T h e H on or abl e K ennet h F. Ri ppl e, Se n i or Ci r cu i t J u dg e f or t h e U

. S. * C o urt of A p p eal s f

o r t he Se vent h C i rcui t , s i t t i ng by desi gnat i o n. F OR P UB LIC AT ION



### U N I TED STA TES C O U R T O F A PPEA LS F O R T H E N IN T H C IR C U IT

U NI TED S T A T ES O F A M ERI CA ,

Plaintif f-Appellee ,

v.

F L ORENCE A. W HI TE E A G LE ,

Defendant-

Appellant

. No. 11-30352

D.C. No. 4:11-cr- 00032- SEH-1

OPI NI ON

Appea l from the United States District Court for the D istrict of Montana Sam E. Haddon, District Judge, Pre siding
Argued and Submitted November

6, 2012—Portland, Oreg on Filed July 5, 2013

B e fo re : K e nn e th F . Ri pp le , M. Marg are t McKeown, *

and Jac qu e lin e H. Nguy e n, Cir c uit Judg e s. Opinion by

J udg e McK eownU NI TED S T A T ES V

. W HI TE E A G LE 2

T hi s s ummary cons t i t ut es no part o f the o pi ni on of

t he cour t

. I t ha s ** b een p repa red b y co urt s t af f f o r t he co nveni ence o f

t he read er. SUMMAR

Y **

Crim inal L aw The pa nel af firmed in par

t and re verse d in part a

criminal judgme nt i n a ca se ar ising out of the involveme nt by the Bur eau of

Indian Aff

airs Superintende nt at the For t Peck Indian R eser

vation in a sche me to obtain money from a tr ibal
cre dit prog ram.

Re ve rsing c onvic tio ns on c ounts c ha

rg ingc on sp ir a c y

to
conver t tribal cre dit pr og ram proce eds (18 U.S.C. § 371) and theft and c onversion from an I ndian Tribal Org anization (18 U.S.C. §§ 1163, 2), the panel he ld t h at the g overnme nt’s misapplication theory , predic ated at b est on an employ er direc tive and a c ivil regulation, cannot support a convic tion; and that the g overnme nt’s embezzlement and conver sion theories a lso fail beca

use the de fenda

nt never controll ed or had custody

of the funds that she later bor rowe d.

Affir ming a b ri bery

conviction (18 U.S.C. § 201(b)( 2)), the pane l held that a jury

could ea sily infer a quid pro quo and had ample e vidence to conclude that the defe ndant’s ac tions
wer e “c orrupt.”

Be cause the gover

nment did not show that the def endant violated a s p ecific duty

to report c redit prog ram fr aud, the pa ne l r e ve rs e d h e r c onvic tio n o f c on c e a lme nt o f p ub lic
corr uption (18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(1) ).U NI TED S T A T ES V

. W HI TE E A G LE 3 The panel reve rsed a

conviction for public a cts aff ecting
a pe rs on a l f

ina nc ia l in te re st (1 8 U. S.C. § 2 08 (a )( 1) ) b e c a us e the conne ction betwee n the pay ment of a BIA Administrative Offic er’ s fra

udulent nominee loans a nd the def

endan t ’s alleg ed fina

ncial intere st is remote and spec ulative.

Th e pa ne l he ld t

hat th e re wa s su ff

icien t e vid e nc e to support the def

endant’ s conviction of misprision of a felony (18 U.S.C. § 4). The pa nel re jected the defe ndant’s conte ntion t h at her
con victions for public ac ts affe cting a fina ncial intere st and misprision of a felony wo uld violate her F ifth Amendment rig ht to avo i d s elf-inc rimination beca use ea ch cha

rg e re lied on her duty

to report c ri m inal activity that would have exposed her to prosec ution. T he pane l rea soned that the
connec tion b et we en t h e d ef en d an t ’s l o an m o d i fi ca t i o nan d the B I A A dmi nis tr a tiv e Of

fi c e r’ s u se of no min e e bo rr ow e rs is too remote to implicate the de fenda nt’s Fif t h Amendment rig hts. The pa nel held that the district cour t er red at sentencing in its application of U .S.S.G. § 2C 1.1(b)( 2), whe n it appear ed to v a lue the lo an modif ic a tio n u sin g sta

nd ard “ los s”
c a lc ulatio ns ins te a d o f f

oc us ingon

the “ va lue of the be ne fi t” the def endant r ece ived. The pa nel explained that any sentenc ing a djustment must be based on the value of the loan modificati o n as a bribe , and re manded f or fur ther pr oc e e din g s.U NI TED S T A T ES V

. W HI TE E A G LE 4

CO UN SEL Steven T. Potts (argu ed ), Gre at Fa lls, Montana, for De fe nd ant- Ap pe lla

nt.

Carl E. R ostad (ar g ued), United States Attorney ’s Office f or the Di strict of Montana, G reat Falls, Montana, J. Bishop Gre well, United States Attorney ’s Off ice fo r the District of Montana, B illings, Montana, f or Plaintiff-Appe llee.

OP IN ION
McKEOWN, Circuit J udg e:
Flore nce White Eag le appe als her c onv ic ti o n a n d sentenc e on s i x c o un t s ar i s i n g o u t o f h e r i n v o l v e m e n t i n a s c h e me to ob t a i nm o n e y

f r o ma tr i b a l c r e d i tp r o g r am : ( I ) c o n s p i r a c y to
conver t tribal cre dit prog ram proc eeds in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; ( I I ) theft and conver sion f rom an I n dian T r i b a l O r g an i z a t i o ni nv i o l a t i o n o f 1 8 U

. S

. C

. § § 1 1 6 3 , 2 ; ( III ) bribery in violati o n o f 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(2); (IV)
c on c e a lme nt o f p ub lic c or ru pti on in v iol a ti on of

18 U. S.C. § 1001(a) (1); (V ) public ac ts af fecting a persona l financia l i n t e r e s t i nv i o l a t i o no f

1 8 U

. S

. C

. § 2 0 8 ( a ) ; an d ( V I) misprision of a felony in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 4. Wi thout a doubt, White Eag le turned a blind ey e to fra

ud and fa c ili tate d it s c ov e r u

p. Th e dif

fi c ult y for the pr os e c uti on

is th a t, in th e ma in , th e c r im e s c h ar g e d d id n o t f it th e f a c ts

. We af fi rm Whit e Ea g le’s convic tions on Count s I I Iand VI (briber y an d m isprision of a fe lony), but reve rse the convictions on Counts I , I I , I V, and V , and re mand for
re s en t en ci n g.U NI TED S T A T ES V

. W HI TE E A G LE 5

B ACKG ROUND
Whit e Ea g le was the Bur eau of I ndian Aff

airs (“B I A”) S u p e r i n t e n d e n ta tt h e F o rtP e c k In d i anR e s e r

v a t i o n

. T h e B IA is the fe de ra l g ov e rnme nt’ s tr us te e fo r land s o n F or

t Pe c k in northea stern Montana , which is home t o the Assi niboine and Sioux Tribes. Until ea

rly 2 0 0 8 , the B I A over saw the F ort Peck C redit P rog ram (“ Credit Prog ram” ), which pr ovided a supplemental source of cre dit to tribal members a n dwas intended to “r ais[e] the ec onomic status of memb er s o f t he Tribes to a point wher e they can look to the same source s of fi na nc inga s a

re loo ked to b y

oth e r c iti zen s. ” On e of

Whit e Eag le’s duties wa s to sign loan documents for Cre dit Progra m loa ns that pl e dg e d tr

us t a sse ts a s c oll a te ra l.

The Cre dit Progra

m was staffed with four tribal employ ees a

nd two BIA employ ees—a l o an spec ialist and a loan assistant. The four

tribal employ ees w ere supervised by the two B I A employ ees, who, in turn, were s u p er v i sed by To ni G re y

bu ll, the B I A A dmi nis tr a tiv e Of fi c e r. Whit e Ea g le was Gr ey bull’s immediate supervisor a nd the two women
wo rk e d to g e the r at F or

t Pe c k f or many y e ars

. Gr e y bu ll w a s a c e ntr a l par

tic ipa nt in a fr a ud ule nt s c he me to advantag e Credit Prog ram employ ees. The setup was not particula rly

co mp li c a te d

—Credit Prog ram e mploy ees obtained loans by

fi l i n g appli cations in the name s of “nominee,” o r stand-in, re latives and then splitting the proce eds among st themselves. To avoid t h e three-pe rson Credit Commi t t ee tasked with application review a nd
a pp ro va l, G re y

bu ll a pp ro ve d ma

ny of the loa ns he rs e lf

. Th is scheme was e x tensive: an Of fi ce of the Inspector G ener al (“O I G”) audit reve aled that of the appr ox imately $1.6 milli on l o an e d b y th e C r e d i t P r o g r am , ar o un d $ 1

. 2 m i l l i o n w e nt t oU NI TED S T A T ES V

. W HI TE E A G LE 6

Cr e dit Pr og ra m e mp loye e s and

the ir sta nd -i n f amil y me mbe rs

. Gre y bull died i n Marc h 2008, leavingbehind a number of unpaid loans in others’ na m es . In May

2008, Gre y

bull’s sis te r L ind a

Chr ist ians e n a

pp ro a c he d Wh ite Eag le wi th documentation for nominee loans that Gr ey bull had taken out in Christi ansen’ s name a s well as in the name of Arthur Gre y bull, I I I(Toni Gre y

bull’s son). Christiansen reque sted that the loans be repa id out of Gre y bull’s life i n suranc e. Appar ently

worrie d that inquiries about t he loans would lead to an a ud it that po te nti a lly wo uld e xpos e the frau d, Whit e Eag le contac ted Gre y

bull’s husband Arthur G rey bull J r. and falsely informed him that Toni Gre y bull (not the nominee bo rr ow e rs ) h a d o uts tand ingloa ns wi th t he Cr e dit Pr og ra m. Gre y bull’s husband then pai d t he loans with money from Gre y bull’s life insuranc e.
Gre y bull was not the only

benef iciary of the loan pr og ra m. Wh ite Ea g le a lso ob ta ine d lo ans from th e Cr e dit Pr og ra m, t ho ug h n ot thr ou g h the us e of no min e e bo rr ow e rs

. In 2 00 2, sh e too k o ut a

sh or t- te rm loa n o f $ 2, 00 0, and

in Fe bruary 2 0 0 7 she obtained a long- term loan for

$5,050. Whi te E a g le ma d e p ay

me n ts a s r e qu ir e d un d e r th e te r ms of the loans. The long -term loan w as modified twice to allow borrowingof additional funds: in J anuar y 2008 the loan wa s incre ased by

$15,000, and in J u n e 2 0 0 9 it was incre ased by another $5,050. These modific ations were approv ed b y the C re d i tP ro gra m ’s C re d i tC o m m i t t ee , n o tGr ey b u l l

. Al th o u gh the g ov e rnme nt d oe s n ot a lleg e the loa ns we re fr a

ud ule ntl y procur ed, White Eag le’s long -term loan modific ati on was cont ra ry to specific dir ectives she had re ceive d. When the B I A r e g ion a l di re c tor

discov e re d in

late 20 07 tha

t Whi te Eag le had take n out loan s , h e t o l d her to pa y them off a

ndU NI TED S T A T ES V

. W HI TE E A G LE 7

d is c o n ti nu e p arti c ip a ti o nin th e Cr e d it

Pr o g r am d

u e to the
c on fl ic t of

int e re st. Th e g ov e rnme nt a rgue s th a t Whi te Eag le’s Credit Prog ram loans also violated t he prohibition on ho l ding f inancial inter ests that conflict with consc ientious perf ormanc e of duty

. See5 C.F.R. § 2635.101(b)( 2).
At trial, the g overnme nt a

rgued that Gre y

bull arra ng ed the 2008 l o an m o d ification as quid pro quo f or White Eag le’s assistance in de aling with possible discovery of the nominee lo ans c h e me tr ig g e r e d

b y G r e y bull’s m o th e r

Patr ic ia M e n z. In September 2007, Me nz vis ited the C redit Prog ram off ices to pay off a loan s he had personally taken out and disc overe d, to her surpr ise, that other loans ha d been taken out in her
name and wi thout he r k no wl e dg e or

c on se nt. Th e Cr e dit Prog ram em p loy ee who assisted Menz had obtained fra udulent loans himself and kne w t hat Gre y bull had obtained fra udulent loans. He dire cted Me nz to speak to Grey bull for
answe rs to her que stions. I nstead, an d wi t hout telling Gre y bull or others involved in the sche m e, Menz contacte d the OI G a nd re po rt e d th e loa

n ir re g ula ri tie s.

Me nz d id no t c omp la in to the B I A or the Cr e dit Pr og ra m, and the re wa s n o o ff

ic ia l r e a so n f

or Whit e Ea g le to a dd

re ss he r c on c e rn s. No ne the le ss, in D e c e mbe r 20 07 , Whit e Ea g le sent Menz a letter on B I A letterhe ad falsely assuringher that sh e ow e d n oth ingbe c a

us e the loa

ns ha d b e e n e rr on e ou sly listed in her name a

nd had also been pa id off. The day befor e Wh i te Eag le sent the letter , she had a pplied for the $15,000 incre ase i n her long -term loan. A lthough the loa n was approve d by the Credit Commi ttee, the g overnme nt presente d evidenc e that Gr ey

bull fa st-trac ked its approva l, even pre v a il in g u

p o n Cr e d it Pr o g r am s ta f f to r e le a s e a hold on Whit e Eag le’s ac count. The g overnme nt also argued that the l o ani s s u e d

o nu nu s u a l l y f

av o r a b l e t e r m s

. U n d e r

i t s th e o r y,U NI TED S T A T ES V

. W HI TE E A G LE 8

the fast-tra cked and favor able loan modific ation was a payoff for White Eag le’s assistanc e in the cove rup.
The fra udulent scheme was uncover ed during a 2 009
a ud it c on du c te d b y

the F or t Pe c k T ri be s. Th e a ud it deter mined that fra

ud had bee n taking place since at least the
e ar ly 1 9 9 0 s , w it

hp arti c ip a ti o nb y

s ix C r e d it

Pr o g r am employ ees. The investigation also ide nti f ie d Ch r is tiansen and Gre y bull I I I(the nominal re cipients of the loans pa id off by Gr e y bu ll’ s li fe ins ur anc e ) a s p art ic ipa nts

. W h i t e E a g l e ’ s p r o s e c u t i o nar o s e o u to f th e a u d i t

. In Marc h 2 01 1, th e g ov e rnme nt c ha rg e d Wh ite Ea g le wi th s ix counts stemm i n g from her involvement in the fra udulent
sc he me and the loa

n modi fi c a tio ns

. Th e jur

y fo un d h e r guil ty on all counts. The district cour t imposed a sentenc e of 51
m o n th s o nC o un t s I th r o u g hV , an d 3 6 m o n th s f

o r C o un tV I, to run conc urre ntly

. Whit e Eag le appe als her c onvictions on all counts, as we ll as the district court’s a pplication of the four- level sentencing enhanc ement base d on the value of the bribe.

A N A L Y SIS

I. C ONVI CT I ONS
Whit e Ea g le pre serve d her claim of i nsufficie nt evidence by moving f

or a judg ment of ac quittal at the close of evidenc e. F ed. R. Crim. P. 29. We theref ore r eview de novo the suffic iency

of the e viden ce supporting the c onviction. United States v. Tuck

er , 641 F.3d 1110, 1118 (9th Cir. 2011). Evi d e n c e is s u f

f ic ie n t t o s u s ta in

a c o n v ic ti o nif

, when construed in the light most favor able to the pr osecution, “ any ra tio na l tr ie r o f f

a c t c ou ld h ave fo un d the e sse nti a l e le me ntsU NI TED S T A T ES V

. W HI TE E A G LE 9

of the c rime beyond a re asonable doubt.” United States v. Ne v ils , 5 9 8 F.3d 1158, 1161 (9th Cir. 2010) (en ba nc) (q u o t i n g J

ac k so n v . V irg ini a , 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (empha sis in original))

. A. Co unt s I a nd II : C ons pir ac y, The ft a nd Conversi on of

Ind ian T ribal Organization P roperty

In Co un ts I

and I I , th e g ove rnme nt a lle g e d th a t Whi te Ea g le and Gr e y

bu ll c on sp ir e d to e mbe zzle or c on ve rt Cr e dit Prog ram funds. A ccor ding to the g overnme nt, t h e o b ject of the conspiracy was W hite Eag le’s $15,000 loan modification. We not e that the se c ha

rg e s ar e na

rr ow ly targ e te d, pa

rt ic ula rl y in comparison to the wide- rang ing nominee b o r r o w e r s c h e me. Counts I and I I focus on Menz’s discovery of the loans in her name, White Eag le’s assistanc e in th e at t empted cove r-up, and Whit e Ea g le ’s re c e ipt

of a loa n mod ific a tio n— e ve nts be g inn ingin l a te 20 07 , lo nga ft e r Gr e y bu ll’ s n omi ne e sc he me occur red w as implemented. The jury was prope rly instructed that conspiracy require d

“ an a g re e me nt b e tw e e n tw o o r m or e pe rs on s” and “ a pla n to commit at le ast one of the cr imes alleg ed in the indictment as an objec t of the conspira cy .” Ninth Circuit Model Criminal J ury Instruction No. 8.20. The g overnme nt a rgues that “[t] he jury cou l d infer a

n ag ree ment” fr om Grey bull’s loans and W h i t e E a g l e ’ s a t t e mp tt o c o v e r u p th e f r a u d u l e n ta c t i v i ty. Howeve r, it does not argue that Gr ey b ull’s loans, which predated t h e all eg ed conspira cy , wer e its object. Instead, under e ach of

the misappropr iation theories, W hite Eagle’s l o anm o d i f

i c a t i o ni s t o u t e d

a s th e o b j e c t o f t h e c o n s p i r a c y: “obtainingmonies tha t her supe rvisor had pr ohibited” (misapplication) or using“her lawful authority over the fundsU NI TED S T A T ES V

. W HI TE E A G LE 10
to ga in what was an otherwise unauthorized possession of the f un d s ” ( e mb e zzl e me n t a

n d c o n v e r s io n )

. H e n c e, we an a ly ze Whit e Ea g le’s loan modification, not Grey bull’s fraudulent
no min e e loa

ns , a s th e ba sis fo r t

he c onvic tio ns on

Cou nts I
an d II.

Th e g ov e rnme nt pr e se nte d n o e vid e nc e that Whi te Ea g le defr auded the Credit Prog ram or that the applications for her lon g -t e rm loa

n a nd su bs e qu e nt m od if

ic a tio ns we re ina c c ur a te or incomplete. See Carlos-Bla z a v. Holder , 611 F.3d 583, 588 (9t h Cir. 2010) (ana ly zing cha rg e for misapplication of bank fun d s an d h o l d i n g that “a c onviction for misapplication . . . nece ssarily involves intent to defr aud”) ; United St ates v. Dre itzler , 577 F.2d 539, 546 (9th Cir. 1978) (to show misapplication, the g overnme nt must prove that “the bank’s funds wer e disbursed under a false rec ord”)

. Un l ike
c or e pa rt ic ipa nts in t he no min e e bo rro we r s c he me , Wh ite Ea g le did no t us e no min e e bo rr ow e rs to s ur re pt it iousl y

g a in a per sonal bene fit. Cf. id. at 545 (upholding misappl ication
c onvic tio n w he re de fe nd ant “ se t up bo g us loa n tr ans a c tio ns , prese nted . . . forg ed docume nts to the ba nk, and re ceive d the proce eds of the ‘ loans’ which he used for his [ insurance ] ag ency ’s bene fit”). The posture of White Eag le’s participation forec loses a convic tion under a traditional misapplication theory

involving fr aud or misre prese ntation of some kind.

Th e go vernme nt instead tethers its theory to two
re str ic tio ns a ff

e c tin g Whit e Ea g le ’s pa

rt ic ipatio n in

the Cr e dit Pr o g r am. T h e f

ir s t r e s tr ic ti o nis th a t W h it e Eag le’s supervisor in 2007 i n s t ructed her not to borrow from the Credit Prog ram; the sec ond, 5 C .F.R. § 2635.101(b) (2), pr oh ibi ts h old ingfi na

nc ial int e re sts that c on fl ic t w ith conscie ntious performance of duty . Howeve r, neitherU NI TED S T A T ES V

. W HI TE E A G LE 11

vio latio n of an e mpl oye r’ s instru c tio n nor a c ivi l r ule by its e lf supports a conviction for conver sion, the ft, or misapplication of fu nd s.
This conclusion follows from analog ous case s involving prosec u t ions for misapplication of ba nk funds under 18 U.S.C. § 656. I n Un ite d S tates v . W olf , 820 F.2d 1 4 99, 1505 (9th Cir. 1987), the def endant submitted fra

udulent loan applications in the name of stand-in b orrowe rs and additional l y

failed to make disclosures re quired by Fe dera l Reserve Reg ulation O. Despite e vid ence that the loan applications we re f

raudule nt, we reve rsed the misapplication
con vict ion

be c a us e of the “ se ri ou s r isk

that th e jur

y wo uld find Wolf gui l t y

of cr iminal mis application . . . bec ause he failed to c omply with Re g ulation O ,” a civil re g ulation. Id. ;
se e als o U

nite d S tates v . Ch ris to , 614 F.2d 486, 492 ( 5th Cir. 1980) (“ A conviction, re sulting fr om t h e g overnme nt’s
a tte mpt to b oo tstra

p a se ri e s of

c he c kin g a c c ount o ve rd

ra ft s, a ci v i l regulatory

violation, into an equal amount of misapplication felonies, c annot be a llowed to stand.”). “[U]nder the log ic of Christ o and W olf , it is i mpe rm iss ibl e to
u s e th e v io lati o n o f a c iv il s ta tute to ipso facto ‘ s u p p l y a cruc ial element’ of a c riminal offe nse.” United States v. Eriksen , 639 F.3d 1138, 1150 (9th Cir. 2011)

. The g overnme nt’s misapplication theory , predic ated at best on an
e mpl oy e r d ir e c tiv e and

a c ivi l r e g ulatio n, c ann ot s up po rt a conviction her e. The g overnme nt’s embezzlement and conv e r s ion theories also fail because Whi te Eagle never controlled or ha d custody of the funds that she later bor rowe d. Even thoug h she sig ned pape rwork for loans involving the pledg e of trust a ssets as collater al, t he Credit Committ ee ( of which White Eag le was not a member ) appr oved loans befor e a c heck w ould issue.U NI TED S T A T ES V

. W HI TE E A G LE 12

See id. at 1145 (ex plaining that “[e]m bezzl ement is the fra udulent appropr iation of proper ty by a per s on to whom such proper

ty has been entrusted, or into whose hands it has lawfully come ”) (alteration in orig inal; citation and interna l qu otatio n ma

rk s o mitte d) ; United St ates v. Andre en , 628 F.2d 1236, 1241 (9th Cir. 1980) (“[C] onversion encompa sses the use of pr operty , place d in one’s custody for a limit ed purpose , in an unauthorized manne r or to an una uthorized ex t ent.”)

. Nor doe s Grey

bull’s shepherdingWhit e E agle’ s loan modification throug h the appr oval proc ess and sig ning pa pe rw or k c on sti tu te e mbe zzle me nt. In c on tr a st t o Gre y bull’s own nominee loans (which circumvented the Credit Commi ttee), White Eag le’s loan modification was ultimately

approve d by

the Credit C ommitt ee. E ven in the light most favor able to the g overnme nt, the evidenc e c o n tr a d i c t s ane mb e z z l e m e n to r c o n v e r s i o nth e o r

y.
Be cause the alleg ed objec t of the conspira cy —the loan
m o d i fication—was not itself criminal, there can be no co nspiracy

. Se e Un ite d S tates v . M

on tgo me ry , 384 F.3d 1050, 1062 (9th Cir.2004) (holding that a conspira cy require s an agre ement to eng ag e in cr iminal conduct). The g overnme nt cannot bootstrap its el f to a cr iminal conviction simply beca use White Eag le disobey ed a superv i sor’s orde r o r c o n tr av e n e d

a g e n e r a l c iv il c o n f

li c t o f inte r e s t s tatute

. We
r e v e r s e W h i t e E a g l e ’ s c o n v i c t i o n s o nC o un t s I an d II.

B. Count III: Bribery The quid pro quo alleg ed here is simple. Whit e Ea g le, as BIA Superintende nt, helped Gr ey bull cover up her f

raudule nt
sc he me ; in e xch ang e Gr e y bu ll he lpe d he r o bta in a

fa vo ra ble loan modification. The gov er nment was re quired to prove that: (1) Whit e Eag le “wa s a public off icial;” (2) she re ceive dU NI TED S T A T ES V

. W HI TE E A G LE 13 “[ so me] th in g o f v a lue

. . . in re tur n f or

. . . b e ingind

uc e d to do or omit to do an[] a c t in

vio latio n o f [h e r] o ff

ic ia l duty ;” and (3) she ac ted “c orruptly”—that is, with the “intent to be influence d to perfor

m an ac t” that violated her of ficial duty .” See 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(2)( C); United States v. Ley va , 282 F.3d 623, 625- 626 (9th Cir. 2002).

Whit e Eag le doe s n ot c ha lle ng e he r s tatus a s a pu bli c officia l. I n s t ea d , she ar g ues that she r ece ived nothing of val u e b e c a

u s e G r e y

b u ll ’ s a s s is ta

n c e w it hth e loan modification was unne cessa ry and tha t she did not act
corr uptly beca use her actions co u l d not have a ffe cted the OIG’s investigation. W hite Eag le also cha lleng es the sufficie ncy

of the indictment, which a lleg es that agree ment and pay ment took place afte r s h e s e n t t h e le tt e r to M e n z.
Th e e vid e nc e is c on sis te nt w ithbr ibe ry , a nd surely sufficie nt under J

ac k so n v . V irg ini a . 4 4 3 U.S. at 319 (evide nce is suff

icient if “ anyrational trier of fac t c ould have fo un d th e e sse nti a l e le me nts of the c ri me be y on d a

re a so na ble dou b t” ) ( e mp h a s is in

o r ig in a l)

. Up o nh e ar in g o f M e nz’s
c on c e rn s, Whit e Ea g le c on du c te d a l m o st n o inve sti g a tio n into whether Menz’s loans wer e actually paid, and did not re port the issue to her super ior. Instead, on De cembe r 12, 2007, she wrote a letter to Menz on BIA letterhe ad fa lsely assuringher that th e loa

ns ha d b e en pai d off

and that th e y

ha d o nly
err oneou s l y b een listed unde r Menz’s name. O nly one day
ear lier, White Eag le had a ppl i ed for the $15,000 loa n modification. The modification appear s to have i s s u ed on irregular a

ndfavor able ter

ms: it included improved repa y ment provisions, and the documentation did not include
a ple dg e of tr us t a sse ts as was no rm a lly re qu ir e d. Gr e y

bu ll, whose sig nature appea

red on the application, fa st-trac ked the loa n a nd pr e va ile d up on the Cr e dit Pr og ra m to re le a se a

ho ldU NI TED S T A T ES V

. W HI TE E A G LE 14

on Whit e Ea g le’s ac count that ar ose af ter a borr ower

for whom Whit e Ea g le had c o-sig ned def aulted on a loa

n.
A r a ti o n a l ju

r y c o u ld e a s il y in f

e r a qu id p r o qu o from these fa cts, conc luding that Whit e Ea g le wrote Menz a letter to alleviate he r conc erns a nd tu rn ed a b lind ey e to the
nom i n ee borrowe r sche me in exchang e for Gre y bull’s later assistance in s ec uringa quick a nd favor able loan mod if ic a ti on . A lth ou g h th e loa n mo dif ic a tio n mi g ht w e ll have issued w i t h o ut Grey bull’s involvement, the jury was entitled to find that her assistance was “something of value ,” pa rt ic ula rl y g ive n th e fa

vo ra ble te rm s.
Whit e Ea g le also arg ues t hat she took no cor rupt ac tions beca use her letter to Menz could not have a ffe cted the O I G’s response to Menz’s complaint. I n doing so, she misconstrues the import of the letter

—transmitting the letter

was c orrupt reg ardle ss of its impact, as succe ss is not an element of the offe nse. More over, White Eag le fa iled to report the obviously illega l nominee borrow er sc heme. See United Sta te s v . B ird sa ll , 233 U.S. 223, 23 1 (1 914) (a dopting, f or bribery purposes, a

broad de finition of officia l a cts and noting that “[t] o constitute . . . officia l action , i t was not necessar y th a t[t h e c o n d u c t ] b e p r e s c r i b e d

b y s t a tu t e ” ); O’Campo v. Ha rd ist y , 262 F.2d 621, 624 (9th Cir. 1958) (same ). The jur y had ample e vidence to conclude tha t Whi te Eagle ’s actions
wer e “c orrupt.”

Whit e Ea g le ar g ues that “[a] person ca nnot be bribed for
a pa st a c t” and

ur g e s u s to re

je c t th e ind ic tme nt b ecause it states that White Eag le ag ree d to the scheme and ac cepte d the pay m en t i n J anuar

y 2008, afte r s h e s e n t t

h e le tt e r to M e n z. B u tth e i n d i c t m e n ts e t s n o d a t e s i ns t o n e

. W h i l e C o un tIII states t hat White Eag le ag ree d to the scheme and re ceive d theU NI TED S T A T ES V

. W HI TE E A G LE 15

loan mo d if

ic a ti o n“ o no r

ar o un d ” Janu ar

y 2 , 2 0 0 8 , the evidenc e in the re cord is consistent wi t h an agree ment b e tw e e n Wh it e E a g le an d G r e y b u ll th a t p r e d a te d

the Dec ember

letter to Menz

. Moreove r, any challeng e to the sufficie ncy

of Count I I Iof the indictment is mispl ace d reg ardle ss of any

impr ecision as to timing. The indictment trac k s the languag e of the bribery statute, contains the elements of the offe nse, and spe cifies which of Whit e Ea g le’s actions violated the la

w, thus allowi ng her to avoid another prosec ution on the same ac tions. See H amling v. Unit ed States , 4 18 U. S

. 87 , 1 17 (1 97 4) ; United States v. Mi lov an ov ic , 678 F.3d 713, 727 ( 9th Cir. 2012) . We affir m W h i t e E a g l e ’ s c o n v i c t i o nun d e r C o un tIII

. C. Co untIV : F als ific at ion , C onc e alm e n t , o rC o v e r ing Up of a Mate rial F act

Th e dis tr ic t c ourt

pr op e rl y ins tr uc te d the jur

y that a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a )(1) require s that: (1) the defe ndant had a

duty to disclose materia l information, (2) the defe ndant fa lsified, conce aled, or cover ed up such a

fac t by trick, sche me, or fr aud, (3) the fa lsifie d , co ncea led, or
cover ed up fa ct was material, (4) t h e fa l sification and/or
conce alment was knowing and willful, a nd (5) t h e material fac t was withi n the j urisdiction of t he Executive B ranc h. See United States v. Varbe l , 780 F.2d 758, 762 (9th Cir. 1986) (i nd ic tme nt a lle g ingc on c e a lme nt in vio latio n o f 1 8 U .S. C. § 1 00 1 fai led whe re the re wa s n o d uty to d isc los e ); se e als o Un ite d S tates v . M oo re , 446 F. 3d 671, 677 (7th Cir. 2006). Whit e Ea gle ch a lle ng e s th e le g a l su ff ic ie nc y of he r d uty to repor t Grey bull’s fraud a

ndclaims that she did re port the fra ud to Darr yl L aCounte, t he BI A Deputy Reg ional Direc tor.U NI TED S T A T ES V

. W HI TE E A G LE 16

Whit e Ea g le’s cla im t h at she re ported the f raudule nt scheme does not withstand scrutiny . She argues only that she told L aCounte that Gre y

bull’s husba

nd had paid the bala

nce of a loa n f or on e of Gr e y

bu ll’ s re lativ e s. Th is ha

rd ly c ounts
as an a ctual “r eport” alerting L aCounte to the fr audulent
a c tiv ity . L a Counte ’s te sti mony a lso c on tr a dic ts Wh ite Eag le’s cla im that she repor ted the fr aud. He rec alled discussing G rey

bull’s husband’s pay

ment with Whit e Ea g le, but d i d n o t remembe r hea ringabout Gre y

bull’s fraud. L aCounte also testified that h e would have r eac ted to any repor t r eg arding fra

udulently obtained loans—but he did not investigate or take any actions. The jury was e ntitled to reject Wh it e E a g le ’ s a c c o un t an d c r e d it L a Co un te ’ s te s ti mo n y

. We
ca n not overturn its cre dibilit y deter minations. S

e e U n ite d Sta te s v . Yoss un tho rn , 167 F.3d 1267, 1270 ( 9th Cir. 1999) (noting that a jury ’s credibility finding cannot be revie wed on
a pp e a l) . We the re fo re fo c us our a na ly sis on wheth e r Wh ite Ea g le ’s fa ilure to r e po rt Gr e y bu ll’ s fr a ud c an s up po rt

a conviction for c oncea lment under 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1).

Whit e Ea g le , li ke a ll g ov e rnme nt e mpl oy e e s, ha d a duty to “ dis c los e wa ste , fr a

ud , ab us e , an d co rr

up tio n to a

pp ro pr iate authorities,” c odified in t h e C o de of F eder al Regulations as a “[b]asic o b l igation of public service .” See 5 C. F .R. § 2 63 5. 10 1( b) (1 1). I t is no t di sp ute d th a t Whi te Ea g le violated this fundamental r ule. Howe ver, she is not c harg ed with brea chingthe public trust or failing to per form her duties
a s a pu bli c se rv ant or g ov e rnme nt em plo y e e . Ins te a d, sh e is
c ha rg e d w ithfr a

ud ule nt c on c e a lme nt, a na rr ow e r o ff

e ns e under the umb re l l a of “Fr aud and F alse Statements.” 18 U.S.C. ch. 47. Be cause failing to r eport fra ud in violation of g e ne ra lly a pp lic a ble e thi c a l pr inc ipl e s is no t e qu iva le nt t oU NI TED S T A T ES V

. W HI TE E A G LE 17

W hi t e E agl e’ s f

ai l ure t o repo rt G rey b ul l ’ s f el o ny was charged i n C o unt 1 V I (m isp risio n o f a fe lo n y) a n d w a s n o t a p a rt o f t h is C o u n t. a “false s tate me n t, ” th e f a c ts d o n o t s u

p p o rt a c o n v ic ti on under § 1001( a)( 1). 1

As other c ircuits have r ec o g nized, a conviction under § 1001(a) (1) i s proper

wher e a statute or g overnme nt
re g ulatio n r e qu ir e s th e de fe nd ant t o d isc los e sp e c if ic information t o a particular person or entity

. See U nited States v. Tobon-Builes , 706 F.2d 1092, 1096 ( 11th Cir. 1983). So, fo r e xamp le , w he n a

de fe nd ant su

bmi ts a re po rt that om its pa rt ic ula r i nf or matio n that by law mus t app e ar in the re po rt , a conviction for c oncea lment is proper. See U nited States v. Mu nta in , 6 10 F .2 d 96 4, 97 1– 72 (D .C. Cir . 1 97 9) . T he same holds true when a defe ndant re sponds to specific que stions on a par ticular topic. Se e Un ite d S tates v . S te war t , 433 F.3d 273, 31 8 (2 d Cir . 2 00 6) (h old ingtha t SE C inve sti g a tor ’s sp e c if ic questions reg arding another individual’s stoc k trade s cre ated a duty to disclose information about those tra des).

In these situations, the defe ndant’s si lence is akin to an
a ff ir mativ e mis re pr e se ntatio n, and the re for e log ic a lly

fa lls within the scope of § 1001’ s prohibition on false and fra udulent sta t ements. Se e Un ite d S tates v . M

ub ay y id , 65 8 F .3 d 3 5, 70 -7 1 ( 1s t Cir . 2 01 1) (“[B ]y fi lin g the fa lse F o r m9 9 0 s , w h i c h h e s i g n e d un d e r p e n a l ty o f

p e r j ur y, Mubay yid did not passively

fail to disclose m ater ial fac ts; he
e ng aged in an a ff

ir mativ e a c t of

c on c e a lme nt.

. . . H is conduct is there fore sufficie nt gr ounds for a conviction under § 1001(a) (1).” ) (c itation omit ted). Similar l y , if a fina ncial instit ution fails to report par ticular transac tions a s require d by law, its silence i s eff

ectively a stateme nt that no such transac tions took pl ace

. Cf. Un ite d States v . P ue rto , 730 F.2dU NI TED S T A T ES V

. W HI TE E A G LE 18

62 7, 63 3 ( 11 th Cir

. 19 84 ) (h old ing that a de fe nd ant i s guil ty of conc e a lm e n t o f a mate r ia l f a c t w h e n h e c a

u s e s e it h e r an inacc urate curr en cy

transac tion report or no c urre ncy transac tion report to be se nt to the I nterna l Revenue Ser vice)

. We c an id e nti fy

no ana log ou s “si le nt state me nt” by Whit e Eag le. I t is true that Whit e Ea g le conc eale d Gre y bull’s loans by writin g a fa l s e letter to Menz claiming that the loans ha d been paid off and by inducing Gre y bull’s husband to pay

the loan balanc es wit h life insuranc e proc eeds. H oweve r, neither
a c t invo lve d a

n a ff ir mativ e fal se or

mis le a din g state me nt t o the g overnme nt. Th e g ov e rnme nt a rgue s th a t Whi te Ea g le furthe r conce aled the f

raud by informing L aCounte that Gre y b u ll ’ s n o mi n e e lo an s h a d b e e np a id

o f f , b u t n o t t e ll ing him that th e y

ha d b e e n f

ra ud ule ntly ob taine d in

the fi rs t pla c e . B ut t

hat in c omp le te r e po rt

—w hil e mis le a din g—d id not contrave ne a spe cific r eportin g d uty . Whit e Ea g le’s pa rt ia l dis c los ur e ma de no re pr e se ntatio n, e xplic it or imp lic it,
a s to the e xiste nc e of fr a

ud in the Cr e dit Pr og ra

m. Her acts may be improper and unethical, but they are not sufficient for
a conc ealment c onviction under § 1001(a )(1)

. Th e D. C. C ir c uit ’s tr e a tme nt o f a n a na log ou s is su e in U n ite d S ta te s v

. S a fa vian , 528 F .3 d 9 57 (D .C. Cir . 2 00 8) , is in s t ru cti ve. The court ove rturned a conviction under § 1001(a) (1) that, like here , arose out of an a lleg ed violation of 5 C.F.R. § 2635.101(b) (11) . Id

. at 959. The de fenda nt, a GSAe mpl oy e e , s ou g ht e thi c a l advi ce a bo ut p art ic ipatin g in g olf tr ip s po ns or e d b y

Jac k Abr amof

f, but di d n ot d isc los e Abramoff’s business be fore the GSA in his request for the ethics opinion. Id. at 960. The g overnme nt argued that the de fe nd ant’ s o mis sio n o f t

his re le va nt d e ta il br e a c he d h is d

uty to di s c l o s e un d e r

th e r e g u l a t i o nan d

o th e r e th i c a l p r i n c i p l e s. Id. at 964. The c ourt ac knowledg ed the e thics rules re quiredU NI TED S T A T ES V

. W HI TE E A G LE 19

disclosure re lating to c orruption, but found that the
re latio ns hip betwe e n th os e re qu ir e me nts and the duty to repor t under § 1001(a) (1) was “tenuous at best.” Id. I t noted tha t th e r e w a s “ n o in d ic a ti o n o f th e p arti c u la r f acts or information” that should be dis closed, a nd that the re g ulation contained no indication that it applied to the defend ant’s conduct. Id. at 965. I t reve rsed the co n v iction under § 1001(a) (1) be cause there was no duty to disclose. Id

. The same rea soning applies here . Although the regulation dis c us se s r e po rt ing“ fr a ud ” and “ c or ru pti on ,” 5 C. F .R. § 2635.101(b)( 11), it does not provide specifics on what kind of inf or matio n s ho uld

be re po rt e d o r t o w ho m. No r d oe s it dis c us s c ri min a l li a

bil ity fo r fa ilure to a

bid e by its pr ov isi on s. See Safav ian , 52 8 F .3 d a t 96 4 (Und e r the F if th A me ndme nt,

“ the de fe nd ant mus t hav e ‘f a ir no tic e

. . . of what c on du c t is fo r b i d d e n

. . . . [T ]h i s “ f

a i r w ar n i n g ” r e qu i r e m e n t

p r o h i bit s application of a c riminal statute to a def endant unless it was
rea sonably

clea r at the time of the alleg ed ac t i on that defe ndant[‘s] actions we re c riminal.’”) (first thre e alter ations in orig inal) (citation omitted). Nothing in § 1001(a)( 1) or the
re g ulatio n in dic a te s th a t a fa ilure to r eport

c ou ld e ff e c tiv e ly be re ad as a

statement t h at no fraud was taking pla ce. B e c a us e the g ov ernm ent d id n ot s ho w that Whi te Ea g le violated a spe cific duty

to report Cre dit Progra

m fraud, w e reve rse he r convic tion as to Count I V.U NI TED S T A T ES V

. W HI TE E A G LE 20

Sect i on 208 ( a) provi des t hat 2
[W ]hoeve r, be i ng an off i cer or em p lo y ee o f

t he executi ve b ranch .

. . p art i ci p at es personall y and

su b sta n tially as a G o v e rn m e n t o ff ic e r o r e m p lo ye e

. . . i n a jud i cial o r o t he r p ro ce ed i ng , ap p lic a t i o n, req ue st f or a r u l i n g or ot h e r de t e r mi n a t i on , c on t r a c t , c l a i m, cont ro vers y , ch ar ge, ac cus at i on, ar r es t , or ot her part i cul ar mat t er i n w hi ch, t o hi s knowl edge, he

. . . ha s a f i nan ci al i nt er es t

. . . [ s ] hal l be s ubj ect t o t he penal t i es
s et f ort h i n s ect i on 216 of

t hi s t i t l e.

1 8 U

. S.C

. § 2 0 8 (a). D. Count V: P ubl ic Act s Aff ect i n g a P ersonal F ina nc ialInt e r e st

Whit e Ea g le was also indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 208(a), the basic c riminal conflict of inter est statute, based on he r 2 alleg ed conc ealment of Gr ey bull’s fraudule nt scheme. Acc ordingto the g overnme nt, the conce alment furthe red Whit e Ea g le’s own inter ests beca use she want ed the loan prog ram to continue so that she could obtain additional future loa ns and e ns ure that

sh e ke pt h e r j ob ; bo th w ou ld b e in jeopar d y if the sche me was discove red. Those interests ar e too remote fr om Whi te Eag le’s ac ts to sust ain a c onviction.

Section 2 0 8 (a ) re g ulates a limited set of “ particula r matters,” g ener ally

arisingout of discre te matters with a direc t impac t on the g overnme nt employ ee’ s finance s. See5 C.F.R. § 2640.103(a) (1) ( listi ng examples that involve the
awa rd and ma int e na

nc e of g ov e rnme nt contra c ts, sp e c if ic hiring decisions, and use of a particular business’s se rvice s). I llustrative case s under § 208( a) unde rscor e the link betwe en the conf lict and a r eal, r ather

than spec ulative, in t er es t in a particula r matter. See, e .g. , United St ates v. Se lby , 557 F.3dU NI TED S T A T ES V

. W HI TE E A G LE 21

96 8, 97 5 ( 9th

Cir . 2 00 9) (p e r c ur iam) (e mpl oy e e wh ose husband ea rn ed commission from a softwa re sa le to the g ov e rnme nt h a d s uffic ie nt f ina nc ia l in te re st t o s us ta in conviction under § 208(a) wher e she ha d actively lobbied for inc re a se d u se of

he r h us ba nd ’s so ft wa re ); United Stat es v. J e we ll , 8 27 F .2 d 5 86 , 587 (9t h Cir. 19 87 ) ( fi na nc ia l in te re st require ment of § 208(a ) wa s met wher e the gove rnment employ ee sig ned invoices a uthorizi ng pay

ment to his own
c o mp an y ) ; Uni ted S

tates v . S mi th , 267 F.3d 1154, 1156–57 (D .C. Cir

. 20 01 ) (r e fe rr a l of pa tie nts to s pe c if

ic me nta l he a lth clinic to which def

endant ha d l o aned money was suff icient under § 208( a))

. The g overnmen t argued that the “ particula r matter” underlying this Cou n t was White Eag le’s re quest that Gr e y bu ll’ s hus ba

nd pa y of f G rey bu ll’s n omi ne e loa

ns wi th the proc eeds of

Gre y bull’s life insuranc e. While an employ ee need not pe rsonally

stand on either si d e o f an unde rlying transac tion, the link betwee n the employ ee’ s interest and the public act must be dire ct and pr edictable

. See U nited States v. Lund , 8 53 F .2 d 2 42 , 24 3 (4 th C ir . 1 98 8) (a pp lyingstatut e to f eder al employ ee’ s involvement in hir ing decision involving a r elative) . There was no such c lear link here.

The c onnection betwe en the pa y ment of Grey

bull’s fra udulent nominee loans a

nd Whit e Ea g le’s alleg ed fina ncial int e re st is re mot e and

sp e c ulativ e . Wh ile Whit e Ea g le ’s a c ts direc tly conce al ed Grey

bull’s fraud, he r own intere sts were further downstream. To find an ef fect on Whit e Ea g le’s
c on tin ue d e mpl oy

me nt a nd /or he r f utu re a bil ity to o bta in Credit Prog ram loans, we m ust assume that discover y of Gr e y bu ll’ s f ra ud wo uld have le d to a

wi de -s c a le investig a tio n, and

on e of tw o o utc ome s: ( 1) a

c ha ng e in policy p re v enting loans to BIA employ ees that would notU NI TED S T A T ES V

. W HI TE E A G LE 22

af fect Whi te Eag le unless and until she desire d a d dit io n al loa ns ; or (2 ) t he c on c lus ion

that Whi te Ea g le wa s at f a ult to
a de g r e e j u s t i f

yi n g h e r t e r m i n at i o n

. T h i s c h a i no f e v e nts require s hy

pothesis hea ped on hy

pothesis and is not the “close causa l link” betwee n the re quest to pay and the e ffe ct on the claimed f

inancial inter ests. Selby , 557 F.3d a t 9 7 5. Any pr op os e d li nk

is f ra ug ht w ithc on tin g e nc ie s, pa rt ic ula rl y beca use Gre y

b u l l ’s under lying f

raud w as par

t of a lon g sta nd ingsc he me tha

t lo ng pr e date d c la ime d c omp lic ity by Whit e Ea g le. See5 C.F. R. § 2640.103(a)( 3)(i) ( “A particula r m atter w ill not have a dire ct ef fec t on a financ ial int e re st, ho we ve r, if the c ha in o f c a us a tio n is a tte nu a te d o r i s co ntinge nt upon the occur renc e of e vents that are sp e c ulativ e .” ). Ac c or din g ly , White Ea g le ’s fi na nc ia l in te re st in th is matt e r w a s in s u f

f ic ie n t un d e r 1 8 U

. S. C. § 2 0 8 ( a )

. We
reve rse he r convic tion on Count V.

E. Co untVI : M ispr isi on o f a F e lon y Misprision of a felony

in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 4 require s the g overnme nt to establish: (1) the commission and completion of a f

elony by a third party , (2) the de fenda nt’s knowledg e of the felony , (3) the def endant’ s failure to notify the authorities, and (4) that the defe ndant took an af firmative step to conce al t h e crime. United States v. Ciambrone , 750 F.2d 1416, 1417 ( 9th Cir. 1985).

The c rime here was Gre y

bull’s f raudule nt use of nominee bo rr ow e rs . T he re wa s e vid e nc e , h ow e ve r, that Whi te Ea g le knew of the fra ud: Christi ansen told White Eag le that the loa ns in h e r n ame and

Gr e y bu ll’ s so n’ s n ame a c tua lly belong ed to Gre y

bull, and that the loans needed to be pa id out of Gr ey bull’s life insuranc e policy . Whit e Ea g le neve r notified rele vant authori t i es of Gre y bull’s use of nomineeU NI TED S T A T ES V

. W HI TE E A G LE 23

borrow e r s , an d

c o n c e a le d

G r e y b u ll ’ s f r a u d b y ar r an g in g f or Gre y bull’s husband to pay

off the long- term loans with life insurance proce eds to h ead off any investigation into t he matter.

As with the bribery

char g e, White Eag le ar g ues that there
was no concea lment and claims that she re ported the c rime by notifying D arr

yl L aCounte, the re levant B I A offic i al, that Gre y bull’s husband had paid the balanc e of a loan f or one of Gre y bull’s relatives. This repor t w as insufficie nt beca

use the law re q u i re s the re porting of the “ commission of a felony ,” not j u s t re l ated acts. See 18 U.S.C. § 4 (“Whoever, ha ving knowledg e of . . . a felony

. . . d o e s n o ta s s o o na s po ssi ble makeknown t he same ” may be subjec t to penalties.) ( e mp h a s i s a d d e d )

. La C o un t e a l s o t e s t i f i e d t o th e c o n t r a ry, and the jury was entitled to rejec t Whi te Eag le’s story to the extent that it conflicte d with L aCounte’s. S e e Yo s s u n th or n , 167 F.3d at 1270 (a jury ’s cr edibili t y finding cannot be revie wed on a

ppeal)

. Whit e Ea g le ad d i t i onally claims that she took no aff irmative step to conc eal the crime beca use the pay

ment of Christiansen and Gr ey

bull I I I ’s loans did n o t m ak e it any harde r for

the g overnme nt to u ncover Gre y bull’s fraud. Ho wever, the jury

hear d testimony

from the tribe ’s chief financ ial office r that her audit fo cu sed primar ily on loan pay ments, not their orig inat i o n

. Be cause this evidence showed that paid off loa

ns were less likely

to be investig ated, the jury could conc lude that p ay

ment of the loans made the dis c ov e ry of the fr a ud le ss l ike ly

and, th eref

or e , th a t Whi te E a g l e t o o k

ana f f i r m a t i v e s t e p t o c o n c e a l th e f e l o n y.
Whit e Ea g le finally

ar gues that her

conviction ca

nnot sta nd be c a us e the re wa s no un de rl yingpr os e c uti on re latin gtoU NI TED S T A T ES V

. W HI TE E A G LE 24 the long -term loans that Gre y bull’s husband paid and that she
a ll e g e d ly c o n c e a le d

. We h av e n e v e r r e qu ir e d e v id e n c e o f a pr os e c ut ion

or c onvic tio n f

or the thi rd pa rt y ’s of fe ns e a s a pr e r e q u is it e f o r a misprision conviction—only the completion of the off ense. S e e Ci ambrone , 750 F.2d at 1417 (listing
co mm is s io nan d

c o mp le ti o no f

a f e lo n y , b u t n o t c o n v iction, as ele ments of the off

ense) ; U n ite d S ta te s v

. King , 402 F.2d 694, 695 (9th Cir. 1968) (holding , without discussing prosec ution or conviction of the pr in ci p als , that sufficie nt
e vid e nc e su

pp or te d th e jur

y ’s f ind ingtha

t th e pr inc ipa ls committed a fe lony). Any o t h er conclusion could ba r prosec ution in cases like this, where the third party dies or for other re asons is not charg ed and/or convicted be fore the de fe nd ant i s tr ie d. Re ve rs a l of Count VI on the se g ro un ds is not warr anted, a

nd we a ffirm Whit e Ea g le’s convic tion on C o un tV I.

F

. Whi te Eag le ’s F ift h Am e ndm e ntDe fens e
Whit e Ea g le also argue s th a t c onvic tio ns fo r C ounts V (public ac ts affe cting a financial intere st) and VI (misprision of a fel ony

) w ou ld v iol a te he r F if

th A me ndme nt r ig ht t o avoid self- incrimination beca use each charg e re lied on her duty to report c rimina l activity that would have e x posed her to prosecution. Howe ver, the se convic tions we re b ased on Whit e Ea g le ’s fa ilure to r e po rt Gr eyb ull ’s crimes, not her own alleg ed cr iminal activity . The c onnection bet we en Whit e Ea g le’s loan modificati o n and Grey bull’s use of nominee borr ower s is too remote to implicate White Eag le’s F if th A me ndme nt r ig hts

. Whit e Ea g le cites to persuasive authority that a misprision conviction cannot stand wher e the def endant’ s duty

to report
wo uld have fu

rn ish e d ev ide nc e a g a ins t th e de fe nd ant.U NI TED S T A T ES V

. W HI TE E A G LE 25 Notably , these c ases arise where the def endants’ c riminal activity arose out of the s ame transactions t hat consti tuted the felonies they wer e obli g ated to repor t. See King , 402 F.2d at 697 (def endant who was present at meeting s of conspirators befor e and a fter ba

nk robber y , rec eived some proce eds fr om it, a nd helped participa

nts le ave town could not be prose cuted fo r f a ilure to r e po rt

ro bb e ry ); United St ates v. Kuh , 541 F.2d 672, 677 (7th Cir. 1976) (prose cution for misprision violated Fifth Ame ndment beca

use the de fe n d ant’s duty to report
arm o r e d c ar r o b b e r

y w o u ld h av e r e v e a le d h is r e c e ip t and po sse ssi on

of mon e y sto le n in that sam e c ri me ). I n c on tr a st, Whit e Ea g le’s liability for he r a l l ege d l y

criminal
a c tiv ity —r e c e ipt of the loa n mo dif ic a tio n— wa s not di re c tly
c onne c te d to the c ri min al a c tiv ity sh e fa ile d to re po rt , Gr e y bu ll’ s u se of

no min e e bo rr ow e rs

. Whit e Eagle ’s inv oc a tio n o f t he F if th A me ndme nt i s ins uf fi c ie nt b e c a

us e he r d isc los ur e of Gr e y bu ll’ s sc he me wo uld no t ha ve pr ov ide d a

str on g e no ug h “li nk in t

he c ha in of e vid e nc e ne e de d to pr os e c ute ” he r for he r o wn mis de e ds

. Cf

. Ki ng , 4 0 2 F.2d at 697 (Fifth Ame ndment protec tions apply wher e the “ individual has re as o n ab le ca use to fea r he might . . . be c onvicted” be cause of the infor mation he
reve als.). I t is true, as Whit e Ea g le ar g ues, that the disclosure of Gre y bull’s fraud mig ht have led to an audit that might have exposed othe r fra

uds, which might in tur

n have implicated Whit e Ea g le

. Ho we ve r, a s the g ov e rnme nt po int s o ut, Me n z’ s c o mplaint had alre ady trig g ere d an OI G investig ation, but no ext ensive a

udit, so discovery

was by no means a ssured
e v e ni f W h i t e E a g l e h a d

r e p o rt e d G r e yb u l l ’ s a c t i v i ty. Be cause the conne ction betwee n disclosure a nd prosec ution
was tenuous and speculative, no Fifth Ame ndment violation
ar i s e s o u to f

W h i t e E a g l e ’ s c o n v i c t i o n s o nC o un t s V an d V I.U NI TED S T A T ES V

. W HI TE E A G LE 26

II. S E NT E NCI NG
We reviewde novo the district cour t’s interpre tation of th e S entenc ing G

uidelines, its application of the Guide lines to the fac ts for abuse of discretion, and its fa ctual finding s for clea r er ror. United States v. Loew , 593 F .3 d 113 6, 11 39 (9 th Cir. 2010).

Th e dis tr ic t c ourt c or

re c tly se t Whit e Ea g le ’s ba se of fe ns e level at 14, a s she was a

public officia l within the meaning of the law. See U.S

. SentencingGuidelines Manua l (“ U. S.S. G. ” ) § 2C1 .1 (a )( 1) (N ov . 201 2) ; 18 U. S.C. § 201(a) (1). How ever , the district court a ppear s to have e rre d in the next s tep: adjusting the sentenc e based on “the value of the pay ment, the benefi t re ceived or to be re ceive d in return for the pa

y ment, the value of

any thing obtaine d or to be obtained . . . , or the loss to the g overnme nt from the off ense, whicheve r is g reatest.” U.S.S.G. § 2C1.1(b)(2)

. The district court a ppropriate ly

looked to the loan modi fication, but simply rec ited the Guidelines languag e bef ore c o n c lu ding that

“ the va lue is the $1 5, 00 0 lo an” and makinga dju stm e nts to th at figure based on White Eag le’s pay ments. Whi le the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s c ry

pti c state me nt giv es little ins ig ht i nto its methodology , it appears t h at i t valued the loan modific ation using standard “loss” calc ulations instea d of focusingon the “value of the be nefit” White Eag le rec eived as the Guidelines require

. Given our r ever sal of the c onversion and misapplication conviction, there is no $15,000 “loss” to t he g overnme nt that could be use d as the basis for the sentenc ing adjustment. Nor is there a ny evidenc e that W h i t e Eag le’s loan modification
was fra udulently obtained such that its e ntire amount could be
c on sid e re d a

lo ss unde r § 2B 1. 1, wh ic h g ov e rn s lo ssU NI TED S T A T ES V

. W HI TE E A G LE 27

calc ulations for financ ial crimes ba sed in fra ud and other forms of thef

t. SeeU. S.S. G. § 2 B 1. 1, int roductory c mt. (n oti ngthat § 2 B1.1 a dd re sse s “ ba sic fo rm s o f p ro pe rt y o f f e n s e s [ l i k e ] th e f

t , e mb e z z l e m e n t , f

r a u d , f o r g e r y, counter feiting ”). A ny sentenc ing a djustment must there fore be base d on the value of

the loan modification as a bribe.

Sectio n 2C1.1, which g overns va luation, does not contemplat e u s i n g § 2B1.1 to de termine the “ value of the benef it rece ived or to be r ece iv ed ” i n a bribe ry conviction. U .S.S.G. § 2C 1.1, cmt. n.3 (stating that “‘ [l] os s , ’ f o r p urp o s es of [ § 2 C 1.1(b)( 2)], shall be determined in a ccor dance with” § 2B1.1, but sepa

rate ly discussing the value of the be nefit or pa y me nt) (e mph a sis a dd e d)

. Whe re , a s h e re , th e re is n o lo ss, or the l o s s i s not the larg est of the listed value s, § 2B1.1 b e c o m e s r e l e v an to n l y a f t e r t h e value of the be nefit or pay ment is oth e r

w is e determined. See U.S.S.G. § 2C1.1(b)(2) (“I f the va lue of the pa y ment [or] the be ne fi t . . . e xce e de d $ 5, 00 0, inc re a se by the numbe r o f l e ve ls from the table in § 2B1.1.” ). The district cour t theref ore e rre d to the extent it relied on § 2B1.1’ s methodology for va luation purp os e s.
The district cour

t also err ed in eq u ating the value of the loan modification to a cash pay ment of the same siz e. “T he value o f a tra

nsaction is often quite diff ere nt than the fa ce amount o f t h at t ransa ction.” United States v. Fitzhugh , 78 F.3d 1326, 1331 (8th Cir. 1996 ). T he Fitzhugh court looked to § 2C1.1 for guidance in a commer cial bribe ry matter g overne d by

§ 2B4.1 a

nd conclude d t h at “[w]hen a loa n is ob ta ine d by br ibe s, it is like ly to be a t f avo ra ble te rm s, in which ca se its value will ty pically be the diff

ere nce be tw e e n the a c tua l cos t of the loa n, and the c os t of

the same loan at fa ir marke t terms and c o nditions.” Id. Th isU NI TED S T A T ES V

. W HI TE E A G LE 28

conclusion follows fr o m § 2C1.1’s mandate to foc us on the net value of “‘the benef it r ece ived or to be re ceive d.’” U. S.S. G. § 2 C1. 1, c mt. n. 3 ( no ti ng that w he re a c on tr a c t is
awa rded in e x chang e fora bribe , the “be nefit” f rom the contra ct is the profit mad e there on, not the entire pa y ment due under the contra ct).

Th e Ei g hth

Cir c uit ’s Fitzhugh decision i s instructive here beca use W hite Eag le was not bribe d with a loan she w as not expected to re pay . Instead, she r ece ived an e x pedited loan that appea

rs to have issued on better te rms than standar d Cr e dit Pr og ra m lo ans

. I t is un c le ar, ho we ve r, wh e the r Wh ite E agle would have re ceive d the loan at a ll absent Gre y bull’s intervention. B oth of t h o s e i ssues ca n fac tor in to the ult imate va luatio n o f t

he ne t be ne fi t c on fe rr e d o n Wh ite Ea g le by the loa n mod if ic a tio n. We a

re no t in a po sit ion to d ic tate the pre cise va luation methodology o n appea l. I nstead, beca use the district cour

t r ested its va luation de cision on the fac e value o f the loan a

nd did not link i ts calculations to t he “value of the be nefit [W hite Eag le] rece ived,” we remand for further proce eding s consistent with this opi nion. U.S.S.G. § 2C1. 1, c mt. n. 3; see also Fitzhugh , 78 F.3d at 1331 (finding that “the sc anty evidenc e of rec ord reg arding the [favora ble] loan

. . . sug g ests that its va lue, proper ly calc ulated, would be far less than its face amount” and re m an ding f or a c orre ct deter mination of its value).

C ONCL US I ON
Whit e Ea g le’s convictions on Counts I , I I , I V, and V a re RE VE RSE D . Her

convictions o n C ounts I I Iand VI are AF F IRM ED . T he matte r i s RE M AN DE D to the district
c ourt fo r f ur the r s e nte nc ing pr oc e e din g s con sis te nt wit h th is opinion.