United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Testimony 

Before the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government 

Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of 

Columbia, Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate 

DOD PERSONNEL 

CLEARANCES 

New Concerns Slow 

Processing of Clearances 

for Industry Personnel 

Statement of Derek B. Stewart, Director 

Defense Capabilities and Management 

For Release on Delivery

Expected at 2:30 p.m. EDT

Wednesday, May 17, 2006

 

GAO-06-748T 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

May 17, 2006

DOD PERSONNEL CLEARANCES

New Concerns Slow Processing of 

Security Clearances for Industry 

Personnel 

Highlights of GAO-06-748T a testimony 

before the Subcommittee on Oversight of 

Government Management, the Federal 

Workforce, and the District of Columbia, 

Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate 

The Department of Defense (DOD)

is responsible for about 2 million 

active personnel security

clearances. About one-third of the

clearances are for industry

personnel working on contracts for

DOD and more than 20 other 

executive agencies. Delays in

determining eligibility for a

clearance can heighten the risk that

classified information will be

disclosed to unauthorized sources

and increase contract costs and 

problems attracting and retaining

qualified personnel. Long-standing

delays in completing hundreds of 

thousands of clearance requests 

and numerous impediments that 

hinder DOD’s ability to accurately

estimate and eliminate its 

clearance backlog led GAO to

declare DOD’s personnel security

clearance program a high-risk area

in January 2005. 

This testimony presents GAO’s 

(1) preliminary observations from 

its ongoing review of the timeliness

and completeness of clearances, 

(2) concerns about the upcoming 

expiration of an executive order

that has resulted in high level 

commitment to improving the

governmentwide clearance

process, and (3) views on factors 

underlying DOD’s decision to stop

accepting clearance requests for 

industry personnel. 

GAO’s ongoing review of the timeliness and completeness of security 

clearance processes for industry personnel has provided three preliminary 

observations. First, communication problems between DOD and the Office 

of Personnel Management (OPM) may be limiting governmentwide efforts to 

improve the personnel security clearance process. Second, OPM faces 

performance problems due to the inexperience of its domestic investigative

workforce, and it is still in the process of developing a foreign presence to 

investigate leads overseas. Third, some DOD adjudication facilities have 

stopped accepting closed pending cases—that is, investigations formerly 

forwarded to DOD adjudicators from OPM—even though some required 

investigative information was not included. 

In addition, the expiration of Executive Order 13381 could slow 

improvements in the security clearance processes governmentwide, as well 

as for DOD in particular. The executive order, which among other things 

delegated responsibility for improving the clearance process to the Office of 

Management and Budget (OMB), is set to expire on July 1, 2006. GAO has 

been encouraged by the high level of commitment that OMB has 

demonstrated in the development of a plan to address clearance-related 

problems. Because there has been no indication that the executive order will

be extended, GAO is concerned about whether the progress that has resulted 

from OMB’s high-level management involvement will continue. Issues such 

as OPM’s need to establish an overseas presence are discussed as potential 

reasons why OPM may not be in a position to assume an additional highlevel commitment if OMB does not continue in its current role.

Finally, inaccurate projections of clearance requests and funding constraints 

are delaying the processing of security clearance requests for industry 

personnel. DOD stopped processing new applications for clearance 

investigations for industry personnel on April 28, 2006. DOD attributed its 

actions, in part, to an overwhelming volume of requests for industry 

personnel security investigations. DOD’s long-standing inability to accurately 

project its security clearance workload makes it difficult to determine 

clearance-related budgets and staffing requirements. The funding constraints 

that also underlie the stoppage are related to the transfer of DOD’s 

personnel security investigations functions to OPM. DOD has questioned 

some of the costs being charged by OPM and has asked OMB to mediate the 

DOD-OPM dispute. Information from the two agencies indicates that OMB 

has directed the agencies to continue to work together to resolve the matter. 

According to officials in the DOD and OPM inspector general offices, they 

are investigating the billing dispute and expect to report on the results of 

their investigations this summer. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-748T.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact 

Derek B. Stewart at (202) 512-5559 or 

StewartD@gao.gov. 
Chairman Voinovich and Members of the Subcommittee: 

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Department of Defense’s 

(DOD) personnel security clearance program and problems related to 

clearances for industry personnel. Since declaring DOD’s program a highrisk area in January 2005, we have testified before this Subcommittee 

three times on security clearance-related issues. Before providing my 

observations about the current problems in the security clearance process, 

I would like to provide some background to (1) give a general context for 

understanding clearances and describe the importance of industry 

personnel to our national security, (2) discuss how clearance problems 

can negatively affect national security, and (3) provide information about 

several recent events affecting the overall status of DOD’s personnel 

security clearance program. 

For over 2 decades, we have reported on problems with DOD’s personnel 

security clearance program as well as the financial costs and risks to 

national security resulting from these problems (see Related GAO Reports 

at the end of this statement). For example, at the turn of the century, we 

documented problems such as incomplete investigations, inconsistency in 

determining eligibility for clearances, and a backlog of overdue clearance 

reinvestigations that exceeded 500,000 cases.1

 More recently in 2004, we 

identified continuing and new impediments hampering DOD’s clearance 

program and made recommendations for increasing the effectiveness and

efficiency of the program.2

 Also in September 2004 and June and 

November 2005, we testified before this Subcommittee on clearanceBackground 

 1

 GAO, DOD Personnel: More Consistency Needed in Determining Eligibility for Top

Secret Security Clearances, GAO-01-465 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 18, 2001); GAO, DOD 

Personnel: More Actions Needed to Address Backlog of Security Clearance 

Reinvestigations, GAO/NSIAD-00-215 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 24, 2000); and GAO, DOD 

Personnel: Inadequate Personnel Security Investigations Pose National Security Risks, 

GAO/NSIAD-00-12 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 27, 1999). 

2

 GAO, DOD Personnel Clearances: Additional Steps Can Be Taken to Reduce Backlogs

and Delays in Determining Security Clearance Eligibility for Industry Personnel, GAO04-632 (Washington, D.C.: May 26, 2004); and GAO, DOD Personnel Clearances: DOD 

Needs to Overcome Impediments to Eliminating Backlog and Determining Its Size, GAO04-344 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 9, 2004). 

Page 2 GAO-06-748T 
related problems faced governmentwide, DOD-wide, and for industry 

personnel in particular.3

A critical step in the federal government’s efforts to protect national 

security is to determine whether an individual is eligible for a personnel 

security clearance. Specifically, an individual whose job requires access to

classified information must undergo a background investigation and 

adjudication (determination of eligibility) in order to obtain a clearance. 

As with federal government workers, the demand for personnel security 

clearances for industry personnel has increased during recent years. 

Additional awareness of threats to our national security since September 

11, 2001, and efforts to privatize federal jobs during the last decade are but 

two of the reasons for the greater number of industry personnel needing 

clearances today. As of September 30, 2003, industry personnel held about 

one-third of the approximately 2 million DOD-issued clearances. DOD’s 

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence has overall 

responsibility for DOD clearances, and its responsibilities also extend 

beyond DOD. Specifically, that office’s responsibilities include obtaining 

background investigations and adjudicating clearance eligibility for 

 3

 GAO, DOD Personnel Clearances: Government Plan Addresses Some Longstanding 

Problems with DOD’s Program, But Concerns Remain, GAO-06-233T (Washington, D.C.: 

Nov. 9, 2005); GAO, DOD Personnel Clearances: Some Progress Has Been Made but 

Hurdles Remain to Overcome the Challenges That Led to GAO’s High-Risk Designation, 

GAO-05-842T (Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2005); and GAO, Intelligence Reform: Human

Capital Considerations Critical to 9/11 Commission’s Proposed Reforms, GAO-04-1084T 

(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 14, 2004). 

Page 3 GAO-06-748T 
industry personnel in more than 20 other federal agencies,4

 as well as the 

clearances of staff in the federal government’s legislative branch. 

Problems in the clearance program can negatively affect national security. 

For example, delays reviewing security clearances for personnel who are 

already doing classified work can lead to a heightened risk of disclosure of 

classified information. In contrast, delays in providing initial security 

clearances for previously non cleared personnel can result in other 

negative consequences, such as additional costs and delays in completing 

national security-related contracts, lost-opportunity costs, and problems 

retaining the best qualified personnel.

Long-standing delays in completing hundreds of thousands of clearance 

requests for servicemembers, federal employees, and industry personnel 

as well as numerous impediments that hinder DOD’s ability to accurately

estimate and eliminate its clearance backlog led us to declare the program 

a high-risk area in January 2005. The 25 areas on our high-risk list at that 

time received their designation because they are major programs and 

operations that need urgent attention and transformation in order to 

ensure that our national government functions in the most economical, 

efficient, and effective manner possible.5

 4

 We identified 22 other agencies in GAO-04-632. Executive Order No. 10865, Safeguarding 

Classified Information Within Industry, Feb. 20, 1960, which was amended by Executive 

Order No. 12829, National Industrial Security Program, Jan. 6, 1993, authorizes DOD to

reach agreement with other federal departments and agencies to extend its regulations 

concerning authorizations for access to classified information by industry. The agencies

that have entered into agreements with DOD for security services under the National 

Industrial Security Program are the (1) National Aeronautics and Space Administration, (2) 

Department of Commerce, (3) General Services Administration, (4) Department of State,

(5) Small Business Administration, (6) National Science Foundation, (7) Department of 

Treasury, (8) Department of Transportation, (9) Department of the Interior, (10)

Department of Agriculture, (11) Department of Labor, (12) Environmental Protection 

Agency, (13) Department of Justice, (14) Federal Reserve System, (15) U.S. Government 

Accountability Office (formerly U.S. General Accounting Office), (16) U.S. Trade 

Representative, (17) U.S. International Trade Commission, (18) U.S. Agency for 

International Development, (19) Nuclear Regulatory Commission, (20) Department of

Health and Human Services, (21) Department of Homeland Security, and (22) Department

of Education. The Department of Energy and the Central Intelligence Agency are 

signatories of the National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual and thus have 

reciprocity with DOD under provisions of the manual. Three federal agencies (the 

Department of Energy, the Central Intelligence Agency, and Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission) also may grant security clearances to industry personnel who work on

national security-related programs. 

5

 GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-05-207 (Washington, D.C.: January 2005). 

Page 4 GAO-06-748T 
Shortly after we placed DOD’s clearance program on our high-risk list, a 

major change in DOD’s program occurred. In February 2005, DOD 

transferred its personnel security investigations functions and about 1,800 

investigative positions to the Office of Personnel Management (OPM). 

Now, DOD obtains nearly all of its clearance investigations from OPM,6

which is currently responsible for 90 percent of the personnel security 

clearance investigations in the federal government.7

 DOD retained 

responsibility for adjudication of military personnel, DOD civilians, and 

industry personnel. 

Other recent significant events affecting DOD’s clearance program have 

been the passage of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act 

of 2004 and the issuance of the June 2005 Executive Order 13381, 

“Strengthening Processes Relating to Determining Eligibility for Access to 

Classified National Security Information.” The act included milestones for 

reducing the time to complete clearances, general specifications for a 

database on security clearances, and requirements for greater reciprocity 

of clearances (the acceptance of a clearance and access granted by 

another department, agency, or military service). Among other things, the 

executive order resulted in the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 

taking a lead role in preparing a strategic plan to improve personnel 

security clearance processes governmentwide. 

Using the context that I have laid out for understanding the interplay 

between DOD and OPM in DOD’s personnel security clearance processes, 

I will address three issues. First, I will provide a status update and 

preliminary observations from our ongoing audit on the timeliness and 

completeness of the processes used to determine whether industry 

 6

 Currently the National Security Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, and National 

Reconnaissance Office each have a waiver that allows them to contract for their own

personnel security clearance investigations. 

7

 In GAO-05-842T, we listed the departments/agencies having statutory or delegated 

authority to conduct background investigations, as identified by the then Deputy Associate 

Director of OPM’s Center for Investigations Services. Those departments/agencies are 

Central Intelligence Agency; Department of State; Department of the Treasury; Internal 

Revenue Service; Bureau of Engraving and Printing; Federal Bureau of Investigation; 

National Security Agency; U.S. Agency for International Development; Department of

Homeland Security; Bureau of Customs and Border Protection; U.S. Secret Service; Small 

Business Administration; Broadcasting Board of Governors; Department of Justice—

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives; U.S. Postal Service; Tennessee 

Valley Authority; National Reconnaissance Office; and Peace Corps. Even though these 

agencies have authority to conduct their own investigations, some of them request OPM to 

conduct all or part of their investigations. 

Page 5 GAO-06-748T 
personnel are eligible to hold a top secret clearance—an audit that this 

Subcommittee requested. Second, I will discuss potential adverse effects

that might result from the July 1, 2006, expiration of Executive Order 

13381. Finally, I will discuss DOD’s recent action to suspend the 

processing of clearance requests for industry personnel. 

With the exception of the update and preliminary observations on our 

current audit, my comments today are based primarily on our completed 

work and our institutional knowledge from our prior reviews of the 

clearance processes used by DOD and, to a lesser extent, other agencies. 

In addition, we used information from the Intelligence Reform and 

Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, executive orders, and other documents 

such as a memorandum of agreement between DOD and OPM. We 

conducted our work in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards in May 2006. 

Although our audit of DOD’s clearance processes for industry personnel is 

ongoing, we have three preliminary observations. First, communication 

problems between DOD and OPM may be limiting governmentwide efforts 

to improve personnel security clearance processes. For example, until 

recently, OPM had not officially shared its investigator’s handbook with 

DOD adjudicators. Adjudicators raised concerns that without knowing 

what was required for an investigation by the investigator’s handbook, 

they could not fully understand how investigations were conducted and

the investigative reports that form the basis for their adjudicative 

decisions. OPM indicates that it is revising the investigator’s handbook and 

is obtaining comments from DOD and other customers. Second, OPM 

faces performance problems due to the inexperience of its domestic 

investigative workforce, and it is still in the process of developing a 

foreign presence to investigate leads overseas. OPM reports that it is 

making progress in establishing an overseas presence, but that it will take 

time to fully meet the demand for overseas investigative coverage. Third, 

some DOD adjudication facilities have stopped accepting closed pending 

cases—that is, investigations formerly forwarded to DOD adjudicators 

from OPM—even though some required investigative information is not 

included. 

Summary 

The expiration of Executive Order 13381 could slow improvements in the 

security clearance processes governmentwide, as well as for DOD in 

particular. The executive order, which among other things delegated

responsibility for improving the clearance process to the Director of OMB, 

is set to expire on July 1, 2006. We have been encouraged by the high level

Page 6 GAO-06-748T 
of commitment that OMB demonstrated in the development of a plan to

address clearance-related problems. Because there has been no indication 

that the executive order will be extended, we are concerned about 

whether such progress will continue without OMB’s high-level 

management involvement. If OMB does not continue in its current role, 

OPM may not be in a position to assume additional high-level commitment 

for several reasons, including its inability to resolve disputes with other 

agencies. 

Finally, a billing dispute between DOD and OPM may cause further delays 

in processing security clearances for industry personnel. DOD stopped 

processing applications for clearance investigations for industry personnel 

on April 28, 2006, and attributed its actions to an overwhelming volume of

requests for industry personnel security investigations and funding 

constraints. DOD’s inability to accurately project its security clearance 

workload makes it difficult to determine clearance-related budgets and 

staffing requirements. The funding constraints that contributed to the 

stoppage are related to the costs resulting from the agreement that 

transferred DOD’s clearance investigations function to OPM. DOD has 

asked OMB to mediate the dispute; however, information from DOD and 

OPM indicates that OMB has directed the two agencies to continue to 

work together to resolve the matter. According to representatives from 

DOD and OPM inspector general offices, they are currently investigating 

all of the issues raised in the Under Secretary’s and Associate Director’s 

correspondences and have indicated that they intend to issue reports on 

their reviews during the summer. 

Mr. Chairman, at your and other congressional members request, we 

continue to examine the timeliness and completeness of the processes 

used to determine whether industry personnel are eligible to hold a top 

secret clearance. Two key elements of the security clearance process are 

investigation and adjudication. In the investigation portion of the security

clearance process, the investigator seeks to obtain information pertaining 

to the security clearance applicant’s loyalty, character, reliability, 

trustworthiness, honesty, and financial responsibility. For top secret 

security clearances, the types or sources of information include an 

interview with the subject of the investigation, national agency checks 

(e.g., Federal Bureau of Investigations and immigration records), local 

agency checks (e.g., municipal police and court records), financial checks, 

birth date and place, citizenship, education, employment, public records 

for information such as bankruptcy or divorce, and interviews with 

references. In the adjudication portion of the security clearance process,

Preliminary 

Observations from 

GAO’s Ongoing Audit 

Suggests Additional 

Problems 

Page 7 GAO-06-748T 
government employees in 10 DOD adjudication facilities—2 of which serve 

industry—use the information gathered at the investigation stage to 

approve, deny, or revoke eligibility to access classified information. Once 

adjudicated, the security clearance is then issued up to the appropriate 

eligibility level, or alternative actions are taken if eligibility is denied or 

revoked. A major part of our audit is reviewing fully adjudicated industry 

cases to determine the completeness of both the investigations and the 

adjudications for top secret clearances. We will complete this audit and 

issue a report to your Subcommittee and other congressional requesters 

this fall. 

I will briefly mention three of the preliminary observations that we have 

been able to derive thus far from our audit. 

• Communication problems may be limiting governmentwide efforts to 

improve the personnel security clearance process. The billing dispute that 

I discuss later in this testimony is one example of a communication 

breakdown. In addition, until recently, OPM had not officially shared its 

investigator’s handbook with DOD adjudicators. Adjudicators raised 

concerns that without knowing what was required for an investigation by

the investigator’s handbook, they could not fully understand how 

investigations were conducted and the investigative reports that form the 

basis for their adjudicative decisions. OPM indicates that it is revising the

investigator’s handbook and is obtaining comments from DOD and other 

customers. 

• OPM acknowledges that despite its significant effort to develop a domestic 

investigative workforce, performance problems remain because of the 

workforce’s inexperience. OPM reports that they are making progress in 

hiring and training new investigators, however, they have also noted that it

will take a couple of years for the investigative workforce to reach desired 

performance levels. In addition, OPM is still in the process of developing a 

foreign presence to investigate leads overseas. OPM also reports that it is 

making progress in establishing an overseas presence, but that it will take 

time to fully meet the demand for overseas investigative coverage. 

• Some DOD adjudication facilities have stopped accepting closed pending 

cases—investigations forwarded to adjudicators even though some 

required information is not included—from OPM. DOD adjudication 

officials need all of the required investigative information in order to 

determine clearance eligibility. Without complete investigative 

information, DOD adjudication facilities must store the hard-copy closed 

pending case files until the required additional information is provided by 

OPM. According to DOD officials, this has created a significant 

administrative burden. 

Page 8 GAO-06-748T 
The July 1, 2006, expiration of Executive Order 13381 could slow 

improvements in personnel security clearance processes governmentwide

as well as for DOD in particular. Among other things, this new executive 

order delegated responsibility for improving the clearance process to the 

OMB Director from June 30, 2005, to July 1, 2006. We have been 

encouraged by the high level of commitment that OMB demonstrated in 

the development of a plan to improve the personnel security clearance

process governmentwide. Also, the OMB Deputy Director met with GAO 

officials to discuss OMB’s general strategy for addressing the problems 

that led to our high-risk designation for DOD’s clearance program. 

Demonstrating strong management commitment and top leadership 

support to address a known risk is one of the requirements for removing 

DOD’s clearance program from GAO’s high-risk list. 

Because there has been no indication that the executive order will be 

extended, we are concerned about whether such progress will continue 

without OMB’s high-level management involvement. While OPM has 

provided some leadership in assisting OMB with the development of the 

governmentwide plan, OPM may not be in a position to assume additional 

high-level commitment for a variety of reasons if OMB does not continue 

in its current role. These reasons include: (1) the governmentwide plan 

lists many management challenges facing OPM and the Associate Director 

of its investigations unit, such as establishing a presence to conduct 

overseas investigations and adjusting its investigative workforce to the

increasing demand for clearances; (2) adjudication of personnel security 

clearances and determination of which organizational positions require 

such clearances is not an OPM responsibility; and (3) agencies’ disputes 

with OPM—such as the current billing dispute with DOD—may need a 

high-level, impartial third party to mediate a resolution. 

DOD stopped processing applications for clearances for industry 

personnel on April 28, 2006. DOD attributed its actions to an 

overwhelming volume of requests for industry personnel security 

investigations and funding constraints. 

The unexpected volume of security clearance requests resulted in DOD 

having to halt the processing of industry security clearances. We have 

testified repeatedly that a major impediment to providing timely 

clearances is DOD’s inaccurately projected number of requests for 

security clearances DOD-wide and for industry personnel specifically. 

DOD’s inability to accurately project clearance requirements makes it 

difficult to determine clearance-related budgets and staffing. In fiscal year 

Expiration of 

Executive Order 

Could Slow 

Improvements in 

Clearance Processes 

Unexpected Volume 

of Clearance Requests 

and Funding 

Constraints Delay 

Security Clearances 

for Industry 

Personnel Further 

Page 9 GAO-06-748T 
2001, DOD received 18 percent fewer requests than it projected (about 

150,000); and in fiscal years 2002 and 2003, it received 19 and 13 percent 

(about 135,000 and 90,000), respectively, more requests than projected. In

2005, DOD was again uncertain about the number and level of clearances 

that it required, but the department reported plans and efforts to identify 

clearance requirements for servicemembers, civilian employees, and 

contractors. For example, in response to our May 2004 recommendation to 

improve the projection of clearance requests for industry personnel, DOD 

indicated that it is developing a plan and computer software to have the 

government’s contracting officers (1) authorize the number of industry 

personnel clearance investigations required to perform the classified work 

on a given contract and (2) link the clearance investigations to the 

contract number. 

An important consideration in understanding the funding constraints that 

contributed to the stoppage is a DOD-OPM billing dispute, which has 

resulted in the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence requesting 

OMB mediation. The dispute stems from the February 2005 transfer of 

DOD’s personnel security investigations function to OPM. 

The memorandum of agreement signed by the OPM Director and the DOD 

Deputy Secretary prior to the transfer lists many types of costs that DOD 

may incur for up to 3 years after the transfer of the investigations function 

to OPM. One cost, an adjustment to the rates charged to agencies for 

clearance investigations, provides that “OPM may charge DOD for 

investigations at DOD’s current rates plus annual price adjustments plus a 

25 percent premium to offset potential operating losses. OPM will be able 

to adjust, at any point of time during the first three year period after the 

start of transfer, the premium as necessary to cover estimated future costs 

or operating losses, if any, or offset gains, if any.”

The Under Secretary’s memorandum says that OPM has collected 

approximately $50 million in premiums in addition to approximately $144 

million for other costs associated with the transfer. The OPM Associate 

Director subsequently listed costs that OPM has incurred. To help resolve 

this billing matter, DOD requested mediation from OMB, in accordance 

with the memorandum of agreement between DOD and OPM. Information 

from DOD and OPM indicates that OMB subsequently directed the two 

agencies to continue to work together to resolve the matter on their own. 

According to representatives from DOD and OPM inspector general 

offices, they are currently investigating all of the issues raised in the Under 

Secretary’s and Associate Director’s correspondences and have indicated 

that they intend to issue reports on their reviews during the summer. 

Page 10 GAO-06-748T 
Mr. Chairman, I want to assure you that we will continue taking multiple 

steps to assess and monitor DOD’s personnel security clearance program. 

As I have discussed, we are currently reviewing the timeliness and 

completeness of the processes used to determine whether industry 

personnel are eligible to hold a top secret clearance. We will report that 

information to your Subcommittee this fall. Also, our standard steps of 

monitoring programs on our high-risk list require that we evaluate the 

progress that agencies make toward being removed from GAO’s high-risk 

list.8

 Finally, we continuously monitor our recommendations to agencies 

to determine whether active steps are being taken to overcome program 

deficiencies.

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my 

prepared statement. I would be happy to answer any questions you may 

have at this time. 

For further information regarding this testimony, please contact me at 202-

512-5559 or stewartd@gao.gov. Individuals making key contributions to 

this testimony include Jack E. Edwards, Assistant Director; Jerome 

Brown; Kurt A. Burgeson; Susan C. Ditto; David Epstein; Sara Hackley; 

James Klein; and Kenneth E. Patton.

Concluding 

Observations 

Staff Contact and 

Acknowledgments 

 8

 The general steps required to remove DOD’s personnel security clearance program from

the high-risk list are summarized in GAO-06-233T. 

Page 11 GAO-06-748T 
Page 12 GAO-06-748T 

Related GAO Products

Managing Sensitive Information: Departments of Energy and Defense 

Policies and Oversight Could Be Improved. GAO-06-369. Washington, 

D.C.: March 7, 2006. 

Managing Sensitive Information: DOE and DOD Could Improve Their 

Policies and Oversight. GAO-06-531T. Washington, D.C.: March 14, 2006.

GAO’s High-Risk Program. GAO-06-497T. Washington, D.C.: March 15, 

2006. 

Questions for the Record Related to DOD’s Personnel Security Clearance 

Program and the Government Plan for Improving the Clearance Process. 

GAO-06-323R. Washington, D.C.: January 17, 2006. 

DOD Personnel Clearances: Government Plan Addresses Some Longstanding Problems with DOD’s Program, But Concerns Remain. GAO-06-

233T. Washington, D.C.: November 9, 2005. 

Defense Management: Better Review Needed of Program Protection 

Issues Associated with Manufacturing Presidential Helicopters. GAO-06-

71SU. Washington, D.C.: November 4, 2005. 

DOD’s High-Risk Areas: High-Level Commitment and Oversight Needed 

for DOD Supply Chain Plan to Succeed. GAO-06-113T. Washington, D.C.: 

October 6, 2005. 

Questions for the Record Related to DOD’s Personnel Security Clearance 

Program. GAO-05-988R. Washington, D.C.: August 19, 2005. 

Industrial Security: DOD Cannot Ensure Its Oversight of Contractors 

under Foreign Influence Is Sufficient. GAO-05-681. Washington, D.C.: 

July 15, 2005.

DOD Personnel Clearances: Some Progress Has Been Made but Hurdles 

Remain to Overcome the Challenges That Led to GAO’s High-Risk 

Designation. GAO-05-842T. Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2005.

Defense Management: Key Elements Needed to Successfully Transform 

DOD Business Operations. GAO-05-629T. Washington, D.C.: April 28, 

2005. 
Maritime Security: New Structures Have Improved Information 

Sharing, but Security Clearance Processing Requires Further Attention. 

GAO-05-394. Washington, D.C.: April 15, 2005. 

DOD’s High-Risk Areas: Successful Business Transformation Requires 

Sound Strategic Planning and Sustained Leadership. GAO-05-520T. 

Washington, D.C.: April 13, 2005. 

GAO’s 2005 High-Risk Update. GAO-05-350T. Washington, D.C.: February 

17, 2005. 

High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-05-207. Washington, D.C.: January 

2005. 

Intelligence Reform: Human Capital Considerations Critical to 9/11 

Commission’s Proposed Reforms. GAO-04-1084T. Washington, D.C.: 

September 14, 2004. 

DOD Personnel Clearances: Additional Steps Can Be Taken to Reduce 

Backlogs and Delays in Determining Security Clearance Eligibility for 

Industry Personnel. GAO-04-632. Washington, D.C.: May 26, 2004. 

DOD Personnel Clearances: Preliminary Observations Related to 

Backlogs and Delays in Determining Security Clearance Eligibility for 

Industry Personnel. GAO-04-202T. Washington, D.C.: May 6, 2004. 

Security Clearances: FBI Has Enhanced Its Process for State and Local 

Law Enforcement Officials. GAO-04-596. Washington, D.C.: April 30, 2004.

Industrial Security: DOD Cannot Provide Adequate Assurances That Its 

Oversight Ensures the Protection of Classified Information. GAO-04-332. 

Washington, D.C.: March 3, 2004. 

DOD Personnel Clearances: DOD Needs to Overcome Impediments to 

Eliminating Backlog and Determining Its Size. GAO-04-344. Washington, 

D.C.: February 9, 2004. 

Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Is Addressing Challenges 

of Its Expanded Mission and Workforce, but Additional Actions Needed. 

GAO-04-242. Washington, D.C.: November 19, 2003. 

Page 13 GAO-06-748T 
Results-Oriented Cultures: Creating a Clear Linkage between Individual 

Performance and Organizational Success. GAO-03-488. Washington, D.C.: 

March 14, 2003. 

Defense Acquisitions: Steps Needed to Ensure Interoperability of 

Systems That Process Intelligence Data. GAO-03-329. Washington D.C.: 

March 31, 2003. 

Managing for Results: Agency Progress in Linking Performance Plans 

With Budgets and Financial Statements. GAO-02-236. Washington D.C.: 

January 4, 2002. 

Central Intelligence Agency: Observations on GAO Access to Information 

on CIA Programs and Activities. GAO-01-975T. Washington, D.C.: July 18, 

2001. 

Determining Performance and Accountability Challenges and High 

Risks. GAO-01-159SP. Washington, D.C.: November 2000. 

DOD Personnel: More Consistency Needed in Determining Eligibility for 

Top Secret Clearances. GAO-01-465. Washington, D.C.: April 18, 2001. 

DOD Personnel: More Accurate Estimate of Overdue Security Clearance 

Reinvestigations Is Needed. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-246. Washington, D.C.: 

September 20, 2000. 

DOD Personnel: More Actions Needed to Address Backlog of Security 

Clearance Reinvestigations. GAO/NSIAD-00-215. Washington, D.C.: 

August 24, 2000. 

Security Protection: Standardization Issues Regarding Protection of 

Executive Branch Officials. GAO/T-GGD/OSI-00-177. Washington, D.C.: 

July 27, 2000.

Security Protection: Standardization Issues Regarding Protection of 

Executive Branch Officials. GAO/GGD/OSI-00-139. Washington, D.C.: July 

11, 2000. 

Computer Security: FAA Is Addressing Personnel Weaknesses, But 

Further Action Is Required. GAO/AIMD-00-169. Washington, D.C.: May 31, 

2000. 

Page 14 GAO-06-748T 
DOD Personnel: Weaknesses in Security Investigation Program Are 

Being Addressed. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-148. Washington, D.C.: April 6, 2000. 

DOD Personnel: Inadequate Personnel Security Investigations Pose 

National Security Risks. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-65. Washington, D.C.: February

16, 2000. 

DOD Personnel: Inadequate Personnel Security Investigations Pose 

National Security Risks. GAO/NSIAD-00-12. Washington, D.C.: October 

27, 1999. 

Background Investigations: Program Deficiencies May Lead DEA to 

Relinquish Its Authority to OPM. GAO/GGD-99-173. Washington, D.C.: 

September 7, 1999. 

Department of Energy: Key Factors Underlying Security Problems at 

DOE Facilities. GAO/T-RCED-99-159. Washington, D.C.: April 20, 1999. 

Performance Budgeting: Initial Experiences Under the Results Act in 

Linking Plans With Budgets. GAO/AIMD/GGD-99-67. Washington, D.C.: 

April 12, 1999. 

Military Recruiting: New Initiatives Could Improve Criminal History 

Screening. GAO/NSIAD-99-53. Washington, D.C.: February 23, 1999. 

Executive Office of the President: Procedures for Acquiring Access to 

and Safeguarding Intelligence Information. GAO/NSIAD-98-245. 

Washington, D.C.: September 30, 1998. 

Inspectors General: Joint Investigation of Personnel Actions Regarding 

a Former Defense Employee. GAO/AIMD/OSI-97-81R. Washington, D.C.: 

July 10, 1997.

Privatization of OPM’s Investigations Service. GAO/GGD-96-97R. 

Washington, D.C.: August 22, 1996. 

Cost Analysis: Privatizing OPM Investigations. GAO/GGD-96-121R. 

Washington, D.C.: July 5, 1996. 

Personnel Security: Pass and Security Clearance Data for the Executive 

Office of the President. GAO/NSIAD-96-20. Washington, D.C.: October 19, 

1995. 

Page 15 GAO-06-748T 
Privatizing OPM Investigations: Implementation Issues. GAO/T-GGD-95-

186. Washington, D.C.: June 15, 1995. 

Privatizing OPM Investigations: Perspectives on OPM’s Role in 

Background Investigations. GAO/T-GGD-95-185. Washington, D.C.: June 

14, 1995. 

Security Clearances: Consideration of Sexual Orientation in the 

Clearance Process. GAO/NSIAD-95-21. Washington, D.C.: March 24, 1995.

Background Investigations: Impediments to Consolidating 

Investigations and Adjudicative Functions. GAO/NSIAD-95-101. 

Washington, D.C.: March 24, 1995. 

Managing DOE: Further Review Needed of Suspensions of Security 

Clearances for Minority Employees. GAO/RCED-95-15. Washington, D.C.: 

December 8, 1994. 

Personnel Security Investigations. GAO/NSIAD-94-135R. Washington, D.C.: 

March 4, 1994. 

Classified Information: Costs of Protection Are Integrated With Other 

Security Costs. GAO/NSIAD-94-55. Washington, D.C.: October 20, 1993. 

Nuclear Security: DOE’s Progress on Reducing Its Security Clearance 

Work Load. GAO/RCED-93-183. Washington, D.C.: August 12, 1993. 

Personnel Security: Efforts by DOD and DOE to Eliminate Duplicative 

Background Investigations. GAO/RCED-93-23. Washington, D.C.: May 10, 

1993. 

Administrative Due Process: Denials and Revocations of Security 

Clearances and Access to Special Programs. GAO/T-NSIAD-93-14. 

Washington, D.C.: May 5, 1993. 

DOD Special Access Programs: Administrative Due Process Not 

Provided When Access Is Denied or Revoked. GAO/NSIAD-93-162. 

Washington, D.C.: May 5, 1993. 

Security Clearances: Due Process for Denials and Revocations by 

Defense, Energy, and State. GAO/NSIAD-92-99. Washington, D.C.: May 6,

1992. 

Page 16 GAO-06-748T 
Due Process: Procedures for Unfavorable Suitability and Security 

Clearance Actions. GAO/NSIAD-90-97FS. Washington, D.C.: April 23, 1990.

Weaknesses in NRC’s Security Clearance Program. GAO/T-RCED-89-14. 

Washington, D.C.: March 15, 1989. 

Nuclear Regulation: NRC’s Security Clearance Program Can Be 

Strengthened. GAO/RCED-89-41. Washington, D.C.: December 20, 1988. 

Nuclear Security: DOE Actions to Improve the Personnel Clearance 

Program. GAO/RCED-89-34. Washington, D.C.: November 9, 1988. 

Nuclear Security: DOE Needs a More Accurate and Efficient Security 

Clearance Program. GAO/RCED-88-28. Washington, D.C.: December 29, 

1987. 

National Security: DOD Clearance Reduction and Related Issues. 

GAO/NSIAD-87-170BR. Washington, D.C.: September 18, 1987. 

Oil Reserves: Proposed DOE Legislation for Firearm and Arrest 

Authority Has Merit. GAO/RCED-87-178. Washington, D.C.: August 11, 

1987. 

Embassy Blueprints: Controlling Blueprints and Selecting Contractors 

for Construction Abroad. GAO/NSIAD-87-83. Washington, D.C.: April 14,

1987. 

Security Clearance Reinvestigations of Employees Has Not Been Timely

at the Department of Energy. GAO/T-RCED-87-14. Washington, D.C.: April 

9, 1987. 

Improvements Needed in the Government’s Personnel Security Clearance 

Program. Washington, D.C.: April 16, 1985. 

Need for Central Adjudication Facility for Security Clearances for Navy 

Personnel. GAO/GGD-83-66. Washington, D.C.: May 18, 1983. 

Effect of National Security Decision Directive 84, Safeguarding 

National Security Information. GAO/NSIAD-84-26. Washington, D.C.: 

October 18, 1983. 

Page 17 GAO-06-748T 
Faster Processing of DOD Personnel Security Clearances Could Avoid 

Millions in Losses. GAO/GGD-81-105. Washington, D.C.: September 15, 

1981. 

Page 18 GAO-06-748T (350866) 
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