alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
§ 18.3 Development and adoption of equal employment opportunity programs. ( a ) *Submission.* Within 90 days after the effective date of this part, the President shall furnish to the Secretary a positive continuing program to assure that employment is provided without discrimination.
( b ) *Development.* The President and the Secretary may consult with each other at any time regarding the development and evaluation of the program in order to better effectuate the purpose of this part. The program may be a part of a general program establishing employment procedures for employees of the university and may cover other rights and privileges of employees.
( c ) *Concurrence.* The Secretary may concur with the program proposed by the President. If the Secretary does not concur with the proposed program, he shall inform the President and make suggestions for improvement. The President will have 30 days thereafter to furnish a satisfactory proposal.
( d ) *Amendment.* After concurrence has been obtained on the program, the President may make recommendations to amend the program to improve its effectiveness and furnish them to the Secretary for concurrence. If the Secretary, at any time finds that a program, as implemented, does not achieve the purposes described in § 18.2, he shall confer with the President concerning needed improvements and changes. The President will furnish a satisfactory amendment to the Secretary within 30 days for concurrence.
( e ) *Effective date.* The program or amendments to it shall be made effective by the President not later than 30 days from the date of concurrence.
###### Editorial Note on Part 1980

#### Editorial Note:

Nomenclature changes to part 1980 appear at 80 FR 9905, Feb. 24, 2015.

#### § 1980.472 Protective advances.

[See § 1980.65 subpart A of this part.]

## Administrative

Refer to RD Instruction 1980-E, Appendix G, Liquidation and Property Management Guide (available in any Rural Development office) for advice on how to interact with the lender on liquidations and property management.

A. Protective advances will not be made in lieu of additional loans, in particular, working capital loans. Protective advances are advances made by the lender for the purpose of preserving and protecting the collateral where the debtor has failed to and will not or cannot meet its obligations. Ordinarily, protective advances are made when liquidation is contemplated or in process. A precise rule of when a protective advance should be made is impossible to state. A common, but by no means the only, period when protective advances might be needed is during liquidation. At this point, the borrower and success of the project are no longer of paramount importance, but preserving collateral for maximum recovery is of vital importance. Elements which should always be considered include how close the project is to liquidation or default, how much control the borrower will have over the funds, what danger is there that collateral may be destroyed and whether there will be a good chance of saving the collateral later if a protective advance in contemplation of liquidation is made immediately. A protective advance *must* be an indebtedness of the borrower.

B. The State Director must approve, in writing, all protective advances on loans within his/her loan approval authority which exceed a total commulative advance of $500 to the same borrower. Protective advances must be reasonable when associated with the value of collateral being preserved.

C. When considering protective advances, sound judgment must be exercised in determining that the additional funds advanced will actually preserve collateral interests and recovery is actually enhanced by making the advance.
###### Editorial Note on Part 1944

#### Editorial Note:

Nomenclature changes to part 1944 appear at 80 FR 9885, Feb. 24, 2015.

#### § 1944.263 Eligibility and priority for 1978 Act recipients.

Grantees funded initially under 42 U.S.C. 8001 shall be eligible to receive continued, non-competitive funding subject to its availability. These grantees will be eligible to receive priority funding under this subpart if they comply with the regulations in this part and with the requirements of any NOFA issued in a particular fiscal year.
#### Harvey Kaufman, Appellant, v Signal Finance of New York, Inc., Respondent.

Judgment unanimously affirmed, without costs. Memorandum: In 1975 petitioner executed and delivered a promissory note and what purported to be an assignment of wages to respondent. Petitioner defaulted on the note in 1976 and respondent filed the wage assignment with the county clerk and with petitioner’s employer in December, 1976. Petitioner commenced this proceeding on November 15, 1978 alleging that the wage assignment was void because respondent failed to file a "true copy” of the wage assignment with the employer (Personal Property Law, §§ 47-a, 48-a) and also seeking a determination that the underlying debt was void because the loan documents violated section 353 of the Banking Law and the Federal Truth in Lending Act. Special Term vacated the wage *806assignment, with leave to refile, because respondent failed to file a "true copy” of the assignment. It dismissed the claims for relief alleging the invalidity of the underlying debt and petitioner appeals. Subdivision 5 of section 47-e of the Personal Property Law provides that "In any proceeding under this section the court shall have jurisdiction to consider any and all defenses to the assignment and the debt secured thereby.” Because of mechanical errors in respondent’s office machinery, the wage assignment as filed was blank and not a true copy of the assignment executed by petitioner. Inasmuch as petitioner has received the relief he sought by the proceeding under section 47-e, there is no need for us to rule on petitioner’s right to challenge the underlying debt and since the parties have not addressed the merits of that issue, we find it inappropriate to do so. (Appeal from judgment of Monroe Supreme Court— vacate wage assignment.) Present—Cardamone, J. P., Simons, Hancock, Jr., Callahan and Moule, JJ.
§ 1540.43 Contents of request. ( a ) A request for emergency action under section 204(e) of the Act shall be submitted in duplicate to the Administrator, Foreign Agricultural Service, United States Department of Agriculture, Washington, DC 20250. Such request shall be supported by appropriate information and data and shall include to the extent possible: ( 1 ) A description of the imported perishable product(s) allegedly causing, or threatening to cause, serious injury;
( 2 ) The beneficiary country(ies) of origin of the allegedly injurious imports;
( 3 ) Data showing that the perishable product allegedly causing, or threatening to cause, serious injury is being imported from the designated beneficiary country(ies) in increased quantities as compared with imports of the same product from the designated beneficiary country(ies) during a previous representative period of time (including a statement of why the period used should be considered to be representative);
( 4 ) Evidence of serious injury or threat thereof to the domestic industry substantially caused by the increased quantities of imports of the product from the beneficiary country(ies); and
( 5 ) A statement indicating why emergency action would be warranted under section 204(e) of the Act (including all available evidence that the injury caused by the increased quantities of imports from the beneficiary country(ies) would be relieved by the suspension of duty-free treatment accorded under the Act).
( b ) A copy of the petition and the supporting evidence filed with the United States International Trade Commission under Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended, must be provided with the request for emergency action.
#### Cleveland Bar Association *v.*Cox.

[Cite as *Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Cox*(1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 218.]

(No. 97-2667

Submitted May 13, 1998

Decided September 23, 1998.)

*221
      *Thomas P. Meaney, Jr.,*and *Robert Lustig,*for relator.

*Roosevelt Cox, pro se.*

*Per Curiam.*

We first take judicial notice that respondent was suspended from the practice of law in Ohio on August 11, 1995 for failure to meet his continuing legal education obligations and remains suspended on this date. *In re Report of the Comm, on Continuing Legal Edn.*(1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 1428, 1429, 655 N.E.2d 1312, 1314.

Having reviewed the record, we adopt the findings of fact of the board. We adopt also its conclusions with respect to counts one, three, four, seven, and twelve. We agree with the board that counts two, six, eight, and thirteen should be dismissed.

The board found in counts five, nine, ten, fourteen, fifteen, and sixteen that respondent’s conduct violated Gov.Bar R. IV(1). This rule states, “The Code of Professional Responsibility as adopted by this Court on October 5, 1970, and set forth in 23 Ohio State 2d Reports, as amended, shall be binding upon all persons admitted to the practice of law in Ohio. The willful breach of the Code shall be punished by reprimand, suspension, disbarment, or probation as provided by Gov.Bar R. V.” This rule does not specify any standards of conduct that are to be observed by lawyers with respect to the public, the legal system, or the legal profession. Instead, this rule merely declares the binding nature of the Code of *222Professional Responsibility and the sanctions that may be imposed for its willful breach.

Therefore, to the extent that the board found that respondent’s conduct violated this rule, the board’s conclusions are vague and fail to inform respondent of the nature of the charges against him. We adopt the conclusions of the board in counts nine, ten, fourteen, fifteen, and sixteen insofar as they do not rely on Gov.Bar R. IV(1). The board’s conclusion in count five relying as it does solely upon this rule, count five is dismissed. Likewise, we dismiss the board’s conclusion in count eleven for lack of specificity.

Nevertheless, the facts which do remain and the conclusions which the board has drawn from them are sufficient for us to find that respondent has engaged in a series of actions that demonstrate contempt for his clients and for the bar. We find that respondent should no longer be included on the roll of those permitted to practice law in Ohio. Respondent is therefore permanently disbarred from the practice of law in Ohio. Costs taxed to respondent.

*Judgment accordingly.*

Moyer, C.J., Resnick, Pfeifer, Cook and Lundberg Stratton, JJ., concur.

Douglas and F.E. Sweeney, JJ., concur in judgment only.
#### Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Respondent, v Larmar Estates, Inc., et al., Defendants, and Harold Pearlman, Appellant.

— In an action on a series of promissory notes and on the guarantees of payment thereof, defendant Harold Pearlman appeals from so much of (1) an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County, dated January 10, 1979, as denied his motion for an order of preclusion and directed the parties to appear for depositions, and (2) a further order of the same court, entered May 23, 1979, as denied his motion for a protective order, directed all parties to appear for depositions, and denied his motion to require plaintiff to submit to an examination by persons designated by him. Orders affirmed insofar as appealed from, with one bill of $50 costs and disbursements. The examinations shall proceed at the place designated in the order under review, at a time to be fixed by plaintiff in a written notice of not less than 10 days, or at such other time and place as the parties may agree. Appellant, Pearlman, had sought an order requiring the plaintiff, a corporation, to submit to an examination before trial of persons designated by him in the first instance. Ordinarily, a corporation has the right in the first instance to select the officers or employees through whom it is to be examined (see *Fernandez v St. John’s Episcopal Hosp., South Shore Div.,*70 AD2d 627). Only where special circumstances exist, may the probing party be permitted to designate the individuals who are to appear on behalf of the corporation (see, e.g., *Wallach v Northeast Airlines,*15 Mise 2d 762). The appellant has not shown any special circumstances that would require deviation from the ordinary rule. Appellant is not foreclosed from seeking further discovery if the testimony of the representatives produced is inadequate, he specifically alleges the nature of the inadequacy and he demonstrates the relationship of that inadequacy to the affirmative claims asserted (see *Lounsbury v New York State Elec. & Gas Corp.,*62 AD2d 1033). We have considered the other contentions of the appellant and find them to be without merit. Mollen, P. J., Damiani, Lazer and Margett, JJ., concur.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 05-6599

MICHAEL G. KESELICA,

Petitioner - Appellant,

versus

MARTIN VAN EVANS; ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE

STATE OF MARYLAND,

Respondents - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

Maryland, at Baltimore. Andre M. Davis, District Judge. (CA-04-

410-AMD)

Submitted: September 29, 2005 Decided: October 6, 2005

Before WILKINSON, KING, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Michael G. Keselica, Appellant Pro Se. Ann Norman Bosse, OFFICE OF

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MARYLAND, Baltimore, Maryland, for

Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Michael G. Keselica, a state prisoner, seeks to appeal

the district court’s order denying relief on his petition filed

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000). The order is not appealable unless

a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability.

28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). A certificate of appealability will

not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner

satisfies this standard by demonstrating both that reasonable

jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of his

constitutional claims is debatable and that any dispositive

procedural rulings by the district court are also debatable or

wrong. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003);

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); Rose v. Lee, 252 F.3d

676, 683 (4th Cir. 2001). We have independently reviewed the

record and conclude that Keselica has not made the requisite

showing. Accordingly, we deny Keselica’s motion for a certificate

of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately

presented in the materials before the court and argument would not

aid the decisional process. 

DISMISSED
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of Candela Corporation (the "Company") on Form 10-K for the period ending
June 28, 2008 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Robert E. Quinn, Principal Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



/s/ROBERT E. QUINNRobert E. Quinn Principal Financial OfficerSeptember 11, 2008


---



QuickLinks
From: Raymond, Gabrielle [mailto:graymond@rti.org]  

Sent: Friday, March 18, 2016 1:44 PM

To: Rosenthal, Steven <rosenthal.steven@epa.gov>; Mulrine, Phil <Mulrine.Phil@epa.gov>

Cc: Munoz, Breda <breda@rti.org>; Hakos, Matthew <mhakos@rti.org>; Parker, Barrett <Parker.Barrett@epa.gov>;

D'Agostino, Kathleen <dagostino.kathleen@epa.gov>; Liljegren, Jennifer <Liljegren.Jennifer@epa.gov>

Subject: RE: Taconite UPL section review and UPL questions

Breda Munoz 

Postdoctoral research, Oregon State University, Corvallis, OR, 2004. 

PhD, Statistics, Oregon State University, Corvallis, OR, 1999. 

MS, Statistics, University of Iowa, Iowa City, IA, 1993. 

BS, Statistics, University of Costa Rica, San Pedro, Costa Rica, 1989. 

Licenciate Mathematics, University of Costa Rica, San Pedro, Costa Rica, 1987. 

Gabrielle Raymond 

BS, Chemical Engineering, North Carolina State University, Raleigh, NC, 2008.
#### §§ 1717.700-1717.749 [Reserved]
#### § 20.3 Delegation of authority.

Authority has been delegated to the Administrator to promulgate amendments and revisions to the regulations in this part.

[Amdt. 3, 45 FR 8562, Feb. 8, 1980]
NOTE : This order is nonprecedential.



# United States Court of Appeals

**for the Federal Circuit**

______________________

VIRNETX INC.,

Appellant

v.

CISCO SYSTEMS, INC.,

Cross

- Appellant

______________________

2023

- 1765 , 20 23

- 1809

______________________

Appeal s from the United States Patent and Trademark

Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in No. 95/001,714

.

______________________

O R D E R

The parties having so agreed, it is ordered that:

(1) The proceeding is DISMISSED under Fed . R. App.

P. 42 (b).

(2) Each side shall bear their own costs.

FOR THE COURT

April 8, 2024

Date

ISSUED AS A MANDATE: April 8, 2024 Case: 23-1765 Document: 30 Page: 1 Filed: 04/08/2024
#### KEOUGH, Appellant v. PURCELL, Respondent.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.

July 12, 1906.)

Action by James Keough against Kate Purcell.

No opinion. Judgment and order affirmed, with costs.
Press Office 

 U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

Fact Sheet February 6, 2006 

USCIS FY 2007 Budget Request Prioritizes Transformation Efforts and 

Expanded Employment Eligibility Verification Program 

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) today announced the Administration’s Fiscal Year 2007 

budget request of $1.98 billion for the agency. This request includes funds to transform USCIS business 

operations and to expand its Employment Eligibility Verification (EEV) Program in anticipation of a 

mandatory employment verification requirement. 

The FY 2007 budget requests $182 million in discretionary funding and $1.804 billon in mandatory funding 

generated from fee revenues paid by persons seeking immigration benefits. USCIS is one of the largest feefunded agencies in the Federal government. 

SAVE/Employment Eligibility Verification Program 

Discretionary funding of $134.9 million is requested for the cost: 

(1) to operate an expanded Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements (SAVE) program to meet the new 

requirements of the REAL ID Act for USCIS to provide the various State departments of motors vehicles 

with immigration status information 

(2) to expand the current EEV Program in anticipation of a mandatory electronic employment verification 

requirement. 

USCIS Transformation Program 

Discretionary funding of $47 million is requested to modernize USCIS business operations and the underlying 

investment technology that supports those operations to more efficiently and effectively meet its mission of 

administering the nation’s immigration laws. 

USCIS Daily Business 

Every business day, USCIS will: process 135,000 national security background checks; receive 135,000 

USCIS.gov web hits; take 82,000 calls at four National Customer Service Centers; process 30,000 

applications for an immigration benefit; see 19,000 visitors at 92 USCIS offices; issue 7,000 green cards; 

capture 8,000 sets of fingerprints at 130 Application Support Centers; welcome 2,100 newly naturalized 

citizens; process almost 300 refugee applications; and help American parents adopt 80 foreign orphans. 

-USCISwww.dhs.gov
**EXHIBIT 32.2**

**CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIALOFFICER PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350 AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

In connection with the Quarterly Report of TennesseeCommerce Bancorp, Inc. (the “Registrant”) on Form 10-Q for thequarter ended September 30, 2006, as filed with the Securities andExchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), the undersignedcertifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant toSection 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1)             The Report fullycomplies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)           Theinformation contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,the financial condition and results of operations of the Registrant.
|   | By:                       | /s/ George W. Fort |   |
|--------|---------------------------|--------------------|--------|
|   | George W. Fort            |
|   | Chief Financial Officer   |
|   |                      |
|   | Dated: November 13,  2006 |

 

----
I 

113TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 2011 

To amend title 38, United States Code, to provide for a two-year extension 

of the Veterans’ Advisory Committee on Education. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MAY 16, 2013 

Mr. DELANEY (for himself and Mr. RENACCI) introduced the following bill; 

which was referred to the Committee on Veterans’ Affairs 

A BILL 

To amend title 38, United States Code, to provide for a 

two-year extension of the Veterans’ Advisory Committee 

on Education. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Veterans’ Advisory 

5 Committee on Education Improvement Act of 2013’’. 

6 SEC. 2. TWO-YEAR EXTENSION OF VETERANS’ ADVISORY 

7 COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION. 

8 Section 3692 of title 38, United States Code, is 

9 amended— 

10 (1) in subsection (a)— 


rfrederick on DSK6VPTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 2011 IH

1 (A) by inserting ‘‘31,’’ after ‘‘30,’’; and 

2 (B) by striking ‘‘and the Persian Gulf 

3 War’’ and inserting ‘‘the Persian Gulf War, and 

4 the post-9/11 operations in Iraq and Afghani5 stan’’; and 

6 (2) in subsection (c), by striking ‘‘December 31, 

7 2013’’ and inserting ‘‘December 31, 2015’’. 

Æ 


rfrederick on DSK6VPTVN1PROD with BILLS
#### Coger *against*Coger.

Chancery.

The authority of the courts of ehancery to decree the sale of *271the real estate • of infants, extends only to estates *descended*to them.

*270[Mr. Owsley for Plaintiff: Mr. Harlan for Defendant.]

From the Circuit Court for Jessamine County.

*October*13

Chief Justice Robertson

delivered the Opinion of the Court,

William J. Coger *prosecutes*this writ of error, to reverse a decree directing the sale of a tract of land, upon the petition of his guardian.

*271Where a special jurisdiction is given by statute, *the record*must show a case within . he statute; other-, wise, a defect of jurisdiction will be presumed. This court will will not decide whethera decree is void or not,in a case where the purchaser of an estate sold under the' decree, is no party — hs on that, his tii. tie depends.

As the statute conferred on the chancellor only a' special authority to decree the sale of real estate which *descended*to infants, he can have no jurisdiction, unless the estate was acquired *by descent;*and therefore, as his juris diction is special and limited, this decree cannot he sustained unless the record shew the fact which alone can give authority under the statute.

It does not appear, in this case, that the infant’s title was acquired by descent; and therefore the circuit court had no jurisdiction ; and consequently the decree directing the sale, must be reversed.

But, as the purchaser1 under the decree is not a party to the writ of error, we cannot now decide, as we have been urged to do, whether the decree is void, or merely erroneous; and whether, therefore, the reversal will affect the sale ; for if the decree be void, the purchaser under it acquired no title whatever; but if it were erroneous merely; and not absolutely void, lie may have acquired a title which the reversal might not, *per se,*divest. 1 . ■

Decree reversed, and cause remanded.
###### Editorial Note on Part 1980

#### Editorial Note:

Nomenclature changes to part 1980 appear at 80 FR 9905, Feb. 24, 2015.

#### §§ 1980.482-1980.487 [Reserved]