United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Testimony 

Before the Subcommittee on Tactical Air 

and Land Forces, Committee on Armed 

Services, House of Representatives

UNMANNED AIRCRAFT 

SYSTEMS 

Improved Planning and 

Acquisition Strategies Can 

Help Address Operational 

Challenges 

Statement of Sharon Pickup 

Director, Defenses Capabilities and Management 

Michael J. Sullivan 

Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management 

For Release on Delivery

Expected at 10:00 a.m. EST 

Thursday, April 6, 2006

 

GAO-06-610T 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-610T.

To view the full product, click on the link 

above. For more information, contact Sharon 

Pickup at (202) 512-9619 or 

pickups@gao.gov, or Michael J. Sullivan at 

(937) 258-7915 or sullivanm@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-06-610T, a testimony 

before the Subcommittee on Tactical Air 

and Land Forces, Committee on Armed 

Services, House of Representatives 

April 6, 2006

UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS

Improved Planning and Acquisition 

Strategies Can Help Address Operational 

Challenges 

DOD has experienced a high level of mission successes with UAS, but 

continues to face challenges in fully maximizing the use of these assets. In 

operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. forces have used UAS for 

intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and offensive strike missions in 

support of joint and service-specific operations. As the numbers of UAS 

operating in the same airspace as manned aircraft grows, DOD continues to 

face operational challenges related to interoperability, availability of 

communications bandwidth, and airspace integration. While DOD and the 

services have taken some positive initial steps to address these challenges, 

such as issuing guidance and developing initiatives to improve 

interoperability, limited progress has been made and the effectiveness of 

these efforts cannot be adequately assessed until they are fully implemented. 

While DOD continues to request funds to support service plans for acquiring 

UAS, it still lacks a viable strategic plan to guide UAS development and 

investment decisions. Since GAO last reported, DOD established new 

oversight bodies and updated its UAS Roadmap, but it is too early to tell how 

the new entities will interrelate and whether they will be able to influence 

service plans. Also, the updated roadmap identifies broad goals, desired 

capabilities, and service acquisition plans, but lacks critical elements, such 

as a clear link among goals, capabilities, and plans, opportunities for joint 

endeavors, and funding priorities and needs. Until DOD develops a strategic 

plan, it will not be well positioned to validate requirements, evaluate and 

integrate services plans, and establish program and funding priorities, nor 

will Congress have all the information it needs to evaluate funding requests. 

Such a plan would also help DOD anticipate and minimize the types of 

challenges that are being experienced today. 

While there have been successes on the battlefield, UAS development 

programs have shared many of the same problems as other major weapon 

systems that begin an acquisition program too early, with many uncertainties 

about requirements, funding, and immature technology, design, and 

production. Unmanned systems have also experienced similar outcomes—

changing requirements, cost growth, delays in delivery, performance 

shortfalls, and reliability and support problems. Future acquisition programs 

can learn from past efforts to craft better and less risky acquisition plans. 

Key steps conducive to success include preparing a comprehensive business 

case, adopting a knowledge-based and incremental acquisition strategy, and 

sustaining disciplined leadership and direction. Frequent changes to the 

Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems technology demonstration program 

and recent budget actions raise some questions about the Department’s 

priorities and future directions for UAS. Concerns have also been raised 

about possible duplication of systems as the services look to expand 

individual fleets. Ongoing Army and Air Force efforts to coordinate the 

Warrior and Predator programs are encouraging and could be a model for 

limiting duplication and fostering jointness and interoperability.

The current generation of 

unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) 

has been in development for 

defense applications since the 

1980’s. As of February 2006, the 

Department of Defense (DOD) had 

more than 3,000 unmanned aircraft, 

about 2,000 of which are 

supporting ongoing operations in 

Iraq. DOD’s 2006 Quadrennial 

Defense Review validates the 

importance of unmanned systems 

and establishes plans to 

significantly expand investment in 

unmanned systems and their use in 

military operations over the next 

several years. The Congress has 

been particularly interested in 

DOD’s approach to determining 

UAS needs and managing the 

growing number of UAS programs. 

This testimony addresses GAO’s 

prior work and preliminary 

observations on (1) the operational 

successes and challenges U.S. 

forces are experiencing with UAS 

in combat operations, and the 

extent to which DOD has taken 

steps to address challenges; (2) 

DOD’s progress in establishing a 

strategic plan and oversight 

framework to guide joint and 

service-specific UAS development 

efforts and related investment 

decisions; and (3) our assessment 

of the Global Hawk and Predator 

programs’ business cases and 

acquisition strategies and the 

lessons learned that can be applied 

to the Joint Unmanned Combat Air 

Systems program. 
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

We appreciate the opportunity to discuss our work on the Department of 

Defense’s (DOD) unmanned aircraft systems (UAS).1

 As you know, the 

current generation of UAS has been under development for defense 

applications since the 1980s and is providing combat forces with 

intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and strike capabilities that are 

helping to transform today’s military operations. We appeared before you 

last year to discuss the performance of UAS in current operations, and 

DOD’s progress in improving strategic and acquisition planning. At the 

time, we testified on our preliminary observations that while unmanned 

aircraft operations had achieved significant mission successes, emerging 

operational challenges could affect DOD’s ability to maximize the use of

UAS to enhance operations and effectively promote force transformation.2

 

We also emphasized the need for DOD to develop a strategic plan to guide 

UAS development and highlighted lessons learned from our prior UAS 

development and acquisition reviews that could be instructive for the 

development and fielding of UAS. Since last year’s testimony, we issued 

two reports on these matters and made several recommendations intended 

to improve DOD’s management and acquisition of UAS.3

 

Since last year, we have seen an increasingly high level of UAS use in 

military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Meanwhile, DOD has issued 

an updated UAS roadmap and recently released its Quadrennial Defense 

Review (QDR) report, both of which indicate the department is planning 

to increase its inventory of unmanned aircraft and associated funding 

requests significantly over the next several years. At the same time, we 

understand that DOD has initiated several studies to determine 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance requirements, including 

those for UAS, which could affect future investment decisions. We 

 1

 Until recently, DOD referred to these aircraft as “unmanned aerial vehicles.” “Unmanned

aircraft” is consistent with the Federal Aviation Administration’s classification and

emphasizes other components of the system, such as payload, ground stations, and

communications equipment. 

2

 GAO, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Improved Strategic and Acquisition Planning Can

Help Address Emerging Challenges, GAO-05-395T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 9, 2005).

3

 GAO, Unmanned Aircraft Systems: DOD Needs to More Effectively Promote 

Interoperability and Improve Performance Assessments, GAO-06-49 (Washington, D.C.: 

Dec. 13, 2005) and Unmanned Aircraft Systems: New DOD Programs Can Learn from 

Past Efforts to Craft Better and Less Risky Acquisition Strategies, GAO-06-447 

(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 15, 2006). 

Page 1 GAO-06-610T 
understand Congress has been particularly interested in DOD’s approach 

to determining UAS needs and managing the growing number of UAS 

programs. We are also aware that DOD has made some changes in its 

plans for key future UAS acquisitions. 

Today, you asked us to discuss the results of our previous reports and our 

preliminary observations on the ongoing work we are conducting for this 

Subcommittee on the integration of unmanned aircraft systems into 

combat operations. Specifically, we will highlight (1) operational 

successes and challenges U.S. forces are experiencing with UAS in combat 

operations, and the extent to which DOD has taken steps to address these 

challenges; (2) DOD’s progress in establishing a strategic plan and 

oversight framework to guide joint and service-specific UAS development 

efforts and related investment decisions; and (3) our assessment of the 

Global Hawk and Predator programs’ business cases and acquisition 

strategies and the lessons learned that can be applied to the Joint 

Unmanned Combat Air Systems (J-UCAS) program. We will be 

continuing our work on the integration of UAS in combat operations and 

plan to issue a report to you based on this work later this year. 

To address our first two objectives, we interviewed officials and reviewed 

documentation from the UAS Planning Task Force within the Office of the 

Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; 

each of the military services; U.S. Joint Forces Command; the Joint Staff;

U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM); and other organizations. We also 

observed Predator training and support to ongoing operations, and 

updated our previously issued reports on UAS strategic planning and 

operational challenges. Additionally, we discussed operational challenges 

with CENTCOM officials and UAS operators who recently returned or are

currently supporting operations in Iraq to better understand the use of 

UAS in ongoing operations. To address our third objective, we 

interviewed officials and obtained data from the Office of the Secretary of

Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; Air Force 

Headquarters; Navy Headquarters; Air Combat Command; Air Force 

Materiel Command’s Aeronautical Systems Center; and prime contractors. 

We reviewed acquisition strategies, plans, and outcomes for the three 

largest UAS acquisition programs, the Global Hawk, Predator, and J-UCAS. 

We compared plans to DOD’s acquisition policy preferences and best 

practices to identify lessons learned for improving future programs. 

We conducted our ongoing work from August 2005 to April 2006 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Page 2 GAO-06-610T 
Summary Warfighting commanders are experiencing a high level of mission success 

with UAS in ongoing operations but, as we observed last year, they 

continue to face operational challenges in fully maximizing the use of 

these assets. In operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. forces have used 

UAS with great success for intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and 

offensive strike missions in support of joint and service-specific 

operations. For example, commanders continue to rely on the Air Force 

Predator and Army Shadow UAS to help identify improvised explosive 

devices and locate the enemy forces who planted them, allowing for the 

detonation of the devices and the capture of the enemy forces. 

Notwithstanding these successes, interoperability remains a challenge as

we previously reported, and integrating UAS into combat operations is 

becoming more complicated. For example, some UAS components cannot 

easily exchange and transmit data with ground forces because they were 

not designed to interoperable standards. Further, the availability of 

communications bandwidth4

 is constrained, limiting the number of UAS 

and other systems that can be operated simultaneously, and the amount of

data that can be transmitted from the UAS. In the absence of standards 

requiring sensor payloads to be reprogrammable from one band to 

another, UAS were designed and built without this flexibility. In our 

December 2005 report, we recommended that DOD take steps to develop 

or adjust standards to address these interoperability and bandwidth 

challenges.5

 Additionally, our preliminary work indicates that airspace 

integration is a growing challenge as demand for UAS remains high and 

the number of assets operating in the same airspace as manned aircraft 

steadily grows. Among other things, unmanned aircraft are deployed and 

controlled at different levels of command, and have generally been rapidly 

fielded without the benefit of a commonly accepted concept of operations. 

As the number and usage of UAS increases, effective airspace integration 

will be crucial to avoid duplicative deployments of UAS and safety 

mishaps. While DOD has taken some positive steps to address these 

challenges and our prior recommendations, such as issuing guidance and 

developing initiatives to improve interoperability, progress to date has 

been limited and the effectiveness of these steps cannot be adequately 

assessed until they are fully implemented. 

 4

 Bandwidth refers to the available frequencies to support the flight of UAS, to transmit the

output of onboard sensors, and to interface with air traffic control centers. 

5

 GAO, Unmanned Aircraft Systems: DOD Needs to More Effectively Promote 

Interoperability and Improve Performance Assessments, GAO-06-49 (Washington, D.C.: 

Dec. 13, 2005). 

Page 3 GAO-06-610T 
While DOD continues to request funds for UAS and the services continue 

to plan, develop, and field UAS systems, it still lacks a robust oversight 

framework and strategic plan to guide UAS development and investment 

decisions. Since we last testified, DOD established additional oversight 

bodies – a Joint Center of Excellence and Joint Material Review Board – to 

supplement the efforts of its already existing UAS Planning Task force and 

to facilitate planning and coordination for the acquisition and use of UAS. 

While these actions appear to be steps in the right direction, it is too early 

to determine how these entities will interrelate with one another, what 

impact they will have on addressing the challenges we have identified, and

whether they will be able to influence service UAS investment decisions or 

deployment. While DOD has updated its UAS Roadmap, it is still not a 

viable strategic plan because it lacks key planning elements. For example, 

while it describes broad goals, desired capabilities for UAS, and servicespecific acquisition plans, it does not provide clear linkages nor does it 

address the relationship among service plans, opportunities for joint 

endeavors, investment priorities and related funding needs. As we have 

previously reported, without a strategic plan and effective oversight 

framework for using UAS, DOD has little assurance that it will have a basis 

for validating requirements, integrating service efforts, and establishing 

program and funding priorities. Furthermore, Congress may not have all 

the information it needs to evaluate DOD’s UAS funding requests. Such a 

plan would help DOD assure that service plans for developing UAS 

anticipate and potentially minimize the types of challenges that are 

emerging today, particularly in the areas of interoperability, bandwidth, 

and airspace integration. 

While there have been successes on the battlefield, UAS development 

programs have exhibited similar problems as other major weapon systems 

that began an acquisition program too early, with many uncertainties 

about requirements and funding, and immature technologies, design, and 

production. Unmanned systems have also experienced similar outcomes—

changing requirements, cost growth, delays in delivery, performance 

shortfalls, and reliability and support problems. Future acquisition 

programs can learn from past efforts to craft better and less risky 

acquisition plans. Key steps conducive to success include (1) establishing 

a comprehensive business case that matches customer requirements with 

available resources to include proven technologies, sufficient time, and 

realistic funding; (2) implementing an incremental, knowledge-based 

acquisition strategy that separates technology development from product 

development and minimizes concurrency between testing and production; 

and (3) maintaining disciplined leadership support and direction. Frequent

changes to the Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems (J-UCAS) technology 

Page 4 GAO-06-610T 
demonstration program and recent budget actions raise some questions 

about the department’s priorities and future directions for UAS. Garnering 

the benefits from improved coordination among the military services’ 

individual programs and maintaining an emphasis on joint development 

and employment strategy seem to be at some risk. Concerns have also 

been raised about possible duplication of systems as the services look to 

expand individual fleets. The ongoing Army and Air Force effort to 

coordinate the Warrior and Predator programs is encouraging and could

be a model for limiting duplication and fostering jointness and 

interoperability. 

DOD defines an unmanned aircraft as a powered aerial vehicle that does 

not carry a human operator, uses aerodynamic forces to provide vehicle 

lift, can fly autonomously or be piloted remotely, can be expendable or 

recoverable, and can carry a lethal or nonlethal payload. Generally, 

unmanned aircraft systems consist of the aerial vehicle; a flight control 

station; information and retrieval or processing stations; and, sometimes, 

wheeled land vehicles that carry launch and recovery platforms. 

According to DOD, many elements are needed for the use of UAS, 

including a systems architecture that allows data to be moved, adequate 

spectrum and bandwidth for communication, airspace management and 

deconfliction, common data standards and formats to allow sharing and 

data fusion, common operating systems, and system interoperability. 

Potential missions considered appropriate for unmanned aircraft systems 

have expanded from the original focus on the intelligence, surveillance, 

and reconnaissance mission areas to the area of limited tactical strike 

capabilities, with projected plans for persistent ground attack, electronic 

warfare, and suppression of enemy air defenses. 

Background 

As shown in table 1, DOD had more than 3,000 unmanned aircraft as of 

February 2006, compared to fewer than 50 unmanned aircraft in 2000.6

 As 

of January 2006, more than 2000 of these aircraft were supporting ongoing

operations in Iraq. Over 88 percent of the unmanned aircraft currently in

inventory are small UAS, those launched by hand or by bungee. As a point

of comparison, no small unmanned aircraft were in inventory in 2000. 

 6

 The total number represents the number of unmanned aircraft, rather than unmanned 

aircraft systems, and includes test and training assets. 

Page 5 GAO-06-610T 
Table 1: Number and Type of Unmanned Aircraft in DOD’s Inventory, as of

February 2006

Type System Service/Command

Total aircraft 

inventory

Pointer Air Force/Special

Operations Command 

126

Raven Army/Air Force/

Special Operations 

Command 

1776

Dragon Eye Marine Corps/ 

Special Operations 

Command 

402

Force Protection

Airborne

Surveillance 

System 

Air Force 126

Swift Special Operations

Command 

212

Small UAS 

(weight less than 

10 lbs./airspeed 

less than 100 

kts.) 

BATCAM Air Force 54

Pioneer Navy and Marine Corps 34

Shadow 200 Army 140

Neptune Special Operations

Command 

15

Tern Special Operations

Command 

15

Mako Special Operations

Command 

15

Tactical UAS 

(weight less than 

500 lbs./airspeed 

less than 120 

kts.) 

Tigershark Special Operations

Command 

6

Predator A Air Force 70

I-Gnat Army 4

Hunter Army 32

Fire Scout Navy/Army 4

Predator B Air Force 6

Theater-level 

UAS 

Global Hawk Air Force/Navy 11

Total 3048

Source: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. 

Similarly, UAS flight hours have also increased. For example, as shown in 

figure 1 below, flight hours have increased from about 5,000 hours in 1996 

to 109,000 hours in 2005.

Page 6 GAO-06-610T 
Figure 1: Unmanned Aircraft Flight Hours, 1996–2005

Note: Numbers do not reflect small unmanned aircraft. 

As the numbers of unmanned aircraft and flight hours have increased, so 

has UAS funding. Total UAS funding shows an increase from about $363 

million in fiscal year 2001 to about $2.06 billion in fiscal year 2006. In 

addition, the fiscal year 2007 President’s Budget projects funding will grow 

to about $3.02 billion in fiscal year 2011. These figures do not include 

supplemental funding. DOD has requested approximately $208 million for 

UAS in its fiscal year 2006 supplemental request.

In December 2002, DOD created the 2002-2027 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

Roadmap, which was designed to guide U.S. military planning for UAS 

development and describe current programs, identify potential missions 

for UAS, and provide guidance on developing emerging technologies. In 

August 2005, DOD issued an updated version of the roadmap covering the 

period 2005-2030. Like its predecessor, the 2005 roadmap contains broad 

goals for unmanned systems that support the department’s larger goals of 

fielding transformational capabilities, establishing joint standards, and 

controlling costs. 

Furthermore, DOD’s 2006 QDR published in February 2006 validates the 

importance of unmanned systems. Overall, the QDR provides direction for 

Page 7 GAO-06-610T 
accelerating the department’s transformation to focus more on combatant

commanders’ needs and to develop portfolios of joint capabilities. In 

particular, the QDR report highlighted the department’s plans to expand 

investment in unmanned systems and their use in military operations. For 

example, it states DOD’s intent to nearly double unmanned aircraft 

coverage by accelerating the acquisition of the Predator and Global Hawk 

systems. It also plans to restructure the Joint Unmanned Combat Air 

Systems program and develop an unmanned longer-range carrier-based 

aircraft to increase naval reach and persistence. Further, the QDR plans to 

develop a new land-based, penetrating long-range strike capability by 2018 

and sets a goal that about 45 percent of the future long-range strike force 

be unmanned. Lastly, the 2006 QDR directs the Air Force to establish an 

unmanned aerial vehicle squadron under the U.S. Special Operations 

Command. 

DOD has experienced a high level of mission success using UAS in combat 

operations, but faces some operational challenges that could hamper joint 

operations. We previously identified interoperability and limited 

bandwidth as challenges and, according to our preliminary work, as the 

number of unmanned systems increases, airspace integration is becoming 

a growing challenge. While DOD has taken initial steps to address these 

challenges, limited progress has been made and the effectiveness of these 

actions cannot be adequately assessed until they are fully implemented. 

Combat Successes 

Realized, but 

Challenges Remain 

Recent UAS Successes in 

Combat Operations 

DOD has achieved significant operational successes in combat operations 

from its use of a variety of unmanned aircraft and their sensor, 

communications, and armaments payloads, thereby increasing the demand 

for and use of UAS. In operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. forces 

have used a variety of UAS, such as the Predator, Raven, and Shadow, in 

integral roles on intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and offensive 

strike joint or service-specific missions. For example, a Predator UAS 

provided video to a U.S. military element which provided situational 

awareness that contributed to the success of a mission that resulted in the 

capture of an al Qaida operational commander. Similarly, the Army used 

its Shadow UAS to identify an improvised explosive device and guide U.S.

forces to the location of the enemy forces, enabling the capture of the 

enemy forces and safe detonation of the improvised explosive device. 

Additionally, small UAS such as the Raven have been instrumental in 

enabling troops to find, locate, and destroy numerous targets. For 

example, a Raven was used to identify a suspicious vehicle in the 

Page 8 GAO-06-610T 
courtyard of a residence, which facilitated the discovery of a large 

weapons and ammunition cache when soldiers conducting the ground 

combat operations confirmed the vehicle contained explosives. As a 

result of successes such as these, the demand for and use of UAS are 

continuing to grow. 

DOD Faces Operational 

Challenges in Integrating 

UAS into Combat 

Operations 

Notwithstanding these operational successes, DOD continues to face 

challenges in effectively integrating unmanned systems into joint combat 

operations, and progress in addressing these challenges has been limited. 

Key challenges identified in ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan 

relate to interoperability,7

 the availability of communications bandwidth, 

and managing UAS and manned systems in the same airspace. 

First, while numerous UAS are being called on to conduct important 

missions in recent operations, interoperability remains a challenge. For 

example, as we reported in December 2005, some unmanned aircraft 

sensor and communications payloads and ground stations cannot easily 

exchange data because they were not designed to interoperable 

communications standards, even within a single service in certain 

circumstances. When communication systems are incompatible, operating

forces may be required to operate their own UAS to accomplish a mission, 

rather than using UAS that are already operating in the same area, thus 

increasing the numbers of systems being operated. To permit the sharing 

of tactical intelligence obtained by unmanned aircraft sensors, the services 

or combatant commands have developed certain technical patches that 

permit compatibility but slow data transmission. DOD guidance requires

interoperability and DOD’s 2005 roadmap identifies it as a key goal. In the 

absence of specific standards, the services have tended to initiate separate

development programs, specifically tailored to service specific 

requirements. Officials from U.S. Central Command have also

emphasized the need for improved interoperability and standards. For 

example, the commander of U.S. Central Command recently testified that

while UAS have transformed the battlespace and demand for their 

capabilities is significant, there is a need to develop an integrated 

architecture of many sensors to support operational units. He further 

stated that experiences to date highlight the importance of an established 

 7

 Interoperability is the ability of systems, units, and forces to provide and receive data and 

information from other systems, units, and forces. 

Page 9 GAO-06-610T 
interoperability standard for all intelligence systems that can function in a

joint and combined environment. 

Second, communications bandwidth continues to represent a major 

challenge for UAS. Unmanned aircraft and their sensor, armaments, and 

communications payloads depend on reliable access to communications 

bandwidth. Bandwidth is needed to support systems that control the 

flight of certain unmanned aircraft, to transmit data collected by payload

sensors, and to interface with air traffic control centers. Because UAS and 

other weapons or communications systems, including manned aircraft, 

often operate on the same frequency, certain frequencies can become 

congested and interference can occur. Such capacity constraints may 

limit the number of UAS and other systems that can be effectively 

operated simultaneously and the amount of available data that can be

transmitted. Despite having the capability to operate multiple UAS 

simultaneously, DOD’s roadmap states that the limited number of 

frequencies available often restricts the number of unmanned aircraft 

airborne at any point in time to one. As we reported in December 2005, 

the problem with constrained bandwidth cannot be easily overcome 

without potentially costly modifications to existing systems because DOD 

has not established standards requiring unmanned aircraft or sensor 

payloads to be reprogrammable from one band to another. 

To address these challenges, we recommended that DOD develop 

standards, including overall UAS interoperability standards and standards 

that will allow for future UAS to be reprogrammable to different 

frequencies. We are also aware that, in the Fiscal Year 2006 National 

Defense Authorization Act, Congress required that the Secretary of 

Defense take such steps to ensure that all8

 service tactical unmanned 

aerial vehicles are equipped and configured so that the data link used is 

the Tactical Common Data Link and those vehicles use data formats 

consistent with the architectural standard for tactical UAS.9

 We 

understand that some of the military services have provided a report to 

Congress to identify which systems are currently in compliance with the 

Tactical Data Link requirement. According to DOD, use of this link is 

 8

 The Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics may waive the 

applicability of these requirements to any tactical UAS if the Undersecretary determines

and certifies to the congressional defense committees that it would be technologically 

infeasible or uneconomically acceptable to integrate a tactical data link.

9

 Pub. L. No. 109-163 § 141 (2006). 

Page 10 GAO-06-610T 
expected to reduce the amount of bandwidth used and allow the UAS to 

utilize a broader band of frequencies; however, it will not totally alleviate 

the problem because it is too heavy to use on small UAS and may result in 

shifting the frequency congestion to other bands. 

Third, our preliminary work indicates that effectively integrating UAS into 

the airspace is becoming a growing challenge in ongoing operations. With

the growing numbers and increasing use of UAS of various types and sizes 

to support combat missions, particularly in Iraq, coordination, integration, 

and deconfliction of airspace among UAS and manned systems are 

becoming more complex. In addition to limitations on communications 

interoperability, UAS are deployed and controlled at different levels of 

command. Furthermore, UAS have generally been rapidly fielded without 

the benefit of a commonly accepted concept of operations for the different

types of UAS, including tactics, techniques, and procedures for 

employment and use of assets. According to U.S. Central Command 

officials, because there are numerous UAS in theater now, many with 

multirole capabilities and disparate command and control, the potential

exists for deployment of multiple UAS capabilities to support the same 

operation. Moreover, UAS are not currently equipped with the capability 

to sense and avoid other unmanned or manned aircraft but instead rely on 

procedural control methods for deconfliction. While aware of only a few 

mishaps, many of the officials we spoke with are concerned about 

problems in the future as the numbers of UAS steadily increase. For 

example, according to a U.S. Central Command official, there have been 

some collisions between small UAS and helicopters. Army officials stated 

that they were aware of one collision between a Raven UAS and a 

helicopter. The cause of the collision was attributed to the helicopter pilot 

being outside of his designated flight area. With the number of UAS in 

support of ongoing operations increasing, effective airspace integration is

critical to maximize service capabilities, avoid duplicative deployments, 

and minimize safety mishaps. 

DOD is taking some initial steps to address interoperability, bandwidth, 

and airspace integration challenges, but progress has been limited. For 

example, to promote interoperability and address bandwidth issues, in 

December 2005 DOD issued guidance reminding the services that common 

data link10 remains the DOD standard for all intelligence, surveillance, and 

 10 The common data link is a family of full-duplex, jam-resistant, point-to-point microwave 

communication links developed by the U.S. government and used in imagery and signals 

intelligence collections systems. 

Page 11 GAO-06-610T 
reconnaissance links. Further, DOD continues to refine its guidance for 

improved interoperability and supportability of information technology 

and national security systems, which include UAS. In March 2006, the 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued an instruction addressing 

certification and validation of DOD information technology and national 

security systems acquisition programs to meet emerging key 

interoperability performance parameters, such as information exchange.11

Additionally, DOD’s 2005 roadmap contains an appendix which outlines 

interoperability standards. However, DOD officials acknowledge that the 

UAS roadmap and the parameters included in the March guidance are 

evolving and neither provides an inclusive list of all standards required to

achieve interoperability. The services are also initiating efforts to improve 

interoperability. For example, the Army and Marine Corps are moving to a

“one system” ground control station to allow multiple UAS platforms to be

operated by a single ground control station. In addition, the Air Force has 

demonstrated a multiaircraft control ground control station that would 

control up to four Predator air vehicles at any one time. Furthermore, an 

initiative originally started by the Air Force—as the Remote Operations 

Video Enhanced Receiver System—has been embraced by each of the 

services to enable ground forces to receive information directly from 

certain airborne unmanned aircraft. Also, the Army has begun to 

integrate Blue Force Tracker12 into some of its UAS to improve situational 

awareness. All of these efforts are in preliminary stages and, while these 

steps are positive, their effectiveness cannot be adequately assessed until 

they are fully implemented. 

While DOD has made some progress, it still lacks a robust oversight 

framework and strategic plan to guide UAS development and investment 

decisions. DOD’s progress includes an update to its roadmap and the 

establishment of new oversight bodies to facilitate planning and 

coordination regarding the development, procurement, and use of UAS. 

Despite our prior recommendations on the subject, DOD’s updated 

roadmap still lacks key planning elements such as a clear link between 

goals, capabilities, plans, funding priorities, and needs. Therefore, it is not 

yet a viable strategic plan for guiding UAS development and investment. 

Progress Made but 

Additional Elements 

Needed to Establish a 

UAS Strategic Plan 

and Effective 

Oversight 

 11 CJCSI 6212.01D (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 8, 2006). 

12 Blue Force Tracker is a satellite-based tracking and communications system that enables 

users to monitor the location of other Blue Force Tracker-equipped aircraft and vehicles. 

Page 12 GAO-06-610T 
Additional UAS Oversight 

Bodies Established 

As you may recall, in October 2001, the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics created the Joint Unmanned Aerial

Vehicle Planning Task Force (now known as the UAS Planning Task 

Force) to provide oversight for the department’s UAS programs and to 

provide guidance, as necessary, to promote interoperability and 

commonality. To communicate its vision and promote commonality of 

UAS systems, the Task Force published its first UAS roadmap in 2002 and

an updated version in 2005. The roadmap describes current programs, 

identifies potential missions, and provides guidance on emerging 

technologies. According to DOD officials, the Task Force is currently 

focused on coordinating with the services as they procure and field greater 

numbers of UAS in an effort to ensure the military services avoid 

duplication of systems, while developing integrated systems that can work

together in joint combat operations. 

To supplement the efforts of its UAS Planning Task Force, DOD has 

established two additional UAS oversight bodies since we last testified. 

For example, in July 2005, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council13

established a new Joint Unmanned Aircraft Systems Center of Excellence 

to focus on UAS operational issues and the Joint UAS Material Review 

Board14 to address joint UAS material issues and prioritize solutions. The 

Center of Excellence—assisted by an advisory council composed of 

representatives from each of the combatant commands, the services, and

the Joint UAS Material Review Board—is responsible for facilitating the 

development and integration of UAS common operating standards, 

capabilities, concepts, doctrine, tactics, techniques, procedures, and 

training. The Center of Excellence has been charged with developing a 

joint concept of operations for unmanned aircraft systems. According to 

center officials, the concept of operations will likely address issues such 

as interoperability and airspace integration. 

 13 The Joint Requirements Oversight Council is a joint organization made up of the Vice 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and a four-star officer designated from each of the 

services that bases recommendations to the Chairman on interaction with combatant

commanders and the Joint Staff Director-led Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment 

teams that perform detailed assessments of programmatic alternatives, tradeoffs, risks, billpayers, and effectiveness. CJCSI 3180.01 (Washington, D.C.: Oct 31, 2002). 

14 This group was formerly known as the Joint UAV Overarching Integrated Process Team

and was rechartered to form the Joint Material Review Board and tasked with addressing 

UAS material issues. 

Page 13 GAO-06-610T 
The Material Review Board is chartered to provide a forum to identify or 

resolve requirements and corresponding material issues regarding 

interoperability and commonality, prioritize potential solutions, assess the 

focus of current and future programs, and seek strategies common to all 

services. The Material Review Board is composed of members from each 

of the services, Joint Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and Joint 

Forces Command. Due to the broad nature of UAS, at various times other 

stakeholders, such as the combatant commanders, also attend board 

meetings. Additionally, the board is not a standing body with full-time 

members, but rather an organization that meets periodically. 

The Joint Requirements Oversight Council also tasked both the Center of

Excellence and the Material Review Board with submitting 

recommendations to the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development 

System and with coordinating service-sponsored UAS submissions.15 DOD 

officials state that having the center and board serve in this coordination

role will allow them to leverage service developmental efforts, capabilities,

and requirements to enable joint interoperability, and reduce duplication 

of effort. As of March 2006, the center and board were in the process of 

organizing, establishing guidance and procedures, conducting initial 

meetings, and identifying initial efforts. 

In addition to the UAS Joint Planning Task Force, DOD views the new 

oversight bodies as means to more effectively manage service UAS 

programs. While these changes appear to be steps in the right direction, it 

is unknown whether they will provide an effective oversight framework. It 

is too early to tell how these entities will interrelate or what impact they 

will have in addressing interoperability issues and the other challenges we 

have identified. While DOD intends for these entities to play a role in 

guiding service UAS acquisition, planning, prioritization, and execution of

unmanned air systems, it is also unclear to what extent they will be able to 

influence the services because none of the entities are chartered with the 

authority to direct the military services to adopt any of their suggestions. 

Rather, they act in an advisory capacity and make recommendations to the 

services and Joint Requirements Oversight Council. 

 15 In June 2003, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff created the Joint Capabilities 

Integration and Development System process. It is a collaborative system that DOD uses 

to identify capability gaps and integrated solutions to resolve these gaps. 

Page 14 GAO-06-610T 
Notwithstanding our prior recommendations on the subject, DOD’s 

updated UAS roadmap lacks key planning elements and is not a strategic 

plan that can guide UAS development and investment decisions. As we 

have previously testified and reported, a strategic plan and effective

oversight can be helpful in guiding efforts to develop and field UAS and to 

address the types of challenges that are emerging with integrating UAS 

into the force structure. Specifically, we emphasized that while DOD’s 

2002 roadmap contained some elements of a strategic plan—in that it 

identified approaches to attaining long-term goals and assessed in part, 

annual performance goals and performance indictors that identified 

progress towards these goals—it only minimally addressed other 

elements, such as the interrelationship between service-specific efforts, 

opportunities for joint endeavors, or funding issues.16 We reported that 

although the joint UAS Planning Task Force had taken a positive step by 

developing the Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Roadmap 2002-2027, a key 

planning document, neither it nor other DOD guidance documents 

represented a comprehensive strategic plan to guide the development and 

fielding of UAS. We further reported that without a strategic framework 

and an oversight body with sufficient program directive authority to 

implement planning, DOD had little assurance its investment would result 

in UAS programs being effectively integrated into the force structure. 

Consequently, we found that DOD risked increased costs, future 

interoperability problems, and duplication among the military services. 

We recommended that DOD establish a strategic plan and designate the 

Task Force or another body to oversee implementation of the plan. 

Updated UAS Roadmap 

Better Identifies 

Challenges but Still Lacks 

Key Strategic Plan 

Elements 

Since that time, DOD has established the previously discussed entities and 

the UAS Planning Task Force published an updated roadmap—the 

Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap 2005-2030. Similar to its 

predecessor, the 2005 roadmap contains some elements of a strategic plan

such as broad long-term goals and priorities, but lacks other crucial 

elements of a strategic plan, such as milestones and performance 

measures for achieving these goals and priorities. While it also describes 

desired capabilities for UAS, operational issues or challenges based on 

ongoing operations, and service-specific acquisition plans, it does not 

provide a clear link among the goals, desired capabilities, and plans, nor 

does it sufficiently address the interrelationship among service plans to 

each other and how they promote joint operations, opportunities for joint 

 16 GAO, Force Structure: Improved Strategic Planning Can Enhance DOD’s Unmanned 

Aerial Vehicles Efforts, GAO-04-342 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 17, 2004).

Page 15 GAO-06-610T 
endeavors, and investment priorities and related funding needs. We 

believe the roadmap does not provide specific guidance on UAS 

development or related force structure integration. In fact, the roadmap 

clearly states that it neither authorizes specific UAS nor prioritizes the 

requirements, as this is the responsibility of the services and the Joint 

Requirements Oversight Council. DOD officials acknowledged to us that

the updated roadmap is not a strategic plan and does not contain details

about force structure, resources, and other capability implementation 

issues, but rather emphasizes technology. U.S. Central Command officials 

have cited the need for an integrated roadmap for UAS to ensure 

interoperability is achieved and that new UAS systems neither interfere 

with nor limit mission performance. We continue to believe that a 

strategic plan is needed to better position DOD to validate requirements, 

evaluate services plans, integrate service efforts, and establish program 

and funding priorities. Without a strategic plan, Congress may not have all 

the information it needs to evaluate DOD’s UAS funding requests. 

Furthermore, a strategic plan and oversight framework would help DOD 

assure that service plans for developing UAS anticipate and potentially 

minimize the types of challenges that are emerging today, particularly in 

the areas of interoperability, bandwidth, and airspace integration. 

While there have been successes on the battlefield, UAS development 

programs have exhibited similar problems as other major weapon systems 

that began an acquisition program too early, with many uncertainties 

about requirements and funding, and immature technologies, design, and 

production. Unmanned systems have also experienced similar outcomes—

changing requirements, cost growth, delays in delivery, performance 

shortfalls, and reliability and support problems. Future acquisition 

programs can learn from past efforts to limit risks and improve outcomes 

by establishing comprehensive business cases to match customer 

requirements and available resources and by adopting disciplined 

knowledge-based and incremental acquisition strategies consistent with 

DOD acquisition policy preferences and best practices. Recent

management decisions and budget actions raise some questions about the 

department’s priorities, future direction for UAS, and possible duplication 

of systems. Ongoing Army and Air Force efforts to coordinate acquisitions, 

logistics, and employment of two similar systems are encouraging. 

Unmanned Aircraft 

Programs Provide 

Lessons Learned for 

Future Systems to 

Craft Better and Less 

Risky Acquisition 

Strategies 

Page 16 GAO-06-610T 
We recently reported on DOD’s three largest UAS programs.17 We analyzed

and contrasted the acquisition strategies and outcomes of the Air Force’s 

Global Hawk and Predator programs. We identified lessons learned that 

could benefit the Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems technology 

demonstration and other future systems. 

Acquisition Strategies and 

Outcomes Experienced by 

Current Programs Can Be 

Used to Improve Future 

Systems 

The Global Hawk and Predator programs had similar beginnings, but 

followed different acquisition strategies that resulted in different 

outcomes. While both programs began with top leadership support and 

accomplished successful, focused demonstration efforts, Global Hawk 

switched to a high-risk acquisition strategy by accelerating development 

and production. With the substantial overlap in development, test, and 

production, the program experienced significant gaps in knowledge about 

technology, design, and manufacturing capabilities while requiring sizable 

funding. As a result, serious cost and schedule problems have ensued, 

some required capabilities have been deferred or dropped, operational 

tests have identified performance problems, and the Global Hawk program 

is being restructured for the fourth time. In contrast, the Predator program 

has pursued an acquisition strategy that is more consistent with DOD’s 

revised acquisition guidance and commercial best practices for a more 

structured and evolutionary acquisition approach. While the Predator 

program has some overlap in development and production and has 

experienced some problems, the program’s cost growth and schedule 

delays have been relatively minor, and testing of prototypes in operational 

environments has already begun.

There are trends that run consistently through the Global Hawk and 

Predator programs, similar to trends in other major defense acquisition 

programs that we have reviewed. That is, when DOD provides strong 

leadership at an appropriate organizational level, it enables innovative,

evolutionary, and disciplined processes to work. Once leadership is 

removed or diminished, programs have tended to lose control of 

requirements and add technical and funding risks. We have also found 

that after successful demonstrations to quickly field systems with existing 

technologies, problems were encountered after the programs transitioned 

into the system development phase of the acquisition process. The 

services pushed programs into production without maturing processes 

 17 GAO, Unmanned Aircraft Systems: New DOD Programs Can Learn from Past Efforts

to Craft Better and Less Risky Acquisition Strategies, GAO-06-447 (Washington, D.C.: 

Mar. 15, 2006). 

Page 17 GAO-06-610T 
and also began to add new requirements that stretched beyond technology 

and design resources. Inadequate technology, design, and production 

knowledge increased risk and led to cost, schedule, and performance 

problems. 

The J-UCAS technology demonstration program and its offspring could 

benefit from the lessons learned in the Global Hawk and Predator 

programs. Since its inception, the J-UCAS program has been in flux. 

Program leadership, funding, and priorities have changed several times. 

The recent Quadrennial Defense Review has directed another 

restructuring into a Navy program to demonstrate a carrier-based 

unmanned combat air system. The Air Force plans to consider J-UCAS 

technologies and accomplishments in its efforts to develop a new longrange strike capability. Before DOD commits to major acquisition 

development programs for the Navy and Air Force, it has the opportunity 

and time to develop the knowledge needed to prepare solid and feasible 

business cases and to adopt disciplined, evolutionary strategies consistent 

with DOD acquisition policy preferences and best practices to support 

advanced unmanned systems acquisitions. Refining requirements based 

on proven technologies and a feasible design based on systems 

engineering are best accomplished in the concept and technology 

development phase that precedes the start of a system acquisition 

program. During this early phase, the environment is conducive to 

changes in requirements that can be accomplished more cost-effectively 

than after systems integration begins and large organizations of engineers, 

suppliers, and manufacturers are formed to prepare for the start of system 

production.

Key lessons that can be applied to J-UCAS and other future systems 

include 

• maintaining disciplined leadership support and direction similar to that 

experienced early in Global Hawk from the Under Secretary of Defense 

for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and with the Predator’s Task 

Force Arnold (a senior group of Air Force leaders that helped the 

program maintain a tight focus on program requirements and 

direction); 

• establishing a clear business case that justifies initial investments and 

constrains individual program requirements to match available 

resources based on proven technologies, engineering knowledge, and 

Page 18 GAO-06-610T 
time available before committing to system development and 

demonstration; 

• implementing an incremental acquisition strategy preferred by defense 

policy and best practices that separates technology development from 

product development and minimizes concurrency between testing and 

production;

• establishing and enforcing controls that require knowledge and

demonstrations to ensure that appropriate knowledge is captured and 

used at critical decision junctures before moving programs forward 

and investing more money; and 

• managing according to realistic funding requirements that fully 

resource product development and production based on a cost 

estimate that has been informed by proven technologies and a 

preliminary design. 

Additionally, lessons learned from the transition of the Global Hawk and 

Predator systems from technology demonstrations into system production 

and operation are important. The advanced concept technology 

demonstration can be a valuable tool to prove concepts and military utility 

before committing time and funds to a major system acquisition. Designing 

in product reliability and producibility, and making informed trade-offs 

among alternative support approaches are key aspects of development and 

can save substantial money in operating and maintaining systems during 

their lifetimes. However, if these operational aspects of system 

development are not addressed early before production, they can have 

major negative impacts on life-cycle costs. The original Predator 

demonstration effort did not emphasize design and development tasks that 

make a system more reliable and supportable. This made the transition 

from demonstration to acquisition more difficult and the Air Force had to

organize a team to respond and resolve reliability and supportability 

issues. 

Future Direction of DOD’s 

UAS Acquisitions 

Frequent changes to J-UCAS and recent budget actions raise some 

questions about the department’s priorities and future direction for 

unmanned aircraft systems, which a strategic plan would help address. 

Garnering the benefits from improved coordination among the military 

services’ individual programs and maintaining an emphasis on joint 

development and fielding strategy seem to be at some risk. 

Page 19 GAO-06-610T 
In terms of overall investment, while development and procurement 

funding have significantly increased since the terror attacks in September 

2001, annual funding requested in fiscal year 2007 for unmanned aircraft 

systems is $1.7 billion, while DOD’s funding for tactical aviation programs 

in 2007 is $25.1 billion. The total funding programmed in the fiscal year 

2006 defense budget request was $15.4 billion and $153.9 billion, 

respectively. The near-term investment plans laid out in the fiscal year 

2007 budget request are smaller than the amounts projected over the same 

period in the fiscal year 2005 budget. 

The termination of the J-UCAS as a joint technology demonstration 

program and uncertain, evolving future plans for its offspring also seem 

somewhat at odds with official plans for jointness. The J-UCAS was one of 

the top priorities in DOD’s roadmap published in August 2005 and was 

cited as leading the way to the next generation of unmanned aircraft—

extending missions beyond the original focus on intelligence, surveillance,

and reconnaissance capabilities to persistent, survivable, and advanced 

combat capabilities with increased levels of autonomy. A weaponized, 

stealthy unmanned aircraft was also selected as the most effective solution 

to close capability gaps identified in the joint strike enabler initial 

capabilities document published in December 2004. The system envisioned 

was to provide a penetrating and persistent strike aircraft against highthreat enemy air defenses and other high-value ground targets. Before JUCAS became a joint program in October 2003, the Air Force had planned 

to accelerate its own unmanned combat air system with initial deliveries in 

fiscal year 2007. It appears to us that Air Force support for such a system 

waned when it became a joint program on a less aggressive fielding 

schedule. 

Also uncertain is how many crossover benefits can be mutually provided 

by separate Navy and Air Force efforts as restructured. The Navy is 

starting up its own program in fiscal year 2007 with about $1.8 billion in 

funds cut from the J-UCAS program. Some of the remaining J-UCAS 

programmed funding was redirected to the Air Force’s long-range strike 

program and other efforts. Requirements are somewhat divergent. The

Navy appears to be most interested in fielding a relatively small aircraft of 

moderate endurance that may operate solo from aircraft carriers to 

provide surveillance for the battle group. The Air Force’s future striker 

will likely be a larger land-based platform able to operate in groups, with a 

longer range requiring aerial refueling and employing a large weaponscarrying capacity. The Air Force is expected to use J-UCAS experience in

conducting an analysis of alternatives during 2006 of the future striker, 

which may be manned, unmanned, or some combination. Air Force plans 

Page 20 GAO-06-610T 
are still evolving at this time and it is unclear how much of the previous 

investment in J-UCAS technology and continuing Navy efforts will benefit 

the Air Force program. 

As the J-UCAS evolves one more time—and efforts return to the individual

services—some key challenges will exist to maintain the advantages that 

were offered by a joint effort. The services need to be aware of those 

advantages and not arbitrarily reject them for parochial reasons. For 

example, exploiting past plans for common operating systems, 

components, and payloads could offer cost savings in acquisition and lifecycle support as well as improved interoperability. In particular, the 

common operating system could be a cutting edge tool to integrate and 

provide for interoperability of air vehicles, allowing groups of unmanned 

aircraft to fly in a coordinated manner and function autonomously 

(without human input). A top priority when the Defense Advanced 

Research Projects Agency led J-UCAS, the common operating system is 

now likely to be terminated, according to a program official. 

Concerns have also been raised about possible duplication of DOD 

unmanned aircraft systems as the services look to expand individual 

fleets. The joint decision of the Air Force and Army to develop a 

memorandum of understanding on the Predator and Warrior programs is 

encouraging and could be a model for inhibiting duplication and fostering 

synergy of efforts. These two systems are similar in mission and design 

and are manufactured by the same contractor. The services agreed to a 

collaborative solution in terms of acquisition, logistics, and employment 

and to optimize funding and leverage current and future systems to rapidly 

field identified capabilities. A more detailed memorandum of 

understanding is expected soon to articulate the path forward for each of

the services in respect to developing complementary capabilities. One 

possible outcome could be a decision to acquire one system to meet the 

needs of both services. We note, however, that the Air Force recently 

substantially increased its planned investments in Predator A to buy much

greater quantities; this year’s funding estimates through 2011 are 165 

percent more than was estimated for the same period last year. It would 

seem more prudent to do the analysis and reach the collaborative 

decisions with the Army before committing to increased investments. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes our prepared statement. We would be happy 

to answer any questions that you or members of the Subcommittee may 

have. 

Page 21 GAO-06-610T 
For future questions about this statement, please contact Sharon Pickup at 

(202) 512-9619 or Michael J. Sullivan at (937) 258-7915. Other individuals 

making key contributions to this statement include Patricia Lentini, 

Michael Hazard, Susan Tindall, Bruce Fairbairn, Shvetal Khanna, Rae Ann 

Sapp, Charlie Shivers III, Brian Simpson, Renee Brown, Katherine Lenane, 

and Charles Perdue. 

Unmanned Aircraft Systems: New DOD Programs Can Learn from Past 

Efforts to Craft Better and Less Risky Acquisition Strategies. GAO-06-

447. Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2006. 

Contacts and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Related GAO 

Products 

Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Global Hawk Cost Increase Understated in

Nunn-McCurdy Report. GAO-06-222R. Washington, D.C.: December 15, 

2005. 

Unmanned Aircraft Systems: DOD Needs to More Effectively Promote 

Interoperability and Improve Performance Assessments. GAO-06-49. 

Washington, D.C.: December 13, 2005. 

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Improved Strategic and Acquisition 

Planning Can Help Address Emerging Challenges. GAO-05-395T. 

Washington, D.C.: March 9, 2005. 

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Changes in Global Hawk’s Acquisition 

Strategy Are Needed to Reduce Program Risks. GAO-05-6. Washington, 

D.C.: November 5, 2004. 

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Major Management Issues Facing DOD’s 

Development and Fielding Efforts. GAO-04-530T. Washington, D.C.: 

March 17, 2004. 

Force Structure: Improved Strategic Planning Can Enhance DOD’s 

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Efforts. GAO-04-342. Washington, D.C.: 

March 17, 2004. 

Nonproliferation: Improvements Needed for Controls on Exports of 

Cruise Missile and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. GAO-04-493T. 

Washington, D.C.: March 9, 2004. 

Page 22 GAO-06-610T 
Nonproliferation: Improvements Needed to Better Control Technology 

Exports for Cruise Missiles and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. GAO-04-175. 

Washington, D.C.: January 23, 2004.

Defense Acquisitions: Matching Resources with Requirements Is Key to 

the Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle Program’s Success. GAO-03-598. 

Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2003. 

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Questionable Basis for Revisions to Shadow 

200 Acquisition Strategy. GAO/NSIAD-00-204. Washington, D.C.: 

September 26, 2000. 

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Progress of the Global Hawk Advanced 

Concept Technology Demonstration. GAO/NSIAD-00-78. Washington, D.C.: 

April 25, 2000. 

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: DOD’s Demonstration Approach Has 

Improved Project Outcomes. GAO/NSIAD-99-33. Washington, D.C.: 

August 30, 1999. 

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Progress toward Meeting High Altitude 

Endurance Aircraft Price Goals. GAO/NSIAD-99-29. Washington, D.C.: 

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Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Outrider Demonstrations Will Be Inadequate 

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Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: DOD’s Acquisition Efforts. GAO/T-NSIAD-97- 

138. Washington, D.C.: April 9, 1997.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Hunter System Is Not Appropriate for Navy 

Fleet Use. GAO/NSIAD-96-2. Washington, D.C.: December 1, 1995. 

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Performance of Short-Range System Still in

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Page 24 GAO-06-610T (350775) 
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