IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

No. 12764 

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IN THE MATTER OF 

JOHN L. McKEON 

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OPINION AND ORDER " 

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The matter of the petition of John L. McKeon for reinstatement to the bar of the State of Montana comes before this 

Court under Rule X, of the Commission on Practice of the 

Supreme Court of the State of Montana (Order in cause no. 

10910, establishing the Commission on Practice, January 1, 

1965, effective April 1, 1965). 

John L. McKeon was disbarred by this Court on ?day 13, 

1974. In the Matter of John L. McKeon (1974) , 164 Plont. 328, 

521 P.2d 1307. His disbarment followed his conviction for 

crimes through a plea bargaining process in which petitioner 

pleaded guilty to four separate felonies, which included (1) 

offering false evidence, (2) obtaining money by false pretense, 

(3) grand larceny by bailee, and (4) forgery. Petitioner 

was sentenced to five years imprisonment on each count with 

the last three years of each sentence suspended, the sentences 

to run concurrently. As a condition of sentence and parole, 

petitioner agreed to make restitution of funds to individual 

clients and to the Workers' Compensation Division of the 

Department of Labor and Industry of the State of Montana. 

The petitioner has fully served his prison time and has 

returned to reside in Anaconda, Montana. The findings of the 

Commission reflect that he has made restitution payments 

on schedule and that there still remains a balance to be 

repaid to discharge his restitution obligations in full. 
Notice of the hearing of the application by the petitioner 

for the reinstatement was sent to the Attorney General of 

the State of Montana, the United States Attorney, the County 

Attorney of Deer Lo2ge County, the president of the ?lantana Bar 

Association, and all members of the Third Judicial District 

of the Montana Bar Association. The notice provided that 

any and all persons desiring to appear and to be heard 

in support of or in opposition to the petition should attend 

and participate in the proceedings. The Commission found 

that the secretary of the Commission had received over 20 

letters in support of petitioner's application and had 

received none in opposition thereto. No person had requested 

an opportunity to appear at the hearing in opposition to the 

application. Supporting petitions were signed by 48 lawyers 

as were petitions containing approximately 500 signatures of 

residents of the city of Anaconda. Following the hearing before 

the Commission on the petition for reinstatement, the secretary 

of the Commission received an additional 18 letters in 

support of the application and one in opposition thereto. 

The opposing letter stated the opinion that anyone convicted 

of felony should be denied reinstatement. 

Prior to the hearing, the Commission on Practice had 

hired special counsel to investigate on behalf of the Commission, 

and to determine if there was any evidence that would indicate 

that the application should be denied. The only adverse 

reaction reported by the special counsel was from a lumber 

yard owner in Anaconda who was a former county commissioner. 

He opposed the application for reinstatement on the grounds 

that the crimes for which petitioner was convicted were so 

severe that he should never be allowed to practice. His 

opposition was not based on any facts occurring subsequent 

to the time of the disbarment. 
The Commission found a uniform consistency among the 

affidavits, letters and sworn testimony that petitioner 

sincerely regrets his transgressions, that he did not turn 

to the use of alcohol or drugs following his conviction,that he 

did not indulge in self pity, but devoted the last 8 years 

of his life to assisting the young and the aged. The Commission 

found him to be a compassionate friend and neighbor. The 

Commission also found that the petitioner himself was a 

convincing witness on his own behalf, acknowledging his 

crime, stating that he was ashamed of it, that he held no 

resentment for the fact that he was prosecuted and required 

to go to prison, that he knew he had done wrong, and that he 

carried no hostility arising out of his convictions and 

subsequent disbarment. The Commission further found: 

"Accordingly, from the evidence presented at the 

hearing and otherwise made known to the Commission, 

the applicant does appear to have rehabilitated himself 

and since his release from prison led a contrite and 

productive life. Notwithstanding this proof, the 

Commission has serious reservations whether the 

format prescribed for reinstatement which is a 

curious mixture of public and confidential proceedings 

will ever bring forth any substantial opposition 

evidence if it exists. Further, it occurs to us that 

there is no adequate way for the Commission or the 

court truly determining the applicant's present ethics 

and morality. Proof in the form of testimony of 

friends and supporters of the applicant is not 

altogether objective evidence. The Commission believes 

that the best indicator of the applicant's moral 

propensities lies in the nature and circumstances 

of the deeds which brought about his disbarment. . . 

"Mr. McKeon's admitted crimes were a series of 

separate calculated felonies, corrmitted over a long 

period of time, the victims of which were persons 

or agencies with whom he developed a trust. There is 

no indication of alcoholism, family need, or other 

ameliorating circumstance which claimed Mr. McKeon's 

criminal acts . . . 

"In view of the gravity of the admitted crimes and 

accumulative moral turpitude of McKeon's crimes, 

the Corunission determines that there is insufficient 

proof that the applicant now possesses a high degree 

of moral and ethical standaurds which are necessary 

to practice law in Montana. 

Seven members of the Commission signed the majority report 

denying petitioner's application recommending that the application 
for reinstatement be denied. These included the three 

lay members who represent the public on the Commission. Three 

lawyer members of the Commission on Practice filed a minority report 

in favor of petitioner's reinstatement. 

Other arguments against reinstatement raised by the majority 

report include the effect upon the public, the majority being 

of the opinion that because of the notoriety and gravity of 

McKeon's felony convictions and imprisonment, reinstatement 

would not be in the best interests of the law profession in 

the state; that if he were applying for the first time as a 

layman for admission at the University of Montana Law School, 

he would undoubtedly be denied; and that section 37-61-309, 

MCA, requires mandatorily that a lawyer convicted of a felony 

be stricken from the roll of attorneys; that there is an 

implication from the statute that the conviction of a crime 

involving moral turpitude mandates permanent deprivation of 

the right to practice. 

Members of the Commission signing the minority report contend 

that the adoption of a rule that persons convicted of felonies 

must never again be admitted to practice is harsh and unnecessary; 

that there has been no public outcry raised against his reinstatement in the area where petitioner is known and resides; 

and that since his conviction and imprisonment, he has shown 

himself not to be a repeat offender. The minority concludes 

that based on the record before the Commission, the evidence 

of petitioner's rehabilitation is so commanding that his 

reinstatement is required. 

We hold that on the record in this case before the 

Commission, petitioner McKeon should be granted reinstatement 

to the Bar of the State of Montana. In so holding we run 

contra to the opinion of seven members of the ten member 
Commission on Practice. Out of deference to all of the 

members of the Commission who hold their positions either 

by appointment by this Court, or by election by their lawyerpeers, we will attempt to explain our reasons for so holding. 

The first issue that we examine is the tenet that an 

attorney, once convicted of a felony, must thereafter be 

permanently Warred from practicing in the courts of this 

State. The Commission majority, though noting that this 

tenet was not essential to their conclusion, nonetheless 

found a strong implication in the provisions of section 37- 

61-309, MCA, upon which to found the tenet. That section 

provides that upon conviction of a felony the judgment of 

the Supreme Court must be that the name of the party be 

stricken from the roll of attorneys, whereas in conviction 

for cases less than a felony, or for misdemeanor not involving 

moral turpitude, the judgment of the court may - be, according 

to the gravity offense, or charge, deprivation of the right 

to practice "permanently or for a limited period." 

First, the making of rules governing the conduct of the 

members of the Bar is particularly within the province of 

the Supreme Court. Art. VII, 5 2, 1972 Mont. Const. The 

power of the courts generally to control the admission and 

readmission of lawyers to practice is recognized in section 

6.2 of the American Bar Association Standards for Lawyer 

Disciplinary and Disability Proceedings: 

"6.2 Disbarment. Readmission. The court has 

exclusive power to readmit a disbarred lawyer. 

"The lawyer should not be able to apply for 

readmission until at least 5 years after the 

effective date of disbarment and should not 

be readmitted unless he can show by clear 

convincing evidence: rehabilitation, fitness 

to practice, competence, and compliance with 

all applicable discipline or disability orders 

and rules." 
Second, the legislature has not shown permanent punishment 

as its desideratum in its general statutes respecting convictions 

for crimes: 

"46-18-801. Effect of conviction -- civil 

disabilities. (1) Conviction of any offense 

shall not deprive the offender of any civil 

or constitutional rights except as they shall 

be specifically enumerated by the sentencing 

judge as necessary conditions of the sentence 

directed toward the objectives of rehabilitation 

and the protection of society. 

" (2) No person shall suffer any civil or 

constitutional disability not specifically 

included by the sentencing judge in his order 

of sentence. 

" (3) When a person has been deprived of any 

of his civil or constitutional rights by reason 

of conviction for an offense and his sentence has 

expired or he has been pardoned, he shall be 

restored to all civil rights and full citizenship, 

the same as if such conviction had not occurred." 

Third, we have in the past restored to practice attorneys 

who had been disbarred for conviction of felony, or under 

circumstances amounting to the commission of a felony. We 

omit citations to these instances out of respect for the 

individuals involved. 

Fourth, we decline in principLe to adopt a position 

that permanent disbarment is just retribution for a felony 

conviction. In the deepest well-springs of our beings, 

expressed in nearly every religious persuasion, is the 

precept that man, though weak in nature, can nonetheless 

reform. To deny that humans, even lawyers, are capable of 

reform is to scant the qualities of memory, understanding 

and will which distinguish us from other vertebrates. 

The second issue to be examined is whether it does 

irreparable damage to the Bar from the viewpoint of public 

acceptance, to readmit a person convicted of felony to 

practice law. It must be admitted that here the majority 

members of the Commission may have a point, though we doubt 
that the damage is irreparable. Undoubtedly there is a good 

deal of skepticism in the public at large when we do readmit 

a lawyer who has been convicted of a felony. Offsetting 

that is the relatively good experience we have had in those 

cases where readmission has been granted. 

Having determined that conviction of the felony should 

not ipso facto make disbarment permanent, and that we have 

been willing to risk public skepticism in earlier cases, we 

move now to the third issue, whether on the record, petitioner 

McKeon has shown by clear and convincing evidence that he is 

rehabilitated, and that this Court should risk, and cause 

his future clients to risk, the quality of his reform. The 

majority members of the Commission agree that petitioner 

"does appear to have rehabilitated himself and since his 

release from prison led a contrite and productive life." 

The majority members, however, backed away from the conclusion 

that he is rehabilitated because of the cunulative nature of 

his earlier crimes, which they feel indicate moral propensities, 

the cure of which no proof is pcssible. 

This Court agrees that the petitioner does aFpear to 

have been rehabilitated, and from the record can deduce no 

risk that petitioner has deluded us about his reform. If 

the evidence here does not support rehabilitation, there 

will be little chance for any future disbarred attorney to 

establish reform. It is difficult also for us to close our 

eyes to the other facets of petitioner's career and demonstrations 

of his ability which have resulted in immense service to the 

public. He is an honorably discharged veteran who served in 

the Armed FG~C~S in World War 11, having voluntarily enlisted 

in those forces at age 17 after graduating from high school. 

He was disabled in the war, and attended the University of 
Montana, by virtue of the provisions of the Disabled Veterans 

Act. Throughout his career he was active in veterans affairs, 

has held offices in veterans organizations, and even since 

his disbarment, has actively counseled veterans of all wars 

including the Vietnam conflict, on their rights as veterans, 

and he has lent assistance in many problem they have had in 

connection with their veterans rights, all without charge 

for his services. While he was a lawyer, he held numerous 

public positions, including stints as an assistant attorney 

general for the State of Moritana, as Deer Lodge County 

Attorney, as a member of the school board of trustees, and 

as state Senator for 14 years, where he represented at 

various times the Counties of Deer Lodge, Powell, Granite 

and portions of the County of Missoula. 

Since his disbarment he has lived in the co~~munity of 

Anaconda. He chose to return after his conviction to his home 

among the people he had known, and despite the shame of his 

criminal convictions. He has had difficulty providing for 

himself and his family since his disbarment and has survived 

by using his assets for living expenses in addition to 

making substantial payments on the obligations he assumed 

for restitution. He testified at the hearing that he has 

continued the study of law by reading the decisions of this 

Court and the Session Laws of the State of Montana and has 

read extensively in legal periodicals, law reviews, and 

issues of legal texts as new volur,es were published. He has 

assisted the youth and elderly in his community; he has 

volunteered his time to the recreation department of AnacondaDeer Lodge County, and has coached basketball teams composed 

of eighth grade students, for all of which he has received 

no compensation. He has particularly interested himself in 
the problems of aged, has been active in the Montana Legacy 

Legislature, and has helped senior citizens in lobbying 

efforts. He has busied himself in other public interest 

pursuits. 

In deciding to restore him to the practice of law, we 

are placing upon him a burden common to all restored lawyers, 

but particularly emphasized in his case. He must now demonstrate 

to the public, to the members of the Practice Commission, 

and particularly to this Court that his reform is genuine, 

and that our trust is not misplaced. 

We are placing no conditions upon his readmission. He 

is subject to the requirements of continuing legal education 

that now apply to all lawyers practicing in this state. His 

duty of restitution is contractual, and is a matter between 

him and the other parties to the contract. We repeat the 

language of the California court in Resner v. State Bar of 

California (1967), 433 P.2d 748, wherein that Court said: 

"There can, of course, be no absolute guarantee that 

the petitioner will never engage in misconduct again. 

But if such a guarantee were required for reinstatement 

none could qualify. All that we can require is a 

showing of rehabilitation and of present moral fitness. 

A reading of the entire record indicates that Resner 

has convincingly established his rehabilitation and 

moral fitness by his own statements and those of 

many attorneys on his behalf. Rehabilitation is, of 

course, a 'state of mind.' The law looks with favor 

upGn the regeneration of erring attorneys and should 

not place unnecessary burdens upon them. (Citing 

cases.) Tested by these standards petitioner has 

met the burden placed upon him. He should be 

reinstated." 433 P.2d at 755, 756. 

WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED: 

That the petitioner John L. McKeon at a suitable time be 

and appear before the clerk of this Court, then and there 

to take and file the oath required of attorneys for admission 

to the Bar, and that thereupon the clerk of this Court add the 

name of John L. McKeon to the list of attorneys authorized 
to practice law in the courts of this State; and that those 

courts which have been notified by the clerk of this Court 

of his disbarment be then notified of his readmission to 

practice. 

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DATED this i/'day of December, 1982. 

We Concur: 

Chief Justice 
Mr. Chlef Justice Frank I. Haswell, concurring and dissenting : 

I would reinstats petitioner for the reasons stated by 

the majority, but I would impose conditions for the protection of the public. 

First, I would require petitioner to pass a bar 

examination. Petitioner has not practiced law for more than 

eight years. Section 6.2 of the American Bar Association 

Standards for Lawyer Disciplinary and Disability Proceedings 

provides in pertinent part: 

"The lawyer . . . should not be readmitted unless he can show by clear convincing evidence: rehabilitation, fitness to 

practice, competence, and compliance with 

all applicable discipline or disability 

orders-and rules. " (Emphasis mine. ) 

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What better way exists to prove present competence to 

practice law by clear and convincing evidence than to 

successfully pass a bar examination? 

The fact that petitioner was presumptively competent 

to practice law at the time of his disbarment in 1974 does 

not constitute clear and convincing evidence that he is 

still competent after an eight-year layoff in my view. Nor 

are the requirements of continuing legal eaucation which are 

imposed upon all attorneys designed to provide a substitute 

for a comprehensive bar examination. 

Petitioner testified at tne hearing on his petition 

for reinstatement that he has continued the study of law by 

reading the decisions of this Court, the Session Laws of the 

Montana Legislature, and has read extensively in legal periodicals, law revlews and issues of legal texts as they were 

published. What better way exists to evaluate the effectiveness of petitioner's self-study program than for him to 
take a bar examination? 

Secondly, I would require petitioner to successfully 

pass the Montana Professional Responsibility Examination. 

This examination tests the examinee's knowledge of ethical 

standards demanded of attorneys, their obligations and 

responsibilities. Petitioner has never taKen this test as 

it has only recently been instituted. As the causes of 

petitloner's disbarment directly relate to his breach of 

these standards, obligations and responsibilities, petitioner should be required to successfully pass this 

examination. 

Finally, I would require that petitioner's reinstatement be made expressly conditional on the continued performance of hls contract obligation to make restitution to 

various clients of his and to the Workmen's Compensation 

Divislon as requested by the Attorney Generai. This wrltten 

restitution agreement dated September 30, 1974, between 

petitioner and the Workmen's Compensation Division was 

approved by the then Attorney General, Robert L. Woodahl, 

and District Judge Peter G. Meloy. As of January 6, 1982, a 

balance of $26,015.62 remained owing by petitioner. Payment 

in full plus accrueu interest is due by September 10, 1984. 

I am not comfortable with readmitting petitioner to 

tne pracclce of law free of these conditions. Surely, we 

owe the public in whose midst petitioner will practice these 

minimum safeguards. 

Q4 44, pU& 

Chief Justice