United States Government Accountability Office 

GAO Report to Congressional Requesters 


September 2004  TRANSPORTATION 

SECURITY R&D 

TSA and DHS Are 

Researching and 

Developing 

Technologies, but 

Need to Improve R&D 

Management 

a
 GAO­04­890 

September 2004 

TRANSPORTATION SECURITY R&D 

TSA and DHS Are Researching and 

Highlights of GAO-04-890, a report to Developing Technologies, but Need to congressional requesters. Improve R&D Management 

Conducting research and For fiscal years 2003 and 2004, TSA and DHS funded over 200 R&D projects 

development (R&D) on designed to develop technologies for enhancing security in most modes of 

technologies for detecting, transportation. In fiscal year 2003, TSA spent 81 percent of its $21 million 

preventing, and mitigating terrorist transportation security R&D budget for aviation projects, and DHS spent threats is vital to enhancing the about half of its $26 million for projects related to more than one mode of 

security of the nation’s 

transportation system. Following transportation. In fiscal year 2004, TSA continued to budget most of its $159 

the September 11, 2001, terrorist million for aviation, and DHS also budgeted most of its $88 million for 

attacks, Congress enacted aviation, as shown in the table below. According to the National Research 

legislation to strengthen homeland Council, federal R&D programs should include some basic research, but TSA 

security, in part by enhancing R&D. and DHS do not appear to be funding any basic research for transportation 

The Transportation Security security. TSA and DHS have not estimated deployment dates for the vast 

Administration (TSA) and the majority of their R&D projects. Other federal agencies, such as the 

Department of Homeland Security Department of Transportation (DOT) and the National Aeronautics and 

(DHS) are the two federal agencies Space Administration, also funded some transportation security R&D 

with primary responsibility for projects. Several members of an expert panel on transportation security and 

transportation security. technology that GAO convened believed the distribution of R&D projects by 

GAO was asked to assess the transportation mode was reasonable, while others believed that aviation has 

transportation security R&D been overemphasized at the expense of maritime and land modes. 

projects that TSA, DHS, and other 

agencies have funded and assess TSA’s and DHS’s Transportation Security R&D Funding by Mode, Fiscal Years 2003 and 2004 

how TSA and DHS are managing 

their transportation security R&D Dollars in thousands 

TSA DHS programs according to applicable Transportation Fiscal year Fiscal year Fiscal year Fiscal year laws and best practices. mode 2003 2004 2003 

(obligated)/(%) (budgeted)/(%) (obligated)/(%) (budgeted)/(%) 

Aviation $17,101 (81.1) $126,487 (79.5) $3,709 (14.3) $63,240 (71.9) 

GAO is recommending that TSA 

Highway 

Maritime 

0 (0.0) 

0 (0.0) 

0 (0.0) 

9,350 (5.9) 

1,052 (4.1) 

3,474 (13.4) 

3,000 (3.4)

1,626 (1.8) 

and DHS improve their Multimodal 3,819 (18.1) 22,242 (14.0) 12,630 (48.8) 20,117 (22.9) 

transportation security R&D 

management by conducting some 

basic research, completing their 

strategic planning and risk 

assessment efforts, developing a 

management information system, 

and better coordinating with other 

federal agencies and reaching out 

to the transportation industry. 

DHS, TSA, and DOT generally 

agreed with the report’s findings 

and recommendations. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-890. 

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Kate Siggerud 

at (202) 512-2834 or siggerudk@gao.gov. 

Pipeline 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 

Rail 169 (0.8) 1,096 (0.7) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 

Transit 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 5,000 (19.3) 0 (0.0) 

Total $21,089 (100.0) $159,175 (100.0) $25,865 (100.0) $87,983 (100.0) 

Source: GAO analysis of TSA and DHS data. 

TSA and DHS have made some progress in managing their transportation 

security R&D programs according to applicable laws and R&D best 

practices, but neither agency has fully complied with the laws or 

implemented the best practices. For example, neither agency has prepared a 

strategic plan for R&D that contains measurable objectives. In addition, 

although TSA has completed threat assessments for all modes, it has not 

completed vulnerability and criticality assessments. DHS also has not 

completed risk assessments of the infrastructure sectors. Furthermore, both 

TSA and DHS lack complete, consolidated data for managing their R&D 

projects. Finally, although TSA and DHS have made some efforts to 

coordinate R&D with other federal agencies, their outreach to consider the 

concerns of the transportation industry has been limited. 

2004 
Contents 


Letter 


Results in Brief 


Background 


TSA, DHS, and Others Are Funding Transportation Security R&D 


Projects and Experts Had Mixed Views about Some Projects 

TSA and DHS Have Made Some Progress in Managing Their R&D 

Programs but Have Not Yet Fully Completed Their Efforts 

Conclusions 

Recommendations for Executive Action 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 

1 

3 

7 

12 

29 

43 

45 

45 

Appendixes 

Appendix I: 

Appendix II: 

Appendix III: 

Appendix IV: 

Appendix V: 

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology  51 


Industry Is Independently Developing New and Emerging 


Transportation Security Technologies  54 


GAO’s Panel of Transportation Security and Technology 


Experts  56 


Comments from the Department of Homeland Security  58 


GAO Comments 63 


GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments  64 


GAO Contacts 64 


Staff Acknowledgments 64 


Tables
	 Table 1: 

Table 2: 

Table 3: 

Table 4: 

Table 5: 

TSA’s and DHS’s Transportation Security R&D Funding by 


Mode, Fiscal Years 2003 and 2004 4 


TSA’s Transportation Security R&D Funding by Mode, 


Fiscal Years 2003 and 2004 14 


DHS’s Transportation Security R&D Funding by Mode, 


Fiscal Years 2003 and 2004 22 


DOT’s Transportation Security R&D Funding by Mode, 


Fiscal Years 2003 and 2004 26 


TSA’s and DHS’s Implementation of Statutory 


Requirements and Best Practices for Managing Their R&D 


Programs 30 


Figures
	 Figure 1: Major Events in the Establishment of TSA and DHS 9 

Figure 2: A Walk-through Explosives Trace Detection Portal 16 

Page i  GAO­04­890 Transportation Security R&D 
Contents 

Figure 3: Distribution of TSA’s R&D Funding by Phase, Fiscal Years 

2003 and 2004 20 

Figure 4: Photograph of a MANPADS 23 

Figure 5: A Mobile Search X-ray Inspection System for Detecting 

Truck Bombs 24 

Figure 6: Distribution of DHS’s R&D Funding by Phase, Fiscal 

Years 2003 and 2004 25 

Abbreviations 

CAPPS II Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System II 


DHS Department of Homeland Security 


DOE Department of Energy 


DOT Department of Transportation 


FAA Federal Aviation Administration 


FHWA Federal Highway Administration 


HSARPA Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency 


MANPADS man-portable air defense systems 


NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration 


R&D research and development 


TRIP Transit and Rail Inspection Pilot 


TSA Transportation Security Administration 


TSWG Technical Support Working Group 


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Page ii  GAO­04­890 Transportation Security R&D 
Page 1  GAO­04­890 Transportation Security R&D 

A
 United States Government Accountability Office 

Washington, D.C. 20548 

September 30, 2004 

Congressional Requesters: 

Researching and developing technologies to detect, prevent, and mitigate 

terrorist threats is vital to enhancing the security of the nation’s 

transportation system. Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, 

Congress enacted legislation to strengthen homeland security, in part by 

enhancing research and development (R&D) for transportation security— 

especially for aviation. The recent bombings of the rail system in Madrid, 

Spain, have heightened concern about the security of all modes of 

transportation in the United States, and concern is growing in Congress 

about whether the Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) and the 

Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) efforts to counter terrorist 

threats to the nation’s transportation systems are proceeding fast enough 

and are focused on the appropriate technologies. 

To enhance the nation’s transportation security, including its R&D 

capabilities, in November 2001, Congress enacted the Aviation and 

Transportation Security Act, which created TSA within the Department of 

Transportation (DOT) and made TSA responsible for security in all modes 

of transportation (aviation, highway, maritime, pipeline, rail, and transit). 

The Homeland Security Act of 2002, passed a year later, established DHS; 

transferred TSA and many other federal agencies to DHS; and made DHS 

responsible for homeland security, including transportation security. The 

act specified, however, that TSA would remain a distinct entity within DHS 

until November 25, 2004. Both laws authorized funding for homeland and 

transportation security R&D and established requirements for its 

management, including requirements for planning and coordination, but 

neither law includes deadlines for implementing these requirements. As 

you requested, we are reporting on 

•
	 the transportation security R&D projects that TSA, DHS, and other 

agencies funded in fiscal year 2003 and have budgeted for in fiscal year 

2004; the status of these projects; and experts’ views on the 

reasonableness of the distribution of these projects by mode and 

•
	 the extent to which TSA and DHS are managing their transportation 

security R&D programs according to applicable laws and best practices 

recommended by the National Academy of Sciences and the National 

Research Council. 

Page 1  GAO­04­890 Transportation Security R&D 
In addition, we are reporting on some new and emerging technologies for 

screening passengers, baggage, and cargo (see app. II). For this review, we 

considered transportation security R&D to encompass the research, 

development, testing, and evaluation of technologies to protect the nation’s 

transportation system from terrorist attacks or major crimes. The 

transportation system consists largely of (1) infrastructure, such as 

airports, seaports, border crossings, rail stations, transit stations, 

highways, bridges, tunnels, and pipelines, and (2) vehicles, such as aircraft, 

ships, ferry boats, trucks, buses, automobiles, and trains. We refer to the 

key modes of transportation as aviation, highways, maritime, pipeline, rail 

(passenger and freight), and transit (buses and subways). Because TSA and 

DHS each has its own R&D portfolio, we discuss the two agencies’ 

transportation security-related R&D programs separately in this report. 

When we discuss TSA’s R&D portfolio, we include projects funded by TSA’s 

Office of Security Technologies, Office of Maritime and Land Security, and 

Office of Aviation Operations. Our discussion of DHS’s transportation 

security R&D portfolio includes projects funded by DHS’s Science and 

Technology Directorate, U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection, and U.S. Secret Service. 

To describe the types of transportation security R&D projects that TSA and 

DHS are funding in fiscal year 2003 and plan to fund in fiscal year 2004, we 

analyzed detailed information on their transportation security R&D 

projects. Detailed information on the transportation security R&D projects 

that TSA and DHS plan to fund in fiscal year 2005 was not yet available. 

Although TSA and DHS are the primary federal agencies responsible for 

conducting transportation security R&D, DOT and the National 

Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) also fund some 

transportation security R&D projects, and we included information on 

those agencies’ projects in this report. We discussed the reliability of 

project and budgetary information with TSA and DHS officials and 

determined that the data they provided were sufficiently reliable for us to 

complete our review. To determine the extent to which TSA and DHS are 

managing their transportation security R&D programs according to 

applicable laws and best practices, we analyzed applicable legal 

requirements for TSA and DHS and best practices for managing R&D 

identified by the National Academy of Sciences and the National Research 

Council; analyzed documentation relating to both agencies’ programs; and 

interviewed TSA and DHS officials about their strategic planning and risk 

management. We also interviewed TSA and DHS officials, as well as other 

stakeholders, about the agencies’ coordination with other federal agencies 

and outreach to technology providers and the transportation industry. To 

Page 2  GAO­04­890 Transportation Security R&D 
help evaluate the reasonableness of the distribution of transportation 

security R&D funding by mode and the challenges that TSA and DHS are 

facing in managing their programs, we convened a panel of transportation 

security and technology experts on March 2, 2004. At our request, the 

National Research Council selected the experts, who were affiliated with 

state transportation departments, universities, national laboratories, 

private industry, and other organizations and were knowledgeable about 

transportation security technologies. 

We conducted our review at TSA, DHS, and DOT in Washington, D.C.; at 

TSA’s Transportation Security Laboratory in Atlantic City, New Jersey; and 

at the Department of Energy’s (DOE) National Laboratories in Los Alamos, 

New Mexico, and Oak Ridge, Tennessee. Appendix I contains detailed 

information about our scope and methodology, and appendix III lists the 

transportation security and technology experts who assisted us in our 

review. We conducted our review from July 2003 through September 2004 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Results in Brief
	 TSA and DHS are funding transportation security R&D projects that are 

aimed at developing technologies to enhance security in most modes of 

transportation. For fiscal years 2003 and 2004, TSA funded 146 

transportation security R&D projects, and DHS funded 56 projects. As 

shown in table 1, in fiscal year 2003, TSA spent about $21 million on 

transportation security R&D projects and budgeted about $159 million for 

fiscal year 2004. In both years, TSA spent or budgeted most of its R&D 

funding for aviation security. TSA’s funding for aviation security R&D 

increased from about $17 million in fiscal year 2003 to about $126 million 

for fiscal year 2004, partly because of an appropriation of $55 million for air 

cargo security R&D. Also as shown in table 1, in fiscal year 2003, DHS spent 

about $26 million on transportation security R&D projects and budgeted 

about $88 million for fiscal year 2004. In contrast to TSA, in fiscal year 2003, 

DHS spent almost $13 million, or about 49 percent, of its R&D funding on 

projects related to more than one mode. However, similar to TSA, for fiscal 

year 2004, DHS budgeted the majority of its R&D funding for aviation 

security, increasing the amount from about $4 million in fiscal year 2003 to 

about $63 million. The majority of this increase is for a program to develop 

technical countermeasures to minimize the threat posed to commercial 

aircraft by shoulder-fired missiles, also known as man-portable air defense 

systems. 

Page 3  GAO­04­890 Transportation Security R&D 
Table 1: TSA’s and DHS’s Transportation Security R&D Funding by Mode, Fiscal Years 2003 and 2004 

Dollars in thousands 

TSA DHS 

Fiscal year 2003 Fiscal year 2004 Fiscal year 2003 Fiscal year 2004 

Mode (obligated) /(%) (budgeted)/(%) (obligated)/(%) (budgeted)/(%) 

Aviation $17,101 (81.1) $126,487 (79.5) $3,709 (14.3) $63,240 (71.9) 

Highway 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 1,052 (4.1) 3,000 (3.4) 

Maritime 0 (0.0) 9,350 (5.9) 3,474 (13.4) 1,626 (1.8) 

Multimodal 3,819 (18.1) 22,242 (14.0) 12,630 (48.8) 20,117 (22.9) 

Pipeline 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 

Rail 169 (0.8) 1,096 (0.7) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 

Transit 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 5,000 (19.3) 0 (0.0) 

Total $21,089 (100.0) $159,175 (100.0) $25,865 (100.0) $87,983 (100.0) 

Source: GAO analysis of TSA and DHS data. 

Note: The figures in this table represent transportation security R&D projects funded by TSA’s Office of 

Security Technologies. Other TSA offices also funded several transportation security R&D projects in 

fiscal years 2003 and 2004, such as Operation Safe Commerce, the Computer Assisted Passenger 

Prescreening System II, and the Transportation Worker Identification Credential program. However, 

TSA was not able to provide us with funding information for these projects. 

Although TSA and DHS have not decided what additional projects they will 

fund in fiscal year 2005 and beyond, the President’s fiscal year 2005 budget 

requests $154 million for TSA’s R&D program and about $1 billion for DHS’s 

Science and Technology Directorate, which includes some transportation 

security R&D.1

 DOT spent $8 million in fiscal year 2003 and has budgeted 

about $31 million for transportation security R&D projects during fiscal 

year 2004. For example, in 2003, DOT spent about $2 million to develop and 

field-test a system to track trailers containing hazardous materials when 

they are not attached to a tractor; for fiscal year 2004, it budgeted $20 

million to develop a secure information network to share air traffic control 

information with DHS and others. NASA did not fund any transportation 

security R&D projects in fiscal year 2003, but it has budgeted about $18 

million for aviation security R&D projects during fiscal year 2004. Although 

the National Research Council has stated that federal R&D programs 

should include some basic research, project information provided by TSA 

and DHS did not show that any of the transportation security R&D projects 

1

The President’s fiscal year 2005 budget request for TSA’s R&D program is for R&D in TSA’s 

Office of Security Technologies only and does not include R&D in other TSA offices, such as 

the Office of Maritime and Land Security and the Office of Aviation Operations. 

Page 4  GAO­04­890 Transportation Security R&D 
funded in fiscal year 2003 and budgeted for in fiscal year 2004 were in the 

basic research phase. TSA and DHS also have not estimated deployment 

dates for the vast majority of the projects that they funded in fiscal years 

2003 and 2004. Of the 24 projects for which the two agencies were able to 

estimate deployment dates, 8 are scheduled for deployment as early as this 

fiscal year, and the remaining 16 are scheduled for deployment during fiscal 

years 2005 to 2014. According to a TSA official, deployment dates are not 

always predictable because deployment is dependent on other factors, 

such as funding for purchasing and installing equipment. Several members 

of our panel of transportation security and technology experts believed 

that the distribution of R&D projects by transportation mode was 

reasonable, while others believed that aviation has been overemphasized at 

the expense of maritime and land modes. Finally, some panelists also 

questioned whether some projects should be funded. 

TSA and DHS have made some progress in managing their transportation 

security R&D programs according to applicable laws and R&D best 

practices, but they have not fully complied with these laws or implemented 

best practices. For example: 

•
	 The Homeland Security Act requires DHS to prepare a strategic plan 

that identifies goals and includes annual measurable objectives for 

coordinating the federal government’s civilian efforts in developing 

countermeasures to terrorist threats. Similarly, the National Research 

Council has indicated that research programs should be described in 

strategic and performance plans and evaluated in performance reports. 

TSA and DHS have prepared strategic plans for their agencies, and TSA 

has prepared a strategic plan for its R&D program, but these plans do 

not contain measurable objectives for tracking the progress of projects. 

According to DHS officials, the department is preparing a separate 

strategic plan for its R&D program that will include more specific goals 

and measurable objectives. 

•
	 The Aviation and Transportation Security Act requires TSA to use risk 

management principles in making its R&D funding decisions. 

Furthermore, under the Homeland Security Act, DHS is required to 

prepare comprehensive assessments of the vulnerabilities of the 

nation’s key resources and critical infrastructure sectors, which include 

transportation. Although both TSA and DHS have established processes 

to select and prioritize R&D projects that include risk management 

principles, they have not yet completed vulnerability and criticality 

assessments, which we have identified as key elements of a risk 

Page 5  GAO­04­890 Transportation Security R&D 
management approach, for all modes of transportation.2

 In the absence 

of completed risk assessments, for example, TSA and DHS officials are 

using available threat intelligence, expert judgment, and information 

about past terrorist incidents to select and prioritize their R&D projects. 

•
	 The National Research Council has emphasized the need for R&D 

programs to have adequate databases that will provide managers with 

key project management information. TSA’s and DHS’s R&D managers 

were not able to provide us with complete information on all projects in 

their R&D portfolios. For example, for the 146 projects that it funded in 

2003 and 2004, TSA was not able to provide information on anticipated 

deployment dates for 91 percent of these projects, the current phase of 

development for 49 percent, and the amounts obligated and/or budgeted 

for 8 percent. DHS was not able to provide information on anticipated 

deployment dates for 68 percent of its projects, the current phase of 

development for 14 percent, and the amounts obligated and budgeted 

for 9 percent. Although the National Research Council has stated that 

federal R&D programs should include some basic research, project 

information provided by TSA and DHS did not show that any of the 

transportation security R&D projects that they funded in fiscal year 2003 

and budgeted for in fiscal year 2004 were in the basic research phase. 

•
	 The Aviation and Transportation Security Act and the Homeland 

Security Act require TSA and DHS to coordinate their R&D efforts with 

those of other government agencies. Similarly, the Transportation 

Research Board, a division of the National Research Council, indicates 

that while TSA should have its own analysis and research capability, it 

should also coordinate with the transportation sector, the federal 

government, and the science and technology community. Although TSA 

and DHS have made some efforts to coordinate R&D with each other 

and with other federal agencies, their coordination with DOT has been 

limited. Specifically, officials from the modal administrations of DOT, 

which continue to conduct some transportation security R&D, said that 

they had not provided any input into TSA’s and DHS’s transportation 

security R&D project selections, nor had TSA or DHS provided any input 

into DOT’s transportation security R&D project selections. In addition, 

TSA’s and DHS’s outreach to the transportation industry has been 

limited. An air cargo association official said that TSA contacted his 

2

GAO, Homeland Security: Key Elements of a Risk Management Approach, GAO-02-150T 

(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 12, 2001). 

Page 6  GAO­04­890 Transportation Security R&D 
association about the air cargo industry’s security R&D needs. However, 

most transportation officials we interviewed said that TSA and DHS had 

not contacted them about their security R&D needs. Consequently, the 

transportation industry’s security R&D needs may not be adequately 

reflected in TSA’s and DHS’s R&D portfolios. 

We recognize that TSA and DHS are relatively new agencies that are 

operating in a changing environment. However, until TSA and DHS prepare 

R&D strategic plans with measurable objectives and complete all of their 

risk assessments, Congress and other stakeholders will not have a reliable 

means of assessing TSA’s and DHS’s progress toward achieving their R&D 

goals or determining whether the millions of dollars that are being invested 

in transportation security R&D projects are being spent cost-effectively and 

address the highest transportation security risks. We are recommending 

that TSA and DHS (1) conduct some basic research, (2) complete their 

strategic planning and risk assessment efforts, (3) develop a management 

information system, and (4) better coordinate with other federal agencies 

and reach out to the transportation industry. We provided TSA, DHS, and 

DOT with draft copies of this report for their review and comment. DHS 

and TSA generally concurred with the draft report’s findings and 

recommendations, agreed that the recommendations are key to a 

successful R&D program, and commented that they would continue to 

evaluate their R&D processes in light of the report’s findings and 

recommendations. However, DHS believed that the report did not 

sufficiently recognize recent changes that have taken place, particularly at 

TSA. In particular, DHS said that TSA has made great strides in defining 

R&D projects and linking them to mission needs and identified gaps. In 

response to these and other technical comments that DHS provided, we 

have made changes to the report as appropriate. DOT agreed with our 

findings and a recommendation that to improve R&D coordination, a 

memorandum of agreement that defines roles and responsibilities be 

developed between it and DHS. DOT also provided some technical 

comments, which we incorporated where appropriate. See appendix IV for 

DHS’s comments and our responses. 

Background
	 The nation’s transportation system is vast and complex, consisting of about 

3.9 million miles of roads, over 100,000 miles of rail, almost 600,000 bridges, 

over 300 ports, over 2 million miles of pipeline, about 500 train stations, and 

over 5,000 public-use airports. The size of the transportation system, which 

moves millions of passengers and tons of freight every day, makes it both 

an attractive target for terrorists and difficult to secure. Moreover, 

Page 7  GAO­04­890 Transportation Security R&D 
transportation systems can be used as weapons themselves as was done on 

September 11, 2001. 

As we indicated in our June 2003 report on transportation security 

challenges,

3

 transportation experts, state and local governments, and 

industry representatives generally believe that investing in transportation 

security R&D is the federal government’s responsibility. After the 

September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, Congress enacted legislation that 

resulted in changes in the federal organization and funding for 

transportation security R&D. In November 2001, the Aviation and 

Transportation Security Act created TSA within DOT and transferred the 

Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) aviation security R&D program to 

TSA. The act also required TSA to meet a December 31, 2002, deadline for 

deploying explosives detection systems to screen all checked baggage. One 

year later, the Homeland Security Act created DHS and transferred TSA 

from DOT to DHS. This legislation also transferred to DHS several other 

agencies that conducted transportation security R&D, including the U.S. 

Customs Service (now part of U.S. Customs and Border Protection) and the 

U.S. Secret Service from the Department of the Treasury and the U.S. Coast 

Guard from DOT.

4

 In addition, the Homeland Security Act extended the 

deadline for deploying new checked baggage screening equipment for 

certain airports to December 31, 2003, and transferred certain chemical and 

biological research programs that have potential transportation security 

applications from the Department of Defense and DOE to DHS. Although 

TSA and DHS have their own research facilities, most of their 

transportation security R&D is conducted by contractors. Figure 1 

identifies major events in the establishment of TSA and DHS. 

3

GAO, Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Help Address Security 

Challenges, GAO-03-843 (Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2003). 

4

Under the Homeland Security Act, the Secret Service and Coast Guard remained distinct 

entities within DHS. The Secret Service and Coast Guard portfolio managers said that DHS’s 

Science and Technology Directorate does not direct the types of transportation security 

R&D projects that they conduct. 

Page 8  GAO­04­890 Transportation Security R&D 
Figure 1: Major Events in the Establishment of TSA and DHS 

2001 

2002 

September 11, 2001: Terrorist attacks on New York City and 

Washington, D.C. 

March 1, 2003: Start of DHS's operations, including transfer of TSA 

and 21 other agencies to DHS. 

December 31, 2002: Deadline in the Aviation and Transportation Security Act for TSA to 

have explosives detection systems in place at airports to screen all checked baggage.a 

November 19, 2001: Enactment of the Aviation and Transportation Security 

Act, creating TSA and transferring FAA's security R&D program to TSA. 

2003 

2004 

2005 

Nov 

Oct 

Nov 

Sept 

Dec 

Nov 

Dec 

Mar 

2005: Fiscal year by which DHS plans to meet the Homeland Security Act of 2002 requirement 

to integrate the department's R&D. 

November 25, 2002: Enactment of the Homeland Security Act of 2002. 

November 25, 2004: Date until which TSA is required by the 

Homeland Security Act of 2002 to remain a distinct entity within DHS's 

Border and Transportation Security Directorate. 

Sources: Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Homeland Security Act of 2002, and DHS. 

a

This deadline was extended to December 31, 2003, by the Homeland Security Act. 

Under the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, TSA is required to 

• secure all modes of transportation; 

•
	 coordinate transportation security countermeasures with other federal 

government agencies; and 

•
	 accelerate the research, development, testing, and evaluation of 

explosives detection technology for checked baggage and of new 

technology to screen for threats in carry-on items and other items being 

loaded onto aircraft, including cargo, and on persons. 

Page 9  GAO­04­890 Transportation Security R&D 
TSA’s Office of Security Technologies is responsible for the research, 

development, testing, and deployment of security technology 

countermeasures employed to protect the transportation system against 

criminal and terrorist threats. It organizes its R&D projects according to 

the different approaches through which threats can reach a target, such as 

on a person; in carry-on items, vehicles, checked baggage, or cargo; or 

through access points at airports or at marine ports. The Office of Security 

Technologies operates the Transportation Security Laboratory, located in 

Atlantic City, New Jersey, which conducts transportation security R&D and 

tests products submitted by potential vendors for compliance with TSA 

standards. 

Although FAA’s aviation security R&D program was moved to TSA and TSA 

has since initiated R&D related to other modes of transportation, several 

DOT administrations5

 conducted transportation security R&D before TSA 

was created and continue to do so. However, security is not the primary 

focus of DOT’s R&D programs. 

The Homeland Security Act brought 22 separate federal agencies under 

DHS’s umbrella and provided a framework for organizing DHS into five 

directorates, giving the Science and Technology Directorate responsibility 

for DHS’s research, development, testing, and evaluation activities and the 

Border and Transportation Security Directorate responsibility for security 

along the nation’s borders and in all modes of transportation. The act also 

requires TSA to remain a distinct entity within the Border and 

Transportation Security Directorate until November 25, 2004. 

Consequently, TSA’s R&D program office—the Office of Security 

Technologies—currently operates outside of DHS’s Science and 

Technology Directorate. 

Under the Homeland Security Act, DHS’s Information Analysis and 

Infrastructure Protection Directorate is required to prepare risk 

assessments of the nation’s key resources and critical infrastructure,

6 

5

These include the Federal Aviation Administration, the Federal Highway Administration, 

the Federal Motor Carriers’ Safety Administration, the Federal Railroad Administration, the 

Federal Transit Administration, and the Research and Special Programs Administration. 

6

The Homeland Security Act refers to the USA Patriot Act for a definition of critical 

infrastructure, which defines it as systems and assets that are so vital to the United States 

that their incapacity or destruction would have a debilitating impact on security, national 

economic security, or national public health or safety. See Pub.L. No. 107-56, § 1016(e) 

(2001). 

Page 10  GAO­04­890 Transportation Security R&D 
which includes transportation. In addition, the Homeland Security Act 

requires the Science and Technology Directorate to 

•
	 coordinate with the appropriate executive branch agencies in 

developing and carrying out the science and technology agenda of the 

department to reduce duplication and identify unmet needs; 

•
	 accelerate the prototyping and development of technologies to address 

homeland security vulnerabilities; and 

•
	 coordinate and integrate all research, development, demonstration, 

testing, and evaluation activities of the department. 

The Science and Technology Directorate’s programs are organized by the 

type of threat (e.g., chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, cyber, and 

high explosives) or by the end-users of the technologies within and outside 

of DHS (e.g., borders and transportation, critical infrastructure protection, 

and emergency preparedness and response). The directorate’s four offices, 

as discussed below, are involved in conducting, coordinating, or soliciting 

some transportation-security-related R&D projects. 

•
	 The Office of Programs, Plans, and Budgets establishes overall 

priorities, oversees R&D activities across the Science and Technology 

Directorate, and provides policy guidance for the directorate’s 

interactions with other DHS components. The office is organized into 

R&D portfolios that are focused on various types of terrorist threats or 

DHS components. The portfolios involving transportation-security	 

related R&D include Border and Transportation Security, High 

Explosives Countermeasures, Biological and Chemical 

Countermeasures, Radiological and Nuclear Countermeasures, the 

Coast Guard, and the Secret Service. 

•
	 The Office of Research and Development executes research, 

development, testing, and evaluation of technologies at DOE and other 

federal laboratories; supports university and fellowship programs; and 

provides an R&D capability dedicated to homeland security. 

•
	 The Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency 

(HSARPA) serves as the department’s R&D external funding arm by 

Page 11  GAO­04­890 Transportation Security R&D 
engaging industry, academia, government, and other sectors in R&D, 

rapid prototyping,7

 and technology transfer. 

•
	 The Office of Systems Engineering and Development takes 

technologies developed by the Office of Research and Development or 

HSARPA and prepares deployment strategies to transfer technologies to 

federal, state, and/or local government users. 

TSA, DHS, and Others 

Are Funding 

Transportation 

Security R&D Projects 

and Experts Had Mixed 

Views about Some 

Projects 

As the primary federal agencies responsible for enhancing the security of 

all modes of transportation, in fiscal year 2003, TSA spent about $21 million 

and DHS spent about $26 million on transportation security R&D projects; 

for fiscal year 2004, TSA and DHS have budgeted about $159 million and 

$88 million, respectively. In addition, DOT spent about $8 million on 

transportation security R&D projects in fiscal year 2003 and has budgeted 

about $31 million for fiscal year 2004. NASA did not fund any 

transportation security R&D projects in fiscal year 2003 but has budgeted 

about $18 million for aviation security R&D projects during fiscal year 

2004. TSA and DHS were not able to estimate deployment dates for the vast 

majority of projects that they funded in fiscal years 2003 and 2004. 

Although TSA and DHS have not decided what additional projects they will 

fund in fiscal year 2005 and beyond, the President’s fiscal year 2005 budget 

requests $154 million for TSA’s R&D program and about $1 billion for the 

Science and Technology Directorate, which includes some transportation 

security R&D.8

 Overall, members of our panel of transportation security 

and technology experts had mixed views about the reasonableness of the 

distribution of transportation security R&D projects by mode and raised 

questions about the types of projects that were funded and not funded by 

TSA and DHS. 

TSA Has Used a Majority of 

Its R&D Funding for 

Aviation Security 

Overall, TSA increased its funding for transportation security R&D from 

$21 million in fiscal year 2003 to $159 million in fiscal year 2004, as shown 

in table 2. Although TSA is responsible for addressing the security needs of 

7

Rapid prototyping is a process that uses computer-aided design and fabrication to create 

and build a prototype more quickly than through traditional means. 

8

The President’s fiscal year 2005 budget request for TSA’s R&D program is for R&D in TSA’s 

Office of Security Technologies only and does not include R&D in other TSA offices, such as 

the Office of Maritime and Land Security and the Office of Aviation Operations. 

Page 12  GAO­04­890 Transportation Security R&D 
all modes of transportation, in fiscal year 2003, TSA spent about $17 

million, or about 81 percent, of its R&D funding for projects related to 

aviation security. For fiscal year 2004, TSA has budgeted about $126 million 

on aviation security, or about 79 percent of its R&D budget. This increase 

reflects, in part, a $55 million appropriation for R&D related to air cargo 

screening. According to TSA, it has spent the majority of its R&D funding 

on aviation security because aviation was the greatest concern following 

the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and because Congress directed 

TSA to use R&D funding to enhance aviation security. In fiscal year 2004, 

TSA increased its budget for multimodal R&D projects from about $4 

million in fiscal year 2003 to about $22 million. This increase is due, in part, 

to a $5.6 million increase for the Manhattan II project9

 and about $6.4 

million for development of a walk-through trace portal for detecting 

explosives on aviation, maritime, and rail passengers. In fiscal year 2004, 

TSA also increased its budget for rail security R&D projects from $169,000 

in fiscal year 2003 to about $1.1 million. This increase reflects the $1.1 

million that was budgeted for the Transit and Rail Inspection Pilot (TRIP).

10 

TSA also increased maritime security R&D funding from zero in fiscal year 

2003 to about $9 million in fiscal year 2004; this increase is due, in part, to 

$3.6 million for a project to develop equipment to screen vehicles on 

ferries. Finally, TSA did not spend any money for highway, pipeline, or 

transit R&D projects. Several members of our panel of transportation 

security and technology experts commented that R&D for rail and transit 

security warrants additional funding. Congress is considering legislation to 

increase funding for these as well as other modes of transportation in fiscal 

year 2005. For example, the Rail Security Act, S. 2273, which has been 

passed by the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and 

Transportation, would authorize $50 million in each of fiscal years 2005 and 

2006 for an R&D program for improving freight and intercity passenger rail 

security. 

9

Manhattan II is TSA’s long-term approach for improving checked baggage screening 

systems for aviation as well as maritime and land modes. This program seeks to achieve 

revolutionary improvements in detection capability and operational efficiency in 5 to 10 

years using new screening technologies. TSA plans to award this project’s first “proof of 

concept” grants in the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2004. 

10TRIP is intended to assess the feasibility of the screening of people and their carry-on 

baggage traveling on U.S. trains. 

Page 13  GAO­04­890 Transportation Security R&D 
Table 2: TSA’s Transportation Security R&D Funding by Mode, Fiscal Years 2003 and 

2004 

Dollars in thousands 

Fiscal year 2003 Fiscal year 2004 

Mode Obligated Percent Budgeted Percent 

Aviation $17,101 81.1 $126,487 

Highway 0 0.0 0 

Maritime 0 0.0 9,350 

Multimodal 3,819 18.1 22,242 

Pipeline 0 0.0 0 

Rail 169 0.8 1,096 

Transit 0 0.0 0 

Total $21,089 100.0 $159,175 100.0 

Source: GAO analysis of TSA data. 

Note: The figures in this table represent transportation security R&D projects funded by TSA’s Office of 

Security Technologies. Other TSA offices also funded several transportation security R&D projects in 

fiscal years 2003 and 2004, such as Operation Safe Commerce, the Computer Assisted Passenger 

Prescreening System II, and the Transportation Worker Identification Credential program. However, 

TSA was not able to provide us with funding information for these projects. 

Aviation Security R&D Projects In fiscal years 2003 and 2004, TSA spent or budgeted R&D funds for 

Funded by TSA projects in several aviation security program areas, including the following: 

•
	 Aviation Checked Baggage: To improve the detection capability and 

operational efficiency of its current checked baggage-screening 

program, TSA has both near-term (1 to 3 years) and long-term R&D 

programs. To date, TSA has spent most of its checked baggage screening 

R&D funds on the near-term programs. In fiscal year 2003, it obligated 

about $12 million, and, for fiscal year 2004, it budgeted about $27 million 

for near-term activities; whereas for long-term activities under the 

Manhattan II project, it obligated $75,000 in fiscal year 2003 and has 

budgeted $5.6 million for fiscal year 2004. Most of the near-term 

activities are to develop next-generation checked baggage screening 

equipment through the Phoenix project, which is funded jointly by 

government and industry. As part of the Phoenix project, in September 

2003, TSA awarded $9.4 million to enter into five cooperative 

agreements with private sector firms to enhance existing systems and 

develop new screening technologies. For example, in fiscal year 2003, 

TSA spent almost $2.4 million to have a contractor develop a new 

Page 14  GAO­04­890 Transportation Security R&D 

79.5 

0.0 

5.9 

14.0 

0.0 

0.7 

0.0 
computed tomography explosives detection system11 that is smaller and 

lighter than systems currently deployed in airport lobbies. The new 

system is intended to replace the systems currently placed in airport 

lobbies, including both larger, heavier explosives detection systems and 

explosives trace detection equipment. The smaller size of the system 

creates opportunities for TSA to transfer screening operations to other 

locations, such as airport check-in counters. TSA expects to certify this 

equipment later this year. TSA is also working with a contractor to 

integrate technologies, such as quadrupole resonance,12 with its 

existing explosives detection systems to improve processing speed and 

detection capability and to reduce false alarm rates and human 

resource requirements. 

•
	 Aviation Checkpoint: To address the limitations of its current metal 

detectors for screening passengers and of X-ray machines for screening 

carry-on baggage, TSA, in fiscal year 2003, obligated about $1 million 

and has budgeted $18 million for fiscal year 2004. For example, during 

the summer of 2004, TSA installed and began testing explosives trace 

detection portals at four airports and had scheduled to test the portal at 

a fifth airport in the near future. Passengers who enter a checkpoint lane 

with a trace portal machine will proceed through the metal detector 

while their carry-on baggage is being screened by X-ray. Each passenger 

will then be asked to step into the trace portal and to stand still for a few 

seconds while several quick puffs of air are released, as shown in figure 

2. The portal will analyze the air for traces of explosives as the 

passenger walks through, and a computerized voice will tell the 

passenger when to exit the portal. 

11A computed tomography explosives detection system uses an X-ray source that rotates 

around a bag, obtaining a large number of cross-sectional images that are integrated by a 

computer, which displays the densities of objects in the bag. The system automatically 

triggers an alarm when objects with high densities, which are characteristic of explosives, 

are detected. 

12Quadrupole resonance uses radio frequency pulses to probe bags by eliciting unique 

responses from explosives based on their chemical characteristics. 

Page 15  GAO­04­890 Transportation Security R&D 
Figure 2: A Walk-through Explosives Trace Detection Portal 

Source: Smiths Detection. 

To help focus its screening resources on the highest risk passengers, in 

fiscal years 2003 and 2004, TSA worked to develop the Computer 

Assisted Passenger Prescreening System II (CAPPS II).13 CAPPS II is 

intended to identify terrorists and other high-risk individuals before 

they board commercial airplanes. Originally, TSA intended to conduct a 

risk assessment of each passenger using national security information, 

commercial databases, and information provided by the passenger 

during the reservation process—specifically, the passenger’s name, 

13TSA was not able to tell us how much it had obligated and budgeted for CAPPS II in fiscal 

years 2003 and 2004, respectively. 

Page 16  GAO­04­890 Transportation Security R&D 
date of birth, home address, and home telephone number. In our 

February 2004 report on CAPPS II, we found that TSA was behind 

schedule in testing and developing initial increments of CAPPS II and 

had not yet completely addressed other issues, including concerns 

about privacy and the accuracy of the data used for CAPPS II.

14 In 

August 2004, a DHS official said that DHS was revising the program 

with an emphasis on fully protecting passengers’ privacy and civil 

liberties. 

•	 Aviation Cargo: To enhance the security of the nation’s air cargo 

system, TSA obligated about $700,000 in fiscal year 2003 for cargo 

security R&D and has budgeted about $53 million for fiscal year 2004. 

For example, as part of its Air Cargo Strategic Plan, TSA plans to 

develop a prescreening system to identify high-risk cargo and to work 

with the appropriate stakeholders to ensure that all such cargo is 

inspected. To complete its inspection of high-risk cargo, TSA has a 

number of R&D projects, one of which is a project budgeted at $19.5 

million for fiscal year 2004 to research and develop equipment for the 

detection of threats in containerized air cargo and mail. Under this 

project, TSA is considering funding several technologies, including highpower computed tomography and X-ray combined with pulsed fast 

neutron analysis.

15 

In its July 2004 report, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon 

the United States expressed concerns about checked baggage, checkpoint, 

and cargo security.

16 The commission recommended that TSA and 

Congress give priority attention to improving the ability of screening 

checkpoints to detect explosives on passengers. The commission also 

stated that TSA should (1) expedite the installation of advanced in-line 

baggage screening equipment; (2) require that every passenger aircraft 

carrying cargo deploy at least one hardened container to carry any suspect 

cargo; and (3) intensify its efforts to identify, track, and appropriately 

screen potentially dangerous cargo in both aviation and maritime modes. 

14GAO, Aviation Security: Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System Faces 

Significant Implementation Challenges, GAO-04-385 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 12, 2004). 

15Pulsed fast neutron analysis probes targets, using high-energy neutrons, for the presence 

of explosives. 

16National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission 

Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United 

States (Washington, D.C.: 2004). 

Page 17 GAO­04­890 Transportation Security R&D 
Maritime and Land Security R&D 

Projects Funded by TSA 

In addition to its R&D projects to enhance aviation security, in fiscal years 

2003 and 2004, TSA spent or budgeted R&D funds for projects to improve 

security for maritime and land transportation, including the following: 

•	 The Transit and Rail Inspection Pilot will assess the feasibility of using 

emerging technologies to screen passengers and their checked baggage 

and carry-on items for explosives at rail stations and aboard trains. In 

May 2004, TSA completed a 30-day test to screen Amtrak and commuter 

rail passengers for explosives at a Maryland train station by having them 

walk through a trace detection portal that TSA is also considering for 

use at airports. According to TSA officials, the test provided useful 

information about customer-screening wait times, the effectiveness of 

screening equipment in a non-climate-controlled environment, and the 

cost and impact of using the technology for Amtrak and commuter rail 

operations. In addition, in June and July 2004, TSA tested the screening 

of Amtrak passengers’ checked baggage for explosives at a Washington, 

D.C., train station, and in July 2004, TSA tested the screening of 

passengers and their carry-on items for explosives on a Connecticut 

commuter rail train while the train was in motion. 

•	 The Transportation Worker Identification Credential is intended to 

establish a uniform, nationwide standard for the secure identification of 

as many as 12 million public- and private-sector workers who require 

unescorted physical or cyber access to secure areas at airports and 

other transportation facilities, such as seaports and railroad terminals. 

TSA was not able to provide funding information for the program for 

fiscal years 2003 and 2004. As we have previously reported, airport and 

seaport officials have expressed concern about how much the program 

would cost and who would pay to implement it.

17 We have recently 

completed a separate review that looked at pilot tests of the program at 

maritime ports and expect to issue a report to the House Transportation 

and Infrastructure Committee by September 30, 2004. 

•	 The Conveyance Tracking Program is investigating the capability of 

technologies that are or are nearly available for the secure tracking of 

hazardous materials shipments by rail and truck. TSA budgeted about $1 

million for this program for fiscal year 2004. 

17GAO, Posthearing Questions Related to Aviation and Port Security, GAO-04-315R 

(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 12, 2003), and Aviation Security: Progress Since September 11, 

2001, and the Challenges Ahead, GAO-03-1150T (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 9, 2003). 

Page 18 GAO­04­890 Transportation Security R&D 
•	 Operation Safe Commerce is designed to improve container supply 

chain security by testing practices and commercially available 

technologies in an operational environment, including technologies for 

tracking and tracing containers, nonintrustive detection of threats, and 

sealing containers. In June 2003, TSA awarded grants to the ports of Los 

Angeles and Long Beach, California; Seattle and Tacoma, Washington; 

and the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey. TSA was not able to 

provide funding information for the program for fiscal years 2003 and 

2004. 

TSA Spent or Budgeted Most of For our review, we classified R&D projects according to the following four 

Its R&D Funding for Projects 

That Are Beyond the Basic 

Research Phase 

phases: 

•	 Basic research includes all scientific efforts and experimentation 

directed toward increasing knowledge and understanding in those fields 

of physical, engineering, environmental, social, and life sciences related 

to long-term national needs. 

•	 Applied research includes all efforts directed toward the solution of 

specific problems with a view toward developing and evaluating the 

feasibility of proposed solutions. 

•	 Advanced development includes all efforts directed toward projects that 

have moved into the development of hardware for field experiments and 

tests. 

•	 Operational testing includes the evaluation of integrated technologies 

in a realistic operating environment to assess the performance or cost 

reduction potential of advanced technology. 

In fiscal years 2003 and 2004, TSA spent or budgeted the majority of its 

transportation security R&D funding for projects in the last three phases of 

R&D, but the agency agrees that it needs to spend more for basic research. 

Figure 3 shows TSA’s allocation of R&D funding by phase of R&D. In fiscal 

year 2003, TSA spent about 88 percent of its $21 million budget on applied 

research, advanced development, and operational testing. For fiscal year 

2004, TSA budgeted about 82 percent of its $159 million budget for projects 

in those three phases. In contrast, according to project information 

provided by TSA, none of the transportation security R&D projects that it 

funded in fiscal year 2003 and budgeted in fiscal year 2004 were in the basic 

research phase. According to the National Research Council, R&D 

organizations should consistently fund some basic research because 

Page 19 GAO­04­890 Transportation Security R&D 
although it typically entails higher risks, it also offers higher payoffs than 

R&D in later phases. Thus far, TSA has focused its R&D efforts on making 

improvements to deployed technologies and testing and evaluating nearterm technologies, and a senior TSA official acknowledged that the agency 

needs to do more basic research. 

Figure 3: Distribution of TSA’s R&D Funding by Phase, Fiscal Years 2003 and 2004 

Percentage 

70 

60 

50 

40 

30 

20 

10 

0 

Phase of R&D 

Fiscal year 2003 (obligated - $21.1 million) 

Fiscal year 2004 (budgeted - $159.2 million) 

Source: GAO analysis of TSA data. 

Note: TSA provided the R&D phase for 74 of the 146 projects that it funded in fiscal years 2003 and 

2004. TSA officials did not explain why the information was not available on the R&D phase for the 

remaining 72 projects. 

Basic research 

Applied research

Advanced development 

Operational testing 

Multiple phases 

Not specified 

Page 20 GAO­04­890 Transportation Security R&D 
TSA Has Not Estimated 

Deployment Dates for Most of Its 

R&D Projects 

Transferring R&D Funds to 

Other Programs Delayed TSA’s 

Progress on Some R&D Projects 

Although many of TSA’s projects are in later phases of development, the 

agency has not estimated deployment dates for 133 of the 146 projects that 

it funded in fiscal years 2003 and 2004. According to TSA officials, 

deployment dates are not always predictable because deployment is 

dependent on factors such as the manufacturing capacity of the private 

sector or the availability of funds for purchasing and installing equipment. 

However, we generally believe that R&D program managers should 

estimate deployment dates for projects that are beyond the basic research 

phase because deployment dates can serve as goals that the managers can 

use to plan, budget, and track the progress of projects. For the 13 projects 

for which TSA had estimated deployment dates, deployment is scheduled 

for fiscal years 2004 through 2014. Nine of the 13 projects are scheduled for 

deployment in fiscal years 2005 or 2006, including the Phoenix project, 

which is intended to enhance existing checked baggage screening systems 

and develop new screening technologies. One of the remaining 4 projects, 

the Manhattan II project, is scheduled for deployment from fiscal years 

2009 through 2014. 

Progress on some R&D projects was delayed in fiscal year 2003 when TSA 

transferred about $61 million, more than half of its $110 million R&D 

appropriation, to operational needs, such as personnel cost for screeners. 

As a result, TSA delayed several key R&D projects related to checked 

baggage screening, checkpoint screening, and air cargo security. For 

example, TSA delayed the development of a device to detect weapons, 

liquid explosives, and flammables in containers found in carry-on baggage 

or passengers’ effects, as well as the development and testing of a walkthrough portal for detecting traces of explosives on passengers. According 

to a TSA official, the agency does not plan to transfer R&D funds to other 

programs in fiscal year 2004. 

Page 21 GAO­04­890 Transportation Security R&D 
DHS Spent the Majority of Overall, DHS increased its funding for transportation security R&D from 

Its Fiscal Year 2003 and about $26 million in fiscal year 2003 to about $88 million in fiscal year 2004, 

Budgeted the Majority of Its as shown in table 3.18 The President’s fiscal year 2005 budget request 

includes about $1 billion for the Science and Technology Directorate, Fiscal Year 2004 which includes some transportation security R&D. Transportation Security 

R&D Funding for 

Multimodal and Aviation 

Projects 	 Table 3: DHS’s Transportation Security R&D Funding by Mode, Fiscal Years 2003 

and 2004 

Dollars in thousands 

Fiscal year 2003 Fiscal year 2004 

Mode Obligated Percent Budgeted Percent 

Aviation $3,709 14.3 $63,240 

Highway 1,052 4.1 3,000 

Maritime 3,474 13.4 1,626 

Multimodal 12,630 48.8 20,117 

Pipeline 0 0.0 0 

Rail 0 0.0 0 

Transit 5,000 19.3 0 

Total $25,865 100.0 $87,983 100.0 

Source: GAO analysis of DHS data. 

In fiscal year 2003, DHS spent $12.6 million, or almost half, of its $26 million 

transportation security R&D budget for projects related to multiple modes 

of transportation. For fiscal year 2004, DHS increased its budget for 

multimodal projects to $20 million; this increase reflects the costs of 

funding pilot programs with the Port Authority of New York and New 

Jersey to test radiation and nuclear detection devices. For fiscal year 2004, 

DHS budgeted almost $63 million, or 72 percent of its $88 million, on 

aviation projects, compared with almost $4 million spent in fiscal year 

2003. This increase provides about $60 million in fiscal year 2004 funds to 

develop technical countermeasures to minimize the threat posed to 

commercial aircraft by shoulder-fired missiles, also known as man-portable 

18Some of DHS’s transportation security R&D projects are funded and managed by DHS’s 

Science and Technology Directorate, while others are funded and managed by other DHS 

agencies, namely the Coast Guard, Customs and Border Protection, and the Secret Service. 

Page 22 GAO­04­890 Transportation Security R&D 

71.9 

3.4 

1.8 

22.9 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 
air defense systems (MANPADS).19 Figure 4 shows a MANPADS that could 

be used to attack a commercial aircraft. 

Figure 4: Photograph of a MANPADS 

Source: U.S. Department of the Army. 

19In our January 2004 report on DHS’s effort, we found that DHS faces significant challenges 

in adapting a military counter-MANPADS system to commercial aircraft, including 

establishing system requirements, developing the technology and design to a mature level, 

and developing reliable cost estimates. (GAO, The Department of Homeland Security Needs 

to Fully Adopt a Knowledge-based Approach to Its Counter-MANPADS Development 

Program, GAO-04-341R (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 30, 2004).) 

Page 23 GAO­04­890 Transportation Security R&D 
DHS decreased its budget for transit security R&D projects from $5 million 

in fiscal year 2004 to $0 in fiscal year 2004; this decrease reflects the 

completion of a project to test chemical detectors in subway stations. DHS 

also increased its budget for highway security R&D projects from $1 

million in fiscal year 2003 to $3 million in fiscal year 2004. This increase 

funds a project to research and develop technology for detecting truck 

bombs. Figure 5 shows an example of a truck bomb detection system. 

Figure 5: A Mobile Search X-ray Inspection System for Detecting Truck Bombs 

Source: American Science and Engineering. 

In fiscal year 2003, DHS spent 25 percent and 60 percent of its $26 million 

transportation security R&D budget for projects in advanced development 

and multiple phases, respectively, as shown in figure 6. For fiscal year 2004, 

DHS budgeted $61 million, or 69 percent, of its $88 million budget for 

advanced development, including $60 million for the counter-MANPADS 

program. According to project information provided by DHS, none of the 

transportation security R&D projects it funded in fiscal year 2003 and 

budgeted for in fiscal year 2004 were in the basic research phase. Although 

DHS has focused its initial R&D efforts on the near-term development and 

deployment of technologies, it recognizes the importance of basic research 

DHS Spent or Budgeted Most of 

Its R&D Funding for Projects 

That Are in Advanced 

Development 

Page 24 GAO­04­890 Transportation Security R&D 
and, according to a senior DHS official, intends to do more basic research 

in fiscal year 2006 and beyond. 

Figure 6: Distribution of DHS’s R&D Funding by Phase, Fiscal Years 2003 and 2004 

Percentage 

80 

70 

60 

50 

40 

30 

20 

10 

0 

Phase of R&D 

Fiscal year 2003 (obligated - $25.9 million) 

Fiscal year 2004 (budgeted - $88.0 million) 

Source: GAO analysis DHS data. 

Of the 56 projects that DHS funded in fiscal years 2003 and 2004, DHS has 

deployed technologies related to 7, has estimated deployment dates for 11, 

and has not estimated deployment dates for the remaining 38. Estimated 

deployment dates for the 11 projects range from fiscal years 2004 to 2007. 

Basic research 

Applied research 

Advanced development 

Operational testing 

Multiple phases 

Not specified 

Page 25 GAO­04­890 Transportation Security R&D 
DOT and NASA Funded 

Some Transportation 

Security R&D Projects 

In addition to the transportation security R&D projects funded by TSA and 

DHS, DOT and NASA funded some such projects. In fiscal year 2003, DOT 

spent about $8 million and has budgeted about $31 million for fiscal year 

2004 on transportation security R&D, as shown in table 4. For example, in 

fiscal year 2003, DOT spent about $2 million to develop and field-test a 

system to track trailers containing hazardous materials when they are not 

attached to a tractor; for fiscal year 2004, it budgeted $20 million to develop 

a secure information network to share air traffic control information with 

DHS and others. 

Table 4: DOT’s Transportation Security R&D Funding by Mode, Fiscal Years 2003 

and 2004 

Dollars in thousands 

Fiscal year 2003 Fiscal year 2004 

Mode Obligated Percent Budgeted Percent 

Aviation $0 0.0 $20,000 

Highway 3,531 43.8 400 

Maritime 0 0.0 0 

Multimodal 906 11.2 7,858 

Pipeline 900 11.2 412 

Rail 400 5.0 400 

Transit 2,325 28.8 1,694 

Total $8,062 100.0 $30,764 100.0 

Source: GAO analysis of DOT data. 

Although NASA did not fund any transportation security R&D in fiscal year 

2003, it has budgeted about $18 million for fiscal year 2004 for aviation 

security R&D projects. For example, NASA budgeted about $5 million for 

technologies and methods to provide accurate information so that pilots 

can avoid protected airspace, continually verify identity, and prevent 

unauthorized persons from gaining access to flight controls. 

Page 26 GAO­04­890 Transportation Security R&D 

65.0 

1.3 

0.0 

25.5 

1.3 

1.3 

5.5 
Experts Had Mixed Views 

on the Reasonableness of 

Distribution of 

Transportation Security 

R&D Projects, and Some 

Experts Questioned 

Decisions to Fund Some 

Projects 

Members of our panel of transportation security and technology experts 

had mixed views on whether the distribution of transportation security 

R&D projects by mode was reasonable and raised questions about whether 

some projects should be funded. According to several panelists, the 

distribution of transportation security R&D projects by mode and program 

area was reasonable. However, several other panelists said that aviation 

has been overemphasized at the expense of maritime and land modes; two 

panelists felt that R&D is focused too heavily on threats that were 

prominent in the 1970s and 1980s, such as airplane hijackings and 

bombings; and one panelist said that the selection of projects seemed to be 

inappropriately based on the most recent terrorist event or perceived 

threat. While the panelists had different and sometimes conflicting views 

about the reasonableness of the distribution of projects, many of them said 

that project selections should be based on current risk assessments. As 

explained in the next section of this report, TSA and DHS plan to select 

their R&D projects on the basis of risk assessments, which have not yet 

been completed for all modes of transportation. 

When asked whether they thought there were any transportation security 

R&D projects in the agencies’ portfolios that did not merit funding, the 

panelists identified several funded by TSA that they believed did not qualify 

as R&D projects. For example, one panelist did not agree with funding 

projects that were designed to enhance existing technologies, such as a 

$30,000 project to test a prototype of a new, handheld ion mobility 

spectrometry explosives trace detector. According to this panelist, at least 

two very good ion mobility spectrometry handheld units can be purchased 

off the shelf. In commenting on a draft of this report, DHS said that TSA 

funded this project because the vendor demonstrated a promising 

technology. 

When asked if there were any important areas of transportation security 

R&D that TSA and DHS were not addressing, individual panelists suggested 

that the following projects be considered for future funding: 

•	 A project for combining neutron inspection technology with traditional 

transmission X-ray and backscatter X-ray technologies could enhance 

air cargo security by providing a thorough look at places where 

Page 27 GAO­04­890 Transportation Security R&D 
explosives might be concealed in containers.

20 A ground-based system 

to scan trucks carrying cargo bound for passenger aircraft, ships, and 

highways could also be tested. 

•	 A multifunctional portal that tests for metals, explosives, narcotics, and 

chemicals in near real time could help to address the limitations of 

current checkpoint screening equipment. 

•	 A standard piece of luggage for testing deployed explosives detection 

systems could be developed to ensure that the systems maintain 

acceptable performance capabilities. 

In commenting on a draft of this report, DHS addressed several 

technologies and projects, including neutron inspection technology, a 

multifunctional portal project, and a project to develop a standard piece of 

luggage for testing explosives detection systems. Specifically, DHS said 

that TSA is looking at pulsed fast neutron analysis, a technology that uses 

X-ray images in conjunction with neutron interrogation and substance 

identification. According to DHS, TSA considers the development of a 

multifunctional portal critical because it creates opportunities for fusing or 

integrating technologies—a long-standing transportation goal. Finally, DHS 

said that a standard piece of luggage had been developed to validate the 

performance of two different explosives detection systems to ensure that 

the systems are performing to their certification levels. Moreover, DHS 

noted in its comments that TSA has two advisory committees—the 

National Academy of Sciences and the Security Advisory Panel—whose 

members have expertise in various modes of transportation. 

20Neutron inspection techniques use neutron beams that penetrate an object and react with 

concealed explosives. Traditional transmission X-ray images create a “shadowgram” image, 

similar to the result of a medical X-ray, when X-rays pass through an object and are 

absorbed, rather than scattered. While transmission technology can reveal fine details such 

as wires and other bomb components, the more objects or clutter in the path of the beam, 

the less object differentiation is achieved. Backscatter X-ray detects reflected X-ray energy, 

providing an image that highlights organic materials such as explosives—materials that 

traditional transmission-only systems can miss. 

Page 28 GAO­04­890 Transportation Security R&D 
TSA and DHS Have 

Made Some Progress in 

Managing Their R&D 

Programs but Have Not 

Yet Fully Completed 

Their Efforts 

TSA and DHS have made some progress in managing their transportation 

security R&D programs according to applicable laws and R&D best 

practices,

21 but their efforts are incomplete in the following areas: 

• preparing strategic plans that contain goals and measurable objectives, 

•	 preparing and using risk assessments to select and prioritize their R&D 

projects, 

• maintaining a comprehensive database of R&D projects, 

•	 coordinating their R&D programs with those of other government 

agencies, 

•	 reaching out to transportation stakeholders to help identify R&D needs, 

and 

• accelerating R&D. 

The Homeland Security Act also authorizes DHS to solicit R&D proposals 

for security technologies from outside entities and requires DHS to 

integrate the department’s R&D programs. Although the laws do not 

contain deadlines for TSA and DHS to complete these requirements, it is 

difficult to determine, until the agencies do, whether they are making R&D 

investments cost-effectively and addressing the highest transportation 

risks. In commenting on their progress in managing TSA’s R&D program, 

TSA officials said that the agency was focusing initially on hiring new 

airport screeners and meeting statutory requirements to install new 

screening equipment. They further noted that a substantial transfer of R&D 

funds in fiscal year 2003 delayed certain projects. DHS officials said that 

the department is a start-up organization. Table 5 shows the progress TSA 

and DHS have made in complying with statutory requirements and best 

practices for managing their R&D programs. 

21National Academy of Sciences, Evaluating Federal Research Programs: Research and the 

Government Performance and Results Act (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 

1999), and National Research Council, World-Class Research and Development: 

Characteristics for an Army Research, Development, and Engineering Organization 

(Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1996). 

Page 29 GAO­04­890 Transportation Security R&D 
Table 5: TSA’s and DHS’s Implementation of Statutory Requirements and Best Practices for Managing Their R&D Programs 

Requirement/Best practice TSA’s implementation DHS’s implementation 

The Homeland Security Act requires DHS to 

prepare a strategic plan that identifies goals 

and includes annual measurable objectives 

for coordinating the federal government’s 

civilian efforts in developing 

countermeasures to terrorist threats. In 

addition, the National Academy of Sciences 

indicates that research programs should be 

described in strategic and performance 

plans. 

Partial—TSA prepared strategic plans for Partial—DHS prepared a strategic plan for 

the agency and its R&D program, but the the department, but the plan does not 

plans did not contain goals or measurable contain measurable objectives. DHS is in 

objectives. the process of preparing a strategic plan for 

its R&D program. 

The Aviation and Transportation Security 

Act requires TSA to use risk management 

principles to make R&D decisions. The 

Homeland Security Act requires DHS to 

prepare comprehensive risk assessments 

for the nation’s key resources and critical 

infrastructure sectors. In addition, GAO has 

advocated the use of a risk management 

approach in responding to national security 

and terrorism challenges. 

Partial—According to TSA officials, threat Partial—DHS is working in a pilot phase


assessments were completed for all modes toward preparing national comparative risk


of transportation, but vulnerability and assessments for infrastructure sectors with 


criticality assessments have not been critical vulnerabilities.


completed. 


The National Research Council indicates Partial—TSA’s database of projects does Partial—DHS’s database of projects does


that R&D organizations should maintain a not provide key information on all projects. not provide key information on all projects.


complete database of projects to help 


prioritize and justify expenditures.


The Aviation and Transportation Security Partial—TSA’s efforts to coordinate with Partial—DHS’s efforts to coordinate with


Act and the Homeland Security Act require other federal agencies have been limited. other federal agencies have been limited.


TSA and DHS to coordinate their R&D


efforts with those of other government 


agencies. 


The Transportation Research Board Partial—TSA’s efforts to reach out to the Partial—DHS’s efforts to reach out to the 


indicates that R&D organizations should transportation industry have been limited. transportation industry have been limited.


reach out to stakeholders to obtain input on 


their R&D decisions.


The Aviation and Transportation Security Unable to assess because of the absence of Unable to assess because of the absence of


Act requires TSA to accelerate R&D on measurable objectives. measurable objectives.


aviation security technologies, and the 


Homeland Security Act requires DHS to


accelerate R&D on homeland security


technologies. 


The Homeland Security Act requires DHS to Not applicable. DHS is drafting an integration plan and has 

integrate the department’s various R&D been directed by the Secretary of Homeland 

activities. Security to integrate the department’s R&D 

activities by 2005. 

Source: GAO analysis of applicable laws, best practices, and information provided by TSA and DHS. 

Note: Analysis of implementation status is based on agency officials’ comments and our review of 

applicable documents and databases. 

Page 30 GAO­04­890 Transportation Security R&D 
Strategic Plans for TSA’s and 

DHS’s R&D Programs Do 

Not Yet Contain Measurable 

Objectives 

The Homeland Security Act requires DHS to prepare a strategic plan that 

identifies goals and includes annual measurable objectives for coordinating 

the federal government’s civilian efforts in developing countermeasures to 

terrorist threats. Similarly, R&D best practices identified by the National 

Academy of Sciences indicate that research programs should be described 

in strategic and performance plans and evaluated in performance reports. 

TSA has prepared strategic plans for both the agency22and its R&D program 

that contain performance goals, such as deterring foreign and domestic 

terrorists and other individuals from causing harm or disrupting the 

nation’s transportation system. Although we reported in January 200323 that 

TSA had established an initial set of 32 performance measures, none of 

them are contained in TSA’s strategic plans or directly pertain to R&D. 

DHS has prepared a strategic plan for the department, but the plan's broad 

objective—to develop technology and capabilities to detect and prevent 

terrorist attacks—is not supported by more specific R&D performance 

goals and measures in any program area, including transportation. A DHS 

official said that the department is preparing a separate strategic plan for 

its R&D program that will include more specific goals and measurable 

objectives. Another DHS official said that the plan will include input from 

the leaders of the Science and Technology Directorate’s functional areas, 

one of which is transportation. DHS has indicated that the Science and 

Technology Directorate’s strategic planning process includes (1) 

determining strategic goals for the next 5 years, threats, and vulnerabilities 

and (2) developing a list of prioritized projects for fiscal years 2005 through 

2010. In a May 2004 report on DHS’s use of the DOE national laboratories 

for research on technologies for detecting and responding to nuclear, 

biological, and chemical threats, we recommended that DHS complete a 

strategic plan for R&D.24 Until TSA and DHS prepare R&D strategic plans 

with goals and measurable objectives, Congress and other stakeholders do 

not have a reliable means of assessing TSA’s and DHS’s progress toward 

achieving their R&D goals. 

22As of August 2004, TSA’s September 2003 strategic plan was still in draft form. 

23GAO, Transportation Security Administration: Actions and Plans to Build a ResultsOriented Culture, GAO-03-190 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 17, 2003). 

24GAO, Homeland Security: DHS Needs a Strategy to Use DOE’s Laboratories for Research 

on Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Detection and Response Technologies, GAO-04-653 

(Washington, D.C.: May 24, 2004). 

Page 31 GAO­04­890 Transportation Security R&D 
TSA and DHS Plan to Use 

Risk Assessments to 

Prioritize and Select Their 

R&D Programs, but Many 

Assessments Have Not Been 

Completed 

The Aviation and Transportation Security Act requires TSA to use risk 

management principles in making R&D funding decisions.25 The Homeland 

Security Act requires DHS to establish R&D priorities for detecting, 

preventing, protecting against, and responding to terrorist attacks26 and to 

prepare comprehensive assessments of the vulnerabilities of the nation’s 

key resources and critical infrastructure sectors, one of which is 

transportation.

27 In addition, under the Homeland Security Act, DHS’s 

Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate is 

responsible for receiving and analyzing information from multiple sources, 

including local, state, and federal government agencies and private sector 

entities, and integrating the information, analyses, and vulnerability 

assessments to identify protective priorities.28 

We have consistently advocated using a risk management approach in 

responding to national security and terrorism challenges. In the context of 

homeland security, risk management is a systematic and analytical process 

of (1) considering the likelihood that a terrorist threat will endanger an 

asset, individual, or function and (2) reducing the risk and mitigating the 

consequences of an attack. In our work on homeland security issues, we 

have identified threat, vulnerability, and criticality assessments as key 

elements of a risk management approach.

29 These elements are defined as 

follows: 

•A threat assessment identifies and evaluates potential threats on the 

basis of factors such as capabilities, intentions, and past activities. This 

assessment represents a systematic approach to identifying potential 

threats before they materialize and is based on threat information 

25Pub.L. No. 107-71, § 112(b)(1)(B) (2001). 

26Pub.L. No. 107-296, § 302(5)(B) (2002). 

27Pub.L. No. 107-296, § 201(d)(2) (2002). 

28Pub.L. No. 107-296, § 201(d)(2)-(d)(3) (2002). 

29GAO-02-150T. 

Page 32 GAO­04­890 Transportation Security R&D 
gathered from both the intelligence and the law enforcement 

communities.30 

•A vulnerability assessment identifies weaknesses that may be exploited 

by identified threats and suggests options to address those weaknesses. 

•A criticality assessment evaluates and prioritizes assets and functions 

in terms of specific criteria, such as their importance to public safety 

and the economy. The assessment provides a basis for identifying which 

structures or processes are relatively more important to protect from 

attack. 

To select and prioritize their R&D projects, TSA and DHS have established 

processes that include risk management principles. According to TSA 

officials, TSA has completed threat assessments for all modes of 

transportation but has yet to complete vulnerability and criticality 

assessments. A DHS official told us that the department has started to 

conduct risk assessments of critical infrastructure sectors but does not 

plan to start its assessment of the transportation sector until 2005. Without 

complete risk assessments, Congress and other stakeholders are limited in 

their ability to assess whether the millions of dollars that are being invested 

in transportation security R&D projects are being spent cost-effectively and 

to address the highest transportation security risks. 

In the absence of completed risk assessments, TSA and DHS officials are 

using available threat intelligence, expert judgment, congressional 

mandates, mission needs, and information about past terrorist incidents to 

select and prioritize their R&D projects. TSA and DHS officials said that 

they obtain threat intelligence from the government’s intelligence 

community to help make R&D decisions. TSA officials said that TSA’s Chief 

Technology Officer receives daily intelligence briefings, and that the agency 

is using threat information to select R&D projects but is not yet using 

formal threat assessments to make those R&D decisions. In addition, DHS’s 

30As we noted in our October 2001 report on risk management, while threat assessments are 

a key decision support tool, it should be recognized that, even if updated often, threat 

assessments might not adequately capture emerging threats posed by some terrorist groups. 

No matter how much we know about potential threats, we will never know whether we have 

identified every threat or whether we have complete information even about the threats of 

which we are aware. Consequently, we believe that a risk management approach to 

preparing for terrorism that supplements threat assessments with vulnerability and 

criticality assessments can provide better assurance of preparedness for a terrorist attack. 

Page 33 GAO­04­890 Transportation Security R&D 
Inspector General reported in March 2004 that although many Science and 

Technology officials agreed on the importance of maintaining a 

relationship with the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection 

Directorate, staff below them were not actively involved in obtaining 

terrorist threat information from this directorate and using the information 

to help select new homeland security technologies.31 

In May 2004, TSA prepared terrorist threat assessments for all modes of 

transportation. In addition, in June 2004, a TSA official said that TSA is in 

the process of preparing vulnerability and criticality assessments for all 

modes of transportation. For example, in 2003, TSA supported the 

government’s strategy to reduce the threat that shoulder-fired missiles pose 

to commercial aircraft by conducting vulnerability assessments at all major 

airports to identify major launch sites around the airports using 

information from local agencies and FAA. In addition to these assessments, 

officials in DHS’s Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection 

Directorate said they were working in a pilot phase toward preparing 

national comparative risk assessments with critical vulnerabilities that 

would allow comparisons to be made across different infrastructure 

sectors, such as transportation. The officials said the pilot program would 

focus on other infrastructure sectors, such as chemical and nuclear plants, 

before addressing the transportation sector, which they expected to work 

on in fiscal year 2005. However, they did not know when risk assessments 

would be completed for all modes of transportation. 

TSA has agreed with a recommendation in our past work that it should 

apply a risk management approach to strengthen security in aviation and in 

other modes of transportation.32 TSA indicated that it is developing four 

tools, including software, that will help assess threats, criticalities, and 

vulnerabilities, and that it plans to create risk assessment models for all 

modes of transportation during fiscal year 2004.33 

31Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, Survey of the Science and 

Technology Directorate, OIG-04-24 (Washington, D.C.: March 2004). 

32GAO, Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities and Potential Improvements for the Air Cargo 

System, GAO-03-344 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 20, 2002). 

33For an explanation of TSA’s four assessment tools, see GAO, Aviation Security: Efforts to 

Measure Effectiveness and Address Challenges, GAO-04-232T (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 5, 

2003). 

Page 34 GAO­04­890 Transportation Security R&D 
In its July 2004 report, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon 

the United States also pointed out the importance of risk management and 

recommended that the government identify and evaluate the transportation 

assets that need to be protected; set risk-based priorities for defending 

them; select the most practical and cost-effective ways of doing so; and 

then develop a plan, a budget, and funding to implement the effort. The 

plan should assign roles and missions to the relevant federal, state, and 

local authorities and to private stakeholders. We agree with the 

commission’s recommendations and are making similar recommendations. 

TSA and DHS Do Not Have 

Adequate Databases to 

Effectively Manage Their 

R&D Portfolios 

R&D best practices identified by the National Research Council indicate 

that a research program should maintain a complete database of projects to 

help prioritize and justify program expenditures. Similarly, we have stated 

that an R&D program should use a management information system that 

readily provides information to track the performance of projects. TSA’s 

and DHS’s R&D managers were not able to provide us with complete 

information on all projects in their R&D portfolios. For example, for the 

146 projects that it funded in 2003 and 2004, TSA was not able to provide 

information on anticipated deployment dates for 91 percent, the current 

phase of development for 49 percent, and the amounts obligated and 

budgeted for 8 percent—including 3 TSA projects, CAPPS II, the 

Transportation Worker Identification Credential, and Operation Safe 

Commerce, that were appropriated tens of millions of dollars in both fiscal 

years 2003 and 2004. For the 56 projects that it funded in 2003 and 2004, 

DHS was not able to provide information on anticipated deployment dates 

for 68 percent, the current phase of development for 14 percent, and the 

amounts obligated and budgeted for 9 percent. Although TSA’s and DHS’s 

databases contain some information, it is scattered among several 

computer files and paper documents and cannot be easily retrieved or 

analyzed. Consequently, additional staff time is needed to prepare 

documents from different reports, and compiling the information could 

result in errors and omissions. Without accurate, complete, and timely 

information, TSA and DHS managers are limited in their ability to 

effectively monitor their R&D programs and ensure that R&D funds are 

being used to address the highest priority transportation security risks. In 

commenting on a draft of this report, DHS said that TSA had recently 

developed a database that will allow it to track milestones, funding, and 

deployment information for individual projects. 

Page 35 GAO­04­890 Transportation Security R&D 
Coordination with Other 

Federal Agencies and 

Outreach to Transportation 

Industry Associations Has 

Been Limited 

The Aviation and Transportation Security Act and the Homeland Security 

Act require DHS to coordinate its R&D efforts with those of other 

government agencies. Similarly, R&D best practices indicate that R&D 

organizations should coordinate to help fill research gaps and leverage 

resources. In addition, R&D best practices indicate that TSA and DHS 

should reach out to stakeholders, such as the transportation industry, to 

identify their security R&D needs. However, TSA’s and DHS’s efforts to 

coordinate with other federal agencies on transportation security R&D and 

reach out to transportation industry associations on the industry’s security 

R&D needs have been limited. 

The Homeland Security Act requires DHS to coordinate with other 

executive agencies in developing and carrying out the Science and 

Technology Directorate’s agenda to reduce duplication and identify unmet 

needs.34 In addition, the Aviation and Transportation Security Act gives TSA 

responsibility for coordinating terrorism countermeasures with 

“departments, agencies, and instrumentalities of the United States 

Government.”35 For TSA and DHS to select the best technologies to 

enhance transportation security, it is important that they have a clear 

understanding of the R&D projects currently being conducted, both 

internally and externally. TSA and DHS have coordinated with each other 

on some of their transportation security R&D programs, such as efforts to 

counter the threat posed to commercial aircraft by MANPADS; develop 

technologies for detecting chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 

programs; and develop explosives detection systems. However, TSA and 

DHS did not coordinate their R&D portfolios in fiscal year 2003. A DHS 

official said that the department reviewed TSA’s fiscal year 2004 R&D 

portfolio. The official said that it was not DHS’s intention to change TSA’s 

R&D portfolio but to learn what TSA was doing and to leverage resources. 

R&D best practices also emphasize the importance of coordinating R&D in 

the transportation security field. A 2002 Transportation Research Board 

34Pub.L. No. 107-296, § 302(13) (2002). 

35Pub.L. No. 107-71, § 101 (2001). 

Page 36 GAO­04­890 Transportation Security R&D 
study36 on the role of science and technology in transportation concluded 

that while TSA should have its own analysis and research capability, it 

should also have the ability to draw on the “rich and varied R&D 

capabilities within the transportation sector, as well as those of the federal 

government and the science and technology community at large.” 

Furthermore, the report said that if TSA views the R&D activities of DOT’s 

modal agencies from a broader systems perspective, it can help fill 

research gaps, monitor the progress of these activities, and observe where 

additional investments might yield large benefits. A member of our 

transportation security and technology panel suggested that TSA and DHS 

could be more effective if they systematized and formalized their R&D 

coordination efforts at the highest levels and included other organizations, 

such as DOT and the Transportation Research Board of the National 

Research Council. 

Coordinating with DOT	 Coordination is limited between TSA and DOT and between DHS and DOT, 

which continues to conduct some transportation security R&D. Although 

DOT modal administration officials said that limited communication was 

occurring between DOT and TSA and between DOT and DHS about 

ongoing DOT R&D projects, none of these officials said that TSA or DHS 

had provided any input about which R&D projects they should conduct or 

had asked the modal administrations for input on which transportation 

security R&D projects TSA and DHS should conduct. An official from one 

modal administration said that TSA should consult DOT agencies about 

their R&D plans because, in some cases, they have expertise about the 

various transportation modes and are more aware than TSA of the R&D 

needs and concerns of the transportation industry. For example, a Federal 

Highway Administration (FHWA) R&D official told us that FHWA has 

conducted extensive research on tracking freight movement and has 

mapped out the movement of freight across transportation modes. This 

official said these efforts could help improve freight security. Other DOT 

R&D officials expressed similar views about their R&D programs and said 

they need to coordinate their security R&D programs with TSA and DHS to 

leverage resources and knowledge and to avoid duplication. An official 

from one DOT modal administration (the Federal Railroad Administration) 

36Transportation Research Board, Deterrence, Protection, and Preparation: The New 

Transportation Security Imperative, Special Report 270 (Washington, D.C.: 2002). The 

Transportation Research Board is a division of the National Research Council, which serves 

as an independent adviser to the federal government and others on scientific and technical 

issues. 

Page 37 GAO­04­890 Transportation Security R&D 
Coordinating with NASA and 

Other Federal Agencies 

Coordinating with the DOE 

National Laboratories 

said that although TSA and DHS had no formal input into the agency’s R&D 

plans, all of the security-related R&D projects it had conducted since 2001 

were at the request of TSA or DHS. DOT R&D officials also said that the 

DOT modal administrations should continue to conduct some security 

R&D because they have research personnel who are experts in various 

transportation modes and could help TSA and DHS with their security R&D 

efforts. 

Because we found during the course of our review that NASA was also 

conducting some transportation security R&D, we asked NASA officials 

about the extent of coordination between NASA and TSA and between 

NASA and DHS. NASA officials said that they have effective coordination 

with TSA on the transportation security R&D they conduct.37 They said that 

TSA and NASA coordinated on identifying the types of R&D projects that 

NASA should undertake to best help meet TSA’s needs. NASA officials also 

said that at DHS's request, NASA provided input to the Science and 

Technology Directorate during the directorate’s strategic planning process. 

In addition, NASA officials said that they are working with TSA on a 

memorandum of agreement for their R&D programs. 

TSA and DHS officials said that coordination with other agencies and R&D 

organizations is occurring at the project level and that some coordination is 

based on personal relationships. In discussing DHS’s coordination with 

other agencies in July 2004, a DHS official said that DHS relies heavily on 

the Office of Science and Technology Policy, a component of the Executive 

Office of the President, to coordinate R&D. He also noted that the 

department was only a year old, and that as it matured, DHS would know 

more about the R&D activities of other agencies. 

In creating DHS, Congress intended that DHS draw on the scientific 

expertise of the DOE national laboratories, which make up the world’s 

largest system of laboratories for advanced research in support of national 

energy and defense needs. The Homeland Security Act requires DHS to 

establish an Office of National Laboratories to coordinate its R&D with that 

37NASA’s transportation security R&D focuses on aviation security, such as technologies and 

methods to provide accurate information so that pilots can avoid protected airspace, 

continually verify identity, and prevent unauthorized persons from gaining access to flight 

controls. 

Page 38 GAO­04­890 Transportation Security R&D 
of DOE’s national laboratories.38 DHS has established this office, and in 

February 2003, DHS and DOE entered into an agreement allowing DOE to 

accept and perform work for DHS on an equal basis with other laboratory 

work. DHS and TSA are sponsoring transportation security-related R&D at 

several national laboratories, including Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos, 

Oak Ridge, Pacific Northwest, and the Idaho National Engineering and 

Environmental Laboratory. Overall, laboratory officials told us they have an 

adequate level of communication and coordination with TSA and DHS 

about their ongoing R&D projects, but some officials believe TSA and DHS 

could use the laboratories more as resources for transportation security 

R&D and would like more information about TSA’s research needs. 

Reaching Out to the In a 2001 report, the Transportation Research Board recommended that 

Transportation Industry	 research be closely connected to its stakeholders, such as transportation 

providers, to help ensure relevance and program support.

39 According to 

the report, stakeholders are more likely to use the research results if they 

are involved in the process from the beginning. However, most 

transportation industry association officials we interviewed said that TSA 

and DHS have not reached out to them to obtain information on their 

security R&D needs. Consequently, the transportation industry’s security 

R&D needs may not be adequately reflected in TSA’s and DHS’s R&D 

portfolios. 

An air cargo association official said that TSA contacted them to 

participate in an air cargo security working group of the Aviation Security 

Advisory Committee, a TSA-sponsored advisory group, where they were 

able to discuss the air cargo industry’s security R&D needs. Some 

transportation association officials said that TSA and DHS should contact 

them to obtain input on their research priorities to determine whether the 

proposed technologies would be useful, avoid duplication of research that 

they are sponsoring, and leverage resources. Officials from another 

aviation association commented that, in contrast to their relationship with 

TSA, they had an effective relationship with FAA. The official noted that 

information-sharing and communication occurred more frequently with 

FAA, partly because FAA management recognized the importance of 

obtaining input from the users of FAA’s services, whereas TSA and DHS 

38Pub.L. No. 107-296, § 309(g) (2002). 

39Transportation Research Board, The Federal Role in Highway Research and Technology, 

Special Report 261 (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 2001). 

Page 39 GAO­04­890 Transportation Security R&D 
have not. An official from a state highway association said that although 

TSA and DHS officials have participated in transportation research projects 

that the Transportation Research Board is conducting for the association, 

TSA and DHS have not directly contacted the association about its security 

R&D needs. A TSA official said that TSA reaches out to aviation 

associations and other organizations on R&D but has not formalized this 

process. 

TSA and DHS Have Made 

Efforts to Reach Out to 

Technology Providers, but 

Some Potential Providers 

Have Expressed Concern 

about the Process 

The Homeland Security Act authorizes DHS to solicit proposals to address 

vulnerabilities and award grants, cooperative agreements, and contracts 

with public or private entities, including businesses, federally funded R&D 

centers, and universities.

40 TSA and DHS have taken some actions to use 

this authority, but some potential technology providers believe that more 

information and communication are needed. 

One way that TSA and DHS have reached out to the private sector is 

through their membership in the Technical Support Working Group 

(TSWG), a joint program of the Departments of State and Defense that 

identifies, prioritizes, and coordinates interagency R&D requirements to 

combat terrorism. TSA and DHS have used TSWG to issue broad agency 

announcements, which request proposals from private and/or public 

entities for projects that address specific R&D needs.41 These solicitations 

have generated substantial numbers of responses. For example, TSWG 

received more than 3,340 responses to a broad agency announcement that 

it issued for DHS in May 2003 soliciting proposals for multiple homeland 

security R&D projects, including a system for screening rail passengers and 

baggage. A DHS official said that as DHS matures, it intends to rely less on 

TSWG and more on the Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects 

Agency (HSARPA), DHS’s external funding arm. 

TSA and DHS have also reached out to the private sector by linking their 

Web sites to the Federal Business Opportunities Web site, which informs 

potential technology providers about opportunities for conducting 

40Pub.L. No. 107-296, § 307(b)(3)-(b)(4) (2002). 

41A broad agency announcement is a competitive R&D contracting approach described in 

the Federal Acquisition Regulation in 48 C.F.R. 35.016. Broad agency announcements are 

used for the acquisition of basic and applied research and development that fulfill 

requirements for scientific study, experimentation, and demonstration and that direct 

advancement of state-of-the-art technology. 

Page 40 GAO­04­890 Transportation Security R&D 
homeland security R&D projects. In addition, TSA’s Web site invites 

potential technology providers and others to submit their ideas about 

innovative security technologies that could contribute to TSA’s work on 

aircraft hardening, baggage and cargo screening, credentialing, physical 

security, and electronic surveillance. According to TSA, it has evaluated 

over 1,000 proposals submitted in response to this invitation. However, 

representatives of several private companies told us of difficulties they had 

experienced in trying to communicate with TSA, navigate its Web site, 

obtain information about its R&D program, and understand its current 

transportation security R&D priorities. For example, a company official 

told us that his company was forced into guessing about TSA’s long-term 

R&D strategy, and that manufacturers do not want to make a large 

investment in developing new technologies without knowing whether TSA 

will embrace those technologies. This company official suggested that TSA 

should communicate its R&D goals promptly to vendors. Similarly, some 

private company representatives told us that they did not have sufficient 

information about DHS’s transportation security R&D priorities and 

requirements to adequately respond to solicitations. In commenting on a 

draft of this report, DHS noted that TSA recently established a working 

group to update and improve the current Web site’s discussion of 

technology ideas, products, and services to make it more user-friendly and 

plans to implement the improvements early next year. 

HSARPA has also conducted various forms of outreach with potential 

technology providers. In September 2003, for example, it conducted a 

bidders’ conference to discuss the release of a solicitation on detection 

systems for biological and chemical countermeasures. In addition, in 

November 2003, HSARPA conducted a best practices workshop that 

allowed potential technology providers to comment on how DHS could 

best keep industry informed about its priorities, make industry aware of 

agency solicitations, and manage the relationship between industry and the 

agency. The industry participants also stressed the importance of 

communication between them and DHS. In addition, some participants 

suggested that DHS issue early drafts of solicitations to allow industry to 

gain a better understanding of DHS’s needs.

42 Following the workshop, in 

January 2004, DHS issued a draft solicitation, for technologies to detect 

radiological and nuclear materials, for industry comment before issuing the 

final version. 

42We are conducting a separate review of DHS’s use of its R&D procurement authorities. 

Page 41 GAO­04­890 Transportation Security R&D 
TSA and DHS have used universities to conduct some of their R&D. For 

example, in June 2004, TSA indicated that it had 24 grants with colleges and 

universities. In addition, the Homeland Security Act requires DHS to 

establish university-based centers for homeland security.

43 According to 

DHS, the centers will conduct multidisciplinary research on homeland 

security. In November 2003, DHS announced that it had selected the 

University of Southern California as its first Homeland Security Center of 

Excellence.

44 DHS will provide $12 million over 3 years for the university to 

conduct a risk analysis on the economic consequences of terrorist threats 

and events. The study will address both the targets and means of terrorism, 

with an emphasis on protecting the nation’s critical infrastructure, such as 

transportation systems. 

TSA and DHS Have Taken 

Steps to Accelerate 

Congressionally Mandated 

Transportation Security 

Technologies 

Under the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, TSA is required to 

accelerate the research, development, testing, and evaluation of, among 

other things, explosives detection technology for checked baggage and 

new screening technology for carry-on items and other items being loaded 

onto aircraft, including cargo, and for threats carried on persons.45 The 

Homeland Security Act requires DHS’s HSARPA to accelerate the 

prototyping and development of technologies that “would address 

homeland security vulnerabilities.”46 Although the Homeland Security Act 

authorized a $500 million acceleration fund in fiscal year 2003,47 a DHS 

official said that no funds were specifically appropriated for that purpose. 

Both TSA and DHS have taken steps to address congressionally mandated 

requirements to accelerate security technologies, but they are operating 

without goals and measurable objectives. As a result, it is difficult to 

determine what progress the agencies have made toward accelerating R&D 

projects. Although TSA does not yet have goals and objectives for 

measuring acceleration, the agency has funded the Phoenix project, among 

others, to accelerate baggage screening technologies in the near term. For 

43Pub.L. No. 107-296, § 308(b)(2)(A) (2002). 

44In April 2004, DHS announced that it had selected two other universities as Homeland 

Security Centers of Excellence, which will focus on the security of agricultural products. 

45Pub.L. No. 107-296, § 137(a) (2002). 

46Pub.L. No. 107-296, § 307(b)(3)(C) (2002). 

47Pub.L. No. 107-296, § 307(c)(2) (2002). 

Page 42 GAO­04­890 Transportation Security R&D 
fiscal year 2004, DHS budgeted $75 million for accelerating technologies 

through its Rapid Prototyping Program. For example, DHS, in coordination 

with TSWG, issued a broad agency announcement in May 2003 to support 

the development of technologies that can be rapidly prototyped and 

deployed to the field. Furthermore, in January 2004, DHS issued a broad 

agency announcement to rapidly develop detection systems for 

radiological and nuclear countermeasures. 

DHS Plans to Integrate the 

Department’s R&D 

Programs 

Although the Homeland Security Act requires TSA to remain a distinct 

entity until at least November 2004,48 another provision of the Homeland 

Security Act requires DHS to integrate all of the department’s R&D 

activities.49 Until that integration occurs, TSA and other DHS components 

that conduct transportation security R&D are operating separately. 

However, DHS has made some efforts to promote R&D coordination within 

the department, such as holding meetings with the different components to 

discuss R&D activities and preparing inventories of the DHS components’ 

R&D capabilities and ongoing projects. DHS officials said they are 

preparing a plan to meet a directive from the Secretary of Homeland 

Security to integrate the department’s R&D activities by 2005. 

Conclusions	 The nation’s transportation systems, many of which are open and 

accessible, are highly vulnerable to terrorist attack. Whether new 

technologies can be researched, developed, and deployed to reduce the 

vulnerability of these systems depends largely on how effectively DHS and 

TSA manage their transportation security R&D programs. The National 

Research Council has stated that effectively managing federal R&D 

programs should include consistently funding basic research because it 

offers opportunities for significant improvements in capabilities. However, 

project information provided by TSA and DHS did not show that any of the 

transportation security R&D projects that they funded in fiscal year 2003 

and budgeted for in fiscal year 2004 were in the basic research phase. While 

TSA and DHS recognize the importance of basic research, they are focusing 

their efforts on the near-term development and deployment of 

technologies. 

48Pub.L. No. 107-296, § 424(a) (2002). 

49Pub.L. No. 107-296, § 302(12) (2002). 

Page 43 GAO­04­890 Transportation Security R&D 
Although DHS is working toward complying with legal requirements and 

implementing best practices for managing its R&D program, it is operating 

without a strategic plan for its R&D program. Furthermore, although TSA 

and DHS officials have said that they plan to use risk assessments to select 

and prioritize R&D projects, TSA has not completed vulnerability and 

criticality assessments, which are key components of risk assessments, for 

all modes of transportation. In addition, DHS has not yet completed risk 

assessments of the infrastructure sectors, such as transportation. As a 

result, Congress does not have reasonable assurance that the hundreds of 

millions of dollars that are being invested in transportation security R&D 

are being spent cost-effectively to address the highest priority 

transportation security risks. In addition, the National Commission on 

Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States recommended that the 

government identify and evaluate the transportation assets that need to be 

protected; set risk-based priorities for defending them; select the most 

practical and cost-effective ways of doing so; and then develop a plan, a 

budget, and funding to implement the effort. 

TSA and DHS also do not have adequate databases to monitor and manage 

their spending of the hundreds of millions of dollars that Congress has 

appropriated for R&D. As DHS integrates its R&D programs, including 

TSA’s, it will be important for the department to have accurate, complete, 

current, and readily accessible project information that it can use to 

effectively monitor and manage its R&D portfolios. 

The limited evidence of coordination between TSA and DHS that we found, 

as well as between each of these agencies and other agencies such as DOT, 

does not provide assurance that R&D resources are being leveraged, 

research gaps are being identified and addressed, and duplication is being 

avoided. In our June 2003 report on transportation security challenges, we 

recommended that DHS and DOT use a mechanism such as a memorandum 

of agreement to clearly delineate their respective roles and responsibilities. 

DHS and DOT disagreed with this recommendation because they believed 

that their roles and responsibilities were already clear. However, we 

continue to believe that DHS’s and DOT’s roles and responsibilities for 

transportation security, including their respective security R&D programs, 

should be clarified because the Aviation and Transportation Security Act 

gives TSA responsibility for securing all modes of transportation but does 

not eliminate the DOT modal administrations’ existing statutory 

responsibilities for the security of different modes of transportation. 

Page 44 GAO­04­890 Transportation Security R&D 
Finally, because most transportation industry associations told us that TSA 

and DHS have not contacted them about their security R&D needs, the 

security R&D needs of transportation providers may not have been 

adequately considered. 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

To support efforts by TSA and DHS to maximize the advantages offered by 

basic research, help select and prioritize R&D projects, better monitor and 

manage their R&D portfolios, enhance coordination with one another and 

with other organizations that conduct transportation security R&D, and 

improve their outreach to transportation, we are making five 

recommendations. Specifically, we recommend that the Secretary of 

Homeland Security and the Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security for 

the Transportation Security Administration 

•	 ensure that their transportation security R&D portfolios contain 

projects in all phases of R&D, including basic research; 

•	 complete (1) strategic plans containing measurable objectives for TSA’s 

and DHS’s transportation security R&D programs and (2) risk 

assessments—threat, vulnerability, and criticality—for all modes of 

transportation, and use the results of the risk assessments to help select 

and prioritize R&D projects; 

•	 develop a database that will provide accurate, complete, current, and 

readily accessible project information for monitoring and managing 

their R&D portfolios; 

•	 develop a process with DOT to coordinate transportation security R&D, 

such as a memorandum of agreement identifying roles and 

responsibilities and designating agency liaisons, and share information 

on the agreed-upon roles and responsibilities with transportation 

stakeholders; and 

•	 develop a vehicle to communicate with the transportation industry to 

ensure that its R&D security needs have been identified and considered. 

Agency Comments and 	 We provided TSA, DHS, and DOT with drafts of this report for their review 

and comment. DHS’s written comments, which incorporated comments Our Evaluation from TSA, are provided in appendix IV, along with our responses to specific 

Page 45 GAO­04­890 Transportation Security R&D 
points. DOT also provided comments on the draft report, which we have 

incorporated into the report as appropriate. 

DHS generally concurred with the report’s findings and commented that 

the recommendations are key to a successful R&D program and that the 

department would continue to evaluate its R&D processes in light of the 

report’s findings and recommendations. However, DHS believed that the 

report did not sufficiently recognize recent changes that have taken place, 

particularly at TSA. According to DHS, TSA has made great strides in 

defining R&D projects and linking them to mission needs and identified 

gaps. In response to these and other technical comments that DHS 

provided, we revised the report as appropriate. 

DHS also provided additional perspectives on our recommendations: 

•	 Recommendation: TSA and DHS should ensure that their 

transportation security R&D portfolios contain projects in all phases 

of R&D, including basic research. DHS said that TSA’s Transportation 

Security Laboratory currently conducts basic research and that TSA’s 

human factors program, Manhattan II project, and air cargo security 

projects include basic research. However, information provided by TSA 

in July 2004 in response to our request for data on projects, including 

their current phase of research, identified no projects in the basic 

research phase. This information from TSA covered the agency’s R&D 

work on human factors, Manhattan II, and air cargo security. In addition, 

a senior TSA official said that the agency needed to do more basic 

research. In light of this information from TSA, we did not change our 

recommendation. 

•	 Recommendation: TSA and DHS should (1) complete strategic plans 

containing measurable objectives for TSA’s and DHS’s transportation 

security R&D programs and (2) complete risk assessments for all 

modes of transportation, and use the results of the risk assessments to 

help select and prioritize R&D projects. DHS said that in 2004, it 

finalized its strategic plan, which defined missions and goals for all of 

the agencies under it, including TSA. DHS also said that the strategic 

plan being developed by TSA’s Office of Security Technology would 

include measurable goals and milestones for R&D projects. However, 

DHS’s strategic plan does not specifically address transportation 

security R&D and neither TSA nor DHS has completed an R&D strategic 

plan containing measurable objectives. Therefore, we did not revise this 

recommendation. 

Page 46 GAO­04­890 Transportation Security R&D 
•	 Recommendation: TSA and DHS should develop a database that will 

provide accurate, complete, current, and readily accessible project 

information for monitoring and managing their R&D portfolios. DHS 

said that TSA had developed a system to track R&D projects’ goals and 

milestones, acquisition, funding, testing, and deployment information. 

While such a project tracking system could address our 

recommendation, TSA struggled as recently as of August 2004 to provide 

us with basic information on many of its R&D projects and, in the end, 

was unable to do so for a significant number. Therefore, we retained this 

recommendation. 

•	 Recommendation: TSA should develop a process with DOT to 

coordinate transportation security R&D, such as a memorandum of 

agreement identifying roles and responsibilities, and share this 

information with transportation stakeholders. DHS said that TSA is 

already working with DOT to avoid duplicative R&D efforts. In addition, 

DHS said that TSA would assess the benefits associated with a 

memorandum of agreement with DOT to determine whether one should 

be initiated. We continue to believe that a memorandum of agreement 

between TSA and DHS is the proper vehicle for coordinating R&D—not 

only to avoid duplication, but also to leverage resources and identify 

unmet needs. Furthermore, DOT concurred with our finding that there 

is room for significant improvement in coordination between DOT and 

TSA and between DOT and DHS. DOT also agreed with our 

recommendation that a memorandum of agreement with DHS is the 

appropriate vehicle for improving the coordination of transportation 

security R&D. 

•	 Recommendation: TSA and DHS should develop a vehicle to 

communicate with the transportation industry to ensure that their 

R&D needs have been identified and considered. DHS said that TSA 

does and will continue to communicate with the transportation industry. 

Although DHS noted some actions that TSA is taking to reach out to the 

transportation industry, as we reported, most transportation industry 

officials we interviewed said that TSA and DHS had not reached out to 

them to obtain information about their transportation security R&D 

needs. Therefore, we did not change this recommendation. 

Finally, DHS commented on the draft report’s conclusion that Congress has 

no reasonable assurance that the hundreds of millions of dollars that are 

being invested in transportation security R&D are being invested costeffectively to address the highest priority transportation risks. According to 

Page 47 GAO­04­890 Transportation Security R&D 
DHS, this conclusion is contradicted by evidence contained in our report, 

namely, that the report underscores the difficulties of integrating multiple 

new agencies missions, resources, and approaches. However, we believe 

that the report’s evidence of incomplete strategic planning and risk 

assessment, inadequate information management, and insufficient 

coordination supports the conclusion. Given that DHS generally concurred 

with all of the recommendations, which address these issues, and said they 

were key to a successful R&D program, we believe that implementing them 

will strengthen TSA’s and DHS’s ability to provide Congress with 

reasonable assurance that the hundreds of millions of dollars that are being 

invested in transportation security R&D are being invested cost-effectively 

to address the highest priority transportation security risks. 

In its comments on the draft report, DOT said that its efforts to coordinate 

research planning with DHS and TSA support our finding that there is room 

for significant improvement. According to DOT, it offers substantial 

transportation expertise that could provide critical input for identifying and 

prioritizing the transportation security R&D agenda. DOT also said that it is 

anxious to work with DHS and TSA to create a mutually beneficial working 

environment that taps its transportation experience and expertise while the 

department benefits from DHS’s security expertise. DOT believes that 

through effective interagency coordination, it could work with DHS and 

TSA to ensure that important research needs are met in areas such as 

critical transportation infrastructure protection, as well as in responding 

to, and recovering from, a terrorist attack on the transportation system. 

Finally, DOT said that coordinating R&D activities represents an area that 

could benefit by being included in an annex to an overall memorandum of 

agreement between DOT and DHS such as we recommended. DOT said it 

fully supports the completion of a comprehensive memorandum of 

agreement with DHS and is working to bring one to fruition. 

As arranged with your offices, unless you publicly announce its contents 

earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 20 days after the 

date of this letter. At that time, we will send copies of this report to 

interested congressional committees and to the Secretary of Homeland 

Security, the Secretary of Transportation, the Secretary of Energy, the 

Secretary of Defense, the Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security for the 

Transportation Security Administration, and the Administrator of the 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration. We will make copies 

Page 48 GAO­04­890 Transportation Security R&D 
available to others upon request. In addition, this report will be available at 

no charge on our Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix V. If you have any 

questions about this report, please contact me on (202) 512-2834 or at 

siggerudk@gao.gov. 

Katherine Siggerud 

Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues 

Page 49 GAO­04­890 Transportation Security R&D 
List of Congressional Addressees 

The Honorable John L. Mica 

Chairman, Subcommittee on Aviation 

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 

House of Representatives


The Honorable Sherwood L. Boehlert 

Chairman, Committee on Science 

House of Representatives


The Honorable Harold Rogers 

Chairman, Subcommittee on Homeland Security 

Committee on Appropriations 

House of Representatives


The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman 

Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Governmental Affairs 

United States Senate


The Honorable Ernest F. Hollings 

Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Commerce, 

Science, and Transportation 

United States Senate 

Page 50 GAO­04­890 Transportation Security R&D 
Appendix I 

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology


The objectives of this report were to review (1) the transportation security 

research and development (R&D) projects that the Transportation Security 

Administration (TSA), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and 

other agencies funded in fiscal year 2003 and have budgeted for in fiscal 

year 2004; the status of these projects; and the reasonableness of the 

distribution of these projects by mode and (2) the extent to which TSA and 

DHS are managing their transportation security R&D programs according 

to applicable laws and best practices recommended by the National 

Academy of Sciences and the National Research Council. 

To complete our first objective, we obtained and analyzed information from 

TSA, DHS, and the Department of Transportation (DOT) on the 

transportation security R&D projects that they were funding and are 

planning to fund. Within DHS, in addition to TSA and the Science and 

Technology Directorate, we collected this information from the U.S. Coast 

Guard, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection agency, and the U.S. Secret 

Service, which DHS officials identified as also conducting transportation 

security R&D. Information on the transportation security R&D projects 

that TSA and DHS plan to fund in fiscal year 2005 was not yet available. 

Because we found during our review that DOT was continuing to conduct 

some transportation security R&D, we obtained and analyzed information 

on the transportation security R&D projects that it was funding in fiscal 

years 2003 and 2004. At DOT, we obtained this information from the 

Federal Railroad Administration, the Federal Transit Administration, the 

Federal Highway Administration, the Federal Motor Carriers Safety 

Administration, the Office of Pipeline Safety, and the Research and Special 

Projects Administration. Regarding their transportation security R&D 

projects, we asked these agencies to provide project descriptions and 

information on who was performing the research (such as private 

contractors or national laboratories); their phase of research; anticipated 

dates of completion, initial deployment, and deployment; and funding data 

for fiscal years 2003 and 2004. We then aggregated these data to determine 

the focus of TSA’s and DHS’s transportation security projects in terms of 

the modes of transportation and program areas. On the basis of interviews 

with TSA, DHS, DOT, and National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

(NASA) officials regarding how their agencies ensure that these data are 

complete and accurate, we determined that these data were sufficiently 

reliable for purposes of this report. To gain a better understanding of the 

types of technologies involved in transportation security, we reviewed 

reports prepared by GAO, the DOT Inspector General, the Homeland 

Security Research Corporation (a private research organization), and 

others and attended conferences where transportation security R&DPage 51 GAO­04­890 Transportation Security R&D 
Appendix I


Objectives, Scope, and Methodology


related technologies were discussed. To help evaluate the reasonableness 

of the R&D projects that TSA, DHS, and DOT have funded in terms of the 

modes of transportation and program areas addressed, we convened a 

meeting of transportation security and technology experts. At our request, 

the National Research Council selected the experts, who were affiliated 

with state transportation departments, universities, national laboratories, 

private industry, and other organizations and were knowledgeable about 

transportation security technologies. 

To complete our second objective, we first identified and reviewed the laws 

relevant to the management of TSA’s and DHS’s R&D programs, including 

the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, the Homeland Security Act, 

and the Government Performance and Results Act. We also identified and 

reviewed best practices applicable to R&D programs identified by leading 

research organizations, such as the National Research Council and the 

National Academy of Sciences. In addition, we interviewed TSA and DHS 

officials about their strategic planning, coordination, and R&D acceleration 

efforts. We also reviewed GAO reports on TSA’s strategic planning, on 

DHS’s interaction with the Department of Energy (DOE) National 

Laboratories, on risk management principles, on implementing the 

Government Performance and Results Act, and on transportation security 

challenges and a DHS Inspector General report on the Science and 

Technology Directorate’s operations. We then compared these laws and 

best practices with TSA’s and DHS’s management of their R&D programs. 

To determine the extent to which TSA and DHS were coordinating with 

each other and other federal agencies, we interviewed officials at TSA, 

DHS, DOT, NASA, the Technical Support Working Group, five DOE national 

laboratories that were conducting transportation security R&D for TSA or 

DHS, and three universities that were conducting R&D for TSA. We visited 

the national laboratories in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, and Los Alamos, New 

Mexico, because the Oak Ridge National Laboratory was conducting more 

transportation security R&D projects for TSA, and the Los Alamos National 

Laboratory was conducting more transportation security projects for DHS, 

compared with the other national laboratories. To determine the extent to 

which TSA and DHS had outreached to the transportation industry and 

potential technology providers, we interviewed officials from 

transportation industry associations and attended DHS industry 

workshops. In addition, we interviewed a number of members of the 

Homeland Security Industries Association, an organization of homeland 

security technology vendors, to obtain their views on TSA’s and DHS’s 

technology solicitation processes and outreach efforts. The association 

identified the members who chose to discuss their views with us. At our 

Page 52 GAO­04­890 Transportation Security R&D 
Appendix I


Objectives, Scope, and Methodology


request, the transportation security and technology experts also provided 

comments on TSA’s and DHS’s management of their R&D programs. 

We conducted our review in Washington, D.C.; Arlington, Virginia; Atlantic 

City, New Jersey; Oak Ridge, Tennessee; and Los Alamos, New Mexico, 

from July 2003 through September 2004 in accordance with generally 

accepted government auditing standards. 

Page 53 GAO­04­890 Transportation Security R&D 
Appendix II 

Industry Is Independently Developing New 

and Emerging Transportation Security 

Technologies 

According to a TSA official, private industry and universities are 

researching and developing several new and emerging technologies that 

are applicable to transportation security, in some cases without any 

funding from TSA or DHS. The official said that TSA has focused most of its 

R&D on making improvements to deployed technologies and testing and 

evaluating near-term technologies. However, the official stated that TSA 

needs to start devoting more funding to researching and developing longterm, high-risk, but potentially high-payoff technologies. Examples of new 

and emerging technologies include the following: 

•	 Terahertz imaging uses terahertz radiation1 to create images of 

concealed objects or to reveal their chemical composition. The rays can 

be directed at a person or an object from a source, with reflected rays 

captured by a detection device. The Homeland Security Research 

Corporation (a private research organization) reports that terahertz 

imaging will be an excellent tool for screening baggage. Terahertz 

imaging has been used in the laboratory to detect explosives on people 

through several layers of clothing. TSA is considering funding the 

development of this technology for detecting explosives in 

containerized air cargo. 

•	 Nuclear resonance fluorescence imaging uses a high-intensity light 

source to identify the atomic composition of a target object. Nuclear 

resonance fluorescence imaging has the potential to detect explosives 

and nuclear materials in baggage, trucks, and cargo containers. 

According to a TSA official, TSA may fund R&D on this technology in 

the future. 

•	 Microsensors are miniature devices that convert information about the 

environment into an electrical form that can be read by instruments. 

There are many types of microsensors, some of which have the potential 

to detect explosives. In fiscal year 2003, TSA funded R&D at two 

national laboratories and NASA on several different types of 

microsensors. A TSA official said that several universities are currently 

doing work on other types of microsensors that have potential to meet 

TSA’s needs, but that TSA did not fund any of this work in 2004. 

1

Terahertz radiation is the part of the electromagnetic spectrum between microwave 

radiation and infrared radiation. With wavelengths of between 30 micrometers and 1 

millimeter, it is non-ionizing and harmless to living tissue. 

Page 54 GAO­04­890 Transportation Security R&D 
Appendix II 

Industry Is Independently Developing New 

and Emerging Transportation Security 

Technologies 

•	 Automated detection algorithms are computer software that processes 

data obtained by detection systems and automatically indicates the 

presence of an explosive or weapon. Although TSA has funded the 

development of such software for its currently deployed computed 

tomography explosives detection systems, it has not yet funded the 

development of such software to process images produced by emerging 

detection technologies, such as X-ray backscatter and millimeter wave.2 

A TSA official believes that incorporating automated detection 

algorithms could substantially reduce the operational cost of future 

detection systems by reducing the need for screeners. According to this 

official, TSA may fund the development of these algorithms in the 

future. 

•	 Raman spectroscopy uses laser light to determine the chemical 

composition of an object and can be used to screen passengers, carry-on 

and checked baggage, cargo, and boarding passes for explosives. 

•	 Nuclear magnetic resonance directs radio waves at an object that has 

been placed in a magnetic field to determine the presence of explosives. 

Nuclear magnetic resonance can be used to screen liquids in containers 

in carry-on and checked baggage for explosives. 

2

Backscatter X-ray detects reflected X-ray energy, providing an image that highlights organic 

materials, such as explosives. Millimeter wave energy analysis provides a 360-degree image 

of a person or object in order to detect weapons and explosives. 

Page 55 GAO­04­890 Transportation Security R&D 
Appendix III 

GAO’s Panel of Transportation Security and 

Technology Experts 

Name Affiliation Expertise 

Norm Abramson - Chair Southwest Research Institute Research policy 

David Albright New Mexico Department of Transportation Surface transportation 

Cheryl Bitner AAI Corporation Human factors, passenger screening 

technologies 

Joedy Cambridge National Research Council, Transportation Transportation policy 

Research Board 

Robert Gallamore Northwestern University Railroads, cybersecurity 

Patrick Griffin Sandia National Laboratories Transportation security technologies, neutron 

spectroscopy 

Yacov Haimes University of Virginia Risk analysis 

Daniel Hall Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Mass transit 

Authority 

Douglas Harris Anacapa Sciences Human factors 

William Harris Consultant Commissioner - President’s Council on Critical 

Infrastructure Protection 

Thomas Hartwick Consultant Transportation security technologies 

Sandra Hyland Tokyo Electron Massachusetts Transportation security technologies 

James Killian National Research Council, National Transportation security 

Materials Advisory Board 

Eva Lerner-Lam Palisades Consulting Group Maritime/Land security 

Len Limmer Consultant Airports, passenger screening technologies 

Terry Lowe Los Alamos National Laboratory Organization 

Toni Marechaux National Research Council, National Transportation security technologies 

Materials Advisory Board 

Harry Martz Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory X-ray technologies, nondestructive evaluation 

Emily Ann Meyer National Research Council, National Technology policy 

Materials Advisory Board 

Dan Murray American Transportation Research Institute Trucking and freight transportation security and 

technologies 

Daniel O’Neil CRADA International Chair, Transportation Research Board 

Committee on Critical Transportation 

Infrastructure Protection 

Clint Oster Indiana University, School of Public & Cargo/Baggage Screening, Aviation, 

Environmental Affairs Transportation Infrastructure 

Joseph Schofer Northwestern University Incident response and management on 

transportation networks 

Eric Schwartz The Boeing Company Aviation and aircraft technology 

Edmund Soliday Consultant Airlines, passenger screening technologies 

Page 56 GAO­04­890 Transportation Security R&D 
Appendix III 

GAO’s Panel of Transportation Security and 

Technology Experts 

(Continued From Previous Page) 

Name Affiliation Expertise 

Mike Story Consultant Mass spectrometry, passenger screening 

technologies 

Joyce Wenger Science Applications International Freight, intelligent transportation, traffic 

Corporation modeling 

Jeffery Western Wisconsin Department of Transportation Surface Transportation - Highways 

Source: National Research Council. 

Note: These experts either attended the March 2, 2004, meeting or provided written comments after 

reviewing information that we provided to them. 

Page 57 GAO­04­890 Transportation Security R&D 
Appendix IV 

Comments from the Department of Homeland 

Security 

Note: GAO comments 

supplementing those in 

the report text appear 

at the end of this 

appendix. 

Page 58 GAO­04­890 Transportation Security R&D 
Appendix IV 

Comments from the Department of Homeland 

Security 

Page 59 GAO­04­890 Transportation Security R&D 
Appendix IV 

Comments from the Department of Homeland 

Security 

See comment 1. 

See comment 2. 

See comment 2. 

See comment 2. 

Page 60 GAO­04­890 Transportation Security R&D 
Appendix IV 

Comments from the Department of Homeland 

Security 

See comment 3. 

See comment 4. 

See comment 5. 

Page 61 GAO­04­890 Transportation Security R&D 
Appendix IV 

Comments from the Department of Homeland 

Security 

See comment 6. 

Page 62 GAO­04­890 Transportation Security R&D 
Appendix IV 

Comments from the Department of Homeland 

Security 

The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Homeland 

Security’s letter dated August 31, 2004. 

GAO Comments 1. 

2. 

3. 

4. 

5. 

6. 

We agree with DHS that aviation security is currently the primary focus 

of TSA’s R&D projects, and that many aviation projects provide data 

that are useful for other transportation security programs. Because 

these topics were discussed in the draft report, we made no change. 

DHS provided comments on three projects that members of our panel 

of transportation security experts suggested should be considered for 

future funding. We added this information to the report. 

DHS said that the report should indicate that TSA has two advisory 

committees—the National Academy of Sciences and the Security 

Advisory Panel—that contain experts from various modes of 

transportation. We added this information to the report. 

DHS commented on a project that one of our panelist believed should 

not be funded (a $30,000 project to test a prototype of a new, handheld 

ion mobility spectrometry explosives trace detector) because it could 

be purchased off the shelf. According to DHS, TSA funded this project 

because the vendor demonstrated a promising technology. We added 

this comment to our report. 

We continue to believe that DHS’s and TSA’s R&D strategic plans should 

contain measurable objectives. Similarly, the National Academy of 

Science indicated that research programs should be described in 

strategic and performance plans. Therefore, we made no changes to the 

report in response to this comment. 

DHS noted that TSA recently established a working group to update 

and improve the current Web site that addresses technology ideas, 

products, and services to make it more user-friendly. TSA plans to 

implement the improvements early next year. We added this 

information to the report. 

Page 63 GAO­04­890 Transportation Security R&D 
Appendix V 

GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 


GAO Contacts	 Katherine Siggerud, (202) 512-2834 or siggerudk@gao.gov 

Tammy Conquest, (202) 512-5234 or conquestt@gao.gov 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

(540068) 

In addition to the individuals named above, other key contributors to this 

report were Dennis Amari, Carol Anderson-Guthrie, Nancy Boardman, 

Gerald Dillingham, Elizabeth Eisenstadt, David Goldstein, Brandon Haller, 

Bob Homan, Dave Hooper, Andrew Huddleston, Michael Mgebroff, Claire 

van der Lee, and Don Watson. 

Page 64 GAO­04­890 Transportation Security R&D 
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