A Review of the Copyright 

Licensing Regimes Covering

Retransmission of Broadcast Signals 

U. S. Copyright Office

August 1, 1997

A Report of the Register of Copyrights
TABLE O F CO NTENTS

Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

I. The Current System of Copyright Licensing for Broadcast

Retransmissions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

A. The Cable Compulsory License . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

B. The Satellite Carrier Compulsory License ................................8

II. Should the Cable and Satellite Carrier Compulsory Licenses

Continue to Exist? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

A. History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

The Introduction of Satellite Carrier

Retransmissions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14

B. The Comments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

1. The Cable License . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

2. Other Reasons Offered For Retaining the

Cable Compulsory License . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

3. Reasons to Eliminate the Cable License . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

4. Possible Free Market Mechanisms for

Clearing Rights to a Broadcast Signal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

5. Particular Problems Presented by Free Market

Negotiation of Broadcast Signals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

C. The Satellite Carrier Compulsory License . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

1. Reasons Supporting the Existence of the

Satellite Carrier License . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

2. Reasons for Elimination of the

Satellite Carrier License . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

3. Reasons for Extending the Satellite
3

Carrier License . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

D. Discussion and Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

III. Should the Cable and Satellite Carrier Licenses

Be Harmonized? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

IV. Should the Cable Rate Structure be Reformed? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

A. Reform Principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

1. The Comments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

2. Summary of Reform Principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

3. Copyright Office Recommendation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

B. The Small System Subsidy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

1. The Comments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

2. Copyright Office Discussion and Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

C. The Artificial Fragmentation Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

D. The Proposed Step-Up Rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

V. How Should the Cable Rate Structure be Reformed? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

A. Local versus Distant Signals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

B. Models for Rate Reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

1. The Flat, Per Subscriber, Per Signal Fee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

2. The Gross Receipts Rate Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

3. Tariffing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

C. Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

1. Avoidance of Tiering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
2. Subscriber Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

3. Direct Comparison to Satellite Carriers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

4. Changing Signal Lineups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

D. Transition to New Rate Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60

VI. Should the Cable Compulsory License Apply to Open Video

System Operations? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62

A. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62

B. Prior Copyright Office Consideration Regarding

the Status of Open Video Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

C. Summary of Comments and Testimony . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66

1. The Eligibility Issue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66

2. The "Nuts and Bolts" of a Compulsory License

for Open Video Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

D. Copyright Office Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76

VII. The Passive Carrier Exemption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

A. Background Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

B. Summary of Comments and Testimony . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84

1. Open Video Systems Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84

2. Satellite Carrier Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

C. Copyright Office Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89

1. Open Video System Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89

2. Satellite Carrier Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91

VIII. Should the Cable Compulsory License be Extended

to the Internet? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92

A. Summary of the Comments and Testimony . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92

B. Copyright Office Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
IX. Unserved Household Restriction: Discussion and Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101

A. What is it? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101

B. History of the Restriction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102

C. The Issues Presented by the Unserved Household

Restriction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107

1. Eligibility for Satellite Network Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107

2. The Local Retransmission Issue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114

3. The PBS Issue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117

D. Discussion and Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117

1. Should the Unserved Household Restriction

Remain in the Copyright Law? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118

2. Local Retransmission: The Best Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119

3. Failure of the Current Unserved Household

Restriction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122

4. The "Red Zone/Green Zone" Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125

5. The PBS National Satellite Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127

6. The Picture Quality and Grade B Standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127

7. The Surcharge Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129

E. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131

X. Additional Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133

A. Treatment of Network Signals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133

1. Payment for Network Signals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133

2. Distribution to Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134

B. Payment for Local Signals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135

XI. Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
i

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

At the request of Senator Orrin Hatch, Chairman of the United States Senate Committee on the

Judiciary, the Copyright Office conducted a review of the copyright licensing regimes governing the

retransmission of over-the-air radio and television broadcast signals by cable systems, satellite carriers, and

other multichannel video providers. The specific issues addressed in this review include whether the

compulsory licenses should continue to exist, whether harmonization of the satellite and cable compulsory

licenses is possible and desirable, whether the satellite compulsory license should be extended, whether to

extend either of those licenses to new technologies such as open video systems and the Internet, whether the

satellite carrier compulsory license should encompass the local retransmission of broadcast signals, how to

solve the disputes surrounding the "unserved household" restriction for the retransmission of network

television stations that is currently a part of the satellite compulsory license, and whether the satellite

compulsory licensing regime should make a special provision for the retransmission of a national satellite

feed of the Public Broadcasting Service with a separate royalty rate for such a signal.

I. THE CURRENT SYSTEM O F CO PYRIGHT LICENSING FO R

BRO ADCAST RETRANSMISSIO NS

There are currently two compulsory licenses in the Copyright Act governing the retransmission of

broadcast signals. A compulsory license is a statutory copyright licensing scheme whereby copyright owners

are required to license their works to users at a government-fixed price and under government-set terms and

conditions. The cable compulsory license allows a cable system to intercept over-the-air television and radio

broadcast signals (comprised of copyrighted programming) and to retransmit the signals to its subscribers

who pay a fee for such service. The satellite carrier compulsory license permits a satellite carrier to intercept

television (but not radio) signals and retransmit the signals to satellite home 
ii

dish owners for their private home viewing. The cable compulsory license does not have a sunset provision,

but the satellite carrier compulsory license is scheduled to expire on December 31, 1999.

The cable compulsory license originated in the 1976 Copyright Revision Act and was premised on

two significant Congressional considerations. The first consideration concerns the difference between cable

retransmission of a broadcast signal to the local audience served simultaneously by the broadcaster and its

retransmission to a distant audience that would not otherwise be able to receive the signal. In 1976, Congress

determined that the carriage of local broadcast signals by a cable operator does not greatly harm the copyright

owners of the programming on the signal retransmitted. Based on that consideration, the compulsory license

essentially lets cable systems carry local signals for a de minimis fee.

To the contrary, Congress found a cable system's retransmission of broadcast signals to subscribers

in distant markets does harm copyright owners. To compensate copyright owners for the retransmission of

their programming to distant markets, Congress requires cable systems utilizing the cable compulsory license

to pay royalties for each signal they carry to distant audiences.

The second consideration concerns a differentiation between large and small cable systems based

upon the dollar amount of receipts a cable system receives from subscribers for the carriage of broadcast

signals. In 1976, Congress determined that the retransmission of copyrighted works by smaller cable systems

whose gross receipts from subscribers were below a certain dollar amount deserved special consideration

because of their mostly rural location. Therefore, in effect, the cable compulsory license subsidizes smaller

systems and allows them to follow a different, lower-cost royalty computation. Large systems, on the other

hand, pay in accordance with a highly complicated and technical formula, principally dependent on how the

Federal Communications Commission regulated the cable industry in 1976. The vast majority of royalties

paid under the cable compulsory license comes from the large cable systems.

The royalty scheme for the large cable systems employs the statutory device known as the distant

signal equivalent (DSE). Whether a signal is distant or local for a particular cable system for purposes of
iii

calculating the system's DSE total is determined in accordance with two sets of FCC regulations on cable

systems: the "must-carry" rules for carriage of broadcast stations in effect on April 15, 1976, and each

station's television market as currently defined by the Commission. A cable system pays royalties based upon

a sliding scale of percentages of its gross receipts depending upon the number of DSEs the station incurs.

The greater the number of distant signals a system carries, the greater the percentage the system must apply

against its gross receipts and the greater the royalty it will pay under the cable compulsory license. 

The statutory rates and percentages applied by cable systems have changed over the years pursuant

to rate adjustment proceedings that were held by the now-defunct Copyright Royalty Tribunal and the

Copyright Office by authority of the statute. The annual royalty funds collected by the Copyright Office have

been distributed to copyright owners pursuant to settlement or distribution proceedings before the same

bodies.

The satellite carrier compulsory license was created by the Satellite Home Viewer Act of 1988. The

license was due to expire at the end of 1994 but was extended by Congress for an additional five years. The

satellite license operates in many respects like the cable license, but with a far simpler royalty calculation

method.

The satellite compulsory license allows satellite carriers to retransmit superstation signals to home

dish owner subscribers located anywhere in the United States, and to retransmit network signals only to

"unserved households." Unserved households are those that cannot receive an over-the-air signal of Grade

B intensity of a network station using a conventional rooftop antenna, and that have not received the signal

from a cable system within the previous 90 days. After the amendment of the satellite carrier compulsory

license in 1994, Congress adopted a "fair market value" standard for adjusting the royalty rates of the satellite

license.

II. SHO ULD THE CABLE AND SATELLITE CARRIER

CO MPULSO RY LICENSES CO NTINUE TO EXIST?
iv

Compulsory licenses are an exception to the copyright principle of exclusive ownership for authors

of creative works, and, historically, the Copyright Office has only supported the creation of compulsory

licenses when warranted by special circumstances. With respect to the cable and satellite compulsory

licenses, those special circumstances were initially seen as the difficulty and expense of clearing all rights

on a broadcast signal. However, as early as 1981, the Copyright Office had recommended the elimination

of the cable compulsory license and full copyright liability for cable systems' retransmission of distant

signals, based on a finding that the cable industry had progressed from an infant industry to a vigorous,

economically stable industry which no longer needed the protective support of the compulsory license.

Revisiting the issue, and factoring in the satellite compulsory license, the Copyright Office finds that

for licensing the copyrighted works retransmitted by cable systems and satellite carriers, the better solution

is through negotiation between collectives representing the owner and user industries, rather than by a

government administered compulsory license. However, the comments demonstrate that the cable and

satellite licenses have become an integral part of the way broadcast signals are brought to the public, that

business arrangements and investments have been made in reliance upon the compulsory licenses, and that

the parties advocating elimination of the licenses at this time have not presented a clear path for such

elimination at this time. For these reasons, the Copyright Office does not advocate the elimination of the

compulsory licenses at the present time. The Copyright Office also believes that the satellite carrier industry

should have a compulsory license to retransmit broadcast signals as long as the cable industry has one.

Consequently, the Copyright Office would support the removal of the sunset date for the section 119 satellite

compulsory license. 

However, the Office recommends major revisions for both the cable and satellite compulsory licenses

that would make them as simple as possible to administer, would provide the copyright owners with full

compensation for the use of their works, and that would treat every multichannel video delivery system the
v

same, except to the extent that technological differences or differences in the regulatory burdens placed upon

the delivery system justify different copyright treatment. 

III. SHO ULD THE CABLE AND SATELLITE CARRIER LICENSES

BE HARMO NIZED?

The commenters were nearly unanimous that the cable and satellite carrier compulsory licenses

should remain separate because the two signal delivery industries are different in nature and are subject to

different communications regulation. For example, the cable technology is terrestrially based and delivers

a mix of local and national programming in relatively local markets, while satellite systems deliver mostly

national programming on a national basis from satellites whose footprints cover the entire continental United

States.

The Copyright Office concludes that merging section 111 and 119 into a single section would not

lead toward any practical benefit to the public administration of the licenses and, therefore, the Office agrees

that the two sections should not be merged. However, the Office does agree with the rationale behind the

idea of harmonization. That is, any existing differences between the copyright treatment of cable

retransmissions and of satellite retransmissions should be removed where possible so that the compulsory

licenses do not affect the competitive balance between the satellite carrier and cable industries.
vi

IV. SHO ULD THE CABLE RATE STRUCTURE BE REFO RMED?

The cable compulsory license rate mechanism that was established in 1976 was based upon a Federal

Communications Commission (FCC) cable regulatory structure that has not been in existence for a number

of years. In addition, the cable royalty system is a three-tiered system with progressively higher rates for

larger systems. These factors have resulted in many anomalies in royalty obligations, and many difficulties

in royalty calculation that affect copyright owners, cable system operators, and the Copyright Office. The

Copyright Office thoroughly examined many ideas for the reform of the royalty rate mechanism, and

concluded as follows.

First, the Copyright Office recommends that section 111 be amended to make cable rates as simple

as possible and reflect fair market value. This would eliminate many of the administrative costs and

uncertainties created by the present royalty mechanism, eliminate undercompensation to authors, and treat

cable systems similarly to satellite carriers.

Second, the Office recommends that Congress reconsider the royalty rate subsidy for small cable

systems. If Congress does not eliminate the subsidy, the Office would urge Congress to raise the minimal

payment paid by small cable systems to an amount that can be considered fair; now the minimal payment

does not even meet the amount it costs the Copyright Office to process the payment.

Third, the Copyright Office recommends that Congress amend section 111(f) to define when two

cable systems under common ownership or control are, in fact, one system for purposes of section 111 in

light of technological advances in headends and in anticipation of open video systems being eligible as cable

systems. If a flat, per subscriber fee is not adopted, the same part of section 111(f) should also be amended

to calculate cable rates only on those subscriber groups that actually receive a particular broadcast signal,

thus addressing the "phantom" signal problem. 

To accomplish these goals, the Copyright Office urges Congress to amend section 111(f) to read,

"For purposes of determining the royalty fee under subsection (d)(1), two or more cable systems under
vii

common ownership or control that are either (a) in contiguous communities, (b) operating from the same

headend, or (c) using the same open video system platform, shall be considered as one system. Once two

or more cable systems have been deemed a single larger cable system, the calculation of the rates shall be

based on those subscriber groups who receive the secondary transmission as the Register of Copyrights shall

by regulation provide."

Fourth, the Copyright Office believes that a rate based on fair market value would obviate the need

for a step-up rate such as the 3.75% rate for the retransmission of distant signals that exceeds a certain quota.

The Office believes that so long as the marginal costs of each additional signal does not go down, that

provides sufficient disincentive for the cable system to import an excessive number of distant signals.

Therefore, in keeping with the Office's proposal that differences between the compulsory licenses be

eliminated where possible, the Office recommends that the cable distant signal rates should be set at fair

market value, with no step-up rate for any class of distant signals, just as the current satellite carrier rates are

set.

V. HO W SHO ULD THE CABLE RATE STRUCTURE BE

REFO RMED?

As a preliminary matter to determining the best rate structure model, the Office addressed how to

improve the method by which the current section 111 distinguishes which signals are local or distant for a

particular cable system. This issue needs to be addressed under any of the three models considered and

should be addressed even if the current rate structure is retained.

The Copyright Office strongly urges Congress to eliminate any reference in section 111 to the nowdefunct 1976 must-carry rules. Instead, Congress should simply move to the new ADI system of determining

a television station's local market. For noncommercial educational stations, which the ADI system does not

address, the Office recommends defining the local market of a station as an area encompassing 50 miles from

the community of license of the station, including any communities served in whole or in part by the 50 mile
viii

radius. The Copyright Office recommends similar treatment for determining when satellite carriers are

retransmitting local or distant signals, as described in Chapter IX.

Having dealt with the issue of when a signal retransmitted by a cable system should be considered

a distant signal, the Copyright Office turns to the issue of how to determine the amount of royalties a cable

system should pay for its carriage of distant signals. The Office considered three models for reforming the

section 111 rate structure to promote simplicity in administration of the license. Each of the models could

be adjusted to provide for a marketplace rate. The three models are: (1) a flat, per subscriber, per signal fee

similar to that paid by the satellite carriers; (2) a reform of the current gross receipts structure; and (3) a

tariffing model proposed by Major League Baseball.

The Copyright Office rejected the tariffing system proposed by Baseball because it would simply

replace one complex system with another. The Office then determined that either a reformed gross receipts

model or the flat, per subscriber, per signal model would work well to achieve simplicity, certainty, equity,

and efficiency. 

As between the two models, the Office strongly recommends the flat, per subscriber, per signal fee

because: it would eliminate the arbitrary royalty calculations that result when cable systems market channels

on different tiers to manipulate their total gross receipts calculations; it would eliminate the time-consuming

and complex calculations necessary for reporting subscriber groupings as discussed in Chapter IV; it would

provide an easy comparison of the rates paid by cable systems and the rates paid by satellite carriers to

facilitate the goal of achieving comparable rates between the two retransmission industries; and it would

offer cable systems the flexibility to change their signal lineups monthly without incurring unintended

additional royalty fees.

The Copyright Office also recommends that the statute be amended to cause a CARP to be convened

to take evidence on what the flat, per subscriber, per signal rates (or the reformed gross receipts model rates)

should be, based on the fair market value of the rates, the rates paid by satellite carriers keeping in mind the
ix

regulatory and technological differences between the two industries, and the economic impact of the new

rate structure on small cable systems. After the CARP has made its initial determination of cable rates, the

Office recommends that all future rate adjustment proceeding be combined into a single cable-satellite rate

adjustment proceeding to be conducted every five years so that the cable and satellite carrier industries can

be compared by the same CARP panel at the same time.

VI. SHO ULD THE CABLE CO MPULSO RY LICENSE APPLY TO

O PEN VIDEO SYSTEM O PERATIO NS?

The Telecommunications Act of 1996 creates the open video system as an entirely new framework

for entering the video marketplace. In creating this new framework, which allows telephone companies and

others to retransmit broadcast signals, Congress and the FCC strove to promote competition, to encourage

in v estment in new technologies, and to maximize the consumers' choice of services. The

Telecommunications Act treats open video systems similarly to cable systems by imposing must-carry and

other carriage requirements. However, unlike a cable system operator, an open video system operator may

act as a programmer itself on no more than one-third of its activated channel capacity, and it must carry

programming for other video programmers on a non-discriminatory basis. The structure and appearance of

open video systems remain largely unresolved at this time.

Without deciding whether open video systems might qualify as a section 111 cable system under the

current statute, the Copyright Office believes that open video systems should be eligible for a cable

compulsory license, and that the statute should be amended to facilitate open video systems' inclusion in

section 111. The Copyright Office is swayed by the strong resemblance between open video systems and

t raditional cable systems in both technological and regulatory aspects. The Office agrees with the

commenters who argue that it would be patently unfair, and that it would thwart Congress's intent in creating

the open video system model, to deny the benefits of compulsory licensing to open video systems when
x

similar benefits are enjoyed by traditional cable systems, satellite carriers, SMATV systems, and MDS and

MMDS operations.

The Copyright Office believes that section 111 should be amended in several ways to facilitate the

eligibility of open video systems for the cable compulsory license. First, the definition of a cable system in

section 111(f) should be amended to specifically include open video systems as cable systems, and to clarify

that each programmer on the open video system is responsible for filing and paying royalties as a cable

system. Furthermore, for purposes of identifying which open video system programmers must file together

as one system to avoid artificial fragmentation of one larger system into smaller systems, it will be essential

for Congress to amend the "contiguous communities" section of the definition of cable system. 

Finally, both the complex rate structure in section 111 and the statute's reliance on the former FCC

rules for determining local and distant signals should be amended, as discussed in Chapter V, to ensure the

smooth administration of the compulsory license with open video systems as cable systems.

VII. THE PASSIVE CARRIER EXEMPTIO N.

The passive carrier exemption in section 111(a)(3) of the Copyright Act provides an exemption from

copyright liability to any carrier who retransmits one or more broadcast signals so long as that carrier has

"no direct or indirect control over the content or selection" of the broadcast signal being retransmitted or the

recipients of the signal, and so long as its only involvement in the retransmission is to provide the "wires,

cables, or other communications channels for the use of others." This provision was intended initially to

ensure that telephone companies, whose wires and hardware were used as a conduit for the retransmissions

made by cable systems, would not somehow be deemed to be infringers under the new Copyright Act of

1976. 

The exemption came into wider use with the rise of superstations in the late-1970's. At that time

satellite carriers became involved in the transmission of over-the-air signals to cable systems, and they, too,

invoked the passive carrier exemption. Three mid-1980's appellate court decisions defined the scope of the
xi

exemption in the satellite carrier context. When the development of home earth station (satellite dish)

technology provided a new market for the retransmission of superstations (i.e., to home dish owners as well

as to cable systems), the limits of the passive carrier exemption were explored. In 1986, Register of

Copyrights Ralph Oman issued the Copyright Office view that the sale and licensing of descrambling devices

to home dish owners by satellite carriers cannot be deemed passive activities within the purview of section

111(a)(3), particularly where the carrier itself encrypts the signal. Thus, for the delivery of superstations to

home dish owners, Congress afforded satellite carriers a separate compulsory license, because they did not

qualify for the passive carrier exemption in that context.

In this study, the Copyright Office reexamined the passive carrier exemption as it might apply to

open video system operators who retransmit broadcast signals for independent programmers. At the same

time, the Office considered the views of commenters regarding the entire scope of the exemption.

The Copyright Office concludes that if Congress amends the Copyright Act to clarify that open video

systems are eligible for the cable compulsory license, then the passive carrier exemption should be amended

to indicate that open video systems qualify for the section 111(a)(3) exemption only in very limited

circumstances: when the open video system operator retransmits broadcast signals for an unaffiliated

programmer and no stations invoke their must-carry privilege. In such limited circumstances, the open video

system would be a truly passive carrier. The Copyright Office believes that providing ancillary services such

as marketing, billing and collecting would not be activities that would disqualify an operator from claiming

the exemption. However, the Office takes the position that is consistent with its position regarding satellite

carriers, that if an open video system operator for some reason had the need to scramble or otherwise encode

its signals and provide decoders to subscribers, it would not qualify for the passive carrier exemption.

However, Congress might consider creating a different exemption for open video systems that only retransmit

must-carry signals.
xii

The Copyright Office believes it is probable in most, if not all instances, that when open video

system operators provide retransmission services for independent programmers, local broadcasters will

invoke their must-carry rights against the operators. Then the operators will be required to retransmit the

must-carry signals to the subscribers of the independent programmers. It is the Copyright Office's view that

in making such carriage of local signals, the open video system operator would be publicly performing the

copyrighted works embodied on the signal and must secure a compulsory license to avoid copyright liability.

It would not be eligible for the passive carrier exemption. However, Congress might consider creating a

different exemption for open video systems that only retransmit must-carry signals. 

The Copyright Office also recommends that Congress may wish to reconsider the holding of the

United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc. v. Southern Satellite

Systems, 777 F.2d 393 (8th Cir. 1985), which permits a satellite carrier to invoke the passive carrier

exemption even though it carries a signal on which national advertising has been substituted by the

broadcaster for the local advertising on the over-the-air signal. The spirit of the law is that the signals should

be retransmitted "as is." However, since it is the broadcaster who is making the alterations, not the satellite

carrier, the question of who benefits, who's harmed, and whether this is a situation that needs to be remedied

is not as clear as if the satellite carrier made the alterations. These issues were not fully briefed before the

Office during the comment period, and therefore no conclusion was reached by the Office except that the

issue deserves further study. 

VIII. SHOULD THE CABLE CO MPULSO RY LICENSE BE EXTENDED

TO THE INTERNET?

The next new multichannel program providers to claim eligibility for compulsory licensing are the

Internet broadcasters of audio and some video events. One of these, AudioNet, Inc., described to the

Copyright Office the "streaming" technology that, within two or three years, should make it possible for

AudioNet to retransmit television broadcast signals to anyone anywhere in the world who has a computer
xiii

with audio capability and access to the World Wide Web. The quality of the audiovisual display for such

retransmissions should be close to advanced digital television standards. AudioNet argues that Internet

retransmitters should be eligible either for a section 111 cable compulsory license or a compulsory license

of their own.

The Copyright Office concludes that it would be inappropriate for Congress to grant Internet

retransmitters the benefits of compulsory licensing. The primary argument against an Internet compulsory

license is the vast technological and regulatory differences between Internet retransmitters and the cable

sy st em s an d satellite carriers that now enjoy compulsory licensing. The instantaneous worldwide

dissemination of broadcast signals via the Internet poses major issues regarding the national and international

licensing of the signals that have not been fully addressed by federal and international policymakers, and it

wo uld be premature for Congress to legislate a copyright compulsory license to benefit Internet

retransmitters. 

IX. THE UNSERVED HO USEHO LD RESTRICTIO N IN THE

SATELLITE CARRIER CO MPULSO RY LICENSE.

Section 119(a)(2)(B) of the Copyright Act provides that the compulsory license granted under section

119 for the retransmission of television network signals is limited to "persons who reside in unserved

households." This provision of section 119 denies the satellite compulsory license to a satellite carrier that

retransmits a network signal to a subscriber who already receives the signal of the network's local affiliate

from another source. As such, it is a communications provision, modeled after the FCC's network

nonduplication rules that apply to cable systems, which has been incorporated in the Copyright Act.

An unserved household, ineligible for receipt of a network signal from a satellite carrier, is defined

in section 119(d)(10) as a household that cannot receive an over-the-air signal of Grade B intensity of an

affiliate of a particular network, using a conventional rooftop antenna, and that has not subscribed to a cable

system that delivers the signal of an affiliate of that network within the last 90 days. The enforcement
xiv

mechanism of the unserved household provision has proved problematic. Congress amended section 119

in 1994 to provide a transitional enforcement regime which allowed network affiliates to issue written

ch allenges against subscribers receiving network service which it believed did not reside in unserved

households. While the term of that transitional regime has expired, it was highly contentious while it lasted.

Now broadcasters who believe they are aggrieved of violations of the unserved household restriction must

once again resort to the traditional enforcement action of the Copyright Act, the infringement suit. Several

such suits have been brought in the last year.

Another controversial issue that surrounds the unserved household issue is the question whether

satellite carriers that retransmit the local network affiliates to subscribers who reside in the affiliates' local

markets qualify for the section 119 license. The retransmission of local signals by satellite carriers was never

before addressed in section 119 because the technology did not exist to make such local retransmission

possible. However, it would appear that such technology is actively being developed and, if satellite carriers

could retransmit the signals of local network stations to subscribers, the concern that led to the unserved

household provision would theoretically become resolved.

Finally, PBS proposes the creation of a direct feed to satellite carriers of PBS programming (i.e., a

national PBS satellite service) that would be exempt from the unserved household restriction.

The Copyright Office suggests that the concept of network program exclusivity protection is not

appropriately located in the copyright law. If the section 119 license is extended, the Copyright Office

recommends that Congress amend the Communications Act of 1934 to provide, or direct the FCC to adopt,

network exclusivity (and, for that matter, syndicated exclusivity) protection for satellite retransmissions of

broadcast signals. Should Congress decline to do so, the Copyright Office admits that satellite subscriber

eligibility for network signals is a problematic issue with few immediate solutions. In an attempt to improve

the current unserved household provisions, the Copyright Office makes some further suggestions.
xv

First, the Office notes that a technological solution would be the best solution in the unserved

households debate. The problem can be eliminated entirely if technology and business practices advance

to enable satellite carriers to retransmit local network affiliates to their subscribers. If the subscribers can

purchase the signals of their local network affiliates, they have no need to import distant network signals,

and there will be no "unserved households." To clarify the law with respect to such local retransmissions,

the Copyright Office recommends that section 119 be amended to allow retransmission of all television

broadcast stations, commercial as well as noncommercial educational, within each station's local market.

The Office proposes that the local market for commercial stations be the same as defined by the FCC (i.e.

ADI, and any modifications thereof), and for noncommercial educational stations all communities in whole

or in part within 50 miles of each station's community of license. This definition parallels the definitions

suggested by the Copyright Office in Chapter V of this study for local signals in the context of the cable

compulsory license. The Office does not at this time take a position as to what royalty rate, if any, should

apply to local retransmissions.

Given that local retransmission has yet to be accomplished commercially in the satellite industry,

the Office recommends that any extension of the section 119 license must include revision of the unserved

household restriction. The Office rejects the substitution of a picture quality standard for the Grade B

standard as too subjective, legally insufficient, and administratively unworkable. Likewise, the Office finds

t h e Grade B standard less than precise and cost inefficient when applied to individual household

determinations.

If Congress declines to take network program exclusivity protection out of the copyright law and put

it into the communications law, the Copyright Office proposes a "red zone/green zone" approach to the

problem. The Office recommends that satellite carriers be permitted to retransmit a network signal to all

subscribers located outside the local market of an affiliate station of that network (the "green zone"). The

satellite carriers would be prohibited from retransmitting the network signal to subscribers located within
xvi

the local market area of an affiliate station of that network (the "red zone"). The Office recommends that

satellite carriers, and their distributors, be required to disclose to any potential subscribers whether that

subscriber resides in a "red zone" or "green zone" with respect to each network signal offered by the satellite

carrier.

The Office is highly skeptical that a system can be devised that would accurately and fairly permit

the retransmission of network signals to certain "unserved" subscribers within the "red zone" without

authorizing some decision-making body to make individual determinations of eligibility. In lieu of creating

such a bureaucracy, the Office suggests that Congress consider a transitional solution to the problem until

either: (1) satellite carriers implement local retransmission of network signals, or (2) over-the-air digital

television becomes a widespread medium and offers a clear standard for determining when a subscriber

receives over the air a network signal with good picture quality. For this transitional solution, the Copyright

Office would support allowing a satellite carrier to retransmit a network signal to subscribers located in a

"red zone" if such subscribers pay a surcharge to the Copyright Office for distribution to the affiliates via

the royalty distribution procedures of chapter 8 of the Copyright Act. The rate for such a surcharge would

be established by a CARP.

PBS national satellite service would be exempted from the “red zone” provision. In addition, the

Copyright Office recommends that Congress eliminate the 90-day waiting period for subscribing to network

signals.
xvii

X. ADDITIO NAL ISSUES

A. TREATMENT O F NETWO RK SIGNALS

Under the cable compulsory license, distant network signals count as only one-quarter of a distant

signal equivalent (DSE), as opposed to the full DSE accorded a distant independent station. Thus, large

cable systems pay four times as much to retransmit an independent station as they pay to retransmit a network

station. This ratio was carried over in the satellite carrier compulsory license, where satellite carriers pay

12 cents per subscriber to retransmit a superstation and 3 cents per subscriber to retransmit a network signal.

One commenter argues that the rates for network and independent stations should be equalized because

subscribers receive valuable programming on network signals, and copyright owners in that programming

should be compensated. The Copyright Office agrees that in both the cable and satellite compulsory licenses,

the rates paid by the licensees for the retransmission of network signals should be equalized with the rates

paid for the retransmission of independent signals (or superstations). The Office, therefore, supports raising

t h e v alue of network signals to one full DSE for cable systems under the present royalty regime.

Furthermore, the Copyright Office recommends that Congress amend section 111(d)(3) to allow owners of

network programming to qualify for a distribution of cable royalties, as they qualify for distribution of

royalties under the satellite license.

B. PAYMENT FO R LO CAL SIGNALS

Although the Copyright Office has declined to comment as to the royalty compensation due for local

retransmission of signals by satellite carriers, the Office does make the following observations about payment

for the retransmission of local signals under section 111. Under the current law, every cable system pays a

minimum copyright royalty fee, whether or not it carries any distant signals. The Copyright Office believes

that the minimum fee is an important aspect of the cable compulsory license and should be retained. The

Copyright Office reiterates that retransmissions of broadcast signals, either local or distant, are public
xviii

performances within the meaning of the Copyright Act and, therefore, fall within the exclusive rights granted

by copyright protection. 

XI. RECO MMENDATIO NS

In Chapter XI, the Copyright Office summarizes and reiterates the recommendations from Chapters

I through X that the Office is sending to Congress.
 Satellite Home Viewer Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3949-3960 (1988) [hereinafter Pub. L. No. 1

100-667 (1988)].

 Satellite Home Viewer Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-369, 103 Stat. 3477 (1994) [hereinafter Pub. L. No. 103- 2

369 (1994)].

INTRO DUCTIO N

On February 6, 1997, Senator Orrin Hatch, Chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary, United

States Senate, sent a letter to the Register of Copyrights requesting the Copyright Office to conduct a global

review of the copyright licensing regimes governing the retransmission of over-the-air radio and television

broadcast signals. Senator Hatch asked the Office to report its findings to the Committee and to develop

policy options and legislative recommendations by May 1, 1997. The reporting date was extended, at the

Office's request, to August 1, 1997.

In making his request, Senator Hatch identified several issues regarding the copyright implications

of broadcast retransmissions which warrant consideration. Specifically, these included the advisability of

the extension of the compulsory copyright license created by the Satellite Home Viewer Acts of 1988 and 1

1994, the disputes surrounding the implementation of that compulsory license, and the "unserved household" 2

restriction for the retransmission of network television stations. Additionally, Senator Hatch asked the Office

to consider harmonization of the cable and satellite carrier compulsory licenses of the Copyright Act, and

whether to extend those licenses to new technologies, such as local retransmission of broadcast signals by

satellite, retransmission of broadcast signals over the Internet and by telephone companies, and new markets

for public television.

In conducting the fact-finding phase for this report, the Copyright Office scheduled three days of

public meetings and solicited comments and reply comments from all interested parties. Comments were

filed with the Office before the public meetings and reply comments were filed within one month after the

public meetings. This arrangement provided all participants ample time and opportunity to express their

views and respond to alternative perspectives.
2

Forty-three parties filed comments in response to the Notice of Inquiry (NOI), and thirty-five parties

filed reply comments. These comments addressed a multitude of questions posed by the Office concerning,

for example, the continued need for the licenses, the harmonization of the licensing scheme, and possible

amendments to the current licenses. More specifically, the comments addressed the extension of the Satellite

Home Viewer Act 1994, disputes surrounding the identification of and service to "unserved households,"

the adaption of the current license to the emerging spot beam technology and "open video systems," and the

applicability of the licenses to the Internet.

During the three days of public meetings, twenty-four witnesses presented testimony to the Register

of Copyrights and her staff on a variety of issues concerning the retransmission of broadcast signals under

the cable and satellite compulsory licenses. Representatives from the motion picture industry, cable

television, the broadcasting industry, local television, sports associations, Internet audio services, performing

rights societies, satellite carriers, small business interests, and the telephone industry each addressed, within

the context of a compulsory licensing scheme, topics raised by recent advances in technology and changes

in the multichannel video programming market.

These meetings and the comments reflected no consensus among the users or the copyright owners

about the future of the licenses. Cable operators found the current cable compulsory licensing adequate and

not in need of any major revision, unlike the copyright owners, who preferred abolishing the entire

compulsory licensing scheme, or in the alternative, moving toward a marketplace solution through the use

of rates based on fair market value in both the satellite and cable compulsory licenses. Similarly, satellite

carriers sought comparable rate structures in both licenses, but advocated that the satellite rate structure be

adjusted to resemble more closely the cable license rate structure. The satellite carriers also voiced a need

for a permanent satellite compulsory license as a means to become more competitive with the cable industry.

While it is clear that there are no easy answers to the questions posed by the emergence of new technology

(spot beaming, "open video systems," and the Internet), it is essential that the current compulsory licenses
3

be reevaluated in light of these technological changes and shifts in how the industries conduct their

businesses.

I. THE CURRENT SYSTEM O F CO PYRIGHT LICENSING

FO R BRO ADCAST RETRANSMISSIO NS

There are currently two compulsory licenses in the Copyright Code, 17 U.S.C. § 101 et. seq.,

governing the retransmission of broadcast signals. A compulsory copyright license is a statutory copyright

licensing scheme whereby copyright owners are required to license their works to users at a government fixed

price and under government set terms and conditions. The cable compulsory license, 17 U.S.C. § 111, allows

a cable system to retransmit both radio and television broadcast programming to its subscribers who pay a

fee for such service. The satellite carrier compulsory license, 17 U.S.C. § 119, permits a satellite carrier to

retransmit television broadcast programming (but not radio) to satellite home dish owners for their private

home viewing. The satellite carrier compulsory license is scheduled to expire on December 31, 1999; the

cable compulsory license has no sunset provision.

 Senator Hatch requested that the Copyright Office examine and consider revision of these

compulsory licenses, as well as the possibility of combining the two into a single license to cover all

broadcast retransmissions. In addition, Senator Hatch requested that the Office focus on specific issues

related to each of the licenses, as well as to compulsory licensing in general. This report examines and

addresses each of these requests.

A. THE CABLE CO MPULSO RY LICENSE

The cable compulsory license applies to any cable system that carries radio and television broadcast

signals in accordance with the rules and regulations of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC).

These systems are required to submit royalties for the carriage of their signals on a semiannual basis in

accordance with prescribed statutory royalty rates. The royalties are submitted to the Copyright Office, along

with a statement of account reflecting the number and identity of the broadcast signals carried, the gross
 See H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 90 (1976) [hereinafter H.R. Rep. No. 1476]. 3

 It should be noted, however, that cable systems which carry only local signals and no distant signals (a rarity) 4

are still required to submit a statement of account and pay a basic minimum royalty fee.

4

receipts from subscribers for those signals, and other relevant filing information. The Copyright Office

deposits the collected funds with the United States Treasury for later distribution to copyright owners of the

broadcast programming through the procedure described in chapter 8 of the Copyright Act.

Creat io n of the cable compulsory license was premised on two significant congressional

considerations: first, the perceived need to differentiate for copyright payment purposes between the impact

of local versus distant broadcast signals carried by cable operators; and, second, the need to categorize cable

systems by size based upon the dollar amount of receipts a system receives from subscribers for the carriage

of broadcast signals. These two considerations played a significant role in deciding what economic effect

cable systems had on the value of copyrighted works shown on broadcast television. Congress concluded 3

that a cable operator's carriage of local broadcast signals did not affect the value of the works broadcast

because the signal was already available to the public for free through over-the-air broadcasting. Therefore,

the compulsory license essentially allows cable systems to carry local signals for free. Congress also 4

determined that distant signals do affect the value of copyrighted programming because local advertisers,

who provide the principal remuneration to broadcasters enabling broadcasters to pay for programming, are

not willing to pay increased advertising rates for cable viewers in distant markets who cannot be reasonably

ex pected to purchase their goods. Increased viewership of the programming through distant signal

importation by cable systems goes uncompensated because advertisers will not pay for it. As a result,

broadcasters cannot pay greater sums to copyright owners. The classification of a cable system, by size,

based on its income from subscribers, assumes that only the larger systems which import distant signals have

any significant economic impact on copyrighted works.
5

Section 111 distinguishes among three sizes of cable systems according to the amount of money a

system receives from subscribers for the carriage of broadcast signals. The first two classifications are small

to medium-sized cable systems known as Form SA-1's and Form SA-2's, in accordance with the title of the

statement of account form which they file with their royalty payments. Form SA-1's pay a flat rate (currently

$28 per half year) for carriage of all signals, while Form SA-2's pay a percentage of gross receipts received

from subscribers for carriage of broadcast signals irrespective of the number of distant signals they carry.

The large systems, Form SA-3's, pay in accordance with a highly complicated and technical formula,

principally dependent on how the FCC regulated the cable industry in 1976. This formula allows the systems

to distinguish between carriage of local and distant signals and to pay accordingly. The vast majority of

royalties paid under the cable compulsory license come from the large cable systems.

The royalty scheme for the large cable systems employs the statutory device known as the distant

signal equivalent (DSE). Distant signals are determined in accordance with two sets of FCC regulations:

the "must-carry" rules for broadcast stations in effect on April 15, 1976, and a station's television market as

currently defined by the FCC. 17 U.S.C. § 111(f). A signal is distant for a particular cable system when that

system would not have been required to carry the station under the FCC's must-carry rules, and the system

is not located within the station's television market. 17 U.S.C. § 111(f).

Cable systems pay for carriage of distant signals based upon the number of DSE's they carry. The

statute defines a DSE as "the value assigned to the secondary transmission of any nonnetwork television

programming carried by a cable system in whole or in part beyond the local service area of a primary

transmitter of such programming." 17 U.S.C. § 111(f). A DSE is computed by assigning a value of one to

a distant independent broadcast station, and a value of one-quarter to distant noncommercial educational and

network stations, which do have a certain amount of nonnetwork programming in their broadcast days. A

cable system pays royalties based upon a sliding scale of percentages of its gross receipts depending upon
 Malrite T.V. v. F.C.C., 652 F. 2d 1140 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied sub. nom., National Football League, Inc. 5

v. F.C.C., 454 U.S. 1143 (1982). 

 Royalties collected from the s 6 yndex surcharge have decreased considerably in recent years because the FCC

(continued...)

6

the number of DSE's it carries. The greater the number of DSE's, the higher the total percentage of gross

receipts and, consequently, the larger the total royalty payment.

As noted above, operation of the cable compulsory license is intricately linked with how the FCC

regulated the cable industry in 1976. 17 U.S.C. 111(b),(c),(f). The FCC regulated cable systems extensively,

restricting them in the number of distant signals they could carry (the distant signal carriage rules), and

requiring them to black-out programming on a distant signal where the local broadcaster had purchased the

exclusive rights to that same programming (the syndicated exclusivity rules). In 1980, however, the FCC

took a decidedly deregulatory stance towards the cable industry and eliminated the distant signal carriage

rules and the syndicated exclusivity ("syndex") rules. Cable systems were now free to import as many 5

distant signals as they desired.

Pursuant to its statutory authority, and in reaction to the FCC's action, the Copyright Royalty

Tribunal conducted a rate adjustment proceeding for the cable compulsory license to compensate copyright

owners for the loss of the distant signal carriage rules and the syndex rules. This rate adjustment proceeding

produced two new rates applicable to large cable systems making section 111 royalty payments. 47 Fed. Reg.

52,146 (1982). The first, to compensate for the loss of the distant signal carriage rules, was the adoption of

a royalty fee of 3.75% of a cable system's gross receipts for carriage of each distant signal that would not

have previously been permitted under the former distant signal carriage rules. 

The second rate, adopted by the Copyright Royalty Tribunal to compensate for the loss of the syndex

rules, is known as the syndex surcharge. Large cable operators must pay this additional fee when the

programming appearing on a distant signal imported by the cable system would have been subject to blackout protection under the FCC's former syndex rules.6
(...continued)

has reimposed syndicated exclusivity protection in certain circumstances.

7

Since the Tribunal's action in 1982, the royalties collected from cable systems have been divided into

three categories for distribution to copyright owners to reflect their origin: 1) the "Basic Fund," which

includes all the royalties collected from SA-1 and SA-2 cable systems, and the royalties collected from large

SA-3 systems for the carriage of distant signals that would have been permitted under the FCC's former

distant signal carriage rules; 2) the "3.75% Fund," which includes the royalties collected from large cable

systems for distant signals whose carriage would not have been permitted under the FCC's former distant

signal carriage rules; and 3) the "Syndex Fund," which includes the royalties collected from large cable

systems for carriage of distant signals containing programming that would have been subject to black-out

protection under the FCC's former syndex rules.

In order to be eligible for a distribution of royalties, a copyright owner of broadcast programming

retransmitted by one or more cable systems must submit a written claim to the Copyright Office. Only

copyright owners of nonnetwork broadcast programming are eligible for a royalty distribution. 17 U.S.C.

§ 111(d)(3). Eligible copyright owners must submit their claims in July for royalties collected from cable

systems during the previous year. 17 U.S.C. § 111(d)(4)(A). Once the claims have been processed, the

Librarian of Congress determines whether there are controversies among the parties filing claims as to the

proper division and distribution of royalties. If there are no controversies -- meaning that the claimants have

settled among themselves as to the amount of royalties each claimant is due -- then the Librarian distributes

the royalties in accordance with the claimants' agreement(s) and the proceeding is concluded. The Librarian

must initiate a distribution proceeding in accordance with the provisions of chapter 8 of the Copyright Act

for those claimants who do not agree. 17 U.S.C. § 801.

In addition to compulsory licensing under section 111, copyright owners and cable operators are free

to enter into private licensing agreements for the retransmission of broadcast programming. Under a private
 Under the cable compulsory license, a cable operator that carries any part of a broadcast signal, no matter how 7

momentary, must pay royalties for the signal as if it had been carried for the full six months of the accounting period.

 Pub. L. No. 100-667 (1988). 8

8

licensing agreement, the parties step outside the licensing regime of section 111 and negotiate their own

terms and royalty rates for the retransmission of broadcast programming. Private licensing occurs most

frequently in the context of particular sporting events, where a cable operator wishes to retransmit a sporting

event carried on a distant broadcast station, but does not wish to carry the station on a full-time basis. The 7

practice of private licensing is not widespread as most cable operators rely exclusively on the cable

compulsory license.

B. THE SATELLITE CARRIER CO MPULSO RY LICENSE

The cable compulsory license was enacted as part of the Copyright Act of 1976 and is indefinite.

In the mid-1980s, the home satellite dish industry grew significantly, and satellite carriers had the opportunity

to retransmit broadcast programming to home dish owners. In order to facilitate this business, Congress

passed the Satellite Home Viewer Act of 1988, which created the sate 8 llite carrier compulsory license found

in 17 U.S.C. § 119.

The satellite carrier compulsory license is similar in many respects to the cable license. The license

allows satellite carriers to retransmit television broadcast signals (but not radio) to their subscribers upon

semiannual submissions of statements of account and royalty fees to the Copyright Office. The calculation

of the royalty fees under the satellite carrier license is, however, significantly different from that of the cable

compulsory license. Rather than determine royalties based upon a complicated formula of gross receipts and

application of outdated FCC rules, royalties under section 119 are calculated on a flat, per subscriber, per

signal fee basis. Television signals are divided into two categories -- superstation signals (i.e. commercial

independent stations) and network signals (commercial network stations and noncommercial educational

stations) -- each with its own attendant royalty rates. Satellite carriers multiply the respective royalty rate
 Pub. L. No. 103-369 (1994). 9

 This procedure, known as the signal intensity measurement procedure, expired on December 31, 1996. 10

9

for each signal they carry by the number of subscribers who receive the signal. This calculation is done for

each of the six months of the accounting period, and the total fees yielded equals the semiannual royalty

payment.

Satellite carriers may use the satellite carrier compulsory license to retransmit superstation signals

t o subscribers located anywhere in the United States. The same is not the case, however, for the

retransmission of network signals. A satellite carrier may only make use of the satellite compulsory license

for the retransmission of network signals to "unserved households." The statute defines an unserved

household as one that cannot receive an over-the-air signal of Grade B intensity of a network station using

a conventional rooftop antenna and has not received the signal from a cable system within the previous 90

days. 17 U.S.C. § 119(d). Section 119 requires satellite carriers to provide the television networks with

subscriber lists to facilitate the determination by broadcasters as to whether subscribers receiving network

signals in fact reside in unserved households.

The satellite carrier compulsory license created by the Satellite Home Viewer Act of 1988 was

intended to expire at the end of 1994. Instead, in that year, Congress re-authorized the license for an

additional 5 years, and made some changes to the license. The two most significant changes made by the 9

Satellite Home Viewer Act of 1994 involved creation of a temporary mechanism designed to allow

broadcasters to target impermissible service of network signals, and adoption of a "fair market value" 10

standard for adjusting the royalty rates of the license.

The purpose of the transitional signal intensity measurement regime was to enable network

broadcasters to eliminate service of network signals to subscribers who did not reside in unserved households

without incurring the cost of bringing copyright infringement suits. For two years, 1995 and 1996, the statute

authorized network affiliate stations to issue written challenges to satellite carriers for any subscribers that
 See text at note 117. 11

10

they believed were not entitled to receive network carriage from the carrier. If the subscriber resided in the

Grade B contour of the challenging station (generally thought to be the station's over-the-air service area),

the satellite carrier, upon receiving the challenge, had the option of either turning off the subscriber's service

of that network, or conducting a measurement of the intensity of the signal arriving at the subscriber's rooftop

antenna. If that measurement indicated that the subscriber did receive a signal of Grade B intensity, then the

carrier would absorb the cost of the test and immediately turn off service of that network signal. If the test

revealed that the subscriber did not receive a signal of Grade B intensity, then service could continue and

the challenging broadcast station was responsible for reimbursing the satellite carrier for the cost of the

measurement. 17 U.S.C. § 119(a)(8).

The transitional signal measurement provisions of the Satellite Home Viewer Act of 1994 were not

satisfactory. While many challenges were issued, few if any tests were conducted. Principal reasons given

for the lack of testing were that the cost of a test exceeded the revenues received from the subscriber for

receipt of network signals, and the failure to reach agreement as to the parameters of an appropriate test.

Subscribers lost their network service without a determination as to whether or not they were unserved

households and without any means of determining if their service could be restored. Moreover, the

transitional signal measurement provisions did not solve the broadcasters' concern about avoiding copyright

infringement litigation. Recently, broadcasters filed several lawsuits against one satellite carrier alleging

violation of the unserved household provision of section 119.11

The second significant change made by the Satellite Home Viewer Act of 1994 involved a change

in the standard used to adjust the royalty rates for superstation and network signals. Under the Satellite

Home Viewer Act of 1988, an arbitration panel was directed to adjust the royalty rates in 1991 according

to a number of established statutory criteria. These criteria included considering the cost paid by cable

operators under the cable compulsory license for the retransmission of broadcast signals, as well as the fees
11

paid for retransmission of broadcast signals under any privately negotiated licenses. The 1994 Act replaced

these criteria by directing the arbitration panel to adjust the royalty rates to yield royalty fees that reflect the

fair market value of the programming contained on the signals. The arbitration proceeding applying this

standard is currently underway, and a final determination will be issued in the fall of this year.

Unlike the cable compulsory license, the satellite carrier compulsory license has a statutory sunset,

and is scheduled to expire at the end of 1999. Consideration of whether or not to extend the license and, if

so, under what conditions, is one of the focal points of this report.
 Private Use, Private Property and Public Policy: Home Recording and Reproduction of Protected Works, 12

David Ladd, Register of Copyrights, p. 44, presented at the VIII Congress of INTERGU, September, 1981.

 H.R. Rep. No. 1476, at 89. 13

 Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on H.R. 2223 Before the Subcomm. On Courts, Civil Liberties, and the 14

Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 976-977 (1975) (letter of Barbara

Ringer, Register of Copyrights).

12

II. SHO ULD THE CABLE AND SATELLITE CARRIER

CO MPULSO RY LICENSES CO NTINUE TO EXIST?

A. HISTO RY

Since its inception, copyright law has been designed to promote the production of creativity by

conferring to authors the exclusive right to exploit their works. Compulsory licensing is an exception to the

rule of exclusive ownership and, therefore, has been supported by the Copyright Office only when

"warranted by special circumstances."12

With respect to the cable and satellite carrier licenses, those special circumstances concern the

difficulties and costs of clearing all rights on a broadcast signal. In 1976, Congress found "that it would be

impractical and unduly burdensome to require every cable system to negotiate with every copyright owner

whose work was retransmitted by a cable system." Congress, therefore, created the cable compulsory 13

license for the secondary transmission of broadcast signals. For those same reasons, the Copyright Office

supported the creation of the cable compulsory license at that time.14

As early as 1981, however, the Copyright Office recommended to Congress that the cable

compulsory license be abolished,

The general principle of the copyright law is that copyright owners are

entitled to receive fair compensation for the public performance of their

works, especially in the case of performances for profit. Cable systems

p erfo rm copyrighted works for profit when they make secondary

transmissions of such works. Copyright owners will be more confidently

assured of rightful compensation if that compensation is determined by

contract and the market rather than by compulsory license.
 Copyright/Cable Television: Hearings on H.R. 1805, H.R. 2007, H.R. 2108, H.R. 3528, H.R. 3530, H.R. 3560, 15

H.R. 3940, H.R. 5870, and H.R. 5949 Before the Subcomm. On Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of

Justice, Pt. 1, 97th Cong., 1st and 2d Sess. 959-960 (1981) (statement of David Ladd, Register of Copyrights, U.S.

Copyright Office).

 Id. at 903. 16

 H.R. 3528, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), H.R. 1388, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); H.R. 3339, 99th Cong., 1st 17

Sess. (1985).

 Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied sub nom., National Association 18

of Broadcasters v. Quincy Cable TV, Inc., 476 U.S. 1169 (1986). But, see, TBS, Inc. v. FCC, 65 U.S.L.W. 4208 (1997),

where the Supreme Court affirmed the 1992 must-carry rules as constitutional.

 S. 2529, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988); H.R. 4293, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988); S. 177, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 19

(1989); H.R. 109, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).

13

In the last five years, the cable industry has progressed from an infant

industry to a vigorous, economically stable industry. Cable no longer needs

the protective support of the compulsory license.

A compulsory license mechanism is in derogation of the rights of authors

and copyright owners. It should be utilized only if compelling reasons

support its existence. Those reasons may have existed in 1976. They no

longer do.15

At the same time that the Copyright Office recommended the elimination of the cable compulsory

license and full copyright liability for distant signals, it recommended an exemption from copyright liability

for local signals and imported network signals where no local network signal was available.16

During the 1980s, several bills were introduced to eliminate the cable compulsory license for any

cable system serving more than 2,500 subscribers on the ground that larger cable systems had matured to the

point where they could negotiate with the copyright owners directly.17

After the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals found in 1985 that the FCC's cable must-carry rules, as 18

written and as justified, were unconstitutional, bills were introduced in the late 1980's that would have

eliminated the cable compulsory license, but would have continued the compulsory license for those systems

that agreed to carry all the television stations in their market.19
 Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., § 605(b) (1984). 20

 Satellite Home Viewer Copyright Act: Hearings on H.R. 2848 Before the Subcomm. On Courts, Civil Liberties 21

and the Administration of Justice on the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 174 (1988) (statement

of Ralph Oman, Register of Copyrights, Copyright Office).

 "As you know, the leaders in the motion picture industry . . . have been very concerned about competition to 22

the cable industry. The concentration that grows seemingly everyday in the hands of a few large MSOs is of concern

to us. . . . [T]here should be competition to the cable industry. Cable . . . enjoys the benefits of compulsory license. This

small competitor should enjoy the same benefit." Id. at 83. (statement of Timothy A. Boggs, MPAA).

 H.R. Rep. No. 887, Part 1, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1988). 23

14

1. The Introduction of Satellite Carrier Retransmissions.

While Congress was reviewing its approach to cable retransmission during the 1980s, satellite carrier

ret ran smissions created a competing industry. Although the industry began with the unauthorized

interception of broadcast signals, Congress amended Section 605 of the Communications Act in 1984 to

allow home dish owners to intercept broadcast signals under certain conditions. In so acting, Congress only 20

resolved the communications policy aspect. There still remained the question of copyright liability for

satellite retransmissions of broadcast signals.

In 1988, the Copyright Office supported the creation of the satellite carrier compulsory license

believing that a marketplace structure for the purchase of satellite retransmitted programming was not

immediately feasible, but the Office also supported an early sunset to the satellite carrier compulsory license,

favoring a marketplace approach for clearing copyrights in place of an indefinite or permanent compulsory

license. Copyright owners also supported the license's creation because they saw the satellite carrier 21

industry as a potentially valuable competitor to cable. 22

Congressional intent, as expressed in the House Judiciary Committee Report on the 1988 bill, stated,

"The bill rests on the assumption that Congress should impose a compulsory license only when the

marketplace cannot suffice." Similarly, the House Energy and Commerce Committee Report called the 23
 H.R. Rep. No. 887, Part 2, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1988). 24

 S. Rep. No. 407, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1994) [hereinafter S. Rep. No. 407]. 25

 Cable and Satellite Carrier Compulsory Licenses: Hearing on H.R. 759 and H.R. 1103 Before the Subcomm. 26

On Intellectual Property and Judicial Administration, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 18-19 (1993) (statement of Ralph Oman,

Register of Copyrights, Copyright Office).

15

satellite carrier license "a temporary, transitional statutory license to bridge the gap until the marketplace can

function effectively."24

In 1994, the satellite carrier license was extended for another 5 years on the basis that "a marketplace

solution for clearing copyrights in broadcast programming retransmitted by satellite carriers is still not

available."25

The Copyright Office supported the extension of section 119 for three reasons: (1) it would resolve

the litigation that was taking place at that time between the Copyright Office and satellite carriers concerning

whether satellite carriers would qualify for a section 111 license in the absence of a section 119 license; (2)

it would assure access to broadcast signals, and thus increase the ability of satellite carriers to attract

investment capital for the then new DBS services; and, as a result, (3) it would guarantee the satellite carrier's

position as a strong and significant competitor of cable.26

As to any extension of the satellite carrier license beyond 1999, the Senate Judiciary Committee said:

While the committee stresses the importance of a private marketplace

solution by the end of 1999, this is not necessarily the final extension of the

satellite carrier compulsory license. It would be neither equitable nor good

p o licy to subject the satellite industry, absent negotiated license

agreements, to full copyright liability in the year 2000 while satellite's

competitor, the larger, well-established cable industry, is allowed to enjoy

the benefits of its own compulsory license indefinitely. The limited

extension of section 119 permits Congress the opportunity to reconsider the

position and relationship of satellite retransmissions in the copyright world

5 years from now and decide whether compulsory licensing is still the

correct legislative solution. During its reconsideration the committee must
 S. Rep. No. 407, at 8. 27

 The National Cable Television Association is the principal cable television industry serving over 80% of the 28

national cable customers and 100 cable network programs. National Cable Television Association, comment 34, at 1

[hereinafter NCTA, comment 34]. 

16

not overlook the relative position of the cable industry in that same world

as well.27

The first question before the Office in this inquiry is whether the time has come when the cable

industry and the satellite carrier industries can, by resort to private marketplace mechanisms, overcome the

transactional problems that were the original justification for Congress' creation of the licenses. 

B. THE CO MMENTS

1. The Cable License.

Representatives of the cable industry uniformly testified that the cable license is still needed. The

National Cable Television Association (NCTA) asserts that the transactional problems for cable systems are,

if anything, greater today than in 1976. They cite the near tripling of cable systems (from 3,681 to almost 28

11,000), and the more than doubling of broadcast stations (from 706 to over 1,500) since 1976. They

describe that in the absence of a license, negotiations would be required to obtain clearances for all programs

on each station a system would want to carry, typically, nine local stations and three distant stations:

 Every cable system in the United States would be forced to anticipate the

programming that would be shown, identify the appropriate owner of the

copyrighted works, negotiate for the rights to retransmit those works, and

acquire the personnel and equipment to black out programming for which

rights could not be obtained. And unlike cable networks, which have rights

to authorize the nationwide carriage of their networks' programming,

broadcasters may not have rights to authorize the retransmission of the

works that make up their broadcast day.

NCTA, comment 34, at 6-7.
 The Small Business Association represents almost 300 small cable operators, most of whom serve fewer than 29

1,000 subscribers. Small Cable Business Association, reply comment 33, at 1 [hereinafter SCBA, reply comment 33

or comment 8].

 The Wireless Cable Association International, Inc. is the principal trade association representing the wireless 30

cable industry. Its membership includes most wireless cable operators in the United States, licensees of many of the

Multipoint Distribution Service stations and Instructional Television Fixed Service stations that lease transmission

capacity to programming and manufacturers of wireless cable transmission and reception equipment. Wireless Cable

Association International, Inc., reply comment 4, at 1 [hereinafter WCA, reply comment 4].

 T he Cable Telecommunications Association represents owners and operators of cable television systems 31

serving approximately eighty percent of the nation’s cable television subscribers. Cable Telecommunications

Association, comment 21, at 1 [hereinafter CATA, comment 21 or reply comment 23].

 Transcript, Copyright Office Hearing on Compulsory Licenses, 408 (May 7, 1997) (testimony of Stephen R. 32

(continued...)

17

The Small Cable Business Association (SCBA) describes the costs of clearing the rights as twofold. There is the cost of the time of the employee or employees of the system, and there is the cost of 29

outside assistance to negotiate the agreements. SCBA estimates that small cable operators would likely incur

at least $10,000 in outside counsel fees to clear the rights to an average of five broadcast signals per system.

That cost would represent anywhere between $10 and $200 per subscriber for the 75% of all cable systems

that have 1,000 or fewer subscribers in their system. SCBA, comment 9, at 3-5.

The SCBA also warns that small cable systems have difficulty negotiating equitable rates for

programming because of unequal bargaining power, and therefore, in a private marketplace they would end

up paying more for their programming than the large operators. Although the small operators have recently

formed a buying co-operative, the National Cable Television Co-operative (NCTC), the SCBA reports that

several major programmers have refused to deal with the NCTC. Id. at 6-7. The Wireless Cable Association

International, Inc. (WCA), representing MMDS systems, also claims its wireless cable operators lack any 30

market power to negotiate. WCA, reply comment 4, at 3.

The Cable Telecommunications Association (CATA) notes that even when a small cable system 31

is owned by a large MSO, it still needs the compulsory license, because, under FCC cable rate regulation,

a smaller cable system may not be cross subsidized by its parent organization.32
(...continued)

Effros, President, Cable Telecommunications Association)[hereinafter CATA, tr.].

 National Public Radio, Inc. is a non-profit membership organization representing 560 full-service public radio 33

stations and managing the Public Radio Satellite Interconnection System. National Public Radio, Inc., comment 36,

at 1 [hereinafter NPR, comment 36 or reply comment 14]. 

18

Certain copyright owners also support retention of the cable compulsory license because they fear

that their modest incomes from the cable license would be reduced severely by the transaction costs of

negotiating in the free marketplace. National Public Radio (NPR) states that it and its member stations 33

currently receive $200,000-$300,000 a year in section 111 royalties, but "this income would likely disappear

as a result of the increased cost of negotiating individual licenses and discontinued cable carriage of public

radio stations." NPR, comment 36, at 6-7.

2. O ther Reasons O ffered For Retaining the Cable Compulsory License.

While the transaction costs of clearing the rights to the works on broadcast signals was the major

reason cited by the commenters who urged that the cable compulsory license should continue to exist, they

supported retaining the license for the following other reasons.

a. Heavily regulated arena. Commenters expressed the view that resort to free market

negotiations for licenses to retransmit broadcast signals is not appropriate in a context where cable systems

are so heavily regulated in every other respect by the FCC. 

So lo n g as one of the players, for instance, a broadcaster, gets the

t ransmission medium from the Government for free while another

competitor has to pay franchise fees just to build their own transmission

medium, and the third competitor, the DBS industry now, has a split system

where some of them under Government mandate were allowed to have

spectrum for free and others have now had to pay for that spectrum, the

Government is intimately involved in every step of telecommunications

policy. . . . We are not free, for instance, in the cable industry not to carry

local broadcast signals. We're required to carry those signals. That's the

must-carry rule. It's not a free market. . . . If you got the government out of

all of the aspects of telecommunications, then we might all be free to

negotiate on an equal basis. CATA, tr., at 404-405. 

See also, NCTA, comment 34, at 7-8.
 Copyright Office Hearing on Compulsory Licenses, 32 (May 6, 1997)(testimony of Benjamin F.P. Ivins, 34

Associate General Counsel [for Intellectual Property and International Legal Affairs] National Association of

Broadcasters [hereinafter NAB, tr.].

 U.S. West, Inc. owns the third largest cable television distributor in the United States, Continental Cablevision. 35

It serves about five million domestic cable customers and holds a partnership interest in Time Warner Entertainment

as well as an array of video program and other production interests. US West, Inc., comment 4, at 1 [hereinafter US

West, comment 4 or reply comment 13].

 The National Association of Broadcasters is an incorporated association of radio and television stations and 36

broadcast networks, which serves and represents the broadcast industry. The National Association of Broadcasters,

comment 39, at 1 [hereinafter NAB, comment 39 or reply comment 30].

 The Association of Local Television Stations, Inc. is a non-profit association of broadcast television stations 37

unaffiliated with the ABC, CBS, or NBC television networks. The Association of Local Television Stations, Inc.,

comment 30, at 1 [hereinafter ALTV, comment 30 or reply comment 10].

19

b. Must-carry requirements. Commenters also note that so long as must-carry

obligations are imposed on cable systems, they cannot be required to carry all the local signals, and at the

same time, negotiate freely for local signals, because the copyright owners know, in the end, that the cable

systems are obliged to take the signal. "We can think of no comparably simple, efficient, and comprehensive

way for must-carry to work, absent the local compulsory license." NAB, tr., at 32. 34

c. Marketplace adjustment. Commenters observe that after 20 years, the marketplace

has fully adjusted to the cable compulsory license. It is a system that generally works for all concerned.

Program suppliers who sell to superstations such as WTBS know the programs will be distributed nationwide

and charge accordingly. Similarly, sports leagues make private arrangements to compensate for the incursion

of out-of-town sporting events into local markets. U.S. West, comment 4, at 7-8. 35

Mak in g a similar argument, The National Association of Broadcasters (NAB), states that 36

eliminating the cable license "would require substantial and costly modifications to existing marketplace

mechanisms." NAB, comment 39, at 5. The Association of Local Television Stations (ALTV), states that 37

"the investment of time and resources necessary to establish a new private licensing scheme would be

misplaced." ALTV, comment 30, at 9.
 Transcript, Copyright Office Hearing on Compulsory Licenses, 511 (May 6, 1997)(testimony of Raymond J. 38

Duffy, Senior Vice President, United Video Satellite Group, Inc. [hereinafter United Video, tr.].

 T ranscript, Copyright Office Hearing on Compulsory Licenses, 58 (May 6, 1997)(testimony of Decker 39

Anstrom, President, the National Cable Television Association [hereinafter NCTA, tr.].

 Transcript, Copyright Office Hearing on Compulsory Licenses, 146 (May 6, 1997)(testimony of Fritz Attaway, 40

Motion Picture Association of America, Inc. [hereinafter MPAA, tr.]

 Transcript, 41 Copyright Office Hearing on Compulsory Licenses, 629, 631 (May 6, 1997) (testimony of Ritchie

T. Thomas, Esq., representing the National Collegiate Athletic Association [hereinafter NCAA, tr.].

 Broadcast Music, Inc. is a music performing rights licensing organization which licenses the public performing 42

right in approximately three million musical works. Broadcast Music, Inc., comment 27, at 1 [hereinafter BMI,

comment 27 or reply comment 27].

 The Office of the Commissioner of Baseball represents the thirty clubs engaged in the sport of Major League 43

Baseball. The Office of the Commissioner of Baseball, comment 17, at 1 [hereinafter Baseball, comment 17 or reply

comment 20].

20

d. Adequate compensation. Users of the compulsory license assert that the compulsory

license system has served well to compensate copyright owners for the use of their works. United Video,38

tr., at 511. The National Cable Television Association observed that the cable industry has paid $2.3 billion

in 20 years for the retransmission of copyrighted works. Currently, the payments amount to about $170

million a year. ALTV states that the record is lacking in establishing that the copyright owners have 39

incurred any harm due to the compulsory license. ALTV, comment 30, at 7-8.

However, the copyright owners who testified in favor of eliminating the cable license assert they are

undercompensated by the current compulsory license. MPAA, ; NCAA, ; BMI, comment 27, at 12. "On 40 41 42

average, cable operators pay less than 12 cents [per subscriber per month per signal] — or less than one-third

of the market rate." Baseball, comment 17, at 14. 43

e. Small system subsidy. The current cable license permits small cable systems to pay

a lower fee for the retransmission of broadcast signals than the larger cable systems. The opposite would

occur in a free marketplace where the larger companies would get discounts but the smaller companies would

not. CATA, tr., at 423-424.
 Transcript, Copyright Office Hearing on Compulsory Licenses, 7 (May 7, 1997)(testimony of Matthew Polka, 44

Esq., Eric Breisach, Esq., representing Small Cable Business Association [hereinafter SCBA, tr.]. 

21

f. Public benefits. The Small Cable Business Association (SCBA) asserts that the 44

cable industry is merely a third party beneficiary of the compulsory license. The primary beneficiary is the

public which is able to enjoy the importation of distant signals made possible by the compulsory license.

SCBA, tr., at 477.

3. Reasons to Eliminate the Cable License.

On the other hand, most copyright owners took an entirely different view of the feasibility of

establishing a free market alternative to the cable and satellite compulsory licenses, and offered the following

reasons why the licenses should be abolished. 

a. Maturation of cable industry. They assert that the cable industry has matured since

1976 and is fully able to negotiate in the free marketplace. Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI) argues that the cable

license is no longer necessary because the cable industry has grown in the last twenty years to the point

where it can negotiate in the free marketplace with no lack of bargaining power. By the end of 1995, 62.1

million households subscribed to cable, and the cable industry's total revenues from all sources were $25.1

billion. This brought the cable industry to virtual equality with the broadcast industry which had revenues

of $27.9 billion in 1995. BMI, comment 27, at 6-7. In contexts other than the compulsory license, the cable

industry has successfully negotiated in the free marketplace for such things as the clearance of basic cable

p ro gram m ing services, broadcast retransmission consent, and the music rights in local origination

programming. Id. at 7-8. BMI believes that the cable industry could negotiate as well the clearance of

programs on broadcast signals.

However, the Wireless Cable Association International, Inc. (WCA) states that MMDS systems, just

recently recognized as cable systems for purposes of using the section 111 compulsory license, are in exactly

the same position today that the cable and satellite industries were in at the time those licenses were created.
 The Motion Picture Association of America, Inc. is an association that represents copyright owners who 45

syndicate movies, television series and specials to broadcast stations and cable networks.

 The American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers is the oldest and largest musical performing 46

rights society in the United States with more than 79,000 members comprised of composers, lyricists and publishers of

copyrighted musical compositions. The American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers, comment 6, at 2

(continued...)

22

WCA describes the wireless cable industry as "fledgling" and "nascent" and asserts that, without the

compulsory license, MMDS systems would find "it difficult . . . to enter the market and provide consumers

with a choice for video programming services . . . or compete with incumbent cable systems." WCA, reply

comment 4, at 3.

b. Programming vitality. Distant signals are no longer the vital source of programming

they once were. The Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) states that the importance of distant 45

sign als t o cable systems has diminished considerably since 1976. "There are well over a hundred

marketplace satellite-delivered cable and satellite services available to the public" as compared to an average

of just three distant signals per cable system, notes MPAA. MPAA, tr., at 46. Therefore, the importance of

the government guaranteeing to cable systems access to these signals at a government set price is no longer

a matter of "the public interest." Id.

c. Government intervention. Government intervention in the marketplace alters the

ch o ices consumers and businesses would make in an otherwise free market. MPAA objects to the

"government picking winners and losers." By granting the compulsory license to some delivery systems and

not others, or by setting a government price for distant signals but not cable channels, "you end up creating

advantages and disadvantages for these various industries in the marketplace," which results in unintended

market dislocations. MPAA, tr., at 56, 119.

d. Shifting of costs. The cable license avoids certain transaction costs, but creates other

transaction costs. The American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP) argues that the

current system unreasonably shifts much of the transaction costs and burdens onto the copyright owners.46
(...continued)

[hereinafter ASCAP, comment 6 or reply comment 11].

23

 While a cable system's only transaction cost, other than the royalty payment itself, is to fill out a government

form twice a year, the "copyright owners must negotiate among themselves about how to divide up the

royalties. If they are unable to agree, again, copyright owners must engage in costly, time consuming and

lengthy arbitrations, first among competing claimant groups to the same royalty pie and then, often, among

claimants within the same claimant group." ASCAP, comment 6, at 24. ASCAP finds that these additional

arbitrations reduce the amount of royalties ultimately paid to copyright owners, and greatly delay the time

when the royalty payments are finally paid to the copyright owners. Id. at 24-25.

e. In adequate compensation. Copyright owners assert they are inadequately

compensated by the current cable license. MPAA offers several analyses to show that the $170 million in

annual royalties the cable industry currently pays is less than what they would pay in a free market. While

the $170 million represents payment for an average of 10 local and distant signals, the cable industry pays

the following for a single channel: CNN - $247.4 million; ESPN - $485.2 million; TNT - $360 million; and

USA - $220 million. MPAA, reply comment 3, at 4. MPAA also endeavors to show that Washington area

cable systems pay in the range of $ .08 to $ .13 per subscriber, per signal, while the following per subscriber

fees obtain for cable channels: CNN - $0.31; ESPN - $ 0.63; USA - $ 0.29; Discovery - $0.14; and TNT -

$0.46. Id. at 5.

f. Small cable systems would be able to negotiate in a free market. ASCAP expresses

confidence that in a free market, there could be reasonable negotiation with the smaller cable systems.

"ASCAP negotiates with the radio industry which has 11,000 radio stations, many of whom are tiny radio

stations, daytimers, that have very little income, that are virtually automated. . . . We're able to negotiate with

them." ASCAP, tr., at 426-427.
 Transcript, Copyright Office Hearing on Compulsory Licenses, 610-611 (May 8, 1997)(testimony of Thomas 47

J. Ostertag, General Counsel, Office of the Commissioner of Baseball [hereinafter Baseball, tr. ].

 In the Matter of Compulsory Copyright License for Cable Retransmission, ¶¶ 12 and 189, 66 Rad. Reg. 2d 48

1259, 1262, 1295 (1989).

24

Major League Baseball (Baseball) also reports good success in concluding free market negotiations

with the cable and satellite carrier industries for specific sports programming, including a Sunday and

Wednesday night package of baseball games on ESPN that reaches 65 million cable and satellite subscribers;

a Monday and Thursday night package of games over the FX and Fox Liberty cable networks; and a package

called MLB Extra Innings for satellite subscribers. "All of these packages are the product of arms length 47

marketplace negotiations. All of these packages provide baseball with fair market compensation and other

marketplace rights, without unnecessary administrative costs. These packages demonstrate that compulsory

licensing is not necessary and that the marketplace can work if given a chance." Id. at 611.

4. Possible Free Market Mechanisms for Clearing Rights to a Broadcast Signal.

In any discussion of the possible elimination of the cable license, the question is what free market

mechanisms exist now, or could come into existence, that would work efficiently to replace the current

compulsory license. The following mechanisms have been suggested:

a. Require broadcast stations to acquire cable retransmission rights from the program

suppliers, and allow the cable system to negotiate with the broadcast station for the entire signal. This

mechanism was suggested by the FCC as the means to go to a free marketplace in its 1989 study of the cable

license.

Broadcast stations are likely to evolve into retransmission rights packagers,

with cable systems operating in a role analogous to "affiliates." Packages

of retransmission rights could encompass the entire programming day of

the broadcast stations, or only a part of it. This would depend on the range

of programming for which the station acquired retransmission rights. . . .

This process could work for nationally, regionally, or locally retransmitted

stations. In some cases, national superstations might actually evolve into

full copyright cable program channels.48
25

However, U.S. West observes that broadcasters have not shown any interest in this arrangement.

"Broadcasters have refused to change their program acquisition practices to place themselves in position to

clear their broadcast day." U.S. West, comment 4, at 5. U.S. West believes that until all broadcasters

assemble the rights to clear their broadcast days for cable retransmission, there is no private market

alternative to the compulsory license. Id. at 6.

b. Allow the major copyright owners to form collectives and bargain directly with

associations representing cable systems. ASCAP notes that copyright owner collectives have already

developed regarding distribution of cable royalties. Under the distribution proceedings that were conducted

by the Copyright Royalty Tribunal, and now by the Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panels, claimant groups

have coalesced to represent the works that are performed on broadcast signals. They are: the Program

Suppliers (movies, re-runs, and specials), the Joint Sports Claimants, the Public Television Claimants (PBS,

PTV stations, and producers for PBS), the Broadcast Claimants, the Devotional Claimants, the Canadian

Claimants, the Noncommercial Educational Radio Claimants (NPR and NPR-affiliated stations), and the

Music Claimants (ASCAP, BMI & SESAC).

Thus, in a free marketplace, cable systems and satellite carriers merely

would be expanding their negotiations with the same limited group of

co llective representatives with whom they now negotiate under the

strictures of the voluntary negotiation provisions of Section 111 and 119,

in rate adjustment proceedings every five years, in retransmission consent

and must-carry matters, and even in certain nonbroadcast rights contexts.

ASCAP, comment 6, at 23.

However, the Association of Local Television Stations is pessimistic about the feasibility of

collectives, calling them "antitrust time bombs" that would lead to "contention and litigation" over whether

t h e collectives undermine competition, and therefore the transaction costs would be "ongoing and

substantial." ALTV, comment 30, at 9. Similarly, NAB conjectures that if collectives are created similar

to those now existing in the music industry, to have antitrust oversight would be required in the form of rate
 AGICOA is the Association for the International Collective Management of Audiovisual Works (European 49

Community).

 Transcript, Copyright Office Hearing on Compulsory Licenses, 168 (May 6, 1997)(testimony of Ellen Agress, 50

General Counsel, American Sky Broadcasting [hereinafter ASkyB, tr.].

26

courts; that would be merely a "variation on a theme" from what currently exists, and there would be a

"whole lot of pain and suffering to get there for no particular benefit." NAB tr., at 104.

c. Guaranteed access. Guarantee program access but have copyright owners and cable

operators negotiate the level of payment, similar to AGICOA in Europe. MPAA supports this as a major 49

improvement to the current compulsory license, but cautions that the difference between the United States

and Europe is that in Europe, the many different languages act as a natural barrier to retransmission of distant

signals, so the amount of negotiation and clearance is far less. MPAA, tr., at 106, 114.

The Small Cable Business Association (SCBA) cautions that this is the system we have now with

the satellite carrier license, and it has not worked. They note that twice, in 1991 and in 1996, the statute

called for the owners and the users to negotiate the level of payment, but twice no agreement was reached,

and the parties had to resort to a government conducted arbitration. SCBA, tr., at 149.

Consequently, SCBA and NCTA oppose this solution because they take the view that both the access

and the price must be set by government to have a meaningful compulsory license. SCBA and NCTA tr., at

115-117.

d. Development of free market. Certain commenters urge that the statute need not make

any provision for free market mechanisms; they will spring up by themselves. This idea was expressed by

MPAA, "Get rid of the compulsory license and the marketplace will work quite nicely." MPAA, tr., at 105,

and by American Sky Broadcasting (ASkyB). When asked whether necessity would be the mother of 50

invention, the General Counsel for ASkyB said, "yes." ASkyB, tr., at 200.

But SBCA asserts that this would not be possible. 
27

Yes, those pieces might get back to the marketplace through other ways--

sports might be back through another process, the movies might go a

different route . . . but you'd no longer be offering what the consumer has

been receiving. You'd be offering a hodgepodge of things . . . basically, the

consumer's going to lose something that they're getting today.

SBCA, tr., at 141-142. 

e. Set certain date for elimination. Some commenters concurred that there is no need

to make provision for free market mechanism, advising that Congress make known the cable and satellite

licenses will be eliminated on a date certain, and set that period as one to be used for the development of a

free market mechanism. However, NCTA cautions about setting "arbitrary dates." NCTA, tr., at 143. NAB

was concerned that there would be so much change in the affected industries during the phase out period that

it would be very difficult to predict what a proper phase out period should be. NAB, tr., at 142-43.

5. Particular Problems Presented by Free Market Negotiation of Broadcast Signals.

In the absence of a compulsory license that allows use of all the works on a broadcast signal, many

believe there could be problems presented by the free market negotiation of broadcast signals. These

problems are identified as follows.

a. Advance negotiation. When a cable system retransmits a broadcast signal it cannot

know in advance every copyrighted work that will be on it, so how can it negotiate ahead of time? 

b. Clearance of all rights. Even when a cable system has negotiated with all the major

collectives, how can it be assured that it has cleared all rights? What if there were an individual copyright

owner who was not represented by any collective, and he or she decided to sue when his or her work was

retransmitted? How can a collective system for negotiation work, if it doesn't represent everyone?

ASCAP offers a solution comparable to a provision in the regulations that govern the section 118

noncommercial educational broadcast compulsory license. There, for any unknown copyright owners who

might later claim that his or her work was used without compensation, the noncommercial educational

broadcasters pay a fee into an escrow fund. If the owner claims compensation within 3 years, he or she is
 The National Collegiate Athletic Association is a voluntary association of 902 colleges and universities and 51

allied and affiliated conferences and institutions, whose members conduct numerous intercollegiate athletic events each

year. The National Collegiate Athletic Association, comment 26, at 1 [hereinafter NCAA, comment 26].

28

compensated from the fund. ASCAP said it would support such an accommodation to take care of those

copyright owners not represented by a collective. ASCAP, tr., at 458-459. 

c. Possibility of blackout. If the cable systems or the satellite carriers successfully

negotiated with most, but not all of the collectives, they could not retransmit the broadcast signal as is. They

would have to blackout the portions of the signals where they could not clear the rights, but subscribers have

consistently expressed dissatisfaction with blacked out signals. How could this situation be remedied?

The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) responds that the cable system or satellite 51

carrier could get substitute programming to fill the blacked out parts of the schedule. Because sections 111

and 119 would no longer apply, the cable system or satellite carrier would no longer be restricted from

altering the signal. NCAA, tr., at 671.
 DIRECTV, Inc., a subsidiary of Hughes Electronics Corporation, is a provider of DBS services. DIRECTV, 52

comment 14, at 1 [hereinafter DIRECTV, comment 14 or reply comment 26].

 Transcript, Copyright Office Hearing on Compulsory Licenses, 575 (May 8, 1997)(testimony of James B. 53

Ramo, Executive Vice President, DIRECTV [hereinafter DIRECTV, tr.].

 The National Rural Telecommunications Cooperative is a not-for-profit cooperative made up of nearly 800 54

rural electric and telephone utilities and affiliated organizations throughout the United States. The National Rural

T elecommunications Cooperative, comment 29, at 1 [hereinafter NRTC, comment 29 or reply comment 31].

 Transcript, Copyright Office Hearing on Compulsory Licenses, 577-578 (May 8, 1997)(testimony of B.R. 55

Phillips, III, CEO, National Rural Telecommunications Cooperative [hereinafter NRTC, tr.]. 

29

C. THE SATELLITE CARRIER CO MPULSO RY LICENSE

1. Reasons Supporting the Existence of the Satellite Carrier License.

While most of the reasons supporting the existence of the compulsory licenses were applicable to

both the cable and satellite carrier licenses, comments were filed by the satellite carriers that addressed their

particular concerns and their interest in extending the satellite carrier license.

DIRECTV notes that the satellite license "gives a distributor, particularly a start-up, but any 52

distributor, the ability to in effect do a deal in one place, have certainty with respect to what the programming

costs will be and then go about developing investing in the marketing of this package." In the absence of 53

a compulsory license, "the satellite carrier theoretically could be forced to negotiate with literally thousands

of copyright holders for rights to retransmit copyrighted programming." Id. at 3.

The comments describe that efforts at private negotiations to settle the satellite carrier rates have

failed in the past and are likely to always fail. The National Rural Telecommunications Cooperative

(NRTC) notes that "from our experience, it's just been very difficult to bring an entrenched party to the 54

table." NRTC, tr., at 577. NRTC also notes that certain copyright owners have said there should be no 55

negotiations until the satellite carriers and distributors "clean up their act," in terms of ending service to

served households, and NRTC avers that it has done its best. Id. at 588.
 Primestar Partners, L.P., an affiliate of General Electric, consists of several cable television multiple system 56

owners and provides DTH service to approximately 1.7 million subscribers located throughout the United States.

Primestar Partners, L.P., comment 19, at 1 [hereinafter Primestar, comment 19].

 United Video Satellite Group, Inc. is a satellite carrier program service provider which transmits independent 57

television stations and other programming, via satellite, to cable television and other local distributors, such as SMATV

and MMDS operators. United Video Satellite Group, Inc., UVTV and Superstar Satellite Entertainment, comment 31,

at 1 [hereinafter United Video, comment 31 or reply comment 12].

 Transcript, Copyright Office Hearing on Compulsory Licenses, 587, (May 8, 1997)(testimony of Raymond J. 58

Duffy, United Video Satellite Group [hereinafter United Video, tr.].

30

Primestar Partners believes that "Congress' hope that the marketplace would provide realistic, 56

feasible alternatives for obtaining rights will not be realized in the foreseeable future," and they recommend

that the satellite carrier license "must be viewed as a long-term solution to the clearance of rights for satellite

distant signal retransmission rather than simply a transitional mechanism." Primestar, comment 19, at 2.

United Video sees the issue as black-white; either there is a satellite carrier license or there will 57

be no retransmission of broadcast signals. "You take [section] 119 away, . . . superstations will disappear.

There's clearly an initiative by certain entities that want to see superstations go away. This is one of the

means to make it happen." United Video, tr., at 587. 58

The Satellite Broadcasting and Communications Association of America (SBCA) says the satellite

carrier license has worked as "a de facto central clearinghouse, thus obviating the need to negotiate thousands

of separate license agreements." SBCA, comment 9, at 6. The SBCA believes the copyright owners have

been "handsomely rewarded" for their creativity and investment. If the satellite license was unduly

inexpensive, there might have been a proliferation of retransmitted broadcast signals, but this "fear . . . has

proven to be unfounded." Id. at 7. Because the satellite carrier license works well, and private marketplace

mechanisms would be onerous, the SBCA urges Congress to recognize this and make the satellite carrier

license permanent. "The temporary nature of the satellite compulsory license has put the DTH (direct-tohome) industry at a competitive and political disadvantage. Unlike the other multichannel video program
 PrimeTime 24 is the nation’s largest and only independent satellite carrier of network television programming 59

to the direct-to-home (DTH) market. PrimeTime 24, comment 11, at 1 [hereinafter PrimeTime 24, comment 11 or reply

comment 15].

31

technologies, every few years the DTH industry must divert its focus and resources from building its business

to lobbying Congress." Id. at 13.

PrimeTime 24 argues that satellite carriers 59

p ro v ide vital competition to the dominant alternatives — the

network/affiliate [broadcast] system, and cable . . . [and] if compulsory

licensing for satellite companies is abandoned, we will stand at a

devastating competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis the cable companies. Such

an action would run contrary to the spirit behind the Telecommunications

Act of 1996 . . . wherein Congress intended to achieve lower prices for

consumers through more competition for the cable industry, not less.

PrimeTime 24, comment 11, at 12.

2. Reasons for Elimination of the Satellite Carrier License.

The commentators who want the cable license abolished also believe the satellite carrier license

should be abolished for the same reasons that were stated above.

However, one commentator, NAB, supports the continuation of the cable license, but opposes an

extension of the satellite carrier license. NAB believes that the satellite carrier industry has not lived up to

t h e co n ditions placed on the satellite carrier license by Congress, namely, to offer network signal

retransmissions only to those households that are unserved by a local network station, and therefore, would

not support the extension of the satellite carrier license until "the satellite carriers demonstrate their

commitment to complying with the conditions of that license." NAB, comment 39, at 6.

3. Reasons for Extending the Satellite Carrier License.

The satellite carrier compulsory license, created by Congress in 1988, and extended by Congress in

1994, is scheduled to expire on December 31, 1999. Having stated in Chapter II that the transactional

problems of clearing the retransmission rights to the programs on broadcast signals and the infeasibility at
32

the present time of moving to a new system justify the continued existence of the cable and satellite carrier

licenses, the question remains, should the satellite carrier license be extended, and if so, for how long?

Representatives of the satellite industry argue that the satellite carrier license should be made

permanent. SBCA states that its members operate under a competitive disadvantage to cable because the

cable industry has a license with no sunset provision: "Rather than spur the development of a marketplace

alternative to the compulsory license, the temporary nature of the satellite compulsory license has put the

DTH (direct-to-home) industry at a competitive and political disadvantage. . . . SBCA, comment 9, at 13.

This uncertainty makes it difficult for DTH providers, many of whom have made substantial start-up

investments in their operations, to develop any meaningful long range business plans." Id.

One of the reasons the Office supported the extension of the satellite carrier license in 1994 was

because the satellite carrier industry is an important competitor to cable. Competition in the delivery of

multichannel video is one of the major goals of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. That competition

should be made as fair as possible, and certainly, no law should have the unintended effect of unbalancing

that competition. 

D. DISCUSSIO N AND CO NCLUSIO N

As the above history has shown, the Copyright Office has traditionally opposed compulsory licenses

because they are a derogation of the author's right to control the use and distribution of his or her work. The

current cable and satellite carrier licenses are justified only because of the transactional difficulties of

clearing all the rights on a broadcast signal. Other countries have preferred to have the problem of clearing

the retransmission rights resolved by private negotiation between collectives representing the owner and user

industries, rather than by a government administered compulsory license. Private negotiation has the virtue

of recognizing the ownership rights of authors, leaving the decisions in the hands of those who are most

affected by them, and avoiding the rigidity of government licenses which require legislation or administrative

proceedings to alter or amend them each time market conditions change.
33

However, the comments show that the cable and satellite licenses have become an integral part of

the means of bringing video services to the public, that business arrangements and investments have been

m ade in reliance upon them, that some copyright owners such as NAB, PBS, and NPR favor their

continuation, and that, at this time, the parties advocating such elimination have not presented a clear path

toward eliminating the licenses. While the Office believes that licensing by private collectives is preferable,

the elimination of the licenses does not seem feasible at this time; and in fact, the Office believes that the

satellite carrier industry should have a compulsory license to retransmit broadcast signals as long as the cable

industry has one. When the time comes when compulsory licensing of the works on broadcast signals has

been superseded by market forces, the license should end for both industries together.

Nevertheless, the Office supports major revision for both licenses and believes the following

principles should apply: they should provide the author with full compensation for the use of his or her

works, they should be as simple as possible to administer, and they should treat every multichannel video

delivery system the same, except where the differences in the multichannel video delivery systems justify

different treatment, or where differences in the regulatory burdens placed on the multichannel video delivery

systems justify different treatment.
34

III. SHO ULD THE CABLE AND SATELLITE CARRIER LICENSES

BE HARMO NIZED?

If the cable and satellite licenses should continue to exist, and should last for the same length of time,

should they be harmonized; that is, should they be made into a single license contained in the same section

of the law, with, perhaps, differences spelled out where necessary?

This question was one of the few in the study that received a nearly unanimous response from the

commenters, owner and user industry alike. The commenters believed that the cable and satellite carrier

license should remain separate. Typical of the responses was NRTC's:

[C]able and satellite are different technologies, providing different services

to consumers. For instance, cable systems are terrestrially based and

deliver a mix of local and national programming in strictly local markets.

Satellite systems deliver programming on a national basis from satellites

whose footprints cover the entire continental United States. Satellite

systems deliver an expanded, different mix of programming than most

cable systems. Two separate copyright licenses are required.

NRTC, comment 29, at 9-10.

Similarly, CATA states: 

[T]he point is, of course, that satellite carriers and cable systems represent

different "voices," subject to vastly different regulatory and technical

constraints. When Section 119 was adopted, it was purposefully not made

identical to Section 111 out of recognition of these differences and in an

attempt to create a harmonious system of compulsory licensing. Forcing

those two different distribution services into a single licensing scheme will

produce, begging the Office's indulgence, nothing but a sour note.

CATA, reply comment 23, at 7.

NAB reminds the Office that, "Congress adopted the cable and satellite licenses only after

considerable stock-taking on their potential impact on users in varying categories of content providers. The

result was a delicate balancing of interests reflected by the differing terms applicable to each communications

technology and the differing regulatory and economic attributes of each." A unitary license would allow new

technologies to be added into the compulsory license regime without the opportunity to consider and deal

with technology-specific characteristics, and thus should be rejected. NAB, tr., at 33.
35

The Office concludes that merging section 111 and 119 into a single section would not lead to any

practical benefit in the public administration of the licenses, and could, as NAB warns, have unintended

adverse consequences. Therefore, the Office concurs with the majority of commenters that the two sections

should not be merged.

However, the Office does agree with the goal of removing differences between the licenses where

possible, so that the compulsory licenses should have the least possible impact on the competitive balance

between satellite carriers and cable systems, while, at the same time, retaining differences that are justified

by the regulatory and technological contexts of the two industries.
 In 1996, there were 6, 60 465 "small" Form 1 systems, 2,853 "medium" Form 2 systems, and 2,353 "large" Form

3 systems paying cable royalty fees to the Copyright Office.

 These anomalies were demonstrated in the comments of St. Croix Cable TV which paid $61,639 in copyright 61

royalties for the second semiannual accounting period of 1996, but the same system located in Miami or Puerto Rico

would have paid only $16,300. St. Croix, comment 1, at 1. 

36

IV. SHO ULD THE CABLE RATE STRUCTURE BE REFO RMED?

As the Office stated in its Notice of March 20, 1997, the cable royalty rates that were established in

1976 were based upon an FCC cable regulatory structure that has not been in existence for a number of years.

As a consequence, the calculation of a cable system's royalties must take into account an understanding of

such rules as specialty stations, significantly viewed, grandfathered permitted signals, and signals that would

have been permitted under the FCC's former waiver policies, many of which the FCC no longer administers.

In addition, the cable royalty system is a three-tiered system. The smallest systems, those grossing

$75,800 or less per half year pay just $28 per half year for an unlimited number of distant signals. The

medium-sized systems, those grossing more than $75,800 but less than $292,000 per half year, pay on a

sliding scale from $28 to $2190 for an unlimited number of distant signals. However, the larger systems,

those grossing $292,000 or above, pay a percentage of their gross receipts for each distant signal they import;

consequently, they pay the bulk of the royalties.60

These two factors--the crazy-quilt application of old FCC rules, and the progressively higher rates

for the larger systems--have resulted in many anomalies in royalty obligations. Cable systems that are

seemingly similarly situated nonetheless pay widely different sums to the Copyright Office because of how

much the cable system grossed, or how many signals they would have been permitted to carry under the FCC

rules that existed in the 1970s.61

In its Notice, the Office asked whether the cable royalty rate should be amended to remove reliance

on old FCC rules, and whether a flat, per subscriber, per signal charge, such as the one that currently applies

in the satellite carrier license, would be preferable to the current three-tiered, progressive rates.
37

A. REFO RM PRINCIPLES

1. The Comments.

In response to any consideration of royalty rate reform, the following are what some of the

commenters listed for the Office as their priorities:

NCTA supports rate reform that ultimately is "revenue-neutral,” -- that is, a reform that collects the

same amount of royalties overall from the cable systems, not an increase--but warns that "even a revenueneutral revision of the royalty rates could cause substantial increases in the fees currently paid by small cable

systems” and that "Congress recognized the special circumstances faced by small cable systems when it

adopted a flat rate approach for them that is not tied to the number of distant signals carried.” Ultimately,

NCTA believes it is up to the proponents of simplification "to demonstrate that any modification is

warranted” and would not upset "the delicate balance of interests reflected in the current law.” NCTA,

comment 34, at 11-13. NCTA is opposed to any payment for local signals, because "what the cable system

is doing is simply ensuring the reception of a signal for which they've [the copyright owners] already

received compensation. . . " NCTA, tr., at 135.

Similarly, CATA states that "the goals of any change in section 111 have to be revenue neutrality

and simplicity,” but CATA opposes a flat fee because, "the flat fee obliterates the carefully crafted three-tier

payment scheme of section 111. This scheme was enacted in recognition of the differing burdens and

obligations of smaller cable systems. Smaller systems are predominantly located in sparsely populated areas.

They were made to pay lower fees so as to encourage their growth and development in rendering service to

an underserved element of our population.” CATA, comment 21, at 5.

The SCBA opposes any rate reform, even if it is "revenue-neutral” overall, if it results in higher

royalties for the small cable systems. SCBA says it was Congress' intention to allow small cable systems to

import distant signals for the benefit of their subscribers. SCBA, tr., at 476-477. 
38

U.S. West opposes any move to a flat per subscriber fee because it sees that as leading inevitably to

an increase in fees. "Under no circumstances should the section 111 cable royalty be modified to introduce

the artificially high royalties of section 119, or the vague arbitration standards which spawned them.” U.S.

West, comment 4, at 14.

Similarly, DIRECTV takes issue with the satellite carrier rates which it describes as much higher

than the section 111 fees, and subject to adjustments based on a two-step process of negotiation and

arbitration which it considers costly and time-consuming. It asks that the satellite carrier fees be comparable

to the cable fees, be put into the statute, and be subject to adjustment by a "straightforward, statutorilyimposed formula.” DIRECTV, comment 14, at 9. SBCA and NRTC take a similar position, and state that

the primary value in rate reform is to have parity between the satellite carrier rates and the cable rates.

SBCA, comment 9, at 9-12; NRTC, comment 29, at 7-9.

Baseball wants cable rates determined by marketplace value. Such a determination, it predicts, would

increase the cable systems' payments. Baseball also supports putting the payments on a per subscriber/per

signal basis to avoid the current complex system which it says, "imposes unnecessary costs and burdens in

determining how much cable operators must pay for particular signals . . . [and] is . . . subject to manipulation

. . . through accounting methods . . . such as ‘tiering.’” Baseball, comment 17, at 19-20. Baseball also wants

copyright payments for the cable retransmission of network programs, the cable retransmission of local

signals, and the retransmission of signals to the cable systems by satellite carriers that are currently exempted

under the passive carrier exemption. Baseball, tr., at 612.

BMI also supports a per subscriber, per signal rate based on marketplace value, and also cites the

practice of "tiering” as a means some systems have used to reduce their payments. BMI, comment 27, at 8-9,

12.

The Canadian Claimants support a per subscriber/per signal rate structure for cable not only for its

simplicity of payment, but because they believe it will simplify the distribution proceedings, as well. "This
39

. . . would be a tremendous aid to the rational distribution of the royalties collected, since only claimant

groups with programming on a signal type would then be ‘eligible' to seek a share of that royalty fund.” CC,

comment 32, at 13. They also believe the rates should be the same for cable and satellite, and based on the

fair market value. Id. at 18. The Canadian Claimants oppose the three-tiered cable rate structure, because

they believe it has led to the same "tiering” practices as a method of rate avoidance mentioned by BMI and

Baseball in their comments. Id. at 21-22. 

MPAA supports a flat, per subscriber, per signal fee for cable based on marketplace value, but also

wants to retain a mechanism, like the current 3.75% rate that inhibits the importation of many distant signals.

MPAA would also vary from the flat, per subscriber, per signal fee concept to allow some consideration for

small systems. MPAA, comment 35, at 5-7, 12-14; MPAA, tr., at 130, 146. For local signals, MPAA takes

the position that when must-carry is invoked by the local broadcaster, the local broadcaster should pay the

copyright fee. MPAA, tr., at 133.

For NAB, any change in the cable rate structure should be done in "such a way that it does not

produce radical changes in carriage. . . To the extent the equalization of cable and satellite rates included any

change in the 3.75% rate that would result in the significant expansion of distant signals being retransmitted

into other television markets, such a change would threaten the ability of local stations to serve their local

communities, to the detriment of important federal policies.” NAB, comment 39, at 9. Generally, NAB

believes that "modification in pursuit of simplification would likely produce a complicated mess, as myriad

carriage situations were reassessed and restructured.” Id. at 12. But "if [Congress] were to go to a flat rate

sy st em , we would very much support a graduated system of increases [in rates] that would create

disincentives to carry an indiscriminate number of additional distant signals.” NAB, tr., at 150.

For ALTV, the cable rates should continue as they are, and especially in the way they act to limit

the importation of distant signals through the application of the 3.75% rate. In the absence of any limiting

factor in the rates, then the number of imported distant signals should be limited by law, and any signals
40

imported above the limit should be negotiated for in the free marketplace. ALTV, comment 30, at 13-14,

ALTV, tr., at 184. ALTV also believes cable retransmission of local signals should be free of copyright

obligation. ALTV, tr., at 179.

2. Summary of Reform Principles.

It is clear from a review of the comments that many principles, some of which are conflicting, are

being invoked. They may be summarized as follows:

(a) Administration.

(i) Some commenters believe that while the

current rates are administratively

co m p lex, things have settled out, the

cable systems know what they owe, and

no reform is necessary.

(ii) Other commenters believe that

sim plification of administration is a

reasonable goal but only if the cable

systems, as a whole, pay the same amount

after reform as they did before reform

("revenue neutral") and the smaller cable

systems still pay the same amount as they

are paying today.

(iii) Other commenters believe that

simplification of administration is very

important, but two features of the current

sy st em should be retained: a lower

payment by the smaller systems, and a

higher, step-up rate for the importation of

distant signals that exceeds a certain

quota.

(iv) Other commenters believe in complete

simplification of administration, similar

to that in place for the satellite carriers,

where the price of a signal is the same for

all systems regardless of how large the

system is, or whether it is the first

imported signal or some number above a

certain quota.

(b) Equity
41

(i) Equity means cable systems pay the same,

over all, after reform as they did before

reform.

(ii) Equity means cable systems pay the same

rates as satellite carriers pay.

(iii) Equity means all cable systems pay the

same rate, regardless of their gross

receipts.

(iv) Equity means that higher grossing cable

systems pay higher rates.

(v) Equity means cable systems pay the fair

market value for the signals.

(vi) Equity means cable systems pay less than

fair market value for the signals.

3. Copyright O ffice Recommendation.

As already shown, the cable and satellite carrier licenses were justified on the basis of the problems

of clearing the retransmission rights to the programs on broadcast signals, not on the basis that the cable and

satellite carrier industry required a subsidy. While the Office concurs that problems remain, there is no

justification for the amounts paid to authors to be less than the fair market value of their works.

Furthermore, beyond the undercompensation to authors, the administrative complexity of the current

cable rates is burdensome, and in many respects, unfair. Many hours are spent by cable systems just to

understand how much they owe and how to fill out the forms (which often requires legal advice). In addition,

there are the hours spent by the Office in rendering interpretations, and the hours spent by copyright owners

in inspecting and challenging filings. These extra efforts might be justified, if there were sound public policy

reasons to make the distinctions among cable systems that the current system makes. But, as St. Croix Cable

points out, the sum of all these distinctions results in an irrational and unjustified disparity in payments.
42

The Office is also concerned about how OVS systems or cable systems using OVS platforms would

calculate their rates under FCC rules that never applied to them. The Office sees simplification as an

important component of making OVS systems eligible for section 111.

Therefore, the Office believes that the cable rates should be as simple as possible and set at fair

market rates.

B. THE SMALL SYSTEM SUBSIDY

Complete simplification of the cable rates would mean requiring that each system pay the same rate

regardless of its size. There would be no small system subsidy. This is the major impediment to complete

simplification, and therefore, an in-depth discussion of the justification of the small system subsidy is

warranted.

Currently, the smaller systems pay less than the larger systems in two respects. First, they pay at a

lower rate. Second, once they make their payment, they have a right to import an unlimited number of distant

signals, whereas the larger systems must pay for every additional distant signal they import.

Congress explained in 1976 why it was affording the smaller cable systems lower rates and unlimited

importation of distant signals: 

Because many smaller cable systems carry a large number of distant signals,

especially those located in areas where over-the-air television service is sparse, and

because smaller cable systems may be less able to shoulder the burden of copyright

payments than larger systems, the Committee decided to give [smaller cable

systems] special consideration.

H.R. Rep. No. 1476, at 96-97.

1. The Comments.

NCTA argues that special consideration for small systems is still required, because there are more

small cable systems than ever: 

Of the 11,000 cable systems in the United States today, more than 6,200 systems

serve less than 1,000 customers each; roughly 2,000 systems serve between 1,000

and 3,500 customers. By comparison, there were fewer than 1,700 systems in 1976
43

serving fewer than 1,000 customers, and fewer than 1,200 systems that served

between 1,000 and 3,500 customers. Therefore, there are more small systems today

in rural and smaller markets than when the license was adopted in 1976.

NCTA, reply comments 16, at 5.

NCTA notes that these systems, located as they are in small and rural communities, remain

dependent on bringing in distant television stations. While conceding that the number of television stations

in the United States has increased since 1976, nonetheless, NCTA finds that "over 26 percent of cable

customers live in areas that do not receive a full complement of signals -- three network, one independent,

and one educational station -- over the air." NCTA, reply comments 16, at 5-6.

However, MPAA disputes both the need for small systems to get a rate subsidy, and the need for

small systems to be able to import an unlimited number of distant signals. MPAA does this by questioning

the connection between “small” and “rural”:

First, the notions that rural America is served primarily by small systems or that

small systems serve primarily rural America are not supported by the facts. [Filing]

data . . . show that more than 50% of Form 1 subscribers [the smallest cable

systems] are located in Top 100 markets, not in rural America. . . . Thus, most small

systems operate in large, not small, markets. Equally compelling, most small

markets are served by large systems: Form 3 systems [the largest cable systems]

serve over 12 million subscribers in smaller markets or outside of all markets as

compared to only about 1.1 million subscribers served by Form 1 systems in these

same markets. In short, the assumption that rural America is predominantly served

by small systems is unsupported. MPAA, reply comment 3, at 6-7.

MPAA also doubts the special need of rural systems to import distant signals. MPAA notes that in

1976, there were 701 commercial stations, but by 1996, there were 1,174 commercial stations, and that this

increase in the number of stations has been mostly felt in the rural areas. "[Filing] data . . . show an average

of 5.5 local stations are carried by systems in smaller markets and outside all markets. This suggests that

viewers in small markets already have a range of local network and independent stations available without

the need to import distant stations to fill out a complement of stations.” Id. at 7.

2. Copyright O ffice Discussion and Recommendations.
 For example, in the second semiannual accounting period of 1995, TCI, the nation’s largest MSO, filed 62

copyright fees on behalf of its 1,144 cable systems. 252 of them filed as “ small” Form 1 systems, paying just $28 per

half year. Three hundred and seventy-eight of them were “ medium” Form 2 systems paying on a sliding scale from $28

to $2190 per half year. Only 514, or just 45%, of them were “ large” Form 3 systems paying on the basis of each distant

signal they imported.

 In reviewing the small system subsidy, BMI reminds the Office that this is not a matter of small versus big, 63

but, in many cases, small versus small. "It's the songwriter’s property that is being used by these entities, the

consummate, the ultimate small businessman. Not gargantuan BMI. That's who we represent, the small businessman.

Much smaller than a cable operator that has 100 subscribers or 1,000 subscribers or 2,000 subscribers. We should be

looking at this end saying how do we protect the small, independent businessman, the small songwriter." BMI, tr., at

464.

44

The last twenty years have also seen the rise of the MSO, the multiple systems operator. While the

filer of the compulsory license fee might ostensibly be a “small” cable system, that same cable system may

be a part of an MSO, and as fully capable of paying the same royalty rate as the other systems in the same

MSO. CATA argues that being part of an MSO does not help a small operator because, due to FCC rate 62

regulation, an MSO may not raise basic rates in another, wealthier system to cross-subsidize the basic rate

of the smaller system. However, there are numerous other ways being part of an MSO helps the small

operator. For instance, the MSO can negotiate better rates for the cable networks the small system is

carrying.

It is ultimately a policy question for Congress whether small systems today continue to need a

subsidy. Industry conditions may very well have changed since 1976. Today, the small system may just 63

as well be an urban system that is part of a large MSO with plenty of available local channels than a stand

alone rural system needing to import distant signals. The Copyright Office recognizes, however, that if the

royalty rate for small systems were raised to true fair market value, the economic impact on the small systems

might be too great. Therefore, the Office recommends that small systems continue to be able to pay less than

the large systems.

Having said that, the Office also believes that the current rate that the smallest systems pay is far too

low. Systems grossing $75,800 or less per half year pay only $28 per half year for the copyright compulsory
 The Office estimates that it costs more to process the $28 payment than $28. Since the Office is entitled to 64

subtract its costs before distributing the royalties to the copyright owners, it is safe to conclude that none of the $28

reaches the copyright owner.

45

licenses, and this can only be described as a nominal payment. Efforts should be made to raise that minimal 64

payment to an amount that can be considered fair.

C. THE ARTIFICIAL FRAGMENTATIO N PRO BLEM

So long as there is a subsidy in the rates for the smaller cable systems, there will be an incentive for

cable systems to structure themselves to qualify as a small system.

This temptation toward artificial fragmentation is avoided under the current system by a provision

in Section 111(f) which states, “For the purposes of determining the royalty fee under subsection (d)(1), two

or more cable systems in contiguous communities under common ownership or control or operating from one

headend shall be considered as one system.” As a result, neighboring cable systems that are commonly

owned or controlled, or systems that operate from the same headend, may not claim to be separate cable

systems.

However, although this provision has worked well to avoid artificial fragmentation, it has had the

result of raising the royalty rates some cable systems pay when they merge. This happens because, if the two

systems have different distant signal offerings, then all the signals are being paid for based on the total

number of subscribers of the two systems, even if some of those signals are not reaching all the subscribers.

This has come to be called the “phantom” signal problem.

To solve the “phantom” signal problem, NCTA has recommended that the cable rates be based only

on those subscriber groups that actually receive the signal. NCTA, comment 34, at 8-11. While the Office

has previously stated that this solution could not be accomplished administratively because the Office lacked

the authority to alter the structure of the cable rates as they are established in Section 111, the purpose of this
 The provision for "subscriber groups" would not be necessary if Congress adopts a flat, per subscriber, per 65

signal, fee.

46

study is to recommend to Congress legislative changes, and the Office endorses this as an appropriate

legislative change.

The Office would also recommend another change. At present, cable systems operating from one

headend are considered as one system regardless of whether they are in contiguous communities or are under

common ownership of control. Changes in the cable industry, and the introduction of OVS, tend to make

this emphasis on the headend obsolete. Technological advances in headends make it feasible, as it never has

been before, to operate many systems from a single headend. Consequently, operation from the same

h eaden d is no longer the hallmark of integrated systems, much less an indicator that an artificial

fragmentation is occurring to avoid royalty payments. Furthermore, if one analogizes headends to OVS

platforms, the rule quickly becomes that all systems operating from the same OVS platform are considered

as one system; such a rule may have an onerous effect on the users of the OVS platform without getting at

true artificial fragmentation. The Office recommends that the better rule is that the systems under common

ownership or control should be considered as one system only when they are in contiguous communities or

use the same headend or OVS platform.

Therefore, the Office recommends that Section 111 be amended to read, 

For purposes of determining the royalty fee under subsection (d)(1), two or

more cable systems under common ownership or control that are either (a)

in contiguous communities, (b) operating from the same headend, or (c)

using the same open video system platform, shall be considered as one

system. Once two or more cable systems have been deemed a single larger

cable system, the calculation of the rates shall be based on those subscriber

gro up s who receive the secondary transmission as the Register of

Copyrights shall by regulation provide.65

Finally, the Independent Cable and Telecommunications Association (ICTA), the trade association

that represents satellite master antenna television (SMATV) systems asks for a change in the interpretation

of “contiguous communities” as it applies to SMATV systems. ICTA states: 
47

Co n t iguous communities are presently identified with reference to political

boundaries and can include incorporated as well as discrete unincorporated areas.

The threshold of contiguity has been developed solely with regard to franchised

cable operators . . . .While such an analysis may be logical as applied to franchised

cable operators, ICTA strongly believes that it is entirely unworkable in the

SMATV context . . .[SMATV] operators . . . enter into individual contracts to serve

discreet , independent buildings or groups of buildings — generally, multiple

dwelling units (MDU's). As a result, a [SMATV] operator may have one system

serving an MDU in the northern portion of a municipality and another system (with

its own separate head-end) serving an MDU in the southern part of an adjacent

unincorporated community . . . ICTA strongly believes that to treat these systems

as serving one large unitary area is contrary to the intended effect of the contiguous

community provision . . . 

ICTA, reply comment 7, at 2-3.

ICTA, therefore, seeks a provision that states that SMATV systems are to be treated as serving

contiguous communities “only when the MDU's which they serve are adjacent or the systems are served by

the same headend.” Id. at 6.

While the Office understands that the nature of SMATV operations is different from that of

traditionally franchised cable systems, the Office cannot recommend a different treatment for SMATV

systems. That would act against the Office's goal of having the same rule for all video delivery systems

wherever possible. However, if the Office's recommendation to allow all § 111 systems to calculate their

rates according to subscriber groups is accepted by Congress, the joining together of SMATV systems that

are in contiguous communities (even though miles apart as in the above quoted example) will have no greater

affect than defining them as a larger cable system rather than a smaller cable system, and, at most, the

affected SMATV systems will pay fair market value rates for their license instead of a subsidy rate.

F. THE PRO PO SED STEP-UP RATE

Another proposed departure from a simple rate is a step-up rate recommended for imported signals

that exceed a certain quota. The current step-up rate, the 3.75% rate, was instituted by the Copyright Royalty

Tribunal starting in 1983, and many copyright owners feel it has served the purpose of keeping a flood of

distant signals from being imported by the cable systems. The Office believes that may have been true for
48

the 1980's when distant signals were an important part of the cable system's offerings, but now in the late

1990's, when so many cable networks are seeking space on the cable systems, there is far less incentive for

the cable systems to fill up their channel capacity with distant signals. The Office believes that so long as

the marginal costs of each additional signal does not go down, that provides sufficient disincentive for the

cable system to import an excessive number of distant signals. There is no need for a step-up rate.

Last, the rates for the satellite carrier compulsory license were put on a fair market basis beginning

in 1994. In keeping with the Office's above-stated principle that differences between the licenses should be

eliminated where possible, especially to avoid tilting the competitive balance in one direction or another, the

Office concludes that cable rates should be set at fair market value, just like the current satellite carrier rates

currently are.
 Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert denied, 476 U.S. 1169 (1986). 66

49

V. HO W SHO ULD THE CABLE RATE STRUCTURE BE

REFO RMED?

Having concluded in the previous chapter that the cable rates should be made simple to administer

and set at fair market value, but with a subsidy rate for the smaller cable systems, the question becomes one

of how this new cable rate structure should look.

Three models have been considered by the Copyright Office: (1) a flat, per subscriber, per signal fee

similar to that paid by the satellite carriers; (2) a reform of the current gross receipts structure; and (3) a

tariffing model proposed by Baseball.

However, before discussing any of these three models, one preliminary issue must be addressed.

That is the issue of the method of deciding whether a signal is local or distant, because that determination

will have to be made under any of these models, or even if the current system is retained.

A. LO CAL VERSUS DISTANT SIGNALS

Currently, cable systems grossing $292,000 or more per half year pay on the basis of the number of

distant signals they import. No definition of a distant signal is found in section 111. However, local signals

are defined. Until the passage of the Satellite Home Viewer Act of 1994, the local service area of the

primary transmitter was defined solely as, “the area in which such station is entitled to insist upon its signal

being retransmitted by a cable system pursuant to the rules, regulations, and authorizations of the Federal

Communications Commission in effect on April 15, 1976. . .” 17 U.S.C. § 111(f). Therefore, a signal is a

local signal if the broadcast station had a right under the FCC must-carry rules in effect in 1976 to insist that

the cable system carry it. If it did not, the signal is, by definition, a distant signal. Although the must-carry

rules in effect in 1976 were declared unconstitutional in 1985, and new must-carry rules were passed by 66

Congress in 1992, one does not refer to the current must-carry rules to determine if a signal is local or distant

but to those must-carry rules in effect in 1976.
50

One of the features of those old must-carry rules was a concept called “significantly viewed,” which

gave a broadcast station a right to be carried by the cable system, even if it were outside of the cable system's

area if the broadcast station could show, by certain FCC criteria, that the signal was, nonetheless,

“significantly viewed” in the cable system's area. The FCC no longer administers “significantly viewed,”

for its determination of its current must-carry rules. Yet, cable systems today must still take this concept into

account when filing their royalty fees.

With the passage of the Satellite Home Viewer Act of 1994, the section 111(f) definition of the local

service area of the primary transmitter was changed. Cable systems are now given a choice. They can find

that a broadcast signal is local if it was entitled to must-carry under the FCC's 1976 rules, or if the cable

system is located in the broadcast station's “television market as defined in section 76.55(e) of title 47, Code

of Federal Regulations (as in effect on September 18, 1993), or any modifications to such television market

made, on or after September 18, 1993, pursuant to section 76.55(e) or 76.59 of title 47 of the Code of Federal

Regulations.” 17 U.S.C. § 111(f).

Section 76.55(e) of the FCC's rules shows the new system of defining a television market as one

called the Area of Dominant Influence, or ADI. If a cable system in the television station's ADI or could

have been required under the 1976 must-carry rules to carry the television station, then the cable system is

local to the television station, and the station's signal does not count as an imported distant signal.

The advantage of referencing the television station's ADI to make a local versus distant signal

determination is that these are the rules that are currently administered by the FCC, and a quick reference

to them could tell any newly started cable system, or any OVS system, whether it is located within the

station's ADI. Furthermore, such a method is designed to be flexible because it allows for modification of

the ADI at any time by the FCC.

The Office is, therefore, convinced that it is time to eliminate all references to the 1976 must-carry

rules, and move to the new ADI system of determining a television station's local market. To achieve parity
51

with the satellite carrier license, the Office also recommends that the local market of a network station be

considered the ADI of the network station, as is further discussed in Chapter IX.

One problem remains, however, with this recommendation. The ADI is for commercial stations.

It does not apply to noncommercial educational stations. Dropping reliance on the 1976 must-carry rules

would cause a problem for categorizing PBS stations. Rather than attempt artificially to apply ADI to

noncommercial educational stations, the Office recommends defining the local market of a noncommercial

educational station as an area encompassing 50 miles from the community of license of the station, including

any communities served in whole or in part by the 50 mile radius. The Office also recommends this 50 mile

radius rule for determining whether a noncommercial educational station is local or distant for satellite

carriers. See Chapter IX.

B. MO DELS FO R RATE REFO RM

The Office now proceeds to a discussion of the three possible reform models.

1. The Flat, Per Subscriber, Per Signal Fee.

Currently, satellite carriers pay under section 119 the following rates:

Sev en t een and one-half cents per subscriber, per month, for each

independent station not subject to syndicated exclusivity blackout demands;

Fourteen cents per subscriber, per month, for each independent station

subject to syndicated exclusivity blackout demands; and

Six cents per subscriber, per month, for each network or noncommercial

education television station.

These rates were established in 1992 by an arbitration panel applying seven statutory criteria, one

of which was “a fair return” to the copyright owner. Congress changed those criteria in 1994. Currently,

a Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel (CARP) is considering adjusting these rates again, endeavoring to

establish fees under the new criteria which, among other things, are to be fees that "most clearly represent

the fair market value” of the programs on the retransmitted signals.
 However, see Chapter XI for discussion of the value of network signals. 67

52

T h e virtue of the flat, per subscriber, per signal, rate structure is simplicity. There are no

interpretations that need to be made; no ambiguities that need to be resolved; no ongoing rulemakings that

need closure; no court cases pending. The Copyright Office's resources that are devoted to the processing

of satellite carrier license fees are a fraction of those devoted to the processing of cable license fees. Both

the users and the owners save expenses under this system.

The flat, per subscriber, per signal, rate structure also has the virtue of treating all satellite carriers

alike. No carrier pays more or less than any other carrier because of any accident of location, or previous

treatment by the FCC.

The flat, per subscriber, per signal, rate structure can be set according to whatever criteria Congress

deems best, and currently, for satellite carriers, that is the fair market value of the signals.

2. The Gross Receipts Rate Structure.

As described above, the current cable rates are determined with reference to the gross receipts of the

cable system. However, it is not gross receipts that makes the current structure so complex. Therefore, it

is possible to simplify the cable rate structure and retain the gross receipts concept. Assuming for the

purposes of example that the current rate for the first distant signal is retained, the simplest gross receipts

rate structure would look like this: "0.893 of 1 per centum of gross receipts for each distant signal

equivalent, but in no case less than 0.893 of 1 per centum of such gross receipts."

With such a rate structure, the cable system would pay 0.893% of its gross receipts if it carried no

distant signals. If it carried distant signals, the cable system would pay 0.893% of its gross receipts for each

distant signal equivalent. Since network and noncommercial educational stations count as just one-quarter

of a distant signal equivalent, the rate for retransmitting them would be one-quarter of 0.893%, or

0.22325%.67
53

If a subsidy for the smaller cable systems is considered desirable, again, using the current rates, a

gross receipts based rate structure could look like this:

(A) if the actual gross receipts paid by subscribers to a cable system for the

period covered by the statement for the basic service of providing

secondary transmission is less than $292,000, 0.893 of 1 per centum of

such gross receipts, regardless of the number of distant signal equivalents,

if any; or

(B) if the actual gross receipts paid by subscribers to a cable system for the

period covered by the statement for the basic service of providing

secondary transmission is $292,000 or more, 0.893 of 1 per centrum of such

gross receipts for each distant signal equivalent, but in no case less than

0.893 of 1 per centum of such gross receipts.

With this type of structure, the smaller cable systems would be paying the same rate as the larger

cable systems, but they would only pay for 1 DSE regardless of how many signals they imported, whereas

the larger cable systems would pay for each DSE.

This system has the virtue of retaining both the gross receipts structure the cable systems are familiar

with and the current policy allowing the smaller systems to import as many distant signals as they want

without an increase in their fees. It would also bring to an end the nominal payments made by the smallest

cable systems, but still keep their payments at a reasonable level. Most importantly, it would end the need

to consider any former FCC rule when calculating the rate.

The Copyright Office performed a study to see whether this flat, gross receipts model, using 0.893%

as the rate, and the current $292,000 as the dividing line between the smaller and larger systems would be

revenue-neutral with what cable systems are currently paying. Looking at the signal importation choices

made by cable systems in the second semiannual accounting period for 1995, and assuming only for the

purposes of the study that those same choices would be made after the reform of the cable rates, the Office

found that a 0.893% would garner somewhat higher royalties than in 1995, and that revenue-neutrality would

probably be reached with a rate of 0.875% instead of 0.893%.
 Baseball proposes that a tariff system replace the rate structure and distribution procedures for both the cable 68

and satellite carrier licenses.

54

The reason why the flat, gross receipts structure is in approximate balance with the current complex,

gross receipts structure is due to counterbalancing changes in the rates. While the rates for the smaller

systems, and the larger systems who pay a declining rate after the first DSE, increased, the rates for the

systems paying the 3.75% rates decreased.

However, the Office performed a static analysis, assuming that no cable system would change its

distant importation choices after cable rate reform. Yet, it is inevitable that as the rate structure changes, the

distant signal choices the cable systems make will change. Therefore, while a gross receipts model makes

the possibility of achieving revenue-neutrality appear to be feasible, in reality, it is not. Further, the Office

believes that the rates, whether based on gross receipts or a flat, per subscriber, per signal fee, should reflect

the fair market value of the signals. The Office assumes that this would require raising the rates from their

current levels.

3. Tariffing.

As proposed by Baseball, the tariffing system would work as follows: each year the claimant

groups that already represent copyright owners under Section 111 and 119 would file tariffs with the 68

Copyright Office. Each tariff would set forth the terms and rates with which the cable systems and satellite

carriers would comply to obtain the compulsory licenses. The claimant group could specify a flat fee, a per

subscriber/per signal rate, or any other rate calculation. The tariff could also set forth different royalty rates

based on factors such as the size of the retransmitter, type of retransmission service, and number of signals

carried. A claimant group would also be permitted to specify in each tariff the terms and conditions that the

cable operator or satellite carrier must meet to qualify for the compulsory license. Examples of such terms

and conditions include blackout provisions that protect exclusivity arrangements with local broadcasters and
55

a right to a financial audit to ensure proper royalty payments. The system or carrier would pay the royalty

set forth in the tariff directly to the entity filing the tariff. Baseball, reply comment 20, at 3-6.

After the tariffs are filed, cable systems and satellite carriers would have a limited period in which

they could petition for review of the tariff to determine whether it meets statutory objectives. The review

would be conducted by a CARP to determine whether the terms and rates at issue meet the objectives set

forth in the Copyright Act. To promote efficiency, all tariff challenges could be consolidated into a single

proceeding. In addition, voluntary agreements between each group of copyright owners and the compulsory

licensees could be negotiated and would govern retransmission of the applicable programming in lieu of the

tariff process. Id. at 4-7.

Baseball states that this tariffing system is similar to the Canadian system but is different in a few

significant respects. First, the rate approved by the Canadian Copyright Board for any particular collective

permits access to all programming on distant signals in that collective's category, not simply the programming

owned by the collective's members. Baseball, on the other hand, is proposing that its tariff only apply to

programming owned by the members of the claimant group. The second difference is that the Canadian

Copyright Board makes an assessment of the overall share of the royalties that each collective is entitled to

(similar to the Phase I allocations made in the United States by a CARP). Baseball is proposing not to adopt

this assessment. Third, the Canadian Copyright Board approves only royalty rates and administrative terms

and conditions, whereas Baseball's proposed tariff system would permit copyright owners to file substantive

terms and conditions for the compulsory license. Id. at 8-10.

Baseball predicts that, similar to the Canadian experience, the need for annual review of the tariffs

will wane as the types of rates and terms proposed by the owners and approved by the government settles

into a pattern, and Baseball believes that this pattern could eventually lead to private negotiations between

the owner and user industries, and provide a segue to installing a free market mechanism. Id. at 10-11.
56

b. Opposition to a tariffing system. The Canadian Claimants, in their comments, do

not believe that the Canadian system is inherently superior to the U.S. system, and therefore, they do not

support implementing a tariff system. In particular, they do not like the direct payment between user and

owner in a tariff system. The Canadian Claimants remind the Office that there are 13,000 cable systems in

the United States and that each system remitting checks to the claimant groups would work a special hardship

on the smaller claimant groups to handle. They prefer retaining the Copyright Office or a private party to

act as the clearinghouse. CC, reply comment 25, at 8. Further, they would not support a system, such as the

one that exists in Canada, where the government sets the overall rate paid by the cable systems and makes

the overall allocation among claimant groups, especially if such allocation is done with reference to program

ratings. Id. at 6-8. They prefer, instead, a flat, per subscriber, per signal rate.

C. DISCUSSIO N

The Copyright Office does not recommend the tariffing system proposed by Baseball as a useful

model for cable rate reform. The tariffing procedure requires yearly proceedings before a government

agency, is speculative in that it asks the agency to approve the rates for the prospective use of works, the

identity and quantity of which is uncertain, and is likely to be appealed and tied up in court review and

possible remands. Baseball seeks such a system because it would give Baseball the ability to set terms that

may not exist in the statute, but Baseball has not established the need for additional terms, or stated how it

is disadvantaged now by the lack of those terms. Foremost, the Office does not see this as a move toward

administrative simplicity, but replacing one complex system with another.

Either the gross receipts model or the flat, per subscriber, per signal model would work and would

achieve simplicity, certainty, equity, and efficiency. However, the Office recommends the flat, per

subscriber, per signal rate as the better model for the following reasons:

1. Avoidance of Tiering. 
57

As mentioned above, copyright owners have all cited the practice of tiering as a method of rate

avoidance they would like to see end. This is how tiering works. The Copyright Office has stated that the

gross receipts from each tier offering broadcast signals must be added together when cable systems calculate

their rate payment. However, if a tier offers no broadcast signals, the revenues from that tier do not become

part of the calculation of gross receipts.

As a result, suppose Cable System A is currently offering 35 channels at $27 a month as part of its

basic tier, some of which are broadcast signals. All the gross receipts from the basic tier are counted as part

of the calculation of the royalties. Now suppose that Cable System A wants to lower that gross receipts

amount. What it does is offer, for example, 18 channels, as Basic Limited for $18, with all the broadcast

signals on Basic Limited. Then it offers Basic Plus which has the rest of the 35 channels that were originally

offered for another $9. While the great majority of subscribers will continue to pay the $27 as before and

receive the same channels as before, they are now subscribing to two tiers instead of one, with all the

broadcast signals on the lower tier. This allows the cable system to report only the $18 per month in gross

receipts when it calculates the rates.

So long as the cable rates are based on gross receipts, tiering remains an attractive and legal way to

reduce copyright liability. However, the Office does not believe the compensation to the copyright owners

should change based solely on how the cable system markets its channel lineup to the subscriber. A change

to a flat, per subscriber, per signal rate would end the option of tiering as a means to reduce copyright

payments.
58

2. Subscriber Groups. 

As discussed in Chapter IV, section 111(f) requires that cable systems in contiguous communities

under common ownership or control or operating from the same headend be considered as one cable system.

This is to avoid the temptation of cable systems to artificially fragment to take advantage of the lower rates

for small cable systems. The Office recommended a change in section 111(f), where section 111(f) works

to combine systems that provide different distant signal complements to different subscriber groups. The

proposed amendment would allow those systems to calculate their royalties based on the subscriber groups

that actually receive the signals rather than on all the subscribers in the combined systems.

Reporting subscriber groups to the Copyright Office is an additional, but necessary, step in the

calculation of rates so long as the rates are based on gross receipts. However, if the rates were based on a

flat, per subscriber, per signal rate, the concept of subscriber groups would already be incorporated into the

per subscriber rate. There would be no need to make a special provision for their creation in section 111(f),

or on the form the cable systems file.

3. Direct Comparison to Satellite Carriers.

The satellite carrier rate is a flat, per subscriber, per signal rate. If the goal is to have comparable

rates between the cable and satellite carrier industry, a flat, per subscriber, per signal rate for cable systems

would make that comparison possible. On the other hand, a comparison of the gross receipts rates that cable

pays with the flat, per subscriber, per signal rates that satellite carriers pay is very problematic, and can only

yield general conclusions.

4. Changing Signal Lineups. 

The current rule is that if a cable system imports a distant signal for even one day in any given

semiannual accounting period, then it must pay for that signal as if it were carried for the entire six month

period. As a result, cable systems are careful to add distant signals only on January 1 or July 1 of a year.
 Such a policy follows the current law concerning CARP rates, "The pendency of an appeal under this paragraph 69

(continued...)

59

To do so at any other time of the year would mean that the cable system would be paying for a period of time

when it did not receive the distant signal.

On the other hand, satellite carriers can change their signals every month because they pay on the

basis of per subscriber, per signal, per month. If the cable systems paid rates that were per subscriber, per

signal, per month, they, too, could make changes by the month rather than by the half year. To afford cable

systems that amount of flexibility in a gross receipts model would be more difficult, because the gross

receipts are calculated semiannually.

D. TRANSITIO N TO NEW RATE STRUCTURE

The Copyright Office strongly recommends that Congress adopt the flat, per subscriber, per signal,

per month model as the basis for reform. The Office does not recommend any specific rates. Rather, the

Office believes that the rates should reflect the true fair market value of those signals. To determine the

rates, a full evidentiary record must be developed.

Therefore, the Office recommends that within six months of passage of the reform bill, a CARP

should be convened to take evidence on what the flat, per subscriber, per signal rates should be based on the

following criteria:

(a) the fair market value of the rates;

(b) t h e rates paid by satellite carriers, and whether any

disparity in the rates paid by cable systems and satellite

carriers is justified in terms of the regulatory,

technological, and economic differences between the two

industries;

(c) the economic impact on small cable systems.

While a CARP is deciding the new rates, the old rates would continue. At the time that the Librarian

of Congress adopts the CARP's rates, those rates would take effect, notwithstanding any pending appeal.69
(...continued)

shall not relieve persons obligated to make royalty payments under section 111 . . . to deposit the statement of account

and royalty fees specified in those sections." 17 U.S.C. § 802(g).

60

Although the time limit on current CARP proceedings is six months, the Office recommends that Congress

allow this particular CARP a longer period to make its determination, if necessary.

Such proceedings should bring the rates to fair market value, narrow the gap between the rates paid

by cable systems and satellite carriers to such amounts as can be justified as based on different regulatory,

technological or economic contexts, and determine how much the subsidy for the smaller cable systems

should be.

After a CARP has made its determination concerning cable rates, the Office recommends that all

future rate adjustment proceedings be combined cable-satellite rate adjustment proceedings conducted every

five years. This will allow the same CARP to compare the cable and satellite carrier industries at the same

time.

It is hoped that by bringing both the cable and satellite carrier rates to full fair market value, the next

step toward elimination of the compulsory license will be a small one. 
 T elecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, (hereinafter referred to as the 70

"Telecommunications Act").

 See First Report & Order in Docket No. 87-266, 56 Fed. Reg. 65,464 (1991). 71

 Id. at § 302(b)(1). 72

 Id. at § 302(b)(3). 73

61

VI. SHO ULD THE CABLE CO MPULSO RY LICENSE APPLY TO

O PEN VIDEO SYSTEM O PERATIO NS?

A. THE TELECO MMUNICATIO NS ACT O F 1996

Before the passage of the Telecommunications, Act of 1996, telephone companies had been 70

p ro h ibited from entering the cable television business within their own service areas. The Federal

Communications Commission did, however, consider the possibility of authorizing telephone companies to

lease channel capacity over their phone lines to third parties who would provide video service to phone

company subscribers. The system was known as video dialtone, and the FCC issued experimental licenses 71

to a handful of video dialtone operators, several of whom had already begun service to subscribers at the time

t h e Telecommunications Act was passed. These operators provided original and source licensed

programming, as well as retransmission of broadcast signals.

When Congress enacted the Telecommunications Act, it repealed the telephone-cable crossownership restrictions embodied in prior telecommunications law. This enabled telephone companies to

p ro v ide v ideo programming directly to subscribers in their telephone service areas. The 72

Telecommunications Act also repealed the FCC's video dialtone rules and policies (without actually requiring

the termination of any video dialtone system that the FCC had already approved) since they were no longer

necessary in light of the more expansive business opportunities afforded the telephone companies under the

new law. Section 651 of the Telecommunications Act lists the following options for telephone companies 73

(as "common carriers") entering the video programming marketplace: (1) provide video programming to
 Id. at § 651(a)(1). 74

 Id. at § 651(a)(2). 75

 Id. at § 651(a)(3). 76

 Id. at § 651(a)(3)-(4). 77

 Id. at § 653(a)(1). 78

 Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in CS Docket No. 96-46 (adopted & released March 79

11, 1996) 61 Fed.Reg. 10,496 (1996) at ¶ 4.

 Id., at 10,500 n. 3, ¶ 2 (quoting Telecommunications Act of 1996 Conference Report, S. Rep. No. 230 at 113). 80

104th Cong., 2d Sess. 131 (1996).

62

subscribers through radio communication under Title III of the Communications Act; (2) provide 74

transmission of video programming on a common carrier basis under Title II of the Communications Act;75

(3) provide video programming as a cable system under Title VI of the Communications Act; or (4) provide 76

video programming by means of an "open video system" under new section 653 of the Communications

Act. Congress also determined that, to the extent permitted by the FCC's regulations, a cable operator or 77

any other person may provide video programming through an open video system.78

The FCC characterizes section 653's open video system option as "an entirely new framework for

entering the video marketplace." In creating a regulatory structure around the Telecommunications Act's 79

open video system provisions, the FCC attempted to incorporate the Act's general goal of "accelerat[ing]

rapidly private sector deployment of advanced telecommunications and information technologies and

services to all Americans by opening all telecommunications markets to competition." More simply put, 80

in creating the new "framework" for entering the video marketplace -- "open video systems" -- Congress and

the FCC strove to promote competition, to encourage investment in new technologies, and to maximize a

consumer's choice of services. To achieve these goals, the law offers telephone companies and, perhaps,

others who choose to enter the field, broad flexibility in determining how to enter the video marketplace.
 Some of the Title VI provisions that do not apply to open video systems under subsection 653(c) are: "leased 81

access" obligations under section 612; franchise requirements and fees under sections 621 and 622 (though an open

video system operator will be subject to a gross revenue fee at a rate not to exceed the franchise fee paid by the local

cable operator under subsection 653(c)(2)(B)); rate regulation under section 623; and consumer protection and customer

service requirements under section 632. Id. at ¶ 6.

63

Generally, the Telecommunications Act states that an open video system operator: (1) is prohibited

from discriminating among video programmers regarding carriage on their systems or among subscribers

regarding information the operations provide for the purpose of selecting programming; (2) shall establish

rates, terms, and conditions of carriage that are just and reasonable; (3) is prohibited from selecting the video

programming (or acting as a programmer itself) on more than one-third of its activated channels if carriage

demand exceeds capacity; (4) shall abide by sports exclusivity, network nonduplication and syndicated

exclusivity regulations established by the FCC for open video systems; and (5) shall abide by any must-carry

rules, and public, educational and governmental (PEG) obligations, and Title III retransmission consent

obligations that the FCC establishes for open video systems. The Act also permits the open video system

operator to use channel sharing arrangements.

 The structure and appearance of open video systems remain largely unresolved at this time. Private

industry is still very much in the planning stage, even though the FCC has its open video system rules in

place, and telephone companies and other entities interested in building open video systems enjoy reduced

regulatory burdens that should maximize their flexibility and reduce the necessity for government oversight

of their operations. It would appear likely that one reason that open video systems have not developed a 81

more apparent structure for doing business is the uncertainty the industry faces about how to clear the

copyrights in the programming that the open video systems will be retransmitting over the telephone lines.

In the Telecommunications Act, Congress gave little guidance as to an open video system's status

under the copyright law. As such, an open video system would arguably be subject to full copyright liability

for the public performance of the many copyrighted works embodied in the broadcast signals being

retransmitted by the system. This, of course, would not be the case if the open video system were eligible
 The Copyright Office noted in its Notice of Inquiry regarding open video systems (Docket No. 96-2) that 82

during the legislative process of the Telecommunications Act, proposals were considered to address specifically

telephone company eligibility for section 111 and such amendments were not included in the Telecommunications Act.

61 Fed. Reg. 20,197-20,199 (1996) at n.6.

 Id. 83

64

for, and satisfied therequirements of, the Copyright Act's section 111 cable compulsory license. Rather than

answering the question whether open video systems are eligible for a section 111 compulsory license, the

Telecommunications Act provides in section 653(c)(4) that "[n]othing in this Act precludes a video

programming provider making use of an open video system from being treated as an operator of a cable

system for purposes of section 111 of title 17, United States Code." 

Some commenters in this study have argued that this provision is a congressional affirmation that

open video systems do indeed qualify for a section 111 license. The Copyright Office, however, believes

that the language merely clears the way for determination of the compulsory license eligibility issue in

another forum (i.e. administrative or judicial) or at another time by Congress.82

B. PRIOR COPYRIGHT O FFICE CO NSIDERATIO N REGARDING THE STATUS O F O PEN

VIDEO SYSTEMS

For the second accounting period of 1995, the Copyright Office received cable compulsory license

statements of account and royalty filings from three systems identifying themselves as video dialtone

operators under the rules of the FCC (regulatory precursors to open video systems). The filing parties

appeared to be independent program providers leasing access on an open video system created by telephone

companies. Faced with these first claims of eligibility under section 111 by open video systems, and

ex p ect in g additional filings by open video system operators in light of the recent passage of the

Telecommunications Act, the Copyright Office opened a Notice of Inquiry to address the eligibility of open

video systems for a cable compulsory license under section 111 of the Copyright Act.83
 Termination of proceeding in Docket No. 96-2A, 62 Fed.Reg. 25,212 (1997). Nothing in this discussion is 84

intended to indicate the Office's disposition of the issues of OVS' eligibility for a compulsory license as a section 111

cable system should Congress decline to act on the Office's legislative recommendations.

 ASkyB, the DBS carrier that intends to offer subscribers the retransmission by satellite of local broadcast 85

stations, would support the elimination of both section 111 and section 119 compulsory licenses. ASkyB, comment 33,

at 2.

65

While the Copyright Office was considering the commenters' arguments as to whether open video

systems are eligible for a compulsory license under section 111 of the Copyright Act, the Office received the

request from Senator Hatch and the Senate Committee on the Judiciary that prompted this study. Soon

thereafter, the Office terminated the Notice of Inquiry regarding open video systems so that it could devote

its full energies to addressing the issues raised in the Notice in this study.84

C. SUMMARY O F CO MMENTS AND TESTIMO NY

1. The Eligibility Issue.

The issue posed in this study, whether open video systems should be eligible for some variety of

compulsory licensing under the Copyright Act, differs from the issue discussed in the Copyright Office's

Notice of Inquiry, whether open video systems are eligible for compulsory licensing under the current section

111, in that the scope of the study can go beyond the words and meaning of section 111 as it now exists. The

study, therefore, addresses whether open video systems should be entitled to compulsory licensing under the

Copyright Act at all and, if so, what statutory provisions would best provide compulsory licensing for the

retransmission of broadcast signals by open video systems considering the legal, technological, and business

realities of the telecommunications world today.

In the context of this study, copyright owners, with the exception of PBS and the Canadian

Claimants, are adamantly opposed to the application of any compulsory licensing provisions to the

retransmission activities of open video systems. Starting with the proposition that the time has come for all

compulsory licensing for the retransmission of broadcast signals to cease, the copyright owners argue that 85
 The NBA is a not-for-profit partnership of 27 clubs engaged in the sport of professional basketball. The NHL 86

is a joint venture organized as an unincorporated association, not-for-profit, of 26 clubs engaged in the sport of

professional hockey.

 However, another commenter has noted that where a compulsory licensing scheme exists for other industries, 87

an industry left without such a license may be left with no opportunities for licensing at all. In comments submitted in

the Copyright Office's Notice of Inquiry regarding open video systems, the Federal Trade Commission noted that were

open video systems required to negotiate for retransmission programming in the free market, "a market for brokerage

service might arise to negotiate universal licenses with programmers ... [h]owever, a brokerage service market may not

arise, since stand-alone demand for broadcast programming by OVS's may not be sufficient to support the development

of efficient, competitive programming brokers." Comments of the Staff of the Federal Trade Commission, reply

comment 3, in Copyright Office Docket No. 96-2, at 5, n.10.

66

giving a compulsory license to open video systems (or other new retransmission services) would require

copyright owners to subsidize the newcomers. NBA/NHL, comment 22, at 2. They further contend that

Congress should afford the marketplace an opportunity to develop licensing mechanisms for open video

systems and similar new retransmission technologies. Baseball, comment 17, at 11; NBA/NHL, comment 86

22, at 2; NCAA, comment 26, at 2; ASCAP, comment 6, at 28; MPAA, comment 35, at 11. ASCAP argues

that "it is a given that inclusion of new technologies in current compulsory licensing schemes or creation of

new ones will discourage private negotiation and inhibit the development of marketplace solutions."

ASCAP, comment 6, at 23. 87

The copyright owners are particularly insistent that the rationale for the creation of the section 111

and section 119 licenses, which was to assist the incipient cable and satellite industries whose existence was

threatened by a lack of access to programming and financial resources, simply does not exist today,

especially with respect to the open video system industry. They contend that "the nature of [the open video

system business] requires that all of the entrants into this field have significant resources for start-up costs

and program acquisition." Id. at 28. There is an underlying view expressed by these commenters that "the

telephone companies" are wealthy, powerful entities that do not need the benefits of a compulsory license

to make a success of their ventures into the business of retransmitting broadcast signals over open video

system platforms. NBA/NHL, comment 22, at 2. These commenters do not address the issue of how an open
 See ASCAP, comment 6, at 8 n.5 (citing FCC, Third Annual Report In the Matter of Annual Assessment of 88

the Status of Competition In the Market for the Delivery of Video Programming, 1997 WL 2451, ¶ 71.)

67

video system would effectively compete in the "free market" with similarly situated cable systems operating

under the section 111 license.

ASCAP contends that new compulsory licensing schemes would place additional burdens and costs

on copyright owners to participate in additional ratemaking and distribution proceedings, and would place

added administrative and operational burdens on the Copyright Office. ASCAP, comment 6, at 28.

However, ASCAP does not specify how this would be the case if section 111 were amended to encompass

open video systems in one overall license, since the only additional burden on the copyright owners and the

Office would be in tracking additional filings and royalties added to the same basic pool.

The NCAA also argues that extending the cable license in any way would "further break down

regional sports broadcast arrangements" as discussed in its arguments in favor of the elimination of all

compulsory licenses for the retransmission of broadcast signals. NCAA, comment 26, at 2.

Finally, the copyright owners stress that the nature of the open video system business is still

undefined and undeveloped, and it would be unwise at this time to create for the benefit of the industry a

compulsory licensing scheme which might not be workable or practical. MPAA, comment 35, at 11;

ASCAP, comment 6, at 28; BMI, comment 27, at 14. ASCAP notes that today only one open video system,

Bell Atlantic's system in Dover Township, New Jersey, is fully operational. ASCAP, comment 6, at 29.88

ASCAP suggests that the telephone companies themselves have put a brake on their plans for rapid expansion

of the open video system business because they haven't decided how to develop the industry. Id.

In the context of the Copyright Office Notice of Inquiry, copyright owners argue more specifically

that section 111 cannot be read to permit open video systems to qualify as cable systems eligible for a

compulsory license, and that only Congress, by specifically amending the copyright law, could make open
 See, e.g., comments in Copyright Office Docket No. 96-2: Joint Sports, reply comment 6, at 4-5; ASCAP, 89

BMI, SESAC, reply comment 8, at 4 [hereinafter Music Claimants, comment 8].

 Time Warner is a diversified media company which acts as a multiple systems operator of cable systems 90

nationwide and is also engaged in the production and distribution of theatrical films, television programs and home

videos. Time Warner, comment 23, at 1, [hereinafter Time Warner, comment 23].

68

video systems eligible for a compulsory license. They contend that it would be inappropriate to "jerryrig 89

a twenty-year old statutory plan created for a different industry." MPAA, comment 1, in Copyright Office

Docket No. 96-2, at 2; see Music Claimants reply comment 8 in Docket No. 96-2, at 4-5.

To the contrary, all the other commenters in this study addressing the issue, and the others in the

Copyright Office administrative inquiry, take the position that open video systems are multichannel video

providers that will most likely operate in a fashion so functionally similar to traditional cable systems as to

justify the applicability of a compulsory license to them, on terms that account for any technological and

regulatory peculiarities of those services. Time Warner, comment 23, at 7; ALTV, comment 30, at 4; NPR, 90

comment 36, at 11; Canadian Claimants, comment 32, at 5; ABC, comment 20, at 2; PBS, comment 28, at

41; U.S. West, comment 4, at 13; USTA, comment 25, at 16. USTA notes that, in fact, open video systems

do not embody a "new" technology at all, but simply a program delivery system established by law and

regulatory overlay. Id. at 3, n.2. As such, and because open video systems are subject to FCC must-carry,

syndicated exclusivity, sports exclusivity, and network nonduplication rules that are almost identical to those

applied to traditional cable systems, they can be deemed to comprise an essentially local subscription service

featuring as a significant component of its services the local retransmission of local broadcast programming,

just like traditional cable. NAB, comment 39, at 8; NPR, comment 36, at 11.

The commenters citing these similarities between traditional cable systems and open video systems

conclude that the open video system industry acts as a nascent competitor to cable, and disparate copyright

treatment for open video systems would substantially skew the competitive arena and force consumers to pay

higher rates for cable service than they otherwise would. NPR, comment 36, at 11. The Federal Trade
69

Commission makes a similar analysis in its comments in the Copyright Office administrative hearing. FTC,

reply comment 3, in Copyright Office Docket No. 96-2, at 5. Even the Canadian Claimants, with a proprietor

perspective, find economic advantage to open video systems' potential eligibility for a compulsory license.

They state that because the statutory and regulatory structure authorizing the existence of open video systems

effectively limits the industry's deployment to large, well-funded companies such as local telephone

companies that have an installed communications system (or companies that can afford to install such a

system), there will be fewer entrants, a limited number of times a signal will be transmitted, and a higher

certainty that the compulsory license royalties will be paid. Canadian Claimants, comment 32, at 5-6.

The USTA offers a detailed discussion of the eligibility of open video systems for compulsory

licen sing. It forcefully argues that Congress' goals in creating open video systems under the

Telecommunications Act will best be met if open video systems are put on an equal copyright footing with

respect to other multichannel video providers:

Congress created OVS in order to bring competition to a market dominated

by incumbent cable operators. Congress stated that it hoped the OVS

approach would "encourage common carriers to deploy open video systems

and introduce vigorous competition," also noting that OVS operators "will

be `new' entrants in established markets and deserve lighter regulatory

burden s to level the playing field." The availability of the cable

compulsory license for OVS operators is an essential and viable means of

fair competition with these incumbent cable operators.

USTA, comment 25, at 13 (citing the Telecommunications Act of 1996, § 653(c)(4), H.R. Conf. Rep. No.

458, 104th Cong., 2d Sess., 178 (1996)). The USTA also points out that Congress has taken a technology

neutral position on the application of the cable compulsory license for other new retransmission systems such

as SMATV, MDS, and MMDS operations, as well as satellite carrier operations; it argues that open video

systems should be no exception to this treatment. USTA, comment 25, at 14, 20-21.

The SBCA takes a position that falls outside the debate of eligibility or ineligibility for open video

systems under section 111. Arguing parity among providers of broadcast signals, SBCA contends that

telephone companies as large and established multichannel video providers should not now enjoy the terms
70

and advantages of the cable compulsory license because those were not available to DTH carriers when they

were new video distribution entrants. The SBCA argues that in fairness, Congress should only make open

video systems eligible for the cable compulsory license at such time as it also gives satellite carriers a

permanent license and cable-like rates; otherwise, it should devise a section 119 like treatment for open video

systems. SBCA, reply comment 22, at 7-8. 

2. The "Nuts and Bolts" of a Compulsory License for O pen Video Systems.

Only a few commenters have discussed in any detail how a revised cable compulsory license that

would encompass open video systems might work. Although MPAA opposes any compulsory licenses for

the retransmission of broadcast signals, in the Copyright Office inquiry on open video systems, MPAA

suggested a legislative proposal that would offer open video systems a temporary compulsory license to

enable its growth as an industry and to ease its transition to the free market. MPAA, comment 1, in

Copyright Office Docket No. 96-2, at 1, 16-19. Although the proposal envisioned interim regulations

allo win g o p en video systems to utilize the present section 111 which would be replaced by some

individualized compulsory license crafted by Congress for a more mature open video system industry, the

proposal makes a useful starting point for a discussion on how section 111 might be revised to encompass

open video systems on a more permanent basis. 

 The MPAA proposal assumes that open video systems will operate under section 111 as it exists

today. It is instructive to note that all of the following discussion would be rendered moot if Congress were

to adopt a flat, per subscriber, per signal rate as recommended by the Office in Chapter V. However, the

Office has included the following discussion in the event that the current rate structure is retained.

First, MPAA addresses the issue of which elements of the open video systems (i.e., the telephone

company operators or the independent program providers that deliver programming via the system) are

eligible for the compulsory license and under what circumstances. MPAA argues that to achieve parity

between the royalties paid by open video systems and those of similarly situated cable systems, and to avoid
 U.S. West argued that if open video system operators were required to include the gross receipts of unaffiliated 91

program providers carried on its system, and the aggregation of receipts resulted in their paying higher royalty rates, they

would be entitled under FCC rules to collect administrative fees associated with such filings and to be reimbursed by

the programmers for any increased royalties. West argued that this situation would be discriminatory and anticompetitive.

71

artificial fragmentation of an open video system from what is really a larger system into a smaller system (the

"contiguous communities" problem for traditional cable systems), each open video system operator must

determine the gross receipts of the entire open video system operation for purposes of determining the

system's filing status (i.e. Form 1/2 or Form 3). The amount of total gross receipts would be the sum of all

payments throughout the entire open video system made by program providers or by subscribers that are

related to the offering of retransmitted broadcast signals to subscribers. Id. at 17; see 11-17. After the open

video system operator makes this determination, MPAA would have each program provider, including the

open video system operator to the extent that it offers programming, calculate its own gross receipts and DSE

values, and file statements of account and make royalty payments based on the entire operation's filing status.

These calculations would be analogous to those made by partially distant subgroups of cable systems. Id.

at 18.

Other commenters in the administrative inquiry take a similar view on the issue. See comments filed

in Copyright Office Docket No. 96-2: Comcast comment 6 at 3; NCTA, at 4; ABC, comment 2, at 7-8. 

Two of those suggest that each open video system facility should generate only one consolidated filing under

section 111. Comcast comment 6 in Copyright Office Docket No. 96-2, at 3; ABC comment 2 in Copyright

Office Docket No. 96-2, at 8. The open video system commenters, however, contend that any entity that

becomes an open video system program provider offering multiple channels, including broadcast signals, to

subscribers should be considered the owner of a cable system responsible for section 111 filings with respect

to the channels it operates. Bell Atlantic, et. al., comment 7 in Copyright Office Docket No. 96-2, at 26; U.S.

West, comment 2, in Docket No. 96-2, at 6. Bell Atlantic suggests that the "contiguous communities" 91

language in the present definition of "cable system," can be applied to open video systems as easily as to
 The ADI is the Area of Dominant Influence, and is the current way the FCC defines the local market of a 92

television station.

72

cable systems if lawmakers adopt the legal fiction that for an open video system programmer, the "headend"

is deemed to be the "office or site where the video distribution antennae receiving off-air signals (the

"primary transmission") interconnects with the OVS wires (the "secondary" transmission)." Bell Atlantic,

et. al., comment 7 in Docket No. 96-2, at 23. Of course, these issues would not be relevant if Congress were

to change the rate structure for section 111 to a flat, per subscriber, per signal fee and to eliminate the lower

rates for small cable systems.

In its response to our Notice of Inquiry, MPAA pointed out that where an open video system provides

service to multiple markets, under the FCC's must-carry rules, the system may provide all the must-carry

signals from each market to all subscribers, or it may configure its facilities so that subscribers only receive

the must-carry stations in their own market. If the system chooses the first alternative, it is likely that some

part or parts of its must-carry station carriage will be distant for copyright purposes. MPAA would have

open video systems determine distant/local status and permitted/non-permitted status on an ADI basis. To 92

address the situation in which a system serves multiple ADI's and its program providers do not restrict their

own service to one ADI, MPAA suggests that the open video system operator would act as arbiter and

determine what percentage of the system's total number of subscribers receive each signal as a distant signal.

Each program provider would then apply that percentage to its own group of signals, including must-carry

signals, to determine the appropriate distant signal equivalent value for its own subscriber group.

Further complicating the issue, the open video system operator has the duty to fulfill the system's

must-carry obligation, but often the subscribers will pay the program provider and not the open video system

operator for such service, and the operators are not required to use a basic tier for must-carry signals. This

situation would make reporting very difficult for an open video system. MPAA, comment 1, in Docket 96-2,

at 11-14. To address this difficulty for open video system operators, MPAA would require each program
73

provider to be liable for the minimum royalty fee payment for the must-carry service provided by the cable

operator to the program provider's subscribers. Id. at 17-18.

For permitted/non-permitted status, MPAA proposes that each system be governed by the rules that

would apply to a cable system located in the largest ADI served by the open video system operator, rather

than try to have each program provider determine permitted/non-permitted status on a subscriber-bysubscriber basis. Id. at 18-19. This system, MPAA suggests, would ensure that an open video system not

"fragment distant carriage among program providers" and avoid the 3.75% rate liability. Of course, again,

these complexities would be avoided if a different rate structure can be devised for section 111.

The telephone companies suggest that to determine local/distant status applying the FCC's must-carry

and ADI rules, where there is no established cable system operating in the same service area as an open video

system, an open video system could be treated as a new, start-up cable system would be treated. Bell

Atlantic, et. al. in Docket No. 96-2, comment 7, at 21-22, 26. They contend that in cases where the FCC

rules require an open video system to carry broadcast signals, these signals should be treated as local signals

for copyright purposes, and that in interpreting permitted/non-permitted carriage, communities and not

systems should be granted grandfathered status, so that open video systems get the benefit of paying for

signals that are permitted as grandfather signals for similarly situated traditional cable systems at the lower

permitted signal rate. Id. On the issue of determining whether signals are local or distant for an open video

system whose programmers are located in various places, USTA suggests that each programmer using an

open video system designate one point at which they receive programming for retransmission to be

designated as the locus of its "facility" and file based on communities served by that point. See comments

in Copyright Office Docket No. 96-2; USTA, comment 9, at 7, n.5; UVTV, comment 4, at 9-10; Adelphia,

comment 12, at 6; Comcast, comment 6, at 1, 6.

Making a similar attempt at creating parity among cable and open video system operators, NCTA

suggests that open video system operators be required to pay the 3.75% rate where the total number of distant
74

signals carried on the system exceeds those that a cable operator in the same market would be permitted to

carry at the statutory base rate. NCTA, comment 11, in Docket No. 96-2, at 5. Several parties suggest that

whatever regulations govern the application of the cable compulsory license to new cable systems or

SMATV systems should be relevant to open video systems. See Comments in Docket No. 96-2: NAB,

comment 13, at 15-16; ALTV, comment 10, at 19-21.
75

D. CO PYRIGHT O FFICE RECO MMENDATIO NS

The Copyright Office is sympathetic to the arguments presented by the majority of copyright owners

in this study regarding the desirability of the elimination of compulsory licenses for the retransmission of

broadcast signals. Given the premise that the time has come for the elimination of the cable and satellite

compulsory licenses, it is difficult to argue that compulsory licensing should apply to more retransmissions

made by a new brand of communications channels, the open video system, that was created by both the

deregulation and the entrepreneurial zealousness of the telephone companies. Assuming, however, that

Congress does not agree with the copyright owners that now is the time to eliminate sections 111 and 119

of the Copyright Act, the Copyright Office agrees with the rest of the commenters that it would be patently

unfair, and it would thwart Congress' intent in creating the open video system model, to deny the benefits

of compulsory licensing to open video systems when similar benefits are enjoyed by traditional cable

systems, satellite carriers, SMATV systems, and MDS and MMDS operations.

The Copyright Office is swayed by the strong resemblance of open video systems to traditional cable

systems. Open video systems use the very same "wires, cables [and] other communications channels" that

traditional cable systems use to deliver broadcast signals to their subscribers. They will be located in the

same geographical areas as traditional cable systems and will potentially serve the same subscribing members

of the public as cable systems. Open video systems will be constrained by the same public interest

obligations as cable to deliver public, educational and governmental programming, to ensure carriage of local

broadcasters and to respect syndicated and sports exclusivity arrangements and protect the network affiliate

system by ensuring network nonduplication. In fact, the only discernible differences between open video

systems and traditional cable systems are historical. Cable arrived on the scene because of consumer desire

for basic programming service, and it fought hard to win a compulsory license that enabled it to become the

giant in the video programming industry that it is today. Open video systems were created by Congress

because of consumer unrest with cable and a burgeoning telecommunications industry that was anxious to
76

expand its interests and challenge cable for part of its market share, but has yet to demonstrate how it will

try to win a place for open video systems in the program delivery universe. The fact that open video systems

will look slightly different from cable systems does not alter the issue of basic fairness confronting the

legislators who have created a compulsory licensing structure and doled it out to first one retransmission

agent and then another. Should some businesses have the undoubted benefits of a compulsory license, its

guaranteed access to programming with its minimal administrative burdens and relatively low cost, but not

their direct competitors? The Copyright Office cannot answer that question in the affirmative when the

businesses operate in a similar universe and are otherwise subject to analogous regulatory burdens.

 While the Copyright Office is, therefore, comfortable with the notion that open video systems should

be eligible for compulsory licensing for their retransmission activities, the Office finds it to be vastly

preferable for Congress to modify the existing cable compulsory license to clarify how open video systems

fit into the licensing scheme rather than trying to suggest that open video systems are already cable systems

under section 111. It would seem prudent to include open video systems in section 111 and not try to create

a separate compulsory license for them. This is so primarily because open video systems are so inherently

similar to cable systems.

The Copyright Office acknowledges the truth in the copyright owners' assertions that the open video

system industry is not yet developed enough to enable Congress to create a compulsory license for open

video systems that mirrors the intricacies of its business arrangements. However, the Office does not think

it will be necessary to know precisely what form or forms the industry will take to draft adequate compulsory

licensing provisions. The basic structure of open video systems is clearly established by statute and

regulation, and it will certainly be very comparable to the structure of cable systems. 

The Copyright Office believes that section 111 should be amended in several ways to facilitate the

eligibility of open video systems for the cable compulsory license. First, the definition of cable system in

section 111(f) should be amended to specifically include open video systems as cable systems, and to clarify
77

that each programmer on the open video system is responsible for filing and paying royalties as a cable

system. Furthermore, for purposes of identifying which open video system programmers must file together

as one system to avoid artificial fragmentation of one larger system into smaller systems, it will be essential

for Congress to amend the "contiguous communities" section of the definition of cable system, as described

in Chapter IV.

In addition, both the complex rate structure of the current section 111 and the statute's reliance on

the former FCC rules for determining local and distant signals must be amended, as discussed in Chapter V,

to ensure the smooth administration of the compulsory license with open video systems as cable systems.

This could eliminate the need for the various legislative or administrative proposals listed earlier in this

chapter that would otherwise be necessary to fit open video systems within section 111. Finally, the passive

carrier exemption should be amended as the next chapter describes.
 T he C opyright Office thoroughly, discussed this controversy and the history of the cable and satellite 93

compulsory licenses in its earlier report. See Library of Congress, U.S. Copyright Office, Report of the Register of

Copyrights, The Cable and Satellite Carrier Compulsory Licenses: An Overview and Analysis (March 1992).

78

VII. THE PASSIVE CARRIER EXEMPTIO N

In the course of its open video system inquiry, the Copyright Office had reason to revisit the passive

carrier exemption in section 111(a)(3) of the Copyright Act. That section provides an exemption from

copyright liability to any carrier who retransmits one or more broadcast signals so long as that carrier has

"no direct or indirect control over the content or selection" of the broadcast signal being retransmitted or the

recipients of the signal, and so long as its only involvement in the retransmission is to provide the "wires,

cables, or other communications channels for the use of others." In comments filed with the Office in Docket

96-2 on open video systems, the parties argued back and forth whether, and to what extent, open video

systems qualify as passive carriers eligible for the exemption.

In requesting information for this study, the Copyright Office posed the question whether the passive

carrier exemption requires amendment to accommodate open video system and/or Internet retransmitters and,

if so, in what fashion. The comments the Office received suggest a number of theories regarding the

applicability of the passive carrier exemption to open video systems, and some also offer additional

comments regarding the perceived abuse of the exemption by satellite carriers who retransmit broadcast

signals to cable systems and the need for a tightening of the exemption.

A. BACKGRO UND INFO RMATIO N

The passive carrier exemption originated during the cable television controversy that raged in the

1960's when Congress was attempting a major revision of the Copyright Act of 1909. At that time, 93

t elep h o n e companies were concerned that because of ambiguity in proposed cable provisions, the

retransmission of broadcast signals by cable systems using a telephone company as a common carrier (i.e.

to provide lines, equipment, etc.) might be deemed to create copyright liability for the telephone companies.
 94 See Letter of Professor Walter J. Derenberg, on behalf of American Telephone and Telegraph Company, to

T homas C . B rennan, Chief Counsel, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate April 25, 1967, (following the

introduction of S. 579), reprinted in Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights of the

Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Copyright Law Revision. 90th Cong. 1st Sess. 1143 (1967). 

 Eastern Microwave, Inc. v. Doubleday Sports, Inc., 691 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1982); WGN Continental 95

Broadcasting Co. v. United Video, 693 F.2d 622 (7th Cir. 1982); Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc. v. Southern Satellite

Systems, 777 F.2d 393 (8th Cir. 1985).

 691 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1982). 96

79

They proposed language for a specific exemption for passive carriers, and their proposal ultimately became

section 111(a)(3).94

In the mid-1970's, technological advances enabled satellite carriers to receive broadcast signals

(either over-the-air by means of a UHF receiving antenna or by means of a direct microwave connection

between the broadcast station and the satellite carrier), then to retransmit the signals to a satellite

transponder, and relay the signals by the satellite back to the cable systems' receiving antennae on earth for

delivery by the cable systems to their subscribers. This method of retransmitting signals transforms ordinary

broadcast stations into "superstations" seen by viewers across the nation. Three mid-1980's appellate court

decisions interpreted the section 111(a)(3) exemption as applying to satellite carriers' activities in

retransmitting superstations based on a finding that they act as purely passive intermediaries between

broadcasters and the cable systems.95

In Eastern Microwave, Inc. v. Doubleday Sports, Inc., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second 96

Circuit held that Eastern Microwave's retransmission of superstation WOR to cable systems fell within the

passive carrier exemption even though the court found that technical restrictions forced EMI to make "an

initial, one-time determination to retransmit the signals of a particular station." It decided that such a

determination does not evidence the "control over the content and selection of the primary transmission

intended to be precluded under section 111(a)(3)." Id. at 125, 126.

The court stated that an ordinary common carrier must render its service to all comers, denying it

to none on the basis of content, and must not select or choose among those who seek to use its service, on
 693 F.2d 622 (7th Cir. 1982). 97

80

any basis other than a legitimate business reason. The court then reasoned that when the communication

service is technologically limited to one sender, a forced "selection" is inevitable, and such a selection cannot

be the type precluded by section 111(a)(c), for to so hold would render the exemption unavailable to "any

carrier that did not retransmit every television broadcast of every television station in the country." Id. at

130.

In reaching its holding, the Second Circuit noted that "[u]nlike the activities of older, established

common carriers, e.g., the telephone company, . . . the activities [of Eastern Microwave] include carrying

the communications desired by receivers rather than those desired by senders" and "unlike older common

carriers, EMI is paid by receivers rather than by senders." However, the court noted that "[l]ike those of

older common carriers, EMI's activities are paid for as services and involve transmittal of the entire signal

without change." Id. at 126. Thus, the court allowed the exemption where the carrier did not look exactly

like a telephone company, so long as the carrier did not alter the signal it retransmitted to cable systems.

In WGN Continental Broadcasting Co. v. United Video, superstation WGN sued a satellite common 97

carrier, United Video, for retransmitting WGN's programming to cable customers stripped of certain teletext

information that had been inserted into the "vertical blanking interval" space between the pictures flashed

on a television screen. That interval can be used to carry such information as subtitles for the hearing

impaired, news bulletins, and weather reports. Id. at 623-24. The Seventh Circuit described the relationship

between the cable system and satellite carrier under the passive carrier exemption as follows:

The cable system selects the signals it wants to retransmit, pays the

copyright owners for the right to retransmit their programs, and pays the

intermediate carrier a fee for getting the signal from the broadcast station

to the cable system. The intermediate carrier pays the copyright owners

nothing, provided it really is passive in relation to what it transmits, like a

telephone company. . . . It may not even delete commercials; an important

part of the scheme set up in section 111 is the requirement that any cable

system that wants to retransmit a broadcast signal without negotiating with
 777 F.2d 393 (8th Cir. 1985). 98

 See H.R. Rep. No. 887, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., Pt. 1, at 12 (1988). 99

81

the broadcast station or copyright owner transmit intact any commercials

it receives from that station.

Id. at 624-25. The court concluded that United Video could not qualify for the passive carrier exemption

"because it was not passive -- it did not transmit WGN's signal intact." Id. at 625.

Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc. v. Southern Satellite Systems examined whether Southern Satellite 98

could still qualify for the passive carrier exemption when it retransmitted superstation WTBS's signal intact

from a direct microwave feed supplied by WTBS even though the station itself altered its over-the-air signal

by substituting national advertising in the place of local advertising when it prepared the microwave feed.

In these circumstances, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit found that the satellite

carrier exercised neither direct nor indirect control over the content of the WTBS signal, and the

broadcaster's involvement in the commercial substitution process did not implicate any of the concerns raised

by Congress in adopting section 111(c)(3) (which prohibits cable systems from engaging in commercial

substitution).

Once the business of the retransmission of superstations to cable systems by satellite carriers was

firmly entrenched, the passive carrier exemption did not again become an issue until the development of

home earth stations (satellite dishes) created another business opportunity for satellite carriers. Initially,

broadcast signals (and other signals) delivered by satellite carriers could be intercepted by dish owners who

were not part of the copyright owners' intended audience, and dish owners paid no fee to carriers or copyright

owners for the signals they received. To control access to the signals, most resale carriers and certain

copyright holders decided to encode, or scramble, their satellite delivered signals, and to provide

descrambling capacity only to paying subscribers of their service. 99
 Letter from Register Ralph Oman, Register of Copyrights, to Robert W. Kastenmeier, Chairman of the House 100

Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property (March 17, 1986).

 H.R. Rep. No. 887, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. Pt. 1, at 14 (1988). 101

 Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3949 (1988). 102

82

This brought the status of the satellite carriers' eligibility for the passive carrier exemption into

question. By scrambling signals and selling, renting, or licensing descrambling devices to subscribing earth

station owners, a carrier arguably exercises direct control over which individual members of the public

receive the signals they retransmit, and the carrier engages in more than merely providing "wires, cables, or

o t her communications channels." In March of 1986, the Chairman of the Subcommittee on

Telecommunications, Consumer Protection and Finance of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce

wrote to the Register of Copyrights to request that the Register issue a "preliminary judgment" on the issue

whether a satellite carrier that engages in activities such as scrambling signals and marketing descrambling

devices would qualify for section 111(a)(3). The Register set forth his view that the sale and licensing of

descrambling devices to satellite earth station owners by satellite carriers falls outside the purview of section

111(a)(3), particularly where the carrier itself encrypts the signal. 100

In response to this controversy, the House Committee concluded that legislation was necessary to

meet the concerns of home dish owners and satellite carriers and "to foster the efficient widespread delivery

of programming via satellite." The "Satellite Home Viewer Copyright Act of 1988" was the result of 101 102

the controversy. The legislation created a statutory license for satellite carriers to retransmit distant

broadcast signals of superstations to dish owners for private home viewing. Thus, under the new legislation,

satellite carriers were to be compulsory licensees; they could not be considered passive carriers with respect

to their activities pertaining to the retransmission of broadcast signals to home dish owners. However, it

should be noted that the new law did provide that satellite carriers can be liable for infringement, if they in
83

any way, willfully alter the content of the programming, commercial advertising, or station announcements

embodied in the signals they retransmit. 17 U.S.C. § 119(a)(4).

B. SUMMARY O F CO MMENTS AND TESTIMO NY

1. O pen Video Systems Issues.

As indicated above, the present inquiry regarding the passive carrier exemption was made to

determine whether open video systems might sometimes be eligible for the exemption. While the comments

occasionally strayed from the open video context, by far the majority of comments on the exemption focused

on open video systems. 

Generally, copyright owner and cable system commenters expressed the view that open video

systems will most likely engage in too many "non-passive" activities regarding their retransmission of

broadcast signals to be eligible for the passive carrier exemption. However, several of the commenters who

took this position seemed to believe that some of a particular open video system's activities might qualify for

the exemption under limited circumstances.

Comcast Cable Communications, Inc. argues that an open video system operator can never be a

passive carrier under section 111(a)(3). Comcast, comment 12, Attachment A, at 4. Comcast argues that

open video system operators are not regulated as carriers under Title II of the Communications Act, but rather

under Title VI which governs cable systems, that they exercise control over the selection of primary

transmissions when they exercise their discretion to decide how to divide their channel capacity, decide

which duplicated programming services offered by multiple programs will share a single channel on the

system, and make other decisions affecting content on the system; and they might provide many non-passive

business services, such as scrambling signals carried by the system and selling or leasing descrambling

devices to subscribers. Comcast, comment 12, at 5. Comcast argues that when an open video system

operator is also a program provider, the chances that it would make "content and channel-based decisions"

as the platform provider would be even greater. Id. As such, Comcast concludes that open video system
84

operators could never meet the requirements of the passive carrier exemption, especially as that provision

has been narrowly construed by the Copyright Office. 

 BMI agrees with Comcast. BMI, reply comment 27, at 11. BMI argues that the telephone industry

wants to expand the scope of section 111(a)(3) to "exempt its forays into the high margin television

business." Id. at 10. BMI differentiates open video systems' retransmission activities from those at issue in

the Eastern Microwave and Hubbard cases because unlike the satellite carriers in those cases, open video

systems will themselves be transmitting signals to subscribers over their own lines, providing marketing,

billing, and collection services, and exercising a certain degree of control over the content customers can see

on their systems. Id. at 11.

NCTA states its view that whether and to what extent the passive carrier exemption would apply to

open video systems depends on the make up of the individual open video system operation and the role

played by the telephone company, which cannot be foreseen in the absence of a concrete open video system

plan. NCTA, reply comment 4, in Docket No. 96-2, at 3. BMI adds that, regarding the uncertainty of the

open video system industry, the FCC's open video system rules are being challenged in federal court in New

Orleans. BMI, reply comment 27, at 11 (citing The Cable-Telco Report, at 1, June 2, 1997).

MPAA argues that only "true" common carriers should be eligible for the passive carrier exemption,

and the exemption should be "tightened to avoid expanding this common carrier provision to accommodate

these [open video system and other new] services." MPAA, comment 35, at 14. This would appear to mean

that open video systems cannot be passive carriers. However, in reply comments, MPAA states that it would

not object to allowing a carrier to offer ancillary services that are separate from program carriage services,

such as billing, without losing its passive carrier status, so long as those services are not a means for the

carrier to select or to control customers of an open video system contrary to the requirements of section

111(a)(3). MPAA, reply comment 3, at 10.
85

Telephone companies, on the other hand, contend that when an open video system operator merely

provides channel capacity to an unaffiliated programmer, and has no control over the programming selected

or distributed by that programmer, the open video system operator should be considered a passive carrier

exempt from copyright liability under section 111(a)(3). USTA, comment 25, at 8-9. To that end, USTA

recommends that section 111(a)(3) be amended to clarify that "wires, cables or other communications

channels" include all delivery systems, platforms and technologies where the carrier or distributor provides

equipment and services but does not control the selection of the content or information delivered over the

system. Id. 

USTA also argues that their activities related to any must-carry signals, PEG channels, and other

channels that open video system operators are required to carry would not disqualify their eligibility for the

passive carrier exemption, although it offers no rationale for this conclusion. Id. at 9-10. U.S. West took

this position in the Copyright Office inquiry regarding open video systems. It maintained that if an open

video system operator were required to carry must-carry or other such signals to subscribers of unaffiliated

programmers, the FCC regulations would allow the operator to charge the programmers for the administrative

costs incurred by the operator for such carriage. Since the programmer would then pass the added cost on

to its subscribers, without the passive carrier exemption, the copyright owners would be getting a double

payment, one reflected in the royalties paid by the open video system operator, and one paid by the

programmer. U.S. West, comment 2, in Docket No. 96-2, at 13; U.S. West, reply comments 2, in Docket No.

96-2, at 4-5.

USTA claims the decisions in Eastern Microwave, WGN Broadcasting, and Hubbard would permit

an open video system operator, as an exempt "passive carrier," to allow its equipment to be used by other

programmers to retransmit broadcast signals simultaneously; would permit an open video system to choose

which broadcasts to retransmit, so long as there is no alteration, deletion, or addition to the signals; and

would permit an open video system to provide ancillary promotional support (such as marketing, billing, or
86

collecting fees from particular recipients of retransmissions on behalf of other program providers). Lastly,

USTA claims that the existing language in section 111(a)(3) should be clarified to permit a telephone

company or other carrier that leases its open video system to a programmer to retain the passive carrier

exemption where the carrier technically selects which homes to serve, because the wires and channels are

capable of serving such homes. Id. at 11. Bell Atlantic/NYNEX supports USTA's arguments in support of

a very broad reading of the passive carrier exemption for the benefit of open video system operators. Bell

Atlantic/NYNEX joint reply comment 11, at 1-2; see Bell Atlantic, et. al., comment 7, in Docket No. 96-2,

at 30-31.

 NAB strongly rejects the position of USTA and U.S. West that open video carriers can deliver mustcarry and PEG programming to the subscribers of their unaffiliated programmers and still maintain their

passive carrier status. NAB argues that an open video system operator that retransmits must-carry signals

cannot be entitled to the passive carrier exemption for such carriage. NAB and PBS both argue that the very

fact that an open video system operator is required to meet must-carry and PEG public access obligations

makes it impossible for it to act solely as a passive conduit for material supplied by open video system

program providers. NAB, comment 13, in Docket No. 96-2, at 10, n.4; NAB, reply comment 5, in Docket

No. 96-2, at 2-3; PBS, reply comment 7, in Docket No. 96-2, at 10, n.4. 

2. Satellite Carrier Issues.

Two parties discuss possible amendments to the passive carrier exemption outside the open video

system context. Baseball expresses the view that the five satellite carriers that retransmit selected

superstations and network stations to cable systems across the country make a separate public performance

of the copyrighted works on the retransmitted stations. Baseball argues that these carriers should not qualify

for an exemption from copyright liability under section 111(a)(3) because they are making a separate use of

copyrighted works and they are commercially profiting by doing so; thus, the carriers should be required to

share their profits with the copyright owners whose works they exploit. Baseball, comment 17, at 17-18. 
87

Of course, United Video strongly opposes Baseball's suggestion regarding the passive carrier

exemption. United Video responds that the exemption was adopted to simplify the retransmission process

and avoid double payment to the copyright owner for the single viewing by the cable subscriber of the

broadcast programming. United Video, reply comment 12, at 4. United Video likens satellite carriers'

function in retransmitting distant signals to those of "Federal Express delivering video tapes or trucks

delivering books" -- they all perform a delivery function for the convenience of the customer who is making

use of the copyrighted work. Id. at 8.

Another party, LIN Television Corp., complains that the ability of satellite carriers to substitute

alternative advertising in the local signals they retransmit is "wholly inconsistent with the basic concept of

a compulsory license given to passive retransmitters of local broadcast signals." LIN, reply comment 1, at

2. LIN notes that, in the context of cable, the Hubbard decision wrongly undercut that basic concept by

allowing a satellite carrier to retain its passive carrier exemption when retransmitting an altered signal so

long as it is the broadcaster who made the alteration. However, LIN contends that commercial substitution

is far more inappropriate in the context of the more limited satellite compulsory license, where it provides

a powerful additional incentive for carriers to maximize the number of subscribers and to ignore the law in

doing so. Id. at 3.
88

C. CO PYRIGHT O FFICE RECO MMENDATIO NS

The Copyright Office believes that in light of the other amendments to the Copyright Act that it is

recommending, Congress should make some corresponding adjustments to the passive carrier exemption.

1. O pen Video System Issues.

If Congress amends the Copyright Act to clarify that open video systems are eligible for the cable

compulsory license, then the passive carrier exemption should be amended to indicate that open video

systems qualify for the section 111(a)(3) exemption only in very limited circumstances. While it is easy

enough to see the logic in USTA's argument that an open video system operator acts in a traditional common

carrier capacity when it merely provides the platform for the retransmission of an unaffiliated programmer's

broadcast signals, and should therefore be eligible for the passive carrier exemption, the Copyright Office

queries when, if ever, an open video system operator will act only in such a capacity. Given the must-carry

requirements imposed upon open video system operators by the FCC, NAB posited that open video systems

will always be more than just passive carriers, because they will always be called upon to retransmit mustcarry signals. The Copyright Office agrees that it seems unlikely that an open video system operator will

ever function in a way that is divorced from its must-carry obligations. A traditional cable system certainly

cannot do so short of retransmission consent, and open video systems are intended to operate in much the

same way as cable systems.

USTA argues that open video system operators should still be considered passive carriers exempt

from copyright liability when they retransmit must-carry signals to the subscribers of their unaffiliated

programmers. Such a treatment would not comport with the treatment the Copyright Office affords cable

systems.

It is the Copyright Office's view, as explained in detail in Chapter X of this study, that any time a

cable system retransmits the signal of a broadcast station (even a must-carry station), the system publicly
89

performs the copyrighted works embodied on the signal and must secure a compulsory license to avoid

copyright liability. However, the Office believes that it may be appropriate for Congress to grant an

exemption from liability for a cable system's retransmission of local signals under the cable compulsory

license because of Congress' historic view that the retransmission of a local signal does not harm the

copyright owners. If Congress granted such an exemption, even though a cable system must secure a

compulsory license to be free from copyright liability for its retransmission activities, its retransmission of

local signals would not garner a significant copyright royalty payment.

In applying this in the open video system context, an open video system operator who retransmits

must-carry signals to the subscribers of an unaffiliated programmer would be publicly performing the

copyrighted works embodied on the signals and should secure a compulsory license to avoid liability;

however, the carriage of must-carry signals would be considered to be the carriage of local signals and, as

such, would accrue a de minimis royalty obligation for the open video system operator or its unaffiliated

programmer. The operator would not need the benefit of the passive carrier exemption to be exempt from

a royalty obligation.

In the event that NAB is wrong, however, and an open video system operator might merely carry

signals for an unaffiliated programmer when no stations invoke their must-carry privilege, it would be

prudent to provide the passive carrier exemption for the operator. In this instance, the open video system

operator acts as a truly passive carrier. In such limited circumstances, the Copyright Office takes the position

that providing ancillary services such as marketing, billing and collecting would not be activities that would

disqualify an operator from claiming the exemption. However, to be consistent with its position regarding

satellite carriers, the Copyright Office takes the position that if an open video system operator for some

reason had the need to scramble or otherwise encode its signals and provide decoders to subscribers, it would

not qualify for the passive carrier exemption.
90

2. Satellite Carrier Issues.

The Copyright Office does not agree with Baseball that satellite carriers who retransmit broadcast

signals to cable systems should be required to pay an additional copyright royalty. So long as the satellite

carriers do not engage in unpermitted selection of signals and subscribers, or alter the signals being

retransmitted, they should qualify for the passive carrier exemption.

However, the Copyright Office agrees with LIN Broadcasting that Congress may wish to reconsider

the method of commercial substitution upheld by the Eighth Circuit in the Hubbard case. Congress crafted

sections 111 and 119 to provide cable systems and satellite carriers a compulsory license to retransmit the

broadcast signals "as is," and the spirit of those sections is that the signals were not to be altered in anyway.

However, since it is the broadcaster who is making the alterations, not the satellite carrier, the questions of

who benefits, who is harmed, and whether this is a situation that needs to be remedied are not as clear as

when the satellite carrier makes the alterations. These issues were not fully briefed before the Office during

the comment period or at the public meetings, and therefore, no conclusion was reached by the Office except

that this issue is deserving of further study. 
 Audio Net, Inc., broadcasts audio and video events in real time and is the largest broadcast network in the 103

Internet. Comment 18, at 1-2, [hereinafter AudioNet, comment 18 or reply comment 29].

 Of all the other commenters in this factfinding study, PBS is the only one that supports the extension of the 104

benefit of compulsory licensing to the Internet. PBS argues that Internet retransmitters should be eligible for a

compulsory license, and a new compulsory license should be created to fill the special needs of Internet retransmitters;

however, PBS would require the Internet compulsory licensees to carry public broadcast stations at their request. PBS,

comment 28, at 39-42. 

91

VIII. SHOULD THE CABLE CO MPULSO RY LICENSE BE EXTENDED

TO THE INTERNET?

When the Copyright Office began to consider the eligibility of open video systems for the cable

compulsory license, several parties cautioned that once the telephone companies were in the business of

retransmitting broadcast signals under the cable compulsory license, someone would want to use the license

to put broadcast signals on the Internet. Two commenters in the Office's open video system inquiry, ABC

and Joint Sports, urged the Copyright Office, in the event that it decided to recognize open video systems

as cable systems, to clarify that customers of a telephone company do not qualify as a "cable system" under

section 111 when retransmitting broadcast programming through a computer network. See ABC, comment

2, in Docket No. 96-2, at 9-10; Joint Sports, comment 5, in Docket No. 96-2, at 11-12. ABC stressed that

allowing retransmissions of broadcast signals over the Internet to qualify for the cable compulsory license

would have a devastating effect on the commercial viability of broadcast television. Id. 

A. SUMMARY O F THE CO MMENTS AND TESTIMO NY

When the Copyright Office requested information for this global review of the cable and satellite

compulsory licenses, the Office asked the public whether it would be appropriate to include broadcast

retransmissions via the Internet in a cable compulsory licensing scheme. Audio Net is the primary 103

proponent of the eligibility of computer networks for the cable compulsory license."104

Currently, AudioNet broadcasts audio and some video events in real time via the Internet to anyone

anywhere in the world who has a computer with audio capability and access to the World Wide Web. The
 Transcript, Copyright Office Hearing, 643 (May 8, 1997) (testimony of Mark Cuban, President, AudioNet, Inc.) 105

[hereinafter AudioNet, tr.]. AudioNet, tr., at 662.

92

types of audio events broadcast are as follows: network feeds of major league sporting events (e.g., Super

Bowl, World Series, NBA Playoffs, Stanley Cup playoffs, etc.); audio of cable television programming (e.g.,

simulcasting audio of C-SPAN I and II, including Senate and House proceedings); local radio stations

carrying talk radio programming, sports events, and music; conferences (e.g., press conferences,

governmental hearings, shareholder meetings, etc.); live concert events; Internet radio stations (including

original music programming); and the AudioNet Jukebox (more than 1,000 compact disc recordings from

more than 30 recording companies). It would appear from AudioNet's written comments that the rights to

retransmit most of the listed programming are purchased in the free market; however, the radio stations

apparently "sign up" to be retransmitted on AudioNet. 105

Internet broadcasts have been made possible by the development of software known as streaming

audio technology. This technology vastly improved the Internet audio experience by permitting the sending

of audio files in virtually real time. AudioNet describes the technology as follows:

The software establishes a "buffer" of memory in the

user's computer random access memory to which the

Internet site downloads a few seconds of audio. As the

audio is played from the buffer, the Internet site replaces

the played material with the next few seconds of audio.

T h e buffer continually is refreshed in this manner,

resulting in a continuous real time playback of audio to the

user -- although only a few seconds of audio actually

resides on the user's computer at any given time.

AudioNet, comment 18, at 3.

Recently, AudioNet has begun expanding its broadcasts into video programming. Although the

technology now permits display on only a small portion of a computer's video screen in less than full motion

video, AudioNet estimates that probably within two to three years, the personal computer will be capable

of displaying full screen real time television broadcasts with quality exceeding the current television
 However, in the public meeting held by the Copyright Office on May 8, 1997, Mark Cuban of AudioNet stated 106

that he preferred "to fit [Internet retransmitters] into the existing" section 111 compulsory license, and that he believed

that they already do fit under the cable license. AudioNet, tr., at 662.

93

standards and fast approaching advanced digital television standards. AudioNet is thus poised to partake,

in the not too distant future, in the market for distribution of television programming via the Internet.

AudioNet asserts that compulsory licensing is necessary to enable access to programming for Internet

distribution. Like small cable systems and open video system operators, AudioNet is concerned about the

logistical and economic difficulties in negotiating for and obtaining licenses from copyright proprietors. It

also fears that, as small, young companies using new technology, Internet broadcasters will face a

competitive disadvantage in dealing with the broadcasting industry and large content providers, who might

intentionally withhold rights to their programming to preclude the newcomers' entry into the retransmission

market. Id. at 6. Finally, AudioNet argues that the establishment of a compulsory licensing scheme for

Internet broadcasters should lead to the development of practical means of such licensing, such as a

collective administration system (akin to ASCAP and BMI) or a clearinghouse (such as the Copyright

Clearance Center). Id. at 7.

AudioNet believes that the Internet should warrant a compulsory license of its own rather than be

folded into the cable or satellite licenses, because Internet broadcasting generates income from advertising

rather than from subscription fees. It suggests that royalties for Internet compulsory licenses should be either

a low flat fee or a small percentage of advertising revenue, and the rate should reflect the "experimental

nature" of Internet video broadcasting. Id. at 7, 8. 106

When questioned at the public meeting regarding the anomaly of a worldwide distribution service

attempting to qualify for a compulsory license designed to benefit local retransmission services, AudioNet

indicated that, in fact, Internet retransmission of broadcast signals can be controlled to "be a local broadcast

medium if the need to distribute in that manner is required." AudioNet, tr., at 687. This would be possible

by first pinpointing the location of any particular user of the service through a process known as "geographic
 AudioNet mistakenly assumes that under a compulsory license "local broadcasters will receive a license fee 107

any time an Internet provider broadcasts a local program," and also argues that local broadcasters will be able to charge

more for advertising. It contends that "Every broadcaster has the same opportunity and broad reach (on the Internet)

. . . no one station has a distinct advantage over another." Audio Net, reply comment 29, at 4.

 Syndicated exclusivity, sports exclusivity, network nonduplication, and PEG requirements are not discussed 108

by AudioNet.

94

identification." AudioNet, reply comment 29, at 6-7. With this information, the Internet retransmitter could

control the extent to which a broadcast signal is retransmitted by using various encryption or other

technology. AudioNet, tr., at 687.

Although it might be possible for AudioNet to operate like a cable system and enforce to some extent

must-carry or other requirements or limitations on free carriage of signals, AudioNet takes the position that

Internet broadcasters should be exempt from the must-carry rules. AudioNet, comment 18, at 8. Rather,

AudioNet claims to promote "localism" by the very act of distributing many local signals to a nationwide or

worldwide audience.107

Regarding the must-carry responsibilities that must be shouldered by traditional cable systems and 108

that are factored into the compulsory licensing equation as discussed in chapter I of this study, AudioNet

states that it "would likely be physically and economically impossible for any Internet broadcaster to carry

all local channels in every market in which Internet access was available." AudioNet, reply comment 29,

at 7. AudioNet is adamant that any statute or regulation that requires implementation of technology such as

geographic identification so as to restrict delivery of programming "unnecessarily restrains consumer access

to information that otherwise may freely be available to the public, and ultimately thwarts the fundamental

opportunity of the Internet as a global communications medium." Id.

Copyright owners, broadcasters, and cable interests alike strongly oppose AudioNet's arguments for

the Internet retransmitters' eligibility for any compulsory license. These commenters uniformly decry that

the instantaneous worldwide dissemination of broadcast signals via the Internet poses major issues regarding
95

the United States and international licensing of the signals, and that it would be premature for Congress to

legislate a copyright compulsory license to benefit Internet retransmitters at this time.

The copyright owners point out that many producers of original programming are beginning to

transmit their works over the Internet, and giving Internet retransmission services the advantages of

compulsory licensing would put those originators at a competitive disadvantage and possible thwart the

development of free market licensing incentives such as blanket licensing. RIAA, comment 24, at 14; RIAA,

reply comment 21, at 8; ASCAP, comment 6, at 20; NPR, comment 36, at 13; Canadian Claimants, comment

32, at 7; BMI, comment 27, at 14.

In response to AudioNet's proposal of a low, flat royalty fee (or, in fact, any compulsory licensing

fee), several copyright proprietors retort that copyright owners should not subsidize the costs of a fledgling

Internet retransmission service's entry into the communications field, especially before the free market has

had an opportunity to operate. Canadian Claimants, comment 32, at 7; RIAA, reply comment 21, at 8;

ASCAP, reply comment 11, at 12. The Canadian Claimants argue that the revenues paid by Internet

retransmitters under a compulsory license would likely not be high enough to result in any worthwhile

additional royalties for copyright owners. Canadian Claimants, comment 32, at 7. They argue that Internet

technology allows almost anyone to retransmit copyrighted material, and a compulsory license for Internet

retransmitters would cause serious losses to copyright owners. But AudioNet explains that streaming

multimedia technology is extremely costly in the same way that it is very costly to retransmit broadcast

signals via satellite, and most likely there would not be a great number of licensees utilizing a compulsory

license for Internet retransmissions. AudioNet, tr., at 656, 663.

The sports interests are particularly concerned that a compulsory license in favor of Internet

retransmissions would displace the sponsoring institutions of telecast sporting events from exploiting

international markets for those time-sensitive telecasts. They argue that, to date, cable and satellite

compulsory licensing mechanisms have shown themselves incapable of addressing and compensating damage
96

to the copyright owners for violations of their exclusivity agreements internationally, and that considering

the Internet's instantaneous worldwide reach coupled with an Internet user's ability to store, edit and

retransmit information, a compulsory license for Internet retransmissions would be bound to create havoc

with the licensing mechanisms working in the free market. NCAA, comment 26, at 2; NBA/NHL, comment

22, at 3; Baseball, comment 17, at 8.

 The broadcast and cable interests declare that the Internet retransmitters should not qualify for

compulsory licensing because they are unregulated in the communications context and they are not a

localized retransmission service. They state first that Internet retransmissions would function very differently

from the other multichannel video providers that already qualify for a cable compulsory license. ALTV,

comment 30, at 4; ABC, comment 20, at 4; Time-Warner, comment 23, at 7; NAB, comment 39, at 8; NBC,

reply comment 24, at 2. They argue that Internet retransmitters are not subject to FCC regulations such as

must-carry, syndicated and sports exclusivity, network nonduplication, and PEG requirements, and with no

such protections to local broadcasters and copyright owners, the compulsory licensing of their services would

severely compromise local broadcasters' ability to control the distribution of their signals, would harm

syndicated programming and local broadcasting businesses, and would jeopardize the network/affiliate

system. Cox, reply comment 17, at 9; ABC, comment 20, at 3-4; NAB, comment 39, at 8; NAB, reply

comment 30, at 8; NPR reply comment 14, at 8.

NPR notes that there is no evidence that the communications policy goal of ensuring the availability

of broadcast signals to consumers is served by allowing a compulsory license for Internet retransmissions.

Rather, there already exists sufficient availability of retransmission service, and an Internet compulsory

license would likely undermine, rather than enhance the production and broadcast distribution of locallyoriented programming. NPR argues that the simultaneous Internet retransmission of local broadcast signals

to national and international audiences would somehow stifle the production of local programming. Id. at

13-14. Thus, NPR concludes that compulsory licensing should not be allowed for Internet retransmissions.
97

Several commenters also express concern that Internet retransmissions are by nature so widespread,

and at this point in time so subject to unauthorized copying, that this factor alone should render them

ineligible for compulsory licensing. These commenters express doubt that any current encryption technology

would be sufficient to protect Internet retransmissions from unauthorized copying, and contend that

compulsory licensing should not be contemplated in the Internet arena until such time as security is a given.

MPAA, comment 35, at 13; NAB, reply comment 30, at 8.

Finally, RIAA and Cox note that federal and international policymakers are only beginning to

address the telecommunications and copyright policy issues posed by the burgeoning Internet industry, and

it would be inappropriate and premature for Congress to adopt a compulsory licensing regime to benefit

Internet retransmission of broadcast signals before such time as the policy debate has been fully aired at all

governmental and intergovernmental levels. RIAA, comment 24, at 12; Cox, reply comment 17, at 10.

B. CO PYRIGHT O FFICE RECO MMENDATIO NS

The Copyright Office agrees with the majority of parties expressing views before us on the issue of

Internet retransmissions. The Office concurs with the many arguments outlined above regarding the

inappropriateness of bestowing the benefits of compulsory licensing on an industry so vastly different from

the other retransmission industries now eligible for compulsory licensing under the Copyright Act. Even

satellite technology, which allows the retransmission of broadcast signals to a far wider audience

geographically than does traditional cable technology, and which remains less regulated than cable at the

federal level, allows for the restriction of retransmissions within the United States unless copyright owners

consent to international retransmissions. Internet retransmitters, while perhaps technologically capable of

restricting their transmissions to a defined area, clearly intend to utilize to the utmost the Internet's ability

to disseminate programming "instantaneously worldwide."

Even beyond the many solid arguments made by the copyright owners and other commenters

summarized above, the Copyright Office believes it is premature to consider the implications for the
 Information Infrastructure Task Force, Intellectual Property and the National Information Infrastructure: The 109

Report of the Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights 53 (Sept. 1995) (hereinafter "NII White Paper").

98

retransmission of broadcast signals via the Internet before it has fully considered the many other copyright

issues involved in all aspects of Internet operations. For example, the Copyright Office questions AudioNet's

position that retransmitting broadcast signals over the Internet does not actually involve copying in addition

to publicly performing the copyrighted works retransmitted. AudioNet, tr., at 656-658. If each user of

AudioNet's services actually copies or has the potential to copy retransmitted programming on his or her

home computer, the copyright implications go far beyond compulsory licensing.

Furthermore, the Copyright Office notes, as did several other commenters, that at the present time,

President Clinton's Information Infrastructure Task Force's Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights

takes a decidedly free market view on the issue of licensing copyrighted works used on the Internet. In its

"White Paper" the Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights states: "[t]he marketplace should be

allowed to develop whatever legal licensing systems may be appropriate for the [National Information

Infrastructure]." The Working Group concludes that given the nascent state of the National Information 109

Infrastructure, it is premature to suggest than a comprehensive licensing system could best be devised from

a "central planning perspective." NII White Paper, at 199.

The Federal Communications Commission seems to take a similarly wait-and-see, anti-regulatory

perspective toward the Internet. In March of this year, the FCC's Office of Plans and Policy issued a

working paper entitled Digital Tornado: The Internet and Telecommunications Policy. In that paper, the

FCC concludes that the government should avoid unnecessary interference with the Internet's development.

The FCC notes that the technological shifts associated with the Internet dovetail with the communications

industry's transition from regulated monopolies to a world of overlapping competitive firms, and that the

greatest contribution that government can make to the development of the Internet is successfully opening
 F C C Office of Plans and Policy, OPP Working Paper No. 29: Digital Tornado: The Internet and 110

Telecommunications Policy (March 1997).

99

the communications sector to competition. At a time when the Internet as an industry seeks to be free from 110

government regulation in order to permit the free market to maximize its potential development, it would

seem unfair to the providers of the content that will ultimately be disseminated via the Internet not to afford

them the same opportunities to maximize their potential over the powerful Internet medium.

For these reasons, the Copyright Office recommends that Congress decline to create a compulsory

license for the retransmission of broadcast signals on the Internet.
 The term "white area" refers to an area unserved by television signals. Originally, the term meant a geographic 111

area that was not capable of over-the-air reception of any broadcast signals, but the term now means in the context of

the satellite license a household which is not capable of receiving an over-the-air signal of a local network affiliate and

has not received a network signal from the local cable operator within the previous 90 days. The satellite license for

network signals is therefore limited to subscribers who reside in unserved households.

 However, there is no such restriction concerning the retransmission of superstations. 112

100

IX. UNSERVED HO USEHO LD RESTRICTIO N: DISCUSSIO N AND

ANALYSIS

A. WHAT IS IT?

Section 119(a)(2)(B) of the Copyright Act provides that the compulsory license granted under section

119 for the retransmission of television network signals is limited to "persons who reside in unserved

households." This provision of section 119 is the network territorial limitation of the compulsory license,

also known as the "white area" restriction. What it means is that satellite carriers may not make use of the 111

section 119 license to retransmit a network signal to a subscriber who already receives the signal from

another source. The restriction is therefore a communications provision, modeled after a regulation of the 112

Federal Communications Commission applicable to the cable industry (the network nonduplication rule),

even though it appears in the Copyright Act.

The means of determining when a particular subscriber resides in an unserved household, and is

therefore eligible for receipt of a network signal under the satellite license, is found in the definition of an

"unserved household" in section 119(d)(10). That provision provides:

The term "unserved household," with respect to a particular television network, means a

household that --

(A) cannot receive through the use of a conventional outdoor

rooftop receiving antenna, an over-the-air signal of Grade B intensity (as

defined by the Federal Communications Commission) of a primary network

station affiliated with that network, and 

(B) has not, within 90 days before the date on which that household

subscribes, either initially or on renewal, to receive secondary
 The comments submitted by the satellite carriers state that private licensing of broadcast programming as a 113

general matter, is not possible. See e.g. SCBA, comment 9, at 3. Copyright owners, however, favor such an approach.

See e.g. MPAA, comment 35, reply comment 3. None of the commenters offered any discussion of whether private

licensing of network signals would be possible for subscribers who were served with network signals from another

source. Given the contentious nature of the unserved household issue in the context of the current statutory provisions,

it is reasonable to infer that copyright owners would not allow private licensing of network programming to served

households.

101

transmissions by a satellite carrier of a network station affiliated with that

network, subscribed to a cable system that provides the signal of a primary

network station affiliated with that network.

If the subscriber resides in an unserved household with respect to a particular network, then a

satellite carrier may make use of the satellite license to retransmit a network signal to the subscriber. If the

subscriber does not reside in an unserved household, then the carrier cannot make use of the license. It is

important to note, however, that the copyright law does not prohibit a satellite carrier from providing network

service to a subscriber who does not reside in an unserved household. Rather, the satellite carrier simply

cannot make use of the compulsory license in this circumstance, and must negotiate privately with the

copyright owners of the programming appearing on the network signals being retransmitted. The Copyright

Office is not aware, however, of any satellite carriers or copyright owners that have attempted to negotiate

such rights.113

B. HISTO RY O F THE RESTRICTIO N

The genesis of the unserved household restriction was the 1988 Satellite Home Viewer Act. At the

time, the satellite industry was in the nascent stage of development, with home satellite dishes still a relative

novelty, and digital satellite service (DBS) still years away. As a new industry, satellite carriers were

relatively free of regulation. Restrictions and limitations applicable to the cable industry, particularly those

addressing the exclusivity of broadcast programming, did not and do not apply to satellite carriers

retransmitting broadcasting programming. Given this lack of regulatory obligation in the communications

context, it was determined that creation of a compulsory license for the satellite industry must be conditioned
 If the station is located in a smaller television market, an additional 20 miles of protection is added, for a total 114

of 55 miles.

102

upon certain communication regulatory concerns. The principal manifestation of these concerns was the

unserved household restriction.

The restriction was designed as a surrogate for the network nonduplication rules of the FCC

applicable to the cable industry. These rules, found at 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.92-76.97, prevent a cable operator

from importing a distant network signal to compete with a local broadcast station carrying that same network.

The purpose of these rules is to allow affiliate broadcasters to negotiate network programming exclusivity

rights with their respective networks so that the network affiliate stations are the only ones authorized to

broadcast network programming in their areas. The area in which a local network affiliate is entitled to

nonduplication protection is defined in its programming contract with its network, but in no case can the

protection exceed an area more than 35 miles from the broadcast station.114

No similar rule existed for the satellite industry at the time of passage of the Satellite Home Viewer

Act in 1988, nor does such a rule exist now. When Congress first considered creating the satellite license,

network broadcasters expressed concern that local affiliates would lose viewers to distant network stations

imported by satellite carriers because of the lack of nonduplication protection. Unlike cable systems, which

carry the signals of the local affiliates (and are now required to do so by the must-carry rules recently upheld

by the Supreme Court), satellite carriers do not provide local signals. Thus, for example, a person residing

in Washington, D.C. who subscribed to satellite service would not receive the Washington, D.C. NBC

affiliate, but would most likely receive the New York City NBC affiliate. The Washington, D.C. affiliate

would therefore lose as viewers those subscribing to a satellite service, thereby affecting the viewing ratings

of the station and, ultimately, reducing its advertising revenues. Broadcasters insisted that if Congress were

to enact a copyright compulsory license for satellite carriers, a restriction must be built into the license to
103

afford them nonduplication protection and prevent their loss of viewership to distant network stations. The

result was the creation of the section 119(a)(2)(B) unserved household restriction.

The legislative history to the 1988 Satellite Home Viewer Act is replete with Congressional

endorsements of the network-affiliate relationship and the need for nonduplication protection. The House

Commerce Committee Report states:

 Under the bill, satellite carriers are provided a limited interim

compulsory license for the sole purpose of facilitating the transmission of

each network's programming to "white areas" which are unserved by that

network. The Committee believes that this approach will satisfy the public

interest in making available network programming in these (typically rural)

areas, while also respecting the public interest in protecting the networkaffiliate distribution system.

This television network-affiliate distribution system involves a

unique combination of national and local elements, which has evolved over

a period of decades. The network provides the advantages of program

acquisition or production and the sale of advertising on a national scale, as

well as the special advantages flowing from the fact that its service covers

a wide range of programs throughout the broadcast day, which can be

scheduled so as to maximize the attractiveness of the overall product. But

while the network is typically the largest single supplier of nationally

produced programming for its affiliates, the affiliate also decides which

network programs are locally broadcast; produces local news and other

programs of special interest to its local audience, and creates an overall

program schedule containing network, local and syndicated programming.

 The Committee believes that historically and currently the networkaffiliate partnership serves the broad public interest. It combines the

efficiencies of national production, distribution and selling with a

significant decentralization of control over the ultimate service to the

public. It also provides a highly effective means whereby the special

strengths of national and local program service support each other. This

m et h o d o f reconciling the values served by both centralization and

decentralization in television broadcast service has served the country well.

The networks and their affiliates contend that the exclusivity

provided an affiliate as the outlet for its network in its own market is an

essential element of the overall system. They assert that by enhancing the

economic value of the network service to the affiliate, exclusivity increased

the affiliate's resources and incentive to support and promote the network

in it s competition with the other broadcast networks and the other

nationally distributed broadcast and nonbroadcast program services.
 H.R. Rep. No. 887 (Part 2), 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 19-20 (1988). See also H.R. Rep. No. 887 (Part 1), 100th 115

Cong., 2d Sess. 18-19 (1988).

104

The Committee intends by this provision to satisfy both aspects of

the public interest -- bringing network programming to unserved areas

while preserving the exclusivity that is an integral part of today's networkaffiliate relationship.115

The sentiments expressed by the 100th Congress extended to the 103d Congress when it passed an

extension of the satellite carrier compulsory license in 1994. Not only did the 103d Congress endorse the

principle of network nonduplication protection embodied in the license, it strengthened the enforcement

provisions. Prior to 1994, a network affiliate (or copyright owner) aggrieved by a satellite carrier's violation

of the unserved household restriction had only the copyright infringement suit as a means of redress.

Statutory damages were limited ($5 per subscriber per month in the case of individual violations, and

$250,000 per accounting period for a pattern of violations), and no suits were brought in the initial term of

the license. While these limitations remained in place, the 103d Congress clearly delineated that, in an

infringement suit, the burden of proof rested with the satellite carrier to demonstrate that it had not violated

the unserved household restriction. 17 U.S.C. § 119(a)(5)(D). Further, Congress created a transitional

enforcement regime, lasting from 1994-1996, which allowed each network affiliate to issue written

ch allenges against subscribers receiving network service which it believed did not reside in unserved

households. 

For subscribers residing within the predicted Grade B contour of a network affiliate, upon receipt

of a challenge, the satellite carrier servicing that subscriber had two options: 1) turn off immediately the

service of that network signal to the subscriber; or 2) conduct a signal intensity measurement at the

household of the subscriber to determine if he or she was receiving a signal of Grade B intensity at his or her

rooftop antenna. If the satellite carrier conducted the signal intensity measurement and it revealed that the

subscriber did not receive a signal of Grade B intensity from the challenging affiliate, then service could

continue and the affiliate was required to pay the cost of the measurement. If the measurement revealed that
 In addition to adopting the transitional signal intensity measurement, Congress broadened the definition of a 116

network signal covered by the unserved household restriction. See 17 U.S.C. § 111(d)(2). Broadcast stations affiliated

with Fox, Paramount and Warner Brothers are now considered network signals under section 119, whereas they are not

under the cable compulsory license.

 Cannan Communications, Inc. v. PrimeTime 24 Joint Venture 117 , CIV. No. 2-96-CV-086, (N.D. Tex., Amarillo

(continued...)

105

the subscriber did receive a signal of Grade B intensity, then the satellite carrier was required to immediately

turn off service of that network to the subscriber and absorb the cost of the measurement (i.e. "loser pays").

Affiliates were limited in the number of subscribers that they could require a satellite carrier to

conduct a measurement for, not to exceed 5 percent of the subscribers within the affiliate's local market

within a calendar year. For those subscribers challenged in excess of 5 percent, the responsibility to conduct

the signal intensity measurement fell to the challenging affiliate. Satellite carriers were given 60 days to turn

off service when the measurement determined that the subscriber received a Grade B intensity signal, and

30 days after termination to notify the affiliate that such action had been taken. At the same time, the

satellite carrier was required to reimburse the affiliate for the cost of the measurement.

For subscribers who resided outside the predicted Grade B contour of the affiliate station, the

responsibility of conducting signal intensity measurements fell upon the affiliate, with the same "loser pays"

regime applicable to the results. If an affiliate made a reasonable attempt to conduct a survey at the

household of a subscriber and was denied access for the purpose of making the measurement, then the

satellite carrier was required to terminate service within 60 days of denial of access.116

As noted above, the transitional signal intensity measurement provisions expired on December 31,

1996. Broadcasters currently aggrieved of violations of the unserved household restriction must once again

resort to the traditional enforcement action of the Copyright Act -- the infringement suit. To date,

broadcasters have brought lawsuits in Texas and Florida for violations of the unserved household restriction,

and the defendant in both those cases, PrimeTime 24, has counterclaimed for antitrust violations in New

York federal district court. 117
(...continued)

Division); CBS, Inc. v. PrimeTime 24 Joint Venture, CIV-Nesbitt No. 96-3650, (S.D. Fla., Miami Division); PrimeTime

24 Joint Venture v. NBC, Inc., 97 CIV-3951, (S.D.N.Y., filed May 30, 1997). 

 One satellite carrier, Primestar Partners , L.P., states that it is too early for the Copyright Office to propose 118

changes, if any, to the unserved household restriction because certain satellite carriers and broadcasters are attempting

to negotiate their differences. Instead, Primestar advocates that Congress should consider adopting any solutions which

the parties may privately negotiate. Primestar, comment 19, at 2-3.

106

C. THE ISSUES PRESENTED BY THE UNSERVED HO USEHO LD RESTRICTIO N

Operation of the unserved household restriction, particularly the transitional signal intensity

measurement provisions, has been problematic. Satellite carriers claim that they cannot determine when

p art icular households are, or are not, eligible for network service, and that the current standard of

measurement -- Grade B -- is flawed and unworkable. Broadcasters claim that the current standard is fine

and superior to any other methods, and that the problem lies with the satellite carriers' (particularly

PrimeTime 24) repeated intentional violations of the restriction. Satellite subscribers faced with termination

of their network service have raised their concerns with Congress, the Copyright Office, and the FCC;

expressing anger and confusion with a law they believe denies them the right to obtain any programming they

are willing to pay for. The controversy engendered by the restriction is one of the principal factors

motivating this study by the Office.

1. Eligibility for Satellite Network Service.

a. Complaints of the satellite carriers. As noted earlier in this study, satellite carriers

assert that extension of the satellite license is critical to the continued success of their industry as a

competitor of the wired cable industry. To foster further success, the satellite carriers uniformly state in their

testimony before the Office that clarification of the unserved household restriction is required so that

consumers may be adequately served while, at the same time, satellite carriers will be able to determine their

responsibilities and liabilities under the Copyright Act in a cost efficient manner.118
 See DIRECTV, reply comment 26, at 6; Hamilton County Telephone Co-op, reply comment 8, at 1, 119

 PrimeTime 24, reply comment 15, at 1. 120

 National Rural Telecommunications Commission, comment 34, at 9-10. 121

107

Suggestions as to the reform of the unserved household restriction range from its abolition, to 119

replacement of the Grade B standard with a picture quality standard for determining subscriber eligibility,120

to payment of a surcharge collected from subscribers to network affiliates to compensate for loss of

viewership.121

PrimeTime 24 is the principal advocate of replacing the Grade B signal intensity standard with a test

of picture quality. Under the PrimeTime 24 proposal, a first-cut approach would categorize subscribers

geographically to determine eligibility. Known as the "red zone/green zone" approach, certain geographic

areas would be targeted as automatically eligible for satellite service ("green zone"), while subscribers in the

remaining geographic areas ("red zones") would be eligible for network service pending the outcome of a

new testing regime. The Grade B signal intensity standard of section 119(d)(10) would be replaced by a

picture quality standard, whereby a subscriber would be eligible for service of a particular network if he or

she did not receive an adequate over-the-air picture from the local affiliate. The subscriber would also be

required to sign an affidavit that he or she did not receive an adequate over-the-air picture, and that such poor

picture is not the product of inadequate or faulty receiving equipment. The affidavit would be turned over

t o t h e respective affiliate located near the subscriber (i.e. the one that caused the subscriber to be

geographically determined to be in a "red zone"), and the affiliate would have the opportunity to challenge

the subscriber's receipt of satellite network service. Once a challenge is issued, an objective third party

observer, approved by both the satellite carrier and challenging affiliate, would enter the subscriber's home

and view his or her over-the-air picture quality of the local affiliate. The third party observer would be

supplied with graded images of standard picture quality, ranging from excellent to unacceptable, agreed to

by both satellite carriers and affiliates. If the observer determined the over-the-air picture to be inadequate,
108

the subscriber could receive satellite service of that network, and the challenging affiliate would pay the cost

of the test. If the observer determined the picture quality to be adequate, the subscriber would be denied

service and the satellite carrier would bear the cost of the test. The observer's determination would be final,

and not subject to appeal.

PrimeTime 24 argues that the Grade B signal intensity test must be replaced with a picture quality

test because an over-the-air broadcast signal of Grade B intensity does not guarantee receipt of a quality

picture. It submits that key provisions of the current definition of an unserved household -- such as

"conventional rooftop antenna" and "signal of Grade B intensity" -- are not defined by the FCC. It further

notes that the FCC's rules governing the Grade B contour and its determination were fashioned by the FCC

more than 40 years ago as predictors of television service, not of the respective quality of the television

picture. See PrimeTime 24, reply comment 24, at 9 (citing MIT study that showed no correlation between

signal strength and picture quality). PrimeTime 24 submits that the ultimate inquiry for the consumer is the

quality of his or her picture, not whether he or she is receiving a signal of any particular strength.

As an alternative to a prohibition on certain satellite subscribers receiving network service, several

commenters propose that subscribers residing in the "red zone" be charged an additional amount for the

privilege of receiving satellite network service. This surcharge would be collected into a fund and distributed

to network affiliates in a manner similar to the division of compulsory license fees under section 119.

DIRECTV, reply comment 26, at 6; Hamilton County Telephone Co-Op, reply comment 8, at 1. Finally, the

satellite carriers submit that whether the unserved household definition is retained or reformed, all existing

subscribers of network service should be grandfathered in their receipt of such service during any extension

period of the 17 U.S.C. § 119 license.

b. Complaints of the broadcasters. Not surprisingly, broadcasters object to any

modifications of the unserved household definition and call for stronger enforcement measures. They assert

that the Grade B signal intensity standard is the only truly objective one, and that a picture quality standard
 See e.g. NBC, comment 39 and reply comment 24; LIN TV, reply comment 1; see also Small Cable Business 122

Administration, comment 8 and reply comment 33.

109

will prove impossible to administer and will result in serious erosion of over-the-air network viewership.

Broadcasters also oppose any grandfathering of existing satellite customers, asserting that violations of the

current statute should not be rewarded in any extension of the license.

Broadcasters' objections to any changes in the current unserved household restriction are principally

championed by the National Association of Broadcasters ("NAB") and the Network Affiliated Station

Alliance ("NASA"). NAB begins its challenge by stating that the legislative history demonstrates that

section 119 was created to allow satellite carriers an opportunity to provide network service to rural areas

of the country, not urban areas, and submit an affidavit of Michael Remington, former majority counsel to

the House Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property and the Administration of Justice, who was

responsible for drafting the 1988 Satellite Home Viewer Act. NAB, reply comment 30, at Appendix A. NAB

submits that section 119 was never created with the intent to allow satellite carriers to enter urban areas of

the country, and that satellite carriers' efforts to amend the unserved household restriction are nothing more

than an attempt to grab a greater market share of television viewers at the expense of local network

broadcasters. Id. at 12.

NAB, NASA, and all other broadcaster commenters, uniformly attack statutory substitution of a 122

picture quality standard for Grade B. NASA states that Grade B "is an objective tool or proxy developed by

the FCC for measuring picture quality," and that in terms of objectivity of a test standard, "[n]othing is a

close second" to the Grade B standard. NASA, reply comment 19, at 17, 40. Both NASA and NAB

challenge satellite carriers' assertions that there is no relationship between a signal of Grade B intensity and

picture quality, asserting that satellite carriers' MIT study demonstrating a lack of such relationship is biased

and analytically flawed. Id. at 9-11; NAB, reply comment 30, at 15-16. During the hearings before the

Copyright Office and in the comments, NAB and NASA presented evidence to demonstrate that there is a
 Much, if not all, of this testimony was for mulated by the broadcasters for their infringement suits against 123

PrimeTime 24 in Amarillo, TX and Miami, FL.

110

direct correlation between Grade B signal intensity and picture quality, and that PrimeTime 24 is serving

numerous subscribers with network signals who are capable of receiving a good quality picture over-the-air

from the local network affiliate.123

Likewise, broadcasters uniformly criticize the picture quality standard put forth by satellite carrier

interests as administratively unworkable. Specifically, they attack PrimeTime 24's proposal of a subscriber

affidavit followed by a third party observer picture quality test. With respect to the affidavit, NAB asserts

that such an affidavit is valueless because subscribers will naturally be biased in the consideration of the

over-the-air picture quality, and are already predisposed to satellite service. Id. at 18. NASA questions what

is meant by an affidavit, and what penalties would be adopted if the subscriber made false statements. NASA,

reply comment 19, at 10-11.

With respect to picture quality, both NAB and NASA submit that, by definition, such a determination

is completely subjective, and submit deposition testimony from PrimeTime 24's expert witnesses in the

Miami and Amarillo cases confirming the subjectivity. Id. at 13-14. Because of the inherent subjectivity,

they question how a third party observer, acting alone, can accurately assess the quality of a picture. Both

NAB and NASA cite the International Telecommunications Union's 1995 publication, "Methodology for the

Subjective Assessment of the Quality of Television Pictures," which calls for at least fifteen nonexpert

observers, viewing the television screen in a controlled lighting environment, to make an accurate picture

quality determination. NAB, reply comment 30, at 16-17; NASA, reply comment 19, at 19. Further, even

assuming that satellite carriers and broadcasters could agree to some kind of observer test, NASA questions

how a subjective picture quality test could be applied by a federal judge and/or jury in determining a

copyright infringement suit for violation of the unserved household restriction. Id. at 20.
111

NASA also criticizes the suggestion of several commenters that, instead of a ban on satellite service

in served households, subscribers pay a surcharge for satellite network service which would be distributed

among local broadcasters. NASA submits that such a proposal "is fundamentally at odds with the principle

of a free market and with traditional protection afforded intellectual property." Id. at 23. NBC asserts that

such a surcharge would not preserve audience share and would jeopardize the economic viability of local

affiliate stations. NBC, reply comment 30, at 7. 

Further, if there is an extension of section 119, all broadcasters oppose the grandfathering of existing

subscribers who are receiving network service in violation of the current unserved household restriction

provision. See e.g. NASA, reply comment 19, at 25; NAB, comment 39, at 42-43.

Although broadcasters oppose any changes to the current unserved household restriction, NASA

proposes several amendments to enhance its operation and effectiveness. First, NASA recommends that any

household passed by cable, whether or not it actually subscribes, be prevented from obtaining satellite

network service. NASA submits that such a proposal favors receipt of the local affiliate from cable, and

would allow removal of the 90 day waiting period after cable subscription currently present in section

119(d)(10). NASA, reply comment 19, at 31. Second, NASA proposes that all satellite carriers be required

to place a disclosure statement in all sales, advertising, promotion, and customer information agreements

identifying the provisions of the unserved household restriction and informing customers and potential

customers that they might not be eligible for satellite service of network signals. Id. at 33. Third, NASA

requests that the limitations on statutory damages in sections 119(a)(5)(A) and (B) be removed so that

broadcasters and copyright owners are entitled to full copyright remedies for unserved household restriction

violations. Id. at 34. 

Fourth, NASA requests that all commercial substitutions performed by satellite carriers in their

carriage of network signals be banned. Id. at 35. See also LIN TV, reply comment 1, at ii. Fifth, NASA

requests that satellite carriers be prevented from providing service of network signals to any subscribers until
112

notice of such service has been given to the area affiliate and the affiliate has had a reasonable period of time

(45 days) to evaluate the subscriber's location and his or her eligibility to receive network service. Id. at 35.

Finally, NASA requests that in providing subscriber lists to the networks (which is currently required by

section 119(a)(2)(C)), satellite carriers be required to sort their subscriber lists by market and send the list

of new subscribers and disconnects to the appropriate local affiliate, with a copy to the network. NASA

asserts that such a requirement will reduce the number of inappropriate challenges brought by local affiliates.

Id. at 36.

c. The 90 day waiting period. In addition to the Grade B intensity standard, the

unserved household definition prohibits a satellite carrier from providing network service to a subscriber that

had received cable service, which included the local affiliates, within the previous 90 days. NAB supports

retention of this aspect of the unserved household restriction and urges that the waiting period be expanded

because Congress should favor local retransmission services, such as cable, over national retransmission

services such as satellite. NAB, comment 39, at 40. 

Satellite carriers oppose retention of the 90 day waiting period. SBCA argues that the provision is

anti-consumer and serves no legitimate copyright function because "one multichannel video service is

favored over another and thus [the provision] has inadvertently created a government-sponsored `industrial

policy.'" SBCA, reply comment 22, at 5. PrimeTime 24 opposes NASA's suggestion that satellite network

service be prohibited to households passed by cable. PrimeTime 24, reply comment 15, at 20-21.

2. The Local Retransmission Issue.

A controversial issue that arose at the initiation of this study is the retransmission by satellite carriers

of local network affiliates to subscribers who reside in the affiliates' local markets. Specifically, local

retransmission was being aggressively advanced by American Sky Broadcasting (ASkyB), a venture of

Rupert Murdoch's News Corporation Limited. Although interest in providing local retransmissions has
 Provision of local network retransmission was supposed to be made a part of a new DBS service known as 124

"Sky," the result of a merger between ASkyB and another satellite carrier, EchoStar. ASkyB, comment 33, at 1, f.n. 1.

The merger of EchoStar and ASkyB did not, however, take place and ASkyB is currently slated to merge with Primestar

Partners. There are no announced plans to begin immediate offerings of local network signals, as was the original

ASkyB plan.

 See, Letter from Marilyn Kretsinger, Acting General Counsel, to William S. Reyner, Jr. (August 15, 1996). 125

113

recently waned, the issue is st 124 ill open for consideration and the testimony of ASkyB and others remain in

the record.

ASkyB's proposal, as presented in its written comments and oral testimony, was to launch a DBS

service late in 1997 to, among other things, retransmit local broadcast signals to local audiences. The

retransmission of local broadcast signals would make ASkyB very much like a local cable operator, in that

its subscribers would not have to rely upon distant (particularly network) signals for broadcast programming.

Local retransmission would be achieved through a combination of signal compression, so that more signals

co uld be placed on each satellite transponder, and a process known as "spot beaming," whereby

retransmission of particular signals would be confined to a narrow geographic area, as opposed to the whole

country, thereby allowing multiple use of the same frequency. 

In the summer of last year, representatives of ASkyB approached the Copyright Office requesting

a declaratory ruling that local retransmission of network signals was permissible under the satellite license

and, specifically, the unserved household restriction. After being informed by the Office that it did not issue

declaratory rulings in matters of statutory interpretation, ASkyB revised its request to inquire as to whether

the Office would accept a statement of account and royalty fees from a satellite carrier that identified

retransmission of network signals within the stations' local markets. The Office replied that it would.125

Although the Office's response has been variously represented as an affirmation of the Copyright Office that

local retransmission of network signals is permissible under the current statute, the Office expressly
114

disavowed making such a determination and confined its opinion to articulating its practice for accepting

satellite statements of account and royalty fees. Id. at 4-5.

ASkyB now requests that the definition of an unserved household be "reaffirmed and clarified" to

ensure that the local retransmission of network signals does not run afoul of the unserved household

restriction. ASkyB, comment 33, at 2. In addition, ASkyB requests that the unserved household definition

be amended to define what constitutes a "local" retransmission. ASkyB asserts that a network station's local

service area should be its Area of Dominant Influence (ADI) as defined by the FCC. Id. at 7. Under this

approach, a satellite carrier would be able to retransmit the signal of the Washington, D.C. NBC affiliate

within that station's ADI without violating the unserved household restriction. Thus, the Baltimore NBC

affiliate could not object to subscribers in the Washington ADI who received an over-the-air signal of Grade

B intensity of the Baltimore affiliate. Finally, ASkyB requests that the royalty rate paid by satellite carriers

for local retransmission of both network and superstation signals be zero, the same rate applicable to local

retransmissions by cable systems carrying local signals. Id. at 8.

Most of the parties presenting testimony in this proceeding favor the concept of local retransmission

of broadcast signals; in fact, some welcome it. See e.g. NBC, reply comment 24, at 8. Those commenting

on the issue, however, urge that satellite carriers retransmitting local signals be required to comply with FCC

regulations applicable to local retransmissions by cable systems, particularly the must-carry rules. See NASA,

reply comment 19, at 30.
115

3. The PBS Issue.

PBS adds an additional wrinkle to the unserved household restriction: namely an exemption from

the restriction for its national satellite service. Rather than rely upon satellite carriage of individual PBS

affiliates, PBS proposes creation of a direct feed to satellite carriers of PBS programming, i.e., a national

PBS satellite service. PBS asserts that it needs the section 119 license to provide this service and, because

it is defined as a network under the license, needs an exemption from the unserved household restriction.

PBS, reply comment 28, at 1. Thus, under PBS's proposal, a subscriber residing in Arlington, Virginia,

would be eligible for service of PBS from his or her satellite carrier, even though there is a PBS affiliate

located in Arlington. PBS asserts that its national service will solve any potential unserved household

restriction problems for public television and should be endorsed. Id. at 2. 

DIRECTV supports a PBS national service, asserting that it "can and should be an important source

of noncommercial educational and informational programming that DBS operators can use to meet their

obligations to reserve channel capacity for such programming under section 335 of the Communications

Act." DIRECTV, comment 14, at 9-10.

D. DISCUSSIO N AND ANALYSIS

The unserved household restriction has created considerable turmoil not only between satellite

carriers and broadcasters, but between consumers and the federal government. The Copyright Office has

received more Congressional inquiries on the eligibility of satellite subscribers for network service than any

other matter in its history, and the FCC (as well as the Office) has been bombarded with literally thousands

of calls and letters from irate subscribers who, for the most part, believe that federal law prevents them from

obtaining network programming that they are willing to pay for and want to see. The question of what to do

about the unserved household restriction is a difficult one which admits of no easy answer. Unfortunately,

there was nothing close to a consensus among the parties presenting testimony to the Office, and the battle

lines between satellite carriers and broadcasters are clear and longstanding. Nevertheless, the Office is
116

entering the fray in an attempt to resolve consumer confusion caused by the unserved household restriction

and to recommend a more efficient and workable compulsory license.

1. Should the Unserved Household Restriction Remain in the Copyright Law?

If section 119 is extended, the threshold question is why retain this restriction at all. The restriction

is a copyright substitute for a communications regulation (the network nonduplication rules) and, as such,

is arguably better located in communications law. The fact that the unserved household restriction ended

up in the copyright law is nothing more than happenstance. Because the FCC did not regulate the carriage

of broadcast signals by satellite, network broadcasters could not receive the exclusivity protection they

enjoyed in the cable setting, and therefore lobbied Congress in 1988 to place such protection in the copyright

law. If the section 119 license is extended, the Communications Act of 1934 could be amended to include

network exclusivity (and, for that matter, syndicated exclusivity) protection for satellite retransmissions of

broadcast signals, or the FCC could be directed to adopt nonduplication rules for the satellite industry. The

FCC has considerable experience and expertise in creating and applying nonduplication rules to the cable

industry and is capable of extending those rules to satellite. The FCC has applied its network nonduplication

rules for a number of years, and the Copyright Office is not aware of any dissatisfaction in either the cable

or broadcast industries with the scope of protection and application of these rules. Furthermore, the FCC

has the continuing jurisdiction and regulatory mechanisms to make adjustments to its regulations on a case

by case basis should any difficulties arise. The Copyright Office, on the other hand, lacks expertise in

communications law, and does not enforce the copyright law or have authority to resolve the substantive

rights of individual parties. Congress may, therefore, wish to remove the matter of network exclusivity

protection from copyright law and place it in communications law where it more appropriately belongs.

Having said this, the Office does understand that there is a fundamental difference between network

exclusivity protection in the cable arena and that of satellite, though such difference does not have a bearing

upon its removal from copyright law. Cable television is a localized retransmission service, technologically
 This presumes, of course, that subscription to satellite preempts viewing of local signals from other sources. 126

 If a satellite carrier is providing service of the local affiliate of a network to a subscriber, there remains the 127

possibility that the carrier may still wish to import a distant affiliate of the same network as an additional service. This

is precisely the situation that the FCC's network nonduplication rules were adopted to cover, and the rules could be

applied to the satellite industry. The Office believes that this could best be accomplished by FCC regulation, as opposed

(continued...)

117

capable (and required by law) of delivering local broadcast stations to subscribers. Every network affiliate

is therefore virtually guaranteed to be on the local cable operator's system. Importation of a distant network

affiliate by a cable system would provide a subscriber with a supplement to his or her local affiliate service,

not a substitute. The same is not the case with satellite service of network signals. Because satellite remains

a nationwide retransmission service, it must select a limited number of network affiliates to provide all its

customers across the country. Thus, in areas where a household is receiving its local network affiliate by

other means (over-the-air or via cable), subscription to satellite acts as a substitute for local viewing.126

Because the satellite industry currently does not provide subscribers with their local network signals, the

Copyright Office believes that importation of distant network signals creates a greater potential for harm for

broadcasters and copyright owners in the satellite context than it does in the cable context. This distinction

explains why there has not been a significant and continuing controversy over the network nonduplication

rules and exclusivity protection in cable, and why the tension between network broadcasters and satellite

carriers over the unserved household restriction is so great.

2. Local Retransmission: The Best Solution.

In the Copyright Office's view, the best solution to the issue of subscriber eligibility for satellite

service of network signals is a technological one. If satellite carriers were to provide subscribers who reside

within the local market of a network affiliate the signal of that affiliate, the need for the unserved household

restriction with respect to that affiliate would be eliminated. The subscriber would be served with the local

network affiliate, and the satellite carrier would no longer be required to import a distant network affiliate

in order to provide network service to the subscriber. The Copyright Office, therefore, recommends that 127
(...continued)

to attempting to include further nonduplication protection in the copyright law.

 It is not, however, the sole method for determining local markets under the cable license. In addition to ADI, 128

cable systems may use the FCC's 1976 must-carry rules, and determinations thereunder, applying whichever one yields

the larger geographic area.

118

retransmission of any broadcast station, network or independent, within that station's local market be

permissible under section 119.

To implement this recommendation, there are certain issues which require resolution. Any

amendment must include a definition of a station's local market, both for commercial and noncommercial

educational stations. NASA recommends that the predicted Grade B contour, adopted under the 1994

Satellite Home Viewer Act to define the area wherein a broadcaster could challenge a subscribers receipt

of satellite network service, be used to determine the local markets. NASA, reply comment 19, at 30. NRTC

favors adoption of a 35 mile zone to define the local market of a network station, while ASkyB favors use

of "market determinations made by the FCC that delineate the geographic scope of the cable compulsory

license under §111" (i.e., the station's Area of Dominant Influence (ADI)). NRTC, reply comment 31, at 5-6;

ASkyB, comment 33, at 7.

Because the Copyright Office is endorsing local retransmission for both network and non-network

stations, local markets must be defined for noncommercial educational stations as well as commercial

stations. The FCC defines a commercial station's local market as its ADI for purposes of the must-carry

rules, and ADI is currently used for determining local markets under the cable compulsory license. The 128

Office believes that ADI is superior to Grade B contours or 35 miles because ADI's are separated from one

another by community lines, unlike Grade B contours or a 35 mile zone which is likely to cross through

communities, resulting in a commercial station which is local to one part of a community but not another.
 This would exclude PBS if its national satellite service preempts carriage of all PBS affiliates. 129

 Small and medium sized systems pay a fixed fee regardless of the number of broadcast signals, local or distant, 130

that they retransmit.

119

Unfortunately, ADI is only applicable to commercial stations. A separate definition is, therefore,

required for noncommercial educational stations. Rather than attempt artificially to apply ADIs to 129

noncommercial educational stations, the Office recommends defining the local market of a noncommercial

educational station as an area encompassing 50 miles from the community of license of the station, including

any communities served in whole or in part by the 50 mile radius. This area is broad enough to resemble the

local market for cable carriage of noncommercial educational stations, and to encompass must-carry

obligations that the FCC might someday impose on local retransmissions by satellite carriers.

In addition to defining the local market, a decision must be made as to what royalty rate, if any,

satellite carriers retransmitting local stations must pay to copyright owners. ASkyB states, that under the

cable compulsory license, large cable systems that carry at least one distant signal (which is the vast majority

of such systems) are not required to pay a royalty fee for local signals. ASkyB then asserts that the rate 130

should be zero to place satellite in parity with cable. ASkyB, comment 33, at 2. The Office notes that a

proceeding under chapter 8 of the Copyright Act to adjust the satellite license rates is currently underway,

and ASkyB has presented testimony to the Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel (CARP) proposing that it

adopt a zero rate for local retransmissions. Because the Copyright Office is obligated under the statute to

review the CARP's determination on this matter, the Office believes that it would be premature to suggest

or comment as to the appropriate royalty rate, if any, to be applied to local retransmissions by satellite. The

Office, therefore, refrains from making any recommendation at this time.

3. Failure of the Current Unserved Household Restriction.

Local retransmission of network affiliates is the best solution for resolving the problem of satellite

subscriber eligibility for network signals. The Copyright Office recognizes, however, that the technology
120

for retransmitting local signals via satellite is not widely available and that even ASkyB, its chief proponent,

m ay be backing away from offering such a service. The satellite industry remains a nationwide

retransmission service, capable of providing a limited number of broadcast signals on a national basis. The

problems associated with the unserved household restriction that existed in 1988, and were revisited in 1994,

persist and the stakes have been raised by the increase in size of the satellite industry and the diminution of

the networks' viewing share to other video sources. If there is another extension of the section 119 license,

the question is whether the problems with the unserved household restriction identified in the above sections

may be corrected, or at least ameliorated.

The section 119 license has now been in existence for almost 10 years. In its first term, the issues

surrounding the unserved household restriction were of private concern between copyright owners,

broadcasters and satellite carriers. These issues were brought into the public eye in 1994 with the adoption

of the transitional signal measurement provisions and the resulting termination of network satellite service

for thousands of satellite subscribers. As noted above, termination of service has led to a barrage of public

complaints with the Copyright Office, the FCC, and the Congress. The consumer ill-will created by the 1994

amendments can be traced to several sources.

First, from a public policy standpoint, the Office believes that the transitional signal measurement

provisions had problems inherent in their conception that doomed them to failure. The putative purpose of

the provisions was to enable broadcasters, through the issuance of challenges to subscribers, to weed out

ineligible subscribers through the mechanism of signal intensity measurements conducted at the subscribers'

households. Although the terms and conditions for conducting the measurements were not put in the statute,

both broadcasters and satellite carriers promised Congress at the time of passage of the 1994 Satellite Home

Viewer Act that they would privately negotiate the terms and conditions. They never did. Even if they had,

it is unlikely that satellite carriers would have conducted many, if any, measurements because the cost would
 Even though the statute provides that the "loser pays" the cost of the measurement, there are still the upfront 131

costs associated with conducting the test. For challenges to subscribers located within the predicted Grade B contours

of local affiliates, satellite carriers were required to incur the actual cost of the measurement, in the hopes of recovering

such cost at a later date. With broadcasters issuing tens of thousands of challenges, it was unreasonable to expect that

satellite carriers would absorb the initial cost of conducting measurements at each of these subscribers' household, even

with the 5% limit on the number of households subject to testing. See 17 U.S.C. § 119(a)(8)C).

 The term "waiver" is actually a misnomer, because the broadcaster is not waiving any provision of the law or 132

its rights. Instead, withdrawing the challenge is more along the lines of a covenant not to sue, whereby the local affiliate

agrees that it will not challenge a subscriber's receipt of satellite service of a network station as violative of the unserved

household restriction.

121

far exceed the revenues received from the subscribers for delivery of network signals. The result of this 131

impasse was that virtually no measurements of any sort were conducted, regardless of their legal sufficiency.

Instead, the common practice of the satellite carriers was, upon receipt of an affiliate challenge, to simply

turn off network service to the subscriber. Although the satellite carriers did not offer any testimony as to

the total number of disconnects, PrimeTime 24 claims to have terminated 300,000 subscribers' network

service as a result of challenges. PrimeTime 24, comment 11, at 1. It is, consequently, no surprise that there

has been a significant consumer uproar. Because the 1994 signal measurement provisions did not establish

a well defined, cost efficient testing regime, they could not operate as intended.

Responding to the complaints of its subscribers, the satellite carriers and their distributors often

informed customers that they could continue to receive service of a network signal if they contacted their

local affiliate and convinced the affiliate to withdraw its challenge. This practice is commonly referred to

as obtaining a "waiver" from the local broadcaster. Through its numerous contacts with satellite 132

customers, the Copyright Office is aware that many network affiliates have agreed to withdraw their

challenges. Many have not, however, and some affiliates have not had any mechanism in place to respond

to subscriber inquiries. Because there are no standards and requirements for this practice, its operation has

been uneven and has contributed to consumer confusion and anger.

Another practice of the satellite carriers was to inform subscribers whose network signal receipt had

been challenged to pay for and conduct their own signal intensity measurement. A corollary to this practice
122

was an offer from the satellite carrier to conduct the test, but at the subscriber's expense. A significant

problem with this approach is that because there are no agreed upon standards for conducting a measurement,

the legal sufficiency of a measurement conducted by a subscriber is in serious doubt. A subscriber could

therefore pay an engineer or other party to conduct a measurement, discover that he or she resides in an

unserved household, but still have network service terminated because the local affiliate and/or satellite

carrier would not accept the results of the measurement.

Another failure of the signal measurement provisions particularly, and the unserved household

restriction generally, is the confusion it has created among consumers. Subscribers who do not understand

the law and are faced with termination commonly complain that federal law prevents them from receiving

the television signals they are willing to pay for, or that the Copyright Office or the FCC has ruled that they

cannot receive network service. Satellite carriers, and particularly their distributors, have directly contributed

to this confusion, especially after they have signed up a potential customer for satellite network service.

Much of this confusion could have been avoided if satellite carriers were required to disclose the provisions

of the unserved household restriction before they provided a subscriber with satellite service.

The Copyright Office has also received numerous complaints regarding the 90 day waiting period

from termination of cable service. Consumers do not understand, in circumstances where they cannot receive

a signal of Grade B intensity and have discontinued their cable service, why they have to do without any

network service for three months. Clearly, the purpose of the 90 day waiting period is to discourage cable

subscribers from terminating their service, thereby making satellite service less attractive. The provision is

anti-competitive by favoring one type of video retransmission provider over another. The Copyright Office

cannot see any sound public policy reasons as to why consumers who do not subscribe to cable are

immediately eligible for satellite network service (provided, of course, that they do not receive the over-the-
 The Office also opposes, for the same reasons, NASA's suggestion that the unserved household definition be 133

amended to prevent any household that is passed by cable, but does not subscribe, from receiving satellite network

service, if it is otherwise eligible.

123

air signal), and those who have subscribed to cable in the past must endure 90 days without any network

service. The Office recommends that the 90 day waiting period be eliminated.133

4. The "Red Zone/Green Zone" Approach.

In sum, the signal measurement provisions have not provided a workable standard. If the section 119

license is extended, and the unserved household restriction remains in the copyright law, what can be done

to better determine a subscriber's eligibility for network service? The Copyright Office believes that the only

clear-cut solution to the problem of determining eligibility is to establish well defined geographic areas

wherein satellite service of a particular network is permitted and to exclude provision of service in all other

areas. This is the "red zone/green zone" approach described above in the discussion of the comments. Under

this approach, the local markets of a network affiliate would be defined, and satellite carriers would be

denied the compulsory license for a network signal for any subscriber who resides within the local market

of an affiliate of that same network (i.e., the "red zone"). Subscribers who reside outside the local market

of a network affiliate could receive satellite service of that affiliate (i.e., the "green zone"). Because Grade

B is not delineated along community lines and is consequently too imprecise to clearly define "red zones"

and "green zones," the Copyright Office recommends that reference to Grade B, for purposes of defining the

local market, be dropped and replaced by the same definitions of local markets for local retransmissions

described above. 

In addition, the Copyright Office recommends that satellite carriers, and their distributors, be

required by statute to disclose to subscribers before they receive satellite service whether or not the

subscriber resides in a "red zone" or a "green zone" for receipt of each network signal offered by the satellite

carrier. Such disclosure statements should substantially reduce consumer confusion by informing a potential

subscriber, up front, whether he or she is eligible to receive service of a particular network signal. 
124

The commenters are divided on the issue of whether subscribers currently receiving satellite network

service, either legitimately or illegitimately, should be grandfathered under any extension of section 119.

The Office is proposing a new standard for determining subscriber eligibility, which will change the

eligibility of many households. Some subscribers now eligible for a network signal will not be eligible for

it under the "red zone/green zone" approach, while subscribers not now eligible will become so under the

new approach. 

The Office is troubled by the idea of grandfathering subscribers who are not currently eligible for

network service, yet receive it anyway, and who would also not be eligible under the "red zone/green zone"

approach. The commenters did not address the issue of grandfathering in the context of the "red zone/green

zone" approach and the intricacies it presents. The Office believes that there is, therefore, an insufficient

record on which to base a recommendation on grandfathering at this time and refrains from doing so.

The Copyright Office believes that the "red zone/green zone" approach is the only way the unserved

household restriction can be reformed so as to provide clear statutory guidelines and a system that will

guarantee the program exclusivity of network affiliates. Implementation of the "red zone/green zone"

ap p ro ach will effectively end satellite service of network stations in urban areas and confine it to

predominantly rural areas of the country, which was the espoused purpose of adopting the satellite

compulsory license in 1988. 

5. The PBS National Satellite Service.

If the "red zone/green zone" approach is adopted, PBS will seek an exemption for its national

satellite service. PBS has represented to the Copyright Office that its affiliates have agreed to a national feed

of PBS programming, and there appears to be no reason to apply the "red zone/green zone approach" to

satellite carriage of the PBS national service. The Office, therefore, favors a statutory exemption for this

service.

6. The Picture Q uality and Grade B Standards.
125

While the Office recommends the "red zone/green zone" approach as the best statutory solution, it

recognizes that there will be households located in a "red zone" that do not receive an adequate over-the-air

signal from the local affiliate, and do not, or cannot, receive the local affiliate from a cable operator or other

multichannel video programming provider. The Office also understands that Congress is desirous of

providing cable with active competition, particularly in urban areas, and that satellite represents the potential

for such competition. The Office does not believe, however, that section 119 can be so finely crafted as to

permit workable determinations at to the eligibility of individual households for satellite receipt of specific

networks, short of creating a bureaucracy to make such determinations.

The Office has examined and considered the approach offered by PrimeTime 24 to replace the Grade

B signal intensity standard with a picture quality standard. The attractive asset of a picture quality standard

is that, in theory, it allows households that have previously not received acceptable network service to obtain

a network picture of high quality. The Office agrees with broadcasters, however, that a picture quality test

for eligibility of satellite service is far too subjective and inherently biased, and will increase consumer

confusion and conflict between satellite carriers and broadcasters. The Office questions the ability of

satellite carriers and broadcasters to agree to a third party observer to make picture quality determinations,

or a group of such individuals, when the parties could not agree to the far more objective Grade B signal

intensity measurement in 1994. Furthermore, the Office does not believe that picture quality is a legally

sufficient standard on which to base a determination of copyright liability. Because of the subjective nature

of picture quality, federal judges and juries are likely to arrive at very different conclusions as to what

constitutes an acceptable over-the-air picture, thereby muddying the infringement standard. The Office,

therefore, concludes that adoption of a picture quality standard would be unsound copyright policy.

At the same time, the Office acknowledges that the current Grade B standard is not without its

problems. While Grade B is certainly more objective than picture quality, over-the-air delivery of a signal

of Grade B intensity does not guarantee a quality picture. Even if Grade B is retained, none of the parties
 Some satellite carriers apparently offer network service for as little as $20 a year. 134

 W hile particularized determinations can be made by a government agency, the Copyright Office is not 135

suggesting that Congress create such an agency, or authorize an existing one, to determine which U.S. households can

or cannot receive what network signals from their satellite carrier.

126

have offered any solution as to how to conduct meaningful intensity measurements that are cost efficient for

satellite carriers. As long as the cost of measurement exceeds the revenues of service, there is no economic 134

incentive to conduct the measurement. If the cost of the measurement is placed upon the subscriber desiring

service, with perhaps the opportunity to recover the cost from the challenging network affiliate, clear

engineering standards must be adopted so as to guarantee uniformity in testing and to assure that the

subscriber will receive network service if the measurement reveals that he or she does indeed reside in an

unserved household. Because it lacks engineering expertise, the Copyright Office cannot recommend what

the measurement standards should be. The only suggestion that can be made is that if the standards are left

to the parties to negotiate, they be forced to go to arbitration after a period of time to resolve the matter so

as to avoid recurrence of the impasse of 1994.

In short, the Office seriously questions whether section 119 can be drafted so as to permit workable,

individual determinations of subscriber eligibility for network service. Individual determination typically

requires examination of individual facts, and a determination as to whether a particular household receives

adequate network coverage requires consideration of topographical features, weather conditions, availability,

location and sufficiency of the household's receiving equipment, access to other program providers, and other

special circumstances. These determinations cannot be made in a statutory provision.135

7. The Surcharge O ption.

Nevertheless, the Office recognizes the consumer issue, and the competition issue, of allowing

satellite carriers to offer network service to those subscribers who reside in "red zones" that legitimately

cannot receive an over-the-air signal. The answer is retransmission of local network affiliates by satellite

carriers. Because the technology to accomplish this is not readily available, the Office has considered other
 A surcharge is also a means of addressing the unique situation of owners of mobile homes and recreational 136

vehicles who desire satellite network service. Currently, satellite carriers are unable to sell satellite network service to

these consumers because such homes/vehicles may move into areas where they can receive over-the-air signals of

network affiliates, even if on a temporary basis. A satellite carrier that can provide network service to a mobile home

or recreational vehicle on one day, because that home/vehicle is an unserved household, can be liable for copyright

infringement the next day, because the home/vehicle has moved into a served area. A surcharge would alleviate this

problem by allowing satellite network service for these home/vehicles, albeit at a higher price than would presumably

be charged by a satellite carrier if the home/vehicle were a permanent structure located in an unserved area. 

127

options. Satellite carriers have proposed imposing a surcharge on these subscribers, and submitting the

surcharge to the Copyright Office for distribution to affiliates via the royalty distribution procedures of

chapter 8 of the Copyright Act. Broadcasters oppose the concept of a surcharge. The Office agrees that, over

the long term, a surcharge may not adequately compensate local affiliates for the loss of viewers, and

accompanying decline in revenues, resulting from increased satellite network service in red zones. A

surcharge, however, appears to be the only statutory mechanism for allowing subscribers in the "red zone"

an opportunity to receive satellite network service. It is not possible to craft a statutory test or standard 136

that will yield individual determinations of adequate network service (if, in fact, one can define what

adequate service is) or provide the economic incentives to make such determinations. A surcharge eliminates

the need for determining individual subscriber eligibility by allowing any subscriber in a "red zone" for a

particular network signal, if he or she wishes to incur the additional cost, to receive satellite service of that

network.

The Office does not offer any suggestion as to what would be an appropriate surcharge to level on

satellite carriage of network signals to "red zone" subscribers because the Office does not have any means

as its disposal for determining what amount of money would adequately compensate local network affiliates

for the loss of viewers to their signal. The rate could be established by Congress in the statute, or by a CARP

convened under chapter 8 of the Copyright Act.

Because of the long term harm to local affiliate viewership, the Office recommends that any

surcharge adopted be temporary. A temporary surcharge would allow the satellite industry additional time
 See Fourth Report and Order, Docket No. 87-268, 11 FCC Rcd 17,771 (1996); Fifth Report and Order, Docket 137

No. 87-268, 62 FR 26966 (May 16, 1997); Sixth Report and Order, Docket No. 87-268, 62 FR 26684 (May 14, 1997).

128

to develop and implement local retransmissions. If the satellite industry fails to implement this technology

by the expiration of the surcharge, then it would be consigned to providing network service to only those

subscribers in "green zones." 

In suggesting a temporary surcharge, the Office is guided by the fact that implementation of over-theair digital broadcasting in the next several years is likely to change the complexion as to what constitutes an

unserved household. The parties represented to the Office that over-the-air receipt of a digital television 137

signal is on an all or nothing basis. Either the household receives a digital quality picture, or it receives no

signal at all. This presents the possibility that a "picture receipt" standard may someday be implemented to

target individual households within the "red zone." It is premature, however, to recommend a solution to the

unserved household restriction for digital television. Even if broadcasters commence transmissions in digital

in a few years time, they will continue to simulcast a corresponding analog signal for a period of time.

Depending upon how well digital broadcast television is accepted by the public will determine how long

broadcasters continue analog transmissions. The FCC has targeted a ten year transition period, but this

certainly could be extended. Until such time as a majority of households choice to receive digital signals

through their television set, digital broadcasting will not offer any real solution to the unserved household

restriction. The Office, therefore, recommends that Congress reexamine the issue of satellite network service

to "red zone" subscribers once digital broadcasting is established and a firm timetable for elimination of

analog transmissions is adopted.

E. CO NCLUSIO N

Satellite subscriber eligibility of network signals is a problematic issue without a clear-cut solution.

Technological limitations created the need for the unserved household restriction, and technological

advancements can eliminate it by enabling satellite carriers to retransmit local network affiliates to their
129

subscribers. If the section 119 license is extended, the Copyright Office strongly recommends that it be

clarified to allow retransmission of all television broadcast stations, commercial as well as noncommercial

educational, within each station's local market. The Office proposes that the local market for commercial

stations be the same as defined by the FCC (i.e. ADI, and any modifications thereof), and for noncommercial

educational stations all communities in whole or in part within 50 miles of each station's community of

license. The Office does not take a position as to what royalty rate, if any, should apply to local

retransmissions.

Given that local retransmission has yet to be accomplished commercially in the satellite industry,

the Office recommends that any extension of the section 119 license should include revision of the unserved

household restriction. The Office found the transitional signal measurement provisions adopted in the 1994

Satellite Home Viewer Act to be a failure. The Office opposes the substitution of a picture quality standard

for the Grade B standard because it is too subjective, legally insufficient, and administratively unworkable.

Likewise, the Office finds the Grade B standard less than precise and costly when applied to individual

household determinations.

If network program exclusivity protection remains in the copyright law, (and the Office suggests that

it be moved to the communications law and regulation), the Office proposes adoption of a "red zone/green

zone" approach, based on local markets rather than Grade B, which would clearly delineate geographically

those subscribers who are eligible for network service and those that are not. The "red zone/green zone"

approach would apply to all network signals, except the PBS national satellite service. In addition, the Office

recommends that satellite carriers, and their distributors, be required to disclose to their potential subscribers

whether they reside in a "red zone" or "green zone" with respect to each network signal offered by the

satellite carrier. The Office takes no position as to whether subscribers should be grandfathered under the

"red zone/green zone" approach.
130

If Congress wishes to allow certain subscribers within the "red zone" to receive network service, the

Office has concerns that this can be accomplished statutorily without authorizing some decision making body

to make individual determinations of eligibility. In lieu of creating such a bureaucracy, the Office suggests

that Congress consider a transitional solution, such as a surcharge, until such time as satellite carriers

im p lement local retransmission of network signals and/or over-the-air digital television becomes a

widespread medium.
 H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 90 (1976). 138

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X. ADDITIO NAL ISSUES

A. TREATMENT O F NETWO RK SIGNALS

There are two issues involving retransmission of network signals by cable systems that have not been

addressed at this point: DSE value accorded to network signals, and distribution of royalties to network

program copyright owners. 

1. Payment for Network Signals.

As discussed above, distant network signals under the cable compulsory license are paid for in a

different manner than independent commercial stations. Congress made the determination in 1976 that

network programs were bought and paid for on a nationwide basis, and that importation of distant network

signals by cable operators did not harm copyright owners. Network signals, therefore, count as only one- 138

quarter of a distant signal equivalent (DSE), as opposed to the full DSE accorded distant independent station.

The one-quarter value accounts for the nonnetwork programming (local news, weather, specials) that appears

on network signals during the course of the typical broadcast day. 

The rationale for the difference in value accorded network versus independent signals was carried

over into the satellite carrier compulsory license. The original satellite rates for payment of superstation (i.e.

independent station) and network signals was 12 cents per subscriber and 3 cents per subscriber, respectively,

which represents the four-to-one ratio established in the cable license. One of the commenters, ABC, Inc.,

asserts that the value of network and independent signals should be equalized under both licenses. ABC,

comment 20, at 3. ABC states that the theory that network programming is adequately compensated by

national advertising revenues is no longer valid because cable system and satellite carrier subscribers receive

valuable programming which should be compensated. Further, ABC notes that superstations such as WGN
 Copyright Broadcast Retransmission Licensing Act of 1992: Hearings on H.R. 4511 Before the Subcomm. on 139

Intellectual Property and Judicial Administration of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).

132

and WTBS receive national advertising revenues, yet their programming receives full value under the

compulsory licenses. Id.

The Copyright Office testified in 1992 in favor of equalizing the rates for the satellite carrier

license. The Office noted that because networks were entitled to a royalty distribution under the section 139

119 license, as opposed to the section 111 license, it no longer made sense to value a network signal at onequarter the value of a superstation signal. The proposal was not adopted in the 1994 Satellite Home Viewer

Act.

The Copyright Office maintains its point of view that the rates for network and superstation signals

should be equalized under the section 119 license. Furthermore, the Office supports equalization of the DSE

value of network and independent stations under the cable license. The Office can determine little

discernible difference between the manner in which programs and national advertising are bought and sold

on network stations and the large independent stations, such as WTBS. Although cable systems undoubtedly

would oppose raising the DSE value of network signals (none addressed the issue), the Office believes that

network programming is of significant value to cable systems and should be compensated. The Office,

therefore, supports raising the value of network signals to one full DSE.

2. Distribution to Networks.

A related issue to the DSE value of network signals under the cable license is entitlement of network

programming for royalty distributions. As noted above, network programming is entitled to distribution of

royalties under the satellite license, but not the cable license. ABC advocates that the distinction be

eliminated, and that networks be allowed to share in cable royalties.

As with equalization of DSE values, the Office supports removal of the restriction entitling only

owners of nonnetwork programming to a distribution of cable royalties. 17 U.S.C. § 111(d)(3). Network
133

programming is of significant value to cable systems, and network program copyright owners should be

entitled to compensation for that value. Further, as a policy matter, it makes little sense to allow networks

royalty distributions under the satellite license, but deny them that right under the cable license. Increasing

the DSE value of a network signal from one-quarter to one should result in a corresponding inclusion of

networks in the royalty distribution.

B. PAYMENT FO R LO CAL SIGNALS

Although the Copyright Office has declined to comment as to the royalty compensation due local

retransmission of signals by satellite carriers, the Office does have several observations about payment of

local signals under section 111.

It is a common belief that carriage of local signals by cable systems is on a royalty-free basis. This

is a fiction, however, for the statute does provide for a minimum copyright royalty fee to be paid by every

cable system, whether or not it carries any distant signals. 17 U.S.C. § 111(d)(1)(B), (C) and (D). Small and

medium sized cable systems (Form SA1-2) pay a flat fee even if they retransmit only local signals, and large

cable systems (Form SA-3) also pay a fee, based upon a percentage of their gross receipts, even if they

retransmit only local signals. Curiously, a large cable system that carries one distant signal, in addition to

local signals, pays the same royalty fee as a cable system which carries only local signals. 

Copyright treatment of local retransmissions was significantly debated during the passage of the

1976 Copyright Act, particularly after the Supreme Court held that local retransmissions under the 1909

Copyright Act were not public performances, and hence not subject to copyright liability. Fortnightly Corp.

v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 , reh'g denied, 393 U.S. 902 (1968). While Congress chose

to impose copyright liability on all broadcast retransmissions by cable systems, it found that copyright

owners were only harmed by retransmission of distant signals, and created a compulsory license regime that
 H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 90 (1976). 140

134

sought to compensate copyright owners principally for retransmissions of distant signals. Nevertheless, 140

cable systems are required to submit a minimum fee for retransmission of only local signals.

The Office believes that the minimum fee is an important aspect of the cable compulsory license and

should be retained. In reaching this decision, the Office considered placing a zero rate on the retransmission

of local signals. If this were done, some systems would not owe any royalties. However, if such systems

were required to file a statement reflecting the signals that they carried, an administrative filing fee to cover

processing costs would be required. The Office rejected such an approach because it believes that local

systems have value even though there may be no economic harm to copyright owners. The Office also

believes that all cable systems should be required to pay at least a minimum amount for the ability to

retransmit broadcast signals.
135

XI. RECO MMENDATIO NS

1. Existence of the Cable and Satellite Carrier Licenses.

 While the Copyright Office prefers marketplace mechanisms for the use and

payment of copyrighted works, the Office recommends that the cable and satellite

carrier licenses not be eliminated at this time.

2. Extension of the Satellite Carrier License.

 The Copyright Office recommends that the satellite carrier license should be in

place as long as the cable license is in place. Therefore, the Office recommends

that the satellite carrier license be extended with no sunset provision.

3. Harmonization of the Cable and Satellite Carrier Licenses.

 The Copyright Office recommends that the cable and satellite carrier licenses

remain separate licenses. 

 The Copyright Office recommends that differences between the two licenses be

removed where possible on the principle that the compulsory licenses should not

unduly affect the competitive balance between the cable and satellite industries.

4. Application of Section 111 to O pen Video Systems.

 The Copyright Office recommends that section 111 be amended to make the cable

compulsory license available to open video systems. 

 The Office recommends that section 111 be amended in the following areas:

(a) definition of a cable system; 

(b) passive carrier exemption;

(c) cable rate structure; 

(d) contiguous communities provision.

5. Application of Section 111 to Internet.

 The Copyright Office recommends against extending the cable compulsory license

to Internet service providers or creating a new compulsory license for Internet

service providers.
136

6. Passive Carrier Exemption.

 The Copyright Office recommends that the passive carrier exemption be amended

t o p ro v ide that open video systems may provide such ancillary services as

marketing, billing, and collecting.

 The Copyright Office recommends that the passive carrier exemption not extend to

open video systems that scramble or encode their signals. 

 The Copyright Office recommends that the passive carrier exemption not be

extended to open video systems that retransmit local signals under their must-carry

obligations, but the Office recommends that Congress might consider creating a

different exemption for open video systems that only retransmit must-carry signals.

7. Cable Rate Reform.

 The Copyright Office recommends that Congress adopt a flat, per subscriber, per

signal fee, similar to the fee structure already in place for satellite carriers. 

 As an alternative to the flat, per subscriber, per signal rate, the Copyright Office

recommends a simplified gross receipts fee structure. 

 The Office recommends against any step-up rate to inhibit the importation of distant

signals.

 The Office recommends that network programs be fully compensated, and that

network signals be paid for as a full distant signal.

 The Copyright Office recommends that the cable rate structure be reformed so that

it is simple to administer and compensates authors at fair market value. 

 The Copyright Office recommends that Congress reconsider the existence of its

current policy to subsidize small systems. The Office recommends that Congress

at least raise the payments made by small systems from their current nominal level.

However, at present, the Office recommends the continuation of a differential rate

for small systems and large systems.

8. The Unserved Household Restriction.

 The Copyright Office recommends that the satellite carrier compulsory license be

clarified to permit the retransmission of a network affiliate to subscribers located

within that affiliate's local market. 

 The Office recommends that a commercial network station's local market be defined

as its Area of Dominant Influence, and a noncommercial educational network

station's local market be defined as the communities that, in whole or in part, are

located within 50 miles of the station's community of license.
137

 The Copyright Office recommends that the unserved household restriction be

removed from the copyright law and placed in the communications law. 

 In the alternative, if the unserved household restriction remains in the copyright

law, the Office recommends adoption of a "red zone/green zone" approach to

determining subscriber eligibility for network signals. The Office also recommends

that satellite carriers, and their distributors, be required to disclose to their potential

subscribers whether they reside in a "red zone" or "green zone" with respect to each

network signal offered by the satellite carrier. 

 The Copyright Office also supports a temporary surcharge to subscribers located in

a "red zone" who nonetheless desire network service, with the monies collected

distributed to local network affiliates. 

 The Office supports this surcharge as a temporary solution and recommends that

Congress revisit the unserved household restriction in the future when technological

developments present better solutions to network service in the "red zone."

 The Copyright Office recommends that Congress eliminate the 90-day waiting

period for subscribing to network signals.