National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

Report to the President 

I Actions to Implement 

the Recommendations 

of The Prazdential Commission 

on the Space Shuttle Chulhgm Acczdent 

3 

L 

July 14,1986 

Washington, D.C. 
DEDICATION 

Those of us at NASA, who have worked incessantly 

since that day in January when the 

CHALLENGER and her crew, our friends, were 

lost, dedicate this report to those who willfly again 

into space in the future. 
THE WHITE HOUSE 

WASHINGTON 

June 13, 1986 

Dear Jim: 

I have completed my review of the report from the Commission 

on the Space Shuttle CHALLENGER Accident. I believe that 

a program must be undertaken to implement its recommendations as soon as possible. The procedural and organizational 

changes suggested in the report will be essential to resuming 

effective and efficient Space Transportation System operations , and will be crucial in restoring U.S. space launch activities 

to full operational status. 

Specifically, I would like NASA to report back to me in 

30 days on how and when the Commission's recommendations 

will be implemented. 

by which progress in the implementation process can be 

measured. 

This report should include milestones 

Let me emphasize, as I have so many times, that the men 

and women of NASA and the tasks they so ably perform are 

essential to the nation if we are to retain our leadership 

in the pursuit of technological and scientific progress. 

Despite misfortunes and setbacks, we are determined to press 

on in our space programs. Again, Jim, we turn to you for 

leadership. You and the NASA team have our support and 

our blessings to do what has to be done to make our space 

program eafe, reliable, and a source of pride to our nation 

and of benefit to all mankind. 

I look forward to receiving your report on implementing the 

Commission's recommendations. 

The Honorable James C. Fletcher 

Administrator 

National Aeronautics and 

Washington, D. C . 20546 

Space Administration 
National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration 

Washington, D.C. 

20546 

Office of the Administrator 

The President 

The White House 

Washington, DC 20500 

Dear Mr. Resident: 

I am pleased to submit the NASA plan to implement the recommendations of the 

Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident. The Commission has 

rendered the nation an exceptional service in conducting a comprehensive and thorough 

investigation. NASA agrees with the recommendations and is vigorously implementing 

them. 

An overview of our efforts, the milestones by which we will measure our progress, 

and a detailed response to the specific Commission recommendations are provided in the 

enclosed report. A status report on our implementation program will be submitted in 

June 1987. 

The men and women of NASA appreciate your continued personal support. 

Enclosure 

James C. Fletcher 

Administrator 

W 
Table of Contents 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ..................... 1 

DETAILED NASA ACTIONS 

Recommendation I .............................. 1 1 

Solid Rocket Motor 

Independent Oversight 

Recommendation 11 ............................. 14 

Shuttle Management Structure 

Astronauts in Management 

Shuttle Safety Panel 

Recommendation 111 ............................ 17 

Criticality Review and Hazard Analysis 

Recommendation IV ...................... Safety Organization . 20 

Recommendation V ............................. 22 

Improved Communications 

Recommendation VI ............................ 24 

Landing Safety 

Recommendation VII ............................ 27 

Launch Abort and Crew Escape 

Recommendation VIII ........................... 30 

Flight Rate 

Recommendation IX ............................ 32 

Maintenance Safeguards 

APPENDIXA ............................... 35 

Strategy for Safely Returning the Space Shuttle 

to Flight Status 

APPENDIX B ................................ 41 

NASA Implementation Direction 

APPENDIXC ................................ 49 

Letter to the Office of Personnel Management 
Executive Summary 

On June 13, 1986, the President directed 

NASA to implement, as soon as possible, 

the recommendations of the Presidential 

Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident. The President requested that 

NASA report, within 30 days, how and 

when the recommendations will be implemented, including milestones by which 

progress can be measured. 

In the months since the Challenger accident, the NASA team has spent many hours 

in support of the Presidential Commission 

on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident 

and in planning for a return of the Shuttle 

to safe flight status. Chairman William P. 

Rogers and the other members of the Commission have rendered the Nation and 

NASA an exceptional service. The work of 

the Commission was extremely thorough 

and comprehensive. NASA agrees with the 

Commission’s recommendations and is vigorously pursuing the actions required to implement and comply with them. 

As a result of the efforts in support of the 

Commission, many of the actions required 

to safely return the Space Shuttle to flight 

status have been under way since March. 

On March 24, 1986, the Associate Administrator for Space Flight outlined a comprehensive strategy, and defined major actions, 

for safely returning to flight status. The 

March 24 memorandum (Appendix A) 

provided guidance on the following 

subjects: 

0 actions required prior to next flight, 

0 first flighdfirst year operations, and 

0 development of sustainable safe flight 

The Commission report was submitted to 

the President on June 9, 1986. Since that 

time, NASA has taken additional actions 

and provided direction required to comply 

with the Commission’s recommendations 

(Appendix B). A summary of the key milestones is included at the end of the Executive Summary. 

rate. 

The NASA Administrator and the Associate 

Administrator for Space Flight will participate in the key management decisions required for implementing the Commission 

recommendations and for returning the 

Space Shuttle to flight status. NASA will report to the President on the status of the 

implementation program in June 1987. 

The Commission report included nine recommendations, and a summary of the implementation status for each is provided: 

~ ~~ 

Recommendation I 

Solid Rocket Motor Design: On March 24, 

1986, the Marshall Space Flight Center 

(MSFC) was directed to form a Solid Rocket 

Motor (SRM) joint redesign team to include 

participation from MSFC and other NASA 

centers as well as individuals from outside 

NASA. The team includes personnel from 

Johnson Space Center, Kennedy Space 

Center, Langley Research Center, industry, 

and the Astronaut Office. To assist the 

redesign team, an expert advisory panel was 

appointed which includes 12 people with six 

coming from outside NASA. 

The team has evaluated several design alternatives, and analysis and testing are in 

progress to determine the preferred approaches which minimize hardware redesign. To ensure adequate program contingency in this effort, the redesign team will 

also develop, at least through concept definition, a totally new design which does not 

utilize existing hardware. The design verification and certification program will be 

emphasized and will include tests which duplicate the actual launch loads as closely as 

feasible and provide for tests over the full 

range of operating conditions. The verification effort includes a trade study which has 

been under way for several weeks to determine the preferred test orientation (vertical 

or horizontal) of the full-scale motor firings. 

The Solid Rocket Motor redesign and certification schedule is under review to fully 

understand and plan for the implementation of the design solutions as they are final1 
Review in September 1986. At this time it 

appears that the first launch will not occur 

prior to the first quarter of 1988. 

Independent Oversight: In accordance with 

the Commission’s recommendation, the National Research Council (NRC) has established an Independent Oversight Group 

chaired by Dr. H. Guyford Stever and reporting to the NASA Administrator. The 

NRC Oversight Group has been briefed on 

Shuttle system requirements, implementation, and control; Solid Rocket Motor background; and candidate modifications. The 

group has established a near-term plan that 

includes briefings and visits to review inflight loads; assembly processing; redesign 

status; and other solid rocket motor designs, including the Titan. Longer term 

plans are being formulated by the group including participation in the Solid Rocket 

Motor preliminary design review in September 1986. 

Recommendation I1 

Shuttle Management Structure: The Administrator has appointed General Sam Phillips, 

who served as Apollo Program Director, to 

study every aspect of how NASA manages 

its programs, including relationships between various field centers and NASA 

Headquarters. General Phillips has broad 

authority from the Administrator to explore every aspect of NASA organization, 

management and procedures. His activities 

will include a review of the Space Shuttle 

management structure. 

On June 25, 1986, Astronaut Robert 

Crippen was directed to form a fact-finding 

group to assess the Space Shuttle management structure. The group will report recommendations to the Associate Administrator for Space Flight by August 15, 1986. 

Specifically, this group will address the roles 

and responsibilities of the Space Shuttle 

Program Manager to assure that the position has the authority commensurate with 

its responsibilities. In addition, roles and responsibilities at all levels of program man2 

and the field center organizations. The results of this study will be reviewed with General Phillips and the Administrator with a 

decision on implementation of the recommendations by October 1, 1986. 

Astronauts in Management: Rear Admiral 

Richard Truly, a former astronaut, has 

been appointed as Associate Administrator 

for the Office of Space Flight. Several active 

astronauts are currently serving in management positions in the agency. The Crippen 

group will address means to stimulate the 

transition of astronauts into other management positions. It will also determine the 

appropriate position for the Flight Crew 

Operations Directorate within the NASA 

organizational structure. 

Shuttle Safety Panel: A Shuttle Safety Panel 

will be established by the Associate Administrator for Space Flight not later than September 1, 1986, with direct access to the 

Space Shyttle Program Manager. This date 

allows time to determine the structure and 

function of this panel, including an assessment of its relationship to the newly formed 

Office of Safety, Reliability, and Quality Assurance, and to the existing Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel. 

Recommendation I11 

Critical Item Review and Hazard Analysis: On 

March 13, 1986, NASA initiated a complete 

review of a1 Space Shuttle program failure 

modes and effects analyses (FMEA’s) and 

associated critical item lists (CIL‘s). Each 

Space Shuttle project element and associated prime contractor is conducting separate 

comprehensive reviews which will culminate 

in a program-wide review with the Space 

Shuttle Program Manager at Johnson 

Space Center later this year. Technical 

specialists from outside the Space Shuttle 

program have been assigned as formal 

members of each of these review teams. AI1 

Criticality 1 and 1R critical item waivers 

have been cancelled. The teams are required to reassess and resubmit waivers in 

categories recommended for continued 

program applicability. Items which cannot 
be revalidated will be redesigned, qualified, 

and certified for flight. All Criticality 2 and 

and proper categorization. This activity will 

culminate in a comprehensive final review 

with NASA Headquarters beginning in 

March 1987. 

As recommended by the Commission, the 

National Research Council has agreed to 

form an Independent Audit Panel, reporting to the NASA Administrator, to verify 

the adequacy of this effort. 

! 

I 3 CIL’s are being reviewed for reacceptance 

Recommendation IV 

Safety Organization: The NASA Administrator announced the appointment of Mr. 

George A. Rodney to the position of Associate Administrator for Safety, Reliability, 

and Quality Assurance on July 8, 1986. The 

responsibilities of this office will include the 

oversight of safety, reliability, and quality 

assurance functions related to all NASA activities and programs and the implementation of a system for anomaly documentation 

and resolution to include a trend analysis 

program. One of the first activities to be undertaken by the new Associate Administrator will be an assessment of the resources 

including workforce required to ensure adequate execution of the safety organization 

functions. In addition, the new Associate 

Administrator will assure appropriate interfaces between the functions of the new safety organization and the Shuttle Safety Panel 

which will be established in response to the 

Commission Recommendation 11. 

Recommendation V 

Improved Communications: On June 25, 1986, 

Astronaut Robert Crippen was directed to 

form a team to develop plans and recommended policies for the following: 

Implementation of effective management 

communications at all levels. 

Standardization of the imposition and removal of STS launch constraints and 

other operational constraints. 

Conduct of Flight Readiness Review and 

Mission Management Team meetings, including requirements for documentation 

and flight crew participation. 

Since this recommendation is closely linked 

with the recommendation on Shuttle management structure, the study team will incorporate the plan for improved communications with that for management restructure. 

This review of effective communications 

will consider the activities and information 

flow at NASA Headquarters and the field 

centers which support the Shuttle program. 

The study team will present findings and 

recommendations to the Associate Administrator for Space Flight by August 15, 1986. 

Recommendation VI 

Landing Safety: A Landing Safety Team has 

been established to review and implement 

the Commission’s findings and recommendations on landing safety. All Shuttle hardware and systems are undergoing design 

reviews to insure compliance with the 

specifications and safety concerns. The 

tires, brakes, and nose wheel steering system are included in this activity, and funding for a new carbon brakes system has 

been approved. Runway surface tests and 

landing aid requirement reviews had been 

under way for some time prior to the accident and are continuing. Landing aid implementattion will be complete by July 

1987. The interim brake system will be 

delivered by August 1987. Improved 

methods of local weather forecasting and 

weather-related support are being developed. Until the Shuttle program has demonstrated satisfactory safety margins 

through high fidelity testing and during actual landings at Edwards Air Force Base, 

the Kennedy Space Center landing site will 

not be used for nominal end-of-mission 

landings. Dual Orbiter ferry capability has 

been an issue for some time and will be 

thoroughly considered during the upcoming months. 

Recommendation VI1 

Launch Abort and Crew Escape: On April 7, 

1986, NASA initiated a Shuttle Crew Egress 

and Escape review. The scope of this analysis includes egress and escape capabilities 

from launch through landing and will 

provide analyses, concepts, feasibility assess3 
ments, cost, and schedules for pad abort, 

bailout, ejection systems, water landings, 

and powered flight separation. This review 

will specifically assess options for crew escape during controlled gliding flight and 

options for extending the intact abort flight 

envelope to include failure of 2 or 3 main 

engines during the early ascent phase. In 

conjunction with this activity, a Launch 

Abort Reassessment Team was estabIished 

to review all launch and launch abort rules 

to ensure that launch commit criteria, flight 

rules, range safety systems and procedures, 

landing aids, runway configurations and 

lengths, performance versus abort exposure, abort and end-of-mission landing 

weights, runway surfaces, and other landing-related capabilities provide the proper 

margin of safety to the vehicle and crew. 

Crew escape and launch abort studies will 

be complete on October 1, 1986, with an 

implementation decision in December 1986. 

Recommendation VI11 

Flight Rate: In March 1986 NASA established a Flight Rate Capability Working 

Group. Two flight rate capability studies are 

under way: (1) a study of capabilities and 

constraints which govern the Shuttle processing flows at the Kennedy Space Center 

and (2) a study by the Johnson Space Center to assess the impact of flight specific 

crew training and software delivery/ 

certification on flight rates. The working 

group will present flight rate recommendations to the Office of Space Flight by August 15, 1986. Other collateral studies are 

still in progress which address Presidential 

Commission recommendations related to 

spares provisioning, maintenance, and 

structural inspection. This effort will also 

consider the National Research Council independent review of flight rate which is 

under way as a result of a Congressional 

Subcommittee request. 

NASA strongly supports a mixed fleet to 

satisfy launch requirements and actions to 

revitalize the United States expendable 

Iaunch vehicle capabilities. 

Additionally, a new cargo manifest policy is 

being formulated by NASA Headquarters 

which will establish manifest ground rules 

and impose constraints to late changes. 

Manifest control policy recommendations 

will be completed in November 1986. 

Recommendation IX 

Maintenance Safeguards: A Maintenance 

Safeguards Team has been established to 

develop a comprehensive plan for defining 

and implementing actions to comply with 

the Commission recommendations concerning maintenance activities. A Maintenance 

Plan is being prepared to ensure that uniform maintenance requirements are imposed on all elements of the Space Shuttle 

program. This plan will define the structure 

that will be used to document (1) hardware 

inspections and schedules, (2) planned 

maintenance activities, (3) maintenance procedures configuration control, and (4) 

maintenance logistics. The plan will also define organizational responsibilities, reporting, and control requirements for Space 

Shuttle maintenance activities. The maintenance plan will be completed by September 

30, 1986. 

A number of other activities are underway 

which will contribute to a return to safe 

flight and strengthening the NASA organization. A Space Shuttle Design 

Requirements Review Team headed by the 

Space Shuttle Systems Integration Office at 

Johnson Space Center has been assigned to 

review all Shuttle design requirements and 

associated technical verification. The team 

will focus on each Shuttle project element 

and on total Space Shuttle system design requirements. This activity will culminate in a 

Space Shuttle Incremental Design Certification Review approximately 3 months prior 

to the next Space Shuttle launch. 

In consideration of the number, complexity, and interrelationships between the many 

activities leading to the next flight, the 

Space Shuttle Program Manager at Johnson 

Space Center has initiated a series of formal 

Program Management Reviews for the 

Space Shuttle program- These reviews are 

structured to be regular face-to-face discussions involving the managers of all major 

4 
Space Shuttle program activities. Specific 

subjects to be discussed at each meeting will 

focus on progress, schedules, and actions 

associated with each of the major program 

review activities and will be tailored directly 

to current program activity for the time period involved. The first of these meetings 

was held at Marshall Space Flight Center on 

May 5-6, 1986, with the second at Kennedy 

Space Center on June 25, 1986. Follow-on 

reviews will be held approximately every 6 

weeks. Results of these reviews will be reported to the Associate Administrator for 

Space Flight and to the NASA Administrator. 

On June 19, 1986, the NASA Administrator 

announced termination of the development 

of the Centaur upper stage for use aboard 

the Space Shuttle. Use of the Centaur 

upper stage was planned for NASA planetary spacecraft launches as well as for certain national security satellite launches. Major safety reviews of the Centaur system 

were under way at the time of the Challenger accident, and these reviews were intensified in recent months to determine if the 

program should be continued. The final decision to terminate the Centaur stage for 

use with the Shuttle was made on the basis 

that even following certain modifications 

identified by the ongoing reviews, the resultant stage would not meet safety criteria 

being applied to other cargo or elements of 

the Space Shuttle system. NASA has initiated efforts to examine other launch vehicle 

alternatives for the major NASA planetary 

and scientific payloads which were scheduled to utilize the Centaur upper stage. 

NASA is providing assistance to the Department of Defense as it examines alternatives 

for those national security missions which 

had planned to use the ShuttleKentaur. 

The NASA Administrator has announced a 

number of Space Station organizational and 

management structural actions designed to 

strengthen technical and management capabilities in preparation for moving into the 

development phase of the Space Station 

program. The decision to create the new 

structure is the result of recommendations 

made to the Administrator by a committee, 

headed by General Phillips, which is conducting a long range assessment of NASA’s 

overall capabilities and requirements. 

Finally, NASA is developing plans for increased staffing in critical areas and is working closely with the Office of Personnel 

Management to develop a NASA specific 

proposal which would provide for needed 

changes to the NASA personnel management system to strengthen our ability to attract, retain, and motivate the quality work 

force required to conduct the NASA mission (Appendix C). 

5 
[TURN TO FLIGHT 

SITE 

;TIONS COMPLETE 

I r STUDIES 

I 

DCR CDR I PDR 

LANDING AIDS NEW INTERIM 

IMPLEMENTATION BRAKES DELIVERY 

COMPLETE 

4 OSF 

SHUlTLE SAFETY PANEL ANNOUNCED 

IMPLEMENTATION 

DECISION 

1 

JANCE PLAN 

4PLETE 

SSME SL NASA 

HEADQUARTERS 

REVIEW 

ORBITER ET 

ZED - GFE SRB 

OMRSD REVIEW OM1 REVIEW-COMPLETE 

TREND SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT 

AND IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETE COMPLETE 

COMPLETE 

RESPONSIBILITY I 

DEFINITION COMPLETE 4 OSF 

IMPLEMENTATION 

3NS DECISION 

LEGEND 

CDR Critical Design Review 

CIL Critical Item List 

DCR Design Certification Review 

ET External Tank 

FMEA Failure Modes and Effects Analysis 

GFE Government Furnished Equipment 

NRC National Research Council 

OM I 

OMRSD Operations and Maintenance Requirements 

OSF Office of Space Flight 

PDR Preliminary Design Review 

SL Spacelab 

SRB Solid Rocket Booster 

SRM Solid Rocket Motor 

SR & QA 

SSME Space Shuttle Main Engine 

Operations and Maintenance Instruction 

and Specifications Documentation 

Safety, Reliability and Quality Assurance 

AI 

OSF IMPLEMENTATION 

DECISION >MMENDATIONS 

I I TO OSF 

I 

MANIFEST CONTROL 

RECOMMENDATIONS TO OSF 

ATIONS TO OSF 1 
 

SPACE SHUTTL 

CHALLENGER ACC IDENT 

NASA INTERIM INVESTIGATION BOARD 

0 PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION 

NASA 51-L DATA AND DESIGN ANALYSIS TASK FORCE 

NASA TASK FORCE PRELIMINARY REPORT 

0 PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 

0 NASA 30-DAY REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 

NASA ONE YEAR REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS 

1. SOLID ROCKET MOTOR DESIGN 

INDEPENDENT OVERSIGHT 

II. SHUTTLE MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE 

ASTRONAUTS IN MANAGEMENT 

SHUlTLE SAFETY PANEL 

111. CRITICALITY AND HAZARD ANALYSIS 

IV. SAFETY ORGANIZATION 

V. IMPROVED COMMUNICATIONS 

VI. LANDING SAFETY 

VII. LAUNCH ABORT AND CREW ESCAPE 

VIII. FLIGHT RATE 

IX. MAINTENANCE SAFEGUARDS 

T986 

JAN I FEB I MAR I APR I MAY I JUN I JU 

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SRM REDESIGN NRFOVERSIGHT 

TEAM GROUP ANNOUN 

STUDY INITIATED A 1 

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INITIATED 

NRC INDE 

AUDIT PA 

OFFICE FOR 

ANNOUNCED 

S,R & QA ASS 

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APR MAY JUN 
NASA Detailed Implementation 

of Presidential Commission 

Recommendations I = IX 

9 

PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE 

SPACE SHUTTLE CHALLENGER ACCIDENT 

RECOMMENDATION 

-1- 

Design. The faulty Solid Rocket Motor joint and 

seal must be changed. This could be a new design 

eliminating the joint or a redesign of the current 

joint and seal. No design options should be 

prematurely precluded because of schedule, cost 

or reliance on existing hardware. All Solid Rocket 

Motor joints should satisfy the following 

requirements: 

8 The joints should be fully understood, tested 

The integrity of the structure and of the seals 

of all joints should be not less than that of the 

case walls throughout the design envelope. 

8 The integrity of the joints should be insensitive 

and verified. 

to: 

- Dimensional tolerances. 

- Transportation and handling. 

-Assembly procedures. 

- Inspection and test procedures. 

-Environmental effects. 

-Internal case operating pressure. 

-Recovery and reuse effects. 

-Flight and water impact loads. 

8 The certification of the new design should 

include: 

-Tests which duplicate the actual launch con- 

-Tests over the full range of operating con8 Full consideration should be given to conducting static firings of the exact flight configuration in a vertical attitude. 

Independent Oversight. The Administrator of 

NASA should request the National Research 

Council to form an independent Solid Rocket 

Motor design oversight committee to implement 

the Commission’s design recommendations and 

oversee the design effort. This committee should: 

figuration as closely as possible. 

ditions, including temperature. 

Review and evaluate certification requirements. 

Provide technical oversight of the design, test 

program and certification. 

Report to the Administrator of NASA on the 

adequacy of the design and make appropriate 

recommendations. 

NASA has formed a Solid Rocket Motor (SRM) Joint Redesign team at the Marshall Space 

Flight Center. This team includes personnel from several NASA Centers, industry, and the 

Astronaut Office. Their activities are being reviewed by a NASNindustry advisory panel and 

an Independent Oversight Group from the National Research Council. 

The team has evaluated several design alternatives, and analysis and testing is in progress to 

determine the preferred approaches which minimize hardware redesign. In addition, an 

approach will be developed, at least through concept definition, for a new design which does 

not utilize existing hardware. The primary selection criteria will be development of an SRM 

joint design that is safe to fly. A secondary objective is to minimize schedule impact by use of 

existing hardware, if that can be done without compromising safety. 

Analysis and testing is being performed to support the design selection process and to ensure 

the adequacy of the verification and certification of the redesigned joint. The static test orientation and configuration is being analyzed, and a proposed method is scheduled to be selected in 

July 1986. The Solid Rocket Motor redesign and certification schedule is under review to fully 

understand and plan for the implementation of the design solutions as they are finalized and 

assessed. 

11 
NASA Implementation of Recommendation I 

On March 24, 1986, the Marshall Space 

Flight Center was directed to form a Solid 

Rocket Motor Redesign Team to include 

participation from Marshall, other NASA 

Centers, and the Astronaut Office, as well 

as individuals from outside NASA. To assist 

the redesign team, an expert advisory panel 

was appointed which includes 12 people, 

with six coming from outside NASA. The 

redesign team was directed to review the 

Commission findings and recommendations 

and develop a plan to provide a Solid 

Rocket Motor that addresses all the criteria 

in the Commission recommendations. The 

primary objective of the redesign effort is to 

provide a Solid Rocket Motor with field and 

nozzle joints that is safe to fly. A secondary 

objective will be to minimize the schedule 

impact by using existing hardware, if this 

can be done without compromising safety. 

To ensure adequate program contingency 

in this effort, the redesign group will also 

develop, at least through concept definition, 

a totally new design that does not utilize existing hardware. Key program milestones 

have been established. Emphasis is being 

placed on the verification effort to ensure 

its adequacy. As one part of the verification 

plan, a trade study is being conducted between vertical (nozzle up and down) and 

horizontal static tests to determine the 

preferred test firing orientation. 

At the request of the NASA Administrator. 

the National Research Council (NRC) has 

established an Independent Oversight 

Group chaired by Dr. H. Guyford Stever 

and reporting directly to the Administrator. 

The NRC Oversight Group has been 

briefed on Shuttle system requirements, implementation, and control; Solid Rocket 

Motor background; and candidate modifications. The group has established a nearterm plan that includes briefings andvisits 

to review in-flight loads, assembly processing, redesign status, and other solid rocket 

motor designs, including the Titan. Longer 

term plans of the group are being formulated. 

Many design alternatives have been evaluated, analyses and tests have been conducted, 

12 

initial verification plans have been established, and overall schedules have been developed. In parallel, major SRM subassemblies and many critical processes have been 

reassessed, and efforts to determine those 

requiring additional review or modifications 

are in varying stages of maturity. 

The team has evaluated several design alternatives and is conducting analyses and testing to determine the best approach which 

will utilize either existing hardware or modification of that in the production flow. An 

alternate joint design that does not utilize 

existing hardware is also under way. Additional design and studies are considering 

modifications to ground support equipment 

to resolve transportation, handling, and assembly difficulties encountered in the past, 

as well as ground and flight systems to compensate for the environmental effects of 

temperature and inclement weather. Other 

design modifications to reduce criticality or 

to resolve prior difficulties relating to the 

ignition system, factory joints, and nozzle 

are being considered. Design solutions for 

these modifications have been identified, 

and programmatic assessments are being finalized. 

Analyses and tests have been performed to 

support design selection. The analyses relate to structural strength, dimensional tolerances, gas and thermal dynamics, elastomeric material behavior, and leak check adequacy. Tests being conducted range from 

small scale cold gas O-ring performance 

tests, to 70 pound motor hot gas insulation 

evaluation, to full size joint mating tests 

evaluating assembly aids. Further, 

thoroughly comprehensive analyses are 

under way and planned that will be testverified to fully understand the joint operation. The total verification program cornprises analyses and an extensive test program using subscale fixtures, full-size mated 

segments subjected to hot gas transient 

motor pressure, full-size segment assembly 

demonstrations, and four full scale static 

hot firing tests that will be either horizontal, 

vertical, or a combination of both. The 

static test orientation is being fully explored, and the preferred configuration is 
anticipated to be proposed in late July 1986. 

Two of these full-scale tests will contain all 

svstem changes. 

and plan for the implementation of the design solutions as they are finalized and 

assessed. The schedule - will be reassessed , " 

after the Preliminary Design Review in 

September 1986. The Solid Rocket Motor design schedule is 

currently under review to fully understand 

L 

13 
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE 

SPACE SHUTTLE CHALLENGER ACCIDENT 

RECOMMENDATION 

- I1 - 

Shuttle Management Structure. The Shuttle 

Program Structure should be reviewed. The project managers for the various elements of the Shuttle program felt more accountable to their center 

management than to the Shuttle program organization. Shuttle element funding, work package 

definition, and vital program information frequently bypass the National STS (Shuttle) Program Manager. 

A redefinition of the Program Manager’s responsibility is essential. This redefinition should give 

the Program Manager the requisite authority for 

all ongoing STS operations. Program funding 

and all Shuttle Program work at the centers 

should be placed clearly under the Program 

Manager’s authority. 

Astronauts in Management. The Commission 

observes that there appears to be a departure from 

the philosophy of the 1960s and 1970s relating 

to the use of astronauts in management positions. 

These individuals brought to their positions flight 

experience and a keen appreciation of operations 

and flight safety. 

w NASA should encourage the transition of 

qualified asrronauts into agency management 

positions. 

w The function of the Flighl Crew Operations 

director should be elevated in the NASA organization structure. 

Shuttle Safety Panel. NASA should establish an 

STS Safety Advisory Panel reporting to the STS 

Program Manager. The charter of this panel 

should include Shuttle operational issues, launch 

commit criteria, flight rules, flight readiness and 

risk management. The panel should include 

representation from the safety organization, mission operations, and the astronaut office. 

NASA is reviewing all aspects of its management structure. The Administrator requested 

General Sam Phillips to return to NASA and review all aspects of the organizational management structure and procedural activities. This activity is currently in process and is expected to 

continue for several months. 

Astronaut Robert Crippen is leading a study addressing the STS management structure and 

the roles of astronauts in that structure. Specifically, the primary objective of the study is to 

strengthen the programmatic authority of STS management, and to clearly define the roles 

and responsibilities between the STS program and the NASA field centers. In addition, ways of 

encouraging astronauts to assume management positions will be identified as well as assessing 

their respective positions in the overall organizational structure. The results of this study will 

be thoroughly reviewed with General Phillips prior to incorporating the recommendations. 

A Shuttle Safety Panel with direct access to the Associate Administrator for Space Flight as well 

as the NSTS Program Manager will be established by September 1,1986. The exact structure 

of this group and its relationship with other NASA safety organizations is currently under 

study. 

14 
NASA Implementation of Recommendation I1 

NASA Administrator 

NASA Administrator Dr. James C. Fletcher 

has appointed General Sam Phillips, who 

served as Apollo Program Director, to study 

every aspect of how NASA manages its programs, including relationships between the 

various centers and NASA Headquarters. 

General Phillips’ review is not limited to the 

Challenger accident and operates with 

broad authority from the Administrator to 

examine all aspects of NASA’s organization, 

management, and procedural activities. He 

will provide his findings and recommendations to the Administrator by the end of 

1986. 

Associate Administrator for Space Flight 

On June 25, 1986, Astronaut Robert 

Crippen was directed to form a fact-finding 

group to assess the National Space Trap 

portation System (NSTS) management 

structure including the Shuttle Program 

Manager’s responsibilities, use of astronauts 

in management positions, and the functional location of the Flight Crew Operations 

Director in the organizational structure. 

The fact-finding group consists of 

Robert Crippen, Group Leader 

Richard Kohrs, Deputy Manager, NSTS 

Walter Williams, Special Assistant to the 

George Page, LSOC, Director of STS 

Office 

NASA Administrator 

Test Operations, Vandenberg Launch 

Site 

This group is supplemented by individuals 

representing each of the field center institutions reporting to the Office of Space 

FIigh t : 

Andrew Pickett, Kennedy Space Center 

William Sneed, Marshall Space Flight 

Clifford Charlesworth, Johnson Space 

Roy Estess, National Space Technology 

Center 

Center 

Laboratories 

The group is interviewing individuals at 

various management levels representing the 

STS program, the field center institutions, 

NASA Headquarters, and the major Shuttle 

contractors. In addition, the group will interview former senior program officials to 

gain their perspective from past program 

experience. Finally, the group will review 

the findings and proposals with a private 

consulting firm that is recognized as knowledgeable in management techniques. 

As of this time, the group has completed interviews at the Marshall and Kennedy Space 

Flight Centers, with subsequent interview 

trips scheduled to the Johnson Space Center and various contractor locations. Presentations of findings and recommendations 

from this study will be presented to the Associate Administrator for Space Flight by 

August 15, 1986. The findings and recommendations will then be reviewed with the 

Administrator to insure that they are consistent with the overall recommendations being developed by General Phillips. The Office of Space Flight will then implement the 

recommendations as appropriate. 

Specifically, the Level I/II/III program 

management concept will be reevaluated 

with changes implemented to strengthen 

the structure and to reduce the potential 

for conflict between the program organization and the NASA institutional organizations. In accordance with the Commission 

recommendations, strong consideration will 

be given to placing all Shuttle program 

funding and work at the centers under the 

Program Manager’s authority. 

In addition, means to implement the recommended use of astronauts in management positions will be identified. There are 

astronauts or former astronauts in ten management positions in the agency at this time, 

including the Associate Administrator for 

Space Flight. This brings the number of astronauts who have been included in management positions during the Shuttle program to approximately thirty, of which half 

have been in positions outside the Flight 

Crew Operations Directorate. This process 

is expected to continue and to be strengthened as the program management is restructured after this review. 

15 
The Associate Administrator for Space 

Flight will form a Shuttle Safety Panel by 

September 1, 1986. This panel will have direct access to the Associate Administrator 

for Space Flight and to the NSTS Program 

Manager. A detailed study to define the 

roles and responsibilities and the staffing of 

this panel is currently under way. In particular, the relationship to the newly formed 

Office of Safety, Reliability, and Quality Assurance, as well as the independent Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel, must be 

assessed. 

16 
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE 

SPACE SHUTTLE CHALLENGER ACCIDENT 

RECOMMENDATION 

- I11 - 

Criticality Review and Hazard Analysis. to flight to ensure mission success and flight safeNASA and the primary Shuttle contractors ty. An Audit Panel, appointed by the National 

should review all Criticality 1, lR, 2, and 2R Research Council, should verify the adequacy of 

items and hazard analyses. This review should the effort and report directly to the Administrator 

identify those items that must be improved prior of NASA. 

- 

NASA has initiated a review of all Space Shuttle Program Failure Modes and Effects Analyses, 

Critical Item Lists, and Hazard Analyses. Each Space Shuttle project element and its prime 

contractors are conducting independent reviews which will be integrated and assessed by the 

element project office. The results of these reviews and recommended actions will be provided 

to the NSTS Program Manager and to the Associate Administrator for Space Flight for final 

resolution. Technical specialists from outside the Space Shuttle program are assigned as formal members of each review team. The teams are reassessing all Criticality 1, lR, 2,2R, and 3 

items. All Criticality 1 and 1R critical item waivers have been cancelled and must be resubmitted for approval after these reviews. The National Research Council has agreed to establish an 

Audit Panel to verify the adequacy of this effort and to report to the NASA Administrator on 

its findings. 

17 
NASA Implementation of Recommendation I11 

All STS project offices and element contractors are required to review their hardware 

design to identify those systems or 

components which if they fail could present 

a risk to the safety of the crew or could result in loss of the vehicle or mission. This is 

accomplished through a process defined in 

NASA Handbook 5300.4 and which requires the project to perform a Failure 

Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and to 

develop a Critical Item List (CIL) and Hazard Analysis (HA) for each element. The 

purpose of the FMEA is to identify the various potential failure modes of the flight element components and assess the effects on 

the specific flight element as well as the total 

launch vehicle and mission. The potential 

failure modes are derived from analyses of 

function, design, and related manufacturing processes. The CIL identifies the critical 

failure modes and the rationale for retention. The items contained in the CIL are 

classified in five major categories commensurate with the degree of criticality. The 

five classifications of the CIL are as follows: 

1 - Loss of life or vehicle 

1R - Failure of both redundant hardware elements could cause loss of 

life or vehicle 

2 - Loss of mission 

2R - Failure of both redundant hardware elements could cause loss of 

mission 

3 -All others 

The Hazard Analysis identifies the hazards 

and their status of resolution and categorizes them as controlled (by design, procedure, etc.) or as an accepted risk. This 

review process was conducted during the 

development phase of the STS program 

prior to the first flight and FMEA’s, CIL’s, 

and HA’s existed at the time of the 51-L 

launch. 

The Commission recommended that a 

reassessment of the FMEAEIL, in conjunction with the hazard analyses, be conducted 

to assure that Criticality 1, lR, 2, and 2R 

items are reevaluated and that the hazard 

analyses properly identify the Criticality 1 

items. Thus, the associated risks and 

18 

hazards will be thoroughly understood and 

appropriate action can be taken to minimize 

their criticality. NASA accepts this recommendation and the review is under way. 

The review was initiated by a March 13, 

1986, letter from the NSTS Program Manager to all project elements requesting that 

each office review its CIL’s and FMEA’s. 

The purpose of the review is to affirm the 

completeness and accuracy of each FMEN 

CIL for the current NSTS design. The 

March 24, 1986, memorandum from the 

Associate Administrator for Space Flight 

defining the strategy for safely returning 

the Space Shuttle to flight status, directed 

that Criticality 1 and 1R items be subjected 

to a total review with a complete reapproval 

process implemented and that those items 

which were not revalidated must be redesigned, certified, and qualified for flight. 

The memorandum also directed that all 

Criticality 2 and 3 CIL’s be reviewed for 

reacceptance and proper categorization. On 

March 28, 1986, the NSTS Manager signed 

Program Directive S400 19 which directed 

that all Criticality 1, lR, and payload safety 

waivers be reverified, signed, and resubmitted for approval. 

Following this direction, teams for each 

NSTS element project office (Level 111), including the Solid Rocket Booster (SRB), External Tank (ET), Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME), Orbiter, Government Furnished Equipment (GFE), Spacelab (SL), 

Kennedy Space Center (KSC), and Vandenburg Launch Site (VLS), have been formed 

and are reviewing the FMEA’s, CIL’s, and 

HA’s which apply to their element hardware to assure that: 

a. The failure modes, causes, and related 

effects are identified and documented. 

b. The criticality has been properly 

assigned. 

c. The retention rationale for each critical item is complete and accurate. 

The reviews are being conducted by technical teams at the appropriate NASA centers 

and the element prime contractors. The results of both reevaluations will be presented 

c 
to a Level 111 Configuration Control Board 

(CCB) Preboard which will review all NASA 

and contractor items and select those which 

require submittal to the Level I11 CCB for 

approval. The preboard will also review and 

recommend enhancements such as design 

and process changes, instrumentation and 

software additions, and testing or checkout 

changes which could be implemented to 

eliminate critical failure modes, reduce criticality, or minimize the possibility of failure 

or the effect of the failure. The preboard 

will select those items which should be submitted to the Level I11 CCB for review. The 

preboard membership will consist of, at a 

mimimum, the following members: 

a. NASA engineering management repb. Safety representative 

c. Reliability representative 

d. Astronaut Office representative 

e. Outside representative (not affiliated 

resentative 

with the NSTS). 

In addition to these project level reviews, 

selected independent contractors will review 

the ET, Orbiter, SRB, and SSME FMEA/ 

CIL’s and provide their assessment to the 

project manager. 

The Level 111 CCB will review the preboard 

data and submit those significant items, including proposed enhancements, to the 

Level I1 Program Requirements Change 

Board (PRCB) for consideration by the 

NSTS Program Manager. 

The element interface functional analysis is 

being reevaluated by the Systems Integration contractor. After this systems integration review, the results will be coordinated 

with the ET, Orbiter, SRB, and SSME Project Offices, and the coordinated results submitted to the Level I1 Systems Integration 

Review Board. The results will then be presented to the Level I1 PRCB for approval. 

The Level I1 PRCB, including membership 

from the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel, 

will review the Level I11 CCB significant 

items, CIL changes, and enhancement recommendations. The Level I1 PRCB may audit the enhancements not selected by Level 

111. The Level I1 PRCB will review and recommend any CIL changes and enhancements to Level I NASA Headquarters for 

approval. A summary of disapproved CIL 

changes and enhancements will also be documented and provided to Level I. 

To assist in this process, the NSTS Program 

Manager has instituted a Level I1 Overview 

Group to assure that prime contractor 

reviews are consistent and conform to the 

Level I1 FMENCIL reevaluation plan. The 

ET contractor, Martin Marietta Corporation (MMC) at Michoud, was visited on June 

16-20, 1986, with satisfactory results. The 

Orbiter contractor, Rockwell International 

(RI) at Downey, CA, will be visited the week 

of July 14, 1986. Rocketdyne, Thiokol, 

United Space Boosters Inc. (USBI), and 

other prime contractors, will be visited in 

the following weeks. 

The Level I1 results and recommendations 

will be reviewed by Level I. The Level I 

board will be chaired by the NASA Associate Administrator for Space Flight and consist of his designated representatives. Level 

I will approve all items on the revalidated 

Criticality 1 and 1R CIL lists. 

The overall reevaluation is planned to occur 

incrementally and is scheduled to continue 

through mid-1987. Each project manager 

will forward the results of their integrated 

review through the management approval 

cycle as each subsystem is completed. Safety 

engineering will present the results of the 

hazard analysis reevaluation to the Level I11 

CCB, the Senior Safety Review Board, the 

Level I1 PRCB for approval, and NASA 

Headquarters for review. 

The Commission recommended that the 

National Research Council (NCR) appoint 

an Audit Panel to verify the adequacy of 

this effort and report directly to the Administrator of NASA. This request has been 

made by NASA and accepted by the NRC. 

The NRC is forming the panel and NASA 

will support them as required. 

19 
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE 

SPACE SHUTTLE CHALLENGER ACCIDENT 

RECOMMENDATION 

- IV - 

Safety Omanization. ." NASA should establish an The resDonsibilities of this office should inclvde: 

Office of Safety, Reliability and Quality 

Assurance to be headed by an Associate Administrator, reporting directly to the NASA Administrator. It would have direct authority for 

rn The safety, reliability and quality assurance 

functions as they relate to all NASA activities 

and programs. 

safety, reliability, and quality assurance rn Direction of reporting and documentation of 

throughout the agency. The office should be problems, problem resolution and trends 

assigned the work force to ensure adequate oversight of its .functions and should be independent 

of other NASA functional and program 

responsibilities. 

associated with flight safety. 

On July 8, 1986, NASA'Administrator Dr. James C. Fletcher announced the appointment of 

Mr. George A. Rodney to the position of Associate Administrator for Safety, Reliability, and 

Quality Assurance. In this position Mr. Rodney will have overall responsibility for development and oversight of all Safety, Reliability, and Quality Assurance functions within NASA. In 

addition, he will assume the responsibility of implementing a system for anomaly documentation and resolution to include a trend analysis program. 

20 
NASA Implementation of Recommendation IV 

A NASA Office of Safety, Reliability, and 

Quality Assurance (SR8cQA) headed by an 

Associate Administrator and reporting 

directly to the NASA Administrator has 

been established. This position will be responsible for the oversight of safety, reliability, and quality assurance functions related to all NASA activities and programs. In 

addition, it will be responsible for the direction of reporting and documentation of 

problems, problem resolution, and trends 

associated with safety. 

c. Investigation of and reporting on all 

NASA mishaps, incidents, and 

accidents. 

d. Implementing a trend analysis program that includes accurate reporting 

of anomalies, analysis and testing of 

problems, and implementation of corrective measures. 

e. Ensuring that SR8cQA issues are fully 

considered at all design, flight, and 

test readiness reviews. 

f. Ensuring that all NASA SR&QA , organizitions are adequately staffed 

with qualified personnel. 

g. Maintaining an effective dynamic safety program. 

h. Providing an integrated focus for 

Specifically, this office will be responsible 

for: 

a. Establishment and implementation of 

agency SR&QA policies, plans, and 

procedures. agencywide program assurance 

b. Insuring that risks are minimized by 

engineering design and operating 

procedures. 

policies. 

21 
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE 

SPACE SHUTTLE CHALLENGER ACCIDENT 

RECOMMENDATION 

-vImproved Communications. The Commission 

found that Marshall Space Flight Center project 

managers, because of a tendency at Marshall to 

A policy should be developed which governs 

the imposition and removal of Shuttle launch 

constraints. 

management isolation, failed to provide full and 

timely information bearing on the safety of flight 

51-L to other vital elements of Shuttle program 

management. 

NASA should take energetic steps to eliminate 

this tendency at Marshall Space Flight Center, 

whether by changes of personnel, organization, indoctrination or all three. 

Flight Readiness Reviews and Mission 

Management Team meetings should be 

recorded. 

The flight crew commander, or a designated 

representative, should attend the Flight 

Readiness Review, participate in acceptance 

of the vehicle for flight, and certify that the 

crew is properly prepared for flight. 

- 

NASA is reviewing this recommendation as part of the review of the program management 

structure (Presidential Commission Recommendation 11). The results of this activity will be 

presented to the Associate Administrator for Space Flight by August 15, 1986. 

22 
NASA Implementation of Recommendation V 

On June 25, 1986, Astronaut Robert 

Crippen was directed to form a team to 

develop plans and policies for the following: 

1. Implementation of effective management communication at all levels. 

2. Standardization of the imposition and 

removal of STS launch constraints and 

other operational constraints. 

3. Conduct of Flight Readiness Review and 

Mission Management Team meetings, including requirements for documentation 

and flight crew participation. 

Because this recommendation is closely 

linked with Recommendation 11, the study 

team will incorporate its plan for improved 

communications with that for the Shuttle 

management review. An integrated presentation of recommendations will be given to 

the Associate Administrator for Space 

Flight by August 15, 1986. 

23 
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE 

SPACE SHUTTLE CHALLENGER ACCIDENT 

RECOMMENDATION 

- VI - 

Landing Safety. NASA must take actions to improve landing safety. 

The tire, brake and nosewheel steering systems 

must be improved. These systems do not have 

sufficient safety margin, particularly at abort 

landing sites. 

The specific conditions under which planned 

landings at Kennedy would be acceptable 

should be ’ determined. Criteria must be 

established for tires, brakes and nosewheel 

steering. Until the systems meet those criteria 

in high fidelity testing that is verified at 

Edwards, landing at Kennedy should not be 

planned. 

Committing to a specific landing site requires 

that landing area weather be forecast more 

than an hour in advance. During unpredictable weather periods at Kennedy, program officials should plan on Edwards landings. Increased landings at Edwards may necessitate 

a dual ferry capability. 

NASA has established a Landing Safety Team to develop an implementation plan to comply 

with the Commission recommendation. Some improvements to the brakes and nosewheel 

steering systems had been made and other changes were under way prior to the accident. 

These planned improvements are being reassessed and additional changes are under consideration, Tire, brake, and runway surface tests are being conducted, and a plan to standardize 

landing aids and to install arresting barriers at all runways has been developed. An improved 

weather forecasting and reporting capability is being developed which will enhance the forecasting of weather in support of launch and landing decisions. Planned end of mission landings at the Kennedy Space Center will occur only after adequate safety margins have been 

demonstrated by test and by landings at Edwards Air Force Base. 

24 
NASA Implementation of Recommendation VI 

The NSTS Program Manager established a 

Landing Safety Team to review the Commission findings and recommendations on 

landing safety and to develop an implementation plan to comply with the Commission 

recommendations. This effort will include: 

quired in tire, brake, nosewheel steering, and other landing systems to assure safe operation; 

b. Development of a plan to implement 

the required improvements and to 

certify the overall landing system; 

c. Determination of landing criteria for 

all potential landing sites, nominal and 

contingency ; 

d. Documentation of landing weather 

criteria for each site, taking local and 

seasonal variability and unpredictability into account. 

a. Identification of improvements reUntil the program has demonstrated satisfactory safety margins through high fidelity 

testing and during actual landings at Edwards Air Force Base, the Kennedy landing 

site will not be used for nominal end-ofmission landings. 

Two brake improvement programs, a tire 

improvement study, a runway surface study 

and other hardware-related studies are 

under way. Design activities to improve the 

redundancy of the nosewheel steering system have been initiated. A plan to provide 

standard landing aids and other facilities including arresting barriers at all runways is 

being developed. An improved weather 

reporting capability is being developed 

which will enhance the weather forecasting 

in support of launch and landing decisions. 

The two brake improvement programs 

currently under way include: an interim energy capability improvement to be implemented by first flight and a longer term carbon brake development program. The interim modification includes addition of six 

hydraulic system orifices, an improved 

brake wear-in procedure, and a stiffer axle 

to correct the dynamic oscillation phenomenon seen on early flights. Also included are 

a pressure balance feature to evenly distribute the energy load between inboard and 

outboard brakes and a thicker stator which 

promises to improve energy absorption capability. The long-term carbon brake program is planned to increase energy absorption capability by 80- 100%. 

The objective of the tire improvement study 

and runway surface study is to determine 

how best to decrease the tire wear experienced during previous KSC €andings and to 

improve crosswind landing capability. Additionally, tests are planned at Wright Patterson AFB to improve the ability to mathematically model tire side force characteristics in support of upcoming simulations. 

A major upgrade of the nosewheel steering 

system was accomplished prior to the STS 

61-A flight. The system to date has demonstrated improved handling qualities but it is 

still characterized by several single point 

failure modes. Two design activities are 

under way to improve redundancy: fail operational fail-safe avionics with the current 

single string hydraulic system and total failoperational fail-safe nosewheel steering (including hydraulics). Either system will require substantial software changes and pilot 

in-the-loop simulations for verification prior 

to flight test. Other hardware related 

studies in progress include tire blowout 

protection, autobraking, tire pressure instrumentation, and anti-skid improvements. 

A thorough review (including climatological statistics) of the available runways 

in Europe and Africa has been accomplished to assist in evaluating those runways 

which can improve Trans-Atlantic Abort 

Landing (TAL) safety margins. A site survey team will look at four Moroccan runways in July. The findings of this team will 

be used to finalize the selection of a site and 

implement recommended improvements. 

In addition, a plan to provide standard 

landing aids and other facilities at all runways has been adopted. This plan includes 

the procurement of arresting barriers to 

provide safe stops in the event of brake failures or unforecast wet runway conditions. A 

minimum weather reporting capability is 

25 
being developed which should ensure acceptable weather for abort and end of niission landings. 

The flight rules which govern the use of all 

landing sites, for both nominal and contingency situations, are being reevaluated. Differences in flight rules between nominal 

end-of-mission and abort landings may be 

necessary because of facility deficiencies at 

some abort landing sites; however, safety 

will not be significantly affected. This landing safety review process is an ongoing 

activity which will be refined as planned 

capabilities are implemented. 

Providing a dual Shuttle Carrier Aircraft 

(SCA) capability for the Orbiter has been a 

programmatic issue for some time. The 

plans for use of Edwards Air Force Base as 

the landing site until landing safety margins 

are improved, will increase the need for a 

dual ferry capability. This issue will be thoroughly considered during the upcoming 

months. 

26 
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE 

SPACE SHUTTLE CHALLENGER ACCIDENT 

RECOMMENDATION 

- VI1 - 

Launch Abort and Crew Escape. The Shuttle 

program management considered first-stage abort 

options and crew escape options several times 

during the history of the program, but because 

of limited utility, technical infeasibility, or program cost and schedule, no systems were implemented. The Commission recommends that 

NASA: 

w Make dl efforts to provide a crew escape 

system for use during controlled gliding flight. 

w Make every effort to increase the range of flight 

conditions under which an emergency runway 

landing can be successfully conducted in the 

event that two or three main engines fail early 

in ascent. 

NASA has initiated a review of the STS Crew EgresdEscape and launch abort capability. The 

crew EgresdEscape analysis is considering concepts for the total mission profile which includes 

pad activities, launch through flight to orbit, and descent from orbit to landing. To analyze 

each aspect of the mission, design teams for ground egress, bail-out ejection systems, water 

landings, and powered flight separation have been established, as well as a systems engineering 

team to maintain study continuity and integrate the results of the proposed systems concepts. 

In conjunction with the systems engineering team, an envelope definition team is providing 

the appropriate trajectories to be used by each team. The trajectories are being overlaid with 

the physiological envelope limits of the crew; the combined trajectory and physiological envelope are being evaluated against the capabilities of the various system concepts. From the data 

and preliminary analysis, the concepts determined to be most feasible will get further study. 

The teams will consider modifications to existing STS hardware and concepts which may be 

included in future vehicle designs. 

A launch abort assessment team has been established to review all aspects of the abort options 

available during the launch phase. This team is reviewing the abort mode software implementation, procedures, and navigation targeting as well as the groundrules and constraints that are 

used during the design of the ascent trajectory. This team is reviewing all aspects of the launch 

process to assure that when operations resume, they are as safe as possible and maximize the 

opportunity for achieving an emergency runway landing during launch phase aborts. 

27 
NASA Implementation of Recommendation VI1 

STS Crew Egress and Escape System.The 

NSTS Program Manager initiated a study 

effort in April of this year to consider all 

aspects of atmospheric crew escape from 

the time of crew ingress on the pad to post 

landing Orbiter egress. This study is being 

conducted by a team led by the Johnson 

Space Center Engineering Directorate with 

support from the Astronaut Office. Inputs 

have been solicited and received from escape experts from the Navy and the Air 

Force as well as the Langley Research Center and the Kennedy Space Center. The 

team is reviewing past studies as well as new 

and innovative concepts. A review of the 

design ground rules confirmed that the 

Shuttle was designed for intact (runway 

landing) abort for the case of loss of thrust 

in one main engine. These analysis requirements have been expanded to include two 

and three engine out cases. The number of 

crew that each concept could safely extract 

and the crew survival requirements will be 

identified. The Crew Escape study will be 

completed on October 1, 1986, with an implementation decision in December 1986. 

The current escape mode for other than intact abort is ditching. This study is emphasizing creation of an alternative to ditching 

and to expanding the escape envelope. The 

study team will identify the maximum altitude of escape coverage for ascent, abort, 

and entry for each individual concept 

under consideration. Thermal protection, 

oxygen, and pressure suit requirements will 

be identified for the concepts covering the 

higher altitudes. 

The study effort is divided into teams covering first stage powered ascent, ejection 

systems, bailout, ditching, and ground 

egress. Consistent envelopes and costing 

techniques are being used to insure uniform assessment. Each team has derived 

several concepts and assessed the advantages, disadvantages, cost, and vehicle 

changes associated with each. 

The preliminary conclusions resulting from 

the study are as follows: 

28 

No concept provides complete coverage 

Low-cost options provide less envelope 

0 More costly concepts severely impact perof the flight envelope. 

coverage. 

formance capability due to additional 

weight. 

threatening and should be avoided, if 

possible. 

The preliminary recommendations of the 

study team are as follows: 

0 Initiate a study of manual and powered 

extraction bailout. Design goals should be 

early implementation, minimum weight, 

and maximum crew size. 

0 Initiate a long-range study for combinations of ejection seats and passenger 

compartments. 

Continue ditching structural integrity 

studies and initiate crew simulation training for ditching. 

aeroseparation during first stage (prior to 

SRB separation) flight. 

0 Flame protection should be provided for 

the launch pad access area, the hazardous 

gas detection system should be reviewed, 

and TV coverage of the total crew egress 

route should be provided. 

0 Reanalyze the slide system from platform 

to basket to bunker to transport vehicle. 

0 Augment Orbiter post landing egress capability with a slide. 

Assign a pad egress safety manager with 

overall pad egress safety responsibility. 

The preliminary recommendations are being reviewed at this time, and hardware 

contractors will be requested to provide 

study plans, design proposals, and funding 

requirements for review by the NSTS Program Office prior to any final implementation decision. 

0 Ditching is unpredictable and life 

0 Initiate a detailed feasibility study of 

LaunchlAbort Reassessment. A LaunchlAbort 

Reassessment Team was formed to perform 

a total review of the launch phase and abort 

options available within that phase. This 

team will insure that all available options to 
provide emergency runway landing capability are defined. These options will then 

be reviewed by the NSTS Program Manager 

prior to any implementation decisions being 

made. 

This team has been formed and is divided 

into subgroups. These sub-groups and their 

work are described in subsequent paragraphs. The initial thrust of this team has 

been directed toward those long-lead 

decisions required for the first flight; 

namely, an evaluation of the Trans- Atlantic 

Abort mode, participation in the flight design process, and a review of the required 

flight software changes. The flight design 

baseline is now complete, and a report citing the acceptability of the Trans-Atlantic 

Abort mode has been provided to the Program Manager. 

The Abort Mode Implementation subgroup 

has focused on the first flight activities. This 

group is reviewing the final submittal of 

flight software modifications, the certification history of the ascent abort modes, the 

verification process for both onboard and 

ground software, contingency procedures, 

and abort targeting. 

The Ascent Design subgroup is reviewing 

the ground rules and constraints that are 

used to shape the ascent trajectory, as well 

as the methods of predicting ascent performance margin. Flight product development 

processes and the verification of these 

products are also being reviewed. The techniques and procedures for assuring the ability of the vehicle to perform in the ascent 

environment, as it is observed to exist on 

launch day, will also be assessed. 

The Systems Management subgroup is 

reviewing all vehicle systems and their operational management. Issues uncovered during these review sessions are being resolved 

by the group, where possible, and, when required, issues are fowarded to the appropriate’level of management. Changes are being 

made to vehicle requirements, ground and 

flight documentation, flight rules, flight 

software, and where necessary, flight hardware changes are being proposed. 

The Range Safety subgroup, which also includes Air Force personnel, will assure the 

adequacy of the tools, procedures, and rules 

for developing the proper blend of flight 

and ground safety during the ascent phase. 

The group is reviewing the Space Shuttle 

range safety hardware to evaluate the need 

for carrying destruct charges on both the 

External Tank and Solid Rocket Boosters. 

Other subgroups of this team are reviewing 

weather statistics and forecasting tools and 

techniques as they pertain to launch and 

landing operations. The process of implementing flight software products to meet 

flight requirements is also being reviewed. 

The Launch Commit Criteria and Flight 

Rule review groups have begun a systematic 

review of the decision making criteria used 

to commit a vehicle to launch and to govern 

the decision making processes used in 

flight. 

This LauncMAbort Reassessment Team will 

review every aspect of the launch process 

and assure that when operations resume, 

they are as safe as possible. The Launch/ 

Abort study will be complete on October 1, 

1986, with an implementation decision in 

December 1986. 

I 

29 
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE 

SPACE SHUTTLE CHALLENGER ACCIDENT 

RECOMMENDATION 

- VI11 - 

Flight Rate. The nation’s reliance on the Shuttle as its principal space launch capability created 

a relentless pressure on NASA to increase the 

flight rate. Such reliance on a single launch 

capability should be avoided in the future. 

NASA must establish a flight rate that is consistent with its resources. A firm payload assignment 

policy should be established. The policy should 

include rigorous controls on cargo manifest 

changes to limit the pressures such changes exert 

on schedules and crew training. 

NASA has formed a Flight Rate Capability Working Group to assess a safe, sustainable flight 

rate and to identify the constraints to this rate. The flight rate capability study will consider all 

required work for the standard vehicle processing flow and assure that the work is optimized in 

relation to the available workforce considering such factors as the manifest, nonscheduled 

work, in-flight anomaly resolution, mods, processing team workloads, and work balancing 

across shifts. The flight production study will review the requirements for mission planning, 

flight production development, payload assignment policy and controls and achievable software delivery capability to support flight controllers and crew training. These studies will 

consider the availability of the third Orbiter Processing Facility, the availability of spares, as well 

as the effects of supporting the Vandenberg Launch Site to determine the maximum achievable safe flight rate. 

A cargo manifest policy is being formulated by NASA Headquarters which will establish 

manifest groundrules and impose constraints to late changes. 

NASA supports increased emphasis on a mixed fleet and action to revitalize the United States 

expendable launch vehicle capability. 

30 
ASA Implementation of 

e assessment of a safe sustainable NSTS 

ated in March 

f this working group, 

udies are under way 

ter and Johnson 

e Center. These studies will assess the 

estimate of flight rate capability and 

identify potential constraints to that 

. An integral part of the flight rate planmechanism will be the identification 

e and structural 

Recommendation VI11 

assessment of the flight rate capability at the 

request of the Chairman of the House 

Subcommittee on HUD-Independent Agencies. NASA is supporting this analysis and 

will incorporate the results into the assessment of flight rate. 

NASA has participated in Senior Interagency Group discussions on overall United 

State space launch strategy. NASA supports 

increased emphasis on a mixed fleet and 

actions to revitalize the United States expendable launch vehicle capabilities. 

A cargo manifest policy is being formulated 

by NASA Headquarters which will establish 

manifest ground rules and impose constraints to late changes. Cargo manifest 

change control is being pursued through 

the generation of a set of manifest stability 

groundrules and policies which will apply to 

both NASA Headquarters and the program 

level. Proposals are being formulated at the 

Johnson Space Center for submission to 

NASA Headquarters in November 1986. In 

addition, manifest change impact prediction 

and measurement tools are being developed. Integrated scheduling and resource 

prediction concepts have been defined and 

the necessary software programming initiated. 

31 
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE 

SPACE SHUTTLE CHALLENGER ACCIDENT 

RECOMMENDATION 

- IX - 

maintenance procedures must be especially 

rigorous for Space Shuttle items designated 

Criticalitv 1. NASA should establish a system of maintenance Plan. 

and execute a comprehensive 

analyzing and reporting performance trends of 

such items. 

Maintenance procedures for such items should 

be specified in the Critical Items List, especially 

for those such as the liquid-fueled main engines, 

which require unstinting maintenance and another. 

overhaul. 

Perform periodic structural inspections when 

scheduled and not permit them to be waived. 

Restore and support the maintenance and 

spare parts programs, and stop the practice of 

removing parts from one Orbiter to supply 

NASA is developing an NSTS Maintenance Plan to ensure that uniform maintenance 

requirements are imposed by all program elements. This plan will define inspection requirements and frequency, periodic maintenance requirements and schedules, configuration control requirements and organizational responsibility, and reporting requirements. All existing 

test and checkout requirements documents are being reviewed and will consider the results of 

the ongoing Critical Items List (CIL) reviews to ensure consistency between the CIL requirements and Operations and Maintenance Instructions at the Kennedy Space Center and the 

Vandenburg Launch Site. NASA is actively reviewing its policy and future planning for program logistics including spare parts provisioning. 

32 
NASA Implementation of Recommendation IX 

The NSTS has established a Maintenance 

Safeguards Team with representatives from 

the Johnson (JSC), Kennedy (KSC), and 

Marshall (MSFC) Space Flight Centers to 

develop a comprehensive plan for defining 

and implementing actions in compliance 

with Presidential Commission Recommendation IX. This team will serve as the focal 

point for all the NSTS maintenance activity 

and will ensure that an adequate maintenance program is in place and well understood by all elements of the program. 

A National Space Transportation System 

Maintenance Plan is being prepared to ensure that uniform maintenance requirements are imposed by all elements of the 

NSTS Program. This plan will define the 

documentation and implementation requirements for (1) hardware inspections 

and schedules, (2) planned maintenance activities and schedules, (3) maintenance 

procedures configuration control, and (4) 

maintenance logistics. The plan will also define organizational responsibilities, reporting, and control requirements for NSTS 

maintenance activities. 

Maintenance requirements for checkout, 

tests, inspections, servicing, and repair will 

be validated for both vehicle processing and 

depot level repair activities. The effort for 

the vehicle processing activity is defined and 

scheduled after completion of the Failure 

Modes and Effects AnalysdCritical Items 

List Review currently under way. Planning 

for a Depot Level Repair Requirements 

Review has been initiated. The Operations 

Maintenance Requirement Specification 

Document (OMRSD) which defines all test 

and checkout requirements is being reviewed to ensure that the requirements are 

complete and that the required testing is 

consistent with the results of the Critical 

Items List (CIL) review. 

Maintenance procedures used by the launch 

sites and repair agencies are being validated 

by technical teams including membership 

from the design centers and element contractors to ensure proper implementation 

of requirements. Verification of Shuttle vehicle checkout and processing procedures is 

currently being accomplished in the Operations and Maintenance Instruction (OMI) 

review. An activity to establish methods to 

rigorously control baselined procedures for 

safety-related critical items and to obtain 

design center concurrence on any changes 

to these critical procedures is in place. 

The problem reporting and corrective action systems presently being used by JSC, 

KSC, and MSFC are being consolidated and 

reviewed for uniformity in documentation, 

reporting, and trend analyses requirements 

based on failure and process nonconformance experience. Safety, reliability, 

and quality assurance activities will be an integral part of the NSTS Maintenance Program. These activities will be closely coordinated with the newly formed office of the 

Associate Administrator for Safety, Reliability, and Quality Assurance. 

Maintenance Inspection Plans are being developed by each NSTS Project. The Space 

Shuttle Main Engine Project has a program 

approved inspection plan in place. This 

plan will be examined and its adequacy verified. The Orbiter Project has submitted, for 

program baselining, an inspection plan 

resulting from studies done by a major airline company. This plan establishes 

rigorous requirements, schedules, and a 

closed loop feedback mechanism for 

providing launch site inspection results to 

project personnel. Inspection plans for the 

External Tank and Solid Rocket Booster 

Projects are being developed. 

The logistics program for the Orbiter vehicle has been a concern of the program since 

the completion of developmental flights. 

The lack of sufficient spare parts led to 

practices such as removal of parts from one 

Orbiter to supply another. NASA has initiated an assessment of spare parts requirements to adequately support the flight rate 

planning. Progress has been made with the 

construction of a large logistic facility at 

KSC in which all available parts can be stored. Additionally, the Orbiter Prime Contractor has establiihed a Logistics Service 

Center near Kennedy Space Center which 

provides field maintenance capability for a 

33 
7 

number of Orbiter subsystem elements. 

Contractual and government management 

changes have been made which will improve 

the logistics planning. Measurement criteria 

for monitoring the availability of spare 

parts are being developed and given proper 

attention by program management. A 

rigorous, closed-loop, accounting system 

that provides the discipline to assure compliance with all program approved checkout, tests, inspections, servicing, and repair 

requirements is being established. 

34 
Appendix A 

March 24, 1986 Memorandum from the Associate Administrator for Space Flight: 

Strategy for Safely Returning the Space Shuttle to Flight Status 

National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration 

Washing ton, D . C . 

20546 

Reply to Attn of: M 

TO: Distribution 

FROM: M/Associate Administrator for Space Flight 

MAR 2 4 1986 

SUBJECT: Strategy for Safely Returning the Space Shuttle to Flight 

Status 

This memorandum defines the comprehensive strategy and major actions 

that, when completed, will allow resumption of the NSTS flight 

schedule. NASA Headquarters (particularly the Office of Space Flight) , the OSF centers, the National Space Transportation System (NSTS) 

program organization and its various contractors will use this guidance 

to proceed with the realistic, practical actions necessary to return to 

the NSTS flight schedule with emphasis on flight safety. This guidance 

is intended to direct planning for the first year of flight while 

putting into motion those activities required to establish a realistic 

and an achievable launch rate that will be safely sustainable. We 

intend to move as quickly as practicable to complete these actions and 

return to safe and effective operation of the National Space 

Transportation System. 

Guidance for the following subjects is included: 

o 

o FIRST FLIGHT/FIRST YEAR OPERATIONS 

o DEVELOPMENT OF SUSTAINABLE SAFE FLIGHT RATE 

ACTIONS REQUIRED PRIOR TO THE NEXT FLIGHT 

ACTIONS REQUIRED PRIOR TO THE NEXT FLIGHT: 

Reassess Entire Program Management Structure and Operation 

The NSTS program management philosophy, structure, reporting channels 

and decision-making process wi 11 be thoroughly reviewed and those 

changes implemented which are required to assure confidence and safety 

in the overall program, including the commit to launch process. 

Additionally, the Level I/IT/ITI budget and management relationships 

will be reviewed to insure that they do not adversely affect the NSTS 

decision process. 

37 

25th Anniversary 

1958-1983 
2 

Solid Rocket Motor (SRM) Joint Redesign 

A dedicated SRM joint design group will be established at MSFC, with 

selective participation from other NASA centers and external 

organizations, to recommend a program plan to quantify the SRM joints 

problem and to accomplish the SRM joints redesign. 

reviewed in detail by the program to include PDR, CDR, DCR, independent 

analysis, DM-QM testing, and any other factors necessary to assure that 

the overall SRM is safe to commit to launch. The type and content of 

post-flight inspections for the redesigned joints and other flight 

components will be developed in detail, with criteria developed for 

commitment to the next launch as well as reusability of the specific 

flight hardware components. 

The design must be 

Design Requirements Reverification 

A review of the NSTS Design Requirements (Vol. 07700) will be conducted 

to insure that all systems design requirements are properly defined. 

This review will be followed by a delta DCR for all program elements to 

assure the individual projects are in compliance with the requirements. 

Complete CTL/OMT Review 

All Category 1 and 1R critical items will be subjected to a total 

review with a complete reapproval process implemented. 

which are not revalidated by this review must be redesigned, certified, 

and qualified for flight. The review process will include a review of 

the OMI's, OMRSD's, and other supporting documentation which is 

pertinent to the test, checkout, or assembly process of the Category 1 

and 1R flight hardware. KSC wil? continue to be responsible for all 

OMI's with design center concurrence required for those which affect 

Category 1 and IR items. 

reacceptance and to verify their proper categorization. 

Those i terns 

Category 2 and 3 CTL's will be reviewed for 

Complete OMRSD Review 

The OMRSD will be reviewed to insure that the requirements defined in 

it are complete and that the required testing is consistent with the 

results of the CIL review. 

modified as necessary to assure flight safety. Inspection/retes€ requirements will be 

Launch/Abort Reassessment 

The launch and launch abort rules and philosophy will be assessed to 

assure that the launch and flight rules, range safety systems/ 

operational procedures, landing aids, runway configuration and length, 

performance YS. TAL exposu~re, abort weights, runway surface, and other 

landing related capabilities provlde an acceptable margin of safety to 

38 
3 

the vehicle and crew. Additionally, the weather forecasting capability 

will be reviewed and improved where possible to allow for the most 

accurate reporting. 

FIRST FLIGHT/FIRST YEAR OPERATIONS 

First Flight 

The subject of first flight mission design will require extensive 

review to assure that we are proceeding in an orderly, conservative, 

safe manner. To permit the process to begin, the following specific 

planning guidance applies to the first planned mission: 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

daylight KSC launch 

conservative flight design to minimize TAL exposure 

repeat payload (not a new payload class) 

no waiver on landing weight 

conservative launch/launch abort/landing weather 

NASA-only flight crew 

engine thrust within the experience base 

no active ascent/entry DTO's 

conservative mission rules 

early, stable flight plan with supporting flight software and 

trai ni nm 

daylight EDW landing (lakebed or runway 22) 

First Year 

The planning for the flight schedule for the first year of operation 

will reflect a launch rate consistent with this conservative approach. 

The specific number of flights to be planned for the first year will be 

developed as soon as possible and will consider KSC and VAFB work flow, 

software development, controller/crew training, etc. Changes to flight 

plans, ascent trajectories, manifest, etc., will be minimized in the 

interest of program stability. Decisions on each launch will be made 

after thorough review of the previous mission's SRM joint performance, 

all other specified critical systems performance and resolution of 

anomal ies. 

In general, the first year of operation will be maintained within the 

current flight experience base, and any expansion of the base, 

including new classes of payloads, will be approved only after very 

thorough safety review. Specifically, 109 percent thrust levels will 

not be flown until satisfactory completion of the MPT testing currently 

being planned, and the first use of the Filament Wound Case will not 

occur with the first use of 109 percent SSME thrust level. 

effort will be made to conduct the first VAFB flight on an expeditious 

and safe schedule which supports national security requirements. 

Every 
4 

DEVELOPMENT OF SUSTAINABLE SAFE FLIGHT RATE 

The ultimate safe, sustainable flight rate, and the buildup to that 

rate, will be developed utilizing a "bottoms-up" approach in which all 

required work for the standard flow as defined in the OMRSD is 

identified and that work is optimized in relation to the available work 

force. Factors such as the manifest, nonscheduled work, in-flight 

anomaly resolution, mods , processing team workloads, work balancing 

across shifts, etc., will be considered, as well as timely mission 

planning, flight product development and achievable software delivery 

capability to support flight controllers and crew training. This 

development will consider the availability of the third orbiter 

facility, the availability of spares, as well as the effects of 

supporting VAFB launch site operations. 

THE BOTTOM LINE 

The Associate Adminstrator for Space Flight will take the action for 

reassessment of the NSTS program management structure. 

Program Manager at Johnson Space Center is directed to initiate and 

coordinate all other actions required to implement this strategy for 

return to safe Shuttle flight. 

The NSTS 

I know that the business of space flight can never be made to be 

totally risk-free, but this conservative return to operations will 

continue our strong NASA/Industry team effort to recover from the 

Challenger accident. Many of these items have already been initiated 

at some level in our organizations, and T am fully aware of the 

tremendous amount of dedicated work which must be accomplished. I do 

know that our nation's future in space is dependent on the individuals 

who must carry this strategy out safely and successfully. Please give 

this the widest possible distribution to your people. 

must understand it, and they who must do it. 

It is they who 

40 
Appendix B 

NASA memoranda directing the implementation of the Presidential Commission on the 

Space Shuttle Accident Recommendations 

41 

National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration 

Washington, D.C. 

20546 

Office of the Administrator 

TO: 

FROM: A/Administrator 

M/Associate Administrator for Space Flight 

SUBJECT: President i a1 Comi ssion Recommendations Action P1 an 

3uW 20 1986 

The President has reviewed the report from the Commission on the Space 

Shuttle CHALLENGER accident and on June 13 directed NASA to undertake a 

program to implement its recommendations as soon as possible. The 

President directed me to report to him in 30 days on how and when the 

Commission's recornendations will be implemented. This report should 

include milestones by which progress in the implementations process can be 

measured. 

The Office of the Administrator assumes responsibility for recommendation 

number 4 on safety organization. 

establishment of the Office of Safety, Reliability, and Quality Assurance 

to answer this recommendation. The Office of Space Flight is directed to 

take the action for all other Commission recommendations and to prepare 

the NASA report to the President. 

I have previously announced NASA's 6 I plan to report to the President on July 11, 1986. Please status me on 

r--;c;;ra weekly basis. 

43 
IZlEGRAPHIC MESSAGE 

FOR INFORMATION CAU 

NMIC m#oMNuw(I 

RICHARD H. TRULY 453- 1132 

I NASA HEADQUARTERS 

may...uu 

Mull 0- 0- @LMm 

- 

- ROUTINE 

*cc)I 

L#umQIfRcAllow 

UNCLASSIFIED 

IT-- I -= 

-- 

6/ 13/86 I" 

THIS SPACE PDR USE OP CoMMUNIc(~0N UNIT 

M€SSAGE TO BE TUWMWED (Uw I.rLI. Jrvciu ad dl ar)iJ k) 

To: 

JOHNSON SPACE CENTER 

HOUSTON, TX 

ATTN: GA/MR. A. ALDRICH 

ATTN: AA/MR. J. MOORE 

KENNEDY SPACE CENTER 

KENNEDY SPACE CENTER, FL 

ATTN: CD/MR. R. SMITH 

MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER 

MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER, AL 

ATTN: DAOl/DR. LUCAS 

NATIONAL SPACE TECHNOLOGY LABORATORIES 

NSTL STATION, MS 

ATTN: AAOO/MR. I. HLASS 

SUBJECT: PRES I DENTIL COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS I"""" ml mol- maw 

UNCLASSIFIED 

44 
NASA HEADQUARTERS 

MAA I 6/13/86 

KMI"CAU 

NAME Mo(ltwyyI 

RICHARD H. TRULY 453-1 132 

ROUTINE 1 UNCLASSIFIED 

TweoI^uL.Uu 

YULm 0- 0- El - 

ADMINISTRATOR. RECOMMENDATION 2 (SHUTTLE MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE, 

MNO. .NO.oleDI 

2 3 

THIS SPACE FOR bSE OF COMMUNIclnON UNIT 

lDUmUNCLASSIFIED 

TO: 

IN A MEETING TODAY BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND THE NASA ADMINISTRATOR, 

PRESIDENT REAGAN DIRECTED THAT A PROGRAM BE UNDERTAKEN TO IMPLEMENT 

THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS. AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. 

THE PROCEDURAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES SUGGESTED IN THE REPORT WILL 

BE ESSENTIAL TO RESUMING EFFECTIVE AND EFFICIENT SPACE TRANSPORTATION 

SYSTEM OPERATIONS, AND WILL BE CRUCIAL IN RESTORING U.S. SPACE LAUNCH 

ACTIVITIES TO FULL OPERATIONAL STATUS. 

NASA WILL REPORT BACK TO THE PRESIDENT IN 30 DAYS ON HOW AND WHEN THE 

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS WILL BE IMPLEMENTED INCLUDING MILESTONES BY 

WHICH PROGRESS CAN BE MEASURED. 

1 

45 
NASA HEADQUARTERS I UNCLASSIFIED I - ROUTINE 

~ 

TO 

ASTRONAUTS IN MANAGEMENT, SHUTTLE SAFETY PANEL) AND RECOMMENDATION 5 

(IMPROVED COMMUNICATIONS) WILL BE ADDRESSED BY LEVEL I. 

RECOMMENDATIONS WILL BE WORKED THROUGH LEVEL 11, NSTS PROGRAM MANAGER. 

ALL OTHER 

THE STS 514 TASK FORCE ACTION CENTER IS HEREBY REDESIGNATED THE NSTS 

ACTION CENTER. 

COORDINATE AND TRACK THE PROGRESS OF EACH OF OUR ACTIONS AND TO BE THE 

NSTS POINT OF CONTACT FOR ORGANIZATIONS EXTERNAL TO THE NSTS RELATING 

TO THE COMMISSION REPORT. 

I INTEND THAT THE NSTS ACTION CENTER SHALL BE USED TO 

AS PRESIDENT REAGAN STATED TODAY IN HIS LETTER TO DR. FLETCHER, 

"...THE MEN AND WOMEN OF NASA AND THE TASKS THEY SO ABLY PERFORM ARE 

ESSENTIAL TO THE NATION IF WE ARE TO RETAIN OUR LEADERSHIP IN THE 

PURSUIT OF TECHNOLOGICAL AND SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS." DR. FLETCHER AND I 

HAVE COMPLETE CONFIDENCE IN OUR ABILITY TO ORGANIZE OUR RESPONSE TO 

THE ROGERS COMMISSION REPORT AND TO CONTINUE OUR EFFORTS TO RETURN TO 

A SAFE FLIGHT STATUS. 

N 

ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR 3 3 UNCLASSIFIED 

FOR SPACE FLIGHT 

wm -Jlrm IOI(IYLICIWW 

EA WMR (41 QI) 10145.306 0 U.S. GOVERNUEUT PRINTING OFFICE : 1983 0 - 381-526 (8273) 

, 

46 
NASA 

National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration 

Washington, D.C. 

20546 

M Reply to Attn of: 

TO: Johnson Space Center 

Attn: GA/Manager, NSTS Office 

FROM: M/Associate Administrator for Space Flight 

SUBJECT: Imp 1 ement at i on of President i a1 Commi ssi on Recommendations 

This direction amplifies my TWX of June 13, 1986, same subject. You are 

hereby assigned responsibility for the action associated with the Presidential 

Commission Recommendations I, 111, VI, VII, VIII, and IX. In fulfilling these 

actions, you will be responsible directly to the Associate Administrator for 

Space F1 ight. 

Specific actions required for each recommendation are enclosed. 

develop a reporting plan that provides me regular visibility into the status 

of all actions. Action status will be routed through the NSTS Action 

Center. My point of contact is Mr. 3. Honeycutt, FTS 453-1261. 

In order to support the. Administrator's initial report to the President, your 

first status is required not later than July 3, 1986. Mr. D. Branscome, FTS 

453-1125, is my point of contact to develop this report. 

with him to reach an agreement on format and content of the portion which 

concerns your act ions. 

You should 

Please work directly 

This work is of the utmost importance to return the U.S. safely to manned 

space flight. 

the work associated with these actions. 

Its importance cannot be overstressed to those who accomplish 

Enclosure 

43 
National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration 

Washington, D.C. 

20546 

M Reply to Attn of: 

TO: M/Robert L. Crippen 

FROM: M/Associate Administrator for Space F1 ight 

SUBJECT: Implementation of Presidential Commission Recommendations 

This direction amplifies my TWX of June 13, 1986, same subject. 

hereby assigned responsibility for the action associated with the Presidential 

Commission Recommendations I1 and V. In fulfilling these actions, you will be 

responsible directly to the Associate Administrator for Space Flight. 

Specific actions required for each recommendation are enclosed. 

develop a reporting plan that provides me regular visibility into the status 

of all actions. Action status will be routed through the NSTS Action 

Center. My point of contact is Mr. J. Honeycutt, FTS 453-1261. 

You are 

You should 

In order to support the Administrator's initial report to the President, your 

first status is required not later than July 3, 1986. Mr. D. Branscome, FTS 

453-1125, is my point of contact to develop this report. 

with him to reach an agreement on format and content of the portion which 

conerns your actions. 

Please work directly 

This work is of the utmost importance to return the U.S. safely to manned 

space flight. 

the work associated with these actions. 

Its importance cannot be overstressed to those who accomplish 

Enclosure 

48 
Abbendix C 

NASA letter to the Office of Personnel Management on revitalization of NASA through 

concepts contained in the President’s proposed Civil Service Simplification Act 

49 
National Aeronautics and 

Space Ad ministration 

Washington, O.C. 

20546 

Off ice of the Administrator JUL 10 ms 

Honorable Constance Horner 

Director, Office of Personnel 

1900 E Street, NW 

Washington, DC 20415 

Management 

Dear Mrs. Horner: 

We appreciate the offer you made in the June 13, 1986, meeting 

with Dr. Fletcher and myself to help in revitalizing NASA. The 

timing could not be better for us to explore jointly innovative 

ways to manage NASA personnel matters. 

Since our initial meeting, we have taken steps to work with 

your office to develop an approach to implement the concepts 

contained in the President's proposed Civil Service 

Simplification Act, with the support of both the Administration 

and the Congress. Gaining the flexibility to better challenge 

and reward our personnel would greatly help NASA's effort to move 

forward. 

We plan to work with your staff to refine these efforts and 

keep the project moving on a very fast track. 

Your continued efforts in partnership with NASA will be vital 

to our success. 

William R. Graham 

Deputy Administrator