Testimony Before the Subcommittee on 

National Security, Emerging Threats, and 

International Relations, Committee on 

Government Reform, House of 

Representatives

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 10:00 a.m. EST 

Wednesday, September 22, 2004 HOMELAND SECURITY

Observations on the 

National Strategies Related 

to Terrorism 

Statement of Norman J. Rabkin, 

Managing Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues 

GAO-04-1075T 
Page 1 GAO-04-1075T 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: 

I appreciate the opportunity to appear before this committee to address 

national strategies related to homeland security. 

We at GAO applaud the efforts of the 9/11 Commission and the dedicated 

family members of the victims of that tragic day whose combined efforts 

have resulted in a definitive account of the past events and 41 

recommendations for the future. As the Commission notes, we are safer 

today but we are not safe, and much work remains. We concur with the 

Commission’s conclusion that the American people should expect their 

government to do its very best. We also acknowledge the efforts of earlier 

congressionally chartered commissions—the Bremer, Gilmore, and HartRudman Commissions—that also analyzed terrorist incidents and 

government programs and made recommendations to improve homeland 

security. 

In an effort to increase homeland security following the September 11, 

2001, terrorist attacks in the United States, the executive branch issued 

seven national strategies related to combating terrorism and homeland 

security. Per your request, this testimony will focus primarily on the 

National Strategy for Homeland Security but also include relevant 

aspects of the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism. Together, 

these two national strategies address preventing terrorist attacks within 

the United States, reducing America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and 

minimizing the damage and assisting in the recovery from future attacks, if 

they occur. 

In my testimony today, I will cover three topics. 

• To what extent are elements of the Homeland Security and Combating 

Terrorism strategies aligned with recommendations issued by the 9/11 

Commission? 

• What key departments have responsibilities for implementing the 

Homeland Security strategy, and what actions have they taken to 

implement the strategy? 

• What challenges are faced by key departments in assessing their progress 

towards achieving homeland security objectives? 

This testimony continues GAO’s efforts to establish baseline assessments 

related to homeland security. In February, we testified on the desired 
Page 2 GAO-04-1075T 

characteristics of national strategies, and whether various strategies—

including the Homeland Security and Combating Terrorism strategies—

contained those desired characteristics.1

 In March, we summarized 

strategic homeland security recommendations by GAO and 

congressionally chartered commissions that preceded the 9/11 

Commission in issuing their reports.2

 We organized this March analysis by 

critical mission area, as defined in the Homeland Security strategy. In 

July, we reported on GAO recommendations to the Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS) and the department’s progress in implementing 

such recommendations.3

 We organized this July analysis by DHS 

directorate or division. Together, these baseline efforts are intended to aid 

congressional oversight in assessing the effectiveness of federal homeland 

security activities. 

The 9/11 Commission issued 8 recommendations that were not addressed 

in the specific initiatives for the critical mission areas of the Homeland 

Security strategy or the goals and objectives of the Combating Terrorism

strategy. These recommendations pertain to enhancing analytical 

capabilities of the Central Intelligence Agency, reorganizing the 

intelligence community, improving accountability of intelligence 

operations, leadership of the Department of Defense in paramilitary 

operations, continuity of national security policymaking, and modifying 

congressional oversight. As the national strategies are expected to evolve 

over time, they could reflect some of these recommendations. The 

remaining 33 Commission recommendations are aligned with the specific 

initiatives of the Homeland Security strategy or the objectives of the 

Combating Terrorism strategy. For example, in the area of Defending 

Against Catastrophic Threats, the Commission recommended that the 

United States prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by 

expanding and supporting existing counterproliferation initiatives. 

Similarly, the Homeland Security strategy includes an initiative to prevent 

terrorist use of nuclear weapons. The 9/11 Commission also recommended 

that the United States engage with other nations in developing a strategy 

 1

 GAO, Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics in National 

Strategies Related to Terrorism, GAO-04-408T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 3, 2004). 

2

 GAO, Homeland Security: Selected Recommendations from Congressionally Chartered 

Commissions and GAO, GAO-04-591 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2004). 

3

 GAO, Status of Key Recommendations GAO Has Made to DHS and Its Legacy Agencies, 

GAO-04-865R (Washington, D.C.: July 2, 2004). 

Summary 
Page 3 GAO-04-1075T 

against terrorism and an approach toward detention and humane 

treatment of captured terrorists. Likewise, the Combating Terrorism

strategy includes an objective to establish and maintain an international 

standard and accountability with regard to combating terrorism. 

Our preliminary analysis identifies six departments—the Departments of 

Defense, Energy, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, Justice, 

and State—as having key roles in implementing the Homeland Security 

strategy. These six departments represent 94 percent of the proposed $47 

billion budget for homeland security in fiscal year 2005. In addition, our 

preliminary analysis shows that these six departments have lead agency 

roles in implementing the Homeland Security strategy. For example, DHS 

was designated as the lead agency for 37 of the 43 initiatives in that 

strategy. According to information received from agency officials, at least 

one of these six departments has demonstrated planning and/or 

implementation activities in each of the 43 initiatives. While our 

preliminary analysis indicates that planning or implementation activities 

were occurring, it was not within the scope of the analysis to assess the 

status or quality of the various departments’ activities on each initiative. In 

a forthcoming report for this committee, we will provide more detailed 

information on these departments’ efforts, including an analysis of lead 

agencies’ current implementation activities. 

As key departments continue to implement the Homeland Security

strategy, the development of performance goals and measures will help 

them assess their progress in implementing homeland security efforts. 

Once they are established, performance measures, such as costeffectiveness and net benefits, can be used to link costs to outcomes. 

Development of standards, particularly systems and service standards, will 

also provide an important means to measure preparedness and guide 

resource investments. 

Terrorism is generally defined as politically motivated violence to coerce a 

government or civilian population. The term “combating terrorism” 

generally refers to the full range of policies, strategies, programs, and 

activities to counter terrorism both at home and abroad. The distinction 

between “homeland security” and “combating terrorism overseas” is that 

Background 
Page 4 GAO-04-1075T 

federal efforts on homeland security have a domestic focus whereas 

combating terrorism overseas efforts have an international focus.4

After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, President Bush issued 

several national strategies related to homeland security and combating 

terrorism. These included the National Strategy for Homeland Security 

(July 2002), the National Money Laundering Strategy (July 2002), the 

National Security Strategy (September 2002), the National Strategy to 

Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (December 2002), the National 

Strategy for Combating Terrorism (February 2003), the National 

Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key 

Assets (February 2003), and the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace 

(February 2003).

5

 This testimony focuses on the Homeland Security and 

Combating Terrorism strategies. 

The Homeland Security strategy, with a domestic focus, sets out a plan to 

organize federal, state, local, and private sector organizations, on an array 

of functions. The strategy organizes these functions into six critical 

“mission areas”:6

• Intelligence and Warning (which involves the collection, analysis, and 

distribution of information appropriate for preempting or preventing a 

terrorist attack). 

• Border and Transportation Security (which emphasizes the efficient and 

reliable flow of people, goods, and services across borders, while deterring 

terrorist activity). 

 4

 For a more detailed discussion of the definition of terrorism and related terms, see GAO, 

Combating Terrorism: Interagency Framework and Agency Programs to Address the 

Overseas Threat, GAO-03-165 (Washington, D.C.: May 2003), pp. 12-15. 

5

 For our detailed analysis of all of these strategies, see GAO, Combating Terrorism, 

Evaluation of Selected Characteristics in National Strategies Related to Terrorism, 

GAO-04-408T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 3, 2004). 

6

 The strategy also includes a discussion of “foundations” which we did not identify 

separately in our analysis. The strategy describes these foundations as unique American 

strengths that cut across all sectors of society, such as law, science and technology, 

information sharing and systems, and international cooperation. The discussion of these 

foundations overlaps with the six mission areas. For example, improving international 

shipping security is covered by the mission area of border and transportation security as 

well as the foundation area of international cooperation. 

The National Strategy for 

Homeland Security 
Page 5 GAO-04-1075T 

• Domestic Counterterrorism (which focuses on law enforcement efforts to 

identify, halt, prevent, and prosecute terrorists in the United States.). 

• Protecting Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets (which stresses securing 

the nation’s individual pieces and interconnecting systems that, if 

disrupted, may cause significant damage to the nation). 

• Defending Against Catastrophic Threats (which emphasizes the detection, 

deterrence, and mitigation of terrorist use of weapons of mass 

destruction). 

• Emergency Preparedness and Response (which focuses on damage 

minimization and recovery from terrorist attacks). 

The Homeland Security strategy also identifies “major initiatives” to be 

addressed within each of these six mission areas. For example, within the 

Intelligence and Warning critical mission area, five major initiatives are 

indicated: (1) enhancing the analytic capabilities of the FBI; (2) building 

new capabilities through the Information Analysis and Infrastructure 

Protection Division of the proposed DHS; (3) implementing the Homeland 

Security Advisory System; (4) utilizing dual-use analysis to prevent 

attacks; and (5) employing “red team” techniques.7

 In all, the strategy cites 

43 major initiatives across the 6 critical mission areas. 

Since the Homeland Security strategy was issued in July 2002, the 

President has also released 12 Homeland Security Presidential Directives 

(HSPDs) that provide additional guidance related to these mission areas. 

For example, HSPD-4 focuses on defending against catastrophic threats, 

and HSPD-7 focuses on protecting critical infrastructure. 

The Combating Terrorism strategy, with an overseas focus, emphasizes 

identifying and defusing threats before they reach the borders of the 

United States. This strategy calls for fighting terrorist organizations of 

global reach and reducing their scope and capabilities to the regional and 

then local levels. The goal is to reduce the scope of terrorism to make it 

more localized, unorganized, and relegated to the criminal domain. The 

strategy seeks to accomplish this through four goals and 15 subordinate 

objectives. Together, these goals comprise the “4D Strategy:” 

 7

 Red-team techniques are those where the U.S. government would create a team that plays 

the role of terrorists in terms of identifying vulnerabilities and planning attacks. 

The National Strategy for 

Combating Terrorism 
Page 6 GAO-04-1075T 

• Defeat terrorist organizations of global reach by attacking their 

sanctuaries; leadership command, control, and communications; material 

support; and finances. 

• Deny further sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to terrorist by ensuring 

that other states accept their responsibilities to take actions against these 

international threats within their sovereign territory. 

• Diminish the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit by 

enlisting the international community to focus its efforts and resources on 

the areas most at risk. 

• Defend the United States, its citizens, and its interests at home and abroad 

by both proactively protecting the homeland and extending defenses to 

identify and neutralize the threat as early as possible. 

Congress, because of concerns about terrorism in recent years, chartered 

four commissions to examine terrorist threats and the government’s 

response to such threats, as well as to make recommendations to federal, 

state, local, and private organizations. These commissions included: 

• The Bremer Commission (the National Commission on Terrorism, chaired 

by Ambassador Paul Bremer), which issued its report in June 2000. 

• The Gilmore Commission (the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic 

Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass 

Destruction, chaired by Governor James S. Gilmore, III), which issued its 

final report in December 2003. 

• The Hart-Rudman Commission (the U.S. Commission on National 

Security/21st Century, chaired by Senators Gary Hart and Warren B. 

Rudman), which issued its final report in February 2001. 

• The 9/11 Commission (the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 

Upon the United States, chaired by Governor Thomas H. Kean), which 

issued its final report in July 2004. 

The 9/11 Commission was established by Congress on November 27, 2002, 

to (1) investigate the relevant facts and circumstances relating to the 

terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001; (2) identify, review, and evaluate 

lessons learned from these attacks; and (3) report to the President and 

Congress on findings, conclusions, and recommendations that generate 

from the investigation and review. The Commission’s investigations were 

Congressionally Chartered 

Commissions 
Page 7 GAO-04-1075T 

to focus on intelligence agencies; law enforcement agencies; diplomacy; 

immigration, nonimmigrant visas, and border control; the flow of assets to 

terrorist organizations; commercial aviation; the role of congressional 

oversight and resource allocation; and other areas of the public and 

private sectors determined to be relevant by the Commission for its 

inquiry. As a result of its work, the 9/11 Commission issued a report on 

July 22, 2004, which included 41 primary recommendations8

 for 

improvements in the United States’ approach to securing the homeland 

and combating terrorism. 

Of the 41 recommendations made by the 9/11 Commission, 30 are strategic 

in the sense that they are broad in focus and implementation would 

require coordination across multiple departments, levels of government, 

and sectors. Examples of such recommendations are tracking terrorist 

financing and preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 

In contrast, 8 recommendations made by the 9/11 Commission are agencyspecific and could be addressed in a single agency’s implementation plan. 

The departments and agencies targeted by these recommendations are 

DHS, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Central Intelligence 

Agency (CIA), the Department of Defense (DOD), and the Transportation 

Security Administration (TSA). For example, the Commission 

recommended that DOD and its oversight committees regularly assess the 

adequacy of Northern Command’s strategies and planning and that the FBI 

should establish a specialized and integrated national security workforce. 

The remaining 3 recommendations are foreign-country-specific. For 

example, the 9/11 Commission recommended that the U.S. support 

Pakistan’s government in its struggle against extremists, with a 

comprehensive effort that extends from military aid to support for better 

education. While some of the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations are 

specific to an individual agency, department, or foreign country, the 

national strategies guide agencies in their implementation of homeland 

security efforts, whether these efforts are collaborative or individual, 

broad or specific. Therefore, we have included all of the Commission’s 

recommendations in our comparative analysis with the national strategies. 

 8

 We define “primary recommendations” as those recommendations that were highlighted 

in bold and specifically identified as a recommendation in the 9/11 Commission report. 
Page 8 GAO-04-1075T 

To determine the extent to which the 9/11 Commission recommendations 

are aligned with the national strategies, we took a number of steps. We 

looked at each of the primary 9/11 Commission recommendations in the 

context of one or more of the six mission areas of the Homeland Security

strategy. Then, to the extent appropriate, we matched each 

recommendation with one or more of the major initiatives for each 

mission area. For those recommendations that were not associated with 

any of the mission areas, we determined the extent to which these 

recommendations were covered in the objectives of the Combating 

Terrorism strategy. Our detailed analysis first focused on the Homeland 

Security strategy because it is more comprehensive in describing its 

purpose, scope, and objectives than the Combating Terrorism strategy. 

To determine what key departments have implementation responsibilities 

for the Homeland Security strategy, we examined the latest available 

homeland security funding data for federal agencies. We then selected the 

six departments with the largest proposed homeland security budgets—

DHS, DOD, the Department of Energy (Energy), the Department of Justice 

(DOJ), the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and the 

Department of State (State)—which together account for 94 percent of the 

President’s proposed $47 billion budget for homeland security in fiscal 

year 2005. Additionally, we reviewed the language in the Homeland 

Security strategy and HSPDs to determine whether these departments had 

been designated as “lead agencies” in implementing the initiatives. We 

then determined whether the six key federal departments addressed these 

43 strategy initiatives in their planning and implementation activity by 

conducting a review of each department’s high-level strategic planning 

documents related to homeland security. As part of this analysis, we 

determined whether each department was specifically engaged in 

conducting planning and implementation activities related to each of the 

43 initiatives. We provided the results of our analyses to officials from the 

various departments for their verification. Departments provided the data 

during fiscal year 2004; however, we did not conduct our own audit to 

verify the accuracy of the data or the progress of particular activities. Nor 

did we assess the status, extent or quality of the work being planned or 

implemented, as it was not in the scope of our engagement. We further 

recognize that the departments may continue to plan and implement at 

least some of their strategies and programs through the remainder of fiscal 

year 2004, resulting in a change in findings over time. 

To determine the challenges faced by key departments in measuring 

progress in implementing homeland security efforts, we reviewed and 

Scope and 

Methodology 
Page 9 GAO-04-1075T 

summarized our products related to strategic planning and performance 

measurement. 

We conducted our work between February and September 2004 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

While we would not expect to see a direct correlation between the 

national strategies’ objectives and the 9/11 Commission recommendations, 

it is nevertheless helpful to examine them side-by-side, to ascertain 

whether there is some alignment. 

Although the Commission’s recommendations are broadly aligned with the 

two strategies, 8 of the 41 recommendations are not addressed in the 

specific initiatives of the critical mission areas of the Homeland Security

strategy or the objectives of the Combating Terrorism strategy. For 

example, the 9/11 Commission recommendations suggest enhancing the 

analytical capabilities of the CIA and reorganizing the intelligence 

community— initiatives that are not identified in either strategy.9

 Table 1 

lists these 8 recommendations. 

 9

 In August 2004, the President issued a series of executive orders related to the 

management of the intelligence community and sharing terrorist information. We have not 

evaluated the extent to which these orders address the 9/11 Commission 

recommendations. 

The National 

Strategies Are 

Generally Aligned 

with the 9/11 

Commission 

Recommendations 
Page 10 GAO-04-1075T 

Table 1: 9/11 Commission Recommendations that are Not Addressed in the Mission 

Area Initiatives of the National Strategy for Homeland Security or the Objectives of 

the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism 

“The CIA Director should emphasize (a) rebuilding the CIA’s analytic capabilities; (b) 

transforming the clandestine service by building its human intelligence capabilities; (c) 

developing a stronger language program, with high standards and sufficient financial 

incentives; (d) renewing emphasis on recruiting diversity among operations officers so 

they can blend more easily in foreign cities; (e) ensuring a seamless relationship 

between human source collection and signals collection at the operational level; and (f) 

stressing a better balance between unilateral and liaison operations.” 

“We recommend the establishment of a National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), built 

on the foundation of the existing Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC). Breaking the 

older mold of national government organization, this NCTC should be a center for joint 

operational planning and joint intelligence, staffed by personnel from the various 

agencies. The head of the NCTC should have authority to evaluate the performance of 

the people assigned to the Center.” 

“The current position of Director of Central Intelligence should be replaced by a National 

Intelligence Director with two main areas of responsibility: (1) to oversee national 

intelligence centers on specific subjects of interest across the U.S. government and (2) 

to manage the national intelligence program and oversee the agencies that contribute to 

it.” 

“Finally, to combat the secrecy and complexity we have described, the overall amounts 

of money being appropriated for national intelligence and to its component agencies 

should no longer be kept secret. Congress should pass a separate appropriations act for 

intelligence, defending the broad allocation of how these tens of billions of dollars have 

been assigned among the varieties of intelligence work.” 

“Lead responsibility for directing and executing paramilitary operations, whether 

clandestine or covert, should shift to the Defense Department. There it should be 

consolidated with the capabilities for training, direction, and execution of such operations 

already being developed in the Special Operations Command.” 

“Since a catastrophic attack could occur with little or no notice, we should minimize as 

much as possible the disruption of national security policymaking during the change of 

administrations by accelerating the process for national security appointments. We think 

the process could be improved significantly so transitions can work more effectively and 

allow new officials to assume their new responsibilities as quickly as possible.” 

“Congress should create a single principal point of oversight and review for homeland 

security. Congressional leaders are best able to judge what committee should have 

jurisdiction over this department and its duties. But we believe that Congress does have 

the obligation to choose one in the House and one in the Senate, and that this 

committee should be a permanent standing committee with nonpartisan staff.” 

“Congressional oversight for intelligence – and counterterrorism – is now dysfunctional. 

Congress should address this problem. We have considered various alternatives: A joint 

committee on the old model of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy is one. A single 

committee in each house of Congress, combining authorization and appropriating 

authorities, is another.” 

Source: GAO analysis of the 9/11 Commission recommendations. 
Page 11 GAO-04-1075T 

Of the remaining 33 initiatives, 22 are aligned with at least one initiative 

related to the critical mission areas of the Homeland Security strategy and 

11 were aligned with at least one of the objectives of the Combating 

Terrorism strategy. For example, the 9/11 Commission recommended that 

a specialized and integrated national security workforce be established at 

the FBI in order to enhance the agency’s expertise in intelligence and 

national security. Similarly, the Homeland Security strategy includes 

initiatives regarding the restructuring and enhanced capabilities of the 

FBI. The 9/11 Commission also recommended that the United States 

provide economic and development support to Muslim nations to help 

prevent the use of these nations as terrorist sanctuaries. Likewise, one of 

the objectives of the Combating Terrorism strategy is to strengthen weak 

states and prevent the emergence or reemergence of terrorism. 

While the Homeland Security and Combating Terrorism strategies are 

aligned with the vast majority of recommendations made by the 9/11 

Commission, the additional recommendations may be considered in future 

updates of the national strategies. 

We identified six departments—DOD, Energy, HHS, DHS, DOJ, and 

State—as having key roles in implementing the Homeland Security

strategy. As shown in figure 1, these six departments have the highest level 

of funding and together comprise 94 percent of the proposed $47 billion 

budget for homeland security in fiscal year 2005. While not shown in figure 

1, these departments also dominate funding for most of the individual 

homeland security mission areas. For example, DHS features prominently 

across all critical mission areas, representing the majority of funding 

requested in intelligence and warning, border and transportation security, 

and emergency preparedness and response, as well as substantial portions 

of the budget submissions for domestic counterterrorism, critical 

infrastructure protection, and catastrophic threat defense. Similarly, three 

of these departments comprise the majority of funding requested in three 

mission areas, respectively – DOJ in domestic counterterrorism, DOD in 

critical infrastructure protection, and HHS in catastrophic threat defense. 

Preliminary Results 

Indicate Key Federal 

Departments Have 

Initiated Planning and 

Implementation of 

Homeland Security 

Strategy Initiatives 
Page 12 GAO-04-1075T 

Figure 1. Proposed Fiscal Year 2005 Homeland Security Funding by Federal 

Department (budget authority in millions of dollars) 

Note: Other agencies includes the Departments of Agriculture ($651 million), Veterans Affairs ($297 

million), Transportation ($243 million), Commerce ($150 million), and Treasury ($87 million), as well 

as the National Science Foundation ($344 million), National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

($207 million), Social Security Administration ($155 million), Environmental Protection Agency ($97 

million), U.S. Army Corps of Engineers ($84 million), General Services Administration ($80 million), 

and several smaller agencies. 

Our preliminary analysis of these six departments reinforced their position 

as key players because they have lead agency roles in implementing the 

Homeland Security strategy. Specifically, the strategy and HSPDs 

designate the six departments as lead agencies for particular initiatives (or 

functions within the initiatives). DHS was clearly the most important 

department for implementation because it was designated as a lead agency 

for 37 of the 43 initiatives in the Homeland Security strategy. The other 5 

departments were also designated as a lead as follows—DOJ (a lead on 9 
Page 13 GAO-04-1075T 

initiatives); HHS and State (each a lead on 5 initiatives); DOD (a lead on 4 

initiatives); and Energy (a lead on 3 initiatives). 

While we consider the designation of lead agencies as a positive step in 

establishing accountability, 14 of the 43 initiatives have multiple lead 

agencies. This indicates that interagency coordination of roles and 

activities will be important, particularly on those initiatives involving 

multiple leads (e.g., domestic counterterrorism and critical infrastructure 

protection). 

Based on our preliminary analysis, it appears that the six key departments 

have incorporated the Homeland Security strategy’s initiatives in their 

strategic planning and implementation activities. Our initial analysis shows 

that all 43 of the strategy’s initiatives were included in some of the 

activities implemented by the six departments; however, we have not 

assessed the status, extent, or quality of the various departments’ activities 

on each initiative, as it was not in the scope of our review. All five 

Intelligence and Warning initiatives have been covered by at least one 

department in each of the initiatives. There are six initiatives under the 

Border and Transportation Security mission area, each addressed by at 

least two departments’ planning or implementation activities. Domestic 

Counterterrorism has six initiatives, each of which are covered by at least 

one department’s planning or implementation activities. The strategy 

identifies eight initiatives under the Protecting Critical Infrastructures and 

Key Assets mission area, in which each of the initiatives are addressed by 

at least four departments. There are six initiatives under the Defending 

Against Catastrophic Threats mission area; all of the initiatives feature 

planning or implementation activities by at least two departments. For the 

Emergency Preparedness and Response mission area, the strategy 

identifies 12 initiatives with coverage of each initiative by at least one 

department’s activities. In a forthcoming report for this committee, we will 

provide more detailed information on these departments’ efforts, including 

an analysis of current implementation activities. 
Page 14 GAO-04-1075T 

Developing clear performance measures and standards for implementing 

the Homeland Security strategy is important for agencies to assess their 

progress in achieving their mission-related goals and objectives. However, 

as we stated in an earlier testimony, the strategy’s initiatives often do not 

provide a baseline set of performance goals and measures upon which to 

assess and improve preparedness.10 Thus, is it a challenge for the nation to 

ensure both a successful and a fiscally responsible preparedness effort. 

The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA) required 

federal agencies to develop strategic plans with long-term, outcomeoriented goals and objectives, annual goals linked to achieving the longterm goals, and annual reports on the results achieved. 

We identified strategic planning as one of the critical success factors for 

new organizations.11 For example, as part of its implementation phase, we 

noted that DHS should engage in strategic planning through the 

involvement of stakeholders, assessment of internal and external 

environments, and an alignment of activities, core processes, and 

resources to support mission-related outcomes. We are currently 

reviewing DHS’s first strategic plan to, among other things, assess the 

extent to which it reflects GPRA requirements and supports the Homeland 

Security strategy. 

Additionally, we have reported that expanding agency use of performance 

measures that link costs to outcomes is important. However, we have 

found that agencies are generally weak on linking costs to performance, 

whether through measures such as cost-effectiveness, net benefits, or 

others. Such measures are broadly required for planning regulatory and 

investment decisions but are seldom used to evaluate actual performance, 

even though the planning documents can sometimes provide a basis to 

compare forecasts and actual outcomes.12 The Congressional Committee 

report on the establishment of GPRA devoted considerable attention on 

links between performance and cost. 

 10 GAO, Homeland Security: Effective Intergovernmental Coordination is Key to Success, 

GAO-02-1011T (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 2002). 

11 GAO, Homeland Security: Critical Design and Implementation Issues, GAO-02-957T

(Washington, D.C.: July 17, 2002). 

12 For example, OMB Circulars A-11 and A-94. 

Development of 

Performance Goals 

and Measures May 

Assist Key Agencies in 

Assessing Progress 

Towards 

Implementing 

Homeland Security 

Efforts 
Page 15 GAO-04-1075T 

To find an example of the need for baseline performance goals and 

measures we need look no further than the nation’s efforts at emergency 

preparedness and response. We have reported that there is not yet a 

comprehensive set of preparedness standards for measuring first 

responder capacities, identifying gaps in those capacities, and measuring 

progress in achieving performance goals. Additionally, in our past work on 

bioterrorism preparedness,13 we reported that state and local officials were 

concerned about the lack of specific standards for measuring 

preparedness, and these officials noted that specific benchmarks would 

help them determine whether they were adequately prepared to respond 

to a bioterrorism incident. Moreover, in our past work on interoperable 

communications,14 we discussed the need to establish national 

interoperability performance goals and standards. Finally, we have 

reported on the lack of reliable information on existing federal, state, and 

local capabilities for combating terrorism and the need to develop a 

comprehensive inventory of existing capabilities. Without standards linked 

to such capabilities, it will be a challenge to assess preparedness gaps and 

efforts to address the gaps.15

Since homeland security relies upon the coordinated actions of federal, 

state, local governments, and the private sector—and, in many cases, upon 

“layers” of defenses—a challenge exists in measuring progress across 

numerous dimensions. Systems and services standards—which focus on 

the performance, design, and overall management of processes and 

activities—hold great potential to both improve coordination across such 

dimensions and enhance measurement of continued preparedness. Such 

standards could assist in overcoming challenges in identifying 

interdependencies, defining roles and relationships, assigning 

responsibilities, and linking federal, state, and local governments, and the 

private sector in a measurable, dependable, and reliable manner. The 

private sector already sets standards within various business chains, such 

 13 GAO, Bioterrorism: Preparedness Varied across State and Local Jurisdictions, 

GAO-03-373 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 7, 2003). 

14 GAO, Homeland Security: Federal Leadership and Intergovernmental Cooperation 

Required to Achieve First Responder Interoperable Communications, GAO-04-963T

(Washington, D.C.: July 20, 2004) and Homeland Security: Challenges in Achieving 

Interoperable Communications for First Responders, GAO-04-231T (Washington, D.C.: 

Nov. 6, 2003). 

15 GAO, Homeland Security: Coordinated Planning and Standards Needed to Better 

Manage First Responder Grants in the National Capital Region, GAO-04-904T

(Washington, D.C.: June 24, 2004). 
Page 16 GAO-04-1075T 

as in the design, raw materials, supply, manufacture, sales, delivery, and 

customer support chain. Within homeland security process chains, 

standards will be essential to overcome the challenge of assuring the 

stability and reliability of all links in the interdependent business chains of 

all involved parties responsible for homeland security. 

Standards can also aid in identifying and fixing fragile links that could lead 

to particularly catastrophic cascading events, such as widespread power 

outages or domino effect impacts on food supply or product distribution 

systems. Systems, services, and management standards can also help 

clarify the important roles each organization, level of government, and 

public or private sector plays in improving homeland security. Standards 

will factor in costs, legal, jurisdictional and other constraints, and identify 

ways to imbed homeland security principles into business and government 

systems in ways compatible with other important social and economic 

goals. Standards will also enable more effective oversight by providing 

means to measure preparedness and guide resource investments.16

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. We look forward to 

providing you with a more detailed report on department plans, activities 

and challenges regarding the implementation of the Homeland Security

strategy. I will now be pleased to respond to any questions that you or 

other members of the committee have. 

For further information about this testimony, please contact Norman J. 

Rabkin at 202-512-8777. Other key contributors to this statement were 

Stephen L. Caldwell, Kristy N. Brown, Jared Hermalin, Wayne A. Ekblad, 

Ricardo Marquez, and Amy Bernstein. 

 16 GAO, Homeland Security: The Need for National Standards, Statement of Randall Yim, 

Managing Director, National Preparedness, Homeland Security and Justice, before The 

National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. (Washington, D.C.: 

November 19, 2003). 

GAO Contacts and 

Staff 

Acknowledgements 

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