a

GAO

United States Government Accountability Office

Report to Congressional Committees

April 2006 CHEMICAL AND 

BIOLOGICAL 

DEFENSE

DOD Needs 

Consistent Policies 

and Clear Processes to 

Address the 

Survivability of 

Weapon Systems 

Against Chemical and 

Biological Threats

GAO-06-592
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

April 2006

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE

DOD Needs Consistent Policies and Clear 

Processes to Address the Survivability of 

Weapon Systems Against Chemical and 

Biological Threats 

Highlights of GAO-06-592, a report to 

congressional committees 

The possibility that an adversary

may use chemical or biological 

weapons against U.S. forces makes

it important for a weapon system to

be able to survive such attacks. In

the National Defense Authorization 

Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Congress 

mandated that the Department of

Defense submit a plan to address

weapon system chemical and 

biological survivability by February 

28, 2005. This plan was to include 

developing a centralized database

with information about the effects 

of chemical and biological agents 

on materials used in weapon 

systems. DOD did not submit its 

plan as mandated. GAO was asked 

to evaluate (1) the extent to which 

DOD addresses weapon system

chemical and biological

survivability during the acquisition 

process, and (2) DOD’s internal

controls for maintaining a 

comprehensive database that 

includes chemical and biological

survivability research and test data

for weapon system design and

development.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is recommending

modifications to DOD’s current 

weapon system acquisition policy 

to ensure that (1) weapon system 

chemical and biological

survivability is consistently

addressed and (2) that DOD’s 

chemical and biological scientific

and technical information database

is comprehensive. DOD concurred 

with GAO’s recommendations and 

currently has actions underway for 

their implementation. 

The extent to which chemical and biological survivability is considered in 

the weapon system acquisition process is mixed and varied. Although DOD 

strategic guidance and policy has emphasized the growing threat of an 

adversary’s use of chemical and biological weapons for over a decade, DOD, 

joint, and military service weapon system acquisition policies are 

inconsistent and do not establish a clear process for considering and testing 

system chemical and biological survivability. To assess the extent DOD 

addresses chemical and biological survivability during the acquisition 

process, GAO conducted a non probability sample of nine major weapon 

systems based on high dollar value, whether the system was a joint program,

and risk of exposure to chemical and biological weapons. Because DOD and 

joint acquisition policies do not require that survivability be specifically 

addressed, the military services have developed their own varying and 

unique policies. Thus, for the nine weapon systems GAO reviewed, the 

program offices involved made individual survivability decisions, resulting in 

inconsistent survivability consideration and testing. In the absence of DOD 

requirements, program offices also inconsistently document their decisions 

regarding how they consider and test chemical and biological survivability. 

Furthermore, DOD policies do not establish a clear process for 

responsibility, authority, and oversight for monitoring program office 

decisions regarding chemical and biological survivability. Without 

establishing consistent policies requiring that chemical and biological 

survivability be considered during weapon system acquisition, and a clear 

process for doing so, military planners and commanders are likely to face 

varying weapon system performance, availability, and interoperability 

issues. These could negatively affect system availability in a contaminated 

environment and limit DOD’s ability to identify risk and ensure that 

appropriate decisions are made. 

 

DOD, through its Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC), maintains a 

centralized database for science and technology information that could 

facilitate program offices’ consideration of weapon system chemical and 

biological survivability, but the comprehensiveness of this database is 

unknown due to inadequate internal controls. It is unlikely that the DTIC 

database contains fully comprehensive information about this for three 

reasons. First, it is unclear whether this information is covered by the broad 

DOD policy directing that scientific and technical information be submitted 

to DTIC. Second, there is no established process for submitting scientific 

and technical information to DTIC. As a result, it is submitted to DTIC 

through the ad hoc actions of individual personnel and organizations, and 

some DOD officials expressed concern that not all information is being 

submitted to DTIC. Third, no office or organization in DOD has been given 

clear oversight responsibility to ensure that information is submitted to 

DTIC. The lack of a database with comprehensive information about weapon

system chemical and biological survivability creates the risk of unnecessary 

expenditures on duplicative testing. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-592.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Davi D' 

Agostino at (202) 512-5431 or 

dagostinod@gao.gov. 
Page i GAO-06-592 Chemical and Biological Defense

Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3

Background 5

DOD and the Military Services Do Not Consistently Address Weapon 

System Chemical and Biological Survivability 9

Comprehensiveness of Chemical and Biological Survivability 

Information in DOD's Centralized Database Is Unknown 13

Conclusions 15

Recommendations for Executive Action 15

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 16

Appendixes

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 19

Appendix II: Sampled Weapon System Programs Either Conducted or 

Considered Some Level of Chemical and Biological 

Survivability Testing 21

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense 26

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 29

Figures Figure 1: Intended Flow of Documents Containing Technical Data 

Related to Chemical and Biological Contamination 

Survivability 8

Figure 2: Chemical and Biological Testing Performed on Sampled 

Weapon Systems 22

Abbreviations

CBIAC Chemical and Biological Information Analysis Center

DOD Department of Defense

DTIC Defense Technical Information Center

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Page 1 GAO-06-592 Chemical and Biological Defense

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

A

April 28, 2006 Letr

Congressional Committees

The Department of Defense (DOD) believes that an adversary may use 

chemical or biological weapons against U.S. forces to respond to our 

superior conventional warfare capabilities and potentially gain an 

advantage on the battlefield. This increases the importance of considering 

a weapon system’s ability to survive chemical and biological attacks as part 

of its design and development. DOD’s investment of billions of dollars in 

modern weapon systems makes it critical that equipment can continue to 

operate after a battlefield is contaminated and can be reused after 

undergoing decontamination procedures. 

DOD and service policies consider chemical and biological survivability to 

be the capability of a system and its crew to withstand a chemically or 

biologically contaminated environment without losing the ability to 

accomplish the assigned mission. This capability includes a weapon 

system’s ability to withstand chemical or biological decontamination, a 

process that may itself be caustic, corrosive, or otherwise harmful to the 

system. Throughout this report, we will refer to this issue as weapon 

system chemical and biological survivability.

This report updates aspects of our prior work and is intended to help 

facilitate DOD’s efforts to address chemical and biological survivability in 

its weapon system acquisition process. Both GAO’s and DOD’s Inspectors 

General have previously reported on problems regarding this aspect of 

weapon system acquisition. For example, in 2003 we reported that DOD 

had not developed a systematic approach for ensuring that the services 

appropriately incorporate chemical and biological survivability into 

weapon system design and testing.1

 In the National Defense Authorization

1

GAO, Chemical and Biological Defense: Sustained Leadership Attention Needed to 

Resolve Operational and System Survivability Concerns (May 30, 2003).
Page 2 GAO-06-592 Chemical and Biological Defense

Act for Fiscal Year 2005,2 Congress mandated that DOD submit a plan for 

addressing such survivability by February 28, 2005. This plan was to 

include development of a centralized database containing comprehensive 

information about the effects of chemical and biological agents and 

contaminants on the materials used in weapon systems. In addition, the 

Senate Armed Services Committee directed that we evaluate DOD’s plan 

and report our findings to Congress within 180 days of the plan’s 

submission. As of April 3, 2006, DOD has not submitted the mandated plan. 

On August 2, 2005, DOD provided Congress with an interim report in partial 

response to the congressional mandate. The interim report indicated that 

DOD may not fully address the mandate until the end of fiscal year 2007. In 

anticipation of receiving DOD’s plan and to provide a foundation for our 

review you asked us to examine DOD’s existing policies and processes for 

considering chemical and biological survivability of weapon systems, and 

to assess the status of DOD’s efforts to create a centralized chemical and 

biological effects database. Our objectives were to evaluate (1) the extent 

to which DOD addresses weapon system chemical and biological 

survivability during the acquisition process, and (2) DOD’s internal controls 

for maintaining a comprehensive database that includes chemical and 

biological survivability research and test data for weapon system design 

and development. 

To examine the extent to which DOD addresses weapon system chemical 

and biological survivability during the acquisition process, we reviewed 

DOD, joint staff, and service policies, guidance, and procedures and 

obtained documentation and interviewed officials throughout DOD and at 

program offices from a non probability sample of nine major weapon 

systems based on several factors including (1) high dollar value 

(2) whether the system is a joint program, and (3) risk of exposure to 

chemical and biological weapons.3

 To evaluate the adequacy of DOD’s 

internal controls for maintaining a comprehensive database that facilitates 

the inclusion of chemical and biological survivability in weapon system 

design and development, we reviewed DOD and service policies, guidance, 

and procedures and conducted interviews with database officials, officials 

at the weapon system program offices we visited, and members of the 

chemical and biological testing community. We compared these policies, 

2

Pub. L. No. 108-375, § 1053 (Oct. 28, 2004).

3

Because the sample is a non probability sample, it cannot be used to make generalizations 

about weapon system program office acquisition, testing, or database submission practices. 
Page 3 GAO-06-592 Chemical and Biological Defense

guidance, and procedures to the objectives and fundamental concepts of 

internal controls defined in Standards for Internal Control in the Federal 

Government.

4 We conducted our review from February 2005 through 

January 2006 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. More detailed information on our scope and methodology is 

provided in appendix I.

Results in Brief DOD, joint, and military service weapon system acquisition policies 

inconsistently address and do not establish a clear process for considering 

and testing system chemical and biological survivability.5 Although DOD 

strategic guidance and policy have for the last decade repeatedly 

emphasized the growing threat of an adversary’s use of chemical and 

biological weapons, DOD and joint acquisition policies currently do not 

require that survivability be specifically addressed, and the military 

services have developed their own varying and unique policies. In the 

absence of consistent policies from DOD and the services, the nine weapon 

system program offices we reviewed made inconsistent decisions in their 

consideration and testing of weapon system survivability, even for similar 

systems. For example, the program offices for the three land systems we 

reviewed each conducted very different tests, even though all three 

systems are intended for the same operating environment. Similarly, the 

program offices for the nine weapon systems we reviewed did not 

consistently document their chemical and biological survivability decisions 

because of the absence of a DOD or joint requirement for them to do so. 

Although the program offices could provide documentation regarding what 

chemical and biological survivability testing was conducted, they did not 

have a consistent method to track what was considered or not included. 

Furthermore, DOD is unable to exercise oversight of program office 

decisions regarding weapon system chemical and biological survivability 

because DOD and service policies have not established a clear oversight 

process for monitoring these decisions. According to DOD officials, 

chemical and biological survivability is not usually a key performance

4

GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1

(Washington, D.C.: November 1999).

5

In commenting on this report DOD noted, and we agree, that the Army has a long-standing 

policy in place for addressing weapon system nuclear, biological, and chemical survivability. 

However, as noted on page 9 Army policies allow service sponsors and program offices to 

individually decide how and to what extent to consider weapon system survivability during 

the acquisition process.
Page 4 GAO-06-592 Chemical and Biological Defense

parameter,6 so the Milestone Decision Authority (MDA)7 does not provide 

oversight, and there is no specific chemical and biological survivability 

Functional Capabilities Board to review program office survivability 

decisions.

DOD, through the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC),8

maintains a centralized database that could facilitate program offices’ 

consideration of weapon system chemical and biological survivability, but 

the extent to which this database is comprehensive is unknown. Although 

DOD policy requires DTIC to maintain a comprehensive database of 

scientific and technical information, it is unlikely that this database 

contains all DOD-related data about the effects of chemical and biological 

agents and decontaminants on weapon systems for three reasons. First, it 

is unclear whether chemical and biological survivability information is 

covered by the broad DOD policy directing that scientific and technical 

information be submitted to DTIC. Some DOD officials we interviewed also 

told us there is disagreement about whether this policy applies to chemical 

and biological information. Second, there is no established process for 

submitting scientific and technical information to DTIC. As a result, 

information is submitted through the ad hoc actions of individual personnel 

and organizations, and some DOD officials expressed concern that not all 

the information is being submitted. Third, no office or organization in DOD 

has been designated as having oversight responsibility to ensure that 

information is submitted to DTIC. The lack of a database with 

comprehensive information about weapon system chemical and biological 

survivability could result in unnecessary expenditures on duplicative 

testing. For example, if research or testing is performed regarding an 

aspect of survivability, but its results not entered in the DTIC database, a 

program office interested in the same research might fail to recognize it 

had already been performed and cause the same work to be redone.

6

Key performance parameters are those attributes or characteristics of a system that are 

considered critical or essential to the development of an effective military capability and 

those attributes that make a significant contribution to the key characteristics.

7

MDA is the designated individual with overall responsibility for a program. The MDA has 

the authority to approve entry of an acquisition program into the next phase of the 

acquisition process and is accountable for cost, schedule, and performance reporting to 

higher authority, including congressional reporting.

8

DTIC is the central coordinating point for DOD’s scientific and technical information 

databases and systems.
Page 5 GAO-06-592 Chemical and Biological Defense

We are making recommendations for DOD to modify its policy to better 

ensure that weapon system chemical and biological survivability is 

consistently addressed in the acquisition process and that DTIC’s 

centralized database contains comprehensive chemical and biological 

survivability information. In commenting on our draft, DOD agreed with all 

our recommendations and stated it expects to (1) issue a department 

Chemical Biological Contamination Policy by May 2006, (2) subsequently 

draft a DOD Directive addressing Chemical, Biological, Radiological and 

Nuclear Survivability, and (3) develop a chemical and biological material 

effects database by the end of Fiscal Year 2007.

Background In the post–Cold War era, the proliferation of chemical and biological 

weapon technologies in developing countries presents DOD with a national 

security challenge. The 1997, 2001, and 2006 Quadrennial Defense Reviews 

as well as other DOD publications have emphasized the need to address the 

increasing threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass 

destruction, including chemical and biological weapons. The 2006 

Quadrennial Defense Review specifically states that DOD’s vision is to 

organize, train, equip, and resource the future force to deal with all aspects 

of the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction. It notes that DOD has 

doubled its investment in chemical and biological defenses since 2001, and 

is increasing funding for its Chemical Biological Defense Program across 

the Future Years Defense Program by $2.1 billion (approximately 20 

percent). However, experiences during the Persian Gulf War and the 

preparations for Operation Iraqi Freedom exposed weaknesses in the 

preparedness of U.S. forces to defend against a chemical or biological 

attack. In addition, we and DOD’s Inspector General have published reports 

addressing continued problems in aspects of DOD’s chemical and 

biological defense preparedness. Finally, at present there remain 

disagreements within DOD regarding the nature and extent of the chemical 

and biological threat and the degree to which major weapon systems 

should be survivable against such threats and capable of operating in a 

contaminated environment (see app. II). This lack of agreement could 

adversely affect DOD’s ability to develop and carry out a coherent plan to 

defend against chemical and biological threats. 
Page 6 GAO-06-592 Chemical and Biological Defense

Until 2003, DOD’s acquisition procedures9 (unless waived) required that 

weapon systems survivability be addressed in accordance with assessed 

threat levels, including chemical and biological, anticipated in the weapon 

system’s projected operating environment. These procedures defined 

survivability as the capability of a weapon system and crew to avoid or 

withstand a man-made hostile environment without suffering an abortive 

impairment of its ability to accomplish its designated mission. The Army, 

Navy, and Air Force issued supplemental acquisition policies that 

established service-specific procedures to address the chemical and 

biological contamination survivability of their weapon systems. In 2003, 

DOD replaced its acquisition procedures with a Defense Acquisition 

Guidebook, which, together with the controlling DOD directive and 

instruction,10 no longer specifically requires that weapon system 

survivability against chemical and biological threats be addressed during 

the system design and development phase. According to a DOD official, 

this action was part of a DOD effort to simplify its weapon system 

acquisition process. The only current DOD acquisition requirement 

specifically related to chemical and biological threats is that weapon 

system program offices address protection for crew members (as opposed 

to the weapon system itself) against the effects of a chemical or biological 

threat.11

As part of weapon system design and development efforts, DOD uses 

scientific and technical information from research and testing activities to 

better understand various chemical and biological agents and their impact 

on military operations, including the survivability of weapon systems. DTIC 

maintains a centralized database containing a broad range of scientific and 

technical information intended to maximize the return on investment in 

research, evaluation, and studies.12 In addition to its centralized database, 

DTIC uses the Chemical and Biological Information Analysis Center 

9

DOD Regulation 5000.2-R, Mandatory Procedures for Major Defense Acquisition 

Programs (MDAPS) and Major Automated Information System (MAIS) Acquisition 

Programs, Apr. 5, 2002.

10See DOD Directive 5000.1, The Defense Acquisition System, May 12, 2003; DOD 

Instruction 5000.2, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, May 12, 2003; Defense 

Acquisition Guidebook, Defense Acquisition University, www.akss.dau.mil/dag/.

11Crew members could be protected by such means as individual protective suits and masks, 

or by air filtration and overpressure built into weapon system crew compartments.

12According to DOD Instruction 3200.14, DTIC is the central coordinating point for DOD 

scientific databases and systems, including those related to chemical and biological data. 
Page 7 GAO-06-592 Chemical and Biological Defense

(CBIAC), a contractor-operated information analysis center, to maintain 

additional databases and provide information specific to chemical and 

biological issues.13 DOD indicated in its August 2005 interim report that it 

intends to build on the existing databases maintained by CBIAC and to 

develop a centralized database by the end of fiscal year 2007 that contains 

comprehensive information on the effects of chemical and biological 

agents and decontaminants on weapon systems.

In executing its role as a coordinating point for DOD scientific and 

technical information databases and systems, DTIC makes information 

available throughout DOD. Figure 1 illustrates the intended flow of 

information among testing facilities, program offices, and DTIC. 

13DTIC manages 9 contractor-operated information analysis centers.
Page 8 GAO-06-592 Chemical and Biological Defense

Figure 1: Intended Flow of Documents Containing Technical Data Related to Chemical and Biological Contamination 

Survivability 

DOD Library

DTIC

Ft. Belvoir, VA

  



Contractor Library

CBIAC

Edgewood, MD

DOD Survivability Analysis Facility

ARL/SLAD

Aberdeen, MD

Data Flow

Contractor Library

DOD Testing Facility

DPG

Dugway, UT

DOD Testing Facility

DOD Library

AFRL

Dayton, OH

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

DPG

AFRL

DTIC

CBIAC

ARL/SLAD

Dugway Proving Ground

Air Force Research Laboratory

Defense Technical Information Center

Chemical and Biological Information Analysis Center

Army Research Laboratory/Survivability and Lethality Analysis Directorate

Note: Based on conversations with DOD officials, the illustrated facilities represent only a

sample of those organizations that conduct chemical and biological survivability testing.
Page 9 GAO-06-592 Chemical and Biological Defense

DOD and the Military 

Services Do Not 

Consistently Address 

Weapon System 

Chemical and 

Biological Survivability

DOD and the military services do not consistently address weapon system 

chemical and biological survivability during the acquisition process. In the 

absence of clear DOD guidance and effective controls, responsibility for 

decisions regarding weapon system chemical and biological survivability 

has devolved largely to the individual military services and weapon system 

program offices. The program offices we visited do not consistently 

document their chemical and biological survivability decisions, nor is there 

an established, clear, and effective DOD-level process for the oversight of 

these decisions. 

DOD and Service Policies 

Do Not Establish a Clear 

Process for Considering and 

Testing Weapon System 

Chemical and Biological 

Survivability

Although emphasis is placed on chemical and biological threats in DOD's 

strategic guidance, DOD and military service policies do not establish a 

clear process for considering and testing weapon system chemical and 

biological survivability. While DOD acquisition policies require that 

survivability of personnel after exposure to chemical and biological agents 

be addressed by all weapon system programs, they do not specifically 

require the consideration of weapon system survivability.14 There also are 

no DOD policies regarding the quantity and type of weapon system 

survivability testing that should be conducted. In addition, joint staff 

policies do not address or provide specific instruction as to how chemical 

and biological survivability should be considered during the acquisition 

process, or how this consideration should be monitored, reviewed, and 

documented.15

Each of the existing service acquisition policies is therefore unique and 

differs in the extent and amount of detail it requires for considering 

weapon system chemical and biological survivability. DOD acquisition 

officials told us that each weapon system service sponsor has the ability to 

decide whether and to what extent to incorporate survivability testing. Of 

the military services, the Army has the most detailed policy for addressing 

this. However, while emphasizing the need to monitor and review chemical 

and biological survivability issues in general, Army policies allow service 

sponsors and program offices to individually decide how and to what 

extent to consider weapon system survivability during the acquisition 

14See DOD Directive 5000.1, The Defense Acquisition System, May 12, 2003, and DOD 

Instruction 5000.2, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, May 12, 2003.

15See Chairman Joint Chief of Staff Instruction 3170.01E, Joint Capabilities Integration 

and Development System, May 11, 2005.
Page 10 GAO-06-592 Chemical and Biological Defense

process. The Air Force and Navy have less detailed policies and also leave 

decision making to the weapon system sponsor and program office. Navy 

officials told us that, in their opinion, having less rigid requirements was 

advantageous because it reduces system development time and costs. 

The extent to which services consider weapon system survivability during 

the acquisition process is further influenced by differences in how each 

service perceives the chemical and biological threat and plans to conduct 

operations in a contaminated environment. The Army focuses on tactical 

and theater chemical and biological threats against exposed ground 

combat personnel and equipment. In comparison, the Air Force concept of 

operations in a contaminated environment is mainly a strategy of 

avoidance and protection, while the Navy view is that a chemical or 

biological attack on surface ships is a less likely threat.

In the absence of DOD-wide policies and processes, DOD officials stated 

that the responsibility for determining the extent of chemical and biological 

survivability consideration or testing has fallen largely on the individual 

weapon system program offices, in consultation with each service sponsor. 

However, program offices also lack specific guidance and a clear process 

governing the extent to which chemical and biological survivability should 

be considered or tested. In our review of nine weapon system programs, we 

found that the program offices exercised broad discretion over whether or 

to what extent to evaluate the need for and benefit of conducting chemical 

and biological survivability testing. Although all nine of these program 

offices had conducted or were considering some kind of testing, we found 

that the extent and nature of this testing varied widely, even for similar 

types of systems. For example, the two sea-based weapon system program 

offices we reviewed considered chemical and biological testing differently, 

even though both systems are intended for similar operating environments. 

The program offices for the three land systems we reviewed also 

conducted very different tests from one another, although these systems 

also are intended for the same operating environment. 

Many factors affected the program offices' determination about the extent 

to test a weapon system's chemical and biological survivability, including 

the type of system (air, land, or sea), required system capabilities, system 

concept of operation, perceived chemical and biological threat, and other 

factors relating to the status of system cost, schedule, and performance. A 

more detailed discussion of the testing conducted for the nine weapon 

system programs we reviewed can be found in appendix II. 
Page 11 GAO-06-592 Chemical and Biological Defense

Program Offices Did Not 

Consistently Document 

Chemical and Biological 

Survivability Decisions

The nine weapon system program offices we reviewed did not consistently 

document their decisions regarding how they considered or tested 

chemical and biological survivability. Although they could provide 

documentation regarding what survivability testing was conducted, they 

did not have a consistent method to track what was considered or was not 

included, because there is no DOD, joint, or service requirement for 

program offices to document these decisions. DOD officials stated that 

there is currently no DOD-level process for documenting how weapon 

system program offices determined whether to consider or test chemical 

and biological survivability. 

DOD Lacks Effective 

Survivability Oversight

There is no effective DOD-level oversight of how chemical and biological 

survivability is considered by weapon system program offices. In 1993, 

Congress directed the Secretary of Defense to designate an office as the 

single DOD focal point for chemical and biological defense matters.16 DOD 

subsequently identified the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for 

Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs as the single DOD 

focal point for chemical and biological defense matters.17 However, the 

military services and various offices within DOD never adopted a 

consistent method for incorporating chemical and biological survivability 

and related testing into major weapon system development acquisition, 

including oversight responsibilities. Between 1994 and 2004, GAO and DOD 

Inspector General reports identified multiple management and oversight 

process problems regarding the incorporation of chemical and biological 

survivability into weapon system development. Various military service 

acquisition offices and DOD agencies, such as the U.S. Army Nuclear 

Chemical Agency, and the office of the Assistant to the Secretary of 

Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense, held differing 

views as to where this responsibility resided and how chemical and 

biological survivability should be incorporated into weapon system 

development. These differing views have hindered the development of an 

oversight process and prevented effective monitoring of weapon system 

program office decisions regarding chemical and biological survivability. 

16National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-160, Section 1701 

(Nov. 30, 1993).

17The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological 

Defense Programs falls under the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology 

and Logistics.
Page 12 GAO-06-592 Chemical and Biological Defense

Although the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and 

Chemical and Biological Defense Programs directed the development and 

issuance of DOD's August 2005 interim report, DOD continues to lack a 

clear and effective department-level process for overseeing the inclusion of 

chemical and biological survivability in weapon system development. 

In addition, according to DOD officials, no single joint organization, such as 

the Joint Requirements Oversight Council18 or the Joint Requirements 

Office,19 specifically monitors or tracks whether weapon system chemical 

and biological survivability is considered in the weapon system acquisition 

process. There also is no specific chemical and biological survivability 

Functional Capabilities Board20 to review program office survivability 

decisions. DOD officials stated that these joint oversight organizations do 

not have a role in overseeing weapon system chemical and biological 

survivability and that consideration of survivability requirements during 

the acquisition process is therefore service-specific. Furthermore, because 

chemical and biological survivability is not usually a key performance 

parameter21 for a weapon system, it is often traded off to satisfy other 

pressing requirements dealing with the weapon system cost, schedule, or 

performance. DOD officials we spoke with acknowledged that program 

cost and schedule concerns could reduce the amount of chemical and 

biological weapon system survivability testing conducted. While the 

Milestone Decision Authority focuses on requirements associated with key 

18The Joint Requirements Oversight Council is an advisory council that assists the Chairman 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in identifying and assessing the priorities for joint military 

requirements to achieve current and future military capabilities. Chaired by the Vice 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Council comprises a senior officer from each of 

the military services. Representatives from other DOD entities, such as the combatant 

commands and the joint staff, serve in an advisory role to the Council.

19The Joint Requirements Office is the office within DOD responsible for the planning, 

coordination, and oversight of joint chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense 

operational requirements. It also serves as the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff's single 

source of expertise to address all issues involving chemical, biological, radiological, and 

nuclear defense within passive defense, consequence management, force protection, and 

homeland security.

20A Functional Capabilities Board is a permanently established body that is responsible for 

the organization, analysis and prioritization of joint warfighting capabilities within an 

assigned functional area.

21Key performance parameters are those attributes or characteristics of a system that are 

considered critical or essential to the development of an effective military capability and 

those attributes that make a significant contribution to the key characteristics.
Page 13 GAO-06-592 Chemical and Biological Defense

performance parameters, none of the nine weapon systems we reviewed 

included chemical and biological survivability as a key performance factor. 

Only specific chemical and biological equipment-such as detection, 

protection, and decontamination equipment-have identified chemical and 

biological survivability as a key performance parameter.

Comprehensiveness of 

Chemical and 

Biological Survivability 

Information in DOD's 

Centralized Database 

Is Unknown

DOD, through DTIC, maintains a centralized database for science and 

technology information that could facilitate program offices' consideration 

of weapon system chemical and biological survivability, but the 

comprehensiveness of the survivability information in this database is 

unknown. We found it unlikely that this database is comprehensive for 

three reasons: (1) DOD policy is unclear as to whether chemical and 

biological information is covered by the policy, (2) no process has been 

established governing how information should be submitted to DTIC, and 

(3) no office or organization is responsible for overseeing that information 

is submitted to DTIC. 

It is unclear whether chemical and biological survivability information is 

covered by the broad DOD policy directing that scientific and technical 

information be submitted to DTIC. This policy requires that DTIC be 

provided with copies of DOD-sponsored scientific and technical 

information, but does not specifically address whether chemical and 

biological survivability information is included. Some DOD officials 

involved in chemical and biological survivability research and/or testing 

told us that they believed they were not required to submit the results of 

their work to DTIC. Further, there is no established process for submitting 

chemical and biological information to DTIC.22 As a result, individual 

personnel and organizations submit information to DTIC through ad hoc 

actions, and some DOD officials expressed concern that not all information 

is submitted to DTIC as required. 

22DOD Instruction 3200.14, "Principles and Operational Parameters of the DOD Scientific 

and Technical Information Program", May 13, 1997, states that a manual should be 

developed prescribing procedures, practices, standards, and training guides necessary to 

implement a comprehensive, efficient, and effective DOD scientific and technical 

information program, including a process for submitting research and testing results to a 

central database. However, such a manual has not been developed. DOD officials told us 

that they do not intend to develop such a manual and that reference to this manual will be 

removed from future versions of the DOD instruction.
Page 14 GAO-06-592 Chemical and Biological Defense

Finally, no office or organization in DOD has been clearly designated as 

responsible for exercising oversight to ensure that chemical and biological 

research and testing results are submitted to DTIC. The DOD instruction 

addressing management of the collection of scientific and technical 

information assigns responsibility for submitting research and testing 

results to the DOD activities involved,23 but this instruction does not 

specifically indicate whether the activity sponsoring or approving the work 

or, alternatively, the organization performing it is responsible for its 

submission to DTIC. Officials at the DOD research and testing facilities we 

visited told us they routinely submitted the results of their work to DTIC, 

and we observed that DTIC and CBIAC were storing large amounts of this 

information. The two major DOD chemical and biological research and 

testing facilities we visited had an oversight process in place for ensuring 

that all research and testing projects submitted the required information to 

DTIC. However, responsibility for submitting this information was either 

left to individual research or testing staff, or was presumed to have been 

submitted to DTIC by the program offices requesting the work. DTIC 

officials stated that DTIC was not responsible for ensuring that DOD 

research and testing facilities submitted all research and testing results, 

and that DTIC had neither the authority nor the desire to do this. We could 

not identify any military service or program office level oversight for 

ensuring that research and testing results were submitted to DTIC, and 

some of the program offices we visited said the submission of research and 

test results to DTIC was not their responsibility. The absence of an internal 

control for ensuring that research and test results are submitted to DTIC 

and entered in DTIC's database could result in unnecessary expenditures 

on duplicative work. For example, if research or testing is performed 

regarding an aspect of survivability, but its results not entered in the DTIC 

database, officials in another program office interested in the same 

research or testing might fail to recognize it had already been performed 

and cause this work to be done again.

23See DOD Instruction 3200.14, "Principles and Operational Parameters of the DOD 

Scientific and Technical Information Program," May 13, 1997, which states, “Primary 

distribution of all documents regardless of form, shall be the responsibility of the DOD 

activity that performed or sponsored the work in whole or in part. Primary distribution shall 

be to the technical community having a direct and immediate interest in the outcome of the 

research and evaluation or studies efforts. The DTIC, applicable DOD Information Analysis 

Centers, and the local DOD technical library or repository that supports the activity 

responsible for sponsoring and creating the documents shall be recipients of the primary 

distribution at the same time.”
Page 15 GAO-06-592 Chemical and Biological Defense

Conclusions The issues identified in previous DODIG and GAO reports regarding 

weapon system incorporation of chemical and biological survivability 

during the system acquisition process remain largely unresolved. Without 

DOD establishing consistent policy requiring that chemical and biological 

survivability be considered during weapon system acquisition and 

establishing a clear process for doing so, the incorporation of chemical and 

biological survivability into major weapons system acquisition is likely to 

remain varied and inconsistent. Consequently, military planners and 

commanders are likely to face varying weapon system performance, 

availability, and interoperability issues. This, in turn, could complicate the 

planning and execution of operations and increase the risk of mission 

failure, because systems that are not chemically or biologically survivable 

but become exposed to chemical or biological agents may not be available 

to a combatant commander for reuse in critical missions, such as deploying 

or supplying troops. Furthermore, without consistent documentation of 

program offices' rationales for trade-off decisions in their consideration of 

weapon system chemical and biological survivability, DOD's ability to 

identify and analyze associated risks could be hindered. Finally, the 

absence of a clearly defined DOD-level process for overseeing military 

service and program office actions limits DOD's ability to ensure that 

appropriate weapon system survivability decisions are being made.

Without clarifying existing policies regarding which research and testing 

information should be submitted, the process to be used for submitting it, 

and which DOD offices or organizations are responsible for overseeing its 

submission, DTIC will likely be unable to ensure the maintenance of a 

centralized database containing comprehensive chemical and biological 

research and testing information. This could limit DOD's ability to 

efficiently and economically assess the effects of chemical and biological 

agent contamination on weapon system components and materials, and 

could result in duplicative research and testing, thus causing unnecessary 

design and development costs.

Recommendations for 

Executive Action

To better ensure the incorporation of chemical and biological survivability 

into weapon systems, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct 

the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 

to take the following six actions:
Page 16 GAO-06-592 Chemical and Biological Defense

• Either modify current DOD policy or develop guidance to ensure that 

chemical and biological survivability is consistently addressed in the 

weapon system acquisition process. This policy or guidance should

• establish a clear process for program offices to follow regarding the 

extent to which chemical and biological system survivability should 

be considered and tested;

• require consistent, DOD-wide documentation of decisions regarding 

how weapon system chemical and biological survivability is 

considered and tested; and 

• establish an oversight process within DOD and the services for 

monitoring weapon system program office decisions; 

• modify current DOD policy to ensure that DOD's database of chemical 

and biological scientific and technical information is comprehensive. 

This modified policy should 

• state which chemical and biological survivability information belongs 

in the body of scientific and technical information that is required to 

be submitted to DTIC;

• clarify responsibilities and establish a specific process for the 

submission of chemical and biological scientific and technical 

information to DTIC; and 

• designate which DOD office or organization is responsible for 

exercising oversight to ensure that this information is submitted to 

DTIC.

Agency Comments and 

Our Evaluation

In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with all 

recommendations. Regarding our recommendations for either modifying 

current DOD policy or developing guidance to ensure that chemical and 

biological survivability is consistently addressed in the weapon system 

acquisition process, DOD plans to issue a Chemical Biological 

Contamination Survivability Policy by May 2006 and subsequently draft a 

DOD Directive addressing Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear 

Survivability. With regard to our recommendations for modifying current 

DOD policy to ensure that DOD's database of chemical and biological 

scientific and technical information is comprehensive, DOD initiated the 
Page 17 GAO-06-592 Chemical and Biological Defense

development of a chemical and biological material effects database by 

forming and hosting an executive steering committee that met for the first 

time in March 2006. DOD plans to establish and institute this database at 

the Chemical and Biological Defense Information and Analysis Center 

(CBIAC) managed by the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC). 

The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and 

Biological Defense Programs is overseeing the development of this 

database, which DOD expects to be ready by the end of Fiscal Year 2007. 

DOD's comments are reprinted in appendix III. DOD also provided 

technical comments, which we have incorporated as appropriate.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Defense, the Air 

Force, the Army, the Navy, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps; and 

the Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will make copies 

available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at 

no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff members have any questions regarding this report, 

please contact me at (202) 512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov. Contact points 

for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found 

on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to 

this report are listed in appendix IV.

Davi M. D'Agostino

Director, Defense Capabilities and Management
Page 18 GAO-06-592 Chemical and Biological Defense

List of Congressional Committees

The Honorable John Warner

Chairman

The Honorable Carl Levin

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Ted Stevens

Chairman

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter

Chairman

The Honorable Ike Skelton

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

The Honorable C. W. Bill Young

Chairman

The Honorable John P. Murtha

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives
Page 19 GAO-06-592 Chemical and Biological Defense

Appendix I

Scope and Methodology AAppenednxidexiIs

To assess the extent to which DOD addresses weapon system chemical and 

biological survivability during the acquisition process, we reviewed DOD, 

joint staff, and service policies, guidance, and procedures and interviewed 

officials throughout DOD. We also conducted a non probability sample of 

nine major weapon systems.1

 We selected programs for this non probability 

sample based on several factors, including (1) high dollar value,2

(2) whether the weapon system was a joint program, and (3) risk of 

exposure to chemical and biological weapons. The methodology used to 

select our sample helped achieve a sample of weapon systems that was 

both diverse and relevant to chemical and biological survivability. For 

example, the sample includes weapon systems from all military services 

and all types of systems-land, sea, and air. The sample also includes both 

legacy systems and those currently in development. To understand how 

DOD's acquisition, testing, and data submission and storage policies affect 

weapon systems program offices' practices, we spoke with officials and 

examined documentation from the nine weapon system program offices we 

reviewed. The list of selected weapons systems is provided below:

• C-17 Globemaster

• DD(X) Destroyer

• Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle

• F/A-22 Raptor

• Future Combat Systems

• Joint Strike Fighter

• Littoral Combat Ship

• Stryker Infantry Carrier

1

Because the sample is a non probability sample, it cannot be used to make generalizations 

about weapon system program office acquisition, testing, or database submission practices 

related to chemical and biological survivability. 

2

Seven of nine of the programs covered in this report are considered major defense 

acquisition programs by DOD. A program is defined by DOD as major if its estimated 

research and development costs exceed $365 million or its procurement exceeds $2.19 

billion in fiscal year 2000 constant dollars.
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 20 GAO-06-592 Chemical and Biological Defense

• V-22 Osprey Vertical Lift Aircraft

To determine the extent to which DOD maintains a comprehensive 

database for facilitating the inclusion of chemical and biological 

survivability in weapons system design and development, we reviewed 

DOD and service policies, guidance, and procedures. We compared these 

policies, guidance, and procedures to the objectives and fundamental 

concepts of internal controls defined in Standards for Internal Control in 

the Federal Government. We also conducted interviews with database 

officials and members of the chemical and biological testing community 

and reviewed documents at the following locations in consultation with 

DOD officials and identified as crucial to this subject area in previous GAO 

reports: 

• Air Force Research Laboratory, Dayton, Ohio

• Army Research Laboratory, Survivability and Lethality Analysis 

Directorate, Aberdeen, Maryland

• Chemical and Biological Information Analysis Center, Edgewood, 

Maryland 

• Defense Technical Information Center, Fort Belvoir, Virginia

• West Desert Test Center, Dugway Proving Ground, Utah

• Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Alexandria, Virginia

We conducted our review from February 2005 through January 2006 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Page 21 GAO-06-592 Chemical and Biological Defense

Appendix II

Sampled Weapon System Programs Either 

Conducted or Considered Some Level of 

Chemical and Biological Survivability Testing ApendxiI

We conducted a non probability sample of nine weapon system programs 

and found that all conducted or were considering some kind of system 

survivability testing. The survivability of the weapon system programs we 

reviewed was tested by an array of testing procedures and a variety of 

simulated and live chemical and biological agents and decontamination 

solutions. Seven conducted either coupon1

 testing of materials or 

component testing. In a few cases, chemical and biological survivability 

testing was only conducted at the weapons system level and not at the 

coupon or component level. All of the weapon system program offices we 

interviewed conducted literature searches, discussions with subject matter 

experts, and consulted with testing facilities and organizations (such as the 

West Desert Test Center) to develop their chemical and biological 

survivability testing strategy. Figure 2 shows the different types of testing 

related to chemical and biological survivability that had been performed on 

the selected weapon systems at the time of our review. This figure does not 

reflect either planned or unplanned survivability testing that might be 

performed with regard to these systems in the future.

1

A coupon-or-swatch is a test specimen cut from a bolt of material. The swatch should be 

selected to be representative of the area of the material to be tested.
Appendix II

Sampled Weapon System Programs Either 

Conducted or Considered Some Level of 

Chemical and Biological Survivability Testing

Page 22 GAO-06-592 Chemical and Biological Defense

Figure 2: Chemical and Biological Testing Performed on Sampled Weapon Systems

Program Offices' Chemical 

and Biological Survivability 

Testing Varied for Reviewed 

Weapon Systems 

We found that the extent and nature of chemical and biological 

survivability testing varied widely in all nine weapon systems we reviewed, 

even for similar types of systems. Both sea-based weapon systems we 

reviewed exhibited varying consideration of chemical and biological 

testing. For example, the Navy's Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program office 

 

Coupon

testing1

Component

testing

System

testing

Ship 

 

 

Stryker Infantry 

Carrier

Weapon system

Future Combat 

Systems 2

DD(X) Destroyer

 4

5 Littoral Combat 

1

3 Expeditionary 

Fighting Vehicle 

9 Joint Strike Fighter 

6 V-22 Osprey Vertical 

Lift Aircraft 

7 F/A-22 Raptor

8 C-17 Globemaster 

1

2 2 2

3 3 3

1

2

3

1

1

1

1

1

1

1 1

1

 Weapon system conducted testing at 

 either the coupon, component, or

 system level.

 Weapon system in design phase.

 Specific procedures for the consider-

 ation of chemical and bilogical

 survivability not developed.

 Concept of operations precludes

 this vehicle from operating in a

 chemical or biological contaminated

 environment.

1Note: A coupon-- or swatch-- is a test

specimen cut from a bolt of material. 

The swatch should be selected to be

representative of the area of the

material to be tested.

Sources: Army: 1, 2; Navy: 4, 5-(Littoral Combat Ship Program Office); Marine Corp: 9, 3-(General Dynamics Land System);

Air Force: 6, 7, 8. GAO analysis of DOD data.

Most Sampled Programs Included Consideration

of Chemical and Biological Survivability
Appendix II

Sampled Weapon System Programs Either 

Conducted or Considered Some Level of 

Chemical and Biological Survivability Testing

Page 23 GAO-06-592 Chemical and Biological Defense

considered chemical and biological survivability testing low-risk due to the 

perceived operating environment and concept of operations for this 

weapon system. Officials stated that the key survivability approach will be 

to reduce susceptibility to contamination through detection and avoidance. 

In contrast, the Navy's next generation destroyer DD(X) was designed with 

a higher chemical and biological system protection level, and consequently 

the program office conducted limited coupon testing of specific materials 

found in the ship's superstructure.2

 In its technical comments on this 

report, DOD stated that this occurred because the DD(X) concept of 

operations does not preclude exposure to chemical and biological attacks, 

while the LCS concept of operations does preclude exposure to chemical 

and biological agents. These systems thus utilized different concepts of 

operations although both are intended to operate in a littoral environment.

DOD and program officials stated that land systems would be those most 

likely to include chemical and biological survivability testing because of the 

increased likelihood of encountering contamination on the modern 

battlefield. However, these programs also conducted tests very different 

from each other although they are intended for the same operating 

environment. The Marine Corps' Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle program 

office conducted four chemical and biological materials tests that looked at 

the effects of decontaminants on a variety of materials and included 

extensive tests using Chemical Agent Resistant Coating on the exterior and 

interior of the vehicle. In comparison, program officials from the Army's 

new wheeled personnel carrier, Stryker, used a different approach, 

focusing on applying a chemical agent simulant to a complete Stryker 

vehicle and then conducting decontamination procedures. However, in this 

case a different testing approach for a similar system may have been 

appropriate because the Stryker is not constructed with new materials and 

all existing materials used in constructing the Stryker meet military 

specification requirements for chemical and biological survivability. The 

Army's Future Combat System is currently reassessing chemical and 

biological survivability in its design and development. This program is still 

in development and has not reached the point where definitive decisions on 

chemical and biological survivability are applicable. The Army sponsor and 

the program office have been coordinating with the Joint Requirements 

Oversight Council, U.S. Army Nuclear and Chemical Agency, and the Army 

2

The DD(X) program office stated that there are plans for additional production testing (at 

both the component and total system level) to include the Countermeasure Washdown 

System, Chemical Detection Systems, and the Collective Protection System. 
Appendix II

Sampled Weapon System Programs Either 

Conducted or Considered Some Level of 

Chemical and Biological Survivability Testing

Page 24 GAO-06-592 Chemical and Biological Defense

Training and Doctrine Command in creating chemical and biological 

survivability requirements. 

Of the four aircraft weapon system programs we sampled, three conducted 

similar levels of chemical and biological testing. Of the three current 

systems, the Air Force's F/A-22 Raptor and Joint Strike Fighter program 

offices conducted testing as extensive as that conducted by the Navy for 

the V-22 Osprey, although these two systems were assessed as much less 

likely to encounter chemical and biological contamination as the V-22 

Osprey. The V-22 Osprey program office performed vulnerability 

assessments, survivability assessments, and some material coupon tests. 

Both the Air Force Joint Strike Fighter and F/A-22 Raptor program offices 

conducted complementary material and component contamination and 

decontamination compatibility tests. To identify material survivability 

issues, the F/A-22 Raptor program office contracted with a defense 

contractor to perform a literature search in advance of any testing. The 

Joint Strike Fighter program office effectively employed the results of this 

F/A-22 Raptor testing performed by using the survivability manual 

developed for the F/A-22 Raptor rather than developing its own. This 

manual was effectively used as a reference to meet both program's 

chemical and biological survivability and decontamination thresholds 

following exposure to chemical and biological weapons and 

decontamination procedures. The legacy aircraft system we reviewed, the 

C-17, conducted little chemical and biological testing because much of its 

testing and development occurred during a different threat environment. 

Program officials stated that decontamination procedures for the C-17 

were developed in the 1980s and that the chemical and biological 

survivability requirements were drastically scaled down after the end of the 

Cold War.

Variety of Factors Affected 

Testing Decisions

Many factors affected the program office's determination about the extent 

to test a weapon system's chemical and biological survivability. These 

factors included the type of system (i.e., air, land, or sea), required system 

capabilities, system concept of operation, the perceived chemical and 

biological threat, and other factors related to the status of system cost, 

schedule, and performance. Senior DOD officials stated that each service 

sponsor has the ability to choose whether to accept the risks related to cost 

and schedule to incorporate testing of chemical and biological survivability.

DOD officials stated that in general land systems are perceived as the most 

likely to encounter chemical and biological contamination and that the 
Appendix II

Sampled Weapon System Programs Either 

Conducted or Considered Some Level of 

Chemical and Biological Survivability Testing

Page 25 GAO-06-592 Chemical and Biological Defense

perceived threat for sea and air systems has traditionally been considered 

lower than the perceived threat for land systems. This perception was 

based on old Cold War concepts and has since changed. DOD officials told 

us that asymmetric threats are a greater concern today and that system 

developers must weigh the threat context as they are developing systems 

and deciding what types of survivability to test based on perceived risk. 

Program offices we visited stated that the high financial cost of both live 

and simulated chemical and biological agent testing was a factor that 

influences decisions about testing weapon system chemical and biological 

survivability. For example, officials at the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle 

program office estimated that coupon testing with live agents could cost 

approximately $30,000 to $50,000, and full system, live agent field testing of 

equipment at a facility such as the West Desert Test Center at Dugway 

Proving Grounds would cost approximately $1 million. In addition, the C-17 

program office stated that live agent testing cost approximately $1 million. 

Interviews with various DOD research facilities where testing is conducted 

supported these amounts. F/A-22 program officials also stated that 

although they conducted coupon and component tests, they would not 

encourage a full system chemical and biological survivability test because 

such a test would be too expensive and would destroy the aircraft being 

tested.
Page 26 GAO-06-592 Chemical and Biological Defense

Appendix III

Comments from the Department of Defense ApendxiI
Appendix III

Comments from the Department of Defense

Page 27 GAO-06-592 Chemical and Biological Defense

Now on p. 16.
Appendix III

Comments from the Department of Defense

Page 28 GAO-06-592 Chemical and Biological Defense

Now on p. 16.
Page 29 GAO-06-592 Chemical and Biological Defense

Appendix IV

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments ApendxiIV

GAO Contact Davi M. D’Agostino, (202) 512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov

Acknowledgments In addition to the contact named above, William Cawood, Assistant 

Director; Renee S. Brown, Jane Ervin, Catherine Humphries, David 

Mayfield, Renee McElveen, Anupama Patil, Matthew Sakrekoff, Rebecca 

Shea, and Cheryl Weissman also made key contributions to this report.

(350641)
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