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THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MARITIME TRANSPORTATION SECURITY

ACT

(109–27)

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON

COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON

TRANSPORTATION AND

INFRASTRUCTURE

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JUNE 29, 2005

Printed for the use of the

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

(
COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

DON YOUNG, Alaska, Chairman

THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin, Vice-Chair

SHERWOOD L. BOEHLERT, New York

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee

WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

PETER HOEKSTRA, Michigan

VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan

SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio

SUE W. KELLY, New York

RICHARD H. BAKER, Louisiana

ROBERT W. NEY, Ohio

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey

JERRY MORAN, Kansas

GARY G. MILLER, California

ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina

ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut

HENRY E. BROWN, JR., South Carolina

TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

SAM GRAVES, Missouri

MARK R. KENNEDY, Minnesota

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas

JIM GERLACH, Pennsylvania

MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida

JON C. PORTER, Nevada

TOM OSBORNE, Nebraska

KENNY MARCHANT, Texas

MICHAEL E. SODREL, Indiana

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania

TED POE, Texas

DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington

CONNIE MACK, Florida

JOHN R. ‘RANDY’ KUHL, JR., New York

LUIS G. FORTUN ̃ O, Puerto Rico

LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia

CHARLES W. BOUSTANY, JR., Louisiana

VACANCY

JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota

NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of

Columbia

JERROLD NADLER, New York

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey

CORRINE BROWN, Florida

BOB FILNER, California

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi

JUANITA MILLENDER-MCDONALD,

California

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon

ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California

BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey

LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa

TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania

BRIAN BAIRD, Washington

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada

JIM MATHESON, Utah

MICHAEL M. HONDA, California

RICK LARSEN, Washington

MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts

ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York

JULIA CARSON, Indiana

TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York

MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine

LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri

ALLYSON Y. SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania

JOHN T. SALAZAR, Colorado

(II)
SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey, Chairman

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina

WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland

PETER HOEKSTRA, Michigan

ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut

MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida

DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington,ViceChair

CONNIE MACK, Florida

LUIS G. FORTUN ̃ O, Puerto Rico

CHARLES W. BOUSTANY, JR., Louisiana

DON YOUNG, Alaska

(Ex Officio)

BOB FILNER, California, Ranking Democrat

CORRINE BROWN, Florida

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi

JUANITA MILLENDER-MCDONALD,

California

MICHAEL M. HONDA, California

ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York

BRIAN BAIRD, Washington

JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota

(Ex Officio)

(III)

(V)

CONTENTS

TESTIMONY

Page

Bone, Craig E., Director of Port Security, United States Coast Guard .............. 3

Jackasta, Robert, Executive Director of Border Security and Facilitation, Office of Field Operations, United States Customs and Border Protection ........ 3

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY WITNESSES

Bone, Craig E ........................................................................................................... 24

Jackasta, Robert ...................................................................................................... 30

(1)

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MARITIME

TRANSPORTATION SAFETY ACT

House of Representatives,

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND MARITIME

TRANSPORTATION, WASHINGTON, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m. in room 2167,

Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Frank LoBiondo [chairman of

the committee] presiding.

Mr. LOBIONDO. Good morning. The Subcommittee on Coast

Guard and Maritime Transportation will come to order.

The Subcommittee is meeting today to oversee implementation of

the maritime transportation security measures required by the

Maritime Transportation Security Act. At this time last year, the

Subcommittee held two hearings to review the implementation of

the final regulations that carried out the maritime security measures under MTSA. Today, U.S. facilities and vessels must operate

under an approved plan that includes measures to enhance security on-site and to identify and ensure the availability of security

measures to deter transportation security incidents and the threat

of such incidents.

I want to applaud the Coast Guard for working so closely with

the maritime sector to put these plans in place before the July 1st

deadline. Nearly one year after these regulations went into effect,

I am looking forward to hearing more about the status of these port

security regulations as well as the Department’s other efforts to secure our ports and our maritime transportation system.

Following the events of September 11th, the Coast Guard has

been designated as the lead Federal agency responsible for securing

America’s maritime transportation system and the Congress adopted the MTSA. That Act established the framework upon which the

Coast Guard and other partner agencies within the Department of

Homeland Security are building the national maritime security

strategy.

While some of the components of this national strategy are in

place, I am extremely concerned at the lack of progress on many

others, including completion of the now long overdue National Maritime Transportation Security Plan, a long-range vessel tracking

system the Transportation Worker Identification Card and the secure systems of the transportation program.

Under the MTSA, the Coast Guard is required to develop systems to target and track vessels as they operate in U.S. waters and

on the high seas. The Coast Guard has implemented the Automatic

Identification System to provide information on vessel movement in
2

12 major ports and expects to expand the system in the future.

However, much less progress has been made toward developing a

system to track vessels at greater distances from the shore, which

I think is extremely essential to our policy and our ability to protect ourselves.

I look forward to the hearing testimony this morning regarding

the Coast Guard’s current efforts to develop a domestic long range

vessel tracking system and to work with the International Maritime Organization to plan and implement a system internationally.

I understand that the Department is currently carrying out a

pilot program to test a prototype of the Transportation Worker

Identification Credential, we call this the TWIC plan. TSA is

issuing prototype TWIC cards in a handful of ports nationwide, including the ports on the Delaware River. This program will improve the security by employing the use of biometric information to

prevent unauthorized persons from accessing secure areas in our

ports and onboard vessels.

I hope that the witnesses can provide the Subcommittee with

some insight into how this pilot program is going.

The Subcommittee also remains concerned about the Department’s efforts to improve cargo security. The MTSA requires the

Department to investigate and develop methods, programs and

technologies to better inspect vessels and cargo, to detect explosives

and radiological, nuclear, chemical and biological weapons carried

aboard vessels and in cargo, and to improve seals and tracking sensors fastened to cargo containers.

However, this secure systems of transportation program authorized under MTSA exist in name only. The Department has not

taken steps to establish this important program. The Subcommittee

continues to be very active in the oversight of the Maritime homeland security.

I thank the Coast Guard for its continued presence before the

Subcommittee. And I welcome the witnesses from the U.S. Customs

Border Protection. I am disappointed that the Transportation Security Administration has declined an invitation to appear before the

Subcommittee. Last year, the 9/11 Commission challenged the Congress to significantly increase its oversight to homeland security.

The Subcommittee will continue active oversight of the Department’s implementation of MTSA, including completion of the National Maritime Transportation Security Plan, enhanced identification credentialing of maritime transportation workers, and a long

range vessel tracking program.

Again, I want to thank the witnesses for coming this morning,

and I look forward to their testimony.

Mr. Simmons. do you care to make any remarks?

Mr. SIMMONS. Simply to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding

this important oversight meeting. I yield back.

Mr. LOBIONDO. Okay. Mr. Filner is on his way. He said it was

okay for us to get started, so if he wants to make any comments

when he comes in, we will certainly allow this.

Right now I would like to introduce our witnesses. We have Rear

Admiral Craig Bone, who is Director of Port Security for the United

States Coast Guard, and Mr. Robert Jacksta, Executive Director of
3

the Border Security and Facilitation Office of the Field Operations

of the United States Customs and Border Protection.

Admiral Bone, it is great to see you again. Thank you for being

here and please proceed.

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL CRAIG E. BONE, DIRECTOR OF

PORT SECURITY, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD; ROBERT

JACKSTA, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF BORDER SECURITY

AND FACILITATION, OFFICE OF FIELD OPERATIONS, UNITED

STATES CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION

Admiral BONE. Thank you, sir.

Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman. It is great to see you again, sir,

and distinguished members of the Committee.

I am Rear Admiral Craig Bone, Director of Port Security and the

Coast Guard’s Marine Safety, Security and Environmental Protection Director. Today I intend to discuss the Coast Guard’s role to

secure our ports and waterways and ensure the safe and efficient

flow of commerce.

The Coast Guard’s overarching security goal is to prevent terrorist attacks against our ports and waterways. Doing so requires a

risk-based approach to identify and intercept threats, ideally before

they reach our shores. We do that by conducting layered, multiagency security operations nationwide while strengthening the security posture and reducing the vulnerability of our ports with a

particular focus on our Nation’s militarily and economically strategic ports.

Our Nation’s maritime transportation system spans 26,000 of

commercial navigable waterways. It accounts for $800 billion of

freight trade each year, and is used by 78 million recreational boaters. A maritime terrorist attack on this system, with its associated

ripple effects throughout our trade and commerce could have a devastating impact on our Nation’s economy. Protecting this system is

a significant challenge for the Department of Homeland Security,

the Coast Guard and our other maritime stakeholders. We accomplish this through partnerships with other Federal, State and local

agencies as well as the maritime industry.

Since trade is global and terrorism is global, we knew it was necessary to build a global security regime. Our domestic and international efforts focused on the implementation of MTSA and the

international ship and port security code, or ISPS code. We collaborated with 147 other countries at the International Maritime Organization to build a new and substantial security code that applies

to all vessels and port facilities around the world. These international requirements mirror the domestic standards set forth in

MTSA. Both the MTSA regulations and the ISPS code went into effect together on July 1st, 2004.

To complement the new security standards, we worked in parallel with the International Standards Organization, or ISO, to develop the ISPS code implementation guide. This guide is meant to

aid countries complying with the standards. I am pleased to report

excellent initial success. Approximately only one out of every 100

foreign-flagged vessels that we inspect in the U.S. require us to

take major port-State control action to correct security deficiencies.
4

We seek to obtain transparency of what and who moves through

the maritime domain with accountability. The IMO and the ISO

have been key allies in developing requirements and practical

standards that lead to consistency, greater compliance and risk reductions. We verify reported compliance and implementation by

conducting vessel offshore boardings, examinations and foreign port

visits.

Implementation has been a big challenge to all stakeholders involved with 9,000 U.S.-flagged vessels, 3,200 U.S. facilities and

8,000 foreign vessels that trade in the U.S. I am pleased to report

the MTSA compliance rates for both vessels and facilities are near

99 percent across the board. This was due in large measure to the

collaboration and excellent relationship Coast Guard captains of

ports have at the local level, working with the area maritime security committees.

I also note that as required by MTSA, we have also established

an international port security program that works in concert with

other Federal agencies to identify foreign countries posing potential

security risks to the international maritime transportation system.

To date, we have visited 27 countries. Two of all 27 countries we

visited have not properly implemented the ISPS code. Five additional countries are currently on our port security advisory list, because they have not reported their compliance to the IMO or the

Coast Guard.

The long term challenge is ahead for all of us. MTSA and the

ISPS code provided the framework for our Nation’s maritime security. But additional capability and capacity is needed by the agencies and industry to ensure we can best protect our maritime interests and respond to threats and terrorist events.

To make maritime domain awareness protection and response

systemic, we have acted on lessons learned. We have identified efforts needed, both domestically and internationally, and many of

these require extensive interagency and industry coordination. This

inventory of projects we refer to as America’s Maritime Shield.

They will improve how we execute the national maritime strategy.

They represent our next wave of improvements to strengthen maritime security. Included are improved maritime domain awareness,

improved identity security, improved underwater detection and response, complete supply chain cargo security and improved training

for personal and vehicle-borne improved explosive devices as well

as a counter-terrorism response.

I thank you for this opportunity to testify today, and I will be

pleased to answer any questions at the appropriate time, sir.

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you, Admiral Bone.

Mr. Jacksta, thank you for being here. Please proceed.

Mr. JACKSTA. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and distinguished

members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for this opportunity to

update the Subcommittee on U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s

effort to strengthen maritime security.

CBP, as the guardian of the Nation’s borders, safeguards the

homeland foremost by protecting the American public against terrorists and instruments of terror, while at the same time enforcing

the laws of the United States and fostering the Nation’s economic

activity through lawful trade
5

Mr. LOBIONDO. Excuse me, Mr. Jacksta, is your microphone on?

Mr. JACKSTA. Yes.

Mr. LOBIONDO. Okay. Just a weak one. Maybe you can pull it a

little bit closer. Thank you.

Mr. JACKSTA. My remarks today will focus on advanced electronic

cargo information, Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism,

CT-PAT, the container security initiative, non-intrusive technology

and the implementation of the Maritime Transportation Security

Act. Automation, electronic information and technology are critical

tools that facilitate the progress we continue to make with regard

to securing in maritime cargo and increasing security against the

terrorist threat.

All information on cargo enroute to the United States is analyzed

in advance of loading the container, based on available intelligence

and historic trade information. This review takes place at our national targeting center, the container security initiative ports and

CBP’s ports of entry.

Further, the NTC provides tactical targeting and analytical research support for CBP field offices and remains the single point

of reference for CBP anti-terrorism efforts. As the Customs-Trade

Partnership Against Terrorism has evolved, we have steadily added

to the rigor of this volunteer industry-partnership program. In

order to join CT-PAT, a participant must commit to increasing its

supply chain security to meet minimal supply chain security criteria.

Perhaps most importantly, participants also make a commitment

to work with their business partners and customers throughout the

supply chains to ensure that those businesses also increase their

supply chain security. By leveraging the influence of importers and

others on different participants in the supply chain, CT-PAT is able

to increase the security of United States-bound goods to the points

of origin. That is, to the point of stuffing the container. This reach

is critical to the goal of increasing supply chain security. In addition, CBP has published the CT-PAT strategic plan, clearly articulating the program’s goals and strategies and complete CT-PAT

human capital plan, which addresses recruitment, training and

workload issues.

To meet our priority mission of preventing terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the United States, CBP has partnered

with other countries on our container security initiative, CSI. Almost 26,000 sea containers arrive and are offloaded at United

States seaports each day. In fiscal year 2004, that equated to 9.6

million containers. Because of the sheer volume of the sea containers traffic and the opportunities it presents to terrorists, containerized shipping is uniquely vulnerable to terrorists’ exportation.

Under CSI, which is the first program of its kind, we are

partnering with foreign governments to identify and inspect high

risk cargo containers at foreign ports before they are shipped to our

seaports and pose a threat to the United States. Today, CSI is

operational at 37 ports.

Non-intrusive inspection technology is another cornerstone in our

strategy. Technologies deployed to our Nation’s ports of entry include large-scale x-ray and gamma imaging systems, as well as a

variety of portable and handheld technologies to include our recent
6

focus on radiation detection technology. Our non-intrusive technologies are viewed as force multipliers that enable us to examine

or screen a larger portion of legitimate trade.

CBP is also moving quickly to deploy nuclear and radiological detection equipment to our ports of entry. CBP is initiating the deployment of radiation portal monitors in the maritime environment

with the ultimate goal of screening 100 percent of all containerized

imported cargo for radiation. Additionally, CBP has deployed personal radiation detectors in quantities necessary for ensuring that

there his 100 percent coverage at primary, the first port of contact.

Finally, CBP is committed to internationalizing core elements of

CT-PAT and CSI programs. The World Customs Organization,

WCO, has worked cooperatively to develop an internal framework

of standards governed by customs to customs relationships and customs to business relationships.

The recent adoption of the World Customs Organization framework of standards and facilitation will strengthen our mutual efforts to secure trade against terrorists and the terrorist threat. I

believe CBP has demonstrated and will continue to demonstrate

our leadership and commitment to the maritime security efforts,

and we anticipate that working with our sister agencies under the

Department of Homeland Security we will further these efforts.

Thank you again for the opportunity to testify. I will be happy

to answer any questions you may have.

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you very much.

Mr. Filner, thank you and the floor is yours.

Mr. FILNER. I apologize for being late, Mr. Chairman. And thank

you for scheduling this hearing and I thank the panel for being

here.

Obviously we are coming up to the first anniversary for the facilities and vessels in the United States to be operating under Coast

Guard approved security plans. And of course, it is time now to see

how our security has improved.

I would like to focus on a couple of issues with the panel first.

What benchmarks are there to help us determine whether or not

the security plans are in fact making our facilities and vessels

more secure? And second, I would like to look at maritime security

from the perspective of, I think what Sheriff Reichert and I talked

about in a previous hearing, and I will just call it community policing, as applied to the Coast Guard. That is to what extent is the

Coast Guard developing the kinds of relationships with the community that would allow better identification of maritime security

threats?

Obviously to implement Coast Guard security plans, marine terminal operators have had to install, for example, fencing and entry

gates at terminals across the United States. Do we know to what

extent have these measures decreased the amount of theft and pilferage at terminals? If televisions or containers are being stolen, I

doubt that the security plans are adequate to prevent WMD from

being smuggled in or out of that terminal.

We all know that cities around the United States have been implementing what we call community policing plans over the past

decade. They are getting police officers out of their cars and having

them walk streets and visit businesses and know the residents.
7

They get to know all these people and they know when something

looks out of place.

In contrast, it seems to me that Coast Guard facilities are restricting access to their facilities. The coastal communities only

know Coast Guard personnel from watching them from afar as they

patrol the waters. In the past, recreational boaters and commercial

fishermen got to know Coast Guard personnel when they conducted

safety exams on their boats to make sure they had enough life preservers.

Now, the Coast Guard has asked the boating and fishing communities to be their eyes in the water and to let them know when they

see suspicious activities. However, when the Coast Guard stops the

recreation or fishing vessel for an exam, they often board them

with weapons. What we have seen in the intelligence community

pre-9/11 was an over-dependence on technology and not enough

emphasis on human intelligence that is based on these kinds of

personal relationships.

What I am worried about, I think, is that the Coast Guard is

going to close itself off in its facilities and become over-reliant on

these technologies to monitor waterways, rather than having Coast

Guard personnel develop personal and ongoing relationships with

our communities. Another component of this might be the Coast

Guard’s rotation policy for its personnel. When Admiral Collins

joined the Coast Guard, most personnel spent their whole careers

in a single Coast Guard district. They knew the business leaders,

the marina operators and the fishermen. Coast Guard personnel

knew the waters and could identify when something looked out of

place, because many of them had even grown up in these local

areas.

However, once the Coast Guard centralized job assignments, personnel were transferred all over the United States from one tour

to the next. It is difficult to develop the kind of personal relationships needed for homeland security if you are only there for three

years.

I hope we can comment on these concerns. Mr. Chairman, I look

forward to working with you to make sure that we have the safest

security possible in our Nation’s coastal communities.

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you, Mr. Filner.

Admiral Bone, I would like to start with some questions for you.

First, I was recalling fondly our little trip back to the Coast Guard

station and was wondering if that may be in the Coast Guard

training library yet.

Admiral BONE. It could have made the video, yes, sir.

[Laughter.]

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you.

Admiral Bone, the MTSA required the Department of Homeland

Security to develop a National Maritime Transportation Security

Plan to prevent and respond to security incidents in the maritime

transportation sector. Last year’s Intelligence Reform Act required

the National Maritime Transportation Security Plan to be submitted by April 1st of 2005. Can you give us any idea of where the

plan is in the Administration’s review process and when it will be

released? Then I have some follow-ups to that.
8

Admiral BONE. Yes, sir. Yes, Mr. Chairman. The plan is actually

undergoing final review, and it will be provided for interagency review in July. That is our schedule.

Originally the plan was going to be completed December 2005,

and as you indicated, there was a change that directed it to be

completed by April. What is inclusive in that plan is related to another security plan, however, when we look at the infrastructure

recovery plan, the Marine Infrastructure Recovery Plan, it is also

required. That’s a piece of the National Maritime Security Plan.

Deputy Secretary Jackson indicated in order to complete these simultaneously that we would need several more months in order to

complete both, since you want them also in parallel. One applies

to the other. So we in fact again, in July we will have it completed

for interagency review and expect it to go forward from there.

At the same time, we also completed the area maritime security

plans as well as the vessel and facility security plans if you look

at it from a tiered structure. We also wanted to ensure that the

National Maritime Security Plan also serves as the sector plan

under the transportation specific security plans. As you can see,

there are multiple plans required of us, some with MTSA and some

under HSPD-13 and HSPD-7.

Mr. LOBIONDO. So if I am understanding you correctly, part of

what you are doing in putting this together is also to, when it is

released, to be able to tell us how this plan will be integrated into

the multi-sector National Transportation Security Plan?

Admiral BONE. Yes, sir, in fact, it actually represents that subsector plan under the transportation security plan, maritime sector.

Mr. LOBIONDO. Have you already begun to implement any of the

measures that will be part of the plan once it is finalized?

Admiral BONE. Yes, sir, and that is why when we look at the

area maritime security plans, although this is a national capstone

document, like a national response plan, that does not keep us

from working, again, at the areas and at the local level in order

to address security now. We knew we couldn’t wait for a national

plan to begin that.

So all of your area maritime security plans have been completed,

as well as all the vessel and security plans, which again, support

that area maritime security plan.

Mr. LOBIONDO. Will the implementation of the plan lead to

changes in existing vessel and facility plans or other already established MTSA programs?

Admiral BONE. I am not aware of any at this time, sir, but I will

get back for the record if there are.

[The information received follows:]

There are no immediate changes in store for MTSA vessel and facility plans.

However, those plans are subject to a regulatory requirement for ongoing review

and revision. The National Maritime Security Plan may suggest mitigation

strategies that could have an impact on maritime security practices and protocols. These strategies may affect vessels and facility owners’ plans, such as passenger security measures for ferries and the sharing of up-to-date reserve cargo

handling capability information and data with the Government to support the

restoration of cargo flow in the aftermath of a Transportation Security Incident

(TSI). Although MTSA-regulated facility and vesel plans may not be immediately affected, the NMSP exercise program could address issues associated

with the restoration of cargo flow and communications at the national level.

Lessons learned from these and other national level exercises may generate rec-
9

ommendations for improvements and corrective actions that could affect the

content or construct of the MTSA system of maritime security plans and programs.

Mr. LOBIONDO. Okay. We look forward to receiving this and we

will already be talking about, after today, about setting up a schedule so that we can have an opportunity to deal with that.

I just have a minute or so left, but I am going to defer to Mr.

Filner.

Mr. FILNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you gentlemen for being here with us. I wonder if, Admiral, you might comment on one of the points I raised about what

we will call community policing, that is access of course restricted

as if it were a military installation, isolation from the public, location policy which takes people away from being in one community,

boarding recreational vehicles with weapons. In the post-9/11

world, we have to move in that direction.

But are you concerned about moving too far? Because we need

the community. We need those on the waters as our eyes and ears.

We want them to be part of us and not in isolation. So I wonder,

where do we find that balance?

Admiral BONE. Representative Filner, I can’t agree with you

more that we need those people. In fact, we seek them out through

America’s Waterways Watch Program and our Coast Guard Auxiliary has engaged them. We do have military facilities, we are a

military organization and we do have force protection issues and

we do provide security at our facilities, the same as other DOD

military facilities. But that in no way should restrict our access, as

you indicated, to the public in carrying out our duties.

Our people have been armed prior to 9/11, conducting boardings,

law enforcement boardings that you are talking about. But in addition, our auxiliary are not armed. Quite often, they are the people

that most often do our boating safety exams that you see on recreational vessels.

But I can tell you that through the Area Maritime Security Committee, there is probably more engagement than ever before, with

the community as a whole, including marinas, than we ever had

before. I don’t know where the perception is, but if it is in a particular area, I would be of interest to know it, so that we can see

if we can address it, sir.

Mr. FILNER. How about the rotation policy?

Admiral BONE. The rotation policy is, when you look at it, it is

kind of a double-edged sword. You want the people to bring the

new approaches and ideas in and you want the experience, the

breadth of experience and in not every port can you receive that

experience to move in the organization. You want people that, for

example, not all vessels operate, all types of vessels or all types of

facilities are in one location. So you don’t want to minimize a person’s ability to develop your skills and their competencies and capabilities, and at the same time, I agree, you want some continuity.

So what we look at is a rotation, and not everyone rotates at

once, obviously. So there is continuity. We also have increased our

civilian billets at many of those units and civilianized those billets

so there will be long term continuity.
10

Mr. FILNER. Do any of your Coast Guard have a say in if they

want to stay at a location longer? Are they required to rotate?

Admiral BONE. When you indicated there are three years, there

are people that have been in geographic areas for fifteen to twenty

years. Not everyone rotates. But I would say that opportunity or

that look to rotate or have another assignment, and it could be an

assignment within the same geographic area, someone could move

from one position to another and still have a job rotation. You can

do that internally within a command, but you can also do it within

command within a geographic area and garner that same interest

of continuity that you are looking for.

Mr. FILNER. In the post-9/11 world, we moved to the so-called Patriot Act, which strongly limits a lot of the privacies and freedoms

we had taken for granted. The Coast Guard becomes something

else. We have to move, obviously, in a direction. But let us not go

overboard, if I may use that expression, in reaction to 9/11, because

we become something that we don’t want to be as a nation, whether it is losing our freedom or losing our close relationship with the

Coast Guard.

Admiral BONE. I agree with you.

Mr. FILNER. My other point I made was effective measurement

of how effective we are. That is, we have implementation of security plans, for example. But can we measure what effect this has

had? Have we identified weaknesses? Are we trying to measure

whether thefts have been prevented? How do we do that?

Admiral BONE. That is a good point. I think there are multiple

ways you can measure. One way is looking at changes. When longshoremen are basically trained and looking, trained to look for

those anomalies and are actually providing that information to you

at different points, that is a change that is significant. There is a

measure with our field intelligence support teams where they are

receiving information just as you said, from the public, but also

from the mariners themselves and the facility workers of unusual

activity or vessels loitering in and around the facility.

I can tell you that our largest problem with facilities has in fact

been access control. We believe that improved credentialing will assist in that.

I have talked to the insurance companies to identify to what degree is the pilfering or theft taking place in the port versus out of

port. It is clear in the view of the insurance companies that the

problem lies outside the port area, and in a sense that it has improved since 9/11. I asked them for statistics, they said they

haven’t done the analysis, but they in fact have a confidence that

since MTSA has been put in place and the increased security following 9/11 that that has improved significantly. They just have

not done the total analysis yet.

Mr. FILNER. Just one more point if I may, Mr. Chairman. The

first item you mentioned is longshoremen, that they know what is

going on. We had a discussion, or several discussions when the security committees were set up, there was no guaranteed representation for the longshoremen. I was just wondering, has that

changed? Are you bringing in these people who know the ports the

best?
11

Admiral BONE. I can speak from experience from New York, myself. The longshoremen in fact were trained, I think, you had the

national, you had the New York Maritime Association actually

training longshoremen and people at the facility themselves. And

the labor leaders were in fact very positive that they wanted to be

a force in place to prevent any actions of terrorism.

Mr. FILNER. But we did not add them as required members of

the security committees, did we?

Admiral BONE. I would have to look, myself.

Mr. FILNER. Would you look into that, please. Thank you, Mr.

Chairman.

Admiral BONE. We could.

[The information received follows:]

Longshoremen are not required members of the security committees. The regulations for Area Maritime Security Committees, however, state that the committee will be composed of members having an interest in the security of the area

and who may be selected from various groups, one of which is maritime industry, including labor.

Mr. LOBIONDO. Okay, thank you, Mr. Filner.

Mr. Reichert.

Mr. REICHERT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome. The Maritime Transportation Security Act created a

requirement that workers entering a secure area in our ports had

a Transportation Worker Identification Card. The port of Seattle,

which has jurisdiction over SeaTac International Airport and the

seaport near downtown Seattle has created a viable biometrics

based access system for the 20,000 plus employees who work in the

airport. Because this port operates both the airport and the seaport, they are extending many features of the airport access system

to the seaport. To date, the seaport of Seattle has invested over $5

million for this biometrics system.

Currently there is a lack of Federal guidance in establishing

these cards. I am sure other ports are also in the process of developing these cards. Do you know if there is an effort by the Department of Homeland Security and the Coast Guard and others to implement management standards?

Admiral BONE. Yes. The Transportation Security Administration

has the lead for the Transportation Worker Identification Card,

which would in fact incorporate air, surface and maritime requirements for the credential itself, in other words, what needs to be on

the identification credential and also for the requirements for

issuance.

The Coast Guard is actually working, since November 2004, with

TSA in order to do this. Again, the Department of Homeland Security has determined TSA to be the lead agency for this in that

there are 12 million people impacted by the TWIC card. The maritime group represents about 300,000 when you look at ships and

facilities. But we are basically poised to move forward when that

standard is set, and in fact the TSA has indicated that they expect

the proposed rulemaking in 2006. That is their timetable for that.

We share concerns that have been raised with regard to the

timeliness of this effort, and we are working with them as closely

as we can to assist them in any way we can to get this moved for-
12

ward for the maritime environment. Again, we don’t own all the

different modes in this regard.

Mr. REICHERT. Right. Some time in 2006, though is the target

date.

Admiral BONE. Say again?

Mr. REICHERT. Is there a target date, you said, sometime in

2006?

Admiral BONE. Yes, end of fiscal year 2006, which would be September 2006.

Mr. REICHERT. Another question. The Maritime Transportation

Security Act created a grant program to help our ports perform security enhancements. These grants have proven very effective in

my home ports of Seattle and Tacoma. My question involves how

these funds are allocated to each port. How does the Department

of Homeland Security determine how to allocate port security

grants to each port? Do you know?

Admiral BONE. Yes. Actually it is first done at the Captain of the

Ports of the Federal Maritime Security Coordinator’s level. The

identification, working with the area maritime security committees,

when you identify your vulnerabilities and your gaps, you look at

what do you need in your system. What happens is industry puts

their proposals forward, they are initially vetted at that level so

that you want to make sure they are going to be effective.

It is then put forward to a national level. And the national level

looks at not just the local but the regional and national impacts.

It is a risk-based formula that is used across ODP, IAIP, CBP, all

agencies, TSA, working together to look at this risk-based approach, looking at vulnerability, threat, and consequence. That is

what you determine, of the critical ports in this case, that have

been identified this year, the 66 critical ports that have economic

and military significance. Those ports then are determined, those

ports are able to put the grants in and those are then evaluated

on a national level and a determination is made based on, again,

value, impact of this proposal against the risk that is being proposed.

Mr. REICHERT. The House of Representatives recently passed a

first responder’s bill that focuses those monies toward first responders on a threat basis and a risk basis. You are involved in

the intelligence gathering process also, across the Nation, involved

with some of the joint analytical centers and terrorism task force

centers around the world. We have those in Seattle. You are involved in that process?

Admiral BONE. Yes. We are actually a full member of the intelligence community. As such, we have access to all the intelligence,

available intelligence, whether it is national or international, working with CIA, FBI, NSA, all the major FBI. We have people in the

JTTFs, personnel that are assigned liaison with the JTTFs. We

have established 30 field intelligence support teams that basically

support the area maritime security committees and the Federal

maritime security coordinators. If you know where your threat is,

then you move your assets based upon the threat.

They also work directly with the JTTFs and the local law enforcement to make sure that we are working collectively and not

duplicating efforts. In other words, by example, in New York, we
13

might have State assets in one location and Federal assets in another, city assets in another location, to maximize the effectiveness,

based upon the threat.

Mr. REICHERT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I see my time has expired.

Mr. LOBIONDO. I thank you, Mr. Reichert.

Mr. Higgins?

Mr. HIGGINS. No questions, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. LOBIONDO. Mr. Coble, Master Chief?

Mr. COBLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, it is good to have you all with us. He calls me affectionately Master Chief. I was never a master chief, unfortunately.

But I like the title.

It is good to have both of you with us. Mr. Jacksta, let me put

a question to you, a multi-faceted question, if I may. The Maritime

Transportation Security Act, as you all know, requires the Secretary to establish a secure system of transportation program, but

no such program has yet been established. Admiral, either you or

Mr. Jacksta, when will this program be established?

Mr. JACKSTA. Well, sir, basically we are working on it right now,

with the World Customs Organization just establishing and agreeing on standards for supply chain. We are working to first of all

begin looking at the supply chain from when the container is actually stuffed, with who is putting the goods into the container, making sure that we measure that responsibility. We seal the container

with a seal where we can verify that the goods have been put in

and that no one else has had access to the container.

Then we have a system of information where we gain the information, we run it against our automated targeting systems to

make a decision whether there is a concern or a threat. At 37 locations today, the container is moving through a CSI port, which allows us to once again, our officers overseas to evaluate the container if there is a concern, we can request the examination of that

container.

We are also working with the importers, the shipping industry,

through the CT-PAT program to make sure that there is a consistent and uniform way of securing the goods, to make sure that no

one can compromise

Mr. COBLE. You are sort of getting into my second question, Mr.

Jacksta. When do you think the program will be online?

Mr. JACKSTA. Sir, I would like to say, I think we are online with

a number of our changes today, through the CT-PAT program,

through the CSI program, working to develop a seal that is a secure seal. So I think there are a number of initiatives that are already started and are actually moving forward.

Mr. COBLE. Like I say, you accelerated ahead of me, you were

sort of reading my mind and my next question. Let me jump into

that now.

Cargo security is largely overseen by U.S. Customs and Border

Protection. However, numerous Federal agencies have some responsibility over securing the transport of cargo through the maritime domain, as you have just pointed out. Let me walk you

through, here is my multi-faceted question, Mr. Jacksta. From the

moment that a cargo container is brought into a foreign port until
14

that container is offloaded at a U.S. port, what responsibilities does

Customs and Border carry out to secure the maritime cargo supply,

A, and B, what are the Coast Guard’s responsibilities with regard

to container security? And Admiral, you can weigh in on that.

What efforts are taken by other DHS agencies and other Federal

agencies? Are these responsibilities well defined, or do they overlap? That is to say, is there duplication, as is oftentimes the case

with the Federal Government? And how are these efforts and requirements integrated for a vessel operator who is pulling into a

U.S. port?

Mr. JACKSTA. What I can do is, I will start it off, sir, with the

responsibility that first of all, we have a number of voluntary programs out there that we work with the industry, the importers, the

exporters and the shipping industry. With that, when a container

arrives at a port overseas, one of the first things that is required

is that before that container can be put on that vessel, we have to

receive information regarding what is in that container. That information allows us to run our automated targeting system and our

rules to identify if there is anything that is a concern or if any recent intelligence has come out that would help us make a decision

on whether an examination needs to take place.

So we review the manifest information before that container gets

on that vessel. If there is a concern, we look at it, we work with

the host governments. This is a cooperative effort where we need

to work on the international side of the house to make sure that

when there is a concern, that it actually gets addressed overseas.

We also are working with our CT-PAT program, and anybody

who is involved with this program is required to put a seal on the

container at the time of stuffing, which is extremely important, because it makes sure that the container is not being compromised.

When the vessel, we work very closely with the Coast Guard, and

the vessel, when it is arriving at our ports of entry, we have some

concerns or new intelligence, we work to develop a plan to make

sure that that container is identified, that when it comes off the

vessel we do the appropriate examinations. And if necessary, working with the Coast Guard, a decision can be made, not actually to

allow that vessel in until we know more about the container itself.

So before the container is actually put on the vessel, while it is

enroute and before it is released by Customs-Border Protection, we

are reviewing the information. We have technology at the ports of

entry through our radiation portal monitors that allow us to determine whether there is any type of threat in the radiological area.

And there is also the systems, what we call our x-ray systems, our

VACUS systems, that allow us to basically take pictures and view

the images of containers and the goods in the containers before

they are released.

So it is a comprehensive, layered approach that we try to work

very closely with TSA in the seaport environment.

Mr. COBLE. Admiral, do you want to weigh in on this?

Admiral BONE. I just offer that HSPD-13 in fact is being developed that identifies very explicitly the responsibility of different

agencies, as Mr. Jacksta mentioned, and kind of describes how that

process works so there isn’t overlap, so there is clarity of respon-
15

sibility. And again, that is one of the plans that is going to be completed.

I just offer that we do have responsibility with regard to the vessels as well as from the time through its transit and when it is on

that facility, a MTSA facility. We do have responsibility for securing and safety of that cargo, not just the security but also the safety of that cargo.

And I think that is where our international code and our standards and our verification, both with our foreign port and our examinations which we do jointly when there is a CSI, so that we look

at the full measure of security, as well as the examinations and

boardings that are conducted offshore, by our offshore, our legacy

assets, and then again at the facility examinations inshore to look

for any anomalies.

Mr. COBLE. I thank the gentleman. Mr. Chairman, I guess my

point is, I would like to avoid duplication, but I would rather have

duplication to preclude an omission if it comes to that. I thank you,

Mr. Chairman.

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you, Mr. Coble. Mr. Diaz-Balart?

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. No questions at this time, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. LOBIONDO. Mr. Mack?

Mr. MACK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Maybe I will try to make this a little more simple for me. In the

State of Florida, we have a number of ports. Just to give you an

example, when I travel, let’s say, with my children, I have a fiveyear old little girl and a two-year old little boy. When we go to the

airport, a lot of times my two-year old little boy is wanded down

at the airport.

So my question is, do you feel like we have the same strength

of security in our ports that we do at our airports? And then, which

I don’t think we do, but I want to hear from your perspective. And

I believe that earlier you said there were 9.6 million containers,

roughly, that come in. What percentage of those are being checked?

And specifically, how do you think the security of our ports

should be funded? I think we have in some cases a funding discrepancy on who is responsible for that funding.

Mr. JACKSTA. I think I will start off with first of all, the question

that is always asked is exactly how many containers are examined

that arrive at our ports of entry. I would like to begin that, first

of all, sir, all freight containers that are arriving at our ports of

entry are screened by an electronic fashion, where we get the information, we review the manifest, and based on intelligence, based

on previous history, based on information provided by other agencies, a decision is made whether an examination should take place

or not.

Mr. MACK. But most of those, the manifests are filled out by the

people who are loading or responsible for loading the containers,

correct?

Mr. JACKSTA. Yes, sir. The information that is provided is provided by the members that are responsible for creating the manifests and responsible for shipping the goods. So the information is

not perfect, but it is fairly accurate in most cases.

With that, when we do the screening, if there is a decision that

is made that there is something unusual or we need to take a look
16

at it, we do screening through our VACUS system, our imaging

systems that we have out there. We have about 167 of them at various ports of entry throughout the country.

Basically, the current rate of examination is approximately 5.4

percent of the containers that are arriving at our ports of entry go

through either a VACUS imaging system or are actually devanned, in other words, we take the goods entirely off the container

to take a look at the container. Those are containers that are either

identified through our automatic targeted system as a risk or containers that we randomly select for examination.

Admiral BONE. With regard to security in the ports versus the

airports, I agree with you. I think the vulnerability of airports is

much different than the vulnerability of a port, accessibility and

controls, moving in and out of an airport, whereas on the waterway, the accessibility and mobility of entities, both from an external but also from an internal threat, like a Kohl type incident, a

small boat that is engaged, or an individual who comes aboard a

high-speed ferry.

So yes, our challenges are greater. But I think also our resources

collectively are also greater. The key to this is pooling those resources collectively together at the Federal, State, local and industry level.

I think the difficult thing to decide is to what degree, whose responsibility is it? Is it a Federal, State, or local responsibility for

protection and response and recovery, and to what degree is that

at those layers, as well as industry’s responsibilities? That is what

Congress, I think, has spent a lot of time doing.

I wouldn’t touch the funding issue, because that is not my business to decide how to pay for it, I don’t think. I do know it is a

challenge. I appreciate the challenge associated with it, and I also

appreciate the challenges industry has with being, staying afloat at

the same time they in fact have to carry out these security

changes.

As I said, our challenges are many. We want to address the most

critical, the highest risk, the highest consequence ones first, and

then it is Congress’ and others, the public’s determination, if it is

worth pursuing the others.

Mr. MACK. Mr. Chairman, for us in Florida, in particular the

port of Everglades, you have the seaport, the airport, a lot of petroleum reserves, and downtown all in one very small location. I just

think that this topic of port security is one that I know the Chairman and I know this Committee has been working on.

But we really have to do more. Because the people who want to

cause harm to this Country are going to look for our

vulnerabilities. They have proven to be sneaky. So they are going

to try to find ways around systems. I just hope that we will continue to work towards a funding solution and also to make sure

that our ports are safe.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you, Mr. Mack.

I can understand, Admiral Bone, your reluctance on the funding

issue. But Mr. Mack, I will tell you, I am not reluctant to say that

I don’t think we have received nearly enough funding for our port

security issues or nearly enough attention. Heaven forbid we ever
17

have an incident at one of our ports and will see the level of awareness rise significantly and probably the funding follow. Our hope

through hearings like this is to make sure that we can keep an incident from happening by keeping the process moving along. But

you are right on the mark with your questions about where we

stand.

Mr. Filner, round two.

Mr. FILNER. Also, Mr. Mack, I agree with everything you said.

San Diego, where I represent, it is the exact same thing, we will

throw in a few nuclear carriers and nuclear subs, and it is pretty

bad as far as the percentage of stuff that is inspected. So thank you

for your comments.

If I may with that, Mr. Jacksta, when I listened to the President

last night, you wouldn’t know that there was anything wrong in

Iraq, that we had not made any errors or that our troops were subject to such risks. Everything was fine. And you guys, I don’t think

you have to say everything is fine. Tell us what is the problem. Because you lose credibility when there is knowledge that is different

than what you are saying.

Let me just make two points, if I may on the CT-PAT system

that you referred to. According to the GAO, the Department has

not confirmed whether most of the importers have actually tightened their security, or whether thousands of high-risk containers

were inspected overseas. They say that 9,000 applications from importers have been submitted for CT-PAT, 5,000 have been accepted. However, you have only verified that 597 were implementing

the required security measures.

So when are we going to know that all of them who are participating in this system are actually complying with your directives?

Mr. JACKSTA. Sir, you asked a question of challenges that we

face. This is clearly one of the challenges that we faced when we

established the CT-PAT program. It grew fairly quickly, which was

good, because it is a voluntarily program and companies wanted to

participate and work with the Government to establish security

protocols.

And based on that, we made a commitment that we would go out

there and verify that what they were telling us through their security profiles was accurate and that they were complying with what

they said. To get started, we needed to bring personnel on board.

And initially when the GAO report that you are referring to was

done, we only had somewhere in the area of about 35 people on

board working on this initiative.

As a result of this, we have taken an initiative, and today we

have over 70 employees that are currently going out there, traveling around the world to verify what these companies are saying is

true. Our goal is that by the end of this calendar year that we have

157 employees working on the CT-PAT program to ensure that we

are visiting the locations and verifying what they say in their security profiles.

What I think is important to note, sir, is that we currently have

about 600 verifications done. We hope to have 1,500 by the end of

this calendar year, and then hopefully by the end of next fiscal

year, we will have close to 3,000 companies that will have had one
18

of our supply chain specialists visit and actually verify that the information that the company provided us is accurate.

So it is one of our challenges. We are making every effort to get

the people on board so that we can go out there and verify that the

companies that are participating in this program are truly in compliance.

Mr. FILNER. Again, I wish you guys would be more clear. If you

add up the number of years it is going to take before you investigate all, the 5,000 that have been accepted, 9,000 want to be, and

you are only up in three years to what did you say, 3,000? Hello?

I don’t have a lot of confidence. You have 70 people out in the

whole world looking at these 5,000?

I don’t have the confidence that you are trying to, I guess in your

tone, provide. But I think you should be saying, look, these are the

challenges, help us meet those challenges, not tell us how everything is fine. Because everything is not so fine. People have said

over and over again, we have to be 100 percent correct, and the terrorist only has to be right once.

But when you leave half or two-thirds of our potential of the CTPTA people that haven’t even been verified, I don’t have a lot of

confidence that you have enough resources to do this job. I am not

questioning your commitment or your attempt. I am saying, be

honest with us so we can get you the resources that you need to

do the job. Just like I wish the President would—you know, what

resources you need to do the mission successful and he says everything was fine.

So let me just make the same point on another issue, and that

is, that you mentioned also the high risk containers and the program to inspect them you outlined earlier in answer to another

question. But apparently, again according to a GAO report, containers have already been loaded and shipped in many cases before

you have scanned them in the way you have told us about in the

foreign port. In fact, some of the host countries have declined to

conduct the inspections.

So we have a certain percentage leaving the port before they are

even going through this thing that you have such high confidence

in. I am not sure that I like the fact that a container that has not

been inspected may have a WMD in it and can go off as it gets to

our port.

So again, what are the exact problems and what do you need to

deal with it?

Mr. JACKSTA. One of the issues, again, a challenge that we have

to face is that we have to work very closely with the foreign government, because our officers are in a foreign port, we have to

make sure that when a shipment is targeted for examination that

we can ensure that that shipment goes through a VACUS image

or actually has the goods taken off. I think what we have done,

once again, a new program that was developed and is continuing

to evolve is we continue to work with the various governments to

ensure that when we target a container for examination that it is

examined. That at times can be a challenge.

What I will tell you and commit to you is that based on the information that we have regarding the container, if it is a threat or a

real concern to us, we have the authority to just not load that con-
19

tainer and give a no-load message that tells the carrier that he is

not allowed to ship that container until examination takes place.

So once again, this is a challenge that we do have, that we are continuing to try to address with the foreign governments.

I think at the World Customs Organization, the recent adoption

of the standards that have been achieved, that we work together

in partnership, both through customs and the industry, to make

sure that when a container is identified by a government for examination that it takes place.

So I think the recent agreement will help us get to that point.

Mr. FILNER. Well, again, I am not getting a lot of confidence

here. I think there are governments that have not put those scanners in or refused to put them in. There are again containers leaving the port before you even get there. So again, I just wish you

had more quantitatively let us know about that so we can, as we

want to do, provide the resources to make us safe. That is all, and

I just don’t think you all in the Administration have got to say everything is going right.

We don’t expect everything to happen overnight, but we do expect to know the real problems so we can help correct them. We

see this as a partnership. If you are not giving us all the information, then we can’t help as much as we would like.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you, Mr. Filner.

For Admiral Bone or Mr. Jacksta, just a follow-up. The MTSA

implementation with the final regulations to implement the requirements of MTSA went into effect one year ago. Has the Coast

Guard and the Department identified additional port security

measures not specifically authorized by MTSA that remain to be

implemented?

Admiral BONE. I can identify one of the areas that we know.

When you talk about the merchant mariners credentialing and the

TWIC card, again, as we discussed earlier, that still remains and

we actually need a legislative change proposal in order to effectively execute that merchant mariner credentialing process, that

would allow the biometrics to be used and allow us to basically

keep someone from receiving a merchant mariner’s document that

is in fact a security risk.

We still have some work to do in that area specifically.

Mr. LOBIONDO. Admiral Bone, for you, I am sure you know and

we are all painfully aware that the design and funding of the Deepwater program has received considerable attention recently, and we

have some serious questions and I think problems. I would like you

to comment on what is your take, will the effect of the delay in the

implementation of the first response cutter program be on the

Coast Guard’s readiness to carry out vessel inspections, interceptions and other port and coastal waterway security missions?

Admiral BONE. I can only tell you that my experience has been

that you don’t want to board these ships in the port. You don’t

want to have it in your own back yard. We need to have cutters,

aircraft and communications systems that will allow us to intercept

these vessels offshore, or any threat that presents itself in an offshore environment, and not in a near shore environment, if at all

possible.
20

Those legacy assets in fact do need replacement. And if we don’t

have replacement, then their availability will be limited and therefore, something that may have been needed to be out on scene may

in fact be in repair. So if your readiness is at risk, then your shield

basically of security is also at risk. It is a serious issue and something that why, in fact, we are requesting the full $966 million that

the President’s budget identifies.

Mr. LOBIONDO. I wish we collectively could do a better job of having everyone understand what the implications are if we are not

able to keep on track with this critical program. It is discussed in

sort of abstract terms sometimes, and it has some very real world

applications which could give us huge problems if we are not able

to bring this together. So thank you.

Mr. Reichert, second round?

Mr. REICHERT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Have you participated in the Top Off exercises?

Admiral BONE. I did not participate in the Top Off exercise that

was recently held, but I have had close to that experience in the

past.

[Laughter.]

Mr. REICHERT. I had experience as the sheriff in Seattle to participate in Top Off II. I just wondered if the Coast Guard—I know

in that exercise the Coast Guard was not a part of that exercise.

Admiral BONE. There was a Top Off exercise recently in Connecticut, Mr. Simmons can probably speak to it. But where the

Coast Guard in fact did have a lead responsibility is—I am trying

to remember the term now, basically served as the Department of

Homeland Security coordinator and lead representative for the Department. And yes, there have been exercises. There is a regularly

scheduled exercise program, including facility level programs as

well as national level programs that the Coast Guard, Customs and

Border Protection, TSA and the other agencies collectively are involved in. I would say that that is a program which is included in

the MTSA that we are carrying out.

Mr. REICHERT. Do you think that those programs are beneficial

for you in helping you identify the weaknesses that we might have

in your response?

Admiral BONE. I think definitely a perfect example is lessons

learned, such as, it may be much simpler to close a port than it

is to decide how to re-open and what would be true impacts and

regional and national impacts associated with that, and who is involved in that decision making and the complexity that that brings.

Mr. REICHERT. So as you have analyzed it, Top Off exercises or

some of the other training exercises, is there any legislation that

you can think of, any way that we can help you to address some

of the weaknesses that you might have identified in some of those

exercises? If you don’t have an answer now to that question, you

can answer for the record.

Admiral BONE. I think what the exercises help you do is give

focus to say, okay, are your screening methods proper, are your

communications effective. If they weren’t, you reexamine what it is

you have. I would not come to you and say, I have a problem, I

would rather come to you with, here is the solution, here is what

we need. And I think that as you say, we are in the early stages
21

of this. But some of those areas that I identified in America’s maritime shield, the efforts that we have ongoing, are directly reflective

of what we have learned in some of those events and exercises.

Mr. REICHERT. Do you think that in some of the smaller fishing

boats, especially from my area I’m familiar with in the Puget

Sound, being subject to some of the same requirements as the larger vessels, is that an issue that you see as a challenge for the Coast

Guard to address?

Admiral BONE. Yes. In fact, we look at legislation, at the potential for legislation to move the Automatic Identification System or

the identification of vessels and their movement to a lower threshold to include vessels 65 feet, all vessels that are down to 65 feet.

We are looking at that. We have not put that forward at this time.

But we do understand that a Kohl type incident which could be

even a smaller vessel than that, has the potential, of course, as the

vessels get larger, they could carry more explosives and therefore

do more damage. But I think anything that could move or be a

transport mechanism, not just the big ships and containers, but

anything internally that moves within the system, a lot of times we

focus out instead of looking within. We need to address those

threats.

Someone may want to move somebody to a location, say you have

great security around your tunnels and your bridges. Well, then,

you get in a boat, you take the boat across, the truck went across,

they drop them off in a location, they get in the vehicle from the

small boat and off they go. We don’t want to have anything large

come in or any vessel be used as a transit method for bringing

weapons of mass destruction, conventional weapons or terrorists in

any direction.

Mr. REICHERT. So you mentioned you are considering proposing

some legislation, maybe in some areas that we might be to help you

in.

Admiral BONE. Yes.

Mr. REICHERT. One last question. I am always curious as to what

agencies looked like pre-September 11th. I know what our sheriff’s

office looked like and what our mission focus was. But after September 11th, it changed. Maybe just give an example of, and maybe

if there is an increase in personnel training, mission focus, your resources, those sorts of things, I imagine you have changed a lot in

the years since September 11th.

Admiral BONE. MTSA actually provided funding of the $101 million we have. We moved 800 more people into position, basically,

to work both as boarding and examination, but also in the liaison

position. Again, a lot of this activity involves coordination, besides

examinations. I think that what you found is an organization that

used to organize themselves and work in partnerships with others

on safety and environmental issues now leveraging some of those

same relationships and adding many more additional in order to

address the security portion of this.

Our intelligence community alone has grown greatly as well. In

other words, if you don’t know the threat then you can’t accurately

place your assets. No different than a police chief has to know

where his high crime areas and where the crooks are moving in

order to move his assets into the proper location to address it.
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Mr. REICHERT. I appreciate the work you are doing. I know that

you have made lots of progress, but there are lots of things yet to

come. We look forward to helping you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you, Mr. Reichert. Mr. Diaz-Balart?

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The MTSA and SOLAS both require that certain vessels operating in U.S. waters be equipped with an operating Automatic Identification System, AIS. AIS includes a position-indicating transponder and an electronic charting or situation display for accessing

information made available by that transponder system. The system allows the operator of a vessel to identify the position and

heading of their vessels but also other vessels in the area. Also, it

will allow shore-based Coast Guard facilities to more easily monitor

the location and heading of those vessels in their area.

Two questions, if I may, Mr. Chairman. The AIS has been traditionally seen as a safety system. However, since 9/11, is that system now being viewed as an anti-terrorism tool, number one. And

number two is, is it unusual for technology that is developed for

commercial and safety missions of the Coast Guard to also serve

now as multi-mission purposes that include port and waterway security? Those would be the two questions.

Admiral BONE. First, AIS, yes, early on was identified as a safety

system. But I can tell you, as early as 1998 even it was being

viewed as a potential security tool at the same time. It just became

of more import after 9/11.

I think that the issue of safety and security go hand in hand. In

fact, environmental protection goes hand in hand. We look at our

requirements both in the impacts of something as having improved

training, improved awareness. It cuts across all of what the Commandant likes to talk about as the three-legged stool of safety, security and environmental protection.

So our multi-mission, our examinations we look at together,

when we go aboard to look at a security boarding, we look at the

safety issues and the environmental issues at the same time. I

think that even whole construction vessels could be identified as

making them stronger and less likely susceptible to a security incident.

So we look at the communications again, the capabilities and the

awareness. Having security officers onboard will also improve the

safety onboard.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Chairman, if I may, just a couple more

questions.

Mr. LOBIONDO. Go ahead.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

You mentioned in your testimony, sir, that the Coast Guard will

be increasing its presence in ports and coastal zones with more

people, boats, ships, your force structure. My question is, where are

those assets and personnel going to come from, number one, and

number two is, do you have enough personnel and vessels and

ships to really make an impact, significantly increase your presence

for port security and your myriad of other, multiple missions?

Admiral BONE. Again, we have received $101 million and again,

included in that, we also have 80 small boats that have been pro-
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cured since 9/11. We have 14 coastal patrol boats and crews. We

have 500 personnel added to our small boat stations and our command centers. That is an example of, in the budget that Congress

has actually provided us to increase our capabilities.

Additionally, in this next year’s budget, there is an increase in

funding for personnel associated that we are going to be placing

again at L&G facilities and to address, again, additional crews to

provide protection of the highest risk arenas.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you, Mr. Diaz-Balart.

Mr. Filner, do you have anything else? Mr. Reichert?

I would like to thank Admiral Bone and Mr. Jacksta for being

here today and for the work that you do and continue to do in a

very, very challenging but critically important area for homeland

security for the United States of America. We on the Subcommittee

will continue to try to be as vigorous as we can and we look forward to hearing from you again soon.

We are adjourned. Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 11:17 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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