IN THE COURT OFAPPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OFWASHINGTON, Respondent,

v. LORI ANN HARGROVE, Appellant. NO. 73220-0-1

DIVISION ONE

UNPUBLISHED OPINION FILED: February 29, 2016 KO
o CO Lau, J. — A jury convicted Lori Hargrove of unlawful possession of a controlled substance and bail jumping. Hargrove appeals her conviction for bail jumping. She contends the State presented insufficientevidence to supportthe conviction. We disagree and affirm. FACTS On April 25, 2014, the State charged Lori Hargrove with possession of methamphetamine. On December 11, 2014, the State amended the information to add
one countof bail jumping when she failed to appearfor a November 13, 2014 trial confirmation hearing.No. 73220-0-1/2 

### Atthe January 13, 2015 trial, the State offered and the court admitted 6 certified courtdocuments as Exhibits 6-11. Exhibit 6 is May 22, 2014 SkagitCounty District Court minute entries indicating Hargrove's arraignment on the drug possession charge. The exhibit states Hargrove was arraigned, advised ofherconstitutional rights, and released upon her promise to appear. The exhibit also indicates Hargrove was ordered to appearfor a court hearing scheduled May 30, 2014, at 9:30 am. The bottom ofthe form provides "Notice to Defendant" and "Defendant's Statement': NOTICE TO DEFENDANT: 1. IF YOU FAIL TO COMPLETE THE ABOVE ACTION BY THE TIME ABOVE INDICATED, AND/OR FAIL TO APPEAR AT THE TIME SCHEDULED, AWARRANT FOR YOUR ARRESTWILL BE ISSUED WITHOUT FURTHER NOTICE TO YOU, AND YOU MAY BE CHARGED WITH AN ADDITIONAL CRIMINAL OFFENSE OF "BAILJUMPING", AND IF THE CHARGE AGAINST YOU IS A TRAFFIC OFFENSE, YOUR DRIVER'S LICENSE WILL BE SUSPENDED. DEFENDANT'S STATEMENT: IAGREE TO COMPLYWITH THE ABOVE ORDER, WHICH I HAVE READ, OR AGREE TO READ. IUNDERSTAND THAT EACH TERM OF THIS ORDER MARKED WITH AN "X" APPLIES TO ME. Ex. 6. "Lori A. Hargrove" signed her name on the defendant's signature line immediately beneath the notice and statement. 

### Exhibit 7 is a copy ofthe information charging Hargrove with possession of a controlled substance. The information included Hargrove's DepartmentofCorrections (DOC) number, case number, birth date, and physical description. Exhibit 8 is a court orderfiled June 13, 2014, quashing a warrant entered inthis
case and setting dates and conditions of release. The order included the warning: FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THIS ORDER SHALL RESULT IN IMMEDIATE ARREST. FAILURE TO APPEAR AT DATES SET ABOVE OR SUBSEQUENTLY SET PROVIDES A BASIS FOR FELONY BAIL JUMPING CHARGES.
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### Ex. 8. The signature of"Lori A. Hargrove" appears immediately beneath this warning, acknowledging "copy received". The order includes Hargrove's name, case number, and residence address. 

### Exhibit 9 is an orderentered October29, 2014, striking all previously scheduled dates and setting new dates for Hargrove's possession of a controlled substance charge. The order indicates a trial confirmation date of November 13, 2014, trial on November 17, 2014, and time for trial date of December 17, 2014. The orderwas signed by "Lori A. Hargrove." Ex. 9. The ordercontains Hargrove's name and case number. Exhibit 10 is a courtorderdirecting the clerkto issue a bench warrantfor Hargrove's arrest based on herfailure to appear atthe November 13 trial confirmation hearing. Itcontains Hargrove's name and case number. Exhibit 11 is a copyofthe criminal clerk's minutes for SkagitCounty Superior Court, indicating a bench warrant was ordered based on Hargrove's failure to appear at the November 13 hearing. Hargrove's community corrections officer (CCO), MarlaneaAspden, identified Hargrove inopen court. Thejury convicted Hargrove on both counts. Based on an offender score of 7, the court sentenced Hargrove to 12 months on the possession charge and 33 months on the bail jumping charge, both to be served concurrently. Hargrove appeals her conviction for bailjumping. ANALYSIS Hargrove challenges the sufficiency ofthe evidence for her bailjumping conviction. Due process requires the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt allNo. 73220-0-1/4 facts ofthe charged crime. State v. W.R.. Jr.. 181 Wn.2d 757, 761-62, 336 P.3d 1134 

### (2014); InreWinship. 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 25 L Ed. 2d 368 (1970). When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency ofthe evidence, we are highlydeferential to thejury's decision, and we do notconsiderquestions ofcredibility, persuasiveness, 

### or conflicting testimony. State v. Davis. 182 Wn.2d 222, 227, 340 P.3d 820 (2014). To determine the sufficiency ofthe evidence, the test is whether, "afterviewing the evidence inthe light mostfavorable to the State, any rational trier offact could have found the essential elements ofthe crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Davis. 182 Wn.2d at 227 (quoting State v. Hosier. 157 Wn.2d 1, 8,133 P.3d 936 (2006)). All reasonable inferences from the evidence are drawn infavor ofthe State and interpreted most strongly againstthe defendant. Davis. 182Wn.2d at 227. We view circumstantial and direct evidence as equally reliable. State v. Ozuna. 184Wn.2d 238, 359 P.3d 739, 745(2015). To prove the charge of bailjumping, the State must show Hargrove was "released by court orderor admitted to bail with knowledge ofthe requirement of a subsequentpersonal appearance" before the court and that she then failed to appear. RCW 9A.76.170(1). Inaddition to proving the defendant's knowledge of a required subsequent personal appearance, the State must also prove the person on trial is the
same person who failed to appear atthe prior hearing. State v. Huber. 129 Wn. App. 499, 502-03, 119 P.3d 388 (2005). Hargrove relies on Huber. The State charged Wayne Huberwith bailjumping after his failure to appearon an unrelated charge. The bailjumping charge was tried separately from the underlying charges. At trial, the State offered and the court

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### admitted four certified courtdocuments, (1) an information charging Huberwith violating
a protection orderand tampering with a witness, (2) a courtorder requiring him to 

### appearon July 10, 2003, (3) clerk's minutes indicating Huberfailed to appear, and (4) the bench warrant. The State called no witnesses, and made no attemptto prove that the exhibits related to the same Wayne Huberthatwas on trial. Huber. 129Wn. App. at 501. On appeal, Division Two ofthis court reversed his conviction. The court 

### reasoned the State failed to establish the defendant's identity because it did not linkthe Wayne Huber named in the certified courtdocuments to the defendanton trial: To sustain this burden when criminal liabilitydepends on the accused's being the person to whom a document pertains.... the State must do more than authenticate and admitthe document; italso must show beyond a reasonable doubt "thatthe person named therein is the same person on trial." Because "in many instances men bear identical names," the State cannotdo this by showing identity of names alone. Rather, itmust show, by "evidence independentofthe record," that the person named therein is the defendant in the present action. 

### The State can meetthis burden in a variety ofspecific ways. Depending on the circumstances, these may include otherwise-admissible booking photographs, booking fingerprints, eyewitness identification, or, arguably, distinctive personal information. Butthe State does not meet its burden merely because the defense opts notto presentevidence; ifthe State presents insufficientevidence, the defendant's election not to rebut it does not suddenly cause it to become sufficient. Huber. 129Wn. App. at 502-03 (footnotes omitted). Likewise, in State v. Santos. 163 Wn. App. 780, 260 P.3d 982 (2011), Division Three ofthis court reversed the defendant's conviction for felony driving underthe influence. To prove the charge, the State had to prove the existence of four prior DUIs within a given time frame. At trial, the State presented the defendant's priorjudgmentsNo. 73220-0-1/6 

### and sentences bearing the name "Santos, Heraquio" or "Heraquio Santos." But the State provided no evidence linkingthosejudgements to the defendanton trial. The court concluded there was nothing inthe exhibits thatcould be compared to Santos "by simple observation" to determine identity. Similarly, "[t]he State produced no 

### evidence ofMr. Santos's address, birthdate, or criminal history," and offered no photographs ofthe defendantfor comparison. Santos. 163 Wn. App. at785. 

### Hargrove claims the State presented the same kind ofdocumentary evidence found insufficientin Huberand Santos. Inherview, without a witness to identify her as the one who signed the certified courtdocuments, or an expertto match her signature, 

### the State could not prove the same person who was on trial signed the documents. She also contends the State failed to establish that she knew about a required subsequent personal court appearance. We disagree. Unlike in Huber. Hargrove was tried for the underlying charge of unlawful possession of a controlled substance inthe same proceeding as the bail jumping charge. During trial, Hargrove's community corrections officer, Marlanea Aspden, identified Hargrove in open court and provided her DOC number. She testified she was personally involved in arresting Hargrove on the underlying charge. On appeal, Hargrove does not challenge the adequacy ofherCCO's in-court identification. Unlike in Santos, the certified documents admitted here all relate to the
same proceeding, and bore the same cause number and same signature of "Lori A. Hargrove." InSantos, the documents were priorjudgments and sentences from unrelated proceedings listing inconsistentversions ofthe defendant's name and date ofNo. 73220-0-1/7 

### birth. Hargrove's unique DOC number appears nextto the case number inthe original and amended information. Huber and Santos are unpersuasive. The in-court identification of Hargrove, and the documents admitted attrial, supportthe rational circumstantial inference thatthe person named inthe documents


### was the person who failed to appearon November 13, and was the same defendant at trial. This evidence also supports the reasonable inference that by signing the order 

### setting the November 13 hearing, Hargrove knew of a mandatory subsequentpersonal court appearance. Considered inthe lightmostfavorable to the State, we conclude 

### sufficientevidence exists to support Hargrove's bail jumping conviction.1 The trial court properly dismissed Hargrove's motion to dismiss. We affirm.

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WE COMCU 

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1 Furthermore, a "solid" connection between different counts can constitute 

### independentevidence thatallcounts relate to the same person. State v. Brezillac. 19 Wn. App. 11, 14, 573 P.2d 1343 (1978). -7-