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91–691PS 2004

U.S. VISION FOR

SPACE EXPLORATION

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

FEBRUARY 12, 2004

Serial No. 108–42

Printed for the use of the Committee on Science

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/science

(II)

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE

HON. SHERWOOD L. BOEHLERT, New York, Chairman

RALPH M. HALL, Texas

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas

CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania

DANA ROHRABACHER, California

JOE BARTON, Texas

KEN CALVERT, California

NICK SMITH, Michigan

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland

VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan

GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota

GEORGE R. NETHERCUTT, JR.,

Washington

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma

JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois

WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri

TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois

MELISSA A. HART, Pennsylvania

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia

PHIL GINGREY, Georgia

ROB BISHOP, Utah

MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas

JO BONNER, Alabama

TOM FEENEY, Florida

RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas

BART GORDON, Tennessee

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas

LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California

NICK LAMPSON, Texas

JOHN B. LARSON, Connecticut

MARK UDALL, Colorado

DAVID WU, Oregon

MICHAEL M. HONDA, California

BRAD MILLER, North Carolina

LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas

ZOE LOFGREN, California

BRAD SHERMAN, California

BRIAN BAIRD, Washington

DENNIS MOORE, Kansas

ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York

JIM MATHESON, Utah

DENNIS A. CARDOZA, California

VACANCY

VACANCY

VACANCY

(III)

C O N T E N T S

February 12, 2004

Page

Hearing Charter ...................................................................................................... 2

A Renewed Spirit of Discovery, The President’s Vision for U.S. Space

Exploration, President George W. Bush, January 2004 ............................ 7

Opening Statements

Statement by Representative Sherwood L. Boehlert, Chairman, Committee

on Science, U.S. House of Representatives ........................................................ 19

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 20

Statement by Representative Bart Gordon, Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives ............................................ 20

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 22

Statement by Representative Dana Rohrabacher, Chairman, Subcommittee

on Space and Aeronautics, Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives ..................................................................................................................... 23

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 24

Statement by Representative Nick Lampson, Member, Committee on Science,

U.S. House of Representatives ............................................................................ 25

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 26

Prepared Statement by Representative Vernon J. Ehlers, Chairman, Subcommittee on Environment, Technology, and Standards, Committee on

Science, U.S. House of Representatives ............................................................. 27

Prepared Statement by Representative Jerry F. Costello, Member, Committee

on Science, U.S. House of Representatives ........................................................ 28

Prepared Statement by Representative Sheila Jackson Lee, Member, Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives ............................................ 28

Witnesses:

Dr. John H. Marburger, III, Director, Office of Science and Technology Policy,

Executive Office of the President

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 29

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 33

Biography .......................................................................................................... 37

Mr. Sean O’Keefe, Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 38

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 41

Discussion

Budget Assumptions and Uncertainties ............................................................. 48

Program Management and Sunk Costs .............................................................. 49

Cost Estimates ..................................................................................................... 49

Heavy Lift ............................................................................................................. 54

Robotic Exploration .............................................................................................. 55

CEV Costs ............................................................................................................. 56

The End of ISS ..................................................................................................... 57

INA ........................................................................................................................ 59

International Participation in the ISS ............................................................... 61

The Exploration Vision and Current Budget Constraints ................................ 62

ARC Accounting and Field Center Closures and ‘‘The Militarization of

Space’’ ................................................................................................................ 63

Page

IV

The Vision’s Focus on Science ............................................................................. 66

Hubble ................................................................................................................... 68

Shuttle RTF .......................................................................................................... 70

The Role of CEV ................................................................................................... 71

Hubble and Risk ................................................................................................... 73

NASA’s Budget and National Security ............................................................... 74

Efforts at Marshall ............................................................................................... 76

INA and Soyuz Purchases ................................................................................... 76

Centennial Challenges ......................................................................................... 77

The Cost of the Vision ......................................................................................... 78

RTF Costs ............................................................................................................. 80

Schedule Pressure ................................................................................................ 81

OSTP Efforts in the Interagency Deliberations ................................................. 82

RTF Delays and Their Effect on the Budget ..................................................... 83

INA ........................................................................................................................ 84

Vision Cost ............................................................................................................ 84

Centrifuge ............................................................................................................. 85

Appendix 1: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions

Dr. John H. Marburger, III, Director, Office of Science and Technology Policy,

Executive Office of the President ........................................................................ 90

Mr. Sean O’Keefe, Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration ................................................................................................................... 97

Appendix 2: Additional Material for the Record

Space Exploration: Overview of President Bush’s New Exploration Initiative

for NASA, and Key Issues for Congress, by Marcia S. Smith, CRS Report

for Congress, February 9, 2004 ........................................................................... 126

How Much Space for Science?, Science magazine, January 30, 2004 ................. 132

Adventure or Inquiry? Two Visions of Cosmic Destiny, article by Dennis

Overbye, The New York Times, February 3, 2004 ............................................. 141

(1)

U.S. VISION FOR SPACE EXPLORATION

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 12, 2004

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE,

Washington, DC.

The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:08 a.m., in Room

2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Sherwood L.

Boehlert (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.

2

HEARING CHARTER

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

U.S. Vision for Space Exploration

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 12, 2004

10:00 A.M.–12:00 P.M.

2318 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING

1. Purpose

On Thursday, February 12th at 10:00 a.m., the Science Committee will hold a

Full Committee hearing on the President’s proposed space exploration initiative,

which was announced Jan. 14. (A copy of the White House document that outlines

the President’s vision is attached as Attachment A.)

2. The President’s Proposal

The President’s plan can be seen as having three distinct, but related aspects. The

first aspect concerns current human space flight programs. The President proposes

to complete construction of the International Space Station (ISS) by the end of the

decade and to retire the Space Shuttle at that point. ISS research is to be reconfigured to focus on questions related to the impact on human health of spending long

periods in space. Under the proposal, the U.S. participation in ISS is slated to end

around 2016, although the Administration has said that that date may shift. The

National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has also decided to cancel

the Shuttle mission that was needed to keep the Hubble Space Telescope in operation past 2007. Ending the Shuttle and Station programs is necessary to free up

funds for other aspects of the proposal and to avoid Shuttle recertification in 2010,

an expensive process called for by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board.

The second aspect of the plan concerns new medium-term goals for human space

flight. The central goal is to return to the Moon between 2015 and 2020. To do this,

NASA will develop a new Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV), which will carry humans

by 2014. (The CEV may also be used to service the Space Station.)

The third aspect of the plan concerns long-range goals for the years past 2020.

The entire plan is geared toward preparing for this period, but what will happen

during these years is (perhaps necessarily) left entirely open-ended. The ultimate

goals are to send humans to Mars and to increase the commercial exploitation of

space. The timing of future exploration is left open and will depend on the pace of

technology development and discovery during the years leading up to 2020. The

President announced the appointment of a nine-member commission, headed by

former Secretary of the Air Force Pete Aldridge, that will focus primarily on recommending what kinds of things ought to be done in the long-run on the Moon and

to get to Mars, and how those activities might shape programs in the nearer-term.

3. Overarching Questions

The President’s plan raises many fundamental questions about the purposes of

the U.S. space program and about the details of how it will be carried out. The overarching questions for the hearing include:

1. What is the purpose of the exploration program? To what degree will it be

designed to answer scientific research questions? To what degree will it be

designed to promote commercialization or national security interests? How

high a national priority is exploration for exploration’s sake?

2. How much will the President’s proposal cost to implement now and in the

future? What are the greatest uncertainties in the budget estimates that

have been presented? When will those figures become more definite? Are

there early points at which progress can reasonably be assessed? What is

being done to avoid the inaccurate cost estimates that have plagued the

Space Shuttle, Space Station and Orbital Space Plane programs?

3. What budgetary tradeoffs will have to be made to fund the President’s proposal? Specifically, what will the impact be on NASA’s programs in astronomy, outer planetary exploration, Earth science, and aeronautics?

3

The overall goal of the hearing is to make sure the Committee has clear information on the philosophy and budgetary assumptions that undergird the President’s

proposal.

4. Witnesses

Mr. Sean O’Keefe, Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

Dr. John Marburger, Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy.

5. Issues

• What is the goal of the President’s initiative? Human space travel is inherently expensive and risky compared to robotic missions. Congress needs to

decide whether human space travel is a priority that merits continued funding, and obviously that will depend, in part, on what is to be gained. In his

Jan. 14 speech, the President said, ‘‘We choose to explore space because doing

so improves our lives and lifts our national spirit.’’ But the Administration

has sent mixed signals about what kinds of improvements will be sought. In

some presentations, the Administration has left the impression that exploration is a basic human need, an end in itself—an activity that will be informed by science and may contribute to science, but that will not have a

science-driven agenda. In other presentations, the Administration has implied

that science is the primary rationale for the President’s vision. In other

places, commercialization, national security, and the possibility of technological spinoffs have been offered as rationales. None of these reasons is mutually exclusive, but the goals of the program will determine the spending

and activities that are undertaken.

• How much will the President’s initiative cost? The President has been

clear that he is not willing to seek massive amounts of new spending to fund

the initiative—unlike the approach that was taken during the Apollo program

in the 1960s. NASA officials have said that if work does not proceed smoothly,

they will extend deadlines rather than increase annual costs. (Moving deadlines would still increase cumulative costs.) The President has proposed a 5.6

percent increase for NASA (to $15.4 billion) for Fiscal Year (FY) 05, by far

the largest increase for any R&D agency.

Figuring out how much the President’s initiative would cost is not easy because of the many assumptions that need to be made. Adding to the complexity, NASA has described the costs differently in different documents,

using different baselines.

The most specific figures concern the next five years (FY05–09), over which

the President proposes to spend a cumulative total of $87.1 billion on the entire NASA budget. NASA has compared the proposal to two different baselines. In the first comparison, NASA says that over the next five years, the

President proposes to spend $1 billion more on the entire NASA budget than

NASA had predicted it would spend in February, 2003. (That estimate was

made as part of the Presidents’s FY04 budget.) In the second comparison,

NASA describes the President’s proposal as providing $12.6 billion more, cumulatively, over five years for the entire NASA budget compared to what

NASA would have received if its spending had been frozen for five years at

the FY04 level of about $15 billion. (NASA uses this figure frequently, but

there is no evidence that NASA was ever going to face such a freeze.)

Figuring out how much of the NASA budget will be dedicated to the President’s initiative depends on what is included in that spending category.

Should it include the Space Shuttle and Space Station? Should it include

robotic missions that were planned before the President’s announcement, but

may contribute to it, or just new ones? NASA, generally, includes all robotic

missions that will contribute to the initiative and excludes the Space Shuttle

and Space Station. Using those definitions, the initiative would receive $31.4

billion over the next five years. Costs would increase considerably in the subsequent 10 years, and costs cannot even be estimated for the period beyond

that because the activities remain undefined. (See Attachment B, although,

according to NASA, the chart was designed more for internal purposes than

to give a precise picture of out-year spending.)

• What are the greatest uncertainties in NASA’s cost projections? Of necessity, the proposed budget is based on best guesses of costs for key elements

of the President’s initiative.

4

Perhaps the greatest uncertainty remains the cost of continuing to operate

the Space Shuttle. Any delay in retiring the Space Shuttle will add significantly to NASA’s costs (as well as raising the question of whether the Shuttle

should fly without recertification). NASA continues to assume a return to

flight this fall, although experts inside and outside the agency are raising

doubts about whether that deadline can be met. Once flights resume, NASA

plans about five flights a year—a pace that Admiral Gehman, the Chair of

the Columbia Accident Investigation Board, has said could revive concerns

about ‘‘schedule pressure’’ adversely affecting safety. Retiring the Shuttle on

schedule may also require using means other than the Shuttle to take up

crew and supplies to the Space Station because the Shuttle will be needed

to complete Station construction. Shuttle retirement could also be delayed if

key portions of the Station, such as the centrifuge being built by the Japanese, are not completed on schedule. (The centrifuge is generally viewed as

the most valuable piece of scientific equipment that will be brought to the

Station.) NASA is still figuring out the ‘‘manifests’’ for the remaining Shuttle

flights—that is, the description of when flights would leave and return and

what they would carry.

The costs of developing the CEV, the new vehicle that would take astronauts to the Moon and beyond also are uncertain because development has

not yet begun. In some ways, CEV development will build on the Orbital

Space Plane (OSP) project that NASA discontinued as part of the President’s

initiative. The OSP, which was to be designed primarily to take astronauts

to the Space Station, was already facing cost overruns in its early design

stages, and Congress was raising doubts about its usefulness. NASA now estimates that it will spend $6.5 billion over the next five years on CEV development.

The CEV will also require the development of a new launch system, and

NASA has not decided yet how to approach the design of a new launch vehicle. NASA is now estimating that the development of such a vehicle will cost

about $5 billion.

Administration officials have said that because the CEV and its launch system will be developed over a longer time period than was allotted for the OSP

there will be time to reevaluate costs before becoming overly committed to a

particular design. Total CEV development is expected to cost about $15 billion.

The cost of the CEV may be affected by how NASA decides to select a contractor for the program. NASA limited OSP development to two competitors.

NASA has not yet made clear whether it will have a more open competition

for the CEV.

• How will the President’s initiative affect the rest of NASA’s programs? The Space Sciences budget will continue to grow (from $3.9 billion

in FY04 to $5.6 billion in FY09) because many of its robotics missions will

be considered part of preparation for human exploration. Most of these missions will be entirely unchanged despite the redesignation. In addition, new

lunar missions will be added. Nonetheless, projects totaling about $2.6 billion

will be cut from the Space Sciences budget over the next five years (compared

to the Administration’s February, 2003 projections) by canceling or deferring

missions and programs that are considered less important to human exploration. (Other projects are added so that, overall, Space Sciences will receive

slightly more over the five-year period than had been planned, if one excludes

Project Prometheus, which is being transferred from Space Sciences to another account.) One question is how Space Sciences will fare in the years after

FY09 when the costs of a human lunar landing will begin to increase substantially.

Earth Science would fare far worse, sustaining cuts in FY05 through FY08.

Earth Science spending would decline from $1.52 billion in FY04 to $1.47 billion in FY09, a year in which it is slated to receive an increase. NASA Earth

Science missions are a major component of the Administration’s climate

change science program.

Aeronautics would be essentially flat through the period, increasing in

some years and decreasing in others, but ending up in FY09 at $942 million—a drop from the FY04 level of $946 million.

(See Attachment C for more details.)

5

• Why is the Shuttle mission to the Hubble Space Telescope being cancelled? The Administration is describing the Hubble cancellation as a ‘‘close

call’’ made by the Administrator because of safety concerns. The Hubble,

which has been enormously successful, is expected to go dark around 2007

without a servicing mission. Many astronomers are lobbying for that mission

to occur, and, indeed, before the President’s initiative was announced, a panel

assembled by the National Academy of Sciences, called for another servicing

mission to be added to extend the telescope’s life even further. That request

became moot with the decision to discontinue the Shuttle in 2010. However,

some experts contend that ground-based telescopes have advanced so much

in recent years that they can now make up for at least some of the capability

that would be lost if the Hubble ceases to function.

A Shuttle mission to the Hubble is a special case because Hubble missions

cannot reach the Space Station, which could be used as a ‘‘safe haven’’ in case

of an emergency or the need to inspect or repair the Shuttle. The Columbia

Accident Investigation Board said that the Shuttle should fly to destinations

other than the Space Station only when NASA had developed an ‘‘autonomous’’ inspection and repair capability—that is, a way to inspect without

using the Space Station. NASA believes such a capability is probably many

years away. As a substitute, NASA examined having a second Shuttle ready

to fly a rescue mission, but viewed that as dangerous and prohibitively expensive. However, debate continues among Hubble enthusiasts as to the relative

dangers of a mission to the Station and a mission to Hubble.

NASA acknowledges that there were ‘‘secondary’’ considerations that also

led to the cancellation of the Hubble mission, including the need to complete

all the Shuttle missions needed for Station construction by 2010.

• How will the President’s initiative change the Space Station program? As a result of the initiative, NASA is re-examining the entire Station

research program. Decisions on the new program may not be made for about

a year. The new program will focus on questions of human health. Among the

questions this raises are: what research will be discontinued and was any of

it of real value? How much will the new research agenda cost? Does the new

research really require facilities in space and will it be peer reviewed? Will

concerns arise since much of the new research will presumably involve using

astronauts as human experimental subjects?

• How will NASA transport crews to the Station after the Shuttle is retired? The Administration acknowledges that it has not yet figured out how

to get crews to the Station between the retirement of the Shuttle in 2010 and

the first flight of the CEV in 2014. (The Shuttle may also be unavailable for

crew transfer earlier, if its schedule needs to be devoted entirely to Station

construction.)

The U.S. is already using the Russian Soyuz spacecraft for crew transfer

while the Shuttle is grounded. However, it is doing so under an agreement

that the Russians will have fulfilled by 2006. Renewing the agreement may

require a change in the Iran Nonproliferation Act (INA), which Congress

passed in 2000. That Act attempts to prevent the spread of weapons of mass

destruction to Iran by prohibiting the purchase of Russian rockets by the U.S.

unless the President certifies that no Russian entity is engaged in any sales

of missiles or missile systems to Iran. (The INA does not apply to the current

agreement.)

Amending the Act would be controversial, and so far the Administration

has hedged its bets, simply saying that the matter is under review.

• How will NASA carry cargo to and from the Station after the Shuttle

is retired? Similar to the crew situation, NASA has no current plan for getting cargo to the Station after the Shuttle is retired. NASA is using Russian

Progress vehicles while the Shuttle is grounded, but continuing to do so indefinitely could require amending the Iran Nonproliferation Act. (See above.)

NASA might also rely on Europe or Japan, which are partners in the Space

Station and which are developing cargo-carrying spacecraft of their own. But

those craft have not yet been flight-tested. Some have suggested that NASA

could convert the space shuttle itself into a cargo-only craft that could deliver

huge loads of cargo to the ISS. But critics have said that such an approach

would be much more expensive than flying smaller loads on existing rockets.

Finally, NASA might try to purchase the services of commercial rocket firms.

But at present no firm has a rocket that can supply the Station, although sevVerDate 11-MAY-2000 16:41 Oct 01, 2004 Jkt 091691 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\WORKD\FULL04\021204\91691 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
6

eral have indicated a willingness to try to carry small amounts of cargo there.

Another complication is that some cargo for the Space Station is very large—

major replacement parts, for example—and most craft other than the Shuttle

are not big enough to carry such cargo.

6. Questions to witnesses:

In his letter of invitation to appear as a witness, Administrator O’Keefe was asked

to address the following questions in his testimony:

(1) What specific activities must be undertaken and milestones achieved over

the next twelve months and over the next five years to implement the new

initiative? What analysis was performed to ensure that the proposed budget

is adequate to accomplish those activities?

(2) Specifically, what changes (in spending and program content) are contemplated in the Shuttle, International Space Station, and Space Science

programs as a result of the new initiative?

(3) What is the current status of NASA’s thinking about a mission to the

Hubble Space Telescope? What changes in spending and in other NASA activities would be necessary to allow one or two more missions to the

Hubble?

(4) Are any changes to the Iran Non-proliferation Act, the Space Station InterGovernmental Agreement or any other agreements required to complete the

Space Station? If so, please explain how the Administration plans to inform

and consult with the Congress on these changes, including the timetable for

any actions that may be necessary.

In his letter of invitation to appear as a witness, Dr. Marburger was given the

following information and asked to address the following questions in his testimony:

In their briefings on the initiative, White House officials have said that you

were an active participant in developing the initiative, and that, more specifically, you had reviewed the initiative to ensure that no essential science activities would be sacrificed to pay for it.

In your testimony, you should describe the role you and your staff played in formulating the initiative and why and how you concluded that the initiative

would be a net benefit from a scientific point of view. As part of that description, please specifically address the following:

(1) What criteria did you use to determine whether an activity was ‘‘essential,’’ and how did you evaluate and balance the differing scientific benefits of existing and potential NASA activities?

(2) To what extent, has and can the International Space Station contribute

to science? Did you review any specific new research agenda for the

Space Station as part of your evaluation of the overall initiative?

(3) To what extent can scientific research that would be accomplished by

manned missions to the Moon be accomplished by space telescopes or

by unmanned probes on the Moon?

(4) How would you describe the contributions to science made by the

Hubble Space Telescope? How would you assess what would be lost if

the Hubble ceases to function earlier than had been planned? How did

you weigh those losses against the potential benefits of other activities

under the new initiative?’’

7. Attachments

Attachment A: A Renewed Spirit of Discovery: The President’s Vision for U.S. Space

Exploration

Attachment B: NASA Budget Projection 2004–2020. (This chart can be viewed in

color on the Internet at http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/

54873main¥budget¥chart¥14jan04.pdf

Attachment C: NASA FY 2005 Budget

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Chairman BOEHLERT. Good morning. I want to welcome everyone

here for the first of what I am sure will be many hearings on the

President’s Space Exploration Initiative. Our goal today is to get as

many facts on the table as possible. Congress can only have a sensible and definitive debate on space policy if we are all working

with the same understandings and assumptions. But policy questions before us are tough enough without a fight over the facts in

the case. And I think everyone concerned with this issue should expect lengthy and spirited debate before Congress decides how to

proceed, which could easily take us to the end of this calendar year.

So what do we hope to better understand at the end of today’s

session? We want a clear description of the goals of the proposed

initiative, the ways it is expected to contribute to science, security,

and the economy. We need a clear understanding of the cost of the

initiative, what has been assumed in developing cost estimates,

and how those estimates are most likely to change. We need to get

more operational details of the initiative, for example, how the

Space Station will be serviced after 2010. And we need a fuller explanation of the impact of the policy. How will it affect Earth

science and aeronautics and other NASA programs?

Right now, we have far more questions than answers, and I look

forward to hearing from our witnesses today, who are among the

key architects of this new policy. We are going to need very direct

and precise guidance from them.

As you might have already gathered, I remain open-minded

about this proposal. The President and his top advisors are to be

congratulated for having done what no one has been able—willing

to do for more than 40 years: lay out a well thought out space policy with a seemingly reasonable price tag. The President has made

hard choices. I know I agree with some of those choices. For example, I have been calling for the past year for a date certain to end

the Shuttle and Space Station programs. The President’s proposal

provides those dates, although we still have to examine whether

the right endpoints were selected.

But I still need much more information about the goals and costs

before I can decide whether I decide the particular choices the

President has made in this proposal. I have to say that this is

hardly the ideal year for this proposal to have come forward, although, perhaps, there never would be an ideal year. But the increase proposed for NASA is especially conspicuous in a budget in

which basic research increases by only c a percentage point. Indeed, non-Defense, non-Homeland discretionary spending, as a

whole, increases only by that same slim amount.

Is this initiative a high enough priority, a pressing enough priority, to be funded in such a budget? I don’t know. And we have

to remember that the percentage increases required in the years

before fiscal year 2009, if not before, may also turn out to be significant.

So I am in a quandary, quite frankly. And the answers we get

today will help me determine which way to turn. I imagine that

will be true of others on the panel and certainly of others in the

Congress. The advance of human space flight is an engaging

dream, but I want to know how we are going to feel when we wake

up. Will we have advanced human knowledge? Will we have enVerDate 11-MAY-2000 16:41 Oct 01, 2004 Jkt 091691 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\WORKD\FULL04\021204\91691 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
20

abled our nation to be more respected, more secure, and more prosperous? Will we have behaved responsibly in meeting the needs of

the American people? Will we, in short, have helped this nation remain what Abraham Lincoln, born this day, called ‘‘The last best

hope of Earth’’? These are, perhaps, the toughest questions we will

confront at a hearing this year.

I look forward to hearing our witnesses provide the specifics that

will help me figure out the answers.

Mr. Gordon.

[The prepared statement of Chairman Boehlert follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN SHERWOOD BOEHLERT

I want to welcome everyone here for the first of what I’m sure will be many hearings on the President’s Space Exploration Initiative.

Our goal today is to get as many facts on the table as possible. Congress can only

have a sensible and definitive debate on space policy if we’re all working with the

same understandings and assumptions. The policy questions before us are tough

enough without a fight over the facts of the case. And I think everyone concerned

with this issue should expect a lengthy and spirited debate before Congress decides

how to proceed—which could easily take to the end of this calendar year.

So what do we hope to better understand at the end of today’s session? We want

a clearer description of the goals of the proposed initiative—the ways it’s expected

to contribute to science, security and the economy. We need a clearer understanding

of the costs of the initiative—what’s been assumed in developing cost estimates and

how those estimates are most likely to change. We need to get more operational details of the initiative—for example, how the space station will be serviced after 2010.

And we need a fuller explanation of the impact of the policy—how it will affect

Earth science and aeronautics and other NASA programs.

Right now, we have far more questions than answers. And I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today, who are among the key architects of this new policy.

We’re going to need very direct and precise guidance from them.

As you might have already gathered, I remain open-minded about this proposal.

The President and his top advisors are to be congratulated for having done what

no one has been able or willing to do for more than 40 years—lay out a well thought

out space policy with a seemingly reasonable price tag.

The President has made hard choices. I know I agree with some of those choices.

For example, I have been calling for the past year for a date certain to end the

Shuttle and Space Station programs. The President’s proposal provides those dates,

although we still have to examine whether the right endpoints were selected.

But I still need much more information about goals and costs before I can decide

whether I support the particular choices the President has made in this proposal.

I have to say that this is hardly the ideal year for this proposal to have come forward—although perhaps there never would be an ideal year. But the increase proposed for NASA is especially conspicuous in a budget in which basic research increases by only half a percentage point. Indeed, non-defense, non-homeland discretionary spending as a whole increases only by that same slim amount.

Is this initiative a high enough priority—a pressing enough priority—to be funded

in such a budget? I don’t know. And we have to remember that the percentage increases required in the years beyond fiscal 2009—if not before—may also turn out

to be significant.

So, I’m in a quandary, quite frankly. And the answers we get today will help me

determine which way to turn. I imagine that will be true of others on this panel,

and certainly of others in this Congress. The advance of human space flight is an

engaging dream, but I want to know how we’re going to feel when we wake up.

Will we have advanced human knowledge? Will we have enabled our nation to

be more respected, more secure, and more prosperous? Will we have behaved responsibly in meeting the needs of the American people? Will we, in short, have

helped this nation remain what Abraham Lincoln—born this day—called ‘‘the last,

best hope of Earth’’? These are perhaps the toughest questions we’ll confront at a

hearing this year.

I look forward to having our witnesses provide the specifics that will help me figure out my answers.

Mr. Gordon.

Mr. GORDON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good morning.

21

I want to thank the Chairman for welcoming the witnesses—or

to join the Chairman in welcoming the witnesses to today’s hearing. And I want to thank Chairman Boehlert for convening this

hearing on the President’s new Space Exploration Initiative. It is

clear that the proposal has the potential to result in significant

changes to NASA’s programs and future direction as an agency. We

need to hear more about it.

First, however, I would like to state that I am pleased that the

President has proposed some specific, long-term goals for the Nation’s human space flight program. That is something that Members on both sides of the aisle have been urging for some time. I

think it is appropriate for this nation to make a sustained commitment to human and robotic exploration of the Solar System, and

I also welcome the President’s speech to that matter. And I think

that an incremental approach, starting with a sustained presence

on the Moon makes a lot of sense for many reasons.

History has shown that past investments in our space program

have resulted in new discoveries and technologies that have delivered significant benefits to our citizens. I have no doubt that we

will learn much from future exploration missions, and the American people will garner benefits, both tangible and intangible, from

our expansion into the Solar System.

Of course, after further review, Congress and the American people may conclude that NASA’s plans for implementing the President’s goals are unrealistic or unaffordable, or both. If so, that

doesn’t mean that the Nation should walk away from the long-term

exploration goals. It just means that we have more work to do to

craft a plan that is workable and sustainable.

As we examine NASA’s plan, I will be looking for answers to a

number of questions, including: one, what will the impact of the

President’s initiative on NASA—be on NASA and other important

activities? I am particularly concerned that NASA’s other missions

not be cannibalized, whether over the short-term or the long-term

to cover the cost of this initiative.

Second, how confident should we be that NASA and the White

House have a good understanding of the cost of their proposal and

have a budget plan that truly reflects those cost? NASA has had

a mixed record on the credibility of its budgeting, and we need to

be convinced that NASA is not being overly optimistic in its cost

estimates. In that regard, I would simply note that the former

President, George H. W. Bush, proposed a similar program in 1989.

His OMB Director estimated its 30-year costs to be about $590 billion in 2003-dollar terms. If that is what NASA is now estimating,

I hope that the budget plans reflect it. If NASA thinks it can be

done cheaper, then we need to understand why.

Third, what are the implications of some of the policy decisions

embedded in the President’s initiative? In particular, what will it

mean to terminate the Space Shuttle Program years before another

American spacecraft is available to get U.S. astronauts into space?

It is clear that we will be dependent on the kindness of others, in

this case, the Russians, to have any way of getting our astronauts

to and from the Space Station. What if the Soyuz fleet is grounded

or unavailable to us for whatever reason? What is plan B?

22

Well, there is much to cover, and I hope that this hearing will

mark the beginning of a thorough review of the initiative. I also

hope that the President will choose to speak out on this space initiative. This will not be an easy year to start a major new initiative

in the face of a growing deficit. The President is going to have to

make the case that this initiative is a high priority if it is going

to survive for more than one or two sessions in Congress.

With that, I, again, want to welcome our witnesses, and I look

forward to your testimony.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gordon follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE BART GORDON

Good morning. I want to join the Chairman in welcoming the witnesses to today’s

hearing. And I want to thank Chairman Boehlert for convening this hearing on the

President’s new space exploration initiative. It is clear that the proposal has the potential to result in significant changes to NASA’s programs and future direction as

an agency. We need to hear more about it.

First, however, I would like to state that I am pleased that the President has proposed some specific long-term goals for the Nation’s human space flight program.

That is something that Members on both side of the aisle have been urging for some

time. I think that it is appropriate for this nation to make a sustained commitment

to the human and robotic exploration of the solar system, and so I welcome the

President’s speech. And I think that an incremental approach, starting with a sustained presence on the Moon, makes a lot of sense for many reasons.

History has shown that past investments in our space program have resulted in

new discoveries and technologies that have delivered significant benefits to our citizens. I have no doubt that we will learn much from future exploration missions, and

the American people will garner benefits both tangible and intangible from our expansion into the solar system.

Of course, after further review Congress and the American people may conclude

that NASA’s plans for implementing the President’s goals are unrealistic or

unaffordable or both. If so, that doesn’t mean that the Nation should walk away

from the long-term exploration goals. It just means that we have more work to do

to craft a plan that is workable and sustainable.

As we examine NASA’s plans, I will be looking for answers to a number of questions. First, what will be the impact of the President’s initiative on NASA’s other

important activities? I am particularly concerned that NASA’s other missions not be

cannibalized—whether over the short-term or the long-term—to cover the cost of the

initiative.

Second, how confident should we be that NASA and the White House have a good

understanding of the cost of their proposals—and have a budget plan that truly reflects those costs? NASA has had a mixed record on the credibility of its budgeting,

and we will need to be convinced that NASA is not being overoptimistic in its cost

estimates. In that regard, I would simply note that when President George H.W.

Bush proposed a similar program in 1989, his OMB director estimated its 30-year

cost to be about $590 billion (in 2003 year dollars). If that is what NASA is now

estimating, I hope that the budget plans reflect it. If NASA thinks it can be done

cheaper, we will need to understand the reasons why.

Third, what are the implications of some of the policy decisions embedded in the

President’s initiative? In particular, what will it mean to terminate the Space Shuttle program years before another American spacecraft is available to get U.S. astronauts into space? It is clear that we will be dependent on the kindness of others—

in this case the Russians—to have any way of getting our astronauts to and from

the Space Station. What if the Soyuz fleet is grounded or unavailable to us—for

whatever reason. What is the ‘‘Plan B’’?

Well, there is much to cover, and I hope that this hearing will mark the beginning

of a thorough review of the initiative. I also hope that the President will choose to

speak out on his space initiative. This will not be an easy year to start major new

initiatives in the face of the growing deficit, the need for continued spending for the

Iraq war, and the increase in the Medicare cost estimate. The President is going

to have to make the case that this initiative is a high priority if it is going to survive

for more than one session of Congress.

With that, I again want to welcome our witnesses, and I look forward to your testimony.

23

Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you very much, Mr. Gordon.

The Chair recognizes the Chairman of the Subcommittee on

Space and Aeronautics, Mr. Rohrabacher.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

How many times have we pointed to this slogan on the wall? All

right. And how many times have we said we want a vision statement, we want a—some guidance from the President, a long-term

strategy? And we got it. And the President has indicated very

strongly in that speech and his—and what has happened since

then that he has got a game plan for us, and he has done his part

of the job, at least he has started doing his part of the job. Now

it is up to us to do our part of the job. It is the time for Congress

to get on board.

And one thing that makes a strategy is that one—is that you are

setting priorities. And where I respectfully disagree with my good

friend, Mr. Gordon, I expect the President to cannibalize other programs in order to make this strategy work. That is called setting

priorities. What we need to do, however, is to make sure that those

decisions, and this I would agree with Mr. Gordon, are clear decisions made that this priority is more important than another and

thus we are taking funds intentionally in order to make sure that

the President succeeds in the goals that he has established.

And Mr. O’Keefe, you can count on me, and I know you can count

on the other Members in this committee, to work with you if, indeed, the President is serious about the vision that he laid out. And

I am banking on the fact that he is serious and that we are going

to do a job here and that we are going to start our way back to

the Moon and then beyond. With your leadership, and then perhaps when we are—10 years or 20 years from now, there will be

a whole new set of characters, but we will have laid the foundation

for the great success that they will accomplish.

Mr. Chairman, I commend your decision of holding this critical

hearing today. As you know, I have been a strong advocate of returning to the Moon and establishing a permanent manned site

there. Now the President has given NASA a vision that may help

us realize that dream as a stepping stone, of course, to even more

further explorations of the universe. Someday, lunar settlements

may be, and will be, thriving and growing, increasing our natural

resources, the natural resources that are available to us, and perhaps providing us abundant energy, but most certainly expanding

our scientific knowledge in creating future industries that we can

only now imagine. In fact, citizen astronauts not only will contribute to our economic development, but also to our national

standing in leadership in science and engineering as well.

First and foremost, this outlook for the future must be built on

a foundation of credible and affordable near and far-term technologies, and that is basically what we are going to be talking

about: the development of these technologies, how to pay for it,

when we expect them to come on board, what—how that relates to

the plan. But experience has shown that the private sector’s innovative approaches are just as important as what government is

doing. So let us, as we move forward, not look at this as simply a

government enterprise. What the President laid out was a National

vision, not just a bureaucratic or governmental process.

24

Emerging space entrepreneurs have demonstrated that space activities are no longer limited to the government domain and that

making a profit is critical to enabling the private sector to make

investments in space. If we make it profitable, we have a vision—

the vision of the Moon includes something where the private sector

is going to make a profit in helping us accomplish this—that mission, we can expect private sector investment to help the taxpayers.

The successful development of new space industries will undoubtedly hinge on expanding market opportunities. And the new space

exploration mandate calls for promoting commercial space.

And however, let me just say that at this moment, I am uncertain exactly what NASA’s plans are for the commercial part of this

and how to attract private sector investment into the technologies

and into the goals that we wish to achieve. We can’t expect to have

that right now, but I know that that is going to be an area of discussion for the next few months and, perhaps, the rest of this year.

NASA must make clear how its long-term investment in the future

exploration activities will support a combination of focused manned

missions, robotic exploration, and private sector initiatives. Anything less threatens the credibility of the President’s space vision.

And again, let me say, you have our 100 percent support, and I

am looking forward to working with you, Mr. O’Keefe, in making

this vision a reality.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rohrabacher follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE DANA ROHRABACHER

Mr. Chairman, I commend your decision in holding this critical hearing early in

the session. As you know, I have been a staunch advocate for us returning to the

Moon and establishing a permanent manned site. Now the President has given

NASA the vision in helping us realize this deferred dream.

Someday lunar settlements will be thriving and growing, increasing our natural

resources at our disposal, providing abundant energy, expanding our scientific

knowledge, and creating future industries that we can only imagine. In fact, citizen

astronauts not only will contribute to our economic development, but to our national

standing and leadership in science and engineering as well.

First and foremost, this outlook of the future must be built upon a foundation of

credible and affordable near- and far-term technologies. Experience has shown that

the private sector’s innovative approach in solving space-related problems has

proved to be invaluable.

Emerging space entrepreneurs have demonstrated that space activities are no

longer limited to the government domain, and that making profits are critical in enabling private sector investments in space. The successful development of new space

industries will undoubtedly hinge on expanding market opportunities. The new

space exploration mandate calls for promoting commercial space, but NASA is unclear how private space ventures will support missions to low-Earth orbit.

NASA must make clear how its long-term investments in future exploration activities support an intelligent combination of focused manned missions, robotic exploration, and private-sector initiatives. Anything less threatens the credibility of

the President’s space vision. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you very much, Mr. Rohrabacher.

And like you, as I indicated in my opening statement, I want to applaud the President’s vision, but I would like to add that before we

get on board and—we have to determine the extent of the ticket

we are willing to purchase for the journey. And that is why it is

so critically important that we get very precise in addressing the

timetables, the dollars, and the impact on science overall. And that

is why I welcome Dr. Marburger here, because this is critically imVerDate 11-MAY-2000 16:41 Oct 01, 2004 Jkt 091691 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\WORKD\FULL04\021204\91691 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
25

portant that we hear from the President’s Science Advisor on how

this critical component of an overall package fits in with everything

else.

With that, I recognize the Subcommittee Chairman—a Ranking

Member on Space and Aeronautics, Mr. Lampson.

Mr. LAMPSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning.

I want to join my colleagues in welcoming Dr. Marburger and

Administrator O’Keefe to this morning’s hearing. It is, indeed, a

very important one.

I hope it is just the first, as it has been said, in a series of hearings to examine the President’s proposed initiative as well as to review the overall NASA budget request.

For me, the President’s announcement of some long-term goals

for the Nation’s human space flight program was both welcome and

overdue. I have long been pushing for a commitment to a sustained

exploration agenda with a series of exciting and significant intermediate milestones on the way to Mars. I introduced legislation to

that effect in the last Congress and I reintroduced it again in this

Congress. I welcome the President’s decision to put forth an exploration agenda, and I look forward to working with him to advance

its goals.

I think space exploration brings out the best of us in us, as a

people. With that said, I am going to also need to be convinced that

the implementation plan laid out by NASA is, in fact, both credible

and sustainable before I can give it my unreserved support. I found

it interesting this—that this morning’s Washington Post had an article on the meeting yesterday, the Commission—Space Exploration

Commission meeting where Norman Augustine, the retired Chairman of Lockheed Martin, made comments that NASA doesn’t have

enough money or bright young stars to achieve President Bush’s

goal of returning astronauts to the Moon and flying from there to

Mars, and ‘‘it would be a grave mistake to undertake a major new

space objective on the cheap,’’ he said. ‘‘To do so, in my opinion,

would be an invitation to disaster.’’ And in that same article, there

was a quote from General Lester Lyles, who is retired from the Air

Force, about the possibility that budgets and technologies of other

government agencies could even be tapped. So it would be interesting to know, Mr. Marburger—or Dr. Marburger, if those were

certainly plans or thoughts that you have.

We will do no favor to the dedicated men and women of NASA

if we fail to ask the tough questions about the President’s initiative. For example, what will be the impact of the President’s plan

on NASA’s other programs? I agree with my colleague, Mr. Gordon.

I am not prepared to do damage to NASA’s other programs, its

other important activities, in order to make this new plan fit within the budget—President’s budget. Those who know me know that

I am an unabashed supporter of NASA’s human space flight program and of the good work done, particularly at the Johnson Space

Center.

Human space flight is an important part of our nation’s overall

space effort, and it has delivered significant technological and other

benefits to our citizens over the years, but it is only one of NASA’s

missions. I don’t know how many of you saw the news about the

local law enforcement officials getting help from NASA technology

26

in identifying the suspect in the tragic abduction and murder of

Carli Bruscha in Florida just recently. And what you may not know

is that the technology was first developed by two NASA employees:

one a solar physicist, and the other atmospheric scientist, to assist

them in their research activities. So it is a poignant but an important example of the ways in which our investments in all areas of

the space program concern the broader needs of our society.

As you know, the House recently passed NASA workforce legislation to improve NASA’s ability to attract and retain the best and

the brightest. What message will we send if we now embrace an

exploration plan that tells a range of dedicated NASA employees,

‘‘Thanks for your hard work, but we now need your budget for our

new initiative’’? It seems to me that the President needs to propose

funding adequate to do the job right or NASA, regrettably, will

have to scale back its aspirations.

My own strong preference is that the President provide the funding needed to do the job right. We, in Congress, will work to do it,

but fundamentally, I don’t want to put the NASA employees in the

situation of once again trying to fit 10 pounds of new tasks into a

five-pound budgetary pack.

Mr. Chairman, I have a great number of questions about the initiative that I hope we will address at this and subsequent hearings,

but I won’t list them all right now. Instead, I just will close by saying that we are being given the opportunity to construct an exciting

and productive future for our nation’s civil space program. We owe

it to NASA and to the American taxpayers to take the time to get

it right.

Thank you, and I yield back my time.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Lampson follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE NICK LAMPSON

I welcome the President’s decision to put forth an exploration agenda, and I look

forward to working with him to achieve its goals. I think space exploration brings

out the best in us as a people. That said, my colleagues and I need to be convinced

that the implementation plan laid out by NASA is in fact both credible and sustainable before I can give it my unreserved support.

We will do no favor to the dedicated men and women of NASA if we fail to ask

the tough questions about the President’s initiative. For example, what will be the

impact of the President’s plan on NASA’s other programs? I agree with my colleague

Mr. Gordon—I am not prepared to do damage to NASA’s other important activities

in order to make this new plan fit within the President’s budget.

Those who know me know that I am an ardent supporter of NASA’s human space

flight program and of the good work done at the Johnson Space Center. Human

space flight is an important part of our nation’s overall space effort, and it has delivered significant technological and other benefits to our citizens over the years. But

it is only one of NASA’s missions.

Recently, law enforcement officials used video imaging technology to identify the

suspect in the tragic abduction and murder of the young girl in Florida. What you

may not know is that technology was first developed by two NASA employees—one

a solar physicist and the other an atmospheric scientist—to assist them in their research activities. It is a poignant but important example of the ways in which our

investments in all areas of the space program can serve the broader needs of our

society.

As you know, the House recently passed NASA Workforce legislation to improve

NASA’s ability to attract and retain the best and the brightest. What message will

we send if we now embrace an exploration plan that tells a range of dedicated

NASA employees: ‘‘thanks for your hard work, but we now need your budget for our

new initiative.’’

It seems to me that the President needs to propose funding adequate to do the

job right, or NASA regrettably will have to scale back its aspirations. My own strong

27

preference is that the President provide the funding needed to do the job right. But

fundamentally, I don’t want to put the NASA employees in the situation of once

again trying to fit ten pounds of new tasks into a five-pound budgetary sack. Mr.

Chairman, I have a great number of questions about the initiative that I hope we

will address at this and subsequent hearings. We owe it to NASA and the American

taxpayers to take the time to get it right.

Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you very much, Mr. Lampson. I am

particularly pleased that you mentioned the successful effort on the

part of this committee to pass the NASA Restructuring Act, because that will enable Administrator O’Keefe, and others associated with that very important agency, to retain the existing stars

on the horizon and to attract the new ones to that lexicon. So I am

very pleased with that.

With that, let me say how pleased we are to have with us two

very distinguished witnesses, who have proven their service to the

Nation by their very capable administration of their duties. First,

we have the honorable John Marburger, Director of the Office of

Science and Technology Policy, affectionately referred to as the

President’s Science Advisor, Dr. Marburger, and secondly, our good

friend, and so are you, Dr. Marburger—our good friend, Sean

O’Keefe, the very able Administrator of the National Aeronautics

and Space Administration. And gentlemen, you know the drill. We

try to condense the opening statements to allow us ample time for

thorough questioning, and there are more questions than can possibly be answered in this hearing. This is the first of several. But

I am not going to run a clock on you, but at some time, if you get

a little bit too loquacious, I will suggest that maybe you stop and

permit us to get a word or two in.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Ehlers follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE VERNON J. EHLERS

I want to thank Chairman Boehlert for holding this hearing today. The President

has outlined an ambitious new vision for the NASA. It is imperative that we fully

understand this vision—its costs, benefits and risks—before we implement it. I am

pleased that Mr. O’Keefe and Dr. Marburger are here this morning to provide us

with a detailed accounting of the mission, how NASA intends to execute it, and how

it fits into the current budget realities of NASA and of the Nation in general.

The President’s vision of robotic and manned missions to the Moon and Mars

would provide NASA with a clear and compelling mission that the agency has

lacked for far too long. As with all daring initiatives, the President’s vision for

NASA poses significant challenges. Enthusiasm for the President’s proposal must be

tempered by the realities that face us. Completing the International Space Station,

developing a new unmanned space vehicle and mounting missions to the Moon and

Mars will all take vast amounts of dedication, innovation, effort and money to accomplish.

To be successful, numerous technical problems, including the development of new

propulsion and energy sources and improved life-support systems, will need to be

solved. NASA will need an educated, dynamic, and vital workforce to overcome

these obstacles. We will need to be serious about expanding our math and science

education programs so that we have trained and talented scientists and engineers

to do this work. I have championed this educational effort for many years, and Congress has been expanding it. However, the President’s proposal dramatizes the need

to accelerate our efforts to improve math and science education.

In addition to the cost of creating the workforce NASA needs to carry out this

mission, the costs of this journey into space in terms of money and human risk are

significant hurdles that we must examine carefully before we agree to expand NASA

and its mission. Going to the Moon, and especially Mars, is an expensive undertaking. Several estimates place the cost at many hundreds of billions of dollars. This

mission is a very long-term commitment—if we are ‘‘in for a penny’’ then we will

be ‘‘in for a pound,’’ or, if fact, many, many pounds. We need a realistic estimate

28

of the overall price tag of the mission and what trade-offs in other programs will

need to be made, to be certain that we can, and want to, assume the costs.

In addition to the monetary risk, we must remember that sending humans into

space is always perilous. Simply landing a probe on Mars has proven difficult—

many of the probes have been lost. A human landing would be complicated by its

size, life-support issues, radiation, and other health hazards, and the need to actually safely return the crew. We will need to decide if the scientific and exploration

value of a human mission outweighs the risks to human health and consider whether robotic missions might be just as valuable, because they can be done at a fraction

of the cost.

As a scientist, I fully understand the desire to explore, to discover, and to learn

the unknown. I applaud President Bush for his ability and willingness to provide

NASA with a compelling and unifying mission that will satisfy our human desire

to explore while inspiring our children to reach towards the heavens. I look forward

to hearing Mr. O’Keefe’s and Dr. Marburger’s justification of the mission, its timeline and technical implementation, and its budget.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Costello follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE JERRY F. COSTELLO

Good morning. I want to thank Administrator O’Keefe and Director Marburger for

appearing before our committee to discuss the President’s Vision for Space Exploration and the FY05 Budget for NASA. Today’s hearing serves as an opportunity

for oversight of certain departmental programs. The President recently announced

his space exploration initiative which provides much needed long-term goals for our

nation’s human space flight program. The lack of clear direction has hampered

NASA’s effectiveness and has kept it from realizing its full potential as the Nation’s

space agency. That is why my colleagues on the Science Committee and I have been

calling for the administration to establish a vision for the space program even before

the Space Shuttle Columbia tragedy. In light of the President’s new initiative, the

budget for NASA leaves many significant questions unanswered and Congress needs

more specifics as we consider the FY 05 budget request for NASA.

NASA continues to be our gateway to the universe. It is through NASA’s efforts

that we will understand our planet, our solar system and beyond. NASA’s budget

should reflect a strong commitment to, and emphasis on, continuing to build the

agency’s core foundation of aeronautics and aerospace research and development as

well as its missions of exploration and discovery to educate and inspire.

While the President’s initiative envisions human lunar landings by 2020 and

human missions to Mars at some point in the future, I am concerned that no cost

estimate has been provided for this new initiative. Further, it is clear from NASA’s

budget plan that most of the expenses would be incurred after President Bush has

left office.

Finally, I am concerned that many important and promising programs, such as

the education programs and space station research, would be eliminated or have

their funding cut, deferred, or flattened in order to fund the space exploration initiative. While the Administration states this new initiative is affordable under the

budgetary plan developed by NASA, NASA’s track record on the credibility of its

cost estimates over the last several years is at best mixed.

The President’s proposal will have a high price tag and it should not come at the

cost of our commitment to our children, our veterans, our seniors, and our other important domestic priorities. We currently have over a half-trillion dollar deficit and

the case is going to have to be made to this committee and the American people

why this proposal should be supported in the face of that deficit.

I welcome our witnesses and look forward to their testimony.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Jackson Lee follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE SHEILA JACKSON LEE

Mr. Chairman,

Thank you for calling this hearing to discuss the future of NASA’s mission in

space, and to understand how the President’s new budget fits in that picture. NASA

is at a great turning point. Our work here today, and in the upcoming months, could

determine if in a century, our kids’ kids’ kids will be exploring Mars, or if they will

be walking through a museum, learning about how long, long ago Americans used

to boldly explore the heavens.

29

I would like to join you in welcoming Dr. Marburger and Administrator O’Keefe.

I commend them for their work so far, in keeping us informed on the President’s

new initiative for human-space flight. Successfully crafting the new mission for

NASA will take unprecedented cooperation between the Administration, and Congress, and the private sector, and the American people. I thank the gentlemen for

coming today. We must keep this dialogue going.

First, I would like to commend the President for articulating his bold new vision

for NASA’s future. We have much work to do to ensure that we fine tune that plan,

to make sure it fits our goals scientifically, meets our responsibilities, and works

within our means in a tough economy. Unfortunately, we are in a time of tight

budget, due to horrible financial mismanagement by this Administration over the

past three years. But space exploration is not about FY05, or even about five-year

projections. It is about an ongoing quest that captures people’s minds and hearts,

drives our technology to the cutting edge, and pushes our economy forward. We cannot afford to abandon progress in space every time we fall on challenging times. If

we allow NASA to follow a boom-bust cycle, it will never have a committed workforce with the expertise and experience necessary to do great things.

So, I feel we must move forward boldly, but not so boldly that we allow the program to collapse under its own weight. We must be safe, and we must be prudent

in making methodical steps, to the Moon, to Mars, and beyond.

For example, it is exciting to think of building the next generation vehicle, and

to retire the Space Shuttle. But if we are on schedule to decommission the Shuttle

in 2010, and then fall behind on the schedule to replace it due to shifting budget

priorities, we could be caught in a very tough place. We may lose access to the International Space Station that we have invested so much in. We could start losing

quality NASA employees to the private sector or to retirement, and lose their institutional memory as well. That could make it very difficult to restart a viable program in the future.

Of course, I am especially interested in how this new mission will affect Johnson

Space Center near my district in Houston. As the hub of the manned space program

over the years, Houston has so much to offer this new mission. However, instability

as old program give way to new, could be detrimental to the space community and

the city as a whole.

And finally I am concerned about safety. Since the Columbia tragedy, we are all

working together to re-focus on safety—improving the NASA safety ‘‘culture’’ as

some call it. We still have much work to do on that. We need to make substantial

improvement before we turn all of our thoughts to new things.

I look forward to hearing more about the new U.S. vision for space exploration,

and the budget to make it happen. Thank you.

Chairman BOEHLERT. With that, I will open with Dr. Marburger.

STATEMENT OF DR. JOHN H. MARBURGER, III, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY, EXECUTIVE

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

Dr. MARBURGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Committee

Members, for inviting me to discuss the President’s vision for space

exploration. I believe the Nation’s space enterprise will be strengthened by this vision, which will continue a brilliant record of NASA

discoveries that have literally changed the way we view the universe. I have prepared a written testimony that is too long for oral

presentation but that does contain detailed responses to the questions that you asked in your letter inviting me to testify. And of

course, I will be glad to answer any questions about that detailed

account, as well as others.

The first issue is the rationale for the President’s vision. The

President describes this vision as a journey, not a race. And it differs profoundly from the Apollo paradigm of a single, massive

project requiring a large budget spike and an aggressive schedule.

In this new vision, milestones are established to guide planning on

a series of discreet and mutually reinforcing projects whose aim at

30

each step is to reduce the cost and the risk of all subsequent missions.

There are certain technical facts about space exploration that

seem to be ignored in much of the public commentary, and I describe these briefly in my written testimony, but the President’s

new paradigm takes these new facts seriously, balancing robotic

and human roles in dealing with them and mandates a step-by-step

approach to address risks and costs within a steady and realistic

flow of resources. Regarding human exploration, the President’s vision implies a fundamental change in ground rules. The idea, in his

words, is to ‘‘explore space and extend a human presence across our

Solar System. . .[making] steady progress: one mission, one voyage, one landing at a time.’’ The emphasis here is on sustained exploration and discovery through all appropriate means at a pace we

can afford in terms of risk as well as cost.

This new paradigm also acknowledges the obvious fact that the

Moon is the nearest platform beyond low-Earth orbit that can sustain the entire range of activities needed in deep space exploration.

It is not just a more remote version of the International Space Station. It has the potential of providing mass for numerous uses in

further exploration missions, and therefore significantly reducing

future costs. The long-term value of the Moon is not primarily in

its direct value to science, but in its value to all future deep space

operations.

The second issue is the deliberative process leading up to the

President’s announcement. I have described this process in my

written statement. It was a normal White House policy process in

which my staff and I were involved from the beginning, as was

NASA and Administrator O’Keefe. An extensive literature with

many analyses and reports exists on space exploration. I would describe the process as taking place in an information-rich environment. And I would be glad to answer any further questions on

process that—Sean and I have sat through a lot of meetings and

we can talk about it, but it—there was nothing particularly unusual about this process.

The third issue is the question of the science benefits of the vision. People have referred to that in the opening statements. The

President’s new paradigm will open up new opportunities to explore and understand the cosmos. Further major advances in understanding the Solar System and the universe, beyond what is

now technically possible, will require much more complex operations in space or on the surface of Solar System objects: moons,

and planets, and asteroids. These would involve high power instrumentation, large area and long-duration investigation of multiple

planetary bodies, and the possible assembly of sophisticated observatories in space or on the surface of other planets. Such complex

missions are not possible today for several reasons that are detailed in my written testimony. These reasons are interrelated, and

overcoming them systematically will build the backbone for a robust exploration agenda.

Related to this issue is a sequence of enabling initiatives associated with the vision. Once again, there are several important enabling initiatives that are outlined in the President’s vision, and I

urge you to read the more detailed analysis in my written testiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 16:41 Oct 01, 2004 Jkt 091691 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\WORKD\FULL04\021204\91691 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
31

mony for each one of these components. I will just name topics that

are addressed in my written testimony: the International Space

Station, what are we going to do with that; the Moon, why the

Moon, what is it that we plan to get out of being on the Moon; the

role of robotics; power; and communications capabilities. These are

all—there is a technical basis for the choice of emphasis on these

topics, and I will be glad to respond to questions about it.

Let me take a little bit more time in my oral remarks to discuss

the next issue, which is the impact on existing science activities.

That is of immediate importance to many Committee Members.

Much of the $11 billion that are reprioritized within the fiscal year

2005 to 2009 budgets comes from discontinuing the launch technology program and savings derived from Shuttle retirement and

reprioritization of research on the International Space Station.

In this budget, space science continues to be robust. The vision

specifically calls for a new series of robotic exploration missions to

the Moon and Mars. The outer planets continue to be a research

priority with the Jupiter Icy Moons Orbiter, JIMO, and a mission

to Pluto also included.

The Sun-Earth Connection research also remains a priority. Despite the stretch-out of the Solar Terrestrial Probes awards, this

program, and all others in NASA’s Sun-Earth Connection theme,

are scheduled to continue.

A whole new generation of space observatories is being planned.

The fiscal year 2005 budget maintains the Webb telescope’s scheduled 2011 launch date. Other observatory missions are described in

the written version of my testimony. I will say more, at the end of

my remarks, about the Hubble telescope.

NASA’s Earth Science Enterprise has been, and will continue to

be, the largest contributor to the interagency Climate Change

Science Program.

The President’s fiscal year 2005 budget supports the NASA Aeronautics Blueprint with a request for $919 billion. This maintains

the funding level for aeronautics that was in the President’s 2004

budget plan. I will say, the presence of fiscal year 2004 earmarks

in the budget numbers creates the impression that reductions have

been made to content in this program, which is not the case. We

are committed to aeronautics, and NASA has created a new enterprise specifically focused on aeronautics within its administrative

structure.

The technology development necessary to execute and implement

the President’s vision will accelerate advances in robotics, autonomous, and fault tolerant systems, human-machine interface, materials, life support systems, and spur novel applications of

nanotechnology and micro-devices.

And finally, a framework and a vision for a sustainable exploration, coupled with intellectually stimulating problems, is a powerful asset in our continuing campaign to spark interest in science

and technology among young people.

Mr. Chairman, this vision opens up a new era of space exploration. It articulates the purpose for humans in space, and it is

good for science.

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Now I would like to take a few minutes in the remaining portion

of my testimony to go into the technical issues related to the

Hubble Space Telescope. You asked——

Chairman BOEHLERT. By all means, do so and ignore the red

light, but we are just keeping it on as a guide so that we can focus

our attention.

Dr. MARBURGER. Thank you.

You did ask me some specific questions about the Hubble Space

Telescope, and there is a longer version of these comments in my

testimony.

First of all, let me say that the decision to cancel the SM–4 servicing mission to the Hubble was based on NASA’s safety assessment and recommendations made by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board. I fully support NASA’s concerns about safety, and

I support the Administrator’s action in asking Admiral Gehman to

review this matter and offer his unique perspective.

Now as to the Hubble’s importance, the authors of a 2001 National Research Council report said, and I quote, ‘‘The Hubble

Space Telescope has arguably had a greater impact on astronomy

than any instrument since the original astronomical telescope of

Galileo.’’

In the 14 years since the Hubble was launched, however—and I

go into many of the discoveries and the assets that Hubble brings

in my written testimony. In the 14 years of its 15-year estimated

lifetime it—when it was designed, tremendous progress has been

made in improving the quality of ground-based telescopes. Using

adaptive optics, ground-based telescopes are now capable of resolution competitive with, and in some cases, better than, the Hubble

in its longer wavelengths at near-infrared.

In its assessment of space astronomy, the National Research

Council report that I quoted did not recommend new missions in

the Hubble wavelength regime for three reasons, and let me quote

from their report, 2001 report. This report is known as the most

recent decadal survey, a very excellent report the astronomy community compiles periodically to guide its future programs. ‘‘First,

many of the key science opportunities [in this wavelength regime]

are predominately in the infrared.’’ ‘‘Second, the IR region has been

studied much less than the optical region, so the potential for discovery is much greater.’’ And third, ‘‘Much of the important optical

astronomy can be done from the ground.’’ The Hubble is an optical

telescope, reaching into the near-infrared. The committee wrote its

report assuming the SM–4 service mission would take place, but its

statements regarding the evolving role of the Hubble relative to

other priorities are important in the present discussion about risk

versus benefits. I might add that the charter for this hearing incorrectly states that a National Academy panel called for yet another

servicing mission beyond SM–4. The panel indicated that the benefits of such a mission would have to be assessed by a review similar

to the one that led to the report that I quoted.

If serviced, I have no doubt that the Hubble would continue to

provide world-class scientific data and be used to further refine our

understanding of the universe. But the safety issues can not be ignored, and they must be considered not only with respect to the

Hubble capability, but also the ever-increasing capability of visible

33

ground-based telescopes combined with the exciting next-generation space observatories now being built.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for giving me time to make this statement.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Marburger follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN H. MARBURGER, III

A New Paradigm for Space Exploration

Thank you for inviting me to discuss the President’s vision for space exploration.

This committee has long supported strong federal science and technology. We believe the Nation’s space enterprise will be strengthened by a new focus that only

a long-term vision can provide. With a sustainable, long-term vision, NASA will continue a record of discovery that in recent decades has literally changed the way we

view the universe. I look forward to your continued support and to working with

this committee to realize this vision for space exploration.

Vision Background and Rationale

Neil Armstrong’s first footsteps on the Moon in 1969 inspired wonder and excitement throughout the world. In that moment it seemed the unimaginable had become reality, and a course established for an enterprise in space in which anything

was possible. Those first footsteps continue to inspire new generations of young scientists and engineers.

Today we know much more about the difficulties of space exploration by humans

or machines, and our thinking about space has evolved with our growing awareness

of its costs and hazards. Against the background of that experience, the President

has provided a general plan for space exploration that is at once visionary and pragmatic. Described by the President as ‘‘a journey, not a race,’’ this plan differs profoundly from the Apollo paradigm of a single massive project requiring a large budget spike and an aggressive schedule. In this new vision, milestones are established

to guide planning on a series of discrete and mutually reinforcing projects, whose

aim at each step is to reduce the cost and risk of all subsequent missions.

Costs and risks are inherent in space exploration. The costs begin with the need

to use rockets with their inherent massive fuel requirements to lift even small payloads away from Earth. The risks come from the hostile space environment,

weightlessness, and the need to execute complex operations at immense distances

from Earth, with mission durations measured not in weeks or months, but years.

The President’s new paradigm takes these facts seriously, balances robotic and

human roles in dealing with them, and mandates a step-by-step approach to address

the risks and costs within a steady and realistic flow of resources. With respect to

human exploration, it implies a fundamental change in ground rules. The idea, in

the President’s words, is to ‘‘explore space and extend a human presence across our

solar system. . .[making] steady progress—one mission, one voyage, one landing at

a time.’’ The emphasis is on sustained exploration and discovery through all appropriate means, at a pace we can afford in terms of risk as well as cost.

The new paradigm also acknowledges the stark fact that the Moon is the nearest

platform beyond low Earth orbit that can sustain the entire range of activities one

would like to conduct in space. It is not just a more remote version of the International Space Station. It has the potential of providing mass for a variety of uses

for further exploration missions, and consequently significantly reducing future

costs. Some lunar resources may be valuable for Earth satellite applications. The

long-term value of the Moon is not primarily in its direct value to science, but in

its value to all future deep space operations.

Deliberative Process

My office has been involved from the outset in developing this vision. OSTP,

NASA, and most segments of the space community recognized the need for a civilian

space vision. This need took on a new sense of urgency on February 1, 2003, when

the Shuttle Columbia was lost. Starting in spring 2003 a group from the White

House, NASA, and other agencies began sorting out the relevant issues. Upon the

release of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board report, which echoed the need

for such a vision, the White House established a formal policy process co-chaired by

the National Security Council and the Domestic Policy Council. I was directly involved in providing technical support to the process and I was involved in each of

the senior meetings, as was Administrator O’Keefe. My staff was engaged in the

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process on a daily basis. In this context, a consensus vision and implementation

strategy emerged.

This process occurred in an environment rich with information about space exploration. Numerous reports and analyses, produced over decades, have considered the

future of civil space exploration in great detail. Tradeoffs between human and

robotic capabilities have been debated, passionate discourses have been written

about the ultimate destination—whether it should be the Moon, Mars, or a

Lagrangian point, and the ultimate wisdom of committing the resources to set our

sights beyond planet Earth. These analyses and inputs were used to inform the discussion and to frame the vision articulated by the President.

Exploration Opportunities

The President’s new paradigm will open up new opportunities to explore and understand the cosmos that are not technically possible today. During the first 40

years of NASA’s exploration, of the solar system, the available technology and resources have allowed for flyby missions of numerous moons, asteroids, comets, and

every planet except Pluto. In a few cases, orbital missions were executed (the Moon,

Venus, Mars, Jupiter, and the asteroid Eros) and in even fewer cases, landings were

made (the Moon, Venus, and Mars).

During the same period, space observatories have become increasingly more sophisticated, opening up windows of observation that are impossible from the ground.

Data from these facilities have transformed our understanding of the formation and

evolution of the Universe.

Further major advances in understanding the Solar System and the universe will

likely require even more complex operations in space or on the surface of solar system objects. These would involve high power instrumentation, large area and longduration investigation of multiple planetary bodies, and the possible assembly of sophisticated observatories.

Such complex missions are not possible today for several reasons including: the

small payload mass we can affordably send into deep space; limitations in power

due to decreasing solar flux at high latitudes on near planets or deeper into space;

slow communications data rates to Earth; and the challenge of programming autonomous missions and controlling operations from Earth given the large time delays

imposed by the finite speed of light.

These ‘‘infrastructure’’ issues are inter-related and their resolution will provide

the backbone for a robust exploration agenda—an agenda that allows for close-in examination, the ability to touch the item under scrutiny, and the evaluation of large

area and long-term trends. The President’s vision also establishes a balance between

robots and humans, using the strengths of each to optimize the complex missions.

The President’s vision and its budget call for the deliberate development of the

capabilities needed to open up the Universe to increased scrutiny. It will create new

transportation options for both robots and humans, harness the natural resources

found in space to foster sustainability, develop robust high power systems, improve

communications, and build vastly more capable robots and improved robotic-human

interfaces.

Near-Term Science and Technology Enablers

There are several important enabling initiatives outlined in the vision:

International Space Station (ISS): The ISS provides an important laboratory for

understanding the effects of the hostile space environment on human health and

well being. The emphasis of the U.S. research on the Station will be refocused to

support space exploration goals, including counteracting the impact of the space environment on human health and advanced life support systems. The U.S. research

on the ISS will leverage terrestrial laboratory work to develop a more complete understanding of the effects of the space environment on human physiology and to develop countermeasures.

Moon: We will return to the Moon as a first step to opening the Solar System to

further human exploration, including Mars missions. The first missions will be

robotic and will provide a more detailed assessment of the material composition and

variability across the lunar surface and will help to resolve uncertainty in our understanding of the formation and early geological history and subsequent evolution

of the Earth and the other inner planets. Furthermore, the lunar missions will demonstrate our ability to live and work on another world. Apollo demonstrated that

we could transport humans to the Moon, land, and return safely. The six Apollo

flights that landed on the Moon spent a sum total of less than 300 hours on the

lunar surface (less than 13 days). While we have demonstrated in the past that we

can land on the Moon and return safely to Earth, we must now demonstrate that

we can build and operate an infrastructure capable of supporting life for many

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months in an alien, inhospitable environment far from home. Furthermore, as previously described, the Moon is potentially a rich source of materials. Previous space

commissions and studies have emphasized that extracted resources from the lunar

surface can greatly enhance our ability to explore the solar system by refueling rockets; providing metals, ceramics, and other materials; and sustaining more cost-effective access to Mars and other worlds by launching materials from the Moon rather

than from the Earth’s surface.

Robotics: The vision specifically calls for robotic missions to serve as the trailblazers. As amply demonstrated by the Mars Exploration Rovers ‘‘Spirit’’ and ‘‘Opportunity’’ and the armada of space observatories and planetary probes, robots serve

us well and provide excellent science returns. But the President’s vision recognizes

the need for human oversight of a next phase of much more complicated missions

than is achievable with today’s remote sensing or limited rovers. Enabling this new

paradigm of exploration will require more sophisticated robotic capabilities and an

exquisite interface between robots and humans.

Power and Communications: The next steps in exploration, which include in situ

robotic operations, sample return missions, and human presence, will require much

greater communication bandwidth and power systems. NASA is currently pushing

optical communications for planetary missions that would in principle improve data

transfer rates to Earth by orders of magnitude. Imagine the advantage, not to mention the excitement, of watching high resolution video—rather than today’s still pictures—from a rover traveling through the Martian landscape. Also integral to the

exploration vision is enabling much greater power to operate the instruments and

tools. Advanced nuclear power systems being developed have the capability to operate at all latitudes on Mars and deeper in the Solar System where the solar flux

is feeble.

Maintaining Strong Science

The changes to the NASA budget reflect the new priorities derived from the vision

as well as the fiscal realities. Much of the $11 billion reprioritized within the FY

2005–FY 2009 budget comes from discontinuing the launch technology program,

savings derived from the Shuttle retirement, and reprioritizing research on the

International Space Station. The rest of the savings comes from slowing down a few

missions and keeping the spending rate constant for other programs.

In this budget, Space Science continues to be robust. The vision specifically calls

for a new series of robotic exploration missions to the Moon and Mars. The outer

planets will continue to be a research priority with the Jupiter Icy Moons Orbiter

(JIMO)—designed for long-duration, in-depth study of three Jovian moons that appear to contain significant water ice. And the budget includes a mission to Pluto—

the only planet in our Solar System left to be visited by robotic probes.

The Sun-Earth Connection research remains important to NASA and the Nation.

Despite the stretch-out of the Solar Terrestrial Probes awards, this program—and

all others in NASA’s Sun-Earth Connection theme—is scheduled to continue. The

Sun-Earth Connection research budget rises by $17 million in 2005 from the 2004

level and will remain at roughly the $200 million level for the next several years.

The 2005 budget therefore enables NASA to continue to pursue its goals in solar

science. In addition, Sun-Earth Connection funding is expected to grow from $746

million in 2005 to $1.05 billion in 2009, providing for the ability to begin new and

exciting major solar and space physics missions.

Observatories that probe the evolution of our universe and the matter within it

are among the most important instruments in science. Building upon the success

of missions like the Hubble, Spitzer, WMAP, and others, a whole new generation

of space observatories is being planned, each pushing the frontiers of new wavelengths and resolutions to peer back in time toward the origins of the universe; observe potentially cataclysmic events; and to identify and study extra-solar planetary

systems. The FY 2005 budget maintains the Webb telescope’s scheduled 2011

launch date. Funding is provided to cover launch delays to the Gamma-ray Large

Area Space Telescope (GLAST), the Gravity Probe B, Swift and Herschel-Planck.

Pushing the frontier of space observations even further are Con-X and the Laser Interferometer Space Antenna (LISA) which are maintained in the budget but slowed

down slightly, which will help NASA to retire some of the technical risk associated

with these pioneering missions.

NASA’s Earth Science Enterprise has been, and will continue to be, the largest

contributor to the interagency Climate Change Science Program (CCSP). The President’s Budget requests nearly $1.5 billion for NASA’s Earth Science programs.

These funds support new missions to measure ocean salinity, assess carbon dioxide

concentration, and monitor aerosol concentrations in-line with the Climate Change

Strategic Plan released this past summer. In addition, funds are provided to ensure

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the continuity of Landsat data as well as test key sensors on the next-generation

of operational Polar orbiting satellites, both of which are important components of

our Earth observing infrastructure. In a few instances missions are deferred and/

or canceled where the absence of specific data sets would not cause undue harm to

scientific progress.

The President’s FY 2005 budget supports the NASA Aeronautics Blueprint with a request for $919.2 M. This maintains the funding level for Aeronautics that was

in the President’s FY 2004 budget plan. The presence of FY 2004 earmarks in the

budget numbers creates the impression that reductions have been made to content,

which is not the case. The Blueprint identifies challenges facing aviation today and

describes a vision of technology advances that will help solve these challenges.

These advances will also create a whole new level of system performance and revolutionize civil and military aviation. The proposed FY 2005 budget request includes

the development of the highest priority (safety/security, noise, and emissions) technologies and directly supports the vision espoused by the Blueprint. To further emphasize the priority of Aeronautics, a new NASA enterprise specifically focused on

Aeronautics has been created.

Benefits to Science and Technology

In addition to the programs described above, two additional benefits for science

and technology are anticipated from the President’s vision. First, the technology development necessary to carry out this vision will accelerate advances in robotics, autonomous and fault tolerant systems, human-machine interface, materials, life support systems, and spur novel applications of nanotechnology and micro-devices. All

of these advances, while pushing the frontiers of space, are likely to spur new industries and applications that will improve life on Earth.

Second, articulating the human journey into the cosmos, with clear and challenging milestones, will inspire future generations of young people to study math,

science, and engineering. A framework and a vision for a sustainable exploration,

coupled with intellectually stimulating problems, is a substantial asset in the continuing campaign to spark interest in science and technology in each new generation.

Conclusion

This vision has consequences. It implies that we optimize not for a single mission

but for the steady accumulation of technologies and capabilities that provide a base

for multiple operations. It emphasizes the role of robotics, of ground-based research,

and of system thinking. And it places the International Space Station in a larger

context of preparation for the journey of exploration.

The vision articulates the purpose for humans in space. We have a vigorous and

highly productive program of non-human space operations for scientific, military,

and commercial purposes. These ‘‘robotic’’ missions have their own strong justification, and will contribute to the achievement of the vision for humans. The philosophy of going step by step, preparing for the future on a broad front, introduces

human capabilities only as appropriate, keeping in mind that the ultimate goal is

to permit humans to operate routinely on missions where they are needed.

The vision is good for science. Enabling this vision will lead to a greater understanding of our place in the universe, the history of the solar system, and push technology on many fronts that are important to the economic security of this Nation.

It will also open up new possibilities for future science missions that have more aggressive goals. And it prioritizes and maintains a healthy portfolio of research in

space and aeronautics.

Hubble Space Telescope

In your invitation to testify at today’s hearing you asked me to describe the contributions to science made by the Hubble Space Telescope and to assess what would

be lost if the Hubble ceased to function earlier than had been planned. And you

asked how to weigh these losses against the potential benefits of other activities

under the new initiative.

Let me start by stating clearly my understanding that the decision to cancel the

SM–4 servicing mission to the Hubble Space Telescope was based upon NASA’s assessment of the safety and recommendations made by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board. We fully support NASA’s concerns about safety and we support the

Administrator’s action in asking Admiral Gehman to review this matter and offer

his unique perspective.

Since its launch in 1990 (and subsequent repair mission), ‘‘the Hubble’’ has provided spectacular data that has improved our understanding of the cosmos. As the

authors of the 2001 National Research Council ‘‘Astronomy and Astrophysics in the

New Millennium’’ put it ‘‘The Hubble Space Telescope has arguably had a greater

37

impact on astronomy than any instrument since the original astronomical telescope

of Galileo.’’ The Hubble was launched with a planned 15 year mission and assumed

service missions approximately every three years. Over the past decade, servicing

missions have made repairs, upgraded instruments, and re-boosted the telescope to

ensure a continuing stream of valuable data. The SM–4 mission was designed to replace the gyros that stabilize the telescope, repair some thermal insulation, replace

the Fine Guidance Sensor, replace the batteries, and to install two new instruments

(Cosmic Origins Spectrograph and Wide Field Camera-3). It was estimated that the

servicing mission would have added 4–5 years of life to the Hubble.

In the 14 years since Hubble was launched, tremendous progress has been made

in improving the quality of ground based telescopes. Using adaptive optics—that is

compensating for atmospheric turbulence which degrades the resolution of the

image—ground based telescopes are now capable of resolution competitive with, and

in some instances better than, the Hubble in the longer wavelengths (near-infrared)—albeit for objects with good contrast and over smaller fields-of-view. Over the

next few years, advanced adaptive optics techniques are being planned for the next

generation of ground based observatories, improving both the resolution and fields

of view.

In its assessment of ultraviolet and optical astronomy from space, the National

Research Council report did not recommend new missions in the Hubble wavelength

regime for three reasons: ‘‘First, many of the key science opportunities [in this regime] are predominantly in the infra-red’’ (the wavelength region covered by the recently launched Spitzer telescope). ‘‘Second, the IR region has been studied much

less than the optical region, so the potential for discovery is much greater. [Third]

much of the important optical astronomy can be done from the ground.’’ The committee wrote its report assuming the SM–4 service mission would take place, but

its statements regarding the evolving role of the Hubble relative to other priorities

are important in the present discussion about risk versus benefits.

There are some things the Hubble can do that ground based telescopes cannot.

It can stare at select regions of the sky for extremely long periods of time. It can

return to anyplace in the sky over time and add up or ‘stack’ exposures. Groundbased observatories can do this same ‘stacking,’ but to a much more limited extent

because of the variations introduced by the atmosphere. In the vast majority of

cases ground-based imaging observations are limited to a single night’s length.

Where they overlap in wavelength coverage, larger ground-based telescopes collect

light faster than Hubble so similar science can be done in less time.

The next generation Webb Space Telescope—Hubble’s replacement—is being designed with about six times the collecting area, which should allow for study of

fainter objects. The Webb is also being designed to be optimized in wavelengths that

are not accessible from the ground, providing data that can not be collected from

a platform other than one in space.

If it is serviced, I have no doubt that the Hubble would continue to provide worldclass scientific data and be used to further refine our understanding of the Universe.

But the safety issues can not be ignored, and they must be considered not only with

respect to the Hubble capability, but also the ever increasing capability of visible

ground-based telescopes combined with the exciting next-generation space observatories being built.

As stated earlier, I commend the NASA Administrator for taking an objective look

at this problem and for soliciting the review by Admiral Gehman.

BIOGRAPHY FOR JOHN H. MARBURGER, III

John H. Marburger, III, Science Adviser to the President and Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, was born on Staten Island, N.Y., grew up in

Maryland near Washington, D.C., and attended Princeton University (B.A., Physics

1962) and Stanford University (Ph.D., Applied Physics 1967). Before his appointment in the Executive Office of the President, he served as Director of Brookhaven

National Laboratory from 1998, and as the third President of the State University

of New York at Stony Brook (1980–1994). He came to Long Island in 1980 from the

University of Southern California where he had been a Professor of Physics and

Electrical Engineering, serving as Physics Department Chairman and Dean of the

College of Letters, Arts and Sciences in the 1970’s. In the fall of 1994 he returned

to the faculty at Stony Brook, teaching and doing research in optical science as a

University Professor. Three years later he became President of Brookhaven Science

Associates, a partnership between the university and Battelle Memorial Institute

that competed for and won the contract to operate Brookhaven National Laboratory.

While at the University of Southern California, Marburger contributed to the rapidly growing field of nonlinear optics, a subject created by the invention of the laser

38

in 1960. He developed theory for various laser phenomena and was a co-founder of

the University of Southern California’s Center for Laser Studies. His teaching activities included ‘‘Frontiers of Electronics,’’ a series of educational programs on CBS

television.

Marburger’s presidency at Stony Brook coincided with the opening and growth of

University Hospital and the development of the biological sciences as a major

strength of the university. During the 1980’s federally sponsored scientific research

at Stony Brook grew to exceed that of any other public university in the northeastern United States.

During his presidency, Marburger served on numerous boards and committees, including chairmanship of the governor’s commission on the Shoreham Nuclear Power

facility, and chairmanship of the 80 campus ‘‘Universities Research Association’’

which operates Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory near Chicago. He served as

a trustee of Princeton University and many other organizations. He also chaired the

highly successful 1991/92 Long Island United Way campaign.

As a public spirited scientist-administrator, Marburger has served local, State and

Federal governments in a variety of capacities. He is credited with bringing an open,

reasoned approach to contentious issues where science intersects with the needs and

concerns of society. His strong leadership of Brookhaven National Laboratory following a series of environmental and management crises is widely acknowledged to

have won back the confidence and support of the community while preserving the

Laboratory’s record of outstanding science.

Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you very much, Dr. Marburger. And

we have given you a little more than double the normal time for

opening, and we would accord Administrator O’Keefe the same

courtesy, because it is such an important aspect. But I would hope

that we could all avoid what I refer to as the schmoozing aspect

of these hearings. I don’t want my colleagues in the Committee

thanking me making this hearing possible. Circumstances make it

necessary. And we know we have good working—solid working relationships, so we want to, as much as——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you for

saying that. That is a——

Chairman BOEHLERT. And with that, we don’t have to remind everyone of the solid working relationship we have with Administrator O’Keefe and the agency and with Dr. Marburger and the

White House crew. We are interested in as much factual content

in this first of many hearings as we can possibly get.

With that, let me introduce my good friend, Sean O’Keefe.

STATEMENT OF MR. SEAN O’KEEFE, ADMINISTRATOR,

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION

Mr. O’KEEFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the

Committee. I appreciate the opportunity to be here. And to summarize, I think in a slightly different direction here than Dr.

Marburger has done, I think he gave a very comprehensive review

of the overall strategy, and I will just try to touch on a couple of

highlights that augment that as well.

First and foremost, last August 26, the Columbia Accident Investigation Board, I think very pointedly, observed the absence of

strategy and national goals as being a contributing factor in the

space policy drift, as they referred to it, over the past, what they

call, three decades. It was an interagency process that Dr.

Marburger described, and as we go into in some detail in the prepared statement, to address and accelerate those very questions

and to examine this point very specifically.

The Congress and certainly in multiple hearings, as well—on

both sides of the Hill, as well as countless editorial pages, call for

39

the President to offer a vision. Well, on January 14, the President

did just that. It is a journey, not a race. That was his primary

phrase, and that was the function, I think, that he was really trying to drive home as a long-term objective. So this is not a program

for which there can be discreet elements that you tote up and determine what the ultimate consequence is; this is something that

over a longer period of time, we can assess, and must assess,

progress as we approach this journey, not toward a singular objective.

It is not a crash program. It is not something intended to be a

take everything out and put everything you have got toward it in

order to achieve single-point destination objectives. It is a longterm set of objectives that I think Dr. Marburger touched on very

extensively.

It is a deliberate focus on lunar, Mars, and beyond objectives.

The exploration will be informed by the scientific objectives. That

is a primary function of exploration informed by the science as we

move forward. It is a deliberate, focused approach to knock down

the technology obstacles and hurdles necessary to achieve each goal

in turn. The strategy of a stepping-stone approach is to build on

successes, as realized, not to anticipate inventions along the way

for the success of each stage. Instead, as successes materialize,

then you adapt the plans and you adjust them necessary to accomplish the longer-term goals that the President has laid out. It is fiscally responsible. The President’s budget as $16.2 billion,

and rising in the five year plan, is well within the President’s fiscal

policy to contain discretionary spending below four percent growth

and to cut the deficit in half within five years. All of that has been

accommodated in the proposal that the President submitted on

February 2.

It is achievable, it is ambitious, it is focused, and it is affordable.

The vision document that all of you have before you is the bridge,

if you will, between the President’s statement, his policy directive,

and the budget that is in place. And we have put that together as

a means to try to describe the entire approach on how this journey

will play out in degrees and by chapter.

There is no massive commitment today that will be expected to

be paid for by a future Congress, and each step in every interval

along the way, the President and the Congress, annually, will have

an opportunity to evaluate that progress and consider proposals for

how that next chapter will proceed. This is the overall game plan.

It is the objectives of what has been articulated, but in terms of

how it is successively taken on is an annual matter of review, and

there is no commitment that is being requested today that commits

to a large balloon note in the future. Each of it is progressively developed.

As mentioned earlier, too, as well, the President developed a

commission, appointed them, they had their first hearings in the

last couple of days here. He appointed them just last week. Secretary Pete Aldridge is Chairman of that commission: nine distinguished members of the academic industry and former public service communities to help guide how that strategy will be carried out.

And finally, Mr. Chairman, if I could offer the observation, I

guess, that has been included in several editorial pages as well is

40

the divergence or disparate views within the public condition right

now. The public interest is there. I offer to you just an anecdote

of the last 40 days; the NASA website has received six billion hits.

Six billion hits. That involves 47 unique different visitors—47 million, excuse me. So as a consequence, it is not only—it is not 47

people hitting the same button at the same time to achieve six billion hits. It is 47 million people who are, in turn, then returning

repetitively to the website in the course of that time. Over the span

of this 40-day period, that is more than twice the total number of

hits we have received all of last year. All of last year was four

times that which we had ever received before. So as a consequence,

the interest level with what is going on and what is involved is extremely high. It involves 430 million page views that are involved

in this. It is effectively the equivalent of distributing all of what is

contained in the Library of Congress 7c times over the course of 40

days. That is what has been delivered through the website alone.

It also includes a wide range if disparate kinds of interests involved. There are more than 1,000 schools in the United States and

universities, which have accessed the web page over the span of

this time. It includes not only K through 12 programs, but also university efforts.

The sections that are being hit, it is not isolated to one area. It

includes not only the Mars rovers updates, but also the kids’ section, which is up five times, students’ section, which is up three

times. Educators are going to this at a factor of three higher than

they have ever gone to it before. And so as a prospect of this—or

a consequence of it, the interest level across everything we are engaged in is pretty high.

Just to give you a quick flavor of what it is they are looking at,

let me ask—there are a couple of charts, I think, before you, but

I will give it to you in a graphic as well, and they are very, very

brief.

[Slide.]

Certainly, the immediate image or interests are on the success

of the two Mars rovers. This first image is a color image taken by

the panoramic camera aboard Spirit showing the Adirondack,

which was, I think, appropriately named, given its formation.

[Slide.]

The next is a medium resolution version of a 360-degree view of

the Martian surface taken aboard Spirit, in its camera.

[Slide.]

The next is a drag mark that was made by the Spirit as it moved

off of the deflated area and moved on to the area referred to as

‘‘Magic Carpet’’ as it moved along.

[Slide.]

The next series is Opportunity. It is a picture taken soon after

Opportunity landed, showing the interior of the crater, which it is

now exploring.

[Slide.]

The next is an image by Opportunity’s navigation camera showing an overhead perspective of the rover itself and how it initially

landed at that point on the Challenger Memorial Station location.

[Slide.]

41

And finally, we have a Martian Coast Guard from the panoramic

camera of Opportunity showing the Martian landscape southwest

of the rover. This is the area they are really examining with great

detail as it works across that.

[Slide.]

And a final image of what is also being struck several times is

that of the Spitzer Space Telescope. This past December, two

months ago, we—as Spitzer became operational and observes the

cosmos in an infrared capacity with unprecedented sensitivity, exactly as Dr. Marburger described. And the comparative images you

see here is one versus—in the smaller inset, is what visible light

would otherwise provide. The one to the right, in the larger image,

is what Spitzer has provided as a consequence of the infrared capability that is now operational and being accessed multi-million

times as a consequence of availability on the website today.

With that, Mr. Chairman, I thank you for the opportunity to testify, and I look forward to your questions, sir.

[The prepared statement of Mr. O’Keefe follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SEAN O’KEEFE

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, thank you for this opportunity to

appear today to discuss NASA’s FY 2005 budget request. On January 14th, the

President visited NASA Headquarters and announced his Vision for U.S. Space Exploration. In his address, the President presented a vision that is bold and forwardthinking, yet practical and responsible—one that explores answers to longstanding

questions of importance to science and society and will develop revolutionary technologies and capabilities for the future, while maintaining good stewardship of taxpayer dollars.

The vision forms the basis of the new U.S. space exploration policy, ‘‘A Renewed

Spirit of Discovery.’’ (See charter, p. 7.) This policy is the product of months of extensive and careful deliberation. The importance of these deliberations increased

with the findings of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board, which emphasized

the importance of setting clear, long-term goals for the Nation’s human space flight

program. Inputs from Members of this committee and other Members of Congress

informed the Administration’s deliberations. Many others contributed ideas for the

future of the space program. These deliberations were also the basis for formulating

the President’s FY 2005 Budget request for NASA. A commission will advise NASA

on specific issues for implementation of the policy’s goals within four months.

Today, I will summarize the President’s FY 2005 budget request for NASA, discuss the goals set forth in the new U.S. space exploration policy, walk you through

the major implementation elements and their associated budget details, explain the

implications of this directive for NASA’s organization, and describe what the Nation’s future in exploration and discovery will look like in the coming years.

FY 2005 Budget Summary

The President’s FY 2005 Budget request for NASA is $16.244 billion, a 5.6 percent

increase over FY 2004, as reflected in Enclosure 1. The NASA budget request is designed with four key goals in mind:

Compelling—The budget fully supports the U.S. Vision for Space Exploration, and

provides for ongoing NASA mission priorities such as Aeronautics and Earth

Science.

Affordable—The budget is fiscally responsible and consistent with the Administration’s goal of cutting the federal deficit in half within the next five years. NASA’s

FY 2005 budget will increase by $1 billion over five years, when compared with the

President’s FY 2004 plan; that is an increase of approximately five percent per year

over each of the next three years and approximately one percent for each of the following two years.

Achievable—The budget strategy supporting the vision will not require large balloon payments by future Congresses and Administrations. Unlike previous major

civil space initiatives, this approach is intentionally flexible, with investments in

sustainable exploration approaches to maintain affordability. After FY 2009, the

budget projects that the exploration vision can be implemented within a NASA

budget that keeps pace with inflation.

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Focused—The budget begins the alignment of NASA’s program structure with the

exploration vision. We now have the needed compass from which to evaluate our

programs and make the needed tough decisions.

Vision Goals

The fundamental goal of this new policy is to advance U.S. scientific, security, and

economic interests through a robust space exploration program. In support of this

goal, NASA will:

• Implement a sustained and affordable human and robotic program to explore

the Solar System and beyond;

• Extend human presence across the Solar System, starting with a human return to the Moon by the year 2020, in preparation for human exploration of

Mars and other destinations;

• Develop the innovative technologies, knowledge, and infrastructures both to

explore and to support decisions about destinations for future human exploration; and

• Promote international and commercial participation in exploration to further

U.S. scientific, security, and economic interests.

Implementation Elements and Budget Highlights

To achieve these goals, NASA will plan and implement an integrated, long-term

robotic and human exploration program, structured with measurable milestones and

executed on the basis of available resources, accumulated experience, and technology readiness. The policy envisions the following major implementation elements:

Space Shuttle—NASA will return the Space Shuttle to flight as soon as practical,

based on the recommendations of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board. The budget includes $4.3 billion for the Space Shuttle, a nine percent increase above FY

2004. Included in this total is an estimated $238 million for Return to Flight (RTF)

activities in FY 2005. The RTF activities are under evaluation to confirm the estimated cost and associated out year phasing. The focus of the Space Shuttle will be

finishing assembly of the International Space Station (ISS). With its job done, the

Space Shuttle will be phased out when assembly of the ISS is complete, planned

for the end of the decade. NASA will determine over the next year how best to address the issues associated with the safe retirement of the Space Shuttle fleet.

International Space Station—NASA plans to complete assembly of the International Space Station (ISS) by the end of the decade, including those U.S. components that will ensure our capability to conduct research in support of the new U.S.

space exploration goals and those planned and provided by foreign partners. The

budget provides $1.9 billion for ISS assembly and operations, a 24 percent increase

above FY 2004. This increase forward funds $100 million in reserves to partially restore planned near-term reserve levels following the $200 million Congressional cut

to Space Station in FY 2004 and provides $140 million in new funding for transportation services to the Space Station. We will separate, to the maximum extent practical, crew and cargo transportation for both ISS and exploration missions. NASA

will acquire ISS crew transport as required and cargo transportation as soon as

practical and affordable. NASA envisions that commercial and/or foreign capabilities

will provide these services.

NASA anticipates that any adjustments in existing ISS Partner responsibilities as

a result of the new U.S. space exploration policy can be accommodated within the

existing ISS agreements. The ISS Multilateral Coordination Board is scheduled to

meet today to begin the process of coordination within the Partnership on implications to the ISS resulting from the new policy. The Administration is also prepared

to address issues associated with obtaining foreign transportation services to the

Space Station, including provisions of the Iran Nonproliferation Act, but until the

ISS Partnership adopts a specific implementation strategy, it is premature to identify specific issues.

U.S. research activities aboard the ISS will be focused to support the new exploration goals, with an emphasis on understanding how the space environment affects

astronaut health and capabilities, and on developing appropriate countermeasures

to mitigate health concerns. ISS will also be vital to develop and demonstrate improved life support systems and medical care. Consistent with this focus, the budget

provides $343 million, a 61 percent increase above FY 2004, for bioastronautics research to understand and mitigate risks to humans on exploration missions. Over

the next year, the Biological and Physical Research Enterprise will conduct a thorough review of all research activities to ensure that they are fully aligned with and

supportive of the new exploration vision.

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New Space Transportation Capabilities—The budget provides $428 million to

begin a new Crew Exploration Vehicle, named Project Constellation, that will provide crew transport for exploration missions beyond low-Earth orbit. The current

budget planning is based on formulation concept studies to be conducted in FY 2004,

preliminary design activities conducted in FY 2005 and FY 2006, a System Design

Review in FY 2005, and a Preliminary Design Review in FY 2006. NASA plans to

develop Project Constellation in a step-by-step approach, with an initial unpiloted

test flight as early as 2008, followed by tests of progressively more capable designs

that provide an operational human-rated capability no later than 2014. Project Constellation may also provide transportation to the Space Station, but its design will

be driven by exploration requirements.

NASA does not plan to pursue new Earth-to-orbit transportation capabilities, except where necessary to support unique exploration needs, such as a heavy lift vehicle. The budget discontinues the Space Launch Initiative, although knowledge

gained on the Orbital Space Plane will be transferred to Project Constellation.

Lunar Exploration—NASA will undertake lunar exploration and demonstration

activities to enable sustained human and robotic exploration of Mars and other destinations in the Solar System. Beginning no later than 2008, NASA plans to launch

the first in a series of robotic missions to the Moon to prepare for and support

human exploration activities. The budget provides $70 million for these robotic

lunar test beds, increasing to $420 million by FY 2009. The policy envisions the first

human expedition to the lunar surface as early as 2015, but no later than 2020.

These robotic and human missions will further science and demonstrate new approaches, technologies, and systems—including the use of space resources—to support sustained human exploration to Mars and other destinations.

Exploration of Mars—The stunning images we have received from Mars are just

the beginning of future Mars exploration. NASA will enhance the ongoing search

for water and evidence of life on Mars by pursuing technologies in this decade for

advanced science missions to Mars in the next decade. Also starting in the next decade, NASA will launch a dedicated series of robotic missions to Mars that will demonstrate greatly enhanced robotic capabilities and enable future human exploration

of the Red Planet. The budget provides $691 million for Mars Exploration, a 16 percent increase over FY 2004, and will double Mars Exploration funding by FY 2009.

NASA will conduct human expeditions to Mars and other destinations beyond Earth

orbit on the basis of available resources, accumulated experience, and technology

readiness.

Other Solar System Exploration—Over the next two decades, NASA will conduct

an increasingly capable campaign of robotic exploration across the Solar System.

The budget provides $1.2 billion for Solar System Exploration missions to Jupiter’s

icy moons, to Saturn and its moon Titan, to asteroids and comets, and to other Solar

System bodies. These missions will search for evidence of life, help us to understand

the history of the Solar System, and search for resources.

Extrasolar Planets—NASA will launch advanced space telescopes that will search

for Earth-like planets and habitable environments around other stars. The budget

includes $1.1 billion for the Astronomical Search for Origins, a 19 percent increase

over FY 2004, to support Hubble Space Telescope operations, the recently launched

Spitzer Space Telescope, James Webb Space Telescope development, as well as three

future observatories. This funding also supports investments to extend the lifetime

of the Hubble Space Telescope to the maximum extent possible without a servicing

mission.

Enabling Capabilities—NASA will pursue a number of key capabilities to enable

sustainable human and robotic exploration across the Solar System. Among the

most important of these capabilities is advanced power and propulsion, and the

budget provides $438 million for Project Prometheus to develop these technologies

for future robotic and human exploration missions. The budget also includes $636

million in other Human and Robotic Technology funding to pursue sustainable approaches to Solar System exploration, such as reusable and modular systems, prepositioned propellants, space resource utilization, automated systems and robotic

networks, and in-space assembly. These technologies will be demonstrated on the

ground, in orbit, and on the Moon beginning in this decade and extending into the

next to help inform future exploration decisions. The budget projects that funding

for these Human and Robotic Technology investments will grow to $1 billion by FY

2009.

The budget also includes innovative opportunities for U.S. industry, academia,

and members of the public to help meet the technical challenges inherent in the new

44

space exploration vision. The budget includes $20 million for the new Centennial

Challenges program, which will establish competitions to stimulate innovation in

space and aeronautical technologies that can advance the exploration vision and

other NASA missions. The budget also provides $10 million for NASA to purchase

launch services for its payloads from emerging launch vehicle providers. And as previously mentioned, the budget includes $140 million for Space Station transportation services.

Ongoing Priorities—The budget supports the vision for space exploration, while

maintaining NASA commitments in other important roles and missions.

NASA continues its commitment to helping understand our changing global climate. The budget makes NASA the largest contributor to the interagency Climate

Change Science Program with $100 million for the Climate Change Research Initiative. The budget includes $560 million for Earth Science research, a seven percent

increase above FY 2004, to support research on data from 80 sensors on 18 satellites

currently in operation. Work also continues on Earth observation missions in development or formulation, including $141 million (a 36 percent increase from FY 2004)

for the National Polar Orbiting Environmental Satellite System Preparatory Project,

$42 million for the Landsat Data Continuity Mission, and $240 million (a 37 percent

increase from FY 2004) for missions in formulation, such as the Orbiting Carbon

Observatory, Aquarius and Hydros.

NASA maintains planned Aeronautics Technology investments to improve our nation’s air system. The budget includes: $188 million, a four percent increase above

FY 2004, for technology to reduce aircraft accidents and improve the security of our

nation’s aviation system against terrorist threats; $72 million, an 11 percent increase above FY 2004, for technology to reduce aircraft noise and improve the quality of life for residents living near airports; $209 million for technology to reduce

aircraft emissions and improve environmental quality; and $154 million for technologies to increase air system capacity and reduce delays in the Nation’s airports.

NASA will continue to make fundamental advances in our knowledge of the Sun

and the Universe. The budget provides $746 million for Sun-Earth Connection missions, including the Solar Dynamics Observatory and the Solar-Terrestrial Relations

Observatory. The budget also provides $378 million for Structure and Evolution of

the Universe missions, including the Chandra X-ray Observatory and three major

missions currently under development.

NASA also maintains its role in science, engineering and math education. The

budget includes $10 million for the newly authorized Science and Technology Scholarship program, which will help attract the Nation’s best college students to NASA

science and engineering careers. The budget also provides $14 million for the NASA

Explorer Schools, which seeks to attract students to mathematics and science during

the critical middle school years. The Explorer Schools program is entering its third

phase and will be selecting 50 new schools for a total of 150 participating schools.

Management of Human Capital Facilities and Institution—NASA has earned the

distinction of being the only federal agency to earn top grades for the Human Capital and Budget and Performance Integration initiatives under the President’s Management Agenda. Congress recently passed the NASA Workforce Flexibility Act.

NASA is grateful for the hard work of this committee in shaping this legislation to

provide necessary flexibilities to better manage the NASA workforce. These flexibilities will be critical to implementing the exploration vision. The budget includes $25

million in FY 2005 to begin to address critical workforce skill and aging issues.

NASA ratings have also improved in the Competitive Sourcing and E-Government

initiatives, resulting in more total improvements than any other agency. Although

we received a disclaimed opinion on our recent audit statement, we are determined

in pursuing the right path in Financial Management in bringing on a new financial

system that will standardize accounting across the Agency and provide the necessary tools for improved program management. NASA remains committed to management excellence and believes it is essential to implementing the new exploration

vision.

The budget includes funding for critical institutional capabilities, including $77

million for the NASA Engineering Safety Center and $27 million for Independent

Verification and Validation. The budget also provides $307 million, a $41 million increase versus FY 2004, for facilities maintenance.

Organizing for Exploration

To successfully execute the exploration vision, NASA will re-focus its organization,

create new offices, align ongoing programs, experiment with new ways of doing business, and tap the great innovative and creative talents of our nation.

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The President has issued an Executive Order creating a commission of private

and public sector experts to advise on these issues. Former Undersecretary of Defense and Secretary of the Air Force, Pete Aldridge, is Chair of the Commission. The

President has named eight other commissioners to join Mr. Aldridge. The commission will issue its report within four months of its first meeting, which is scheduled

for February 11, 2004.

Immediately following the President’s speech, we established an Exploration Systems Enterprise, which will have responsibility for developing the Crew Exploration

Vehicle and other exploration systems and technologies. Retired U.S. Navy Rear Admiral Craig Steidle, former manager of the Defense Department’s Joint Strike

Fighter Program, is heading this new organization. Relevant programs of the Aerospace Technology, Space Science, and Space Flight enterprises are being transferred

to the Exploration Systems Enterprise. The Aerospace Technology Enterprise has

been renamed the Aeronautics Enterprise to reflect its new focus.

As human explorers prepare to join their robotic counterparts, coordination and

integration will increase. The Exploration Systems Enterprise will work closely with

the Space Science Enterprise to use the Moon to demonstrate new approaches, technologies, and systems to support sustained human exploration. NASA’s Space

Science Enterprise will have responsibility for implementing early robotic testbeds

on the Moon and Mars and will also demonstrate other key exploration technologies—such as advanced power, propulsion, and communications—in missions to

Mars and Jupiter’s moons. NASA’s Space Science Enterprise will eventually integrate human capabilities into exploration planning for Mars and other destinations.

Many other elements of the NASA organization will be focused to support this

new direction. NASA’s Biological and Physical Research Enterprise will put much

greater emphasis on bioastronautics research to enable the human exploration of

other worlds. NASA’s Office of the Space Architect will be responsible for integrating the exploration activities of NASA’s different Enterprises and for maintaining exploration roadmaps and coordinating high-level requirements.

As we move outward into the Solar System, NASA will look for innovative ideas

from the private sector and academia to support activities in Earth orbit and future

exploration activities beyond. Many of the technical challenges that NASA will face

in the coming years will require innovative solutions. In addition to tapping creative

thinking within the NASA organization, we will leverage the ideas and expertise

resident in the Nation’s universities and industry.

In his speech, the President directed NASA to invite other nations to share in the

challenges and opportunities of this new era of exploration and discovery, and he

directed us to fulfill our standing international commitments. We are discussing the

impact of our vision implementation plans on the ISS with our partners, and as I

have already indicated we will complete the assembly of the ISS. The President

called our future course of exploration ‘‘a journey, not a race,’’ and other nations

have reacted positively to the President’s guidance. Several have already contacted

us about joining in this journey. Building on NASA’s long history and extensive and

close ties with the space and research agencies of other nations, we will actively

seek international partners in executing future exploration activities.

NASA will also invigorate its workforce, focus its facilities, and revitalize its field

centers. As exploration activities get underway, NASA anticipates planning, reviews, and changes to align and improve its infrastructure. In order to achieve the

exploration vision, we will be making decisions on how to best implement new programs. While some of these necessary actions will not be easy, they are essential

to achieving the goals of the overall effort before us. I urge you to consider the full

context of what we will be proposing rather than any isolated, specific action. Such

a perspective will allow us to move forward in implementing the vision.

FY 2003 Accomplishments

Much of the NASA’s future ability to achieve the new space exploration vision is

predicated on NASA’s many previous accomplishments. The most visible NASA successes over the past year are the Spirit and Opportunity rovers currently on Mars.

Already, the landscapes imaged by these twin rovers and their initial science returns are hinting at fundamental advances in our understanding of early environmental conditions on Mars and whether Mars was once capable of sustaining water

and the development of life.

However, Spirit and Opportunity are not the only recent NASA mission successes.

NASA successfully launched four new Space Science missions (including the two

Mars rovers), three new Earth Science missions, one new NASA communications

relay satellite, and completed two Space Station deployment missions. Missions in

operation have also achieved a number of notable successes, including the Stardust

mission’s successful flight through the tail of Comet Wild-2, initial images from the

46

recently launched Spitzer Space Telescope, a ten- to 100-fold improvement in

Earth’s gravity map from the GRACE satellite, the most accurate maps of Earth

temperatures to date from the Aqua satellite, and new insights into space weather

and solar activity from Sun-Earth Connection missions.

NASA exceeded or met 83 percent of its annual performance goals for FY 2003.

Among these accomplishments were demonstrations of new systems to improve air

traffic control and to combat aircraft icing, improvements in battery, telescope sensor, and life support technologies, fundamental advances in understanding states of

matter from Space Station research, and the implementation of new remote sensing

tools for tracking diseases and wild fires.

The Nation’s Future in Exploration and Discovery

As the President stated in his speech, we are embarking on a journey, not a race.

We begin this journey of exploration and discovery knowing that many years of hard

work and sustained effort will be required, yet we can look forward to achieving concrete results in the near-term. The vision makes the needed decisions to secure longterm U.S. space leadership. It provides an exciting set of major milestones with

human and robotic missions. It pursues compelling science and cutting-edge technologies. It invites new ideas and innovations for accomplishing this bold, new vision. And it will provide the opportunity for new generations of Americans to explore, innovate, discover and enrich our nation in ways unimaginable today. The

President’s challenging vision provides unique opportunities for engaging students

across the country, ‘‘as only NASA can,’’ to enter careers in science, engineering,

technology and math.

I sincerely appreciate the forum that the Committee has provided today, and I

look forward to responding to your questions.

47

48

DISCUSSION

BUDGET ASSUMPTIONS AND UNCERTAINTIES

Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you very much. I would observe

that probably most of us in this room are part of the 47 million

people who have been excited and have been responsible for those

six billion hits on your website. I would also point out that it is the

unmanned mission that is exciting the world. And we are here

mainly to concentrate on the manned exploration portion of the

President’s initiative, and that is what we are going to be very specific in addressing.

Mr. O’Keefe, is—a plan as long-range and far-reaching as the Exploration Initiative necessarily has to budget for many items whose

costs can not be known with any certainty at this point, what items

in the Exploration Initiative are most likely to cost significantly

more or less than is currently budgeted? Presumably, the figures

used to calculate the budget for the initiative are sort of in the

middle range of possible costs. Can you give us the full range of

the cost of the initiative? And how likely is it that the initiative can

be accomplished for the amount budgeted? A comprehensive question.

Mr. O’KEEFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, there is no way to put a price tag on a program that

is in definition. Again, the objective is to lay out the longer-term

objectives, and that is exactly what the President’s Directive does.

So at each successive stage, there will be a price tag attached to

it. Along the way, too, a slight contrast, I think, to your opening

comment, this is a combination of both human capacity as well as

robotic capacity. That is what is included in the exploration objectives. And all of it is a set of precursor missions that require or demand robotic capabilities beforehand. So the definition of the price

tag of those is going to get higher and easier to define as we move

along in this particular approach.

In the immediate term, what the plan calls for is an immediate

cost of return to flight, of completion of the International Space

Station. And on those two, I think we can give you a much greater

definition of cost estimate for those accomplishments than on many

other elements of it. And then the next stages from there are to

develop a Project Constellation, the crew exploration vehicle, which

will extend beyond the scope of this decade. And during the course

in this time, $6.6 billion has been budgeted and more to follow as

we continue that development effort.

Chairman BOEHLERT. But where—I would—so I am assuming

middle-range of projections, those are the assumptions we are operating under. But where is the greatest uncertainty? Is it the CEV?

Is it the Shuttle? Development? Where is the greatest uncertainty

at this juncture?

Mr. O’KEEFE. I personally think that the greatest uncertainty

will be the cost to develop power generation of propulsion capacities and over what span of time. Right now we have no means to

generate powers or to propel anywhere. It is all based on solar

power collection, and that is it. What we are trying to do with

Project Prometheus is develop the capacity to propel anywhere,

which will get you there faster as well as inform the science opporVerDate 11-MAY-2000 16:41 Oct 01, 2004 Jkt 091691 PO 00000 Frm 00052 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\WORKD\FULL04\021204\91691 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
49

tunities to generate more power for the science packages involved.

That one is the one I think that has got the greatest prospect of

uncertainty in terms of what its overall cost is, depending on how

you want to size its use. Do you want to apply it just to robotic capabilities? Do you want to include downstream toward the—to

power and generate power for and propel a crew exploration vehicle? Those are the—that would be the primary ones, I think, would

be the limitations.

Chairman BOEHLERT. Well, is propulsion for the CEV or for

later?

Mr. O’KEEFE. Yes, sir; both.

Chairman BOEHLERT. Both?

Mr. O’KEEFE. Yes, sir.

PROGRAM MANAGEMENT AND SUNK COSTS

Chairman BOEHLERT. All right.

The next question: in the past, Congress has often invested so

heavily in NASA programs that it seems too late to cancel a program even after it proves to be troubled. We have seen an example

of that. What milestones for assessment are built into the major aspects of the Exploration Initiative? At what point should NASA and

the Congress re-examine the initiative, particularly CEV development, to determine whether it is appropriate to proceed to completion?

Mr. O’KEEFE. Yes, sir. Thank you for the question. It is an exactly critical one in the sense that the approach we have taken

here is a strategy that gives multiple opportunities to assess

progress. The approach with the crew exploration vehicle, under

Project Constellation, is specifically to develop and use a spiral development technique, which will require the deployment of unmanned capacity on at least a couple of occasions, probably more,

between now and the time that we develop a human-rated capability. So what you do is each component, in turn, is launched to

demonstrate that success and then build on it.

As that success is evaluated, then you make the decision to move

to the next phase thereafter. Along the way, concurrently with

that, is also a range of robotic capabilities for lunar exploration as

well as potential power generation capability there as well that

again will be assessed each, in turn, by mission. And to the extent

that there is an adjustment necessary in acceleration or a slowdown of those activities based on the relative success of each of

those steps, that is when you make the decision to move off. So

there isn’t a one-time commitment that will in turn create a balloon note down the road. At each step, you make a judgment about

how you progress ahead.

Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you.

Mr. Gordon.

COST ESTIMATES

Mr. GORDON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I am taking your

cue to get down to business.

Let me repeat Mr. Augustine’s comments yesterday: ‘‘It would be

a grave mistake to undertake a major new space objective on the

50

cheap. To do so, in my opinion, would be an invitation to disaster.’’

Certainly nobody here wants a human disaster or a financial disaster. And I think a financial disaster is getting a quarter of the

way down, 20 percent of the way down, 50 percent of the way down

the line and saying, ‘‘We can’t afford this. We are going to do something else.’’ Maybe, you know, there will be some benefits, but we

don’t want to do that.

And so Mr. O’Keefe, I—this—dollar cost is something that we are

all concerned about. I had written you and asked you specifically

about that. Your response was, in terms of the cost, it depends,

which was pretty much what you said here today. It depends. But

we need a benchmark, and I know you can do various things. So

if we gave you a benchmark, like going to the Moon by the year

2020, what would be your estimation of that cost?

Mr. O’KEEFE. Well, sir, first and foremost, let me suggest that

Augustine’s comment yesterday—Mr. Augustine’s comment yesterday was also that he had not read any of the details involved in

the plan. So I think he quoted that point as well. The second point

of exactly how we would return to the Moon by 2020 depends on

which components you want to have back into it.

Mr. GORDON. You take any—that is what I am saying. You take

any set of components you want. You just take one, get us there,

and tell me what it is going to cost.

Mr. O’KEEFE. Okay. Yes, sir. The robotic capability to return to the Moon within this decade should not cost more than $500 to

$600 million.

Mr. GORDON. $500 to $600 million?

Mr. O’KEEFE. $500 to $600 million for that robotic capacity——

Mr. GORDON. Just robotic? Okay.

Mr. O’KEEFE [continuing]. To follow through. Then after that,

you make a judgment of whether you want to go back with what

capabilities.

Mr. GORDON. You go ahead. You just go ahead and lay a benchmark out of what you think would be reasonable, and tell me what

it would cost.

Mr. O’KEEFE. I wouldn’t want to presume success at any stage.

I want to make sure each step along the way——

Mr. GORDON. Well, no, go ahead.

Mr. O’KEEFE [continuing]. And we do this properly.

Mr. GORDON. Just go ahead, you know, and let—go ahead and

presume a reasonable course, and tell me what it would cost.

Mr. O’KEEFE. Over the course of this past year, and since February 1, 2003, I have made it a point not to anticipate success beyond the next stage.

Mr. GORDON. Okay. Well, let me put it this way. Dr. Marburger

said that you went through a very extensive program, lots of meetings, that it was an environment, as he said, that was informationrich. And you told me that the President was very engaged in this.

Now surely the President wouldn’t have a pig and a poke. Did the

President never ask you what this was going to cost?

Dr. MARBURGER. I think it is important to realize that this is——

Mr. GORDON. Well, that is what I——

Dr. MARBURGER [continuing]. Not a mission——

Mr. GORDON. I have got a limited amount of time. I——

51

Dr. MARBURGER. This is not a single mission, Apollo-like——

Mr. GORDON. Right.

Dr. MARBURGER [continuing]. Program. And the——

Mr. GORDON. I will take any—again——

Dr. MARBURGER. The fiscal year 2005——

Mr. GORDON. If I could, please——

Dr. MARBURGER. Yes, sir.

Mr. GORDON [continuing]. Because we—I am going to lose time.

You know, you take anything you want. You know, just tell me, did

the President, in this discussion, at any time, say, ‘‘What is this

going to cost?’’

Dr. MARBURGER. Absolutely.

Mr. GORDON. Okay. And what was your——

Dr. MARBURGER. And the fiscal year 2005——

Mr. GORDON. And what was your answer?

Dr. MARBURGER. The President’s budget request has multi-year

budget commitments that he is prepared to support that go

beyond——

Mr. GORDON. But only five years, isn’t it? Does it give anything

beyond the five years?

Dr. MARBURGER. Yes, it goes out through 2020——

Mr. GORDON. And are there budget——

Dr. MARBURGER [continuing]. As a matter of fact.

Mr. GORDON [continuing]. Numbers that go with that?

Dr. MARBURGER. And there is a budget profile that goes with

that. It is calibrated in, I presume, 2004 dollars.

Mr. GORDON. Okay. So what is it——

Dr. MARBURGER. It goes up——

Mr. GORDON. So what is it going to cost? So—I didn’t see——

Dr. MARBURGER. Okay.

Mr. GORDON. So what is the cost by 2020 to go to the Moon?

Dr. MARBURGER. If—you would have to integrate under that

curve to find the total cost, but the curve goes up on a line that

is quite consistent with the fiscal year 2004 approved budget

profile——

Mr. GORDON. Okay. So what does that cost?

Dr. MARBURGER [continuing]. Up to about—the NASA budget in

the year 2020, according to this, would be about, what is that, $22

billion.

Mr. GORDON. But what is that cumulative cost, then, to get to

the Moon by 2020?

Dr. MARBURGER. The—I mean this includes the entire NASA

budget and their components. It looks like only about——

Mr. GORDON. Well, again——

Dr. MARBURGER.—2/3 of that——

Mr. GORDON [continuing]. If I could, did the President never ask

you what the cost of this program was going to be?

Dr. MARBURGER. The President understands that we are enabling all future space exploration by putting into place——

Mr. GORDON. Okay. Please, you know, please just—you know, we

have a short amount of time.

Dr. MARBURGER. And the——

52

Mr. GORDON. Let me ask you—just if I could ask you this. Did

the President ever ask you what this was going to cost? Yes or no,

please, sir.

Dr. MARBURGER. Yes, of course.

Mr. GORDON. All right. And what did you tell him?

Dr. MARBURGER. And we showed him this chart.

Mr. GORDON. Okay. And—all right. And what does that—could

you tell me? Could you add that up and tell me what that means

then?

Dr. MARBURGER. The—I mean I can’t—I would have to do some

calculations on this chart. The——

Mr. GORDON. So you didn’t—you haven’t done calculations——

Dr. MARBURGER. It clearly——

Mr. GORDON [continuing]. Before?

Dr. MARBURGER. Yes, I am sorry. This—these precise numbers

that you are asking me here are not part of what I carry in my

head.

Mr. GORDON. I am—just a general number of what is it going

to—you know, did the President ever ask you, ‘‘What is it going to

cost to go to the Moon?’’

Dr. MARBURGER. Actually, the question of going to the Moon is

part of the program that would be accomplished according to the

timetables——

Mr. GORDON. Okay. Well, get—please——

Dr. MARBURGER [continuing]. In this——

Mr. GORDON [continuing]. I am not trying to be argumentative.

Dr. MARBURGER. Well, they are right in there. They are——

Mr. GORDON. Okay.

Dr. MARBURGER. I am looking at the same pictures that you are.

Mr. GORDON. All right. So when the President asked you what

it is going to cost, you didn’t tell him? You just gave him this

chart?

Dr. MARBURGER. No, there were tables of numbers associated

with this that do appear in the fiscal year 2005——

Mr. GORDON. All right. Did the President ever——

Dr. MARBURGER [continuing]. Presidential——

Mr. GORDON [continuing]. Ask you what anything was going to

cost?

Dr. MARBURGER. Yes, of course.

Mr. GORDON. Okay. What——

Dr. MARBURGER. Yes.

Mr. GORDON [continuing]. Did he ask you, and what did you tell

him?

Dr. MARBURGER. I would like to respond to that in writing so

that I can be sure of my response.

Mr. GORDON. Okay. So you——

Dr. MARBURGER. I would prefer not to try to calculate it from

this graph.

Mr. GORDON. All right. So—but you don’t have to calculate it, but

if you were there in this environment rich—you don’t remember

him asking you what anything was going to cost and what you told

him?

53

Dr. MARBURGER. No, I am sorry, Mr. Congressman, that I am unable to answer these questions that you are asking in precisely this

form. The emphasis is—the emphasis in this vision is on——

Mr. GORDON. Okay. Well—and I have got to——

Dr. MARBURGER [continuing]. Affordable——

Mr. GORDON [continuing]. Go on. I will stop.

Dr. MARBURGER [continuing]. Sustainable, affordable——

Mr. GORDON. Okay. I got it. Stop.

Dr. MARBURGER [continuing]. Budget. And so we——

Mr. GORDON. You said you were going to——

Dr. MARBURGER [continuing]. Do not want to devote more of our

discretionary budget than we can afford——

Mr. GORDON. Okay.

Dr. MARBURGER [continuing]. In any one year, and we will adjust

the timetables——

Mr. GORDON. I understand. It all depends. All right. Again, you

said you would respond to me. My question to you was did the

President ever ask you what anything was going to cost?

Dr. MARBURGER. Yes.

Mr. GORDON. What were those various things, and what did you

respond?

Dr. MARBURGER. And——

Mr. GORDON. Okay. And you don’t have to do it now. That is fine.

Dr. MARBURGER [continuing]. I would be glad to respond.

Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you, Dr. Marburger, and submit it

for the record. I would observe that the 2005 budget projects out

to 2009, not beyond. So those are the figures we have——

Dr. MARBURGER. The initial one in the budget, but this entire

graph, up through 2020, is an important part of the vision. It

shows how the funds available for exploration, for a credible exploration program, can be made available within an affordable envelope. This is a very important part. We—the reason we are having

this problem is that we are looking at this from different perspectives. This is not an Apollo-like project. This is a—the key word is

to enable future space exploration. We are going to become a space

faring Nation to take advantage of the assets and the resources

that exist——

Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you, Dr. Marburger.

Dr. MARBURGER [continuing]. And the opportunities for discovery.

Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you, Dr. Marburger. I just want you

to know that it is evident, in that we have just had two of us who

have had the opportunity to ask some questions, that we are very

interested in getting as precise information as we possibly can get.

And we understand fully, and some instances are going to have to

be ranges. And we fully understand that there are assumptions,

and we are assuming, and we want this verified, that you can give

us the ranges and further assume that we are probably looking at

the midpoint in the ranges. And some things go well and the costs

are reduced. Other things don’t go as well as anticipated, and costs

are increased. So we are dealing with ranges, but we want as much

specificity as we can possibly get. For example, we have been told

by the NASA Comptroller that a development to full completion of

the CEV could cost as much as $15 billion. True, Mr.——

54

Mr. O’KEEFE. Oh, absolutely. And that is a fair range, and to

that very specific point, of what is the development of that capability, that unique asset. The answer is in that range of $15 billion.

Everything we did on the orbital space plane, 75 percent of that effort is certainly transferable to the same kinds of activities we

would pursue with crew exploration vehicle under Project Constellation. And that is in the range of about that. $6.5 billion of it

is what is in the budget before you between fiscal year 2005 and

2009.

Chairman BOEHLERT. Um-hum.

Mr. O’KEEFE. And as we move through those spiral development

phases, the definition of that particular estimate will become much

better understood. The first spiral development product that you

have to deploy that will be unmanned, certainly by the end of this

decade, is a capability that is well within the range of the amounts

that we have budgeted so far. And depending on what the outcome

of that is as to whether you commit future resources to it. But the

overall cost of that asset to go anywhere is in that range of cost.

By program, by mission objective, that is a different question. It

depends on how you employ it, where you go, when you do it, how

many times. Those are all factors that need to be resolved.

Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you very much. I do appreciate

that.

Mr. O’KEEFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman BOEHLERT. With that, the Chair recognizes the distinguished Chairman of the Committee on Space and Astronautics—

Aeronautics, Mr. Rohrabacher.

HEAVY LIFT

Mr. ROHRABACHER. As long as you don’t say the extinguished

Chairman, that is all right.

I am just trying to—and I think that the question Bart is asking,

Mr. Gordon is asking, is a very relevant question, and I think that

we do need specifics. And I believe—Mr. Gordon, I am complimenting you on your questions, Bart. Let me just note that I believe the question—line of questioning that you had is very justified, and we do need specifics.

But let me—if I could go through some of the general areas, and

maybe you could come back to us with as much specifics as you

can. In order to handle this first phase that we are talking about

in terms of the President’s vision, our first step toward the Moon,

we have a CEV, which is a crew exploration vehicle, that we will

have to develop. Will we be developing a heavy-lift capability, a

new rocket that would have heavy-lift? Is that necessary as well?

Mr. O’KEEFE. No, sir, I don’t think so, but it could evolve that

way, but that would involve a back to the future approach, if you

will, of saying, ‘‘Let us do this just like we did Apollo. Let us put

everything on one asset.’’

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay.

Mr. O’KEEFE. ‘‘And just brute force it right off of this rock.’’

Okay. That is the approach we used with Apollo. The approach we

have defined here is a spiral development approach in which you

develop each component and launch them separately, so as a consequence, the available assets that are in inventory today at the

55

initial phases of deployment, the expendable launch vehicles, Atlas

and Titan, as well as the potential combination of a Shuttle

stack——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Um-hum.

Mr. O’KEEFE [continuing]. There are a number of different alternatives that you could pursue, when given the chance.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. When do we know—when do you think we

will know if a new heavy-lift rocket is necessary to actually fulfill

the requirements?

Mr. O’KEEFE. I think certain definition of that would be reasonable within this next six months to a year.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay.

Mr. O’KEEFE. Because if it calls for something larger, in terms

of mass——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right.

Mr. O’KEEFE [continuing]. Then you have got to go beyond the

scope of Atlas and Titan or Shuttle stack or something else.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. But there may be ways of doing this, having

a certain amount of support equipment being on another rocket

that——

Mr. O’KEEFE. Exactly.

Mr. ROHRABACHER [continuing]. Doesn’t need to go up with the

other——

Mr. O’KEEFE. Exactly.

Mr. ROHRABACHER [continuing]. With the crew.

Mr. O’KEEFE. And at each component, you could potentially do

a launch and assembly thereafter, as opposed to a one-size-fits-all,

let us get the static displays of the Saturn Vs out and stand them

straight up and try to use them again. I mean, that is just not—

that is not part of the cards here.

ROBOTIC EXPLORATION

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. The—and also another element of this

is, of course, an expenditure that we are going to need to know the

specifics on is how much it is going to cost for the robotics. Seeing

that we don’t—the President just outlined the vision. We don’t

know exactly what robotics capabilities will be necessary right now,

but how long will it take before we know exactly what those

capabilities——

Mr. O’KEEFE. Sure.

Mr. ROHRABACHER [continuing]. Will require and how much that

will cost?

Mr. O’KEEFE. Yes, sir. With precision, I can give you the numbers, and we will submit it for the record here, on the future Mars

exploration missions we have that are all robotic.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right.

Mr. O’KEEFE. And they are in—they are scheduled for 2007 and

2009. And there are some very specific missions that go with that

that we can give you a price tag of what that out term—out year

projection is. The lunar missions are, as Mr. Gordon was inquiring

a little earlier, will require the development here over the next six

months. But again, I am looking at something in the range of $500

to $600 million worth of initial lunar robotic exploration capacity

that will be——

56

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right. But what we——

Mr. O’KEEFE [continuing]. Laid out on the table as well.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. But we actually have not determined—I

mean the President, you know, has just set down this goal. We

have not determined exactly to what extent the robotics’ cost development will be, because we don’t know how much robotics capability we will need, at this point, in terms of the Moon——

Mr. O’KEEFE. Yes, sir.

Mr. ROHRABACHER [continuing]. Part of the goal.

Mr. O’KEEFE. That is correct.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Because we may need robotic—robots that,

for example, might do extensive work with soil analysis or——

Mr. O’KEEFE. Yes, sir.

Mr. ROHRABACHER [continuing]. Other type of exploration, and

we may not, but that will be determined within the next six

months.

Mr. O’KEEFE. Yes, sir. And as a reserve in the five year projection of the kind of resources that could—would be available for,

specifically, those robotic objectives.

CEV COSTS

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. So this—the crew exploration vehicle— let me note that I think that $15 billion for the development of a

crew exploration vehicle is a pretty big ticket item, and that sounds

a little out of line to me, and I am really going to look at that as

it goes—moves forward.

Also, I would suggest—there are rumors running around that

people might be thinking that they are going to design this crew

exploration vehicle that is going to be used both on the Moon as

well as on the Mars part of this Presidential challenge. Just an admonition from this Congressman, just as you—it is hard to plan

budgets 20 years out, I think that the idea of trying to have a vehicle that we are planning right now that is going to be accomplishing both of those goals even though those goals will be about

10 years differential and when you achieve those goals is not really

a rational way to plan that stepped approach that you are talking

about.

Mr. O’KEEFE. Indeed. And that is the precise reason why answering the question of exactly how much it—will it cost to do the following thing is, right now, an imponderable point, because, depending on how you array the components necessary and develop them

in each of the stages of the spiral development for the crew exploration vehicle, gives you a different configuration.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes, sir.

Mr. O’KEEFE. And again, the answer on Project Constellation

right now is finite of $6.5 billion in the budget right there by line

item, 2005 through 2009, and then the additional costs thereafter

to develop all of the following spirals for a human rating capacity

is what would occur in the next phase——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, we do expect—and as I say, Mr. Gordon

is absolutely right in asking for specifics, but at—but I think that

the question is more appropriate to say that we expect specifics as

we move forward.

Mr. O’KEEFE. Yes, sir.

57

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And we don’t expect to have just, you know,

a general plan in the future.

Mr. O’KEEFE. Exactly. No, at each stage, you get a real—you

know, greater definition.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right. Now let me note this. The Space

Launch Initiative, which is something that I put a lot of time and

effort in getting into the budget and finally I got it accepted the

idea that we were going to actually have some part of the budget

committed to developing new launch systems. That is the—seems

to be the line item in the budget that has been most cannibalized

by this effort. I am not upset about that. I would expect that. Let

me just say that even though this has been my baby, I would expect that that—those funds would be used in a priority fashion to

help fulfill the President’s goal. So—and I would hope that all of

the rest of us, as we move forward, we all have things that we pay

special attention to in the budget and things we have pride in that

we are—don’t let our ego get in the way of letting that—those

funds be used to help us prioritize and achieve the goals the President has outlined.

Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you very much, Mr. Rohrabacher.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes, sir.

Mr. O’KEEFE. And if I could, Congressman, very quickly, there

is—the Space Launch Initiative did its job. You did exactly what

I think it was intended to do, which is it served up the options and

we made the selection of the options. It worked exactly right, and

it is—it gave—it provided us the capacity to be where we are right

now. So I thank you, sir.

Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you very much.

And I think it is very evident from what has been said to date

that all of us are looking at this, not in isolation, not as just one

piece to the overall puzzle, we want to see the big picture and how

this impacts on every other piece so that we can make rational

judgments and develop responsible policy.

Speaking about responsible policy, Mr. Lampson?

Mr. LAMPSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

THE END OF ISS

And speaking of what you were saying, I think you led right in

to what I wanted to ask. I have a couple of questions. I always—

there are many things that we want clarification on. Let me try to

focus on two of them in my very short five minutes here.

Mr. O’Keefe, NASA’s budget charts indicate that there won’t be

U.S. funding for the International Space Station beyond 2016. We

need to know what you intend to do with the U.S. portion of the

Space Station beyond that time. When you responded to Mr. Gordon’s written question on that topic, you said then, ‘‘NASA will continue the operation and maintenance of the ISS consistent with the

U.S. space exploration goals.’’ However, that statement is contradicted by the budget plan that accompanies the President’s initiative. So which is it? Is NASA going to continue to fund the U.S.

participation in the Space Station after 2016? If so, about how

much will it cost and for how long? And if not, what did you mean

by Mr. Gordon’s question and your response to Mr. Gordon’s question?

58

And let me say one other thing before you answer that. Your response to Mr. Gordon also stated: ‘‘Any final decision about the

U.S. Government’s role in the ISS, once this research is complete,

will not need to be made until the middle of the next decade.’’ Are

you seriously saying that the U.S. can wait until the middle of the

next decade to let its international partners in the Space Station

program know what the U.S. intends to do? That sounds pretty unbelievable to me, and I want to know if that is really what you are

saying.

Mr. O’KEEFE. Yes, sir. I appreciate that, and thank you for the

question.

First of all, the objective of the next dozen years between now,

2004, and 2016 is the targeted span that we are looking at to really

refocus all of the research effort that the U.S. modules will be conducting, focused on human physiology and long-duration space

flight consequence. So all of the other priorities that were outlined

in the remap effort, you may recall a year and a half ago that we

went through, of looking at what science prioritization, the answer

now is there is one priority. We are focusing on life sciences. We

are focusing on what the challenge is of understanding the research necessary to inform long-duration space flight.

Mr. LAMPSON. Is there an expectation, then——

Mr. O’KEEFE. Yes, sir.

Mr. LAMPSON [continuing]. That we can end that by 2016?

Mr. O’KEEFE. Yes, sir. That is the expectation is that that research will take us through the middle of the next decade of 10 to

12 years to achieve that. If it doesn’t, we will have to continue that

activity beyond that point.

Mr. LAMPSON. Okay. At what point do we have to notify our

international partners of what we are going to do, because it impacts them as well?

Mr. O’KEEFE. Yes, sir, absolutely. And we discuss with our international partners on a regular basis. They are in—they are meeting and convening today. We will continue to do so on a regular

basis, and we will constantly update them as we move through

this. They do not feel as though there is an abandonment that is

occurring here. Their view is that as we step through this, we have

got to determine what the components and modules look like, what

the laboratory segments look like, when they deploy, and how long

we want to all deploy them—or operate them.

Mr. LAMPSON. In 2016, if this ends, is there a plan, then, to bring

it back?

Mr. O’KEEFE. No, sir. Again, there is no presumption here that

upon the completion of our research endeavor to examine the

human physiology effects on long-duration space flight that we

turn out the lights on Station. Our partners intend to continue

operating——

Mr. LAMPSON. But we may give it——

Mr. O’KEEFE [continuing]. And we may, too.

Mr. LAMPSON. So our part——

Mr. O’KEEFE. And we may, too. So as a consequence, it is designed, through the next decade, to continue on. And there is no

presumption here of turning off the lights on Station by the middle

of the next decade.

59

Mr. LAMPSON. Okay. Are—okay. Well, let me go to my next one,

because I am running out of time.

Mr. O’KEEFE. No, sir, the budget only goes through 2009. The

budget only goes through 2009, so the longer-term projection is we

are trying to give you visibility over what the research plan is. We

are trying to lay out goals to the research community to say within

the next 10 to 12 years, we have to conquer these particular challenges of long-duration space flight.

Mr. LAMPSON. Doesn’t that end, on your chart, at 2017?

Mr. O’KEEFE. Yes, sir. That is the specific cost on—in the activities related to long-duration space flight, human physiology, life

sciences research. How that may be adapted beyond that point to

build a capacity on what Station could—can still afford is something that we have got an opportunity to examine.

Mr. LAMPSON. We have—we may have some more questions on

that.

Mr. O’KEEFE. Yes, sir.

INA

Mr. LAMPSON. But right now, let me switch quickly to the issue

of the Russian Soyuz. It is clear that we will have some dependence

on the Russians for Soyuz crew transfers to and from the Space

Station after 2010 when the Shuttle fleet is abandoned. It is also

clear that we will need to acquire Soyuz vehicles for the Space Station starting in 2006, which is less than two years from now. We

know that it takes about 18 months or so, 16 or 18 months to build

a Soyuz. I wanted to make a comment about outsourcing our jobs

and talent to Russia, but I won’t. And in fact, in 2005, NASA’s

budget plan now includes a multi-year funding stream for ISS

cargo and crew services that NASA concedes may include payments

for Soyuz services. Yet, as we have discussed in the past, the Iran

Nonproliferation Act prohibits such payments to Russia in the absence of a presidential certification on nonproliferation, and that

has not been forthcoming.

And the State Department has made it clear in writing, in written testimony to this committee, that payments to U.S. companies

purchasing Soyuz vehicles or services from Russian companies

‘‘would raise questions under Section 6 of the Iran Nonproliferation

Act and would likely be viewed as an evasion of the law.’’ Similarly,

the State Department has made it clear to the Committee that having our other international partners purchase Soyuz vehicles or

services from the Russians in exchange for compensation from the

United States would also ‘‘raise legal questions under Section 6 and

would likely be viewed by many as an evasion of the law.’’

So here we are. Your Administration is saying that you can’t acquire Soyuz from the Russians without violating the INA, and yet

your approach to the Space Station is critically dependent on a continuing supply of Soyuz vehicles. Do you plan to seek a legislative

repeal or modification of the INA to permit you to acquire Soyuz?

If so, when will you notify Congress of that intent? And if not, what

specifically is your plan?

Chairman BOEHLERT. And that is a very important question. The

gentleman’s time has expired, but we are allowing additional time,

because this is a—he has hit to the heart of a very important issue.

60

Mr. O’Keefe.

Mr. O’KEEFE. Yes, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

We are not seeking exemption to the law at this time. We are

a—negotiating with all of our international partners on what our

continuing challenges to operate Station will entail. Right now, the

only means to achieve access to Station is by the Soyuz craft. There

is clearly an intent on the part of all of our partners to expand the

crew size aboard the International Space Station once Shuttle returns to flight and we continue to build out the capacity of International Space Station. So all of that will require a modification to

our current agreements, which expire in 2006, among all of us as

partners, all 16 nations. And we are enjoining in that question

now, beginning today. All of the partners are in town, and there

will be continuing activities through the end of March, early April

with the heads of agencies to discuss exactly these points.

Our intent at this moment, at this time, is not to seek a—either

an amendment to or repeal of the Iran Nonproliferation Act.

Mr. LAMPSON. Okay. And there is really not a plan yet. Thank

you for your indulgence, but——

Chairman BOEHLERT. Yeah, you just said that. Your intent now

is not to seek.

Mr. O’KEEFE. At this moment, on this date, no. We are beginning

negotiations starting today with all of our partners on what the

way ahead is for both cargo as well as crew transfer and building

in the proposition of when we return to flight and how we continue

to build the Station out and what all of those implications more—

may portend. So we are beginning, among the 16 nations, to have

that discussion, starting today.

Chairman BOEHLERT. I am sure, Administrator O’Keefe, you recognize as much as we do, the importance of this very issue?

Mr. O’KEEFE. Yes, sir.

Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you very much.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman? Mr. Chairman?

Chairman BOEHLERT. Who seeks recognition? Mr. Rohrabacher.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Just to point a personal privilege for one moment.

Chairman BOEHLERT. Yes, sir.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Being in—being one of the co-authors of the

Iran Nonproliferation Act and——

Chairman BOEHLERT. Mr. Rohrabacher, you are recognized

for——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. For 10—for 15 seconds just to note that there

are exceptions in that act, especially when the lives of American

astronauts are at stake that could be, you know, analyzed in a way

that are determined——

Chairman BOEHLERT. Interpreted.

Mr. ROHRABACHER [continuing]. Interpreted in a way that would

not create the barriers that we are talking about. So it is possible

that it is not the barrier that we think it is, but it has to be looked

at very closely.

Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you very much for that intervention.

Mr. Smith.

61

INTERNATIONAL PARTICIPATION IN THE ISS

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Is it worth it—at this time of record-high deficit spending, is it

worth it to borrow this money from our kids and our grandkids for

this kind of venture at this time? As Chairman, the—as Chairman

of the Research Subcommittee, and with the understanding that

the main purpose of the Space Station is scientific research and as

a place for the shuttles to travel to, I have often questioned witnesses on the justification for manned space flight as well as the

Space Station. Some witnesses have expressed concern that the

costs are too high and the benefits too few compared to the results

that we could get by investing this money in other research that

can better help us in our future, with research efforts as well as

our economy. With $500 billion-plus deficits, limited dollars for research are there, and as we make this balance between our efforts,

especially in manned space, versus unmanned space flight and the

achievements that you demonstrated with the pictures with unmanned space flight. Part of the decision of this committee, and of

the Appropriations Committee, has got to be the priorities on

where we can best spend this money. It is going to—it seems to me

that the question I have is with the growing reluctance of other

countries to contribute. Is there a possibility that we should or we

could put the Space Station expenditures on hold for the time

being? Mr. O’Keefe, earlier you have stated before this committee

that you thought it was possible to maintain the Space Station

with unmanned flight. And I am just very concerned with borrowing with the tremendous pressure on the budget. And I would

just suggest that we are going to reduce the budget below what the

President has suggested overall. And so setting those priorities is

even more important. And I am afraid that I am tempted with the

comments that we have had from other countries of their reluctance to contribute more and more to the Space Station. With the

cap that we set a few years ago of $25 billion, number one, should

we consider delaying this project for the time being? And number

two, are other countries more and more reluctant to contribute

more and more dollars to their cooperative effort in the Space Station?

Mr. O’KEEFE. Well, thank you, Congressman, for that very important question.

If anything, what we have seen demonstrated in this past year

is exactly the contrary. Our partners have stepped up in a way that

is absolutely unbelievable. We have paid not one dime more for the

continuing activities of access to the International Space Station

during this time, which we have grounded the Shuttle, over this

past year. So all of the activities, all of the logistics support, everything, has been contributed to by our partners and in participating

in that, it has not cost us one dime more as a consequence of it.

So as a result, if anything, the depth and strength of this partnership has been demonstrated——

Mr. SMITH. Yeah, but you say not one dime more, but what—over

the next five years, what we are looking at is about a $12.6 billion

increase because of this new suggested venture.

62

Mr. O’KEEFE. Yes, sir. You have asked two different questions,

so I will try to focus on the first part, which was your questions

about International Space Station, and then we will get to the exploration discussion, if you would like.

But the first part is what we have done during the course of this

time, and your assertion that reluctance of partners to contribute.

No, to the contrary. They have been contributing more in this span

of the last year than what, frankly, I would have ever anticipated

and what we may have otherwise thought was possible. And the

continuing operations of Station are occurring today as a consequence of the partnership and the strength thereof.

The second point would be that our whole focus now on the research on International Space Station, once we return to flight and

we have continued building the—and complete the assembly of Station, is to focus on life sciences research, human physiology. One

of the biggest problems we have to conquer is the degradation of

muscle mass and bone mass. If from that we can also understand

how to arrest the consequences of osteoporosis——

Mr. SMITH. Or radiation, but this is within——

Mr. O’KEEFE [continuing]. Or radiation——

Mr. SMITH. This is within the Van Allen Belts, so I have been

told that the simulation can be done just as adequately on the

ground in terms of the radiation consequences.

Do we want to send a man in space? Do we want to occupy Mars

or the Moon at this time when the economic pressures are so great

on this country? And is it something that we can put off, or is it

something that we should consider abandoning altogether?

Chairman BOEHLERT. The gentleman’s time has expired, but——

Mr. SMITH. I mean, we are cutting down on the budget——

Chairman BOEHLERT [continuing]. Dr. Marburger——

Mr. SMITH [continuing]. For NSF.

THE EXPLORATION VISION AND CURRENT BUDGET

CONSTRAINTS

Chairman BOEHLERT [continuing]. I think, as the Science Advisor

to the President, is in a good position to get a broader view on that

question.

Dr. MARBURGER. We must not abandon the vision of space exploration. I believe that the vision of space exploration is an inspiring

vision. There is a reason for humans to be in space. We must overcome the technical difficulties and obstacles in the way, and as we

make the investments to do so, we will also energize our economy.

There is no question that the technologies that are necessary to

embark on this venture, on this new vision for space exploration,

will have a very positive effect on the—on our economic competitiveness and on the basic technologies that form the infrastructure

of our society.

Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you very much, Dr. Marburger.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman BOEHLERT. Ms. Lofgren.

63

ARC ACCOUNTING AND FIELD CENTER CLOSURES AND ‘‘THE

MILITARIZATION OF SPACE’’

Ms. LOFGREN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, witnesses, for being here today.

I have a bunch of questions, and we don’t have a lot of time, so

I may follow up in writing with some of the questions that I have.

But one of the things that I am puzzling over is your new accounting system and how to figure out, really, what is happening on the

ground in the proposed budget. And taking a look at Ames Research Center, which I know that you value and you have visited

on many occasions for the nanotechnology work that they are doing

in robotics and the like, I see a $90 million reduction in the proposed budget, and it is in something call service pools. Now I think

$55 million of that is the wind tunnel that is going away, but I am

not clear how the other $35 million—is that a programmatic cut or

exactly what is that? That is question number one.

I have another question, which relates to the analysis that is apparently going on by a guy that you have brought on from the

Navy who used to do the base closings, and I understand that this

Mr. Casey is going to do real property mission analysis for NASA.

And I have a concern about that, because certainly we have land

that are assets to the agency, but the land is really not the sum

total of the asset. I mean, it is the human power. I mean, it is so

much more than just taking a look at real estate and how the

science will be integrated in the analysis. I am interested in hearing from you and obviously all of the Science Committee Members

will want to be involved in this process, and I am wondering if it

is your intention to close one or more centers, and if so, you know,

what the time frame is and the parameters are and the like.

And finally, I have an interest and a concern over the future of

space as a demilitarized zone. I—you know, in past years, in past

Administrations, we have talked about space exploration, but I see

the word security popping up in the discussion of space at this

point in a way that is relatively new. And I am interested in

whether the Administration has a design or an interest in arming

space in a way that humankind has not done in the past.

So those are my three questions for now, and I will follow up

with you in writing on the others, if I may, Administrator O’Keefe.

Mr. O’KEEFE. Yes, indeed, there is a transfer that has occurred

between 2003 and 2004 and now continued in 2005 of now capturing all of the costs associated with an activity in what is called

a full-cost——

Ms. LOFGREN. Right.

Mr. O’KEEFE [continuing]. Accounting method. So now when you

look at a program, you see the total cost of what it takes to carry

that out as opposed to fractions of it or incremental pieces that are

buried in lots of other locations. You can now make an informed

decision each year on what you think the value of the program is

and what—one of the advantages of the discussion we had earlier

here is we will be able to add, with precision, each year exactly

what the cost of that next increment of achieving these next exploration goals we will encounter.

64

Let me give you a table, for the record, if you would, of the comparison year-to-year as it pertains to the Ames Research Center

budget, but there is a specific effort that needs to go on in the next

few months, it will probably be completed by summer, to really

transfer all of the data to be comparable apples to oranges so you

can see what the differences are. Because in the one case, you had

to assemble it all based on all of the disparate pieces. Now you get

the assemblage all in one place. And we will provide that for the

record (see chart below), so I couldn’t speak to the specific——

Ms. LOFGREN. All right.

Mr. O’KEEFE [continuing]. Differences between that dollar versus

the other dollar at this moment.

Ms. LOFGREN. So the reduction from $172 million to $74 million

is just little bits and pieces? It is not a particular program that is

being——

Mr. O’KEEFE. Indeed.

Ms. LOFGREN [continuing]. Proposed?

Mr. O’KEEFE. Indeed. And again, I will give you more specificity

on that.

Ms. LOFGREN. I would very much value that.

Mr. O’KEEFE. Yes, ma’am.

On the second point, the gentleman we have recruited in is a fellow named Cassidy——

Ms. LOFGREN. Right.

Mr. O’KEEFE [continuing]. And he has been—was—in the last

Administration, was at the Defense Department during the base

realignment effort——

Ms. LOFGREN. Right.

Mr. O’KEEFE [continuing]. In 1993 and 1995. He has been

brought in a month ago, following a comprehensive effort that we

conducted last year to look at real property assessments, what do

we have out there, just in terms of inventorying what we have. The

approach that we asked for and have developed now, developing a

strategy is how do we use those facilities in the most cost-effective

way? There is no specific intention to look at a realignment or closure activity. It is more just to inventory what we have. His expertise was primarily in the realignment phase, working with indiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 16:41 Oct 01, 2004 Jkt 091691 PO 00000 Frm 00068 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\WORKD\FULL04\021204\91691 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
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vidual communities to assure transition from one mission to another. And so given that expertise and his capacity in that regard,

we have asked that rather than reinventing the wheel ourselves,

we bring him in for his understanding of how that activity occurs

as we move ahead from this point.

There will be several different steps in this: a strategy, a business plan, and ultimately a mission analysis effort that we will

work with you to define exactly what each of those steps are as we

proceed ahead.

And finally, on the national security objectives, there is no implied or specifically stated objective to expand this to a national security mission. That is not an intention here. It is a broader definition of security of the Nation, economic and otherwise. That is

what we intend to proceed with this exploration agenda.

Ms. LOFGREN. If I may, just a quick follow up on getting back

to the real estate analysis as well. One of the issues, as you know,

Ames is co-located at a spot that used to be the Moffett Naval Air

Station, and there are huge toxic issues that, unfortunately, the

Navy never dealt with, and I—that has unfortunately been the case

all across the country. So the local communities have—it is not in

my District, but the local communities have pushed for a long time

for clean up of the—that base, and I am hopeful that if we are

doing an analysis, we can make sure that—I mean the massive

clean up costs are, once again, raised to the attention of the Navy.

Maybe we can get them to do something about that.

And thank you very much for——

Mr. O’KEEFE. Yes, ma’am. Now this is an interesting irony. Having served as Secretary of the Navy at the time the Moffett Air

Field was part of the Naval establishment——

Ms. LOFGREN. Right.

Mr. O’KEEFE [continuing]. And then coming back to NASA and

finding we now have it, it seems to be a deed that I carry with me

wherever I go, but it is one that we are evaluating and trying to

assess exactly what the environmental impact would be.

Ms. LOFGREN. Finally, I would like to, not at this point, because

other Members have questions and time is running short, but I do

have some concerns about how full-cost accounting is working. I

certainly don’t have an objection to understanding overhead and

how it works and the like, but I do have a concern when you have,

I think, Ames and I think this is—would be also true at Langley

where you have a multiplicity of science projects that are not huge

projects and yet essential to the mission in robotics or whatever allocating the overhead, there is no consistent, one project, to do it,

and so we may have the unintended consequence of really starving

science projects that are going to end up to be essential for the

broader mission later. And I know that you don’t want that and I

don’t want that, but I am interested in how we might avoid that

consequence.

Mr. O’KEEFE. You know, that is a very, very important question,

and again, it is really—you want to make sure that the process you

develop in this particular case doesn’t serve, you know, an

unintended——

Ms. LOFGREN. Right.

66

Mr. O’KEEFE [continuing]. Consequence like that. I mean, what

we have tried to put together here is in full concert in compliance

with the Government Performance Results Act. How do you develop a full-cost visibility in what is involved, we have introduced

that, and that is the primary focus and objective we are after here,

and a budget and program integration effort so you can see, with

total visibility, what that will entail.

Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you very much, Mr. O’Keefe.

Mr. O’KEEFE. I am sorry.

Chairman BOEHLERT. You are putting—you are bringing several

of your hats back in now: former Secretary of the Navy, the OMB.

We are getting you on all sides.

The Chair now recognizes Dr. Bartlett.

THE VISION’S FOCUS ON SCIENCE

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much.

Mr. O’Keefe, I was pleased that you mentioned an emphasis on

human physiology. In a former life, I was a human physiologist. I

was involved with the very earliest space exploration. I was at the

School of Aviation Medicine at Pensacola, Florida in the first suborbital primary flight, the monkey you may remember that the

Army lost their monkey, Abel, when they were taking the implanted electrodes out and they gave him a general anesthetic. I

then went on to Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory where I was involved—you mentioned Ames. I was involved

with a—we built a satellite to launch an experiment for Dr.

Tourgal Tiarotti where he had developed the technique for putting

an electrode in a single fiber of the otolith, which is the only organ

in the body that specifically directly responds to gravity, so I have

had a long familiarity with the space program and appreciate the

importance you place on human physiology.

You know, I think that perhaps the best justification for going

back to the Moon and on to Mars has yet to be articulated. Let me

explain. This is a challenge that we face that has been building for

more than three decades. Three decades ago, I was at IBM—by the

way, one of the major reasons for this challenge is the tyranny of

the urgent. The urgent always takes precedence over the important, and so here we are because we always—we let that tyranny

exist. Three decades ago, I was at IBM, and we were concerned

that we, at IBM, and we, the United States, were going to lose our

superiority in computers to Japan. That just about happened for

one simple reason: every year, Japan was turning out more and at

least as good, maybe better in some respects, scientists, mathematicians, and engineers, than we were, and we knew, at IBM,

that if that continued, we were not, at IBM, going to remain—be

able to remain the world’s premier company in computers.

As a country, we now face that challenge. It has been going on

and increasing for three decades now. For the short-term, it is a

threat to our economic superiority. All you have to do is go to one

of our major—any of our major universities and look who the students are in the technical areas. Fewer and fewer of them are from

this country. I have a son, who—our tenth child, who just got his

Ph.D. two years ago from Carnegie Mellon. He was so fervently

courted by our national labs that he felt compelled to go there. And

67

the reason he was courted was that very few of those graduates

were American citizens and you can’t get a security clearance to a

foreign national, so he now is at—out in Sandia labs in New Mexico.

For the short-term, this is a threat to our economic superiority.

We will not continue to be the world’s superior—supreme economic

power unless we turn out more scientists, mathematicians, and engineers. And for the longer-term, it is a threat to our national security. We will not continue to be the world’s premier military power

unless we turn out adequate numbers of well-trained scientists,

mathematicians, and engineers. Our country desperately needs

something that captures the imagination of our people and inspires

our young people to go into careers in science, math, and engineering. Right now, the best and brightest of our young people are increasingly going into destructive pursuits. We have more and more

lawyers and more and more political scientists. Mr. Chairman, we

need a few of each of those, but we have gone beyond that few of

each that we need, and we now really need something that entices

our young people to go into careers of science, math, and engineering.

Hopefully this program, rightly conducted, will do that. You

know, this really has to do with our national survival, and we are

making an investment here, sir, that is going to pay big, big dividends. This is not a cost. This is an investment. I don’t think we

can afford not to do it. And I hope that when you do it, you do it

in such a fashion that you do capture the imagination of our people

and inspire our young people.

Because I am a physiologist, a scientist, and because this is the

Science Committee, let me ask a question. It is not clear to me the

extent that this initiative will be driven by science. In some of the

documents, it talks increasingly about exploration. I would hope

that in capturing the imagination of our people and inspiring our

young people that you really do focus on science, because our people have a lot of curiosity, and this brings, you know—this really—

science brings us there very well, I think.

You put the plan together. Are you going to continue to focus on

science? Is that going to be a high priority that drives what you

do?

Mr. O’KEEFE. Absolutely, Congressman. Thank you very much

for the question.

It is an exploration agenda informed by the science objectives.

There is a science objective behind each of the exploration activities

that we would be pursuing. As we see playing out right now on

Mars, on both of the Mars rovers, the objectives are very clearly—

this is a good characteristic example of the precursor missions we

are envisioning is they have very specific science agendas and objectives that are to be informed, and it is an exploration opportunity in addition to that.

To your earlier part, the—and just anecdotally as—in terms of

what the interest level is among folks who are accessing what we

are into and what we are doing, the website statistics I offered earlier, what—based on everybody that has filled out the surveys here,

roughly 20 percent of everyone who is coming to the NASA website,

of the six billion hits, 20 percent of them are K through 12 stuVerDate 11-MAY-2000 16:41 Oct 01, 2004 Jkt 091691 PO 00000 Frm 00071 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\WORKD\FULL04\021204\91691 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
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dents. 15 percent are college and graduate students. I mean, the

level of interest in the kind of activities we are involved with here

is inspiring that next generation of explorers. We want to continue

that. And it is unabated. This is not a spike that has occurred in

interest and is dropping off. It is continuing.

Dr. MARBURGER. I would just like to add that exploration is part

of science. And as clever and fascinating as the Mars rovers are,

their capabilities are very, very limited. Now we can imagine much

more sophisticated and extensive robotic networks, but eventually,

the complexity, and especially the need to do things at a distance

where there are tremendous communication lags because of the

distance of the destinations from Earth, they ultimately need

human oversight. And the more sophisticated and complex the exploration and science missions become, the greater need there will

be for human presence, not just to go out and plant flags, but actually to do something that is important in reaping the assets and

the resources of space.

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you very much.

Mr. Udall.

HUBBLE

Mr. UDALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I, too, want to welcome

the panel and thank you for your testimony.

I am going to take my time to focus on the Hubble. And I feel

moved to make a series of statements. I hope I will give you a

chance to reply, but hang tight here.

I share the concern of a lot of people across the country about

the decision that was made in regards to the Hubble, and I wanted

to share a couple of perspectives that have been presented to me,

if I might.

Dr. Marburger, you mentioned adaptive optics in your earlier

statement, and I found that interesting and important, but I have

since found out from some folks at the Association of Universities

of Research and Astronomy that adaptive optics will be important,

but they won’t be competitive with Hubble until 2015, and that is

because adaptive optics require guide stars to fix the telescope. And

with that sort of an approach, adaptive optics will allow us to see

one percent of the whole sky. The Hubble gives us 100 percent

across the spectrum of wavelengths. Adaptive optics only work in

the infrared wavelength, and Hubble works both in the visible and

infrared.

There are two instruments that have been built in my District.

I should offer that disclaimer that this is important to the 2nd Congressional District, the costs and the wide field three. And if we

were to deliver those instruments on Service Mission 4, we would

further enhance Hubble’s advantages over land-based capabilities.

The COS adds ultraviolet wavelength capability and the wide field

three improves infrared and visible wavelength capability. So I

want to just put that into the record.

If I might, let me move on and talk a little bit about the arguments that I think have been made to cancel the Hubble. The one

has been cost, and I think if you really step back and look at the

cost, I don’t think that that argument really can be justified. An

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extra mission is about $100 million. If we were to cancel the entire

Shuttle program, and I think that is a legitimate reason on a cost

basis, but to do a fifth mission, say, in a year to service the Hubble,

from what I understand, it is in the order of $100 million, and it

is a small cost relative to the cost it takes to maintain the army

of engineers and technicians.

The second argument is the safety argument. And I share your

concerns about safety, but I think you can make the argument—

I don’t really think, I believe you can make the argument, if it is

safe enough to fly to the ISS, then it is safe enough to fly to

Hubble. So we have asked, as Congress, manufacturers to make

$167 million worth of instruments that I mentioned, the wide field

and the COS, only to be told that we are not going to fly those instruments to the Hubble because of safety concerns. But if that is

the behavior we are going to accept, if we are going to work off that

approach, then what guarantee do we have that if we spend billions to prepare a manned Moon or Mars mission that in the future

we are not going to get cold feet and cancel that mission?

So in sum, it is difficult for me to understand, if we are too riskadverse to send up a servicing mission to Hubble, where does that

leave us if we are—when we are talking about going to a piloted

mission to Mars or the Moon? When I look at the CAIB’s recommendations, and I am going to quote their recommendation with

regard to safety in on-orbit repair and inspection capability for the

Shuttle. I want to quote: ‘‘The ultimate objective should be a fully

autonomous capability for all missions to address the possibility

that an International Space Station mission fails to achieve the

correct orbit, fails to dock successfully, or is damaged during or

after undocking.’’

Now this is an unambiguous recommendation that applies to all

flights, whether it is the Space Shuttle or for some other mission—

I mean to the Space Station, excuse me. The initiative of the President calls for retiring the Shuttle in 2010, which means there

would be another 25 to 30 flights. When does NASA intend to comply with the recommendation that I just read? In the first three

flights? The first five? The first ten? Because at that point, if you

are flying—if you are complying in the first 10 flights, even the

first 15 flights, that still provides a window to do that servicing

mission to Hubble and keep it up and running for another seven

to ten years before the Webb is fully operational? I guess I have

left you a little bit of time to answer my question.

Dr. MARBURGER. Good. Let me respond briefly to the science

issue. No one is disputing that the Hubble is a very valuable instrument. It is an extremely useful and productive instrument, and

the—I am not suggesting that adaptive optics is a killer argument

here. But it is also true that the Hubble’s uniqueness is diminishing and that it has, essentially, approached the end of its design

life. Yes, we could continue to keep it alive by servicing it in this

way, but there are alternative ways of getting the same or similar

scientific data so that the risk-benefit equation has been altered as

a result of technical progress. It is—that is a point that hasn’t been

made very strongly in this discussion. And I just thought it was important to make it. I am not suggesting that the decision is easy

or that there aren’t still some unique qualities that the Hubble has.

70

But I think the deliberations of the National Research Council

group on the decadal surveyor are quite interesting in its context,

which is why I quoted them.

As far as risk is concerned, risk is also, to some extent, a technical issue. And I believe that the CAIB and Admiral Gehman are

among the experts on the issue of risk, and I do think that it was

a very wise decision by the Administrator to call upon them to assess this aspect of the Hubble equation.

SHUTTLE RTF

Mr. UDALL. If I might, I would ask the Administrator, yeah, his

thoughts on when we would have that capability to repair the

Shuttle, the autonomous capability. And then if I could, since the

Chairman has been indulging all of us, if you would give us a sense

of where are we with the review, Admiral Gehman’s role, and how

do you intend to respond to his recommendation or his comments?

Mr. O’KEEFE. Yes, sir——

Mr. UDALL. And Administrator O’Keefe, if I might just interrupt.

Dr. Marburger, I just was passed a note. Somebody reminded me

that the B–52 also had long past design life, but it is still useful,

so I think that is important to acknowledge that there are technologies that have long-time applications for us.

Mr. O’KEEFE. This was among the most painful decisions I have

ever had to confront. It is a remarkable piece of scientific achievement and its capacity to continue to operate is just amazing. That

said, my concern was not generated by a risk-aversion, Congressman; it was more generated by a capacity to honestly tell you that

we intend to embrace the recommendations of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board report, and that facing the prospect that

the point in which that mission, singularly the only mission that

would go to other—any other location than Station, would not be

able to achieve, I believe, at the time of that launch, compliance

with all of those recommendations in the manner in which we said

we would.

The issues you identified are among many that are involved in

this particular question. The autonomous repair capacity has to be

demonstrated on the first two flights. That is our objective. That

is our approach in what we want to do. I have no idea whether that

is going to be successful or not. So here we are making a decision

about its success before we have ever demonstrated it. That is

point one.

The second one is it requires the development of tools and capabilities we currently do not have in the inventory and would have

to develop in order to do this, and yes, that is right, we would have

to use it for Station as well as Hubble. But nonetheless, they have

not been developed at this time, and won’t be demonstrated until

those first two flights. And so as a consequence, we would be assuming success at a time we are planning on a servicing mission

when we could be diverting that attention toward how to maintain

and operate this capacity for a longer period of time than we are

currently expecting. There are a number of different ways we could

do that, short of a servicing mission. So those are the kinds of

things we are trying to examine as well.

71

The third factor that comes to play is the question of contingency

planning, of what do you do in the event of a challenge, a problem,

much like we saw on the Columbia mission. To the extent that

were to occur, the objective on Station is you have multiple means

to examine the Shuttle as it approaches the International Space

Station on a number of maneuvers we have designed. And then in

turn, as it docks, you have the capacity to examine it thoroughly.

There is no comparable means on Hubble. So as a result, the only

way that you can accommodate this is to literally stack two Shuttles, two orbiters on two pads, the second one being available in the

event of a contingency, and the only means by which you can

achieve a safe haven maneuver for the damaged Shuttle would be

to literally tether the entire crew across during a mid-orbit maneuver where you bring everybody outside and you put what would

amount to about 10 people on one Shuttle flight to bring them

home. We have never tried it, we have never performed it, it is

strictly on paper, and a full analysis of that was contained in the

Columbia Accident Investigation Board’s recommendations in the

appendix.

THE ROLE OF CEV

Mr. EHLERS. [Presiding.] The gentleman’s time has expired. I

thank you for the explanation.

I happen to be next on the list.

Unfortunately, I have approximately two hours worth of questions. I thought, perhaps, I could arrange a private briefing, but

now that I have the Chair, perhaps I can just do it all here. But

to—let me reassure my colleagues I will not do that.

Several observations, since time is limited, and then a few specific questions on the crew exploration vehicle.

I may sound like a naysayer, but I don’t intend to be. I am supportive of the President’s proposal. At the same time, I am very

skeptical about many of the details of it. I am concerned about the

assumptions that I see underlying that chart up there. Time

doesn’t allow me to go into the details, but with a history of cost

overruns on major projects at NASA, I think I have good reason to

be concerned. And that is not meant to be a derogatory statement.

I know, as a scientist, you don’t know what problems you are going

to encounter until you get into when you do something brand new.

But I am concerned about the impact on other science, both within

NASA and outside of NASA. The effects on continuing our efforts

on space science, I think we have to continue that unabated. Our

Earth science that NASA does is incredibly valuable to our nation

and to, in fact, our planet, and we must continue that.

I am concerned about the Mars mission, the purpose, the cost,

the scientific value. I believe it must be an international effort. We

simply can not afford that as a nation alone. I think, personally,

it would be a foolish waste of money for us to go to Mars, given

our present state of technology. We simply—we have to have better

energy sources. We have to have better propulsion systems to even

think about going to Mars.

Dr. Marburger, you mentioned the limited nature of the robots,

and that is very true, and we all recognize that. At the same time,

we can send approximately 1,000 robots to Mars for the cost of

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sending one human and bringing that human back. And so we have

to compare what we can do with 1,000 robotic flights compared to

one human flight.

The—I am concerned about the Space Station, its cost, its value,

the science that is going to be done. If that is simply going to be

to determine the long-duration effects of flight in space flight, that

is a mighty expensive way to do it, and that is something else I

would like to explore with you at some time.

Let me down get down to a specific question on the crew exploration vehicle. And I am, first of all, very concerned, Mr. O’Keefe,

with the idea that this is going to be the vehicle for the Space Station, for the Moon, and for Mars. And I need clarification in that.

What are you envisioning this vehicle to do? Is it—I mean, that

seems to me too much to expect from a single vehicle. Isn’t that

likely to lead to the same problems we have with the Space Shuttle, that we expected too much of it, and it ended up being very,

very expensive? I would hope that you would not even think about

developing a Mars vehicle until we are much further down the

pike.

The—well, let me have you answer that, first, before we get into

other questions on it.

Mr. O’KEEFE. Yes, thank you, sir.

The approach is not to devise or to develop a one-size-fits-all answer to this. No question. Instead, the spiral development approach

that we are trying to lay out is to test each component individually,

and then you size and derive variance, depending on mission requirements. You need a substantially less volume requirement to

get from here to the International Space Station. You certainly

need more volume in order to get to the Moon. You need even more

to get beyond that. So at each successive stage, you are looking at

a different assemblage of modules and components in order to

achieve that task, but at its core are a handful of fundamental aspects that you want to develop. And that is what the spiral development approach is designed to do.

The initial approach in these next few years is—certainly by the

end of the decade, is to demonstrate those spiral developments and

launch, unmanned, those capacities to see how each of those components then, in turn, can be lashed together. But it is not an intent to have a one-size-fits-all approach. We are not going that direction.

Mr. EHLERS. Are you envisioning this to be a reusable vehicle,

or are you leaving that as an open question?

Mr. O’KEEFE. Yeah, I don’t know yet. I—there is a spirited argument on this one way—on both sides. But I—there is certainly no

predisposition either way at this juncture.

Mr. EHLERS. These first specs that you are developing in four

months, is that related to the Mars mission at all or is that strictly

development of the crew of a CEV?

Mr. O’KEEFE. Yes, sir, strictly to the Project Constellation crew

exploration vehicle to develop the initial requirements to go beyond

low-Earth orbit, and that will be a very short list of things here

what we have to build into that as a requirement set.

73

Mr. EHLERS. And when you talk about assembling components in

space, are you talking about actual assemblage or simply docking

and proceeding on from there?

Mr. O’KEEFE. Yes and yes. You could be looking at both combinations, it depends. I mean, what we have learned from the International Space Station is we can do this. It is an astonishing engineering effort to pull together components in the manner that we

have. So it demonstrates that yes, this can be achieved, and it all

is within the realm of doing it with a launch capacity that does not

need to exceed what we presently have at—in the current inventory.

Mr. EHLERS. But it is also very expensive to assemble in space.

Mr. O’KEEFE. Yes and no. I mean, it is—once there, the cost to

actually do so is an awful lot easier than trying to assemble it in

space from scratch. If you have got components that are launched,

as we are doing on Station, you literally are doing it with a very

minimal set of requirements. The actual cost to get there, yes, is

expensive, but that is mostly ground costs.

Mr. EHLERS. Well, do you envision also using these vehicles to

carry fuel up there for additional missions to Mars or to the—even

to the Moon?

Mr. O’KEEFE. It really—it depends on what we find. On the

Moon, if there is a capacity, as I think Dr. Marburger has opined,

of developing a means for renewable energy sources, that may be

an option. Another approach from Project Prometheus, to the extent we are able to develop the propulsion and power generation

capacities that we are anticipating to demonstrate on the deeper

space exploration missions to Jupiter, there may be a capacity and

a means to use that kind of capability for power generation on surfaces. So there are a number of options that could be explored in

every one of these avenues, the answer of which will be found as

we succeed at each of those steps.

HUBBLE AND RISK

Mr. EHLERS. All right. Let me comment on the Hubble for just

a moment, too. I share the concerns expressed by Mr. Udall, and

I am really surprised at the safety concerns. We have Shuttles that

are flown 100 missions, and I assume you will take care of the

problem that brought down the Columbia. I am not sure I agree

with the need to visually inspect every Shuttle, or any space vehicle. You are going to have the same problem on the CEV. You can

not visually expect—inspect every vehicle that you send into space.

And this is a hazardous enterprise. The astronauts are test pilots.

They have risked their lives before to test vehicles. We can’t encumber a program with such absolute requirements for safety that

we literally price ourselves out of doing it. And I don’t expect you

to respond to that, unless you wish, but I think we have to use a

little common sense here and say we can’t make these as safe as

our family car.

Mr. O’KEEFE. Yeah.

Mr. EHLERS. In fact, they really exceed the safety of the family

car. And let us recognize, there is risk to space exploration.

Mr. O’KEEFE. Um-hum. Well, thank you, Congressman. I couldn’t

agree more. It is—we are doing our level best to reduce the risk

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to the level of what is humanly possible. That said, you are exactly

right: there will always be an inherent risk in this operation, particularly with Shuttle. I think what the Columbia Accident Investigation Board demonstrated is there is a lot more inherent risk in

this asset than what we had thought. And so as a consequence—

and it is the things you don’t know that are lurking out there as

well that really worry you.

And in the case of the servicing mission, though, it is the common mission of each and every one of the variables. And when you

add them up, it is a higher risk than the risk involved in going to

Station. And so as a consequence, when you evaluate it on that

basis, it is a higher margin of risk, and so therefore, it becomes—

it turns on the question of is that acceptable. And my greatest concern, again, was finding ourselves in the position of having a Shuttle ready to go and not being in compliance with the Columbia Accident Investigation Board’s recommendations as thoroughly as we

need to, and in turn, then, making the choice about whether to

launch the mission prematurely or watch the Hubble dissipate at

that point.

So it really became a case of now is the time to make that kind

of a call up front in order to make sure we redirect our energies

toward getting the longest service life we can out of Hubble.

Mr. EHLERS. My time has expired. I don’t totally agree with you

on that, but we can discuss that later.

Mr. O’KEEFE. Thank you, sir.

Mr. EHLERS. Next we have—Mr. Feeney is next.

NASA’S BUDGET AND NATIONAL SECURITY

Mr. FEENEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Dr.

Marburger and Administrator O’Keefe. I really appreciate you

being here today. And you know, with space at this critical juncture in American policy, we really only have one of two choices, in

my view, and that is that America can continue to lead space exploration in the future or we can remain in the status quo and we can

atrophy and we can let somebody else fill the potential void. And

for 30 years or so, as the Gehman Commission reported, NASA, in

many ways, has been an agency adrift, largely because of a lack

of a focused vision. And what we have needed is a President and

an Administration that has provided a responsible but bold vision.

And that is exactly what the President has now down.

We can pick it apart with 535 different views of what the optimal

role of America ought to be in space, but if that is the way Congress is going to behave, then everybody will know who dropped

the ball. I do believe that this vision, while I might have designed

it slightly different myself, is focused. I think it is bold. It is affordable, $200 million a year, based on the way we spend money

around here, is a relatively inexpensive, first-stage start. Much of

the costs come out of programs that will become unnecessary, superfluous, or obsolete, and I congratulate you, because this is a lot

more affordable. I heard figures like, not $1 billion, but $1 trillion

floating around as—leading up to the President’s announcement. It

is an incremental approach. It is flexible. We can change as we get

better with respect to the technologies we are developing. I want

to congratulate you heartily.

75

I do want to suggest that there is a lot of talk about how we can

best spend an additional billion dollars or so in the next five years

on research. And it does become difficult, for example, to argue

that finding a cure for Alzheimer’s or finding a cure for cancer isn’t

just as important as exploring outer space. And that is a difficult

argument to make. We have got a great record in our manned and

unmanned NASA division in terms of providing some wonderful

technologies that often are not well explained to the American people, but it has been—it has returned our investment, I think, many

times over and will continue to do so.

But I want to focus on part of this potential that has not been

talked a lot about today. One of the Congresswomen earlier expressed her concerns that security was suddenly being talked about

as part of the President’s vision. In fact, she is correct that a renewed spirit of discovery, the President’s vision for U.S. space exploration that was just released in January, this is the President’s

proposal. It talks about the fundamental goal of this vision is to advance U.S. scientific security and economic interests. And I will tell

you, I think it is important that America has to maintain and help

maintain, with other peace-loving nations, the integrity of commercial travel, of exploration, both manned and unmanned, and I also

think that we need to absolutely be prepared to help develop the

technologies that will protect our space capabilities, which are absolutely integral to everything that our military does. Probably 99

percent of their sophisticated weaponry, planes, ships could not deport without their total reliance on the GPS and the other satellite

capabilities.

And we are not necessarily talking about arming space through

NASA. We know that is not your vision. What we are talking about

is the absolute unknowable advancements that you can make

through your technologies. The Wright Brothers weren’t thinking

about making sure that the United States Air Force had air superiority in the last 50 years as we won, not only World War II, but

also the Cold War, in large part because of that capability. I am

sure Mr. Ford, as he developed his assembly line, was not thinking

about also having the best tank armaments and armored personnel

carriers, for example. But the types of technologies that we are able

to develop here, Dr. Marburger and Mr. O’Keefe, are absolutely essential for a lot of reasons, not the least of which is security. I am

glad we have had this open discussion, because I will tell you this,

if some other hostile nation is able to develop dominance in space

technology, the consequences for American security are unimaginably horrible.

And I invite you to comment or not, as you like.

Dr. MARBURGER. Well, as Administrator O’Keefe said that national security was not a driver for this mission, but there is no

question that the kinds of technologies whose development would

be accelerated under this program would have security—national

security relevance. And I can do no more than to agree that this—

that there certainly would be consequences that would make us a

stronger nation.

Mr. O’KEEFE. Well, I fully agree. There is no question. The spinoffs that occur here, and again, your analogies are exactly right, I

want to associate myself precisely with your commentary, are the

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kinds of things that we can develop through this technology advance and in turn can have applications there.

Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you very much. The gentleman’s

time has expired.

Mr. Bonner.

Mr. BONNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. O’Keefe, I represent the State of Alabama in the 1st Congressional District, and although Huntsville is not in my District,

it is an important part of NASA’s history and certainly an important part of the state’s contribution toward the space program.

Could you, since some of my colleagues have already raised the

question about the President’s proposal to—for the orbital space

plane to be replaced with the crew exploration vehicle, could you

tell me what some of the efforts of Marshall might be with regard

to developing the orbital space plane that would be channeled into

this new crew exploration vehicle program?

EFFORTS AT MARSHALL

Mr. O’KEEFE. Yes, sir. The effort that Marshall Space Flight

Center and, indeed many of the contributors throughout the NASA

community involved in the orbital space plane, is the foundation

which we are building on with crew exploration vehicle. The efforts

we undertook last year were absolutely imperative to understanding the scope of the task that we are about to undertake,

which is looking at a beyond low-Earth orbit capacity. It is 75 percent common with an awful lot of the work we have already done.

So much of that is resident there. And I can—I fully expect that

our exploration systems enterprise, led by Craig Sterdle, will be examination all of those alternatives and bringing to bear the best of

that talent that is resident within—at—certainly at Marshall for

the purposes of expanding that particular effort and going forward

within the next few months.

INA AND SOYUZ PURCHASES

Mr. BONNER. Let me shift gears now. If the Russian agreement

to provide the Soyuz crew support ends in 2006 and it takes one

or one and a half years to build a Soyuz module on the Russian

production line, don’t the Russians need the money flowing to them

soon? And when will we know who is going to pay for these Soyuz

flights starting in 2006?

Mr. O’KEEFE. Thank you, sir. Again, as I mentioned with Mr.

Lampson and his commentary on this point, we are beginning negotiations and discussions with our 16—our 15 other partners in

the International Space Station partnership today. And they are

here in Washington. And in the weeks ahead, as we lead up to a

head of agency meeting here at the end of March, beginning of

April, likely in Montreal, the discussions will be over exactly this

kind of question. How do we go forward beyond 2006 for the continued transfer and return vehicle capacity that our Russian partners

provide? We are also intending on returning the Shuttle to flight

and completing the Station activities. So as a consequence, all of

those contributions will be discussed. And how do we expand expedition crew size, how many more vehicles will be needed.

77

The Europeans are bringing to bear the ATV logistics capability

here in the next several months. It is going to be substantially

greater than the Progress vehicles that we are currently using, so

there are any number of variables that will go into those negotiations, so I expect in the next couple of months we will have clearer

answers on the more specific definition of the questions you have

asked.

Mr. BONNER. As a follow up to that question, if I might, why

haven’t we, at this juncture, had a crew vehicle for the Space Shuttle?

Mr. O’KEEFE. A crew vehicle for the Space Shuttle? I am sorry.

I don’t understand the——

Mr. BONNER. A—to model after the Soyuz, the Russian vehicle.

Mr. O’KEEFE. Oh, I see. Again, the Space Shuttle is, and was, designed to be not only a crew but also a cargo-carrying asset. The

Soyuz is of no similar or comparable capability. It is strictly a crew

complement. The recommendations of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board are that we design a capability that separates

the crew from the cargo. So until this—until the time of the, I

think, Columbia Accident Investigation Board’s recommendations,

we had looked to maintain Shuttle in a singular capacity only in

low-Earth orbit in this mode. So now to look at evolving that out

into a crew separated from cargo approach, as the Columbia Accident Investigation Board recommended, is where we are proceeding. Why we haven’t done it before, I could only offer speculation. Why we are doing it in the future, I could tell you definitively,

it is because of our recommendations and the President’s direction.

Mr. BONNER. Let me shift gears one more time, please, sir.

Mr. O’KEEFE. Yes, sir.

CENTENNIAL CHALLENGES

Mr. BONNER. Could you elaborate on the centennial challenge

prizes that NASA wants to start for space entrepreneurs?

Mr. O’KEEFE. This is an opportunity, and really very much in

concert with the President’s direction, of looking at new, creative

ways to accomplish these tasks and, in turn, encourage the entrepreneurial approaches that are out there and let us figure out how

we achieve those kinds of objectives by creating spirited competitions for their continued development. So we are intent on pursuing that direction.

Mr. BONNER. Just one final comment, not a question. All of us

who remember growing up watching the Apollo space program

takeoff and man land on the Moon taking the first steps and then

we watched with pride in the Shuttle program and the tragedy of

Challenger and Columbia, I think all of us, especially in this room

and on this committee and really, as evidenced by the tremendous

crowd that is here today on a day when the House is not in session,

we support what you are doing. We are proud of the work you are

doing. With that said, I think the American people, as we face

these tough budget decisions, deserve a renewal of explanation of

what space exploration has meant to them in terms of their daily

lives, in terms of the advancements of medicine, miracles of medicine, and some of the other technological breakthroughs that have

a direct link so that when we go home to our Districts, when we

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go home and visit with the people that sent us here, we can give

them an updated answer to the questions of why now, why this

much money, why this bold a vision. And I would certainly encourage NASA to help us sell the story of NASA, and I think you will

find willing partners here.

Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, for giving me an opportunity

to question——

Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you, Mr. Bonner.

Mr. O’KEEFE. Mr. Chairman, if I could, very quickly, 10 seconds.

I will get you a piece of paper that will give you the specific derivatives of all of the things we have developed over the course of the

last few years that can be available for——

Chairman BOEHLERT. Mr. O’Keefe, I wish we had six billion hits

on that. And let me suggest to you that it is critically important,

in that part of your communications program, that you explain to

the American people all of the benefits that have come from our investments in the space program.

Mr. BONNER. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman BOEHLERT. Yes, sir.

Mr. BONNER. Especially those investments made in Alabama

would be very helpful.

Chairman BOEHLERT. Understandable.

The Chair recognizes Mr. Gordon.

THE COST OF THE VISION

Mr. GORDON. Thank you.

At the risk of being a broken record, I want to go back to the

issue of cost, and I do so because I think I would be negligent in

my job if I didn’t. Now I don’t want to overstate, but I think it is

fair to say that most everyone, if not everyone on this committee,

is, at a minimum, disappointed, potentially disillusioned, with the

cost estimates that we have been given up until recently even on

the Space Station and the benefits that we were going to achieve.

So we need to go out in front of this.

And so, Mr. O’Keefe, you know, I had written you and asked you

for some cost estimates. And in your response, if I—as I stated earlier, you said it depends on timing, scope, technology, and research.

Here is what I would like to do and what I really think is important for us. Let us set up just a benchmark and then we can—

knowing that we can move beyond that. And I will help—you can—

you know, I want you to set up that benchmark. So we are going

to say, okay, the first thing you said, you can’t—we can’t give a cost

unless we know the timing. It could be from 2015 to 2020. Well,

around here, things usually take longer rather than sooner, so let

us say we will give you the time. We will fill in the blank: 2020.

Then you say the scope, the specific—and that specific demonstration is carried out on the Moon as well as the number, duration,

type, size of missions to support these demonstrations. Why don’t

you just take what you think would be the reasonable scope? Then

the technology, the same thing, and the research. Just—let us set

a definitive benchmark of—within these four areas, of what you

think would be reasonable things to achieve. And then, can you

cost that out for us?

Mr. O’KEEFE. For what objective?

79

Mr. GORDON. So that we know what we are getting into and so

that—we don’t want to get into a situation where later on we decide we can’t afford this and we wish we hadn’t spent all of this

money because there might have been a better approach.

Mr. O’KEEFE. Yes, sir.

Mr. GORDON. That is the reason. And I think if—when you were

at OMB, and if someone came before you, surely to goodness, you

would have asked those questions.

Mr. O’KEEFE. This is the functional equivalent of making assumptions on what, 16 years from now, the cost of my mortgage

payment will be, what the light bill will be, any number of

different——

Mr. GORDON. Well, isn’t that what you did with that chart up

there?

Mr. O’KEEFE. No, what this projects here, sir, is the—between

2005 and 2009 is the specific amounts that the President has proposed in the budget.

Mr. GORDON. Oh, okay. So we don’t know what we are going to

get for it, but that is just what the proposal——

Mr. O’KEEFE. Yes, sir, we do. I am sorry. I apologize for interrupting you. Let me let you finish.

Mr. GORDON. Okay. Well, anyway, let us just—you know, again,

surely, you know, I don’t know what the interest rates are going

to be in 10 years, but there are those folks that can make an estimate, and that is all I am asking you to do is to take the best information that you have and it can be prefaced by those estimates as

to what you think those costs will be. I don’t really think that is

too much to ask.

Mr. O’KEEFE. Yes, sir, I appreciate that.

In the period of time of 2005 to 2009, as the budget is presented

before you to——

Mr. GORDON. Yeah.

Mr. O’KEEFE [continuing]. From the President to the Congress,

the total amount is $86 billion. That is the total amount we are requesting, proposing, projecting, forecasting to be spent on NASA

activities. In this coming year, it is 16.2. That is the part that you

have the most amount of control, in terms of redirection to, as well

as those out-year forecasts.

Mr. GORDON. I just want to—I want to get your best—your—you

know, once you plug in the blanks as the timing, scope, technology,

and research what you think it is going to cost to do that particular

job.

Mr. O’KEEFE. Yes, sir.

Mr. GORDON. And again, let me ask you, did the President ever

ask you, at any time in these information-rich hearings, what the

cost would be to go to the Moon?

Mr. O’KEEFE. What he asked specifically is what do we plan to

spend in this five year span of time and does it create a balloon

note. What this chart creates—or——

Mr. GORDON. But he never asked you what it is going to cost?

Mr. O’KEEFE. Yes, sir, he did, and I am trying to answer that.

I apologize, sir.

Mr. GORDON. Okay.

80

Mr. O’KEEFE. $86 billion is the amount that we specifically identified in the span of time from 2005 to 2009. And what this chart

attempts to demonstrate is in the out-years beyond that, not within

the scope of the President’s budget proposal to you, were we creating a set of commitments that would be larger than the annual

rate of inflation increase that would be reasonably anticipated for

a budget proposal. And the answer is no. The amount that is included here is a rearrangement, specifically, of the assets necessary

to continue to pursue this exploration agenda informed by the scientific objectives, and as a result, what you see is a wind-down of

the Shuttle program, a wind-down, ultimately, of the——

Mr. GORDON. So if we add up that top—I am color-blind, but I

guess it is blue, that—you know, that blue chart on your chart. If

we were to add that up, you are saying that would be the cost of

getting us to the Moon, in your opinion?

Mr. O’KEEFE. I think it is the combination of robotic missions,

manned human space flight missions, a whole range of things to

go to Mars, the Moon, any other destination you like.

Mr. GORDON. Okay. So then you could tell us, then, you—and I

will ask you then, if you would add up those amounts and tell us

what you expect that we are going to get from that by the year

2020.

Mr. O’KEEFE. 2020.

Mr. GORDON. Yes, sir.

Mr. O’KEEFE. Yes, sir. Let me provide that for the record. It

gives you a specific breakdown of what those little sliced segments

mean. I can’t—I have forgotten off the top of my head exactly what

those individual pieces are, but I will provide that for the record,

because that is a projection of what this might entail, beyond 2009,

to demonstrate that we are not trying to pass on——

Mr. GORDON. Right.

Mr. O’KEEFE [continuing]. Additional costs beyond the scope and

visibility of what Congress has before you right now.

RTF COSTS

Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you very much, Mr. Gordon. Thank

you, Administrator O’Keefe. We look forward to that written submission, because it is information we all wish to become more familiar with.

In dealing with cost, let me go on to something that is in the

2005 to 2009 time frame. NASA continues to refine its cost estimates to implement the Columbia Accident Investigation Board

recommendations for Shuttle return to flight. We appreciate your

efforts in keeping the Committee informed of the actions NASA is

taking and the costs associated with the return to flight program.

In November of last year, NASA estimated cost for return to flight

at $456 million over the next five years. Two weeks ago, we received from NASA a letter with another cost estimate of more than

$1 billion. The estimates have doubled in three months. We understand that this is a work—as work progresses, you are refining

your estimates, and there is a lot of work left to complete. My question is do you expect cost to continue to grow, or do you think you

have a pretty solid estimate right now? What areas of the return

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to flight activity entail the greatest risk for increased cost? What

areas entail the greatest risk of slipping the schedule?

Mr. O’KEEFE. To my knowledge, sir, the last update that we released about a week ago for return to flight and the continuing implementation plan, so in other words monthly we update that, still

hovers in that neighborhood of about $450 to $500 million, is my

recollection. If another piece of paper was sent to you, I am not familiar with exactly what the differences of those numbers are at

this juncture. But——

Chairman BOEHLERT. Well, I have the document here. Let me

tell you where the document is. Oh, it is from you, from NASA.

And the projections are one billion and 79 million in the document.

I will share this with you——

Mr. O’KEEFE. Yes, sir. No, I——

Chairman BOEHLERT [continuing]. If you are not familiar with it.

Mr. O’KEEFE. I suspect that what that also covers—I am not familiar with exactly the document you are looking at——

Chairman BOEHLERT. It starts with 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006,

2007, 2008, 2009.

Mr. O’KEEFE. Right. Let me reconcile that for the record for you.

Chairman BOEHLERT. Okay.

Mr. O’KEEFE. And because, again, the exact direct cost on return

to flight still is in that range of 450. The out-year cost to—for example, the longer-term implications of creating the NASA Engineering and Safety Center and so forth, that is all additive to it,

and I suspect that that is what—but let me reconcile those two

numbers for you.

Chairman BOEHLERT. That would be helpful, because——

Mr. O’KEEFE. Yes, sir.

Chairman BOEHLERT [continuing]. You can see, obviously, you

know where we are coming from.

Mr. O’KEEFE. Yes, sir.

Chairman BOEHLERT. We want to get it as precise as we can.

Mr. O’KEEFE. Yes, sir.

Chairman BOEHLERT. All right.

Mr. O’KEEFE. No question.

SCHEDULE PRESSURE

Chairman BOEHLERT. And there is another question that is always on the minds of all of us and that is schedule pressures. As

you know, the Columbia Accident Investigation Board cited schedule pressure as a contributing cause of the Columbia accident.

Members of CAIB said the schedule pressure would likely become

excessive if the Shuttle were flown more than four times a year.

But the exploration initiative assumes five flights a year for each

of the next five years, starting this fall, and we are beginning to

appreciate that it might be some slippage with that. Isn’t that

guaranteed to create undue schedule pressure? And how will you

prevent undue pressure from developing? Will NASA be hiring

more personnel to accomplish five missions a year?

Mr. O’KEEFE. Yes, sir. No, thank you for the question. The objective is to complete assembly of the International Space Station by

the end of the decade. The President was very specific in the Directive in, you know, determining it as the objective, the milestone is

82

to complete assembly of the Station. We project that that is going

to run four to five flights per year and are anticipating as many

as five. The approach we have got to look to now is two things, the

two drivers on the schedule that I have seen. Number one is not

only the systems integration challenge of when do you send the

components and the modules, but also how do you have a spacing

in between them that is sufficient to provide for a launch of the

next vehicle in time to assure safe haven requirements while folks

have been aboard Station, should there be any problem on the prior

mission. So the combination of both of those is going to give us that

answer rather than what the current schedule says. And we are

still working that through to figure out precisely what that will entail.

Chairman BOEHLERT. Let me ask you this. It—is it still the operating assumption that you will be able to return to flight by September or are—is there some cause to pause and rethink that very

ambitious schedule?

Mr. O’KEEFE. Yeah, based on the information I have seen just in

the last 10 days and reviewed now a couple of times, there are two

items that now make that prospect very low. The first one is the

external tank. The determination by an external panel, a group of

folks and the Stafford Covey Task Force, was to expand the coverage of the insulation area from 67 degrees off centerline to 80 degrees. What that means is you are now looking at a wider area

that needs certification from debris coming off of the insulation

from the external tank. The second one is the actual development

of the imaging capacity on the boom that we are developing and

have never tested is continuing to have issues that are not insurmountable, but they may take longer. So I have my doubts, and I

do not believe that the September/October time frame will be met.

I think it is more likely we are going to push that to the right, and

we determine that conclusively next week on how we would revise

that schedule.

Chairman BOEHLERT. Well, that is a good news and bad news response. I mean, the bad news is, obviously, we can’t do something

we hoped to be able to do by a certain time period, but the good

news, from my perspective, is that you are not so arbitrarily committed to a specific date that you will let the pressure of meeting

that date overturn good judgment. And you are going to—that is

good news.

OSTP EFFORTS IN THE INTERAGENCY DELIBERATIONS

Now let—the final question I have, and then Mr. Rohrabacher

will have one more and maybe Mr. Lampson and—because we have

to get out of here. The final question I have is for Dr. Marburger.

When you participated in the interagency deliberations that led to

the development of this new initiative and the vision by the President and the Administration, you were, I hope, representing all

science and not just the interest of science within NASA. In other

words, I hope you were operating from the perspective of the bigger

picture, focusing, obviously of necessity, because of the assignment,

on the program within the agency. But there are all of us up here

who are concerned about the impact on science overall. That is a

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concern that I know you share. And so would you address that

question, please?

Dr. MARBURGER. Yes. First of all, it is my responsibility to be

concerned about all of science. The vision that the President set

forth is a vision that extends long into the future. And I believe

that the way this vision is structured is good for science. It establishes a framework that is independent of a specific scenario or a

single project that has to be accomplished in a certain time frame

that actually reduces the risk of invading science budgets in the future. This is a—this provides more predictability. It provides a better framework for planning for all of science. And I particularly like

the aspect of this vision that joins robotics and human exploration

in a rational, balanced approach so that the scientific goals associated with this vision, in my opinion, are stronger than they have

ever been in NASA. Integration of science with human exploration

is a very important feature of this. So in—I think that in the long

run, to embark on this course is actually better for science than

what we had before.

Mr. LAMPSON. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman BOEHLERT. Mr. Lampson.

Mr. LAMPSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am still concerned about the Iran Nonproliferation Act. And

knowing that——

Chairman BOEHLERT. We were honoring the—alternating back

and forth. Come on. You have a question, if you have an opportunity.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I am sorry. I have got a plane in Dulles that

I have got to run out for, and—yeah, I—thank you very much, Mr.

Chairman.

RTF DELAYS AND THEIR EFFECT ON THE BUDGET

First and foremost, how will the Shuttle delays that you just

mentioned affect the rising cost in—for your budgets for fiscal year

2005 through 2009?

Mr. O’KEEFE. I can’t make an assessment right now, but I don’t

think this is going to be a cost-driver. It is more a technical driver

on the two—the external tank as well as the imaging boom, neither

of which appear to be cost-drivers, and they are more just technical

development questions. So I don’t anticipate a big cost differential

here.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. But just the time will cost money, will it not?

Mr. O’KEEFE. Sure, by definition, but, you know, we are not talking about—we are not—it is single-digit months, not years.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. So number one—number two, let me

just note, for the record, that as far as I am concerned, and I think

a large number of people are concerned, because we are on budget

constraint, we are worried about science programs being cut, anything that can be done commercially that will be—that will make

it cheaper to achieve our goals in space, especially those concerning

Station, should be done, because that leaves more money available

for science projects and other projects. And also—and that includes

the servicing of the Space Station, which there are alternatives—

private sector alternatives that have been offered, and if they can

be—if they are cheaper, they should be done.

84

And finally, I guess we have talked about the pursuing of commercial interests, so that is just about it.

Mr. O’KEEFE. Thank you, sir. Yes, sir. I understand——

Chairman BOEHLERT. And have a great flight, Mr.

Rohrabacher——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you.

Chairman BOEHLERT [continuing]. The very distinguished Ranking Member of the Committee on Space and Aeronautics.

Mr. Lampson.

INA

Mr. LAMPSON. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

Just a quick statement about the INA that I still concern myself

with. Mr. Rohrabacher made the comment earlier on his first time

around about the exception for imminent danger that we can, indeed, deal with the Russians under those circumstances. There

presently is not an imminent danger. And the concern is that we

only have Soyuz that are going to be built, I think, two under construction, and soon we will not have anything there if—and even

though we are involved with discussions with our ISS partners,

current law tells us we can’t do it with the Russians. And there is

pending legislation that would allow us to solve that problem, give

the President the flexibility necessary, NASA the flexibility necessary to do these negotiations. It just doesn’t make sense that we

are not looking at those opportunities, and it seems to me that we

are going forward without a good plan with a major initiative here.

And I yield my time to Mr. Gordon.

VISION COST

Mr. GORDON. Excuse me. A quick, final clarification. The post2009, that period for the lunar/Mars, that looks to me like about

$150 billion. Does that sound about right to you?

Mr. O’KEEFE. Well, sir, I would have to go back and take a look

at the numbers. I really can’t offer it off of the top of my head. I

am sorry.

Mr. GORDON. Okay. But you are going to do that, though, right?

Mr. O’KEEFE. Yes, sir. Yes, sir.

Mr. GORDON. And I—and the final thing is, that is what you are

allocating. And I assume that what you are allocating and what

you think is necessary to complete the mission is the same thing?

Mr. O’KEEFE. No, sir. What is occurring in 2009 and out is a projection of what the transition, the transformation of the approach

that we are taking here would import if you compare it to the annual cost of an inflation level increase to the annual top line. That

is all that this attempts to do, but I will try to parse that——

Mr. GORDON. Okay. So is that—and again, just for me, so that—

does that budget, then, get us to the Moon or not?

Mr. O’KEEFE. It is not a budget. It is a projection.

Mr. GORDON. Okay.

Mr. O’KEEFE. The only budget before you is 2005 through 2009.

Mr. GORDON. Okay. Does that projection try—is that projecting

what it is going to cost to get us to the Moon?

Mr. O’KEEFE. No, sir, it does not.

85

Mr. GORDON. Then why are you doing it, then? What is the benefit of it?

Mr. O’KEEFE. To demonstrate, as we continue this particular approach of, again, building on the successes at each successive stage,

is there some balloon note beyond 2009. And the answer is no,

based on this approach. At the concurrent time in which you are

seeing at retirement of Shuttle, you will see an acceleration of the

development on the Project Constellation crew exploration vehicle,

the development of the human and robotic technologies——

Mr. GORDON. Okay.

Mr. O’KEEFE [continuing]. All of that——

Mr. GORDON. But you don’t know what you get, though?

Mr. O’KEEFE. Yes, sir, we could walk through that, but there

is——

Mr. GORDON. Okay.

Mr. O’KEEFE [continuing]. No pretense of precision of program

numbers out through 2020 that would give you that level of granularity to say this is the cost of that——

Mr. GORDON. Okay.

Mr. O’KEEFE [continuing]. Broader set of mission objectives. It is

going to be a combination of all of them and depending on which

sequence you pursue.

Mr. GORDON. Okay. Thank you.

Mr. O’KEEFE. Thank you, sir.

Chairman BOEHLERT. I thank you. And now, as Martin Agronski

used to say for the final word, Dr. Ehlers.

CENTRIFUGE

Mr. EHLERS. If I were to find a word, I think everyone in the

room would be overjoyed.

I do want to thank both of you for being here and to sympathize

with—yesterday, I sympathized with the panel who was being

asked tough questions here, including Dr. Marburger. Today, I

sympathize with you in a deeper sense, because you have a very,

very tough job ahead of you. As science is always difficult, but

when you are doing it to this extent, it is also very expensive and

a lot of dollars riding on the decisions you make everyday. So I express my appreciation for you, but also my sympathy.

All right. I want to ask a specific question about what I understand as a problem on the Space Station of a very crucial component. Mr. O’Keefe, you mentioned the purpose—primary scientific

purpose at this point is the study of the human effects of long-term

space flight. And I understand a very important part of that is the

Japanese centrifuge portion of the Space Station. I also understand

that that is in trouble and that you have been giving them some

help, but that it is behind schedule, it may not be ready to launch.

The first question is, will it be ready to launch before you discontinue the current Shuttle? And secondly, what is the problem?

Is it serious? Can it be remedied? And will they meet their timetable?

Mr. O’KEEFE. Yes, sir. Our Japanese partners have been examining a cost challenge that they are having with development of the

centrifuge. It was due to be delivered and launched, I believe, in

2008, and we are going to be examining that again, beginning

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today through these next several weeks, to look at what the sequence of that may mean on the schedule itself. But what the cost

is to them and what they may be experiencing in terms of overrun

are their responsibility, but in terms of the actual delivery date of

the module, that is the point we will need to continue to work

through.

Mr. EHLERS. Are you confident it will be ready to fly before you

discontinue the Shuttle?

Mr. O’KEEFE. It appears that way, but again, there may be

tradeoffs of what we may come to based on the ultimate configuration of Station, which may call for other modules or components to

be considered. But that is part of what we are going through here

in this current set of meetings that are convening today and going

through the next several weeks and will continue on.

Mr. EHLERS. Is—am I correct that that is a very crucial component if you really want to examine the effects of low gravity?

Mr. O’KEEFE. Let—I am going to let Dr. Marburger comment

here in just a second, but I am told that the approach that is taken

depends really on the kind of experimentation you are looking for.

And the—it essentially simulates a gravitational condition.

Mr. EHLERS. Yes.

Mr. O’KEEFE. So it therefore reverses the effects of what——

Mr. EHLERS. Right.

Mr. O’KEEFE [continuing]. We are trying to understand about living in micro-gravity conditions.

Dr. MARBURGER. I will just say a technical word. The point of the

centrifuge is to be able to tune the gravity from——

Mr. EHLERS. Right.

Dr. MARBURGER [continuing]. Zero up to some value that the centrifuge is capable of. The unique thing about the Space Station environment is it has zero gravity. We can not achieve that on Earth

for long periods of time, so the availability of zero in that parameter is—already suggests a lot of experiments you can do, even if

you can’t tune all of the way through the spectrum of values that

gravity could have.

Mr. EHLERS. Yeah, but I assume that we already knew a great

deal about the effects of zero gravity on humans, because we had

the Mir Space Station and Skylab. People have been up there for

many——

Dr. MARBURGER. Not all of those experiments were designed to

get the kind of biomedical information that you can have, and

many of them were done in an era where we knew much less about

how the body works. We are in a much better position today to understand these problems scientifically than we were even a few

years ago. So the—I believe that one of the values of focusing research is, in fact, to have a much more deliberate progress toward

understanding these effects.

Mr. EHLERS. Can you give me an example of something that we

can do now that we had no idea we needed to do before? I am just

surprised we couldn’t do better before.

Dr. MARBURGER. Well, the way the systems of the human body

work have benefited from these very large investments we have

made in biomedical research for the last 10 years. And we understand them much better now. I might add that NASA works very

87

closely with NIH in developing strategies for doing this work, and

it would be surprising if there weren’t important developments that

we can take advantage of. But the—you know, the objectives of

many of these past missions were not only focused on

weightlessness issues.

Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you very much.

And that was the final——

Mr. O’KEEFE. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman, just very short.

Chairman BOEHLERT. Ten seconds.

Mr. O’KEEFE. There is the National Academy of Sciences study

just released here on medical effects on astronauts that—and cosmonauts, based on the limited information we have there. We are

only three years into continuous presence. Our longest duration

space flight, on Station, is 196 days. That is it. So the cohort is

pretty small in trying to make determinations here.

Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you very much. And I think, as we

conclude, it should be evident to all concerned in this very substantive probing analysis and exchange that costs are a major consideration, and there is a lot of uncertainty about the cost. And the

chart, while attractive, leaves some questions for all of us.

This is not the beginning of the end, this is the end of the beginning, and we will have more substantive hearings, like this one, as

we move forward together and try to identify with shaping of the

best possible responsible policy, not just for NASA, but for the Nation.

Thank you very much. Hearing adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:46 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]

(89)

Appendix 1:

ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS

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ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS

Responses by John H. Marburger, III, Director, Office of Science and Technology Policy, Executive Office of the President

Questions submitted by Chairman Sherwood Boehlert

Q1. Through its Earth Science programs NASA funds a significant share of the federal global change research budget. But to help pay for the President’s exploration proposal, the NASA budget proposes to cut Earth Science by about three

percent below the amount appropriated for the current year. This would mean

canceling a number of projects, such as the Ocean Winds mission, an Ozone

measuring mission, and deferring other projects, such as the Global Precipitation Monitor. How will these cuts and delays affect the implementation of the

global change program’s newly developed plan? To what extent did you consult

with other partners in the global change research program before proposing

these cuts?

A1. There is nearly $1.5 billion requested for NASA’s Earth Science programs in the

FY 2005 President’s Budget. NASA’s Earth science program will continue to provide

key data sets and building blocks required for climate science and a comprehensive

Earth observing system. Funds support new research-oriented missions to measure

ocean salinity, carbon dioxide concentration, and aerosol concentrations in line with

the Climate Change Strategic Plan. In addition, funds are provided to ensure the

continuity of Landsat data, as well as test critical sensors on the next-generation

of operational Polar orbiting satellites, both of which are key components of our

Earth observing infrastructure. In the few instances where missions were deferred

and/or canceled, the decision was made that delaying the availability of specific data

sets would not unduly impede scientific progress.

The Global Precipitation Mission (GPM) will be deferred two years. This is a new

data set, so there are no data continuity issues, although it does build on the data

established from NASA’s Tropical Rainfall Measuring Mission launched in 1997.

The GPM data is expected to advance our understanding of the water cycle, which

is why the Administration remains committed to the mission, as well as to continuing our partnership with the Japanese.

Ocean Vector Winds, a canceled mission, was designed to ensure data continuity

in wind surface measurement during the anticipated gap between the Japanese

Midori II Spacecraft and the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental

Satellite System (NPOESS). However, the Midori II recently failed, and due to previous ocean wind mission failures, the historical data record has numerous gaps.

While such missions provide an important variable for understanding patterns in

weather and climate, the Administration believes that ensuring the near-term continuity of other parameters is of greater scientific importance. Systematic collection

of the ocean winds data set will become an operational endeavor with the first flight

of the NPOESS program in 2010.

Q2. Much of the President’s vision for space exploration begins in earnest after 2010,

when we finish the Space Station and retire the Shuttle. How significant a factor were the agreements we have with our international partners in the Administration’s decision to continue the Space Station even until then?

A2. Consideration of the interests of our international partners was a significant

factor in the discussions on ISS. Several other important factors were considered,

including the ISS’s unique capabilities to support research on understanding and

countering the impact of the space environment on astronaut health. The commitment to the international partners was acknowledged as important in the President’s speech on January 14, 2004, when he stated, ‘‘We will finish what we have

started, we will meet our obligations to our 15 international partners on the project.’’

Q2a. If we did not have these international agreements, would the President have

proposed completing the Space Station?

A2a. As mentioned above, the commitment to the international partners was an important consideration—but not the only one.

Q3. The President’s ‘‘Vision’’ document lists ‘‘advanc[ing] security’’ as a fundamental

goal of the exploration initiative. In what ways will the initiative advance security? Are there any projects that will be designed in a particular way to further

security goals? Does the goal of ‘‘advancing security’’ conflict in any way with

the stated intention to make the exploration initiative an international effort?

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A3. Enhanced security will be an indirect consequence of the implementation of the

President’s vision. For example, the vision provides focus to the civilian aerospace

sector which should lead to a more coherent investment strategy. The vision should

also stimulate more citizens to maintain an interest in science, math, and engineering. And some of the technologies developed (e.g., enhanced human-machine interface and robotics) should have ‘‘spin-off’’ applications to the national security sector.

In addition, some development programs to support the vision may directly benefit

both the civil and national security space sector. Such programs could include new

heavy lift launch capability or the ability to deploy large arrays in space. There

should be no conflict with the intention of making the exploration initiative an

international effort. Export control issues will, of course, need to be addressed as

they arise.

Q4. Does it adversely affect the U.S. if other nations have humans in space and we

don’t? In what way? What advantages are the Chinese likely to gain from their

human program other than proving they can do something the U.S. has already

done?

A4. In the short-term, not having a human space flight program would have an intangible impact that would likely affect many people. That impact could include a

sense that the U.S. had lost its technological leadership. The average person still

views the Apollo landing as one of the crowning achievements of our society and

an accomplishment that will long be identified with the U.S. In the longer-term, the

loss of human capability in space will limit our ability to conduct more ambitious

and complex exploration activities. Leveraging human cognitive ability on site with

robotic and tele-operated systems is likely to offer the greatest reward in discovery.

In terms of the Chinese space flight program, it’s premature to predict advantages

the Chinese are likely to gain.

Q5. You were quoted in Science magazine as saying ‘‘The vision has greater scientific significance than past missions—and science will be more productive

with it than in its absence.’’ Can you give us some specific examples of how the

initiative will increase the productivity of science?

A5. The President’s new paradigm will open up opportunities to explore and understand the cosmos that are not technically possible today. During the first 40 years

of NASA’s exploration of the solar system, the available technology and resources

have allowed for flyby missions of numerous moons, asteroids, comets, and every

planet except Pluto. In a few cases, orbital missions were executed (the Moon,

Venus, Mars, Jupiter, and the asteroid Eros) and in even fewer cases, landings were

made (the Moon, Venus, and Mars)—and only the Moon has had a sample return

to date.

During the same period, space observatories have become increasingly more sophisticated, opening up windows of observation that are impossible from the ground.

Data from these facilities have transformed our understanding of the formation and

evolution of the Universe.

Further major advances in understanding the Solar System and the universe will

likely require even more complex operations in space or on the surface of solar system objects. These would involve high power instrumentation, large area and longduration investigation of multiple planetary bodies, and the possible assembly of sophisticated observatories.

Such complex missions are not possible today for several reasons, including: the

small payload mass we can affordably send into deep space; limitations in power

due to decreasing solar flux at high latitudes on near planets or deeper into space;

slow communications data rates to Earth; and the challenge of programming autonomous missions and controlling operations from Earth, given the large time delays

imposed by the speed of light.

These ‘‘infrastructure’’ issues are inter-related and their resolution will provide

the backbone for a robust exploration agenda—an agenda that allows for close-in examination, the ability to touch the item under scrutiny, and the evaluation of large

area and long-term trends.

The President’s vision and its budget call for the deliberate development of the

capabilities needed to open up the Universe to increased scrutiny. It will create new

transportation options for both robots and humans, harness the natural resources

found in space to foster sustainability, develop robust high power systems, improve

communications, and build vastly more capable robots and improved robotic-human

interfaces.

Q6. Are there any scientific objectives related to the Moon that require a human presence? If not for the proposed human landing, how high a priority would a lunar

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robotic mission be? How many of these missions would be launched? Why have

lunar missions rarely appeared as a top scientific goal in National Academy of

Science studies or NASA’s own plans?

A6. The President’s vision calls for undertaking lunar exploration activities to further science, to test out new technologies and techniques, and to develop key capabilities to support more distant, more capable, and/or longer duration human and

robotic missions. It may also be necessary to have humans on the Moon to ‘‘oversee’’

robotic systems involved in the construction of complex devices—whether for in situ

resource utilization or a deep space observatory. The presence of humans should

also enhance scientific missions as noted by the National Academy of Sciences over

the years. For example, the Apollo rovers (man-piloted) typically traveled 30 km in

a three-day period (average of 10 km per day). That was accomplished 30 years ago.

Today, the Mars Rovers (tele-operated) travel tens of meters per day. So mobility

is enhanced with direct human oversight. Humans are also better able to quickly

identify anomalies in the background and focus on areas of high interest.

In terms of science and exploration, the Moon has roughly the same surface area

as the continent of Africa—yet remains largely unexplored. The total time that humans have spent on the surface of the Moon is about 300 hours—or about 12 days.

Going back to the Moon will help to resolve open issues about the formation of the

Moon, its cratering history (used to date events throughout the solar system), and

the lunar bulk composition across the surface and at depth. Since the lunar surface

has remained relatively unchanged for billions of years, it is also hoped that the

Moon can supply important information on how the inner planets formed and

evolved. For example, we only have accurate crater dates of the areas where samples were collected. These indicate that those regions were formed within a narrow

time interval about 3.8 billion years ago. Extending this result to other regions of

the Moon has important implications as to the history of these cataclysmic events

and, by extrapolation, how it affected the Earth’s history.

The National Academy of Sciences Space Studies Board’s recent report, ‘‘New

Frontiers in the Solar System: An Integrated Exploration Strategy,’’ recommended

that NASA initiate a sample return mission from the Moon. Specifically it advocated

studying the Aitken Basin region of the lunar south pole which is the largest known

impact crater in the solar system and may also represent one of the oldest and deepest craters on the Moon.

Questions submitted by Representative Bart Gordon

Q1. What did the President ask you about the costs of the President’s space initiative, and how did you respond?

A1. The President considered cost parameters; however, as you know, it would be

inappropriate to provide details of discussions held during the deliberative process.

The budget ‘‘sandchart’’ was considered and background data supporting it were developed during this process. The ‘‘sandchart’’ delineates the distribution of the $87

billion that makes up the President’s FY 2005–FY 2009 budget submission. It further shows a notional distribution of funding within NASA for FY 2010–FY 2020,

assuming an increase to the NASA budget roughly consistent with inflation. The

total notional budgetary estimate for NASA during FY 2010–FY 2020 is shown on

the chart as $228 billion. Of this total, approximately $143 billion is estimated for

human and robotic exploration (including the CEV) and approximately $85 billion

is estimated for the ISS, ISS transport, Shuttle, and non-exploration portions of

NASA budget (such as aeronautics).

Q2. In 1989, President George H.W. Bush proposed an initiative similar to that

being proposed by his son, President Bush—returning humans to the Moon and

eventually going on to Mars. To quote from a 1992 Congressional Research Service report: ‘‘At the time of President Bush’s original speech, however, Richard

Darman, Director of OMB, estimated that it would cost $400 billion over 30

years.’’ That works out to about $590 billion in today’s dollars.

Q2a. Is there any reason to believe that wouldn’t be a reasonable estimate for the

cost of the President’s proposed initiative?

A2a. The President’s proposal presents an appropriate approach to our nation maintaining its leadership role in space, and the cost you mention is not a reasonable

estimate. The budget estimate for the Space Exploration Initiative (SEI) assumed

a particular approach to Mars exploration that is no longer being considered. The

SEI reference architectures assumed extensive infrastructure and are described in

the 1989 ‘‘Report of the 90-Day Study on Human Exploration of the Moon and

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Mars.’’ In this report, NASA estimated the cost of two of the architectures as approximately $470 billion and $540 billion over a 35-year time horizon. The estimated

cost to establish a lunar outpost was about $100 billion and about $158 billion for

establishing the Mars outpost. The rest of the budget was for further base extension

and operations. Thus, achieving a permanent presence on the Moon and an outpost

on Mars, without the long-term operational costs, was estimated at $258 billion.

The SEI architectures assumed significantly more extensive and complex infrastructure than is assumed today. As two examples of major differences in the architectures between SEI and the President’s proposal, consider the reference space

transport infrastructure and the role of the Space Station. The SEI assumed that

the Space Shuttle would continue to fly indefinitely and would be used to transport

crew from Earth to the Space Station. In addition, a separate heavy launch vehicle

(about 60 metric tons) would be developed to support the lunar missions. Yet another, even larger, heavy launch vehicle (about 140 metric tons) would be developed

to support the Mars missions. Given the tight time lines on the SEI, the development cost for both of these heavy launch systems plus the operational costs of continuing the Space Shuttle were concurrent expenses. Furthermore, both new launch

vehicles required enhancement to the ground launch and production facilities. As a

second example, consider the role of the Space Station. SEI assumed an evolvable

space station that would be the location for on-orbit assembly of vehicles, serve as

the transportation node, and allow for refurbishment of the vehicles upon their return. This envisioned space station would evolve through four configurations beyond

assembly complete that would ultimately accommodate 12 permanent crew members

plus an additional transient crew of four. It would also contain enclosed vehicle

hangers and an assembly facility. This role for the Space Station is well beyond that

planned in the current vision, which calls for focusing the Space Station on research

relevant to the exploration initiative.

The cost of the space initiative will be strongly dependent upon the architecture.

To demonstrate how much the cost is dependent upon the specific architecture, consider the Lawrence Livermore concept ‘‘The Great Exploration,’’ that was proposed

around 1990 as an alternative to the SEI. The Great Exploration program provided

for permanent bases on the Moon and Mars within ten years of initiating the program and with an estimated cost of $40 billion. Greater than a factor of ten difference in cost estimate between SEI and The Great Exploration was due to the assumed development, risk, and infrastructure.

Q2b. Do you have a better estimate that you can share with this committee?

A2b. As illustrated in the answer above, cost estimates for human missions to the

Moon and Mars are very sensitive to the architecture. The cost estimates are also

sensitive to the timeframe chosen, since the initial costs of establishing a human

presence on the Moon or Mars is only one component of the cost if along-term

human presence is desired. For the SEI architectures described above, roughly 50

percent of the cost was for establishing an initial capability on the Moon and Mars

and the remaining 50 percent was for expansion and operational costs. We do not

yet have a defined architecture. Nor do we have a detailed timetable for getting to

Mars. Thus estimating the cost of establishing a presence on the Moon and Mars

(to compare with SEI) would involve a great deal of speculation. Much of the large

range in costs between the estimates for SEI and The Great Exploration (described

in the answer above) can be attributed to the very different mass estimates assumed. Some of the technical challenges for NASA are therefore to decrease the

mass required to support humans (such as developing high efficiency life support

systems), to utilize in-space resources to decrease mass launched from the Earth,

and to lower the effective transportation costs (such as prepositioning cargo utilizing

lower cost launches).

The goal of the President’s vision is, however, about more than a mission to the

Moon and Mars. Ultimately the vision is to advance U.S. scientific, security, and

economic interests, to explore the solar system and beyond, and to extend human

presence across the solar system. The vision does not have an end date—as the

President stated on January 14, we will continue to make progress ‘‘one mission,

one voyage, one landing at a time.’’ As such, it is not possible to assign an ‘‘overall

cost’’ to the vision. The strategy, instead, is to maintain a stable budget for NASA

to enable long-term planning and to be responsive to both challenges and opportunities not yet understood. The emphasis shifts from budgeting to reach a specific destination, and instead, seeks to maximize the progress and opportunities given a specific budget. Unlike previous major civil space initiatives, the approach is intentionally flexible, with adjustable exploration milestones to maintain affordability.

This approach places a premium on avoiding balloon payments for future Congresses, Administrations, and taxpayers.

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Q3. How much do you estimate it will cost to achieve a human lunar landing by

2020, and what assumptions are included in that estimate?

A3. The human lunar landing is only one element of the new vision, so it is difficult

to try to extract the costs of that one milestone from the overall cost of the vision.

Should the development of a new heavy-lift launch vehicle—one that would also be

useful for a Mars mission and potentially for future commercial or defense missions—be included in the cost estimate for a first human lunar landing? Should the

lunar robotic missions that conduct science and explore as they set the stage for

human landings be included? What about the technology development that enhances

the capabilities of those robots?

In response to Congressional inquiries, NASA did attempt to determine what the

cost of a human lunar mission would be, through 2020, if conducted in a mode similar to the Apollo program. That estimate is $63 billion. However, that estimate does

not reflect new architecture studies or design analysis. Nor does it include potential

benefits from new technologies or innovative approaches yet to be undertaken. It

also does not include the robotic precursor missions that will do science and perform

risk reduction activities applicable to the broader exploration vision. The estimate

assumes:

• Lunar lander ($12 billion)—based on similar Apollo lunar lander.

• Launch vehicle ($15 billion)—assumes development and production of a new

100-mT Saturn V-class vehicle. Estimate based on scaling EELV

parametrically is $13 billion. Similarly, recent Marshall Spaceflight Center

studies estimate $2–13 billion development depending on number of new engines, stages, and facilities. Approximately $3–4 billion of total is for production.

• Crew Exploration Vehicle development and operations ($24 billion)—this includes $15 billion for development and $9 billion for operations.

• Operations ($10 billion)—first landing by 2020. Costs comparable to Apollo.

• Other ($2 billion)—funding available for follow-on mission hardware and reserves.

Questions submitted by Representative Nick Lampson

Q1. In order to fund the President’s initiative, cuts, deferrals, and cancellations will

be made to a wide range of NASA programs.

Q1a. Did you offer to make such cuts in order to fund the President’s initiative, or

were you directed to make such cuts? If the latter, who directed you to make

them?

A1a. NASA, working with OMB, used the new vision to prioritize ongoing activities

and to fit within a top-level agreed upon budget. Some near-term decisions were

readily apparent (e.g., canceling the Orbital Space Plane) while others are still being

assessed (e.g., specific research projects within the Office of Biological and Physical

Research). The new vision provides the needed context to assess the relative priority

of projects and to make difficult, yet necessary, decisions. In most cases, the impact

on the science missions was negligible. In the few cases (e.g., the proposed dark energy probe), OSTP is working directly with OMB and NASA to reduce the impact.

Q1b. Why are the science and aeronautics programs that have been cut, deferred, or

canceled considered a lower priority than the President’s Initiative?

A1b. The space exploration vision provides the overarching focus for the civil space

exploration program. Research efforts that do not directly support enabling the vision remain important and have been appropriately prioritized. In a fiscally constrained environment, hard choices need to be made to ensure that sufficient resources are available to execute the primary vision, as well as the important science

projects. This is a hallmark of leadership. Furthermore, only a handful of current

science programs have been cut, deferred, or canceled. No aeronautics programs

were cut as a result of the new vision. The majority of the cuts have come from

within the human space flight portfolio and much of the remainder is from slowing

the rate of growth in the budgets.

Questions submitted by Representative Mark Udall

Q1. In your written testimony, you cite the failure of the NRC’s 2001 Decadal Survey

to recommend new missions in the Hubble wavelength regime as a scientific raVerDate 11-MAY-2000 16:41 Oct 01, 2004 Jkt 091691 PO 00000 Frm 00098 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\WORKD\FULL04\021204\91691 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
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tionale for not pursuing the SM–4 HST servicing mission. However, isn’t it true

that the Decadal Survey assumed that the Hubble Space Telescope would continue to operate until the end of this decade and that it endorsed NASA’s decision to continue HST operations through this decade? If this is true, why do you

cite the Decadal Survey?

A1. The Decadal Survey did assume that Hubble would continue to operate until

the end of this decade. This point was mentioned in my written testimony where

I stated, ‘‘The committee wrote its report assuming the SM–4 service mission would

take place, but its statements regarding the evolving role of the Hubble relative to

other priorities are important in the present discussion about risk versus benefits.’’

My point in citing the National Research Council was to highlight that the future

space science objectives were shifting to other wavelength regimes. This is relevant

when objectively evaluating the benefit with the risk. I am pleased that the National Academy will specifically address the Hubble servicing issue, and I look forward to their assessment of options and recommendations.

Q2. What countries have been approached about their willingness to participate in

the new human space flight vision? What have their reactions been? What additional countries do you intend to approach? What is the U.S. government’s current position on whether China is eligible to participate in significant human

space flight activities with NASA? Would you in fact welcome China’s participation in this initiative?

A2. In announcing the Space Exploration Vision, President Bush said: ‘‘The vision. . .is a journey, not a race, and I call on other nations to join us on this journey, in a spirit of cooperation and friendship.’’ Following up on this invitation,

NASA has initiated a dialogue with the current International Space Station partnership consisting of 15 foreign countries. While this dialogue is only beginning,

many of the partners have indicated a great deal of enthusiasm and interest in participating in executing this long-term vision. Participation in executing the vision

is not limited to the Space Station partners alone. The participation of each country,

including China, will be evaluated on an individual basis, taking into account both

the experience of the country and the bilateral relationship.

Q3. What is the scientific rationale for the President’s initiative? How much of that

rationale will be satisfied by planned robotic missions, and how much will require human explorers? From a scientific standpoint, what objectives specifically

require human explorers?

A3. The President’s new paradigm will open up new opportunities to explore and

understand the cosmos that are not technically possible today. During the first 40

years of NASA’s exploration of the solar system, the available technology and resources have allowed for flyby missions of numerous moons, asteroids, comets, and

every planet except Pluto. In a few cases, orbital missions were executed (the Moon,

Venus, Mars, Jupiter, and the asteroid Eros) and in even fewer cases, landings were

made (the Moon, Venus, and Mars)—and only the Moon has had a sample return

to date.

During the same period, space observatories have become increasingly more sophisticated, opening up windows of observation that are impossible from the ground.

Data from these facilities have transformed our understanding of the formation and

evolution of the Universe.

Further major advances in understanding the Solar System and the universe will

likely require even more complex operations in space or on the surface of solar system objects. These would involve high power instrumentation, large-area and longduration investigation of multiple planetary bodies, and the possible assembly of sophisticated observatories.

Such complex missions are not possible today for several reasons, including: the

small payload mass we can affordably send into deep space; limitations in power

due to decreasing solar flux at high latitudes on near planets or deeper into space;

slow communications data rates to Earth; and the challenge of programming autonomous missions and controlling operations from Earth, given the large time delays

imposed by the finite speed of light.

These ‘‘infrastructure’’ issues are inter-related and their resolution will provide

the backbone for a robust exploration agenda—an agenda that allows for close-in examination, the ability to touch the item under scrutiny, and the evaluation of largearea and long-term trends.

The President’s vision and its budget call for the deliberate development of the

capabilities needed to open up the Universe to increased scrutiny. It will create new

transportation options for both robots and humans, harness the natural resources

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found in space to foster sustainability, develop robust high power systems, improve

communications, and build vastly more capable robots and improved robotic-human

interfaces.

The vision does not artificially separate the role of humans and robots in enabling

this new capability—but assumes that the strengths of each will be used to achieve

the stated mission.

Questions submitted by Representative Zoe Lofgren

Q1. In NASA’s document ‘‘The Vision for Space Exploration,’’ the goal of the President’s initiative is stated as follows: ‘‘The fundamental goal of this vision is to

advance U.S. scientific, security, and economic interests through a robust space

exploration program.’’ I am very confused by the wording of your statement. You

do not refer to U.S. geo-political interests, which motivated President Kennedy

and the Apollo program. You do not refer to U.S. diplomatic interests, which motivated President Clinton to reach out to Russia as a partner in the International Space Station. You refer—repeatedly—to U.S. security interests. For

those of us committed to the peaceful explorations and uses of outer space, this

language is troubling.

Q1a. Please explain how this new space vision will contribute to the security interests of the United States. Please be specific and try to avoid general statements

about how the initiative will have undefined economic spin-offs.

A1a. The Space Exploration Vision as outlined by President Bush is a civil initiative but has the potential to enhance U.S. national security also. The implementation of the vision will contribute to U.S. scientific and technological leadership; inspire more citizens to study science, math, and engineering; and will likely advance

robotics, human-machine interface, applications of nanosystems, and other technologies that are likely to have ‘‘spin-off’ applications to national security and commercial enterprises.

Meaningful cooperation with other countries in executing the vision also will contribute to advancing U.S. foreign policy interests. Further, the inspiration provided

by space exploration has a profound positive impact on the hearts and minds of people around the world.

Q1b. Will the Department of Defense be involved in the Moon–Mars initiative? If so,

how?

A1b. The space exploration vision is an inherently peaceful scientific endeavor. In

executing the vision, NASA will cooperate with the Department of Defense in the

development and use of space transportation capabilities—particularly the Evolved

Expendable Launch Vehicles—and will continue to rely on the Department of Defense’s space tracking and surveillance capabilities.

Q1c. Can you give me your commitment that this new initiative will not contribute

in any way to the placement of weapons in space?

A1c. The space exploration vision is an inherently peaceful scientific endeavor.

Question submitted by Representative Brad Sherman

Q1. According to NASA’s budget plan, the President’s exploration initiative is estimated to cost close to $200 billion over the next 15 years, with more costs incurred after that time. Why is this investment better than investing the same

amount of money in energy R&D, with the goal of making the U.S. energy independent? Which of the two alternative investments do you think would deliver

a greater benefit to the American economy and to overall societal goals?

A1. Both space exploration and energy R&D are important issues and both will return different benefits to the American economy and to society in general. The

President’s FY 2005 budget includes the resources necessary to aggressively pursue

both topics in a manner that is prudent and sustainable.

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ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS

Responses by Sean O’Keefe, Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Questions submitted by Chairman Sherwood Boehlert

Q1a. Please provide the key milestones (e.g., Systems Requirements Review, Preliminary Design Review, Critical Design Review, etc.) along with associated dates

through the first launch for the following initiatives: the lunar robotic mission

planned for 2008; and

A1a. The details of these missions are still being developed, but here is a preliminary schedule thus far:

Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO)

Release of AO for payload 06/04

Receipt of Proposals for Peer Review 09/04

Payload Selection 11/04

Begin Phase A/mission definition 01/05

Systems Requirements Review 03/05

Preliminary Design Review 05/05

Critical Design Review/Confirmation 04/06

LRO Pre-Ship Review 07/08

LRO Launch Readiness Review 09/08

LRO Launch 10/08

Arrival at Moon 10/08

Nominal Measurement Mission 11/08–12/09

(+ goal of up to five-year extension)

The first human mission to the Moon is currently planned for the 2015–2020

timeframe. This mission is highly dependent upon the outcomes of our robotic missions and the development of the Crew Exploration Vehicle; therefore, it is too early

in the process to provide details. NASA will of course keep the Committee apprised

of our progress toward this goal.

Q1b. Please provide the key milestones (e.g., Systems Requirements Review, Preliminary Design Review, Critical Design Review, etc.) along with associated dates

through the first launch for the following initiatives: the human mission to the

Moon, including but not limited to the Crew Exploration Vehicle, planned for

2015.

A1b. The Office of Exploration Systems is formulating the acquisition plan for the

elements of Project Constellation. The following milestones represent significant

events in the next ten years towards a human Lunar mission as early as 2015.

These milestones are for planning purposes only.

June 2004—Two Broad Area Announcements (BAA) for (1) Technology Maturation

and (2) Concept Exploration and Refinement of the Lunar Architecture.

September 2004—Release first draft of Level I Requirements

January 2005—RFP for CEV Design, Development, and Flight Demonstrations

2006—CEV Program Initiation

2008—CEV Risk Reduction Flight Demonstration

2008—CEV Design Review—Select CEV Prime Contractor

2011—CEV Unmanned Flight Demonstration

2014—CEV Manned Flight

Q2. What alternatives exist or could be developed, if any, to the Soyuz capsule for

crew-escape on the Space Station by 2006? If there are none, does the Administration believe a legislative change to the Iran Nonproliferation Act is necessary?

If not, please explain the circumstances under which the Administration plans

to acquire Soyuz capsules in 2006? If a legislative change is necessary, when

does the Administration plan to propose such changes and what is the latest

date by which Congress will need to act?

A2. At this time, NASA has not identified any alternatives to the Soyuz capsule for

crew-escape on the Space Station by 2006. NASA and the Administration are aware

of the provisions of the Iran Nonproliferation Act and will work with the Congress

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to ensure that our strategy for procuring additional Soyuz capsules anytime in the

future is sound and meets all statutory requirements. The Administration is developing its approach at this time.

Q3. If the Space Shuttle must be operated beyond 2010 for any reason, does NASA

plan to abide by the recommendation of the Columbia Accident Investigation

Board and re-certify that it is safe to fly?

What does steps would recertification involve and how much would it cost?

Does either of NASA’s five-year or 20-year budget projection include funds to pay

for re-certification?

A3. Yes, NASA intends to implement the recommendations of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board. NASA is currently reassessing the ISS assembly sequence

to ensure that the Shuttle can be safely retired following assembly of the International Space Station, planned for the end of the decade. To prepare for the contingency that the Shuttle may need to operate beyond 2010, NASA is assessing the

need to recertify Space Shuttle systems, subsystems, or components consistent with

the Vision for Space Exploration and in line with the recommendations of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board. The technical work required to determine

when and if recertification would be needed will continue into this summer. Once

the technical definition of the recertification tasks is completed, cost estimates will

be developed on the items we need to recertify and made available for discussion.

NASA’s budget does not include funds to pay for re-certification.

The budget does, however, include some funding to address safety-enhancing upgrades and maintenance-related component and/or subsystem recertification.

Q4. How much does NASA estimate the first mission will cost and are funds for

these subsequent missions included in the budget projection NASA provided

through 2020? Ref. Robotic Mission to Moon, human missions to Moon. Does the

projection include funds for a lunar descent stage and ascent stage on the first

human mission to the Moon? Does the projection include funds for a base of any

kind on the Moon or any other infrastructure?

A4. NASA is committed to realizing the Vision for Space Exploration without substantial augmentation of NASA’s existing budget. More importantly, NASA will organize its exploration program so that it does not require major new commitments

of funding in future administrations. By leveraging technologies that already exist,

and emphasizing demonstrated performance, NASA will ensure that investments directly lead to mission success.

Mission architecture assessments are currently in work to provide input to the development of Level I mission requirements that will be released in draft form in

September 2004. These Level I Requirements and the acquisition plan for developing the element of Project Constellation are critical to the detailed assessment of

cost. Budget estimates for planning purposes include multiple robotic and human

missions as well as possible Lander, Descent, and Ascent Stages.

NASA is adopting an approach to vehicle and systems development based on the

Defense Department’s ‘‘spiral development’’ model. This approach emphasizes the

use of existing technologies and the incremental demonstration of performance. By

focusing research and test programs on rapid deployment of technologies that can

be evolved, NASA will ensure that it is focused on the capabilities that are most

critical to exploration rather than the most comprehensive designs that are possible.

NASA’s exploration programs will also employ management techniques such as

earned value management, which will ensure that costs are allocated based on strict

planning geared towards national priorities. Through the combination of these techniques and a commitment to managing requirements within budget guidelines,

NASA will make the hard choices needed to realize the Vision for Space Exploration.

Q5. In response to questions from Congressman Bart Gordon, NASA said the Space

Station research program is being re-focused on overcoming the limits to crew

survivability in space due, for example, to radiation and bone loss. NASA said

the budget for this program is roughly $550 million for fiscal year 2004 and will

decline to $427 million by 2009.

Q5a. What is included in these estimates and how did NASA develop these estimates

before developing the program’s agenda?

A5a. The year-by-year ISS research funding through FY 2009 referenced in the

question is an estimated projection of the ISS Research Capabilities (ISSRC) budget

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through FY 2009. On completion of our pending exploration replanning, we will realign the ISSRC budget to complement the replanning.

Our replanning estimates include the following assumptions: (1) we will de-emphasize fundamental research, broadly targeted long-range research and commercially driven research that does not support the priorities. We recognize, however,

that some broad-based fundamental research must continue to be a part of our research portfolio, albeit a significantly smaller portion than before, as it invariably

results in unanticipated breakthroughs that can contribute to the Vision for Space

Exploration; (2) our review of the existing portfolio and plans for changes to that

portfolio has begun internally, but as we progress we will seek the advice of representatives from our research community, such as through our Biological and Physical Research Advisory Council, the Institute of Medicine, and the National Research Council.

Q5b. Why does the amount of funding decline over time?

A5b. As outlined in NASA’s letter to the Committee dated April 7, 2004, the Biological and Physical Research Enterprise (BPRE) is continuing to examine the Enterprise research portfolio and current plans for U.S. research on the International

Space Station (ISS), with the intent to specifically emphasize research projects that

most directly advance the Vision for Space Exploration.

BPRE expects to make specific decisions regarding existing and future research

areas, including each of the U.S. facilities planned for the ISS, in the coming weeks.

The Enterprise expects to continue to manifest many planned facilities. BPRE also

expects to terminate and/or stop work on some activities, including the development

and/or manifesting of selected research facilities, if it is determined that the activities do not contribute significantly to the Vision for Space Exploration, especially

given the limitations on access to ISS during remaining assembly. In some cases,

decisions will affect rack-level facilities, in other cases; decisions will involve multiuser ‘‘inserts’’ that are placed inside rack-level facilities, or experimental pieces

within these inserts. In all cases, it is the intent of BPRE to provide a logical transition strategy and funding for the investigators and students who are impacted by

these changes. At this time, this action is anticipated to conclude the flight hardware terminations derived from the BPRE reprioritization effort, and is expected to

affect approximately three percent of planned FY 2004 BPRE funding. Following determination of relevant termination costs from these pending decisions, BPRE may

propose changes in a future Operating Plan update that would redirect residual

funds toward higher-priority research.

Q6. Please provide the facts and analysis used in making the decision to cancel future servicing missions to the Hubble Space Telescope.

A6. The difficult decision to not proceed with an HST servicing mission using the

Space Shuttle was made after careful review of risk issues following the tragic loss

of the Columbia Space Shuttle and crew. The safety recommendations of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board were used as our guide, along with our progress

in meeting the recommendations in our return-to-flight activities. NASA is now

challenged by safety constraints that are more difficult to address at the orbit of

the HST than at the orbit of the International Space Station. They include the ability to inspect and repair the thermal protection tiles of the Space Shuttle while on

orbit, the ability to provide a place of refuge for the astronauts, and the ability to

have a second Space Shuttle ready to launch should a rescue mission be needed.

When all factors were considered, the combined risk was deemed to high. While

space flight always carries risk, reasonable precautions must be taken to protect our

astronauts.

NASA is proud of the amazing accomplishments of the HST mission. The HST

has met or exceeded all scientific expectations, and has provided the scientific community with a large archive of data that will continue to be maintained for many

years, providing a rich source of new scientific discoveries and results. NASA is now

working hard to find ways to extend the life of the space telescope for years beyond

its planned minimum lifetime of 15 years, even without a Shuttle servicing mission.

Furthermore, NASA is now eagerly studying and considering a robotic mission to

service Hubble. Such a mission could extend Hubble’s mission even beyond the end

of the decade.

Q6a. What plans does NASA have for the instruments developed for the next Hubble

servicing mission?

A6a. If we are indeed able to do a robotic servicing mission, then some of the components of SM–4 might still be used.

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Q7. Some scientists have said that perhaps the most valuable research component

of the Space Station is the Centrifuge, but it has experienced long delays and

technical setbacks.

Q7a. When does NASA expect to fly the Centrifuge to the Space Station?

A7a. Delivery of the CAM to Kennedy Space Center is currently planned to support

a launch to the ISS no earlier than November 2008. We are planning to fly the Centrifuge well before the Space Shuttle is retired in 2010. On July 29, 2003, NASDA

President Yamanouchi confirmed Japan’s commitment to provide a fully capable

Centrifuge on a mutually agreed schedule that takes into account Centrifuge launch

delays as a result of the Columbia tragedy.

Q7b. If it cannot be flown before the Space Shuttle is retired, does NASA have any

backup plans to conduct the research it would have performed?

A7b. NASA has identified six alternatives to the CAM, in the event the Space Shuttle is retired prior to completion of the facility:

Proceed with animal studies on ISS at Microgravity only, as a worst case and assuming fractional gravity will be less harmful

Rely on cellular/tissue studies in smaller scale centrifuges on ISS

Increase reliance on human test subjects on ISS

Design/build NASA centrifuge for ISS

Develop and utilize free flyers

Use the Moon as a research base or develop Moon-based CAM

We are committed to studying these alternatives, although many of them may not

be affordable to implement. The optimal combination in the absence of the CAM is

currently under evaluation. Even with the pursuit of these alternatives, the CAM

still provides unique capabilities:

Ability to simulate a full Mars mission, including (1) long duration microgravity, followed by a period of time at 3/8 gravity; (2) followed by more long duration

microgravity during which we can test bone loss, immunology, and other reactions to gravity changes.

In situ dissections and detailed anatomy, physiology after exposure to fractional

gravity. This information is needed to determine the mechanisms of the observed changes and guide the development of new countermeasures.

Q7c. Would it be possible to develop and fly a Centrifuge as a free flying platform

to perform that research?

A7c. NASA is currently engaged in studying the free flyer option. Thus far our studies indicate that free flyers could be an early complement to ISS research using

small diameter centrifuges with automated procedures for cells and small organisms

to be studied at fractional gravity. However, on-orbit sampling and dissections are

required to answer key questions regarding de-conditioning and adaptation effects,

countermeasure efficacy and interactions. Without sampling and dissections we do

not obtain insight into anatomy or biochemistry, and little physiology. Cost and time

for full program will likely exceed that of the CAM.

Q8. Without the Space Shuttle after 2010, NASA will have to find other ways of delivering cargo to the Space Station as well as bring back experiments to Earth.

Q8a. What are NASA’s plans for cargo delivery and cargo return after 2010?

A8a. NASA is developing an integrated ISS cargo delivery and return strategy consistent with the Vision for Space Exploration and existing law and policy. NASA is

refining ISS cargo and crew rotation requirements based on the Vision and considering a full range of domestic and International Partner transportation options including:

U.S. commercial capabilities;

ISS partner assets such as the European Automated Transfer Vehicle, Japanese

Transfer Vehicle, and Russian Progress and Soyuz vehicles;

Capabilities under definition in the NASA Constellation Program when available.

Q8b. How much funding has NASA assumed it will need to develop or purchase this

capability?

A8b. The FY 2005 budget establishes a new line item in the ISS Program for ISS

to provide for launch, delivery and return to Earth services for ISS crew and cargo.

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Q8c. When does NASA expect to make a decision on how to proceed?

A8c. There are unique challenges associated with each of these access options.

NASA expects to have a preliminary strategy to discuss with Congress in June

2004.

Q9. The proposed plan calls for the Space Shuttle to retire in 2010, yet the Crew Exploration Vehicles first flight with humans on-board won’t occur until 2014.

Therefore, between 2010 and 2014 the U.S. will have no way to fly humans to

space. During the same period, we plan to have astronauts on the Space Station

and we will have to provide a means both for crew transport and crew rescue

in case of an emergency.

How will crews be transported back and forth to the Space Station between 2010

and 2014? Will they have a crew rescue vehicle during this time?

A9. NASA is evaluating the manifest for all flights to the International Space Station. We are conducting the evaluation based on the Vision for Space Exploration,

and on Station assembly, logistics, maintenance, and utilization requirements. We

will complete the evaluation this summer. The evaluation will also include a review

of available and proposed domestic and international vehicles for crew applications.

The Space Shuttle and Soyuz spacecraft are currently the only vehicles safety

rated to transport crews to and from the ISS. NASA will evaluate use of the new

Crew Exploration Vehicle for this purpose when it becomes available and will continue to work with the private sector and our International Partners to safely meet

crew and logistics requirements.

There will always be a crew rescue vehicle docked to the ISS when the orbiting

laboratory is occupied. The Soyuz spacecraft is currently the only vehicle capable

and rated for crew rescue. NASA is working with our international partners to ensure adequate Soyuz spacecraft are available for safe ISS operations. The issue is

being worked across the Partnership.

Q10. How many Shuttle flights are necessary to complete the Space Station?

A10. NASA currently anticipates that it will take between 25–30 Shuttle flights to

complete the ISS.

Q10a. How much slack, if any, is there in the current Shuttle manifest to complete

the Space Station by 2010?

Q10b. If the Shuttle manifest through 2010 is not known, on what grounds did

NASA conclude that the Space Station can be completed by 2010?

A10a&b. NASA is evaluating the current manifest for flights to the ISS in light of

the Vision for Space Exploration. The ISS assembly sequence and final configuration

are being examined, as are the complement of currently available and proposed domestic and international vehicles that are capable of delivering crew and cargo to

and from the ISS, and the predicted Shuttle return to flight date. This evaluation,

which will factor in the historic turn-around time between Shuttle flights, is expected to be complete in the summer and will provide a better idea of how many

Shuttle flights will be needed to complete assembly of the ISS. NASA plans to trade

ISS requirements against launch capabilities to ensure that the Shuttle can be operated safely and the ISS assembly can be completed by the end of the decade, consistent with the Vision for Space Exploration.

Q11. Please explain how NASA plans to implement this portion of the new policy

(‘‘pursue commercial opportunities for providing transportation and other services supporting the Space Station and exploration mission beyond low-Earth

orbit’’)?

A11. NASA will explore opportunities to utilize commercially developed and operated systems to the maximum extent possible to support the logistics infrastructure

of the ISS and other exploration systems. Commercial systems, including launch,

communications, and other end-to-end support services, will be integrated into the

overall logistics planning as they are developed.

Q12. The FY 2005 budget shifts Project Prometheus, NASA’s program to develop nuclear powered propulsion for spacecraft, to the newly created Exploration EnterVerDate 11-MAY-2000 16:41 Oct 01, 2004 Jkt 091691 PO 00000 Frm 00105 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\WORKD\FULL04\021204\91691 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
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prise, and it delays, by several years, the launch of the Jupiter Icy Moons Orbiter.

What is the reason for the delay?

A12. A major reason for the delay is that NASA needs some time to analyze how

investments in Prometheus and the Jupiter Icy Moons Orbiter (JIMO) can be leveraged to support the Vision for Space Exploration. To meet future space exploration

needs, we expect that a more detailed, wider ranging analysis, and possibly more

extensive development of advanced nuclear power and propulsion systems will be

required—beyond that originally envisioned when Project Prometheus and JIMO

were formulated last year. Such analyses and potential future capability development includes, but may not be limited to:

Power and propulsion for advanced robotic missions after JIMO;

Potential surface power for human missions to the Moon and Mars; and

Power and propulsion for the transit of human missions to Mars or other destinations.

To aid in this analysis, NASA has asked the National Research Council to advise

NASA regarding (a) scientific goals and missions that may be enabled uniquely by

nuclear power and propulsion technology and (b) the engineering aspects of the missions identified.

The decision to delay JIMO was also made in light of the need to craft a credible

and responsible NASA budget. Over the next few years, NASA will be returning the

Space Shuttle to flight, completing assembly of the International Space Station, beginning development of a new crew transport system, and conducting vigorous space

science, Earth science, education, and aeronautics programs. The previous schedule

for Prometheus was unaffordable without making large cuts to these other priorities.

Q13. The President’s plan calls on NASA to ‘‘pursue opportunities for international

participation to support U.S. space exploration goals.’’

Q13a. How and when does NASA plan to engage the international community on

its exploration plans?

A13a. NASA has begun informal preliminary discussions with potential partners

and has heard positive reactions thus far. With the recent release of the ‘‘President’s

Commission on Implementation of United States Space Exploration Policy’’ (Aldridge Commission) provides its advice on international cooperation, NASA will

move ahead with pursuing international cooperation.

Q13b. Will NASA develop the plan and then invite international partners to participate, as was done on the International Space Station, or does NASA plan to

involve the international partners in the formulation of the project?

A13b. We expect there will be a mix of approaches based on the specific needs of

individual programs. In many exploration missions that focus on science, there is

already substantial international cooperation which begins in the early stages of a

program.

Q13c. China launched its first astronaut last year. Will NASA seek participation

from China or allow China to participate?

A13c. No country, including China, has been excluded from participation at this

stage. If Chinese participation advances the goals of the vision and is consistent

with broader U.S. policy objectives, NASA will consider it at the appropriate time.

Q14. Does NASA plan to use existing launch systems, such as the Atlas 5 and Delta

4, to implement any aspect of the President’s initiative for human space flight

or will it require the development of a larger ‘‘heavy-lift’’ system?

A14. NASA is developing architectures and requirements necessary to implement

the Vision for Space Exploration. NASA plans to continue to utilize a Mixed Fleet

Launch Strategy to meet space launch requirements, relying on both domestic and

international launch capabilities. As part of the ongoing internal trade studies, capabilities of existing systems, such as the Atlas V, Delta IV, and partner systems,

are being considered, as well as contractor-proposed vehicle enhancements to performance and reliability. Ideas for meeting the to-be-defined space transportation requirements are also being offered by emerging domestic companies.

Q14a. If the answer has not yet been determined, when does NASA expect to have

the information to make that decision?

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A14a. NASA expects to have initial human space flight exploration requirements

and a flexible architecture defined within the next 12 to 18 months. Over the next

12 months, NASA will develop a roadmap that identifies when key decisions need

to be made on investments, including any future launch enhancements/developments, which will be included in future updates to the NASA Integrated Space

Transportation Plan.

Q14b. Do NASA’s five- and 20-year budget projections assume it will be able to use

existing vehicles or do they include the development of a new heavy-lift launch

vehicle?

A14b. The President’s proposed budget for NASA was designed to be sufficient to

allow the execution of the Vision for Space Exploration, whether or not a new heavy

lift launch vehicle is required. NASA is currently defining detailed program requirements, which will determine the necessity of such things as a new heavy lift vehicle.

This information will be used as part of the FY06 budget planning process.

Q15. Does NASA expect to have anything other than full and open competitions for

any contracts involving the Crew Exploration Vehicle? If not please explain.

A15. NASA plans only full and open competitions for the CEV, starting with Broad

Area Announcements (BAA) in June 2004 and an RFP in January 2005. NASA

plans to maintain competition through flight demonstrations in 2008.

Q16. In response to questions from Congressman Bart Gordon, NASA said that a decision about the U.S. government’s role in the Space Station will not be made

until the middle of the next decade. However, NASA’s budget projections

through 2020 show that it no longer plans to support the Space Station after

2016.

Why does NASA’s budget projection make an assumption that NASA as a

whole appears unable to make?

A16. The 2016 budget projection for the Space Station was based on a fifteen-year

operating life after the deployment of the U.S. Laboratory and predates the Vision

for Space Exploration. The ISS end of service life was documented in the Cost Analysis Requirements Description (CARD) approved in May 2002, and will be updated

as requirements for on-orbit research evolve over the life of the program. This is

consistent with the response provided to Congressman Gordon.

Q17. Are Return-To-Flight (RTF) activities budgeted and managed as a separate line

within the Space Shuttle account?

A17. Although Return-to-Flight (RTF) activities are not budgeted as a separate line

item, NASA does manage these funds separately. RTF activities are approved for

implementation by the Space Flight Leadership Council and managed by the Space

Shuttle Program Requirements Control Board (PRCB).

Q17a. If not, what are the criteria for determining which activities should be included in the breakdown of cost estimates provided to the Committee for RTF?

A17a. NASA bases the RTF estimates provided to the Committee on the corrective

actions necessary to address the CAIB recommendations, as well as other ‘‘raising

the bar’’ initiatives, after they have been reviewed and approved by the PRCB.

Q17b. NASA produced the initial RTF cost estimate on October 10, 2003, and provided revised estimates to the Committee on November 17, 2003, and January

30, 2004. Please explain the reason for the increased estimates for these costs,

including details about the assumptions and the technical content that have

changed. What is the basis of estimate for these costs?

A17b. The costs to address RTF activities have increased as new tasks have been

approved, the scope of work for previously approved tasks has increased, and/or cost

estimates have been refined. Although there is a greater level of technical maturity

for RTF activities, engineering requirements are still evolving. Cost estimates therefore remain dynamic, and are still under evaluation. As appropriate and depending

on data available, estimates are based on cost relationships derived from previous

cost histories, cost analogues for similar work, or engineering estimates for components of unique activities, including studies, design efforts, development, production,

integration, certification, verification, implementation and retrofit.

Q17c. Please provide the five-year runout for RTF activities included in the FY05

budget.

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Q17d. Please provide a breakdown of the current estimate for RTF costs, if different

than the FY05 budget levels.

A17c&d.

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Q17e. What affect does the recent schedule slip for RTF to March 2005 have on RTF

costs?

A17e. NASA is reassessing the RTF technical, schedule, and cost requirements as

part of the FY 2006 budget formulation process. Revised cost estimates will be

shown in the periodic releases of the NASA’s Implementation Plan for Space Shuttle

Return to Flight and Beyond, or through separate correspondence if significant

changes are realized prior to a scheduled RTF plan update.

Q18. NASA’s briefing materials include funding for the NASA Engineering and

Safety Center (NESC) along with its RTF cost estimates, however, NESC is

paid for through General and Administrative (G&A) accounts.

Why is NESC funding displayed as part of RTF costs?

A18. NASA has displayed costs associated with the NESC separately from RTF

costs, and identified as ‘‘Other RTF Related.’’ Please note that funding for NESC

is not included in the totalization of RTF costs because the NESC provides comprehensive engineering and safety assessment of all NASA programs and projects,

including the Shuttle. In fact, only a portion of the NESC costs in the first six

months of its existence have been applied to the assessment of Shuttle technical

problems. However, it is fully anticipated that a significant percentage of NESC expenditures in the first several years will be devoted to Shuttle technical problem assessment. Consequently, NASA elected to display costs associated with the NESC

separately from total RTF costs for information and to acknowledge other sizable

investment efforts that are direct outcomes of the Columbia tragedy.

Q19. Does NASA’s budget projection through 2009 assume maintenance and operation of NASA’s current level of infrastructure?

A19. No. NASA’s budget projections for infrastructure repair, maintenance and operation are based on our known infrastructure needs at the time of the projections.

Many facilities have been or are planned to be mothballed or put on ‘‘standby.’’ In

addition, NASA has allocated $10 million per year for FY04 through FY 2007 for

facilities demolition to remove older, excess facilities from our infrastructure base.

And we are also planning to lease out under-utilized facilities to the extent possible,

especially through our recent Enhanced Use Leasing demonstration authority. We

are also implementing an innovative Reliability Centered Maintenance concept at

our Centers to increase facility maintenance efficiency. All those actions help to reduce infrastructure costs, however, NASA’s infrastructure continues to age, and

maintenance and repair costs for remaining infrastructure continue to rise. NASA

is committed to ensuring that our facilities are of the right type and size, are safe,

secure, and environmentally sound, are quality workplaces, and are affordable.

Q19a. Does NASA have any plans to review its infrastructure?

A19a. Yes, NASA has plans to review its infrastructure.

Q19b. If so, what is the schedule for such a review?

A19b. There is a two-fold process in place: First, NASA reviews its infrastructure

yearly during budget preparations. The need for existing facilities, as well as the

condition of those facilities, is analyzed as part of the budget process. Second, NASA

is conducting a Real Property Mission Analysis (RPMA) which is reviewing all

NASA real property with an independent, mission-driven, top-down process to develop the proper balance of real property as it supports NASA’s vision and mission.

The RPMA team was formed in February 2004 and has been conducting data gathering and site visits. The RPMA is expected to conclude no earlier than December

2004. Implementation of approved recommendations will depend on the scope of

those recommendations.

Q20. The current Progress vehicle manifest indicates that only three flights are

planned this year rather than the four previously agreed to by the Multilateral

Coordination Board (MCB). What is the rationale for this change?

What effect would a Progress mission failure have on the Space Station program?

A20. Within a month of the Space Shuttle Columbia accident, the ISS Multilateral

Coordination Board (MCB) approved a near-term ISS operations plan that would

allow the Partnership to maintain a continued crew presence on the ISS until the

Space Shuttle is able to return to flight. Among other things, the plan approved as

a goal that the Russian Progress flight schedule be accelerated to support crew and

ISS consumable needs until the Space Shuttle returns to flight. Since late February

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2003, the near-term operations plan has been continuously reviewed and updated

as required. Modifying this operations plan to reflect improved conditions is a normal part of ISS operations and does not require MCB approval.

The key constraint driving the near-term ISS operations plan has been projected

consumable usage with water being the limiting item. However, actual water usage

has been less than predicted. The NASA and Russian program management staffs

have on-going technical discussions to determine a revised Progress schedule based

on actual experience to date with on-orbit consumables. Consumables are managed

so that the loss of a Progress resupply mission would not require immediate decrewing of the Station. Procedures exist for orderly de-crewing of the ISS should this

be required. The need to implement this response will be dictated by the state of

consumables aboard the ISS. Efforts to accelerate the next supply vehicle launch

would probably be conducted in parallel with preparation for de-crewing if a

Progress mission failure were to occur and consumables were critical.

Q21. One of the fundamental questions in space policy is how much risk we should

ask astronauts to assume. The Shuttle is being discontinued because of its

risks; the Hubble mission was canceled because of its risks. How will the risks

of a lunar landing compare with those of current activities?

A21. Project Apollo made six successful lunar landings in six attempts (Apollo XIII

did not attempt a lunar landing) between 1969 and 1972. That record was made

with 1960s technology. It is NASA’s expectation that, with 21st century technology

and the experience gained in all aspects of space activity since the time of Apollo,

the risk of lunar landing will be significantly less than it was in the 1960s/1970s.

Our Level 1 requirements for the development of lunar systems should reflect this

expectation. All the trade studies being done to develop the lunar mission requirements are specifically determining which system hazards to the crew and vehicle

are associated with each part of the mission and how those hazards can be mitigated through vehicle design and technology advancements.

Q21a. How about the risks of longer-term activities on the Moon, or a landing on

Mars?

A21a. A Mars mission should pose a similar risk to the crew as a long ISS mission

combined with a lunar exploration mission, with the exception that there will be no

quick abort-back-to-Earth capability that one has with ISS and lunar missions. As

a result, there will be added emphasis on flight system safety and reliability and

on-board medical care to handle crew injury/illness risks. NASA’s Exploration Systems Enterprise is conducting trade studies to determine the optimum system configuration for both the lunar surface missions and the Mars missions. Integral to

these trade studies is an assessment of the extent to which the architecture will ensure safety for all mission phases. This includes identifying mission and crew health

risks and system hazards, abort options for all mission phases, and system design

redundancy and reliability.

Q21b. What risks will astronauts be asked to assume as participants in the new biological experiments that are planned for the Space Station?

A21b. Space Station crew members will be asked to assume minimal or reasonable

risk as participants in biomedical/biological experiments. The definition of Minimal

Risk is ‘‘the probability and magnitude of harm or discomfort anticipated in the research are not greater in and of themselves than those ordinarily encountered in

daily life or during the performance of routine physical or psychological examinations or tests’’ (from 45 CFR 46.102(i)). The definition of Reasonable Risk is ‘‘the

probability and magnitude of harm or discomfort anticipated in the research are

greater in and of themselves than those ordinarily encountered in daily life or during the performance of routine physical or psychological examinations or tests, but

the risks of harm or discomfort are considered acceptable when weighed against the

anticipated benefits and the importance of the knowledge to be gained from the research’’ (from JSC 20483). Minimal risk and reasonable risk judgments for clinical

research have been used for many years. These applications, which are utilized by

our Institutional Review Board process (now Committee for the Protection of

Human Subjects), have also been in place for many years. A consistent process has

and will be applied to ISS.

The astronauts will be volunteers who will be fully informed regarding (1) the nature of the research to be performed on them, and (2) the probable risks. Most of

the studies performed will be in the ‘‘Minimal Risk’’ category. A few studies will be

in the ‘‘Reasonable Risk’’ category. It is important to note that the research will benefit the astronaut research subject directly by either acting as a countermeasure or

by better defining the risk to human health resulting from space flight.

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Q21c. What is NASA’s overall philosophy as to what constitutes acceptable risk?

A21c. There are four major categories of risk that NASA is faced with: (I) safety

and health risk to the public, (II) safety and health occupational risk (risk to astronauts and other NASA and contractor workforce), (III) risk to high-value property,

and (IV) programmatic risk.

In NASA Procedural Requirements (NPR) 7120.5B, NASA Program and Project

Management Processes and Requirements, November 21, 2002, risk is defined as

follows:

Risk. The combination of (1) the probability (qualitative or quantitative) that a

program or project will experience an undesired event such as cost overrun, schedule slippage, safety mishap, compromise of security, or failure to achieve a needed

technological breakthrough; and (2) the consequences, impact, or severity of the

undesired event were it to occur.

Acceptable risk is defined in the same document as follows:

Acceptable Risk. The risk that is understood and agreed to by the program/project,

GPMC [Governing Program Management Council], Enterprise, and other customer(s) sufficient to achieve the defined success criteria within the approved level

of resources.

This is how NASA defines acceptable risk in a programmatic context. It is this

definition of acceptable risk that would ultimately apply to the development of new

Exploration systems. More specific (quantitative) requirements for acceptable risk

will be found in the requirements documents for specific flight systems, such as the

Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV). These requirements will affect the risk to crew

members, as well as the risk to people and property external to the flight systems.

In situations where the public or other external stakeholders are involved or affected, it is NASA’s policy to augment the concept of acceptable risk to include risk

that is acceptable to the broader group(s) of affected stakeholders. In many of these

cases, ensuring that risk is maintained below threshold levels of acceptability dictated by compliance with federal, state, local, or other specific types of requirements

may satisfy risk acceptability for these affected groups. From a safety standpoint,

NASA will ensure that the risk to the general public and foreign countries will be

no greater than that for conventional aircraft flying overhead, as referenced in Legislative History, 81st Congress, p. 1235.

Q22. What milestones for assessment are built into the major aspects of the exploration initiative? At what point should NASA and the Congress re-examine the

initiative, particularly CEV development, to determine whether it is appropriate to proceed to completion?

A22. The acquisition plan for the CEV and other elements of Project Constellation

builds in decision milestones as follows:

Milestone A initiates the technology maturation and concept design phase of the

program.

Milestone B initiates development after successful completion of the System Requirements Review and a System Design Review.

Milestone C initiates final design certification.

This milestone process will occur in a phased approach to all Project Constellation

elements, starting with the Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV). NASA intends to utilize an evolutionary acquisition approach that approves entrance to the next step

of development when requirements for that phase (entrance criteria) are fully developed.

Q23. How likely is it that we will know enough about the effects of radiation and

lack of gravity by 2016, when NASA apparently plans to stop using the Space

Station?

A23. The ISS has a number of U.S. and Russian devices, both active and passive,

for monitoring radiation on the Station. In addition to the on-board monitoring capability, we rely on real-time monitoring and forecasting data from the NOAA Space

Environment Center. These data provide an early warning for proton fluxes and

other radiation events, and allows us to take steps to mitigate crew exposure. In

this way, we continue to build our essential data record on space radiation.

Q23a. How would research be conducted after that point?

A23a. We will continue to perform a range of experiments on Earth in conjunction

with the measurements that monitor the radiation aboard the ISS. To ensure the

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safety of spacecraft crews, NASA biologists and physicists will perform thousands

of experiments at the new NASA Space Radiation Laboratory (NSRL) commissioned

at the Department of Energy’s (DOE) Brookhaven National Laboratory in Upton,

N.Y. This laboratory, built in cooperation between NASA and DOE, is one of the

few facilities that can simulate the harsh space radiation environment. With approximately 80 investigators conducting research annually, the NSRL will enable us

to triple the ability of researchers to perform radiobiology experiments and the resulting science knowledge in the coming years and beyond our use of the ISS.

Questions submitted by Representative Bart Gordon

Q1. What did the President ask you about the costs of the President’s space initiative, and how did you respond?

A1. The exploration vision is affordable in both the short-term and the long run.

NASA’s FY 2005 budget request is fiscally responsible and consistent with the Administration’s goal of reducing the budget deficit by over 50 percent within the next

five years. The budget strategy supporting the exploration vision places a premium

on avoiding balloon payments for future Congresses and Administrations. Unlike

previous major civil space initiatives, the approach is intentionally flexible, with adjustable exploration milestones and investments in sustainable exploration approaches to maintain affordability.

Q2. How much do you estimate it will cost to achieve a human lunar landing by

2020, and what assumptions are included in that estimate?

A2. NASA has developed a budget projection through 2020 to define the resources

that will be available to achieve the vision for space exploration, as shown in table

below [sand chart]. The first five years are based on the details contained in the

President’s FY 2005 Budget request, and fiscal years 2010–2020 are based on roughly inflationary growth. NASA has taken the unusual step of projecting the budget

beyond five years to demonstrate the exploration vision’s sustained and affordable

approach, which redirects resources within NASA and does not require balloon payments beyond the normal five-year budget horizon.

The President’s five-year FY 2005–2009 budget request establishes necessary

groundwork for the execution of the exploration vision. Proposed near-term investments are focused on technology risk reduction and flight experiments as well as

robotic missions throughout solar system.

The table below shows a rough estimate for the cost of the exploration initiative

through 2020 including the initial human lunar landing sometime between 2015

and 2020. Projections for the blue ‘‘Exploration Missions’’ wedge over the period FY

2010–2020 total approximately $103 billion and include both human and robotic exploration activities. Human lunar activities over this time period including the initial landing and subsequent activities represent about half of this total. This represents a bounding estimate based on experience and actual costs from relevant elements of the Apollo program. The estimate does not reflect architecture studies, design analysis, new technologies, and innovative approaches yet to be undertaken. It

also does not reflect that the vision, unlike Apollo, views the lunar landing not as

an end in itself, but as one step in a sustained human and robotic program to explore the solar system and beyond.

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110

Q3. As was agreed at the hearing, please provide a breakdown of what programs are

included in each of the wedges of the ‘‘sand chart’’ displayed at the hearing.

A3.

Q4. As was agreed at the hearing, please provide the total funding included within

the blue ‘‘Exploration Missions’’ wedge over the period FY 2010–2020. Is it accurate, as you seemed to say at the hearing, that the funding within this wedge

does equate with the funding necessary to achieve the President’s lunar objectives, including human missions to the Moon by 2020. If that is true, what components of these lunar objectives (e.g., a lunar lander) are not encompassed within the blue wedge?

A4. Projections for the blue ‘‘Exploration Missions’’ wedge over the period FY 2010–

2020 total approximately $103 billion and include both human and robotic exploration of the Moon and robotic exploration of Mars, other solar system destinations,

and beyond. As stated in the response to Question 2 above, this level of funding represents a bounding estimate based on experience and actual costs from relevant elements of the Apollo program. The estimate does not reflect architecture studies, design analysis, new technologies, and innovative approaches yet to be undertaken. It

also does not reflect that the vision, unlike Apollo, views the lunar landing not as

an end in itself, but as one step in a sustained human and robotic program to explore the solar system and beyond.

Q5. If certain of the programs in the President’s initiative wind up costing more than

you expect, will you ask for more money, propose additional cuts to other activities, or stretch out the timeline?

A5. NASA intends to pursue the President’s Vision for Space Exploration within the

funding projections in the FY 2005 budget request. As we learn more and refine our

cost estimates, the scope of our planned activities and schedule may be adjusted to

be consistent with funding projections, while still meeting the vision put forth by

the President.

Q6. In response to a written question asking whether the Administration plans to

transfer any current NASA activities or programs to other agencies or the private sector over the next five years, you did not deny that possibility. Instead you

stated, ‘‘Some programmatic decisions are still under consideration and will be

announced at the appropriate time.’’

Q6a. What specific ‘‘programmatic decisions’’ are under consideration?

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Q6b. What activities or programs are being considered for transfer to other agencies

or to the private sector?

A6a&b. There are no programs currently identified for transfer to other agencies

or to the private sector. NASA will review the recently released report of the President’s Commission on Implementation of United States Space Exploration Policy

with respect to such possible considerations.

Q7. One of the significant policy decisions embedded in the President’s plan is the

decision to terminate the Shuttle program years before a replacement vehicle will

be available. Basically, that means we will be dependent on the Russians for getting our astronauts into space. Leaving aside the question of the Iran Nonproliferation Act, why does it make sense to rely on Russia to provide access to

space for American astronauts for a number of years?

A7. Development of a new U.S. crewed space system will cost billions of dollars.

Until the Shuttle—which costs over $4 billion per year to operate—is retired, funding available within NASA’s budget for developing the new crew exploration vehicle

(CEV) is limited. Speeding up the schedule for CEV availability would either require

large increases to NASA’s budget, or drastic cuts to other NASA programs. Extending the operational life of the Shuttle also does not solve the problem—each year

the Shuttle continues operating past 2010 is another year that billions of dollars are

not available for CEV development, resulting in delays to CEV availability. For

these reasons, we believe that the only affordable approach to transitioning between

the Shuttle and CEV is to rely on others to launch U.S. astronauts during the period between Shuttle retirement and CEV availability.

The ISS Program is currently reviewing plans for assembly completion and operations as part of the FY 2006 budget formulation activity. Crew transport to/from

the ISS after Shuttle retirement is a consideration in this effort. Discussions with

our international partners concerning how to best proceed with ISS operations in

light of the decision to retire the Shuttle will be held in summer 2004. If the decision is made to use Russian crew transport services, we will be working with a reliable partner. In the wake of the Columbia accident, Russia has provided, consistent

with partnership agreements, Soyuz flights to transport crews and Progress vehicles

to ferry supplies to the ISS during the current hiatus in Shuttle flights.

Q8. The February 7, 2004 edition of the New York Times reported that the NASA

engineer who had written a pair of internal assessments of the risk of the

Hubble servicing mission that were at odds with your justification for canceling

the mission ‘‘declined to be identified for fear of losing his job.’’ That is a very

troubling indication that the NASA culture, as described by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board as one that discouraged dissent, still exists. What specific steps have you taken to ensure that the employee will face no reprisals for

his/her actions, and what assurance have you given that employee—and all

NASA employees and contractors—that you consider such dissent healthy and

welcome?

A8.

Background

NASA had begun to address issues of ‘‘culture’’ before the Columbia accident.

Even as the 2002 Federal Human Capital Survey results identified NASA as one

of the best places to work in the Federal Government, a grassroots effort was underway to explore issues within the NASA culture that, if addressed, could improve the

Agency’s effectiveness and performance.

In July 2002, a team of NASA and contractor employees began working to assess

the feasibility and define the action plan needed to create a more highly unified

NASA organization. This One NASA team set out to formulate a set of specific recommendations for organizational and cultural change, emphasizing teamwork and

collaboration across the Agency, which would elevate NASA to a new level of effectiveness and performance.

The CAIB issued its report in August 2003, a mere seven months after the tragic

loss of Columbia and her crew, and found that NASA’s history and culture contributed as much to the Columbia accident as any technical failure. This is explicitly

identified in the Organizational Cause Statement found in Chapter 7 of the report.

This chapter gave us a very candid look into our organizational culture and provided

us with a great opportunity to take a deeper look at our culture, to look at those

aspects that are positive and also those that need improvement, and to take action

to achieve positive, long-lasting change at NASA.

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Progress and Actions

Safety Climate and Culture Survey

Based upon the CAIB report and our desire to place even greater attention on

moving to a more effective culture, we felt it would be beneficial to engage external

expertise to assist us in developing and deploying an organization plan for culture

change at NASA. To this end, on February 9, 2004, NASA awarded a contract to

Behavioral Science Technology, Inc. (BST), an organization with specific expertise

and proven track record helping organizations achieve safety excellence through culture transformation and leadership development.

The first part of BST’s effort involved establishing a baseline of our culture by

administering a Safety Climate and Culture Survey. BST delivered the final survey

results, along with a recommended implementation plan for NASA to achieve positive improvements in its culture, in a report entitled, Assessment and Plan for Organizational Culture Change at NASA, which is available on the NASA HQ website

(http://www.nasa.gov/about/highlights/index.html).

The results of the survey support NASA’s legacy of technical excellence, teamwork, and pride, indicating that we are strong in areas such as teamwork, work

group relations, approaching coworkers about safety concerns, and reporting incidents or deviations that affect safety. The survey also identifies important safety

and organizational issues that must be addressed before we can initiate positive

changes within the agency. There is a general perception that the organization as

a whole does not show concern for the needs of employees. There is also a perception

that there are deficiencies in the quality and quantity of upward communication

about safety issues.

While these issues are similar to those highlighted in the Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report, this Assessment and Plan for Organizational Culture

Change at NASA has given us specific data to assess organizational functioning

down to the directorate level, as well as a specific plan of action for improving these

aspects of our culture.

Implementation Plan

One of the first steps of this plan will be for the core leadership team to validate

and embrace NASA’s Core Values. These values will drive the culture change effort.

The plan also calls for focused change-related activities to take place at a specific

Centers and Directorates, with the aim of achieving measurable results in five

months.

These activities will first take place at Glenn Research Center, the Engineering

and Mission Operations Directorates at Johnson Space Center, the Safety and Mission Assurance Directorates at Goddard Space Flight Center and Kennedy Space

Center, and at Stennis Space Center. Activities at these locations will include leadership practices assessments, development of individual action plans for Center

leadership, behavioral observation and feedback, and behavior-based project team

effectiveness training.

Additionally, in the next months, BST will assist each Center in developing Center-specific implementation plans to achieve positive cultural improvements, driven

from NASA’s core values, while accommodating the unique needs of each Center.

At the end of five months, we will use specific data and feedback to determine

if measurable progress has been achieved, including whether NASA leadership has

adopted behaviors that support the desired culture. Once measurable progress has

been achieved and the processes used to achieve forward progress have been validated, NASA plans an agency-wide deployment of the above-mentioned approach.

In addition to specific implementation steps we can undertake to achieve positive

change in our culture, the plan also emphasizes the need for a single culture change

initiative that integrates existing activities where appropriate but minimizes the

proliferation of multiple approaches, philosophies, models, methods, and terminology. This culture change effort that NASA is undertaking will serve as an integration point to ensure that all the Agency’s ongoing efforts related to culture

change are aligned in a manner conducive to a comprehensive organizational culture

change.

Culture Change Efforts and NASA OmBuds Program

A very important aspect of this culture change effort is to create an environment

in which it is routine to actively solicit the minority opinion, enabling employees to

feel comfortable raising safety concerns to their supervisors and Center and Agency

management. In part, this will be achieved through focusing on helping managers

and supervisors maintain an effective balance between task orientation and relationship orientation. The survey results and assessment indicate that at NASA,

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usual for technical organizations. However, strong task orientation at the expense

of relationship orientation can lead to inhibition of upward communication. By taking steps to help managers and supervisors improve their balance between task and

relationship orientation, NASA can move toward a culture where people really feel

free to speak up without retribution.

In addition to the culture change effort, on January 27, 2004, the NASA Administrator announced the establishment of NASA’s Ombuds Program, empowering

Ombuds at each NASA Center and Headquarters to listen to and act on employees’

concerns related to safety, organizational performance and mission success. The

Ombuds are designed to serve as a safety valve when employees feel regular channels for raising issues and concerns are not working effectively. Each Ombuds has

the ability to raise issues directly with Center Directors, and at Headquarters with

the Deputy Administrator. The Assistant Administrator for Institutional and Corporate Management leads the program, and names of the designated Center

Ombuds were provided to the NASA workforce.

Question submitted by Representative Todd Akin

Q1. As you well know there has been a significant public outcry to save the space

telescope from the general public, but I have also heard that some in the scientific community are very concerned about the impact to real scientific research

capability that the loss of the Hubble Space Telescope (HST) may cause. Even

though ground based telescope technology continues to advance, notably in

adaptive optics to help combat the blurring effects of the Earth’s atmosphere on

astronomical observations, the HST still provides far greater resolution over

greater fields of view than any ground telescope. The HST also provides tremendous ultraviolet capability that does not exist with Earth based scopes. Many astronomers consider the HST’s Ultra-Violet (UV) capability very valuable. For example, I am told that UV light typically radiates from extremely hot, dynamic

phenomena, such as the cores of active galaxies, quasars, energetic stars and

vast disks of dust around black holes. Given the superior resolution and unique

UV capabilities of the HST do we not risk the loss of a significant research capability with the retirement of the HST? Are there any alternatives to recapture

this UV capability when HST ceases to function?

A1. The Hubble Space Telescope has made tremendous contributions to astronomical discovery, and it continues to produce world-class scientific results. Hubble was

designed for a nominal mission length of at least 15 years, a milestone that will be

reached in 2005. Within this span, Hubble has reached or exceeded every one if its

scientific and technical goals and expectations. NASA plans to extend Hubble’s mission for several more years by judicious use of the telescope’s battery power and

pointing capability, and possibly by a robotic servicing mission, which is currently

under study. As a result of extensive planning and advice from the astronomical

community, NASA also has over 30 newer space astronomy and physics missions

in operation or in development; these will continue to support a vigorous national

and international astronomical research program. Hubble is the first of NASA’s four

‘‘Great Observatories,’’ Hubble has capabilities at visible, infrared, and ultraviolet

wavelengths.

The other three Great Observatories include the Chandra X–Ray Telescope, the

Compton Gamma-Ray Observatory, and the infrared Spitzer Space Telescope.

Compton’s mission is completed, and Chandra and Spitzer are in the prime phase

of their missions, producing astounding results.

Energetic phenomena such as active galaxies, energetic stars, and material

around black holes are often best observe at X–Ray wavelengths, studied with

Chandra and other telescopes like XMM–Newton. Many other space telescopes with

various wavelength capabilities are also planned or in operation. In visible light

wavelengths, Hubble still provides the best resolution and sensitivity available for

many types of observations. However, in recent years, large ground-based observatories (such as the Keck telescopes) have developed remarkable capabilities for precision observations in visible and infrared light, employing larger telescope apertures and innovative techniques. For example, at infrared wavelengths, the use of

Adaptive Optics on ground-based telescopes can now achieve a precision comparable

to that of Hubble. For studies at ultraviolet (UV) wavelengths, a space-based capability is required. It is likely that the ultraviolet capability of Hubble will be maintained even longer than that of some other wavelengths such as infrared, due to the

lower power consumption required. Two other NASA missions in addition to Hubble

are also currently available for observations at ultraviolet wavelengths: GALEX and

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FUSE. FUSE performs precision spectroscopic studies, and GALEX allows ultraviolet imaging over fields of view larger than that seen by Hubble.

Future large astronomy missions (including wavelength coverage of those missions) are planned in concert with prioritization efforts of the scientific community,

such as the Decadal Surveys of the National Research Council. For example, the

highest priority for large space-based astronomy missions in the latest decadal survey is for the highly sensitive observations at infrared wavelengths that will be

achieved by NASA’s James Webb Space Telescope, due to launch in 2011. Future

moderate-size missions for ultraviolet and other wavelength observations can be realized through NASA’s highly successful and competitive Explorer program. NASA

is also currently soliciting and receiving ideas from the community for larger missions at any wavelength range.

NASA’s regular strategic planning process gets underway this year, and through

this process the proposals and expertise of the scientific community are employed

to help set priorities for future NASA astronomy missions.

Questions submitted by Representative Nick Lampson

Q1. In order to free up money for the President’s initiative, the budget plan would

basically lump Earth Science, Aeronautics, Education, some parts of Space

Science, and some parts of Biological and Physical Research together in an account whose purchasing power, according to one of the charts describing the

President’s initiative, will decline by some 40 percent over the next fifteen years.

That means that any increase in any one of those program areas will necessitate

cuts to one or more of the other areas—while the total pot of real dollars continues to decline.

Q1a. Is the plan to slowly starve those other programs for resources until NASA can

terminate its involvement in them?

Q1b. If not, what is the rationale for that funding approach?

A1a&b. NASA is not changing its fundamental account structure in the manner

suggested by the question. The proposed Exploration, Science and Aeronautics account contains the same key research elements as todays Science, Aeronautics and

Exploration account: Space Science, Earth Science, Biological and Physical Science,

Aeronautics and Education. Further, this account is not separate from the vision—

rather, some of these elements are critical to the new vision.

NASA is committed to its full mission and will continue to invest in all of these

important areas. The chart below shows the prospective budget for NASA beyond

our five-year horizon. This figure, which has been widely distributed, illustrates

NASA’s public plan to conduct the vision in both the short-term and the long-term

without large NASA budget increases. In this chart, the activities described in the

question do not decline, but rather are shown as increasing at an inflationary level

beyond the five-year budget horizon, maintaining their relative purchasing power

within the entire NASA budget.

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Q2. In order to fund the Presidents initiative, cuts, deferrals, and cancellations will

be made to a wide range of NASA programs.

Q2a. Did you offer to make such cuts in order to fund the Presidents initiative, or

were you directed to make such cuts? If the latter, who directed you to make

them?

A2a. The NASA budget process evaluated and selected programs with respect to

four key principles:

Compelling—The programs fully support the Vision for U.S. Space Exploration or

provide for ongoing NASA mission priorities such as Aeronautics and Earth Science

in accordance with the NASA Strategic Plan.

Affordable—The programs are part of a budget that is fiscally responsible and consistent with the Administration’s goal of cutting the federal deficit in half within

the next five years.

Achievable—The programs will not require large balloon payments by future Congresses and Administrations.

Focused—The exploration vision provides the needed compass with which to evaluate our programs and make the required tough decisions.

Q2b. Why are the science and aeronautics programs that have been cut, deferred, or

canceled considered a lower priority than the President’s Initiative?

A2b. The Vision for Space Exploration challenges NASA to implement a sustained

and affordable human and robotic program for the exploration of the solar system

and beyond. This challenge also requires changes in the research agenda of the

International Space Station to intensify the emphasis on understanding how space

environments affect astronaut health and capabilities as well as the development of

effective countermeasures. We recognize the importance of basic research that can

uniquely be pursued on the ISS as a part of our research portfolio, as it both informs applied mission-driven research and invariably results in unanticipated

breakthroughs that can contribute to the exploration agenda. We plan to emphasize

research on the ISS that will support the Nation’s new exploration agenda. Life

science research conducted by NASA will not only benefit future manned space missions, but will also lead to the improvement of life here on Earth, including applications in medicine, agriculture, industrial biotechnology, and environmental management.

Earth science research remains a priority for NASA. Although some new projects

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lion annually, representing a significant Administration priority. NASA remains the

largest federal contributor to the Climate Change Research Initiative. Approximately 40 percent of the FY05 Earth Science budget will go towards research on

data from 80 sensors supported by NASA’s 18 Earth-observing satellites. NPOESS

Preparatory Project (NPP), used to harness NASA satellite data for global climate

change observations, increased funding by 36 percent for FY 2005. The Orbiting

Carbon Observatory (OCO), which relies on space-based platforms to measure atmospheric levels of carbon dioxide that generate data for the enforcement of emissions standards, was increased by 37 percent in FY 2005.

NASA’s budget for Structure and Evolution of the Universe averages $400 million

annually over the next five years. The budget for Sun-Earth Connection ramps up

to $1 billion over the next five years. While some previously planned work has been

deferred, these activities remain significant strategic objectives of the Agency.

Aeronautics funding remains a priority for NASA, and has not been reduced as

a result of the Vision for Space Exploration. A minor dip in the budget in FY 2005

represents a planned project completion in FY 2004. In addition, in FY 2004 Congress added $88 million for Congressional earmarks, which are not reflected in the

FY 2005 budget request for NASA..

Q3. After the Shuttle program ends in 2010, Russia will have a monopoly in providing crew transport to and from the Space Station. How will you ensure access

to Soyuz vehicles at a reasonable price?

A3. The ISS Partnership is currently engaged in detailed discussions on the selection of an ISS configuration. As part of this process, the Partnership is assessing

any implications to the program resulting from the new U.S. Vision for Space Exploration, including retirement of the Space Shuttle. (The Shuttle is slated for retirement upon completion of Station, which is planned for 2010.) In the event that any

acquisition of Soyuz services from Russia are required to fulfill U.S. obligations to

the international partnership it will be conducted in accordance with the U.S. Federal Acquisition Regulations and all other applicable U.S. laws and regulations. As

with past acquisitions for the ISS program from Russian sources, the reasonableness of the price will be a central part of the negotiations.

Q3a. The President has basically told the civil servants and contractors working on

the Shuttle program that their jobs will be gone in six years. The best employees will start leaving first. Yet the Shuttle still has to fly safely over that entire

period (some 25 to 30 flights). What is your plan for ensuring that you will

retain the critical skills and focus needed to fly the Shuttle safely in the midst

of such change?

A3a. Our contractors have the requirement to hire appropriately skilled personnel

or train them to meet all the conditions of the contracts. They have been hiring or

training to meet and maintain our skill level requirements and this trend is anticipated to continue. As the Space Shuttle program nears retirement, we fully anticipate that aerospace technician employment opportunities will continue with NASA,

driven in part by the Vision for Space Exploration and the continuing need to support the International Space Station.

NASA understands the challenges of maintaining an incentivized workforce as the

Shuttle Program phases down. We are beginning to develop a plan to ensure that

the skills required to maintain a safe and reliable fleet are in place until the last

Space Shuttle flight has completed its mission.

The retirement of the Space Shuttle is not the end of the space program but rather the beginning of an opportunity to transition a highly skilled workforce into programs requiring their skills and challenging their creativity. We believe, at the appropriate time, these workers who have Shuttle experience will be able to continue

to work with NASA on new programs requiring their unique skills.

Q3b. How much do you estimate it will cost?

A3b. While we currently do not anticipate increased costs associated with maintaining critical skills as the Space Shuttle program draws down, there are still too many

unknowns at this point.

Q3c. If you do not know now, when will you have such a plan and cost estimate completed?

A3c. As noted above, we are just beginning to develop a plan to ensure that we

maintain the critical skills and focus necessary to safely fly the Shuttle until its retirement. At this time, we cannot provide an estimate of when the plan and cost

estimate will be complete.

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Q4. After the Shuttle is retired in 2010, there will be no way to get any major pieces

of failed Space Station hardware back to Earth to be repaired and refurbished.

Since that had been the maintenance and repair philosophy for the Space Station, how much will you have to spend acquiring sufficient ‘‘throwaway’’ spare

parts? Where is that ‘‘book-kept’’ in the Space Station budget?

A4. Based on the Vision for Space Exploration, NASA is refining its projections for

ISS cargo and crew support (including spare parts). This activity is being done in

concert with developing an integrated strategy for using a range of domestic and

international assets for transportation to and from the Station. Once a comparison

is made between future logistics needs and the capabilities of existing and potential

transportation assets, NASA will determine if additional spares will be required,

what their projected cost will be, and whether the costs can be accommodated within projected program budget reserves.

Q5. The President’s plan does not set any timetable for sending humans to Mars.

Based on your assumed inflationary growth budget plan and all of the lunar

activities you have planned, what is the earliest date at which a human mission

to Mars would be possible from a budgetary standpoint?

A5. Before the timeline for a human mission to Mars can be established, a number

of steps must be completed. First, to get the range of possible dates, architectural

concepts will have to be developed based on extensive and rigorous trade studies.

Second, to narrow the possible dates, many scientific, risk-reduction, and technology

demonstration missions will have to be conducted.

Multiple architectural concepts for conducting a human Mars mission are currently under development. These options will identify trade studies and options for

conducting precursor robotic or human demonstrations in relevant environments including the Lunar surface. New concepts will be developed by soliciting ideas from

industry, academia, NASA, and other sources. Mission concepts will be scientific and

discovery driven, and will maximize the potential of robots and humans working together towards the Vision for Space Exploration.

Many important steps will be taken along the way to Mars, including development flights of a new Crew Exploration Vehicle, robotic missions to the Moon, and

human missions to the Moon. In parallel, robotic missions to Mars will continue to

identify key scientific goals for future human missions. Robotic missions to Mars in

this decade include the Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter (MRO) in 2005, and the

telecom orbiter and Mars Science Laboratory (MSL) in 2009. Mars sample return

missions and the ‘‘Safe on Mars’’ missions are planned for the following decade. As

these precursor missions evolve, their results in terms of technology demonstrations

will enable the establishment of the timeline for a human mission to Mars.

Q6. When will the permanent ISS crew be expanded beyond three people to support

the restructured research agenda? Your response to Mr. Gordon’s written question on that topic states: ‘‘We fully anticipate increasing the crew size beyond

three when feasible, in order to increase the ISS’s research productivity.’’ What

does ‘‘when feasible’’ mean? What determines when it is feasible?

A6. There are two critical factors to growth beyond three crew; these are life support and crew rescue capability. Crew rescue for a crew greater than three will require a second Soyuz spacecraft docked to the ISS. Continued provision of the Soyuz

is an issue that is being worked across the Partnership and has several solution

paths.

The current Environmental Control and Life Support (ECLSS) system on-orbit is

capable of maintaining three crew. To grow beyond three crew, additional ECLSS

capacity and habitability elements are required. NASA has been continuing development of regenerative ECSLS elements to meet this requirement.

NASA is presently evaluating the options for launch and on-orbit accommodation

of the regenerative ECLSS and habitability elements. These studies will be concluded in the fall of 2004 with the selection of a feasible assembly sequence option,

which includes capability for growth beyond three crew.

Q7. Under your plan, a Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) capable of carrying humans

into low-Earth orbit won’t be available for another 10 years. It only took eight

years to get humans to the Moon in the 1960s. Before NASA suspended the Orbital Space Plane (OSP) program, you were saying that you thought the OSP

could be ready to carry humans into low-Earth orbit in six years.

The pace of the CEV program seems to be driven solely by the budget, especially

since the development funding is largely flat over the next five years. Is that accurate? If not, why does it take ten years to develop the CEV?

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A7. The budget phasing will impact the CEV schedule, but NASA is committed to

realizing the Vision for Space Exploration without substantial augmentation of

NASA’s existing budget. More importantly, NASA will organize its exploration program so that it does not require major new commitments of funding in future administrations. The success of the CEV, in respect to capability and affordability, is

significantly driven by the development of sound requirements from the beginning.

The CEV will be one critical element in an overall transportation architecture that

must work together as a system of systems to support long-range goals for human

exploration. Architecture studies and the process of developing requirements will define the CEV interfaces and its relationship to the many supporting elements of the

exploration transportation system. The budget phasing supports this process. The

CEV program will start in 2006, with the initiation of the design and development

process towards the first human flight in 2014. Selection of a single concept for detailed design and development will occur in 2008.

Q8. NASA’s FY 2005 budget request sets aside $140 million for additional cargo and

crew services. The Russian Soyuz is the only non-Shuttle means of providing

crew services. Historically, legislation provides that funds appropriated to NASA

must be spent within two fiscal years, which means that this $140 million would

need to be obligated either in FY 2005 or FY 2006. However, the Iran Non-Proliferation Act makes it illegal to expend these funds for additional Soyuz services

during those two years.

Q8a. How do you explain this discrepancy?

A8a. The FY 2005 performance goal for this project, as submitted in the 2005 Budget Estimates, is to ‘‘baseline a strategy and initiate procurement of cargo delivery

service to the ISS.’’ This would be an augmentation of current Shuttle capability

using commercially procured services, and could include domestic capabilities if

available, or foreign capabilities such as the ATV.

Q8b. Do you agree that expending these funds in FY 2005 or FY 2006 on Soyuz or

Progress services would require a legislative change to the INA?

A8b. NASA is aware of the provisions of the INA and will work with Congress to

resolve any issues associated with it.

Questions submitted by Representative Brad Sherman

Q1. According to NASA’s budget plan, the President’s exploration initiative is estimated to cost close to $200 billion over the next 15 years, with more costs incurred after that time. Why is this investment better than investing the same

amount of money in energy R&D, with the goal of making the U.S. energy independent? Which of the two alternative investments do you think would deliver

a greater benefit to the American economy and to overall societal goals?

A1.

It is Affordable—The budget fits within the goals of reducing the deficit by half

over five years and constraining discretionary growth.

Represents 0.7 percent of Federal Budget vs. 1.0 percent in 1994 and over four

percent peak during Apollo.

From FY 1995 through the FY 2005 request, NASA budget increase is one-fourth

the rate of overall non-defense discretionary spending—17 percent compared to 69

percent.

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It is Achievable—The vision can be accomplished within the long-term funding

plans, and it builds on NASA’s recent successes and demonstrated management reforms.

Space Station program now under control, demonstrating solid resource management.

Mars Exploration Rovers successes highlight NASA’s technical and management

skills.

NASA is leading implementation of the President’s Management Agenda in two

areas government-wide, and has improved in more areas than any other federal

agency.

It is Focused—The budget aligns programs with the vision goals, affirms the Nation’s commitment to space exploration and provides a clear direction for the civil

space program.

Vision responds to concerns expressed by the Columbia Accident Investigation

Board (CAIB), Congress, and elsewhere on the need for a long-term vision for

human space exploration.

Vision encompasses human and robotic missions and includes pursuit of multiple

destinations, including the return of humans to Moon.

Activities will be paced by experience, technology readiness, and affordability.

Implementation begins now with key missions that are already in progress, such

as Mars exploration, visits to other solar system targets, and Space Station research.

It is Compelling—The budget fully supports the vision for space exploration and

supports other mission priorities such as Aeronautics and Earth Science.

Exploration of the solar system and beyond will be guided by compelling questions

of scientific and societal importance.

NASA exploration programs will seek profound answers to questions of our origins, whether life exists beyond Earth, and how we could live on other worlds.

It Funds Critical Near-Term Priorities in Space Shuttle Return-to-Flight and

Space Station–Space Shuttle Return-to-Flight and Space Station account for 85 percent of the FY 2005 increase.

• $374M increase for Shuttle, to safely return to flight and continue assembly

and operations of the Space Station.

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• $365M increase for Space Station to continue assembly and operations, due

primarily to new funding for crew & cargo services and needed reserves, and

$200M appropriation cut in FY 2004.

Questions submitted by Representative Mark Udall

Q1. In your response to my question on the timetable for having the autonomous repair capability (ARC) required for the Hubble Space Telescope (HST) servicing

mission, you stated: ‘‘The autonomous repair capacity has to be demonstrated

on the first two flights. That is our objective.’’ From the projected annual Shuttle flight rate and the projected availability of ARC, the HST servicing mission

could proceed safely as planned in 2006. While there may be uncertainty as to

whether a successful demonstration will occur on that timetable, that uncertainty affects planning for Shuttle missions to both HST and the International

Space Station.

Given these facts, wouldn’t it make sense to continue planning for the servicing

mission in the same manner as planning is continuing for Shuttle missions to

the Space Station, pending demonstration of the repair capability?

A1. The decision to cancel the Hubble SM–4 servicing mission was made after evaluating the requirements that came from safety recommendations of the Columbia

Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) report. NASA rigorously examined the on orbit

inspection techniques and repair methods that are required to ensure adequate mission safety. NASA determined that safe inspection techniques and repair methods

could be developed for use on the Shuttle while docked at the International Space

Station (ISS) because of the safe haven capabilities of the ISS and because the

Space Station Remote Manipulator System (SSRMS) would be available to assist

with inspection and repairs.

For the scenario of the Shuttle in a non-Station orbit (like the HST servicing mission), NASA determined that it would have to develop unique, single use technologies and tools in order to be able to accomplish the needed inspection techniques

and repair methods. It is unlikely the new technology needed to service Hubble

would be ready before critical Hubble systems fail (Gyroscopes will probably fail by

late 2006; the battery is expected to fall below needed capacity in about 2008).

NASA would also have to dedicate two Shuttles for a servicing mission to comply

with safety recommendations of the CAIB for a non-Station mission. NASA would

need a second Shuttle positioned for launch, which would require an unprecedented

double workload for ground crews. The rescue, if required, would involve a Shuttleto-Shuttle crew transfer with unproven techniques. All this would have to be done

under extreme schedule pressure, because Shuttle life support, food and water are

limited. On a non-Station autonomous mission, the crew would only have two to

four weeks before the rescue Shuttle would have to arrive.

NASA issued a formal ‘‘Request for Information’’ (RFI) on February 20, 2004, to

solicit from industry, academia, or anyone who may have useful information bearing

on how to extend the useful scientific lifetime of the Hubble. NASA received 26 responses, which are being evaluated at this time. A plan will be developed when a

decision is made as to the approach the Agency will take to prolong the life of

Hubble.

NASA has also formally requested a study by the National Academy of Sciences

to ensure we have fully considered all reasonable alternatives to finding the best

way to extend the lifetime of the Hubble Space Telescope.

Q2. In your written testimony, you cite the failure of the NRC’s 2001 Decadal Survey

to recommend new missions in the Hubble wavelength regime as a scientific rationale for not pursuing the SM–4 HST servicing mission. However, isn’t it true

that the Decadal Survey assumed that the Hubble Space Telescope would continue to operate until the end of this decade and that it endorsed NASA’s decision to continue HST operations through this decade? If this is true, why do you

cite the Decadal Survey?

A2. The difficult decision to not proceed with an HST servicing mission was made

after careful review of risk issues following the tragic loss of the Columbia Space

Shuttle and crew. The safety recommendations of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board were used as our guide, along with our progress in meeting the recommendations in our return-to-flight activities. Safety, not science, was the reason

for the cancellation.

It is true that the decadal survey endorsed NASA’s plan to operate Hubble to the

end of the decade, at reduced operating cost for the final years. This, however, assumed normal Shuttle operations and a Shuttle servicing mission by or before 2004.

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The decadal survey endorsed a different wavelength band, infrared, for the next

large space telescope (now known as JWST). It now appears, with current projections, that with judicious use of the telescope’s battery power, HST will continue to

operate for three to four more years, even without a servicing mission. Furthermore,

NASA is now studying and considering a robotic mission to service Hubble. Such

a mission could extend Hubble’s mission even beyond the end of the decade.

Q3. What countries have been approached about their willingness to participate in

the new human space flight vision? What have their reactions been? What additional countries do you intend to approach? What is the U.S. government’s current position on whether China is eligible to participate in significant human

space flight activities with NASA? Would you in fact welcome China’s participation in this initiative?

A3. NASA has not formally approached any other nations about specific participation in the human missions called for in the Vision for Space Exploration. NASA

has discussed the Vision with current space partners and with other nations that

have expressed interest. NASA is continuing preliminary discussions with prospective partners, and is now considering the advice of the President’s Commission on

Moon, Mars, and Beyond (Aldridge Commission) on international participation before proceeding more vigorously. Reactions to the vision thus far have been favorable. The European Space Agency has initiated a formal process to consider its participation in the Vision.

No country, including China, has been excluded from participation at this stage.

If Chinese participation advances the goals of the Vision and is consistent with

broader U.S. policy objectives, NASA will consider it at the appropriate time.

Q4. What is the scientific rationale for the President’s initiative? How much of that

rationale will be satisfied by planned robotic missions, and how much will require human explorers? From a scientific standpoint, what objectives specifically

require human explorers?

A4. The science content of the President’s exploration initiative flows directly from

and enhances the science agenda formally presented in the NASA 2003 Strategic

Plan. Specifically, the Vision for U.S. Space Exploration advances exploration of the

solar system and beyond, promotes the search for life in the universe and extends

life beyond our home planet.

Robotic Precursors

The initial steps in the President’s initiative must be undertaken robotically, just

as the precursor missions to the Apollo human expeditions were undertaken in the

1960’s. Specifically, the ongoing Mars Exploration Program will intensify its efforts

to understand the potential habitability of Mars, chart the potential resources that

may help enable human exploration of the red planet, and establish a knowledgebase for understanding the modern Martian environment (i.e., weather, climate,

dust, toxic components, etc.). This is already underway thanks to the Spirit and Opportunity rover missions, the ongoing activities of the Mars Global Surveyor and

Odyssey orbiters, and with the 2005 launch of the Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter,

which will help chart landing sites that may one day serve as the places the first

humans on Mars must visit. In addition, the President’s initiative calls for a robotic

lunar exploration program, which will be guided by applied science/engineering drivers to return humans to the lunar surface no later than 2020. The first specific

lunar mission will be the Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO), which NASA will

launch in 2008. This mission will chart the Moon using the latest in measurement

devices, searching for resources such as water ices, and developing the knowledge

of what it will take to land both robots and humans on the Moon in new places,

as a stepping stone to getting people to Mars. LRO will establish a high precision

global map of the Moon necessary for safe landings and discover what lies in the

permanently shadowed regions of the planet. Many LRO measurements will support

ongoing science priorities recommended to NASA by the National Academy of

Sciences for the Inner Planets of the Solar System.

Human Exploration of the Moon

Once the robotic precursors have identified the most compelling and safe places

for human-based exploration, human explorers will venture to the Moon to new

kinds of places, much more directly aligned with the kinds of activities humans will

have to undertake on Mars. The first human explorers will serve as highly adaptable field samplers, collecting invaluable materials for both on-site analysis (in prototype surface laboratories) and for more detailed analysis back on Earth. They will

set up equipment as precursors for what will have to be done on Mars, perhaps inVerDate 11-MAY-2000 16:41 Oct 01, 2004 Jkt 091691 PO 00000 Frm 00125 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\WORKD\FULL04\021204\91691 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
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cluding drilling devices for accessing the subsurface to depths of 30 feet or more,

where even more compelling scientific materials may be isolated. In addition, they

will undertake life sciences experiments designed to conduct experiments necessary

to understand (and ultimately to predict) how living systems respond to variable

gravity and deep space radiation. These keystone measurements and experiments

will serve as both scientific and operational stepping-stones toward the more challenging goals of sending humans to Mars, where they will undertake activities that

seek to understand whether Mars ever harbored life as we presently understand it.

One example (of many) of an activity that humans are uniquely suited for, on the

Moon or Mars, would be in situ radiometric age determination of rocks. This sort

of analysis requires careful sample selection, preparation, handling, and subsequent

analysis in complex instrumentation such as mass spectrometers. Humans could

conduct the first field-based assessments of the absolute ages of lunar (and later

Martian) surface materials for the purpose of understanding the chronology of key

Solar System events, including gigantic impacts (such as those that formed the impact basins). The timing of such events is critical to understanding any record of

life on planets such as Mars, and for using the Moon as a key stepping-stone.

Scientific Goals on Mars

In 2000, the Mars Exploration Payload Assessment Group established a set of scientific goals for Mars exploration at a series of meetings and workshops that involved more than 110 individuals from universities, research centers and organizations, industry, and international partners. The primary scientific goals are: the

search for life, evaluation of Mars geology, and studies of Martian climates. The following discussion considers the implications of pursuing the first of these goals, and

the potential advantage of using humans on location.

We will attempt to establish if there is, or ever was, life on Mars. The investigation of life on Mars has at least three possible outcomes: (1) Life arose independently and different from life on Earth; (2) Life arose just like life on Earth, but

evolved differently; or (3) There is no evidence of life ever existing on Mars.

If we find that there was or is life that arose independently on Mars, then we

have answered the big question—we are not alone. It also implies the broader

search for life throughout the universe should bear fruit—there is a lot of life in

the universe. If it can evolve independently in two places, then it is going to be

present in billions of places.

Furthermore, suppose the life we find is not based on nucleic acids, as every form

of life on Earth is. Suppose it is protein based (it will almost certainly be carbonbased, since no other element has the stability and complex covalent bonding of carbon) instead of nucleic acid based. It would be simply the biggest scientific discovery

ever made.

Suppose we find that there is life but it did not develop independently, instead

Mars seeded Earth or vice-versa. Again, an astounding discovery and the differences

in subsequent evolution would reveal incredible things about how life occurred and

evolved on Earth.

Suppose we do not discover life on Mars. How can it be that life did not arise

in a place with water and all the elements necessary for life? What was so different

on Mars from the Earth? There is plenty of life on the Earth that lives in much

harsher conditions than Mars. Extremophiles live in water that is hotter than steam

(doesn’t boil due to being deep underwater, therefore under high pressure), other life

lives where the pH is that of hydrochloric acid, others with pH of ammonia. Life

is tough stuff. Was there some event in Earth’s past that made life begin here? If

we find no life on Mars, then it is possible we really are alone. Earth could contain

all the life in the universe. If that is true, then insuring our survival as a species

is transformed from an important, somewhat egocentric goal to what must be considered a universal imperative.

Role of People in Pursuing Science on Mars

The very character of research begins with the ability to observe, to be able to

recognize something new and valuable, and then to envision a new direction that

so often cannot be anticipated by or pre-programmed into a computer.

The crew provide feedback that machines cannot—they participate, they think,

they observe, they ‘‘feel.’’ They use all five senses, and interpret and respond to

these senses. People can anticipate problems and be proactive (whereas computers

are only reactive); people are our eyewitnesses to discovery.

People are needed in space research because any research—in space or on the

ground—requires human abilities that exceed the capabilities of modern machines.

We must be able to observe, adapt, overcome unforeseeable obstacles, and recognize

serendipity. These things cannot be programmed into machines.

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Direct human intervention remains indispensable in four specific areas:

Creative input in response to observed and unexplained space-based phenomena requiring specific scientific expertise

Instrumental dexterity combined with human judgment in order to carry out complex activities specific to working in a microgravity environment

Troubleshooting and repair activities not feasible through automation

Inspiration and sharing of experience: The most common question about space flight

is ‘‘How does it feel?’’ Astronauts bring the experience of ‘‘being there’’ to people

all over the world.

The first step is observation and appropriate sampling. Consider taking a walk,

first a human walk, then a robotic one. A woman is walking along and sees an interesting patch of orange on a rock. She goes to the rock, takes a picture, and notices

that the orange area has varied patterns of texture. She touches a few locations

without much reaction but suddenly finds a spot that starts to crumple and give

off a vapor when touched. She quickly grabs a sample container, fills it with material from the crumbling area, and then uses a tool to carefully extract a similar looking area, along with its surrounding structures, without touching it directly. She

walks along a little further and feels something soft beneath her feet. Looking down

she sees a patch of material that looks like dry moss. The part she stepped on is

dissolving but there is another tiny patch nearby that she carefully scoops up for

a sample. She goes on to find samples under rocks, inside crevices, on top of walls.

Now consider sitting by a monitor on Earth operating a robot taking a similar

walk. We spot the interesting patch of orange on the rock. Of course, by the time

we see it, our robot has already walked past it for fifteen minutes. We send the command to turn around, retrace the path for 30 minutes (since that is when our command will get there), and then wait. 30 minutes later we see that the robot got our

command and turned around. 30 minutes later we see the area near the interesting

rock. Now we command the robot to go to the rock and wait. 30 minutes later we

tell the robot to touch an interesting spot. 30 minutes later we learn that spot is

solid, not very interesting. We command the robot to touch several spots. 30 minutes

later we see a couple of the spots we touched crumple, give off vapor, and dry up.

30 minutes later we tell the robot to touch 10 more spots and immediately sample

every spot touched. 30 minutes later we see if we wasted 10 sample containers or

if we got a good sample. Unfortunately, we may not be able to carefully extract a

similar looking area, along with surrounding structures, because our robot is not

dexterous enough or because the 30 minute feedback is too slow to react to crumbling or cracking that occurs in the extraction. By now it is getting dark and we

have used all our sample containers so we go back to return our samples to the lab.

Perhaps we drive over the dry mossy patch but we do not notice the change in surface texture so we miss an opportunity. Or perhaps we have a very sophisticated

robot and we do notice the change in texture. Then, 15 minutes later. . ..

Back in the laboratory, we have to analyze the samples. We try various techniques including microscopy and biochemical analysis. However, life on Mars may

not look or act like life on Earth at all. It may not need water. It may not even

contain DNA or RNA or even any nucleic acids. If we find a promising specimen,

we would like to get it to grow. How do you feed something that doesn’t use proteins, fats, or carbohydrates? We may need to build a terrarium that is highly specific to the ecology where we obtained the sample. Even that may not succeed so

we may need to bring our culture materials out in the field and set them up within

the ecology of our specimen. We may need to catch transient findings—perhaps the

sample will be dying before our eyes. We may need to create new tests in response

to our results—perhaps we need different pieces of equipment and have to cannibalize an instrument to build a new one. These are tasks that require humans

for success.

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Appendix 2:

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL FOR THE RECORD

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