J-S13030-16 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

IN RE: K.B.B., A MINOR 

IN RE: T.M.B., A MINOR 

IN RE: D.Z.C., A MINOR 

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 

APPEAL OF M.C., NATURAL MOTHER 

 Nos. 1414 WDA 2015, 

1415 WDA 2015, 

1416 WDA 2015, 

1417 WDA 2015, 

1418 WDA 2015, 

1419 WDA 2015, 

1460 WDA 2015, 

1461 WDA 2015, 

1462 WDA 2015 

Appeal from the Orders Entered August 12, 2015 and the Decrees Entered 

August 24, 2015 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County 

Orphans' Court and Civil Division at Nos: 2014 AD 39, 2014 AD 39A, 2014 

AD 39B, CP-07-DP-00048-2013/FID: 07-FN-00027-2013, CP-07-DP-00047-

2013/FID: 07-FN-00027-2013, CP-07-DP-0000046-2013 

BEFORE: LAZARUS, STABILE, and FITZGERALD,* JJ. 

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED APRIL 19, 2016 

Appellant, M.C. (“Mother”), appeals from the August 12, 2015 goal 

change orders and the August 24, 2015 decrees terminating her parental 

rights to D.Z.C. (born 2007), T.M.B. (born 2011), and K.B.B. (born 2013) 

____________________________________________ 

*

 Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. 
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(collectively, “Children”) and changing their permanency goals to adoption.1 

We affirm. 

Police removed the Children from Mother’s care on May 5, 2013, when 

police discovered Mother unconscious in her home, leaving the Children 

unattended.2 The family’s home was in poor condition. Mother testified that 

she became unconscious because she was ill after the recent birth of K.B.B. 

Investigation revealed that Mother was hemorrhaging from birth 

complications. After a June 24, 2013 hearing the trial court adjudicated the 

Children dependent and placed them in foster care. The office of Blair 

County Children and Families (“CYF”) developed a service plan to help 

Mother work toward reunification with the Children. Among Mother’s goals 

was cooperation with CYF’s service providers, including attendance of 

scheduled visits with the Children; obtaining mental health services; 

maintaining suitable housing; and resolving an allegation of abuse based on 

one child’s diaper rash. Mother was compliant and made progress in several 

____________________________________________ 

1

 The trial court also terminated the parental rights of T.E.P, father of 

D.Z.C., and M.W.B, father of T.M.B. and K.B.B.. The fathers have not 

appealed. 

2

 The Commonwealth charged Mother with endangering the welfare of 

children, and Mother was accepted for alternative rehabilitative disposition 

(“ARD”) on May 17, 2014. The Commonwealth filed a petition to revoke 

ARD in April of 2015. The status of that petition is not of record. The record 

also reflects that Mother’s first child died as an infant when she left the child 

in the care of an abusive boyfriend. N.T. Hearing, 6/16/15, at 97-101. The 

record indicates a criminal investigation of the child’s death is pending. Id. 
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areas, though her housing situation remained unstable. The allegation of 

abuse was deemed unfounded. 

In February of 2014, Mother decided to end her cohabitation with 

M.W.B, father of T.M.B. and K.B.B. Mother testified that M.W.B. was 

abusive. N.T. Hearing, 6/16/15, at 99-100. Mother stayed with a friend 

while searching for housing. Mother’s housing search was difficult because 

two prior evictions and the pending charge for endangering the welfare of 

children rendered her ineligible for subsidized housing. Mother hoped to 

have the Children move in with Mother, but at a safety inspection, the friend 

informed investigators she intended to move within a week and that Mother 

would not accompany her. Informed of this, the trial court convened a 

hearing on June 19, 2014 at which it changed the placement goal to 

adoption, directed CYF to proceed with a termination of parental rights 

(“TPR”) petitions, and directed Mother 30 days to procure suitable housing. 

Mother leased an apartment at 1009 16th Avenue, Altoona, in August of 

2014. The trial court conducted further hearings on September 24, 2014 

and October 7, 2014. On December 8, 2014, the trial court denied the TPR 

petitions and changed the placement goal from adoption to reunification. 

In denying the first TPR petition, the trial court counted Mother’s 

decision to move away from M.W.B. as a sign of growing strength, especially 

since she also had suffered abuse at the hands of T.E.P. Trial Court Opinion, 

12/9/14, at 5. The trial court also noted Mother’s steadfastness in her 
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housing search, despite the complications brought on by her prior 

convictions and criminal record. Id. at 6. Also, Mother regularly attended 

scheduled visits with the Children, maintained phone contact, and attended 

church and doctor appointments with the Children. Id. at 8. Mother was 

attending counseling and appeared to have obtained permanent and suitable 

housing. Id. at 11. 

Subsequently, Mother’s attendance at counseling became sporadic 

despite the agency offering transportation to the sessions. N.T., 3/31/15, at 

61. Mother’s mental health was in worse condition as of March of 2015 than 

it had been when services first commenced. Id. at 74. Likewise, Mother 

failed to attend various appointments for various physical ailments, including 

a serious dental condition. Id. at 74-76; N.T. Hearing, 4/9/15, at 94-95; 

N.T. Hearing, 6/16/15, at 44-45, 102-03. Mother also failed to follow 

through on services to teach her to support D.Z.C., her autistic son. Id. at 

79-80. Also, Mother resumed contact with M.W.B. even after he had a 

criminal assault charge filed against him and a PFA issued against him based 

on his abuse of his new girlfriend. N.T Hearing, 6/11/15, at 18; N.T. 

Hearing, 6/16/15, at 81-82. Mother permitted M.W.B. to visit her and to 

bring her supplies such as diapers for the Children. Id. 

Mother remained at 1009 16th Avenue until the completion of the 

instant TPR proceedings, but that residence never was safe enough for the 

Children to move in. Investigations revealed several safety issues, including 
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loose floorboards in the Children’s bedroom. N.T. Hearing, 6/11/15, at 9-10, 

29-30. Mother never resolved that issue. Id. Investigations also revealed 

that Mother failed to keep the residence clean. Clothes and garbage piled up 

and investigators reported foul odors. Id. at 11; N.T. Hearing, 3/31/15, at 

68-70. Mother’s delinquency on her electric bills resulted in her losing power 

from May 12 to May 27, 2015, during which time the food in her refrigerator 

spoiled. N.T. Hearing, 6/11/15, at 6-7. After power was restored, 

investigators reported that the refrigerator needed a thorough cleaning and 

a broken window needed repaired. Id. Mother’s residence also had an 

infestation of fruit flies. N.T. Hearing, 3/31/15, at 69. At least one 

scheduled visit with the Children had to be moved to another location 

because of the infestation. N.T. Hearing, 4/19/15, at 119. 

Mother’s financial situation also is insecure. She has no job and no 

income other than social security that she receives due to a learning 

disability. Mother has difficulty with numbers and corresponding difficulty 

with managing her finances. Attempts to help mother sort out her finances 

were unsuccessful. N.T. Hearing, 3/31/15, at 81-82. Mother tested positive 

for marijuana on March 27, 2015, despite her repeated denials of marijuana 

use. N.T. Hearing, 3/31/15, at 67. Mother also tested positive for 

marijuana use in April and May of 2015. N.T. Hearing, 6/11/15, at 22. 

At the trial court’s direction, the agency scheduled increased visits—

normally twice per week—between Mother and the Children in 2015. The 
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visits were partially supervised, and the supervisors expressed concerns 

about Mother’s ability to interact with the Children alone. N.T. Hearing, 

3/31/15, at 33-34. In particular, Mother did not consistently recognize 

safety risks—on one occasion, for example, she attempted to blow dry the 

Children’s hair while they were in a bath tub full of water—to the satisfaction 

of the visitation supervisors. Id. at 72-73. The increased visits also seemed 

to be a strain for the Children. During the increased visitation schedule, 

D.Z.C. exhibited an increase in stuttering, humming, rocking back and forth, 

and biting himself. Id. at 54-56. Mother did not use suggested methods to

limit such behavior. Id. T.M.B. became increasingly negative during the 

visits. Id. at 56. The supervisor believed T.M.B. succeeded in getting more 

of Mother’s attention when he misbehaved. Id. Mother never progressed to 

unsupervised visits or overnight visits. Id. at 34-36. 

CYF filed its second TPR petition on March 11, 2015. The trial court 

conducted hearings on April 9, 2015, June 11, 2015, and June 16, 2015. In 

orders and decrees dated August 12, 2015 and August 24, 2015, the trial 

court terminated Mother’s parental rights and changed the Children’s 

permanency goal to adoption. This timely appeal followed. 

Mother raises three issues for our review: 

A. Whether or not the trial court erred in terminating

Mother’s parental rights to [Children] under 23 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 2511(a)(2) and (8)? 

B. Whether or not the trial court erred in terminating

Mother’s parental rights under [23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b)]? 
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C. Whether or not the trial court erred in changing the 

goal to adoption? 

Mother’s Brief at 17. 

Our standard of review is as follows: 

[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion 

standard when considering a trial court’s determination of a 

petition for termination of parental rights. As in dependency 

cases, our standard of review requires an appellate court to 

accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the 

trial court if they are supported by the record. If the factual 

findings are supported, appellate courts review to determine if 

the trial court made an error of law or abused its discretion. As 

has been often stated, an abuse of discretion does not result 

merely because the reviewing court might have reached a 

different conclusion. Instead, a decision may be reversed for an 

abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. 

In re S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826 (Pa. 2012). 

The trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights under § 2511(a)(2) 

and (8). We need only affirm under one subsection of § 2511(a). In re 

Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1117 (Pa. Super. 2012). In this case we will rely on 

§ 2511(a)(8), which provides as follows: 

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a 

child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the 

following grounds: 

[. . .] 

(8) The child has been removed from the care of the

parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an 

agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the date of 

removal or placement, the conditions which led to the removal 

or placement of the child continue to exist and termination of 

parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the 

child. 
J-S13030-16 

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23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8). 

The party seeking termination under § 2511(a)(8) must prove the 

following by clear and convincing evidence: “(1) the child has been removed 

from parental care for 12 months or more from the date of removal; (2) the 

conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to 

exist; and (3) termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and 

welfare of the child.” Z.P. 994 A.2d at 1118 (quoting In re M.E.P., 825 A.2d 

1266, 1275–76 (Pa. Super. 2003)) Further, “[t]ermination under Section 

2511(a)(8) does not require the court to evaluate a parent’s current 

willingness or ability to remedy the conditions that initially caused placement 

or the availability or efficacy of Agency services.” Id. “The standard of 

‘clear and convincing' evidence is defined as testimony that is so clear, 

direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a 

clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” 

In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 336 (Pa. Super. 2002). 

In support of its decision to terminate Mother’s parental rights, the 

trial court offered the following observations: 

1. [Mother] lost consistency in her meetings with [Family 

Intervention Crisis Services], began avoiding FICS 

workers and had ‘no shows’ as well as losing all contact 

with FICS and the foster family during the period of 

time that she actually had increased time with the boys. 

2. [Mother] struggled with stress and feeling overwhelmed 

when the visits increased to the extent she found it 

necessary to use marijuana to assist her ability to cope. 
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3. [Mother] found it difficult to have consistency with 

individual counseling which she and all others agreed is 

critical to any safe and healthier emotional functioning 

due to her past traumatic childhood and adult years. ] 

4. [Mother could not complete the FICS 

nurturing/parenting group despite the fact she had 

transportation offered and available. 

5. [Mother] could not keep her utilities current nor did she 

reach out to others to alert them or ask for assistance 

when the termination occurred. 

6. [Mother] struggled to manage her ARD program which 

resulted in a bench warrant and [Mother’s] efforts to go 

‘underground’ that created concern for [CYF], FICS and 

the foster parents when her complete silence occurred 

for days. 

7. [Mother] failed to attend her psychiatric assessment 

without any reasonable explanation and also failed to 

build support for herself outside the [CYF] system by 

applying for peer support services. 

8. [Mother] failed to complete or follow through with 

medical transportation services (MTAP) over several

months despite her understanding that if or when the 

boys would return she would need help with 

transportation beyond the FICS or Blair Foundation 

workers. 

9. [Mother] missed medical appointments and failed to 

follow through with her needed serious dental work 

which would have removed the difficult and logistical 

coordination of those matters upon any return of the 

boys. 

Trial Court Opinion, 8/12/15, at 6-7. The trial court went on to summarize 

these nine observations: 

Even without all the other facts relating to [Mother’s] 

ability or inability to retain parenting prompts, prevent fruit flies 

infestations, negotiate effectively with the landlord for housing 

safety, bathe, cook or discipline the boys, these above-
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enumerated factors alone create the clear and convincing 

evidence that the conditions leading to placement have not 

changed and cannot be remedied by [Mother]. 

Id. at 7. 

We have conducted our own review of the record, summarized above, 

and we conclude the record supports the trial court’s findings. The Children 

have not been in Mother’s care since May 5, 2013. Thus, the first of the 

three prongs of § 2511(a)(8) analysis is not in dispute. Mother has never 

found suitable housing for herself and the Children. The record indicates her 

current home frequently is dirty, fruit fly infested, and unsafe. After the trial 

court denied CYF’s first TPR petition and increased Mother’s visits with the 

Children, Mother failed to make progress toward addressing the conditions 

that led to placement. In addition to the housing issues, Mother has been 

inconsistent in her cooperation with various service providers and has 

resorted to marijuana use to cope with stress. Also, she has failed to 

comply with the terms of her ARD imposed on for her endangering the 

welfare of children offense. In addition, Mother has exhibited a lack of 

awareness of potential safety hazards during her interaction with the 

Children. Thus, the record supports the trial court’s findings that the 

conditions that led to the Children’s placement continue to exist, and that 

termination of Mother’s rights would best serve their needs and welfare. 

Mother argues the trial court erred because the record contains no 

evidence that she is a threat to the Children’s safety based on Mother’s 
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analysis of a child safety guide published by the American Bar Association 

and Action for Child Protection, Inc. Mother’s Brief at 28. Mother asserts 

she is able to perform basic parental duties, that her apartment has not 

been cited for a code violation, despite FICS’ concern with the structural 

integrity of the floor in the Children’s room. Mother also notes that she has 

never been violent towards the Children and that none of them has 

sustained a serious injury while in her care. Mother claims she has not 

rejected services, but rather is frustrated by what Mother believes are 

unrealistic expectations. 

Mother’s arguments about the sufficiency of her apartment are 

contrary to the evidence of record and to the trial court’s findings. We are 

glad Mother has not subjected the Children to any violence, but that fact is 

not sufficient to defeat a TPR petition. Similarly, the absence of any serious 

injury to the Children while under Mother’s supervision does not preclude a 

finding that termination of her parental rights will best serve the Children’s 

needs and welfare. In summary, the facts of record support the trial court’s 

findings, and we discern no error in the trial court’s conclusion that 

termination of Mother’s parental rights is appropriate under § 2511(a)(8). 

We now consider whether termination is appropriate under § 2511(b): 

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the 

rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the 

child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on 

the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, 

furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be 
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beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition 

filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not 

consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions 

described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the 

giving of notice of the filing of the petition. 

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). “One major aspect of the needs and welfare 

analysis concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between 

parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child of 

permanently severing any such bond.” In re C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1215 

(Pa. Super. 2015) (quoting In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 

2007). Further, 

[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court can 

equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, and should also 

consider the intangibles, such as the love, comfort, security, and 

stability the child might have with the foster parent. Additionally, 

this Court stated that the trial court should consider the 

importance of continuity of relationships and whether any 

existing parent-child bond can be severed without detrimental 

effects on the child. 

Id. at 1219. 

The trial court found the Children are thriving in their foster home, 

where they have been living for two years. As noted above, the Children’s 

behavior declined in response to increased visits with Mother. During 

meetings, the Children would say hurtful things to Mother and complain 

about the condition of her apartment. N.T. Hearing, 6/11/15, at 20, 50-52. 

The caseworker acknowledged that Mother showed exemplary patience in 

response to the Children’s behavior. Id. at 19-20. Nonetheless, as of May 

1, 2015, the visits occurred either in the foster home or at an FICS office, 
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because the condition of Mother’s apartment continued to decline and he 

electricity was turned off. Id. at 6-7. When the frequency of visits 

lessened, the Children’s behavior improved. Id. at 20-21, 26. The Children 

seemed “happier” and “more relaxed” after the visits decreased. Id. at 53. 

D.Z.C., the oldest child, was five years old when he was removed from 

Mother’s home. Prior to placement, he was not toilet trained or able to eat 

with utensils. Also, he was afraid to take baths. The foster family was able 

to resolve those issues. N.T. Hearing, 10/7/14, at 19-20. The foster family 

has been consistent in providing a stable physical and emotional 

environment, and the Children’s growth and development in placement has 

been significant. N.T. Hearing, 9/24/14, at 26. 

The trial court acknowledged that the Children love Mother and Mother 

loves them, but Mother, after more than two years of services, has been 

unable to provide for the Children’s developmental, physical and emotional 

needs on any consistent basis. Increased interaction between Mother and 

Children after denial of the first TPR petition proved to be emotionally 

difficult for the Children. We discern no error in the trial court’s finding that 

termination of Mother’s parental rights was appropriate under § 2511(b).3 

____________________________________________ 

3

 The trial court noted that the foster family was open to continued visits 

between Mother and the Children, such that termination of Mother’s parental 

rights will not entirely sever the bond between Mother and Children. Trial 

Court Opinion, 8/12/15, at 10. Recently, in In re G.L.L., 124 A.3d 344, 348 

(Pa. Super. 2015), this Court noted that the potential for open adoption is 

(Footnote Continued Next Page) 
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For her third argument, Mother asserts the trial court erred in 

changing the Children’s goal to adoption. Mother argues the Children’s 

permanency goal should be permanent legal guardianship without 

termination of Mother’s parental rights. Given our decision to affirm the 

decree terminating Mother’s parental rights, this issue is moot.4 

In any event, we discern no error in the trial court’s goal change order. 

“In a change of goal proceeding, the best interests of the child, and not the 

interests of the parent, must guide the trial court, and the parent's rights are 

secondary.” M.T., 101 A.3d at 1173. CYF bears the burden of proving a 

goal change is in the Children’s best interests. All of our analysis of Mother’s 

first two arguments demonstrates why a goal change is in the Children’s 

best interests. Further, Mother’s legal support for her argument rests solely 

on a footnote in In re I.G., 939 A.2d 950 (Pa. Super. 2007). There this 

Court suggested 

consideration of permanent legal custody in paternal aunt, 

which would not lead to termination of Father’s parental rights, 

in particular since the record indicates that paternal aunt would 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________ 

not an appropriate or relevant consideration under § 2511(b). We do not 

believe a possible open adoption was a deciding factor in the trial court’s 

analysis. As explained in the main text, a substantial body of evidence 

supports the trial court’s decision to terminated Mother’s parental rights 

under § 2511(b). 

4

 We note that a change of permanency goal from unification to adoption 

was not a prerequisite for terminating Mother’s rights. In re M.T., 101 A.3d 

1163, 1166 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc). 
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be willing for the children to have a relationship with Father and 

that Father and paternal aunt have a good relationship. 

Id. at 957 n.9. Mother believes permanent legal guardianship is a better 

option here because the foster family would not guarantee that D.Z.C. would 

remain in public school rather than private school. Mother believes D.Z.C., 

given his autism, would fare better in a public school equipped to handle 

D.Z.C.’s condition. Mother cites no law or evidence to support this 

proposition, and the only supporting law she cites comes from a suggestion 

of this Court in a case with its own distinct facts. Mother is not entitled to 

relief on her third argument. 

In summary, we have concluded that the trial court did not err in 

terminating Mother’s parental rights and changing the Children’s goal to 

adoption. We therefore affirm the orders and decrees on appeal. 

Orders and decrees affirmed. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 4/19/2016