UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 08-4890

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff – Appellee, 

 v. 

DEMANI JAWARA BOSKET, 

 Defendant – Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Anderson. G. Ross Anderson, Jr., Senior 

District Judge. (8:07-cr-01362-GRA-1) 

Submitted: October 30, 2009 Decided: December 15, 2009 

Before MICHAEL, SHEDD, and AGEE, Circuit Judges. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Robert Sneed, ROB SNEED LAW FIRM, LLC, Greenville, South 

Carolina, for Appellant. W. Walter Wilkins, United States 

Attorney, A. Lance Crick, Assistant United States Attorney, 

Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
PER CURIAM: 

Demani Jawara Bosket appeals his jury conviction for 

possessing a firearm and ammunition after having been convicted 

of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one 

year, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006). On appeal, 

he contends the district court erred by informing the jury that 

he had elected not to testify, by using the term “felon,” and by 

commenting on specific evidence in its instructions, and that 

the errors were cumulatively prejudicial. We affirm. 

Because Bosket raises these issues for the first time 

on appeal, our review is for plain error. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 

52(b); United States v. Reid, 523 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 663 (2008). To establish plain error, 

Bosket must show that an error occurred, that the error was 

plain, and that the error affected his substantial rights. See

United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993). Even if he 

makes this threshold showing, the decision whether to correct 

the error is within our sound discretion. Id. at 735-36. 

Bosket first contends that the district court plainly 

erred when it informed the jury that he had elected not to 

testify or to offer any evidence, and that consequently, they 

would be moving into the final phases of the trial. The court 

had previously instructed the jury that Bosket had no burden to 

prove his innocence or to present any evidence; he had the right 

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to remain silent; and they were prohibited from using the fact 

that he may not testify against him. The court subsequently 

reminded the jury that the burden was on the Government to 

persuade them beyond a reasonable doubt that Bosket was guilty, 

and Bosket had no obligation to offer any evidence. 

Bosket contends that the district court’s comment 

regarding his decision not to testify was a violation of his 

right not to incriminate himself under the Fifth Amendment. We 

disagree. The district court did not instruct the jury that 

Bosket’s silence was evidence of guilt, but in fact instructed 

them that the decision not to testify could not be used against 

him. Because the district court did not adversely comment on 

Bosket’s silence, there was no plain error. See Lakeside v. 

Oregon, 435 U.S. 333, 338-39 (1978). 

Bosket next contends the district court’s references 

to the term “felon” constituted plain error in violation of the 

Rules of Evidence and his right to a fair trial. He argues 

there was an “obvious danger that the jury would convict [him] 

because he was a convicted felon.” We find no plain error. As 

we have observed, the term “crime punishable by imprisonment for 

a term exceeding one year” in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is commonly 

referred to as a “felony.” United States v. Milton, 52 F.3d 78, 

79 n.1 (4th Cir. 1995). Moreover, we have held that “in a 

felon-in possession case such as this, the district court must 

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instruct the jury that the government must prove beyond a 

reasonable doubt that at the time the defendant possessed the 

firearm he had a qualifying previous felony conviction, that is 

a prior conviction for an offense punishable by a term of 

imprisonment exceeding one year.” Id. at 81. Therefore, while 

a defendant who stipulates to the existence of a prior felony 

conviction may exclude evidence concerning the nature of the 

felony conviction, he may not exclude evidence concerning the 

existence of the felony conviction. Id. at 81 n.7. 

In this case, Bosket stipulated that he was “a person 

who has been convicted for a crime(s) punishable by imprisonment 

for a term exceeding one year for purposes of Title 18, United 

States Code, Section 922(g)(1).” The district court instructed 

the jury that the Government had to prove Bosket had “been 

convicted of a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment 

exceeding one year”; that this was “the definition of a felon 

under federal law, convicted of a crime punishable by a term of 

imprisonment exceeding one year”; and that Bosket had stipulated 

he “has been previously convicted of a crime punishable by a 

term of imprisonment exceeding one year, and therefore, he is in 

fact a felon under federal law.” The court also instructed them 

that the law prohibited any person who had been convicted of a 

crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year 

from possessing any type of weapon or ammunition. Finally, the 

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court gave a limiting instruction that the fact that Bosket had 

admitted he was a felon by previous conviction should not be 

considered by the jury in deciding whether he possessed the 

weapon in this case, and he was presumed innocent until proven 

guilty. We find no plain error in the court’s instructions. 

Bosket next contends the district court improperly 

commented on specific evidence when charging the jury. 

“District courts are necessarily vested with a great deal of 

discretion in constructing the specific form and content of jury 

instructions.” Hardin v. Ski Venture, Inc., 50 F.3d 1291, 1293 

(4th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). “So long as the charge is 

accurate on the law and does not confuse or mislead the jury, it 

is not erroneous.” Id. at 1294. Jury instructions should be 

drawn with reference to the particular facts of the case on 

trial, because abstract instructions that are not adjusted to 

the facts of a particular case may confuse the jury. United 

States v. Holley, 502 F.2d 273, 276 (4th Cir. 1974). “Different 

factual situations obviously call for different degrees of 

particularity,” id. at 277, and “the choice of generality versus 

specificity in the charge is a matter left to the sound 

discretion of the trial courts.” Hardin, 50 F.3d at 1295. 

Bosket first complains that the district court used 

the term “road stop” rather than “law enforcement’s sweeping 

checkpoint” when giving an instruction on the proof required 

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concerning the date of the offense, which occurred at a traffic 

checkpoint. As noted by the Government, the Supreme Court has 

used a similar term, i.e., roadblock, when referring to traffic 

checkpoints. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 

38 (2000). We find no plain error in the charge. 

Bosket also complains about the district court’s 

charge that the jury had to decide whether the Government had 

proven beyond a reasonable doubt that he “tossed the pistol in 

evidence to the ground while he was running away from” police, 

contending it implied he possessed the firearm and corroborated 

the account of Government witnesses. The district court had 

explained that Bosket’s mere presence was insufficient to prove 

he possessed the firearm, and its charge concerning what the 

Government must prove was not confusing or misleading. Finally, 

Bosket contends that the district court’s errors were 

cumulatively prejudicial. Because we find no plain error, we 

conclude Bosket cannot show any prejudice. 

We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED