IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 

RAMON MURIL DORADO, 

Appellant, 

VS. 

THE STATE OF NEVADA, 

Respondent. 

No. 79556 

FILED 

FEB 2 5 2022 

ORDER OF REVERSAL 

ELIZABETH A. BROWN 

CLERK2F‘ 9UPREME COURT 

BY • Y 

DEPUTT' CLERP -4-4 

This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction, pursuant to a 

jury verdict, of three counts of sexual assault. Eighth Judicial District 

Court, Clark County; David M. Jones, Judge. 

One evening in April 1999, Michelle L. went out with some 

friends to the Silver Saddle Saloon, where she met appellant Ramon 

Dorado. Sometime in the early morning hours the next day, believing that 

she and Dorado would eventually join her friends at another bar, Michelle 

drove Dorado to either his or his friend's apartment so that he could call out 

from work. Dorado invited Michelle inside the apartment where she says 

he sexually assaulted her. Later that day, she went to a police substation 

to report the assault and completed a rape kit. Four months after Michelle 

reported the assault, a detective cleared the case due to a lack of leads in 

the investigation. In 2016, about 17 years after the assault occurred, 

Michelle's rape kit was tested and inputted into the police's database, which 

led to the identification of Dorado as a potential match. Police executed a 

warrant to obtain a fresh DNA sample from Dorado and confirmed the 

match with Michelle's rape kit. 

.2,2-0Q)1(9S 
In April 2017, the State charged Dorado by way of indictment 

with three counts of sexual assault. Dorado filed various motions to dismiss 

the indictment for preindictment delay, failure to preserve evidence, and 

destruction of evidence. The district court denied the motions. Following a 

three-day trial, the jury returned a guilty verdict on the charges against 

Dorado. 

Dorado argues on appeal that he was prejudiced by the State's 

failure to preserve material evidence; namely, Michelle's clothing worn at 

the time of the assault and an audio recording from her initial statement to 

police. Although the written transcription of Michelle's statement was 

retained, it was determined that the audio recording was destroyed. The 

State argues that it did not fail to preserve exculpatory evidence and that 

Dorado failed to demonstrate that any missing evidence was material to his 

defense. We disagree with the State. 

"We review a district court's decision to grant or deny a motion 

to dismiss an indictment for abuse of discretion." Hill v. State, 124 Nev. 

546, 550, 188 P.3d 51, 54 (2008.) "A conviction may be reversed when the 

'Dorado also contends that he was prejudiced by the loss of a 911 call 

because 911 calls are "often more truthfur and, assuming the call would 

have contradicted Michelle's testimony, he argues that he could have used 

it to impeach her. As an initial matter, it is unclear from the record whether 

a 911 call even existed. Michelle testified that she never made a 911 call 

because she went directly to a police substation to report the incident. But 

counsel for the State indicated that the 911 call had been lost. However, 

even assuming such a call did exist, Dorado has failed to establish that this 

call had any exculpatory value or that it would have been material to his 

defense. See Mortensen v. State, 115 Nev. 273, 285, 986 P.2d 1105, 1113 

(1999) CPVIJere assertions by the defense counsel that an examination of the 

evidence will potentially reveal exculpatory evidence does not constitute a 

sufficient showing of prejudice?' (alteration in original) (internal quotation 

marks omitted)). Thus, we conclude this argument is without merit. 

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state loses evidence if the defendant is prejudiced by the loss or the state 

acted in bad faith in losing it." Cook v. State, 114 Nev. 120, 125, 953 P.2d 

712, 715 (1998) (emphasis added). A defendant bears the burden to 

establish prejudice by demonstrating "that it could be reasonably 

anticipated that the evidence [lost] would have been exculpatory and 

material to the defense." Id. When considering the materiality of the lost 

evidence, "[t]he question is whether when . . . evaluated [in the context of 

the entire record] a reasonable doubt exists which was not otherwise 

present." Sparks v. State, 104 Nev. 316, 319, 759 P.2d 180, 182 (1988). 

In Cook v. State, we explained that the loss of corroborating 

evidence for sexual assault cases is particularly concerning because 

[t]he crime of rape is rarely perpetrated in the 

presence of witnesses other than the defendant and 

the victim and great reliance must be placed on the 

testimony of the victim, and, if given, the 

defendant. Thus, the presence or absence of other 

evidence which would support or refute the 

testimony of the involved parties has the potential 

for great significance. 

114 Nev. at 126, 953 P.2d at 716 (quoting State v. Havas, 95 Nev. 706, 708, 

601 P.2d 1197, 1198 (1979), disapproved of in part by Deere v. State, 100 

Nev. 565, 566-67, 688 P.2d 322, 323 (1984) (disapproving of Havas to the 

extent that it contradicts the rule that "[t]he materiality and potentially 

exculpatory character of lost or destroyed evidence must be determined on 

an ad hoc basis on the facts of each particular case)). 

Dorado first contends that he was prejudiced by the State's loss 

of Michelle's clothing she was wearing at the time of the assault because 

the clothing would have supported his defense theory of consent. Dorado 

argued at trial that the sexual contact was consensual and, based on 

Michelle's testimony, her clothing would have either buttressed or belied 

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the defense theory. See Cook, 114 Nev. at 125, 126, 953 P.2d at 715, 716 

(concluding that the defendant made the requisite showing of prejudice 

where he asserted, contrary to the victim's testimony, "that the victim's nose 

began to bleed after the [sexual contact], when she was not wearing her 

sweatee but the State failed to preserve the sweater, among other items). 

Further, the State should have reasonably anticipated that Michelle's 

clothing would have been exculpatory and material to Dorado's defense 

because in sexual assault cases a victim's clothing often contains DNA 

evidence or can show signs of struggle, which can corroborate or disprove a 

victim's testimony. Here, Michelle testified at trial that Dorado ripped her 

pantyhose during her assault and having the pantyhose would have either 

corroborated or belied her testimony. 

The State argues that at the time, the exculpatory nature of 

Michelle's clothing was not apparent, and even if it were, there is other 

evidence demonstrating that Michelle fought off Dorado. While the State 

did present evidence showing that Michelle had bruises, a scratch on her 

chest, a red mark on her back from a carpet burn, and broken fmgernails, 

Dorado demonstrated that Michelle's initial statement may have been 

inconsistent with her trial testimony because she did not mention in her 

initial statement that Dorado ripped her pantyhose but at trial she did. Cf. 

Deere, 100 Nev. at 566, 688 P.2d at 323 (concluding that the defendant did 

not establish prejudice due to missing undergarments "where[ ] the victim's 

testimony was not ambiguous and was amply corroborated by other 

testimony and by physical evidence). Moreover, this compounded the 

prejudice to Dorado from the State's loss of Michelle's clothing as he was 

unable to use the pantyhose to impeach Michelle regarding this 

discrepancy. See Sparks, 104 Nev. at 319, 759 P.2d at 182 ("The State 

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cannot be allowed to benefit . . . from its failure to preserve evidence."). 

Thus, we conclude that, based on the record as a whole, Dorado has shown 

that it could be reasonably anticipated that lost clothing would have been 

exculpatory and material to his defense. See Cook, 114 Nev. at 125, 953 

P.2d at 715; Sparks, 104 Nev. at 319, 759 P.2d at 182. 

Dorado next argues that he was prejudiced by the State's loss 

of the audio recording of Michelle's initial statement because without it he 

was unable to impeach Michelle's testimony. We agree. Although the 

written transcript of Michelle's initial statement was available, there were 

numerous blanks throughout the transcript. There is independent evidence 

that Michelle's testimony may have been inconsistent with her initial 

statement and that at least one of those inconsistencies led to an additional 

count of sexual assault. See Cook, 114 Nev. at 125, 953 P.2d at 715 

(reversing the defendant's conviction based in part on the State's loss of the 

victim's initial statement to police). For example, there was no mention of 

digital penetration in Michelle's initial statement, whereas she testified to 

digital penetration during trial. Likewise, there is no mention in Michelle's 

statement that Dorado ripped her pantyhose, but she testified at trial that 

he did. We thus conclude that Dorado has also shown that it could be 

reasonably anticipated that lost audio recording of Michelle's voluntary 

statement would have been exculpatory and material to his defense. See 

Cook, 114 Nev. at 125, 953 P.2d at 715; Sparks, 104 Nev. at 319, 759 P.2d 

at 182. 

For these reasons, we conclude that Dorado has established 

that he was prejudiced by the State's failure to preserve evidence that could 

reasonably have been anticipated to be both exculpatory and material 

evidence, and reversal is thus warranted. Accordingly, we 

5 
Parraguirre 

J. 

Hardesty 

Cadish 

J. 

ORDER the judgment of the district court REVERSED.2 

cc: Hon. David M. Jones, District Judge 

Michael Lasher LLC 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Clark County District Attorney 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

2Given our disposition in this matter, we need not address Dorado's 

remaining arguments raised on appeal. 

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