SHAHEIM HASSAN LOMAX,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO 

FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND 

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

CASE NO. 1D13-4271

_____________________________/

Opinion filed September 10, 2014.

An appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County.

Mallory D. Cooper, Judge.

Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and W. C. McLain, Assistant Public Defender, 

Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Virginia Harris, Assistant Attorney 

General, for Appellee.

WOLF, J. 

Appellant challenges his convictions for second-degree murder and 

possession of a firearm by a juvenile delinquent found to have committed a felony 

act. He argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence 

found during a traffic stop because an officer’s observation of his car swerving 
over solid double yellow lines was not probable cause that he committed a traffic 

violation. We affirm. 

An officer testified that appellant was traveling down a two-lane road 

separated by solid double yellow lines. The officer observed the car swerve, with 

both the driver’s side front and back tires traveling over the double yellow lines, so 

that the vehicle was partially in the oncoming lane of traffic. The officer then 

conducted a traffic stop and wrote appellant a ticket for violating a traffic control 

device as prohibited by section 316.047, Florida Statutes. The officer testified that 

when appellant crossed the double yellow lines, he was not attempting to pass 

another car. He testified there were no oncoming cars or cars in front of appellant, 

and that appellant did not interfere with the safe operation of any vehicle. 

In his motion to suppress, appellant argued that his briefly swerving two 

tires over the double yellow lines did not constitute violating a traffic control 

device. Specifically, he argued the purpose of the double yellow lines was to 

prohibit passing, not brief swerving. He relied on a federal driving manual 

pertaining to traffic control devices that was incorporated by reference in Florida 

Administrative Code Rule 14-15.010. The manual states that double yellow lines 

delineate “where crossing the centerline markings for passing is prohibited.” See

Federal Highway Administration Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices, 

2009, at Section 3B.01-3B.02. Appellant argues that because there was no 

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evidence that he was passing or attempting to pass another vehicle, his briefly 

swerving two tires over the double yellow lines did not constitute the traffic 

offense of violating a traffic control device. Thus, he argued there was no probable 

cause for the traffic stop. The trial court denied the motion to suppress.

“‘The ruling of the trial court on a motion to suppress comes to us clothed 

with a presumption of correctness and we must interpret the evidence and 

deductions in a manner most favorable to sustaining the trial court’s ruling.’” 

Johnson v. State, 608 So. 2d 4, 9 (Fla. 1992) (quoting Owen v. State, 560 So. 2d 

207, 211 (Fla. 1990), receded from on other grounds by State v. Owen, 696 So. 2d 

715 (Fla. 1997)). In reviewing a motion to suppress, a trial court’s findings of fact 

are reviewed for whether there is competent, substantial evidence to support the 

findings, whereas a trial court’s findings of law are reviewed de novo. See Calabro 

v. State, 995 So. 2d 307, 311 (Fla. 2008).

The State notes that section 316.0875, Florida Statutes, prohibits both 

passing and driving to the left of the pavement striping in no-passing zones: 

(1) The Department of Transportation and local authorities are 

authorized to determine those portions of any highway under their 

respective jurisdiction where overtaking and passing or driving to the 

left of the roadway would be especially hazardous and may, by 

appropriate signs or markings on the roadway, indicate the beginning 

and end of such zones, and when such signs or markings are in place 

and clearly visible to an ordinarily observant person, every driver of a 

vehicle shall obey the directions thereof.

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(2) Where signs or markings are in place to define a no-passing zone

as set forth in subsection (1), no driver shall at any time drive on the 

left side of the roadway with such no-passing zone or on the left side 

of any pavement striping designed to mark such no-passing zone 

throughout its length.

(3) This section does not apply when an obstruction exists making it 

necessary to drive to the left of the center of the highway, nor to the 

driver of a vehicle turning left into or from an alley, private road or 

driveway.

(4) A violation of this section is a noncriminal traffic infraction, 

punishable as a moving violation as provided in chapter 318.

§ 316.0875, Fla. Stat. (2010) (emphasis added). 

We find the officer’s testimony that he observed appellant’s front and back 

driver’s side tires travel over the solid double yellow lines, so that the vehicle was 

partially in the oncoming lane of traffic, was competent, substantial evidence that 

appellant violated the traffic control device of double yellow lines. Thus, there was 

competent, substantial evidence that appellant violated section 316.0875 by 

“driv[ing] . . . on the left side of any pavement striping designed to mark such nopassing zone.” 

We note that in a similar context, courts have found that a driver’s failure to 

maintain a single lane as required by section 316.089, Florida Statutes, does not by 

itself establish probable cause for a traffic stop unless the driver’s behavior placed 

other vehicles in danger. See, e.g., Hurd v. State, 958 So. 2d 600 (Fla. 4th DCA 

2007). Because section 316.089 prohibits leaving a lane unless it can be done “with 

safety,” courts have reasoned that “the failure to maintain a single lane alone 

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cannot establish probable cause when the action is done safely.” Hurd, 958 So. 2d 

at 603.*

In contrast, section 316.0875 does not permit crossing solid double yellow 

lines even if it can be done safely, unless one of the exceptions in subsection (3) 

applies. Instead, it states “no driver shall at any time drive . . . on the left side of 

any pavement striping designed to mark such no-passing zone.” § 316.0875(2), 

Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). Thus, the officer’s observation of appellant crossing 

the solid double yellow lines here constituted probable cause, regardless of the fact 

the officer testified that appellant did not create a safety hazard. We AFFIRM. 

LEWIS, C.J., and WETHERELL, J., CONCUR.

* We note that, as discussed in Hurd v. State, 958 So. 2d 600 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007), 

erratic driving can give rise to reasonable suspicion of impairment in certain 

circumstances. However, that was not an issue in this case.

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