### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT KNOXVI LLE Jul y 14, 200 5 S es sio n
ROB ERT WILLIAM FU LLER , JR . v. LY NN GA IL FU LLER

Appeal f romthe Chancer y Court for Bradley County No. 93-253 Je rri S. Bryant, Chancellor

No. E2004-02537-COA- R3-CV - F ILED AUGU ST 22, 2005

I n th is p o s t- d iv o r c e a c ti o n , Ro b e r t Wi ll ia m F u ll e r , Jr

. ( “ F a th e r ” ) f il e d a p e ti ti o n s e e king, a mong other thing s, a modification of the custody arr ang ement with respe ct t o the parties’ minor son, Ry an; an enf orce ment of pa re n t i n g time with both R y an and his daug hter, Caitly n; and a f inding of contempt ag ainst his former w ife, Ly nn Gail Harrison, former ly Fuller (“Mother ”). Mother filed a
c ou nte rc la im, se e kin g a n inc re a se in c hil d su pp ort. F oll ow ing a he ari ng , th e tr ia l c ou rt

e sse nti a lly d e n i e d F a t h e r ’ s p e t i t i o n

. It l e f tM o t h e r a s t h e p r i m ar y

r e s i d e n t i a l p ar e n to f

b o t h c h i l d r e n

. In addition, the trial court orde red tha t Fathe r’s visitation with Caitl y n would be at the sole discretion of a na med counse lor. The trial court did not find Mother in conte mpt. Father appea ls. W e af

firm in part, re verse in part, and modify in part. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Chancer y Court Aff irm ed in Par t; Re verse d in P art; Modif ied in Part ; Case R em anded

C H A RLES D. S US ANO , J R ., J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which D. M I CH A EL S WI NEY and S HAR ON G. LEE , J J ., joined.

H. Fr anklin Chance y , Cleveland, Te nnessee , for the a ppellant, Robert Willi am Fuller , J r.
Ba rre tt T. Painter, Cleveland, Te nnessee , for the a ppellee, L y nn Gail Har

rison.

OP IN ION

I.

Father a nd Mother we re divorced in 1993. Mother was named primary residential pa

rent of both of the parties’ minor chil d re n ; Fa ther wa s g rante d rea sonable visitation. Over the next five y ear s, the parties returne d to court on two separa te occ asions, resulting in court orde rs that, among other thing s, increa sed F ather ’s visitation ti me with his children.-2-

On J anuary

20, 2004, Father filed a pe tition t o modify the custody

arr ang ement. He asked to b e na me d th e prim ary re sid e nti a l pa

re nt o f R y a n a ndso ug ht t o e nf or c e vis itatio n ti me wi th Ca itl y n. I n a dd iti on , F a the r r e qu e ste d th a t Mo the r b e he ld i n c on te mpt fo r int e rf e ri ng wi th h is c ou rt

de c re e d p are nti ng tim e . M oth e r a ns we re d F a the r’ s p e tit ion a nd fi le d a c ou nte rc la im f or a n in c re a se in child support.

The trial court conducte d a hearing on the parties’ competing pleading s. At the conc lusion of the hearing , the t rial court found t hat t here was a materia l chang e in circ umstances wa rra nting a n incre ase in F ather ’s visitation ti me with Ry an, thoug h t he court declined to name Father a s the child’s primary

residential pa

rent. W ith respec t to Caitl y n, the court ordere d that Father’s visitation with her would occur only with the consent of the c hildren’s c ounselor, Dr . Stulce. I n addition, the
c ou rt or de re d a n inc re a se in F a the r’ s c hil d su pp ort ob lig a tio n. Th e c ou rt de c lin e d to fi ndMo the r i n contempt of c ourt. These finding s were memorialized in a n order enter ed Oc tober 8, 2004. From thi s o rd e r, F a the r a

pp e a ls.

II.

As thi s is a no n-

jury c a se , ou r re vie w i s de novo upon the re cord of the proc eeding s below; but the rec ord c o m es t o us with a presumption of cor rec tness as to the trial court’s fac tual de te rm inatio ns – a

pr e su mpt ion we mus t honor unle ss the e vid e nc e pr e po nd e rate s a g a ins t th os e fi nd ing s. Te nn

. R. A pp . P. 13 (d ); Wri ght v . City of Knox v ill e , 898 S.W .2d 177, 181 (Tenn. 1995) ; Union Carbide Corp. v . Huddleston , 854 S.W .2d 87, 91 (Tenn. 1993) . The trial c ourt’s conc lusions of l aw, however , are acc orded no such presumption. Cam pbell v. Florida Steel Corp. , 919 S.W .2d 26 , 3 5 ( Te nn . 1 99 6) ; Pre sle y v . Be nne tt , 860 S.W .2d 857, 859 (Tenn. 1993)

.

III

. A.

F a the r’ s is su e s o n a

pp e a l c a n b e su c c inc tly

state d a s f

oll ow s: (1) Does the evidenc e pre ponderate ag ainst the trial court’s judgme nt that it is i n t h e b es t interest of the parties’ son, Ry an F uller, for Mo the r t o c on tin ue a s th e c hil d’ s p ri ma ry re sid e nti a l par e nt w ith fu ll de c isi on -m akin g a uth or ity wi th r e sp e c t to him ?
(2) Doe s the evidenc e pre ponderate ag ainst the t rial court’s judgme nt ref us i n g t o find Mother in conte mpt of court for failing to send the parties’ daug hter, Caitly n, to Fathe r for visitation?
(3) Does the evidenc e pre ponderate ag ainst the trial court’s judgme nt providing that future contac t be tween F ather and Caitly n would be at t h e s o l e d i s c r e t i o n o f

a t h i r d p ar t y?-3- (4) Did the trial court violate F ath er ’s due proc ess rig hts by vesting
a c ou ns e lor

wi th the so le dis c re tio n as to whe the r Ca itl y n visi ts w ith Father?

We will address ea ch of the se issues in turn.

B.
First, F at h er contends that the evide nce pr eponder ates a g ainst the trial court’s finding that Mother should continue to ser ve as Ry an’s primary residential pa

rent with full dec ision-making authority

. Th e te sti mon y

of the pa rt ie s r e ve a le d, wi tho ut a ny re a l di sp ute , th a t Ry a n’ s a c a de mic perf ormanc e has suf

fer ed in the recent y ear s. Whi le in the six th gr ade, Ry an re ceive d four F ’s and three D’s on his report car d, and in the seve nth gr ade ( which he completed just prior to the hearing) , Ry an’s r eport c ard r efle cted six F ’s and four D’s. I n response to these poor g rade s, Fa ther be lieved that Ry an’s pa

rticipation in school athletics should be suspended until his g rade s improved. Mother, howeve r, disag ree d with this approach a nd chose to deny Ry an certain privileg es, such a s television and video g ames. When Mother was cross-e x amined about her decision to allow R y an to continue play ing sports, she testified that s he gave into Ry an “be cause I did fee l like he re ally

was that upset [a b o u t th e p r o s p e c t o f n o t b e in g ab le to w r e s tl e ] a n d th a t it w o u ld r e a ll y b e a c h a n g in g f actor for hi m. ” Mo th er wen t on to s ta te sh e ho pe d th a t a llo wi ng Ry a n to c on tin ue wi th athl e tic s w ou ld motivate him to im prove his g rade s, but she admitted that his gr ades ha d not improved.

Whil e the tria l court incre ased Fathe r’s parenting time with Ry an, it declined to na me Father as primary

residential pa

rent. We find that the e vidence does not preponder at e aga i n st the trial court’s d e c is io n to le a v e M o th e r a s Ry a n ’ s p r im ar y

r e s id e n ti a l p ar e n t. We d o f in d , h o w e v e r , tha t the e vid e nc e pr e po nd e rate s a g a ins t a llo wi ng Mo the r t o co nti nu e to m a ke de c isi on s w ith re sp e c t to Ry an’s e ducation and e x trac urricula r ac tiviti es. It is clea

r from the rec ord that Mother’ s approa ch to motivating Ry an to i mprove his work in school has not been succe ssful, as Ry an’s g rade s declined from six th gr ade to se venth g rade . We believe it is in Ry an’s best interest that F ather be desig nated
a s t h e p ar e n t t o m ak e d e c i s i o n s w i t h r e s p e c tt o R ya n ’ s e d u c a t i o n a n d r e l a t e d a c t i v i t i e s

. A c c o r d i n g l y, we mod if y the tr ia l c ou rt ’s jud g me nt to re fl e c t that F a the r h a s e xclu siv e de c isi on -m a kin g a uth or ity
ov e r a ll s c ho ol i ssu e s p e rt a ini ng to R y a n, inc ludi ng, bu t not l imi te d to , Ry a n’ s p art ic ipatio n in extracur ricular

school ac tiviti es, including athletics. I n so holding, we caution that our de cision should not be broadly construed as holding that ther e is one way , and one w ay only , to motivate a child to improve his or her pe rformance in school. Such a judg ment is bey ond our area of expertise; further mor e , th e r e is n o e xp e r t te s ti mo n y b e f o r e u s , o n e w a y o r th e o th e r , o n th is s u b je c t. Our d ec i s i o n i s s i m p l y a re co gn i t i o n o n o u r pa rt t h at M o t h er ’s ap p ro ac h i s n o two rk i n g in R y an ’s c as e
.-4- C.

Fa t h er n ext contends that the trial court e rre d in refusing to find Mother in contempt for interfe ring with Fathe r’s pa renting time with Caitl y n. We disag ree

.
T h e t ri al co u rt m ad e t h e f o l l o wi n g re m ar k s t o t h e p ar t i es at t h e c o n cl u s i o n o f t h e h ea ri n g:

I wa nt the pa

rt ie s to he ar m e

. B ut f

or y ou -a ll t o b e thi s a ng ry

a ndthi s noncommunicative a fter te n y ear s is not norm al. I t’s not. And I looked throug h this file to see what kind of di vorce it was and what
wa s r e a lly

g oin g on a ndwh a t’ s th e re a l st ory here, a ndit’ s a pr e tty sanitiz ed file.

For the g ood of t he lawy ers that handled the divorce, the y didn’t put
a lot of the dirt in the fi le . So sh ou ld y ou r chi ld ren eve r d e c ide to
rea d y ou r divorce file someday , it’s not going to taint them, I hope, any more. B ut it doe sn’t g ive me much g uidance as to fig uring out why y ou-all hate eac h other so much.

I me a n, g oo d g ri e f. I t’ s b e e n te n y e ars . G e t ov e r i t. Y ou ’r e bo th
rema rried. Y ou’ve g ot to move on. And beca use y ou-all ca n’t move
o n , t h es e ch i l d re n ca n ’t m o v e o n

. T h es e c h i l d re n h av e h i tt h e c ei l i n g. They ’ve hit this gla ss ceiling , and they cannot c ontinue to gr ow beca use y ou-all have place d a limit on them based on y ou-all’s lac k of communica tion.

I don’t know if y o u j u s t ca n ’t see it. B ut there is so much ne g ative tension betwee n the t wo of y ou-all here and in the e-mails that I rea d and the letter s back a nd forth and just the a nswers tha t I hear when y ou talk about ea ch other that it is eating at the both of y ou and ref lecting neg atively on y our own persona l qua lity of life; I ’m sure on the qu a lit y

of lif e of y ou r s po us e s, a nd I ’m

no t g oin g to l oo k a t so me of the spouses in h ere; and most definitely , and the one that I ’m
conce rned a

bout, the quality

of life of y our childre n.
An d h op e fu lly

in this pa re nti ng c la ss y ou wi ll h a ve a li ghtning bo lt
c ome do wn a ndwa

ke y ou up a ndle t y ou se e wh a t’ s g oin g on be c a us e that’ s th e pu rp os e of

thi s c lass , is to w ake y ou up a ndsa y , o h, my g oo dn e ss, wh a t a m I

do ing to m y

c hil dr e n. An d ma y

be thi s c la ss w ill he lp y ou sin c e me diatio n a ndta lki ng a ndc ou ns e lin g ha sn ’t be e n a ble to do that so far.-5-

I t is c le ar f

ro m th e se re mark s th a t th e tr ia l c ou rt fo un d b oth pa

rt ie s to be e qu a lly

a t f a ult in their par enting issues. The evide nce pr ep onderates that problems with Caitly n’s visitation can be attributed as much to F ather as to Mother. Ac cording ly , we f ind that the ev i d en ce d oes not pr e po nd e rate a g a ins t th e tr ia l c ou rt ’s de c isi on on the c on te mpt iss ue . A c c or din gly , we d e c lin e to interfe re w ith the court’s judg ment with respec t to the contempt char g e.
D. Finally , Fa t h er asserts that the trial court e rre d in holding that any future c ontact betwe en Father a nd Caitly n would be at the sole discretion of Caitly n’s counse lor, Dr. Stulce.
We ag ree that the trial court err ed in making this decision. At the time of the hea ring in the ins ta nt c a se , Ca ilt y n w a s 1 5 y e ars of a g e a ndsh e is no w 16

. Th e e vid e nc e pr e po nd e rate s a g a ins t a ho ldi ng that a nythi ng ha s oc c ur re d in the re la tio ns hip be tw e e n F a the r a ndhis daug hte r tha t w arr a nts pla c ing a c ou ns e lor

in c on tr ol o f wh e the r, a nd to wh a t e xten t, Ca itl y n vis its wi th h e r F a the r. Whil e a counse lor may

be helpf ul in facilitating the court-dec ree d visitation, t he powe r vested in the counselor by

the trial court is unwarra nted. Father’s visit ation with Caitly n will be as set forth in the most rece nt pre-a

ppeal or der of

the trial court addre ssing this issue.

We no te tha

t F a the r fr a me s the “ c ou ns e lor ” iss ue in te rm s of a vio la tio n o f h is d ue pr oc e ss ri g hts . T he la w i s c le ar tha t we sh ou ld de c lin e to a dd re ss c on sti tut ion a l is su e s “ un le ss r e so lut ion is absolutely nece ssary for determination of t he case and the rights of the pa rties.” Ow e ns v . Sta te , 908 S.W

. 2 d 9 2 3 , 9 2 6 ( T e n n

. 1 9 9 5 ) ( c it a ti o n s o mi tt e d )

. “ I f is s u e s in a c a s e c a n b e r e s o lv e d o n nonconstitutional grounds, c ourts should avoid deciding constitutional iss ues.” Id. Be cause we f ind that the e vid e nce p rep on de rate s a g a ins t th e tr ia l c ou rt ’s de c isi on on thi s is su e , w e de c lin e to a dd re ss Father’s due proce ss arg ument.

I V.

Th e jud g me nt o f the tr ia l c ou rt de sig nati ng Mo the r a s p ri mary re sid e nti a l pa

re nt w ith fu ll de c isi on -m akin g a uth or ity wi th r e sp e c t to bo th c hil dr e n is he re by mod if ie d s o a s to ve st F a the r w ith
e xclu siv e de c isi on -m akin g a uth or ity wi th re sp e c t to Ry a n’ s e du c a tio n a nde xtra c ur ri c ula r a c tiv iti e s. As mod if ie d, that po rt ion of

the jud g me nt i s a ff

ir me d. Th e jud g me nt o f the tr ia l c ou rt re fu sin g to find Mother in conte mpt of court is he reby aff irmed. The judgme nt of the trial court pr oviding that Father’s visitation with the parties’ daug hter is subjec t to the consent of the c hild’s counselor, Dr

. Stulce, at his sole discretion, is here by reve rsed and held for na ug ht. This case is re manded to the tr ia l c ou rt fo r the e nf

or c e me nt o f the tr ia l c ou rt ’s jud g me nt, a s mod if ie d, a ndfo r c oll e c tio n o f c os ts assessed be low, all pursuant to applica ble law. Exercising our di scre tion, we tax the costs on appe al
on e -h a lf to the app e lla nt, Rob e rt Willi a m F ull er, J r. , a ndon e -h a lf to the app e lle e , Ly nn Ga il Har rison.-6- _______________________________ CHARL ES D. SUSANO, J R., J UDGE