WHO STAYS AND WHO GOES:

ARMY ENLISTED RESERVE 

AND NATIONAL GUARD RETENTION

Clayton K. S. Chun

July 2005

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ii

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iii

FOREWORD

 The U.S. Army faces global challenges that have required it to 

use reserve components in a manner unseen since World War II 

and the Korean War. Today, there are many questions and concerns 

about the future of the Army Reserve and National Guard due to the 

unprecedented, continued mobilization of these reserve components 

and problems involving retention. Without adequate retention of 

personnel, valuable experience and unit readiness are at risk. The 

Army would have to spend its limited resources to replace many 

seasoned soldiers with junior personnel or use more contractors who 

may not be as effective or efficient. 

 This monograph examines Army Reserve and National Guard 

enlisted retention patterns from 1995-2002. It provides a necessary 

background to compare retention patterns in the past with those of 

today. This information will help reserve component leadership to 

assess their personnel retention efforts and adjust appropriate public 

policies to improve their force structure.

 The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this monograph 

as a contribution to the debate on reserve component personnel 

issues.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute 
iv

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

CLAYTON K. S. CHUN is the Chair for the Department of Distance 

Education at the U.S. Army War College. He holds the Army War 

College’s General Hoyt Vandenberg Chair of Aerospace Studies. 

Before assuming his current duties, he was Professor of Economics 

at the College. He completed a full career in the Air Force. His 

assignments include missile, space, acquisition, education, strategy 

development, and command positions. Dr. Chun has written articles 

and books dealing with issues related to national security, military 

history, and economics. He holds a Bachelor of Science in Business 

from the University of California, Berkeley; Master of Arts degree in 

Economics from the University of California, Santa Barbara; Master 

of Science degree in Systems Management from the University of 

Southern California; and a doctorate in Public Policy Analysis from 

the RAND Graduate School, a part of the RAND Corporation.
v

SUMMARY

 Today, USAR and ARNG personnel serving with their active 

components are a common sight and are transparent in many areas 

of operation. Army reserve components have actively participated in 

Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, and for homeland 

security. Reserve and National Guard units provide specialist and 

augmentation support for active forces. In some cases, active forces 

could not sustain field operations without reserve component 

support. National leadership increasingly has called upon these 

reserve components to replace operational active Army units as 

commitments grow in breadth and scope. Force commitments 

around the globe will ensure future mobilizations of U.S. Army 

Reserve (USAR) and Army National Guard (ARNG) personnel in 

areas away from home and under conditions not foreseen just a few 

years ago.

 Frequent and large mobilizations of units and individuals 

to supplement and support active forces come at a cost, not only 

financially, but in terms of readiness and perhaps retention. Like 

their active duty counterparts, USAR and ARNG forces rely strictly 

on volunteers to fill their ranks. If conditions become intolerable for 

potential recruits and existing members, these organizations may find 

personnel refusing to consider participation in the reserves. Perhaps 

a first step in determining whether the Army faces such a problem is 

to determine if it faces retention concerns among its forces.

 This monograph examines trends in USAR and ARNG enlisted 

members’ retention. Its primary objective is to create a baseline to 

compare future USAR and ARNG retention and concentrates on the 

period from 1995 to 2002. The author compares demographic factors, 

such as race and martial status, to examine who stays and who leaves 

their respective components. These trends should provide the basis 

for further study and policy recommendations. The USAR and 

ARNG face many of the same problems as the active Army, but their 

situation is more complex. They face problems with their members 

balancing civilian and military careers, family concerns, and other 

challenges that can force them to leave service before the completion 

of a full reserve career.
vi

 Three groups are examined: enlisted members with 4-7 years, 8-

10 years, and 19 years of service. These groups represent relatively 

junior, middle grade, and senior military members. If the junior 

members start to leave, the reserve component needs to work 

harder to recruit more soldiers. Middle grade enlisted members 

serve as the backbone of the reserve force and affect future senior 

enlisted leadership capability. If soldiers start to retire, lack of senior 

leadership can affect unit readiness and capabilities by forcing junior 

and middle grade enlisted members to take over positions and work 

assignments earlier than they might otherwise. This could also affect 

their retention. 

 Several notable differences have occurred between the groups. 

Overall, the Army Reserve had a higher retention rate than the 

National Guard. Within all of the three enlisted groups, USAR groups 

had a higher retention rate than comparable ARNG ones. Retention 

actually increased in almost all groups over the period, despite 

lowered unemployment rates. During some periods of decreased 

unemployment, some retention rates among junior enlisted members 

increased, while in other cases high unemployment corresponded 

with lower retention.

 Other demographic trends include married members having 

higher retention rates than single members whether the person was 

in the USAR or ARNG. However, if one examines individuals who 

indicate how many dependents that member claims, the observation 

changes. Single members with dependents normally have greater 

retention rates than married members with the same number of 

dependents, up to a point. These observations could have significant 

policy implications to improve retention among particular groups, 

like providing health insurance or childcare that could affect 

retention.

 Retention rates regarding males and females also differ. In the 4-

7 year group, female retention was generally greater than male rates. 

The other groups indicate males staying in the military at greater 

rates. One could wonder if this is a new trend where females seek 

a career with the USAR and ARNG; this will create new challenges. 

Conversely, as the reserve female members gain experience, they 

tend to leave at greater rates. This may signal new areas for research 

on why they leave.
vii

 Curiously, deployments did not affect retention in this period. 

Members with one or two deployments had better retention rates 

than those who had none. Perhaps those members who were not 

deployed faced more work, did not get a chance to practice their 

skills, faced the loss of a career opportunity, or felt left out of their 

unit, which affected their behavior. 

 Race was the last major demographic factor examined. White 

members had lower retention rates than nonwhites. Given the 

changing national demographics and potential impact on future 

recruitment, nonwhites must play a larger role in the reserve 

components. This will affect a host of leadership, training, and other 

policy issues in recruitment and retention of our enlisted forces.

 These observations are general and indicate further study is 

needed to examine policy changes that improve retention. Today, 

Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM have 

placed additional stress on the reserve components. While one does 

not know what retention rates will be found in the reserve components, 

certainly these events will change perceptions about a reserve career. 

This monograph may provide the basis to compare retention rates 

between the continued mobilizations of reserve components and the 

period where selected deployments were the norm. If the United 

States returns to a period where reserve components are used in less 

routine deployments, retention may return to its previous rates. The 

reserve components face problems they must solve to retain soldiers. 

Policy options, like bonuses, have been implemented to improve 

retention. Perhaps other options, based on who stays or goes, might 

be more effective. Personnel policies to sustain retention rates might 

not be motivated solely by monetary rewards. 

1

WHO STAYS AND WHO GOES:

ARMY ENLISTED RESERVE 

AND NATIONAL GUARD RETENTION

 Since the end of the Vietnam War, the nation has relied heavily 

upon her reserve components in times of peace and war. In the 60 

years since World War II, the government has mobilized elements 

of the reserve components on a number of occasions, but other than 

the Korean Conflict and the Persian Gulf War, these mobilizations 

have been relatively small and short. The Army mobilized 138,600 

National Guardsmen1 and 240,500 Army Reservists2 for the Korean 

Conflict from 1950 to 1953. Other mobilizations included the 1961 

Berlin Crisis and much smaller amounts for Vietnam and other 

conflicts. During the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War, the President called 

to active duty more than 140,000 Army National Guard (ARNG) and 

U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) members from over 1,040 units from 

around the country.3

 Since then, and especially since September 11, 

2001, the nation has increased its reliance on reserve components, 

and this has changed the character of the armed forces.

 Today, USAR and ARNG personnel serving with their active 

components are a common sight and component source is transparent 

in many areas of operation. Army reserve components have actively 

participated in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, and 

for homeland security. Approximately 143,000 reserve component 

members were on active duty on June 9, 2003.4

 Reserve and National 

Guard units provide specialist and augmentation support for active 

forces. In some cases, elements of the active force could not sustain 

field operations without reserve component support. National 

leadership increasingly has called upon the reserve components 

to replace operational active Army units as commitments grow in 

breadth and scope. Force commitments around the globe will ensure 

future mobilizations of USAR and ARNG personnel and employment 

in areas away from home and under conditions not foreseen just a 

few years ago.

 Frequent and large mobilizations of units and individuals 

to supplement and support active forces come at a cost, not only 
2

financially, but in terms of readiness and perhaps retention. Like 

their active duty counterparts, USAR and ARNG forces rely strictly 

on volunteers to fill their ranks. If conditions become intolerable for 

potential recruits and existing members, these organizations may find 

personnel refusing to consider participation in the reserves. Perhaps 

a first step in determining whether the Army faces such a problem is 

to determine if it faces retention concerns among its forces.

 This monograph examines trends in USAR and ARNG enlisted 

members’ retention. It concentrates on the period from 1995 to 2002, 

with a primary objective of creating a baseline to compare future 

USAR and ARNG retention. The project compares demographic 

factors, such as race and marital status, to examine who stays and who 

leaves their respective components. These trends should provide the 

basis for further study and policy recommendations. The USAR and 

ARNG face many of the same problems as the active Army, but their 

situation is more complex. They face problems with their members 

balancing civilian and military careers, family concerns, and other 

challenging opportunities that can force them to leave military 

service before the completion of a full reserve career.

 Given the current status of forces and potential expansion of the 

use of the military element of power, the Army’s reserve component 

faces a host of future challenges that includes acquiring new 

equipment, adjusting to force structure modifications, reorganization 

issues, changes to mission, more frequent mobilizations, and other 

issues. For example, before Operations DESERT STORM/DESERT 

SHIELD, a typical reserve component member might expect a once 

in a generation mobilization of his or her unit to deploy to an active 

theater. Today, mobilizations have become a question of “when,” 

not “if.” In some respects, the difference between active and reserve 

components, in terms of deployments, are minimal. Soldiers with 

certain reserve component capabilities, especially civil affairs, may 

even surpass their active duty counterparts in deployments because 

of the nature of today’s conflicts and the preponderance of that 

capability in the reserve components.

 Retention questions are front and center for the Army’s reserve 

components. If retention falters, experience, readiness, leadership, 

resources, and a number of other issues become a focus for the USAR 
3

and ARNG. Soldiers completing their first and second enlistments 

represent the core of valuable mid-level enlisted strength. For 

example, less qualified or experienced junior noncommissioned 

officers (NCOs) might require the Army to have its more senior 

NCOs focus more attention on their subordinates, thus taking 

the senior NCOs away from their main duties. Readiness might 

suffer. Similarly, the Army might have to substitute technology for 

experience. Instead of having certain field maintenance conducted 

or supervised by these NCOs, equipment components would need 

to be designed for removal and replacement only. The Army could 

also rely on contractors. This may reduce operational capability, and 

personnel costs may spiral. Replacing USAR and ARNG personnel 

may require higher recruitment goals that may force a lowering of 

quality that could further affect retention.

 Failure to maintain such individuals in the USAR and the ARNG 

will create problems for future leadership. Since the USAR and 

ARNG uniformed members promote from within, they usually do 

not enlist nonprior service personnel to fill junior or mid-grade NCO 

positions directly; thus, whole cohorts of reserve components may 

be wanting for personnel. This action may affect Army operations in 

a number of areas. Additionally, personnel might stay to qualify for 

a reserve military retirement, but if retention rates fall among these 

individuals, then senior leadership quality and effectiveness might 

come into question. Leadership is still one of the top qualities that the 

nation’s military must capitalize on to adapt to an uncertain world. 

The lack of senior NCO leadership and capability would then default 

to junior and middle grade NCOs that might force them to make 

decisions and perform in positions where they are not qualified. This 

may create more morale problems that affect retention or, worse, 

wrong decisions on the battlefield.

 The USAR and ARNG do have some tools to improve retention, 

but effective targeting of groups of individuals and policies might 

help sustain a more vibrant force that could address potential 

retention concerns. Past events and trends offer one approach to 

identify where Army leadership might concentrate its efforts to 

improve its retention efforts.
4

Retention: The Key to the Army’s Future.

 Force structure in the United States has relied on a Total 

Force approach for decades, especially in times of crisis. Reserve 

components have supported crisis intervention, humanitarian 

assistance, peacekeeping, training, and a host of activities to 

supplement, and in some cases replace, active duty forces. The dawn 

of the All-Volunteer military created a situation where the active 

forces could no longer draw upon relatively “cheap” and “available” 

pools of drafted personnel to meet mission needs. Instead, a 

professional active force, supplemented by reserve components, 

could handle most contingencies. The integration of the active and 

reserve components worked well, assuming that the respective 

components could recruit and retain sufficient personnel to meet 

their mission requirements.

 Today, operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, homeland security, 

humanitarian missions, and other activities around the world have 

strained both components. Since the mid-1990s, reserve call-ups and 

mobilizations of reserve components have become more frequent and 

longer. Those reserve forces conduct missions that are either unique 

to or predominately conducted by the USAR or ARNG. Although 

the Department of Defense (DoD) has attempted to privatize or 

use civilian employees instead of uniformed personnel for some 

functions, many activities still require uniformed personnel to 

accomplish a mission. Reserve components provide manpower 

for many of these activities. Additionally, some combat arms 

capabilities also rest in the reserve components that act as the nation’s 

immediate insurance in case of an emergency.

 USAR and ARNG retention is the key to maintaining a flexible 

response to crises. The loss of experience, added cost of replacements, 

readiness issues, and other concerns are highlighted if the Army 

cannot retain its trained personnel. Future leadership springs 

internally within the USAR and ARNG through grooming individuals 

from each year group or cohort. The reserve components do not 

generally hire nor do they promote from outside military sources. 

The reduction in any one year’s cohort will, in fact, deplete the 

pool of candidates for leadership positions that affects future 

capabilities for the USAR and ARNG specifically, and the nation’s 

interests in general.
5

 Retention has become a strategic issue, given that certain 

capabilities reside only in the reserve components. For example, 

many of the Civil Affairs functions reside predominantly in the 

reserve components. Given the nature of conflict termination and 

efforts to establish democracy in selected areas, without these 

functions the Army may not be able to meet national objectives in a 

timely, effective, and efficient manner. 

 Today, the USAR and ARNG face a very significant shift in 

operations in terms of scale and scope. Soldiers in reserve components 

must be ready to deploy rapidly and repeatedly to areas of the world 

that take them into harm’s way. Although this aspect of reserve 

duty has always been part of their obligation, the frequency and 

uncertainty of deployments has added increased stress to these 

citizen-soldiers. Given the volunteer status of these individuals and 

the demands placed on them, the state of the reserve component 

may come into some question. One measure, retention, may provide 

a signal to decisionmakers about how individuals value the reserve 

component service.

 People choose to leave the service for many reasons. However, 

the first step is to find out if historical retention rates have changed. 

Retention rates for a single year or two may not provide sufficient 

breadth and depth for analysis. Similarly, retention rates among 

groups of individuals may differ. For example, persons with one 

enlistment may have alternatives, job opportunities, or school, 

relative to senior enlisted members who have higher motivation to 

gain from further service like a future reserve retirement or higher 

rates of compensation.

 Retention rates may also differ not only by year group cohorts, 

but by demographic characteristics as well. Women entering the 

reserve components may desire a military career that offers more 

independence, financially and skill-wise, rather than an alternative 

work career. Race, marital status, number of dependents, and other 

factors can become major determinants in a study of retention. These 

factors provide clearly identifiable variables to characterize people 

for study.

 Information from a retention study can visibly aid in making or 

revising policy. Retention trends may tell us where to concentrate 
6

efforts to recruit or put funding, in terms of reenlistment bonuses. 

Conversely, it could tell us if certain personnel actions, policies, or 

events can affect our retention. These general trends can provide an 

overall look at the health and future of the force. As the face of America 

changes, the composition and the look of the reserve components 

will change as well. This survey of retention can help senior leaders 

devise ways to help transform the reserve components for the 21st 

century.

Methodology.

 Retention rates are measured between cohorts based on the 

number of years of credible reserve service for retirement. Retention 

is a relative term. In this monograph, one compares who is eligible to 

stay in the particular reserve component and who leaves the service. 

These retention rates can lead to potential trends that indicate how 

particular groups have chosen to act towards retention. 

 The monograph examines three groups of enlisted personnel 

from 1995 to 2002. The first group includes individuals that have 

4-7 years service, the junior enlisted members in the USAR and the 

ARNG. The second group examines experienced personnel with 8-

10 years of reserve duty. The last group studies personnel with 19 

years service5, to see if people will stay in the service or retire. These 

enlisted groups are composed of traditional reservists who perform 

their monthly weekend training and 2-week active duty period per 

year. It does not examine those USAR or ARNG personnel who 

choose to take extended tours of duty with the active Army.

 Each group acts as a cohort that can provide insights into trends 

of retention. All personnel in the studied group were eligible to 

separate at the end of their enlistment contracts or retire. Each group 

of individuals was compared a year later, after they could separate 

from the reserve component, to see if they had continued in the 

USAR or ARNG. The analysis includes as a loss individuals who 

transfer to active duty or transfer to another reserve component (e.g., 

Army USAR to ARNG or to another service), since these are still 

considered “losses” to the USAR and ARNG components.

 The collected information is also organized by year group, from 

1995 to 2002, with separate entries based on the three age cohorts. 
7

This organization allows the analysis to compare cohorts over an 

extended period. This longitudinal approach can provide more 

confidence in the extrapolation of results. The data is arrayed such 

that a person could also appraise the difference between the cohorts 

in a particular year. This can show how a particular event can affect 

the retention rate on the cohort, such as the September 11, 2001, 

attacks on the United States.

 The data was collected from records maintained by the Defense 

Manpower Data Center (DMDC) at Fort Ord, California. The USAR 

and ARNG keep identical records, with data elements that are 

suitable for comparison.6 Unfortunately, there are periods in the 

data files where definitions and data elements changed such that 

comparisons are not possible among various years. For example, a 

reliable data element that consistently measures when an individual 

is eligible to separate from service is important. Selected years do not 

have records that contain such data. 

 Normally, a study about retention would use a sample since 

collecting the data from all personnel would be difficult and 

expensive. Since the USAR and ARNG maintain individual records 

for each soldier, the collection of data was relatively easy. This aspect 

of the DMDC records is a key aspect to consider. Instead of a sample 

of records that one can use to estimate the effect on all USAR and 

ARNG eligible members, we face a different situation. These records 

tell us exactly who left and who stayed with their components, and 

we have consistent measures of particular characteristics about 

those individuals. Through this method we can tell, with confidence, 

which elements of the population acted in a certain way or did not.

 Additionally, the manipulation of computerized records allowed 

for the search and segregation of records fitting certain characteristics, 

e.g., those eligible to separate from the service. Records were selected 

based on certain characteristics, e.g., years of service credited for 

a reserve retirement, that allowed a researcher to further study a 

cohort by a particular year, given those individuals’ demographic 

characteristics.

 Isolating the particular reasons why soldiers choose not to stay 

affiliated with the USAR or ARNG is difficult. Certainly economic 

conditions, social acceptance, and other opportunities exist to affect 
8

retention decisions. Exit surveys do not exist for the past, and such 

surveys would only measure the intent of individuals. However, 

intentions are not the same as actual actions of individuals. For 

example, some individuals may show an intention to separate. 

However, on future reflection those soldiers may decide to do 

otherwise because of economic reasons such as unemployment 

prospects, organizational loyalty, a new promotion, or other 

reasons. 

 Officers were not included in the analysis. Officers usually do not 

have terms of service, but serve at the convenience of the President. 

However, officers who have been recently commissioned, or taken a 

training course, may have an obligated term of service. Officers can 

separate from the service by merely resigning their commissions. 

Further study of officer retention merits attention since many of 

the same dynamics that affect retention in the enlisted ranks affect 

officers too.

USAR and ARNG.

 Retention rates between the USAR and ARNG do show 

differences. The USAR personnel have a higher overall retention rate 

than ARNG members. Although the general enlisted retention rates 

among all reserve components have increased from 1995 to 2002, 

the trend has improved much more with USAR personnel than the 

ARNG.

 There are several general trends that confirm conventional 

wisdom. Enlistees with 4-7 years of credible service tend to stay for 

further duty at lower rates than individuals who have 8-10 years. 

The retention rates fall after individuals reach retirement eligibility. 

The difference between rates is significant. The difference in 

rates between soldiers with 4-7 and 8-10 years of service was 11.3 

percentage points on average for the ARNG, and an even greater 

12.7 percentage points for the USAR. Perhaps those personnel who 

left only wanted certain benefits, such as educational ones and, once 

vested, left. Conversely, when personnel attain sufficient time to 

qualify for a reserve retirement, they start to leave. Retention rates 

fall between the 8-10 and the 19-year groups. Despite being able to 
9

retire, the 19-year groups still show significantly higher retention 

rates than the junior 4-7 year groups by about 6 percentage points 

for each component. This would suggest retention among junior 

members of the USAR and ARNG remains the toughest problem 

facing the reserve components in this period.

 One might argue that economic conditions could explain 

retention rates for reserve component retention. Individuals desiring 

to increase their income or trying to maintain employment, albeit 

part-time, may want to maintain their status in the reserves. This 

would result in a positive relationship between unemployment and 

retention rates. If unemployment is high, reserve retention rates 

would also be greater than average. From 1995 to 2000, the level of 

unemployment fell to historic lows. However, the reserve retention 

was generally higher, despite low unemployment. If the economy 

offered a position to any qualified person willing to work, then the 

individual had the opportunity to leave the USAR or ARNG to take 

that opportunity.

 The response was not as predicted. Persons in the USAR and 

ARNG did not leave the service. In fact, retention increased among 

several groups, while unemployment rates tumbled. However, as 

unemployment rates increased, there was some decline in retention 

rates among some ARNG cohorts. This observation also seemed 

contrary to conventional wisdom. Although these problems fell 

mostly on the enlisted members with 4-7 years, the other two ARNG 

cohorts did have some minor declines. Individuals could seek 

economic security in the reserves, but they did not. 

 The USAR and ARNG each had much different retention rates. 

Perhaps this is a signal that the ARNG and USAR have different 

personnel policies that affect retention rates. Since the USAR and 

ARNG offer different opportunities; have similar, but different 

missions; and varying deployments, certain demographic factors 

might illustrate where policy changes or enforcement could help 

improve retention among these components. 

Marital Status.

 The military culture has changed significantly over the past few 

decades. During the 1960s, the vast majority of military uniformed 
10

ARNG 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Mean

4-7 59.8 59.6 58.3 61.6 58.3 66.1 57.8 62.9 60.6

8-10 72.5 71.5 71.9 73.4 69.4 77.1 68.9 70.8 71.9

19 58.1 64.6 68.6 67.5 68.0 71.7 70.0 69.8 67.3

USAR

4-7 59.5 62.6 62.9 67.9 65.7 66.3 66.7 74.3 65.7

8-10 73.3 76.2 75.5 79.3 77.6 77.1 77.5 79.7 77.0

19 63.2 70.8 75.2 67.5 77.6 71.7 72.8 75.4 71.8

Unemployment Rate

 5.6 5.4 4.9 4.5 4.2 4.0 4.7 5.8 

Table 1. Retention Rates Between USAR 

and ARNG Components.

members were single. Today, under a volunteer force, many see 

military duty, active or reserve, as a career with its subsequent 

appeal to members with families. One characteristic concerning 

retention, easily measured, is a person’s marital status. However, as 

individuals begin to marry later and people decide to become more 

career oriented, then the trend of retention biased towards married 

individuals may not be as strong as some might expect.

 From 1995 to 2002, married individuals generally had higher 

retention rates than single soldiers. However, the rates of retention 

between married and single individuals did not differ significantly. 

The greatest differences occurred at the 4-7 year period. The least 

experienced enlisted members had a 3.3 percentage point difference 

between married and single retention rates, with married having 

a higher retention rate. A more significant variance is between the 

USAR and ARNG members. The propensity to stay in the reserves 

was at least 5 percentage points higher among both married and 

single USAR soldiers compared to ARNG soldiers. This shows that 

the lowest retention rates among USAR single members were greater 

than the highest ARNG married rates for the same year groups. 

 These findings provide many potential policymaking implications 

for senior leadership. Does the USAR have programs that tend to 

attract and retain married and single members at a greater rate than 

the ARNG? Focusing on married members and trying to retain them 
11

may be a very legitimate focus. However, if those members wish to 

stay anyway, should the proper emphasis become more on single 

members? What might motivate single members and how do their 

views differ from those of married members? Although retention 

rates among single members over time improve, as the member 

transitions from junior to senior enlisted status, what might we 

learn from this experience? These members become self-selected, 

and those who desire to finish their career do so regardless of their 

marital status.

 One trend that appears in the USAR and the ARNG is a gradual 

narrowing of retention rates between married and single personnel 

from 2000 to 2002. For example, ARNG rates once dominated by 

married personnel were slowly eclipsed in the 8-10 and the 19-

year groups. Perhaps married members were motivated to stay in 

service, but something changed. With additional peacekeeping and 

homeland security requirements, increases began in both the number 

and duration of voluntary and involuntary deployments. Could the 

prospects of uncertain requirements for deployments start a new 

trend where single vice married members tend to maintain their 

reserve commitments? Single members may have greater flexibility 

without familial requirements to stay in the USAR or ARNG. 

Before Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, the reserve 

components normally had a once in a generational, massive call-up 

for active duty. Today, USAR and ARNG personnel are frequently 

called to relatively long stints of active duty to supplement or replace 

active duty units.

 Married members now encounter higher opportunity costs to stay 

in the USAR and ARNG, as these members deploy and the costs due 

to family concerns start to rise. This fundamental change in personnel 

policies may create conditions where married individuals may 

become the focus of attention among reserve retention concerns. 

 Marital and family structures normally seek stability. Whether the 

issue involves job security, social situations, or other concerns, people 

with family responsibilities may be attracted to situations where 

routines become more of the norm than the exception. Increased 

reliance upon reserve components to replace active components 

throughout a range of possible situations from hostile situations to 
12

ARNG 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Mean

4-7

Married 61.9 61.2 59.8 63.2 59.8 68.8 59.8 64.0 62.3

Single 58.1 58.2 57.2 60.3 56.9 62.9 55.9 62.1 59.0

8-10

Married 72.9 72.1 72.6 74.2 69.3 78.7 70.2 70.3 72.5

Single 71.5 70.3 70.6 72.2 69.5 73.3 67.1 71.6 70.8

19

Married 57.9 65.9 67.9 67.4 67.6 71.6 69.3 69.6 67.2

Single 58.7 57.7 71.9 67.6 69.7 72.2 72.6 70.7 67.6

USAR

4-7

Married 62.8 65.4 66.2 70.5 68.3 69.2 67.2 73.8 67.9

Single 57.8 61.2 61.3 66.6 64.4 64.8 66.4 74.6 64.6

8-10

Married 74.9 75.5 76.2 80.5 77.8 76.0 77.3 82.2 77.6

Single 71.1 76.9 74.6 78.2 77.3 76.8 77.7 76.2 76.1

19

Married 82.2 71.6 76.6 67.2 76.1 74.4 74.0 75.5 74.7

Single 76.2 68.8 71.3 68.2 81.8 71.0 69.8 75.3 72.8

Table 2. Retention Rates between Components by Marital Status.

supplementing training functions may bring more stress and pressure 

on the married than the single member to seek added stability. The 

expectation of increased deployments may create conditions among 

married members that further service would risk levels of stability to 

a point where they decline re-enlistment.

Marital Status and Dependents.

 Marital status can provide many insights into retention rates. 

Perhaps individuals seeking a career with the reserves also may 

be influenced by not only marital status, but the number of their 

dependents. Single parents or divorced members who desire a 

secondary career may be motivated to stay in the reserves. They 
13

also face legal and financial responsibilities for dependent care that 

necessitate continued participation in the reserves. As the condition 

of reserve participation changes, will this affect their tenure in the 

reserves?

 Increasingly, members of the reserve and active duty components 

face a problem with individuals who become single parents or have 

concerns providing care of dependents while performing their 

duties. For families having both parents in the military, either both 

in the reserves or one serving in the reserves and the other on active 

duty, having to perform additional military duties may strain their 

relations as spouses and parents. However, financial considerations 

also play a major role in many career decisions. Support and care 

for family members is a very expensive proposition. Perhaps 

members in an enlisted status may be motivated to begin a reserve 

component affiliation in part, due to the financial reward in the 

short time frame as opposed to longer term considerations. Few 

business opportunities offer a “part-time” career that can provide 

a retirement annuity, medical care, and other benefits to the extent 

of the reserve components. Pressure on family responsibilities and 

financial considerations become locked in conflict. One way to 

examine this idea is to compare the married and single members 

who have dependents. Perhaps married members with dependents 

become sensitive to retention as deployments become more probable 

over a career. Conversely, single members with dependents, either 

divorced or sole wage earners, may find that they have to serve to 

satisfy their financial obligations since they are starved financially.

 Generally, USAR and ARNG personnel follow a pattern in 

retention. Members who have more dependents tend to have greater 

retention rates. However, where married members normally have 

greater retention rates than single members, this is reversed if the 

single member indicates that he or she has dependents. Single 

members with dependents tend to stay in the reserves more than 

members with no dependents. Members with dependents also show 

stratification based on longevity which is consistent with other 

groups. For example, single members with 4-7 years of credible 

service for retirement have lower retention rates, retention increases 

with members in the 8-10 years of service, and then the rate drops 

after completion of at least 19 years of service. 
14

 For the USAR, the pattern of retention reflects several trends. 

In the 4-7 year group, single members have higher retention rates 

when the number of dependents is one or two; those members tend 

to stay in service at a higher proportion than married members. 

This trend reverses as the number of dependents increases. Perhaps 

this is because the financial rewards are outweighed by the familial 

obligation or responsibilities, especially if a member can provide 

more support. The 8-10 year cohort also demonstrates this effect, but 

to a lesser extent. Single members have higher retention rates than 

married ones, plus as the number of their dependents rise, they stay 

in at a higher rate. The potential to serve out a career, higher pay 

(presumably due to higher rank),7 older dependents who require 

more financial support, and other rationale most likely play into the 

decision to continue in the reserve component. This trend generally 

continues, albeit at overall lower rates, with the 19-year group. Many 

single members with one or two dependents decide to postpone 

separation at higher rates than married ones, but the degree of 

difference is slight. (See Table 3.)

 The ARNG data indicates that single members with dependents 

stay in uniform more than married ones. In the 4-7 and 8-10 year 

groups, single members with dependents remain in the reserves at 

increasing rates as the number of dependents the member claims 

increase. In the ARNG, the rates of retention differ between these 

groups by 2 to 3 percentage points. These are slight differences, but 

the trend towards increased retention with the number of dependents 

seems remarkable. The drop in retention rates for singles with four 

dependents in the 8-10 year cohort, and three or four dependents 

in the 19 year cohort most likely represent a very small population 

and thus may not be statistically relevant. In general, the greater the 

number of dependents, the more likely one stays in the ARNG and 

USAR.

 Relative differences between ARNG and USAR groups show some 

interesting patterns. For married members, differences between the 

USAR and ARNG start to increase with the number of dependents. 

the USAR has greater rates of retention as the number of claimed 

dependents rise in the 4-7 year groups. The other year groups also 

show the USAR retentions groups at higher rates, but with a much 

lower difference. For the single members, this trend also continues 
15

USAR 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Mean

4-7

Married

1 58.7 62.7 61.1 64.7 57.5 63.3 63.1 61.8 61.6

2 60.6 63.6 67.8 71.3 60.9 67.8 65.9 65.7 65.5

3 69.8 68.7 68.3 76.3 64.7 76.2 73.1 67.2 70.5

4 70.0 80.1 77.6 78.5 64.3 78.9 76.9 69.1 74.4

Single

1 63.5 66.8 64.6 71.6 63.8 68.5 71.9 68.5 67.4

2 67.8 68.3 71.0 80.7 60.3 75.9 67.2 67.9 69.9

3 67.2 66.7 59.7 69.5 62.2 70.0 70.5 70.3 67.0

4 68.4 52.9 46.7 44.0 72.7 80.0 75.0 42.1 60.2

8-10

Married

1 72.1 70.4 72.1 80.5 68.9 73.3 75.2 79.8 74.0

2 74.6 73.3 78.4 80.3 69.8 76.8 77.5 81.9 76.6

3 73.7 78.2 77.0 82.7 68.4 77.4 77.3 86.5 77.7

4 82.1 82.8 80.9 76.6 73.6 80.0 85.1 80.4 80.2

Single

1 67.8 74.8 80.6 80.0 71.9 79.2 86.6 75.7 77.1

2 76.5 83.3 77.7 75.0 70.6 83.3 69.7 81.8 77.2

3 75.7 69.7 85.3 90.9 76.0 71.4 69.6 86.9 78.2

4 87.5 70.0 60.0 100.0 71.4 85.7 80.0 66.7 77.7

19

Married

1 54.5 66.7 71.8 64.4 61.7 73.7 66.7 73.3 66.6

2 60.8 74.4 77.9 66.0 74.0 80.8 69.7 68.2 71.5

3 65.5 75.5 75.9 70.9 67.4 69.1 75.2 76.3 72.0

4 69.0 69.1 81.7 67.9 71.7 77.8 81.9 82.1 75.2

Single

1 64.5 71.4 54.7 62.5 62.8 70.5 75.7 82.1 68.0

2 60.0 72.4 75.9 73.7 77.3 66.7 76.7 70.8 71.7

3 61.1 72.7 90.9 88.2 65.0 64.3 33.3 75.0 68.8

4 100.0 50.0 100.0 25.0 100.0 100.0 66.7 75.0 77.1

Table 3. Marital Status and Dependents, USAR.

with USAR members having a greater overall retention rates than 

ARNG members. (See Table 4.)

 These results have profound policy implications. Members with 

increasing number of dependents have greater retention rates. 

Improving retention may hinge on the perceived benefits that 
16

ARNG 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Mean

4-7

Married

1 59.5 60.2 57.9 61.2 57.5 67.7 57.9 61.8 60.5

2 64.1 61.2 61.8 63.9 60.9 66.7 61.7 65.7 63.3

3 66.3 64.6 62.1 67.6 64.7 72.9 60.7 67.2 65.8

4 64.5 63.1 65.8 68.4 64.3 74.1 65.4 69.1 66.8

Single

1 63.1 57.7 62.8 68.9 63.8 62.8 60.6 68.5 68.2

2 69.3 62.1 67.8 72.7 60.3 75.5 64.3 67.9 67.0

3 61.8 62.5 50.9 76.9 62.2 81.8 73.0 70.3 68.6

4 77.8 72.7 71.4 63.6 72.7 0.00 72.2 42.1 67.4

8-10

Married

1 73.2 70.2 72.2 72.8 68.9 79.4 69.2 67.2 71.6

2 71.5 72.7 72.4 76.5 69.8 75.5 71.0 72.8 72.8

3 72.8 75.6 72.1 76.2 68.4 78.5 71.9 71.6 73.4

4 74.4 73.4 76.2 73.7 73.6 84.1 71.0 75.1 75.2

Single

1 70.6 73.7 74.3 76.2 71.9 72.7 70.4 74.2 73.0

2 76.0 66.9 74.5 78.2 70.6 75.6 67.4 72.4 72.7

3 86.9 69.6 71.4 67.9 76.0 75.0 77.8 73.2 74.7

4 75.0 54.5 28.6 60.0 71.4 66.7 80.0 100 67.0

19

Married

1 51.7 63.8 68.2 63.6 61.7 71.9 67.7 67.2 64.5

2 59.1 65.8 73.9 67.5 74.0 67.6 68.5 72.8 68.7

3 60.5 65.2 63.9 69.9 67.4 74.2 67.9 69.8 67.4

4 62.8 65.9 66.2 67.9 71.7 75.0 77.4 68.6 69.4

Single

1 50.0 46.8 72.1 66.2 62.8 83.3 79.5 75.3 67.0

2 56.3 74.1 87.1 69.0 77.3 40.0 67.3 77.5 68.6

3 71.4 41.7 80.0 57.1 65.0 100.0 70.0 53.8 67.4

4 66.7 33.3 50.0 75.0 100.0 0.00 54.2

Table 4. Marital Status and Dependents, ARNG.

members can receive to support those dependents. Issues such 

as pay, benefits, terms of service, and other quality of life issues 

may play a key part in maintaining or strengthening those rates. 

Conversely, problems with single members who have sole custody 

of dependents or provide support may have implications for 
17

deployment or other concerns. For example, more family support 

programs while members deploy may help. However, as more and 

longer deployments occur, these concerns about family support and 

benefits will become more important.

Male/Female Retention.

 Another interesting aspect of retention involves male and female 

decisions to stay or leave the reserve components. The decision to 

remain as part of the USAR or the ARNG may depend on a number 

of factors. Familial responsibilities, available opportunities, financial 

considerations, and other concerns affect people’s decisions to consider 

a reserve career. In the last 2 decades, many career opportunities 

for women have expanded the horizons for increased participation 

of females in the USAR and ARNG. This action may have added 

motivation for females to stay in the reserves. If true, the retention 

rates should exceed or at least be similar to male retention rates. 

More junior enlisted members would be exposed to greater career 

opportunities than the more senior enlisted members. Additionally, 

the more senior female enlisted members may have been limited to 

certain career fields that could also affect their promotion chances.

 The retention rates between male and female members do not 

seem to differ greatly between members in their own component. 

For example, the mean retention rates for ARNG enlisted members 

with 4-7 and 8-10 years of service differed by less than 1 percentage 

point between males and females. Although female retention rates 

were greater than male rates from 1995 to 2000, the difference was 

slight. In the USAR, one sees a similar pattern of slim differences 

between mean averages within the same year groups. The retention 

rates for USAR personnel at the 19-year group does not show a clear 

difference between males and females.

 Curiously, the female mean retention rates for the ARNG and 

USAR were greater than the comparable male rates. However, from 

about 2000 onwards, a trend towards greater male retention rates has 

occurred. Why might this happen? One reason may be opportunity 

costs among female personnel to pursue more lucrative employment 

and other business ventures. Pay compatibility between civilian male 

and female members, although still not equal, had narrowed, and 
18

gains for females were made. Perhaps the increased pay compatibility 

and other business avenues to advancement have put pressure on 

women to pursue civilian opportunities and not ones in the Army 

reserve components. Similarly, the overall drive in the business world 

is to increase work productivity among its workers. In some respects, 

one manner of increasing productivity is to increase overtime hours 

or spread responsibilities among fewer workers. Given the cost of 

hiring new workers or increasing the work load on existing workers, 

an employer would try to save money by using existing workers. The 

challenge for the worker is to keep their main civilian occupation, 

yet maintain their reserve affiliation. Increased deployments among 

USAR and ARNG units during the latter time period of the analysis 

may have also caused a change affecting decisions to stay in or leave 

the reserves. These observations may work well to explain some of 

the decisions that influence retention. The relatively constant level 

of retention rates, male and female, may reflect the success of the 

ARNG and USAR in weathering some of these concerns.

 The rates of retention between USAR and ARNG do seem to 

differ. Is the problem one reflected among males and females? If 

so, then the retention rates should differ significantly between one 

another. One does not find this in the data. Males and females, 

within their respective component and time cohort, seem to stay in 

the USAR and ARNG at about the same rates. Perhaps the USAR has 

transitioned to a more accepting environment for females better than 

has the ARNG. If the question becomes one of females not being 

willing to stay in the reserves, then one only needs to see the rise 

in retention rates in the USAR during 2001 and 2002 (see Table 5 

and 6). Increased mobilizations for active duty tours did not seem to 

diminish female retention rates in the USAR (though they may have 

affected the ARNG); in most cases, USAR female retention rates 

started to increase along with male rates. Retention rates varied, 

but there was no great exodus of female reserve members in either 

component.

 Policies directed towards female retention rates may become 

more focused on maintenance rather than expansion. The actions 

among female reserve members seem to mirror the male rates. 

This might imply that expansion of opportunities might be better 

served with an eye to male and female members, not just one specific 

group.
19

USAR 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Mean

4-7

Male 58.3 62.0 62.6 67.7 65.3 66.7 67.3 75.0 65.6

Female 63.2 64.5 64.2 68.7 66.9 65.0 64.9 72.6 66.3

8-10

Male 74.0 76.7 76.5 80.3 77.9 76.2 77.5 80.2 77.4

Female 70.2 74.8 73.2 76.2 76.6 76.8 77.3 78.1 75.3

19

Male 64.5 69.8 75.6 67.6 78.3 74.8 71.7 75.2 72.2

Female 54.3 75.5 73.6 67.4 74.4 68.5 76.9 76.4 70.9

Table 5. Male and Female Retention Rates for the USAR.

ARNG 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Mean

4-7

Male 59.6 59.3 57.9 61.5 58.1 65.9 57.8 63.3 60.4

Female 61.6 61.9 62.3 62.2 59.8 67.5 57.3 60.4 61.6

8-10

Male 72.5 71.5 71.8 73.4 69.3 77.1 69.2 70.9 71.9

Female 71.9 71.3 72.2 74.3 71.4 76.0 66.4 69.1 71.6

19

Male 58.3 64.9 68.4 68.0 67.9 71.9 70.0 70.2 67.5

Female 52.0 56.7 73.3 54.2 69.0 66.7 69.8 63.1 63.1

Table 6. Male and Female Retention Rates for the ARNG.

Deployments.

 Deployments have increased for USAR and ARNG over the past 

2 decades. Much debate has swirled among policymakers about 

the impact of deployments on retention. The major deployments 

identified for this period involved combat actions like Operations 

DESERT SHIELD/STORM, peacekeeping, Operation NOBLE 

EAGLE, and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. The current period 

of unheard of mass mobilizations of USAR and ARNG personnel 

starting after the 1991 Persian Gulf War has transformed the 
20

reserve components. Previously, senior USAR and ARNG 

members probably would have expected a once in a generational 

mobilization. Although the reserve components were a part of a 

total force structure, the immersion of USAR and ARNG personnel 

in total force planning caused them to routinely supplement or 

replace active forces. This has changed the face of reserve service, 

and expectations of future service may affect retention.

 Most senior USAR and ARNG personnel had no, one, or two 

deployments in a full career. Individuals who performed three or 

more deployments were very rare. Due to the increased emphasis on 

deployments over the last 2 decades, junior enlisted members have 

experienced more deployments in their careers than their seniors. 

This may create interesting leadership problems. The retention issues 

may seem fairly straightforward: If a member has signed onto service 

with the USAR or ARNG with a belief that he or she would serve in 

a role with a more traditional link of service to the local community, 

or as a mobilization of last resort, then retention problems may 

arise due to increased mobilizations. Individuals could decide that 

the commitment was not what they imagined and simply fail to reenlist.

 Surprisingly, the USAR and ARNG show some interesting 

patterns. Individuals with no deployments have lower retention 

rates, at least with the 4-7 and 8-10 year cohorts, than individuals 

with one or more deployments. In the USAR, the rates of retention 

increase from 63.8 percentage points for no deployments to 70.0 

percentage points for one deployment in the 4-7 year group. Higher 

retention rates occurred in the 8-10 year group. If we take the once 

in a generational mobilization, Operations DESERT SHIELD/

DESERT STORM, out of consideration, focusing on people in the 4-

7 year group starting in 1998 and onwards, we find retention rates 

in some cases were higher than earlier periods. This may suggest 

that even with the expectation of more peacekeeping operations or 

the prospects of service in Afghanistan in 2002, individuals tended 

to stay in service. Retention in the 8-10 year cohort and even the 19 

year cohort improved. If the 1996 retention rates for members with 

one deployment is excepted, then even the 19-year group, despite its 

lowered mean average, would fit the pattern of other year groups 

higher retention with more deployments.
21

 The ARNG shows similar patterns to the USAR. Individuals with 

deployments, in most cases, tend to stay at a slightly higher rate than 

those with none. Improvement in retention has occurred from 1995 

to 2002. The 4-7- year ARNG cohort tended to mirror the USAR 

group, except for people with two deployments. In this case, more 

than one deployment tended to reduce retention rates. How ARNG 

deployments differ from USAR ones might explain these rates.

 Why might retention improve because of deployments? A sense 

of increased patriotism and duty after September 11, 2001, may have 

created emphasis for higher re-enlistments. In most cases, in 2002 

the retention rates were higher than in previous periods. This is 

especially true for those with at least one deployment. Curiously, 

individuals with no deployments had lower retention rates in 

2002. Could deployment service have been a motivating factor 

to demonstrate trained skills, or did individuals who joined the 

reserves really want to serve in ways other than traditional images 

of the reserve? Similarly, individuals with deployment histories 

may view their service as a career enhancement or a reflection of 

their desire to volunteer. Unfortunately, the period studied did not 

include Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and subsequent deployments. 

Follow-on studies to test retention rates, given routine deployments 

into hostile areas, may show significant alterations in the retention of 

personnel.

 Smaller scale deployments that were nonroutine and fairly 

defined were more of the norm after Operations DESERT SHIELD/

DESERT STORM. Retention largely was unaffected by a history of 

deployment. Policies toward the use of reserves in deployments 

might need revision, given the past history and retention rates that 

we have seen in the 1995 to 2002 period. Perhaps more peacekeeping, 

humanitarian, homeland security, and supplemental use of reserves 

during a major conflict may not have affected retention. Until data 

from Operation IRAQI FREEDOM is analyzed, policy decisions 

relating to rotation of reserve components need to be delayed.

Race. 

 Another visible demographic factor to compare retention rates 

among reserve component personnel is race. In the United States 
22

USAR 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Mean

4-7

0 58.4 59.3 61.9 67.9 65.6 66.2 66.3 64.7 63.8

1 62.2 63.5 68.6 68.1 66.6 67.0 71.8 92.0 70.0

2 87.8 56.1 71.4 69.6 63.8 81.4 80.0 92.7 75.4

8-10

0 71.3 74.9 75.1 78.4 76.9 75.5 77.2 71.9 75.2

1 76.7 79.1 76.5 82.2 79.5 79.7 77.8 88.9 80.1

2 92.6 85.2 74.3 81.5 76.0 76.5 85.0 94.7 83.2

19

0 64.8 72.5 75.9 68.6 78.6 74.6 72.1 65.9 71.6

1 58.7 27.5 72.8 65.1 76.2 69.6 73.7 86.9 66.3

2 66.7 60.0 100.0 62.5 50.0 77.8 100.0 90.2 75.9

Table 7. USAR Retention Rates and Deployments.

ARNG 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Mean

4-7

0 60.8 59.3 58.0 61.4 58.0 68.0 57.4 52.2 59.4

1 53.3 63.4 63.2 64.4 59.3 59.4 60.8 81.4 63.2

2 50.0 56.1 57.6 57.7 58.3 57.6 57.9 86.6 60.3

8-10

0 72.1 71.1 71.8 73.4 63.3 77.1 77.2 62.4 71.1

1 74.8 73.8 72.9 73.2 70.9 76.8 77.8 83.3 75.4

2 78.0 71.4 70.9 76.6 100.0 76.5 85.0 87.9 80.8

19

0 59.5 63.9 67.8 67.2 67.4 69.4 72.1 63.4 66.3

1 53.3 68.0 73.9 68.9 71.0 81.8 73.7 79.7 71.3

2 25.0 60.0 60.0 85.7 75.0 100.0 100.0 94.6 75.0

Table 8. ARNG Retention Rates and Deployments.

today, there have been social changes to concepts of race. Past census 

classifications have focused on only a few race and ethnic categories; 

today with wider identification of more ethnic and racial groups, 

classifications have become more graduated. Immigration has also 
23

added finer comparisons between racial groups. Additionally, 

individuals raised in interracial marriages are free to identify 

with two or more racial groups. In this portion of the monograph, 

individuals are sorted as “white” or “nonwhite” to provide a more 

manageable comparison. 

 Do minorities or those who self-identify themselves as “nonwhite” 

have a higher or lower rate of retention? How “nonwhites” view 

possible opportunities for future service is key. In many populous 

states, like California or Texas, the rise of nonwhite populations may 

one day surpass the white majority. Understanding how nonwhites 

view future service is important in order to integrate future 

populations to man the reserve component.

 The USAR and ARNG retention rates for nonwhites are higher 

than ones for whites. Differences between the USAR and ARNG vary. 

The USAR rates have larger differences between the two groups than 

the ARNG among more junior members, but the trend reverses with 

seniority. For example, in the 4-7 year cohorts, nonwhites stay in the 

USAR at a 7.4 percentage point higher rate than whites, while the 

ARNG difference is only 2 percentage point difference. Conversely, 

in the 19-year cohort, the ARNG holds more nonwhites in service 

after they are eligible for retirement than the USAR. USAR and 

ARNG middle seniority personnel, with 8-10 years, demonstrate a 

similar percentage point difference between whites and nonwhites 

of 2.8 percentage points. 

 Why, then, do nonwhites stay in service more than whites? What 

are the implications for future leadership, recruitment, training, 

and other policies? As U.S. demographics change to a higher rate of 

population growth for nonwhites than whites, the face of who serves 

may change rapidly. If the population becomes heavily nonwhite and 

the reserve components are successful in recruitment, then retention 

problems may not appear as severe. However, this assumes certain 

conditions are present to explain why nonwhites stay in service. Do 

nonwhites stay in service because the USAR and ARNG offer better 

opportunities than other business opportunities? Like women in the 

past, as nonwhites become a more predominant face in America, 

they may find better prospects, in their opinion, than the reserves. 

Conversely, if nonwhites start to eclipse whites in the reserves, then
24

USAR 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Mean

4-7

White 55.8 60.2 60.1 65.5 62.7 62.4 64.9 73.5 63.1

Nonwhite 65.9 67.0 68.1 72.8 71.4 73.5 69.9 75.7 70.5

8-10

White 70.8 74.7 73.4 79.8 75.6 75.6 76.4 80.0 75.8

Nonwhite 77.4 78.3 78.6 78.8 80.5 77.4 78.9 79.2 78.6

19

White 60.0 68.5 72.7 66.9 73.5 69.8 70.6 72.5 69.3

Nonwhite 67.5 74.0 78.6 68.3 82.9 77.8 75.7 79.5 75.5

Table 9. USAR Retention Rates by Race.

ARNG 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Mean

4-7

White 59.2 59.7 57.9 61.2 57.5 65.3 57.4 63.0 60.2

Nonwhite 62.3 59.1 59.8 63.2 61.2 70.1 59.0 62.8 62.2

8-10

White 71.4 70.8 71.2 73.0 68.5 76.9 68.3 70.1 71.3

Nonwhite 75.8 73.5 74.3 75.1 72.6 77.9 71.0 73.2 74.2

19

White 57.2 63.3 66.3 65.2 65.7 70.1 65.6 68.2 65.2

Nonwhite 60.2 67.8 74.5 73.0 73.6 78.3 81.6 74.7 73.0

Figure 10. ARNG Retention Rates by Race.

the USAR and the ARNG may need to evaluate policies that influence 

everything from personnel to training policies. For example, how 

can the USAR and ARNG ensure adequate leadership which helps 

ensure growing nonwhite enlisted populations are motivated to meet 

their missions? How will the Army overtake potential language and 

social barriers? These and other concerns may create many situations 

that can challenge future leaders.

Potential Retention Policy Modifications.

 The USAR and ARNG can undertake several initiatives to 

increase retention. If conditions return where deployments become 
25

more of the exception than the rule, the reserves could approach 

an environment similar to the 1995-2002 period. Unfortunately, 

contingencies not withstanding, national security leadership may not 

have the benefit of a return to past times. However, several insights 

into the reserve component retention become clear to an observer. 

The type of person who stays in the reserve component can lead to 

selected policies to enhance retention.

 First, during the 1995-2002 period, retention did not change over 

time among similar cohorts. For example, among members of the 

4-7 year cohort, retention for ARNG hovered around 60 percentage 

points, while USAR was about 65 percentage points. Throughout 

the period, there was some retention increase after 2001, presumably 

due to terrorist attacks here in the United States. However, two 

observations must be made at this stage. If retention seems adequate 

at the 60 percentage point level, does this provide sufficient experience 

to ensure mission requirements? Hypothetically, what if we retained 

100 percent of all eligible individuals? Do the USAR and ARNG 

have sufficient funds and manpower authorizations to keep these 

people in the reserves? Would this slow promotions and affect entry 

by nonprior service or other junior enlisted members? The second 

observation is that, even within the Army reserve components, there 

is a distinct difference between the USAR and ARNG. Generally, the 

USAR has a higher rate of retention than the ARNG. The difference 

between the two organizations involves mission, personnel 

composition, and organization. Developing policies for the ARNG 

may not work for the USAR, and the same for USAR policies and the 

ARNG. Two distinct personnel policies may need to be considered. 

Curiously, perhaps the existence of different personnel policies may 

have contributed to the USAR and ARNG retention rate disparity.

 Second, if the reserves have changed their approach fundamentally from being “on call” to frequent and routine support of active 

forces since 2002, then this analysis is somewhat muted. Continual 

deployments, on a routine and large scale basis, have distorted the 

view of the traditional duties for reserve components. The return of 

certain reserve activities required for large scale deployments to the 

active duty forces or the increase in privatized efforts could change 

how the nation uses its reserve components. Our reliance on reserve 

components has altered the traditional use of reserve components 
26

such that the difference between deploying reserve or active duty 

units is marginal. There may be less of an advantage towards a 

career in the reserves since members returning from deployments 

may experience a financial loss, disruption in their lives, delay in 

education, or sudden unemployment. 

 However, who stays and who leaves the USAR and ARNG is 

still relevant in finding proper personnel policies. Depending 

on how one views retention policies, one can establish policies to 

entice those members who traditionally stay, try to keep those in 

uniform who are likely to leave, or both. Given limited resources, 

if the member will stay in service regardless of “perks” or benefits 

used to retain personnel, then perhaps we can use those resources in 

a more effective and efficient manner. This is not to imply that the 

Army should allow decay in benefits such that those members who 

currently stay would find reasons to depart. Maintaining practices 

or policies that retain members should continue. Perhaps looking at 

those members who tend to leave or have a lower retention rate may 

be more fruitful for the USAR and ARNG.

 One possible area of review is determining why there is a 

difference between USAR and ARNG retention. The USAR had 

higher retention rates overall in almost all categories. Mission, 

personnel policies, deployments, and other factors have a bearing 

on retention. Unfortunately, the USAR and ARNG have many 

significant differences in composition, use, and funding. The USAR 

succeeds perhaps due to a single focus, support to the active Army. 

Unlike the USAR, the ARNG has two masters, the support of the 

active Army and the appropriate state level government. This creates 

more opportunities for calls to active duty, and tasks that may fall 

out of a unit’s trained mission.

 In some respects, many of the same problems faced with one 

group probably have application to many others in the service. 

One such contention is that pay and benefits are a prime element of 

decisions by those in civilian occupations to leave the service. For 

example, retention rates differ by not more than 3 percentage points 

between married and single members of the USAR and ARNG. 

Married members have a higher retention rate than single members. 

One could propose, with some legitimacy, that married members 

have more responsibilities in terms of dependent needs. If so, then 
27

they may be motivated to stay in the reserves for the immediate and 

long-term financial returns for service. Conversely, single members 

without the obligations of family or financial burdens may face a 

set of opportunities that offer higher return from free time, or 

provide higher immediate (e.g., civilian occupation) or long-term 

(e.g., education) return for their time. Unlike in-kind benefits, like 

the expanded commissary or exchange benefits, finding a means 

to reward single or married reservists, without the appearance of 

discriminating against either group is important. Single members can 

use the commissary, but the perceived benefit for a married family 

member might alter the view of the “true” worth of this opportunity 

in comparison to single members. Instead, the increase in pay or 

educational benefits designed solely for the member is an important 

policy decision.

 Another area where one can focus the difference between 

married and single personnel is dependents. The difference between 

single and married soldiers with dependents provides more ground 

to explore. Soldiers tend to stay in the USAR and ARNG at greater 

rates as the number of dependents rise. This positive relationship is 

important, since one might be able to design programs that could 

help married or single soldiers to stay in the reserves. Single soldiers 

with dependents tend to have an even greater rate of retention than 

married individuals with the same number of dependents. Perhaps 

these single soldiers have more financial or other pressures to maintain 

or support dependents and households. Despite the possibility of 

deployments or other conditions that might have caused individuals 

to quit, these soldiers decide to stay for immediate and long-term 

compensation. DoD has added unlimited commissary shopping and 

exchange privileges, and has explored extending healthcare insurance 

as benefits for the individual and his or her dependents. Perhaps 

access to more morale, welfare, and recreation, e.g., childcare or 

other benefits, might help to increase retention. Financial incentives, 

perhaps an exploration of tax-free (at the federal level) payments of 

certain stipends such as a truncated housing allowance or subsidized 

commercial health care program, might attract these members to 

stay. 

 A general pay raise might help, but notice Table 1, where general 

unemployment rates were posted with retention rates: Retention 
28

rates actually increased in many cases with lower unemployment 

rates. Normally, with lower unemployment rates, pressure to raise 

wage rates is put on a smaller available labor pool. This means 

that the opportunity cost of an individual serving in the reserves is 

higher. Perhaps the existing rates of pay were sufficient, given the 

pay raises for the period. This is especially telling since the lower 

unemployment rates started in the mid-1990s. Individuals may have 

stayed in the reserve components for other reasons.

 Similarly, retention appears to sag at the two extremes of senior 

and junior personnel. The drop for senior personnel might be 

explained by the availability of retirement. What personnel policies 

might encourage those who are eligible to stay in longer than their 

retirement eligibility? Would this include additional promotion 

opportunities of some type to motivate individuals? This is probably 

not an area where the Army should concentrate its retention efforts 

since most of these individuals might stay a short period of time. 

Conversely, if the Army looks at the 4-7 year group, there is more 

potential for gain than cost. These individuals could potentially stay 

in for as many as 16 or more years or as little as 13 years. This group 

would help the USAR and ARNG in their enlisted force.

 Programs to support retention by the sex of the member do 

not seem to be necessary. Males have a higher retention rate than 

females. However, the difference in rates is not great. Adding more 

programs to extend opportunities may not aid significantly in 

their retention. Opportunities that have widened enlisted careers 

may have succeeded, and the USAR and ARNG could maintain its 

program without significant changes.

 Recent events have focused on the number, type, duration, and 

frequency of mobilizations and deployments. Today, the use of 

the reserve components has put a strain on the USAR and ARNG. 

Surprisingly, up to 2002, the number of deployments by reserve 

component personnel did not seem to affect the level of retention. In 

fact, personnel without a deployment history did not have a higher 

retention rate than those that did. Although most soldiers, if they 

had a deployment, had a single deployment, one has to evaluate this 

data carefully. Routine deployments may act as a means to validate 

the individual and unit’s service. However, repeated deployments 

for multiple mobilizations or for uncertain time commitments may 
29

not support this observation in the future. There was some decrease 

between 2001 and 2002 in the 19-year cohort for retention. Perhaps 

the opportunity cost of staying in the reserve components was too 

high compared to a competing requirement, like a highly paid 

profession, to be away on deployment. So, they tended to opt out of 

the reserves.

Conclusion.

 Retention is a potential concern among active and reserve 

components in all branches of service. Keeping a quality soldier in 

uniform not only improves force capability, but is cost effective as 

well. Although retention seems to have stayed relatively constant 

from 1995 to 2002, one might not find the same results today. 

Changing conditions from a periodic reliance on reserve component 

use to a routine one may solve current force structure problems, but 

may create problems in the future.

 This monograph examined a slice of history for the USAR and the 

ARNG. My intent was to use the data as a basis to compare future 

retention studies with a relatively stable period where the United 

States did not use the reserve components as frequently as today. 

Only a sustained comparison of reserve components in the future 

can shed light on the impact of increased and scheduled use of USAR 

and ARNG units on retention. 

 Future examination might focus on the effect on reserve 

component members who were mobilized for active duty and 

those who were not. This could answer questions about the effect 

of mobilization on decisions to separate or retire. Unlike the 1991 

Persian Gulf War that was relatively short, future mobilizations may 

last more than a year, and members might face the possibility of 

repeated deployments just like active military members. This type of 

analysis could yield valuable insight in viewing options for using the 

reserve components immediately compared to longer-term impacts. 

Small, infrequent mobilizations during this period did not seem to 

affect retention. However, future mobilizations in conflicts that are 

relatively long, extensive, and unpopular at home may have other 

results.
30

 Perhaps future reserve component leadership will view the period 

before 2002 as a “golden” one in terms of retention. The challenge for 

the future is two-fold. First, recruit the type of personnel that, in the 

past, have been willing to stay in the reserve components. However, 

this action is no guarantee. Certain conditions affecting retention 

may change rapidly depending on a conflict or future deployments. 

Changing conditions of reserve duty can have unexpected 

consequences. Second, trying to use “one size fits all” incentives 

for retention may not work or may become counterproductive. 

Individuals continue in the USAR and ARNG for various reasons, 

from job training, to patriotism, to future annuities. Simplifying 

the retention study to demographic groups was a start to examine 

where particular groups stayed or left. A concentrated focus on a 

particular group might offer insight into what types of incentives 

may encourage future retention. 

ENDNOTES

 1. Michael D. Doubler, I Am The Guard: A History of the Army National Guard, 

1636-2000, Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2001, p. 237.

 2. Richard B. Crossland and James T. Currie, Twice the Citizen, Washington, 

DC: Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, 1984, p. 99.

 3. Frank N. Schubert and Theresa L. Kraus, The Whirlwind War, Washington, 

DC: Center of Military History, 1995, p. 121.

 4. E. J. Degen Gregory and David Tohn, On Point, Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Combat 

Studies Institute Press, 2004, p. 176.

 5 . The 19-year timeframe was selected to coincide with a decision to retire at 

exactly 20 years.

 6. All data used for the monograph was taken from the DMDC’s “Reserve 

Components Common Data System” files. These files include information on each 

USAR and ARNG member. DMDC personnel assessed 8 years of data and created 

the subfiles to represent each cohort. All references to study results come from 

these subfiles.

 7. Increased rank and pay may act to reduce the opportunity cost of working 

more hours at a regular civilian job or finding alternative part-time work to care 

for dependents.