In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 01-3101

United States of America,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

David G. Huusko,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Wisconsin.

No. 98 CR 83--John C. Shabaz, Judge.

Argued December 7, 2001--Decided December 21, 2001

 Before Flaum, Chief Judge, and Manion and

Diane P. Wood, Circuit Judges.

 Flaum, Chief Judge. David Huusko appeals

the district court’s imposition of a twoyear sentence following revocation of his

supervised release. Because we do not

find this sentence plainly unreasonable,

we affirm. 

I. Background 

 In 1994, David Huusko pleaded guilty to

two counts of bank robbery and was

sentenced to seventy-eight months’

imprisonment followed by a three-year

term of supervised release. General

Condition I of his supervised release

provided that Huusko would not commit any

other federal, state, or local crime. On

January 4, 2001, after having served 2 

years of his probation, Huusko was found

guilty of armed robbery, being party to a

crime, and habitual criminality, and was

sentenced by the Eau Claire County

Circuit Court to 15 years’ imprisonment.

Huusko is presently appealing that

conviction. 

 Upon the recommendation of the probation

officer, the district court in the

Western District of Wisconsin held a

revocation hearing at which it considered

Huusko’s sentence in light of his

noncompliance with General Condition I.
At the hearing, Huusko stipulated that he

had been convicted in a state court; he

did not stipulate that he was guilty of

the underlying crimes, however. The court

revoked Huusko’s supervised release and

imposed a 24-month term of imprisonment--

the statutory maximum under 18 U.S.C.

sec.3583(e)(3)--to be served

consecutively to his state sentence. The

United States Sentencing Guidelines’

recommended imprisonment range for a

Grade A violation (which this was)

coupled with a level II criminal history

(which Huusko had) is 15-21 months. The

court chose to impose the maximum

sentence allowable "because of the

violent nature of the violation. The

sentence to be imposed by the Court will

protect the community and promote

personal and general deterrence."

II. Discussion

 Huusko appeals not the revocation of his

supervised release, which he concedes the

court was required to do, but the

sentence imposed. No mandatory sentencing

guidelines exist for supervised release

violations; therefore, we may reverse the

sentence only if it is plainly

unreasonable. United States v. Harvey,

232 F.3d 585, 587 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing

United States v. McGee, 60 F.3d 1266,

1272 (7th Cir. 1995)). 

 Huusko argues that the 24-month sentence

imposed consecutively to his state

sentence is plainly unreasonable because:

(1) the court failed to consider the

weakness of the state court charges and

the possible success on appeal when

determining the length of the sentence;

(2) the court failed to give appropriate

weight to the recommended sentencing

guideline range when determining the

length of the sentence; and (3) the court

should have imposed a concurrent sentence

because the conduct forming the basis for

the revocation was the very conduct

underlying the state-imposed sentence. We

address each argument in turn.

 First Huusko contends that the district

court failed to give any weight to the

prospect that he had been wrongly

convicted and would win his appeal. If

that should happen, he argues, he would

be improperly held in federal custody

while he attempted to obtain counsel and

file a habeas corpus petition. This
argument is unavailing. The district

court was entitled to rely on Huusko’s

conviction as adequate proof of the

violation of state law. United States v.

Fleming, 9 F.3d 1253, 1254 (7th Cir.

1993). The pendency of an appeal in an

underlying state conviction does not

affect the court’s decision as to the

length of sentence following supervised

release revocation.

 Next Huusko argues that the district

court did not give appropriate weight to

the recommended guideline range. He

correctly notes that, while the U.S.S.G.

policy statement setting forth the range

is merely advisory, sentencing courts are

statutorily required to consider it.

Under 18 U.S.C. sec.3583(e)(3), the

sentencing court must consider: (1) the

nature and circumstances of the offense;

(2) the defendant’s history and

characteristics; (3) the need of the sen

tence to deter future crime, protect the

public, and provide the criminal with

necessary services; (4) Sentencing

Commission recommendations regarding

sentence range; (5) Sentencing Commission

policy; and (6) sentence consistency for

like violations. Harvey, 232 F.3d at 588

(citing United States v. Hale, 107 F.3d

526, 530 (7th Cir. 1997)). In this case,

the court noted the guideline range but

chose to apply the maximum sentence after

considering the factors as a whole,

including: the violent nature of the

crime, Huusko’s criminal record, and

protection of the community. Sentencing

courts need not make findings as to each

factor; it is sufficient "if the

sentencing court made comments reflecting

that the appropriate factors were

considered." Hale, 107 F.3d at 530. Here,

the court carefully considered and

commented upon the sec.3583(e)(3) factors

in coming to its decision. The sentencing

guideline range is merely a

recommendation; a judge’s decision "not

to follow [it] to the letter [is] not

plainly unreasonable." Harvey, 232 F.3d

at 588.

 Lastly Huusko contends that the sentence

imposed by the district court is plainly

unreasonable because it is consecutive to

the sentence he is serving on the state

charges. He argues that where the conduct

forming the basis for the revocation is

the same as that underlying the current

sentence, a concurrent sentence is the
only reasonable option. This Circuit’s

precedent and the policy promulgated by

the Sentencing Commission state

otherwise. While this Court has held that

when the conduct underlying the

revocation and the current sentence is

the same, a concurrent sentence would be

reasonable, United States v. Hill, 48

F.3d 228 (7th Cir. 1995), we have never

held that imposing a consecutive sentence

in that same case would be plainly

unreasonable. In fact, we have held

squarely the opposite. Harvey, 232 F.3d

at 588-89. Moreover, section 7B1.3(f) of

the Sentencing Guidelines recommends that

"[a]ny term of imprisonment imposed upon

the revocation of . . . supervised

release shall be ordered to be served

consecutively to any sentence of

imprisonment that the defendant is

serving, whether or not the sentence of

imprisonment being served resulted from

the conduct that is the basis of the

revocation of . . . supervised release."

U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual

sec.7B1.3(f) (2001) (emphasis added). The

violation of a condition of supervised

release is a breach of trust--and while

the sentencing court at revocation takes

into account the seriousness of the

underlying crime, it is primarily this

breach of trust that is sanctioned. U.S.

Sentencing Guidelines Manual ch. 7, pt.

A, introductory cmt. Therefore, it is not

unreasonable for this sanction to be con

secutive to any sentence imposed for the

underlying conduct.

III. Conclusion

 For the reasons stated herein, we AFFIRM

the decision of the district court.