United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit 

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No. 19-1607

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United States of America

 Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Ryan Nicholas Haynes

 Defendant - Appellant

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Iowa - Des Moines

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Submitted: January 16, 2020

 Filed: May 5, 2020

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Before SMITH, Chief Judge, LOKEN and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges. 

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GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.

Ryan Nicholas Haynes appeals his conviction and sentence for being a felon 

in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). We 

affirm. 
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I.

 In July 2017, police officers followed a bus in downtown Des Moines, Iowa. 

Officer Luke Harden observed both that the bus did not properly signal while making 

multiple turns and that it did not have a light illuminating its license plate. The 

officers initiated a traffic stop. 

As the officers approached the driver, passengers were moving about the bus, 

and Officer Harden believed that some passengers were rowdy. He also noted a 

strong smell of marijuana emanating from the bus. Officer Harden boarded the bus 

and assisted in removing an individual that another officer had observed passing 

what appeared to be a marijuana cigarette. 

Haynes was seated toward the front of the bus. Officer Harden noticed that 

Haynes was making “furtive movements and gestures” and seemed nervous 

compared to the other passengers. Eventually, Officer Harden asked Haynesto leave 

the bus. As he did so, Haynes, unprompted by the officers, began emptying his 

pockets. Haynes pulled out a marijuana cigarette and showed it to the officers. 

Officer Harden then conducted a pat-down search of Haynes and felt what he 

believed to be a firearm in Haynes’s left pant leg. Harden did not make Haynes 

aware of the fact that he felt the firearm and instead attempted to handcuff him. As 

he did so, Haynes pulled away and began to flee on foot. The officers pursued 

Haynes, running between alleys and buildings, over fences, and through shrubbery. 

During the chase, the officers lost sight of Haynes. Eventually, Haynes stopped and 

the officers took him into custody. 

The officers did not find a weapon on Haynes after the chase. After retracing 

Haynes’s steps, however, they recovered a firearm between two townhomes and in 

front of a fence that Haynes jumped. Later, an officer dusted the firearm for 

fingerprints but was unable to lift any fingerprints from the firearm or magazine. 
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Officers did not check the firearm, magazine, or ammunition for DNA, nor did they 

check the identity of the last known purchaser of the firearm. 

In September 2017, Haynes was arraigned in Iowa state court. Seven weeks 

before his state trial date, he was charged by federal indictment in the Southern 

District of Iowa with being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 

U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). On August 14, 2018, Haynes was arrested on a 

federal warrant. Haynes later filed a motion to suppress the evidence resulting from 

Officer Harden’s pat down and a motion to dismiss that alleged a Speedy Trial Act 

violation. The district court1 denied both motions. Haynes proceeded to trial, and 

the jury returned a guilty verdict.

After his conviction, Haynes filed a motion for judgment of acquittal, and 

alternatively, a motion for a new trial based upon insufficient evidence, which the 

district court denied. At the sentencing hearing, the district court calculated a total 

offense level of 28 and a criminal history category of VI, resulting in an advisory 

sentencing guidelines range of 140 to 175 months’ imprisonment. But because the 

statutory maximum sentence for the crime is 120 months, see § 924(a)(2), that 

necessarily became the guidelines recommendation. See U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(a) 

(“Where the statutorily authorized maximum sentence is less than the minimum of 

the applicable guideline range, the statutorily authorized maximum sentence shall be 

the guideline sentence.”). The court sentenced Haynes to 120 months’ 

imprisonment. 

Haynes appeals his conviction and sentence on several grounds. He argues 

that the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss and in denying his 

motion to suppress. He also argues that insufficient evidence existed to support his 

conviction. Finally, he asserts that the district court’s sentence is substantively 

unreasonable. We address each argument in turn.

1

The Honorable Stephanie M. Rose, United States District Judge for the 

Southern District of Iowa.
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II. 

A.

Haynes asserts both that the district court erred in finding no Speedy Trial Act 

(“the Act”) violation and abused its discretion by failing to hold an evidentiary 

hearing on the matter. 

We review a district court’s findings of fact as to whether a defendant’s rights 

under the Speedy Trial Act were violated for clear error and review its legal 

conclusions de novo. United States v. Aldaco, 477 F.3d 1008, 1016 (8th Cir. 2007). 

The Act provides that an indictment must be filed against an individual “within thirty 

days from the date on which such individual was arrested or served with a summons 

in connection with such charges.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b). The thirty-day clock to 

return an indictment under the Act begins when there is a federal arrest or summons. 

See United States v. Beede, 974 F.2d 948, 950 (8th Cir. 1992) (“Only a federal arrest, 

not a state arrest, triggers § 3161(b).”).

Haynes does not dispute that, if the federal arrest and indictment dates are 

used, the Act was not violated. He argues, however, that an exception applies and 

that the thirty-day clock began to run on the date of his state arrest because there is 

evidence of collusion between Iowa and federal prosecutors. See United States v. 

Sims, 779 F.2d 16, 17 (8th Cir. 1985). He alleges the federal prosecutor brought 

charges seven weeks before the date of his state trial in order to avoid the results of 

a pending Iowa Supreme Court case that, according to Haynes, would have 

supported his pending motion to suppress in state court.

2

 

There is no evidence that Iowa and federal prosecutors colluded. We have 

held that mere delay between a state arrest and federal indictment does not constitute 

2

We will assume without deciding that a federal indictment on the eve of a 

state court suppression hearing can implicate the Speedy Trial Act collusion 

exception.
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evidence of collusion. See id. Haynes offers no evidence beyond the timing of his 

federal indictment to suggest that it was a result of collusion. Additionally, Haynes’s 

reliance on a District of Massachusetts case, United States v. Ganious, 635 F. Supp. 

2d 80, 85 (D. Mass. 2009), is unavailing. In Ganious, the court held that the 

defendant was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on collusion even though he 

was arrested by state agents who were part of a federal task force, prosecuted by a 

state prosecutor who was also a Special Assistant United States Attorney, and held 

in custody for 404 days before his arraignment on federal charges. Id. at 82-86. As 

that court also noted, “mere delay cannot show the existence of a ruse without active 

federal involvement in the state prosecution.” Id. at 86. Because Haynes does not 

offer any evidence of such active involvement other than speculation about the 

timing of his federal arraignment coinciding with a state supreme court decision, the 

Government did not violate the Speedy Trial Act. 

Haynes also argues that the district court abused its discretion by failing to 

hold an evidentiary hearing regarding the existence of collusion. See United States 

v. Santos-Pulido, 815 F.3d 443, 445 (8th Cir. 2016). A district court must hold an 

evidentiary hearing when the moving party identifies material facts in the record 

“that are actually in dispute.” See United States v. Saucedo, No. 19-1693, 2020 WL 

1870254, at *3 (8th Cir. Apr. 15, 2020). Haynes offered the district court mere 

speculation that his federal and state prosecutors colluded and does not “identify any 

material facts in the record . . . that are actually in dispute.” Id. Therefore, the 

district court did not abuse its discretion in denying an evidentiary hearing. 

B. 

Haynes next argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to 

suppress because he was unlawfully seized and then unlawfully searched by the 

officers. When reviewing a district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we review 

factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo. United States v. 

Oliver, 950 F.3d 556, 563 (8th Cir. 2020). A factual finding is “clearly erroneous” 

when a court reviews the evidence in its entirety and is “left with the definite and 
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firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” United States v. Guzman, 926 F.3d 

991, 997 (8th Cir. 2019). “A finding based on the credibility of live witnesses can 

almost never be clearly erroneous.” United States v. E.R.B., 86 F.3d 129, 130 (8th 

Cr. 1996). 

Although Haynes does not dispute that the officers lawfully stopped the bus 

for traffic violations, he argues that he was unlawfully seized when Officer Harden

ordered him off the bus. 

“[A]n officer making a traffic stop may order passengers to get out of the car 

pending completion of the stop.” Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 415 (1997) 

(noting that any “intrusion on the passenger is minimal”); see also United States v. 

Cloud, 594 F.3d 1042, 1045 (8th Cir. 2010). The Supreme Court has explained that 

“the possibility of a violent encounter stems . . . from the fact that evidence of a more 

serious crime might be uncovered during the stop,” a possibility equally applicable 

to both drivers and passengers, and that passengers are less likely to have access to 

dangerous weapons when they are outside the vehicle. Wilson, 519 U.S. at 414. 

Officer Harden lawfully ordered Haynes off the bus, particularly as the smell 

of marijuana alerted the officer that “evidence of a more serious crime” than failure 

to use a turn signal “might be uncovered during the stop.” See Wilson, 519 U.S. at 

414. Haynes’s effort to distinguish the situation here from Wilson by relying on

United States v. Henderson, 463 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 2006), is fruitless. In that case, an 

officer demanded a passenger’s information, including his social security number, 

to investigate him for failure to wear a seatbelt. See id. at 29. The court held that 

the demand of information was not proper under Wilson because the questioning

“expanded the scope of the stop, changed the target of the stop, and prolonged the 

stop.” Id. at 46. But here, prior to Haynes producing the marijuana cigarette, Officer 

Harden did not ask Haynes any questions but merely ordered him off the bus in 

keeping with Wilson. Therefore, Haynes was not unlawfully seized.
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Haynes further argues that he was unlawfully searched by Officer Harden 

because he did not consent to a search and Harden did not have a reasonable 

suspicion that Haynes was armed and dangerous. But we have held that once 

probable cause for an arrest exists, an officer may conduct a pat-down search

incident to arrest. See United States v. Jerde, 481 F. App'x 280, 282-83 (8th Cir. 

2012) (finding that, after a suspect voluntarily produced a marijuana pipe, an officer 

had probable cause to arrest him, and therefore a pat down of the suspect was 

lawful); see also Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 77 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring) 

(reasoning that a defendant may not validly say, “Although the officer had a right to 

arrest me at the moment when he seized me and searched my person, the search is 

invalid because he did not in fact arrest me until afterwards”). 

Once Haynes produced his marijuana cigarette, Officer Harden had probable 

cause to arrest him and therefore was permitted to search him. See United States v 

Binion, 570 F.3d 1034, 1040 (8th Cir. 2009) (holding that a suspect’s admission to 

carrying an ounce of marijuana in his pants created probable cause for an arrest); see 

also Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 111 (1980) (explaining that, when police 

already possess probable cause for an arrest and “the formal arrest followed quickly 

on the heels of the challenged search of petitioner's person,” it is not “particularly 

important that the search preceded the arrest rather than vice versa”); State v. Horton, 

625 N.W.2d 362, 363-64 (Iowa 2001) (holding that an officer had probable cause to 

believe a defendant had committed a drug offense when he observed “marijuana 

roaches” in plain view, and further concluding that a subsequent pat down was 

justified as a search incident to arrest even though the pat down technically preceded 

formal arrest); Iowa Code § 124.401(5) (criminalizing possession of marijuana). 

Thus, Haynes was not unlawfully seized or searched, and the district court did not 

err in denying his motion to suppress.
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C. 

Haynes also argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction 

because the evidence did not demonstrate (1) that he knowingly possessed a firearm 

or (2) that he knew he was prohibited from possessing a firearm. We review 

sufficiency of the evidence arguments de novo, viewing the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the jury verdict. United States v. Reddest, 512 F.3d 1067, 1069-

70 (8th Cir. 2008). “We reverse only if no reasonable jury could have found the 

defendant[] guilty.” United States v. Johnson, 450 F.3d 366, 372 (8th Cir. 2006). 

All credibility determinations are resolved in favor of the jury’s verdict. United 

States v. Wiest, 596 F.3d 906, 910 (8th Cir. 2010). 

First, Haynes’s argument that the Government failed to prove that he 

knowingly possessed a firearm is unavailing. See United States v. McDonald, 826 

F.3d 1066, 1072 (8th Cir. 2016) (holding that, in order to prove the element of 

knowing possession, “it is sufficient if the [G]overnment proved [the defendant] had

actual or constructive possession of the firearm”). Although there were no 

fingerprints or DNA linking Haynes to the weapon, Officer Harden testified he was 

“100 percent certain” that he felt a gun during his pat down of Haynes. Moreover, 

while no officer saw Haynes drop a gun while he ran, officers saw him jump over a 

fence and stop immediately thereafter. And officers testified that they found a 

loaded handgun in a flowerbed next to the fence that Haynes jumped, indicating that 

Haynes dropped it there. After hearing this evidence, the jury was entitled to weigh 

the credibility of Officer Harden’s testimony and credit his statement that he felt a 

gun on Haynes’s person during the pat down. See Wiest, 596 F.3d at 910. Therefore, 

a reasonable juror could have found that Haynes knowingly possessed a firearm. 

Second, Haynes’s argument that the Government did not present sufficient 

evidence that he knew he was a convicted felon prohibited from possessing a firearm 

as required by Rehaif v. United States, 588 U.S. ---, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019), also 

fails. In Rehaif, “the Supreme Court held that to sustain a conviction under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 922(g), the government must prove both that the defendant knew that he possessed 
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a firearm and knew of his prohibited status.” United States v. Warren, 951 F.3d 946, 

951 (8th Cir. 2020). We have held that a reasonable juror could conclude that a 

defendant knew of his prohibited status under Rehaif when the defendant stipulated 

at trial that “he had been previously convicted of a crime punishable [by] a term 

exceeding one year,” the defendant was imprisoned for a term longer than one year 

for a previous offense, and the defendant fled the scene of the crime. Warren, 951 

F.3d at 951 (discussing the same “reasonable juror” standard that is used in 

reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, but in the plain error context); see also

United States v. Hollingshed, 940 F.3d 410, 415-16 (8th Cir. 2019). Because Haynes 

had previously been imprisoned for a term longer than one year, he fled the scene of 

his pat down, and he stipulated at trial that he had been previously convicted of a 

crime punishable by a prison term of longer than one year, there was sufficient 

evidence that he knew of his prohibited status.3

Haynes also argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying his 

motion for a new trial based on his claim of insufficient evidence. See Hallmark 

Cards, Inc. v. Murley, 703 F.3d 456, 462 (8th Cir. 2013) (noting that we review a 

denial of a motion for a new trial for an abuse of discretion and will not reverse 

absent a “miscarriage of justice”). Based on the strength of the evidence detailed

above, we likewise find no abuse of discretion in denying the motion for a new trial.

3

Haynes also claims that the district court plainly erred in failing to instruct 

the jury on whether he knew of his prohibited status when he possessed a firearm. 

To establish plain error, a defendant must show that the error affected his substantial 

rights. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993). Because sufficient 

evidence demonstrated that Haynes knew of his prohibited status, Haynes cannot 

demonstrate that a failure to so instruct the jury affected his substantial rights, see 

Warren, 951 F.3d at 951, and therefore the district did not plainly err. 
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D. 

Lastly, Haynes argues that his sentence is substantively unreasonable because 

he claims the district court unfairly punished him for not accepting a plea bargain. 

We review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence for an abuse of discretion. 

United States v. Stoner, 795 F.3d 883, 884 (8th Cir. 2015).

 “[I]t will be the unusual case when we reverse a district court sentence—

whether within, above, or below the applicable Guidelines range—as substantively 

unreasonable.” United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 464 (8th Cir. 2009) (en 

banc). A court is required to carefully weigh the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) when 

imposing a sentence. United States v. McGlothen, 556 F.3d 698, 702 (8th Cir. 2009). 

“A sentencing court abuses its discretion when it fails to consider a relevant factor, 

gives significant weight to an irrelevant or improper factor, or considers only 

appropriate factors but nevertheless commits a clear error of judgment by arriving at 

a sentence that lies outside the limited range of choice dictated by the facts of the 

case.” United States v. Hernandez, 518 F.3d 613, 616 (8th Cir. 2008). 

Haynes asserts that comments made by the district court at sentencing 

demonstrate that it gave undue weight to his decision not to plead guilty, suggesting 

it imposed its sentence as punishment for that decision. He acknowledges that this

was not an improper factor to consider because the sentencing guidelines provide 

that a defendant who accepts responsibility by pleading guilty may be eligible for a 

sentence reduction. See United States v. Wilcox, 487 F.3d 1163, 1175 (8th Cir. 2007) 

(“It is settled that a court, consistent with the Constitution, may grant leniency in 

return for a plea of guilty, and may withhold similar leniency from a defendant who 

proceeds to trial.”). We therefore consider whether the district court committed a 

clear error of judgment in weighing the appropriate factors. See United States v. 

David, 682 F.3d 1074, 1077 (8th Cir. 2012).
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In light of the aggravating factors here, the district court did not commit a 

“clear error of judgment by arriving at [its] sentence.” See Hernandez, 518 F.3d at 

616. For example, the court considered the short amount of time—14 months—that 

Haynes had refrained from criminal activity since his release from prison. The court 

also noted that Haynes, a felon with a “very violent history who ha[d] no business 

being around guns,” was on a bus using marijuana and carrying a loaded handgun. 

Moreover, the sentence imposed here was within the guidelines range and not greater 

than the statutory maximum. See United States v. Saguto, 929 F.3d 519, 525 (8th 

Cir. 2019) (“[W]e may presume a within-Guidelines sentence is reasonable.”). 

Therefore, we find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s sentencing decision. 

III. 

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

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