An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling 

legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the 

provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

NO. COA14-903

NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS

Filed: 3 March 2015

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v. Lee County

Nos. 11 CRS 50049, 50055

EDWARD EARL MULDER

Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 7 May 2014 by Judge 

C. Winston Gilchrist in Lee County Superior Court. Heard in the 

Court of Appeals 9 February 2015.

Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General 

Scott A. Conklin, for the State.

Peter Wood for defendant-appellant.

HUNTER, JR., Robert N., Judge.

On 15 October 2012, a jury found defendant Edward Earl Mulder 

(“Defendant”) guilty of the following: one count of breaking and 

entering; one count of felonious operation of a motor vehicle to 

elude arrest; one count of reckless driving to endanger; one count 

of speeding; one count of littering; one count of failure to 

maintain lane control; one count of injury to personal property; 

one count of failure to heed light or siren; two counts of 
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violating a domestic violence protective order (“DVPO”); and five 

counts of assault with a deadly weapon on a government officer. 

The trial court imposed consecutive sentences of 15–18 months in 

prison for the first two counts of assault with a deadly weapon on 

a government officer; 19–23 months in prison for the next three 

counts of assault with a deadly weapon on a government officer; 6–

8 months in prison for the consolidated offenses of speeding, 

reckless driving, felonious operation of a motor vehicle to elude 

arrest, failure to heed light or siren, failure to maintain lane 

control, and littering; and 75 days in prison for the DVPO 

violations, the injury to personal property offense, and the 

breaking or entering offense. 

Defendant appealed, and this Court held that “Defendant was 

unconstitutionally subjected to double jeopardy when he was 

convicted of speeding and reckless driving in addition to felony 

fleeing to elude arrest based on speeding and reckless driving.” 

State v. Mulder, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 755 S.E.2d 98, 106 (2014). 

Therefore, this Court arrested judgment on the speeding and 

reckless driving convictions and remanded Defendant’s case for 

resentencing. Id.

The trial court conducted a resentencing hearing on 7 May 

2014. Attorney Ed Page, who represented defendant in his original 
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trial, was reappointed to represent him at resentencing. The trial 

court arrested judgment on Defendant’s convictions for speeding 

and reckless driving. The trial court imposed a sentence of 6-8 

months for the consolidated offenses of felonious operation of a 

motor vehicle to elude arrest, failure to heed light or siren, 

failure to maintain lane control, and littering. Defendant 

appeals. 

Defendant’s sole argument on appeal is that the trial court 

erred by failing to conduct an inquiry into his dissatisfaction 

with court-appointed counsel, Ed Page. We review the trial court’s 

decision whether to appoint new counsel for an abuse of discretion. 

State v. Bowen, 56 N.C. App. 210, 212-13, 287 S.E.2d 458, 460

(1982).

“While it is a fundamental principle that an indigent 

defendant in a serious criminal prosecution must have counsel 

appointed to represent him, an indigent defendant does not have 

the right to have counsel of his choice appointed to represent 

him.” State v. Thacker, 301 N.C. 348, 351-52, 271 S.E.2d 252, 255 

(1980) (internal citations omitted). Our Supreme Court further 

explained:

A trial court is constitutionally required to 

appoint substitute counsel whenever 

representation by counsel originally 

appointed would amount to denial of 
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defendant’s right to effective assistance of 

counsel, that is, when the initial appointment 

has not afforded defendant his constitutional 

right to counsel. Thus, when it appears to 

the trial court that the original counsel is 

reasonably competent to present defendant’s 

case and the nature of the conflict between 

defendant and counsel is not such as would 

render counsel incompetent or ineffective to 

represent that defendant, denial of 

defendant’s request to appoint substitute 

counsel is entirely proper. 

Id. at 352, 271 S.E.2d at 255 (internal citations omitted). “Once 

it becomes apparent that the assistance of counsel has not been 

rendered ineffective, the trial judge is not required to delve any 

further into the alleged conflict.” State v. Poole, 305 N.C. 308, 

311-12, 289 S.E.2d 335, 338 (1982). Furthermore, our Supreme Court 

“has held that a disagreement over trial tactics generally does 

not render the assistance of the original counsel ineffective.” 

Thacker, 301 N.C. at 352, 271 S.E.2d at 255. 

Defendant argues that he “articulated compelling reasons for 

the court to remove Page” and therefore offered “‘more than broad 

and general statements of dissatisfaction with his attorney.’” 

(quoting State v. Shubert, 102 N.C. App. 419, 425, 402 S.E.2d 642, 

646 (1991)). We disagree. It appears that the root of Defendant’s 

complaint with Mr. Page was related to his claims that (1) the 

charges against him were “trumped up” and fabricated by law 

enforcement; (2) that he never committed any domestic violence; 
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and (3) that Mr. Page was refusing to give Defendant e-mails which 

would prove his allegations. Defendant apparently wanted Mr. Page 

to introduce this evidence at resentencing. Defendant’s claims, 

however, are relevant to the guilt phase in his original trial and 

are therefore misplaced at resentencing. Indeed, counsel 

appropriately advocated for Defendant by requesting that the court 

consolidate his offenses, run his sentence concurrent to his other 

sentences, or suspend the sentence. Counsel also noted Defendant’s 

age and lack of a criminal record. Based on the foregoing, we are 

satisfied that the trial court adequately inquired into the reasons 

for Defendant’s dissatisfaction, and based on those reasons, it 

was apparent that assistance of counsel had not been rendered 

ineffective. See Poole, 305 N.C. at 311-12, 289 S.E.2d at 338. 

We therefore discern no abuse of discretion on the part of the 

trial court.

No error.

Chief Judge MCGEE and Judge STEPHENS concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).