Filed 12/8/20 In re Alize D. CA2/7

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

In re ALIZE D., a Person Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

 B304214

(Los Angeles County

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

ADRIAN D.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 Super. Ct. No. 19CCJP08176A)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Kristen Byrdsong, Juvenile Court Referee. 

Affirmed in part and dismissed in part.

Donna P. Chirco, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant 

County Counsel, and William D. Thetford, Principal Deputy 

County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
2

INTRODUCTION

Adrian D. appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdiction 

findings and disposition orders declaring his four-year-old child 

Alize D. a dependent of the court and removing her from his 

physical custody. Adrian contends that substantial evidence did

not support the court’s jurisdiction findings under Welfare and 

Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b),1 that there 

were reasonable means to protect Alize without removing her, 

and that the court abused its discretion in ordering him to 

complete a domestic violence program and parenting classes and 

in restricting his visits with Alize. We dismiss the appeal from 

the juvenile court’s findings under section 300, subdivision (a), 

and otherwise affirm. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Adrian Hits His Girlfriend in Alize’s Presence

On October 31, 2019 Adrian’s girlfriend Dulce V. tried to 

leave Adrian’s house to look for a job, but Adrian prevented her 

from leaving because he thought she was going to cheat on him. 

When Dulce tried to call her mother, Adrian “snatched” Dulce’s 

phone from her. When Dulce tried to take it back, Adrian

punched her in the face, causing her to fall to the ground and 

bleed from her nose. Dulce walked to a nearby store and 

borrowed a phone to call the 911 emergency operator. A Los 

Angeles County Sheriff’s deputy arrived and observed “redness, 

swelling, and dried blood” on Dulce’s nose. Dulce told the deputy

that Adrian hit her and that “there has been previous history of 

1 Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions 

Code.
3

‘[d]omestic [v]iolence,’” but that she had not reported it because 

she was scared. Dulce said she wanted to leave Adrian’s home 

and had started to pack her belongings because Adrian was 

“extremely possessive and violent with her.” When Dulce said

Alize was present during the incident, the deputy contacted the 

Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family 

Services. 

B. The Department Investigates and Files a Petition 

Under Section 300, Subdivisions (a) and (b), and the 

Court Detains Alize

A week later the Department interviewed Adrian about 

Dulce’s report of domestic violence. Adrian told the Department 

social worker that he and Dulce were arguing and that, when he 

tried to get her out of the house, she “tripped over a bike onto the 

table in the dining room.” Adrian stated, referring to Dulce, “I 

just tapped her.” Adrian said that Alize “did not see anything,” 

that the deputy “lied about [Dulce] having a busted lip,” and that 

Dulce’s face was red because she had an “‘ingrown pimple’” on her 

face. The Department social worker advised Adrian “a plan 

would need to be put in place to ensure Alize’s safety,” but Adrian

failed to attend the meeting to discuss the safety plan. Adrian

also failed to return the social worker’s text messages and phone 

calls.

When the social worker interviewed Dulce, she denied 

Adrian hit her. She stated that, while she and Adrian were 

arguing, Adrian pushed her (“not hard”), and she tripped and fell.

Dulce explained that she called law enforcement because she was 

upset, that the deputy mistakenly believed she sustained a bruise 

on her cheek because Adrian had hit her, and that the bruise 

“was a result of an ‘ingrown pimple.’” Dulce also denied Adrian

hit her in the past.
4

The Department filed a petition under section 300, 

subdivisions (a) and (b), alleging Adrian’s violence toward Dulce 

in Alize’s presence “endangers the child’s physical health and 

safety, creates a detrimental home environment, and places the 

child at risk of serious physical harm, damage, and danger.” The 

juvenile court detained Alize and ordered Adrian to enroll in a 

“domestic violence treatment” program. 

C. The Department Investigates Further

The Department investigated and confirmed Alize 

witnessed the physical violence. Alize told the Department social 

worker, “The police took my dad because he was bad. My dad 

socked Belen in her nose and she was bleeding a lot. I saw him 

. . . and my tummy started hurting, so my dad told me to go to my 

room. It was scary.” “Belen” was the name Alize used for Dulce. 

The Department found out that in July 2019, three months 

before Dulce reported the domestic violence, Adrian contacted the 

Department because he was concerned Alize had sustained 

bruises while in the care of her mother, Ashley R.2 Ashley 

explained to the social worker that, when she petitioned in family 

court for custody of Alize, Adrian called the Department to report 

his suspicion Alize was being physically and sexually abused 

while at Ashley’s home. Ashley stated that, as a result of the 

“false allegations of physical and sexual abuse,” the family court 

gave Adrian temporary custody of Alize and required all visits 

with Ashley to be monitored until the next hearing, which did not 

2 Ashley is not a party to this appeal.
5

take place because Adrian failed to appear.

3 Alize denied all of

Adrian’s allegations, and the Department closed the July 2019 

referral from Adrian.

In its report for the jurisdiction and disposition hearing, 

the Department questioned Adrian’s credibility “regarding his 

concerns” Ashley physically abused Alize, observing that, “despite 

[Adrian’s] concerns, he would allow [Alize] to have long periods of 

unmonitored contact with her mother Ashley.” The Department 

also stated that it had “continued efforts to provide services to the 

family . . . and provided referrals” and that, although Adrian said

he was willing to participate in services, as of December 27, 2019 

he had been “unable” to enroll in any classes. 

D. The Juvenile Court Asserts Jurisdiction over Alize 

and Removes Her from Adrian

On January 8, 2020 the juvenile court held a hearing on the 

Department’s petition. Adrian testified that the allegations were

false because the deputy who arrested him “used excessive force”

and that, when Adrian said he was going to report him, the 

deputy told Adrian “he was going to send [the Department] . . . to 

remove [Alize].” Adrian stated that, even assuming Alize’s 

statements were true, “this was a one-time incident.” The court 

rejected Adrian’s argument his physical altercation with Dulce

was an isolated incident because, the court concluded, Dulce 

“reported to the police there has been domestic violence in the 

past” and her statement “closest [in time] to the incident is most 

credible.” The court found that there was an “ongoing risk” to 

Alize because Adrian failed to take responsibility for his conduct 

3 After the Department filed the petition in this case, the 

family court continued the custody matter pending the juvenile 

court’s ruling on the petition. 
6

and that Dulce was “recanting because of her fear.” The court 

sustained the allegations in the petition and declared Alize a 

dependent of the court under section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b). 

As for disposition, Adrian argued the court should not 

remove Alize from his custody because the court could order 

Adrian not to have Dulce in his home while Alize was present. 

The Department argued the court should remove Alize from 

Adrian and place her with Ashley. The Department explained it 

investigated Adrian’s allegations that led to the temporary 

custody order in family court and “did not find any supporting 

evidence of those allegations.” 

The court found by clear and convincing evidence that 

leaving Alize in the home of Adrian “would pose a substantial 

danger to [her] physical health, safety, protection, and emotional 

well-being, given [Adrian’s] failure to address domestic violence, 

failure to be forthcoming, putting a four-year-old in the middle of 

a custody battle, making false allegations, [and] failing to 

acknowledge the power and control dynamics.” The court also 

found that “the Department has provided reasonable means to 

prevent removal,” but that, in light of the court’s findings (which 

included Adrian’s failure to address the domestic violence), “no 

reasonable means exist[ed]” to protect Alize without removal.

The court removed Alize from Adrian and placed her with Ashley. 

The court ordered Adrian to complete a 52-week domestic 

violence program, participate in individual counseling sessions, 

and attend parenting classes because Adrian had “chosen to put a 

four-year-old in the middle of a custody battle and continues to be 

inappropriate.” The court ordered monitored visitation for 

Adrian. Adrian timely appealed. 
7

DISCUSSION

A. Substantial Evidence Supported the Jurisdiction 

Finding Under Section 300, Subdivision (b)

1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

Section 300, subdivision (b)(1), authorizes the juvenile 

court to assert jurisdiction where the child protective agency 

proves the child “has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that 

the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result 

of the failure or inability of his or her parent or guardian to 

adequately supervise or protect the child.” (See In re J.M. (2019) 

40 Cal.App.5th 913, 921; In re M.W. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1444, 

1453.) The Department “has the burden of proving by a 

preponderance of the evidence” that the child is a dependent of 

the court under section 300. (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 

773; see In re M.W., at p. 1453.)

‘“While evidence of past conduct may be probative of 

current conditions, the question under section 300 is whether 

circumstances at the time of the hearing subject the minor to the 

defined risk of harm.’ [Citation.] Thus, domestic violence 

between a child’s parents may support the exercise of jurisdiction 

only if there is evidence that the violence harmed the children or 

placed them at risk of harm, and ‘the violence is ongoing or likely 

to continue.’” (In re M.W., supra, 238 Cal.App.4th at 

pp. 1453-1454.) However, ‘“[t]he court need not wait until a child 

is seriously abused or injured to assume jurisdiction and take the 

steps necessary to protect the child.’” (In re I.J., supra,

56 Cal.4th at p. 773; see In re T.V. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 126, 

133 [“The focus of section 300 is on averting harm to the child.”].) 

‘“In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence 

supporting the jurisdictional findings . . . , we determine if 
8

substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, supports 

them. “In making this determination, we draw all reasonable 

inferences from the evidence to support the findings and orders of 

the dependency court; we review the record in the light most 

favorable to the court’s determinations; and we note that issues 

of fact and credibility are the province of the trial court.” 

[Citation.] . . . “‘“[T]he [appellate] court must review the whole 

record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to 

determine whether it discloses substantial evidence . . . such that

a reasonable trier of fact could find [that the order is 

appropriate].’””’” (In re I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 773; see In re 

R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 633; In re M.W., supra, 

238 Cal.App.4th at p. 1453.)

2. Substantial Evidence Supported the 

Jurisdiction Finding Under Section 300, 

Subdivision (b)

Adrian contends substantial evidence did not support the 

finding Alize came within section 300, subdivision (b), “because at 

the time of the hearing, she was not at risk.” Adrian is incorrect.

Substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s finding 

that domestic violence was an ongoing problem in Adrian’s home 

and posed a substantial risk of serious physical harm to Alize. 

Both Alize and Dulce recounted Adrian’s assault on Dulce that 

left her bleeding on the ground. Alize easily could have been 

“‘accidentally hit by a thrown object, by a fist, arm, foot or leg.”’ 

(In re E.B. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 568, 576, disapproved on 

another ground in Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 

1010, fn. 7 (O.B.).) And witnessing the incident of domestic 

violence caused Alize to experience symptoms, including fear and 

stomach pain. (See In re V.L. (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 147, 156 

[“Even if a child suffers no physical harm due to domestic 
9

violence, a ‘cycle of violence between . . . parents constitute[s] a 

failure to protect [a child] “from the substantial risk of 

encountering the violence and suffering serious physical harm or 

illness from it.’””]; In re R.C. (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 930, 941 

[same].) 

Moreover, although Dulce recanted her statement Adrian

had been violent with her in the past, her actions belied her

retraction. Dulce tried to call her mother during her argument 

with Adrian, which suggested she feared the argument would

turn violent. Dulce also packed her belongings to leave Adrian

because, as she reported to law enforcement, this was not the 

first time Adrian tried to control her with violence. Significantly, 

notwithstanding her prior suggestion she might leave the abusive 

relationship, Dulce reconciled with Adrian, which increased the 

risks that Adrian would again become angry with Dulce and 

resort to violence and that Alize would be in danger. (See In re 

R.C., supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at p. 942 [“‘“past violent behavior in 

a relationship is ‘the best predictor of future violence”’”]; In re 

E.B., supra, 184 Cal.App.4th at p. 576 [the mother’s “record of 

returning to [the father] despite being abused by him, supports 

the juvenile court’s finding that her conduct in the domestic 

altercations endangered the children”].) And Adrian’s insistence

the incident “was just an argument,” as well as his failure to 

acknowledge the risk his conduct posed to Alize, further 

supported the jurisdiction finding. (See In re V.L., supra, 

54 Cal.App.5th at p. 156 [“A parent’s denial of domestic violence 

increases the risk of it recurring.”]; In re John M. (2013) 

217 Cal.App.4th 410, 418-419 [in evaluating the risk of harm to 

the child, the juvenile court may consider “evidence of the 

parent’s current understanding of and attitude toward the past 

conduct that endangered a child”].)
10

Adrian argues that, because “Dulce stated that the 

information in the police report was incorrect,” there was “no 

substantial risk to Alize based on the isolated incident.” The 

juvenile court, however, found Adrian’s denials and Dulce’s 

“minimization” were not credible. Instead, the court credited 

Dulce’s statements to law enforcement, made shortly after Adrian

hit her, that she and Adrian had a history of domestic violence 

and that she did not report any of the other incidents because she 

was afraid. We defer to the juvenile court’s credibility 

determinations. (See In re I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 773 

[“‘“[w]e do not reweigh the evidence”’”]; Georgeanne G. v. Superior 

Court (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 856, 865 [“We . . . may not substitute 

our deductions for those of the juvenile court.”].)

B. The Appeal from the Jurisdiction Findings Under 

Section 300, Subdivision (a), Is Not Justiciable

“‘When a dependency petition alleges multiple grounds for 

its assertion that a minor comes within the dependency court’s 

jurisdiction, a reviewing court can affirm the juvenile court’s 

finding of jurisdiction over the minor if any one of the statutory 

bases for jurisdiction that are enumerated in the petition is 

supported by substantial evidence.’” (In re I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th 

at p. 773; accord, In re Madison S. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 308, 

328-329.) “We nonetheless retain discretion to consider the 

merits of a parent’s appeal [citation], and often do so when the 

finding ‘(1) serves as the basis for dispositional orders that are 

also challenged on appeal [citation]; (2) could be prejudicial to the 

appellant or could potentially impact the current or future 

dependency proceedings [citations]; or (3) “could have other 

consequences for [the appellant], beyond jurisdiction.”’” (In re 

M.W., supra, 238 Cal.App.4th at p. 1452; see In re Madison S., at 

p. 329; In re Drake M. (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 754, 762-763.)
11

It is not appropriate to exercise that discretion here. 

Adrian does not argue the jurisdiction finding under section 300, 

subdivision (a), served as the only basis for the disposition orders 

he challenges. As we will discuss, the jurisdiction finding under 

section 300, subdivision (b), provides an independent and 

sufficient basis for the juvenile court’s disposition orders. 

Therefore, even if we were to reverse the jurisdiction findings 

under section 300, subdivision (a), we could not grant Adrian any

effective relief. (See In re I.A. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1491, 

1495 [dismissing a father’s appeal as nonjusticiable because “any 

order we enter will have no practical impact on the pending 

dependency proceeding, thereby precluding a grant of effective 

relief”]; cf. In re D.M. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 634, 639 [exercising 

discretion to review an otherwise moot appeal from a jurisdiction 

finding because “the court’s order requiring [the] mother to 

attend parental education and individual counseling . . . hinge on 

the validity of the jurisdictional finding against her” under 

section 300, subdivision (a)].) Adrian’s conclusory assertions

(without referring to any specific finding) that the 

“[j]urisdictional findings could affect this dependency proceeding 

or a future dependency proceeding” and that ‘“refusal to 

address . . . jurisdictional errors on appeal . . . has the 

undesirable result of insulating erroneous or arbitrary rulings 

from review’” are too speculative to justify exercising discretion to 

review the jurisdiction finding under section 300, subdivision (a). 

(See In re I.A., at pp. 1494-1495 [“[a]lthough raising the specter of 

a future impact, [the father] . . . fails to suggest any way in which 

[the jurisdiction finding] actually could affect a future 

dependency or family law proceeding”].) 
12

C. Substantial Evidence Supported the Order Removing 

Alize from Adrian

1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

Section 361, subdivision (a), provides in relevant part: “In 

all cases in which a minor is adjudged a dependent of the court on 

the ground that the minor is a person described by Section 300, 

the court may limit the control to be exercised over the dependent 

child by any parent.” Section 362, subdivision (a), “amplifies” 

this provision by authorizing the court to make “any and all 

reasonable orders for the care, supervision, custody, conduct, 

maintenance, and support of the child.” (In re Anthony Q. (2016) 

5 Cal.App.5th 336, 346.) Thus, “[i]n making its disposition orders 

the court has broad discretion to resolve issues regarding the 

custody and control of the child, including deciding where the 

child will live while under the court’s supervision.” (Ibid.)

Section 361, subdivision (c)(1), provides that a “dependent 

child shall not be taken from the physical custody of his or her 

parents, . . . with whom the child resides at the time the petition 

was initiated, unless the juvenile court finds clear and convincing 

evidence” that “[t]here is or would be a substantial danger to the 

physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional wellbeing of the minor if the minor were returned home, and there 

are no reasonable means by which the minor’s physical health 

can be protected without removing the minor from the minor’s 

parent’s physical custody.” (See In re V.L., supra, 54 Cal.App.5th

at p. 154 [“To remove a child from parental custody, the court 

must make one of five specified findings by clear and convincing 

evidence.”]; In re D.P. (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 1058, 1065 [same].) 

“‘“Clear and convincing” evidence requires a finding of high 

probability.’” (In re V.L, at p. 154.) “Actual harm to a child is not 

necessary before a child can be removed. ‘Reasonable 
13

apprehension stands as an accepted basis for the exercise of state 

power.’” (Ibid.) “The court may consider a parent’s past conduct 

as well as present circumstances” in deciding whether to remove 

a child. (In re N.M. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 159, 170.)

“In general, when presented with a challenge to the 

sufficiency of the evidence associated with a finding requiring 

clear and convincing evidence, the court must determine whether 

the record, viewed as a whole, contains substantial evidence from 

which a reasonable trier of fact could have made the finding of 

high probability demanded by this standard of proof.” (O.B., 

supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 1005; see In re V.L., supra, 54 Cal.App.5th

at p. 149 [in reviewing the disposition orders removing the 

minors from the father, “we heed the holding of [O.B.] 

establishing that when a statute requires a fact to be found by 

clear and convincing evidence, and when there is a substantial 

evidence challenge, the reviewing court must determine whether 

the record contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable 

trier of fact could find the existence of that fact to be highly 

probable”].) “In conducting its review, the court must view the 

record in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below 

and give appropriate deference to how the trier of fact may have 

evaluated the credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in the 

evidence, and drawn reasonable inferences from the evidence.” 

(O.B., at pp. 1011-1012; see In re V.L., at p. 155.)

2. Substantial Evidence Supported Removal 

Adrian contends that, even if we affirm the jurisdiction 

findings, “the disposition findings should be reversed” because 

“[t]here were reasonable means to protect Alize in the home of 

[Adrian],” such as ordering Dulce “not [to] be present in the home 

with [Adrian] and Alize,” in-home services to support Alize, or 

counseling for Dulce. The juvenile court reasonably rejected any 
14

proposal short of removing Alize because the Department 

demonstrated Adrian could not be trusted to protect Alize from 

harm. As discussed, the court found Adrian’s testimony was “not 

credible.” Adrian still maintained that Dulce never told the 

deputy he physically abused her and argued instead that the 

deputy falsified the report of abuse because Adrian threatened to 

make an excessive force report. Adrian also continued to

maintain that Dulce suffered a bruise on her face by tripping over 

a bike, which the juvenile court disbelieved, and that Dulce’s 

bruise was an “ingrown pimple.” And despite Adrian’s 

representation to the court he was “willing . . . to participate in 

whatever he needs to in order to have [Alize] in his custody,” he 

never met with the social worker to put a safety plan in place for 

Alize or enrolled in any of the classes the court ordered him to 

attend.

As discussed, Adrian failed to accept any responsibility for 

the incidents of domestic violence, failed to appreciate how that

violence put Alize at risk, failed to cooperate with the 

Department, and failed to comply with any part of his case plan. 

Substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s finding by 

clear and convincing evidence that Adrian’s violent tendencies

posed a substantial risk of harm to Alize and that there were no 

reasonable means to protect Alize except by removing her from 

Adrian’s custody. (See In re V.L., supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at 

pp. 156-157 [reasonable trier of fact could have found it highly 

probable that “there were no reasonable means to protect [the] 

minors without removal from [their] father’s physical custody” 

because “[t]he inference from [the father’s] denial [of domestic 

violence] is that he is less likely to change his behavior in the 

future,” which “increases the risk of [the violence] recurring”]; In 

re T.V., supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at pp. 136-137 [father’s denial of 

responsibility supported the juvenile court’s finding that the child 
15

“was at substantial risk of harm as a result of the parents’ 

ongoing domestic violence and there were no reasonable means 

by which she could be protected without removal”]; In re 

Heather A. (1996) 52 Cal.App.4th 183, 196 [rejecting a father’s 

argument that the juvenile court could have allowed him to 

retain custody of his children ‘“on the condition that [he] not 

invite a domestic partner into the home with the minors’” because

“there [was] no indication that [the father’s] violent, abusive 

tendencies [were] only limited to ‘domestic partners,’ and not to 

other women to whom the minors might be exposed”]; cf. In re 

Ashly F. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 803, 810 [“[a]mple evidence 

existed of ‘reasonable means’ to protect [the children] in their 

home,” given the mother’s expression of remorse and enrollment 

in a parenting class].)

D. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in 

Ordering Adrian To Complete a Domestic Violence 

Program and Attend Parenting Classes

Adrian contends the court’s order requiring him to 

complete a 52-week domestic violence program “was cumulative” 

because the court ordered his individual counseling to address 

domestic violence issues. Adrian also contends there was “no 

evidence to support a finding that [he] was in need of a parenting 

class” because “Alize was not brought before the court based on 

any deficiencies in [Adrian’s] parenting.” Neither contention has 

merit. 

The juvenile court has ‘“wide latitude’” in formulating 

reasonable disposition orders for the care, custody, support, and 

well-being of dependent children. (In re K.T. (2020) 

49 Cal.App.5th 20, 24; see § 362, subd. (a); In re Daniel B. (2014) 

231 Cal.App.4th 663, 673.) The juvenile court “‘may direct any 

and all reasonable orders to the parents or guardians of the child 
16

who is the subject of any [dependency] proceedings . . . as the 

court deems necessary and proper to carry out this section,’ 

including orders ‘to participate in a counseling or education 

program.’” (In re Daniel B., at p. 673.) In addition, “‘[t]he 

program in which a parent or guardian is required to participate 

shall be designed to eliminate those conditions that led to the 

court’s finding that the child is a person described by Section 

300.’” (In re K.T., at p. 24; see § 362, subd. (d).) 

“The court’s broad discretion to determine what would best 

serve and protect the child’s interest and to fashion a 

dispositional order in accord with this discretion, permits the 

court to formulate disposition orders to address parental 

deficiencies when necessary to protect and promote the child’s 

welfare, even when that parental conduct did not give rise to the 

dependency proceedings.” (In re K.T., supra, 49 Cal.App.5th at 

p. 25; see In re Briana V. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 297, 311 [“At 

disposition, the juvenile court is not limited to the content of the 

sustained petition when it considers what dispositional orders 

would be in the best interests of the children. [Citations.] 

Instead, the court may consider the evidence as a whole.”].) “We 

review the juvenile court’s disposition case plan for an abuse of 

discretion.” (In re D.P., supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 1071; see 

In re K.T., at p. 25.)

The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in ordering 

Adrian to complete a domestic violence program in addition to 

participating in individual counseling that included counseling on

domestic violence. The record supports the court’s conclusion 

that both were reasonably necessary to protect Alize. As 

discussed, at the time of the hearing, Adrian had not

acknowledged that he injured Dulce in front of Alize, that he 

physically abused Dulce in the past, or that the ongoing domestic

violence put Alize at substantial risk of harm. Also, as discussed, 
17

since the Department first advised him about the need for a 

safety plan for Alize in early November 2019, Adrian did not do 

anything to address his history of domestic violence with Dulce. 

Indeed, Adrian refused to sign the case plan the court ordered at 

the disposition hearing two months later. Adrian does not argue 

the domestic violence program or the individual counseling

sessions were not “designed to eliminate the conditions that led 

to the dependency.” (In re Daniel B., supra, 231 Cal.App.4th at 

pp. 674-675.) Nor could he: Both the domestic violence program 

and the individual counseling will help Adrian understand and 

address his need for what the court described as “power and 

control” in his domestic relationships. (See ibid. [“Based on the 

history of domestic violence in the home and the seriousness of 

the altercation that led to [the] dependency proceedings, [the 

mother] has failed to show an abuse of discretion in the type of 

domestic violence program selected by the juvenile court.”]; see 

also In re D.P., supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1071-1072 [juvenile 

court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the mother to 

participate in “a full drug and alcohol program with aftercare as 

well as a 12-step program” because the record showed the mother

“had persistent issues with alcohol that contributed to dangerous 

manic episodes in [her child’s] presence”].)

Nor did the juvenile court abuse its discretion in ordering 

Adrian to attend parenting classes. As discussed, the juvenile 

court may make orders necessary to address deficiencies in 

Adrian’s parenting to protect and promote Alize’s welfare, even if 

Adrian’s deficient parenting skills did not give rise to the 

dependency proceedings. (See In re K.T., supra, 49 Cal.App.5th

at p. 25.) The court found Adrian put Alize “in the middle of a 

custody battle.” Adrian exercised poor judgment in some of the 

parenting decisions he made: He either made false allegations of 

abuse against Ashley in order to gain full custody of Alize, which 
18

created instability for Alize, or, if Adrian sincerely believed Alize 

had been abused at Ashley’s house, he knowingly put Alize in 

harm’s way by continuing to drop Alize off at Ashley’s house after 

the family court awarded him temporary custody. In addition, 

Adrian lacked insight into how domestic violence in the 

household harmed Alize. Parenting classes will help Adrian

appreciate the need for him to stop the violence, not only because 

it is wrong, but because of the negative consequences for Alize. 

(Cf. David B. v. Superior Court (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 768, 790 

[expressing concern about a parent’s “grasp of the important 

parenting concepts–things such as a child’s need for . . . freedom 

from violence”].)

Adrian’s citation to In re Jasmin C. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 

177 and In re Drake M., supra, 211 Cal.App.4th 754 does not help 

him. In re Jasmin C. involved a disposition order requiring a 

nonoffending parent, who “did not abuse her children, fail to 

protect them, or engage in any other inappropriate behavior,” to 

attend parenting classes. (In re Jasmin C., at pp. 180-181.) In re 

Drake M. involved a disposition order requiring a father to

submit to random drug testing and to participate in drug 

counseling and parenting courses, even though nothing in the 

record indicated he had a substance abuse problem or lacked 

parenting skills. (In re Drake M., at p. 770.) In contrast, the 

record here contained evidence Adrian did not understand that 

his ongoing domestic violence with Dulce and his ill-conceived

plan to use Alize as the means to gain an advantage in family 

court harmed Alize.

E. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in 

Ordering Monitored Visits

Section 362.1, subdivision (a)(1)(A), provides in part, 

“Visitation shall be as frequent as possible, consistent with the 
19

well-being of the child.” “The power to regulate visits between 

dependent children and their parents rests with the juvenile 

court and its visitation orders will not be disturbed on appeal 

absent an abuse of discretion.” (In re D.P., supra, 44 Cal.App.5th

at p. 1070.) As discussed, the juvenile court found that the 

ongoing domestic violence posed a substantial risk of physical 

harm to Alize and that there were no reasonable means to protect 

Alize except by removing her from Adrian’s physical custody. 

The same substantial evidence that supported the court’s 

jurisdiction finding under section 300, subdivision (b), and the 

removal order under section 361, subdivision (c)(1), supported the 

court’s order for monitored visitation. (See In re D.P., at p. 1070 

[even though the mother participated in counseling and tested 

clean for alcohol, substantial evidence supported the juvenile 

court’s “implicit determination that unmonitored visitation could 

place [the child] at risk”]; see also § 362.1, subd. (a)(1)(B) [“[n]o 

visitation order shall jeopardize the safety of the child”].) 

Adrian argues requiring a monitor to supervise his visits

will reduce their frequency. Adrian, however, does not cite any 

evidence to support this assertion. The juvenile court did not 

abuse its discretion in ordering monitored visitation until Adrian

takes steps to address the issues identified in his case plan. (See 

In re R.R. (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1264, 1284 [“[g]iven [the]

father’s recent drug use and his efforts to keep that information 

from [the Department] and the court, we cannot say the juvenile 

court abused its discretion in requiring monitored visits”].)
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DISPOSITION

The jurisdiction finding under section 300, subdivision (b),

and the disposition orders are affirmed. The appeal from the 

jurisdiction finding under section 300, subdivision (a), is 

dismissed as nonjusticiable.

SEGAL, J.

We concur:

PERLUSS, P. J.

FEUER, J.