EFFECTS OF CATASTROPHIC EVENTS

ON TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM

MANAGEMENT AND OPERATIONS

Baltimore, MD—Howard Street Tunnel Fire—July 18, 2001

July 2002

U.S. Department of Transportation

ITS Joint Program Office
ii

Notice

This document is disseminated under the sponsorship of the Department of

Transportation in the interest of information exchange. The United States

Government assumes no liability for its contents or use thereof.
Technical Report Documentation Page 

1. Report No. 2. Government Accession No. 3. Recipient's Catalog No. 

5. Report Date 

July 2002 

4. Title and Subtitle 

Effects of Catastrophic Events on Transportation System Management 

and Operations, Howard Street Tunnel Fire, Baltimore City, Maryland 

– July 18, 2001 6. Performing Organization Code 

7. Author(s) 

Mark R. Carter, Mark P. Howard, Nicholas Owens, David Register, 

Jason Kennedy, Kelley Pecheux, Aaron Newton 

8. Performing Organization Report No. 

9. Performing Organization Name and Address 10. Work Unit No. (TRAIS) 

Science Applications International Corporation 

7980 Science Applications Court 

Vienna, VA 22183 

11. Contract or Grant No. 

13. Type of Report and Period Covered 

Catastrophic Events Case Study 

12. Sponsoring Agency Name and Address 

U.S. Department of Transportation 

Federal Highway Administration 

ITS Joint Program Office 

400 Seventh Street, SW 

Washington, DC 20590

14. Sponsoring Agency Code 

15. Supplementary Notes 

Contracting Officer's Technical Representative (COTR) – Joseph Peters 

16. Abstract 

This report documents the actions taken by transportation agencies in response to the earthquake in Northridge, 

California on January 17, 1994, and is part of a larger effort to examine the impacts of catastrophic events on 

transportation system facilities and services. The findings documented in this report are a result of a detailed 

literature search on Northridge lessons learned. As part of a larger effort, four case studies will be produced: 

• New York City, September 11, 2001 

• Washington, D.C., September 11, 2001 

• Baltimore, Maryland, rail tunnel fire, July 18, 2001 

• Northridge, California, earthquake, January 17, 1994. 

17. Key Word 

Emergency Response, Emergency Preparedness, 

Transportation System Recovery, Disaster, 

Catastrophic Event, Fire, Rail Tunnel, Baltimore 

18. Distribution Statement 

No restrictions 

19. Security Classif. (of this report) 

Unclassified 

20. Security Classif. (of this page) 

Unclassified 

21. No. of 

Pages 

22. Price 

Form DOT F 1700.7 (8-72) Reproduction of completed page authorized
1

1.0 Introduction

1.1 Regional Context

The City of Baltimore is the principal metropolitan area in the State of

Maryland. The City is located in the heart of the state and is a central

transportation hub for the Northeast Corridor. I-95, the main north-south

interstate highway along the East Coast, runs through the heart of the City,

connecting to the Inner Harbor and downtown Baltimore via I-395. I-695, the

Baltimore beltway, links I-95 with I-70, a major interstate route that connects

the mid-Atlantic region with the Midwest, and I-83, which links Baltimore with

York, PA, Harrisburg, PA, and points north. In addition to the above roads, two

tunnels passing under the Port connect the interstate system: the Fort

McHenry Tunnel, which is part of I-95, and the Baltimore Harbor Tunnel, which

is part of I-895 connecting with I-95. The map presented in Figure 1 shows the

locations and routes of major interstate and state highways located within and

around the City. Average daily traffic on the interstate and state highway

system in and around Baltimore is shown in Table 1.

Baltimore is also a major transit point for the movement of freight. The City is

served by two major railroads, Norfolk Southern and CSX. The Howard Street

Tunnel, which is owned and operated by CSX, represents the only direct rail

link between the Northeast, Southeast, and mid-Atlantic regions. The City is

also home to the Port of Baltimore and Baltimore-Washington International

(BWI) Airport. The Port of Baltimore is one of the largest container ports on the

East Coast, and is also one of the leading ports for RO/RO traffic (roll-on/rolloff, including automobile imports into the United States). The Port generates

significant freight traffic, both truck and short-line rail (Camden Line), with

approximately 80,000 truck trips into and out of the port on an annual basis.

Figure 1. Baltimore City Regional Highway System
2

An extensive mass transit system is operated within the City and the

surrounding region by the Maryland Transit Administration (MTA). The Central

Light Rail Line travels a 29-mile corridor extending from Hunt Valley in

Baltimore County to Cromwell Station–Glen Burnie in Anne Arundel County,

including branches from BWI and Baltimore Penn Station. MTA reports that

daily light rail ridership is about 30,000 passengers. MTA also operates the

Baltimore Metro subway system, with daily ridership of 45,000 passengers, and

a city-wide bus service, with daily ridership of approximately 250,000 people.

Commuter rail service (MARC) is operated between Baltimore and Washington,

DC, on two lines. The Camden Line operates over CSX tracks, and the Penn Line

operates on Amtrak’s Northeast Corridor tracks. A third service operates from

Martinsburg, WV, via Brunswick, MD, and Frederick, MD, terminating at Union

Station in Washington, DC. Of these three services, the Camden Line, with daily

ridership of 3,500 passengers and a terminus at the Camden Yards Station near

the stadiums, was the only one impacted by the event on July 18. The location

of rail transit systems in the Baltimore region is shown in Figure 2.

Interstate Description Average Daily Traffic

I-95 Major north-south interstate along the East South Baltimore -170,350

Coast. Traverses the southern part of Baltimore East Baltimore – 91,875

City, including the Port of Baltimore, and passes

under the harbor via the Fort McHenry Tunnel

I-895 South Baltimore, connects the Baltimore South Baltimore – 45,225

Harbor Tunnel with I-95. East Baltimore (near merge point

with I-95) – 57,125

I-695 Baltimore beltway system West of Baltimore – ranges from 160,000 to

180,000 (I-70 juncture)

East of Baltimore – ranges from 30,000

(Dundalk) to 120,000 (Parkville)

North of Baltimore – ranges from 150,000

to 190,000

South of Baltimore – ranges from 30,000

(Francis Scott Key Bridge) to 160,000

(I-95 juncture)

I-83 South from Pennsylvania border across I-695 Baltimore County–Baltimore City border –

into downtown Baltimore (Section from 112,325

Baltimore Beltway also called the Jones Falls Mid-town (Cold Spring Lane) – 93,325

Expressway, or JFX) End point (Inner Harbor) – 43,425

I-395 Spur from I-95 into Baltimore City; enters the From I-95 to Martin Luther King

City by Orioles Park at Camden Yards and (MLK) Boulevard exit ramp – 99,590

Convention Center, and merges with MLK Blvd. to Howard Street – 55,250

Howard Street

Source: Maryland State Highway Administration Traffic Volume Map 2001

Table 1. Interstate Traffic In and Around Baltimore City
3

Baltimore is located approximately 40 miles northeast of Washington, DC, and

the Baltimore-Washington corridor that runs along I-95 is one of the more

highly urbanized and densely populated corridors in the United States. The

two cities combined represent the fifth largest metropolitan area in the United

States, and rank among the most congested urbanized areas with respect to

vehicular traffic. In 2000, Baltimore ranked in the top 30 of 75 U.S. urban areas

in each of the 10 congestion indices developed by the Texas Transportation

Institute, and in the top 20 for annual person hours of delay, annual excess fuel

consumption, and congestion cost. Even so, Baltimore has a relatively high

proportion of mass transit use, with 16% of commuters using transit to get

to work.

1.2 Howard Street

Howard Street, and the Howard Street Tunnel, are located in the heart of

Baltimore City’s business and cultural districts, and are adjacent to the core of

the City’s tourist and sports attractions and the Inner Harbor. The south end of

Howard Street is near Oriole Park at Camden Yards and the Baltimore Ravens’

football stadium. The south end is also close to the Inner Harbor and the

National Aquarium, the heart of Baltimore’s tourist area. The north end of

Howard Street, near the Mount Royal light rail station, is located close to the

Maryland State Government office complex and the City’s art district

(Meyerhoff Symphony Hall and the Lyric Opera House).

The street runs through the downtown business and entertainment districts

and passes directly by or near some of the City’s major museums, concert halls,

and cultural attractions. Figure 3 shows the locations of both Howard Street

and the Howard Street Tunnel within the City of Baltimore. Please note that

Figure 2. Baltimore City Transit System
4

Figure 3, adapted from the Baltimore Sun, also shows street

closures that resulted from the incident. Table 2 shows the

major cultural and tourism attractions, business districts,

hospitals, universities, and other facilities that are located

within 2,000 feet of the tunnel.

Howard Street also intersects all major surface transportation

systems in Baltimore, including interstate and state highways

and city streets. Interstate 395, which links Interstate 95 to

downtown Baltimore, terminates at the south end of Howard

Street, with an exit ramp for stadium parking and for Martin

Luther King Boulevard. I-395 runs almost directly over the

south end of the tunnel. The entry points of the Baltimore–

Washington Parkway (MD-295), a major north-south commuter

route and connector to BWI Airport and US 40, the major eastwest route into western Baltimore City, also are located in the

vicinity of Howard Street. MD-295 enters the City by the two

sports stadiums, and is within 1,000 feet to the west of the

tunnel. US-40 crosses Howard Street.

These roadways serve passenger traffic, commercial vehicle

traffic in transit, and commercial vehicle traffic with

destinations in Baltimore City. Howard Street is also one of the

major north-south routes running through the City’s central

business district, and intersects with all major east-west routes.

Table 3 lists the major routes that intersect Howard Street, and

also provides average daily traffic count information for

selected streets included in the Baltimore Metropolitan

Council Regional Traffic Count Program June 30, 2002, Status

Report. Traffic count data were collected over a six-month

period from January 1 through June 30, 2002, at locations

throughout the City’s central business district. Although the

data were not collected at the junction of Howard Street and

intersecting routes, the data do provide an indication of traffic

volumes in and around the section of Howard Street under

which the tunnel is located. The cross streets are listed

beginning with Pratt Street, located at the south end of

Howard Street near the merge point with I-395 and at the

south portal of the tunnel. The listing of streets continues up to

the northern portal of the tunnel near Mount Royal Avenue.

The listing also includes average daily traffic count data for US

40 and MD 295, which include commuter as well as cross-town

traffic.

The MTA Central Light Rail Line runs above the tunnel on

Howard Street. MTA bus service also runs down Howard Street, Figure 3. Howard Street Corridor
5

as well as on many of the major streets that intersect Howard Street and cross

over the tunnel. The MTA’s subway system, the Metro, passes below Howard

Street and the Howard Street tunnel. The MARC rail system’s Camden Line uses

the CSX track between Baltimore and Washington, and the MARC track within

the City is adjacent to the Howard Street Tunnel.

Table 2. Attractions on Howard Street and in the Surrounding Environs

Attractions near the Howard

Street Tunnel Description Proximity to the Tunnel

Baltimore Ravens’ Stadium, Oriole Park Football and baseball stadiums Within 1,000 feet west of the south portal

at Camden Yards of the tunnel

Inner Harbor Tourist center, includes Harbor Place,

Galleria Mall, several hotels Within 2,000 feet to the east

University of Maryland at Baltimore Medical school, University Hospital Within 2,000 feet to the west

Convention Center Exhibition space and conference Adjacent to the tunnel near Oriole Park

center

Baltimore Arena Concert, sporting event facility Adjacent to the tunnel

Edward A. Garmatz Federal Courthouse United States District Court for the Within 1,000 feet to the east

District of Maryland

Charles Center and Mechanic Theater Major business district and cultural Within 2,000 to the west

attraction in downtown Baltimore

Lexington Market Major transit point for Metro, light rail, Within 1,000 feet to the west

bus; restaurants, produce, and

food stores

Maryland General Hospital Medical facilities Within 1,000 feet to the west

Mercy Hospital Medical facilities Within 2,000 feet to the east

Walters Art Gallery and Peabody Cultural attractions Within 2,000 feet to the east

Conservatory

State Center Maryland State Government campus Within 1,000 feet to the east

Lyric Opera House and Meyerhoff Cultural attractions Within 1,000 feet to the east/southeast

Symphony Hall of the north portal

University of Baltimore Academic institution Within 1,000 feet to the east/southeast

of the north portal

Residential Communities Federal Hill (south portal), Within 2,000 feet of the tunnel

Seton Hill, Mt. Vernon Square,

Bolton Hill (north portal)
6

1.3 Howard Street Tunnel

The Howard Street Tunnel is the only freight through-route in the Northeast

Corridor, from the southern states through Washington and Baltimore and on

to New York and Philadelphia. The tunnel, constructed in 1895 out of brick,

runs for 1.7 miles through the heart of the City of Baltimore and is said to be

the longest underground conduit of freight on the Atlantic seaboard. The

south portal of the tunnel is located in the Camden Yards area of Baltimore

and the north portal exits in the Mount Royal area, an uphill south-to-north

run with a steep 4.8% grade. The tunnel ranges from 60 feet underground at

its deepest to 3 feet underground at its shallowest.

Transportation officials have long known that the possibility has existed for a

fire or other disaster to cause a significant problem in the Howard Street

Streets Crossing CBD Vehicle Occupancy Count Locations Location of Count Station with

Howard Street respect to Howard Street

Russell Street – Martin Luther King Blvd. 63,758 Southwest

MD 295

Pratt Street Martin Luther King Blvd. 9,731 West

West President Street 37,055 East

Lombard Street Martin Luther King Blvd. 9,928 West

West President Street 25,112 East

Baltimore Street Martin Luther King Blvd. 7,189 West

West President Street 13,502 East

Fayette Street Martin Luther King Blvd. 4,185 West

West Fallsway 12,929 East

Saratoga Street Martin Luther King Blvd. 5,562 West

Franklin Street Martin Luther King Blvd. 13,850 West

Orleans Street – E. Patterson Park Ave. 23,910 West

US 40 E St Paul Street 37,514 East

Mulberry Street Martin Luther King Blvd. 11,038 West

Madison Street E. Patterson Park Ave. 15,858 West

Chase Street E. Guilford Ave. 4,053 East

Preston Street E. Patterson Park Ave. 4,649 West

West Fallsway 6,916 East

Mt. Royal Ave S. Lafayette Street 16,722 Northwest

Source: Baltimore Metropolitan Council

Table 3. Howard Street Cross Streets and Average Daily Traffic
7

Tunnel. An article published in the Baltimore Sun on July 19, 20011 , contains a

1985 quote from an unidentified federal transportation safety official who

observed “...the problem would be getting in there to fight the fire... If you

had an explosion, fire would shoot out of both ends like a bazooka.”

Notwithstanding this potential for disaster, the tunnel’s freight traffic has

slowly increased over recent years as CSX and Conrail have sought to divert

freight traffic away from Amtrak’s former PRR Northeast Corridor. Published

reports vary on the number of freight trains that pass through the tunnel on a

daily basis, but the most reliable available estimate is contained in an article

published in RailFan and Railroad magazine in November 2001. The article,

titled “Fire in the Hole”, estimates that 28 to 32 trains pass through the tunnel

each day, carrying a mixture of hotshots (nonstop freight trains), mixed

freights, and cross-town transfers.

1.4 Description of the Event

At 3:04 p.m. on Wednesday, July 18, 2001, the 60-car CSX freight train L412-16

entered the Howard Street Tunnel in downtown Baltimore. The train, being

pulled by three engines, carried 31 loaded and 29 empty cars, with a mix of

freight that included empty trash containers, paper products, plywood, soy oil,

and several tanker cars. At 3:07 p.m., the engineers heard a grinding noise, saw

the air pressure in the brake line drop to nothing, then felt the train lurch and

come to a rough stop.

The engineers tried to radio the CSX dispatcher to give notice that the train

had stopped in the tunnel, but they were in a dead zone in the tunnel and

were not able to get through on the radio. At 3:15 p.m., one of the engineers

used his cell phone to reach the train master and told him that the train had

come to a stop in the tunnel.

Noticing that the fumes from the diesel engines were growing worse (the

engineers did not know at that point that several cars had derailed and a fire

had broken out), the engineers shut down the two rear engines, uncoupled all

three engines from the train, and exited the tunnel at the north portal. They

cleared the tunnel at 3:27 p.m. and were then able to reach the CSX dispatcher

in Jacksonville, FL. They notified him that the train had come to an unexpected

stop in the tunnel. The engineers had initially planned to reenter the tunnel to

determine what the problem was, but noticed that the smoke from the tunnel

had not abated and was increasing—evidence of a fire somewhere among the

cars (see Figure 4). The engineers then reviewed the bill of lading and saw the

words “hazardous materials.” They radioed Jacksonville and asked the

dispatcher to notify Baltimore City that not only had a train derailed in the

tunnel and caught fire, but that the load carried hazardous materials.

1 See Baltimore Sun “Hidden Historical Asset of Baltimore”, July 19, 2001, by Scott Calvert.
8

Baltimore City firefighters received

notification of the event somewhere

between 3:35 p.m. and 4:15 p.m.2 and were

given the bill of lading upon arrival on site.

After reviewing the bill of lading and

assessing the scene, it became apparent to

the Fire Department crew that the freight

train was carrying a variety of hazardous

materials (including tripropylene and

hydrochloric acid) and that several of the cars

carrying these materials were threatened by

the fire. At 6:15 p.m., emergency response

efforts were further complicated when a

break in a 40-inch water main located under

the intersection of Howard and Lombard

Streets, almost directly above the site of the

derailment, spilled water into the tunnel and

onto the street. These events occurred as the

City of Baltimore was preparing for both the evening rush hour and the

second game of a baseball doubleheader at Oriole Park at Camden Yards. The

City thus found itself facing a potentially catastrophic situation at peak

demand hours for transportation services.

The exact location of the fire in the tunnel was not determined until about

5:00 a.m. the following morning. It was assumed, and confirmed, that the fire

had occurred in the vicinity of the water main break. The water main break

was almost directly above the heart of the fire. A manhole on Howard Street

approximately 50 feet from the water main break, was found to have a

connection to the tunnel. Firefighters entered the manhole and gained access

to an alcove in the tunnel near the fire. This became the firefighters’ primary

access route for fighting the fire. Figure 5, adapted from the Baltimore Sun,

provides a realistic display of how firefighters used the manhole access to fight

the fire.

As the fire suppression efforts continued, an assessment was made of the

actual situation in the tunnel. As reported RailFan and Railroad magazine3 , “it

was determined that a derailment had in fact occurred, with a break of 300 to

400 feet between the 45th car, the first car off the track, and the 46th through

60th car, with cars 46 through 54 derailed. The 52nd car, the loaded tank of

tripropylene, was the major source of the fire...and the 53rd car, a tank car, was

slowly leaking its load of hydrochloric acid (HCl). Car 54, another HCl tank, was

derailed but not leaking. Car 55, which carried the tank of ethyl hexylphthalate,

3

 Ibid, page 46.

2 Published reports have listed two different times regarding when the Fire Department was notified. CSX

records indicate that notification was provided at 3:35 PM, while Fire Department records indicate that

notification was received at 4:15 PM. See RailFan and Railroad, November 2001, “Fire in the Hole”, p. 44.

Figure 4. Smoke Billows from the Tunnel’s South Portal,

with the Baltimore City Skyline in the Background.

Source: Baltimore Sun
9

was still on the rails.” Firefighting efforts were hampered by the fact that

several carloads of paper, pulpwood, and plywood were also burning, creating

intense heat in the tunnel.

Firefighting efforts continued through Saturday, July 21, and three rail cars

(boxcars of paper and plywood) were removed from the tunnel on Sunday,

July 22. The removal of these three cars, and the extinguishing of their still

flaming contents, ended the major fire suppression effort. In addition, the

water main break was also finally stopped on 22. At mid-afternoon on the 22nd,

an inspection of the tunnel revealed no significant structural damage, and on

the morning of July 23, the final two cars were removed from the tunnel. At

7:45 a.m. on July 24, the tunnel was cleared for traffic following an additional

round of inspections the day before, and at 8:58 a.m., the first post-fire train

passed through the tunnel.

Figure 5. Attacking an Underground Fire

Source: Baltimore Sun
10

2.1 Pre-Event

Baltimore City and the State of Maryland share responsibility for the operation

of transportation facilities located within the City. The Baltimore Department

of Public Works has responsibility for all surface roads within the City,

including non-interstate routes and I-83, I-295, and MD Highway 40, whereas

the Maryland Department of Transportation (MDOT) modal administrations

are responsible for most of the interstate network, transit, and the Port

of Baltimore.

The Maryland Transit Administration (MTA) operates all transit services in the

City, including bus, light rail, heavy rail (Metro), and commuter rail (MARC). The

Maryland Port Authority (MPA) is responsible for operating the Port of

Baltimore, and the Maryland Aviation Administration (MAA) operates BWI

Airport. The Maryland Transportation Authority (MdTA) owns and maintains

the I-95 approaches to the Fort McHenry Tunnel, from Caton Avenue on the

south side to the northern Baltimore City line, including I-395 into Baltimore’s

Camden Yards and Inner Harbor areas. (The MdTA is also responsible for other

toll facilities in the state, including the Baltimore Harbor Tunnel and its

approaches (I-895) and the Francis Scott Key Bridge on the southeastern

section of I-695 (the Baltimore Beltway.) Regional and district offices of federal

transportation agencies are also located in Baltimore and at BWI Airport.

The City’s Office of Emergency Management is responsible for handling

emergencies and incident management within Baltimore. State agencies do

not have jurisdictional authority within the city but frequently work closely

with city agencies in emergency and incident management situations. Both

the State and the City maintain emergency response plans and at times have

conducted joint practice exercises, in particular in the area of hazardous

materials response.

2.2 Day of the Event

The initial challenges facing the City once the fire was detected were:

◆ Identifying the exact location of the fire in the tunnel.

◆ Determining the potential environmental impact from the burning

cars containing hazardous materials.

◆ Determining whether downtown Baltimore would need to be

evacuated.

The problem of identifying the potential environmental impact was resolved

by the Maryland Department of the Environment’s (MDE) Emergency

Response Division (ERD). Following a review of the bill of lading provided by

the CSX engineers, the ERD personnel contacted members of the South

Baltimore Industrial Mutual Aid Plan (SBIMAP). SBIMAP is a voluntary

consortium of manufacturers, emergency response personnel, Baltimore City

environmental and emergency management personnel, and MDE, focused on

2.0 Event Response
11

the South Baltimore industrial area. The consortium’s purpose is to plan for

and respond to incidents such as the Howard Street Tunnel fire where

hazardous materials and potential environmental incidents are involved.

SBIMAP was established in 1982 and is largely funded by industry.

SBIMAP member companies provided two chemists, who quickly determined

that the hazardous materials involved in the fire would not, in fact, either

individually or in combination, present a serious environmental hazard. While

MDE immediately initiated air and water quality monitoring in order to detect

any leaks or discharges, a determination was made quickly that evacuating the

downtown area would not be necessary.

The search for the exact location of the fire was hampered by smoke and the

intense heat generated by the conflagration. The tunnel’s 4.8% grade between

the south and north portals created a chimney effect that made entry into the

tunnel problematic. Initial fire suppression efforts were unable to penetrate

very far into the tunnel, but the water main break flooded the tunnel and

helped to control the fire. By July 19, firefighters were able to identify the

location of the fire.

2.3 Summary Time Line – July 18, 2001

Table 4 presents a brief summary of the events of July 18, 2001, involving the

Howard Street tunnel train derailment and transportation and emergency

management responses. (A more in-depth chronology is included in

Appendix A).

Time Elapsed Time Event/Action Taken

3:07 p.m. 0 hrs. 0 mins. 60-car CSX freight train carrying hazardous materials derails in the Howard Street

Tunnel in Baltimore, Maryland.

3:15 p.m. 0 hrs. 8 mins. Engineers detect fire in 1.7-mile-long tunnel.

3:25 p.m. 0 hrs. 18 mins. Engineers decouple engines from burning train, exit from tunnel.

4:15 p.m. 1 hr. 8 mins. Baltimore City Fire Department arrives as first responder, assumes incident

command responsibilities. CSX engineers provide bill of lading indicating derailed

train is carrying hazardous materials.

4:15 p.m. 1 hr. 8 mins. CSX Transportation notifies Maryland Department of the Environment, Emergency

Response Division (MDE ERD), of the derailment of train cars carrying hazardous

materials.

4:20 p.m. 1 hr. 13 mins. MDE ERD personnel arrive on the scene, contact the National Transportation Safety

Board, Baltimore City Fire Department Battalion Chief 6, and Baltimore City Fire

Department hazardous materials (HazMat) coordinator. Units begin assisting city

personnel with analysis of train documentation and potential hazardous products.

MARC commuter rail, MTA’s Central Light Rail Line, and rail freight movement are

disrupted by the tunnel street fire. MTA initiates a bus bridge to bring MARC

passengers from Dorsey Station south of Baltimore to the City.

Table 4. July 18, 2001, Time Line
12

2.4 Agencies Involved with Incident

Response

The response to the Howard Street Tunnel fire involved multiple agencies from

the City of Baltimore, the Maryland State Government, and the Federal

Government. The Baltimore City Fire Department was the first responder to

arrive at the scene of the tunnel fire, and under established incident

management procedures, assumed responsibility for incident command. The

Baltimore City Fire Department Chief assumed the role of Incident

Commander. Additional incident response support was provided by the

Baltimore City Police Department, the Baltimore City Department of Public

Works, the Maryland Departments of Transportation and Environment, the

Chief of the City Fire Department requests that all major roads (I-395, I-83, US-40)

into Baltimore City be closed.

4:30 p.m. 1 hr. 23 mins. Baltimore City Police Department and Department of Public Works start rerouting

downtown traffic away from the scene using signs and physical barriers; Howard

Street and all streets crossing over the Howard Street Tunnel are closed.

Interstate highways I-395 northbound and I-83 southbound are closed to traffic

trying to enter the City.

4:35 p.m. 1 hr. 28 mins. MDE requests consulting chemist assistance through South Baltimore Industrial

Mutual Aid Plan (SBIMAP). MDE advises Baltimore City HazMat of potential

hydrogen fluoride (HF) vapor hazard due to thermal degradation of fluorosilicic

acid; identifies specialized treatment needed for HF exposures.

4:45 p.m. 1 hr. 38 mins. Baltimore City Emergency Management contacts MDE to report that city officials

are preparing to sound siren system to notify nearby residents to shelter in place.

MDE concurs with shelter in place order.

4:53 p.m. 1 hr. 46 mins. MDE contacts U.S. Coast Guard and requests assistance. MDE and SBIMAP

personnel conduct air quality monitoring along Howard Street corridor and in the

vicinity of the Mt. Royal Station.

5:00 p.m. 1 hr. 53 mins. U.S. Coast Guard closes Inner Harbor to boat traffic.

Orioles’ office workers are told to leave B & O Warehouse.

5:45 p.m. 2 hrs. 38 mins. Civil defense warning sirens sound.

6:15 p.m. 3 hrs. 8 mins. Water from the broken water main located under the Howard and Lombard Street

intersections surfaces and floods the street.

MTA closes Metro’s State Center station due to smoke entering the station via

subway tunnel and station ventilation fans.

8-9:00 p.m. 4 hrs. 53 mins. Roads and entrance/exit ramps on major thoroughfares into the City reopen

sporadically.

11:00 p.m. 7 hrs. 53 mins. Baltimore City Fire Department Command Staff direct primary Command Post

operations to be relocated to the vicinity of Camden Yards stadium complex.

Water is cut off by BCDPW at the point of the water main break.

Time Elapsed Time Event/Action Taken

Table 4. July 18, 2001, Time Line (continued)
13

Jurisdiction Modal Administration Role in Incident Area of Concern

or Agency Response

Baltimore City Fire Department Incident command Fire suppression

Police Department Traffic enforcement Closing of streets crossing over the

Howard Street Tunnel.

Department of Public Works Infrastructure repairs Repairs to water main and street surface

Traffic management at Howard and Lombard Streets.

Traffic control in Baltimore City.

Office of Emergency Interagency coordination Media Information

Management Public information

Maryland Headquarters Coordination of DOT Working with Baltimore Department of

Department of response activities Public Works (DPW) to establish a plan on

Transportation how to repair the infrastructure damage

once the fire was extinguished (procure

ment issues – having a contractor in place

to do repairs, developing a plan on how

repair work would be implemented once

the “green light” would be received, plans

for site survey, traffic diversion plan, etc.).

State Highway Administration Traffic management on Through Coordinated Highways Action

interstate system Response Team (CHART) system, posted

notices on fixed and mobile VMS advising

that major routes into the City were closed.

Mass Transit Administration Rail and bus transit Light rail and bus operations.

operations in Baltimore Establishing bus bridge between north and

City south segments of light rail.

MARC operations.

METRO subway operations – tunnel

inspection.

Maryland Transportation Traffic management on Responsible for ensuring I-395 route into

Authority I-95 approaches to Fort Baltimore was closed off during initial

McHenry Tunnel; I-395 incident response activities.

Maryland Emergency Response Division Air quality Obtaining information on possible

Department of Water quality environmental impact of train fire (hazardous

the Environment Hazardous materials materials).

leaks/discharge Monitoring air and water quality in area around

the tunnel and the Inner Harbor.

Working with Coast Guard to contain leakag

into Inner Harbor.

Checking rail cars pulled from tunnel for

structural integrity.

Coordinating removal and disposal of

hazardous materials from the train.

Maryland Emergency Coordination of state Coordinating activities of state agencies.

Management Agency N/A government emergency Media relations and rumor control.

esponse and incident

management activities

U.S. Coast Guard US DOT Supported MDE Implementing waterway safety measures,

including closing of Inner Harbor.

Supporting hazardous material detection and

containment.

U.S. Environmental N/A Supported MDE Assisting with monitoring of air and water

Protection Agency quality.

Maryland Emergency Management Administration, the U.S. Environmental

Protection Agency, and the U.S. Coast Guard. The particular responsibilities of

each agency involved in responding to the tunnel fire are summarized in

 Table 5.

Table 5. Incident Response and Agency Responsibilities
14

In reporting on the impact of the Howard Street Tunnel fire, simply stating

statistics on street closings, estimates of traffic diverted, light rail disruptions,

and other quantitative indicators does not capture the emotional impact of

the event. As noted, it took several hours to identify the exact location of the

fire within the tunnel and to determine that the burning chemicals did not

pose a significant environmental threat to the City. In the meantime, however,

downtown workers were attempting to leave the City only to find all major

streets crossing Howard Street closed off, with limited information available

initially on alternative routes. Residents were advised to stay indoors and to

turn off their air conditioning to avoid smoke intake. The sounding of the civil

defense sirens at 5:45 p.m. only added to the confusion. Many residents did

not know why the sirens were being sounded, and instead of turning on radios

and televisions to obtain information on the crisis (the intent of the exercise),

called in to report malfunctioning sirens or to inquire why the sirens had been

sounded. The sirens were a relic of the Cold War era and had originally been

intended to signal that Baltimore was under attack. All of this occurred while

smoke billowed from both ends of the tunnel and the water main break at

Howard and Lombard streets flooded the surrounding area, further

complicating matters. In reviewing the following information on

transportation and other impacts, it is important to remember the context of

the event.

3.1 Short-Term Transportation Impacts –

July 18, 2001

The tunnel fire had an immediate impact on transportation services in

Baltimore City. Emergency responders were required to make a number of

decisions about how to handle evening rush hour and the evacuation of

Oriole Park at Camden Yards. In addition, the tunnel fire and water main break

seriously disrupted surface transportation operations within downtown

Baltimore. Specific actions that were taken, and specific short-term

transportation impacts resulting from the tunnel fire and water main break,

included:

◆ A request by the Incident Commander to close the major roadways into

the City. MD DOT contacted Maryland State Highway Administration

(MD SHA) State Operations Center, which handled road closures for I83 southbound, MD-295 (Baltimore-Washington Parkway) northbound,

and Route 40 east (inbound); and MdTA, which restricted access to I395 northbound. In addition to physically barricading entrance ramps

to the facilities, the closures included posting variable message signs

(VMSs) advising that in-bound routes to Baltimore were closed, as well

as highway advisory radio (HAR) messaging. The roadway system was

opened to traffic the following morning. Figure 6 shows the road

closures on July 18, 2001.

3.0 Event Impacts
15

◆ The closing of city streets in the vicinity of the tunnel, and the rerouting of

passenger, bus, and commercial vehicle traffic. The closing of Howard

Street and the surrounding area in essence cut Baltimore’s central

business district in half, closing off east-west traffic flows. The day of

the incident, drivers were trapped on gridlocked streets, and people

waited at curbs for buses diverted from their regular routes. However,

once traffic management procedures were put in place, the City was

cleared of traffic within two hours of normal rush hour times (8:00 p.m.

as compared to 6:00 p.m.). The MTA sent supervisors and other staff

into the streets to intercept buses and advise passengers of the delays.

In-bound buses were rerouted around the incident, or were sent back

on the return portion of their routes.

◆ During initial response to the fire, the closing of the Metro subway’s State

Center station (the station closest to fire) due to smoke accumulation.

Metro officials conducted an inspection of the tunnel running under

the Howard Street Tunnel and determined that no damage had been

incurred and were able to keep Metro running throughout the event.

State Center reopened on July 21, 2001, to help handle the crowds

attending the first Orioles game since the day of the incident. MTA

reports that there was no other disruption to Metro service during the

incident and that the system maintained normal operations.

Figure 6. Road Closures into Baltimore City
16

◆ The disruption of light rail service in the vicinity of the water main break.

MTA set up a bus bridge between the Patapsco and North Avenue

stations to convey passengers around the area in which service had

been disrupted. This service was initiated within an hour of the

discovery of the water main break, and continued throughout the time

needed for repairs to the water main and the light rail track. Two 8-

hour shifts were established, with eight buses running on each shift.

Buses departed from each terminus at 15-minute intervals. MTA

estimated that the bus bridge ridership was about 15,000 passengers

per day.

◆ The disruption of MARC commuter rail and Oriole game day service.

MARC trains were stopped at the Dorsey Station near BWI Airport, and

a bus bridge was set up by the MTA to bring passengers into the City.

The bus bridge was for July 18 only.

◆ The disruption of bus services. MTA officials indicated that disruptions

were systemwide. Bus routes crossing Howard Street were diverted or

the buses turned back on the return portion of a route prior to

reaching the normal endpoint; buses were pulled off routes to provide

the bus bridge services; routes not located in the vicinity of Howard

Street experienced delays due to unexpected congestion and traffic

patterns caused by the closing of Howard Street.

◆ The closing of the Inner Harbor to boat traffic by the U.S. Coast Guard. The

Maryland Department of the Environment set up booms in the Inner

Harbor to minimize the contamination from the chemicals seeping

from the leaking rail cars.

◆ The disruption of rail freight movement along the East Coast. The Howard

Street Tunnel is one of only two direct northeast-southeast direct

freight lines along the East Coast. Losing access to the tunnel required

CSX to divert or delay a significant portion of rail traffic along the

eastern seaboard. CSX issued an advisory that freight moving to and

from Chicago to Baltimore and Philadelphia had been rerouted

through Selkirk and South Kearny, NJ, with expected delays of 18 to 24

hours. Freight moving along the eastern seaboard from the Northeast

to Florida and other southern states was advised to expect delays of

24 to 36 hours. CSX was able to reroute six trains a day on Norfolk

Southern’s Hagerstown-Harrisburg-Reading corridor, including the

famous Tropicana “juice train” carrying Florida orange juice to the New

York–New Jersey market. However, this Norfolk Southern line is the

only other northeast-southeast direct freight line and it is operating at

near-full capacity. Freight rail traffic moving to points north of

Philadelphia that in normal circumstances would have used the tunnel

was instead diverted as far west as Ohio.
17

Baltimore City’s Department of Public Works adjusted traffic lights near the

Howard Street corridor and added parking restrictions aimed at improving

traffic flow downtown. According to the Baltimore Sun, Doris McGuigan, who

serves on the city’s emergency planning committee, was quoted as saying,

“They (Baltimore City police and other emergency responders) handled the

evacuation fine,” but communication with people driving into the city was less

successful. An example of this comes from a report from a journalist with the

Baltimore Sun, who was driving around the Beltway, trying to get back into the

city the evening of the incident. With all major roads into the city closed, he

reported having to wind through surface streets to make his way home.

Oriole Park at Camden Yards is located at the terminus of the MARC Camden

Line, which is also the point where I-395 enters downtown Baltimore streets.

Joe Foss, vice chairman and chief operating officer of the Baltimore Orioles

baseball team, estimated that 2,500 to 5,000 fans were at or around the

stadium, along with 2,000 employees, all of whom were evacuated (see Figure

7). A traffic enforcement officer at Conway and Sharp Streets was assigned to

divert traffic and pedestrians away from the stadium.

3.2 Medium-Term Transportation

Impacts – July 19-23, 2001

Suppression of and initial clean up from the tunnel fire took

approximately five days. All cars were removed from the tunnel

and inspected for damage, and all hazardous materials were offloaded and removed. The tunnel was inspected for structural

damage, and reopened to rail traffic on July 23. That same

Monday morning, when city and state employees returned to

work (after many employees took advantage of liberal leave on

Thursday and Friday), traffic utilizing I-395 to commute into

downtown Baltimore was backed up more than a mile on

northbound I-95. Street closures in the vicinity of Howard and

Lombard Streets caused MTA officials to divert 23 bus routes.

Light rail service continued to rely on buses to transport riders

between the Patapsco and North Avenue Station stops around

the section of track damaged by the water main break. For five

days following the incident, streets in the vicinity of the tunnel

and the

water main break remained closed, and all vehicle traffic was

diverted. On July 24, nearly all streets were opened to traffic. Only

a two-block stretch of Howard Street (around the intersection

with Lombard Street) and a portion of Lombard Street from

Sharp Street to Eutaw Street remained closed.

Commuters took advantage of Metro services to travel into

Baltimore during this time. Metro officials reported that ridership

Figure 7. Evacuating Orioles Park at the

Camden Yards Station on July 18, 2001

 Source: Baltimore Sun
18

on Monday, July 24, was 7,000 higher than normal. Metro officials also

provided service on Sunday, July 23 (Metro did not usually operate on Sundays

until a service change in September 2, 2001), with ridership of about 6,600

passengers.

While high-priority cargo found ways around Baltimore’s Howard Street

Tunnel the day of the fire, the East Coast rail network became increasingly

constrained with each day that the major north-south artery remained closed.

Freight trains were delayed, cancelled, or diverted hundreds of miles

throughout the mid-Atlantic states due to the blocked tunnel. In fact, CSX’s

entire system along the East Coast, and in the Midwest as far away as Ohio, was

affected by the bottleneck. The railroad received help from its chief

competitor, Norfolk Southern Corp; as some CSX trains were diverted onto

Norfolk Southern tracks. Other shipments were sent over alternate CSX tracks.

“We cooperate with each other when we have problems like this,” said Rob

Gould, a spokesman for CSX. Delayed trains were scattered throughout several

states. CSX reported that on July 19, eight trains that would have used the

tunnel were detouring through Cumberland, MD, and Youngstown, OH, five

through Hagerstown, MD and Harrisburg, PA, and five through Cleveland, OH,

and Albany, NY. In addition, 12 trains had been stopped in various yards and 3

trains had been cancelled. In addition, freight destined for the Port of

Baltimore, only a few miles east of the tunnel’s south portal, had to be either

held across the harbor from its destination or detoured via Philadelphia. When

the tunnel was reopened for traffic on July 24, much of the initial traffic

consisted of cross-town traffic. Through trains were diverted for much of the

next day.

MARC commuter rail service on the Camden Line was also disrupted until the

fire was suppressed. MARC service on the Camden Line was ended at Dorsey

Station, but there was not a significant decrease in ridership. Apparently, MARC

commuters took advantage of free parking at the Dorsey Station and chose

not to switch to other modes of transportation to reach Washington, DC.

3.3 Long-Term Transportation Impacts –

Days 6 through 55

The major long-term impact from the tunnel fire was on the Central Light Rail

Line. The light rail track in downtown Baltimore runs directly over the Howard

Street Tunnel and the water main. When the water main broke and the area

around the break collapsed, much of the foundation support for this section of

the light rail track was removed. The light rail track is embedded on a concrete

slab, but much of the fill underneath the slab was washed away or collapsed

(see Figure 8).

In order to gain access to the water main, the light rail track and the

supporting concrete slab had to be cut. Once the water main had been

repaired, the track itself had to be repaired and shored up, and the new
19

concrete slab had to cure. MTA also had to

determine if the area impacted by the water main

break remained solid under the light rail track. MTA

used ground-penetrating radar to determine if there

were substantial voids (holes or gaps) in the soil

below the track bed. Once the slab of concrete with

the embedded light rail was replaced, grout was

injected to ensure that any small holes were filled.

The slab is still being monitored monthly to

determine whether there is any shifting or

movement of the rail.

It should be noted that the closure of the Howard

Street portion of the Central Light Rail Line had an

unexpected, salutary benefit to the MTA. Light rail

managers had become increasingly concerned

about evidence that the vibration of the light rail

tracks against the concrete slab rail bed was

loosening the fasteners that affixed the track to the

slab. During the shut-down of the Howard Street

Corridor while repairs to the concrete slab were

effected, MTA’s engineering department

implemented a fix for the problem with the

fasteners: they inserted a resilient rubber boot between the rail and the slab

and installed fasteners designed to dampen the vibrations that were causing

the problem.

Completing repairs to the water main required 12 days, while

reconstruction of the light rail bed and tracks took 53 days.

During this time, the two-block area around Howard and

Lombard Streets remained closed (see Figure 9). MTA

continued to operate the bus bridge linking the north and

south segments of the light rail. Maintaining this bus bridge

required MTA to utilize close to 100% of available equipment.

MTA estimates that at any given time, 17% of its equipment is

out of service due to repairs and maintenance. During the

incident MTA utilized X% of its available resources4 .

Maintaining 100% use required constant monitoring of

schedules and reallocating buses as needed to support the

bus bridge from routes where service could be consolidated.

The MTA also had to shuffle driver schedules in order to

ensure that drivers maintained compliance with hours of

service regulations.

An additional impact on MTA operations was that the water

main break in essence cut the light rail line in half, and rolling

Figure 8. The Water Main Break

Figure 9. Closing Howard

and Lombard Streets

Source: Baltimore Sun

4

 We are waiting for accurate data from MTA.
20

stock located on the southern segment could not reach maintenance facilities.

MTA established a temporary maintenance facility at the Cromwell Street

Station. A service pit was dug under a storage rail, and equipment was brought

in from the maintenance facility.

Throughout this period, MTA was able to keep all light rail equipment

operational and did not have any drop in service levels. The MTA, however, did

realize a significant drop in light rail ridership, down about 50% from normal

levels to 15,000 passengers per day. MTA officials report that within two

months of the reopening of service, ridership was back to pre-tunnel fire

levels.

An additional impact resulting from the tunnel fire was the periodic closure of

the tunnel over a three-week period for maintenance, repair, and clean-up

activities. These closures did result in some delays for freight movement

through the tunnel, but were minimal when compared with the impact of the

actual event.

3.4 Other Impacts

3.4.1 Telecommunications

On the day of the event, Keynote Systems, an Internet performance company,

discovered significant Internet backbone slowdowns. Initially, the “Code Red”

virus was thought to be the cause of the problem, but then reports of the

Howard Street Tunnel fire were received. The cause of the problem was found

by identifying specific backbones experiencing slowdowns. The Howard Street

Tunnel houses an Internet pipe serving seven of the biggest US Internet

Information Service Providers (ISPs), which were identified as those ISPs

experiencing backbone slowdowns. The fire burned through the pipe and

severed fiber optic cable used for voice and data transmission, causing

backbone slowdowns for ISPs such as Metromedia Fiber Network, Inc.;

WorldCom, Inc.; and PSINet, Inc. Reports were received from up and down the

East Coast about service disruptions and delays (for example, the Hearst

Corporation lost e-mail and its main links to its Web pages on the Internet),

and even the U.S. embassy in Lusaka, Zambia, in Africa experienced problems

with sending and receiving e-mail.

In addition to the more severe Internet problems, the flood resulting from the

water main break disrupted phone service to two downtown office towers in

Baltimore City and caused other temporary communications problems within

the City.

Both WorldCom and MFN had fully redundant service restored by July 20.

WorldCom used its own crews while MFN contracted its work to LAI

Construction Services, with the project managed by Bechtel

Telecommunications. Some 24,000 feet of cable were laid to create a fully

redundant MFN system, and service was restored within 36 hours.
21

3.4.2 Business Impact

According to an article published in the Baltimore Sun, merchants along

Howard Street reported that business dropped 80 percent in the five days that

Howard Street and east-west streets were closed to cars, buses, and light rail

(see Figure 10).

CSX reimbursed businesses for losses, but the burst water main that kept light

rail out of service for weeks cut foot traffic at a time when many renovation

and new construction projects had been initiated in an effort to revive Howard

Street and the western part of downtown Baltimore.5 In addition, the

Baltimore Orioles cancelled three games due to the tunnel fire at an estimated

per-game cost of $1.5 to $2.0 million in revenues. An additional cost of the

cancelled games was the loss of spending by fans at restaurants, parking

facilities, and stores in the area surrounding the stadium, as well as the loss to

the State of Maryland of sales tax and other tax revenue.

5

 Calvert, Scott “For Howard Street Rough Road”, Baltimore Sun, July 29, 2001

Figure 10. A Vacant Howard Street

in the Days after the Fire

Source: Baltimore Sun
22

4.1 Planning and Preparedness

A consistent theme identified in the interview process was that the agencies

involved in responding to the Howard Street Tunnel fire had effective plans in

place and were prepared to respond to an emergency. Emergency response

personnel were on site literally within minutes of the fire being reported, and

incident command procedures were established promptly. What complicated

efforts was that these agencies had not planned for a situation where both a

hazardous materials spill and a fire occurred in the same incident, which

created some difficulties with establishing response priorities. For example, the

Baltimore City Fire Department’s main priority was fire suppression, while

MDE’s priority was determining the potential health and environmental threat

posed by hazardous materials burning in an enclosed area. MDE needed time

to determine what the potential hazards were, and what, if any,

accommodations would need to be made in fire suppression (e.g., use of

particular chemicals, what materials not to use, what type of equipment was

needed, etc), while the Fire Department felt it important to commence fire

suppression efforts immediately.

The agencies interviewed all stressed the importance of ongoing training and

practice as the key to developing and maintaining incident response

capabilities.

Notwithstanding the generally positive responses of individuals interviewed

with respect to how well existing plans supported the emergency response

efforts for the Howard Street Tunnel Fire, Baltimore City officials have

acknowledged the need to update and improve the City’s hazardous materials

incident plan. The major gaps in the existing emergency plan are the lack of

any provision on responding to an incident involving chemicals carried by

train or truck and the lack of any mention of the Howard Street Tunnel.

Baltimore City Mayor Martin O’Malley was quoted in the Baltimore Sun as

saying, “It is not a question of if but when...Baltimore will again be confronted

with comparable challenges” and that the Fire Department needed to answer

fundamental questions about the crisis, including, “Were we adequately

prepared to respond to the crisis?”6 Mayor O’Malley has instructed emergency

planners to conduct a comprehensive review of the plan, and according to

Baltimore City Fire Chief Hector Torres, the City will seek Federal-funding

assistance to update the plan and pay for emergency response improvements.

4.2 Institutional Coordination

The agencies responding to the incident represented three levels of

government—local, state, and Federal. Agencies from Baltimore City, the State

of Maryland, and the Federal Government do not typically work together on a

single incident, and had not established the informal relationships and

4.0 Findings

6

 See Dewar, Heather and others “Accident Plan Leaves City Unprepared”, Baltimore Sun, July 26, 2001.
23

networks that are frequently identified as the key to successful incident

response. The number and type of agencies involved also complicated the

response efforts.

These circumstances notwithstanding, institutional coordination in general

worked well. The State agencies involved in the response efforts had wellestablished working groups, and proactively sought out counterparts at the

City level to offer assistance. An example of this was the effort by MDOT

personnel to work with City Department of Public Works staff to plan how the

water main break would be repaired once the water flow was stopped—

identifying what type of contractor services would be needed, acquiring

necessary legal and procurement waivers to obtain services quickly,

identifying potential sources of emergency and disaster relief funding, and

other similar planning activities. An additional example occurred when the

MTA provided the City Fire Department with specialized equipment needed to

remove the train cars from the tunnel.

4.3 Guiding Priority

As indicated previously, the tunnel fire created a unique situation where

agency functions at times seemed to be at cross-purposes. The initial response

to the incident quickly established at least three competing guiding

priorities—fire suppression, maintaining transportation mobility, and

containment of a potential environmental hazard. With respect to

transportation mobility, the priority was to restore transportation

infrastructure and services and to ensure movement of people out of the area

impacted by the event.

This incident demonstrates the changing nature of incident response – first

responders (fire fighters) initially moved into the tunnel, but then had to delay

response until MDE, EPA, and CSX identified the chemical contents of trapped

cars and determined the appropriate response. The prompt response by MDE

in identifying the potential environmental impact of the fire in the cars

containing hazardous materials helped to resolve the differences between this

priority and the transportation and fire suppression priorities.

4.4 Communications

In general, communications between responding agencies were not as

effective as might be desired. This was due in large part to the differences in

guiding priorities as well as the fact that the Incident Commander was initially

concerned only about fire suppression. The MTA helped to resolve this by

providing a mobile command post with state-of-the-art communications

capabilities that were used by all parties.

An additional communications area where interviewees identified a need for

improvement was in the notification process. Many responding agencies first
24

heard of the incident via the media, and implemented emergency response

plans based on these media reports. Agency to agency notification procedures

could have been better managed.

The one area where communications were relatively successful was public

information. The City and the State agencies each assigned public information

officers (PIOs) to handle all press inquiries, and regular reports were provided

to the media. This proved particularly effective in providing information to the

public about the absence of a severe environmental hazard due to the fire, and

helped significantly with rumor control. The PIOs were able to track down

rumors, obtain whatever information was needed to clarify or address a

particular rumor, and get this information directly to the media.

The media also provided a valuable service in providing information about the

crisis. Local radio and television news teams provided regular reports, and

worked cooperatively with the PIOs to distribute information on road closures,

alternate routes, and other related information. The MTA cited as examples of

the effectiveness of media support the wide-spread reporting that Metro was

not closed as a result of the fire and the opening of Metro service on Sunday,

July 23.

4.5 Role of Advanced Technology

The most significant contribution from advanced technology came in the use

of VMS and Highway Advisory Radio (HAR) to provide information to travelers

on the closing of roadways into the City on the day of the event. Maryland’s

CHART is a state-of-the-art system, and the State was able to post messages

that covered the portions of the Interstate Highway system impacted by the

incident.

Notices about the event were posted on CHART’s web site. As can be seen in

Figure 11, the web site experienced a significant spike in hits on the day of and

the two days immediately following the event.

Howard Street Tunnel and Following Week's 

Hits on CHART Web Site

0

5,000

10,000

15,000

20,000

25,000

30,000

35,000

40,000

Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri

Hits

7/16/2001 - 7/20/2001

7/23/2001 - 7/27/2001

Figure 11. Hits on CHART Web SIte

Source: Baltimore Sun
25

Interviewees stated that NEXTEL Direct Connect (digital two-way radio) was

the most effective communications system available at the site. Cellular

telephones were not as reliable, in particular on the day of the event, and

experienced circuit overload. Many of the State personnel involved in the

response had been provided with NEXTEL equipment by their agencies.

4.6 System Reliability and Redundancy

The involvement of City and State agency personnel guaranteed some

redundancy in systems simply because agencies with similar responsibilities

and functions were involved. An example is the presence of both the

Baltimore City Office of Emergency Management and the Maryland

Emergency Management Agency.

The agencies also proved capable of handling unexpected situations, such as

the water main break and the disruption of MARC services. In both instances,

MTA was able to establish a bus bridge to keep service operating and to

prevent passengers from being stranded.

Where system redundancy was a significant problem was the extensive

rerouting of freight traffic along the eastern seaboard due to the closing of the

tunnel.

4.7 Environmental Considerations

The events of July 18 and the tunnel fire had the potential to be a catastrophic

environmental event for the City of Baltimore. While the environmental impact

of the tunnel fire in the end was minimal, thanks in part to the prompt

response of SBIMAP in determining the potential dangers caused by the

mixing of the chemicals on the train, the tunnel fire does highlight the

potential for an environmental catastrophe resulting from a rail incident

involving hazardous materials. In fact, the Howard Street Tunnel fire has been

cited by a number of environmental groups to illustrate the potential dangers

involved in the transport of nuclear waste materials to the Yucca Mountain site

in Nevada.

A report prepared by Radioactive Waste Management Associates (RWMA)7

used the Howard Street Tunnel fire to demonstrate, on a hypothetical basis,

what might have occurred had nuclear waste been part of the cargo. Under

current Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulations, a cask containing nuclear

waste (spent nuclear fuel or high-level radioactive waste) must be able to

withstand an engulfing fire for 30-minutes at 1,475 degrees Fahrenheit. The

Baltimore Sun has reported that the fire reached temperatures as high as 1,500

degrees Fahrenheit, and burned out of control for a period of approximately

24 hours.

7

 Lamb, Martin, and Marvin Resnikoff, “Radiological Consequences of Severe Rail Accidents Involving Spent

Nuclear Fuel Shipments to Yucca Mountain: Hypothetical Baltimore Rail Tunnel Fire Involving SNF”.

Radioactive Waste Management Associates, NY, NY, September 2001.
26

The RWMA study used the Department of Energy’s computer models to

determine the impact of a severe high-level radioactive waste transport

accident based on the Howard Street Tunnel fire. The study estimated that the

release of radiation in Baltimore City from such a catastrophic event would

cost multiple billions of dollars to clean up and would cause 115 latent cancer

fatalities.

The State of Nevada’s web site includes a listing of rail transportation routes

that are projected by the Department of Energy as possible routes for

shipment of nuclear waste to Yucca Mountain. The routes listed for Maryland

for shipment of spent nuclear fuel from the Constellation Energy Group’s

Calvert Cliffs nuclear plant located on the western shore of the Chesapeake

Bay in Calvert County include the same CSX railway trackage that experienced

the train tunnel fire. Thus, while the RWAA analysis was hypothetical, the

analysis, when viewed in the context of an actual tunnel fire and the planned

routing of nuclear waste shipments, does demonstrate the potential dangers

facing the State of Maryland (and other states) from the shipment of nuclear

waste, and other hazardous materials. An additional consideration is that the

proposed Western Maryland route is the CSX line used for the MARC

Brunswick, MD, to Washington, DC, commuter service.

4.8 Role of the Private Sector

The assistance provided by SBIMAP volunteers in identifying the chemicals on

the train and determining that the fire did not represent a potential

environmental catastrophe was one of the key points in responding

successfully to the crisis. Once this assessment was made, an appropriate

containment strategy was implemented to handle the leaking chemicals. More

importantly, the PIOs were in turn able to inform the media that no

environmental catastrophe was imminent and to ensure that this information

was transmitted to the general public. In addition, CSX offered the services of

its contractors to help with fire suppression and removal of cars from the

tunnel. This level of private-sector cooperation and support played a critical

role in ensuring successful incident response.
27

The Howard Street Tunnel fire represented a major transportation-related

incident that had the potential for catastrophic impacts on the local, regional,

and national levels. Major damage to the Howard Street Tunnel could have

had substantial adverse effects on freight movement throughout the East

Coast and beyond; the MTA’s Central Light Rail Line was disrupted for a period

of nearly two months; and potentially serious problems could have resulted

for a variety of other local and regional transportation facilities. During the

incident, the utilization of an integrated Incident Management System

approach to the fire and associated occurrences resulted in effective

management of the scene, the fire suppression effort, and the containment

and mitigation of hazardous materials involved. Furthermore, participants in

the incident pointed out the following “lessons learned” that were imparted in

the course of the event:

◆ Close relationships are essential for building confidence in collective

capabilities to do the job right. All interviewees stressed that

establishing a network between agencies, so that responders know

whom to contact, is critical for ensuring coordinated and effective

incident response.

◆ Little could be done to improve the transportation situation

immediately after the consequences of the water main break became

evident. MTA responded promptly and effectively, but the flooding of

downtown streets coupled with the closure of cross streets over

Howard Street created an impassable situation. The closure of major

inbound thoroughfares to allow gridlocked downtown streets to clear

was, in retrospect, an effective strategy for managing transportation

impacts.

◆ The problems with communications were routine. The interviewees

indicated that enough experienced personnel who understood the

importance of good communications were involved in the response to

the fire that appropriate processes for exchanging information were

implemented.

◆ Once the key issue of potential environmental hazards had been

resolved, incident response activities were coordinated and

implemented using standard incident response procedures and

command structures. This approach allowed responders to operate

within a well-understood and well-rehearsed framework that has been

tested in a wide variety of situations, with positive results.

The Howard Street Tunnel event does, however, raise a number of difficult yet

timely public policy issues that jurisdictions need to consider in planning for

incident management and response:

1. Transportation of Hazardous Materials – Determining the balance

between the public’s “need to know” and the potential for

compromising security

5.0 Conclusions
28

Officials interviewed for this case study indicated that little

information is provided on the movement of hazardous materials by

rail, truck, or ship. While hazardous material cars carry warning

placards, these indicate the type of threat posed by the hazardous

material, not the precise nature of the material being transported. No

one has responsibility for monitoring the types and quantities of

chemicals passing through Baltimore (or any other urban area).

Balancing this concern about providing information on hazardous

materials movement is the issue of not creating unnecessary public

panic. Providing this information has the potential to cause extensive

public concern as to whether or not such materials should be

transported through urban areas, making it difficult or expensive to

move materials needed for industry and other end users. Simply

shifting hazardous materials shipments to rural areas may actually

increase the risk of a major incident, as rural areas often lack the

infrastructure and resources needed to respond rapidly and effectively

to chemical emergencies.

Providing this information also raises security concerns. In particular,

the tragic events of 9/11 have heightened sensitivities to and

awareness of the dangers of hazardous materials being used for

sabotage and terrorist purposes. Information that is provided on

hazardous materials movement needs to be provided in such a way

that security is not compromised.

Officials responsible for emergency management and response will

need to find the appropriate balance between these competing issues.

2. The Need for Redundant Systems

The massive tie-ups in freight movement along the East Coast as a

result of the fire demonstrated that the rail freight system is at or near

capacity and lacks redundancy and back-up systems. This is not an

issue that can be easily resolved, but does demonstrate the

importance of identifying chokepoints and redundant systems (to the

extent feasible) that can be used to compensate for a major

transportation system disruption.

Transportation system right-of-ways are increasingly being used for

the placement of fiber optic cable. The disruption to the Internet as the

result of the fire, however, demonstrates the potential for damage that

can result from collocating cable along transportation routes where

there is the potential for catastrophic incidents. Planning for

redundancy in communications systems is critical to ensure that a

transportation-related incident does not in turn disrupt

communication systems and infrastructure.
29

3. The Need for Improved Planning and Communications

The shortcomings in Baltimore’s emergency response plan (the lack of

any provision for responding to an accident involving chemicals

carried by train or truck, and the absence of any mention of the

Howard Street Tunnel) highlight additional concerns that jurisdictions

need to address. Jurisdictions need to ensure that such plans identify

all potential hazards for their particular area, and that a response is

formulated. Jurisdictions should also assess all infrastructure elements

to identify potential hazards and plan accordingly.

An additional consideration for jurisdictions is to identify incidents

that may require responses from multiple agencies (or jurisdictions) or

may have multiple guiding priorities. As has been noted, the

emergency response to the Howard Street Tunnel fire at times was

hampered by lack of coordination and communication between City

and State agencies that did not have well established relationships

and also did not have a history of working together in responding to

incidents. In addition, the differing guiding priorities of the

respondents created some conflict as to what should be done first in

managing the incident scene. Jurisdictions would benefit from

identifying such possible scenarios, and ensuring that agencies likely

to be involved in such a response have a prior agreement on how

response priorities will be coordinated, what each agency’s

responsibilities are, and who the points of contact are for each agency.

4. The Need to Identify All Available Resources – Public and Private

The roles of SBIMAP and the CSX contractors in identifying the

potential environmental hazards and supporting fire suppression

efforts were critical in responding to the tunnel fire. Jurisdictions

should identify such resources and reach out proactively to plan how

assistance might be provided in an emergency. This should include

establishing working relationships and obtaining agreements on what

types of assistance might be provided, establishing notification

procedures, and identifying points of contact.
30
31

July 18, 2001 – Day 1

3:04 p.m. 60-car CSX freight train L412-16 being pulled by three engines, carried 31

loaded and 29 empty cars, with a mix of freight that included empty trash

containers, paper products, plywood, soy oil, and several tanker cars enters the

Howard Street Tunnel in downtown Baltimore.

3:07 p.m. Train unexpectedly comes to stop in tunnel.

3:15 p.m. Engineers notify CSX dispatcher via cell phone that train is stopped in tunnel.

3:27 p.m. Engineers decouple engines and exit from tunnel. Increasing smoke provides

evidence train is burning. CSX dispatcher notified via radio that train is on fire,

and that cargo contains hazardous materials.

3:35/4:15 p.m. Baltimore City Fire Department arrives as first responder and assumes incident

command responsibilities. CSX Engineers provide bill of lading indicating

derailed train is carrying hazardous materials.

4:11 p.m. CSX Transportation notifies Maryland Department of the EnvironmentEmergency Response Division (MDE ERD) of the derailment of train cars

carrying hazardous materials.

4:15 p.m. The Baltimore City Department of Health contacts the Maryland Emergency

Management Agency (MEMA).

4:20 p.m. MDE ERD personnel arrive on scene, contact National Transportation Safety

Board, Baltimore City Fire Department Battalion Chief 6, and Baltimore City Fire

Department hazardous materials (HazMat) coordinator. Units begin assisting

city personnel with analysis of train documentation and potential hazard

products.

MARC commuter rail, MTA’s Central Light Rail Line, and rail freight movement

are disrupted by tunnel street fire. MTA initiates bus bridge to bring MARC

passengers from Dorsey Station, south of Baltimore, to the City.

Chief of the City Fire Department requests that all major roads (I-395, I-83, US40) into Baltimore City be closed.

4:30 p.m. Baltimore City Police Department and Department of Public Works start

rerouting downtown traffic away from the scene using signs and physical

barriers; Howard Street and all streets crossing over the Howard Street tunnel

are closed.

Interstate highways I-395 northbound and I-83 southbound are closed to

traffic trying to enter the City.

4:35 p.m. MDE requests consulting chemist assistance through South Baltimore

Industrial Mutual Aid Plan (SBIMAP). MDE advises Baltimore City HazMat of

potential hydrogen fluoride (HF) vapor hazard due to thermal degradation of

fluorosilicic acid; identifies specialized treatment needed for HF exposures.

Appendix A. Detailed Chronology
32

4:45 p.m. Baltimore City Emergency Management contacts MDE to report that city

officials are preparing to sound siren system to notify nearby residents to

shelter in place. MDE concurs with shelter in place order.

4:50 p.m. Initial air monitoring by MDE and Baltimore City HAZMAT commences at Mt.

Royal using pH paper, photoionization detectors, and multigas instruments.

MDE directed to begin air monitoring in the vicinity of Camden Yards.

4:53 p.m. MDE contacts U.S. Coast Guard and requests assistance. MDE and SBIMAP

personnel conduct air quality monitoring along Howard Street Corridor and in

the vicinity of the Mt. Royal Station.

5:00 p.m. U.S. Coast Guard closes Inner Harbor to boat traffic.

Orioles’ office workers are told to leave B & O Warehouse.

5:45 p.m. Civil Defense warning sirens sound.

6:15 p.m. Water from the broken water main located under the Howard and Lombard

Street intersections surfaces and floods the street.

MTA closes Metro’s State Center station due to smoke entering the station via

subway tunnel and station ventilation fans.

7:15 p.m. MTA initiates bus bridge connecting north and south segments of light rail

between Patapsco station and North Avenue.

Exact location of fire is identified (near Howard and Lombard Street

intersection).

MDE, working with SBIMAP, determines that a catastrophic environmental

event is not likely to happen because of the train fire and Baltimore City

determines that an evacuation of the downtown area is not necessary.

8-9:00 p.m. Roads and entrance/exit ramps on major thoroughfares into the City reopen

sporadically.

8:30 p.m. MDE receives reports of odor and solids emanating from a storm drain outfall

near the Harbor Place complex at Pratt and Light Streets. Personnel are

dispatched from ERD Field Office with 1,000 feet of containment boom on a

trailer.

10:30 p.m. Containment boom in place around outfall. Dark solids and pronounced

“chemical” odor present. On-site personnel obtain water and product samples

and proceed to Mt. Royal office for analysis.

10:50 p.m. MDE visual inspection of sample indicates dark particulate/liquid mix floating

on the water. Photoionization detector readings are positive for presence of

volatile organic compounds.

11:00 p.m. Baltimore City Fire Department Command Staff direct primary Command Post

operations to be relocated to the vicinity of Camden Yards stadium complex.

Water is cut off by BCDPW at the point of the water main break.
33

11:15 p.m. MD DOT, MDE, MEMA, and MD Department of General Services discuss

possible closure of state offices near Mt. Royal on July 19. MDE shares results of

environmental monitoring and indicates no hazardous materials threat to

those facilities. MD DOT and MD GSA tentatively agree to enact liberal leave

for state office complex due to road closures and mass transit disruptions.

Coordination call between city and state agencies set for 4:00 AM July 19, 2001

so that a final recommendation can be made to the Governor.

July 19, 2001 – Day 2

4:00 a.m. MDE operations shift to Camden Yards command post.

5:00 a.m. MDE confers with CSX and Baltimore City Fire Department incident command

staff to discuss incident mitigation strategy. Fire appears to be located under

the Howard and Lombard Street intersection and may be accessible from the

surface.

Inner Harbor is reopened.

State Personnel assigned to State Center office complex granted liberal leave.

6:30 a.m. Baltimore City Fire Department, U.S. Coast Guard Activities Baltimore, and MDE

discuss marine safety zones on Patapsco River and agree to lift same.

9:30 a.m. MDE meets with USCG Activities Baltimore and requests assistance from

Activities Baltimore staff in establishing a Hazardous Materials division with

the USCG ICS to coordinate monitoring efforts of CSX, MDE, EPA, USCG, and

SBIMAP assets.

10:30 a.m. Fire personnel are able to access the tunnel via a manhole at the Howard and

Lombard Street intersection and begin fighting the fire at that location. Small

leaks reported in one tank car of hydrochloric acid (HCl). CSX, MDE, and

Baltimore City fire personnel begin planning acid transfer operations along

with CSX contractors.

1:00 p.m. MDE deploy to Lombard/Howard intersection to assist with product transfer

operations and monitor air and liquids for presence of HCl.

7:00 p.m. MDE personnel escort first tank truck of transferred hydrochloric acid to Sasol

facility in South Baltimore. Transfer and escort operations continue until

approximately 3:00 a.m. on July 20, 2001.

July 20, 2001 – Day 3

6:00 a.m. CSX personnel consult with MDE regarding construction of dike around

leaking HCl car. Initial suggestion by contractor staff was to use soda ash bags

as diking material; this action changed after MDE staff express serious safety

reservations about the reaction with soda ash should the tank car suddenly

fail.

8:00 a.m. USCG Activities Baltimore develops written site safety plan; MDE adopts plan

and is covered by it in order to ensure unity of operations and safety purposes.

1:30 p.m. MDE, SBIMAP consultant, and two CSX personnel enter north end of tunnel via

high-rail vehicle to assess tank cars. SBIMAP consultant is overcome by fatigue
34

and exhausts air supply. Personnel begin to evacuate the tunnel and contact

intervention team for assistance per existing safety plan. MDE and SBIMAP

consultant transported to University of MD medical center for observation and

released.

4:00 p.m. Multi-agency incident strategy meeting held, led by Baltimore City Office of

Emergency Management.

July 21, 2001 – Day 4

State Center Metro station is reopened.

Camden Yards Central Light rail line station is reopened; however, bus bridge

continues to operate between Patapsco and North Avenue stations due to

presence of emergency equipment near Camden station.

4:00 a.m. MDE personnel are provided with status update on all cars. Tank cars at

northern end of tunnel are removed and assessed. All are reported intact.

Remaining tank cars are being removed from south end of tunnel.

5:45 a.m. Undamaged HCl tank is removed from tunnel’s south portal.

7:00 a.m. Undamaged HCl tank car is inspected visually by MDE staff. Small amount of

vapor is visible near manway. Vapor is confirmed to be acidic and CSX is

notified.

11:30 a.m. Damaged HCl tank car is removed from south end of tunnel.

11:45 a.m. MDE confers with CSX, USCG, EPA, and Baltimore City Fire Department

regarding need for continued MDE presence. Monitoring and long-term cleanup efforts are discussed.

1:30 p.m. MDE personnel depart scene as emergency operations have concluded. Work

plan is established for follow-on monitoring and assessment during clean-up

operations.

7:05 p.m. First Orioles game is played at Orioles’ Park at Camden Yards since the day of

the incident.

July 23, 2001 – Day 6

Broken valve is repaired near water main break and water flow stops.

Howard Street is reopened to traffic, except in vicinity of water main break.

Cross streets intersecting Howard Street reopen except streets between

Baltimore Street and Pratt Street.

MTA continues bus bridge between north and south light rail branches.

Liberal leave for state employees ends and regular work hours resume.

7:10 a.m. Final rail car is removed from tunnel and remaining fires are extinguished.
35

4:45 p.m. CSX bridge maintenance engineers, Federal Railroad Administration officials,

Baltimore City engineers, and Baltimore Mass Transit Administration officials

enter the tunnel for the first time to inspect the damage.

July 24, 2001 – Day 7

MARC’s Camden Line resumes service from Washington, DC, to Camden Yards

station in time for morning commute.

CSX’s test run through the Howard Street tunnel with two locomotives and 50

loaded cars at reduced speed is successful; CSX resumes freight service

through the Howard Street tunnel at limited speeds.

July 29, 2001 – Day 12

Water main repairs are completed.

August 11, 2001 – Day 25

Manhole covers fly four feet into the air and traffic signals are disrupted in

small area downtown due to the ignition of tripropylene by electrical sparks.

Approximately 2,000 gallons of tripropylene are recovered from storm drain

system and nearby conduit vaults.

September 4, 2001 – Day 49

Intersection of Howard Street and Lombard Street is reopened to traffic.

Central Light Rail line is repaired.

September 8, 2001 – Day 53

Central Light Rail Line is reopened, bus bridge is discontinued.

September 10, 2001 – Day 55

Baltimore City completes repairs to road surfaces.
36

Baltimore Sun (www.sunspot.net)

July 19, 2001

‘Hidden historical asset of Baltimore’ was born of necessity; Possibility of a fire in

1.7-mile rail tunnel did not go unconsidered

http://www.sunspot.net/news/local/bal-te.md.tunnel19jul19.story

Baseball fans and commuters held hostage by road closings; Rush-hour timing

aggravates widespread gridlock, frustration

http://www.sunspot.net/news/local/bal-te.md.scene19jul19.story

Train fire, toxic cargo shut city; Firefighters stymied as CSX freight burns in Howard

Street Tunnel; Civil defense sirens wail; I-395, Inner Harbor closed; water main break

cuts power

http://www.sunspot.net/news/local/bal-te.md.train19jul19.story

Firefighters battle unknown dangers; Dangers: The chemical fire presented unusual

dangers for firefighters who, with limited oxygen supplies, were unsure of what they

would face

http://www.sunspot.net/news/local/bal-te.md.fire19jul19.story

Freight carried dangerous cargo; Chemicals listed on the train’s manifest

http://www.sunspot.net/news/local/bal-te.md.chemicals19jul19.htmlstory

Morning transit; Information for commuters

http://www.sunspot.net/news/local/bal-te.md.transit19jul19.story

July 20, 2001

Tunnel fire choking East Coast rail freight; Cargo being rerouted, but customers

nervous

http://www.sunspot.net/news/local/balte.bz.freight20jul20.story?coll=bal%2Dhome%2Dheadlines

Train derailment severs communications—Fiber optic cables in tunnel damaged;

Flood knocks out phone service

http://www.sunspot.net/news/local/balte.bz.fiber20jul20.story?coll=bal%2Dhome%2Dheadlines

Hazardous materials pass daily—and no one knows; On land, sea, and air, potential for

disaster

http://www.sunspot.net/news/local/balte.md.hazard20jul20.story?coll=bal%2Dhome%2Dheadlines

Burning cars in rail tunnel resist control; Crews use manhole to approach blaze with

cooling water; ‘Like walking into an oven’; 5 of 60 cars removed; Heat makes cleanup of

acid leak difficult

http://www.sunspot.net/news/local/balte.md.train20jul20.story?coll=bal%2Dhome%2Dheadlines

Appendix B. Information Sources

and Documents Reviewed
37

There when you need them; Without warning: Emergency responses were generally

good, but luck was better; The worst did not happen.

http://www.sunspot.net/news/local/bal-ed.siren20jul20.story

Aging infrastructure invites other disasters; Baltimore: City was lucky the freight train

derailment and fire produced only a big scare.

http://www.sunspot.net/news/local/bal-ed.tunnel20jul20.story

An all-nighter for O’Malley; Response: The mayor acts quickly to defuse a tense

situation, tracking emergency efforts and putting people at ease.

http://www.sunspot.net/news/local/bal-te.md.mayor20jul20.story

Rail accident linked to water main break; New valve to be installed today; Pipe repairs

might take days, official says

http://www.sunspot.net/news/local/bal-te.md.water20jul20.story

Orioles at loss if makeups missed; Backlog of games could cost O’s dearly; Ripken

‘finale’ sought

http://www.sunspot.net/news/local/bal-sp.orioles20jul20.story

Duck and Cover? No, find the remote; Emergency: Many in the city were puzzled when

the Civil Defense sirens sounded – and it wasn’t Monday

http://www.sunspot.net/news/local/bal-to.siren20jul20.story

Downtown stores, workers struggle after fire, flood; Buildings drenched, firms

inconvenienced, and business slows for some

http://www.sunspot.net/news/bal-te.bz.downtown20jul20.story

Morning transit; Information for commuters

http://www.sunspot.net/news/local/bal-te.md.transit20jul20.story

July 21, 2001

Chronology: With a rumble, chaos

http://www.sunspot.net/news/local/bal-te.md.accident21jul21.story

These events leave a cloud over our city

http://www.sunspot.net/news/local/bal-to.kasper21jul21.column

CSX train fire sparks debate of stay or go; Reaction: Clear messages from reliable

sources help people figure out what to do when facing possible disaster

http://www.sunspot.net/news/local/bal-to.disaster21jul21.story

‘It’s a little bit of hell’; 22 smoldering cars pulled out; those with toxic cargo next; Heat,

smoke slow battle; Fire, water rupture keep downtown in turmoil for 3rd day

http://www.sunspot.net/news/local/bal-te.md.train21jul21.story

Waiting game is only one O’s play; Rail cleanup keeps schedule in flux; O’s tell of

evacuation fears

http://www.sunspot.net/news/local/bal-sp.orioles21jul21.story
38

Plans to repair water main hit another snag; Pipe embedded in arch of tunnel; Work

stopped for safety of firefighters; ‘We’re in a holding pattern’

http://www.sunspot.net/news/local/bal-te.water21jul21.story

Firms find way around major Internet artery; Downed data lines on key route cause

delays across country

http://www.sunspot.net/news/local/bal-te.bz.fiber21jul21.story

Weekend transit

http://www.sunspot.net/news/local/bal-te.transitbox21jul21.story

July 22, 2001

Fire, flood and gridlock: Mayor’s reputation at stake

http://www.sunspot.net/news/local/bal-md.olesker22jul22.column

Crews remove riskiest cars; Tankers carrying acid, other liquid out of tunnel; Burning

boxcars remain; Danger delays full probe; Officials hope to open more streets in time

for morning rush hour

http://www.sunspot.net/news/local/bal-te.md.train22jul22.story

O’s fans get to game despite shut streets, reduced light rail; Normal downtown traffic

still may be days away

http://www.sunspot.net/local/bal-te.md.traffic22jul22.story

July 23, 2001

Disaster experts to the rescue; Emergencies: Containing deadly chemicals in

dangerous situations is all in a day’s work for specialized crews

http://www.sunspot.net/news/local/balte.md.wrecks23jul23.story?coll=bal%2Dhome%2Dheadlines

Firefighters deserve high-fives and another fete

http://www.sunspot.net/news/local/bal-md.rodricks23jul23.column

‘The hardest part is over’; Firefighters declare triumph over blaze in Howard Street

Tunnel; Nearly 100 hours of work; Investigation begins, could take months to

determine cause

http://www.sunspot.net/news/local/bal-te.md.train23jul23.story

Commuters still face city snarls; Drivers urged to use Metro, avoid going through

downtown

http://www.sunspot.net/news/local/bal-te.md.downtown23jul23.story

Today’s transit; Information for commuters

http://www.sunspot.net/news/local/bal-te.transitbox23jul23.story

July 24, 2001

Howard Street, tunnel reopen; Broken water main eyed as cause of CSX derailment,

fire; ‘City is back in business’

http://www.sunspot.net/news/local/bal-te.md.train24jul24.story
39

Makeup plan set for O’s, Rangers; Texas doubleheader slated tomorrow, plus 1 game

here Monday

http://www.sunspot.net/news/local/bal-sp.ossider24jul24.story

Firefighters’ heroism; Fearless work: With little regard for own safety, city firefighters

did a great job with blazing train wreck

http://www.sunspot.net/news/local/bal-ed.fire24jul24.story

Mass transit’s weakness; Commuting: Last week’s events show that the region badly

needs a system that works

http://www.sunspot.net/news/local/bal-ed.transit24jul24.story

July 25, 2001

After early morning trial run, freight traffic resumes in tunnel; CSX employee recalls

how bad passage looked hours after fire began

http://www.sunspot.net/news/local/balte.ride25jul25.story?coll=bal%2Dhome%2Dheadlines

NTSB, city sifting clues to accident; U.S. investigators find ‘earthy material’ atop derailed

train; ‘Fire came first,’ city says; One week afterward, Baltimore almost back to normal

http://www.sunspot.net/news/local/bal-te.md.train25jul25.story

July 26, 2001

Accident plan leaves city unprepared; Its 440 pages fail to consider tunnel, deal with

toxic spills

http://www.sunspot.net/news/local/balte.md.plan26jul26.story?coll=bal%2Dhome%2Dheadlines

Officials discuss costs of train fire; City tallies expenses of $1.3 million; CSX agrees to

pay bulk; ‘Exchange of information’

http://www.sunspot.net/news/local/balmd.train26jul26.story?coll=bal%2Dhome%2Dheadlines

July 27, 2001

Tunnel blame drama begins; City, CSX, others have much at stake in the placing of fault

http://www.sunspot.net/news/local/bal-bz.legal27jul27.story

Officials to improve city emergency plan; Spokesman says firefighters prepared for

chemical spills

http://www.sunspot.net/news/local/bal-md.fire27jul27.story

July 29, 2001

For Howard Street, it’s been rough road; Troubles: The train derailment, fire and water

main break that stifled retail trade are just the latest in a long line of misfortunes and

setbacks

http://www.sunspot.net/news/local/bal-te.md.howard29jul29.story

NTSB probe of tunnel derailment could take 9 months; Agency started investigation

immediately after accident

http://www.sunspot.net/news/local/bal-te.md.train29jul29.story
40

July 31, 2001

Avoiding tunnel is impractical, costly, CSX says; Federal law limits local authority over

hazardous freight; Bypasses create delays

http://www.sunspot.net/news/local/balte.md.train31jul31.story?coll=bal%2Dhome%2Dheadlines

Howard repairs could take 5 weeks; Water main fixed Sunday, but extensive damage,

light-rail work noted; Project could begin Thursday

http://www.sunspot.net/news/local/balmd.main31jul31.story?coll=bal%2Dlocal%2Dheadlines

August 13, 2001

Sewers, Howard tunnel connect; CSX reveals link, but manhole blasts still called a

mystery

http://www.sunspot.net/news/local/bal-te.md.hazmat13aug13.story

August 14, 2001

Explosions in city still a mystery; City, state, CSX call six downtown blasts ‘baffling,’

‘puzzling’; ‘Just spinning our wheels’; Investigators continue to look for a link to rail

tanker car leak

http://www.sunspot.net/news/local/bal-md.explode14aug14.story

August 15, 2001

Tests to seek chemical source; Officials aim to learn whether explosions, CSX train fire

linked

http://www.sunspot.net/news/local/bal-md.explode15aug15story

August 16, 2001

Howard Street repair in high gear; Crews try to correct water main damage in about 5

weeks; ‘Challenge for everybody’

http://www.sunspot.net/news/local/bal-te.md.main16aug16.story

August 17, 2001

Mystery of train accident unsolved; Evidence in tunnel obliterated during 5 days

fighting blaze

http://www.sunspot.net/news/local/bal-md.ntsb17aug17story

August 29, 2001

Intersection repair work almost done; Officials tell legislators about wreck aftermath

http://www.sunspot.net/news/local/bal-md.derail29aug29.story

September 5, 2001

Howard, Lombard junction reopens; Traffic able to flow freely for first time since break

of water main

http://www.sunspot.net/news/local/bal-md.howard05sep05.story
41

September 8, 2001

Derailed train linked to chemical in sewers; Sample from storm drain matched to CSX

load supplied by La. Company

http://www.sunspot.net/news/local/bal-md.train08sep08.story

Washington Post (www.washingtonpost.com)

July 19, 2001

Train Sets Tunnel Afire, Shuts Down Baltimore; Hazardous Smoke Closes Roads, Cancels

Ballgame

http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wpdyn?pagename=article&node=&contentId=A17542-2001Jul18¬Found=true

July 8, 2002

In Nuclear Waste Site Debate, Visions of Transport Disaster

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A36463-2002Jul7.html

Baltimore City Paper Online (www.citypaper.com)

September 12, 2001

The Feds Are Considering Shipping Spent Nuclear Fuel Through the Howard Street

Tunnel. Are They Playing with Fire?

http://www.citypaper.com/2001-09-12/feature.html

February 20, 2002

Baltimore Tunnel Fire, Aberdeen Missile Test Targets in National Nuke-Transport

Debate

http://www.citypaper.com/2002-02-20/mobs.html

WBAL-TV (www.thewbalchannel.com)

July 19, 2001

Progress Made in Tunnel Fire

http://www.thewbalchannel.com/news/879713/index.html

Train Derails; Hazardous Chemicals Onboard; Two Cars Carrying Hydrochloric Acid

http://www.thewbalchannel.com/news/878827/index.html

July 23, 2001

Inspectors Assess Rail Tunnel Damage; Repairs Set to Begin to Aging Tunnel System

http://www.thewbalchannel.com/news/883994/index.html

July 24, 2002

Most Downtown Roads Reopen After Tunnel Fire

http://www.thewbalchannel.com/news/886604/detail.html
42

UTU Daily News Digest (www.utu.org)

July 20, 2001

Chemicals Drained from Baltimore Train; Tunnel Fire Slows Internet Service

http://www.utu.org/News/NewsDgst/2001/July/0720/010720.htm

July 24, 2001

Way Cleared for Baltimore Tunnel Reopening; NTSB Wonders if Flooding Caused

Baltimore Train Wreck

http://www.utu.org/News/NewsDgst/2001/July/0724/010724fr.htm

November 5, 2001

Leak temporarily closes Baltimore rail tunnel

http://www.utu.org/News/NewsDgst/2001/November/1105/1105fr2.htm

Constellation (http://www.nab.usace.army.mil)

September 2001

Accident Causes Interruption of Light Rail Service

 http://www.nab.usace.army.mil/publications/Constellation/2001/index.htm

CSX Corporation (www.csx.com)

July 24, 2001

Press Release: Howard Street Tunnel Operations to Resume

http://www.csx.com/aboutus/news/press/pressview.cfm?ID=6621

CSX Intermodal (www.csxi.com)

July 19, 2001

CSX Intermodal Advisories: Line Disruption in Baltimore

http://www.csxi.com/advisories/index.cfm?fuseAction=Detail&id=6601

July 25, 2001

CSX Intermodal Advisories: Line Interruption in Baltimore – Update

http://www.csxi.com/advisories/index.cfm?fuseAction=Detail&id=6680

August 17, 2001

CSX Intermodal Advisories: Howard Street Tunnel Re-Routs Have Ended

http://www.csxi.com/advisories/index.cfm?fuseAction=Detail&id=6826
43

NIRS (www.nirs.org)

July 21, 2001

Press Release: What if the Baltimore Train Tunnel Fire Had Involved High-Level Nuclear

Waste?

http://www.nirs.org/newsreleases/PRwhatifbaltimore0701.htm

Common Dreams (www.commondreams.org)

February 11, 2002

Last Summer’s Tunnel Fire Would Have Ruptured Containers, Contaminating Baltimore,

a Report Says

http://www.commondreams.org/headlines02/0211-01.htm

Baltimore City Government (www.ci.baltimore.md.us)

July 18, 2001

Press Advisory: Traffic Advisory – Most Major Arteries Reopened Detours to be Posted

for Rush Hour

http://www.ci.baltimore.md.us/government/dpw/press/010718.html

Baltimore Trasit Archives (www.btco.net/index2.html)

June 18, 2002

Howard Street – The Aftermath

http://www.btco.net/Howard/Howardst.html

ZDNET UK (http://news.zdnet.co.uk)

August 3, 2001

Train Crash Could be to Blame for Internet Derailment

http://news.zdnet.co.uk/story/0,,t274-s2092503,00.html

Global Beat Syndicate (http://www.nyu.edu/globalbeat/syndicate)

July 26, 2001

A Train Tunnel Fire in Baltimore Exposes the Dangers of Nuclear Waste Transportation

http://www.nyu.edu/globalbeat/syndicate/kamps072601.html
44

Emergency.com (www.emergency.com)

July 18-23, 2001

Train Fire Declared Under Control by Incident Commander

http://www.emergency.com/2001/Balt-hzmt-0718.htm

Maryland Department of the Environment

(www.mde.state.md.us)

September 7, 2001

Chemical Links Baltimore’s Manhole Explosions to CSX Train Derailment

http://www.mde.state.md.us/press/nr_mde-010907.html

The WHIR (http://thewhir.com)

July 21, 2001

Metromedia Rebuilds Fire Damaged Network in 36 Hours

http://thewhir.com/marketwatch/metromedia722.cfm

FindArticles.COM (www.findarticles.com)

September 19, 2001

Industry Shares Credit for Baltimore Response

http://www.findarticles.com/m3066/35_163/78932032/p1/article.jhtml?cf=0

Fall 2001

Peering Into The Abyss

http://www.findarticles.com/cf_0/m3870/12_17/78805350/p1/article.jhtml

RAILSERVE (www.railserve.com)

July 19, 2001

Baltimore Train Accident: News, Photos, and Links.

http://www.railserve.com/baltimore.html

Interviews

January 28, 2002 Maryland Department of Transportation

April 15, 2002 Maryland Emergency Management Agency

May 6, 2002 Maryland Transit Administration

May 7, 2002 Baltimore City Office of Transportation

June 10, 2002 Maryland Transit Administration
45

Additional Information Sources

Maryland State Highway Administration

State of Nevada Agency for Nuclear Projects

http://www.state.nv.us/nucwaste/states/maryland.htm

HMHTTC Response Incorporated

http://www.hmhttc.com/baltimore_csx.htm

Radioactive Waste Management Associates

Lamb, Matthew and Marvin Resnikoff. “Radiological Consequences of Severe Rail

Accidents Involving Spend Nuclear Fuel Shipments to Yucca Mountain: Hypothetical

Baltimore Rail Tunnel Fire Involving SNF,” September 2001, p. 20.

University of Maryland, Baltimore Campus

http://www.umbc.edu

Mitchell, Alexander D., IV. “Fire In the Hole,” Railfan & Railroad. November 2001.

pp. 42-49
46
U.S. Department

of Transportation