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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 45586

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

JOSEPH JOHN DAVIS,

Defendant-Appellant.

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Filed: June 15, 2021

Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED

OPINION AND SHALL NOT

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District, State of Idaho, 

Kootenai County. Hon. Scott Wayman, District Judge. 

Judgment of conviction, affirmed.

Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender; Justin M. Curtis, Deputy 

Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. 

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy 

Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. 

________________________________________________

GRATTON, Judge 

Joseph John Davis appeals his conviction for first degree murder. Davis argues that the 

district court abused its discretion by admitting irrelevant and prejudicial evidence of his 

premarital, sexual relationship. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm. 

I. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Davis was charged with first degree murder after the death of his sixteen-month-old 

stepson while in his care. Before trial, the State filed notice of its intent to introduce evidence of 

the child’s biological father, Wilburn, as a rival and sexual competitor to Davis. This included

evidence that the child’s mother, Cheyney, had a sexual relationship with Wilburn when she was 

sixteen years old and she became pregnant, as well as a sexual relationship with Davis, soon 

thereafter, during the early stages of her pregnancy. At the pretrial hearing on the motion, the 
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State argued that this evidence was relevant to establish motive. Davis argued that it was not 

relevant; it was prejudicial due to the nature of the relationship; it was lacking an adequate offer 

of proof; and it would confuse the jury. The district court reserved ruling on the matter until 

trial. 

Before cross-examination of Davis at trial, the State sought to question Davis on his 

sexual relationship with Cheyney prior to their marriage, and Davis objected. The district court 

overruled Davis’s objection, finding that the testimony solicited by the State was relevant to 

motive and impeachment, and its probative value was not outweighed by unfair risk of prejudice. 

The State then questioned Davis, and presented three additional witnesses on rebuttal, all of 

whom testified that Davis had a sexual relationship with Cheyney when she was sixteen years 

old and pregnant with Wilburn’s child. The jury found Davis guilty of first degree murder. 

Davis timely appeals.

II. 

ANALYSIS

Davis argues that the district court abused its discretion when it admitted the State’s 

evidence of his premarital, sexual relationship with Cheyney. Specifically, Davis argues that the 

evidence was admitted in violation of Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b), as the evidence of Davis’s

premarital relationship had no other purpose outside of portraying him as a person of bad 

character.

The evidence rule in question, I.R.E. 404(b), provides:

(1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not 

admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular 

occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.

(2) Permitted Uses; Notice in a Criminal Case. This evidence may be 

admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, 

preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident. In 

a criminal case, the prosecutor must:

(A) file and serve reasonable notice of the general nature of any 

such evidence that the prosecutor intends to offer at trial; and

(B) do so reasonably in advance of trial--or during trial if the court, 

for good cause shown, excuses lack of pretrial notice.

This rule prohibits introduction of evidence of acts other than the crime for which a 

defendant is charged if its probative value is entirely dependent upon its tendency to demonstrate 

the defendant’s propensity to engage in such behavior. State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 54, 205 P.3d 

1185, 1190 (2009). Of course, evidence of another crime, wrong, or act may implicate a 
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person’s character while also being relevant and admissible for some permissible purpose, such 

as those listed in the rule. See State v. Pepcorn, 152 Idaho 678, 688-89, 273 P.3d 1271, 1281-82 

(2012). 

When determining the admissibility of evidence to which a Rule 404(b) objection has 

been made, the trial court must first determine whether there is sufficient evidence of the other 

acts that a reasonable jury could believe the conduct actually occurred. If so, then the court must 

consider: (1) whether the other acts are relevant to a material and disputed issue concerning the 

crime charged, other than propensity; and (2) whether the probative value is substantially 

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Grist, 147 Idaho at 52, 205 P.3d at 1188; State v. 

Parmer, 147 Idaho 210, 214, 207 P.3d 186, 190 (Ct. App. 2009). On appeal, this Court defers to 

the trial court’s determination that there is sufficient evidence of the other acts if it is supported 

by substantial and competent evidence in the record. Parmer, 147 Idaho at 214, 207 P.3d at 190. 

We exercise free review, however, of the trial court’s relevancy determination. State v. Sheldon, 

145 Idaho 225, 229, 178 P.3d 28, 32 (2008). The trial court’s balancing of the probative value of 

the evidence against the danger of unfair prejudice will not be disturbed unless we find an abuse 

of discretion. State v. Norton, 151 Idaho 176, 190, 254 P.3d 77, 91 (Ct. App. 2011).

A. Sufficient Evidence

Davis first argues that the State did not present sufficient evidence to establish the prior 

bad act, in this case the premarital relationship, as fact. Before cross-examination of Davis, the 

State requested that the court rule on the admissibility of evidence pertaining to the premarital 

relationship, which they sought to establish through questioning Davis. The district court found 

that there was sufficient evidence to establish the premarital relationship took place, through 

testimony the State sought to elicit from Davis, among other facts and circumstances on the 

record, which included the State’s offer of proof at the pretrial hearing that Cheyney would 

testify to establish the relevant facts. 

Davis argues that since the State had not presented any evidence of the premarital 

relationship prior to questioning Davis, the district court lacked a basis to find that a reasonable 

jury could believe the conduct actually occurred. However, the evidence presented to the jury 

and the State’s offer of proof was more than adequate to support the finding from the district 

court that the jury could reasonably believe that the relationship actually occurred. Davis is 

essentially arguing that evidence of a prior act must exist on the record before evidence of a prior 
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act may be admitted into the record. We disagree. The district court did not err in finding that 

there was evidence sufficient to support a jury’s reasonable belief that the premarital relationship 

occurred.

B. Relevance

The district court admitted the evidence of Davis’s premarital, sexual relationship, 

finding the evidence was relevant to motive and impeachment. The State’s theory behind 

presenting this evidence was to show that Davis harbored some ill-will toward his stepson due to 

his rivalry with the child’s biological father, thereby establishing some motive to harm the child. 

The evidence was also used to impeach Davis’s credibility, as he testified at trial that he did not 

have a sexual relationship with Cheyney while she was pregnant and had previously told 

investigators that he had known Cheyney for three or four years as friends, implying a platonic 

relationship. 

Davis argues that the evidence of his premarital relationship was relevant only to his

character. Turning first to the court’s finding that the evidence was relevant to motive, Davis 

argues that since he had already married Cheyney, there was no ongoing sexual competition. 

There was also no additional evidence that Davis harbored any resentment toward his stepson, or 

history of abuse, and the State’s assertion that the evidence demonstrated motive was therefore 

completely speculative. Rather, the evidence of the premarital relationship was used to portray 

Davis as a man of bad character who had a sexual relationship with a sixteen-year-old girl. 

“Motive is generally defined as that which leads or tempts the mind to indulge in a 

particular act. It is distinguishable from intent, which is the purpose to use a particular means to 

effect a certain result.” State v. Stevens, 93 Idaho 48, 53, 454 P.2d 945, 950 (1969) (internal 

citation omitted). Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make the existence of any fact 

that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it 

would be without the evidence. I.R.E. 401. “Evidence of motive is relevant when the existence 

of a motive is a circumstance tending to make it more probable that the person in question did 

the act.” State v. Russo, 157 Idaho 299, 308, 336 P.3d 232, 241 (2014) (internal quotation marks 

omitted).

The evidence of Davis’s premarital relationship with Cheyney while she also had a 

recurring relationship with the father of his stepson, does have some tendency to show that a 

rivalry existed, and is relevant to show motive as to why Davis may have harmed his stepson. 
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Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted the evidence of Davis’s

premarital relationship. While Davis argues that after he married Cheyney, there was no longer a 

competition and that there was no additional evidence of abuse or resentment, the jury, as the 

ultimate finder of fact, was allowed to consider the evidence as it was presented, including the 

potential weaknesses that Davis points out. We will not substitute our own view of the evidence 

with that of the jury. State v. Knutson, 121 Idaho 101, 104, 822 P.2d 998, 1001 (Ct. App. 1991).

Davis also argues that the State’s use of three additional witnesses on rebuttal led to a 

mini-trial where the jury repeatedly heard about Davis’s premarital relationship. This testimony, 

Davis argues, resulted in the jury repeatedly hearing about Davis’s alleged premarital 

relationship with Cheyney without any legitimate basis other than showing Davis’s bad 

character. We disagree with Davis’s argument that this evidence was time-consuming and 

confusing to the jury. As established above, the evidence was relevant. The three witnesses all 

testified to facts that Davis disputed, making each of their testimonies valuable in giving weight 

to the State’s argument that Davis did in fact have a premarital relationship with Cheyney. 

Therefore, the district court did not err in allowing the testimony. 

Turning to impeachment, Davis argues that the evidence of his premarital relationship

was not relevant to impeach his credibility. Davis indicated to investigators that he and Cheyney 

were friends for several years before they were married. Based on this statement, the State 

sought to admit evidence of Davis’s premarital, sexual relationship to impeach Davis’s

credibility. Davis argues that the statement to investigators that he and Cheyney were friends 

and the evidence of the alleged premarital relationship were not actually in conflict, as it is 

possible for friends to have sexual relationships. Regardless, the statement that one is a friend

strongly implies that the relationship is platonic. Therefore, these statements do have some 

tendency to show that Davis may have been untruthful with investigators. This factual issue was 

for the jury to determine. The evidence of Davis’s premarital affair was relevant to 

impeachment, and the district court did not err in admitting evidence for this purpose as well. 

C. Probative Value

Davis argues that the evidence of his premarital relationship had little, if any, probative 

value and a substantial risk of unfair prejudice due to the nature of the relationship. The district 

court found that the risk of unfair prejudice did not substantially outweigh the probative value of 

the evidence, because the evidence was relevant to both motive and impeachment and was not 
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the kind of unlawful act that would shock, confuse, or tend to engage the emotions of the jury 

and cause them to lose sight of the evidence. The district court also noted that the acts subject to 

the Rule 404(b) analysis were not similar to the acts which were the subject of the trial and, 

therefore, did not show propensity. The trial court’s balancing of the probative value of the 

evidence against the danger of unfair prejudice will not be disturbed unless we find an abuse of 

discretion. Norton, 151 Idaho at 190, 254 P.3d at 91.

When a trial court’s discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court 

conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the 

issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the boundaries of such discretion; (3) acted 

consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and (4) reached 

its decision by an exercise of reason. State v. Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 270, 429 P.3d 149, 158 

(2018).

Here, the district court noted that its decision to admit the evidence was discretionary. It 

acted within the bounds of its discretion by solely deciding whether or not to admit the evidence 

in question. The court also considered the legal standards, the probative value and risk of unfair 

prejudice, and properly concluded that the risk of unfair prejudice did not significantly outweigh 

the probative value of the evidence. The court considered the impact of the evidence on the jury, 

and exercised reason in reaching its conclusion. We conclude that the district court did not abuse 

its discretion by admitting evidence of Davis’s premarital relationship with Cheyney. 

III. 

CONCLUSION

The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence of Davis’s

premarital, sexual relationship with Cheyney. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s 

judgment of conviction. 

Chief Judge HUSKEY and Judge BRAILSFORD CONCUR.