PREVENTIVE WAR AND ITS ALTERNATIVES:

THE LESSONS OF HISTORY

Dan Reiter

April 2006

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ISBN 1-58487-241-1
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FOREWORD

The 2002 National Security Strategy suggested preventive attacks, 

diplomacy, deterrence, and other policies as means of curtailing 

threats presented by the spread of nuclear, biological, and chemical 

(NBC) weapons to terrorists and rogue states. Dr. Dan Reiter, the 

author of this External Research Associates Paper, analyzes which 

mix of these policies might best and most cost-effectively address 

the NBC threat, with special focus on preventive attacks. The past 

performances of preventive attacks, diplomacy, deterrence, and 

other policies as means of curtailing the NBC threat are analyzed. 

The author’s central findings are that preventive attacks are 

generally unsuccessful at delaying the spread of NBC weapons; 

that deterrence, especially nuclear deterrence, is highly successful at 

preventing the use of NBC weapons by states; and that diplomacy 

has had moderate and perhaps unappreciated success at curtailing 

the spread of NBC weapons. The monograph also discusses how 

funds spent on preventive wars, which are much more expensive 

than diplomacy or deterrence, might be better spent to combat 

threats from terrorism and proliferation through such initiatives as 

fissile material recovery, ballistic missile defense, and port security.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to publish this report as 

a contribution to the debate of this vital issue.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute 
iv

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

DAN REITER is a Professor of Political Science at Emory University 

and has been an Olin post-doctoral fellow in security studies at 

Harvard University. He has authored or coauthored two books, 

Crucible of Beliefs: Learning, Alliances, and World Wars and Democracies 

at War. He has published more than 20 scholarly articles on a variety 

of topics, including the causes of war, the democratic peace, NATO 

expansion, international alliance formation, statistical methodology, 

nuclear proliferation, air power, public opinion, war outcomes, 

learning and foreign policy, military strategy, and others. In 

2002, he received the Karl Deutsch Award, given annually by the 

International Studies Association to the scholar under age 40 or 

within 10 years of receiving the dissertation who has made the most 

significant contribution to the study of international relations and 

peace research. Dr. Reiter received his Ph.D. in political science from 

the University of Michigan in 1994. 
v

SUMMARY

The 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS) describes several policy 

tools available to curtail threats from nuclear, biological, and chemical 

(NBC) weapons, including diplomacy, deterrence, preventive 

attacks against NBC programs, and others. This monograph asks the 

question: What mix of these policies best addresses the NBC threat 

posed by rogue leaders and terrorists? This question must be asked 

because the NBC threat remains, and because financial and other 

constraints prevent the pursuit of all policy choices simultaneously.

The central findings are that, while some of the NSS recommendations are sound, preventive wars are not attractive policy options 

for addressing NBC threats. Examination of the historical record 

reveals that limited strikes on NBC programs are generally ineffective. 

Larger-scale attacks intended to overthrow a regime are sometimes 

successful, though their financial, human, military, and geopolitical 

costs (including counterproductive effects on the war on terrorism) 

are so substantial that they are unattractive policy choices. The 

financial costs are especially disturbing, given the hundreds of billions 

spent on regime change attacks which could more effectively be 

spent on other counterproliferation and counterterrorism initiatives, 

including ballistic missile defense, fissile material recovery, and a 

variety of counterterrorism initiatives such as port security.

Fortunately, the other elements of the NSS do promise to address 

the NBC threat effectively. Diplomacy generally has been successful 

at dissuading many states from acquiring NBC weapons, and 

persuading others to give up such weapons. Deterrence has been 

extremely successful at preventing the state use of NBC weapons. 

Some ballistic missile defense systems are showing promise of 

addressing short- and medium-range missile threats. Finally, 

evidence suggests that defensive counterterrorism measures work. 

The monograph recommends pursuing these policies. Regarding 

preventive attacks, the NBC threat might be reduced more effectively 

if the United States offered to make no-invasion pledges to countries 

such as North Korea in exchange for substantial NBC concessions, 

rather than considering or threatening the actual launch of such 

attacks.

PREVENTIVE WAR AND ITS ALTERNATIVES:

THE LESSONS OF HISTORY

Introduction.

The official document titled National Security Strategy of the United 

States of America (NSS) (September 2002) describes nuclear, biological, 

and chemical (NBC) weapons in the hands of rogue leaders or 

terrorist groups as among the gravest threats faced by the United 

States. It lays out four components of American strategy to confront 

this threat: deterrence and defense, strengthening diplomatic and 

multilateral efforts, improving abilities to respond to and reduce the 

effects of the actual use of NBC weapons, and preventive attacks 

against emerging NBC programs.1 The last of these has received the 

greatest attention, as it marks perhaps the largest departure from past 

approaches and was the conceptual underpinning of the 2003 Iraq 

War. Some have speculated on the possibility of future preventive 

attacks against countries such as North Korea or Iran.

This monograph asks the question: What mix of policies best 

confronts the threat posed by NBC weapons? This question retains 

critical policy relevance because the NBC threat has not been 

eliminated. Some might propose that, given the gravity of the threat, 

the United States should pursue all policies simultaneously. However, 

each has costs and benefits, and informed policy decisions require a 

complete assessment of each to ensure the most effective reduction of 

the threat at the most acceptable cost. Further, budgetary resources 

are finite, requiring prior analysis of where resources ought to be 

allocated to reduce the threat as efficiently as possible consisent with 

effectiveness.

The monograph also offers comparative assessments of a variety 

of different counterproliferation and counterterrorism policies, 

with a focus on the most novel component, preventive attacks. Do 

preventive attacks work? What are their costs and dangers? Do they 

make the employment of other policy tools more difficult? Are other 

policy tools equally or more effective at combatting the threats of 

NBC proliferation and terrorism?
The central conclusion of this monograph is that preventive 

attacks are generally ineffective, costly, unnecessary, and potentially 

even counterproductive tools for use in behalf of nonproliferation 

and counterterrorism. Other policies, including diplomacy, 

deterrence, ballistic missile defense, and an array of counterterrorism 

policies are likely to be more effective at containing the spread and 

use of NBC and less costly in human lives. 

The next three sections of this monograph consider preventive 

attacks, diplomacy, and deterrence, respectively, focusing on their 

historical records of success and failure. The section that follows 

these offers some assessments, with a focus on the financial costs of 

preventive wars and the potential underfunding that such wars may 

impose on other counterterrorism and nonproliferation initiatives 

like ballistic missile defense and the recovery of fissile material. The 

final section concludes that NBC weapons might be more effectively 

curtailed by offering no-invasion pledges in exchange for substantial 

NBC concessions, rather than by launching preventive attacks.

Preventive Action against NBC Weapons Threats.

Generally, preventive action means attacking to forestall a rising 

threat. Political scientists have long considered the phenomenon 

of preventive attacks, exploring in particular what factors make 

preventive attacks more likely.2 Preventive attacks are sometimes 

conflated with preemptive attacks, though the former are usually 

thought of as addressing medium- or long-term threats, whereas 

the latter are usually thought of as addressing immediate threats.3

Before the September 11, 2001 (9/11), attacks, the United States 

generally avoided launching preventive or preemptive attacks. The 

claim of the NSS is that new threats posed by tyrants, terrorists, and 

other rogue actors armed with tremendously powerful weapons like 

nuclear warheads make preventive attacks more essential policy 

options. The Cold War policy of deterrence cannot be counted on 

to work against these new enemies, given the possibility that they 

may be stateless and/or suicidal in outlook. Further, even a single 

use of such destructive weapons against American territory or 

interests could be catastrophic, further emphasizing the imperative 

of eliminating such weapons through force before they can be used.
Have past preventive attacks against NBC programs been 

successful?4 Specifically, have such attacks substantially delayed the 

spread of NBC weapons? Though no two opportunities to launch 

such attacks are exactly the same, examination of past efforts at least 

can help improve our estimation of whether future attacks against 

states like Iran, Syria, North Korea, or a fundamentalist Pakistan 

might succeed. 

The past record of preventive attacks against NBC programs is not 

encouraging. Specifically, two sets of factors have worked to limit the 

success of such strikes. First, several attacks have been made against 

targets which were unlikely to acquire NBC weapons. That is, even 

though attacks may have been operationally successful in the sense 

of destroying specific targets, the spread of NBC weapons was not 

significantly delayed by the attack because, even in the absence of the 

attack, the target state was not close to acquiring NBC weapons. In 

short, the costs of preventive attacks were borne without reaping the 

benefits of reducing NBC threats. A series of attacks was launched 

against the nuclear program of Nazi Germany during World War 

II, especially against a heavy water production facility in Norway, 

though scientific and other errors would likely have prevented 

Germany from ever coming close to building an actual atomic device 

during the time available.5 The 1998 missile attacks launched by the 

Clinton administration against alleged chemical weapons production 

facilities in Sudan also likely made little difference, considering that 

the evidence associating the installation in question with chemical 

weapons production was quite weak.6 Further, though the 2003 

invasion of Iraq was justified publicly as necessary to eliminate 

Saddam’s emerging NBC weapons program, the dictator had no 

NBC weapons or weapon production programs at the time of the 

war.7 Similarly, the 1993 and 1998 cruise missile strikes against Iraqi 

targets were aimed at a dormant NBC program. 

The fundamental problem underlying these episodes is poor 

intelligence about the status of a target state’s NBC programs. 

Collecting quality intelligence about other states’ NBC programs 

is extremely difficult, since such states obviously place very high 

priority on keeping the existence and progress of these programs 

secret. Indeed, beyond the examples mentioned above, the United 
States has an underwhelming track record in assessing the NBC 

programs of other states, sometimes underestimating and sometimes 

overestimating a state’s progress towards acquiring NBC weapons. 

Though the Allies had some knowledge of Japan’s extensive biological warfare program during World War II, they had no knowledge 

of the developing Japanese nuclear program.8 In July 1949, the 

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) estimated that the Soviet Union 

would not be able to construct a nuclear weapon until mid-1951, 

though the first Soviet nuclear test occurred only some weeks later 

in August 1949.9 Some debate existed in the intelligence community 

in the 1980s over possible evidence of a Soviet biological weapons 

program, but the end of the Cold War brought the shocking revelation 

of a massive Soviet biological weapons program, undertaken in 

violation of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention.10 Intelligence 

on the first Chinese nuclear test was a bit better, although estimates 

prior to the test fluctuated in their predictions; the day before the 

test, the CIA estimated a Chinese test within 6 to 8 months.11 The 

CIA was surprised by the May 1998 series of Indian nuclear tests; 3 

months earlier, the national intelligence officer in charge of warning 

had accepted the conclusion that Indian nuclear tests were not 

imminent.12

Unfortunately, this intelligence problem will likely not be solved 

anytime soon. A March 2005 White House-commissioned report on 

NBC intelligence was extremely critical of American intelligence 

on Iraqi NBC prior to the 2003 Iraq War, noting the thin body of 

information about potential preventive strike targets such as Iran and 

North Korea.13 Greg Thielmann, former head of the Office of Strategic 

Proliferation and Military Affairs in the State Department’s Office of 

Intelligence and Research, was quite blunt: “The effectiveness of any 

first-strike military doctrine depends on reliable intelligence. The U.S. 

intelligence community’s inability to produce accurate information 

on enemy threats renders such a doctrine feckless and reckless.”14

Some regard the 1981 Israeli attack on the Iraqi Osiraq nuclear 

reactor as the best example of a successful attack against an NBC 

program, because it delayed the Iraqi acquisition of a nuclear weapon, 

preventing Iraq from fashioning one by the time it invaded Kuwait in 

1990. However, according to the existing evidence, we cannot claim 

that the 1981 attack substantially delayed the Iraqi nuclear weapons 
program, because, absent the attack, Iraq would not have been close 

to building a nuclear weapon.

The key contribution of the Osiraq reactor to the Iraqi weapons 

program would have been to provide plutonium for an Iraqi 

weapon, but several factors would have prevented Iraq from 

diverting plutonium from the French-provided reactor. The reactor 

itself was a light water reactor, not well-designed for plutonium 

production. Moreover, the French had planned on supplying 

Caramel fuel, a composite which contained some low enriched 

uranium permitting reactor operation but not lending itself well to 

plutonium production. Most importantly, Iraq was a signatory to the 

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and its reactor was under 

inspection by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) officials 

and French technicians. Illicit plutonium activity would have been 

easy to detect, and such activity would have caused a shutoff in fuel 

supply and an end to reactor operation.

Including IAEA officials, many weapons experts and scientists 

have argued that Osiraq would not have provided Iraq with much, if 

any, fissile material for a bomb. Perhaps most persuasively, a number 

of Iraqi scientists who worked inside Saddam’s bomb program have 

made the same point. Former Iraqi physicist Imad Khadduri goes 

so far as to claim that the reactor “was specifically designed to be 

unsuitable for the production of plutonium for a bomb,” and that 

the possibility of plutonium production at Osiraq was “delusional.” 

Khadduri goes on to state:

The tight refueling schedule for such an endeavor, which is required 

to prevent “poisonous” plutonium 238 from developing, would be 

impossible to hide from the French scientists, who would have been 

collaborating with us for years, and the IAEA inspectors. Had we even 

diabolically thought of kicking both out and running the reactor ourselves 

for such a purpose, the limited fresh fuel that was allowed for us would 

have aborted any such attempt at the outset. Neither would the unique 

design of the reactor core for the “Caramel” fuel allow for fuel designs 

specific for plutonium production. 

Former Iraqi scientist Mahdi Obeidi agreed, pointing out that using 

the Osiraq reactor for weapons production was “a mismatch between 

idea and reality,” and that there were construction problems at 
6

the reactor at the time of the attack which would have introduced 

operational problems. Jafar Jafar, head of the Iraqi weapons program 

in the 1980s, also concurred, pointing out technical difficulties at the 

time, including inadequate equipment to extract plutonium.15

Disturbingly, some evidence suggests that the attack may have 

actually accelerated Iraq’s nuclear program by causing Saddam to 

increase his personal and material commitment to it. After the attack, 

Saddam released from prison Dr. Jafar, a nuclear scientist earlier 

suspected of opposition activity, and commissioned him to produce 

a nuclear weapon quickly. At the same time, Saddam multiplied the 

human and financial resources assigned to the Iraqi nuclear program 

by a factor of 15-plus.16

Thus far, the discussion has focused on intelligence failures 

undermining the viability of preventive attacks as an attractive 

policy choice. A second set of factors operating against the success of 

preventive attacks is the anticipation of the attack by the target. Ever 

since the Israeli strike, states with NBC programs have been much 

more aware of the possibility of being the target of a preventive 

attack. Some states have taken steps to reduce the vulnerability 

of their NBC programs by hardening facilities, building duplicate 

facilities, and keeping the existence and location of facilities secret. 

These moves can decrease substantially the chances that air and 

missile attacks against NBC facilities can succeed. Iraq provides 

one example. After the 1981 attack, the entire Iraqi program went 

underground, and Saddam ordered the construction of a whole 

array of secret installations, consulting with the KGB about how 

to build secret and survivable facilities. In the 1991 Gulf War, the 

Coalition launched a massive set of airstrikes against Iraqi NBC 

facilities, including nearly 1,000 air and missile attacks. These 

were in a narrow sense successful, in that they generally hit their 

designated targets. However, the attacks did not substantially 

degrade Iraqi NBC weapons and programs because the extent and 

locations of the program’s elements were unknown, a direct result 

of Saddam’s decision to disperse the program after the 1981 raid. 

Official U.S. Government analyses after the raid were quite blunt in 

their assessment of the attacks’ failure. A General Accounting Office 

report declared: 
The goal of eliminating Iraq’s NBC capabilities was not even approximated 

by the air campaign; very substantial NBC capabilities were left 

untouched. An intelligence failure to identify NBC targets meant that the 

air campaign hit only a tiny fraction of the nuclear targets and left intact 

vast chemical and biological weapons stores.17

The Gulf War Air Power Survey also was skeptical that the strikes 

substantially degraded or delayed Iraqi NBC programs.18 (However, 

as we shall note in detail later in this monograph, after 1991 Saddam 

Hussein ended the Iraqi nuclear program and destroyed its chemical 

weapons stockpile, for which production was never resumed. Also, 

the biological weapons program was terminated in 1995.)

Evidence suggests that other nations with illegal nuclear 

programs also got the message, and dispersed and concealed their 

programs. As early as 1993, the U.S. Air Force opposed air strikes 

against the North Korean nuclear program because of concerns that 

important elements of their program may have been unknown to 

U.S. intelligence. These reservations persisted some 10 years later 

when concerns about the North Korean program reappeared.19 Iran 

has also likely concealed important elements of its nuclear program. 

A report emerged in June 2005 that North Korea had sent advisers 

to Iran to help them build underground bunkers in which to hide 

components of the latter’s nuclear weapons program.20

The discussion thus far has focused on limited attacks, namely, air 

and missile strikes against industrial and scientific targets. A different 

class of preventive attacks, however, aims to stop an NBC program 

by overthrowing the regime that sponsors it. If military victory is 

followed by the installation of a stable and peaceful democratic 

regime that remains engaged with the international community, 

then such a regime replacement may indeed provide long-term 

inoculation against pursuit of NBC weapons. The advantage of this 

approach is that it avoids the intelligence problem of not knowing the 

location of all NBC production facilities, and it prevents a destroyed 

program from being rebuilt by a persistent rogue leader. There 

are some examples of such regime-change attacks. The 2003 Iraq 

War that overthrew Saddam Hussein is the clearest one, since the 

primary declared justification for that war was to prevent Iraq from 

developing NBC weapons. There have been other wars culminating 
in regime change in which removing an NBC threat was either a 

secondary motivation or a serendipitous benefit. Examples include 

the defeat and transformation of Germany and Japan during World 

War II (both had nuclear programs, and Japan had a biological 

weapons program as well), and the overthrow of the Taliban during 

the 2001 Afghanistan War (some NBC production materials were 

discovered in Afghanistan after the Taliban’s removal). 

But the record on attempts to change regimes and/or install 

enduring democratic institutions through military action, regardless 

of motives, is mixed. Successes include Germany, Italy, and Japan 

after World War II, Grenada in 1983, and Panama in 1989. Some 

failures are post-World War I Weimar Germany and several Latin 

American interventions, including those in the Dominican Republic 

between 1915 and 1924, and in Haiti between 1915 and 1934. The 

critical question for U.S. foreign policy is whether Afghanistan and 

Iraq can be transformed into stable, peaceful democracies, but it is 

certainly too soon to tell.

Although the prospect for success with regime-change attacks is 

uncertain, the costs are considerable. Unlike air and missile attacks, 

American casualties are unavoidable. The 2003 Iraq operation, 

which continues today, serves as a useful comparison since regimechange invasions of such states as Iran and North Korea would not 

be any easier, and likely far more difficult, than the Iraq operation. 

As of the week ending January 12, 2006, 2,205 American servicemen 

and women have been killed in theater since the start of combat 

operations, and the most reasonable projection is that this number 

will continue to climb during the continued America presence.21

Casualties aside, regime-change operations draw off military 

assets from other priorities. Special Forces units, CIA paramilitary 

units, and unmanned Predator aircraft were drawn away from 

Afghanistan in 2002 in preparation for the 2003 Iraq War, which 

in turn undermined American efforts to eliminate al Qaeda from 

Afghanistan and capture Osama bin Laden.22 In May 2005, the 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff wrote in a classified report to 

Congress that the Iraq War had limited the ability of the American 

military to fight in other conflicts, because of depleting stockpiles of 

precision weapons, the stress on reserve units, and other factors.23
The Iraq War has also reduced the willingness of young American 

men and women to volunteer for military service. In the fiscal year 

ending September 30, 2005, the Army missed its recruiting goals, 

achieving only 84 percent of the enlistment goal for the Reserve, 

80 percent for the National Guard, and 92 percent for the activeduty force.24 These shortfalls, the worst since 1979, are especially 

disturbing because they come in the wake of significantly greater 

recruitment efforts, including offering recruits more money, 

lowering educational standards, putting more recruiters in the field, 

increasing the advertising budget, and cutting corners by recruiters 

(including allegations of helping enlistees cheat on aptitude and 

drug tests, and helping them fake educational credentials) in order 

to meet individual quotas.25 Typical of such measures, in October 

2005 the percentage of recruits allowed into the Army who score low 

on the military aptitude tests (Category IV recruits) was doubled 

from 2 to 4 percent, and the quota for enlistees who lack high school 

diplomas was increased.26 Department of Defense (DoD) studies 

reveal that such low-scoring recruits are more likely to experience 

discipline problems, and less likely to reenlist.27 Applications to the 

Army, Naval, and Air Force academies were also down 9, 20, and 

23 percent, respectively, for the classes entering in the summer of 

2005.28 Moreover, the Pentagon in June 2005 unequivocally ruled out 

a draft, due to performance concerns with conscripts.29

These shortfalls are related directly to the war in Iraq. A 2004 

Army survey revealed that the source of the problem was physical 

fear of service there: “In the past, barriers [to enlistment] were about 

inconvenience or preference for another life choice. Now they have 

switched to something quite different: fear of death or injury.”30

Parents, a key factor affecting the decisions of young men and 

women to enlist, are also becoming disenchanted. One DoD survey 

noted that the percentage of parents who would recommend military 

service to their children declined from 42 percent in August 2003 to 

25 percent in November 2004.31

Projecting trends is difficult; some saw bright spots in an upturn 

in recruitment in the summer of 2005 after it seemed to bottom 

out in the preceding winter and spring.32 Others, however, remain 

concerned about recruitment in the short and medium term. Major 
10

General Michael D. Rochelle, the officer in charge of Army recruiting, 

declared in May 2005 that 2006 would likely be even more difficult 

for recruiting, perhaps the worst recruiting year since the initiation 

of the All-Volunteer force in 1973. Some speculate that this “death 

spiral” of recruiting may take years to overcome.33 The implications 

for combat readiness are direct and negative. In General Rochelle’s 

words, “It means positions in combat units cannot be filled in a 

timely manner.”34 Indeed, the recruiting shortfall of the late 1990s 

led the Army to rank one out of five of its combat divisions at the 

lowest level of combat readiness.35 These shortfalls also threaten the 

Army’s goal of expansion from 315,000 combat troops to 355,000 

combat troops over the next several years.36

Regime-change operations are also quite expensive; Congress 

appropriated $207.5 billion for the Iraq War from 2003 to 2005, with 

more yet to come.37 Given that American willingness and ability 

to spend on measures to combat terrorism and NBC weapons 

proliferation are not unlimited, we must ask how those funds can be 

spent most effectively towards accomplishing these goals. We shall 

return to this issue in subsequent sections.

A final concern about the costs of preventive actions is their 

potential to stimulate the very thing they were designed to prevent—

terrorism. Preventive wars might increase terrorism in four ways: first, 

the substantial use of force may increase global anti-Americanism, 

which in turn may increase the motivation of some individuals to 

join terrorist groups. This has certainly been the case with the 2003 

Iraq War; one British Muslim leader in July 2005 claimed the Iraq 

War served as a “successful recruitment sergeant” for al Qaeda.38

The CIA reported in 2004 that Hezbollah “would likely react to an 

attack against it, Syria, or Iran with attacks against U.S. and Israeli 

targets worldwide.”39 Second, the deployment of U.S. troops abroad 

may create targets of opportunity for terrorists. The militaries of 

democracies are tempting targets for terrorists, because democracies 

are perceived to be highly sensitive to casualties. One study found 

that most of the 188 instances of suicide terrorism from 1980 to 2001 

were launched against targets associated with democratic nations, 

particularly their militaries, in attempts to eject what were perceived 

as armies of occupation.40 Currently, U.S. troops deployed in Iraq and 
11

Afghanistan have served as magnets for international terrorists who 

see themselves as attempting to oust invading forces. Obviously the 

lower levels of security in those countries mean that American troops 

deployed there are more vulnerable than they would be on military 

bases on American soil. Third, if preventive attacks open the door to 

insurgency wars, thus providing ready targets for terrorist reprisals, 

then the preventive attacks in effect generate training opportunities 

for terrorist organizations. A 2005 CIA report concluded that terrorists 

recruited by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi are enjoying superior training 

and preparation in comparison to what was received by individuals 

serving under Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan. Both this report 

and a Canadian Intelligence Security Service report anticipate that 

terrorists training and fighting in Iraq will likely employ their newly 

developed skills elsewhere.41 Fourth, even if a military operation 

does culminate in regime change, the target state may be gripped 

by chaos and disorder, making it possible for terrorists and rogue 

elements to seize materials useful for producing NBC weapons. This 

was the case in Iraq when, from April to May 2003, materials for 

the construction of NBC weapons and ballistic missiles were looted 

from dozens of sites around the country.42

Diplomacy.

A second major approach to controlling the growth of NBC 

weapons-based terrorism is diplomacy. This is a mixed bag of 

actions by national and international entities such as Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty (NPT) members, Nuclear Suppliers Group, 

Missile Technology Control Regime, IAEA, and the United Nations, 

employing the full gamut of economic, political, and foreign policy 

tools. Recently, the Bush administration has joined with other 

nations to enact the Proliferation Security Initiative, which relies on 

international law and agreements to intercept possible NBC weapons 

shipments on the high seas and in ports.43 The United States has long 

been a supporter of using diplomacy to control the spread of NBC 

weapons.

A promising diplomatic approach contains several components. 

Most central is providing incentives for states to avoid acquiring NBC 

weapons or to give them up if they have them. These incentives can 
12

be positive, such as access to peaceful nuclear technology for states 

shunning these weapons, or negative, such as economic sanctions 

for states acquiring weapons. The incentives can be material, such as 

trade deprivation which attends the imposition of economic sanctions, 

or nonmaterial, such as conferral of pariah status for violating 

international norms. Beyond providing incentives, diplomacy also 

includes the actions of international organizations such as the IAEA 

to monitor state compliance with nonproliferation commitments. 

Formal nonproliferation rules and standards give states specific 

behavioral goals which, when achieved, acknowledge to the world 

community that they have met international expectations. In the realm 

of NBC weapons, this enforcement mechanism can be especially 

important as there are widespread possibilities for the military use 

of civilian technologies. Specific guidelines allow nations to know 

exactly what must be done to meet international expectations. The 

existence of monitoring machinery increases the incentives of states 

to comply. They know they are more likely to get “credit” (and receive 

carrots rather than sticks) for obeying nonproliferation norms if an 

authoritative third party certifies that they have indeed complied 

with international nonproliferation expectations and standards.

Nonproliferation diplomacy has enjoyed many successes, as well 

as a small number of disturbing failures. The principal structure of 

nonproliferation diplomacy is the NPT, signed in 1968. In one view, 

the NPT has been quite successful; when signed, only five countries 

had conducted nuclear tests (the United States, Britain, France, 

China, and the Soviet Union), and over the past 37 years, only two 

additional states (India and Pakistan) have conducted nuclear tests. 

Even if one includes the other states which are likely nuclear as of 

2005 (Israel and North Korea) and had secret nuclear arsenals in the 

past (South Africa), the resulting number is still quite small. This 

is a notable accomplishment, given the expectation in the 1960s 

that nuclear proliferation was likely to be rapid. In 1963, President 

Kennedy estimated that by 1970 there would be 10 nuclear powers, 

growing to 15 to 25 in the 1970s.44 The Johnson administration came 

to a similar conclusion in 1965.45

Nonproliferation diplomacy has prevented some states from 

going nuclear and encouraged other states to renounce their 

nuclear programs. By one count, 21 states (excluding Libya) have 
13

voluntarily abandoned nuclear aspirations or weapons since 1945, 

many because of the influence of the international community.46

International pressure pushed South Africa in the early 1990s to reveal 

and abandon its nuclear program and to join the NPT. Brazil and 

Argentina abandoned their nuclear programs, joining the NPT in the 

1990s. Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Ukraine were all born nuclear when 

the Soviet Union broke apart in the 1990s, and all three voluntarily 

abandoned their nuclear arsenals and joined the NPT in response to 

international incentives. Libya also voluntarily abandoned its NBC 

programs in 2004, largely in response to international pressure. 

Nonproliferation diplomacy has also slowed and reversed the 

spread of chemical weapons. Numerous nations have signed the 

1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which requires the 

disclosure and destruction of chemical weapons. This treaty has 

helped encourage states to stop constructing new chemical weapons 

and destroy their old ones. For example, when Albania, a signatory 

of the CWC, discovered a secret Communist-era cache of chemical 

weapons, it quickly revealed the discovery and moved immediately 

to arrange for the weapons’ destruction, assisted by $20 million in 

U.S. aid.47

With regard to Iraq, Iran, North Korea, and Pakistan, the effects 

of nonproliferation diplomacy are more complicated. In each case, 

nonproliferation diplomacy can be viewed as having had some 

success and some failure, and should be evaluated in a more nuanced 

fashion. Importantly, even when diplomacy was not successful, 

military action itself either failed or would not have proven to be an 

attractive alternative.

For Iraq, the experience of nonproliferation diplomacy can be 

broken down into three periods, pre-1981, 1981-91, and post-1991. 

In the pre-1981 period, Iraq sought to acquire a nuclear weapon, but 

was closely monitored by the international community. As discussed 

earlier, France provided a nuclear reactor and reactor fuel which did 

not lend themselves well to producing fissile materials. Furthermore, 

the IAEA knew about the Osiraq reactor and monitored it closely. 

The reactor never became operational, but the critical question is this: 

Had the Israelis not destroyed it, would the IAEA have been able 

to monitor the reactor sufficiently to prevent Iraq from producing 

fissile materials?
14

Many observers have concluded that the IAEA could have 

prevented Iraq from using Osiraq to build a nuclear weapon. The 

likelihood of detection of illegal weapons activity would have been 

high, both because the production of plutonium would have required 

a substantial amount of unusual activity and because the presence 

of hundreds of foreign technicians and inspectors would have been 

detected by camera surveillance and other means of observation. 

Had illegal weapons activity been discovered, the reactor would 

have been shut down, as Iraq depended on the import of reactor fuel 

from France, which would have ended the export of the fuel under 

such circumstances. In fact, an American physicist who visited the 

destroyed reactor in 1983 concluded that weapons activity would 

likely not have eluded the notice of the international community.48

During the 1981-91 period, nonproliferation diplomacy failed 

in the sense that, although Iraq remained a member of the NPT, 

it pursued a secret nuclear program unknown to the IAEA. How 

close Iraq was to producing a nuclear weapon when the Gulf War 

commenced is disputed, with estimates of the extra time needed 

ranging from 6 months to several years. Interestingly, nonproliferation diplomacy failed in large part because of the 1981 preventive 

attack, since Iraq was able to pretend that the attack destroyed its 

nuclear program while continuing to pursue nuclear weapons in 

secret. One former Iraqi nuclear scientist remarked, “Israel made a 

mistake. They destroyed the Osiraq reactor and this relieved Saddam 

of any problems with the Non-Proliferation Treaty.”49

During the post-1991 period, Iraq was subject to a series of intensive 

inspection regimes backed by economic sanctions. The 2004 Duelfer 

Report concluded that after 1991 Iraq ended its nuclear program, 

unilaterally destroyed its chemical weapons stockpiles, and did 

not resume production. Iraq’s biological weapons program ended 

in 1995. These moves were motivated in large part by the desire to 

get economic sanctions lifted. The report does declare that Saddam 

hoped to restart Iraq’s NBC programs once sanctions were lifted, 

which leaves open the question of whether there would have been 

some sort of post-sanctions NBC inspections regime which might 

have slowed or stopped Saddam’s pursuit of NBC weapons. In sum, 

however, the sanctions/inspection regime of the 1990s succeeded in 

removing NBC weapons and their production facilities from Iraq.50
15

A second key case and potential failure for NBC diplomacy is 

North Korea. North Korea signed the NPT in 1985, but did not sign the 

mandatory inspection agreement until 1992. Immediately after it did 

so, IAEA inspectors discovered gaps between the projected amount of 

plutonium produced in its reactor and the actual amount produced. 

North Korea rejected a more intrusive inspection the following year, 

at which point the IAEA declared it to be noncompliant with its NPT 

obligations. The United States considered launching military strikes 

against North Korea, but in 1994 diplomacy produced the Agreed 

Framework, in which North Korea agreed, among other things, 

to adhere to its NPT obligations and readmit IAEA inspectors, in 

exchange for energy and economic assistance.51 Military action was 

considered at the time, though dismissed. Planners were concerned 

that attacks would not be successful operationally, both because of 

the possibility of North Korean concealment of facilities, and because 

North Korea’s preference for burying facilities deep underground in 

narrow valleys limited the effectiveness of even the most advanced 

bunker-buster in America’s arsenal, the GBU-28.52

An additional concern was the possibility that even a limited 

airstrike on North Korean nuclear facilities might escalate to a 

general and very costly war. One North Korean defector, Cho Myung 

Chul, had attended high-level North Korean military meetings, and 

reported a lesson the North Koreans drew from the 1991 Gulf War, 

namely, that Iraq was not sufficiently aggressive, especially regarding 

its nonuse of NBC weapons. Cho estimated the chances of a limited 

attack on nuclear facilities escalating to general war to be about 80 

percent.53 Others, including former Commander-in-Chief of Joint 

Republic of Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command General Gary 

Luck, also feared that a limited attack could escalate to a general 

war.54 Such a war could, according to a 1995 estimate, yield up to 

100,000 American dead and $100 billion in financial costs.55 If North 

Korea were to use some of its several nuclear weapons in a military 

conflict, these numbers would, of course, be much higher.56

Signs emerged in the late 1990s that North Korea was not abiding 

by the terms of the Agreed Framework. In the spring of 1997, a 

high-level North Korean defector claimed that North Korea already 

possessed nuclear weapons. In early 1998, North Korea again refused 
16

to permit IAEA inspectors full access to relevant facilities. In August 

of that year, American satellite reconnaissance revealed construction 

near Yongbyon, which experts speculated may have been a nuclear 

reactor or reprocessing plant.57 The following March, North Korea 

permitted American officials to inspect the construction site, revealing 

only a network of empty tunnels. The Clinton administration 

declared there was no evidence that North Korea was violating the 

terms of the Agreed Framework, although this statement met with 

much criticism.58

In a 2002 meeting, the North Koreans seemed to concede that they 

had maintained a secret uranium enrichment facility, which would 

be in violation of the Agreed Framework. Soon after, in November, 

the United States, South Korea, and Japan declared that they were 

“suspending” oil shipments as laid out in the Agreed Framework, 

which was followed by the North Korean announcement that they 

were renewing work on three controversial reactors. Soon after, North 

Korea removed IAEA seals and surveillance cameras and ejected 

IAEA inspectors. In January 2003, North Korea formally withdrew 

from the NPT. Since then, talks between North Korea, the United 

States, and other nations have followed a start-and-stop pattern, 

with little progress. Overall, judging the success of the Agreed 

Framework is difficult. The North Koreans cheated, but some argue 

that the Agreed Framework provided benefits nonetheless. With the 

Framework, according to this argument, the North Koreans as of 

2002 had only one or two nuclear weapons instead of the 100 or so 

they might have had without the agreement.59

A third case is Iran, also a member of the NPT. Iran has had a 

peaceful nuclear program for years, with no declaratory weapons 

capacity. In August 2002, however, an Iranian opposition group 

announced the existence of two secret government facilities to 

produce fissile materials, one at Natanz to enrich uranium and one 

at Arak to produce plutonium; these claims were later confirmed by 

U.S. intelligence. The IAEA inspected the Natanz facility in February 

2003, finding extensive equipment for uranium enrichment, as well 

as evidence that some enrichment had already taken place. The 

Iranians also declared that they had another uranium enrichment 

facility using laser isotope separation, and that they were building a 
17

facility at Isfahan to convert yellowcake (uranium ore) into uranium 

hexafluoride, the latter being the substance which can be enriched 

into fissile material. These activities placed Iran in violation of its NPT 

commitments. Since then, the United States, and more particularly 

England, France, and Germany, have been in negotiations with 

Iran over its nuclear program. As of this writing, Iran has refused 

to renounce its claim to the right to enrich uranium for “research” 

purposes.60 As in the case of North Korea, there has been reluctance 

to pursue military action, both because of concerns that at least some 

nuclear facilities may be concealed, and because of the possible 

Iranian reaction to even a limited attack, which may include such 

steps as increasing its worldwide support of terror and bolstering its 

resolve to pursue nuclear weapons.61

A fourth case is Pakistan. Though Pakistan never signed the 

NPT, the United States unilaterally employed diplomatic tools, 

including economic sanctions, in an attempt to dissuade Pakistan 

from developing a nuclear program. These efforts were successful 

to the extent that Pakistan refrained from conducting a nuclear test 

for decades after the 1974 Indian nuclear test. However, Pakistan 

conducted its first nuclear test in 1998, and there have been recent 

revelations that Pakistani scientists had been supplying nuclear 

knowledge and materials to other nuclear aspirant states for years.62

America’s long-standing military, diplomatic, and economic 

relationship with Pakistan, especially its close cooperation since 

2001 in prosecuting the global war on terrorism, has foreclosed 

consideration of military action against its nuclear facilities.

What does the past record of nonproliferation diplomacy reveal? 

At the least, nonproliferation diplomacy is successful much of 

the time, and its economic, human, and diplomatic costs are low. 

Even apparent failures, such as North Korea, Iraq, and Pakistan, 

contain successful elements. The 2002 NSS appropriately embraces 

continuing and expanding current diplomatic efforts. 

Should preventive attacks be employed when diplomacy 

fails? This is the central recommendation of most preventive 

war advocates; when the United States cannot be confident that 

diplomacy and inspections are sufficient to prevent a state from 

acquiring NBC weapons, preventive attacks to destroy production 
18

facilities or overthrow the government should be options. However, 

preventive attacks are usually not attractive second choices in the 

face of diplomatic failure. Most critically, the principal factor likely 

to block successful inspections, the existence of secret facilities, will 

probably also undermine a limited military strike’s chances for 

success. Indeed, preventive military action did not work or would 

not have worked for diplomacy’s three greatest failures, post-1981 

Iraq, North Korea, and Iran, because of the concealment of facilities. 

Further, the temporary failure of diplomacy does not mean that 

diplomacy is permanently ineffective. In some cases, the diplomatic 

option has lured defiant states such as South Africa, Brazil, and 

Argentina back into the international fold, and even the temporary 

failure now to prevent states from acquiring weapons does not 

foreclose the potential for future success. Moreover, the failure of 

diplomacy does not necessarily entail the actual use of NBC weapons 

by states or terrorists. Deterrence can help prevent the former, 

and counterterrorist measures can help prevent the latter. Finally, 

whether or not it succeeds operationally, the military option means 

accepting potentially high diplomatic, economic, and human costs.

Deterrence.

Deterrence is the policy of threatening military action in response 

to some proscribed behavior. Although deterrence—especially 

nuclear deterrence—was the center of American defense policy 

during the Cold War, the NSS is critical of the suggestion that 

Cold War policies of deterrence can be extended to deal with NBC 

threats in the 21st century. It argues that deterrence is less likely to 

work against leaders willing to sacrifice their nations in pursuit of 

aggressive goals, that rogue state leaders might use NBC weapons to 

undermine the credibility of American retaliatory threats, and that 

deterrence threats will not work against terrorists, who may accept 

or even welcome their own deaths.

These criticisms have some merit insofar as deterrence is unlikely 

to work well in preventing state or terrorist acquisition of NBC 

weapons or the terrorist use of NBC weapons. However, deterrence 

is an extremely effective tool in preventing the use of NBC weapons 
19

by states, one of the key threats addressed by the NSS. Since 1945, 

nuclear-armed defenders have a perfect record of deterring the 

use of NBC weapons against themselves by other state actors. The 

United States has intimidated a long string of anti-American, nucleararmed dictators, including Soviet leaders from Stalin to Gorbachev, 

Chinese leaders from Mao to Hu Jintao, and North Korea’s Kim Jong 

Il, regarding use of NBC weapons against the United States or its 

allies. The few uses by states of NBC weapons have been against 

non-nuclear actors, including the Egyptian use of chemical weapons 

in 1965 during the Yemeni Civil War and Iraqi use of chemical 

weapons against Iranian targets and Iraqi Kurdish villages during 

the 1980s. 

Notably, deterrence does not prevent all aggression. Nuclear 

theorists have described the “stability-instability paradox,” in which 

nuclear weapons provide stability and peace at highly intense 

levels of violence (the use of NBC weapons), but less stability at 

lower levels of violence because the use of nuclear weapons is not 

credible against lesser threats.63 During the Cold War, the American 

nuclear deterrent did not prevent lower levels of Communist 

aggression, including intervention in the Third World (e.g., the 

Cuban intervention in Angola) and within the Communist bloc 

itself (e.g., the Soviet invasions of Hungary and Czechoslovakia). 

Furthermore, there are a few instances of nuclear-armed states 

being attacked with conventional weapons, including the 1969 SinoSoviet border dispute, the 1982 Falklands invasion by Argentina, 

and Iraq’s 1991 Scud missile attacks on Israel. However, the NSS is 

not concerned with conventional attacks; American conventional 

forces are sufficient in quality and quantity to address virtually any 

conceivable conventional threat, and such threats do not have the 

catastrophic potential attending NBC use. Our strategy is concerned 

rather with NBC attacks, and within this area deterrence is extremely 

effective.

Even with regard to the argument that post-Cold War leaders of 

rogue states are less deterrable than Cold War adversaries (because 

rogue state leaders seem more willing to sacrifice their nations then 

the latter), there may be less difference between these two groups of 

leaders than is often thought. Just as some now view rogue leaders 
20

as being casualty-insensitive, during the Cold War many had the 

same view of Communist leaders, though the latter were deterred 

successfully. Western defense analysts often worried during the Cold 

War that Soviet leaders would be willing to engage in aggression 

at the risk of sacrificing millions of their own citizens. After all, in 

this view, the loss of 25 million Soviet citizens and soldiers during 

World War II might have made them more willing to accept mass 

casualties.64 There were similar fears of Cold War China, driven 

partly by public statements by Mao Tse-Tung about the acceptability 

of nuclear war.65 However, despite these concerns about Communist 

casualty insensitivity, the United States successfully deterred both 

the Soviet Union and China from using NBC weapons during the 

Cold War. Nuclear deterrence helped keep many of the major Cold 

War crises, including the 1948 Berlin crisis, the 1958-61 Berlin crises, 

the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, and the 1973 Yom Kippur War, from 

escalating to war between the superpowers with the concomitant use 

of NBC or even conventional weapons. The Soviet Union also never 

attacked any American allies; their only overt acts of aggression, 

against Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and Afghanistan 

in 1979, were against Soviet allies to prop up or reinstall friendly 

governments. 

Similarly, the United States has for 50 years successfully deterred 

China from aggression involving an array of American interests in 

crises ranging from the post-revolution Taiwan invasion scare of 

1950 through the Quemoy/Matsu island crises of 1955 and 1958, to 

the Taiwan Straits missile tests of 1996. 66 Arguably perhaps, the only 

failure of American nuclear deterrence of China concerns the Chinese 

decision to intervene in the Korean War in late 1950. However, 

this event should not lessen our confidence in 21st century nuclear 

deterrence. The United States had made only vague deterrent threats 

in 1950, leading Mao to expect that America would not use nuclear 

weapons in response to the Chinese intervention. Clearer and more 

credible deterrent threats of nuclear escalation might have worked 

better then, and would likely work better in the future. 

Cold War episodes aside, substantial evidence suggests that 

rogue states have been deterred since the end of the Cold War. 

Iraq’s August 1990 invasion of Kuwait was probably not a failure 

of deterrence, because mixed signals sent by American Ambassador 
21

April Glaspie just prior to the invasion did not clearly convey an 

American intention to intervene. During the war, Iraq did not use 

chemical or biological weapons against either Coalition forces or 

Israeli cities (Iraq did attack the latter with conventionally-armed 

SCUD missiles). Alhough there is little first-hand evidence about 

Iraqi decisionmaking at this time, many have argued that the threat 

of Israeli nuclear retaliation deterred Iraq from launching biological 

or chemical weapons against Israel.67 American conventional and 

nuclear forces also prevented Iraq from engaging in any international 

aggression between 1991 and 2003. In particular, American threats 

and military deployments forced Iraq to back down during the 

Kuwait invasion scare of 1994.68

Some have argued that Saddam was not deterrable, and that 

his foreign policy actions from the 1970s forward describe a riskacceptant leader who frequently ignored information about the likely 

consequences of his actions and continuously made bad choices.69

However, the risky, deterrence-defying actions these observers point 

to fall into one of two categories. Some actions, such as attacking 

Iraqi Kurds in 1974, invading Iran in 1980, invading Kuwait in 1990, 

refusing to withdraw from Kuwait in 1991, setting fire to Kuwaiti oil 

fields, and dispatching hit squads to the United States were actions 

that did not involve the use of NBC weapons and hence, while 

outrageous, are actions outside the purview of the NBC threat that 

is the focus of the NSS. The second category involves the planned 

use of NBC weapons against Israel or Coalition troops in 1991 in the 

event of a nuclear attack or a march on Baghdad. These hypothetical 

possibilities amount to a stronger critique of regime-change invasions 

than of deterrence failures, because they indicate that a government 

with its back against the wall and literally nothing to lose may lash 

out and launch NBC weapons against the United States or its allies. 

However, if this is the only credible scenario in which deterrence 

might fail and enemy NBC use becomes a possibility, then the best 

way to avoid NBC use is to forgo regime change attacks which might 

put an incumbent regime in this position. Advocates of regime 

change attacks might argue that the key is to strike before such 

weapons have been developed, but the intrinsically poor nature of 

NBC intelligence undermines our confidence that a target state has 

not yet acquired NBC weapons. Certainly, in 1991 the air and missile 
22

strikes failed to destroy completely Iraq’s biological and chemical 

weapons, and Iraq would have had the capability then to use these 

weapons against Coalition troops had they marched on Baghdad.

Iraq aside, neither North Korea, Syria, Cuba, Libya, nor Iran has 

attacked its neighbors since 1990. This absence of aggression can 

likely be attributed to one of two possible explanations. The first is 

that these states at least occasionally considered aggression, as Iraq 

probably did in 1994, but they were deterred from action. This would 

then be evidence in favor of our relying on deterrence. The second 

is that these states did not even contemplate interstate aggression 

over this period. This second explanation suggests that it would be 

inappropriate to view the past 15 years as evidence of deterrence 

success, but it would also suggest that fears of the essentially 

aggressive nature of rogue leaders are likely exaggerated, as are fears 

that their acquisition of NBC weapons poses fundamental dangers 

to international order. 

In sum, the National Security Strategy’s critique of the efficacy 

of deterrence is off the mark. Deterrence worked during the Cold 

War, even against anti-American, NBC-armed, tyrannical, casualtyinsensitive regimes, and the absence of rogue state aggression after 

the Cold War is attributable either to successful deterrence or to 

heretofore underestimated rogue state conservatism in foreign 

policy. Deterrence since 1945 did not necessarily prevent states from 

supporting terrorism, cheating on international agreements, or even 

occasionally launching limited conventional attacks. However, the 

historical record does demonstrate that deterrence (especially nuclear 

deterrence) can accomplish the fundamental goal of preventing stateto-state use of NBC weapons, one of the fundamental problems that 

preventive strikes are intended to solve. Deterrence provides the 

critical backstop behind diplomacy when negotiations, the IAEA, 

and sanctions occasionally fail to prevent a state from acquiring NBC 

weapons.

Choices and Tradeoffs.

The NSS presents an array of different tools to confront the NBC 

threat. What choices should be made? There is no reason to abandon 

deterrence. It has essentially no geopolitical and only negligible 
23

financial costs. There is also no reason to abandon nonproliferation 

diplomacy. Despite the critiques of the NPT, it is essentially cost-free 

for the United States to pursue these efforts.

Preventive strikes, however, are more controversial and may 

impose higher costs. Limited strikes in some circumstances may be 

relatively cheap in terms of American lives or dollars, though, as noted 

earlier, attacks against North Korea or Iran may have unacceptably 

high costs. Costs aside, the record of success for limited strikes is 

quite poor, and future attacks would likely be even more difficult 

since potential target states now disperse and conceal their facilities 

in reaction to past attacks.

Some have speculated that just the threat of preventive strikes can 

make states more compliant with nonproliferation diplomacy. This 

claim is difficult to square with the rapid progress of the Iranian and 

North Korean nuclear programs since the threatening declarations 

of the U.S. strategy in 2002. These (and perhaps other) states got the 

clear message from our declaratory strategy that they were possible 

targets of American attack if they pursued the acquisition of NBC 

weapons, but that if they actually acquired them, they would not be 

attacked. In fact, some have now suggested that preventive action 

against NBC programs might erode the global anti-nuclear norm. 

The disturbing implication is that the NSS may have undercut 

diplomatic nonproliferation efforts.70

President Bush in his 2004 State of the Union Address claimed 

that the threat of preventive action was critical in pushing Libya to 

abandon its NBC programs in late 2003.71 At this juncture, we do not 

have sufficient evidence to verify or disprove this claim. However, a 

number of informed observers, including former Assistant Secretary 

of State Martin Indyk and former National Security Council member 

Flynt Everett, believe that international political and economic 

isolation, specifically the imposition of a series of U.S. sanctions starting 

in 1979 and UN sanctions in 1992, and not the threat of preventive 

strikes, were the leading factors in pushing Libya’s disarmament.

Notably, Libya’s reversal did not begin after the NSS declarations 

or the invasion of Iraq, but rather years earlier after the imposition 

of sanctions. During the 1990s UN sanctions pressured Libya into 

turning over suspected terrorists to international authorities and 
24

reducing markedly its support for international terrorism; and in 

1999 Libya offered to abandon its chemical weapons program in 

exchange for the elimination of sanctions.72 Beyond sanctions, the 

Libyan decision in late 2003 to disarm may have also been driven by 

the October 2003 seizure of centrifuges used for uranium enrichment 

from a ship en route to Libya, under authority of the Proliferation 

Security Initiative.73 Advocates of the threat of preventive strikes also 

must explain why previous military pressure, notably the 1986 air 

and naval strikes which killed some 93 Libyans including Qaddafi’s 

daughter, had failed to dissuade Libya from either pursuing NBC 

weapons or supporting terrorist groups. 

Thus far, three central components of the 2002 NSS have been 

discussed, including preventive attacks, diplomacy, and deterrence. 

What of other means of reducing the NBC threats, including, but not 

limited to, two other elements of NSS strategy—defense against and 

preparation to mitigate the effects of NBC attacks against America? 

Importantly, preventive attacks, especially major attacks intended 

to overthrow governments, may consume resources which might 

otherwise be allocated to these essential approaches. Preventive 

attacks are tremendously expensive, costing hundreds of billions of 

dollars over just the medium term. The unfortunate reality is that the 

United States does not have an infinite amount of money to spend. 

So we must ask the questions: What financial tradeoffs does this 

amount of spending force us to contemplate? Are those tradeoffs 

acceptable? 

To combat proliferation and terrorism, these resources will be 

spent more efficiently on priorities other than preventive wars such 

as the 2003 Iraq War. Currently an array of counterproliferation and 

counterterrorism priorities exist which are or will be underfunded or 

unfunded. First, ballistic missile defense (BMD), which includes an 

array of programs including Ground-Based Midcourse Defense, the 

Aegis sea-based system, and the Patriot Advanced Capability-3, may 

face threats to its funding in the future. A March 2005 Government 

Accountability Office Report found that:

in the future, MDA [the Missile Defense Agency] will likely face increased 

funding risks. . . . DoD’s acquisition [BMD] programs are likely to be 

competing for a decreasing share of the total federal budget and MDA’s 
25

programs are competing against hundreds of other DoD programs. . . . 

Furthermore, procurement and sustainment will demand increased 

funding as more missile defense components are fielded over time.74

BMD may become an increasingly important part of American 

nonproliferation policy since ballistic missiles present a current 

national security threat to American interests. Most notably, North 

Korea and Iran have the capability to attack American allies with 

ballistic missiles, and, according to the 2001 National Intelligence 

Estimate, the North Korean Taepo Dong-2 missile may have at least 

the theoretical capability to attack anywhere in the North America 

homeland with ballistic missiles.75 North Korea has the capability 

to arm its ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads, according to the 

April 2005 testimony of the chief of the Defense Intelligence Agency.76

BMD can provide at least some protection from ballistic missiles. The 

PAC-3 has demonstrated its effectiveness in both testing and combat 

conditions, and the Aegis system has had some successes in testing.77

In short, BMD is an increasingly viable solution to a real threat which 

will probably present increasingly difficult fiscal demands. 

A second priority is securing NBC weapons and related (especially 

fissile) materials from states willing to dispose of or eliminate 

them, especially former Soviet states. The 1991 Cooperative Threat 

Reduction (CTR) Act provides a framework for these initiatives, 

and has thus far been quite successful, decommissioning more than 

6,500 nuclear warheads. Securing these materials is a highly effective 

means of reducing the risk of nuclear terrorism. The most difficult 

part of fashioning a nuclear weapon is acquiring the necessary 

fissile material, and both types of material which can be used at 

the heart of a nuclear weapon (uranium 235 and plutonium) are in 

finite supply around the world, and very difficult and expensive to 

amass.78 A variety of grant-giving programs have been successful 

at preventing former Soviet NBC program functionaries from going 

to work for rogue states’ weapons programs.79 However, the Bush 

administration has approved only a small increase in spending 

under the Cooperative Threat Reduction Act from 2005 to 2006, to a 

little over a billion dollars.80

More funds could well be devoted to strengthening these vital 

efforts. A 2001 Department of Energy report estimated that $30 
26

billion would be needed to secure nuclear materials and know-how 

in Russia alone, and some estimate that under the current schedule 

it will take an additional 13 years to secure loose NBC materials in 

the entire former Soviet Union.81 An extensive 2004 Harvard report 

on the threat of nuclear terrorism and policy solutions such as CTR 

measures concluded that “whether one looks at budgets or at the 

more critical resource of sustained high-level leadership to overcome 

the obstacles, it continues to be the case that there is a substantial 

gap between the scope and urgency of the threat as President Bush 

himself has described it, and the response of the U.S. government.”82

Expansion of programs aimed at preventing NBC scientists from 

working for rogue states also is needed.83

A third priority is increasing the security of potential targets. 

Reports indicate that Al Qaeda has been trying to use commercial 

vessels to attack U.S. ports since at least 1997.84 A nuclear weapon 

could arrive in a shipping container, and either be unloaded onto 

U.S. soil or be detonated before unloading in a port. The Coast Guard 

estimates that needed improvements in ship and port security will 

cost in excess of $7.2 billion over the next decade. This contrasts with 

the relatively meager federal allocation of $46 million spent in 2004, 

and even the $150 million increase in federal port security grants 

in 2005.85 Another area demanding greater attention is emergency 

preparedness to respond to a possible NBC attack. A 2003 study 

recommended spending an additional $98 billion over 5 years 

beyond what had been committed to emergency preparedness at 

that point.86 More generally, there is a long list of priority needs for 

improved security against possible terrorist attack. For example, 

chemical plants and nuclear power plants require more resources for 

security and closer attention. Consider, too, that less than a quarter 

of all U.S. border crossings have sufficient radiation devices to check 

all entering goods.87

Some evidence exists that such defensive measures do work. 

The terrorist group that attacked a Moscow theater in 2002 had 

originally targeted the Kurchatov Institute, home of enough enriched 

uranium to make thousands of nuclear weapons. The high security 

at Kurchatov, however, induced the terrorists to attack the theater 

instead, their second-choice target.88 One systematic study found 

that installing metal detectors at airports reduced skyjackings, and 
27

that fortifying embassies was similarly effective in reducing attacks. 

In both cases, however, these defensive measures led to increased 

terrorism against other types of targets.89 Defensive measures do not 

offer a panacea to the problem of terrorism, but increasing security 

at high-priority targets like nuclear power plants can dissuade 

terrorists from NBC attacks and move them instead towards other 

acts which, though deadly, lack the catastrophic potential of attacks 

performed with nuclear, biological, or chemical agents. 

Conclusions.

The 2002 NSS sets forth a number of components of American 

strategy to address the threats posed by NBC weapons. This monograph has explored what mix of components should be employed 

to meet these threats. The central conclusion is that, although 

deterrence, diplomacy, defense, and various counterterrorism options 

are worth retaining, preventive attacks against NBC programs are 

generally undesirable. Limited strikes against NBC programs are 

lower in cost, but are quite unlikely to enjoy success in the medium, 

long, or even short term because of poor intelligence and enemy 

measures to decrease the vulnerability of his NBC facilities. Such 

attacks may also provoke aggressive responses. Larger attacks aimed 

at changing the regime of an NBC-armed rogue state have a better 

(though still limited) chance of reducing NBC threats, although they 

pose tremendous costs, most notably in the form of generating U.S. 

casualties (thus undermining the viability of a volunteer military), 

siphoning off military resources from more promising alternatives, 

and stimulating anti-Americanism, which may in turn increase 

terrorism.

American resources are better spent on other policy tools which 

are less costly, less dangerous, and have better chances of success. 

The American government should continue to support diplomatic 

efforts to contain the NBC threat through means such as the Nuclear 

Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Missile Technology Control Regime, 

the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the Proliferation Security 

Initiative. Deterrence should continue to be relied upon as a proven 

means of preventing the use of NBC weapons by states which acquire 

them. Substantial resources should be spent on other programs 
28

which promise to help contain the threats of NBC terrorism and 

proliferation, such as recovering fissile materials and improving port 

security.

Should preventive attacks against NBC programs ever be 

launched? It is difficult to imagine circumstances in which such 

attacks would serve the national interest. Concealment makes 

limited attacks in the future even less likely to succeed, and such 

attacks against countries such as North Korea and Iran would likely 

cripple any chance diplomacy might have, increase the target state’s 

motivation to acquire NBC weapons, and perhaps cause the target 

state to retaliate by supporting terrorism or launching interstate 

aggression. 

Regime change attacks also are unlikely to be attractive. The costs 

of even successful attacks on countries like Iran and North Korea 

would be gigantic, while democratization and stabilization would 

not promise to be any easier than in Afghanistan or Iraq. Indeed, 

the United States might make more headway in addressing the NBC 

threat if it considered using as a negotiations bargaining chip a pledge 

not to invade in exchange for critical concessions. In 1962, President 

Kennedy promised to remove obsolete missiles in Turkey and not 

to invade Cuba in exchange for a Soviet commitment not to deploy 

nuclear missiles in Cuba. The result best served American national 

security interests by removing a direct NBC threat to the American 

homeland in exchange for leaving Fidel Castro, a foreign leader who 

ultimately posed only minor security threats to American interests 

during the Cold War, in power. Today, North Korea’s greatest fear 

is an invasion by the United States. An American decision to move 

beyond the current technical state of war and commit not to invade 

North Korea is one of the very few bargaining chips which might 

move the North Koreans to make real progress towards verifiable 

disarmament. Such a promise could be worded specifically so that it 

does not mean American abandonment of commitments to defend 

allies like South Korea, does not amount to a commitment not to 

retaliate or even invade in retaliation in the face of due provocation, 

and does not abrogate America’s right to attack first if threatened 

by an NBC attack by North Korea. A similar promise might also 

achieve progress in ongoing negotiations with Iran over its weapons 

program.
29

Some might object that the United States needs to maintain 

maximum flexibility in action, both to allow for the possibility of 

invasion and to use the prospect of invasion as a club in inducing the 

other side to make concessions. However, in practice, such flexibility 

offers few benefits. As we have stressed, such regime change attacks 

are prohibitively costly, unnecessary, and counterproductive; and 

the United States loses very little in giving up an essentially bad 

policy option. The threat of attack also seems to add little in the way 

of bargaining leverage because potential targets have responded, 

not by making concessions, but rather by making their production 

facilities less vulnerable and by steeling their resolve to acquire such 

weapons as quickly as possible. Ultimately, the United States is likely 

to make more progress towards its fundamental goal of reducing 

the NBC threat by offering to forgo preventive attacks rather than 

threatening to launch them. 

ENDNOTES

1. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, Washington, DC: 

U.S. Government Printing Office, September 2002, pp. 14-15.

2. See, for example, A. F. K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger, 

Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980; Robert Gilpin, War and Change in 

World Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981; Robert Powell, In 

the Shadow of Power: State and Strategies in International Politics, Princeton: Princeton 

University Press, 1999.

3. Dan Reiter, “Exploding the Powder Keg Myth: Preemptive Wars Almost 

Never Happen,” International Security, Vol. 20, Fall 1995, pp. 5-34.

4. For further discussion of all past preventive attacks against NBC programs, 

see Dan Reiter, “Preventive Attacks against Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical 

Weapons Programs: The Track Record” in William W. Keller and Gordon R. 

Mitchell, eds., Hitting First: Preventive Force in U.S. Security Strategy, Pittsburgh, 

PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, forthcoming 2006.

5. Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb, New York: Simon and 

Schuster, 1986.

6. James Risen, “Question of Evidence: A Special Report,” New York Times, 

October 27, 1999, p. A1; Peter L. Bergen, Holy War Inc.: Inside the Secret World of 

Osama bin Laden, New York: Free Press, 2001, esp. pp. 123-125.

7. Comprehensive Report of the Special Adviser to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD, 

Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 30, 2004.
30

8. Rhodes, Making of the Atomic Bomb; Yuki Tanaka, Hidden Horrors: Japanese 

War Crimes in World War II, Boulder: Westview, 1996, esp. pp. 140-145.

9. Richard Rhodes, Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb, New York: 

Touchstone, 1995, pp. 363-366.

10. Judith Miller, Stephen Engelberg, and William Broad, Germs: Biological 

Weapons and America’s Secret War, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2001.

11. William Burr and Jeffrey T. Richelson. “Whether to ‘Strangle the Baby 

in the Cradle’: The United States and the Chinese Nuclear Program, 1960-64,” 

International Security, Vol. 25, Winter 2000/01, pp. 83-91.

12. James Risen, “India’s A-Tests Prompt C.I.A. to Review Its Warning 

Systems,” New York Times, July 4, 1998, p. A3.

13. Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding 

Weapons of Mass Destruction, Report to the President, March 31, 2005, www.wmd.

gov/report/.

14. Greg Thielmann, “Preventive Military Intervention: The Role of Intelligence,” Ridgway Center Policy Brief 04-1, October 2004.

15. Michael Jansen, “Baghdad’s Bomb—An Inside View,” Middle East 

International, January 10, 2003, p. 11; Imad Khadduri, Iraq’s Nuclear Mirage: Memoirs 

and Delusions, Toronto: Springhead, 2003, pp. 81-82; Mahdi Obeidi and Kurt Pitzer, 

The Bomb in My Garden: The Secrets of Saddam’s Nuclear Mastermind, Hoboken, 

NJ: Wiley, 2004, pp. 49-50; Jafar D. Jafar, Oppdraget:Innsidehistorien om Saddams 

atomvåpen, Oslo: Spartacus, 2005, with thanks to Kristin Bakke for assistance 

with translation from the original Norwegian. Two American scientists skeptical 

of Osiraq’s bomb-making potential are Harvard physicist Richard Wilson, “A 

Visit to the Bombed Nuclear Reactor at Tuwaitha, Iraq,” Nature, March 31, 1983; 

and Brookhaven Laboratory weapons expert Anthony Fainberg, “Osirak and 

International Security,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 37, October 1981, pp. 

33-34. For more on Osiraq, see Dan Reiter, “Preventive Attacks against Nuclear 

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pp. 355-371.

16. Khadduri, Iraq’s Nuclear Mirage, p. 82; Shai Feldman, Nuclear Weapons 

and Arms Control in the Middle East, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997, p. 136; Michael 

Eisenstadt, “Can the United States Influence the WMD Policies of Iraq and Iran?” 

Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 7, Summer 2000, p. 66; Shyam Bhatia and Daniel 

McGrory, Brighter than the Baghdad Sun: Saddam’s Nuclear Threat to the United States, 

Washington, DC: Regnery, 2000, p. 140; Khidhir Hamza with Jeff Stein, Saddam’s 

Bombmaker: The Terrifying Story of Iraq’s Nuclear and Biological Weapons Agenda, New 

York: Touchstone, 2000, pp. 137-139; “National Terrorism Alert Goes Up; Interview 

With Saddam’s Bomb Maker,” CNN Crossfire, February 7, 2003, transcripts.cnn.

com/TRANSCRIPTS/0302/07/cf.00.html, November 22, 2004; Jafar, Oppdraget, esp. 

pp. 55-56. 
31

17. Bhatia and McGrory, Brighter than the Baghdad Sun; General Accounting 

Office, “Operation Desert Storm: Evaluation of the Air Campaign,” GAO/NSIAD97-134, June 1997, Appendix III 9.2.5, www.fas.org/man/gao/nsiad97134/index.html, 

August 2, 2004.

18. Barry D. Watts and Thomas A. Keaney, Gulf War Air Power Survey, Volume 2: 

Operations and Effects and Effectiveness, Part II: Effects and Effectiveness, Washington, 

DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993, pp. 312-345. The 2004 Duelfer report 

characterizes the 1991 attacks as more successful, but unfortunately it does not 

go into great detail or directly rebut the GAO or GWAPS reports. Comprehensive 

Report, Vol. 2, “Nuclear,” esp. p. 4; Bhatia and McGrory, Brighter than the Baghdad 

Sun.

19. Leon V. Sigal, Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea, 

Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998, p. 76; Joel S. Wit, Daniel B. Poneman, 

and Robert L. Gallucci, Going Critical: The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis, 

Washington, DC: Brookings, 2004, pp. 103-104; Ann Scott Tyson, “Use of Force in 

Korea Is Tricky Proposition,” Christian Science Monitor, February 12, 2003, p. 2.

20. Brenda Shaffer, “Iran at the Nuclear Threshold,” Arms Control Today, Vol. 

33, November 2003, pp. 7-12; Shahram Chubin and Robert S. Litwak, “Debating 

Iran’s Nuclear Aspirations,” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 26, Autumn 2003, p. 108; 

Michael Knights, “Iranian Nuclear Weapons, Part II: Operational Challenges,” 

Policywatch, No. 761, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, May 29, 2003, www.

washingtoninstitute.org/watch/index.htm, August 2, 2004; Albright and Hinderstein, 

“Iran”; David E. Sanger, “Diplomacy Fails to Slow Advance of Nuclear Arms,” 

New York Times, August 8, 2004, p. 1; James Fallows, “Will Iran Be Next?” Atlantic, 

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21. “The Human Toll,” Army Times, January 23, 2006, p. 7.

22. Seymour Hersh, “The Other War,” New Yorker, April 12, 2004, Vol. 40, Issue 

8, p. 40; Graham Allison, Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe, 

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23. Thom Shanker, “Pentagon Says Iraq Effort Limits Ability to Fight Other 

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24. Tony Perry, “Marines Hit Recruiting Goal; Won’t Lower Bar,” Los Angeles 

Times, October 14, 2005, p. A30.

25. Damien Cave, “San Antonio Proudly Lines Up Behind the Military 

Recruiter,” New York Times, October 7, 2005, p. A1; Damien Cave, “Army Recruiters 

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26. Mark Mazetti, “Army Plans to Reorganize, Not Expand, to Meet Combat 

Needs,” Los Angeles Times, October 7, 2005, p. A13; Tom Bowman, “Criteria on Test 

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27. Bowman, “Criteria on Test Scores,” p. A1.
32

28. Brian MacQuarrie, “Fewer Applying to Military Academies,” Boston Globe, 

June 13, 2005, p. A1.

29. Bob Dart, “Army Misses Its Recruiting Targets Again,” Atlanta JournalConstitution, June 11, 2005, p. A8.

30. Thom Shanker, “Army Likely to Miss 2 Recruiting Goals,” New York Times, 

March 24, 2005, p. A18; Eric Schmitt, “After Lowering Goal, Army Falls Short on 

May Recruits,” New York Times, June 8, 2005, A10; “For Recruiters, A Distant War 

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Few Good Men and Women,” St. Louis Post Dispatch, March 16, 2005, p. B6.

31. Damien Cave, “Growing Problem for Military Recruiters: Parents,” New 

York Times, June 3, 2005, p. A1.

32. See the comments of Army spokeswoman Beth Musselman in Arthur Kane 

and Beth Potter, “Army Misses Recruit Target,” Denver Post, October 2, 2005, p. 

A1.

33. Damien Cave, “Army’s Top Recruiter Says 2006 May Be Biggest Test,” New 

York Times, May 13, 2005, p. A16.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid.

36. Ann Scott Tyson, “Recruiting Shortfall Delays Army Expansion Plans,” 

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38. Anonymous, Imperial Hubris: Why the West is Losing the War on Terror, 

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39. Allison, Nuclear Terrorism, p. 35.

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33

45. The Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, “A Report to the President,” 

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51. Ted Galen Carpenter and Doug Bandow, The Korean Conundrum: America’s 

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52. Wit et al., Going Critical, pp. 103-104.

53. Nicholas D. Kristof, “Tunneling Toward Disaster,” New York Times, January 

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54. Sigal, Disarming Strangers, p. 10.

55. Ibid. When President Clinton was briefed in May 1994, he was told by 

military planners that in the first 90 days there would be 52,000 Americans and 

490,000 South Koreans killed and wounded, at a direct financial cost of $61 billion. 

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57. Carpenter and Bandow, The Korean Conundrum, p. 53.

58. Ibid., pp. 53-57.

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34

62. Congressional Research Service, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Proliferation Activities 

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71. Available at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/20040120-7.html.

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35

76. David S. Cloud and David E. Sanger, “U.S. Aide Sees Arms Advance by 

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