March 10, 1971 

Eon:Clifford P-11 

Caunty Attorney 

Opinion No. H- 806 

Grayson- County Courthouse Re: huthority of a city and/or 

Sherman, Texas a'county to provide for 

ambulance services, and 

Dear Mr. Powell: related questions. 

I 

Your recent letter requesting the opinion of this 

office concerning the referenced matter poses the following 

questions 3 

"(1) Does the City of Sherman have the legal 

and constitutional prerogatibe to declare that the 

city ambulance service as set out in the attached 

ordininceto be a franchise? 

"(lA) If the City has such power, can 

.,; .the franchise area be extended to pass 

the City limits and into the area of the 

City's extraterritorial jurisdiction? 

"(2).If the City can declare sucl~ambulance 

service4 to be a franchise, is the County entitled 

to contract with other private ambulance services 

(any or all of them) to service areas of the 

county's responsibility hot serviced by the City 

of Sherman? 

l (2?4 If the County is not so emp c wer ed 

-. 'to make suc h private qmtracts, must the 

County either participate financially with 

the-City-of Sherman or operate its own 

public ambulance service? 

-3912- 
Hon. cliffora Powell, page 2 (M-806) 

~"(3) Is the County entitled to submit to 

solicit bids from the private industry to provide 

such services aad if so, to what extent must such 

successful bidder be able to furnish such services 

(Le., must such a successful private bidder have 

ambulances available in a central location within 

the county or could'such anibulanoes be kept within 

. points in the county and still satisfy the County's 

.duty, if any, to provide such services)?* 

Texas courts have held that, under the authority of 

hrticles 1011,.10&S, ana 1175, Vernon's Civil'Statutes, the 

State has delegated to municipalities the police, power'and the 

comomitant right to -atact the health, safety, moxals, and 

generalwelfare of their citisensbyregulations thatarereasonable ahd necessary for that purpose, subject to limitations imposed by the Constitution and statutes enacted by the Lsgislature, 

12 Tex.J'ur.2d 409, Coastitutional Law; Sec. 64; 40 Tex.Jur.2d 12, 

Dunicipal-Corpoxaticas, Sea. 321; SeeI V. Dulte, 10 8.W.2d 694 

(Tex.Com.App. 1928); Jmbardo v. DallaL, 124 Tax. Xr 73 S.W.2d 

475 (1934)7 and citv of Dallas v.. Smith, 130 Te%. 225, 107 S.W. 

2a 872 (1937). 

Article 4434, V&non's civil Statutes, prwiaes as 

‘follows: 

*The municipal authorities of toims and 

cities, ana camissionets courts of the counties 

wherein such tams and cities a?ze situated, amy 

cm-operate with 8ach other in msking such imprwemeats connected with 8aid towns, cit~es~,sad ccunties 

as said authorities and couHs may deem neew8sax-y to 

imprwe the public healtb kna togmsmte efficient 

sanitary rsgulations; and, by mutual agreement, 

theylaayprwide forth OOM~UC~~~ Of 8aid haprwemsnts and the paymsnttherefor.* 

Relevant portions.of the ordinanos mentioned in your 

first question alid attached to your letter (Ordinance Ro. 2793, 

pa8Sed by.the City council of the city df shermn oa october 20, 

1970) are a8 follows* 

: 

] -3913- 
Hon. Clifford Powell, page 3 (M-806) 

“SECTION 1. That there be and'there is hereby created a service to the people to be called.the 

Shermsn Ambulance Service, which service shall be 

operated within the Fire Department. 

. . 

%EcTicH 2. That. the said ambulance eervice 

shall be available to the citizens of the City of 

Sherman, in accordance with the terms of this orainance, jand to the citisens of,Gravson Countv, nrovided a rruitable contract for service in the Countv 

is annrwed bv the Citv Council of the Citv of Sherman 

and the Countv Commissioners Court. i 

l : / ; . 

. . . . *í 

. *sDCTIcm'5. Tbe business of providing ambulance service both'emsrgency and transfer; is here . 

1 tiav declared 'to be a busin&s~effected (-1, Qith ' 

. 

the .publi.k'interest and public utility and no.'person :, 

8hall opkrate said business ‘within the corporate ol:.- .?' 

extraterritorial limits of the Citv of Sherman, except 

on a mission with a patient through the area, except'~ 

upon tbe issuance ofa certificate of public conveyati& and n8cessity by the City Council 0,f the City of 

shemsn, mmss. . . .* (Emphasis added.) 

The City of Sherman is a home rule city; its &din&es must conform to this charter. 

*Every 8wereignty has an inherent power to enact laws 

for sanitary purposes and protection of the health of the public." 

28 Tex.Jur.2d 9, Dealth, Sec. 1. . 

.*Hunicipalitie8 have the right, under the police power, 

to protect the health; 8afety, morals, and general welfare of 

their citisens by regulations that are -reasonable andnecessary 

for the purpose. A city has comprehensive power in this respect, 

and the power is not narrowly circumscribed by'precedent." 40 

Tex.Jur.2a 13., Municipal Corporations, Sec. 322. I . 

. 

.*. . . . 
Hon. Clifford Pawell, page 4 (M-806) 

"In the interest of public health a municipality may 

regulate any occupation, trade, or profession . . .* 40 Tex.Ju. 

2d 67, Municipal Corporations, Sec. 388. 

However, "A municipal corporations' jurisdiction or 

zls confined to the territory of its clitus, ana, unless exempowered by the constitution or a statute it may not 

exercise authority beyond its corporate limits.* 39 Tex.Jur.2d 

640, Municipal Corporations, Sec. 310. Ses, also, 55 A.L.R. 1182 

and 14 A.L.R.Zd 103 (annotations dealing with extension of police 

power of municipal corporation beyond territorial limits). 

In the case of Citv of ?unarillo v. Griasa~Southwest 

j4OrtUarV. Inc, 406 S.w.2d 230 (Te%.Ci~.App. 1966, error ref. 

n.r.e.), the c&t held that the city of Amarillo coda validly. 

pass an oraim03 regulating ambulanoe 8&viceupon the streets 

ofthatcity,andreguire, inter alia, the issuance of a city 

permit ana of a cert.ificate of convenience and necessity as a 

prerequisite fooperating anaalhlanae 8erViCe. 

InhnvOf the foregoing,and in ansWer+OyaUr first 

question, we are of the opinion that'the City.of Sherman has the 

legal prerogative to pa813 the Ordinancp attached to your letter 

(and partially quoted hereinabove), mbject to our answer, in 

the following paragraph; to your querrtion lA, . 

Qudstion lJ4 involves the extraterritorial jurisdiction 

of the City of Sherman, and the application of the terms of the 

Grainancetothatarea. Pursuant to the terms of Article 4434,. 

supoa, the prwieion8 of Section 2 of the Grdinance relating to 

thefutni8hing of aabulance8ervicetOthe Citi8ens of GraySon 

County, eubject to.the execution of a'con8ensual con-act between 

.the City of Sherman and ~rayson County, are legal. 

However, the authorities cited in 39 Tex.Iur.Zd 640, 

quoted supra, clearly show that the underscored portion oe Section 5 of the Ordiniuxe, :hezeimbove quoted, 18 void and of no 

effect. .-~ 

Your second guestion involves the power of Grayeon 

County to contract with private arbulance services to furnish 

-391s 
Eon. Clifford mwell, page 5 (M-806) 

such services to t.hose,parts of the County not encompassed within 

the jurisdiction of the City of Sherman. 

Article 441Sf, Vernon-8 Civil Statutes, prwides, in 

part, that: ; 

* . The CaamDissioners Court of any County 

shall have the authority to appropriate and expend 

money from the general revenues of its County for 

and in behalf of public health and sanitation within 

its County." 

: . 

. ,A’ttorney &&eral'e Opinion No. C-772 (1966) helrt that, 

plrsuant to Article 441Sf, supia, a county could operate’and 

msi+ain an ambulanck service; and that it could cooperate with 

a Mty within the county in the operation of that service. 

Attortiey General's Opinion No. M-365 (1969)held that 

to&s, cities,~'counties, and hospital districts have authority 

.,,..to expexid.mone'y toprwiae ambulance service.when there.hss been 

'a determination by such gwernmantal dgency that 8uch bervice will 

be in fiktherance of the public health and general welfare of its 

citizens. That Opinion also held that such authority to provide 

ambulance service extending to entering into contraots with a 

private agency to provide the service , subject to-the.prwisions 

of Section 52 of Article III of the Constituticn of Texas. 

See, .alro, Attorney General's Opinion No. C-759.(1966) 

and NO. M-231 (1968). 

In view of Arti&4418f, supra, and the foregoing 

Cipinions of the Attorney General, your second question is answered 

in the affirmative. As this question has been answered in the affirmative, question 2A is not applicable. 

your third question involves the applicability of 

Article 2368a(2); Vernon's Civil Statutes. .That Article provides, 

in pertinent part, as~followsr 

*No county, acting through its Commissioners 

Court, and no city in thisstate shall hereafter 

make any contract calling for or reguiring the expenditure of payment;o;ff,o Thousand Dollars 

..,,.- 

‘3916, 
Bon. Clifford Powell, page 6 (M-806) 

($2,000.00) a more out of any fund or funds of any 

city or county or subdivision of any county aeating 

or imposing an obligation or liability of any nature 

or character upon such county or any subdivision of 

such county, or upon such city, without first submitting such proposed contract to competitive bids 

. Provided, that in case of public calamity. 

;h&e it becomes necessary to act at once to appropriate money to relieve the necessity of the 

citizens, or to preserve the property of such county, 

subdivision, or city, or when it is necessarv to 

preserve or nrotect the nublic health of the citisens of such countv or city . . ** thjs Drwisi.on 

shall not annlv . . .-(rtnphasis added.1 

In Construing the underscored portion of Article 

2368a(2), supra, the Ccmmission of Appeals, in an opinion 

adopted by the Supreme court of Texas, held that a county could 

validly expend funds to protect the public health without the 

necessity of requiring the competitive bids otherwise required 

by that Article, .and that the public health exception to the 

competitive bid requirement was operative at all times, whether 

or not there was a "case of public calamity'. )ioffman v. Citv 

of Mt. Pleasant, 126 Tex. 632, 69 S.W.Z# 193 (1936). 

You are advised, in answer to that portion of your 

third question relating to the necessity of competitive bidding 

for ambulance services, that it is the opinion of this office 

that such services are encompassed within the purview of the 

public health exception to Article .2368a(2), supra, and are, 

therefore, services ~for which the Grayson County Commissioners 

Court may contract without the necessity of receiving competitive bids therefor. 

As for that portion of your third question relating 

to the extent to which a successful bidder must be able to 

furnish such services, we have concluded that this is a factual 

determination upon which this office cannot pass,. and that such 

determination is properly left to the judgment and discretion 

of the Grayson County Can\miSSionerS Court. 

-3917- 
Bon. Clifford Powell,, page 7 (M-806) 

SUMMARY 

(1) The City of Sherman, subject to the provisions of its Home Rule Charter, has the legal 

prerogative to estabiish, by ordinance, a municipal 

ambulance service within its fire department, pursuant to its constitutional powers to prwide for 

'and protect the public health of its citizens. Such 

ordinance may also provide that no person shell operate an ambulance service within the municipal boundaries, except on missions with a patient through that 

area, unless such person first obtains a certificate 

of public coxdnience and necessity'from'the munici- : 

pa1ity. 

(2) Pursuant to Article 4434. Vernon's Civil 

Statutes, a city and a county *y coopsrate and 

jointly contract to establish a city-county ambulance service; however, the operating area of a 

city ambulance service cannot be extratarritorially 

exterided beyond the boundaries of a city without the 

consent of the county or other governing body affected. 

(3) Pursuant to Article 4418f, Vernon's Civil 

S$etutes, a county is entitled to establish a county 

ambulance service, for all or part of a county, and 

td contract with private ambulance services to psrform such services, provided such expenditures to, 

private parties a0 not contravene Section 52 of 

Article III of the Constitution of Texas. 

(4) Pursuant to the public health exceptiq of 

Article 236Sa(2), Vernon's Civil Statutes,.a county 

is not required to follow competitive bidding procedures in establishing a county ambulance service. 

Very truly yours, 

CRAWFORD C. MARTIN 

Attorney General of Texas 

,+y: 

NOLA WHITE 

First Assistant 

-3918- 
Eon. Clifford Powell, page 8 (M-806) 

Prepared by Austin C. Bray, Jr. 

Assistant Attorney General 

APPROVED: 

OPINION COMMITTEE 

Kerns Taylor, Chairman 

W. E. Allen, Co-Chairman 

Sam Jones 

Max Flus the 

8. J. Aronson 

David Longoria 

&BADE F. GRIFFIN 

Staff Legal Assistant 

ALFREDWALKER 

Executive Assistant 

. 

. 

-3919-