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SJC-12136

SEAN GANNON vs. CITY OF BOSTON.

Suffolk. December 8, 2016. - April 18, 2017.

Present: Gants, C.J., Botsford, Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, &

Budd, JJ.1

Anti-Discrimination Law, Handicap, Employment, Burden of proof.

Employment, Discrimination. Handicapped Persons.

Municipal Corporations, Police. Public Employment, Police. 

Practice, Civil, Summary judgment, Burden of proof.

Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 

September 27, 2012.

The case was heard by Douglas H. Wilkins, J., on a motion 

for summary judgment, and a motion for reconsideration was 

considered by him.

Harold L. Lichten (Adelaide H. Pagano also present) for the 

plaintiff.

Nicole I. Taub, Senior Special Assistant Corporation 

Counsel, for the defendant.

Simone R. Liebman & Constance M. McGrane, for the 

Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination, amicus curiae, 

submitted a brief.

Robert S. Mantell, for Massachusetts Employment Lawyers 

Association, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.

 

1 Justice Botsford participated in the deliberation on this 

case prior to her retirement.
2

GANTS, C.J. The issue presented on appeal is whether a 

city is entitled to summary judgment on a handicap 

discrimination claim under G. L. c. 151B, § 4 (16), where the 

police department limits an officer to desk duty based on an 

informed, good faith belief that the officer can no longer 

safely patrol the streets because of his perceived handicap. We 

conclude that summary judgment is not appropriate where there 

are facts in dispute as to whether the officer is a qualified 

handicapped person capable of performing the full duties of a 

patrol officer without posing an unacceptably significant risk 

of serious injury to himself or others. The city at trial may 

present the evidence that caused the department to believe that 

the officer cannot safely assume the full duties of a police 

officer, but that determination rests with the fact finder based 

on the preponderance of the evidence, not with the department

based on its informed, good faith belief. Therefore, we vacate

the motion judge's entry of summary judgment in favor of the 

city of Boston (city) and remand the case for a trial.2

Background. The plaintiff, Sean Gannon (Gannon or 

plaintiff), began working for the Boston police department

(department) in 1996. For the first decade of his employment, 

Gannon was a patrol officer performing the full range of patrol 

 

2 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the 

Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination and the 

Massachusetts Employment Lawyers Association.
3

officer duties. Gannon is an avid practitioner of mixed martial 

arts (MMA) who has trained since his teenage years in techniques 

including taekwondo, judo and aikido, Brazilian jujitsu, and 

Filipino stick and knife fighting. He began fighting in MMA 

amateur bouts at night clubs on the South Shore in 2002, before 

making his professional debut in August, 2004.

Gannon suffered repeated head injuries in his professional

fights. In his first fight, Gannon received a roundhouse kick 

to his head and afterwards began vomiting and did not feel well. 

An ambulance transported him to a hospital, where he was 

diagnosed with a concussion. Gannon's next fight came two 

months later, in October, 2004, when he faced off with a widely

reputed fighter known by the moniker "Kimbo Slice." Gannon and 

that opponent agreed to a bare-knuckle boxing match governed by 

the traditional London Prize Rules, which permit a fight to 

continue until a fighter is knocked down and cannot return to 

his feet in thirty seconds. Gannon won the fight by knockout, 

but afterwards he spent several days in the hospital and was 

diagnosed with another concussion. Gannon's final professional 

fight came on October 7, 2005, where he lost by a technical 

knockout, and broke his right eye socket. He did not return to 

work until October 14, 2005, and was then placed on restricted 

duty, limited to "inside only" work, and barred from paid 

details. The restrictions were lifted on October 20, 2005.
4

In December, 2005, Gannon was diagnosed with obstructive 

sleep apnea and insomnia. He was treated for these conditions 

with various medications and procedures. On February 1, 2006, 

Gannon did not appear for his scheduled shift of police duty,

and officers went to his home to check on him. They found him 

in an incoherent and confused state. Gannon explained that he 

had overslept as a result of the treatment he was undergoing for 

sleep apnea. After this incident, the department placed him on 

administrative duty, pending a fitness evaluation by the 

department's psychiatrist, Dr. Marcia Scott.

Based on her initial evaluation, Dr. Scott described Gannon 

as "physically very restless" and opined that "[h]is

restlessness could be associated with brain injury from his

sport." Accordingly, Dr. Scott ordered additional 

neuropsychological testing with Dr. Lucinda Doran, who

administered tests to assess Gannon's intellectual abilities. 

She concluded that, while Gannon appeared to possess "solid 

overall capabilities," his "inability to process information 

quickly clearly reduce[d] his mental efficiency and his ability 

to react and respond appropriately." Around the same time, Dr. 

Scott reported from her ongoing interactions with Gannon that 

his thinking was impaired, "he ha[d] difficulty focusing, his 

speech [was] pressured and garbled, his face red and twisted." 

Later in 2006, Dr. Scott noted that Gannon remained "on modified 
5

duty due to significant mental impairments and reduction in 

mental performance . . . [a]lthough there [had] been some 

improvement over the intervening months." She continued to 

recommend against Gannon's return to full-duty status, 

explaining in a follow-up report in October, 2008, "Mr. Gannon 

has serious mental deficits that interfere with his ability to 

do the essential functions of an armed police officer."

Gannon sought treatment from his own doctors, including Dr. 

Aaron Nelson, a neuropsychologist, and Dr. Tuesday Burns, a 

psychiatrist. In a 2006 evaluation, Dr. Nelson's testing 

revealed "baseline verbal intellectual ability in the superior 

range and highly variable performance on measures of attention 

and executive function, suggestive of frontal systems 

compromise." Dr. Nelson opined that Gannon's issues "likely 

related to his history of multiple concussive injuries" and that 

Gannon's anxiety problems were exacerbating his difficulties. 

Two years later, however, Dr. Nelson tested Gannon for a second 

time and reported "stronger performance on a wide range of test 

measures." Dr. Burns, who had been treating Gannon for anxiety 

and attentional difficulties, subsequently informed the 

department that Gannon had "improved significantly across all 

areas" and that there were no "psychiatric or neurologic 

contraindications to Mr. Gannon being re-instated to full duty 

at the Boston Police Department."
6

Dr. Scott, the department's psychiatrist, disagreed with 

Dr. Burns's assessment. "Mr. Gannon has a serious chronic 

mental disorder as well as a history of repeated head trauma," 

she wrote in January, 2009. "These impairments interfere with 

his ability to accurately assess situations, communicate 

accurately, make accurate judgments, solve problems and manage 

the stresses involved in the job of an armed police officer."

In 2010, the department retained neuropsychologist Dr. 

Muriel Lezak to review Gannon's testing records. Dr. Lezak 

evaluated the prior testing results against metanorms developed 

from twenty-eight studies. She reported that Gannon's response 

or reaction times fell below the fifth percentile for persons 

his age, in the borderline-defective to defective range. 

"[W]hat he appears to be unable to do, when thought or 

concentration is required, is maintain accuracy and respond at a 

normal rate of speed," Dr. Lezak wrote. Dr. Lezak later tested

Gannon herself. Her new results supported her earlier 

evaluation, and led her to conclude, "[I]t is unlikely that an 

intensive remediation program could improve [Gannon's] response 

speed to near normal levels or enable him to develop consistent 

memory recall, both to a level that would allow him to 

perform . . . police functions requiring response speed and 

reliable memory recall."
7

In March, 2011, the department filed an application with 

the Public Employee Retirement Administration Commission (PERAC)

to involuntarily retire Gannon. PERAC rejected the application

after three physicians performed independent evaluations of 

Gannon and all concluded that he was capable of performing the 

essential functions of his job as a police officer. Gannon 

remained (and continues to remain) on desk duty, where he serves 

as the booking officer and works at the front desk of the East 

Boston police station. Gannon is not currently permitted to 

carry a service weapon, which prevents him from obtaining detail 

work and certain overtime opportunities.

In September, 2009, the Boston Patrolmen's Association 

filed a grievance on Gannon's behalf demanding that he be 

permitted to resume the full duties of a patrol officer. In 

advance of the arbitration proceeding, Gannon solicited an 

assessment from an additional neuropsychologist, Dr. Neal 

McGrath. Dr. McGrath concluded that Gannon was fit to return to 

full patrol duty, stating that "any cognitive deficits that 

Officer Gannon may have demonstrated in past evaluations ha[d]

cleared and were therefore more likely related to treatable 

medical conditions such as sleep disorder or mood disorder." 

But Dr. McGrath changed his opinion after reviewing Dr. Lezak's 

testing, recommending "further confirmation of . . . Gannon's 

ability to respond to emergency decisions as a police officer 
8

under conditions more closely resembling actual emergencies." 

Consequently, the union hired a police consultant, who performed 

live simulation testing on Gannon. This testing included a 

"Shoot/Don't Shoot" target drill, and other role-playing 

scenarios. Gannon performed well, and Dr. McGrath reaffirmed 

his position that Gannon was "fit for full duty as a Boston 

[p]olice officer." Dr. Lezak stood by her opinion and rejected 

Dr. McGrath's reliance on the simulations, saying that "no 

matter how real you try to make [them]," the simulations were 

not sufficient. She added, "[Gannon] is not responding while 

running, he's not responding while he is sensing danger for 

himself, he's not responding while there's a whole bunch of 

stuff going on, sirens, and other cars pulling up. This is 

where my concern is." In May, 2014, the arbitrator found that 

the union had not "undercut the force of Dr. Lezak's medical 

opinion," and concluded that the department did not act 

unreasonably in placing Gannon on administrative duty because of 

his "neuropsychological problem of speed and accuracy."

In 2012, Gannon brought a complaint with the Massachusetts 

Commission Against Discrimination (MCAD), alleging that the city 

acted in violation of G. L. c. 151B, § 4 (16), by refusing to 

return him to full duty. After the requisite ninety days, he 

filed a discrimination lawsuit against the city in Superior 

Court. The city moved for summary judgment in August, 2015, 
9

arguing that Gannon did not meet the statutory definition of a 

handicapped person; that he could not perform the essential 

functions of a full-duty police officer; that he had not 

suffered any adverse action; and that, even if he had, the 

adverse action was taken for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory 

reason. In ruling on the city's motion, the judge, viewing the 

evidence in the light most favorable to Gannon, determined that 

Gannon had met his burden of showing a prima facie case of 

handicap discrimination. He found that "the evidence . . . 

obviously supports a fact-finder in concluding . . . that the 

[c]ity regards Gannon as having physical impairments . . . that 

curtail[] a 'major' life activity, including brain functions 

such as memory, ability to recall and follow directions, and 

[]ability to make split second decisions," thus satisfying the 

requirement that Gannon prove he has a "handicap" within the 

meaning of G. L. c. 151B, § 1 (17). The judge also noted, "The 

evidence could hardly be more in conflict on the facts bearing 

on the medical aspects" of the case. He concluded that, because 

he cannot resolve factual disputes in a motion for summary 

judgment, he must accept as true the reports, testimony, and 

affidavits from Gannon's doctors and other experts that state 

that Gannon can perform the essential duties of a full-duty 

Boston police officer. The judge also assumed for purposes of 

the motion that the city had taken an adverse employment action 
10

against Gannon by assigning him to desk duty rather than full 

duty.

After he concluded that Gannon had made the required prima 

facie showing of discrimination, the judge found that "[t]he 

city [had] met its burden to articulate a non-discriminatory 

reason for its assignment of Gannon to desk duty, namely its 

concern that Gannon's loss of cognitive function and memory 

impairs his ability to do essential tasks, such as responding in

an emergency and exercising the necessary judgment in high 

stress situations, including those involving the use of 

firearms."

The judge then determined that, even viewing the evidence 

in the light most favorable to Gannon, he had failed to sustain 

his burden of proving "that the [c]ity's articulated reason is a 

pretext for discrimination." The judge framed the question of 

pretext as "whether the medical and psychological evidence is so 

thin that a reasonable jury may conclude that the [c]ity could 

not honestly have concerns about Gannon's abilities in critical 

areas, including reactions and decisions during crisis, possibly 

involving firearms." Finding that "[t]he answer, compelled by 

the record, is 'no,'" the judge allowed the city's motion for 

summary judgment.

The plaintiff moved for reconsideration, claiming that "it 

is illegal disability discrimination for the [c]ity to place 
11

Gannon on desk duty because of his perceived handicap if he is 

in fact capable of performing the essential functions of a 

police officer." The judge denied the motion, declaring that 

"the question of whether the plaintiff was in fact a qualified 

handicapped individual is distinct from whether the [c]ity 

discriminated because of his perceived handicap." The judge 

found that, where the city had concluded, "with ample expert 

support," that Gannon could not perform the duties of a patrol 

officer, "[t]he stated reason for its action was nondiscriminatory -- the plaintiff's inability to do the job. It 

did not matter why the plaintiff lacked that ability."

Gannon filed a notice of appeal, and we allowed his

application for direct appellate review.

Discussion. Under G. L. c. 151B, § 4 (16), it is an 

"unlawful practice . . . [f]or any employer . . . to . . . 

refuse to . . . advance in employment or otherwise discriminate 

against, because of his handicap, any person alleging to be a 

qualified handicapped person, capable of performing the

essential functions of the position involved with reasonable 

accommodation, unless the employer can demonstrate that the 

accommodation required to be made to the physical or mental 

limitations of the person would impose an undue hardship to the 
12

employer's business."3 In interpreting the meaning of these

provisions, we give "substantial deference" to the guidelines 

interpreting G. L. c. 151B promulgated by the MCAD, although we 

recognize that the guidelines do not carry the force of law. 

Dahill v. Police Dep't of Boston, 434 Mass. 233, 239 (2001), 

citing Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination,

Guidelines: Employment Discrimination on the Basis of Handicap

Chapter 151B § II.A.7 (1998) (MCAD Guidelines). We remain 

mindful that the Legislature instructed that G. L. c. 151B 

"shall be construed liberally for the accomplishment of its 

purposes." G. L. c. 151B, § 9.4

There are two general categories of handicap discrimination 

cases, which differ according to the explanation given for the 

adverse employment action by the employer. In the first, the 

employer denies that the employment action was motivated by the 

plaintiff employee's handicap, and contends that the action was 

 

3 The law defines the term "handicap" to mean "(a) a 

physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or 

more major life activities of a person; (b) a record of having 

such impairment; or (c) being regarded as having such 

impairment." G. L. c. 151B, § 1 (17). "[H]andicapped person" 

means any person who has a handicap. G. L. c. 151B, § 1 (19).

4 Because the language of G. L. c. 151B resembles language 

used in Federal statutes prohibiting discrimination, we also 

look to Federal case law for guidance in our interpretations of 

the scope of our antidiscrimination law. See, e.g., Russell v. 

Cooley Dickinson Hosp., Inc., 437 Mass. 443, 451 n.6 (2002); Cox

v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 414 Mass. 375, 384 (1993); 

Wheelock College v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 

371 Mass. 130, 137-138 (1976).
13

based on other conduct by the employee, such as insubordination,

poor job performance, or chronic tardiness, or resulted from a 

reduction in force, that is unrelated to the plaintiff's 

handicap. See Tate v. Department of Mental Health, 419 Mass 

356, 361 (1995). In these cases, we follow the framework, 

patterned on that set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 

411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973), in which the plaintiff employee bears 

the burden of making a prima facie showing of handicap 

discrimination by offering evidence that (1) the employee is a 

"handicapped person" because he or she has "a physical or mental 

impairment which substantially limits one or more major life 

activities" (or a record thereof) or because the employee is 

"regarded [by his or her employer] as having such an 

impairment," G. L. c. 151B, § 1 (17), (19) (defining "handicap" 

and "handicapped person"); (2) he or she is a "qualified 

handicapped person" who "is capable of performing the essential 

functions of a particular job, or who would be capable of" doing 

so with reasonable accommodation, G. L. c. 151B, § 1 (16) 

(defining "qualified handicapped person"); (3) he or she was 

terminated or otherwise subject to an adverse action by his or 

her employer; and (4) where, as here, the adverse action is 

prohibiting the plaintiff from assuming the duties of a 

position, the position otherwise remained open to him or her.

5

 

5 Where the adverse action is termination of the plaintiff 
14

See MCAD Guidelines, supra at § IX.A.2.

6 Where the plaintiff

employee makes this prima facie showing, the burden shifts to 

the employer to show with credible evidence that the real reason 

for the adverse employment action was not the employee's 

handicap but a lawful reason that was unrelated to the 

employee's handicap. See id. See also Abramian v. President & 

Fellows of Harvard College, 432 Mass. 107, 116 (2000); Blare v. 

Husky Injection Molding Sys. Boston, Inc., 419 Mass. 437, 441-

442 (1995). Where the employer meets this burden, the burden 

shifts back to the plaintiff employee to prove that the adverse 

action was taken "because of his [or her] handicap," G. L. 

c. 151B, § 4 (16), and not for the reason proffered by the 

employer. See MCAD Guidelines, supra. See also Bulwer v. Mount 

Auburn Hosp., 473 Mass. 672, 681 (2016); Abramian, 432 Mass. at 

117; Blare, 419 Mass. at 442-443. This type of case is often 

labeled a "pretext case" because the plaintiff employee may 

defeat an employer's motion for summary judgment by showing that 

 

employee, the fourth element requires the employee to show that 

"the position he [or she] had occupied remained open and the 

employer sought to fill it." See Dartt v. Browning-Ferris 

Indus., Inc. (Mass.), 427 Mass. 1, 3 (1998); Beal v. Selectmen 

of Hingham, 419 Mass. 535, 541 (1995).

6 This standard reflects our recognition that proof of an 

employer's true motive can be elusive. See Wheelock College, 

371 Mass. at 137-138. We have noted in reference to the final 

element that the necessary showing may vary depending on the 

specific circumstances of each case. See Beal, 419 Mass. at 

541.
15

there are disputed issues of fact as to whether the employer's 

proffered reason was not the true reason, which permit the 

inference that the employer offered a pretextual reason because 

the true reason was discrimination on the basis of handicap.

See Bulwer, supra at 681-682; Blare, supra at 444-445.

7 

Virtually all cases alleging discrimination on the basis of 

race, gender, and national origin fall into this first category, 

because an employer will rarely concede that the employer's true 

motivation for the employment action was the employee's race, 

gender, or national origin.

In the second category of handicap discrimination cases, 

the employer admits that the adverse action was taken because of 

the plaintiff employee's handicap but contends that the employee

is not protected under the statute because the employee was not 

capable of performing the essential functions of the job even 

with reasonable accommodation, and therefore is not a qualified 

handicapped person. In this type of case, the plaintiff

 

7 Although a showing of pretext permits a finding of 

discriminatory intent at trial, it does not require such a 

finding. "The employer may counter the effect of this evidence 

by showing that, even if his articulated reason for the adverse 

action is untrue, he had no discriminatory intent, or that his 

action was based on a different, nondiscriminatory reason." 

Abramian v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 432 Mass. 

107, 118 (2000). See Lipchitz v. Raytheon Co., 434 Mass. 493, 

508 (2001) (burden-shifting rules and pretext inquiry involve 

questions of law more appropriately left to trial judge; jury 

instructions should focus on ultimate issues of harm, 

discriminatory animus, and causation).
16

employee's burden to make a prima facie showing is 

straightforward: the plaintiff employee must show that he or 

she suffered an adverse employment action, that he or she has a

"handicap," as defined in G. L. c. 151B, § 1, that he or she is 

a "qualified handicapped person," as defined in § 1, and that 

the adverse action was taken because of his or her handicap. 

See Russell v. Cooley Dickinson Hosp., Inc., 437 Mass. 443, 450 

(2002). Accord Ward v. Massachusetts Health Research Inst., 

Inc., 209 F.3d 29, 32-33 (1st Cir. 2000). The plaintiff

employee need not prove that the employer's stated reason was 

not the true reason for the adverse action, but instead must 

prove that he or she indeed was capable of performing the 

essential functions of the job and therefore was a qualified 

handicapped person. See Russell, supra; Ward, supra.

Accordingly, this type of case is best described as a qualified 

handicapped person case, because the crux of the case is not 

whether the employer's explanation was a pretext but whether the 

plaintiff employee was a qualified handicapped person.

8

 

8 We have at times referred to pretext cases as "indirect 

evidence" cases, and qualified handicapped person cases as 

"direct evidence" cases. See Lipchitz, 434 Mass. at 501; Wynn & 

Wynn, P.C. v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 431 

Mass. 655, 664-665 (2000). We find this focus on the nature of 

the evidence unhelpful and a potential source of confusion in 

distinguishing these cases. In a pretext case, where the 

plaintiff employee must generally rely on circumstantial 

evidence, the plaintiff may still offer in evidence specific 

statements by supervisors reflecting discriminatory animus 
17

The judge erred in analyzing the evidence in this case as 

if it were a pretext case when it should have been analyzed as a 

qualified handicapped person case. Where, as here, the city has 

limited the duties of a police officer because it considers him 

or her incapable of performing the essential duties of a patrol

officer as a result of physical or mental limitations arising 

from the officer's handicap, the adverse employment action is 

"because of his [or her] handicap." G. L. c. 151B, § 4 (16). 

See MCAD Guidelines, supra at IX.A; Labonte v. Hutchins & 

Wheeler, 424 Mass. 813, 821-822 (1997). See also Ward, 209 F.3d 

at 37-38. It does not become a pretext case simply because the 

department contends that the adverse employment action was 

motivated solely by those physical or mental limitations, and 

not by the handicap, where those limitations arise from the 

handicap. See Rizzo v. Children's World Learning Ctrs., Inc., 

84 F.3d 758, 762-763 (5th Cir. 1996) (judge erred by applying 

pretext analysis to school's claim that it demoted hearing-

 

(which the employer will seek to characterize as "stray 

comments") that might be described as direct evidence. See 

Bulwer v. Mount Auburn Hosp., 473 Mass. 672, 684-687 (2016) 

(discussing five different kinds of evidence jury might have 

relied on in determining employer's real reasons for 

termination). See also Johansen v. NCR Comten, Inc., 30 Mass. 

App. Ct. 294, 302 (1991). Similarly, in a qualified handicapped 

person case, there may be so-called indirect evidence that the 

employer's belief that the employee is incapable of performing 

the essential duties of the job is based on stereotypes and 

assumptions rather than hard facts. See Labonte v. Hutchins & 

Wheeler, 424 Mass. 813, 815 (1997).
18

impaired bus driver out of fear that she would not be able to 

hear if student in her bus was choking; relevant question was 

whether plaintiff actually presented safety threat). For 

instance, where a police department terminates an officer's 

employment because of his or her failing eyesight, it cannot 

defeat a discrimination claim by arguing that it did not fire 

the officer because of the handicap but because he or she could 

not see clearly enough to perform the position's essential 

duties.

This analytical flaw transformed the plaintiff's burden on 

summary judgment in this case. By mischaracterizing this as a 

pretext case, the judge determined that Gannon could not prevail 

on his claim of handicap discrimination because he had failed to 

rebut the department's contention that the real reason for its 

refusal to return him to full duty was that it "honestly" had 

concerns about Gannon's reaction time and his decision-making 

during crisis. But where these concerns arose from Gannon's 

handicap, this analysis essentially meant that the department 

prevailed because Gannon failed to present evidence to show that 

the department did not act in good faith in concluding that 

Gannon could not perform the essential duties of his job. In a 

qualified handicapped person case, however, the employer does 

not prevail simply because it indisputably acted in good faith; 

it can prevail only if the handicapped employee fails to prove 
19

by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she was able to 

perform the essential duties of the position with reasonable 

accommodation. See Dartt v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc.

(Mass.), 427 Mass. 1, 3 (1998). See also Pushkin v. Regents of 

the Univ. of Colo., 658 F.2d 1372, 1385 (10th Cir. 1981) ("It 

would be a rare case indeed in which a hostile discriminatory 

purpose or subjective intent to discriminate solely on the basis 

of handicap could be shown. Discrimination on the basis of 

handicap usually results from more invidious causative elements 

and often occurs under the guise of extending a helping hand or 

a mistaken, restrictive belief as to the limitations of 

handicapped persons").

As to the issue whether Gannon was capable of performing 

the essential duties of a patrol officer, the judge recognized 

that there was a genuine dispute of material fact, and that 

Gannon had offered substantial evidence from medical and police 

experts indicating that he can perform the essential, full 

duties of a Boston police officer. Because there remains a 

factual dispute as to whether Gannon can capably perform the 

essential duties of a full-duty police officer, the department's 

motion for summary judgment should have been denied. At trial, 

the fact finder must determine, not whether the department acted 

on a good faith belief that Gannon cannot capably perform these 

duties because of his handicap, but whether Gannon has proved by 
20

a preponderance of the evidence that he can do so. See Labonte, 

424 Mass. at 822-823. See also Gates v. Flood, 57 Mass. App. 

Ct. 739, 745 (2003) (it is no defense that employer mistakenly 

judged employee's qualification). Cf. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 

U.S. 624, 628-629, 649 (1998) (where patient infected with human 

immunodeficiency virus alleged that dentist discriminated 

against her in violation of Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 

U.S.C. § 12182[a], by refusing to fill her cavities in his 

dental office because he feared for his safety, "[h]is belief 

that a significant risk existed, even if maintained in good 

faith, would not relieve him from liability"). The department 

may offer in evidence all of the tests and expert opinions that 

caused it to conclude that Gannon cannot perform the essential 

duties of a patrol officer, but our law of handicapped 

discrimination grants this determination to the fact finder

based on the preponderance of the evidence, not to the employer

based on its good faith belief. See Cox v. New England Tel. & 

Tel. Co., 414 Mass. 375, 383 (1993).

In order to rebut Gannon's prima facie case, the city bears 

the burden of specifying which essential duty or duties Gannon 

is incapable of performing because of his handicap. See, e.g.,

Carleton v. Commonwealth, 447 Mass. 791, 810 (2006). The 

department appears to contend that it is an essential duty of a 

patrol officer to respond to stressful situations and 
21

emergencies with reasonable judgment and speed, and that Gannon 

is not capable of performing these duties because of his 

cognitive limitations and slow reaction time. Implicit in this 

contention is that, if Gannon were allowed to become a patrol 

officer, he would put the safety of the public, his fellow 

officers, and himself at risk.

Where an employer defends a decision to terminate or not 

hire a handicapped individual (or, as here, to not allow the 

individual to resume being a full-duty patrol officer) because 

"there is a risk of future injury to the employee or others," 

the MCAD Guidelines deem this an affirmative defense for which 

the employer bears the burden of proving "that there is a 

'reasonable probability of substantial harm' to the employee or 

others." MCAD Guidelines, supra at IX.B.3, quoting Ryan v. 

Lunenberg, 11 M.D.L.R. 1215, 1241-1242 (1989). Placing this 

burden of proof on the employer is improper for two reasons.

First, it is contrary to our case law holding that the 

burden of proving unlawful discrimination remains with the 

plaintiff "at all times." See Abramian, 432 Mass. at 118,

quoting Wheelock College v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against 

Discrimination, 370 Mass. 130, 139 (1976). See also Cox, 414 

Mass. at 386 (plaintiff had burden to "persuade the judge that 
22

he was capable of climbing poles safely" or prove that climbing 

was not essential function of position).9

Second, where, as with a patrol officer, the nature of the 

job will at times place the employee in harm's way, it is 

impossible to divorce the question whether the employee is 

capable of performing the essential functions of the position 

from the question whether the employee can perform those 

functions safely.10 General Laws c. 151B, § 1, defines various 

 

9 The defendant employer bears the burden of proof only 

where it claims that the reasonable accommodation that might 

enable the employee capably to perform the essential functions 

of the position would impose an undue hardship on the conduct of 

the employer's business. See Godfrey v. Globe Newspaper Co., 

457 Mass. 113, 120 (2010) ("Once an employee 'make[s] at least a 

facial showing that reasonable accommodation is possible,' the 

burden of proof [of both production and persuasion] shifts to 

the employer to establish that a suggested accommodation would 

impose an undue hardship" [citations omitted]). See also 

Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination, Guidelines: 

Employment Discrimination on the Basis of Handicap Chapter 151B 

§ II.D (1998). The employer's burden as to this issue is 

imposed by the plain meaning of the language of G. L. c. 151B, 

§ 4 (16), which prohibits discrimination against qualified 

handicapped individuals "unless the employer can demonstrate 

that the accommodation required to be made . . . would impose an 

undue hardship to the employer's business."

10 Surveying the Federal decisions in this area, one 

treatise remarks that while "[o]rdinarily a party asserting an 

affirmative defense bears the burden of proof, . . . many courts 

have been reluctant to require the employer to prove [a] direct 

[safety] threat. Their reasoning is that Congress placed 

burdens on both parties, because the plaintiff must prove that 

he or she is 'otherwise qualified' for the job. The plaintiff's 

showing of being 'otherwise qualified' encompasses or subsumes 

the issue of direct threat, the argument goes, because a person 

who is a direct threat would not be qualified for the job; being 

qualified implies not being a direct threat." 9 L.K. Larson, 
23

terms in c. 151B, but it does not define "capable of performing 

the essential functions of a particular job." Section 4 (16), 

however, recognizes that the safe performance of a job is part 

of its capable performance, because it requires that a physical 

or mental job qualification requirement "shall be functionally 

related to the specific job or jobs for which the individual is 

being considered and shall be consistent with the safe and 

lawful performance of the job." See Dahill, 434 Mass. at 240, 

quoting Cox, 414 Mass. at 383-384 ("The public policies 

underlying G. L. c. 151B, § 4 [16], are clear: to protect 

'handicapped individuals from deprivations based on prejudice, 

stereotypes, or unfounded fear, while giving appropriate weight 

to such legitimate concerns of [employers] as avoiding exposing 

 

Employment Discrimination § 156.03[4][c] (2d ed. 2016) (Larson). 

See Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Amego, Inc., 110 F.3d 

135, 143 (1st Cir. 1997) ("Under § 504 [of the Rehabilitation 

Act], it is clear that the question of whether the employment of 

the plaintiff poses risks to the health of others is analyzed as 

a matter of whether the person is "otherwise qualified").

Those Federal courts that take the opposite view and place 

the burden of proof on the employer have emphasized that the 

Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a), (b), 

provides a defense to a charge of disability discrimination 

where the individual poses "a 'direct threat' to the health or 

safety of him or herself or to others in the workplace." 

Larson, supra, citing Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. 

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 477 F.3d 561, 571 (8th Cir. 2007); Nunes

v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 164 F.3d 1243, 1247 (9th Cir. 1999); 

U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. AIC Sec. 

Investigations, 55 F.3d 1276, 1283-1284 (7th Cir. 1995). 

General Laws c. 151B, § 4 (16), does not set forth a "direct 

threat" defense; it simply places on the employee the burden of 

proving that he or she is a "qualified handicapped person."
24

others to significant health and safety risks'"). Section 

4 (16) does not recognize a separate affirmative defense of 

"reasonable probability of substantial harm" to the employee or 

others. See MCAD Guidelines, supra at IX.B.3.

While the handicapped employee ultimately bears the burden 

of proving that he or she can safely perform the essential 

functions of a particular job, the employee need only confront 

this burden where the employer has met its burden of producing

specific evidence showing that the employee would pose an

unacceptably significant risk of serious injury to the employee 

or others.11 The employer meets its burden of production where 

it offers evidence showing that it has made "an individualized 

factual inquiry" based on substantial information regarding the 

employee's individual work and medical history. See MCAD 

Guidelines, supra at § IX.B.3. See also Knapp v. Northwestern 

Univ., 101 F.3d 473, 484-486 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 

U.S. 1274 (1997). It may not meet its burden based upon pure 

speculation as to the likely risk of injury. See MCAD 

Guidelines, supra. Nor is it sufficient to show simply an 

increased risk of injury. See id. See also Mantolete v. 

Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416, 1422 (9th Cir. 1985), quoting S. Rep. No. 

 

11 We choose the standard of an "unacceptably significant 

risk of serious injury to the employee or others" because we 

recognize that the performance of some inherently dangerous jobs 

might always involve a significant risk of serious injury to the 

employee or others.
25

48, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., at 16 (1974) ("A mere 'elevated risk' 

standard is not sufficient to insure handicapped people's 'right 

to employment which complements their abilities'"). The

employer must offer evidence showing an increased risk of 

serious injury that is so significant that it cannot reasonably 

be deemed acceptable by an employer. See Beal v. Selectmen of 

Hingham, 419 Mass. 535, 543 (1995) (concluding that plaintiff 

who was discharged as police officer has no reasonable 

expectation of demonstrating that she is "qualified handicapped 

person" under G. L. c. 151B "[b]ecause police officers are 

responsible for public safety, and the plaintiff's handicap 

severely compromises her capability to ensure the general safety 

of the public"). See also Burton v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 

244 F. Supp. 2d 252, 262 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (plaintiff not 

qualified to perform essential functions of his bus driver

position where his health condition posed "unacceptable" risk to 

public).

Where the employer has satisfied this burden of production, 

the plaintiff employee must prove that he or she is capable of 

performing the essential functions of the job without posing an 

unacceptably significant risk of serious injury to the employee 

or others. In making this determination, the fact finder must 

consider the potential severity of the feared injury and the 

probability that the employee in that position would cause such 
26

injury. An employee may be found incapable of safely performing 

the essential functions of a position, and therefore not 

qualified under the statute, without the risk rising to the 

standard of a "reasonable probability of substantial harm." 

Contrast MCAD Guidelines, supra at § IX.B.3, quoting Ryan, 11 

M.D.L.R. at 1242.

Conclusion. We reverse the allowance of the defendant's 

motion for summary judgment, and remand the case for a trial.

So ordered.