NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 20-1171

__________

MICHAEL J. BEAUTYMAN; 

MICHAEL J. BEAUTYMAN FAMILY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP

v.

DAVID J. LAURENT a/k/a DAVID J. LEHARVEO; 

GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA; 

AMERICAN BANKERS INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA

DAVID J. LAURENT a/k/a DAVID J. LEHARVEO,

 Appellant 

__________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-17-cv-05804)

District Judge: Honorable Robert F. Kelly

____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

October 1, 2020

Before: SHWARTZ, RESTREPO and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: October 1, 2020)

___________

OPINION*

___________

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.
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PER CURIAM

Pro se appellant David J. Laurent appeals from the judgment entered against him 

by the District Court after a jury trial. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the 

District Court’s judgment. 

In 2017, Michael J. Beautyman and the Michael J. Beautyman Family Limited 

Partnership (hereinafter collectively referred to as “Beautyman”) filed an action in the 

Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas against Laurent, General Insurance Company of 

America (GICA), and American Bankers Insurance Company of Florida for damages to 

real and personal property stemming from the period during which Laurent rented 

Beautyman’s condominium. The matter was removed to the District Court for the 

Eastern District of Pennsylvania. GICA filed a cross-claim against American Bankers 

and Laurent for contribution and/or indemnity. In June 2018, American Bankers was 

dismissed pursuant to a stipulation of settlement between it and Beautyman; all crossclaims by and against American Bankers were dismissed without prejudice. The District 

Court subsequently granted GICA’s motion for summary judgment with respect to 

Beautyman’s claims; the cross-claim against Laurent remained outstanding. 

The matter proceeded to trial on the breach of contract claims against Laurent. 

After a jury verdict, judgment was entered on October 4, 2019, in favor of Beautyman in 

the amount of $135,689.68. On October 17, 2019, Laurent filed a renewed motion for 
3

judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b). The District Court denied 

the motion in an order entered November 1, 2019, and this appeal ensued.1

Laurent’s first two arguments relate to service of process. He maintains that the 

District Court ran afoul of Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) when it granted Beautyman’s request for 

substituted service of process. He also argues that the District Court lacked personal 

jurisdiction over him because Beautyman did not properly effectuate service on him. 

“Issues concerning the propriety of service under Rule 4 are subject to plenary review.”

See McCurdy v. Am. Bd. of Plastic Surgery, 157 F.3d 191, 194 (3d Cir. 1998).

Rule 4(m) requires a district court to dismiss a case without prejudice, or to order 

that service be made within a specified time, if the plaintiff fails to serve the defendant 

within 90 days of filing the complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). “But if the plaintiff shows 

good cause for the failure, the court must extend the time for service for an appropriate 

period.” Id. Here, Beautyman filed a motion to substitute service on May 1, 2018, 125 

1 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. At the time the appeal was filed, 

GICA’s cross-claim against Laurent remained pending, and, therefore, the appeal was 

taken from a non-final order. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291; Hill v. City of Scranton, 411 F.3d 

118, 124 (3d Cir. 2005). However, the cross-claims have since been effectively 

withdrawn, see DCD #90-1, and the appeal is now ripe for review. See DL Res., Inc. v. 

First Energy Sols. Corp., 506 F.3d 209, 216 (3d Cir. 2007) (applying the doctrine of Cape 

May Greene, Inc. v. Warren, 698 F.2d 179, 185 (3d Cir. 1983) (holding that a notice of 

appeal filed before a final decision has been made but followed by a final appealable 

order is treated as an appeal from the final order in the absence of prejudice to the 

respondent)); see also Bethel v. McAllister Brothers, Inc., 81 F.3d 376, 382 (3d Cir. 

1996) (holding that “an otherwise non-appealable order may become final for purposes of 

appeal where a plaintiff voluntarily and finally abandons the other claims in the 

litigation”).
4

days after the complaint was filed. The District Court determined that, despite a “good 

faith effort to locate and serve” Laurent, Beautyman had not been able to do so because, 

it appeared, Laurent was “concealing his physical whereabouts” to avoid service of 

process. District Ct. Docket (DCD) #19. The Court granted Beautyman permission to 

make service of process to Laurent’s last known mailing and internet addresses. 

Laurent argues that the Court erred in failing to dismiss the complaint or direct 

that service be made within a specified period of time in accordance with Rule 4(m). We 

find no reversible error. Courts consider “three factors in determining the existence of 

good cause under Rule 4(m): (1) reasonableness of plaintiff’s efforts to serve[;] (2) 

prejudice to the defendant by lack of timely service[;] and (3) whether plaintiff moved for 

an enlargement of time to serve.” MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Teleconcepts, Inc., 71 F.3d 

1086, 1097 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v. Nuttall, 122 F.R.D. 163, 166-67) (D. 

Del. 1988)). Laurent does not dispute that Beautyman showed a basis for good cause as 

to why he could not reasonably effectuate service. The thrust of his argument is that 

Beautyman failed to demonstrate a reasonable basis for failing to timely move for an 

enlargement of time to serve. See id. 

According to Laurent, Beautyman was aware of a “proper mailing address” for 

Laurent in mid-March 2017, and he “could have petitioned the court for substituted 

service at any time before the 90-day window expired.” Appellant’s Br. at 5. But the 

address known to Beautyman at that time was a P.O. Box. See App. Vol. II at 298, 303; 

see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(2) (noting that service may be made by delivering a copy of 
5

the summons to the individual personally, or by leaving it at their dwelling or with 

authorized agent). In any event, there is no specified time limit on a Rule 4(m) motion; 

rather, its timeliness is a factor in determining whether the motion for extension of time 

should be granted. See McCurdy, 157 F.3d at 196-97 (affirming the denial of a Rule 

4(m) motion where the plaintiff did not seek “an extension of time before the time 

allotted under the Rules had lapsed” and until after the statute of limitations had expired)

(emphasis in original). Although the motion for substituted service was filed after the 90-

day period, it is clear that Beautyman made several timely attempts to serve Laurent, and 

that he sought to confirm his address for personal service through a variety of means, 

including a Freedom of Information Act request to the United States Postal Service and a 

search of court records. This diligence, when considered with Laurent’s apparent efforts 

to evade service of process, established good cause for failing to timely serve. Having 

determined as much, the Court was required to grant Beautyman’s motion, which was 

tantamount to a Rule 4(m) motion. See id. at 196. 

In granting Beautyman’s motion to substitute service, the District Court impliedly 

granted an extension of time to make service of process; but it failed to technically 

comply with Rule 4(m)’s requirement that it set a specific time period for service. 

Laurent was not prejudiced by this error, however, where service was made within 16 

days of the Court’s order and there is no indication that the applicable statute of 

limitations would have barred Beautyman from refiling the complaint were it dismissed. 

Moreover, for all of the foregoing reasons, the District Court did not err in dismissing the 
6

complaint under Rule 4(m) either sua sponte or, even assuming one was filed, on motion 

by Laurent.2

 

Laurent next argues that the Court lacked personal jurisdiction over him because 

he was not properly served and proof of service was not established as required by Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 4(c) and (l). Specifically, he asserts that Plaintiff’s counsel could not properly 

serve the affidavit, and that the affidavit of service was electronically signed and lacked 

the notary’s stamp and license number. Laurent waived these personal jurisdiction 

arguments by failing to properly object to service of process on these bases in the District 

Court. See Tri-M Grp., LLC v. Sharp, 638 F.3d 406, 416 (3d Cir. 2011) (noting that 

arguments not raised in the district court will not be considered for the first time on 

appeal); see also Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 

694, 703 (1982) (noting that personal jurisdiction can be waived). In any event, we agree 

with Beautyman that service was made in compliance with the federal rules.

Laurent next maintains that Beautyman thwarted his attempts to obtain discovery 

by failing to respond to requests for production of documents and interrogatories, as well 

as to a subpoena to inspect the real property at issue in the matter. Contrary to his 

2 In an email to the District Court judge’s deputy clerk, Laurent indicated that he was 

“seeking the court, on its own, without a motion” to dismiss the matter for failure to 

comply with Rule 4(m). DCD#29 & Ex. A-1. Laurent raised the issue at the pretrial 

conference hearing (Rule 16 hearing) held in June 2018. The District Court advised him 

to file a Rule 4(m) motion. Instead, Laurent raised the issue as an affirmative defense in 

his answer to the complaint. See DCD#29. 
7

contention, Beautyman did not act in bad faith by filing a motion to quash Laurent’s 

discovery requests, and the District Court did not abuse its discretion in granting the 

motion, where the discovery requests were “served” more than eight months after 

discovery had closed and within a month of when trial was scheduled to start.3

 See DCD 

##53, 54; see Eisai, Inc. v. Sanofi Aventis U.S., LLC, 821 F.3d 394, 402 (3d Cir. 2016) 

(noting that discovery decisions are reviewed for abuse of discretion). We also find no 

abuse of discretion in the Court’s decision to deny Laurent’s motion to exclude evidence 

at trial which Beautyman allegedly failed to provide in discovery. See Stecyk v. Bell 

Helicopter Textron, Inc., 295 F.3d 408, 412 (3d Cir. 2002) (review of a district court’s 

evidentiary rulings is for abuse of discretion). The District Court credited Beautyman’s 

representation that the evidence had been produced, and Laurent provides no basis, other 

than his say-so, to suggest that the Court erred. See DCD #64; App. Vol. II at 210-11. 

Finally, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Laurent’s motion to 

dismiss the action based on Beautyman’s alleged failure to provide a list of disclosures as 

required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1). DCD ##59, 61. The issue was not timely raised, 

and, regardless, we agree with Beautyman that Laurent could not show the requisite 

prejudice under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a) where he otherwise received the relevant 

information in, inter alia, copies of responses to GICA’s discovery in August 2018, and 

3 Beautyman maintained in the District Court that he was never properly served with 

these belated discovery requests.
8

Beautyman’s pretrial memorandum. See Nicholas v. Pa. State Univ., 227 F.3d 133, 148 

(3d Cir. 2000).

Finally, we find no abuse of discretion in the District Court’s decision to deny 

Laurent’s motion for a continuance. Laurent sought the continuance to allow for 

additional time for discovery and settlement negotiations, and to secure counsel; but he 

provided absolutely no bases for granting the motion. Moreover, the motion was filed in 

September 2019, just weeks before trial, long after discovery had ended,4 and nearly a 

year and a half after the Court advised Laurent to obtain counsel. See App., Vol. II at 

243. Furthermore, in an email to Beautyman’s counsel just a week prior to filing the 

motion for a continuance, Laurent acknowledged that there were no fruitful settlement 

negotiations, declaring that “the only path” he saw “to obtain immunity for [him]self and 

receive final closure . . . [wa]s to proceed to trial.” Id. at 255. 

Based on the foregoing, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 

4 At the Rule 16 hearing in June 2018, the District Court ordered discovery to be 

completed by October 2018; it subsequently granted a motion to extend the discovery 

period, by two months, until December 18, 2018.