[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 22-10684

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

HYRAM FRANKLIN PATTON, 

Defendant-Appellant,

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Alabama

D.C. Docket No. 3:20-cr-00006-ECM-KFP-1

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 22-10684

Before NEWSOM, LAGOA, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Hyram Franklin Patton appeals his conviction for possession 

of a firearm by a convicted felon. The government, in turn, moves 

for summary affirmance and to stay the briefing schedule. 

I.

In 2020, a grand jury charged Patton with one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Patton, 

through counsel, initially pled not guilty. Patton then moved to 

suppress all evidence gathered, and any statements made, during a 

traffic stop, car search, and subsequent interrogation that took 

place in January 2019 based on the officer unlawfully prolonging 

the stop. 

A magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation 

finding that the officer did not unlawfully prolong the stop. The 

report and recommendation advised parties that they could file objections within a period of time and warned them that a failure to 

do so would waive their right to challenge on appeal any proposed 

determinations except on grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Neither party objected, the district court adopted the report 

and recommendation, and denied the motion to suppress.

Patton pled guilty and consented to enter a guilty plea before the magistrate judge. After the magistrate judge conducted a 

change of plea hearing, the magistrate judge found that he entered 

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a knowing and voluntary plea supported by an independent basis 

of fact. The magistrate judge issued an oral report recommending 

that the district court accept the plea, which it later did.

The district court ultimately sentenced Patton to 57 months’ 

imprisonment, followed by 3 years’ supervised release. Patton appealed his conviction.

On appeal, the Patton primarily argues that that the district 

court plainly erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence 

from the traffic stop. He does not expressly address the impact of 

his guilty plea on his ability to present his arguments on appeal, nor 

does he challenge the validity of his plea.

Rather than responding the government moves for summary affirmance and to stay the briefing schedule, arguing that Patton cannot challenge on appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress because he entered an unconditional, knowing and 

voluntary guilty plea that waived all non-jurisdictional defects.

II.

Summary disposition is appropriate, in part, where “the position of one of the parties is clearly right as a matter of law so that 

there can be no substantial question as to the outcome of the case 

. . . .” Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th 

Cir. 1969). A motion for summary affirmance or summary reversal 

shall postpone the due date for the filing of any remaining brief until we rule on such motion. 11th Cir. R. 31-1(c).

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Normally, we use a mixed standard of review when reviewing denials of a motion to suppress. United States v. Dixon, 

901 F.3d 1332, 1338 (11th Cir. 2018). We review findings of fact for 

clear error and legal conclusions de novo. Id. All facts are construed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below. Id. 

A party failing to object to a magistrate judge’s findings or recommendations contained in a report and recommendation waives the 

right to challenge on appeal the district court’s order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions if the party was informed 

of the time period for objecting and the consequences on appeal 

for failing to object. 11th Cir. R. 3-1. In the absence of a proper 

objection, however, the court may review on appeal for plain error 

if necessary in the interests of justice. Id.

Arguments not raised in an initial brief are abandoned. 

Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins., Co., 739 F.3d 678, 680 (11th Cir. 

2014). 

Generally, a voluntary, unconditional guilty plea waives all 

non-jurisdictional defects in the proceedings. United States v. Patti, 

337 F.3d 1317, 1320 (11th Cir. 2003). Therefore, when a defendant 

enters an unconditional plea, he can ordinarily challenge on appeal

only (1) the district court’s jurisdiction over the case or (2) his sentence. United States v. Pierre, 120 F.3d 1153, 1155 (11th Cir. 1997). 

If a defendant wished to preserve a non-jurisdictional ground for 

appeal, he would have had to have entered a conditional plea in 

accordance with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2). Id. A conditional plea 

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needs to be consented to by the district court and the government. 

Id.

Under Rule 11, before a court can accept a guilty plea, it 

must inform the defendant of his rights should he plead not guilty, 

the nature of the charges against him, the potential penalties, and 

the court’s obligation to calculate his advisory guideline range. See

Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(B)–(E), (G)–(M). The court must also explain that a guilty plea waives the defendant’s trial rights and ensure that the plea is entered voluntarily and is supported by a sufficient factual basis. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(F), (b)(2)–(3). Further, the court must explain that the defendant can be prosecuted 

for perjury for testifying falsely under oath. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 

11(b)(1)(A).

In evaluating whether a Rule 11 error has affected a defendant’s substantial rights, we have examined Rule 11’s three “core 

principles,” which are ensuring that: (1) the guilty plea is free of 

coercion; (2) the defendant understands the nature of the charges 

against him; and (3) the defendant understands the direct consequences of the guilty plea. Presendieu, 880 F.3d at 1238. Regarding 

the first core principle, Rule 11(b)(2) elaborates that the court must 

ensure that the plea did not result from force, threats, or promises 

not included in the plea agreement. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(2). 

Whether the court has complied with the second core principle depends on a variety of factors, including the complexity of the offense and the defendant’s intelligence and sophistication. Presendieu, 880 F.3d at 1238–39. To comply with the third core 

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principle, the district court must inform the defendant of the rights 

that he gives up by pleading guilty, the court’s authority to impose 

certain punishments, and the possibility of a perjury prosecution 

for false statements during the plea colloquy. United States v. Moriarty, 429 F.3d 1012, 1019 (11th Cir. 2005); see also Fed. R. Crim. 

P. 11(b)(1).

Ultimately, to show that an unpreserved Rule 11 error affects substantial rights, a defendant “must show a reasonable probability that, but for the error, he would not have entered the plea.” 

United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 83 (2004); see also 

United States v. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d 1291, 1299 (11th Cir. 2005) 

(explaining that the Dominguez Benitez requirement is a way to 

show the third prong of the plain error test). We have indicated 

that, for Rule 11 error to substantially prejudice a defendant’s 

rights, it must be tantamount to the district court’s “total or almost 

total failure to address a Rule 11 core concern,” as distinct from a 

situation in which the court “adequately addressed the three core 

concerns but slipped up and failed to cover explicitly one item in 

the Rule 11 list.” United States v. Monroe, 353 F.3d 1346, 

1355 (11th Cir. 2003) (quotation marks omitted). If an error committed during a plea colloquy does not affect one of Rule 11’s core 

principles, and it is clear that the defendant understands the plea 

and its consequences, any error is harmless. United States v. Jones, 

143 F.3d 1417, 1420 (11th Cir. 1998).

Here, we grant the motion for summary affirmance. As an 

initial matter, Patton does not expressly challenge the validity of 

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his guilty plea, meaning any arguments in that respect are abandoned. Sapuppo, 739 F.3d at 680. 

However, even if Patton implicitly raised that argument, his 

plea was still valid. The magistrate judge complied with Rule 

11 and the first core principle by confirming that his guilty plea was 

free from coercion. Presendieu, 880 F.3d at 1238. Patton confirmed that his plea had not been induced by any threats or promises, that he was satisfied with his trial counsel’s representation, and 

that he had committed the acts stated in the factual basis for the 

plea. Thus, there was no indication of coercion in the record.

Second, the magistrate judge confirmed that Patton understood the nature of the charges against him. Presendieu, 880 F.3d 

at 1238. Patton confirmed that he could read and write, had a GED, 

and had read and understood the charges against him. He also confirmed that he was not under the influence of any drugs or medication and did not suffer from mental illness. The magistrate judge 

explained to him the charges in the indictment and the elements 

thereof, and he confirmed that he understood them. Further, the 

factual basis his attorney recited was accurate. Thus, the colloquy 

demonstrated that Patton understood the nature of the charges 

against him. 

Third, the magistrate judge confirmed that Patton understood the consequences of his guilty plea. Presendieu, 880 F.3d at 

1238. Patton confirmed that he understood the punishments he 

could face. The magistrate judge informed him of the collateral 

consequences of a felony conviction, the possibility of restitution, 

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and that any statements he made during the colloquy could be used 

against him in a future prosecution for perjury or making a false 

statement. The magistrate judge informed him that: (i) he had the 

right to plead not guilty and (ii) the right to a trial by jury, (iii) the 

government would have to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable 

doubt, (iv) he had the right to counsel at trial, (v) he could crossexamine witnesses and call his own witnesses, (vi) he could testify 

or not testify at trial, and (vii) if he chose not to testify that choice 

could not be used against him. Additionally, the magistrate judge 

noted that he could not challenge how the government had acquired evidence. Further, even if the district court had omitted 

things in its colloquy, he would not be able to show that but for 

that error, he would not have pled guilty. Dominguez Benitez, 

542 U.S. at 83; see Monroe, 353 F.3d 1346, 1355.

Because Patton entered a valid guilty plea, he waived all 

non-jurisdictional arguments on appeal. Patti, 337 F.3d at 1320. 

Further, there is no evidence in the record showing his plea agreement was a conditional plea. See id. Therefore, he waived his motion to suppress arguments, and we affirm the decision of the district court based on that waiver. 

Accordingly, because the government’s position is clearly 

correct as a matter of law, we GRANT the government’s motion 

for summary affirmance and deny its motion to stay the briefing 

schedule as moot per 11th Cir. R. 31-1(c). Groendyke Transp., Inc., 

406 F.2d at 1162. 

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