alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### George SHANKLIN, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Joe ORTIZ, Director, Colorado Department of Corrections; Larry Reid, Warden, Colorado State Penitentiary, Canon City, Colorado; John Suthers, Attorney General, State of Colorado, Respondents-Appellees.

No. 07-1004.

United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.

Nov. 2, 2007.

C. Keith Pope, Boulder, CO, for Petitioner-Appellant.

Laurie A. Booras, State of Colorado Department of Law, Denver, CO, for Respondents-Appellees.

Before BRISCOE, McKAY, and McCONNELL, Circuit Judges.

ORDER*

MONROE G. McKAY, Circuit Judge.

Petitioner, a state prisoner represented by counsel, seeks a certificate of appealability to appeal the district court’s denial of his § 2254 habeas petition. Petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in his trial for first-degree and attempted first-degree murder because counsel failed to interview and present testimony from a woman who would have contradicted some of the testimony given by a key prosecution witness. This claim was rejected in state postconviction proceedings, and the federal magistrate judge concluded that this rejection was not “contrary to” and did not “involve[] an unreasonable application of[] clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2006). The magistrate judge agreed with Petitioner that one of the state appellate court’s factual findings was not supported by the record. However, this finding was not critical to the state court's other factual determinations nor to the court’s conclusion that Petitioner had not demonstrated that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. After considering Petitioner’s objections, the district court adopted and approved the magistrate judge’s recommendation and accordingly denied the petition.

To obtain a certificate of appealability, Petitioner must make “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2006). In order to meet this burden, Petitioner must demonstrate “that reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been re*752solved in a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted).

We have carefully reviewed Petitioner’s filings, the magistrate judge’s thorough report and recommendation, the district court’s disposition, and the record on appeal, including the record from the state trial and postconviction proceedings. Nothing in these materials raises an issue which meets our standard for the grant of a certificate of appealability. For substantially the reasons set forth by the magistrate judge and district court, we DENY Petitioner’s request for a certificate of appealability and DISMISS the appeal.

*

 This order is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R.App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
EXHIBIT 32.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                              18 USC, SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

     In connection  with the  quarterly  report of Northern  Ethanol,  Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-QSB for the nine month period ended September 30, 2006, as
filed with the  Securities  and  Exchange  Commission  on the date  hereof  (the
"Report"), I, the undersigned,  in the capacity and on the date indicated below,
certify,  pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:

     1.   The Report fully complies with the requirements of Rule 13(a) or 15(d)
          of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     2.   The  information  contained  in the  Report  fairly  presents,  in all
          material respects,  the financial  condition and results of operations
          of the Company.



Dated: November 20, 2006              s/Gordon Laschinger
                                      ------------------------------------------
                                      Gordon Laschinger, Chief Executive Officer
119 So.2d 94

#### John J. CASWELL, Chairman of the Orleans Parish Democratic Executive Committee, et al. v. Mrs. Ethel HOFT et al.

No. 45119.

March *24,*1960.

Thomas Barr, III, Alden W. Muller, New Orleans, for plaintiffs-appellants.

Carroll Montet, in pro. per., George W. Reese, Jr., Hugues de la Vergne, II, Charles Schwartz, Jr., New Orleans, for defendants-appellees.

FOURNET, Chief Justice.

The plaintiff John J. Caswell, individually as a registered Democrat and in his official capacity as Chairman of the Orleans Parish Democratic Executive Committee, joined by Peter W. Murtes, Salvador Anzelmo, and Rodney A. Buras, as Democratic nominees for the Louisiana House of Representatives- — the former from the Thirteenth Ward and the latter from the Seventh — instituted these proceedings seeking to have declared “ineligible to participate as Republican nominees in the General Election to be held April 19, 1960,” some twenty named defendants, and from a judgment dismissing their suit on defendants’ exception of no cause and no right of action, they prosecute this appeal.

We think the challenge of the appellees to the appellate jurisdiction of this court, in a motion to have the appeal dis*505missed, is well founded. Grace v. Boggs, 220 La. 22, 55 So.2d 768, 769. In that case this court very aptly observed that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, “original, appellate and supervisory, is established by Section 10 of Article 7 of the Constitution. The grant of appellate jurisdiction set forth therein is of a limited nature, being confined to seven different classes of cases,” and held, in clear and unmistakable language, that an appeal “which involves solely the assertion and enforcement of a political right granted by statute, is not cognizable here under our appellate jurisdiction as defined by Section 10 of Article 7 — for, obviously, there is no amount (monetary or something capable of monetary appraisal) in controversy nor does it fall within any of the other types of cases of which we have appellate jurisdiction, even though there be no amount in dispute. Therefore, the appeal properly lies to the Court of Appeal as that Court is vested with general appellate jurisdiction of all cases of which the District Courts have exclusive original jurisdiction and ‘of which the Supreme Court is not given jurisdiction * * * >»

A mere reading of plaintiffs’ petition in the instant case readily discloses that this is not an election contest as contemplated by R.S. 18:364, or R.S. 18:1251, but, instead, as in the Grace case, a suit having for its object the disqualification of candidates by reason of their alleged ineligibility.

For the reasons assigned, availing ourselves of the provisions of R.S. 13 :4441, it is ordered that this appeal be transferred .to the Court of Appeal for the Parish of Orleans, provided the record is filed in that court within two days from the date of this decree; otherwise; the appeal shall be dismissed. The costs incurred in this court shall be paid by the appellants.

SIMON, J., absent.
# -------~-~ ~~~= = = """ ' "==""'="- == == = = = ==== = ~~ - ,. ' I

Chi ef Essential Air Service & Domesti c Analysis Division United States Department of Tr anspo rtati o n l200 New Jersey Ave SE W a shington, DC 20590 . '
. Tra n e Comnmrc i al System s 101 William Wh i t e Blvd Pu e blo, CO 8 1 001 USA To l ( 719 ) 585-3800 www . Trane
. co m

October 15,2013

Dear Mr. Schlemmer: • . . •. • .. 1 ' 

### I am aw are 

### of the commi tments m a d e an d exe c ute d by th e City 

### of Pueblo, the S t ate of Co lo rado, and the United State s Department of Transpo rt ation to improve Pueblo Memorial Ai rport and 

### am grateful for th e impro v ement s witnes s ed to date. I am writi ng to day to personally communicate 

### my thank s f or those efforts and to support the request made 

### by representatives of the City of Pueb l o, Pueblo Economi c Development Commission, Pueblo Chamber of Commerce and Pueblo County to expand and improve air service offerings at Pu eb lo Memo rial Airport. Trane I Ingersoll Rand maintai n a s ignific ant presence in Pueblo. The Trane c ampus i s located on 27 acres in the Pueblo airport indu strial park
. The campus i s co mprised of two buildings to t al ing ap p roximately 450 , 000 square feet. Local oper ation s include two manufacturing groups employing approximately 350 people in the production of commercial chillers and HV AC climate solution products shipped around the world. In addition, the Trane-Pueblo campus is home to commerc ial product engineering, product development and produ c t marketing team s . Tot al Pueblo employment is app roximatel y 425 people
. The campus includ es the world ' s first American Heating & Refriger ation Institute 

### (AHRI) approved run test facili ty for air coo l ed chillers. Pueblo's product test capability aids our customers and the community as customers from around the world travel to Pueblo LO view Trane product capabilities and w itness performan c e testing of the products they purch a se . We host approximately 50 cu s tomer groups annu al ly; bring i ng significant travel , lodging and related rev e nue to Pueblo and the Southern Co l orado regio n . The benefits of expanded air service at Pueblo Memori al Airport would aid the provision of effi c ient and effective service to our customers thereby enhancing the success of our organization. Please consider these facts ill your review and d e termination. Respectfully ,


### David "Mitch" Human Trane-Pueblo Leader 

# ( jjJ W) Ingersoll Rand
§ 15a.445 Marital or parental status. ( a ) *Status generally.* A recipient shall not apply any rule concerning a student's actual or potential parental, family, or marital status that treats students differently on the basis of sex.
( b ) *Pregnancy and related conditions.* ( 1 ) A recipient shall not discriminate against any student, or exclude any student from its education program or activity, including any class or extracurricular activity, on the basis of such student's pregnancy, childbirth, false pregnancy, termination of pregnancy, or recovery therefrom, unless the student requests voluntarily to participate in a separate portion of the program or activity of the recipient.
( 2 ) A recipient may require such a student to obtain the certification of a physician that the student is physically and emotionally able to continue participation as long as such a certification is required of all students for other physical or emotional conditions requiring the attention of a physician.
( 3 ) A recipient that operates a portion of its education program or activity separately for pregnant students, admittance to which is completely voluntary on the part of the student as provided in paragraph (b)(1) of this section, shall ensure that the separate portion is comparable to that offered to non-pregnant students.
( 4 ) Subject to § 15a.235(d), a recipient shall treat pregnancy, childbirth, false pregnancy, termination of pregnancy and recovery therefrom in the same manner and under the same policies as any other temporary disability with respect to any medical or hospital benefit, service, plan, or policy that such recipient administers, operates, offers, or participates in with respect to students admitted to the recipient's educational program or activity.
( 5 ) In the case of a recipient that does not maintain a leave policy for its students, or in the case of a student who does not otherwise qualify for leave under such a policy, a recipient shall treat pregnancy, childbirth, false pregnancy, termination of pregnancy, and recovery therefrom as a justification for a leave of absence for as long a period of time as is deemed medically necessary by the student's physician, at the conclusion of which the student shall be reinstated to the status that she held when the leave began.
#### § 15e.151 Program accessibility: New construction and alterations.

Each building or part of a building that is constructed or altered by, on behalf of, or for the use of the agency shall be designed, constructed, or altered so as to be readily accessible to and usable by individuals with handicaps. The definitions, requirements, and standards of the Architectural Barriers Act (42 U.S.C. 4151-4157), as established in 41 CFR 101-19.600 to 101-19.607, apply to buildings covered by this section.
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 16**  **- 1014** 

ROBINSON A
. WILLIAMS , Plaintiff

- Appellant ,

v. THE CHEESECAKE FACTORY RESTAURANTS, INC. , Defendant

- Appellee
.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland , at Baltimore

. Ellen L. Hollander , District Judge. ( 1:15

- cv - 03700

- ELH )

Submitted : June 16, 2016 Decided: June 22, 2016

Before WYNN and DIAZ , Circuit Judges , and DAVIS, Senior Circuit Judge
.
Affirmed by un published per curiam opinion

. Robinson A. Williams, Appellant Pro Se. Andrew Butz, BONNER, KIERNAN, TREBACH & CROCIATA, LLP, Washington, D

. C
. ; Justin McArthur Cuniff, Christy Ann Fisher, BONNER, KIERNAN, TREBACH & CROCIATA, LLP, Annapolis, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Robinson A. Williams appeals the district court ’ s orde r sua sponte dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (2012) conspiracy action

. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district
court. Williams v. Cheesecak e Factory Rest., Inc. , No. 1:15

- cv 03700

- ELH (D. Md. filed Dec. 8, 2015 ; entered Dec. 9, 2015 )
. We also deny as moot Williams’ motion to stay pending appeal

. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
th is court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 23-6356

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

JUSTIN DEONTA STROM, a/k/a Jae Dee, a/k/a Jae, a/k/a J-Dirt,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at 

Alexandria. Leonie M. Brinkema, District Judge. (1:12-cr-00159-LMB-1; 1:23-cv-00342)

Submitted: August 29, 2023 Decided: September 1, 2023

Before KING, AGEE, and BENJAMIN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Justin Deonta Strom, Appellant Pro Se. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

USCA4 Appeal: 23-6356 Doc: 5 Filed: 09/01/2023 Pg: 1 of 2
2

PER CURIAM:

Justin Deonta Strom appeals the district court’s order construing his February 26, 

2023, postjudgment filing as an unauthorized, successive 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion, and 

dismissing it without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction.∗

 Our review of the record confirms 

that the district court properly construed Strom’s filing as a successive § 2255 motion over 

which it lacked jurisdiction because Strom failed to obtain prefiling authorization from this 

court. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b)(3)(A), 2255(h); McRae, 793 F.3d at 397-400. 

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order. United States v. Strom, No. 1:12-cr00159-LMB-1 (E.D. Va. Mar. 15, 2023). 

Consistent with our decision in United States v. Winestock, 340 F.3d 200, 208 (4th 

Cir. 2003), we construe Strom’s notice of appeal and informal brief as an application to 

file a second or successive § 2255 motion. Upon review, we conclude that Strom’s claims 

do not meet the relevant standard. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h). We therefore deny 

authorization to file a successive § 2255 motion. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

AFFIRMED

∗ A certificate of appealability is not required to appeal the district court’s 

jurisdictional categorization of a postjudgment filing as an unauthorized, successive § 2255 

motion. United States v. McRae, 793 F.3d 392, 400 (4th Cir. 2015).

USCA4 Appeal: 23-6356 Doc: 5 Filed: 09/01/2023 Pg: 2 of 2
###### Editorial Note on Part 1962

#### Editorial Note:

Nomenclature changes to part 1962 appear at 80 FR 9902, Feb. 24, 2015.

#### § 1962.43 [Reserved]
```

[109th Congress Public Law 209]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]

[DOCID: f:publ209.109]

[[Page 120 STAT. 318]]

Public Law 109-209
109th Congress

                                 An Act

 
 To extend through December 31, 2006, the authority of the Secretary of 
 the Army to accept and expend funds contributed by non-Federal public 
    entities to expedite the processing of permits. <<NOTE: Mar. 24, 
                         2006 -  [H.R. 4826]>> 

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. FUNDING TO PROCESS PERMITS.

    Section 214(c) of the Water Resources Development Act of 2000 (33 
U.S.C. 2201 note; 114 Stat. 2594; 117 Stat. 1836; 119 Stat. 2169) is 
amended by striking ``March 31, 2006'' and inserting ``December 31, 
2006''.

    Approved March 24, 2006.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY--H.R. 4826:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 152 (2006):
            Mar. 14, considered and passed House.
            Mar. 16, considered and passed Senate.

                                  <all>
```
EXHIBIT 32.1

SECTION 1350 CERTIFICATIONS

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Ruths Chris Steak
House, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 26, 2006, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Craig S. Miller, President and Chief Executive Officer
of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:



|(1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
|--- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|(2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company at the dates and for the periods
indicated.
|--- | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

May 3, 2006



/s/ Craig S. MillerCraig S. MillerPresident and Chief Executive Officer


A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document authenticating,
acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906, has been provided to Ruths Chris Steak House, Inc. and will be retained by
Ruths Chris Steak House, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
#### FIREMAN’S FUND INDEMNITY COMPANY, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.

No. 13341.

United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.

Feb. 19, 1954.

Anderson, McPharlin & Conners, Kenneth E. Lewis, Los Angeles, Cal., for appellant.

Ellis N. Slack, Meyer Rothwacks, Fred E. Youngman, Sp. Assts. to Atty. Gen., Washington, D. C., Laughlin E. Waters, U. S. Atty., E. H. Mitchell, Edward R. McHale, Asst. U. S. Attys., Los Angeles, Cal., for appellees.

Worthington, Park & Worthington, Alden Ames, Herbert Kohlwes, San Francisco, Cal., amici curiae.

Before MATHEWS, STEPHENS and BONE, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

In an action by appellee, the United States, against Swedlow Engineering Company, Inc., and appellant, Fireman’s Fund Indemnity Company, D.C., 100 F. Supp. 796, and a judgment was entered against both defendants on November 21, 1952. Appellant has appealed. The judgment is reversed as to appellant upon the authority of Westover v. William Simpson Construction Co., 9 Cir., 908 F.2d 209, decided January 28, 1954.
1 In The



### Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

__________________

N O . 09

- 20

- 00045

- CR

__________________

BARRIAN MCCRAY BLACKWELL , Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS , Appellee

__________________________________________________________________

On Appeal from the 9th District Court

Montgomery County, Texas

Trial Cause No. 17

- 08

- 09638

- CR

__________________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Barrian McCray Blackwell has filed a motion to dismiss his appeal. See Tex.

R. App. P. 42.2. A request to dismiss the appeal is signed by appellant personally

and joined by counsel of record. No opinion has issued in this appeal. The motion is

granted, and the appeal is therefore dismissed.2 APPEAL DISMISSED.

_________________________ STEVE McKEITHEN

Chief Justice

Submitted on April 21, 2020

Opinion Delivered April 22, 2020

Do Not Publish

Before McKeithen, C.J., Kreger and Johnson, JJ.
###### Editorial Note on Part 1940

#### Editorial Note:

Nomenclature changes to part 1940 appear at 80 FR 9876, Feb. 24, 2015.

#### § 1940.590 [Reserved]
**Exhibit15**

April 26, 2007

MWI Veterinary Supply,Inc.Meridian, Idaho

We have reviewed, inaccordance with the standards of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board(United States), the unaudited interim financial information of MWI VeterinarySupply, Inc. and subsidiaries for the periods ended March 31, 2007 and2006, as indicated in our report dated April 24, 2007, because we did notperform an audit, we expressed no opinion on that information.

We are aware that ourreport referred to above, which is included in your Quarterly Report onForm 10-Q for the three-month period ended March 31, 2007, isincorporated by reference in Registration Statement Nos. 333-127879 and333-127880 on Form S-8 and Registration Statement No. 333-141078 on FormS-3.

We also are aware thatthe aforementioned report, pursuant to Rule 436(c) under the SecuritiesAct of 1933, is not considered a part of the Registration Statementprepared or certified by an accountant or a report prepared or certified by anaccountant within the meaning of Sections 7 and 11 of that Act.

/s/ DELOITTE & TOUCHE LLPBoise, Idaho

----
```

[109th Congress Public Law 182]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]

[DOCID: f:publ182.109]

[[Page 120 STAT. 289]]

Public Law 109-182
109th Congress

                            Joint Resolution

 
  Increasing the statutory limit on the public debt. <<NOTE: Mar. 20, 
                        2006 -  [H.J. Res. 47]>> 

    Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United 
States of America in Congress assembled, That subsection (b) of section 
3101 of title 31, United States Code, is amended by striking out the 
dollar limitation contained in such subsection and inserting in lieu 
thereof $8,965,000,000,000.

    Approved March 20, 2006.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY--H.J. Res. 47:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD:
                                                        Vol. 151 (2005):
                                    Apr. 28, considered and passed House 
                                        pursuant to 
                                        H. Con. Res. 95.
                                    Mar. 16, considered and passed 
                                        Senate.

                                  <all>
```