J. S66044/19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA :

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v. :

:

RONALD CHARLES PURVIS, : No. 3230 EDA 2018

:

 Appellant :

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 6, 2018,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County

Criminal Division at No. CP-46-CR-0007567-2017

BEFORE: STABILE, J., NICHOLS, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. 

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: Filed:May 21, 2020

Ronald Charles Purvis appeals from the July 6, 2018 judgment of 

sentence entered by the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County after 

a jury convicted him of two counts each of delivery of a controlled substance, 

possession of drug paraphernalia, and possession of a controlled substance, 

and one count each of drug delivery resulting in death, recklessly endangering 

another person (“REAP”), hindering apprehension or prosecution, tampering 

with or fabricating physical evidence, and abuse of a corpse.1 The trial court 

 

1 35 P.S. §§ 780-113(a)(30), (32), and (16); 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2506(a), 2705, 

5105(a), 4910, and 5510, respectively.
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imposed an aggregate sentence of 18-47 years’ imprisonment.2 After careful 

review, we affirm.

The trial court set forth the following factual history:

On March 29, 2017, . . . Kevin High was released from 

the Montgomery County Correctional Facility after 

serving a sentence. He left the prison by bus and 

travelled directly to the home of his drug supplier, 

[appellant], located at 376 E. High Street, 

Apartment 9, in the Borough of Pottstown. Two 

individuals, Jennifer Wiegand and [appellant], resided 

there.

As described by witnesses and corroborated by video 

surveillance from around appellant’s apartment, the 

events of the afternoon and evening began at 

approximately 3:09 PM on March 29, 2017, when 

Kevin High arrived at appellant’s apartment at 

376 E. High Street in Pottstown after being released 

from jail earlier that day. He greeted appellant when 

he got there, and then entered appellant’s apartment. 

A number of other individuals, including 

Jennifer Wiegand, Shemar Reed, David Hillier, and a 

friend of Ms. Wiegand’s named Jessica, were at the 

apartment as well. Ms. Wiegand testified that 

appellant handed Mr. High a wax paper bag of 

something that he snorted, and, in addition, gave 

Mr. High something from a small metal container that 

normally had methamphetamine in it, which the 

victim snorted. Mr. High took both drugs relatively 

close in time to each other. Mr. High then asked [] 

appellant what the drugs were, and appellant failed to 

respond directly. Soon after he took the drugs, 

Mr. High sat down on the couch and started to fall 

asleep. When others attempted to speak to him, he 

would mumble or nod. Mr. High’s complexion 

changed dramatically. He became pale and his 

 

2 The trial court sentenced appellant to consecutive sentences of 15-40 years’ 

imprisonment for drug delivery resulting in death, 2-5 years’ imprisonment 

for hindering apprehension or prosecution, and 1-2 years’ imprisonment for 

abuse of a corpse. (Notes of testimony, 7/6/18 at 40-41.)
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breathing became noisy, labored, and irregular. As a 

result of Mr. High’s obvious physical distress, 

appellant took out his blood pressure monitor and 

took Mr. High’s blood pressure. No one was able to 

rouse Mr. High. Appellant then took a “shock collar,”

typically used on a dog, and placed it around 

Mr. High’s neck. He then shocked the victim in an 

attempt to wake him up. Mr. High did not respond or 

wake up. At 4:59 PM, “Jessica”[

3] got a glass of water 

to splash on Mr. High to try to wake him up, to which 

Mr. High again did not respond. When it became clear 

that the victim was unconscious and he could not be 

awakened from any of these stimuli, appellant called 

a neighbor, Mike Pascal, at approximately 5:47 PM, to 

help him remove Mr. High from his apartment. With 

Mr. Pascal’s assistance, the pair moved the victim 

from the couch in the living room to the hallway area 

outside of appellant’s apartment door. Appellant left 

the victim’s unconscious body on the floor, in a 

hallway of the building, at the top of a flight of stairs. 

Appellant claimed at the time that “. . . he didn’t want 

Kevin to wake up alone in the apartment; so he 

wanted to move him outside so he could wake up and 

just leave.” At this point, Mr. High was still alive.

At approximately 9:11 PM, [] appellant, Ms. Wiegand, 

and Jessica left appellant’s apartment and went to 

Walmart. By this time all the other guests had left 

appellant’s apartment. Mr. High was still lying 

unconscious in the hallway outside of appellant’s 

apartment. Appellant, Ms. Wiegand, and Jessica 

checked out of Walmart at 11:22 PM, stopped for 

fast-food and returned to appellant’s apartment. 

When they returned home, appellant stayed in the car 

and told Ms. Wiegand to go check on Mr. High. 

Ms. Wiegand found him where they left him, outside 

of the apartment door on the landing in the hallway. 

At that time, Mr. High was obviously deceased. 

Ms. Wiegand testified that Mr. High looked pale and 

that she did not feel any breath or pulse. She went 

back outside and told appellant that the victim had 

died. Appellant instructed her to get Jess[ica] and go 

 

3 Jessica’s last name does not appear in the certified record.
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to Wawa. The two women left [] appellant alone at 

his apartment with the deceased body of the victim 

lying at the top of the stairs in the hallway. 

Ms. Wiegand went to Wawa and waited there in the 

car until appellant told her she could come back. 

When Ms. Wiegand returned from Wawa, appellant 

was at his apartment with a neighbor named 

Floyd Wilkins. Mr. Wilkins dragged Mr. High’s dead 

body from the landing, down the steps, to make it look 

like he “. . . just walked out there himself.” Once the 

victim’s body was dumped on the bottom of the stairs, 

appellant permitted Ms. Wiegand to call 911.

On March 30, 2017, the Pottstown Police Department 

responded to Apartment 9 at 376 E. High Street, 

Pottstown, Pennsylvania for a report of an 

unconscious subject. At approximately 3:15 AM, 

officers arrived at the scene and found the victim, 

Kevin High, deceased in the vestibule at the bottom 

of the stairway leading up to Apartment 9. The 

Pottstown Police Department commenced an 

investigation into the suspicious death of Kevin High 

culminating in their filing charges against appellant on 

September 19, 2017.

Trial court opinion, 2/21/19 at 4-7 (citations to the record and extraneous 

capitalization omitted).

On April 18, 2018, a jury convicted appellant of the aforementioned 

crimes. Following his conviction and imposition of sentence, appellant filed a 

timely post-sentence motion, which the trial court denied on October 15, 

2018. 

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. The trial court ordered 

appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal 

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), and appellant timely complied. The trial court

subsequently filed an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).
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Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

[1.] Did the trial court err in denying [appellant’s] 

motion to suppress where police conducted a 

custodial interrogation without issuing 

Miranda[

4] warnings?

[2.] Did the trial court err in denying [appellant’s] 

motion for a mistrial where jury instructions did 

not cure the prejudice?

[3.] Was the evidence sufficient to convict 

[appellant] of abuse of a corpse where the 

Commonwealth’s only eyewitness testified that 

a man named Floyd was the person who 

committed the acts giving rise to the charge?

[4.] Did the trial court err in assigning costs of 

prosecution without a determination of 

[appellant’s] ability to pay where he is indigent?

[5.] Was the sentence manifestly unjust and did the 

court below abuse its discretion by sentencing 

[appellant] significantly outside of the 

guidelines on the basis of incorrect facts and 

duplicative criteria giving appropriate weight to 

mitigating factors?

Appellant’s brief at ix.5

I.

In his first issue, appellant argues that the trial court erred when it 

denied his motion to suppress, in which he alleged that the Commonwealth 

unlawfully obtained evidence in violation of his Miranda rights. (Appellant’s 

 

4 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

5 We have reordered appellant’s issues for ease of discussion.
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brief at 25.) Specifically, appellant avers that he was subjected to a custodial 

interrogation and he was not given his Miranda rights. (Id. at 25-26.)

[An appellate court’s] standard of review in 

addressing a challenge to the denial of a suppression

motion is limited to determining whether the 

suppression court’s factual findings are supported by 

the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn 

from those facts are correct. Because the 

Commonwealth prevailed before the suppression

court, we may consider only the evidence of the 

Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the 

defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the 

context of the record as a whole. Where the 

suppression court’s factual findings are supported by 

the record, [the appellate court is] bound by [those] 

findings and may reverse only if the court’s legal 

conclusions are erroneous. Where . . . the appeal of 

the determination of the suppression court turns on 

allegations of legal error, the suppression court’s legal 

conclusions are not binding on an appellate court, 

whose duty it is to determine if the suppression court 

properly applied the law to the facts. Thus, the 

conclusions of law of the courts below are subject to 

[] plenary review.

Commonwealth v. Jones, 121 A.3d 524, 526-527 (Pa.Super. 2015), appeal 

denied, 135 A.3d 584 (Pa. 2016), quoting Commonwealth v. Jones, 988 

A.2d 649, 654 (Pa. 2010) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

It is axiomatic that under the United States and Pennsylvania 

Constitutions that an individual subject to a custodial interrogation has a right 

to remain silent. See Miranda, supra; Commonwealth v. Boyer, 962 A.2d 

1213, 1216 (Pa.Super. 2008), citing Commonwealth v. Bomar, 826 A.2d

831, 842 n.12 (Pa. 2003), cert. denied sub nom. Bomar v. Pennsylvania, 

540 U.S. 1115 (2004). Our supreme court has provided the following 
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guidance for determining whether an individual is subject to a custodial 

interrogation:

Custodial interrogation is defined as “questioning 

initiated by law enforcement officers after a person 

has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of 

his freedom of action in any significant way[,]”

Miranda, [384 U.S.] at 444, [] and the 

Commonwealth does not contest that appellant was 

questioned by law enforcement officers; the only 

dispute is whether he was in custody.

An individual is in custody if he is “physically denied 

his freedom of action in any significant way or is 

placed in a situation in which he reasonably believes 

that his freedom of action or movement is restricted 

by the interrogation.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 

[] 727 A.2d 1089, 1100 ([Pa.] 1999) (citations 

omitted). Regarding custody, the United States 

Supreme Court has further held the “ultimate inquiry 

is . . . whether there [was] a ‘formal arrest or restraint 

on freedom of movement’ of the degree associated 

with a formal arrest.” Stansbury v. California, 511 

U.S. 318, 322, [] (1994) (citation omitted). The 

standard for determining whether an encounter is 

custodial is an objective one, focusing on the totality 

of the circumstances with due consideration given to 

the reasonable impression conveyed to the individual 

being questioned. Commonwealth v. Gwynn, [] 

723 A.2d 143, 148 ([Pa.] 1998) (Opinion Announcing 

Judgment of the Court) (citation omitted).

Commonwealth v. Cooley, 118 A.3d 370, 376 (Pa. 2015).

In denying appellant’s suppression motion, the trial court concluded as 

follows:

Considering the totality of the circumstances 

surrounding [appellant’s] questioning by [d]etectives 

from the Pottstown Police Department on March 30, 

2017, [the trial c]ourt concludes that [appellant] was 

free to leave and was not in custody. [The trial c]ourt 
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finds that his statements were voluntary and are not 

subject to suppression for lack of Miranda warnings.

Trial court order, 2/21/18 at 10; ¶ 10. Moreover, the trial court explicitly 

found the testimony of the police officers to be credible and “worthy of belief.” 

(Id. at 8; ¶ 64.)

After a careful review of the record, viewing the totality of the 

circumstances of appellant’s statements to police, the record supports the trial 

court’s factual findings and legal conclusions. Indeed, appellant was not 

placed in handcuffs when the police transported him to the police station to 

give a statement regarding Mr. High’s death. (Notes of testimony, 2/8/18 

at 19.) At no point did appellant tell the police that he did not want to go to 

the police station. (Id. at 19-20.) When appellant asked if he was in custody, 

Sergeant Michael Markovich—the lead investigator—told appellant that he was 

not in custody at that time and that he was free to leave. (Id. at 31.) 

Moreover, Detective Thomas Leahan testified that he spoke with appellant’s 

then-attorney, Michelle Fioravante, Esq., telling her that the police were 

investigating a suspicious death, that appellant was not identified as a prime 

target in their investigation, and that they only wished to speak to him about 

the circumstances of Mr. High’s death. (Id. at 57.) Detective Leahan further 

testified that Attorney Fioravante told him that appellant could talk as long as 

he felt comfortable and that the minute he felt uncomfortable, he was to leave. 

(Id. at 57-58.) The record further reflects that during questioning, appellant 

wanted to leave and was permitted to do so. (Id. at 34, 58.)
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Accordingly, we find that the trial court’s factual findings are supported 

by the record and that the trial court properly applied the law to the facts of 

the case. Appellant’s first issue is without merit.

II.

In his second issue, appellant contends that the trial court erred when 

it denied appellant’s motion for a mistrial after Jennifer Wiegand testified that 

appellant “indirectly threatened [her] family if [she] were to testify against 

him[.]” (Appellant’s brief at 42.) Appellant further argues that the prejudice 

the statement caused to the jury could not be cured by a curative instruction. 

(Id. at 42-43.) 

Appellate review of a denial of a motion for a mistrial is governed by the 

following standard:

The trial court is in the best position to assess the 

effect of an allegedly prejudicial statement on the 

jury, and as such, the grant or denial of a mistrial will 

not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion. A 

mistrial may be granted only where the incident upon 

which the motion is based is of such a nature that its 

unavoidable effect is to deprive the defendant of a fair 

trial by preventing the jury from weighing and 

rendering a true verdict. Likewise, a mistrial is not 

necessary where cautionary instructions are adequate 

to overcome any possible prejudice.

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 107 A.3d 52, 77 (Pa. 2014), cert. denied 

sub nom. Johnson v. Pennsylvania, 136 S.Ct. 43 (2015), quoting 

Commonwealth v. Rega, 933 A.2d 997, 1016 (Pa. 2007), cert. denied 

sub nom. Rega v. Pennsylvania, 552 U.S. 1316 (2008) (citation omitted). 
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When the trial court provides cautionary instructions to the jury in the event 

the defense raises a motion for mistrial, “[t]he law presumes that the jury will 

follow the instructions of the court.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 786 A.2d 

961, 971 (Pa. 2001), cert. denied sub nom. Brown v. Pennsylvania, 537 

U.S. 1187 (2003) (citation omitted).

At trial, Ms. Wiegand testified for the Commonwealth. On direct 

examination, Ms. Wiegand testified that she was in a relationship with 

appellant but that their relationship “wasn’t a particularly good one.” (Notes 

of testimony, 4/17/18 at 124.) Ms. Wiegand also stated that appellant “could 

be abusive at times, physically, emotionally.” (Id.) Appellant did not object 

to these statements. Ms. Wiegand then testified that she felt afraid to 

cooperate with the authorities in this case because she was afraid of appellant. 

(Id. at 130-131.) Appellant did not object to this statement. When asked 

why she was afraid of appellant, Ms. Wiegand stated that appellant “indirectly 

threatened [her] family if [she] were to ever testify against [appellant.]” (Id.

at 131.)

Appellant immediately objected and moved for a mistrial. (Id. at 131-

132.) The trial court denied appellant’s motion for a mistrial and instead 

provided the jury with the following curative instruction: “The witness made 

a comment about threats. I am going to strike that from the record, and I’m 

going to instruct you that you may not consider that last comment at all.” 

(Id. at 135.)
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Here, appellant fails to demonstrate that the trial court’s curative 

instruction was not adequate to overcome any potential prejudice that would 

prevent the jury from weighing and rendering a true verdict. Rather, appellant 

baldly contends that “the surprise testimony regarding an alleged threat made 

by the accused exponentially buffered the prosecution’s theory of [appellant] 

as a controller who orchestrated the events at issue.” (Appellant’s brief 

at 43.) In support of this theory, appellant relies upon statements made by 

the Commonwealth and the trial court during the sentencing hearing. (Id.

at 44.) Statements made during the sentencing hearing have no effect on the 

jury, as the jury had already rendered its verdict in the case. Therefore, 

appellant did not meet his burden of establishing that the comments at issue 

prevented the jury from weighing and rendering a true verdict. Johnson, 

107 A.3d at 77. Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion when it denied appellant’s request for a mistrial.

III.

In his third issue, appellant complains that the Commonwealth failed to 

prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant abused a corpse. Specifically, 

appellant relies on Ms. Wiegand’s testimony, which indicated that Mr. Wilkins 

was the only person to move Mr. High’s body from the top of the staircase 

outside appellant’s apartment to the bottom. (Appellant’s brief at 44-45.) 

Our well settled standard of review in sufficiency of the evidence claims 

is as follows:
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As a general matter, our standard of 

review of sufficiency claims requires that 

we evaluate the record in the light most 

favorable to the verdict winner giving the 

prosecution the benefit of all reasonable 

inferences to be drawn from the evidence. 

Evidence will be deemed sufficient to 

support the verdict when it establishes 

each material element of the crime 

charged and the commission thereof by

the accused, beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Nevertheless, the Commonwealth need 

not establish guilt to a mathematical 

certainty. Any doubt about the 

defendant’s guilt is to be resolved by the 

fact finder unless the evidence is so weak 

and inconclusive that, as a matter of law, 

no probability of fact can be drawn from 

the combined circumstances.

The Commonwealth may sustain its 

burden by means of wholly circumstantial 

evidence. Accordingly, [t]he fact that the 

evidence establishing a defendant’s 

participation in a crime is circumstantial 

does not preclude a conviction where the 

evidence coupled with the reasonable 

inferences drawn therefrom overcomes 

the presumption of innocence. 

Significantly, we may not substitute our 

judgment for that of the fact finder; thus, 

so long as the evidence adduced, 

accepted in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth, demonstrates the 

respective elements of a defendant’s 

crimes beyond a reasonable doubt, the 

appellant’s convictions will be upheld.

Commonwealth v. Franklin, 69 A.3d 722-723 

(Pa.Super. 2013) (internal quotations and citations 

omitted). Importantly, “the jury, which passes upon 

the weight and credibility of each witness’s testimony, 

is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence.” 
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Commonwealth v. Ramtahal, [] 33 A.3d 602, 607 

([Pa.] 2011).

Commonwealth v. Sebolka, 205 A.3d 329, 336-337 (Pa.Super. 2019).

The Crimes Code defines abuse of a corpse as a person, “treat[ing] a 

corpse in a way that he knows would outrage ordinary family sensibilities[.]” 

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5510. We find this court’s decision in Commonwealth v. 

Hutchison, 164 A.3d 494 (Pa.Super. 2017), appeal denied, 176 A.3d 231 

(Pa. 2017), to be instructive. In Hutchison, the defendant argued that failing 

to notify the authorities when he discovered the decedent’s body was not 

criminalized under Section 5510. Id. at 498. This court held that evidence 

of the defendant’s failure to notify the authorities of the decedent’s death 

constituted sufficient evidence to warrant a conviction of abuse of a corpse. 

Id. at 499.

Here, appellant does not dispute that he did not call 911 immediately 

upon realizing that Mr. High was dead. To the contrary, the record reflects 

that appellant waited until Mr. Wilkins moved Mr. High’s body to the bottom 

of the stairwell before telling Ms. Wiegand to call 911. (Notes of testimony, 

4/17/18 at 149-150.) When viewing this evidence in the light most favorable 

to the Commonwealth, we find, in light of our holding in Hutchison, that the 

Commonwealth introduced sufficient evidence to warrant a conviction of abuse 

of a corpse. See Hutchison, 164 A.3d at 499.
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IV.

In his fourth issue, appellant claims that the trial court erred when it 

assigned the costs of prosecution to appellant as part of his sentence. 

(Appellant’s brief at 48.) Appellant acknowledges that he is raising this issue 

for the first time on appeal. (Id.) Generally, raising an issue for the first time 

on appeal results in waiver of that issue. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 

33 A.3d 122, 126 (Pa.Super. 2011), appeal denied, 47 A.3d 845 (Pa. 2012), 

citing Commonwealth v. Rush, 959 A.2d 945, 949 (Pa.Super. 2008), 

appeal denied, 972 A.2d 521 (Pa. 2009). Appeals pertaining to the legality 

of sentence, however, are non-waivable and can be raised for the first time 

on appeal. Commonwealth v. Bezick, 207 A.3d 400, 403 (Pa.Super. 2019) 

(citation omitted). This court has recognized that appeals addressing the trial 

court’s authority to impose costs challenge the legality of the sentence. 

Commonwealth v. Garzone, 993 A.2d 306, 316 (Pa.Super. 2010), aff’d., 

34 A.3d 67 (Pa. 2012), citing Commonwealth v. Allshouse, 924 A.2d 1215 

(Pa.Super. 2007) (citation omitted). Accordingly, we find that appellant

challenges the legality of his sentence. Therefore, we will review this issue on 

its merits.

Here, appellant specifically contends that both statutory law and the 

Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure require that “the sentencing court 

consider a defendant’s ability to pay prior to [imposing costs] and that such 
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costs should be waived where a [defendant] is indigent.” (Appellant’s brief 

at 48.) 

The Judiciary Code requires a trial court to order a convicted defendant 

to pay costs. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(c.1). In Commonwealth v. Ciptak, this 

court held that a “defendant’s liability for costs is not part of the punishment 

for the offense, and it is not a sentence to pay something additional to any 

penalty imposed by law.” 657 A.2d 1296, 1297 (Pa.Super. 1995), rev’d. on 

other grounds, 665 A.2d 1161 (Pa. 1995), citing Commonwealth v. 

Bollinger, 418 A.2d 320 (Pa.Super. 1979.) Indeed, our supreme court has 

recognized that, 

Although a presentence ability-to-pay hearing is not 

required when costs alone are imposed, our Rules of 

Criminal Procedure provide that a defendant cannot 

be committed to prison for failure to pay a fine or costs 

unless the court first determines that he or she has 

the financial means to pay the fine or costs. 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 706(A).

Commonwealth v. Ford, 217 A.3d 824, 826 n.6 (Pa. 2019) (emphasis 

added).

Here, appellant is not being incarcerated due to his ability, or lack 

thereof, to pay the costs of prosecution imposed at this sentencing. Because 

our supreme court does not require a sentencing court to hold an ability to 

pay hearing prior to the imposition of costs, we find that the trial court did not 

err when it did not conduct a hearing to determine appellant’s ability to pay 
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the costs of prosecution. Id. Accordingly, appellant’s fourth issue is without 

merit.

V.

In his final issue, appellant contends that the trial court abused its 

discretion when it imposed sentences for drug delivery resulting in death, 

hindering prosecution, and abuse of a corpse in excess of the sentencing 

guidelines. (Appellant’s brief at 17.) Put another way, appellant raises a 

challenge to the discretionary aspects of his sentence.

Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentence 

are not appealable as of right. Commonwealth v. 

Leatherby, 116 A.3d 73, 83 (Pa.Super. 2015). 

Rather, an appellant challenging the sentencing 

court’s discretion must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction 

by (1) filing a timely notice of appeal; (2) properly 

preserving the issue at sentencing or in a motion to 

reconsider and modify the sentence; (3) complying 

with Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f), which requires a separate 

section of the brief setting forth “a concise statement 

of the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal with 

respect to the discretionary aspects of a sentence[;]”

and (4) presenting a substantial question that the 

sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the 

Sentencing Code. Id. (citation omitted).

Commonwealth v. Padilla-Vargas, 204 A.3d 971, 975 (Pa.Super. 2019).

Here, appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and filed a post-sentence 

motion in which he alleged that the trial court imposed a manifestly excessive 

and unreasonable sentence. (See appellant’s post-sentence motion, 7/16/18 

at 6-9.) Appellant also included a Rule 2119(f) statement in his brief. (See

appellant’s brief at 14-17.)
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We must now determine whether appellant raised a substantial 

question.

“The determination of what constitutes a substantial 

question must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.” 

Commonwealth v. Prisk, 13 A.3d 526, 533 

(Pa.Super. 2011). Further:

A substantial question exists only when 

the appellant advances a colorable 

argument that the sentencing judge’s 

actions were either: (1) inconsistent with 

a specific provision of the Sentencing 

Code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental 

norms which underlie the sentencing 

process.

Id. (internal citations omitted).

Commonwealth v. Swope, 123 A.3d 333, 338 (Pa.Super. 2015). This court 

has held that a claim that a trial court does not sufficiently state its reasons 

for deviating from the sentencing guidelines raises a substantial question. 

Commonwealth v. Twitty, 876 A.2d 433, 439 (Pa.Super. 2005), appeal 

denied, 892 A.2d 823 (Pa. 2005), citing Commonwealth v. Brown, 741 

A.2d 726, 735 (Pa.Super. 1999), appeal denied, 790 A.2d 1013 (Pa. 2001).

Here, appellant claims that the trial court’s departure from the 

sentencing guidelines was improper because it “relied upon reasons that did 

not justify the departure[,]” that the trial court failed to adequately consider 

mitigating factors set forth by appellant, and that the trial court “relied upon 

factors that were necessary elements to establish the crimes [appellant] 

committed and that were already incorporated into the offense gravity 
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scores.” (Appellant’s brief at 17.) Put another way, appellant alleges that the 

reasons relied upon by the trial court in crafting his sentence were not 

sufficient to justify a deviation from the sentencing guidelines. We, therefore, 

find that appellant has raised a substantial question, and we shall consider 

this appeal on its merits. Twitty, 876 A.2d at 439 (holding that allegation of 

trial court failure to sufficiently state reasons for deviating from sentencing 

guidelines raises substantial question).

When reviewing the merits of appellant’s claim, we are governed by the 

following standard of review:

Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion 

of the sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be 

disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse of 

discretion. In this context, an abuse of discretion is 

not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather, 

the appellant must establish, by reference to the 

record, that the sentencing court ignored or 

misapplied the law, exercised its judgment for reasons 

of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or arrived at a 

manifestly unreasonable decision.

Commonwealth v. Zirkle, 107 A.3d 127, 132 (Pa.Super. 2014), appeal 

denied, 117 A.3d 297 (Pa. 2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Hoch, 936 

A.2d 515, 517-518 (Pa.Super. 2007) (citation omitted).

On appeal, appellant argues that the trial court’s reasons for deviating 

from the sentencing guidelines “belie the excessiveness of the sentence.” 

(Appellant’s brief at 21.) Specifically, appellant contends that the trial court 

“relied on elements of offenses for which [appellant] was convicted as 
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aggravating factors. The trial court also wrongly attributed actions of others 

to [appellant] and does not significantly weigh mitigating factors.” (Id.)

In every case where the court imposes a sentence 

outside the sentencing guidelines . . . the court shall 

provide a contemporaneous written statement of the 

reason or reasons for the deviation from the 

guidelines. Failure to comply shall be grounds for 

vacating the sentence and resentencing the 

defendant.

Leatherby, 116 A.3d at 83, quoting Commonwealth v. Rodda, 723 A.2d 

212, 215 (Pa.Super. 1999), citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b).

In the instant case, the trial court enumerated its reasons for deviating 

from the sentencing guidelines both in writing and in remarks delivered from 

the bench during appellant’s sentencing hearing. (See trial court order, 

7/31/18;6 notes of testimony, 7/6/18 at 35-40.) In its order, the trial court 

concluded that “[appellant’s] actions were undertaken with malice and a 

reckless disregard for the value of human life.” (Trial court order, 7/31/18 

at 1.) Additionally, the trial court stated that appellant’s efforts to conceal the 

victim, prevent others from seeking assistance, and destroy evidence “all 

reflect the worst violations of these crimes[,]” and that appellant’s conduct 

rose above “conduct that would constitute violations of these statutes.[.]” 

(Id.) The trial court also noted that appellant displayed “a complete lack of 

remorse and cruelty as evidenced by his winking at the family and supporters 

 

6 While the trial court’s order explaining its reasons for deviating from the 

sentencing guidelines is dated July 6, 2018, it was not entered by the 

Montgomery County clerk of courts until July 31, 2018.
J. S66044/19

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of [Mr. High] in court after the verdict[.]” (Id.) Finally, the trial court 

acknowledged the sentencing guidelines and found the guideline sentencing 

ranges to be “inappropriately low considering the severity of [appellant’s] 

specific actions” giving rise to his convictions. (Id.)

As evidenced above, the record reflects that the trial court considered 

the sentencing guidelines and chose to deviate from them after setting forth 

the reasons for doing so. (See notes of testimony, 7/6/18 at 35-40; trial 

court order, 7/31/18.) We, therefore, discern no abuse of discretion on the 

part of the trial court.

Finally, appellant argues that the trial court failed to adequately weigh 

his mitigating factors, “such as: [appellant’s] lack of family support and 

[appellant’s] struggle with alcohol addiction, ADHD, and depression.” 

(Appellant’s brief at 24.) This claim is without merit.

We have held that, “[w]hen a sentencing court has reviewed a 

presentence investigation report, we presume that the court properly 

considered and weighed all relevant factors in fashioning the defendant’s 

sentence.” Commonwealth v. Baker, 72 A.3d 652, 663 (Pa.Super. 2013), 

appeal denied, 86 A.3d 231 (Pa. 2014), citing Commonwealth v. Fowler, 

893 A.2d 758, 767 (Pa.Super. 2006). Here, the record reflects that the trial 

court reviewed appellant’s presentence investigation report, as well as the 

PPI evaluation. (Notes of testimony, 7/6/18 at 33.) Additionally, the trial 

court explicitly states that it considered any mitigating factors based on its 
J. S66044/19

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review of the presentence investigation report in its Rule 1925(a) opinion. 

(Trial court opinion, 2/21/19 at 38.)7 Accordingly, we find that appellant’s 

claim that the trial court failed to consider his mitigating factors is without 

merit.

We, therefore, discern no abuse of discretion in the sentence imposed 

by the trial court.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/21/20

 

7 Appellant’s claim is further belied by the record of his sentencing hearing. 

Indeed, appellant’s counsel noted that appellant had a history of ADHD, 

depression, and anxiety. (Notes of testimony, 7/6/18 at 23.) Counsel also 

noted that appellant had a history of addiction and further noted that no one 

from appellant’s family attended the trial. (Id. at 24, 26-27.) The trial court 

acknowledged counsel’s argument before imposing sentence. (Id. at 34.)