No. 3–09–0355 Opin ion f il ed Apri l 29, 2011
IN THE APP ELL ATE C OURT

OF IL LINO IS THIRD DI STRICT A.D., 2011 THE PEOPLE OFTHE STATE OFILLINO IS, ) Ap peal f rom th e Ci rcui t Court ) of th e 1 0th Judi ci al Ci rc ui t, Plai ntif f-A ppelle e, ) Peor ia County, Ill in ois. ) v. ) Nos. 08-DT-173 & 08-TR-14549 ) GEORGE W

ILLIA MS, ) Ho nor able Albert L. P ur ham, Jr ., and ) Honorable R

ebecca Steen

rod, De f en da n t-A pp el l an t. ) Jud ges , P re siding JUS TI CE HOL DRI DGE deliver ed t he judg ment o f the co ur t , w ith o pinion. Jus t ice Lyt t on c onc ur re d in t he judg ment a nd o pinion. Jus t ice McD ade spe cially

co ncur re d, wit h op inion.

OPINI ON A jury co nvicte d t he de fendant of d ri vi ng u nde r the i nf l uen ce of alcohol (DUI) a nd f ail ure to y i el d. Th e tr i al cou rt s en ten ce d h i m to 18 mon

th s of con di ti on al disch arge

wi th com m un i ty se rvic e a nd alc o ho l t r ea t men t co nd it io ns a nd impo se d o ve r$1 , 30 0 in fine s a nd co st s. On ap pe al, t he de fen da nt ar gu es t ha t he is e nt it led t o a n ew t r ial be ca us e t he t r ial c o ur t did no t st r ict ly co mply with the requi

remen ts of Ill in ois Suprem

e Court Rule 431(b) (ef

f. May 1, 2007) during voir dire
. Alter nat ively, the defend ant ar gue s t hat he is ent itled t o a $5 c re dit aga inst t he DU I fine for t he
one da y tha t he sp en t i n c us tody on th at c ha rge , as req ui red by se cti on 1 10- -14 (a) of

the Code of2

Criminal Pro ced ur e o f 196 3 ( t he Co de) (7 25 I LCS 5/ 110 -1 4( a) (Wes t 200 8) ). We affirm the defend ant ’s co nvictio n and mo dify the lo wer co ur t ’s judg ment t o r eflect a cr edit of $ 5 ag ainst t he DUI f i ne . FA CTS Jur y select ion in t he de fendant ’s t rial beg an o n Mar ch 10 , 2 009 . At t he beg inning of t he voir dire , t he t r ial c o ur t ad dr es se d a ll o f t he membe r s o f t he ve nir e c o llec t ive ly and st at ed , in
re l ev an t pa rt:

“ You

m us t f oll ow th e l aw s a s I gi v e i t [ sic ] to y

ou. Y ou may not use your ow n ideas abo ut what you t hink t he law s hou ld be in deci din g this case. *** Un der th e l aw , a def en da nt i s p res um ed to be i nn ocent of t he ch ar ge s a ga inst him an d t his p r es ump t io n r ema ins w it h him thr ough out e ve ry stageof the tri al an d du ri ng your del i be rati on on a v er dic t . I t is no t o ve r co me u nle ss fr o m all t he ev ide nc e in t his
cas e you ar e co nvinced be yond a re aso nable do ubt t hat t he de f en da nt i s g ui l ty . The Sta

te hasthe bu rde n of prov i ng the gui l t of t he de fendant beyond a r eas ona ble do ubt and t his burd en r emains on the Stat e throughout the case. *** The def endan t is n ot required to *** prove hi s i nnocen ce nor is h e required to present any

evi dence on h

is own beh al f. He
ma y rel y on the presum ption of i nnocen ce. ***3 *** [I]t’ s e ss en

ti al dur i ng the cou rs e of the tri al tha t you not ar rive at any dec ision o r c onc lusion o f any kind unt il y ou ’ve he ar d a ll t he ev ide nc e, t he ar gu men t o f t he law yer s, an d my in structions on the law. I’m goi ng to repeat t hat more than onc e be ca us e y ou m i gh t be ba ck i n th e j ury room at a br ea k or somethi ng. I’m going to tell

you, don’t ma

ke y our mi nd up ab out any thin g. Now is not the tim

e to do that. ***
*** [W]hen

de ci di ng thi s c as e, y ou m us t not a l l ow sy mpa thy or prej udic e to inf

lue nce y ou. Our system

of law i s bas ed on t he pr inciple tha t a jur y will dec ide t he ca se o n t he law a nd evi dence onl y. If you’re se le cted as jurors, that’s the oath that you’l l take an d I’m sure you’l l be f ai thf ul to it i f you are s elected.” T he t r ial c o ur t t he n se at ed t he po t en t ial ju r o r s in g r o up s o f six an d q ue sti on ed th em b oth
as a g r o up an d in div idu ally. Five o f t he six p er so ns s ea t ed in t he init ial g r o up we r e e ve nt ua lly chosen to serve as jurors. While addressi ng this group, t he trial court st ated t hat “you m ust follow the l

aw as I gi ve i t t o you even

if you di sagree wi

th it.” The court t hen

asked each po t en t ial ju r o ra s er ies o f qu es t io ns, inc lud ing wh et he rhe o rshe wo uld “fo llo w t he law ev en if you d isagr ee w ith it ,” “hold t he St at e t o t he bur den o f pro ving all elements of t he o ffense beyo nd a reasonabl

e doubt,” and “presum

e the def endan t is i nnocen t as he si ts here now and *** th rough out th e c our se of th e tr i al .”Ea ch

i n di v i du al ch ose n to s er v e a s a j uror a n swered “yes ” to each of these questi ons. The def ense raised no obj ections duri ng voir dire
.1 Ac cordi ng to F al l ert, the d ef endan t told h i m that he was

dri vi ng s outhb ound on

Fol kers when Henry ’s truck ran i

nto him. Falle

rt t old the def

endan t t hat if that were tr ue, Henry ’s truck
wou l d h av e h ad th e ri gh t of wa y b ec au se th ere is a sto p s i gn on Fo l kersat th e i n ter se cti on wi th 4 Af ter t he j ury was

em panel ed, the Stat e presented i

ts evidence. The State calle d three witne sses. Ci

ndy Henry testifi ed that, o n the eveni

ng of A pril 21, 2008, she was dri

vi ng he r pickup truck eastboun

d on Starr Street i n Pe oria , approac

hi ng th e i nters ection wi

th F olk ers St re et . S he sa w ano t her vehicle t ra veling t ow ar d her go ing wes t bou nd o n St ar r. Jus t as she reached the i

ntersection of Starr and F olkers, the other vehi cl e m ade a left turn i

n f ront o f h er (t ur ning fro m St ar r o nt o F olk er s). Henr y put her car in neut ra l and hit t he br ake s, bu t t he
vehi cles c oll i ded; the p ass enger’ s si

de of Hen ry ’scar h i t the pa sse

nge r’sside of the othe r ve hi cle. The veh ic le s pulle d over, and one of the resi dents of that area cal

le d the police. Peo ria p olice o ffi

cer Winfred Fa llert was dispa t ched t o t he sc ene. Fallert t est ifi ed t hat he had b een train

ed and educated as an

accident in

vesti gator and acci

dent reconstructionis

t and that hi s prim ary res ponsi bi li ty i s i nve stigati ng auto acciden

ts. Fall ert also testif

ie d that he had recei

ved t r ain ing in D UI de t ec t io n a nd ha d p er so na lly ar r es t ed o ve r20 0 D UI s a nd as sis t ed in “p r o ba bly
ove r a hundr ed” ot her DUI ar re st s. At t he ac cident sce ne, Fallert spo ke w ith t he de fendant , w ho ident ifi ed himself as t he dr iver o f the car t hat had c ollided wit h Henr y’s picku p t ru ck. Acco rd ing to Fal le rt, t he def endan t smel le d of alcohol, his speech

was sl urred, and he di

d not have a steady bal ance. Fa ll ert t estif ie d that t he def

endan t admi tt ed that he had a f

ew beers or drin

ks that
ev en i ng, a l though he did not i nc l ude th i s i nf orma tion i n h i s pol i ce re port. In ad

di tion , Fal l ert t hou ght t hat t he de fendant was co nfused as t o w hich way he ha d bee n go ing at t he t ime of t he
ac ci den t. 1 In Fal le rt’s opini on, the defen

dant was under the i

nf lue nce of a lc ohol. Moreover, afterSt ar r. Acco rd ing t o F allert , t he de fendant denied t hat t her e wa s a st op sign at t he inte rse ct ion and

wa s “adam

an t” th at h e h ad b een tra v el i n g s outh b oun d on Fo l kersat th e ti me of th e acc i den

t. Fa l l er t di d n ot i n cl ude th i s i n f orm ati on i n h i s p oli ce repor t. 5 ex am i n i n g th e p h y si ca l ev i den ce (i n cl udi n g th e ski d m ar ks , a cc i den

t de b ri s, an d dam ag e to b oth veh ic le s), Falle

rt co ncl uded that the defen

dant had b een travel

in g westbound on Starr and had turne d lef t in f ront of Hen ry ’struck wh

en the acci den t occurred
. Peo ria p olice o ffi

cer Ro n Har t zell also t est ifi ed fo r t he St at e. Har t zell came t o t he
acc ident sce ne t o c ond uct a DU I invest igat ion at Fallert ’s r equ est , a nd he s po ke w ith t he defen dant at the scene. Hartzell testifi ed that the defen

dant sm elle d of al cohol f rom three f

eet aw ay a nd ha d b lo o ds ho t eye s a nd slu rr ed sp ee ch
. Ha r t ze ll had t he de fen da nt pe r fo rm t wo field
so briet y tes t s, w hich the defend ant failed. T he de fendant st at ed t hat he co uld no t per for m the t es t s ( wh ich r eq uir ed st an din g o n o ne leg fo r30 se co nd s a nd wa lkin g s ev er al h ee l-t o - t o e s t ep s in a st ra ight line) beca use he had a low leg o r a nkle injury. B elieving the defend ant t o be i n tox i ca ted , H ar tze l l ar re ste d h i m an d put h i m i n a s qu ad ca r. A f ter ar re sti n g th e def en da n t, Ha rtz el l of f ered h i m a B re ath al y zer te st, wh

i ch h e ref us ed . A v i de o re cordi

n g of th e f i el d s ob riety tests was ad

m i tted i nto ev i den ce a nd p l ay ed f or the j ury . The def en se c al l ed de f endan t’s gi rl f ri end, Je anette Berry

, as i ts onl y wi tnes s. Be rry test if ied that , o n the day of t he accident, the de fendant had co me to a barbeque at her sister ’s hou se a fte r he go t off fro m wor k in t he aft er noo n. Alt hou gh Be rr y claim ed t hat t he de fendant was not in

to xicated when the two lef t t he b arbeque together in de fen dant’s car la

ter t hat even

in g, she adm itted that defenda

nt had 11⁄2 beers

at the barbeque. Berry

was i n the pass enger’s

seat when the defe ndan t dro ve westbound on Starr, to ward Folkers. Sh e testif ie d that, as they started6

t o mak e a left t ur n on F olk er s, M s. H enr y’s picku p t ru ck s eemed t o s pee d up and hit t hem on t he passen ger’s si de. Berry al

so test if ie d that t he def

endan t has compl

ai ned to her about havi

ng a f ra ctu re d f i b ul a a n d, e v er si n ce sh e h as kn own h i m , he h as re ce i v ed m i l i tar y disa b i l i ty b en ef i ts because of the condi

tion of h is feet. As l

ong as she has kn

own hi m, the def

endan t has wal ked wit h his feet ou t t o t he side while leaning o ver . B er ry t oo k pict ur es o f the defend ant ’s feet t he day aft er t he ac cident , w hich wer e ad mitt ed int o e vidence . T he de fendant did no t t est ify dur ing the tri al , and the

def en se c al l ed n o other wi

tnes ses . The j ury conv

icted the defen

dant of both charges . The court imposed the se ntence recomm ended b y the parties. For driv

in g under the i

nf lue nce, the def

endan t was sentenced to an 18- mont h t er m of co ndit ional disc har ge w ith sp ecific co mmunity ser vice and alco hol t re at ment co nd it io ns. T he co ur t als o impo se d a $1 , 00 0 fin e p lus o t he rfine s a nd co st s. Fo rt he t r affic offense of failing to yield, t he co ur t or der ed t he de fendant t o p ay a $3 00 fine. The defend ant tim el y appe aled. ANA LYSIS A. Rule 431(b) Compl

ia nce The def en da n t m ai n tai n s th at th e tr i al cou rt c om m i tted re v er si b l e error b y f ai l i n g to conduct an adequate voir dire un der Su pre me C ourt R

ule 4 31( b) . He con ce de s th at he di d n

ot
rai se th i s iss ue b el ow, ei th er at tr i al or i n a p ost trial moti on . N ev

er th el es s, h e u rg es usto disreg ard h

i s f orf ei ture of th i s iss ue an d h ol d th at th e tr i al cou rt’ s f ai l ur e to c om

pl y str i ctl y wi th the requirem

ents of Rul

e 431(b) requi

res automatic rev

ersal of his convi

ction. In the al

ternative, t he de fendant ar gue s t hat he is ent itled t o a new t rial und er t he plain er ro r d oc t rine7

not wit hst anding his fo rfeit ur e o f the issue be cau se t he t rial co ur t ’s violat ion o f Rule 43 1( b) depriv ed hi m of a “sub stantial

righ t.” We dis agree. Because the voir dire i

n th i s c as e oc cu

rre d i n Marc h 2 009 , th e curren

t, am en de d vers i on of Rule 431(b) governs this case. That rul e provide s : "The court shall ask each potentia l juror, in div idua ll y or i n a group, whether that juror underst ands and accepts the following prin cipl es: (1) t hat the defendant is presum ed in nocent o f the charge(s) against h i m or her ; (2 ) that b ef

orea def en da n t ca n b e c on v i cte d th e S tate mus t pro ve the def

endan t guil ty be yond a reasonabl

e doubt; (3) that the defe ndan t is n ot required to offer an

y e vi dence on h

is or her
ow n behalf; and ( 4) t hat t he de fendant 's failure t o t est ify canno t be he l d agai ns t hi m or her;however, no i

nq ui ry of a p rospe cti

ve j uror shall be made int o t he de fendant 's failure t o t est ify when t he defendan t o bj ects. The court's method of i

nqui ry s hal l provi de each juror an op po rt unit y to re spo nd t o s pec ifi c qu est ions c onc er ning t he prin ci ple s set out in

this section.” Il

l. S. Ct. R. 431(b) (eff

. May 1, 2007)
. In the i nstant case, the court admoni shed the j ury v eni re regardin

g the fi rst t hree pri

nci ple s li sted in the rule b

ut negle cted to me

ntion duri ng voir dire t hat t he d efe nda nt ’s fa ilur e t o t es t ify
ca nn ot be he l d agai ns t hi m . Mor eover, al thou gh the tri al cou rt as ke d e ac h p oten

ti al j uror individually whet her he o r she wo uld “pr esu me the defend ant is innoce nt *** t hro ugho ut t he2 T he de fen da nt er r o ne o us ly cla ims t ha t , in People v. Wilmington , 394 Ill . App. 3d 567,

572-7 6 (200 9), and People v. Graham , 39 3 Il l . A pp. 3d 2 68, 275 -76(20 09) , th e F i rs t Di stri ct of t he App ellate Co ur t app lied a r ule o f aut omat ic reve rsa l and “held t hat a violat ion o f Rule 43 1( b) does not lend i

tself to *** pla

in error analy

si s.” To t he contrary, i

n both cases , the court applie d a plai n error anal

y si s to forf

ei ted cl ai m s tha t the tri al court vi ola ted the rule. 8 co ur se o f the t rial” and “hold t he St at e t o t he bur den o f pro ving all elements of t he o ffense beyo nd a reasonabl

e doubt,” she nev

er expl ic itl y asked the j urors whether they un derstoo d and accepted th at th e def en da n t wa s n ot re qui re d to of f er an y ev i den ce on h i s ow n b eh al f or th at h i s f ai l ur e to t est ify co uld no t be held a gainst him. Acco rd ingly, the t rial co ur t did no t st rict ly comply with t he terms of Rul e 431 (b). T he de fen da nt ar gu es t ha t t his fa ct , st an din g a lo ne , man da t es an au t o mat ic r ev er sa l o f his
con vi cti on. Heac kn

owl edge s th at w e h ave re j ec ted a b righ t-li ne rul e of au tomati c re ve rs al f or vi olations of Rule 431(b) when

the defe ndan t fails to rais e the i ssue b el ow and hav e i nstead appl i ed a p l ai n error anal

y si s. See , e.g. , People v. Amerman , 396 Ill . App. 3d 586, 592-96 (20 09) ; People v. Alexander , 39 6 Ill. App. 3d 5 63, 574 -77 (20 09) ; People v. Russe ll , 39 5 I ll. App. 3d 926, 939-40 (2009). The defen dant nevertheles s argues f or aut omatic

reversal “i n order to preserve the issue” sh

ould the Illi

nois Supreme C ourt adopt such a rule. 2 Our Illinois Su pr eme Co ur t re cent ly reject ed t he ar gument t hat violat ions o f Rule 43 1( b)
ar e a ut o mat ica lly re ve r sible an d c o nfir med t ha t fo r feit ed Ru le 4 31 ( b) cla ims lik e t ho se as se r t ed in thi s ca se s houl d be anal y zed u nde r the ru bri c of plai n error. People v. Thompson , 238 Ill . 2d 598 (2010) ; see al so People v. Glasper, 2 34 Ill. 2d 17 3, 19 3- 20 3 ( 20 09 ) ( ru ling t hat a vio lat io n o f a pr ior ver sion o f Rule 43 1( b) d id no t re quir e au t omat ic reve rsa l). I n Thompson , the tri al court3 The court not ed that the Uni ted St ates Supreme Court has recogni zed an error as structur al “onl y i n a very l im ited cl ass of cases,” i

ncl udin g “a com ple te deni al of counsel, trial befo re a bia se d ju dg e, ra cia l disc rimina t io n in t he s ele ct io n o f a g ra nd ju ry, de nial o f se lfre pr ese nt at ion at t rial, d enial of a p ublic t rial, a nd a d efect ive rea so nable do ubt instr uct ion. ? Thompson , 238 Ill . 2d at 609 (citin g Washington v. Recuenco , 548 U .S. 212, 2 18 n .2 (200 6)).

9 admo nished member s o f the venire r ega rd ing o nly thre e o f the fou r Ru le 431 (b) pr inciples du ring voir dire , a ske d t he individual jur or s whe t her t hey unde rst oo d o nly two of t he fo ur pr inciples, a nd
aske d th em wh eth er th ey ac ce pte d on l y on e of th e p ri n ci pl es . N ev er th el es s, th e c our

t re f us ed to appl y a rule of automatic reve

rsal . The court r ule d that “automatic reversal is required onl

y w hen an error is dee

me d ‘structural.’ ” Thompson , 238 Ill . 2d at 608 (quo ting Glasper , 234 Ill . 2d at 197 ). An err or is typica lly des ignat ed a s “st ru ct ur al” o nly i f it “er od e[ s] t he inte gr ity o f the jud icia l pr o ce ss an d u nd er mine[ s] t he fair ne ss o f t he de fen da nt ’s t r ial” an d t he r efo r e “ ne ce ss ar ily
ren ders a c ri m i na l tri al f un da men tal l y unf ai r or a n u nr el i ab l e m ea ns of de term i ni ng gui l t or i nn ocen ce.” (Intern al quotati on m

arks omi tted.) Thompson , 2 38 I ll. 2d a t 608 -0 9 ( citing Glasper , 234 Il

l . 2d at 19 6-98). 3 The

court he l d tha

t a tria l court’s f ail ure to ques

tion j urors regardin g the Rul e 431(b) prin

ci ple s durin g voir dire did n

ot rise to the le vel of structural
er ro r— even t hou gh full co mpliance wit h t he r ule’s r equ irement s is bo t h “impor t ant ” and
man da t o ry—b ec au se “vio lat io n o f t he rule do es no t ne ce ss ar ily re nd er a t r ial fu nd ame nt ally u nfa ir or unreli abl e i n determi ni ng gui lt or in nocence.” Thompson , 2 38 I ll. 2d a t 611 . T he qu est ioning mandat ed by Ru le 431 (b) “is simply one way o f helping t o e nsur e a fair and impar t ial jury,” a nd fai lure to compl

y w ith the rul e “does not necess aril

y res ult i n a b iased j ury.” Thompson , 23 8 I ll. 2d at 61 0- 11
. T he co ur t fo un d t ha t t he r e w as “no ev id en ce t ha t [ t he ] de fe nd an t wa s t r ied by a10

bi as ed j ury ” i n th e c as e b ef ore i t, pa rticul arl y consi deri ng tha t “ the tri al cou rt di d a ddr es s s ome of the Rule 431(b) requirements i n i ts voir dire an

d ** * the j ury

wa s adm oni sh ed an d i ns tructed on Rul e 431 (b) pri

nc i ples” be f ore i t beg an i ts del i berati ons. Thompson , 238 Ill . 2d at 611
. Accordin gly , the court concl

uded that the tr ia

l c ourt ’s v

iolation of am

ended Rul

e 431(b) “d[i

d] not require automatic rev ersal of [the] defe

ndan t’s convi ction.” Thompson , 238 Ill . 2d at 611. Thompson f

ore cl ose s th e def en da n t’s argu men t th at th e tr i al cou rt’ s n on com pl i an ce wi th Rule 4 31( b) in t his case re quir es a ut omat ic reve rsa l. Like t he t rial co ur t in Thompson , the trial
co ur t her e ad monished t he po t ent ial juro rs c ollect ively regar ding t hre e o f the fou r Ru le 431 (b) princi ples an d questioned each juror r egarding some of the Rule 431(b) pr in cipl es but failed to ask
eac h juro r w het her he o r she unde rst oo d and acc ept ed a ll f ou r p rinciples. Also, as in Thompson , al l of the Rul

e 431 (b) pri

nc i ples w ere accura

tel y conv ey ed to the j ury

through the j ury ins t ruc t io ns , an d t he r e is no t hin g t o su gg es t t ha t t he jury in t his ca se wa s b ias ed
. Ac co r di ng ly, Thompson ’s ho lding co nt ro ls. T he t rial co ur t ’s failure t o s t rict ly comply with t he dict at es o f the rule duri ng voir dire do es no t fall w it hin t he ve ry limite d c las s o f st ruc t ur al e rr o r s t ha t wo uld requi re autom ati c rev ersa l
. I n t he alt er na t ive , t he de fen da nt ar gu es t ha t his c o nvic t io n is r ev er sible un de rt he pla in
erro r do ctr ine. As noted , t he defendant co ncedes t hat he ra ised no object ion to the t rial court ’s vi olation of Rul e 431(b), ei

ther durin g the voir dire or in a posttrial motion. Thus , the iss

ue has be en f orfe i ted. People v. Allen , 22 2 Ill. 2d 340 , 35 0 (2 006 ); Amerman , 396 Il l . Ap p. 3d a t 592. Howev er, the plai n error rule by

pas ses norm al f orfe i ture pri nc i ples a nd a l l ows a re vi ewi ng c ourt t o co nsid er un pr es er ve d c laims o f er r o rin t wo sp ec ific c irc ums t an ce s. Sp ec ifica lly, c o ur t s w ill app ly the plain er ro r d oc t rine w hen:11 “ ‘( 1) a c lea ro ro bvio us er r o ro cc ur r ed an d t he ev ide nc e is so closel y b al anced that the error alone threatened to tip the scal es of just ice ag ainst t he de fendant , r ega rd less o f the ser iou sness of t he
erro r, o r (2) a clear or o bvi ous err or o ccurred and t hat erro r is so
ser iou s t hat it affec t ed t he fairne ss o f the defend ant 's t rial and challenge d t he inte gr ity o f the judicial pr oc ess, re gar dless o f the cl oseness of

the evi dence.’ ” Thompson , 2 38 I ll. 2d a t 613 (q uo t ing People v. Piatkow

ski , 225 Il l . 2d 551 , 565 (2 007)). As no t ed a bove , t he t rial co ur t ’s failure t o a sk e ach p ot ent ial juro r w het her he o r she
un ders tood a

nd ac ce pte d e ac h of

the Rul e 4 31(

b)pri nc i pleswa s error. Th e def

en da nt d oesnot argue that the evi den ce was cl osel y ba l anced. In

stead , he argue s onl

y that the tria l court’s f ail ure to comply ful ly with the requiremen

ts o f Rul e 431(b) depr iv

ed hi m of a sub stantial ri

ght. T hus, we lim it our plai n error anal

ys is to the second prong of the pl ai n error test . See Alexander , 396 Ill . App. 3d at 575; see also Thompson , 238 Il l . 2d at 61 3. Our supreme

court has equated the sec ond prong of pl ai n error revie

w wi th structur al error, as serti

ng th at reversa l i s req ui red un der thi s pron

g onl y f or fu nda men tal , sy stem i c errors t hat “ ‘er od e t he inte gr ity o f the judicial pr oc ess a nd und er mine the fair ness o f the defend ant 's tria l .’ ” (I ntern al quotati on m

arks omi tted.) Thompson , 2 38 I ll. 2d a t 608 -0 9 ( quo t ingGlasper , 23 4 I ll.2 d a t 19 7- 98 )
. A find ing t ha t t he de fen da nt wa s t r ied by a b ias ed jur y “wo uld ce r t ain ly sat isfy the se co nd pr ong of p lain-er ro r r eview be cau se it wo uld affec t his right t o a fair t rial and chal le nge the i ntegrity of the j udic ia

l process.” Thompson , 2 38 I ll. 2d a t 614 . H ow ever , t he defen dant “h as the burden

of persuasi

on on this is sue,” and a court “can

not presume the j ury was4 The court rejected the argumen t t hat the 2007 am

endm ent to Rule 431(b)—whi

ch im posed a duty on trial

court s to perform the Rule 431(b) questioni ng i n every cri

mi nal case tried by a j ury—m

ade the Rule 431(b) questioni ng “ in dis pensable to a fai r trial .” Thompson , 238 Ill . 2d at 6 14- 15;se e al so Thompson , 238 Ill . 2d at 610. T he court reasoned that “the fai lure to conduct Rul e 431(b) questioni

ng does not necessa

ril y res ult i n a b iased j ury, regardless of wh ether that qu es t io ning is ma nd at o ry o rpe rmiss ive un de ro ur rule
. Alt ho ug h t he ame nd men t t o t he rule
se rve s t o pr o mo t e t he se lec t io n o f an impa r t ial ju ry by mak ing qu es t io ning man da t o ry, R ule 43 1( b) qu es t io nin g i s o nly o ne met ho d o f he lp ing t o en su r e t he se lec t io n o f a n imp ar t ial j ur y. 12 biased si mpl y b ecause the trial

court erred in

conductin

g the Rule 431(b) questioni ng.” Thompson , 238 Ill . 2d at 614. T hus, whe re a defe ndan t presents no evidence of

juror bi as resu l tin g f rom a vi ola tion of R ule 431 (b), h

i s cl ai m of p l ai n error m ust f ail
. Thompson , 238 Ill . 2d at 614-1 5. Applying t hese pr inciples in Thompson , th e supr em e c ourt rej ec ted

a c l ai m of pl ai n e rror very si m i l ar to the cl

ai m pres en ted i n th i s ca se. Thompson , 238 Il l . 2d at 61 3-15. In Thompson , t he pr os pec t ive juro rs “r ece ived so me, bu t not all, o f the re quir ed R ule 43 1( b) q ues t ioning, ” and “the veni re was al so admonished an d in structed o n Rul

e 431(b) prin

ci ple s.” Thompson , 23 8 I ll. 2d at 61 5. Mo r eo ve r , alt ho ug h t he de fen da nt co mpla ine d t ha t t he t r ial c o ur t faile d t o fully c o mply wi th Ru l e 431 (b), h

e “ [did] not presen

t[] any evi den ce that the j ury

wasbi ase d” as a res ul t. Thompson , 23 8 I l l . 2d

at 6 14 . Acc ordi

n gl y , the c our

t f oun d th at th e def en da n t h ad “ f ai l ed to
meet h i s b

urden of sh owi n g th e error af f ected th e f ai rnes s of h i s tr i al an d ch al l en ge d th e i n teg ri ty of the j udic ia

l process,” an

d hel d that “the second prong of pl ai n-error review [di

d] not pro vi

de a basis f or excusi ng def endan t's procedural def

aul t.” Thompson , 238 Ill . 2d at 615
. 4[Citation.] It is n ot the only

me ans of achi evi ng that obje ctive .” Thompson , 238 Ill . 2d at 614
. 13 We ap plied similar re aso ning and r eac hed t he sa me co nclusio n in Amerman , a c as e t ha t is stri ki ngl y si m i l ar to the i

nstant ca se. Amerman , 3 96 I ll. App. 3d a t 592 -9 6. In Amerman , as in t his case , t he t rial co ur t admo nished t he po t ent ial juro rs r ega rd ing t he first t hre e Ru le 431 (b) prin ci ple s but fa

il ed to mention duri

ng voir dire t hat t he de fendant ’s failure t o t est ify canno t be
us ed ag ain st him. Amerman , 396 Ill . App. 3d at 588. As i n thi s case, the trial

court never explici tly as ked the juror s whether they understo od and accept ed that princi ple and di d not ask
each of th e j urorswh

eth er th ey un ders tood a

n d acc ep ted

th at th e def en da n t wa s n ot re qui re d to pres en t any evi den ce. Amerman , 396 Il

l . Ap p. 3d a t 592-96. Moreover , as i

n th i s ca se, the j ury instr uct ions a ddr esse d all fou r o f the Rule 4 31( b) p rinciples, and t hat was t he first t ime in the pro ceedings that the jurors wer e to ld that a defendant’s f ail ure t o t estify

cannot be held agai

nst hi m . Amerman , 396 Il

l . Ap p. 3d a t 588-89. This co ur t affirmed t he de fendant ’s co nvictio n, w ith Ju st ice McD ade dissent ing. R elying on t he su pr eme co ur t ’s de cision in Glasper , we r ea so ne d t ha t t he t r ial c o ur t ’s failu r e t o st r ict ly compl y w ith R ule 431(b) di d not result in

a bi ased j ury, particul

arly because the record showed that “the j ury was

in structed [o n] the [Rule 431(b)] prin ci ple s bef ore its delib erations.” Amerman , 396 Ill . App. 3d at 595 (citin g Glasper , 23 4 Il

l . 2d at 2 01) . W e n

oted tha t a c ontr ary con cl us i on “wo uld r equ ire u s t o p re sume t hat citize ns swo rn a s juro rs igno re t he law a nd t he jur y instr uct ions gi ven to them

,” wh i ch i s con trary to our preced

en t. (Intern al quotati on m

arks omi tted.) Amerman , 396 Ill . App. 3d at 595. We also found i t sign if ic ant that our suprem

e court has expr essly “moved awa y” fro m the p or t ion o f its ho lding in People v. Zehr , 103 Il l . 2d 472(1984 ), wh i ch sta ted tha t the Rul e 4 31(

b)que sti ons m us t be covere d “ i

n th e c ours e of

i nte rrog ati on on14

voir dire ” and that “the f

ai lure to ask these questions am ounts to ‘prej udic ia

l e rror. ’ ” (Internal quotati on m

arks omi tted.) Amerman , 396 Ill . App. 3d at 595 (quo ting Glasper , 234 Ill . 2d at 197). Thompson and Amerman dictat e the r esult in this case. As not ed abo ve, t he tr ial cou rt ’s violat ions o f Rule 43 1( b) in t his case clos ely para llel the er ro rs d iscuss ed in t hos e ca ses, and t he jury inst ru ct ions g iven in each c ase wer e su bst ant ially ident ical. Like t he de fendant s in Thompson and Amerman , the def

endan t in thi s ca se of

f ers n othi ng to su ggest that the tri

al court’s errors durin g voir dire re su

l ted i n j uror b i as . Th

e def en da n t al l udes i n v ag ue an d c on cl us ory f ash i on to un sp ec ific ed “p r eju di ce ” a nd t he de pr iva t io n o f “s ub st an t ial r ig ht s, ” b ut he simp ly presumes that such cons equences

fl ow auto ma

tical ly from the vi olation of Rul e 431(b); h

e does not pro vi

de any evi dence or argume

nt purport in

g to show that jury

bias or any

ot her prej udic e actuall

y res ulted from the trial court ’s v iolation of the rul

e i n thi s case. A s our supreme court has m ade clear, that i s n ot enough
. Thompson , 238 Ill . 2d at 614 (r uli ng that “[w]e can

not presume the j ury was biased simply

beca use t he t rial co ur t er re d in co nduc t ing t he Ru le 431 (b) que st ioning, ” and holdi ng that defen

dant fai le d to me et his

burden un

der the plai

n error doct rin

e where h e off ered no eviden ce of juror bias); see al

so Amerman , 396 Il

l . Ap p. 3d a t 592-96. The cas e fo r a ffi

rmance is even st ro nger her e t han it w as in Amerman , because the tri al court in this case took additional

steps durin

g voir dire t o en su r e t ha t t he jur o r s w o uld fait hfu lly appl y the la w in an un biased f ashi on. Specif

ic ally , the court adm

onis hed the en

tire ven ire that

“ [y ]ou m us t f oll ow th e l aw s a s I gi v e i t [ sic ] to you. You may

not use your own i deas about what yo u t hink t he law sho uld be in d ec idin g t his c as e * **
. ” W hile a dd r es sing t his fir st gr o up o f six po t ent ial juro rs in t he jur y box ( when a ll m embers of t he venire app ar ent ly still were p re sent ), t he15

court stated t hat “y

ou must fol

low the l aw as I gi ve i t t o you even if you d

isagree w ith it. ” (Em phasi s ad ded.) The co ur t t hen as ked eac h po t ent ial juro r a ser ies o f que st ions, including wh eth er h e or sh e w oul d “ f oll ow th e l aw ev en i f you d i sa gr ee wi th i t.”Ea ch i n di v i du al ch ose n to serv e as a j uror an swe

red “ yes” to each of these questions. The court al

so adm oni shed th e en

tire
ve ni re th at “ i t’s es senti al dur i ng the cou rs e of the tri al tha t you n ot arr i ve at a ny de ci si on or conc l usi on of an y ki nd u nti l you’ve heard a

l l the evi den ce, the argu

men t of the l awy ers, and my instructions on the law

” (e m phas i s adde d), tha

t “ when de ci di ng thi s c as e, y ou m us t not a l l ow symp at hy o rpr eju dic e t o influ en ce yo u, ” a nd t ha t “[ o ] ur sys t em o f law is ba se d o n t he pr inc iple t hat a jur y will

dec ide t he ca se o n t he law a nd evide nce o nly.” The se a dmo nitio ns and questions—i

n c onj unc tion wi th the other ad moni sh men ts, ques tions, an d the j ury inst ruc t io ns— en su r ed t ha t t he jur y un de r st o o d t he Ru le 4 31 ( b) pr inc iple s a nd ag r ee d t o ap ply them i n renderi ng i ts verdi ct. See Russell

, 395 Ill. App. 3d at 941- 42 (ho ldi ng that lower co urt ’s f ail ure to strictl

y com pl y wi th Ru l e 431 (b) was n

ot pla i n error whe

re, inter al

ia , the court asked the jurors whet her they would apply the law as gi

ven i n the jury instruct ions, decide the case wit ho ut symp at hy an d p r eju dic e, an d w ait un t il t he en d o f t he t r ial t o fo rm an o pin io n)
. T his fully sati sf i ed th e sp i

ri t, if not the l etter, of R

ule 431 (b). The defend ant re lies on People v. Blanton , 39 6 I l l . A pp . 3d 23 0 ( 4th Dist. 20 09 ), to sup po rt his claim of plain err or , bu t t hat cas e is inapp os ite. In Blanton , the jurors were nev er ad vise d o rinst ruc t ed t ha t a d efe nd an t ’s failu r e t o t es t ify co uld no t be he ld a ga inst him. I n t his case, by contrast, the jury

was i nstructed on that princi

ple prior to its deli

berations , and the trial court posed

questions to each

j uror wh i ch he l ped to ensure

that the j urors woul

d app l y the j ury i nstructi ons as gi

ven. M oreover , Blanton was deci ded bef ore Thompson , an

d i ts h ol di ng res ts on16

an er ro neo us p re mise tha t t he su pr eme co ur t squ ar ely reject ed in Thompson
. S pe cif ica lly, Blanton h el

d th at Glasper ’s rul

in g that a vi olation of

Rul e 431(b) was n

ot structur al

error t hat requi red au tomati c rev ersa l appl i ed onl y to the prea

mended v ersi on of the ru l e. Blanton , 39 6 I ll. App. 3d a t 238 -3 9. In Thompson , the c our t ex pr es sl y re j ected th at a rgum en t an d r ul ed th at i ts analysis in Glasper

al so app l i ed to the c

urren t, amended v

ersi on of the ru l e. Thompson , 23 8 I ll. 2d a t 614 -1 5. Thu s, t he de fendant ’s r eliance o n Blanton i s un av ail i ng. The doctri ne of p l ai n error i s n

ot “ ‘a gen eral sav i ng c l aus e pres ervi

ng f or revi ew al l errors aff ectin g substantial

righ ts whether or not t hey

have been

brought to the attention of the trial court .’ ” People v. Herron , 215 Ill . 2d 167, 177 (2005) (quo ting People v. Precup , 73 Ill . 2d 7, 16 ( 197 8) ). Rat her , it is a nar ro w exc ept ion t o t he r ule o f forfe itu re t hat app lies only in the specifi c ci rcumstances di scussed above. Because the def endan t do es not argue that t he ev ide nce in t his c as e w as clo se ly bala nc ed an d h as faile d t o sho w t ha t t he t r ial c o ur t ’s vio lat io n o f Ru le 431(b) amounted t o a st ruct ural error , his cl aim of plai n error fai ls. B. Per diem Cr ed it T he de fen da nt als o ar gu es t ha t he is e nt it led t o $5 cr ed it fo rt he sing le d ay t ha t he sp en t in
cu stod y on th e D UI cha

rge . Se cti

on 1 10- -14 (a) of

the Code p rov

i de s th at “ [a] ny pers on i nc arc era ted on a ba i l ab l e of f ense wh o doe s n ot su ppl y ba i l an d agai ns t whom a f i ne i s l ev i ed on con vi cti on of such of f ense sh al l be al l owe d a cre di t of $5 f or ea ch da y so i nc arc era ted upon app licatio n of t he de fendant ,” pr ovid ed t hat t he amo unt of t he cr edit do es no t exce ed t he amo unt of t he fine. 7 25 I LCS 5/ 110 -1 4( a) (Wes t 200 8) . As t he St at e co nced es, a de fendant ’s ent itlement to this per diem credit i s m andatory unde

r the statut e, and a def

endan t may be awarded the $5- per-day credi

t o n appeal

even when he f ai ls to rais e the i ssue b efore the trial court . See , e.g. ,17

People v. Woodard , 175 Il l . 2d 435 , 457 (1 997); People v. Scott, 277 Ill . App. 3d 565, 566 (1996). Here, t he def

endan t was in carcerated for a port ion of a si ngle day , and he was later fi ned $1 , 00 0 fo rt he DU I o ffen se . Ac co r din gly, as t he St at e c o nc ed es , he is e nt it led t o a $ 5 c r ed it under the statute even though he n ever asked the tri al

court to award the credi

t and did n

ot obje ct when the cou rt neg l ec ted

to do s o sua sp onte .

CONCLUSION Fo r t he fo re go ing re aso ns, w e affirm the judg ments of c onvict ion impo sed by the Pe o r ia Cou nty ci rcu i t cou rt an d m odif y the j udg men ts to re f l ec t a c red

i t of $5 a gai ns t the DU I f i ne f or t he t ime that t he de fendant spe nt in pre sent ence cus t od y, as r equ ired by sect ion 1 10- -1 4( a) of t he Cod e (72 5 ILCS 5/11 0-14 (a) ( West 20 08)) . As par t o f our judgment, we gra nt t he St ate ’s request that t he def

endan t be assess ed $50 as costs for this appeal . See People v. Williams , 235 Ill . 2d 286

(2009 ). Af f i rmed as modi f i ed. JUS TI CE McD ADE , sp ecially conc ur ring I c onc ur in this de cision be cau se t hat re sult is req uire d by t he su pr eme co ur t ’s r ece nt dec ision in People v. Thompson , 238 Il l . 2d 598 (2010 ). I wr it e s ep ar at ely t o emp ha siz e t o de fen se co un se l t ha t t he y re ly o n t he lan gu ag e o f rule 431(b) (I ll . S. Ct . R. 431 (b) (eff. May 1, 2007) ) to the peril of thei r clients. In t he 20 07 a mendment t o r ule 43 1( b), t he su pr eme co ur t elimi nat ed lang uag e r equ iring that t he def

endan t ask the court to in

struct o r question j urors o n the f our fundam

ental trial pr inc iple s inc lud ed in t he rule
. I n t ha t ame nd men t , t he co ur t ap pe ar ed t o pla ce t he bu r de n o f fully in structing the j ury ab out the Zehr pri n ci pl es wh oll y on th e tr i al cou rt j udge s. Now

wi th i ts18

dec ision in Thompson t he su pr eme co ur t , de sp it e b o t h t he ev o lut io n o f rule 43 1( b) an d it s p lain l an gua ge , ef f ec ti vel y puts the bu rde n on ceag ai n on de f en da nt, thr ough hi s c oun se l , to ask

t he court to carry

out itsresp onsi

bi l i ty or to obj ect if

i t does n ot do so ful

l y . If the def endan t fails to do either of those thi

ngs, he or she i s obliga

ted to prove prejudi

ce attr ib utable to that specif

ic error o n the part of the trial judge
. Thompson , 238 Il l . 2d at 61 4. I f i n d i t v i rtu al l y i m pos si b l e to e n v i si on a l i ke l y si tua ti on i n wh i ch , i n th e a b se n ce of appropri ate qu es t io nin g o f t he jur o r s b y t he t r ial c o ur t o ran o ut r ig ht po st t r ial d ec lar at io n o f avio lat io n by a juror, a defen

dant could possi

bl y prove the requi

si te prejudice. The supr em e court con

tin uesto declare that i

ts rules a re not mer

e su ggestions b

ut are
mandatory

and, wh i l e the y are n ot law , they

do ha ve the f orce of l aw. In re D enzel W. , 237 Ill . 2d 285 (2 010). D oin

g the 431(b) voir dire as s

peci f i ed i n the rul e i s n ot rocket sci

ence. Non eth el es s, th e c our

t re qui re s th e def en da n t to m eet a s eem

i n gl y i m pos si b l e stan da rd of proof to redress the trial

court ’s f ai lure to follow the rule. Foll owing Thompson , de f

ense attor n ey s a n d p ros ecutor s w

h o are c om

m i tted to
ma in taini ng the l evel pla yi ng f ie ld requi red for a properly

-fun ctioni ng adversaria

l c rim in al jus tice syst em must be vigilant in ens ur ing t hat po t ent ial juro rs a re ade qua t ely -- by which I mean in a
man ner actually

com pli an t wi th the procedu res th e su prem e court has s et out in

rule 431 (b) -- instr uct ed o n t he fund ament al pr inciples ar t iculat ed a nd pr ot ect ed in People v. Zehr , 103 Ill . 2d 472 (1 984).