[Cite as State v. Glenn-Coulverson, 2017-Ohio-2671.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

State of Ohio, : 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 16AP-265 

 (C.P.C. No. 15CR-2997)

v. : 

 (REGULAR CALENDAR) 

Nishawn Glenn-Coulverson, : 

 Defendant-Appellant. : 

 

D E C I S I O N 

Rendered on May 4, 2017 

 

On brief: Ron O'Brien, Prosecuting Attorney, and 

Valerie B. Swanson, for appellee. Argued: Valerie B. 

Swanson.

On brief: Dustin M. Blake Co., LLC, and Dustin M. Blake, 

for appellant. Argued: Dustin M. Blake. 

 

APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas 

LUPER SCHUSTER, J. 

{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Nishawn Glenn-Coulverson, appeals from a judgment 

of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas convicting him of one count of murder, 

with firearm and gang specifications; two counts of felonious assault, with firearm 

specifications; and two counts of having a weapon while under disability. For the 

following reasons, we affirm.

I. Facts and Procedural History 

{¶ 2} In June 2015, Glenn-Coulverson was indicted on two counts of murder in 

violation of R.C. 2903.02, with firearm and gang specifications, unclassified felonies; two 

counts of felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11, with firearm specifications, 

second-degree felonies; two counts of having a weapon while under disability in violation 
No. 16AP-265 2 

of R.C. 2923.13, third-degree felonies; and one count of carrying a concealed weapon in 

violation of R.C. 2923.12, a forth-degree felony. Glenn-Coulverson pleaded guilty to one 

count of having a weapon while under disability, and elected to have the other count of 

having a weapon while under disability tried to the court. On the state's request, a nolle 

prosequi was entered for the carrying a concealed weapon count. The remaining charges 

were tried before a jury in February and March 2016. 

{¶ 3} As pertinent to this appeal, the following facts were adduced at trial. On 

March 20, 2015, friends Esak Gemeraw, Omar Sow, and Zadarrick Brooks drove together 

to a convenience store, "De Store," on Chatterton Road in Franklin County. They arrived 

at the store's parking lot, which is shared with other businesses, when there was still 

daylight at approximately 6:00 p.m. They entered the store and soon returned to their 

vehicle. As they began to drive away, a gunman shot at them. Gemeraw was struck by a 

bullet in his torso, and he died as a result of the wound. Ten spent cartridge casings from 

the same firearm were found at the scene of the shooting. 

{¶ 4} Sow, who was in the vehicle's rear passenger seat, testified as follows 

regarding the circumstances surrounding the shooting. As he, Gemeraw, and Brooks 

were about to enter the store, they passed a group of four or five individuals who were 

"just saying, just little subliminal messages so they can get our attention." (Mar. 1, 2016 

Tr. at 114.) Sow was not sure exactly what those individuals were saying, but it "was like 

they was just rapping lyrics." (Mar. 1, 2016 Tr. at 114.) Sow described the nature of the 

lyrics as "[j]ust gang and some -- whole bunch of other stuff." (Mar. 1, 2016 Tr. at 114.) 

Sow did not know anyone in the group. Each member of the rapping group was black and 

was wearing either a black or gray "hoodie." After passing the rapping group, and without 

anyone speaking between the groups, Sow, Gemeraw, and Brooks entered the store. After 

exiting the store, they loaded into their vehicle, with Brooks as the driver. Gemeraw was 

in the front passenger seat. As Brooks began to turn out of the parking lot and left on to 

Chatterton Road, there were gunshots. A window of the vehicle shattered, and Gemeraw 

said he had been struck by a bullet. Sow heard numerous gunshots as Brooks drove away. 

He testified that he could not clearly see who was shooting, but he could see smoke near 

the shooter's hands and that the shooter was black and was wearing "all black." (Mar. 1, 

2016 Tr. at 123.) 
No. 16AP-265 3 

{¶ 5} Brooks, who drove the vehicle, testified that after they purchased some 

snacks in the convenience store, Gemeraw and Sow exited the store before him. Brooks 

exited the store approximately one minute later and met them at the vehicle. Before the 

vehicle turned on to Chatterton Road, Brooks heard gunshots. Brooks turned left into 

traffic and then heard Gemeraw say "I'm hit, I'm hit." (Mar. 1, 2016 Tr. at 158.) Brooks 

testified that he did not see the shooter as he drove away. 

{¶ 6} On the day of the shooting, Shalaina Hunter went to the Little Caesars in the 

Chatterton Road shopping plaza with her family. She testified as follows. As Hunter was 

leaving to go home, she noticed a group of three young black males loudly "rapping and 

just saying the 'N' word." (Mar. 2, 2016 Tr. at 216.) Their "pants were down low" and one 

was wearing black and the other two were wearing gray. (Mar. 2, 2016 Tr. at 216-17.) The 

man in black came within ten feet of her. After Hunter left the parking lot in her vehicle, 

she heard gunshots and looked in her rearview and side mirrors and saw a young black 

male shoot multiple times. Hunter pulled her vehicle to the side of the rode, and Brooks 

drove past her. Hunter got a good look at the shooter, who she described as "a young guy, 

[with a] black sweatshirt, dreadlocks, brown skin, [and] jeans." (Mar. 2, 2016 Tr. at 221.) 

The shooter was one of the three rapping lyrics shortly before the shooting. After the 

shooting, the other two who had been hanging out with the shooter "took off running." 

(Mar. 2, 2016 Tr. at 223.) 

{¶ 7} Approximately one week after the shooting, Columbus police showed 

Hunter a surveillance video from inside De Store shortly before the shooting. Hunter was 

able to identify the shooter in the video and in a still frame taken from the video. The 

surveillance video, along with the still frame from the video, were again shown to Hunter 

at trial and she again identified the shooter from the video and still frame. Finally, in the 

courtroom, Hunter identified Glenn-Coulverson as the shooter. 

{¶ 8} Aja Keyes was also in the Chatterton Road shopping plaza at the time of the 

shooting, and she testified as follows. Keyes went into De Store for a few minutes and 

then exited to go to her vehicle. She was in her vehicle when she heard a gunshot. She 

turned in the direction of the gunshot and saw the shooter. She also saw two or three 

individuals near the shooter run toward a housing development. The shooter remained in 

his spot, "shooting towards a vehicle." (Mar. 2, 2016 Tr. at 264.) Keyes witnessed the 
No. 16AP-265 4 

shooter fire approximately six to ten shots at the vehicle. She had a clear view of the 

shooter, but she could not get a good look at his face. The shooter was wearing a black 

hoodie and had his hair in "singles" or "dreads" down between his eyes and chin. (Mar. 2, 

2016 Tr. at 269.) The individuals who ran toward the housing development were wearing 

"lighter hoodies, * * * gray, maybe." (Mar. 2, 2016 Tr. at 271.) Keyes was shown the 

convenience store surveillance video at trial and could not identify the shooter in the 

video, but she noted that one individual had a black hoodie and short braids like the 

shooter. She acknowledged however that the shooter's hairstyle and black hoodie are 

common. 

{¶ 9} Jeffrey Gillman was walking toward the Little Caesars at the Chatterton 

Road shopping plaza when the shooting began. He testified as follows. When Gillman 

arrived at the shopping plaza, he noticed a small group "just dancing and yelling," but he 

could not understand what they were saying. (Mar. 2, 2016 Tr. at 289.) As Gillman 

stepped on to the sidewalk in front of Little Caesars, he heard gunshots. He turned and 

saw "a young man shooting five, six, eight times out into the street." (Mar. 2, 2016 Tr. at 

290.) The shooter was wearing a "black hoodie and blue jeans and braided hair." (Mar. 2, 

2016 Tr. at 292.) He described the braided hair as "[n]ot long * * * [s]hort. Shoulder 

length, maybe." (Mar. 2, 2016 Tr. at 292.) The others in the group, who were wearing 

gray hoodies, ran toward a housing development. Gillman had a clear view of the shooter. 

{¶ 10} Approximately one week after the shooting, Columbus police interviewed 

Gillman and showed him the De Store surveillance video and then a still frame from that 

video. Gillman identified the shooter on the video and still frame from the video as the 

black male wearing a black hoodie. When asked at trial whether the shooter was in the 

courtroom, Gillman testified that the "defendant looks like him, but I'm - - I couldn't 

identify him today." (Mar. 2, 2016 Tr. at 306.) However, he had no doubt that he 

correctly identified the person in the video as the shooter. 

{¶ 11} Shortly before the shooting, Pamela Woods arrived at the Chatterton Road 

shopping plaza to pick up her sons who were getting haircuts. She testified as follows. 

Woods was sitting in her vehicle in the shopping plaza when she saw three or four black 

males exiting De Store. One of the individuals wearing a gray hoodie looked similar to her 

nephew. One of the other individuals had "dreads" and was wearing "all black," including 
No. 16AP-265 5 

a black hoodie. (Mar. 2, 2016 Tr. at 329.) The third individual was wearing a gray hoodie. 

Woods got a good look at the face of the individual wearing all black because he walked 

within approximately eight feet of her. When the individual in all black had walked near 

her vehicle, he was "dancing, kind of like - - almost as if he was listening to music and he 

was kind of just dancing around." (Mar. 2, 2016 Tr. at 346.) After the individuals walked 

by her vehicle, Woods heard a "pop" and then another "pop." (Mar. 2, 2016 Tr. at 333.) 

She exited her vehicle and saw a man shooting a firearm until he had "unload[ed] the 

clip." (Mar. 2, 2016 Tr. at 334.) The shooter was the individual in a black hoodie with 

"dreads" who had just walked past her vehicle. (Mar. 2, 2016 Tr. at 335.) 

{¶ 12} Approximately one week after the shooting, Woods went to Columbus 

police headquarters and watched the De Store surveillance video. Woods identified the 

black male with a black hoodie in the video as the shooter. She also identified the black 

male with a black hoodie in the video still frame as the shooter. In the courtroom, Woods 

identified Glenn-Coulverson as the shooter. 

{¶ 13} Columbus Division of Police Officer Derek Blaine testified as follows. There 

are multiple gangs that operate in the area of the shooting, including the Crips, James & 

Livingston Hot Boys, East Main Money Gang, and East Haven Bloods. As a patrol officer, 

Officer Blaine interacted with members of these gangs on a regular basis. Officer Blaine 

had numerous interactions with Glenn-Coulverson over the previous few years, and he 

knew Glenn-Coulverson was in the James & Livingston Hot Boys gang. Additionally, 

when Officer Blaine interacted with Glenn-Coulverson, Glenn-Coulverson was frequently 

with individuals with known ties to that gang. Many of the individuals connected with the 

James & Livingston Hot Boys gang have the words "Hot Boys," "James Road," or 

"Livingston Avenue," tattooed on their bodies. 

{¶ 14} On August 11, 2013, approximately 19 months before the shooting, Officer 

Blaine encountered Glenn-Coulverson in connection with a traffic stop. Because there 

was marijuana in the vehicle, Officer Blaine and another officer at the scene required all 

four individuals to exit the vehicle. As he exited the vehicle, Glenn-Coulverson admitted 

to having two weapons on his person. The driver and two other passengers of the vehicle 

were all connected with the James & Livingston Hot Boys gang, and they all had "Hot 

Boys" tattoos to indicate their affiliation. 
No. 16AP-265 6 

{¶ 15} At trial, Officer Blaine was shown the convenience store surveillance video, 

and he identified Glenn-Coulverson on that video. Officer Blaine also identified a known 

associate of the PTSQ gang, Eric Smith Ross, on the video. According to Officer Blaine, it 

is not unusual for individuals of different gangs to hang out together. 

{¶ 16} Columbus Division of Police Detective Bill Best, a declared expert in 

criminal street gangs, testified as follows. For the past five years, Detective Best served in 

the Criminal Intelligence Unit, or Gang Unit, dealing with gangs and gang activity. Gang 

members use identifiers, such as wearing the same color, tattoos, and scarring, to indicate 

their affiliation. For example, it is common for James & Livingston Hot Boys gang 

members to have tattoos on their hands to indicate their affiliation with the gang. The 

parties stipulated that Glenn-Coulverson has "Hot Boys" tattooed on his hands and 

"James Road" tattooed across his torso. Detective Best testified that having these types of 

tattoos is "a way for people to see that you're a Hot Boy." (Mar. 2, 2016 Tr. at 395.) 

{¶ 17} Detective Best also testified regarding the connection between criminal 

gangs and violence. He testified that criminal activity enhances a member's "street value." 

(Mar. 2, 2016 Tr. at 376.) "[W]hen it comes to the gang members, violence is what rules. 

If you're out on the street, you want to have the most violent reputation." (Mar. 2, 2016 

Tr. at 377.) Committing acts of violence, such as carrying weapons and openly firing ten 

times at a moving vehicle, increases an individual's status on the street. 

{¶ 18} Detective Best further testified that the James & Livingston Hot Boys gang 

is linked to the nationally recognized Bloods gang, whose members normally wear red. In 

the De Store surveillance video, Glenn-Coulverson can be seen wearing a red bandana in 

his right back pocket of his jeans. Detective Best testified that Glenn-Coulverson's display 

of a red bandana in the right back pocket indicated his affiliation with the Bloods gang. 

The color red "signifies * * * a Blood, and * * * wearing it in the right back [also] signifies a 

Blood." (Mar. 2, 2016 Tr. at 388.) Detective Best also acknowledged Ross' presence in the 

surveillance video, and he noted that he knew Ross to be an associate of the East Haven 

Bloods and PTSQ gangs. He testified it is not uncommon for East Haven Bloods to hang 

out with James & Livingston Hot Boys. 

{¶ 19} Lastly, Detective Best further testified that James & Livingston Hot Boys 

gang members have committed felonious assaults, shootings, drug dealing, thefts, and 
No. 16AP-265 7 

robberies in Columbus. For example, in February 2014, James & Livingston Hot Boys 

gang member Ted Vanhed was convicted of participating in a criminal street gang, two 

counts of aggravated robbery, and weapons charges. Additionally, in March 2015, Robert 

Broom, also a James & Livingston Hot Boys gang member, was convicted of involuntary 

manslaughter as a result of his involvement in a drive-by shooting. Detective Best 

testified that he had listened to an interview of Glenn-Coulverson in which he "said that 

[Robert Broom] was his homey * * * that he rolls with the Hot Boys." (Mar. 2, 2016 Tr. at 

393.) 

{¶ 20} At the conclusion of trial, the court found Glenn-Coulverson guilty of the 

tried count of having a weapon while under disability. The jury found him guilty of one 

count of murder, with firearm and gang specifications, and two counts of felonious 

assault, with firearm specifications. The jury found him not guilty of the other count of 

murder. The trial court sentenced Glenn-Coulverson to a total of 35 years to life in prison 

for the convictions. 

{¶ 21} Glenn-Coulverson timely appeals. 

II. Assignments of Error 

{¶ 22} Glenn-Coulverson assigns the following errors for our review: 

[1.] The trial court abused its discretion by admitting 

irrelevant and prejudicial testimony by a police "gang expert," 

in violation of Ohio Rules of Evidence 401, 402, 403, and 404 

which amounts to reversible error. 

[2.] Defendant-Appellant's convictions are not supported by 

sufficient, credible evidence. 

[3.] Defendant-Appellant's convictions are against manifest 

weight of the evidence. 

[4.] The Defendant's right to the effective assistance of 

counsel was violated where counsel's performance was 

deficient to the Defendant's prejudice. 

[5.] The trial court erred in imposing the gang specification 

where there was no indication that the shooting was gang 

related thus unconstitutionally applying R.C. 2941.142 to the 

Defendant. 
No. 16AP-265 8 

III. Discussion 

A. First Assignment of Error – Admission of Testimony Relating to 

 Gang Activity 

{¶ 23} In his first assignment of error, Glenn-Coulverson asserts the trial court 

erred in admitting into evidence testimony regarding gang activity and related conduct. 

Glenn-Coulverson argues that the gang-related testimony was inadmissible under Ohio 

Rules of Evidence 401, 402, 403, and 404 because it was irrelevant, unfairly prejudicial, 

and improper character evidence. 

{¶ 24} The admission or exclusion of relevant evidence rests within the trial court's 

sound discretion. State v. Sage, 31 Ohio St.3d 173 (1987), paragraph two of the syllabus. 

Thus, a reviewing court will not reverse a trial court's evidentiary ruling absent an abuse 

of discretion that materially prejudices the affected party. State v. Issa, 93 Ohio St.3d 49, 

64 (2001). A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts "unreasonably, arbitrarily, or 

unconscionably." State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 23 (2002). 

1. Relevance and Unfair Prejudice

{¶ 25} Glenn-Coulverson argues that the state was erroneously permitted to 

present irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial testimony concerning gangs. In particular, he 

contends that the trial court should not have permitted Officer Blaine and Detective Best 

to testify regarding gangs and gang activity. He argues that their testimony was improper 

because there was no evidence that the shooting was gang-related, the testimony was not 

probative of the shooter's identity, and the testimony was inflammatory. 

{¶ 26} Evid.R. 401 defines "relevant evidence" as "evidence having any tendency to 

make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action 

more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." Generally, 

relevant evidence is admissible, and irrelevant evidence is inadmissible. Evid.R. 402. 

"[T]he question of whether evidence is relevant is ordinarily not one of law but rather one 

which the trial court can resolve based on common experience and logic." State v. Lyles, 

42 Ohio St.3d 98, 99 (1989). 

{¶ 27} Evid.R. 403(A) provides that "[a]lthough relevant, evidence is not 

admissible if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 

prejudice, of confusion of the issues, or of misleading the jury." For the purpose of 
No. 16AP-265 9 

Evid.R. 403(A), emphasis must be placed on the word "unfair" because " 'if unfair 

prejudice simply meant prejudice, anything adverse to a litigant's case would be 

excludable.' " State v. Crotts, 104 Ohio St.3d 432, 2004-Ohio-6550, ¶ 24, quoting Oberlin 

v. Akron Gen. Med. Ctr., 91 Ohio St.3d 169, 172 (2001). Thus, " '[u]nfair prejudice is that 

quality of evidence which might result in an improper basis for a jury decision.' " Id., 

quoting Oberlin at 172. Evidence may be unfairly prejudicial if it " 'arouses the jury's 

emotional sympathies, evokes a sense of horror, or appeals to an instinct to punish.' " Id., 

quoting Oberlin at 172. Because fairness is subjective, the determination of whether 

evidence is unfairly prejudicial is left to the sound discretion of the trial court. Crotts at 

¶ 25, citing State v. Robb, 88 Ohio St.3d 59, 68 (2000). 

{¶ 28} The state argues that Glenn-Coulverson failed to preserve his relevance and 

unfair prejudice evidentiary arguments set forth in his first assignment of error. 

However, even assuming these arguments were preserved for the purpose of appeal, 

Glenn-Coulverson fails to demonstrate the trial court committed evidentiary error 

regarding the gang-related testimony of Officer Blaine or Detective Best. 

{¶ 29} The factual issues at trial went beyond identifying the shooter. For example, 

whether Glenn-Coulverson was actively participating in a criminal gang was also a 

relevant issue because the state was required to prove that fact to meet the requirements 

of the charged gang specification. As set forth above, Glenn-Coulverson was indicted on 

two counts of murder, with a firearm and gang specification attached to both of those 

counts. A gang specification under R.C. 2941.142 mandates a prison term of one, two, or 

three years on an offender who commits a felony "that is an offense of violence while 

participating in a criminal gang." Pursuant to R.C. 2941.142, to demonstrate that GlennCoulverson committed a felony "that is an offense of violence while participating in a 

criminal gang," the state needed to present evidence of the existence of a criminal gang 

and that Glenn-Coulverson committed a felonious act of violence while participating in 

that criminal gang. 

{¶ 30} Regarding the existence of a criminal gang requirement of the gang 

specification, the state must prove that the "persons in the organization, association, or 

group individually or collectively engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang 

activity." R.C. 2923.41(A)(3). See State v. Johnson, 10th Dist. No. 07AP-538, 2008-Ohio-
No. 16AP-265 10 

590, ¶ 41 (vacating the appellant's conviction on gang specification because of insufficient 

evidence for jury to find pattern of criminal gang activity due to absence of testimony that 

members of the appellant's gang committed any of the type of crimes listed in R.C. 

2923.41(B)(1)); State v. Bickerstaff, 7th Dist. No. 09 JE 33, 2011-Ohio-1345, ¶ 58-60 

(finding sufficient evidence to establish pattern of criminal gang activity based on police 

detective and gang member testimony outlining the felony offenses committed by 

members of the appellant's gang). Further, the state must demonstrate the offense of 

violence was committed while participating in that criminal gang. See State v. Smith, 6th 

Dist. No. L-15-1027, 2017-Ohio-776, ¶ 49-50 (finding sufficient evidence to support 

conclusion that the offenses were committed while the appellant participated in a criminal 

gang based on testimony regarding local gang culture, the appellant's affiliation with a 

criminal gang, and the connection between violence and gang status); State v. Yates, 8th 

Dist. No. 96774, 2012-Ohio-919, ¶ 22 (finding sufficient evidence that shooting was 

related to gang activity where the appellant and other criminal gang members were 

"patrolling their territory" in a vehicle when "they came upon the [pedestrian] victims" 

and the appellant "exchanged words" with one of the pedestrians before shooting). Thus, 

gang-related testimony is not only relevant but necessary for the state to prove a gang 

specification. 

{¶ 31} Although the testimony of Officer Blaine and Detective Best was not 

relevant to the identity of the shooter, that testimony was relevant to gang specification 

issues, namely, whether Glenn-Coulverson shot someone while participating in a criminal 

gang. The testimony of Detective Best provided information for the jury regarding gang 

culture, and the testimony of Officer Blaine indicated Glenn-Coulverson's position within 

that culture. Their testimony also informed the jury regarding the James & Livingston 

Hot Boys gang in particular and the pattern of criminal activity exhibited by that gang. 

Moreover, although evidence that Glenn-Coulverson actively participated in a criminal 

gang was unfavorable to him, that fact did not make the gang-related evidence unfairly 

prejudicial when it was highly relevant to the charged gang specification. 

{¶ 32} For these reasons, we find that the testimony of Officer Blaine and Detective 

Best was relevant and not unfairly prejudicial. Thus, the admission of their testimony was 

not contrary to Evid.R. 401, 402, or 403. 
No. 16AP-265 11 

2. Other Acts Evidence

{¶ 33} Glenn-Coulverson argues that the trial court erroneously permitted Officer 

Blaine to testify regarding his alleged prior acts. He asserts that this testimony was 

admitted to prove he acted in conformity with his bad character, an impermissible basis 

to admit evidence of other acts under Evid.R. 404(B). 

{¶ 34} Evid.R. 404(B) states that "[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not 

admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity 

therewith." Such evidence "may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof 

of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of 

mistake or accident." Evid.R. 404(B). These listed exceptions are not exclusive. State v. 

Rocker, 10th Dist. No. 97APA10-1341 (Sept. 1, 1998), citing State v. Smith, 49 Ohio St.3d 

137, 140 (1990). Thus, " 'other acts' evidence not fitting within the enumerated categories 

may be admissible so long as the evidence is admitted for any proper purpose other than 

proving the defendant's propensity to act and conformity with a particular trait of his 

character." Id., citing Smith at 140. Thus, it is proper to admit evidence necessary to 

prove an element of a charged specification. See State v. Sosnoskie, 2d Dist. No. 22713, 

2009-Ohio-2327, ¶ 33 (evidence tending to prove a necessary element of a charged crime 

is not excludable "other acts" under Evid.R. 404(B)); State v. Coleman, 85 Ohio St.3d 129, 

140 (1999) (evidence tending to prove death-penalty specification was not "other acts" 

evidence limited by Evid.R. 404(B)). 

{¶ 35} Glenn-Coulverson's Evid.R. 404(B) challenge concerns the admissibility of 

Officer Blaine's testimony regarding the August 11, 2013 traffic stop involving GlennCoulverson. Officer Blaine testified that Glenn-Coulverson was a passenger in the vehicle 

he stopped that day. Officer Blaine and another officer determined there was marijuana 

in the vehicle and directed the driver and passengers to exit the vehicle. The other officer 

asked Glenn-Coulverson if he had any weapons on his person, and he admitted he was 

carrying two weapons. Officer Blaine testified that the driver and other passengers of the 

stopped vehicle were also members of the James & Livingston Hot Boys gang. 

{¶ 36} Before Officer Blaine testified, Glenn-Coulverson's counsel generally 

objected to anticipated testimony on the basis of Evid.R. 404(B). However, this was not 

in response to a specific inquiry by the prosecution. Even assuming Glenn-Coulverson 
No. 16AP-265 12 

preserved this issue for review on appeal, he cannot demonstrate that the trial court 

admitted evidence in violation of Evid.R. 404(B). The testimony regarding the traffic stop 

in August 2013 supported the gang specification. Glenn-Coulverson was in the vehicle 

with known members of the gang, with guns and drugs, and Detective Best testified that 

the gang was involved in drug dealing and weapons offenses. The testimony regarding the 

presence of drugs in the vehicle with Glenn-Coulverson and three other James & 

Livingston Hot Boys gang members generally related to the criminal activities of his gang. 

Additionally, the testimony that Glenn-Coulverson was in possession of two weapons at 

the time of the traffic stop in August 2013 tended to show that he was an active member of 

the gang. Thus, that testimony constituted evidentiary support for the charged gang 

specification and was not excludable as other acts evidence pursuant to Evid.R. 404(B). 

{¶ 37} Accordingly, we overrule Glenn-Coulverson's first assignment of error. 

B. Second and Third Assignments of Error – Sufficiency and Manifest 

 Weight of the Evidence 

{¶ 38} In his second and third assignments of error, Glenn-Coulverson alleges his 

convictions were not supported by sufficient evidence and were against the manifest 

weight of the evidence. He argues there was insufficient evidence to convict him of 

murder, felonious assault, and the gang specification because there was a lack of physical 

evidence, the eyewitness testimony was unreliable, and there was no evidence 

demonstrating that the shooting was gang related. Because the evidence was sufficient to 

support these convictions, and the convictions were not against the manifest weight of the 

evidence, these assignments of error lack merit.

{¶ 39} Whether there is legally sufficient evidence to sustain a verdict is a question 

of law. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386 (1997). Sufficiency is a test of 

adequacy. Id. The relevant inquiry for an appellate court is whether the evidence 

presented, when viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, would allow any 

rational trier of fact to find the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a 

reasonable doubt. State v. Mahone, 10th Dist. No. 12AP-545, 2014-Ohio-1251, ¶ 38, citing 

State v. Tenace, 109 Ohio St.3d 255, 2006-Ohio-2417, ¶ 37. 

{¶ 40} When presented with a manifest weight argument, an appellate court 

engages in a limited weighing of the evidence to determine whether sufficient competent, 
No. 16AP-265 13 

credible evidence supports the jury's verdict. State v. Salinas, 10th Dist. No. 09AP-1201, 

2010-Ohio-4738, ¶ 32, citing Thompkins at 387. "When a court of appeals reverses a 

judgment of a trial court on the basis that the verdict is against the manifest weight of the 

evidence, the appellate court sits as a 'thirteenth juror' and disagrees with the factfinder's 

resolution of the conflicting testimony." Thompkins at 387, quoting Tibbs v. Florida, 457 

U.S. 31, 42 (1982). Determinations of credibility and weight of the testimony are 

primarily for the trier of fact. State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230 (1967), paragraph one 

of the syllabus. Thus, the jury may take note of the inconsistencies and resolve them 

accordingly, "believ[ing] all, part, or none of a witness's testimony." State v. Raver, 10th 

Dist. No. 02AP-604, 2003-Ohio-958, ¶ 21, citing State v. Antill, 176 Ohio St. 61, 67 (1964). 

{¶ 41} An appellate court considering a manifest weight challenge "may not merely 

substitute its view for that of the trier of fact, but must review the entire record, weigh the 

evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses, and 

determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its 

way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be 

reversed and a new trial ordered." State v. Harris, 10th Dist. No. 13AP-770, 2014-Ohio2501, ¶ 22, citing Thompkins at 387. Appellate courts should reverse a conviction as 

being against the manifest weight of the evidence only in the most " 'exceptional case in 

which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.' " Thompkins at 387, quoting 

State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist.1983). 

{¶ 42} As set forth above, the jury found Glenn-Coulverson guilty of one count of 

murder, with firearm and gang specifications, and two counts of felonious assault, with a 

firearm specification. The trial court found Glenn-Coulverson guilty of having a weapon 

while under disability on the date of the shooting.1 He argues that his other convictions 

should be reversed because the only evidence that he was the shooter on March 20, 2015 

was unreliable eyewitness testimony, and because there was no evidence linking the 

shooting to gang activity. 

{¶ 43} We find that sufficient evidence supported the guilty verdicts, and that those 

verdicts were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The central issue raised at 

 

1 Glenn-Coulverson pleaded guilty to having a weapon while under disability at the time he was arrested, 

but he is not challenging that conviction on appeal. 
No. 16AP-265 14 

trial was identification—namely whether Glenn-Coulverson was the shooter. Testimony 

revealed that at approximately one week after the shooting, eyewitnesses Hunter, Woods, 

and Gillman reviewed the convenience store surveillance video and a still frame from the 

video. At that time, all three identified Glenn-Coulverson as the shooter. At trial, both 

Hunter and Woods identified Glenn-Coulverson as the shooter, though Gillman could not 

identify the shooter in the courtroom. Keyes, another eyewitness to the shooting, 

reviewed the surveillance video at trial and indicated she could not positively identify the 

shooter in the video. However, she noted that one individual had a black hoodie and 

short braids like the shooter. Sow, a passenger in the targeted vehicle, could not identify 

the shooter, but he testified that the shooter was black and was wearing all black. Thus, 

multiple eyewitnesses identified Glenn-Coulverson as the shooter, before the trial and at 

trial. Additionally, the eyewitnesses to the shooting who could not identify GlennCoulverson as the shooter provided descriptions of the shooter that were consistent with 

the eyewitnesses who could identify him. 

{¶ 44} As to Glenn-Coulverson's manifest weight argument that no physical 

evidence connects him to the crime, this court has concluded that a lack of physical 

evidence, standing alone, does not render an appellant's conviction against the manifest 

weight of the evidence. State v. Conner, 10th Dist. No. 12AP-698, 2013-Ohio-2773, ¶ 12; 

see State v. Jackson, 7th Dist. No. 09 JE 13, 2009-Ohio-6407, ¶ 16 ("If [witness] 

testimony is believed then the lack of fingerprints, DNA, footprints or any other type of 

physical evidence does not render the conviction against the manifest weight of the 

evidence."). Thus, the fact that no physical evidence connected Glenn-Coulverson to the 

shooting did not render the verdicts against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

{¶ 45} Glenn-Coulverson also challenges his convictions by critiquing the 

testimony of the eyewitnesses, asserting their testimony contained ambiguities, 

inconsistencies, and vague descriptions. However, the trier of fact saw each witness's 

demeanor, gestures and voice inflections, and, as such, is in the best position to determine 

witness credibility. Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80 (1984). 

Furthermore, "[w]hile the jury may take note of the inconsistencies and resolve or 

discount them accordingly, * * * such inconsistencies do not render defendant's 

conviction against the manifest weight or sufficiency of the evidence." State v. Nivens, 
No. 16AP-265 15 

10th Dist. No. 95APA09-1236 (May 28, 1996). As discussed above, the central factual 

issue at trial was whether Glenn-Coulverson was the shooter. While there was no physical 

evidence linking Glenn-Coulverson to the shooting, multiple eyewitnesses identified him 

as the shooter. Determining the credibility of those identifications was for the jury to 

decide, and Glenn-Coulverson presents no persuasive reason for this court to find that the 

jury lost its way in reaching its findings that Glenn-Coulverson murdered Gemeraw and 

committed felonious assault against Sow and Brooks. 

{¶ 46} Glenn-Coulverson also contends that the evidence was insufficient to 

convict him of the gang specification because no evidence reasonably demonstrated a link 

between the shooting and gang activity. We disagree. To prove the gang specification, the 

state needed to show that Glenn-Coulverson committed the murder "while participating 

in a criminal gang." See R.C. 2941.142. Here, evidence demonstrated that the James & 

Livingston Hot Boys gang is a criminal gang and that Glenn-Coulverson was a member of 

that gang. There was also evidence of factual circumstances tending to show that GlennCoulverson engaged in the violence for a gang-related reason. Testimony indicated that, 

shortly before the shooting, Glenn-Coulverson and others with him were seeking 

attention in the shopping plaza's parking area as they rapped lyrics that included some 

type of gang-related message. Glenn-Coulverson displayed a red bandana in his back 

right jeans pocket which is an outward demonstration of his membership in a Bloods 

affiliated gang. Also, Glenn-Coulverson made no attempt to conceal himself as he openly 

fired at the vehicle within view of numerous individuals, including at least one other gang 

member. The convenience store's surveillance video shows that Glenn-Coulverson was 

hanging out with East Haven Bloods gang member Ross shortly before the shooting and 

eyewitness testimony puts him with the same individual at the time of the shooting. 

Testimony from a gang expert indicated that openly committing violence, such as by 

standing in a busy shopping plaza and firing ten bullets into a moving vehicle, is a means 

to increase status within gang culture. Collectively, evidence of these facts reasonably 

demonstrated that Glenn-Coulverson committed the act of murder, at least in part, for the 

purpose of furthering the interests of his criminal gang or his personal status within that 

gang. Therefore, sufficient evidence was presented at trial for the jury to find that the 

shooting occurred while Glenn-Coulverson was participating in a criminal gang. 
No. 16AP-265 16 

{¶ 47} For these reasons, we find that sufficient evidence supported GlennCoulverson's convictions, and his convictions were not against the manifest weight of the 

evidence. Accordingly, we overrule Glenn-Coulverson's second and third assignments of 

error. 

C. Fourth Assignment of Error – Alleged Ineffective Assistance of Trial 

 Counsel 

{¶ 48} Glenn-Coulverson's fourth assignment of error alleges he received 

ineffective assistance of trial counsel. In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel, Glenn-Coulverson must satisfy a two-prong test. First, he must 

demonstrate that his counsel's performance was deficient. Strickland v. Washington, 466 

U.S. 668, 687 (1984). This first prong requires Glenn-Coulverson to show that his counsel 

committed errors which were "so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' 

guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Id. If Glenn-Coulverson can so 

demonstrate, he must then establish that he was prejudiced by the deficient performance. 

Id. To show prejudice, Glenn-Coulverson must establish there is a reasonable probability 

that, but for his counsel's errors, the result of the trial would have been different. A 

"reasonable probability" is one sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the 

trial. Id. at 694. 

{¶ 49} In considering claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, courts indulge in a 

strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable 

professional assistance. State v. Conway, 109 Ohio St.3d 412, 2006-Ohio-2815, ¶ 101. 

Here, Glenn-Coulverson contends his trial counsel was ineffective in (1) failing to file a 

motion to suppress the pretrial identifications of him, (2) failing to request a jury 

instruction pursuant to R.C. 2933.83(C)(3), and (3) failing to request a jury instruction for 

the other acts testimony presented at trial. 

1. Motion to Suppress

{¶ 50} Glenn-Coulverson argues his trial counsel should have moved to suppress 

testimony regarding the pretrial identifications of him as the shooter because those 

identifications violated his due process rights. He argues the pretrial identifications were 

unduly suggestive due to the investigating authorities not complying with R.C. 2933.83, 
No. 16AP-265 17 

and the circumstances surrounding the identification created a substantial likelihood of 

irreparable misidentification. 

{¶ 51} When a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is based on counsel's 

failure to file a particular motion, a defendant must show that the motion had a 

reasonable probability of success. State v. Carmon, 10th Dist. No. 11AP-818, 2012-Ohio1615, ¶ 12. Glenn-Coulverson cannot demonstrate that a suppression motion would have 

been granted. 

{¶ 52} Courts apply a two-prong test to determine the admissibility of 

identification testimony. First, there must be a determination that the identification 

procedure was so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a substantial likelihood of 

misidentification. State v. Monford, 190 Ohio App.3d 35, 2010-Ohio-4732, ¶ 38 (10th 

Dist.), citing Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972). Second, it must be determined that the 

identification itself was unreliable under the totality of the circumstances. Id. Pretrial 

identifications may be suppressed only if they are both unnecessarily suggestive and 

unreliable under the totality of the circumstances. Monford at ¶ 40. If the pretrial 

confrontation procedure was not unduly suggestive, any remaining questions as to 

reliability go to the weight of the identification, not its admissibility, and no further 

inquiry into the reliability of the identification is required. State v. Reddy, 10th Dist. No. 

09AP-868, 2010-Ohio-3892, ¶ 31. The factors that must be considered when evaluating 

reliability under the totality of the circumstances test are as follows: (1) the witness's 

opportunity to view the offender at the time of the crime; (2) the witness's degree of 

attention at the time of the crime; (3) the accuracy of the witness's prior description of the 

offender; (4) the witness's level of certainty when identifying the suspect at the 

confrontation; and (5) the length of time that has elapsed between the crime and the 

confrontation. Monford at ¶ 39, citing Biggers at 199-200. 

{¶ 53} Even if Glenn-Coulverson's counsel had moved to suppress the 

identifications, it would have been proper for the trial court to deny the motion because 

the identification procedure was not unduly suggestive. According to Glenn-Coulverson, 

investigative authorities failed to comply with R.C. 2933.83, resulting in unduly 

suggestive identification procedures. We disagree. R.C. 2933.83 governs the 

administration of "photo lineups" and "live lineups" and is "aimed at preventing the use of 
No. 16AP-265 18 

unnecessarily suggestive procedures." State v. Davis, 8th Dist. No. 101502, 2015-Ohio1144, ¶ 15. R.C. 2933.83 "requires any law enforcement agency or criminal justice entity 

that conducts live lineups and photo lineups to adopt minimum procedures for 

conducting the lineups." State v. Thompson, 4th Dist. No. 12CA688, 2013-Ohio-2235, 

¶ 22. R.C. 2933.83(A)(7) defines "live lineup" as "an identification procedure in which a 

group of persons, including the suspected perpetrator of an offense and other persons not 

suspected of the offense, is displayed to an eyewitness for the purpose of determining 

whether the eyewitness identifies the suspect as the perpetrator of the offense." R.C. 

2933.83(A)(8) defines "photo lineup" as "an identification procedure in which an array of 

photographs, including a photograph of the suspected perpetrator of an offense and 

additional photographs of other persons not suspected of the offense, is displayed to an 

eyewitness for the purpose of determining whether the eyewitness identifies the suspect 

as the perpetrator of the offense." 

{¶ 54} Here, the investigative authorities did not present a photo lineup or live 

lineup to the eyewitnesses. The eyewitnesses were presented with a surveillance video 

and a still frame from that video of activity near and immediately before the shooting. 

Thus, R.C. 2933.83 was not applicable to the identification procedure used. Furthermore, 

the identification procedure was not otherwise unduly suggestive. Showing the 

convenience store's inside surveillance video to the eyewitnesses was a valid and reliable 

investigative procedure as the video depicts actual events connected in time and space to 

the crime itself. See State v. Smith, 11th Dist. No. 91-T-4610 (Sept. 30, 1993) (noting that 

the rights of accused are not jeopardized when surveillance photographs of the crime itself 

are used as part of identification procedures). Also, a printed still frame from the video 

was only shown to the witnesses who could identify the shooter in the video, which 

depicts numerous individuals. The printed still frame served the functional purpose of 

enabling the witness to circle the shooter with a pen. Because the pretrial identification 

procedures were not unduly suggestive and the trial court would not have erred in 

denying any motion to suppress the pretrial identifications, Glenn-Coulverson's counsel 

was not deficient in not moving to suppress those identifications. 

 
No. 16AP-265 19 

2. Jury Instructions

{¶ 55} Glenn-Coulverson argues that his trial counsel should have requested a jury 

instruction pursuant to R.C. 2933.83(C)(3) and an instruction concerning other acts 

testimony presented at trial. 

{¶ 56} Strategic and tactical decisions of trial counsel cannot form the basis of a 

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. See, e.g., Columbus v. Oppong, 10th Dist. No. 

15AP-1059, 2016-Ohio-5590. Because the decision not to request a particular jury 

instruction is a matter of trial strategy, that decision generally will not substantiate a 

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Morris, 9th Dist. No. 22089, 2005-

Ohio-1136, ¶ 100. We find no reason to deviate from this general rule in this case. 

{¶ 57} Glenn-Coulverson's trial counsel's decision not to request an instruction 

under R.C. 2933.83 was reasonable. When there is evidence of noncompliance with the 

requirements of R.C. 2933.83, a trial court must "instruct the jury that such 

noncompliance may be considered in determining the credibility of the witness 

identification." State v. Jones, 8th Dist. No. 102318, 2015-Ohio-4694, ¶ 55, citing 

R.C. 2933.83(C)(3). The trial court charged the jury regarding eyewitness identification, 

including instructing the jury that the value of identification testimony depends on the 

opportunity of the witness to observe the offender, the strength of the identification, and 

the circumstances under which the identification was made. Glenn-Coulverson does not 

challenge the general eyewitness identification charge given to the jury, but asserts that 

his counsel should have requested the additional instruction regarding identification 

pursuant to R.C. 2933.83(C)(3). However, because R.C. 2933.83 was inapplicable, the 

trial court was not required to provide the additional R.C. 2933.83(C)(3) instruction. 

Thus, Glenn-Coulverson's trial counsel was not deficient in not requesting such an 

instruction. 

{¶ 58} We are also unpersuaded by Glenn-Coulverson's argument that his counsel 

was deficient in not requesting a jury instruction regarding other acts testimony. The 

testimony regarding the August 2013 traffic stop was admissible because it supported and 

was offered to prove the gang specification. Furthermore, a limiting instruction regarding 

the testimony only being admissible in furtherance of the gang specification and not to 

prove the character of the defendant could have, in the view of trial counsel, unnecessarily 
No. 16AP-265 20 

highlighted the existence of that evidence. Under these facts, his counsel's decision not to 

request a limiting instruction was within the realm of reasonable trial tactics. 

{¶ 59} Accordingly, we overrule Glenn-Coulverson's fourth assignment of error. 

D. Fifth Assignment of Error – Constitutionality of Gang Specification 

 As Applied to Glenn-Coulverson 

{¶ 60} In his fifth assignment of error, Glenn-Coulverson argues that R.C. 2941.142 

was unconstitutionally applied to him because there was no indication that the shooting 

was gang related. Glenn-Coulverson did not raise this argument in the trial court. Before 

Officer Blaine and Detective Best testified at trial, Glenn-Coulverson's counsel stated, "I'd 

just make a general motion. I realize the weight of the case law is against this, but just a 

general motion to the admissibility to the gang specification, the constitutionality. Also 

404(B) evidence, things like that. Just make that for the record." (Mar. 2, 2016 Tr. at 

355.) While Glenn-Coulverson generally challenged the constitutionality of R.C. 

2941.142, the gang specification statute, in the trial court he did not challenge the statute 

as being unconstitutionally applied to him or give the basis for such a challenge. "A 

constitutional issue not raised at trial 'need not be heard for the first time on appeal.' " 

State v. Douglas, 10th Dist. No. 09AP-111, 2009-Ohio-6659, ¶ 61, quoting State v. Awan, 

22 Ohio St.3d 120 (1986), syllabus. Because Glenn-Coulverson did not raise his as 

applied constitutional argument regarding the gang specification in the trial court, he did 

not preserve this issue for appeal. 

{¶ 61} Therefore, we overrule Glenn-Coulverson's fifth assignment of error. 

IV. Disposition 

{¶ 62} Having overruled Glenn-Coulverson's first, second, third, fourth, and fifth 

assignments of error, we affirm the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common 

Pleas. 

Judgment affirmed. 

KLATT, J., concurs. 

TYACK, P.J., dissents. 

TYACK, P.J., dissenting. 

{¶63} I simply do not find an evidentiary basis for a gang specification in this case. 

I, therefore, dissent. 
No. 16AP-265 21 

{¶64} Three young African-American men were in the area of a store. They liked 

rap music, perhaps even "Gansta Rap." This tells you nothing but the fact that they were 

young African-American men. 

{¶65} One of the men had a red bandanna hanging out of his pocket. This could 

be an indicator that he is in a so-called gang with a distant affiliation with the Los Angeles 

gang known as Bloods. I worry that the mere fact certain young African-American males 

who like to socialize or hang out in a group made them a gang member in some minds. 

{¶66} I am not sure what qualifies someone to be considered an "expert in 

criminal gangs," let alone what qualifies that person to testify as to who is a member of a 

particular so-called gang. A detective with the Columbus division of police felt he could 

testify as to the existence of the James & Livingston Hot Boys as a gang and Nishawn 

Glenn-Coulverson as a member. However, Detective Best clearly testified that there were 

no other members of the James & Livingston Hot Boys present when the shooting 

occurred. 

{¶67} No one who testified at trial knew or knows why the shooting occurred. The 

idea that the shooting was gang related is pure speculation, and pure speculation cannot 

be the basis for a criminal conviction. 

{¶68} The State of Ohio, by throwing in the gang specification, got away with 

putting a lot of prejudicial testimony before the jury. The fact that Glenn-Coulverson 

referred to another man as a "homey" tells you nothing other than they could be 

considered friends. There was no legitimate basis for the testimony that the "homey" 

Robert Broom was convicted of involuntary manslaughter as part of the trial of GlennCoulverson. The testimony had minimal to no relevance and was highly prejudicial. The 

same is true about the testimony concerning Ted Vanhed and his crimes. 

{¶69} In short, I would sustain the first and fifth assignments of error. Because 

the majority does not, I dissent.