . . ., the finding 

is presumed to be supported by competent evidence and is binding on appeal.”).

We need not review every challenged finding of fact, only those necessary “to 

determine whether the ALJ properly ruled that [DSS] [failed to] establish[] by a 

preponderance of the evidence that [it] had just cause to terminate [Ayers’s] 

employment[.]” See Blackburn v. N.C. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 246 N.C. App. 196, 210, 

disc. rev. denied, 368 N.C. 919 (2016).

B. ALJ and Appellate Court Just Cause Review

State employees in North Carolina enjoy legislatively-enacted career 

protections. Among these is that no career State employee “shall be discharged, 

suspended, or demoted for disciplinary reasons, except for just cause.” N.C.G.S. § 

126-35 (2023). “This Section establishes a condition precedent that must be fulfilled 

by the employer before disciplinary actions are taken.” Brown v. Fayetteville State 

Univ., 269 N.C. App. 122, 130 (2020) (emphasis added) (marks omitted). This is true 

for every career State employee, and one’s “position as a supervis[or] . . . does not 

lower the standard that must be met in order to justify his dismissal.” Whitehurst v. 

E. Carolina Univ., 257 N.C. App. 938, 948 (2018).

An employee who believes she was disciplined without just cause may pursue 

a grievance. Under the grievance procedure, she is entitled to an informal final 

agency decision that specifically sets forth the basis for her dismissal. N.C.G.S. § 
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126-34.01 (2023). She may appeal that decision to the OAH “as a contested case 

pursuant to the method provided in [N.C.G.S.] § 126-34.02” and N.C.G.S. § 150B-22 

et seq. Harris, 252 N.C. App. at 98. On appeal to the OAH, the agency must show 

just cause by a preponderance of the evidence, N.C.G.S. § 150B-25.1(c) (2023),3 and 

the “ALJ is free to substitute their judgment for that of the agency regarding the legal 

conclusion of whether just cause existed for the agency’s action.” Harris, 252 N.C. 

App. at 102. The ALJ enters a final decision, specifying findings of fact and 

conclusions of law, N.C.G.S. § 150B-34(a) (2023), and may reinstate the employee and 

award back pay and attorneys’ fees as appropriate “without regard to the initial 

agency’s determination.” Harris, 252 N.C. App. at 102; see N.C.G.S. § 126-34.02(a), 

(e) (2023). A party may appeal the ALJ’s final decision directly to this Court, N.C.G.S. 

§§ 7A-29(a), 126-34.02(a) (2023),

4 and we review the existence of just cause de novo. 

Wetherington II, 270 N.C. App. at 190.

Just cause may be based on either unsatisfactory job performance or UPC. 25 

N.C.A.C. 1J.0604(b) (2023). DSS alleges Ayers’s conduct met three grounds of UPC, 

as enumerated in the North Carolina Administrative Code: 

3 Specifically, the statute reads, “[t]he burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence 

that a career State employee subject to Chapter 126 of the General Statutes was discharged, 

suspended, or demoted for just cause rests with the agency employer.” N.C.G.S. § 150B-25.1(c) (2023). 

Despite the clarity of this language, DSS, at times, misapprehends the burden of proof, stating, 

“Respondent contends Petitioner failed to meet her burden of proving Respondent acted without ‘just 

cause’ in terminating her employment.”

4 Previously appeal was to the Superior Court, as governed by N.C.G.S. § 150B-43. See 

N.C.G.S. § 126-37(b2) (2012). Hence, some cases refer to the reviewing court as the “trial court.” E.g., 

Carroll, 358 N.C. at 660 (“[T]he trial court applies the whole record test . . . .”).
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(a) conduct for which no reasonable person should expect 

to receive prior warning;

. . .

(d) the willful violation of known or written work rules;

(e) conduct unbecoming a [S]tate employee that is 

detrimental to [S]tate service . . . .

See 25 N.C.A.C. 1J.0614(8)(a), (d)-(e) (2023). 

Whether an agency has just cause to discipline an employee based on UPC

requires three inquiries:

[t]he proper analytical approach is to first determine 

whether the employee engaged in the conduct the employer 

alleges. The second inquiry is whether the employee’s 

conduct falls within one of the categories of [UPC] provided 

by the Administrative Code. [UPC] does not necessarily 

establish just cause for all types of discipline. If the 

employee’s act qualifies as a type of unacceptable conduct, 

the tribunal proceeds to the third inquiry: whether that 

misconduct amounted to just cause for the disciplinary 

action taken. Just cause must be determined based upon 

an examination of the facts and circumstances of each 

individual case.

Warren I, 221 N.C. App. at 383. The ALJ concluded—and Ayers does not contest in 

this appeal—that Ayers’s use of a racial epithet was UPC under all three of DSS’s 

alleged examples under the North Carolina Administrative Code. Ayers II, 279 N.C. 

App. at 519. Accordingly, we consider the third inquiry: whether DSS has proven by 

the preponderance of the evidence that Ayers’s UPC amounts to just cause to dismiss 

her. We conclude DSS did not meet its burden. 
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C. The Just Cause Framework

“Whether conduct constitutes just cause for the disciplinary action taken is a 

question of law we review de novo.” Warren I, 221 N.C. App. at 378. “Just cause, like 

justice itself, is not susceptible of precise definition. It is a flexible concept, 

embodying notions of equity and fairness[.]” Carroll, 358 N.C. at 669 (marks and 

citations omitted). “Inevitably, [the just cause] inquiry requires an irreducible act of 

judgment that cannot always be satisfied by the mechanical application of rules and 

regulations.” Id. Rather, “public agency decision-makers must use discretion in 

determining what disciplinary action to impose in situations involving alleged 

unacceptable personal conduct[.]” Brewington, 254 N.C. App. at 25 (characterizing 

this as the “primary holding” of Wetherington I, 368 N.C. at 593); see also Warren I, 

221 N.C. App. at 382 (“[N]ot every instance of unacceptable personal conduct as 

defined by the Administrative Code provides just cause for discipline.”). 

Accordingly, “[a] formulaic approach” “comparing the misconduct in this case 

to the misconduct in . . . cases in which our appellate courts have held just cause for 

dismissal existed . . . is unpersuasive, as just cause ‘. . . can only be determined upon 

an examination of the facts and circumstances of each individual case.’” Watlington, 

261 N.C. App. at 770 (quoting Carroll, 358 N.C. at 669). However, we look to 

precedent to guide our application of the facts and circumstances of each individual 

case: consideration of “factors such as the severity of the violation, the subject matter 

involved, the resulting harm, the [employee’s] work history, [and] discipline imposed 
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in other cases involving similar violations . . . is an appropriate and necessary 

component of a decision to impose discipline upon a career State employee for 

unacceptable personal conduct[,]” Wetherington I, 368 N.C. at 592, to “the extent 

there was any evidence to support them. [The disciplining agency] [can]not rely on 

one factor while ignoring the others.” Wetherington II, 270 N.C. App. at 190. Where 

the agency ignores a required factor—or purports to consider it but actually applies 

a per se rule—we will not give the agency an additional “bite[] at the apple” to 

consider the factor, so long as the record permits our meaningful de novo review of 

the factor.

5 Compare Wetherington II, 270 N.C. App. at 191-201 (disallowing further 

discretionary factfinding despite the agency’s failure to consider “severity of the 

violation,” “resulting harm,” and “discipline imposed in other cases involving similar 

violations” factors), with Ayers II, 279 N.C. App. at 523-27 (remanding based on our 

inability to meaningfully review the “resulting harm” factor). 

In Wetherington II, we separately analyzed each of the five Wetherington 

factors. Wetherington II, 270 N.C. App. at 191-200. There, the petitioner, 

then a trooper with the North Carolina State Highway 

Patrol, misplaced his hat during a traffic stop; he then lied 

about how he lost his hat, which was later recovered, 

mostly intact. [The highway patrol] terminated [his] 

employment as a trooper based upon its “per se” rule that 

any untruthfulness by a state trooper is unacceptable 

personal conduct and just cause for dismissal. 

5 In contrast, where an incomplete investigation frustrates our meaningful de novo review of 

a required factor, we remand for further investigation, as we did in DSS’s prior appeal. Ayers II, 279 

N.C. App. at 523-27.
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Id. at 162. On the trooper’s initial appeal, our Supreme Court held the patrol’s “use 

of a rule requiring dismissal for all violations of the [p]atrol’s truthfulness policy was 

an error of law”6 and remanded for the patrol to make a proper just cause analysis. 

Wetherington I, 368 N.C. at 593. On remand, the patrol affirmed its termination of 

the trooper. On appeal from that determination, we held the patrol’s second 

consideration “was substantively no different” than its prior application of a per se 

rule and “conclude[d] as a matter of law, on de novo review, that [the trooper’s]

unacceptable personal conduct was not just cause for dismissal.” Wetherington II, 

270 N.C. App. at 163, 199.

Here, DSS likewise failed to undertake a proper just cause analysis initially. 

Ayers II, 279 N.C. App. at 523-25. On remand, DSS again considered the UNC School 

of Government twelve-factor test, see id. at 516-17, 524, but did so “along with the 

five Wetherington factors.” Although Wetherington I’s recognition of the “flexible 

definition of just cause” and description of “factors such as” the five it explicitly 

addressed contemplates that additional factors may sometimes be relevant to just 

cause, Wetherington I, 368 N.C. at 591-92 (emphasis added) (marks omitted), DSS 

makes no argument that the twelve factors of the UNC School of Government were

either appropriate or necessary to its analysis of just cause here. We believe the 

6 Thus, the law is no longer—as DSS seeks to rely—that “[o]ne act of UPC presents ‘just cause’

for any discipline, up to and including dismissal.” Hilliard v. N.C. Dep’t of Corr., 173 N.C. App. 594, 

597 (2005).
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Wetherington factors are sufficient for us to analyze de novo whether Ayers’s conduct 

constituted just cause for her termination, so we do not consider the twelve-factor 

test.

D. Analyzing the Just Cause Factors

Having discussed the just cause framework, we turn to whether DSS had just 

cause to dismiss Ayers. Before analyzing the appropriate and necessary factors, 

however, we address generally DSS’s challenges to findings of fact. DSS purports

7 to 

challenge 39 of 139 findings of fact and 28 of 52 conclusions of law—several of which, 

in actuality, are findings of fact, see Watlington, 261 N.C. App. at 768—as 

unsupported by substantial evidence. These challenges, as well as DSS’s discussion 

of resulting harm, frequently highlight how Hurd’s version of the facts in DSS’s Final 

Agency Decision Addendum differ from the ALJ’s findings. This approach is

unpersuasive because the ALJ “was not obligated to find facts based on” a party’s 

“own view of the record,” Brewington, 254 N.C. App. at 23, and because “we defer to 

the ALJ’s findings of fact, even if evidence was presented to support contrary findings.” 

Harris, 252 N.C. App. at 108 (emphasis added). 

We turn to our just cause analysis and consider each of the “appropriate and 

necessary” factors in turn. Wetherington I, 368 N.C. at 592. In doing so, we address 

7 DSS does not specifically argue nine of these findings. See Brewington, 254 N.C. App. at 17 

(“[B]ecause finding of fact 11 is the only finding that [the petitioner] challenges with a specific 

argument, issues concerning the remaining challenged findings have been abandoned.”).
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specific challenged findings of fact as necessary. See Wetherington II, 270 N.C. App.

at 178 n. 8.

1. Severity of the Violation

We first address the severity of Ayers’s UPC. Since our Administrative Code 

defines UPC flexibly such that “there is no bright line test to determine whether an 

employee’s conduct establishes [UPC,]” Carroll, 358 N.C. at 675; see 25 N.C.A.C.

1J.0614(8) (2023), we cannot pragmatically assess Ayers’s UPC against some baseline 

violation. See Watlington, 261 N.C. App. at 770 (marks omitted) (“[C]omparing the 

misconduct in this case to the misconduct in . . . cases in which our appellate courts 

have held just cause for dismissal existed . . . is unpersuasive, as just cause . . . can 

only be determined upon an examination of the facts and circumstances of each 

individual case.”). Rather, for this factor, we examine the potential harmfulness and 

frequency of Ayers’s UPC. See id. at 770-71 (considering potential harm and the 

frequency of the petitioner’s misconduct, albeit without explicitly discussing the 

Wetherington factors); accord Davis v. N.C. Dep’t Health & Hum. Servs., 269 N.C. 

App. 109 (2019) (unpublished) (“[T]he potential for harm does speak to the severity 

of the violation.”). 

In Wetherington II, our severity analysis discussed the context and effects of 

the trooper’s UPC in a manner that, at first, appears duplicative of the “subject 

matter involved” and “resulting harm” factors, but actually suggests a potential harm 

inquiry. We said that the trooper’s “untruthful statement regarding losing his hat 
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was not a severe violation of the truthfulness policy” because “[i]t did not occur in 

court and it did not affect any investigation, prosecution, or the function of the 

Highway Patrol”; rather, it “was about a matter . . . all parties concede was not very 

important.” Wetherington II, 270 N.C. App. at 191. Thus, our discussion connected 

the lie’s out-of-court context to its lack of effects on patrol’s investigatory and 

prosecutorial functions. In this light, any apparent redundancy between this factor 

and “resulting harm” merely reflected that the particular circumstances created 

minimal, if any, potential harm.

In Wetherington II’s severity analysis, we further considered the isolated 

nature of the trooper’s UPC. Specifically, the trooper’s conduct was not “an elaborate 

lie full of fabricated details” but rather contained only a singular fabricated detail:

“the lie or ‘untruth’ lay only in the hat’s location when [the trooper] misplaced it.” 

Wetherington II, 270 N.C. App. at 191-92. Conversely, in Watlington v. Department 

of Social Services of Rockingham County, we considered that the frequency of the

dismissed employee’s UPC displayed a “repeated inclination” to engage in it. 

Watlington, 261 N.C. App. at 770-71 (considering the employee’s five instances of 

exchanging gifts with social services clients). 

Here, the ALJ concluded “[t]he preponderance of evidence proved there was 

only a minimal degree of potential risk that Petitioner’s racial comment could or 

would have affected [] Respondent’s integrity, employee morale, or provision of 

services.” DSS points to several unavailing bases for potential harm. Primarily, it
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argues it has shown “widespread potential harm” in that its continued employment

of Ayers would reflect poorly on Hurd’s “credibility and trust” in the eyes of the county

board of social services. See N.C.G.S. §§ 108A-1 to -11 (2023). DSS grounds this 

argument in the Addendum, but the ALJ made no findings of fact that reflect how 

Ayers’s UPC could have affected Hurd’s individual reputation in the eyes of the board. 

See Harris, 252 N.C. App. at 100. Regardless—as consistent with the ALJ’s final 

decision—we do not see how an adverse reflection on Hurd’s individual reputation, if 

any, based solely on Hurd’s own assertions, created any potential to undermine the 

mission of DSS or is otherwise relevant to whether DSS had just cause to dismiss 

Ayers. 

DSS further posits that “Petitioner’s UPC exposed DSS to vulnerability for 

negligent retention and supervision liability” and “violated DSS’s compliance with 

the Civil Rights Act of 1964[,]” see 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, et seq., which “could jeopardize 

the receipt of federal funding.” The ALJ found,

123. While [] Hurd and Respondent claim that Petitioner 

violated various policies that Respondent is required to 

follow, [] Hurd and Respondent failed to demonstrate how 

Petitioner violated any of these policies when she 

spontaneously uttered a racial slur in a vacant office to her 

supervisor. . . . 

DSS argues this finding is contrary to several portions of the record: the policies

themselves, Hurd’s testimony, the Addendum, and Sutton’s testimony. But none of

this evidence demonstrates how DSS’s usage of non-dismissal forms of discipline to 
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address Ayers’s UPC would have subjected the agency to tort liability or violated 

federal law.

Despite this lack of identifiable liability, Ayers’s conduct carried a risk of

significant potential harm, albeit a relatively low risk of that harm coming to pass. 

Ayers’s use of a racial slur in an office, with the door open, created the possibility that 

her subordinate employees or a client in the building might have overheard the 

language. And the impact of such a slur having been heard was potentially great;

Sutton testified that merely learning of Ayers’s “inappropriate, disrespectful, and 

belittling” words after-the-fact adversely affected her professional relationship with 

Ayers, undermined Ayers’s supervisory authority, and was inconsistent with DSS’s 

core values. This conduct, if exposed to a subordinate or client, “would have affected 

[] Respondent’s integrity, employee morale, [and the] provision of services,” not only 

by virtue of the morale impact on any listeners who have been personally affected by 

the slur, but also by severely undermining confidence that DSS’s employees were 

discharging their duties in a manner that upheld the dignitary equality of all persons, 

regardless of race.

However, our “severity of the violation” inquiry does not end there. While

gravity of the harm, had it come to pass, speaks to the severity of the conduct, “that 

Petitioner’s conduct . . . was an aberrant and unintended event” mitigates this 

severity. The ALJ found,
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139. The preponderance of the evidence established that 

Petitioner’s conduct on [3 November 2017] was an aberrant 

and unintended event. There was no evidence that 

Petitioner acted maliciously, with any racially-motivated 

reason or with any racially motivated intent to offend, 

harass, or belittle any given ethnicity, race, or anyone with 

whom she worked. Instead, the evidence proved that 

Petitioner’s statement was a careless mistake and a 

“momentary lapse in judgment” by a highly effective and

professional employee.

This finding is best characterized as an ultimate fact, and it is reasoned from ample 

evidentiary facts; in particular, those reflecting that Ayers has not otherwise made 

inappropriate remarks and expressed immediate and consistent embarrassment, 

regret, and remorse: 

35. Petitioner immediately regretted her statement, told [] 

Hurd that she could not believe she had said that, and 

apologized to [] Hurd.

. . . . 

37. Shortly after Petitioner made the above-described 

statement, Petitioner and [] Hurd left the vacant office to 

locate the file for the “F” family. On the way, Petitioner 

apologized to [] Hurd again and said something like, Please 

don’t tell anyone about what I said, especially the first part. 

It’s Friday.” Petitioner made this request because she was 

embarrassed and surprised by what she had said.

. . . . 

45. [After the 6 November 2017 pre-disciplinary 

conference], Petitioner apologized and told [] Hurd: 

It was [an] inappropriate comment . . . It was 

a guess. It was words [that] just came out of 

her mouth. I shocked myself. I apologize. I 
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don’t use these words in my personal life, my 

work life. I don’t allow this in staffing. We

were solving a ‘word problem.’ I apologize for 

me and to you. These comments were not to 

the family - I think not it means ‘nonreported.’ It was in a vacant office. It is 

inappropriate.

. . . . 

60. At the 2018 Hearing, Petitioner admitted she 

“absolutely said something that’s improper.” “I’m still 

embarrassed by that.” “I apologize for making that 

comment. I know the comment was unacceptable. It would 

be unacceptable in any setting, personal or professional.” 

61. She “had never made an off-color remark like that 

before in her [[] Hurd’s] presence or anyone else’s presence, 

at work or even my personal life.”

. . . . 

114. . . . . The evidence at both the initial hearing and at 

the reconvened hearing showed without question that 

Petitioner was remorseful about making a racial comment 

during the [i]ncident, . . . . Respondent failed to present 

any credible evidence to rebut those facts.

. . . . 

124. . . . A preponderance of the evidence showed that 

Petitioner demonstrated introspection regarding her 

conduct in the [i]ncident, both immediately following the 

[i]ncident, throughout the local administrative processes, 

during the 2018 Hearing, and during the 2022 Hearing.

. . . . 

128. Despite the passage of over four and one-half years 

between the [i]ncident and the 2022 Hearing, Respondent 

presented no evidence of any form of unprofessional 
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conduct by Petitioner in any setting other than during the 

[3 November 2017] [i]ncident.

129. Petitioner consistently expressed regret and 

embarrassment about the incident in her conversations 

with and written submissions to [] Hurd following the 

[i]ncident. 

130. While testifying before the Undersigned on two 

separate occasions, several years apart, Petitioner has 

consistently demonstrated that she regrets and is 

embarrassed by her conduct from the [i]ncident.

In other words, although the harm itself may have been great under different 

circumstances, we cannot ignore the ALJ’s findings that the circumstances 

themselves, including the time of day and volume of potential listeners in the 

building, created a low risk of such a harm actually coming to pass and were 

uncharacteristic of Ayers’s past and future behavior relative to the incident.

DSS seeks to resist finding of fact 139 by challenging each of the above findings

save for number 35. Specifically, DSS argues that Ayers has not been consistently 

remorseful. It acknowledges that several “findings imply Petitioner has in all ways 

been remorseful and taken responsibility for her egregious utterance” but adds that, 

“[n]otwithstanding the ALJ’s discretion to [determine] matters of credibility, the 

record does not bear this out.” However, several of the findings quoted above directly 

quote the evidence that “bears out” Ayers’s remorse and acceptance of responsibility.

DSS also argues we cannot “ignore . . . DSS’s repeated findings and conclusions 

made throughout DSS’s investigation that Ayers showed no remorse and did not take 
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responsibility.” But it was the ALJ’s prerogative to assess the credibility and weight 

of DSS’s investigatory findings. See Harris, 252 N.C. App. at 100. Moreover, the ALJ 

found Ayers’s statements during DSS’s investigation were “reasonably attributable 

to Petitioner’s concern that [] Hurd had already made her decision about the 

[i]ncident” and that, “if she provided any more testimony about the [i]ncident, [] Hurd 

would just ‘pick it apart and . . . make a deal out of that too.’” We hold the ALJ’s 

ultimate fact 139 is properly reasoned from evidentiary facts, which in turn are 

supported by substantial evidence in the record. 

Accordingly, the ALJ’s finding and conclusion that Ayers’s UPC was “an 

aberrant and unintended event” rather than a pattern of misconduct mitigates the 

severity of Ayers’s UPC. Nevertheless, we reiterate that Ayers’s UPC carried a risk 

of significant potential harm.

2. Subject Matter Involved

Turning to the subject matter involved, DSS does not identify the subject 

matter, arguing only “[t]here is no dispute . . . that the subject matter is most serious.” 

Ayers, meanwhile, identifies the subject matter as “improper language[.]” However, 

the subject matter is best identified as the meaning of “NR” in the race field on DSS’s 

intake form. 

In Wetherington II, we considered the subject matter to be, trivially, “the loss 

of the hat”; that is, the object of the trooper’s lie and not dishonesty generally. 
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Wetherington II, 270 N.C. App. at 192. Likewise, here, we consider the object of 

Ayers’s racial slur. The ALJ found this was the meaning of “NR”:

115. . . . Petitioner was only answering Hurd’s question 

regarding what did the letters “NR” mean. Given those 

facts, there was no proof that Petitioner was referring to 

the specific family listed on the form when she blurted out 

her racial comment.

Again, pointing to the Addendum, DSS contends that Ayers intended her slur to 

describe the family listed on the DSS form. However, the ALJ credited Ayers’s

contrary testimony that she was not referencing the family but “trying to decipher 

the race code.” Undeterred by this evidence, DSS makes a conclusory argument that,

“Ayers’[s] own testimony on these issues does not and cannot amount to ‘substantial 

evidence.’” But it is well established that “the probative value of particular testimony 

[is] for the [ALJ] to determine, and [the ALJ] may accept [or reject] . . . the testimony 

of any witness.” Harris, 252 N.C. App. at 100 (second and third alterations in 

original).

Accepting finding of fact 115, this subject matter is not any person or family, 

mitigating its seriousness. However, we are also cognizant that, in light of the form’s 

coding being used as a racial demarcation, the subject matter and decision to use the 

epithet carries an irretractable gravity, even when not referring to a particular 

person or family. Thus, the mitigation on this factor is, ultimately, only partial.

3. Resulting Harm
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We proceed to “resulting harm.” In Ayers II, we considered the factor as “harm 

to DSS” and held DSS had only considered “the potential for harm to the reputation 

of, and workers at, DSS[.]” Ayers II, 279 N.C. App. at 525. Thus, we “remand[ed] to 

the ALJ with instructions to remand to DSS” to investigate resulting harm to DSS. 

Id. at 527. Unsurprisingly, on this appeal, the parties devote the bulk of their 

arguments to this factor and related factual issues.

DSS identifies several bases for resulting harm. Specifically, DSS points to the 

disruption caused by Ayers’s mandated absence, legal fees incurred by DSS in 

defending Ayers’s dismissal, harmful rumors of Ayers’s UPC upon her absence, 

Ayers’s frustration of policies, Hurd’s diminished trust in Ayers, and Hurd’s personal

offense upon hearing Ayers’s UPC. Although DSS contends that “[Hurd], within her 

discretion, determined that there was irreparable harm to DSS. . . . . [Her] 

determination that harm resulted was a sufficient exercise of that discretion[,]” an 

agency’s discretion does not permit it to classify any and all harm as “resulting 

harm.”

8 See Wetherington II, 270 N.C. App. at 194 (rejecting the highway patrol 

supervisor’s discussion of potential harm as a basis for resulting harm). Thus, we do 

not defer to Hurd’s determinations of harm but, rather, consider the ALJ’s findings

related to each of DSS’s proposed bases of resulting harm.

8 In Ayers II, we rejected DSS’s similar argument that its discretion permitted it to ignore the 

“resulting harm” factor entirely. Ayers II, 279 N.C. App. at 524-25.
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The ALJ ultimately found each basis for resulting harm either resulted from 

the discipline itself or was not factually supported:

113. In the Final Agency Decision Addendum, [] Hurd 

characterized several matters as actual harm purportedly 

resulting from the [i]ncident. However, these matters are 

all either descriptions of potential harm or resulted from [] 

Hurd’s decision to dismiss Petitioner and were not caused 

by or the result of the [i]ncident itself.

. . . . 

133. After conducting an investigation specifically to 

determine whether the agency suffered any actual harm 

resulting from the [i]ncident, [] Hurd was unable to show 

that the agency suffered any actual harm. However, [] 

Hurd tried to portray the potential for harm as actual harm 

even though much of the potential harm was speculative, 

based only on her subjective belief, or is contrary to or 

otherwise refuted by the passage of nearly five (5) years 

since [] Hurd dismissed Petitioner.

We agree with the ALJ’s legal conclusion that “potential harm [and matters] 

result[ing] from [] Hurd’s decision to dismiss Petitioner” are not resulting harm. See 

Wetherington I, 368 N.C. at 592; Wetherington II, 270 N.C. App. at 194-95. Further, 

we consider the ALJ’s findings and conclusions to the effect that DSS has not 

otherwise shown resulting harm are best classified as ultimate findings of fact. Thus, 

for each of DSS’s bases, we inquire whether DSS may fairly characterize it as 

resulting harm; and, if so, we further consider whether the ALJ’s ultimate finding 

that the basis lacks factual support was appropriately reasoned from evidentiary 

findings supported by substantial evidence. 
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a. Ayers’s Absence and DSS’s Legal Expenses

We have previously distinguished between resulting harm and mere potential 

harm. E.g., Wetherington II, 270 N.C. App. at 194-95. This case requires us to further

distinguish between the harm proximately resulting from the UPC and that resulting

ipso facto from an agency’s imposition of discipline. When an agency disciplines an

employee for UPC, we inquire “whether that misconduct amounted to just cause for 

the disciplinary action taken.” Warren I, 221 N.C. App. at 383 (emphasis added). Any 

harm resulting from the discipline had not yet resulted when the agency was required 

to determine whether just cause existed for the discipline.9 See Brown, 269 N.C. App. 

at 128-32 (adopting the U.S. Supreme Court’s reasoning that “after-acquired evidence 

. . . could not serve as a valid justification for upholding the employee’s termination 

because the employer did not know [this evidence] until after she was discharged” 

and applying it to contested cases brought by career State employees).10

DSS’s proposed bases for resulting harm illustrate this point. DSS argues 

Ayers’s UPC “interrupted [Hurd’s] normal duties and require[ed] others to pick up 

her workflow” and notes “[t]he [Final Agency Decision] Addendum also addressed 

the actual harm to DSS’s budget[.]” However, it does not challenge that “any 

9 DSS argues that some harm—specifically employee resignations—might have resulted had 

it not terminated petitioner. We decline to speculate what harm would and would not have resulted 

had DSS opted for a non-dismissal form of discipline. 

10 Brown further held “this type of evidence could be used to limit the employee’s relief[,]” at 

least where the evidence creates an independent and lawful basis for the termination. Brown, 269 

N.C. App. at 128. DSS does not ask us to limit Ayers’s relief should we conclude it lacked just cause. 
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Opinion of the Court

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interruption of [] Hurd’s duties, other staff’s duties, or workflow at DSS was not due 

to the [i]ncident itself . . . [but rather] resulted from [] Hurd’s decision to place 

Petitioner on leave and Petitioner’s resulting absence from the agency after [] Hurd 

dismissed Petitioner.”

These bases seek to use of the fact of Ayers’s dismissal to justify the dismissal, 

but “[f]airness and equity do not allow just cause for dismissal to be predicated upon” 

the dismissal itself. Cf. Whitehurst, 257 N.C. App. at 947 (“Fairness and equity do 

not allow just cause for dismissal to be predicated upon [the petitioner’s] failure to 

respond appropriately to facts of which he had no knowledge.”). Rather, this

circularity “is functionally indistinguishable from [a rule of] ‘per se’ dismissal[.]” 

Wetherington II, 270 N.C. App. at 191. A contrary holding would place disciplined

State employees in a Catch-22, as an exercise of their right to appeal, see N.C.G.S. §§ 

126-34.01 to -.02 (2023), would subject the agency to legal expenses and potentially

tip the scales in favor of just cause, even where none had existed prior.

11 

b. Rumors of Ayers’s UPC

DSS also points to harm to Sutton upon learning of rumors of Ayers’s UPC as 

a basis for resulting harm. Learning of Ayers’s words “disappointed and shocked” 

11 Such a result could raise due process implications as well. Brewington, 254 N.C. App. at 27-

28 (“It is well established that career State employees enjoy a property interest in continued 

employment. This property interest is created by state law, N.C.[G.S.] § 126-35(a), and is guaranteed 

by the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 

Constitution.”).
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Opinion of the Court

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Sutton, and she understandably considered them “inappropriate, disrespectful, and 

belittling.” However, Sutton did not witness Ayers’s UPC and only learned of it 

because of Ayers’s absence from work after her dismissal. The dismissal itself

required DSS have just cause. N.C.G.S. § 126-35 (2023). DSS could not have relied 

upon after-the-fact office gossip as potential harm—realized only after the 

dismissal—as “resulting harm” to show just cause for the dismissal. Brown, 269 N.C. 

App. at 128-32.12

c. Frustration of Policies

12 DSS fairly notes, “[r]egardless of when or how she learned of the conduct, Sutton was 

harmed.” Consistent with the “flexible concept” of just cause, Carroll, 358 N.C. at 669, we do not ignore 

this but have more appropriately considered it as potential harm—not-yet realized when DSS imposed 

discipline.

DSS also notes, “[i]t is likely that in many situations, properly investigating the use of racial 

slurs to a supervisor, will necessarily result in harm to colleagues who learn of the slurs. As such, 

Ayers’[s] use of the slurs, even though it was a single incident and even though she had little prior 

discipline, [or, more accurately, no prior discipline,] constitutes good cause for dismissal.” DSS,

elsewhere, argues, “[it] cannot possibly be the law of North Carolina” that “[Hurd] was required to ask 

other social workers whether they also heard the racial slurs” because such an investigation “would 

necessarily be causing additional harm to the agency by spreading the vile racist slurs throughout the 

agency[.]”

Whether DSS considers such a holding possible or not, we held DSS was required to conduct a 

complete investigation, sufficient for the ALJ to make findings of fact regarding resulting harm, 

including discerning “whether anyone else heard such statement[.]” Ayers II, 279 N.C. App. at 526 

(emphasis omitted). To consider harm caused by or “spread” by an investigation as “resulting harm”

would tie the level of resulting harm to the thoroughness of an agency’s investigation therein. This 

would create tension between just cause’s “notions of equity and fairness” and an agency’s discretion 

over how to conduct its investigation. See Brewington, 254 N.C. App. at 14, 25.

We are mindful that, if mere knowledge of an employee’s UPC would create harm, and if the 

very act of investigating UPC spreads knowledge of the UPC, it could be unavoidable for an agency to 

investigate just cause without spreading harm. If and when such cases arise, we trust agencies will 

exercise their discretion over their investigations in a manner to minimize that harm. We note, for 

example, that Hurd’s transcribed interview of Sutton in this case utilized open-ended questioning that

did not require Hurd to repeat Ayers’s words, not even in redacted fashion.
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Another of DSS’s bases for resulting harm is an even more naked application 

of a per se rule. DSS argues “[t]he Addendum addressed harm to the DSS’s mission 

and work by frustrating the purpose of numerous policies[.]” Although Ayers’s policy 

violation was certainly relevant to whether Ayers’s conduct constituted UPC, Ayers 

does not contest that prong of Warren. Rather, at this prong, we consider whether 

this particular “frustrati[on] of the purpose” of a policy “amounted to just cause for 

the disciplinary action taken.” Warren I, 221 N.C. App. at 383. Restating the fact of 

the UPC does not advance this inquiry. Further, although Hurd testified that “a 

supervisor who disregards policy is harmful because supervisors are intended to be 

leaders” at DSS and it is “important that they demonstrate compliance with those 

policies personally[,]” Ayers’s position as supervisor or leader “does not lower the 

standard that must be met in order to justify [her] dismissal.” See Whitehurst, 257 

N.C. App. at 948.

d. Hurd’s Diminished Trust in Ayers

DSS’s remaining bases for resulting harm lack factual support. DSS argues it 

showed harm to Hurd in that “Petitioner’s UPC justifiably obliterated [Hurd’s] trust 

in Petitioner’s judgment, . . . [and] there was simply no way Petitioner could function 

autonomously without total supervision or eliminate the risk of another abhorrent 

racial outburst.” Although this reads more like potential harm, it is relevant to just 

cause regardless (to the extent it is supported in fact) and we address it here. 
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Opinion of the Court

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In Wetherington II, we held a supervisor’s unreasonable belief that an 

employee would repeat his UPC if permitted to remain in his position is not a proper 

basis for resulting harm. There, the trooper’s supervisor claimed in his dismissal 

letter to the trooper that

I have no confidence that you can be trusted to be truthful 

to your supervisors or even to testify truthfully in court or 

at administrative hearings. . . . [Y]our ability to perform 

the essential job functions of a Trooper is reparably limited 

due to the Highway Patrol’s duty to disclose details of the 

internal investigation to prosecutors[.] . . . If you were to 

return to duty with the Highway Patrol I could not, in good 

conscience, assign you to any position . . . within the 

Highway Patrol . . ., any assignment would compromise the 

integrity of the Highway Patrol and the ability of the State 

to put on credible evidence to prosecute its cases.

Wetherington II, 270 N.C. App. at 165. But while “[i]t [was] easy to understand the 

resulting harm to the agency from a trooper’s intentional lie about substantive facts 

in sworn testimony or in the course of his official duties[,]” the trooper had made no 

lie of that sort, and the highway patrol “ha[d] never been able to articulate how this 

particular lie was so harmful.” Id. at 195 (emphasis added). Rather, the highway 

patrol’s analysis was “substantively no different” than a per se rule because any “sort 

of untruthfulness, in any context” would have permitted dismissal under the highway 

patrol’s reasoning. Id. at 195, 199. 

Under Wetherington II, Hurd and DSS could not reasonably presume Ayers’s 

one instance of UPC meant she would have a future “racial outburst” in the manner 

that the highway patrol assumed the trooper’s single lie meant he would have 
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Opinion of the Court

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perjured himself given the opportunity; they needed some reasonable ground for the

belief. As DSS notes, Hurd was simultaneously the sole witness, “principal 

investigator,” and administer of discipline, making this basis for harm wholly 

dependent on the reasonableness of her individual belief. However, the ALJ found

this belief to be unreasonable:

114. [] Hurd subjectively believed that Petitioner was not 

fit to be entrusted with her supervisory or other duties for 

Currituck DSS and claimed this belief constituted “harm” 

resulting from the [i]ncident. However, Hurd’s subjective 

belief was unsubstantiated, speculative, and unreasonable.

[] Hurd’s subjective opinion on these matters was not 

supported by a preponderance of the evidence and was 

contrary to other evidence in the record. The evidence at 

both the initial hearing and at the reconvened hearing 

showed without question that Petitioner was remorseful

about making a racial comment during the [i]ncident, that 

Petitioner’s comment was uncharacteristic of her, and that 

there was no reasonable expectation or likelihood that 

Petitioner would repeat such comment. Respondent failed 

to present any credible evidence to rebut those facts.

On the other hand, the ALJ expressly found, based on supporting evidence on the 

record, “Hurd’s decision to dismiss Petitioner from employment was influenced by [] 

Hurd’s past philosophical differences with Petitioner and their past history.”

These findings were amply reasoned from unchallenged findings of fact that 

reflect the “friction[,]” and “difficult but professional relationship[,]” and “significant 

philosophical differences” between Hurd and Ayers. Indeed, DSS admits that Hurd 

relied, in part, on these “prior difficulties” to determine “there was irreparable harm 

to DSS[.]” Further, Romm—the former DSS director over both employees—“did not 
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Opinion of the Court

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think [Ayers’s] conduct on [3 November 2017] was typical or characteristic of [her]

behavior” and had no “doubts or concerns about [her] fitness to be a supervisor at []

DSS[,]” despite her UPC.

DSS further challenges finding of fact 114 based on its opinions that Ayers was 

not remorseful and had a “racist upbringing[.]” But the ALJ’s findings reflect neither 

of these, and any evidence in support of its opinions does not preclude the ALJ’s

findings to the contrary. See Harris, 252 N.C. App. at 108.

e. Hurd’s Personal Offense

DSS’s last basis of resulting harm is that “[h]earing the statement harmed 

[Hurd’s] morale, who considered it highly offensive, vulgar, crude, and 

discriminatory.” The ALJ found “Respondent presented no evidence . . . that 

Petitioner’s comment during the [3 November 2017] [i]ncident affected . . . the morale 

of any DSS employees . . . . [T]he [i]ncident did not affect . . . the morale of any 

employee[.]” Citing a portion of Hurd’s 2018 testimony, DSS argues “[i]t is not true 

there was no evidence of it negatively impacting the morale of any DSS employee . . .

Hurd is an employee[] . . . [and] testified to the unsettling effect this had on her.” 

However, “the probative value of particular testimony [is] for the [ALJ] to determine,”

id. at 100 (second alteration in original), and we have, in Ayers II, already considered 

the effect of this testimony and held Hurd’s consideration that she “thought [Ayers’s 

UPC] was extremely offensive and inflammatory” was not consideration of resulting 

harm. Ayers II, 279 N.C. App. at 525. We may not revisit our conclusion that Hurd’s 
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Opinion of the Court

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personal offense was not resulting harm to DSS. Wetherington II, 270 N.C. App. at 

172-73 (“According to the doctrine of the law of the case, once an appellate court has 

ruled on a question, that decision becomes the law of the case and governs the 

question both in subsequent proceedings in a trial court and on subsequent appeal.”).

Having considered each of DSS’s proposed basis for resulting harm, we hold 

the ALJ’s ultimate findings that DSS has not shown resulting harm are properly 

reasoned from evidentiary facts supported by substantial evidence in the record. The 

facts, as the ALJ found based on substantial evidence, do not show that Ayers’s UPC 

had caused any resulting harm to DSS, its reputation, its employees, or its ability to 

provide services to the public at the time DSS dismissed Ayers. This factor weighs 

against the existence of just cause to dismiss Ayers. 

4. Ayers’s Work History

Having discussed at length the “resulting harm” factor, we turn to Ayers’s work 

history. Analyzing this factor in Whitehurst v. East Carolina University, we 

considered both the dismissed employee’s performance reviews and her disciplinary 

history. Whitehurst, 257 N.C. App. at 938. 

DSS does not challenge the ALJ’s findings related to Ayers’s work history: 

10. From 2011 through 2017, [] Romm conducted the 

annual evaluations of Petitioner.[] Romm consistently 

rated Petitioner as “substantially exceeded” expectations 

in all areas and rated Petitioner’s performance as 

“Excellent” in all areas. An “Excellent” rating was the 

highest possible evaluation rating an employee can receive 

in a performance evaluation.
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Opinion of the Court

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11. [] Romm never had any concerns about Petitioner’s 

professionalism, adherence to policy, attitude, or her work 

performance.

12. Until her dismissal, Petitioner had not received any 

prior disciplinary action during her employment with 

Respondent.

. . . . 

132. In the [8 November 2017] termination letter and the 

[21 November 2017] Final Agency Decision, [] Hurd 

referenced a [21 July 2017] conversation with Petitioner to

show she had placed Petitioner on prior notice that 

Petitioner’s conduct towards [] Hurd was inappropriate 

and unprofessional. However, the preponderance of the 

evidence showed that [] Hurd actually relied upon the [21 

July 2017] conversation to show support for, and further 

justify, her decision to dismiss Petitioner even though she 

never documented her [21 July 2017] conversation with 

Petitioner as a disciplinary action. . . . Hurd never issued 

any disciplinary action to Petitioner for prior job 

performance or conduct deficiencies. [] Hurd never 

documented the [21 July 2017] matter in writing or as a 

disciplinary action. There was no evidence [] Hurd 

documented “many discussions” with Petitioner about any 

prior unacceptable conduct.

DSS does not argue we should consider the 21 July 2017 conversation and concedes

Ayers’s work history is “mitigation[.]” As Ayers received consistently excellent 

performance reviews and had no prior disciplinary actions, “[t]his factor could only 

favor some disciplinary action short of termination.” Wetherington II, 270 N.C. App. 

at 196.

5. Discipline Imposed in Other Cases Involving Similar Violations
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We now turn to the final Wetherington factor. DSS argues “[t]he ALJ’s reliance 

on the lack of prior DSS discipline for similar conduct is misleading as no employee 

had ever used a racial epithet at work before.” To the extent the ALJ considered that 

DSS permitted employees to use non-racial profanity in the workplace, we agree with 

DSS that this was error. However, this does not end our inquiry into this factor. 

Consistent with just cause’s “notions of equity and fairness[,]” Carroll, 358 

N.C. at 669, we have characterized this factor as whether “this dismissal was based 

upon disparate treatment[.]” Wetherington II, 270 N.C. App. at 198-99. “Similar 

violations” are not limited to factually similar UPC; rather, the similar violations only 

need “some relevant denominator . . . for comparison.” Id. at 199. “Although there is 

no particular time period set for this factor, [there is] no legal basis for relying only 

upon disciplinary actions during a particular [director’s] tenure.” Id. 

In Warren’s second trip to this Court, we considered a State employee’s 

dismissal for a violation of his agency-employer’s policy against unbecoming personal 

conduct by driving his patrol vehicle while off duty and with an open bottle of liquor 

in the trunk. Warren v. N.C. Dep’t of Crime Control & Pub. Safety (“Warren II”), 267 

N.C. App. 503, 506-10 (2019). Under the first two prongs, we held the employee 

violated the policy and that the violation was UPC. Id. at 506-08. But, at the third 

prong, we held there was no just cause for the employee’s termination, in part because

the disciplinary actions [the] respondent has taken for 

unbecoming conduct typically resulted in either: a 

temporary suspension without pay, a reduction in pay, or a 
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Opinion of the Court

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demotion of title. In fact, where the conduct was equally or 

more egregious than that of petitioner (i.e., threats to kill 

another person, sexual harassment, assault), the employee 

was generally subjected to disciplinary measures other 

than termination.

Id. at 509. 

Here, DSS does not challenge the ALJ’s findings that

21. During Romm’s nineteen years as Director of Currituck 

DSS, Romm dismissed three individuals for engaging in 

unacceptable personal conduct. Each of these employees 

had engaged in either a pattern or a series of unacceptable 

personal conduct repeatedly over a period of time. One 

employee lied to Romm for months regarding an 

unauthorized destruction of case records. A second 

employee refused to perform a core duty of her position. []

Romm fired that employee when the employee failed to 

perform a second core duty involving the safety of children 

and after the supervisor advised the employee of the 

serious consequences that could result from her continued 

refusal to perform her duties. A third employee falsely 

reported, written and verbally, the status of cases over 

several months. 

22. [] Ro[m]m never terminated anyone for unacceptable 

personal conduct based solely on a one-time incident. She 

never terminated anyone for unacceptable personal 

conduct based on something the employee said in a private 

conversation. 

. . . . 

[Conclusion of law] 46. In this case, it was undisputed that 

neither [] Hurd nor [] Romm had encountered a similar 

conduct violation at Currituck DSS in the past. Neither [] 

Hurd nor [] Romm had dismissed any employee based on a 

single incident of misconduct in the past. In fact, prior 

disciplinary practices at Respondent demonstrated that 

dismissal was not ordinarily imposed for a single act of 
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Opinion of the Court

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misconduct, and generally an employee would only be 

dismissed following a warning and repetition of some act of 

misconduct.

While we do not compare for all purposes the relative egregiousness of Ayers’s use of 

a racial slur to previously dismissed DSS employees’ dishonesty and dereliction of job 

duties, we conclude these prior instances of UPC establish the “relevant 

denominator[.]” Wetherington II, 270 N.C. App. at 199. DSS has not historically 

imposed dismissal as the discipline for an employee’s first instance of UPC. Since 

Ayers’s dismissal for a single instance of UPC is contrary to DSS historical practice, 

this factor weighs against the existence of just cause to dismiss Ayers. 

E. Balancing the Equities

Having analyzed each of the Wetherington factors, we reach the “irreducible 

act of judgment[,]” Carroll, 358 N.C. at 669, of whether DSS had just cause to dismiss 

Ayers. 

DSS implores us to accord deference to its determination of just cause. 

Specifically, it argues Hurd “was best positioned to determine the impact of 

Petitioner’s misconduct” based on her education and training, as well as in that “[s]he 

is of long tenure in that DSS and was selected by her predecessor for her integrity 

and judgment[.]” It further argues, “[a]s the supervisor, witness to the slurs, and 

principal investigator, [Hurd] had to rely on her judgement [sic] and discretion in 

determining whether harm was caused. The ALJ failed to give her sufficient 

deference in the challenged Conclusions of Law.” However, “[the ALJ] . . . owe[d] no 
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Opinion of the Court

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deference to [Hurd’s] conclusion of law that [] just cause existed” and was “free to 

substitute [her] judgment for that of [Hurd] regarding the legal conclusion of whether 

just cause existed for [DSS’s] action.” Harris, 252 N.C. App. at 102. 

We likewise review the ALJ’s legal conclusion de novo. See, e.g., Wetherington 

II, 270 N.C. App. at 190. There is no “formulaic approach” for this determination. 

See Watlington, 261 N.C. at 770. Although not every Wetherington factor must favor 

the existence of just cause for it to exist,

13 e.g., id. at 770-72 (determining just cause 

existed despite a lack of resulting harm), we may not ignore the absence of factors. 

See Wetherington II, 270 N.C. App. at 190 (“[The disciplining agency] could not rely 

on one factor while ignoring the others.”)

We hold DSS failed to meet and carry its burden of proving it had just cause to 

dismiss Ayers for her UPC. In doing so, we do not “compar[e] the misconduct in this 

case to the misconduct in . . . cases in which our appellate courts have held just cause 

for dismissal existed” or did not exist, Watlington, 261 N.C. at 770, but hold only

“upon an examination of the facts and circumstances of [this] individual case[,]” as 

found by the ALJ and supported by substantial evidence. Carroll, 358 N.C. at 669. 

Ayers’s use of a racial slur in the workplace, even when not directed at a particular 

person and seemingly without the intent to convey racial animosity, was a severely 

unprofessional and insensitive choice. But the ALJ did not, and we cannot, ignore 

13 Thus, DSS is correct when it argues “actual harm is not necessary to support a decision to 

terminate under the law.” 
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Opinion of the Court

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the considerable circumstances in mitigation: Ayers immediately and consistently 

recognized and regretted the wrongfulness of her conduct, DSS has not shown any 

harm had resulted by the time it terminated Ayers, Ayers had an otherwise 

unblemished employment history, and DSS has not historically dismissed employes

for a single instance of UPC. In other words, despite the severity and seriousness, 

DSS has not established why appropriately addressing Ayers’s UPC required it to 

deviate from its historical disciplinary practices where Ayers’s UPC was an aberrant

incident for which she readily accepted responsibility and felt remorse, especially 

where no actual harm resulted.

To conclude our just cause analysis, we address one more argument from DSS. 

It argues that

to suggest that an agency tasked with protecting minority 

children is not harmed when a State employee says the Nword to her supervisor when trying to determine the race 

[of] a family receiving critical services[] is disingenuous to 

the equal rights movement and jurisprudence. Discipline 

amounting to nothing more than a slap on the wrist is a 

slap in the face to that policy and to all people receiving 

services therefrom. This [C]ourt should not cosign such 

inexplicable leniency and should instead draw a judicial 

line in the sand about what is and what is not appropriate 

within our governmental agencies.

Reasonable people can disagree about whether “the equal rights movement and 

jurisprudence” is best served by DSS’s desired zero-tolerance policy14 or one that 

14 DSS acknowledges that “Hurd, by her actions, was setting ‘a very strong zero tolerance 

standard[.]’”
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Opinion of the Court

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offers those who engage in UPC an opportunity to learn from their mistakes and earn 

a second chance. But any “judicial line in the sand” has already been drawn on the 

far side of DSS’s preferred option: “the better practice, in keeping with the mandates 

of both Chapter 126 and our precedents, [is] to allow for a range of disciplinary actions

in response to an individual act of [UPC], rather than the categorical approach” that 

DSS sought to employ. Wetherington I, 368 N.C. at 593 (emphasis added). Since DSS 

has not shown just cause to dismiss Ayers for this individual act of UPC, its 

disciplinary action must fall elsewhere on this range. 

F. ALJ’s Alternative Discipline

We briefly mention the ALJ’s alternative discipline.

Under [N.C.G.S. § 126-34.02(a)(3)], the ALJ has express 

statutory authority to “[d]irect other suitable action” upon 

a finding that just cause does not exist for the particular 

action taken by the agency. Under the ALJ’s de novo

review, the authority to “[d]irect other suitable action”

includes the authority to impose a less severe sanction as 

“relief.”

Because the ALJ hears the evidence, determines the 

weight and credibility of the evidence, makes findings of 

fact, and “balanc[es] the equities,” the ALJ has the 

authority under de novo review to impose an alternative 

discipline. Upon the ALJ’s determination that the agency 

met the first two prongs of the Warren standard, but just 

cause does not exist for the particular disciplinary 

alternative imposed by the agency, the ALJ may impose an 

alternative sanction within the range of allowed 

dispositions.
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Opinion of the Court

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Harris, 252 N.C. App. at 109 (second, third, and fourth alterations in original); see 

N.C.G.S. § 126-34.02(a)(3) (2023). 

Here, the ALJ ordered DSS to “retroactively reinstate Petitioner to the same 

or similar position she held prior to her dismissal with full back pay, suspend 

Petitioner for two weeks without pay, and order Petitioner to attend additional 

cultural diversity and racial sensitivity . . . training.” Ayers does not contest that 

DSS had just cause to impose this form of discipline, and DSS does not argue it had

just cause for discipline less than dismissal but greater than this alternative. Thus, 

the adequacy of this discipline is not before us, and we express no opinion on it.

G. Attorney Fees

We do not reach DSS’s attorney fees argument. Pursuant to its authority, the 

ALJ ordered DSS to reimburse Ayers the cost of reasonable attorney fees. See

N.C.G.S. § 126-34.02(e) (2023) (“The Office of Administrative Hearings may award 

attorneys’ fees to an employee where reinstatement or back pay is ordered[.]”); see 

generally Rouse v. Forsyth Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 373 N.C. 400 (2020); see also 

Hunt v. N.C. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 266 N.C. App. 24, 32, disc. rev. denied, 373 N.C. 60

(2019) (“A[n] [ALJ’s] decision to grant attorneys’ fees is discretionary.”). DSS argues 

only that we should reverse the ALJ’s award of attorney fees based on the merits. 

Since we uphold the ALJ’s decision that Ayers prevails on the merits, we do not reach 

this argument. Id.

CONCLUSION
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Opinion of the Court

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Reviewing de novo, based on the individual facts and circumstances of this case 

as reflected in the ALJ’s findings of fact supported by substantial evidence, we 

conclude DSS failed to meet and carry its burden of proving it acted with just cause 

to dismiss Ayers. We affirm the ALJ’s final decision. 

AFFIRMED.

Judge TYSON concurs in result only.

Judge COLLINS dissents by separate opinion. 
No. COA23-420 – Ayers v. Currituck Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.

COLLINS, Judge, dissenting.

Petitioner was the supervisor for the Child Protective Services Unit at the 

Currituck County Department of Social Services (“DSS”). When responding to an 

inquiry from her supervisor, the DSS Director, as to what the racial demarcation 

“NR” meant on an intake form that had been completed by a social worker, Petitioner 

responded either “nigra rican” or “nigger rican.” Petitioner initially laughed about 

the comment but became apologetic and embarrassed soon afterward. The sole issue 

before this Court is whether Petitioner’s unacceptable personal conduct amounted to 

just cause for her dismissal. Because I believe Petitioner’s unacceptable personal 

conduct was just cause for dismissal, I dissent from the majority opinion.

This Court has articulated a three-part analytical approach to determine 

whether just cause exists to support a disciplinary action against a career State 

employee for alleged unacceptable personal conduct:

The proper analytical approach is to first determine 

whether the employee engaged in the conduct the employer 

alleges. The second inquiry is whether the employee’s 

conduct falls within one of the categories of unacceptable 

personal conduct provided by the Administrative Code. 

Unacceptable personal conduct does not necessarily 

establish just cause for all types of discipline. If the 

employee’s act qualifies as a type of unacceptable conduct, 

the tribunal proceeds to the third inquiry: whether that 

misconduct amounted to just cause for the disciplinary 

action taken.

Warren v. N.C. Dep’t of Crime Control & Pub. Safety, 221 N.C. App. 376, 383, 726 

S.E.2d 920, 925 (2012).
AYERS V. CURRITUCK CNTY. DEP’T OF SOC. SERVS.

Collins, J., dissenting

2

Here, there is no question that Petitioner engaged in the misconduct DSS 

alleged and that Petitioner’s misconduct falls within one of the categories of 

unacceptable personal conduct. The only issue is whether that unacceptable personal 

conduct amounted to just cause for her dismissal. 

“Just cause must be determined based upon an examination of the facts and 

circumstances of each individual case.” Wetherington v. N.C. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 270 

N.C. App. 161, 193, 840 S.E.2d 812, 834 (2020) (quoting N.C. Dep’t of Env’t & Nat. 

Res. v. Carroll, 358 N.C. 649, 669, 599 S.E.2d 888, 900 (2004)). In examining the facts 

and circumstances of each individual case, an “appropriate and necessary component” 

of a decision to impose discipline on a career State employee is the consideration of 

certain factors, including: “the severity of the violation, the subject matter involved, 

the resulting harm, the [career State employee’s] work history, or discipline imposed 

in other cases involving similar violations.” Wetherington v. N.C. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 

368 N.C. 583, 592, 780 S.E.2d 543, 548 (2015).

Taking the first two factors together, the violation is severe precisely because 

of the subject matter involved. “Far more than a ‘mere offensive utterance,’ the word 

‘nigger’ is pure anathema to African-Americans. ‘Perhaps no single act can more 

quickly alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working 

environment than the use of an unambiguously racial epithet such as ‘nigger’ . . . .” 

Spriggs v. Diamond Auto Glass, 242 F.3d 179, 185 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Rodgers 

v. Western-Southern Life Ins. Co., 12 F.3d 668, 675 (7th Cir. 1993)); see Granger v. 
AYERS V. CURRITUCK CNTY. DEP’T OF SOC. SERVS.

Collins, J., dissenting

3

Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, 197 N.C. App. 699, 706, 678 S.E.2d 715, 719 (2009) 

(quoting Spriggs).

Furthermore, the harm, both resulting15 and potential, was significant. 

Petitioner’s conduct eroded the Director’s trust in Petitioner’s motives and judgment. 

Petitioner’s conduct also negatively affected her African-American co-worker’s ability 

to trust Petitioner’s judgment and accept guidance from Petitioner. Moreover, DSS 

has policies prohibiting individuals from using demeaning or inappropriate terms or 

epithets and telling off-color jokes concerning race. DSS has a duty to enforce these 

policies, and to further its stated goal of supporting parents by respecting each 

family’s cultural, racial, ethnic, and religious heritage in their interactions with the 

family and the mutual establishment of goals. Finally, Petitioner’s unacceptable 

personal conduct exposed DSS to vulnerability for negligent retention and 

supervision liability and violated DSS’s compliance with the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 

see 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, et seq., which could jeopardize its receipt of federal funding.

There was no evidence in this case of discipline imposed in other cases 

involving similar violations in this or similar DSS offices. Thus, the fourth factor 

15 “No showing of actual harm is required to satisfy definition (5) of [unacceptable personal 

conduct], only a potential detrimental impact (whether conduct like the employee’s could potentially 

adversely affect the mission or legitimate interests of the State employer).” Hilliard v. N.C. Dep’t of 

Corr., 173 N.C. App. 594, 597, 620 S.E.2d 14, 17 (2005) (citing Eury v. Emp’t Sec. Comm’n, 115 N.C. 

App. 590, 610-11, 446 S.E.2d 383, 395-96, disc. review denied, 338 N.C. 309, 451 S.E.2d 635 (1994). 

The ALJ’s conclusion in this case that Petitioner’s unacceptable personal misconduct did not cause 

Respondent actual harm as a basis for concluding there was no just cause to dismiss Petitioner is 

thus erroneous.
AYERS V. CURRITUCK CNTY. DEP’T OF SOC. SERVS.

Collins, J., dissenting

4

need not be considered. See Wetherington, 270 N.C. App. at 189-90, 840 S.E.2d at 831 

(courts must consider “any factors for which evidence is presented”). Nonetheless, 

this case is similar to Granger, wherein an employee was dismissed for uttering a 

racial slur to a subordinate. 197 N.C. App. at 706-07, 678 S.E.2d at 719-20 (“By 

uttering this epithet in the workplace, where Petitioner was overheard by one of her 

subordinates, Petitioner undermined her authority and exposed Respondent to 

embarrassment and potential legal liability.”)

Although this appears to have been an isolated incident by Petitioner, a single 

act of unacceptable personal conduct can present just cause for any discipline, up to 

and including dismissal. See Hilliard, 173 N.C. App. at 597, 620 S.E.2d at 17 (“One 

act of [unacceptable personal conduct] presents ‘just cause’ for any discipline, up to 

and including dismissal.” (citations omitted)). When the facts and circumstances are 

considered together, I believe Petitioner’s unacceptable personal conduct was just 

cause for Petitioner’s dismissal. I would thus reverse the ALJ’s decision to award 

reinstatement and attorney’s fees and affirm DSS’s decision to terminate Petitioner.