UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-7785

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

TORRANCE JONES,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle, 

District Judge. (5:96-cr-00079-BO-1)

Submitted: June 30, 2010 Decided: July 20, 2010

Before NIEMEYER, SHEDD, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Clayton R. Kaeiser, CLAYTON R. KAEISER, PA, Miami, Florida, for 

Appellant. George E. B. Holding, United States Attorney, 

Anne M. Hayes, Assistant United States Attorney, Raleigh, North 

Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Torrance Jones appeals from the district court’s order 

denying his 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (2006) motion for reduction 

of sentence based upon the crack cocaine amendments to the 

Sentencing Guidelines. The district court denied the motion, 

finding Jones ineligible because his offense involved more than 

4.5 kilograms of crack cocaine. On appeal, Jones asserts that, 

at sentencing, he was only found responsible for 1.5 kilograms 

of crack cocaine, that the district court is barred from holding 

him responsible for a larger amount, and that he should, 

accordingly, be eligible for a reduction. We affirm. 

We review an order granting or denying a § 3582(c)(2) 

motion for abuse of discretion. United States v. Munn, 595 F.3d 

183, 186 (4th Cir. 2010). A district court abuses its 

discretion if it fails or refuses to exercise discretion, or if 

it relies on an erroneous factual or legal premise. DIRECTV, 

Inc. v. Rawlins, 523 F.3d 318, 323 (4th Cir. 2008). In a § 3582 

proceeding, the district court may only consider the effect of 

the retroactive amendment, not any other sentencing or guideline 

issues. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 1B1.10, p.s., 

comment. (n.2) (2009). 

Amendment 706 to the Guidelines lowered the offense 

levels for drug offenses involving certain quantities of crack 

and is retroactive. See USSG §§ 1B1.10(c), p.s. & 2D1.1(c) 
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(2009); USSG App. C Amends. 706, 711, 715. However, the base 

offense level for offenses involving 4.5 kilograms or more of 

crack is unaffected by Amendment 706. USSG § 2D1.1(c)(1). 

Accordingly, if Jones was responsible for more than 4.5 

kilograms of crack cocaine, he would not be eligible for a 

sentence reduction under Amendment 706, because the Amendment 

did not lower his sentencing range. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).

While the district court may not make new findings of 

drug amounts inconsistent with those made during the original 

sentencing, the court is permitted to make new findings that are 

supported by the record and not inconsistent with the findings 

at the original sentencing. See United States v. Hall, 600 F.3d 

872, 876 (7th Cir. 2010). Specifically, “a finding that the 

defendants were responsible for at least 4.5 kilograms is not 

inconsistent with the conclusion of the original sentencing 

court that the defendants were responsible for amounts in excess 

of 1.5 kilograms.” United States v. Woods, 581 F.3d 531, 539 

(7th Cir. 2009); see also United States v. Moore, 582 F.3d 641, 

646 (6th Cir. 2009) (“We do not agree with [the defendant] that 

the district court’s previous determination of ‘more than 1.5 

kilograms’ means that it cannot also find more than 4.5 

kilograms.”).

Thus, although the district court only explicitly 

found Jones responsible for 1.5 kilograms of crack cocaine at 
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his sentencing hearing, our review of the record convinces us 

that the district court did not abuse its discretion by 

concluding that, at Jones’ original sentencing, it implicitly 

adopted the drug amounts in the presentence report (including 

26.3 kilograms of crack cocaine). As such, the district court 

properly concluded that Jones was not eligible for a reduction 

under the crack cocaine amendments, and we therefore affirm the 

district court’s judgment. We deny Jones’ motion for judicial 

notice. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

AFFIRMED