U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402–0001

95–192 PDF 2004

S. Hrg. 108–602

NOMINATION OF DAVID M. STONE

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON THE

NOMINATION OF DAVID M. STONE, OF VIRGINIA, TO BE ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY, TRANSPORTATION SECURITY 

ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

JUNE 23, 2004

Printed for the use of the Committee on Governmental Affairs

(

(II)

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine, Chairman 

TED STEVENS, Alaska 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota 

ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania 

ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah 

PETER G. FITZGERALD, Illinois 

JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire 

RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Deleware 

MARK DAYTON, Minnesota 

FRANK LAUTENBERG, New Jersey 

MARK PRYOR, Arkansas 

MICHAEL D. BOPP, Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

JOHANNA L. HARDY, Senior Counsel 

JOYCE A. RECHTSCHAFFEN, Minority Staff Director and Counsel 

JENNIFER E. HAMILTON, Minority Research Assistant 

AMY B. NEWHOUSE, Chief Clerk 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Opening statements: Page 

Senator Collins ................................................................................................. 1

Senator Lieberman ........................................................................................... 3

Senator Lautenberg .......................................................................................... 5

Senator Akaka .................................................................................................. 6

Senator Dayton ................................................................................................. 18

Senator Carper ................................................................................................. 22

WITNESS 

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 23, 2004

David M. Stone, of Virginia, to be Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security, 

Transportation Security Administration, Department of Homeland Security: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 8

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 29

Biographical and professional information requested of nominees .............. 33

Pre-hearing questionnaire and responses for the Record ............................. 40

Post-hearing questions and responses for the Record ................................... 150

Letter from Peter A. Iovino, Director of Legislative Affairs, with attached 

letters clarifying answer to Question 16.a. of pre-hearing questions 

from Mr. Stone .............................................................................................. 196

(1)

NOMINATION OF DAVID M. STONE 

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 23, 2004

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:35 a.m., in room 

SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Susan M. Collins, 

Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Collins, Lieberman, Akaka, Dayton, Carper, 

and Lautenberg. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN COLLINS 

Chairman COLLINS. The Committee will come to order. 

Good morning. First, let me apologize for the shifting of times in 

the commencement of this hearing. We have been trying to coordinate the schedule with the votes on the floor and that explains why 

it has gone back and forth. I do appreciate Mr. Stone’s cooperation 

in being here and I know that he has been looking forward to this 

day. 

The Committee on Governmental Affairs is holding this hearing 

to consider the nomination of David Stone to be the Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security for the Transportation Security Administration. 

Since it was created in November 2001, the TSA has made great 

strides in improving the security of our Nation’s transportation systems. These have been particularly evident in the field of aviation 

security. With hundreds of commercial airports, thousands of commercial aircraft and millions of passengers passing through our airports each day the job of securing our aviation system has been 

and continues to be an enormous task. 

Despite the significant challenges facing this young agency, the 

TSA accomplished its goal of hiring and deploying more than 

55,000 airport screeners by November 19, 2002. The TSA also 

quickly expanded the ranks of Federal air marshals, from only approximately 50 shortly after the September 11 attacks to thousands 

now. And it has made substantial progress in its checked baggage 

and passenger screening operations. 

In addition, the TSA has awarded millions of dollars in grants 

for airport terminal security, commenced a pilot program to test 

new technologies aimed at monitoring and securing access to controlled areas and begun efforts to conduct vulnerability assessments at certain airports. 

2

Let me commend you, Admiral Stone, and the hardworking men 

and women of the TSA for the remarkable progress that the agency 

has made in a very short time. 

Despite all this progress, however, there is still significant room 

for improvement and much more work that remains to be done. Recent reports by the General Accounting Office, including one requested by our distinguished Ranking Member, make clear that 

vulnerabilities persist and systems are imperfect. 

The TSA must, for example, increase its efforts to improve the 

security of airport perimeters. It must also take additional steps to 

ensure the integrity of the one million airport workers who have 

full access to sensitive areas. And it faces a particular challenge in 

improving security in general aviation. 

Understandably, TSA has focused much of its efforts on securing 

our airways. The agency has really only begun to address the other 

vulnerabilities of our transportation modes such as maritime and 

rail. Our Nation’s ports in particular, may well present the greatest 

vulnerabilities through the global cargo container system. Approximately six million cargo containers arrive in U.S. ports each year. 

Although our ability to target at-risk containers continues to improve, the potential remains for containers to be used to deliver a 

dirty bomb or even terrorists themselves to our Nation’s shores. 

Passenger vessels, including ferries, are also considered by some 

security experts as possible targets for terrorists. On July 1, the 

screening of passengers, cargo and baggage will be required on 

ships and ferries under the Maritime Transportation Security Act. 

while these measures are intended to improve security on our waterways we must be mindful that these new requirements also entail a significant cost to the industry and its passengers. 

TSA and other Federal enforcement agencies must adopt a practical approach to effectively balance security and efficiency. 

Admiral Stone will also be responsible for implementing the new 

Computer-Aided Passenger Prescreening System known as CAPPS 

II. The TSA continues to face challenges in designing and testing 

the system in a way that protects the privacy of personal data of 

passengers while targeting those who do require additional scrutiny. 

Finally, Admiral Stone has reiterated the Department’s commitment to ensuring that every State receives a base level of homeland security grant assistance. This is critically important to smaller States like my home state of Maine. We, in Maine, are acutely 

aware that two of the September 11 hijackers, including the ringleader, Mohammed Atta, started their journey of death and destruction from Portland, Maine. Each and every State now requires 

a certain level of funding to meet a baseline level of competencies. 

The mission of the TSA is by no means an easy one. The challenges that Admiral Stone will face if confirmed will continue to be 

significant and, in some cases, daunting. 

I have little doubt however that with his extensive background 

and experience with the TSA and the Navy, as well as his lifelong 

commitment to public service, that Admiral Stone will continue to 

meet these challenges successfully. 

Senator Lieberman. 

3

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LIEBERMAN 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Madam Chairman. My 

thoughts mirror yours to a large extent. 

I am glad to welcome Admiral Stone here to thank you for your 

long and distinguished record of public service to your government 

and also, I suppose, more directly to the American people. You 

have had a proud career in the U.S. Navy, during which you demonstrated both a readiness and an ability to protect our national 

interests and make America safer. 

Since December of last year you have been serving ably as Acting 

Transportation Security Administrator and therefore you have certainly earned our appreciation and respect for your service and 

your dedication to our country. 

The tasks ahead of you at TSA, as I would guess by now you 

know, are truly awesome and will really call on that sense of service and dedication. The administrator, in this moment in our history, has got to be willing to take bold and aggressive actions to 

meet the Nation’s remaining and very pressing transportation security needs. And these are, unfortunately, considerable. 

After September 11, obviously our most urgent concern was to 

close the growing gaps in air security that allowed the 19 terrorists 

to pass through the security gates at those three airports, board 

four planes, and use them to destroy human life on a massive 

scale. We, in Congress, quickly passed the Aviation and Transportation Security Act and the Transportation Security Administration 

was born. 

Since that time, TSA has worked hard to establish a more professional comprehensive screening process for passengers and their 

baggage. And as TSA’s first Federal Security Director at the Los 

Angeles International Airport, Admiral Stone, you led the effort to 

train and deploy the largest screener workforce in the country. And 

you did that ahead of schedule. 

But passenger screening checkpoints are, as you know, just one 

piece of the transportation security challenge. What of security in 

the back parts of the airports, behind the scenes, on the tarmac or 

air cargo screening and detection of explosives on passengers? 

TSA’s failure to deal thus far with the security challenges in 

those areas has, I am afraid, left airline travelers more vulnerable 

to terrorist attack than they should be almost 3 years after September 11. 

As the Chairman mentioned, earlier this month the GAO did 

issue a report that focused on TSA’s responsibilities to secure the 

tarmac and the airport perimeter, baggage and cargo handling 

areas, entrances and exits used by airport workers and contractors, 

and TSA’s responsibility to ensure that airport workers are thoroughly screened before they enter those secure areas. 

As I am sure you know, the GAO found that the TSA had only 

just begun, and in some cases had not yet begun, to fulfill its statutory obligations to safeguard those areas of airports. 

TSA has no overall picture of the vulnerabilities and secure areas 

at the Nation’s 400 commercial airports, GAO said, nor does it 

have a plan for how it will address its responsibilities for the back 

of the airport areas. 

4

Another missing piece in the security picture is adequate antiterrorist training for flight attendants. They are, after all, the first 

responders, perhaps the first preventers in airplane security. Since 

September 11, we have placed thousands of air marshals aboard 

planes to protect passengers. Thank God we have. We have hardened cockpit doors and allowed pilots to carry guns to protect themselves. 

Yet most flight attendants have been left, if you will, virtually 

defenseless, at least unprepared to defend themselves and their 

passengers. I hope, Admiral Stone, that you will carefully focus on 

this gap and work to establish guidelines and timetables so that 

flight attendants might learn the basics of self-defense, self-protection and passenger protection in the event of future hijackings. 

If TSA’s work on aviation security is incomplete, the job of securing other modes of transportation has barely begun. And yet I fear 

the Administration has sought very little money to secure our vast 

rail networks and the subways and buses used by millions of commuters every day that we have seen in other countries unfortunately have become a target of terrorists. 

We still need better measures to protect rail shipments of hazardous materials. We need video surveillance, chemical and radiological detection, improved communications and other monitoring 

devices to deter potential attacks within our mass transit systems. 

The American Public Transportation Association has identified at 

least $6 billion in security needs. But local systems need Federal 

help to improve their security, and so far the DHS has allocated 

only about $115 million to help. 

TSA has taken no concrete steps to protect our vast web of oil 

and gas pipelines, again as we have seen elsewhere in the world, 

targets of terrorists. Given the geographic expanse of this network, 

protecting it clearly poses extraordinarily difficult challenges. But 

our pipelines must be secure to ensure uninterrupted delivery of 

these vital resources and prevent the kind of economic disruption 

that we know the terrorists want to bring to our homeland. 

Finally, TSA has not yet produced a comprehensive transportation security strategy for identifying vulnerabilities and putting 

solutions in place. This plan has been far too long in the making, 

given its importance in establishing the roles and responsibilities 

and priorities of your agency. So there is no resting on the laurels 

and achievements of improved airline passenger safety, as am sure 

you know. 

As a matter of fact, as I list the agenda ahead of you of as yet 

to be met security challenges in transportation, I must say I not 

only admire your record of service in the past to our country, I admire your willingness to take on this assignment. 

And a final word, and I think you know this and I count on you 

to carry it through, the TSA administrator, in addition to being the 

administrator, also has an important responsibility to be a very aggressive advocate within the Administration and before Congress to 

win the funding and support necessary to meet the full range of security challenges that we face in this new age of terrorism. I know 

that you have all that it takes to do that and I look forward to 

working with you to assure your success in this new assignment. 

Thank you. 

5

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you, Senator. Senator Lautenberg. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR LAUTENBERG 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Welcome Admiral Stone. We are pleased to see you here. I share 

the view, the complimentary view just expressed by our colleague, 

Senator Lieberman, and the Chairman as well, about your capacity 

to do to this job. 

We think you need help. Not you personally, but in terms of 

what the budget commitments are seem to be insufficient. I am 

concerned about how well we have done so far to beef up the Nation’s security. The budget, currently presented, has not provided 

sufficient funding to meet our real homeland security needs. We 

know that initially the Administration resisted creating the Department of Homeland Security. And I do not know that there is 

any lingering concerns about their initial worries, but whether 

there is a full commitment out there to give the Department the 

resources it needs to do the job is still questionable. 

Now whether it is port security, rail security, funding for first responders, too many of our security needs are not being met. Too 

often this has resulted in DHS officials presenting creative programs such as cross-training air marshals and other schemes to try 

to justify not having sufficient funding to secure our country. 

Now Admiral, you are going to need to pull some magic, I think, 

to stretch too few dollars to get the job done. But I hope that you 

will speak up when the Administration’s budget shortfalls and 

other actions increase the risk of putting Americans at further risk 

of terrorism. 

So some have said that TSA should not exist. It does exist and 

it is a mammoth undertaking that we have presented to get this 

Department, this giant organization, into functioning. One has to 

expect that, even if you are not satisfied with that. But based on 

your experience gained at the Agency of so far I want to hear your 

views about the future of the Agency that you have been nominated to head. 

And last, I am concerned about the ability of DHS to provide information to those of us in Congress who make inquiries. And this 

is not just my concern that some questions go unanswered for long 

periods of time. My concerns are shared by others as well and I 

hope that you will take a look at those questions that are outstanding from some months ago that have yet to get an answer. 

On June 9, Republican Congressman Hal Rogers, who chairs the 

Homeland Security Appropriations Subcommittee in the House 

defunded the DHS Office of Legislative Affairs in the fiscal year 

2005 Homeland Security Appropriations Bill. That tells us something about the sentiment that exists out there. 

But my questions, some of which go back as far as last September, about aviation security and rail security and port security 

have gone unanswered and again I would like a review of those. 

Whether it is because the resources are not available or these answers are being held up by other offices of the Administration, that 

is a serious problem, Admiral, and I hope that your confirmation 

for this enormous task, and as was said before by our colleague, 

Senator Lieberman, why do you want it? But we are glad that you 

6

are willing to do it. We encourage you to give it your full ability, 

which is abundant. 

We thank you very much for being here. 

Chairman COLLINS. Senator Akaka. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. 

I would like to add my welcome to Admiral Stone this morning. 

It is good to see you again. It was good visiting with you, also. 

Since its inception in 2002, the Transportation Security Administration has been tasked with the mammoth challenge of maintaining the safety of travel in the United States. 

As an open society, we naturally resist measures that restrict our 

freedom and impede our day-to-day activities. Managing this juxtaposition of security and freedom is a difficult but necessary job. 

And Admiral Stone, I commend you for your willingness to serve 

our country in what I am sure will be a very challenging position. 

I want to share with you a comment made by a former colleague 

of yours who currently serves as a TSA Federal Security Director. 

He said that when you were in training with him to be the first 

class of TSA FSDs, everyone in the class knew that you were going 

to be the one to rise to the top of TSA. That was his comment. 

Praise from colleagues like him is among the most valuable kind 

and I thought such an opinion should be made part of the record 

today. 

Our transportation system is critical for our homeland security. 

Whether it is the attacks of September 11, the USS Cole, the US 

Embassy in Kenya, or the UN headquarters in Baghdad, transportation systems have been exploited to execute terrorist attacks. 

TSA has made some progress in securing air travel with added 

baggage screening equipment and security of personnel, but more 

needs to be done. TSA’s responsibilities extend beyond airport security and should therefore address all transportation modes. We 

must avoid the trap of only securing against past terrorist attacks 

and protect ourselves against terrorist tactics that have not yet 

been employed. 

American seaports are one of this country’s greatest vulnerabilities. While security at ports has improved, the level of improvement does not yet correspond to the crucial role ports play in 

our economy. My home State of Hawaii, for example, is equally dependent on its seaports as its airports. These are the only two ways 

Hawaii can access the rest of the country. 

Yet the TSA budget proposal for fiscal year 2005 allocates only 

$24 million of its $5.3 billion requested budget to maritime and 

land security. That is less than 1 percent of the overall TSA budget. I realize that we, as a country, have put a high priority on aviation security since September 11, and rightly so, but we also must 

protect our other modes of transportation. 

Congress passed the Maritime Transportation Security Act, 

MTSA, in 2002 to increase the security requirements for U.S. ports. 

The July 1, 2004, deadline for implementation of many of the 

MTSA requirements is nearly upon us, and I am not convinced that 

our ports are ready. Less than 1 percent of port facilities and vessels have submitted a security plan that has been approved, as 

7

called for in the MTSA. Members of the Coast Guard have offered 

assurances that these plans will be submitted and approved by 

July 1, but it seems unlikely since the deadline is less than 2 

weeks away. 

While much of the responsibility of port security has fallen to the 

Coast Guard and the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, it 

is right to ask, ‘‘Where is TSA?’’ As the Agency responsible for all 

transportation security, TSA has a responsibility for maritime and 

land security. I do not believe its current budget structure adequately reflects that responsibility and I hope that, if confirmed, 

you will take a serious look at TSA’s involvement in this area. 

I am also concerned about the impact that airport security privatization could have on screeners who are currently Federal employees. It would not be right to strip them of their status as Federal employees when just a few years ago they were recruited to 

TSA with the promise of joining the Civil Service. There needs to 

be a plan for how these employees’ rights and benefits will be protected in the event that an airport opts to privatize. Those who are 

working to make our homeland a safer place should not slip 

through these so-called cracks. 

I would also like to call your attention to the National Transportation Security System Plan, NTSSP, which has yet to be delivered 

to Congress. In September 2003, I expressed my frustration with 

the delayed delivery of the NTSSP and now, 9 months later, it has 

still not been issued. Your job is too hard to do in a piecemeal fashion. There must be an overall plan guiding TSA actions. While I 

understand it can be difficult to get reports to Congress within an 

assigned timeline, I would like to express my frustration that is a 

plan is long overdue. 

Admiral Stone, I hope you will give serious consideration to these 

concerns I have mentioned. I have heard good things about your 

leadership at TSA as Acting Administrator, and I look forward to 

working with you in the future on TSA matters. I want to wish you 

well. 

Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. 

As has been mentioned, Admiral Stone currently serves as the 

Acting Administrator of the TSA. Previously he served as Deputy 

Chief of Staff at TSA and as the Federal Security Director at the 

Los Angeles International Airport. 

Prior to joining TSA, Admiral Stone had a distinguished and impressive career in the U.S. Navy where he served for 28 years, retiring as a Rear Admiral. 

Admiral Stone has filed responses to the biographical and financial questionnaire, answered pre-hearing questions submitted by 

Committee, and had his financial statements reviewed by the Office of Government Ethics. Without objection, this information will 

be made part of the hearing record with the exception of the financial data which are on file and available for public inspection in the 

Committee’s offices. 

Our Committee’s rules require that all witnesses at nomination 

hearings give their testimony under oath, so Admiral Stone, I 

would ask that you stand and raise your right hand. 

8

1The prepared statement of Mr. Stone appears in the Appendix on page 29. 

Biographical and professional information appears in the Appendix on page 33. 

Pre-hearing questionnaire and responses for the Record appears in the Appendix on page 

40. 

Post-hearing questionnaire and responses for the Record appears in the Appendix on page 

150. 

Do you swear that the testimony you are about to give to the 

Committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the 

truth, so help you, God? 

Mr. STONE. I do. 

Chairman COLLINS. Admiral Stone, I understand that you may 

have a family member with you and I would invite you to introduce 

your family to the Committee at this time. 

Mr. STONE. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

It is my pleasure to introduce my wife, Faith. Faith has been my 

guiding light in my life and we have been married for 27 years. 

I am also privileged to have a mentor and very close friend of our 

family, Admiral Steve Abbott and his wife Marjorie here today. 

Thank you. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you, we welcome them as well. 

Admiral Stone, do you have a statement that you would like to 

make at this time? 

TESTIMONY OF DAVID M. STONE,1 TO BE ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY, TRANSPORTATION 

SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 

SECURITY 

Mr. STONE. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Good morning, Madam Chairman, Senator Lieberman, and distinguished Members of this Committee. 

I am grateful to you for scheduling this hearing on my nomination by the President for the position of Assistant Secretary of 

Homeland Security, Transportation Security Administration. 

I appreciated very much the opportunity meet with several of the 

Members of this Committee after the President sent my nomination to the Senate, and also to meet with and answer questions 

from your respective staffs. I am honored that President Bush has 

nominated me for this important position in the Department of 

Homeland Security. 

If confirmed, I will do everything in my power to serve the President, the Secretary, the Congress and the American people faithfully. I have an outstanding team at the Transportation Security 

Administration and am very proud to be a member of it. 

I have spent my entire adult life in service to our great Nation. 

After attending the Naval Academy, I proudly served in our Navy 

for almost 28 years, retiring with the rank of Rear Admiral. During 

my Navy career I had many challenging assignments, including 

four operational commands at sea. During those assignments I was 

honored to serve with some of the finest men and women in our 

Armed Forces. 

I believe my Navy experience has given me a thorough understanding of national security policy and a broad view of the requirements necessary to defend our national interests. In assuming 

increasing command responsibility over the years, I have developed 

a firm knowledge of how large organizations function, and how to 

9

lead, manage, and motivate people to ensure that the organization’s strategic and operational goals are met. 

After my retirement from active duty, I was honored that Secretary Mineta selected me as one of the first Federal Security Directors in the newly formed Transportation Security Administration. I was pleased to serve as the first FSD for Los Angeles International Airport. 

When I arrived in Los Angeles in July, 2002 our focus was on 

meeting the two Congressional deadlines found in the Aviation and 

Transportation Security Act. The main focus was on the screening 

of passengers with Federal screeners by November 19, 2002 and 

the screening of all checked baggage for explosives with electronic 

screening equipment by December 31 of that year. Meeting those 

deadlines was an exceptional challenge. 

With the help of many dedicated people and a true spirit of partnership, Los Angeles International Airport was able to meet both 

deadlines. The support by all of the local entities was indicative of 

the amazing level of cooperation that all of us have seen time and 

again throughout our great country following the attacks of September 11. 

Themes such as leadership, caring about people, partnership, 

working as a teammate, and friendship, establishing trust and confidence were keys to the success at that airport. 

Admiral Loy, then the administrator of TSA, later asked me to 

take an assignment with him in Washington, DC. In August 2003, 

I rejoined TSA at the headquarters staff as his Deputy Chief of 

Staff with a particular focus on ensuring that TSA was responsive 

to the important concerns and the direction of Congress. 

Four months later, in December 2003, I was named Acting Administrator of TSA. I am extremely grateful for the confidence that 

Secretary Ridge, Deputy Secretary Loy and Undersecretary Hutchinson have shown in me in asking me to serve in this critical position. The continued support and mentoring that I receive from each 

of them has been outstanding. 

As you well know, recent events have reinforced the fact that we 

live in dangerous times. Last December, the national threat level 

was raised to orange due to concern over a number of potential 

threats to homeland security, particularly in the aviation sector. In 

February and March, terrorists attacked subway and rail systems 

in Moscow and Madrid, resulting in many lives lost. Clearly, the 

transportation sector remains an inviting target for terrorist attacks. 

With these threats in mind, as Acting Administrator, I have 

worked to bring an intense operational focus to TSA. I am in the 

midst of giving our Federal Security Directors more authority in 

the hiring, training, testing, and managing of their screener 

workforces. 

If confirmed, I will continue down this road. I expect our Federal 

Security Directors to be engaged coordinators of the security program at their assigned airports. If confirmed, I will work to give 

them the tools to excel and will hold them accountable for their 

performance. Empowerment at the local level will be a major focus 

of effort. 

10

Intelligence is also at center stage at TSA. I chair a daily comprehensive review of the intelligence assembled on all sectors of 

transportation and the threats that are signaled by this intelligence. Together with all of my senior staff we review in detail 

daily reports from Federal Security Directors on incidents concerning aviation security as well as the daily reports of incidents 

affecting non-aviation modes of transportation. 

I take this daily briefing very seriously and make it the center 

of gravity of our workday. I use it to shape the course that I would 

like TSA to take for developing both short- and long-term risk mitigation planning. 

If confirmed, I plan to continue this practice so that every day 

TSA is focused on the threats to transportation security and prepared to rapidly bring our resources to bear on mitigating risk with 

a true sense of urgency. 

I would like to briefly address TSA’s advancements in security in 

the non-aviation modes of transportation. TSA has made steady 

progress in this area and we fully realize there is much work left 

to do. 

TSA is staying attuned to the security needs across the transportation sector and we are engaged in risk mitigation efforts daily. 

That Secretary designated TSA with the responsibility to prepare 

an overarching sector specific plan for the transportation sector. As 

required under the National Infrastructure Protection Plan outlined in Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7, a significant 

portion of TSA staff is involved in this major undertaking. We are 

working in close coordination with DHS components, with the Department of Transportation and its modal administrations, and 

with other key Federal agencies, as well as appropriate stakeholders in developing this plan. 

Of note, TSA recently issued the first security directives to rail 

and transit operators. We are also well into phase 2 of our transit 

and rail inspection pilot, called TRIP, to evaluate the use of emerging technologies in a rail environment to screen cargo, checked and 

unclaimed baggage, as well as temporarily stored personal items 

for explosives. The completed phase 1 test at New Carrollton, 

Maryland evaluated screening passengers for explosives in a rail 

environment and we are pleased to date with the phase 2 effort ongoing at Union Station. 

In closing, on behalf of our organization I would like to thank 

you for your support of TSA. I fully recognize the critical role of 

Congress and if confirmed will work to ensure our organization is 

responsive and respectful of that important relationship. 

Madam Chairman, Senator Lieberman, and Members of the 

Committee, this concludes my prepared statement. I am looking 

forward to your questions. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you, Admiral. 

There are three standard questions that we ask of all the nominees who come before this Committee. 

First, is there anything that you are aware of in your background 

which might present a conflict of interest with the duties of the office to which you have been nominated? 

Mr. STONE. No. 

11

Chairman COLLINS. Second, do you know of anything personal or 

otherwise that would in any way prevent you from fully and honorably discharging the responsibilities of the office? 

Mr. STONE. No, I do not. 

Chairman COLLINS. Third, and you addressed this a little bit at 

the end of your statement, do you agree without reservation to respond to any reasonable summons to appear and testify before any 

duly constituted committee of Congress if you are confirmed? 

Mr. STONE. I do. 

Chairman COLLINS. We will now start with a first round of questions limited to 6 minutes each. 

Admiral Stone, in the Department’s strategic plan, the vision of 

the Department highlights preserving our freedoms as a priority. 

And indeed, as we fight the war against terrorism, we have to be 

careful not to trample on the very values that define us as Americans. 

One of those values is personal privacy. I have been concerned, 

as has Senator Lieberman, with the efforts that the TSA has made 

through contractors in obtaining personal information about passengers in anticipation of testing and implementing your CAPPS II 

screening program for airports. 

What concerns me is that the TSA has been slow to reveal the 

full extent and details of its involvement in the transfer of personal 

passenger data from airlines to the government via contractors. 

First we learned that TSA had assisted an Army contractor in 

obtaining personal information from JetBlue Airlines about its passengers. Then we learned that American Airlines shared with TSA 

personal information about its passengers. And now we have just 

learned from your responses to the written questions submitted by 

the Committee that, in addition to these two incidents, that companies working with TSA obtained passenger data from several other 

airlines, including Delta and Continental. 

By our count it looks like there may be as many as eight airlines 

that have provided passenger data. This is far beyond the scope of 

what was originally reported to me and to Senator Lieberman 

when we began to inquire about this. 

Would you agree to provide this Committee and the public with 

a detailed, thorough and complete account of TSA’s involvement in 

obtaining passenger data from airlines as well as any plans that 

TSA has to secure such data in the future? 

Mr. STONE. Madam Chairman, I will commit to that. We have a 

report on the PNR data issues that you have addressed that we 

have provided to the Department of Homeland Security. It is their 

intent also to publish that on the Web after that is reviewed by 

them. I will ensure that I follow up on that and keep the Committee closely advised on the circumstances surrounding PNR data. 

Chairman COLLINS. The implementation of the CAPPS system 

will require the collection of that data. What is of great concern to 

me is it appears that TSA, in the initial stages, was proceeding—

or at least contractors were proceeding—to start collecting that 

data without public notice and clear guidelines for protecting privacy that are required under the Privacy Act. What steps will you 

take to ensure that the Agency fully complies with the requirements of the Federal Privacy Act? 

12

Mr. STONE. Madam Chairman, it is very clear in my discussions 

with the Department, as well as Members of Congress and my own 

organization at TSA, that there will be no use of PNR data and 

testing of CAPPS II without making sure that all privacy requirements are fully met. 

Making note of Secretary Ridge’s vision statement for the Department in which he states, ‘‘Preserving our freedoms, protecting 

America, we secure our homeland,’’ that first phrase of preserving 

our freedoms. That is on the first page of every briefing we give 

every morning at our organization. It is the reason why we have 

held a privacy education week in which we have provided materials 

to the field as well as headquarters about the Privacy Act. It is also 

why we recently hired a privacy officer, Ms. Lisa Dean, to spearhead our efforts. 

But the key, I truly believe, that the organization, having viewed 

in it, as we are doing from the very senior leadership, that this preserving our freedoms is first and foremost. And that anything that 

we do to protect America should not be trampling on those very 

freedoms that we cherish. 

So I commit to making sure that that spirit and intent is followed up on. 

Chairman COLLINS. I appreciate that. That is going to be very 

important if the Agency is going to be successful in implementing 

the CAPPS II program and similar screening programs. 

I mentioned in my opening statement that I view port security 

as being one of our greatest challenges and presents enormous 

vulnerabilities. The Department has several important efforts underway in cooperation with private industry and with other countries, and is increasingly successful in targeting at-risk cargo because obviously it is not practical to inspect six million containers 

arriving in our ports each year. 

But there is a broader issue of funding. Do you believe that we 

are adequately funding the programs that are necessary to enhance 

the security of our ports? 

Mr. STONE. I think our funding that we currently have in 2004, 

and also for 2005, is appropriate funding for the risk mitigation efforts that we believe are necessary to protect America. That risk 

mitigation, and those actions that we take when we evaluate vulnerability, criticality of assets and the threat and make a riskbased decision, is always an ongoing effort. 

As that changes, I pledge to ensure that I work within the Department to identify any additional resources that I think are appropriate to reduce that risk. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Lieberman. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks again, Madam Chairman and Admiral Stone. I want to pick up on a few of the points that I made in 

my opening statement. 

The first is the screening of airport workers who have unescorted 

access to secure areas of airports. TSA, I gather, still says that onetime employee fingerprinting is sufficient and physical screening 

would be too expensive and difficult. 

But as I am sure you know, a recent Federal investigation found 

that literally thousands of airport workers had falsified immigration, Social Security or criminal history information to gain 

13

unescorted access to secure airport areas. And in New York and 

Miami, in fact, workers unfortunately were arrested for smuggling 

drugs aboard aircraft. 

At that time Michael Garcia, DHS Assistant Secretary said, ‘‘a 

network of corrupt airport employees motivated by greed might 

just as well have been collaborating with terrorists as with drug 

smugglers’’. Of course, that is the fear that we have and that he 

quite correctly stated. 

So I want to ask you what your attitude is toward the screening 

of airport workers who have unescorted access to these secure 

areas of the airports? And more generally, how can we be confident 

that we have taken all of the necessary steps to safeguard commercial aviation when physical screening, which is admittedly expensive and difficult, is not being done? 

Mr. STONE. Senator, I think that the issue of sterile access, SIDA 

access, is one of my top three issues related to threats, the other 

two being explosive technology at the passenger checkpoint and air 

cargo. So we talk daily about the SIDA sterile issues that you addressed. 

Therefore, I am looking at three things that I think reduce the 

risk in that area. The first thing that we are doing is to do enhanced background checks on the 1.2 million airport workers. We 

have already commenced a program of doing that. What we will be 

doing is running those names through the no-fly list, as well as any 

other terrorist databases, to give us an additional level of risk mitigation effort on our current airport workers. 

I also have pending at the Department security directives to enhance security both at the front door at the screening checkpoint 

for vendors that work within the airport, as well as a security directive to address enhanced security of the SIDA area with our 

presence at baggage check areas, as well as surveillance in the airport security plans. These two security directives, combined with 

the enhanced background check, are our near-term measures here 

to mitigate risk of the SIDA and sterile areas. 

We are committed as well, and are meeting regularly with the 

Civil Aviation Partnership Group which is a group of TSA—which 

is composed of TSA, the ATA, as well as AAA and ACI—to address 

how we can continue to reduce the vulnerabilities in our SIDA 

areas since we are currently not doing 100 percent screening. 

And so I am committed to providing the Department a game plan 

for how we can continue to mitigate the risk in these SIDA areas 

through these SDs, enhanced background checks, and in the future 

to address some of the other challenges we face there. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. That is an encouraging response and I 

thank you for it. 

Just for a moment, if you would tell me about what additional 

screening your directive would require for those who come on-site 

because they work for vendors at the airport? 

Mr. STONE. Currently at our Nation’s airports we have workers 

that are part of the SIDA badging system which allows, in some 

cases, them to access the vendor businesses in our gate areas without going through our security passenger checkpoint. This security 

directive gets at this issue and requires that those workers go 

14

through our passenger screening checkpoint so that we have consistency on that. 

Currently, about 85 percent is the estimate that the industry and 

ourselves have given. Eighty-five percent of those vendors are already going through those checkpoints but we have some cases 

where, because of badging policies, that they are allowed to badge 

through and go to work in that sterile area. 

So this is the kind of vulnerability at the front door part that we 

are going after. And on the back door, the security directives relating to sterile insiders are planned. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. That is excellent. That is very good to hear. 

But for now you are reluctant to go to full physical screening of airport workers to gain access to these secure areas? 

Mr. STONE. For the near-term, we do not have 100 percent regime planned. However, I owe the Department a plan on how I 

would do that. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. The other question I wanted to address in 

my time here was this one of training for flight attendants. I have 

met with organizations of flight attendants and I presume you 

have, too. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 and the FAA Reauthorization Bill enacted last December require that flight attendant 

training programs be updated and approved. But thus far TSA has 

not taken any action that I know of to do that on an industry-wide 

basis. 

I gather that some of the airlines are doing this and some are 

not doing it very well. And it seems to me that this just may be 

one area where they are not going to do it because it does involve 

some additional expense obviously, unless the government mandates that they do it. 

I find encouragingly that the organizations of flight attendants 

want this additional training. And therefore I wanted to ask you 

when TSA would update its training guidance for airlines and take 

steps to ensure that flight attendants have the critical skills necessary to protect their passengers and themselves? 

Mr. STONE. We are aware that the basic training for the flight 

attendants has been a source of concern with regard to the standards on that. We have a proposal that we are putting together that 

we are currently coordinating with the Department on that, in 

order to get that out so that there can be a higher standard required for basic training. 

Our focus also is very much on the FAA Reauthorization Bill requirement that we have an advanced level training program ready 

for December of this year. We think we have got some initiatives 

forthcoming that will enable that to also raise the bar significantly 

for our flight attendants and the level of training they receive. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Very good. Well, I look forward to working 

with you on that and hearing your progress on those. Thank you. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Lautenberg. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. 

Admiral Stone, the focus for the Department that you will be responsible for, without a doubt, they focus so much on aviation 

leaves concerns about other parts of our national security that 

must be attended to. According to the U.S. Attorney in Newark, the 

FBI has identified the stretch between Port Newark and Newark 

15

International Airport as the most dangerous 2 miles in the United 

States when it comes to terrorism. I do not know whether you are 

familiar with that or not. 

But it is a very busy area, densely packed with all kinds of transportation activities. And again, the kind of a place that terrorists 

depend bent on a mission of destruction can hide between the 

cracks. There is always a perimeter around airports that concerns 

me now, talking about shoulder fired weapons and things of that 

nature. 

So I wonder whether because of the relatively slow pace of responding to Congressional inquiries that we have had in the past—

and I mentioned that to you—what happens when the general public makes an inquiry of TSA or DHS? Is there a system in place 

that gives these inquiries response and A, timely but B, expansively enough to make sense? 

Mr. STONE. Yes sir. One venue for that is we have our TSA call 

center which receives a number of calls every day ranging from 

baggage claim to operational concerns or a sighting of someone that 

they thought was on the be-on-the-lookout list. The way we are orchestrated, that report then goes, if it has an operational flavor, to 

our TSA operations center in Herndon. The next morning we are 

reading in our briefing——

Senator LAUTENBERG. How many inquiries might you get in a 

given day? 

Mr. STONE. I would say we get well over 300 to 500 ranging from 

administration issues to operational ones mixed in. 

So that process is there to get visibility at the senior level that 

there has been a call, there has been either a credible or non-credible threat presented at Newark. And we then ensure that that is 

put out in a number of ways. 

Under our responsibilities for being responsible for five of the six 

modes of transportation, we are the lead agency for rail, mass transit, highways, pipeline, and aviation. And the Coast Guard is lead 

for maritime. 

Under our modal responsibilities what we do is once a week we 

hold a stakeholder outreach in which we brief all stakeholders nationwide who have any interest in those six modes, we give an intelligence update via teleconference on that. And we have an opportunity for folks in the field to say we have a threat in L.A. or Newark or Duluth. 

So that intelligence outreach, which we hold every Thursday 

with all stakeholders gives them an intelligence pulse. We also 

then talk at that forum about best practices, public education initiatives and emerging technologies like our portal. 

So I think we have good measures in place to have that information come in at the senior level and be reacted to. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. I asked that question in connection with 

this exposure around Newark Airport because we get lots of calls 

into my office of people worried about what their exposure might 

be. 

One of the things that is now coming up fairly frequently is a 

question about whether or not screeners assignment ought to be 

turned over to corporate or commercial hands. Have you had airVerDate 0ct 09 2002 08:52 Sep 21, 2004 Jkt 095192 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\95192.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PHOGAN
16

ports approaching you expressing interest in using contract screeners instead of TSA screeners? 

Mr. STONE. I have had a number of airport directors ask me 

about how soon will the procedures be promulgated so we can take 

a look at it. We are interested primarily from an efficiencies point 

of view. 

I have not had any airport director tell me that they have security concerns about the Federal screeners and therefore would like 

to opt-out. 

Very few have approached me about opting out, other than interested in can this be done in a more efficient and effective manner 

and will you have some guidelines that we can look at prior to November 19 so we can figure out what is best for our airport. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Because it was not too long ago when we 

took 28,000 people who were screening baggage and made them 

Federal employees because the others were so inefficient and so 

rife with problems of the character of the screeners, etc. And now 

we are talking about going back the other way. It is, to me, a question that has to be reviewed in detail before we can participate in 

the approval there. 

The last thing I want to ask you about, are you familiar with 

complaints about material taken from baggage in the process of 

screening belonging to travelers? I know that has happened. Do 

you see that as something that you would have to work on? 

Because when we are asked now to make sure your bag is not 

locked, if you want to send it Federal Express they say make sure 

your bag is locked. And people do not quite understand this. There 

is a much better feeling about having a locked bag. 

On the other hand, if it requires a personal inspection or manual 

inspection then if that is the only way to do it then we have to do 

it unless we can find a way to do these things electronically or mechanically and not have to go through that routine. 

Mr. STONE. Yes, sir. I am concerned about that. It is one of the 

reasons we have asked our Federal Security Directors to go out and 

design methods in which we can verify whether we have some 

screeners that are taking items out of bags. 

Most recently, we had our Federal Security Director in New Orleans work an operation in which we installed a camera there at 

the airport and we found some screeners that were taking items. 

It is that sort of proactive measure that we need to be taking on 

the part of our Federal Security Directors, in partnership with the 

airport directors, to ferret out that sort of activity. 

Obviously, there are security concerns as well about that sort of 

access to bags and removing the items because of the reverse of 

putting something in. And so this is an area of risk in which we 

believe strongly that we need to take proactive measures to monitor what is going on, as we did in the New Orleans case. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Chairman COLLINS. Senator Akaka. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. 

Thank you, Admiral Stone, for your comments and your statement. I also want to add my welcome to your family and others 

who are here. 

17

I would like to take this opportunity to remind everyone that my 

home State of Hawaii is located about 5,000 miles away from the 

Nation’s capital. Hawaii grapples, as you know, with transportation 

issues that other States do not have. We can only access the rest 

of the country via sea and air. 

Admiral Stone, I hope you will have the opportunity to visit Hawaii so you can see its unique transportation needs firsthand. 

My first question to you is regarding the installation of explosive 

detection systems, EDS equipment. The fiscal year 2005 budget 

proposal includes $12 million for EDS machine installation. This 

funding reimburses past installations but will not cover any new 

installations, as I understand it. There are many airports, including Honolulu International Airport, that cannot fund the installation of the EDS equipment with State resources alone. 

Can you explain, Admiral, how TSA plans to help the airports 

that are still using lobby-based machines to relocate the equipment 

to allow for a more efficient screening process? 

Mr. STONE. Yes, sir. 

Our focus right now on that is that we take those monies that 

are apportioned to us for non-LOI expenditures and ensure that we 

apply those funds that those airports that need them in order to 

maintain full compliance with 100 percent electronic check. 

What we are currently engaged in is reaching out with the industry and the airports to find out, based on the return of the industry 

now to pre-September 11 levels, what type of capacity they are feeling that they are going to be experiencing at their individual airports so that we can then apply that to our future year funding. 

Right now, we are excited about the return to pre-September 11 

levels but we want to make sure we have all of the industry facts 

so that we can then apply all of the equipment and resources to 

those airports that will need those in order to maintain compliance 

with the 100 percent electronic checking. 

Senator AKAKA. As a long-standing proponent for whistleblowers, 

I am concerned that TSA’s position before the Merit Systems Protection Board has been that appeal rights to the Board are not permitted for claims of retaliation for whistleblowing. This is despite 

the inclusion of Section 883 in the Homeland Security Act of 2002, 

which states that the Department of Homeland Security shall not 

be exempt from coverage of the Whistleblower Protection Act. 

Based on this apparent contradiction, could you please tell this 

Committee why TSA has denied whistleblowers an opportunity to 

be heard by an independent adjudicatory body for claims of retaliation when their disclosures could show a specific and substantial 

risk to public safety? 

Mr. STONE. Senator Akaka, I pledge to find out in detail the 

background on that decision. But also, I want to make you very 

much aware that the theme of the Federal Security Director, being 

a leader at an airport and providing that covenant leadership for 

the professional growth of individuals under his or her charge. And 

also to ensure that those freedoms that they enjoy as citizens is 

something that we talk about at the airports frequently and make 

sure that screeners know that they have these rights and that we 

want to make sure we are following up on them enjoying those. 

18

So I pledge to get back with you on a more throughout answer 

on the legal background of the whistleblower piece. 

Senator AKAKA. Admiral, you have stated that one of your goals 

as the TSA Administrator would be to empower the Federal Security Directors and allow more decisionmaking at the local level. 

How do you intend to accomplish this objective? 

Mr. STONE. The areas that we focused on in the last few months 

have been on training, hiring—those two areas in particular—and 

also on testing. Those three areas. 

We have already done a lot of work on the training piece by designating master trainers at our airports so that we are no longer 

required now to go to a contractor to come train our screeners at 

an airport. The preponderance of our airport Federal Security Directors now have master trainers from our workforce and they are 

able then to conduct the recertification training. 

This sort of empowerment of now letting the Federal Security Director determine training schedules and to ensure that we are not 

dependent on expensive contractor fees to retain our force and keep 

them certified, I think is significant. 

Testing, the majority of our testing 6 months ago was done out 

of a covert testing team in Washington. In the last few months now 

we have sent the testing kits out to the field and we have empowered the Federal Security Director to have their own local testing 

program so that they can document the local performance of their 

screeners, combined also with—we now have threat image projection capability on our x-ray machines that allows us to designate 

by the punch code that the screener puts in their performance to 

images that are put on that screen. 

So the empowerment of both training and testing is well underway and we are seeing the results of that. 

With regard to hiring, in Boston last month, we started our first 

pilot with George Naccara, our Federal Security Director, to hire 

locally. We have sent up teams from Washington to ensure that he 

and his staff have the tools that they need. We are going to open 

up future local hiring arrangements at Chicago O’Hare, LAX, and 

Houston International Airports. 

And we are going to expand this down to the lowest level so that 

we can also cut that cord to where all hiring is Washington, DCcentric and get it out into the field because we know there is tremendous efficiencies there. 

Senator AKAKA. My time has expired but I just want to mention 

that I like the three key principles you had in your statement, that 

of leadership, partnership, and friendship. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you, Senator. I am waiting for the invitation to Hawaii that you extended to Admiral Stone. 

Senator AKAKA. You have that invitation. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Dayton. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR DAYTON 

Senator DAYTON. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Admiral Stone, welcome. I apologize if there is repetition, I 

missed the first part of the questioning. But certainly, thank you 

19

for taking on this assignment and I look forward to supporting 

your nomination. 

Just a couple of inquiries. I wanted to follow-up on what Senator 

Lieberman asked about the flight attendant training. You said that 

you were going to set up a higher level of training. It is my understanding that there really is not any training whatsoever at this 

point, that the airlines have their own on sort of a voluntary and 

very haphazard basis. Some of it is virtually non-existent. 

Is there going to be a formalized set of requirements for airlines? 

Or is there going to be some central training program? It just 

seems to me that we are overlooking an opportunity to have 

some—they are already well-qualified people—but well-trained people. The pilots are supposed to fly the plane and they are facing 

forward. I do not understand why we would not utilize this opportunity. 

Mr. STONE. Yes sir, Senator. 

We are supportive at TSA and understand that basic level of 

training has shortfalls. We have reached out to the flight attendant 

stakeholder group. They have shared with us their concerns. We 

are working what we think is a thoughtful package to enhance 

that. And our focus, as I mentioned earlier, was on we really want 

the December advance package to be something that is meaningful 

because it includes both course curriculum as well as the actual 

mat training. 

We have a number of initiatives ongoing which we think are innovative on how to get the advanced course moving smartly, as 

well. 

Senator DAYTON. Again, my understanding is, and correct me if 

I am wrong, but there is not any advanced course, is there a basic 

course? 

Mr. STONE. The basic course is what the airlines have which has 

mixed reviews in terms of the consistency and the quality of it and 

that we have been asked and we are working to put a standard on 

that. 

Senator DAYTON. Are all the airline’s providing a basic course 

that meets certain requirements? And are they doing that on a consistent basis? 

Mr. STONE. I am told there is inconsistency in that in terms of 

the number and the type of training, and that is why we are moving forward to give a standard to that. 

Senator DAYTON. What is the timeline then where there is going 

to be a rule or something that is going to put some teeth into this 

requirement? We are 21⁄2 years now past September 11. Some of 

these things—and the airlines, I understand, are under cost pressures. But when it comes to the safety of the traveling public, we 

do not know what is going to happen next. We do not know what 

is going to happen tomorrow. As we learned 21⁄2 weeks ago here in 

the Capitol, we do not know when the next emergency is going to 

occur. 

Mr. STONE. Sir, I pledge to move that through aggressively and 

keep you advised of the timeline on that. 

Senator DAYTON. I just would like to also follow-up on what was 

said by Senator Lautenberg regarding the security personnel. I 

have read a report on a report recently that claimed that the curVerDate 0ct 09 2002 08:52 Sep 21, 2004 Jkt 095192 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\95192.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PHOGAN
20

rent screening capabilities that were the same or similar and not 

very good to what preceded them. I just find it to be absolutely the 

opposite. I find an enormous improvement in the quality of the 

screening, the consistency of it, the professionalism, in contrast to 

the previous private contractors. 

I asked a lot of pilots and a lot of flight attendants the same. The 

only problem I have encountered is that there was a period where 

they were sufficient in number, at least the airports I was going 

through, and then TSA cut back I believe 5,000 positions. And I 

found spot shortages and lines resulting from insufficiency of personnel but not from inadequacy of procedures. 

I would just ask, if there is any serious consideration going to be 

given by this Administration to privatizing any aspect of this, that 

we be notified in advance and given the reasons why we would 

want to go back to that former system. 

Mr. STONE. Yes, sir. 

Your comments concerning the professionalism of the current 

screening force, we are very proud of that. We measure that. The 

70 percent improvement of our own testing results, I think, is reflective of that continuous improvement of our screeners. 

Having worked in an environment at LAX with pre-federalized 

screeners and post, I can see the night and day difference between 

the standard-setting and the consistency that we have had with 

our Federalized screening force. And we will keep you advised, sir, 

as that evolves with regard to the Screening Partnership Program 

otherwise known as Opt-out. 

Senator DAYTON. I realize, Admiral, that this is out of your immediate jurisdiction but given your overall mandate and certainly 

the Department’s responsibility for homeland security, we had this 

really alarming incident a couple weeks ago where a commercial 

plane, a State plane but essentially a private propeller plane, with 

a non-functioning transponder caused the evacuation of the Capitol 

and all of the Senate and House buildings. I had a constituent in 

my office who was 61⁄2 months pregnant who had to try to make, 

along with the rest of us, this rapid escape. People were being told 

to evacuate the Capitol, take off their shoes and run for their lives. 

And then we find out that it is a plane that has gotten somehow, 

and I was not aware this was even an option, permission from 

somebody—I guess FAA—to land at National Airport. 

I just find it incredible, with all due respect to a governor or any 

governor, who is coming in for a funeral 2 days later who, in my 

opinion and frankly for taxpayers purposes ought to be on a commercial plane, but who chooses to fly in for whatever reasons on 

a State plane can get permission to land at National Airport. 

I have flown, I think, about four or five times on non-public private planes, a couple times myself, which I paid for myself, and a 

couple of times with other senators. We flew out of Dulles and the 

general aviation there. And I thought that the security there being 

quite contrary to what it is at the commercial sites. I was concerned about that option, the possibility of somebody going through 

there with something and taking over one of those planes. But I 

thought at least it is Dulles. 

21

1 A single waiver for Construction Support Operations was granted for permission to pick-up 

and drop off rigging at Signature’s General Aviation Terminal at DCA related to a heavy lift 

operation involving the installation of a rooftop air-conditioning unit for a building in Arlington, 

VA. A law enforcement officer was on board the aircraft for the flight. 

I am just astonished that we are allowing planes other than the 

regularly scheduled commercial planes to come in and out of National Airport. 

I wonder if you would either yourself, please, or ask somebody 

who is responsible for those decisions, to give me in writing—and 

you can send it to the Committee Chairman—the criteria for making those permissions. 

Mr. STONE. Yes, sir. 

We have a waiver program that applies and we will make sure 

that we provide that briefing on the criteria for it and also the data 

on how often we have been approving that. 

We have provided that once in the context of the reopening of 

general aviation at Reagan. There were a number of questions 

about that waiver program and we will prepare that briefing. 

Senator DAYTON. So general aviation now operates out of 

Reagan? 

Mr. STONE. No, the briefing on general aviation at Reagan had, 

as its sub-context, are there any aircraft that currently are allowed 

to land there on the waiver program? And so we have a briefing 

that we can provide for you on that, sir.

INSERT FOR THE RECORD 

RESPONSE TO SENATOR DAYTON

Waiver for General Aviation flights in Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA): 

Although General Aviation (GA) is generally prohibited from operating into and 

out of DCA, TSA recognizes that certain exceptions must be made. Accordingly, a 

process has been implemented whereby some general aviation and commuter aircraft are permitted access into Reagan National Airport on a case-by-case basis. The 

waiver program is an inter-agency process in which TSA and FAA work closely together to ensure that the National Capital Region airspace remains secure while at 

the same time allowing a limited number of GA flights to operate within the Flight 

Restricted Zone (a radius of approximately 15 nautical miles centered on the Reagan 

National Airport navigational beacon) or into Reagan National Airport. These waivers are issued on a very limited basis for very specific purposes and only when very 

stringent security procedures have been implemented. 

For GA planes that operate in or out of DCA, a waiver request must be filed with 

TSA. Once a submission is received, TSA determines whether the applicant satisfies 

one of the three possible categories that would make an applicant eligible for a 

waiver, based upon the requested purpose and need for a waiver. Those categories 

include special/classified operations, government operations, and elected officials.1 If 

an applicant does not fit into one of these three categories, he or she is not eligible 

for a waiver and TSA does not forward the waiver request to the FAA. However, 

if the applicant is eligible, the pilot and crew are vetted through the FBI National 

Crime Information Center (NCIC), terrorist databases, and the No-Fly and Selectee 

lists to ensure that known or potential threats are not given waivers. Passengers 

are also checked against the No-Fly and Selectee lists. 

If these checks come back without derogatory information, an approval number 

is assigned to the flight and a waiver request form is drafted for delivery to the 

FAA. If the FAA approves and issues a waiver, the TSA Office of Airspace Security 

inputs the waiver into the ‘‘Master List’’ and then notifies the FAA, National Capital Region Coordination Center (NCRCC), and Potomac TRACON of the waiver authorization. 

All waivers are issued with strict compliance instructions for the pilot. Specifically, no later than one hour prior to flight, the pilot of a scheduled flight operating 

under a waiver is required to contact both the NCRCC and Potomac TRACON in 

22

order to inform both entities of the intended flight plan. The waiver also outlines 

other communications requirements related to operations in the area. When a flight 

with a waiver is operating within or approaching the Washington Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) (a ring approximately 30 miles around Washington, DC) or 

FRZ, the NCRCC, based at TSA’s Transportation Security Operations Center, can 

track the flight and determine the identity of the aircraft based upon the information provided before the flight and if the aircraft’s transponder is squawking. Additional security protections exist in that all general aviation flights that operate into 

and out of Reagan National Airport must have armed law enforcement officers on 

board. Furthermore, FAA has recently mandated that all aircraft entering the 

Washington ADIZ, including aircraft operating under waivers into or out of DCA, 

must have an operable transponder with automatic altitude reporting capability.

Senator DAYTON. I appreciate that. Thank you. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Carper. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARPER 

Senator CARPER. If I could follow up on Senator Dayton’s comments with respect to the governor’s airplane——

Senator DAYTON. Former governors from Delaware certainly 

should be granted that. 

Senator CARPER. When I was governor of Delaware people would 

say to me at governors meetings, talk to me about your State airplane, Governor. And Delaware is the second smallest State in the 

Union and I would always say Delaware’s State plane is a glider. 

Chairman COLLINS. Which you personally flew. 

Senator DAYTON. I hope it has a transponder anyway. 

Senator CARPER. Admiral, it is good to see you again. Thanks for 

coming out. 

I was kidding the Admiral when we had a chance to meet earlier 

this week, I said does your wife know that you are taking on this 

responsibility? He assured me that she did and I see that she is 

here today. And I just want to acknowledge your presence and 

thank you for your willingness to share with our country a very 

good man for a long time and for your willingness to share him 

with us for a little bit longer. 

When we met, I did not have a chance to talk to you at all about 

rail security. I live in a part of the country where a lot of people 

do ride the train. And during the course of this year some 25 million people will probably ride inner-city passenger rail. In the 

course of a day we have hundreds of thousands of people who are 

on commuter rail trains. At any point in a day there are probably 

more people on commuter trains and Amtrak trains going under 

rivers into Penn Station than there are in four or five C–47s fully 

loaded. 

And during the course of a day there will be more people who 

will use trains going in and out of Penn Station, for example, than 

will use all of New York City’s airports combined. So the issue of 

rail security is of concern to us particularly in our part of the Nation. 

With that having been said, we have focused a lot here today on 

aviation security. I would just welcome your thoughts on what we 

ought to be doing and what we are doing. I know you are doing 

some interesting things on rail security. Just take a minute or two 

and share those with us, please. 

Mr. STONE. Yes, sir. 

23

Our main focus of effort is in the areas of mass transit and rail 

to address this issue. We are the modal leaders for both of those. 

And so in that capacity what I have been doing is talking with the 

head of FTA and FRA on how we can partner on your existing programs that you have in order for us to further mitigate risk in the 

short-term. 

To date, our efforts have been on intelligence sharing, to have a 

weekly teleconference with stakeholders to share what we know 

about intelligence and threats to the mass transit and rail arena. 

In addition to that intel sharing, the work that we have been 

doing at New Carrollton and Union Station is critically important 

because it represents the ability for us to use technology to mitigate the risk. As we have seen in Moscow and Madrid, that risk 

is real and we need to have technologies that we have experimented with and marry them up with people so that we have a tool 

in our toolbox, particularly if we have intelligence and threat information that indicates interest in a particular area, that we might 

have an exportable capability that the Secretary can then use as 

he sees appropriate. 

And so my game plan on that, as a result of New Carrollton and 

now what we are doing at Union Station and next month what we 

are doing in putting equipment actually on a car, is to be able to 

marry up that equipment with TSA screeners—as the screeners 

that we have used at New Carrollton and Union Station are part 

of our national screening force and they have been trained in this 

area—is to have that exportable capability then to go forth wherever we think we need to have it. 

I think that is a very good short-term approach that if someone 

says in 2 weeks: ‘‘What can you do to enhance the security in an 

area?’’ that we have that. 

That coordination with FTA and FRA, as far as compliance, is 

key because they have already got a number of inspectors that 

have been out. They know the arena. We are partnering with them 

to form these partnership assist teams in which we can go out into 

a particular area and evaluate where they stand with regard to the 

recent security directives that we put out for mass transit and rail. 

As so these partnership assist teams were not meant to just provide a list in which entities have to go work on but they are meant 

to really understand the problem with those that are dealing with 

it every day, whether it be Amtrak or a subway system. We really 

want to understand what the frustrations are and the shortfalls 

and how much risk that we are living with in these particular 

areas. 

And so an emphasis on forming these assist teams and getting 

them up there and understanding what risk we have and where we 

think we need to mitigate it is also part of that philosophy. 

But we as an organization at TSA, whether it is aviation, mass 

transit or highway or maritime, realize that that intermodal connection is key. So HAZMAT truck drivers and our responsibilities 

which we are currently undertaking to ensure that HAZMAT drivers and their interface with the rail industry is covered. 

The stand up this year of the TWIC program, the Transportation 

Worker Identification Credential where we intend on having this 

pilot stood up this fall, where we have these cards so that at these 

24

key intermodal places, in order to gain access, these cards have to 

be produced. 

This is all part, I think, of a strategy to mitigate the risk in not 

just aviation but in all intermodal aspects of transportation. 

Senator CARPER. As my time expires, let me just leave you with 

this thought. Over the last several years there have been over 100 

terrorist attacks against rail operations around the world. Most everyone is familiar with what happened in the tragedy in Madrid. 

We know of threats against our own rail systems here. 

And it is just important that as we focus on threats to other 

modes of transportation that we be mindful of the threat that we 

face on rail. 

Madam Chairman, I have a statement as well that I would like 

to ask unanimous consent to have in the record. 

Chairman COLLINS. Without objection. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Carper follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARPER 

Thank you, Madam Chairman. And thank you, Admiral Stone, for being here 

today. We appreciate your service to our country and your willingness to continue 

that service by taking the lead in a very challenging area. 

As my colleagues are aware, September 11 was a wake up call in a number of 

respects. Among other things, that tragic day pointed out some glaring 

vulnerabilities in our nation’s air transportation system. I’m proud of the fact that 

Congress and the President worked swiftly in the days following the attacks to address some of those vulnerabilities. The creation of the Transportation Security Administration was a big part of those efforts. Thanks to Admiral Stone, his predecessor Admiral Loy and the thousands of hard working men and women at TSA, 

we are mindful ever time we visit an airport or board an airplane of the work we 

have done to make air travel safer in this country. 

Madam Chairman, I believe we had another wake up call in the area of transportation security this past March when terrorists placed bombs on commuter trains 

in Madrid, Spain, killing nearly 200 people. I firmly believe that we have an obligation to heed that wake up call and take the steps necessary to ensure that Americans who ride trains are as safe as those that travel by air or any other mode of 

transportation. 

Likewise, citizens across America deserve to know that the thousands of rail shipments carrying hazardous materials that pass through their communities on a daily 

basis are as secure as is reasonably possible. Amtrak, freight railroads, and local 

transit agencies are doing all that they can to strengthen the security of their systems, but the Federal Government, specifically the Department of Homeland Security and the TSA, must do more to help them, as we have done with other transportation sectors. 

At his confirmation hearing before this Committee this past November, Admiral 

Loy acknowledged our nation’s rail security needs and said rail would need to be 

a part of the transportation security plan that Homeland Security is apparently developing. At that same hearing, however, he hinted that it probably is not possible 

to make rail as secure as the aviation sector, saying we should focus more on how 

to recover from an attack than on how to prevent one. 

While this statement was alarming, Admiral Loy made a valid point. It is not possible, nor necessarily desirable, to implement exactly the same kinds of security 

measures at train stations as we have at airports. However, there is much we can 

do and I have not seen a concerted effort at Homeland Security to strengthen rail 

security using all available and reasonable means. In a lot of ways, our nation’s rail 

infrastructure is probably as vulnerable today as it was on September 10, 2001. 

To date, the Department of Homeland Security has been unable to tell me the 

amount of resources and the number of staff that are specifically dedicated to rail 

security. To my knowledge, they have not undertaken a coordinated, systematic assessment of the vulnerabilities of our national passenger and freight railroads, beyond ad hoc local efforts. In addition, no funds other than those granted to Amtrak 

to reimburse security costs directly associated with September 11 have been made 

available for increased intercity passenger rail security. In fact, when my staff recently asked Homeland Security officials, they said that they were not sure if AmVerDate 0ct 09 2002 08:52 Sep 21, 2004 Jkt 095192 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\95192.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PHOGAN
25

trak was even eligible for funds from the Department through any existing grant 

program. President Bush’s FY 05 budget, like its predecessors, requests no specific 

funding for rail security efforts. 

The Department of Homeland Security issued a series of security directives just 

last month designed to protect our rail systems from potential terrorist attacks. 

These requirements, however, appear largely to require actions already taken by 

most rail and transit agencies. Requiring that rail operators remove trash cans, inspect their facilities and make use of bomb-sniffing dogs, as the directives do, are 

positive steps. But these efforts fall short of the critical capital investments and security operations funding that are needed to protect railroad and transit passengers. 

In addition, the directives are not accompanied by any additional Federal funding 

for rail and transit security. Thus, the railroads and transit agencies will continue 

to be forced to spend scarce funds to pay for security improvements, including these 

recent unfunded mandates. 

Madam Chairman, we need to begin a serious effort to help railroads, states, cities, and transit agencies pay for key rail security efforts. Many rail operators, especially Amtrak, barely have enough resources to operate from day to day. We can’t 

expect them to shoulder 100 percent of their security costs, just as we don’t expect 

the aviation industry to cover all of its security costs. 

I am a strong supporter of two important pieces of legislation that would give rail 

operators the resources they need to cover some of those costs. S. 2273, a bill reported out of the Commerce Committee unanimously on April 8, requires a comprehensive vulnerability assessment of our nation’s rail infrastructure and authorizes Homeland Security to award $350 million in grants for security improvements. 

It also includes $667 million for improvements to the rail tunnels in NYC, Baltimore 

and DC and authorizes studies on passenger screening and steps taken in other 

countries to improve rail security. S. 2453, a transit security bill reported out of the 

Banking Committee unanimously on May 6, requires Homeland Security to begin 

taking a role in transit security and to begin awarding grants to transit agencies 

for security enhancements. I look forward to hearing Admiral Stone’s views on these 

two bipartisan efforts. 

More than two years after September 11—and more than two months after Madrid—rail security remains a major vulnerability. This vulnerability remains an 

Achilles heel in our nation’s efforts to secure our homeland. I hope Admiral Stone 

can commit today to take a leadership role in this area’s work with this Committee 

and all of our colleagues to begin to tackle this difficult problem.

Senator CARPER. Just in closing, I would say I welcome your 

nomination. I appreciated the chance to get to meet you and I look 

forward to working with you. 

Mr. STONE. Thank you, Senator. I appreciate that. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you, Senator. 

Admiral I want to follow-up on two issues that have been raised 

before turning to a completely different issue. 

One, I want to echo the concerns expressed by my colleagues for 

the need for TSA to promptly issue standards governing the basic 

training for flight attendants. All of us who fly regularly back to 

our States have had flight attendants approach us and express concern about the adequacy of training. They are, after all, on the 

front lines if there is a terrorist attack on an airline. It seems to 

me that the Department, the TSA, needs to act promptly to ensure 

that minimum standards are established for that basic training. 

I know you have done a lot of work on the advanced training but 

it seems to me that is putting the cart before the horse, and we 

need to get the standards for the basic training in place as soon 

as possible. 

So I just wanted to express my personal concern and reinforce 

the points made by my colleagues. 

The second issue I want to follow-up on was raised by my friend 

and colleague, Senator Akaka, and that is the transition that some 

airports are going to make from using Federal screeners to private 

contractors to perform screening. 

26

The Federal Government has obviously made a substantial investment in the training, hiring and deployment of Federal screeners. Can you tell us whether Federal screeners will have the right 

of first refusal to stay on with a private contractor taking over 

screening at a particular airport? 

Mr. STONE. Madam Chairman, it is our intent to have the 

screeners have priority for that job, first priority for that job. We 

intend to follow-up on that. 

I think that is absolutely critical, as I talk with our screeners in 

the workforce and their anxiety and churn, and the tremendous investment that we have made in the screeners who are true patriots, we want to make sure that that priority for if an airport does 

choose to go from Federal to privatized screening, and that is approved, that we have them have that priority. 

Senator COLLINS. I am glad to hear that. I think there is considerable anxiety among the workforce, and your assurances are very 

important. 

I would ask that, as you proceed with those plans, you keep the 

Committee informed. This Committee not only has oversight responsibility for the Department of Homeland Security, but it is also 

responsible for the laws that govern our Civil Service. So we have 

a dual interest in this important issue. 

Finally, I want to raise an issue that affects my state of Maine. 

As you know, the coast of Maine is dotted with islands. We have 

more than 3,000 of them. And while most of them are uninhabited, 

many of them are thriving communities where the residents commute from the island to the mainland every day for jobs and for 

school. 

The island residents of many of our islands up and down the 

coast are concerned about the impact of the new security requirements imposed by the Maritime Transportation Security Act. I 

know the Coast Guard has the lead responsibility here and I have 

met with Admiral Collins to discuss this issue, but I want to make 

you aware of it as well. 

The residents are concerned about the additional burden and the 

inconvenience that will be imposed by the new security measures. 

Keep in mind that in many cases these individuals are daily commuters from, for example, Peaks Island to Portland, Maine. 

They are also concerned about the increased cost of ferry tickets 

that are caused by the need to pay for the new security measures. 

And they are also concerned about whether the threat really justifies imposing this burden and the inconvenience of the cost. If the 

threat is sufficient, then obviously the cost is worth it, the inconvenience is worth it. But many of them question whether there 

really is a sufficient threat to justify the increased costs and burden. 

What assurances can you give my constituents that the new Department will take steps to not unduly disrupt the lives of individuals living on the islands off the coast of Maine? How will you 

strike the right balance between imposing a certain level of security and yet not making it so burdensome and costly that it really 

is a problem? 

Mr. STONE. Madam Chairman, I am a big proponent that when 

we make risk-based decisions that they must be based on the critiVerDate 0ct 09 2002 08:52 Sep 21, 2004 Jkt 095192 PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\95192.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PHOGAN
27

cality of the assets, the vulnerability and the threat and that we 

not then have undue measures for areas where that risk is not 

present. 

I met with Vice Admiral Allen from the Coast Guard late last 

week to talk to him about measures concerning ferries as well as 

cruise lines. I am very sensitive to the issue that you raised and 

pledge to ensure that that is part of the thinking when decisions 

are made on security. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. I look forward to working further 

with you on that issue and the many others that we have raised 

this morning. 

Senator Akaka. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. I have 

just one more question. 

Also, I want to ask that a question for Senator Fitzgerald be entered into the record here. 

Chairman COLLINS. Without objection. 

Senator AKAKA. Admiral, a February Government Executive article reported that the recertification program for TSA screeners is 

structured in a way to ensure that employees pass. One employee 

was quoted as saying that the tests are a joke and that TSA waters 

down the tests if screeners do not pass on their first try. 

Have you looked into this report, and is it accurate? Further, 

what steps will you take to ensure that screeners are knowledgeable about their jobs? 

Mr. STONE. The recertification program is a program we are extremely proud of. The way it was depicted in that article, I 

thought, was inaccurate. 

We have focused on this program because it gets to the issue of 

the credibility of our screening force and whether or not the standard operating procedures, the training on the x-ray machine and 

how we do our secondary screening protocols, whether those standards are reinforced throughout the year. And so an annual recertification program is our means of ensuring the American people 

that those standards are maintained. 

We looked at the way in which the most recent program was 

completed and believe it was done in a very thoughtful manner and 

that the standards were not compromised in any way. 

In fact, we had a number of screeners who thought that they 

would lose very good people because of the rigorous requirements 

of that recertification program. 

So we are constantly, though, eager to hear feedback on how we 

might improve it for the next year’s cycle. But we believe that the 

recertification program that we most recently executed is very credible and should be very reassuring to the traveling public that we 

have got our eye on the ball with regard to keeping the high standard of our screeners. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much for all of your responses. 

I want to wish you well and urge the Chairman to move your confirmation as fast as we can. Thank you. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you Senator. 

I want to thank you, Admiral Stone, for appearing before the 

Committee today. 

28

There will be some additional questions from myself and other 

Members for the record. Without objection, the record will be kept 

open until 5 p.m. tomorrow for the submission of additional questions and for your responses to them. 

We do appreciate your cooperation. 

And I want to join my colleagues in thanking you for your willingness to take on what is a very tough and vitally important job. 

I noticed that none of us is eager to take your place in taking on 

this responsibility. It is enormously important and, like Senator 

Akaka, I have heard from TSA employees on the front lines who 

have been very pleased with your openness and your leadership as 

you have been Acting Administrator. I think that bodes well for 

your future leadership of this vital agency. 

So thank you and this hearing is now adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 1:06 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

(29)

A P P E N D I X 


95191.001
30


95191.002
31


95191.003
32


95191.004
33


95191.005
34


95191.006
35


95191.007
36


95191.008
37


95191.009
38


95191.010
39


95191.011
40


95191.012
41


95191.013
42


95191.014
43


95191.015
44


95191.016
45


95191.017
46


95191.018
47


95191.019
48


95191.020
49


95191.021
50


95191.022
51


95191.023
52


95191.024
53


95191.025
54


95191.026
55


95191.027
56


95191.028
57


95191.029
58


95191.030
59


95191.031
60


95191.032
61


95191.033
62


95191.034
63


95191.035
64


95191.036
65


95191.037
66


95191.038
67


95191.039
68


95191.040
69


95191.041
70


95191.042
71


95191.043
72


95191.044
73


95191.045
74


95191.046
75


95191.047
76


95191.048
77


95191.049
78


95191.050
79


95191.051
80


95191.052
81


95191.053
82


95191.054
83


95191.055
84


95191.056
85


95191.057
86


95191.058
87


95191.059
88


95191.060
89


95191.061
90


95191.062
91


95191.063
92


95191.064
93


95191.065
94


95191.066
95


95191.067
96


95191.068
97


95191.069
98


95191.070
99


95191.071
100


95191.072
101


95191.073
102


95191.074
103


95191.075
104


95191.076
105


95191.077
106


95191.078
107


95191.079
108


95191.080
109


95191.081
110


95191.082
111


95191.083
112


95191.084
113


95191.085
114


95191.086
115


95191.087
116


95191.088
117


95191.089
118


95191.090
119


95191.091
120


95191.092
121


95191.093
122


95191.094
123


95191.095
124


95191.096
125


95191.097
126


95191.098
127


95191.099
128


95191.100
129


95191.101
130


95191.102
131


95191.103
132


95191.104
133


95191.105
134


95191.106
135


95191.107
136


95191.108
137


95191.109
138


95191.110
139


95191.111
140


95191.112
141


95191.113
142


95191.114
143


95191.115
144


95191.116
145


95191.117
146


95191.118
147


95191.119
148


95191.120
149


95191.121
150


95191.122
151


95191.123
152


95191.124
153


95191.125
154


95191.136
155


95191.137
156


95191.138
157


95191.139
158


95191.140
159


95191.141
160


95191.142
161


95191.143
162


95191.144
163


95191.145
164


95191.146
165


95191.126
166


95191.127
167


95191.128
168


95191.129
169


95191.130
170


95191.131
171


95191.132
172


95191.133
173


95191.134
174


95191.135
175


95191.147
176


95191.148
177


95191.149
178


95191.150
179


95191.151
180


95191.152
181


95191.153
182


95191.154
183


95191.155
184


95191.156
185


95191.157
186


95191.158
187


95191.159
188


95191.160
189


95191.161
190


95191.162
191


95191.163
192


95191.164
193


95191.165
194


95191.166
195


95191.167
196


95191.168
197


95191.169
198


95191.170
199


95191.171
200


95191.172
201


95191.173
202


95191.174
203


95191.175
204


95191.176
205

Æ


95191.177