U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

65–150 CC WASHINGTON : 2000

PEACEKEEPING IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

OF THE CONGO

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 15, 2000

Serial No. 106–115

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international relations

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COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York, Chairman

WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois

DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey

DAN BURTON, Indiana

ELTON GALLEGLY, California

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina

DANA ROHRABACHER, California

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California

PETER T. KING, New York

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio

MARSHALL ‘‘MARK’’ SANFORD, South

Carolina

MATT SALMON, Arizona

AMO HOUGHTON, New York

TOM CAMPBELL, California

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

KEVIN BRADY, Texas

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina

PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio

GEORGE P. RADANOVICH, California

JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado

SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut

TOM LANTOS, California

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American

Samoa

MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio

CYNTHIA A. MCKINNEY, Georgia

ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida

PAT DANNER, Missouri

EARL F. HILLIARD, Alabama

BRAD SHERMAN, California

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida

STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey

JIM DAVIS, Florida

EARL POMEROY, North Dakota

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York

BARBARA LEE, California

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York

JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania

RICHARD J. GARON, Chief of Staff

KATHLEEN BERTELSEN MOAZED, Democratic Chief of Staff

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman

AMO HOUGHTON, New York

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio

TOM CAMPBELL, California

GEORGE RADANOVICH, California

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey

ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York

BARBARA LEE, California

TOM SHEEHY, Subcommittee Staff Director

MALIK M. CHAKA, Professional Staff Member

CHARISSE GLASSMAN, Democratic Professional Staff Member

CHARMAINE V. HOUSEMAN, Staff Associate

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C O N T E N T S

Page

WITNESSES

The Honorable Richard Holbrooke, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations .... 9

APPENDIX

Prepared statements:

The Honorable Edward R. Royce, a Representative in Congress from California and Chairman, Subcommittee on Africa ................................................. 30

The Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman, a Representative in Congress from New

York and Chairman, Committee on International Relations ........................... 32

The Honorable Sam Gejdenson, a Representative in Congress from Connecticut .................................................................................................................. 34

The Honorable Tony Hall, a Representative in Congress from Ohio .................. 35

His Excellency Faida M. Mitifu, Ambassador of the Democratic Republic

of the Congo .......................................................................................................... 39

Professor Ernest Wamba dia Wamba, President of the Rally for Congolese

Democracy ............................................................................................................. 43

His Excellency Dr. Simbi Mubako, Ambassador of the Republic of Zimbawe .... 47

Government of Namibia .......................................................................................... 53

Embassy of the Republic of Angola ........................................................................ 60

Her Excellency Edith G. Ssempala, Ambassador of Uganda ............................... 62

His Excellency Dr. Richard Sezibera, Ambassador of Rwanda ............................ 68

The Honorable Richard Holbrooke ......................................................................... 73

Additional material:

Questions submitted for the record for the Department of State ........................ 79

Response to questions submitted for the record from the Department of State 81

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PEACEKEEPING IN THE DEMOCRATIC

REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

Tuesday, February 15, 2000,

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, Washington, D.C.

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:09 p.m., in room

2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Edward R. Royce

(Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Royce, Chabot, Tancredo, Payne,

Meeks, and Lee.

Also present: Representatives Gilman, Bereuter, McKinney,

Crowley, and Hall.

Mr. ROYCE. [presiding] The hearing of the Subcommittee on Africa will come to order. Before we begin, let me apologize for the

tight quarters here today. As you know, the International Relations

Committee full hearing room is undergoing renovation and so every

effort was made to better accommodate you, but I’m afraid these

are our quarters for this particular hearing.

I’d like to welcome back all the Subcommittee Members. This is

our first hearing of this Congress’ second session and I’m pleased

that we have the opportunity today to examine such a critical and

timely issue as the proposed second phase of the United Nations

peacekeeping mission for the Democratic Republic of Congo.

The Subcommittee has been closely following developments in

Congo for several years. I led a congressional delegation to Congo

in 1997 and met with President Kabila a few days after he was inaugurated there. The Administration, at this point in time, is now

prepared to approve a substantial peacekeeping effort for Congo.

This hearing will give Subcommittee Members an opportunity to

better understand American options regarding the Congo.

The Great Lakes conflict is a complex and intense one. The level

of fear, insecurity, and mistrust in the region is as high as anywhere in the world. How could it be otherwise, given the backdrop

of the 1994 genocide? This makes the proposed U.N. peacekeeping

operation a great challenge.

While the Administration and the U.N. have a formulated plan,

success for this ambitious undertaking is far from assured. To be

successful, this operation, built on the fragile Lusaka Peace Agreement will have to have its share of breaks. Any scenario for success

should be tested against the UN’s large-scale Congo peacekeeping

operation, which ended in failure in 1964. A key to success today

will be making good on the Lusaka-mandated national dialogue,

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designed to bring a democratically based political stability to

Congo.

In facing this challenge, there can be no room for revisionism. In

1998, President Kabila did not have his democratic aspirations

frustrated by the renewed outbreak of conflict. Before the August

1998 invasion he banned political parties. Before that invasion, he

had unduly restricted nongovernmental organizations, harassed

leading political figures, including Mr. Tshisekedi, and repressed

the vibrant civil society that had struggled under Mobutu. In hindsight, more external democratic pressure should have been brought

to bear. Meanwhile, conditions in rebel-held territory have been no

better. There are accounts of attacks on religious independence, for

example. I make these points to illustrate the extent of the challenge that the U.N. is attempting to tackle.

I also want to suggest that we have some recent experience that

should be valuable as the U.S. and U.N. attempt to prod along the

national dialogue. Congolese democrats want external pressure,

and it’s incumbent upon the international community in proceeding

with this large commitment to apply that pressure.

Bringing about a successful national dialogue is but one of the

many concerns we should all have about this plan. That doesn’t

mean, though, that the U.N. peacekeeping operation should not

proceed. In 1994, the international community sat on the sidelines

as nearly 1 million men and women and children were slaughtered

in Rwanda. Three years ago, at a subcommittee hearing on the

Congo, as the Mobutu regime was literally dying, I said that the

U.S. has a role to play in the Congo because we can make a difference and because we have interests in doing so.

It’s worth noting that Americans long ago expressed a humanitarian interest in the Congo. The noted journalist and historian

George Washington Williams and Mark Twain were central figures

in a worldwide movement against slave labor in King Leopold’s

Congo.

Today’s genocide lurks and we have increasingly evident national

security interests centered on rogue regime activity in the Congo,

which I raised at our last hearing on this crisis. At that hearing,

I also quoted a U.S. Institute for Peace study which called the

Lusaka Peace Agreement, quote, ‘‘A last exit on the region’s highway to hell.’’ Now that’s strong language and it’s strong language

that is still valid.

But, as we proceed with this U.N. option in an attempt to make

a difference, let’s make sure that we give ourselves and the people

of the region the best chance of success. That means not band-aiding problems. In addition to prodding a successful national dialogue, there needs to be real disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration in the Congo. Territorial integrity must be respected

and nonsignatories to Lusaka must be dealt with.

Moreover, the U.N. needs competent peacekeepers. I share the

chairman of the International Relations Committee’s recently expressed concern over the incompetence of U.N. peacekeepers in Sierra Leone. High operating standards must be set. While Congress

should not put up a stop sign for this peacekeeping operation, rules

of the road must be established and must be obeyed.

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Finally, it’s important that the U.S. doesn’t turn this operation

over entirely to the United Nations. While the Congo peacekeeping

operation will not involve American troops, it must be bolstered by

the active diplomatic engagement of the world’s superpower. Success, as I’ve said, will require good luck. The parties to the conflict

will have to make good on their Lusaka obligations. I urge them

to look toward the future and do so. Success will also require a

strong focus and will and a great deal of energy and imagination

by the United States. Without this American commitment, failure

is assured. I know that Ambassador Holbrooke appreciates this reality.

The stakes for this peacekeeping operation are high. It is no exaggeration to suggest that the lives of thousands of Africans, if not

more, are on the line. I will work to maximize this operation’s

chance for success, for failure is likely to sow devastating consequences.

[The statement of Mr. Royce appears in the appendix.]

Mr. ROYCE. I’d like to now recognize the Ranking Member of the

Subcommittee, Mr. Payne of New Jersey, for an opening statement.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and let me

once again commend you for your attention to your position as

Chairman of this Subcommittee. I appreciate your calling this very

important hearing on peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic of

Congo.

This Subcommittee tends to look at the totality of the issue and

what comes out of it, we always try to have a fair, a balanced, and

a direct approach to the policy. I have to indicate that, on this Subcommittee in particular, bipartisanism is the way that we move

forward. I’d also like to recognize Chairman Ben Gilman who is

Chairman of the all overall Committee and has shown a strong interest in Africa.

Let me also thank Ambassador Holbrooke for coming before this

Subcommittee today. It was his tenacity that brought all of the signatories to the Lusaka accord to New York at the United Nations

headquarters. I know it took a lot of persuasion because other

meetings were called on the continent of Africa. The Mobutu Conference, for example, where all of the signatories did not attend. So

I know it took an extra-special effort to bring all of the participants

even five times further than the meeting that was held on the continent. So we really appreciate his tenacity.

The interest that the Security Council, under his leadership, during the month of January, having President Mandela there talking

about the Burundi situation; having Vice President Gore there

talking about the whole crisis of HIV virus that causes AIDS,

which will have to be confronted on a worldwide basis. Of course,

persuading seven heads of state to come to the United Nations and

let me commend you for that.

As you know, this is our fourth hearing of the Subcommittee during the past 3 years. In each of those four previous meetings, we’ve

had the one who has been there right on the firing line year in and

year out as it relates to African affairs, our Assistant Secretary of

State for African Affairs, Dr. Susan Rice, who not only for the

Congo but in the early days of the Ethiopian/Eritrean situation and

the problems in Liberia, but wherever there was a conflict on the

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continent, it was her skillful negotiations and ability that has

brought us this far. It’s good to see you here too.

The development in the Congo has drastically changed over the

40 years since Congo gained its independence from Belgium. The

conflict in the Congo is described as Africa’s first world war, with

nearly 12 countries involved.

I hope that everyone will turn their phones off, because it is really distracting. If there’s something very important, wait outside

and they can get you there.

That the involvement of so many countries really is a move in

a direction that we do not like to see. With the three rebel groups

getting safe haven for their refugees or for providing troops or providing resources really is a dangerous trend that we have seen over

the past few years.

It is ironic that during the Cold War, the U.S. spent more than $13 trillion on Defense, with Zaire profiting as a major staging

ground. So much of the problems that we see there, the disintegration and lack of leadership, is certainly a direct result, as you

know, of our world policy of the Cold War. Therefore, in my opinion, we, therefore, since we assisted getting Zaire into the problem

that it’s in, we have the same responsibility, in my opinion, to help

them come out of the problem that’s been created by 30 years of

Cold War activities.

Despite the vast mineral, agricultural, and water resources and

its eminent potential as a country to serve as an economic power

house for the whole continent of Africa, Congo has been plundered

in nearly 30 years because of the vacuum left by a lack of leadership and, therefore, the potential and the people have suffered dramatically.

I am concerned about the ethnic hatred and the genocidal overtones coming from the Uganda/Congo border. I think that arms embargo must be strongly enforced and possibly extended to countries

that provide weapons to ethnic groups inciting genocide. We must

strive to dismantle the institutional framework that underlie genocidal hatred.

A key to all of this is a national dialogue which will, hopefully,

let us finally begin to talk about disarmament and demobilization

and reintegration and resettlement and bringing the people of the

Congo into having the determination on their future.

So, in conclusion, let me say that I had the opportunity to glance

at the statement made by the Senator from Virginia, Senator Warner, where he stated that he did not want a single dollar going into

Africa until we honor our commitments in Europe. I think that this

is an unfortunate comment. I hope that he really didn’t mean it.

I know that he seems to be too intelligent to make a statement like

that and, evidently, was misquoted. I know that he doesn’t mean

that.

We should certainly move forward. I know you’ll have an opportunity to clarify this issue. We know it’s a big country; much is at

stake. But I know that we need to have everyone involved.

Another thing that disturbs me is I hear from some of my good

friends on the other side, not on this Subcommittee, but the Full

Committee in general, some of the staff members saying that we

need to be sure that everything is in place before we move forward.

5

I just hasten to use as an example of stumbled peace talks, we’re

in our 42nd year of peace talks in areas and we have never stopped

funding because we’ve had indictments or convictions. We’ve had

politicians go to jail. We’ve had failed negotiations. We’ve had people walk out. But, for example, Fiscal Year 2000, we see another $1 billion

added. 11.3 increase, for example, for the Wye Accord, which I support wholeheartedly and I have supported, for example, aid to

Israel as long as I’ve been in Congress. But I’ve never heard people

talk about let’s not do it until everything is right, because we

would have stopped it a dozen times, there. Thank you.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Payne.

I’d like to now turn to the Chairman of the International Relations Committee, Mr. Gilman, who would like to make a statement.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you.

Mr. ROYCE. Welcome, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Chairman Royce. I want to thank you

for arranging this important and timely meeting on this important

issue.

We want to welcome Ambassador Holbrooke and Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Susan Rice to our Committee.

We appreciate your efforts to focus the Security Council’s attentions on Africa during the month of January. We’ve been impressed

with your personal energy and commitment, Mr. Ambassador, to

address some of the world’s most intractable conflicts. We’re

pleased that Chairman Royce was able to accommodate your request for an opening hearing on this important issue.

I read your congressional notification with interest and had a

number of questions. In fact, my staff conveyed some 11 modest

questions to the State Department last Wednesday and we requested responses to them prior to this hearing. Regrettably, we

still don’t have any of those responses. We hope you can clarify

some of the questions we raised.

Mr. Chairman, with your permission I’d like to submit a copy of

the questions that we submitted to the State Department, for the

record.

Mr. ROYCE. That will be done.

[The information referred to appears in the appendix.]

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Ambassador, a few weeks ago Secretary Albright and National Security Advisor Sandy Berger emphasized their desire to

conduct a bipartisan foreign policy in close cooperation with the

Congress. I know from our many conversations that you share that

perspective and we thank you for reaching out to the Congress.

It is therefore distressing that we’ve experienced so little in the

way of forthright cooperation when it came to this important proposed peacekeeping operation. I assume it may be some laxity of

the Department. We would welcome your clarifying it.

Ambassador Holbrooke, you have rightly pointed out in the press

that Congress recognizes the importance of this conflict in the

Congo. However, it’s the duty of the legislative branch to ask questions of the executive before we commit hundreds of millions of dollars overseas on any issue. In like manner, we believe it’s the duty

of the executive branch to provide answers to those questions.

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The recent record of peacekeeping in Africa, regrettably, has not

been impressive. In Sierra Leone, for example, we just authorized

the expansion of the peacekeeping operation to 11,000 troops. To

date, there have been at least five separate incidents in which rebel

forces there have mugged U.N. peacekeepers and stolen rifles, and

ammunition, armored vehicles, fuel, rockets, and cash. We are only

3 months into that peacekeeping operation and it already appears

to be bogged down. We hope we’re not going to be confronted with

similar situations with regard to the Congo.

Your testimony here, of course, is not about Sierra Leone, but

about the Congo. Perhaps there is more reason to be hopeful in the

Congo, but there are, clearly, some obvious reasons for concern. If

Sierra Leone, a small nation with a comparatively good transportation infrastructure, presents such problems to U.N. peacekeepers,

we’re concerned what could happen in the Congo, a country 33

times that size. I think that that illustrates some of our concern.

Mr. Ambassador, in his famous treatise, Carl Von Clausewitz

warned leaders to consider carefully before embarking on war. He

wrote, ‘‘The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching active judgment that the statesman and commander has to make is to establish the kind of war on which they are embarking, either mistaking

it for or trying to turn it into something that’s alien to nature.’’

I believe that if Clausewitz were alive today, he might apply the

same dictum to all of our peacekeeping operations. Those of us who

support the United Nations, and I include myself, and who believe

it has a crucial role to play in Africa are concerned. However, we

fear the prospect of peacekeeping operations, like Somalia, are

poorly defined, could end badly, and leave in their wake little support for future endeavors.

I look forward, Mr. Ambassador, to your testimony here today

and we look forward to reviewing the written answers to questions

we asked about prior to approving funds for this peacekeeping mission.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The statement of Mr. Gilman appears in the appendix.]

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also have a statement

from the Full Committee’s Ranking Member which, without objection, I will enter into the record.

[The statement of Mr. Gejdenson appears in the appendix.]

We’ve also been joined by the Vice Chairman of the International

Relations Committee, Mr. Doug Bereuter of Nebraska.

Mr. Bereuter, do you have a statement you’d like to make at this

time?

Mr. BEREUTER. Chairman Royce, thank you for letting me attend

today’s hearing since I’m not a Member of this Subcommittee. I

wanted to hear the testimony. I think the subject of the hearing is

very important.

I haven’t seen Chairman Gilman’s questions. I may have some of

those questions myself. But by my presence here today, I wanted

to demonstrate my support for the initiative that Ambassador

Holbrooke and Secretary Rice will be explaining to us today. Beyond the importance of it and the legitimacy of taking this initiative, I think it also will enhance the American credibility in the

7

United Nations and make it more likely that some of the reforms

we’ve been pushing for, in fact, are reality.

Thank you very much, Mr. Royce, for letting me sit in with you.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Bereuter. We’ve also been joined by

Ms. Lee of Oakland, Mr. Chabot of Ohio, Mr. Tancredo of Colorado,

Ms. Cynthia McKinney of Georgia, Mr. Crowley of New York, and

Mr. Tony Hall of Ohio. All members will have a chance later to ask

questions, but if any of you would like to have a brief opening remark at this time, we’ll open it up. We’ve also been joined by Mr.

Meeks of New York. Thank you.

Any questions or any opening statement at this time?

Ms. LEE. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ROYCE. Yes, Congresswoman.

Ms. LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me just briefly thank

you and our Chairman, Mr. Gilman, and our Ranking Member, Mr.

Payne, for this hearing. Also Assistant Secretary Susan Rice and

our Ambassador for being here.

This is such an important issue for this country and for all of us

here. Peace and stability in Africa is critical if we’re going to address the HIV/AIDS pandemic and all of the other issues that the

continent needs to address and very quickly must address. I want

to thank the Ambassador for really helping us focus on the whole

AIDS crisis in Africa because certainly none of these issues are separate. They all are interrelated.

So I look forward to your testimony today. I hope that we can

hear what the United States is doing in terms of ensuring that the

Lusaka Agreement is moved forward and also in terms of peacekeeping. Whatever it takes, I think we must move ahead in that

accord.

Thank you.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Congresswoman Lee. We’ve also been notified that Congressman Hall would like to make a brief statement.

I know he’s just back from Sierra Leone so Congressman Hall.

Mr. HALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do have a statement for

the record. I won’t read it. I just have a couple of points I want

to make. I, like the other representatives, want to thank you for

allowing me to be here. I don’t serve on this Subcommittee. I don’t

serve on the Full Committee. I used to be on it when I was in my

first term in the Congress.

It’s good to be with Ambassador Holbrooke and Assistant Secretary Rice. You’re talking to our best people; our great representatives of our government. They have been at the heart of so many

important issues and have performed so well. So I look forward to

their testimony.

I’m glad that you’re focusing on Africa as well. It fits right in

with the fact that 5,000 Americans are coming to Washington from

all over the country this week to talk just about Africa and about

the issues and about our policies.

I’m troubled about some of the aspects of the proposal that’s before us. There are many key points that all of you have mentioned.

I think the one key point that I just want to touch on briefly is the

fact that I think that, at the heart of this problem, are diamonds.

It’s an issue that, I hope, that we can address this year. The U.S.

estimates that the trade in Congolese diamonds is about $600 milVerDate 11-MAY-2000 09:36 Sep 21, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 65150.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
8

lion per year. That’s cash. News reports say $20 million worth of

Congolese diamonds pour through Rwanda and Uganda every

month.

I think diamonds are at the root of wars in three other countries:

Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Angola. Capturing diamond-rich regions

is one aim of these wars. Frank Wolf and I went to Sierra Leone.

We’ve been all over Africa together. We see what diamonds do

when they’re used to buy weapons that terrorize people and keep

these civil wars going. In the past 10 years, we have put about $2 billion on humani- tarian aid into these countries but, at the same time, $10 billion

in illicit diamonds has come out of them. Great Britain and Canada

are with us on this. As Britain’s foreign secretary, Robin Cook, put

it, ‘‘The diamond market is pretty tight. The places you can sell

uncut diamonds are pretty limited. It should not be beyond our wit

to devise an international regime in cooperation with the diamond

trade that cuts off the flow of these diamonds to use them to buy

arms and fuel conflicts.’’

So far, the diamond industry hasn’t done much. They’ve had a

public relations campaign going on. It hasn’t really helped very

much. They could police themselves. We’ve introduced a bill to cutoff illicit diamonds, to let Americans know where these diamonds

are coming from. As a matter of fact, we buy 65 percent of all the

diamonds in the world. We ought to know where they’re coming

from. The United Nations has the ability to stop this. They can

help on Congo right now, by sanctioning Congolese diamonds that

are fueling this war.

So, with that, I’d just want to thank you, Mr. Chairman. It’s a

very important hearing.

[The statement of Mr. Hall appears in the appendix.]

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Hall.

We also have Mr. Meeks of New York who wanted to make an

opening statement.

Mr. MEEKS. Yes and I’ll be brief.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you.

Mr. MEEKS. But I just wanted to first thank you, Mr. Chairman,

and Ranking Member Payne for conducting this hearing and holding this hearing today. But I particularly want to thank Ambassador Holbrooke and Secretary Rice for your leadership on this

matter.

The unprecedented event that took place at the U.N. Security

Council earlier surely let all of us in the United States and the

world know that Africa is a focus. As I look at that map on the

wall, it just reminds me of how small the world has become. What

is taking place in Africa will indeed affect us here in the United

States of America and those all around the globe, as my colleague

has talked about, particularly in reference to the AIDS epidemic.

When you talk about the economies of all the world, it affects the

economy here. I just think that it is very important for us, at this

point, to not, because of what’s going on, to not withdraw, but we

need to be more affirmative in our actions as to what’s taking place

in Africa.

When I look at, and I know it’s a start, of the 5,000 some-odd

troops that we have there and we talk about how to enforce the

9

Lusaka Agreement, we know that that’s nowhere near enough,

when we look at the size of that great country and that we need

to let all of the countries that are involved know, I mean, and there

are several countries that are involved in this, that the world is indeed looking at them. That is what will help force them to do what

took place at the U.N. Council: sit down, talk to one another, and

work out an agreement and have someone to oversee those agreements so that we could make sure that we could have peace.

Our hands are not clean in this one. I don’t think that is clear.

Our hands are not clean and the Cold War will testify to that. I

think that we just have an obligation to make sure that we do all

that we can to have peace in the Congo and on the Continent of

Africa.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Meeks.

Now before we proceed, without objection, I will submit for the

record statements presented by several of the countries involved.

[Statements referred to appear in the appendix.]

We’re fortunate to have the presence of several Ambassadors, including Ambassador Mitifu of Congo here today. My message,

again, to the Ambassadors is that we all need to cooperate now to

make this process work. The international community’s commitment to Central Africa cannot be taken for granted.

We’ll now go to our first panel. Ambassador Richard Holbrooke

was confirmed by the Senate as the permanent U.S. representative

to the U.N. last August. This was the latest in a diplomatic career

that dates to 1962, when the Ambassador began his foreign career

fresh out of Brown University. During his distinguished career,

Ambassador Holbrooke has been a professional diplomat, a magazine editor, an author, a Peace Corps director, and an investment

banker.

Ambassador Holbrooke has taken a particular interest in Africa,

for which he should be commended. In December, he made a

lengthy tour of the Great Lakes region. In January, building on

this trip, he engineered the attendance of seven African heads of

state at a special session of the Security Council dedicated to the

Congo crisis, which I was able to attend. At that session, these African leaders recommitted to the lagging Lusaka peace process.

We look forward to hearing more about this process and the U.N.

and U.S. commitment to the region. Ambassador, we thank you for

your appearance. Before we begin, let me mention that the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Susan Rice, is with us

also, available for questions. Dr. Rice, we thank you. Ambassador.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE RICHARD HOLBROOKE, U.S.

AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED NATIONS; ACCOMPANIED BY

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS

SUSAN RICE

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Mr. Chairman, thank you so much for

inviting us to testify today. It’s a great honor to appear before your

Subcommittee for the first time. I am particularly pleased to be

joined by Susan Rice, who will answer the tough questions after I

deliver the single statement.

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The participation of so many members of this Committee in our

efforts in New York in the last 8 weeks is a remarkable and extraordinarily important fact. I would like to begin by thanking you,

Congressman Payne, Congressman Meeks, Congresswoman Lee,

Congressman Crowley, Congresswoman McKinney, Congressman

Bereuter, and, of course, Chairman Gilman and Congressman Hall

and many others who are not here today for coming to New York;

sitting with our delegation; meeting the permanent representatives; in your case, participating on the inner deliberations of the

Security Council in an unprecedented way.

I want to stress at the outset that in my 37 years in and out of

the government, this was the most intense congressional consultative process I’ve ever been involved in. I was glad that Chairman

Gilman made similar remarks last week at the Woodrow Wilson

Center after my speech. I believe that you sent a very important

signal to the U.N. membership and this went equally for the Members of the Senate who also visited. I think the U.N. permanent

representatives are far more knowledgeable today than they were

3 months ago as to the role of the Congress, both houses, both parties, in the way we make foreign policy.

I reiterate to those of you who haven’t yet joined us in New York

that we hope you will. Many of you can attest to whether the hospitality is sufficient or not, but we hope it is.

Your continued interest in Africa is essential. We need your support. We cannot forge, in a period in which two different parties in

an election year control the two branches of government, a foreign

policy for Africa or almost any other part of the world without a

bipartisan effort.

We need your support because, as Congressman Meeks and Congresswoman Lee and others, Chairman Royce, have just said, because Africa matters. I’m very struck by the fact that the National

Summit on Africa, which Leonard Robinson will begin in a few

days and which many of you will participate in, has as its motto,

‘‘Africa matters.’’ That has been their motto for some years and we

have adopted the same motto in New York in an effort to dispel

the pernicious and false argument that the United States follows

a double standard in regard to Africa, a point that Congressman

Payne addressed very specifically a moment ago.

Last December, we made a trip to 10 nations in Africa, accompanied by Senator Feingold and backed strongly by Chairman

Royce and Congressman Payne, neither of whom were able to go

but both of whom we consulted in detail before we left and who we

talked to as soon as we returned. Susan and I were on that trip

together along with Howard Wolpe. We had many items on our

agenda, but two dominated: the spread of HIV/AIDS and the crisis

in Congo.

We are not here today to discuss AIDS, but I want to echo what

Congresswoman Lee has already said. It is a scourge beyond imagination. We must deal with it.

We are proud that the Vice President came to New York to begin

the Month of Africa with a significant increase in what the Administration will ask for in regard to dealing with that problem. I’ve

heard that many of you are considering bills which would be even

higher than that number. I commend you for your attention. I

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know, because I spoke to President Clinton about this just 2 days

ago, that he wishes to deal with this problem head-on.

I can report to you today that the Security Council, having broken new ground by dealing with a health issue for the first time

in its history, intends to keep it up. The Economic and Social Council will be having meetings on it. We are going to be meeting with

businessmen in New York. We’re working very closely with the

White House. This was not a gimmick or a piece of theater; it was

the beginning of an intensification of an issue which we cannot

leave alone.

I’d now like to turn to the Congo, Mr. Chairman, because we believe, as you know, that the time has come to take the next steps

in the search to bring peace to that explosive area. You are aware,

of course, of the fact that on February 7, the State Department notified this Committee and other Members of the Congress that the

U.S. intends to support a resolution in the Security Council to expand the U.N. Observer Mission in the DRC, called MONUC for its

French initials, M-O-N-U-C. This peacekeeping operation will subsume and expand upon the current U.N. mission in the Congo. It

is imperative that we fulfill our responsibility to help.

No Security Council resolution has yet been adopted, but as we

speak here in Washington, my colleagues in New York are negotiating with members of the Security Council and other concerned

countries, many of whose Ambassadors, I’m glad to say, in Washington, are sitting behind us today. I’m very pleased that you all

could attend. We are negotiating with other Security Council members on the resolution, which we expect will be voted on next week

and, in any case, no earlier than February 23.

Let me now outline the background to the situation in the Congo

and also address the specific concerns that were raised by some of

you, particularly Chairman Gilman, Congressman Hall, and others.

Let me say at the outset, Mr. Chairman, Congressman Gilman,

that I regret that your questions were not answered prior to this

hearing. I read them this morning for the first time. I believe we

will answer most of them during this hearing, directly or indirectly,

and we will be happy, Congressman Gilman, to give to you a more

detailed written answer after this hearing.

As you know, we focused on Africa in January in the Security

Council. As several of the members have already said, we had

seven heads of state and I might add two of the three rebel signatories to Lusaka come to New York at the end of January for the

open meeting chaired by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright.

The summit meetings and the follow-up and the private meetings

not reported by the press went well. All of the leaders in New York

recommitted themselves to the Lusaka Agreement, including, and

I stress this, President Kabila, who was making his first trip ever

to the United States. We also had in New York former President

Masire of Botswana, who outlined his plans on the national dialogue.

This morning I spoke to Ambassador Swing in Kinshasa, who

had just concluded a 3-hour meeting with President Masire in

Kinshasa, had just met with the U.N. special representative and

was waiting to see President Kabila. He reported to us and asked

me to report to the committee that President Masire has gotten off

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to an excellent start in the national dialogue. In fact, if you want

to be precise about it, the national dialogue is not technically supposed to start for another month and a half or so, but President

Masire has done a kind of a pre-national-dialogue dialogue, which

we are glad is off to a quick start. The United States will do everything it can to support President Masire and the OAU.

But success, as all of you have already said, requires more than

just talk. Action is necessary to prevent further conflict and the resurgence of genocide and mass killing in Central Africa. The U.N.

can and must play a key role in this process and, in our view, the

next step is to deploy the next phase of the process called for by

Lusaka, that is a peacekeeping mission or, to be more precise, an

observer mission backed up by support and logistics and security

forces in the Congo as soon as it is practical to do so.

Allow me, therefore, Mr. Chairman, to review for you the phased

approach to peacekeeping in the Congo. I should stress that this

plan reflects what the U.S. Government, including the Pentagon,

has advocated as the best approach. For many months, the Pentagon-UN relationship—for many years, I should say—was perhaps

not as close as it should have been, but, in the last month, the Secretary of Defense William Cohen has come to New York to talk to

the leadership of the U.N. Undersecretary of Defense Walt

Slocombe has been there twice and has invited his United Nations

counterpart, Bernard Miyet, to Washington. Even as we speak, Secretary Cohen is in Pretoria on a swing through Africa.

So I think you can see that the Pentagon involvement with Africa has dramatically increased in the last 6 weeks. I stress this

point to you, because I do not think the U.S. Government can operate in these areas without an integrated policy that includes the

Pentagon.

After months in which the United States intentionally and publicly dragged its feet on this effort—and I had discussed this with

many people in this room. I remember particularly conversations I

had with Congresswoman McKinney on this point—we had intentionally dragged our feet because we felt that the U.N. Peacekeeping Office did not have a viable plan and we felt that the

Lusaka signatories had not been keeping their part of the bargain.

We feel that, after the Month of Africa in New York, after the Pentagon’s new hands-on relationship with the United Nations, that it

is time to move to the next phase of the process. This approach ties

U.N. deployments to concrete progress toward the Lusaka Agreement’s objectives, both political and military.

There are three phases to the Lusaka Agreement. The first phase

focused on establishing liaison with the parties, their field commanders, and the Joint Military Commission. Phase I was

launched in August of last year when the Security Council authorized MONUC to send up to 90 U.N. military liaison officers to the

Congo and to the capitals of other African countries involved in

this issue.

Implementation during Phase I was imperfect. The cease-fire has

been violated intermittently with heavy fighting in the northwest

and around the central town of Ikela. The U.N. liaison officers also

encountered some setbacks initially in their deployments. But

today, 79 of the 90 military liaison officers have deployed to rear

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headquarters on both sides in multiple locations. Still they’ve been

barred from some key sites, including those held in government

areas.

That being said, the peace process in Congo is moving forward,

although slowly. Fighting that was once wide-scale has been contained to a relatively smaller number of areas. The international

community is now poised for greater action and the parties have

renewed their commitments. In no way, Mr. Chairman, do I wish

to suggest by what I’ve just said that we minimize what is actually

going on in the area now or recent reports of refugees in eastern

Congo.

As a result of the meeting of the JMC political committee in

Harare on January 18 and the Security Council session that many

of you attended in New York on January 24, the Lusaka signatories reiterated their commitment to the peace process and to providing full security and access for all U.N. personnel. Significantly,

all parties including President Kabila, called for the immediate deployment of the Phase II military observer mission.

The Secretary General’s report on January 14 outlined the fundamental structure and mandate for Phase II. It recommended an

expansion of the current U.N. mission of 90 military liaison officers

to a 500-member observer mission with force protection and support, bringing the total up to 5,537 military personnel. If the Council authorizes this deployment, Phase II deployment of MONUC

would begin when and only when key conditions are met, including

security, access, and cooperation with U.N. personnel. No United

States peacekeeping troops would be on the ground as part of this

operation.

The observers would monitor the implementation of the ceasefire on the ground, assist with the disengagement of troops at certain locations, and assist the JMC with developing the mechanisms

to implement Lusaka. Phase II operation would not, repeat not, be

an interposition force.

Upon the successful completion of Phase II, the U.N. might recommend a Phase III operation to build on the progress of the national dialogue under President Masire and to support full and

complete implementation of Lusaka. The precise mission size and

functions of such a Phase III U.N. force remain undefined and cannot be defined in any precision at this time.

I think Congressman Payne’s point earlier about why you can’t

have certainty about the final phase before you go into the intermediate phase and his references to the Mid-East resonated with

me. That is a very strong evocation of my own views, Mr. Congressman. Although I’d never thought about it that way, when you said

it, I was very struck by it.

We have stated repeatedly that the U.N. would not take on enforcement responsibilities, including any potential forcible disarmament of non-state actors. Let me stress, Mr. Chairman, transition to Phase III is not automatic, but would depend on developments during Phase II, including significant progress in the national dialogue. Any movement toward Phase III would require further Security Council action and would involve extensive consultations with you and your Committee at the same level of intensity

of early consultations and discussions that has, I believe, characterVerDate 11-MAY-2000 09:36 Sep 21, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 65150.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
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ized the relationship Susan and I have had with you and your

Committee in the 5 or 6 months since I first got involved in this.

I know that Susan has been heavily involved in the consulting with

you long before that.

Moving to the U.S. national interest, Mr. Chairman. We have a

profound interest in regional stability in Central Africa, in preventing the resurgence of the genocide and mass killing which we

saw in Rwanda in 1994. In particular, the former Rwandan Army,

referred to as the ex-FAR, and the Interahamwe militia, who were

heavily responsible for the genocide of 1994 in Rwanda, are still operating in the region. They contribute significantly to instability.

Congo is a contagion of crises. If the conflict there is allowed to fester, efforts to resolve conflicts and promote stability throughout the

region in Angola, Rwanda, Uganda, Sudan, and Burundi, will be

even more difficult.

Let me at this point, Mr. Chairman, draw your attention to the

fact that President Mandela will be in Arusha next week to try to

prevent Burundi from exploding. President Clinton, who was invited to attend the Arusha meeting will not be able to attend because of prior commitments, but I can tell you today that, for the

first time in history, at least as far as I’m aware, the President of

the United States will participate in a negotiation by two-way teleconference and will, from the White House, participate in President

Mandela’s Arusha meeting. We’re very proud of that fact. I know

President Mandela is very pleased and he himself will return to

New York for the second time in 6 weeks upon completion of the

Arusha mission to bring us up to date on his efforts.

So I want to stress that President Clinton is personally involved

in the effort in Burundi and is actively following our efforts in the

Congo and is following this hearing very closely.

The political and military vacuum in the Congo has drawn in the

rogue states I regret to say. Libya, Iran, North Korea, Cuba, and

the Sudan are all finding ways to be opportunistic. These states are

seeking a foothold in a destabilized Central Africa for weapon

sales, political allies, terrorist bases, and access to strategic minerals.

At this point, let me comment briefly on Congressman Hall’s

comment, although I guess he’s left already, we share his concern.

We have put $1 million down to work on this with Sierra Leone.

It’s part of the agreement that’s supposed to bring peace to Sierra

Leone. The Lome Agreement. I am profoundly troubled by the diamond problem. I do not, however, know how to get ahold of it in

a fundamental way because of the unique and fungible nature of

diamonds and the ease with which they can be moved across international borders. For all these and more reasons, Mr. Chairman,

the U.S. has a clear national interest to support the U.N. effort in

resolving the conflict in the DRC.

For purposes of clarity, let me review for you the key points. This

operation will not involve U.S. troops. The observers in Phase II

would monitor the cease-fire and verify the redeployment of the

party forces to defensive positions as agreed upon in the agreement. Transition to Phase III in the future is not automatic. Movement to Phase III is dependent on the parties observing Lusaka;

disengagement of forces along confrontation lines; substantial

15

progress in the national dialogue; the completion by the parties of

a viable plan for dealing with nonsignatory armed groups; further

action by the U.N. Security Council; and extensive consultations

and notification, if required, to this and other relevant Congressional Committees.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I want to assure you that the administration is fully aware of the risks of this operation. Any effort toward

peace in the Congo will not be easy. However, while there are risks

undeniably involved with Phase II deployments by the United Nations, the risk of inaction is far greater. We cannot promise you immediate peace in the Congo. What we can say is that without

strong U.N. leadership, there is a high probability, in fact, a nearcertainty, of a catastrophic disaster in Central Africa. Inaction

risks the resurgence of genocide, as we saw in Rwanda, and the

danger that this proxy war will devolve into a direct war between

the states already involved.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, let me point out that this past year

has been a dramatic one for the United Nations in peacekeeping.

New missions in Kosovo and East Timor and the expanded mission

in Sierra Leone have not only greatly increased the number of U.N.

peacekeepers in the field, but have added a new level of complexity

to international peacekeeping. Congo is important, but success in

these missions is also critical. We will not allow our concern for the

Congo to come at the expense of our commitment to fulfilling our

other missions, in particular Kosovo. No money will be reprogrammed from Kosovo for this program.

To sustain all of these U.N. peacekeeping efforts, we need the

support of other UN-member states, the parties to the various conflicts, and, most importantly, the support of Congress. Without the

means to finance our assessed contributions to peacekeeping activities, the U.N. would be unable to fulfill its mandates.

The stakes are high. The challenge is daunting. We cannot expect the U.N. to impose peace on the Congo. But it is imperative

that the U.N. do what it can to support the peace process created

by the African political leaders themselves. Failure to act could irreparably damage the capability and credibility of U.N. peacekeeping and American policy in Africa.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your time. We hope that we will

have the support of you and Chairman Gilman and your Committee. Your role is crucial to our success. I thank you again on behalf of Susan, myself, the Secretary of State, and the entire administration for the immense amount of time that you and your colleagues on this podium today have spent in New York in consultations leading up to this important hearing. Thank you.

[The statement of Ambassador Holbrooke appears in the appendix.]

Mr. ROYCE. I thank you, Ambassador Holbrooke. I have two

questions, but before I ask them, I’m going to turn to the Full Committee Chairman, Chairman Ben Gilman. He has two questions for

you.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I regret I’m being called

to another meeting and I appreciate your allowing me to move

ahead on my questions.

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Mr. Ambassador, we thank you for your review of where we are

with this peacekeeping mission. We recognize it’s an important

mission and we recognize that it is complex.

Mr. Ambassador, has the United Nations asked the administration to provide support to the proposed expansion to the current

monitoring mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. No.

Mr. GILMAN. Is the Department of Defense currently considering

providing strategic airlift to the proposed peacekeeping force?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. No.

Mr. GILMAN. Will it be asked to provide lift to support the peacekeepers inside the DRC as well?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. They have not been asked at this

point.

Mr. GILMAN. Will the administration seek reimbursement for any

formal request from the U.N. for logistical support?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. I will have to get you a written answer

on that because I need to consult the Pentagon whose leader is in

Pretoria today I think addressing similar questions.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you very much.

In an editorial, Mr. Ambassador, in the Washington Post on February 14, yesterday, it was noted that ‘‘The Congo plan is being

discussed at a time when other major UN-led peacekeeping operations are faltering.’’ While the editorial noted that the crisis in the

Congo should not be ignored, it did suggest that the Administration

would have a more credible case to make for an expanded mission

in that country if you were more fully meeting the commitments

you’ve made elsewhere in other missions, such as those in Kosovo

and East Timor. What’s your reaction to that editorial?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Mr. Chairman, I read that editorial

with great interest. It was a very smart editorial, but I would quibble with that last sentence. There is no question that the peacekeeping effort in Kosovo is encountering some very significant difficulties, as we speak, in the town of Mitrovica. They are widely

publicized and deserve our undivided attention when we’re dealing

with the Balkans. Indeed, I participated in as many meetings on

Mitrovica as I have on the Congo in the last few days. As for East

Timor, East Timor is going quite well, all things considered. I

wouldn’t say that for the last 20 years, but the last 6 months have

been pretty good.

With all due respect to the rest of the editorial, which was very

well informed, I would go back to what Congressman Payne, Congressman Meeks, and others said. I do not understand why a great

nation, the world’s only superpower, at the apogee of its power,

cannot deal with the crisis in the Congo simply because we’re having a problem in Kosovo.

I underline one point again, Mr. Chairman, no reprogrammed

funds away from Kosovo. Nothing we do in Congo will in any way

diminish the resources we have to support our men and women on

the line at Camp Bonesteel where Congressman Bereuter is about

to lead a very important congressional delegation. We have made

a firm commitment to you, to the Armed Services Committee, to

Senator Warner, and to Chairman Helms as well as yourself. But

I simply don’t understand how you could follow a policy which says

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don’t do it in the Congo until you have solved the Kosovo. Because

Kosovo is one tough problem.

The United States, without trying to be the world’s policeman,

without trying to solve every problem on earth, and there are dozens of problems way beyond our reach, should not say that we have

to get Kosovo right before we do other things, because it may not

be possible. I would also draw your attention to Tim Juda’s article

in today’s New York Times on this same point.

But I appreciate your point. I’m very glad you raised it because

it gives us a chance to make clear, on behalf of the entire administration, that Kosovo will not in any way, shape, or form, be diminished by what we’re asking from you today.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. Based on your familiarity with the U.N. and with its Department of Peacekeeping Operations, does the U.N. have the capability of handling three or more

major missions in Africa, in Asia, and Europe?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. I don’t know, Mr. Chairman. I really

don’t know.

Mr. GILMAN. We hope they do.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. If you want me to say yes, I’ll say yes.

But I——

Mr. GILMAN. I just want your accurate——

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. I know you. I know you were expecting

a different answer. But I would be misleading you if I said yes. The

DPKO office is headed by an excellent senior French official, Bernard Miyet. He has only 300 people in that office. As you know, because you and I have discussed this before, he’s understaffed. Much

depends upon his success.

Secretary General Kofi Annan, who I think is one of the finest

international civil servants we have ever seen and I believe the

best secretary general since Dag Hammerskjold is concerned about

this issue, as you and I are. If the U.N. did not do such a great

job in the early 1990’s in peacekeeping twice in Africa and once in

Europe—Rwanda, Somalia, and Bosnia—they have got to get it

right this time. That is one of the reasons I have stressed the role

of the Pentagon.

I would draw your attention again to the fact that Secretary

Cohen is in South Africa today on a very important trip. South Africa is critically involved in these issues.

We are working overtime to help DPKO without taking over an

area which is, after all, an international body. There is no friction

between us. There is no national issue. There is no U.S.-French

thing. We’re working very closely together. But I don’t know the

answer to your question. Much depends on it. In fact, I have said

in my speech that you and I did together a week ago, I have said

that I think, overall, not just the Congo, but the future of the U.N.

as a peacekeeping organization will depend on it.

Now one last point, Mr. Chairman. When the U.N. was formed

by Franklin Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and the founding fathers, this was what they had in mind: conflict prevention and conflict resolution. This is through the Security Council and through

a secretariat which would carry out its mandate. With a few notable exceptions, Namibia, Mozambique, and a few special cases, it’s

18

had a very mixed record. We must work with the U.N. to get it

right.

Because if we don’t, consider the alternative. This is not an issue

the American public or your esteemed body wishes to take over for

the U.S. This is not going to fall in the same category as something

in the heartland of NATO or where we have a solemn security treaty like Japan. We have to make the U.N. work.

So I’m not prepared to give you a simple yes. All I can tell you

is that the entire mission in New York and your direct involvement

and support are critical to helping the U.N. get there. I stress

again, the secretary general is 100 percent behind this effort. He

knows how important it is.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Ambassador, we appreciate your candid assessment. We also appreciate the manner in which you’re handling

these very difficult problems.

Just one last comment. How will a peacekeeping operation address Congo’s financial commitments to the rogue states that you

mentioned?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Congo’s financial commitment to the

rogue states? I’m not sure I understand the question, sir.

Mr. GILMAN. President Kabila has some debts to pay. How will

this peacekeeping operation affect those commitments?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. You mean, how will this.

Mr. GILMAN. Peacekeeping operation.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Do you want to take it? It’s a good

chance to let Susan get warmed up here.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you.

Ms. RICE. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. Mr. Chairman, I think,

to be quite plain about it, MONUC itself will not directly address

any obligations that Congo may have incurred to rogue states or

even to neighboring states that have participated on its behalf in

the Congo. That’s not its mission. Nevertheless, the involvement of

rogue states is a source of major concern to us, as Ambassador

Holbrooke noted in his opening statement. We believe the best way

to minimize the opportunities and the influence of those rogue

states is through a lasting and effective peace in the Congo so

there is no vacuum and no opportunity for them to gain a further

foothold.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you. Thank you, Ms. Rice, and thank you,

Mr. Chairman, for allowing me.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Mr. Chairman, we will give you written answers to the 12 questions. I apologize profusely that you

didn’t have them before this hearing. That was a logistical oversight. You should have. They’re very good questions. They were

helpful because we practiced answering them before we got here so

we were ready.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Ambassador

Holbrooke for your commitment to respond in writing to those

questions.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. In writing.

Mr. ROYCE. Yes.

[The answers to the questions appear in the appendix.]

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

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Now let me go to my two questions, if I could, Ambassador. The

first would be this. The congressional notification for this peacekeeping operation notes that the Lusaka Peace Agreement calls on

the Joint Military Commission to develop mechanisms for the disarmament and demobilization of non-state-armed groups that are

non-signatories of Lusaka. Now that would include the

Interahamwe.

As we’ve discussed before, this is critical, in my view, toward

peace. So my first question goes to the question of how has the

JMC worked to date? What kind of muscle does it have? How will

it undertake this difficult task?

My second question is this: When you sent the notification, in it

it warns of ‘‘a dangerous security vacuum that has drawn in rogue

states which are seeking weapon sales, political allies, and access

to strategic minerals,’’ unquote. Now you cite this in your testimony as well.

At our September hearing, when I asked the Administration

about press reports of North Korean activity at the Lakasim uranium mines, the response was, and I’m going to paraphrase here,

but the response was, yes, we have seen reports of a few hundred

North Koreans in the country but we cannot tell you, with any precision, where they are or what they are doing. With this notification, the administration seems to be suggesting that it has a better

sense of what the North Koreans are up to and, in fact, last week

there were more press reports of North Koreans mining uranium

in Congo.

Now on this issue, it is worth noting that over 80 percent of the

uranium in the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs came from the

Congo mines. What, exactly, can you tell us about North Korean

and other rogue state activity in Congo? Ambassador, is a U.N.

peacekeeping operation the best way to deal with this challenge?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. On the first part of your question, Mr.

Chairman, as all of us who traveled in Southern Africa in the last

few months saw—and I know this includes Congressman Payne,

the CODEL headed by Congressman Gephardt, Congressman

Houghton, myself, Senator Feingold, many of your colleagues, as

you know from our discussions—the JMC, the Joint Military Committee got off to a very, very slow start.

It is for this reason that we have been clear, and this is where

the Pentagon’s role has been so valuable, that the Joint Military

Committee and the United Nations must colocate and work together in the closest possible manner. We are not going to vote for

the Security Council resolution until we get this right. As we

speak, Susan has been sending cables out to her Ambassadors in

the region about this. It’s a very technical issue at one level. It’s

a very simple issue at the other. We’re not going to move forward

until our own military people are satisfied.

On the second issue, I’d like to ask if Susan could address this

because she has been heavily involved in this for some time. It was

not clear to me who you were quoting earlier. May I just——

Mr. ROYCE. In terms of press reports?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. No, you quoted somebody from——

Mr. ROYCE. Ambassador Wolpe.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Was it Howard Wolpe?

20

Mr. ROYCE. Yes.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. That’s what I thought. Susan.

Ms. RICE. I’d like to think I haven’t been heavily involved with

North Koreans over a long period of time.

But, in any case, Mr. Chairman, as you know, we can provide

futher details on this question in a closed session, some of which

would not be appropriate here for an open session. But as, I think,

you and others on the Committee know that the North Koreans

have had ties for many years to a number of African countries, including Congo, going back to the era of Mobutu.

North Korea, as you know, has its own uranium mines and the

quality of their ore is suitable already for military purposes. The

Congo mines in Katanga Province in southeastern Congo have not

produced uranium for several years and have not received proper

maintenance. The mines would require a great deal of capital investment for future exploitation.

So that is what we can share with you in this session. We’re

happy to provide what details we have further on this subject in

a closed session.

Mr. ROYCE. I raised this issue with President Kabila as well. The

answer was much the same in terms of the assumption that, because President Mobutu had a North Korean presence, this justified a North Korean presence today. Basically, the position was, we

had a contract. I joked at the time, it’s a rule of law thing. You’ve

got a contract that you couldn’t break.

I think there’s a lot that we don’t know. In talking with others

from the region and from representatives from other states, there’s

a great deal of concern here. I will be following this up. But I thank

you very much for your questions and I’m going to turn to our

ranking member, Mr. Payne of New Jersey, for his questions.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Ambassador, we know that some of the weapons are coming from Russia,

Bulgaria, perhaps the Ukraine, some of the Baltic states. Have we

tried any kind of negotiation in the region of those capitals to try

to meet with their leadership as it relates to trying to get them to

cease and desist in the supply of military weapons to the various

belligerents in the conflict in the DRC?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Efforts have been made. I’ve talked to

several of the countries you’ve mentioned directly in New York, and

our Ambassadors have in capitals. I would be misleading you if I

suggested we’re satisfied with the responses, even from the countries we have good relations with. Of course, there are some rogue

states heavily involved in this operation. It is a very serious aspect

of the problem.

I don’t believe it can be dealt with, absent progress on the political front. That’s just an instinctive feeling on my part. But it is

a real problem.

I do not, however, Congressman Payne, despite the importance

of it, and I completely agree with what you and Chairman Royce

have said about its importance, I do not actually believe it’s the

critical variable here. I think the critical variable is political will

and not simply leverage on arms sales. Here, the immense wealth

of the Congo is its greatest tragedy, of course. There’s just all this

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money going into the wrong hands and being spent for the wrong

purposes. Angola as well.

Mr. PAYNE. I had an opportunity to speak to most of the heads

of state there at the U.N. I was unable to speak directly with Mr.

Kabila, but the question that I would have asked him with the

JMC, they are supposed to each work in concert with demobilization, attempting to go and to disarm or to bring the Interahamwe

and the ex-FAR out of the Democratic Republic of Congo and reintegrate it back into their countries of Uganda and, primarily,

Rwanda.

In your conversations with Mr. Kabila, or maybe Mr. Royce had

a chance to see him. He’s the chairman and I missed out because

I saw him when nobody went out to catch him. Is there willingness

on the part of the government to try to separate the Interahamwe

from average ex-military Hutus, who are not all Interahamwe or

who are not genocidaires but who could be separated and those

who are accused sent to the authorities in Arusha or in Rwanda?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. The starting point for an answer to

this rather critical question is quite basic. President Kabila has

signed the Lusaka Agreement, which calls for the disarming of the

non-state armed forces. One of those armed forces is about as odious a group as the world has seen since the Khmer Rouge were at

their height. In fact, they are really the African equivalent of the

Khmer Rouge, and that’s the group you’re referring to. Or at least

parts of it.

Now, we have some problems here. We don’t really know the

exact size. We had several very interesting private meetings in

New York between the presidents, some of which I discussed with

you and Chairman Royce privately. They argued vehemently about

the size of the ex-FAR and Interahamwe; who’s supporting them;

where they are; how heavily they’re armed. Our information is very

uneven. So it’s very hard for me to give you a clear answer.

However, if President Kabila does not honor his part of the commitment, we would have a serious problem. His response, were he

here today, would be let the other side honor its commitments.

There are obligations on both sides here. The African parties involved in this fighting have split in a tragic way along lines that

are both hostile and supportive of the government in Kinshasa.

I, while the ex-FAR/Interahamwe issue is probably—not probably, it is certainly—one of the two or three critical issues, it cannot be solved unless the other elements of the Lusaka process are

also dealt with in parallel processing: disarming other foreign elements; getting the national dialogue moving; and, and this is why

we’re here today, getting the United Nations to start putting its

Phase II observer mission in. If any part of that process breaks

down, we’re going to be back to square one, notwithstanding all the

drama and good words of the Month of Africa in New York.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Payne. We’re now going to go to the

Vice Chairman of the Full Committee, Mr. Bereuter of Nebraska.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ambassador

Holbrooke, thank you very much for your testimony. I would seek

comments from you in two areas. Next week the congressional delegation I’ll lead will visit with the European NATO countries and

22

Canada plus European Union personnel, including Javier Solano

and Chris Patton. First, what level of cooperation and interest are

you getting from the Europeans in moving ahead with Phase II of

MONUC?

Second, what kind of benchmarks should we look for—actions accomplished, actions taken on the part of the United Nations to prepare themselves to make sure that Phase II does work and that we

find ourselves ready to take on Phase III?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. On your first question, Congressman,

the Europeans are fully supportive, right now, of what is happening. There is a lot of the traditional rivalries of Central Africa,

which have such a long history going back into the pre-independence era, have not manifested itself this time around so far. Probably because everybody realizes that, as Secretary Albright has

said, we could be on the brink of the first world war of Africa and

that would be a tragedy.

So our cooperation with all of the groups you mentioned and, indeed, with Solano himself, with whom I met at length on this.

Chris Patton, who also has a role. The British, French, Belgium,

and Canadian Ambassadors. The Canadians are very active here

and they’re looking forward to playing an important role. It’s been

very good.

There is one area, though, that I’m concerned about. That’s the

one Congressman Hall raised: diamonds. Diamonds are a whole different issue. They transcend everything else. I don’t profess to understand the issue. I doubt anyone in this room really does, but

Congressman Hall was very right to single it out.

On your second question, the benchmarks, perhaps we could submit for the record the Harare Declaration of January 18 in which

they laid out their own benchmarks. The answer to your question

is the Africans have given us the benchmarks. There are a series

of very precise dates by which certain things must happen. One of

the reasons we dragged our feet earlier, the point I made earlier,

was because they were missing their own benchmarks. They hadn’t

appointed a facilitator. They hadn’t started the withdrawals. Under

those circumstances, it seemed inappropriate for us to start down

the U.N. peacekeeping route.

Mr. BEREUTER. Ambassador, you expect the Security Council

would accept or has endorsed those kinds of benchmarks?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Yes. The Security Council actually endorsed Lusaka in macro terms when it came out. In the draft resolution we’re now negotiating, we will reendorse Lusaka.

That brings us to the benchmarks. I mentioned earlier Mr.

Masire. The fact that he is in Kinshasa today for the first time on

an agreement that was signed on July 10 is really a—let us not underestimate this. He is in charge of the all-important political dialogue. We’ve finally gotten him there. I don’t think it’s a

misstatement to say that the United States played a role of which

we can all take some pride that he’s there. He just spent 3 hours

with President Kabila.

So the benchmarks, which we will submit to you in writing, Congressman, are very clear.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

23

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Bereuter. We’ll go to Ms. Lee of California.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Could I just ask you, Congressman, to

please convey to the American troops at Camp Bonesteel and to the

commanders particularly that there will be no reduction in our support for their efforts because of any other activities in any other

part of the world? It’s very important, because we are focusing on

Africa, but nothing will diminish our support. You will be leading

the biggest CODEL, I think, ever to go to Bonesteel. So it would

be very helpful to us.

Mr. ROYCE. We’ll take that assurance. Thank you.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Thank you, sir.

Ms. LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ambassador Holbrooke, I

would once again thank you for bringing all the signatories together and the heads of state at the United Nations.

I read and have talked to you a little bit about these discussions

that took place. Obviously they were very difficult. I’m wondering,

in terms of the reluctance to proceed with Lusaka, where do you

see any reluctance among the signatories to the agreement? Or is

everyone kind of waiting for the other to move forward?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. No, I think it’s more the latter. This

has got to be parallel processing. The way I envisage Lusaka, everyone has their own metaphor, Congresswoman Lee, but the way

I envisage it, it’s like one of those old-fashioned European train stations where all the trains are lined up at, Victoria Station, together. One is called the national dialogue. That’s under President

Masire. One is called the ex-Far/Interahamwe. One is called the

rebel forces: Bemba, Wamba dia Wamba, and Ilungo who, between

them, have 25,000 to 30,000 armed men in the field. One is called

the foreign forces under the control of the pro-Kinshasa forces, the

so-called ‘‘allies.’’ Then there are forces in the field that oppose

them.

Each one of those is a track. All of them need to move forward

together. If one doesn’t move, the others are going to say, I’m not

moving. In that sense, it’s very similar to what we’ve tried to do

in Bosnia with two major differences. This is far more complicated

because there are more actors, more participants. Second, American military power, NATO force of the sort we had available to us

in the Balkans is not a clear option.

But in terms of parallel processing, it takes an immense amount

of effort. Howard Wolpe’s name has been mentioned earlier today,

your former colleague. He would be with us today except that

Susan has sent him out to the region to work on this issue, pushing those trains forward and, also, to join President Mandela in

Arusha.

Ms. LEE. Yes, I was going to ask you. What is our role, then, and

how can the United States be helping you in moving these three

tracks forward as quickly as possible?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. With the greatest respect for the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of all the states in

Central Africa, the United States should continue to do what it’s

been doing.

Here I’d like to make a point. I had been told by many people

that there would be sensitivity on the part of the African states if

24

the U.S. was too, ‘‘aggressive.’’ All I can tell you is that that was

not what Susan and Howard and I found on our trip. I felt that,

despite our legacy in a country that used to be called Zaire, which

is a very specific, unique historical burden, but what I now think

is clearly in the past, after President Kabila’s trip to New York, despite that legacy, the African states understand that this is no

longer the Cold War; that the U.S. has no live-or-die strategic interest at stake in Africa.

We are there to help them because it is in our long-term interest

to do so; because it’s the right thing to do; because, as the wealthiest nation of the world and the only superpower, we can do it

through the U.N. and that we have no vested interest and we’re

not taking sides. That all we’re doing is trying to help the African

leadership implement what Salim Salim, the OAU’s secretary general calls, ‘‘an African solution to an African problem.’’

As you well know, because you and I have talked about this, this

is my first extended involvement with Africa. Before it, I called on

many of you. I spent 2 hours with Congressman Payne, an hour

with Chairman Royce, and got your advice. What I found was that

the leadership in Africa, and I think that’s demonstrated by the

quality of the Ambassadors sitting behind us today, welcomed our

activities in support of their policy, as long as we don’t put forward

an American plan. We don’t have an American plan, Mr. Chairman. What we have is American support for the African plan, the

Lusaka plan, through the U.N.

I have been assured by every African leader, including leaders

who are really hostile to each other, that they all want continued

American engagement. That specifically includes this Committee.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Ambassador. I know we have just enough

time here for a question from Mr. Meeks and one from Mr.

Tancredo. Mr. Meeks.

Mr. MEEKS. I just want to echo what you just said. I’ve found in

my conversations with some of the presidents that I had the opportunity to talk to in the United Nations, that they did very much,

in fact, want the UN’s involvement because they thought that if

peace were to happen, it could not happen without the U.N. and

the United States.

But, also, I have a number of individuals from the Congo that

live in my district. One of the things that seems to emanate from

them quite often is what can the U.S. and/or the U.N. do? Whether

or not there was anything under the U.N. charter that would help

humanitarian causes for the civilians and the hundreds or thousands of civilians that are being killed every day, is there anything

that we can do or can the U.N. to enforce, through their charter,

so that we can have some kind of mandate with regards to the civilians that are being killed in the Congo?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. I couldn’t agree with you more, Congressman Meeks, about the humanitarian consequences of this.

That’s why we had the special session on refugees in Africa on January 13 with Mrs. Ogata. In that session, I really took the gloves

off and blasted the United Nations, and will gladly repeat it here

again today, for an arbitrary distinction between a refugee and an

internally displaced person, which leaves somewhere between 2, 3,

and 90 percent of the refugees in Africa uncovered by the UNHCR.

25

I find a lamentable situation. I have talked to the head of the

World Food Program, Carolyn Bottini, about it. I have talked to

Mrs. Ogata. I do not think we can let these issues slip through the

cracks. Mr. Chairman, I would urge that you consider additional

hearings on the refugee issue.

But I hope, if you do so, you will help us address what I think

lies behind your question. In Angola, for example, 90 percent of the

homeless people are not considered refugees under the U.N. definition. Worldwide, including Asia and Central America, two-thirds of

the homeless people in the world don’t fall under the U.N. definition of refugee. So they get catch-as-catch-can help from the World

Food Program and so on.

Now this is, let’s be honest with each other, when I talk about

this, if we decide to undertake, it may mean some additional

money. It’s a big decision. But if you go to a refugee camp in Congo

or Angola and people say, this isn’t a refugee camp, this is an IDP

for internally displaced people, it’s an acronym, you get very angry.

I think that’s what your Congolese constituents are reflecting. I

share that concern. I spent over 20 years of my life working on refugees in Asia and Africa and Europe. I would urge that you consider a separate hearing on this and bring in the refugee experts.

I know that the secretary general and other people would welcome this kind of public exposure to a bureaucratic anomaly which

is increasingly distressing as the African situation continues to

cause the problems that Congressman Meeks referred to.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Ambassador. I want to thank the members of this panel for their participation today. We have one last

question. I’m going to turn to Congresswoman McKinney of Georgia. Then we’ll conclude this hearing.

Ms. MCKINNEY. Great, thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Actually, I have two questions. One is a theoretical question and one

is a bit more pragmatic.

We know that this Administration’s Africa policy has as its cornerstone forging relationships with key renaissance leaders. Yoweri

Museveni of Uganda is one of those leaders and Paul Kagame is

another. The United States has a close military relationship with

these countries, including lethal JCET training. The U.S. has supported multilateral loans for these countries, despite their having

violated international law and invaded the Democratic Republic of

Congo.

These countries have invaded the DRC stating security concerns

on their border, yet they station troops as far west in the DRC as

Boma on the Atlantic Ocean. They are currently supported armed

factions that have become known in international parlance as rebel

groups. These armed factions, along with the invading troops of

Uganda and Rwanda have committed and are committing crimes

against humanity. In addition, they are fomenting nationalism,

ethnic strife in Congo and the ready availability of weapons makes

the situation even more lethal.

I requested a briefing today from the State Department to know

what the U.S. has done to emphasize in more than rhetorical terms

for our allies that their invasion of Congo is unacceptable, that the

United States stands with the rest of Africa and not with them in

the de facto partition of Congo. That their continued presence is

26

creating ethnic hatred heretofore unknown in the Congolese context.

Unfortunately, Mr. Ambassador, I didn’t get satisfactory answers

to my questions. In fact, I learned instead that we still have a military relationship in IMET with these countries. That we have not

yet voiced our concern about the situation with Archbishop of

Bukavu, Monsignor Kataliko and that we continue to cover up and

make excuses for our successive policy failures with respect to this

region.

Mr. Ambassador, can you tell me how your stewardship of the

Great Lakes peace will be any different than the failed policies of

the past that seemingly have abetted the current climate of ethnic

hatred, genocide, revenge genocide, crimes against humanity, and

the violation of any national law?

My second question, Mr. Ambassador, is that I believe the U.N.

must be the only place on the planet where colossal failures result

in promotions. In 3 weeks, the U.N. apologized for its behavior in

Rwanda, Srebrenica, in East Timor, and, this week, Kosovo. We

have seen the U.N. repeatedly get it wrong and then those very

people who got it wrong get promoted to more responsibility.

Could you tell me what safeguards you will make sure get in

place that, so that the Congo becomes a place of opportunity for the

U.N. to redeem itself, rather than just another opportunity for yet

another apology?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Can I take the second question first?

Who has been promoted as the result of Srebrenica in the U.N. system or Rwanda that shouldn’t have been? I quite take your point

about the Dutch. I don’t understand how Colonel Karden could

have been promoted after Srebrenica. But I don’t see rewarding in

the U.N. system. Do you have someone specific in mind?

Ms. MCKINNEY. I absolutely do have some specifics and we can

talk about it afterwards if you like.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Because I must say, I thought that the

Rwanda and Srebrenica reports were truly courageous on the part

of the secretary general insofar as he allowed reports in which he

himself took some criticism.

I take it you’re not arguing with the substance of these reports.

You agree with them. I certainly do. I’ve spoken out quite strongly

on this. But I do want to reiterate my high admiration and support

for the secretary general and that includes the fact that he did

something that very few politicians in our country or anywhere else

have done.

Mr. ROYCE. Ambassador, might I make a suggestion?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Yes, sir.

Mr. ROYCE. Because we face a series of votes upon the conclusion

of our hearing. I wonder if there would be any objection if your responses are to the record to Congresswoman McKinney and, at the

same time, also, we very much appreciate your commitment to respond to the chairman’s questions in writing, for the record.

Mr. ROYCE. We want to thank you for your frankness. We want

to thank Assistant Secretary Rice for her participation as well. Ambassador, we very much look forward to working with you and

thank you so much for this hearing today.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Thank you, sir.

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Mr. ROYCE. This hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 3:42 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

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