The United States Army War College

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

CENTER for

STRATEGIC

LEADERSHIP and

DEVELOPMENT

The United States Army War College educates and develops leaders for service 

at the strategic level while advancing knowledge in the global application 

of Landpower.

The purpose of the United States Army War College is to produce graduates 

who are skilled critical thinkers and complex problem solvers. Concurrently, 

it is our duty to the U.S. Army to also act as a “think factory” for commanders 

and civilian leaders at the strategic level worldwide and routinely engage 

in discourse and debate concerning the role of ground forces in achieving 

national security objectives.

The Strategic Studies Institute publishes national 

security and strategic research and analysis to influence 

policy debate and bridge the gap between military 

and academia.

The Center for Strategic Leadership and Development 

contributes to the education of world class senior 

leaders, develops expert knowledge, and provides 

solutions to strategic Army issues affecting the national 

security community.

The Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute 

provides subject matter expertise, technical review, 

and writing expertise to agencies that develop stability 

operations concepts and doctrines.

The Senior Leader Development and Resiliency program 

supports the United States Army War College’s lines of 

effort to educate strategic leaders and provide well-being 

education and support by developing self-awareness 

through leader feedback and leader resiliency.

The School of Strategic Landpower develops strategic 

leaders by providing a strong foundation of wisdom 

grounded in mastery of the profession of arms, and 

by serving as a crucible for educating future leaders in 

the analysis, evaluation, and refinement of professional 

expertise in war, strategy, operations, national security, 

resource management, and responsible command.

The U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center acquires, 

conserves, and exhibits historical materials for use 

to support the U.S. Army, educate an international 

audience, and honor Soldiers—past and present.

U.S. Army War College

Senior Leader Development and Resiliency

SLDR
STRATEGIC

STUDIES

INSTITUTE

The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) is part of the U.S. Army War 

College and is the strategic-level study agent for issues related 

to national security and military strategy with emphasis on 

geostrategic analysis.

The mission of SSI is to use independent analysis to conduct 

strategic studies that develop policy recommendations on:

• Strategy, planning, and policy for joint and combined 

 employment of military forces;

• Regional strategic appraisals;

• The nature of land warfare;

• Matters affecting the Army’s future;

• The concepts, philosophy, and theory of strategy; and,

• Other issues of importance to the leadership of the Army.

Studies produced by civilian and military analysts concern 

topics having strategic implications for the Army, the Department of 

Defense, and the larger national security community.

In addition to its studies, SSI publishes special reports on topics 

of special or immediate interest. These include edited proceedings 

of conferences and topically oriented roundtables, expanded trip 

reports, and quick-reaction responses to senior Army leaders.

The Institute provides a valuable analytical capability within the 

Army to address strategic and other issues in support of Army 

participation in national security policy formulation.

i

iii

Strategic Studies Institute

and

U.S. Army War College Press

TERRORIST AND INSURGENT 

UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES: 

USE, POTENTIALS, AND MILITARY 

IMPLICATIONS

Robert J. Bunker

August 2015

The views expressed in this report are those of the author and 

do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the 

Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. 

Government. Authors of Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) and 

U.S. Army War College (USAWC) Press publications enjoy full 

academic freedom, provided they do not disclose classified 

information, jeopardize operations security, or misrepresent 

official U.S. policy. Such academic freedom empowers them to 

offer new and sometimes controversial perspectives in the interest of furthering debate on key issues. This report is cleared for 

public release; distribution is unlimited.

*****

This publication is subject to Title 17, United States Code, 

Sections 101 and 105. It is in the public domain and may not be 

copyrighted.
iv

*****

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should 

be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. 

Army War College Press, U.S. Army War College, 47 Ashburn 

Drive, Carlisle, PA 17013-5010. 

*****

All Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) and U.S. Army War 

College (USAWC) Press publications may be downloaded free 

of charge from the SSI website. Hard copies of this report may 

also be obtained free of charge while supplies last by placing 

an order on the SSI website. SSI publications may be quoted 

or reprinted in part or in full with permission and appropriate 

credit given to the U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. 

Army War College Press, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA. 

Contact SSI by visiting our website at the following address: 

www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil.

*****

The Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War 

College Press publishes a monthly email newsletter to update 

the national security community on the research of our analysts,

recent and forthcoming publications, and upcoming conferences sponsored by the Institute. Each newsletter also provides 

a strategic commentary by one of our research analysts. If you 

are interested in receiving this newsletter, please subscribe on the 

SSI website at www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/newsletter.

ISBN 1-58487-698-0
v

FOREWORD

This manuscript focuses on the present threat 

posed by terrorist and insurgent use of unmanned 

aerial vehicles (UAVs) as well as the associated future 

threat potentials identified. The work presents a counterintuitive analysis in the sense that armed drones 

are typically viewed as a component of America’s 

conventional warfighting prowess—not a technology 

that would be used against U.S. troops deployed overseas or against civilians back home. Utilizing a red 

teaming approach, the author, Dr. Robert J. Bunker, a 

past Minerva Chair at our institution, investigates the 

emerging threat of such UAV use. His unique analysis and creative approach, especially when related to 

the threat scenario variants generated, make for very 

informative reading.

The work is divided into an introduction to the 

topical area, a UAV historical overview and discussion of present use by the U.S. military, a chronological narrative of terrorist and insurgent UAV use (and 

attempted use) from 1994 through 2015, the ensuing 

baselines and trending identified, and the foreseen potentials derived from these trends—based upon tactical, operational, and strategic influencing scenarios, 

and the resulting military implications and suggested 

policy responses this will entail. The analysis not only 

has immediate value for Army force protection and 

counterterrorism programs, but also for research being conducted on projected robot-on-human force-onforce engagements in insurgency type environments, 

as well as strategic considerations related to emerging 

“drone swarm” concepts and the changing character 

of warfare as robot Landpower technologies evolve 

and are increasingly fielded. 
The Strategic Studies Institute hopes that the analysis and recommendations found in this monograph 

will be of use to the various U.S. Army organizations 

impacted by nonstate threat UAV use and those entities in sister services also so effected, as well as domestic policing and federal law enforcement bodies tasked 

with counterterrorism and homeland security missions. Further, other Army and sister service entities, 

as well as various U.S policymaking bodies, hopefully 

will find the larger implications posed by this report 

related to semi-autonomous and autonomous UAV 

type robotic systems of some benefit.

 

 

 DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

 Director

 Strategic Studies Institute and

 U.S. Army War College Press

vi
vii

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

ROBERT J. BUNKER is 2015 Futurist in Residence, 

Behavioral Research and Instruction Unit, Federal 

Bureau of Investigation Academy, Quantico, VA, 

and an Adjunct Research Professor, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College. He is also Adjunct Faculty, Division of Politics and Economics, 

Claremont Graduate University, and a Non-Resident 

Counterterrorism Fellow, TRENDS Research & Advisory, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates. Past professional associations include Distinguished Visiting 

Professor and Minerva Chair at the Strategic Studies 

Institute, U.S. Army War College; Chief Executive Officer, Counter-OPFOR Corporation; Adjunct Faculty, 

School of Policy, Planning, and Development, University of Southern California; Terrorism Instructor, California Specialized Training Institute, California Office 

of Emergency Services; Staff Member (Consultant), 

Counter-OPFOR Program, National Law Enforcement 

and Corrections Technology Center-West; Fellow, Institute of Land Warfare, Association of the U.S. Army; 

Adjunct Faculty, National Security Studies M.A. Program and Political Science Department, California 

State University San Bernardino; and Faculty, Unconventional Warfare M.A. Distance Education Program, 

American Military University. Dr. Bunker has delivered over 200 presentations—including papers and 

training—to military, law enforcement, academic, and 

policy audiences including U.S. Congressional Testimony. He has hundreds of publications ranging from 

edited books and booklets through reports, chapters, 

articles and essays, response guidance, subject bibliographies, and encyclopedia entries in academic, 

policy, military and law enforcement venues. Among 
these are Studies in Gangs and Cartels, with John P. Sullivan (Routledge, 2013), and Red Teams and Counterterrorism Training with Stephen Sloan, (University of 

Oklahoma, 2011); and edited (and co-edited) works 

including Global Criminal and Sovereign Free Economies 

and the Demise of the Western Democracies (Routledge, 

2014), Criminal Insurgencies in Mexico and the Americas: The Gangs and Cartels Wage War (Routledge, 2012), 

Narcos Over the Border: Gangs, Cartels and Mercenaries

(Routledge, 2011), Criminal-States and Criminal-Soldiers

(Routledge, 2008), Networks, Terrorism and Global Insurgency (Routledge, 2005), and Non-State Threats and 

Future Wars (Routledge, 2002). Dr. Bunker holds university degrees in political science, government, social 

science, anthropology-geography, behavioral science, 

and history. 

viii
ix

SUMMARY

Derived from the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) 

use threat scenarios, three levels of military significance are foreseen with terrorist and insurgent activities associated with these devices. Because of the 

technologies that will eventually be associated with 

UAVs—robotics and expert (and artificial intelligence) 

systems networked together—their significance is projected as increasing over time from the tactical to the 

operational and then to the strategic levels of concern. 

These levels of military implication and the suggested 

policy responses related to them are: 

Tactical.

The impact of even singular terrorist UAV use at 

this level is viewed as an immediate- and near-term 

problem. It may represent more of a domestic security 

issue than an overseas basing or deployment threat—

although such weaponized devices could just as easily be utilized for terrorism purposes overseas against 

service personnel and their families as they could be 

used against civilians in the United States. The tactical 

level threat derived from the drone-up shooting, improvised explosive device (IED) crowd targeting, and 

aircraft takedown scenario variants will be of concern 

to domestic law enforcement, homeland security, and 

Federal Bureau of Investigation Joint Terrorism Task 

Force elements as well as the military. 

Operational.

This level of impact is insurgency environment 

focused and pertains to the use of groups of human 
controlled and semi-autonomous UAVs. The virtual 

martyrs and drone squadron scenario variants portrayed the various types of flying IED, weapons platform, and human insurgent fighter combined arms’ 

hybrid threats that could be encountered at this level 

of concern. While conceivably representing a present-day operational risk scenario as the technologies 

exist for insurgents to utilize UAVs in this way, this 

is much more likely a near futures issue that could 

still be some years out on the horizon before nonstate opposing forces even contemplate or attempt 

such attacks. 

Since no terrorism component is readily foreseen 

but rather force-on-force engagements are being focused upon, this is not viewed as a domestic law enforcement and homeland security concern. Rather, 

it is an Army and allied services expeditionary concern bridging the tactical into the operational level 

of impact. 

Strategic.

While the drone swarms of normal and microsized UAVs projected in this threat scenario may still 

be a few decades out and possibly even beyond the 

capacity of terrorist and insurgent forces to field on 

their own without state sponsorship, now is the time 

to attempt to get ahead of such developments and 

help shape the future combat environment. At a minimum, we may presently be in an inter-war period, as 

experienced between World Wars I and II, when the 

various elements leading to a Revolution in Military 

Affairs took place with the evolution of the tank and 

supporting arms that resulted in the mass armor and 

mechanized formations that fought in World War II. 

x
xi

In this instance, similar disparate elements, involving robotics, expert systems, artificial and collective 

(cloud-like based) intelligence, network communications, and 3rd and 4th dimension (3D and 4D) replicators may be ushering in another revolution in land 

warfare involving both ground and aerial based unmanned vehicles and systems.

UAVs have increasingly been in the news as the 

cost of these systems continues to drop and their popularity increases. A few million of these systems are 

now said to exist globally, with the numbers rapidly 

increasing. Recent stories highlighting UAVs have 

caused quite a bit of sensationalism and have been 

focused on increasing concerns over their terrorism 

potentials. Interestingly, serious concerns over terrorist use of UAVs, and later insurgent use of UAVs (that 

includes terrorism as an insurgent tactic), have existed 

for roughly over a decade, but such concerns had not 

been widely disseminated by the media until recently.

The U.S. Army and the rest of the U.S. governmental defense community have a vested interest in better 

understanding this area of threat concerns and potentials. While terrorist and insurgent use (and projected 

use) of UAVs is important for its homeland defense 

and defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) implications, it is also—and quite possibly more importantly—likely to have great influence on the conduct of 

future forms of conventional warfighting. The reason 

for this contention is because, ultimately, UAVs represent artifacts belonging to the ongoing informational 

and robotics revolutions that have been taking place 

for decades. The significance of advances in information systems and robotics and what this will mean to 

future warfighting have not been lost on the Strategic 

Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College or on 

other U.S. defense policy institutions.
With these thoughts in mind, this monograph 

will provide context related to a short UAV historical 

overview and their present use by the U.S. military, a 

section on terrorist and insurgent use (and attempted 

use) of UAVs, UAV baselines and trending analysis, 

potentials based on projected UAV threat scenarios, 

what this may mean in terms of U.S. military implications, and finally suggested forms of policy response 

at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. 

The first military use of UAVs dates back to World 

War I when early tests were carried out—one in 1917 

by the United Kingdom (UK) involved a radio-controlled Sopwith Camel biplane loaded with dynamite. 

In World War II, about 15,000 UAVs were built in 

one Southern California plant alone for anti-aircraft 

targeting purposes. U.S. military interest and use of 

UAVs waxed and waned during the Cold War. UAV 

use then drastically increased due to Section 220 of the 

National Defense Authorization Act, FY 2001 (from 

2000) which mandated the fielding of unmanned air 

and ground vehicles, combined with the September 

11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Towers and the 

Pentagon, resulting in the use of armed drones in increasing numbers in the global war against al-Qaida. 

Terrorist and insurgent use (and attempted use) of 

UAVs spans the 1994 Aum Shinrikyo cult’s attempt 

to use weaponized drones through the 2015 Islamic 

State (IS) use of these craft for reconnaissance and propaganda video purposes. Such groups are still very 

much in an experimental phase of using these craft 

and possess relatively few of them, and—when they 

do have them in their inventories—they tend to be 

inferior commercial models (as opposed to military 

grade UAVs). Still, their use by terrorist and insurgent groups is increasing, as are the capabilities of 

xii
xiii

the systems being deployed. During that time span, 

al-Qaida, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—People’s Army, Fatah, Hizbollah, Lashkare-Taiba, and Hamas have all been involved in actual 

or attempted UAV use. The purpose of this use has 

included reconnaissance and surveillance, messaging, IED delivery, weapons of mass destruction 

delivery, and as a weapons platform. Other UAV 

capabilities that exist—yet have not been tied to terrorist or insurgent use so far—are smuggling, limited 

electronic intelligence capability, logistical resupply, 

and surrender of opposing force personnel. Recent 

technology trends that may influence future nonstate 

threat potentials are smart glasses and virtual reality 

goggles, apps and modular payloads, expert systems 

and artificial intelligence, and three-dimensional (3D) 

printing.

Transitioning from present baselines of terrorist and insurgent use of UAVs, along with technology trends influencing their potential uses, three red 

teaming threat scenarios have been created for early 

warning purposes: 1) Single UAV—human controlled 

with drone-up shooting (like a walk-up shooting), 

IED crowd targets, and aircraft takedown variants, 2) 

Groups of UAVs—human controlled or semi-autonomous with squad-sized virtual martyr units and semiautonomous drone squadron variants; and 3) Swarms 

of UAVs—considered as autonomous to highlight the 

projected evolution of this weaponry use with drone 

swarm and micro-drone swarm variants. 

These three threat scenarios result in three corresponding levels of impact found at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of military significance. For 

the U.S. Army, the tactical implications of such UAV 

use will fall within force protection, counterterrorism, 
xiv

and defense support of civil authorities’ missions. It 

will focus on UAV detection, countermeasures, and 

tactical response and is an immediate concern. The 

operational level of impact is insurgency environment 

focused and most likely a near futures issue. It pertains 

to the use of groups of human controlled and semiautonomous UAVs and represents an expeditionary 

concern bridging the tactical into the operational level 

of impact. This means that experimentation and red 

teaming is warranted related to threat forces’ use of 

UAVs in insurgency type environments. The strategic 

level of concern, on the other hand, may still be a few 

decades out, and possibly even beyond the capacity 

of terrorist and insurgent forces to field on their own 

without state sponsorship. Still, its autonomous and 

semi-sentient drone swarm potentials are viewed as 

having an immense impact on the future conduct of 

war. Considerations need to be made concerning arms 

control regimes related to such autonomous, intelligent, and lethal robotic systems as well as their integration with human soldiers into future force structures, if that Army unit composition is elected to be 

followed—which presently appears to be the national 

trajectory.
1

TERRORIST AND INSURGENT UNMANNED 

AERIAL VEHICLES: USE, POTENTIALS, AND 

MILITARY IMPLICATIONS

Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), sometimes 

called simply “drones,” have increasingly been in the 

news as the cost of these systems continues to drop 

and their popularity increases.1 At present, a few million of these systems are said to exist globally, with the 

numbers rapidly increasing.2 Recent stories highlighting UAVs have caused quite a bit of sensationalism 

and have been focused on increasing concerns over 

their terrorism potentials. Such stories have included:

• In London, a December 2014 governmental confirmation of an earlier incident of a UAV almost 

hitting an airliner at Heathrow Airport followed by ongoing illegal drone flights over city 

landmarks and sports stadiums in 2015.3 These 

incidents have increasingly sensitized the public and officials to drone terrorism threat potentials—even including those to United Kingdom 

(UK) nuclear plants.4

• A small quadcopter that penetrated Secret Service security and crash-landed on the White 

House lawn on January 27, 2015. It turns out 

the UAV was being flown for recreational purposes by a U.S. Government employee around 

midnight who said that he lost control of the 

device (known as a flyaway).5

• Mystery UAVs flying over Paris in late-February and early-March 2015 then created a minihysteria in a city already on edge from the earlier mid-January Charlie Hebdo, supermarket, 

and printing firm gun battles involving radical 

Islamist terrorists proclaiming allegiance to 
2

al-Qaida and the Islamic State (IS).6 While the 

UAV intrusions were shown to have no terrorism links, the psychic damage had already 

been done—much of the French public now realize that terrorists could use drones for future 

attacks.

Interestingly, serious concerns over terrorist use 

of UAVs, and later insurgent use of UAVs (that includes terrorism as an insurgent tactic), have existed 

for roughly over a decade but such concerns had not 

been widely disseminated by the media until recently.7

 The U.S. Army and the rest of the U.S. governmental defense community have a vested interest in better 

understanding this area of threat concerns and potentials—not because they have now been sensationalized 

but because of the underlying early warning patterns 

that they have been generating for some time. 

While terrorist and insurgent use (and projected 

use) of UAVs is important for the Army’s homeland defense and defense support of civil authorities 

(DSCA) implications, it is also—and quite possibly 

more importantly—likely to have great influence on 

the conduct of future forms of conventional warfighting. The reason this contention is being made is 

because ultimately UAVs represent artifacts belonging to the ongoing informational and robotics revolutions that have been taking place for decades.8

 Such 

artifacts, when utilized for conflict and war, are, of 

course, not only being employed by violent nonstate 

actors but also by sovereign states. States, indeed, 

have almost totally monopolized this combat capability until quite recently. In fact, the United States and 

its allies have been without peer in their utilization of 

UAVs since September 11, 2001 (9/11), to target and 
3

engage a number of the terrorist and insurgent groups 

identified in this monograph and even, at times, using UAVs against targets associated with the sovereign states which sometimes harbor these terrorists or 

insurgents. 

The significance of advances in information systems and robotics and what this will mean to future 

warfighting have not been lost on the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College or on other 

U.S. defense policy institutions.9 In December 2015, 

Dr. Steven Metz wrote a short yet prescient essay 

about the coming Landpower robot revolution and 

provided five questions related to its first phase based 

on early innovation and experimentation:

1. What is the appropriate mix of humans and 

robots?

2. How autonomous should the robots be?

3. What type of people will be needed for robot 

heavy Landpower formations?

4. What effect will robot centric Landpower have 

on American national security policy?

5. What to do about enemy robots?10

This monograph addresses some of Metz’s questions in the areas of projected enemy (terrorist and 

insurgent) UAV (robot) capabilities and their level of 

autonomy. Also, some mention of envisioned threat 

forces of mixed humans and robots will be highlighted. While this discussion will not specifically 

provide guidance related to future American robot 

Landpower, it may help to provide some analytical 

preconditions for such an effort. With these thoughts 

in mind, this monograph will provide context related 

to a short UAV overview and their present use by the 

U.S. military, a section on terrorist and insurgent use 
4

(and attempted use) of UAVs, UAV baselines and 

trending analysis, potentials based on projected UAV 

threat scenarios, what this may mean in terms of U.S. 

military implications, and finally suggested forms 

of policy response at the tactical, operational, and 

strategic levels. 

UAV OVERVIEW 

PRESENT U.S. MILITARY USE

The first military use of UAVs dates back to World 

War I when early tests were carried out—one test in 

1917 by the UK involved taking a radio-controlled 

Sopwith Camel biplane loaded with dynamite to see 

if it could be made to ram into one of the German zeppelins, the craft that were then bombing British cities. 

The demonstration had to be scrapped due to radio 

command and control failures which almost resulted 

in a group of gathered generals on the ground being 

killed by what had then become a rogue UAV diving towards them.11 Testing continued on and off by 

the United States, the UK, and others over the ensuing years with drone use for anti-aircraft targeting 

practice becoming common in the 1930s. 

In World War II, about 15,000 UAVs were built 

in one Southern California plant alone for such purposes.12 Attempts at creating unmanned B-17 and 

B-24 bombers, which were conceptually based on the 

earlier World War I Kettering Bug concept—to dive 

into highly defended German military-industrial targets—were also attempted. These drones were beset 

with numerous issues—including the fact that they required human operators to get them airborne and arm 

their explosive charges prior to bailing out from the 

planes—and achieved very limited results. The Germans utilized drones in a different way, with 8,000 of 
5

their infamous V-1 flying bombs being launched later 

in the war against Britain in an indiscriminate terror 

campaign.13

U.S. military interest and use of UAVs waxed and 

waned during the Cold War. Reconnaissance drones 

were used in Southeast Asia, based on an initial 1962 

contract, with over 3,000 missions of the Fire Fly crafts 

flown. Then, between 1979-87, the failed Army Aquila 

project—which sought to create 780 drones that could 

relay operational level battlefield intelligence—resulted in only a few prototypes being produced at a cost 

of over $1 billion. One of the limited drone successes 

during this era can be attributed to Israel. In its 1982 

Bekaa Valley attack on Syrian air defenses (situated 

in Lebanon), an initial wave of UAVs triggered the 

system, which proceeded to fire its missiles at the decoy drones. While the Syrians were in the process of 

reloading their own missiles, a second wave of Israeli 

jets came in and fired their radar homing missiles, 

wiping out the Soviet derived air defense system.14

Until 9/11, U.S. military drone use existed at a low 

yet somewhat steady level, with some of the older Fire 

Fly (renamed Lightning Bug) units still in existence 

along with the newer RQ-2 Pioneer system fielded 

in 1986 and considered vital for battlefield reconnaissance (and later targeting) missions by the various services. Limited chaff and propaganda (leaflet) 

dropping missions also took place with some of these 

UAVs. Further, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 

quietly became involved in influencing UAV fielding 

and use from the 1980s onward, with the emergence 

of their large Predator surveillance drone (and its dedicated satellite links) in 1994, which was deployed to 

the Balkans in the mid- and late-1990s.15
6

Section 220 of the National Defense Authorization 

Act, FY 2001 (from 2000) established the following initial goal—then changed the equation:

(a) Goal.—It shall be a goal of the Armed Forces to 

achieve the fielding of unmanned, remotely controlled 

technology such that—

(1) by 2010, one-third of aircraft in the operational deep strike force aircraft fleet are unmanned; 

and,

(2) by 2015, one-third of the operational ground 

combat vehicles are unmanned.16

When combined with the 9/11 attacks on the 

World Trade Towers and the Pentagon, these events 

not only resulted in a firebreak promoting future 

mandated UAV use by military forces but saw those 

systems, along with UAVs belonging to the CIA, used 

in increasing numbers in the global war against al-Qaida. Prior to those dual events, only small numbers of 

UAVs (estimated at less than 50) were being utilized 

by the intelligence community and armed services. 

About a decade later, a 2012 Congressional Research 

Services (CRS) report entitled U.S. Unmanned Aerial 

Systems (UAS) identified 7,494 Department of Defense 

(DoD) UAS platforms in the inventory.17 This number 

did not include CIA dedicated units, which conservatively are estimated at 30 but could be somewhat 

higher.18 In the CRS report, UAVs now equal about 70 

percent of the manned U.S. aircraft inventory (which 

stands at 10,767) and are collectively engaged in all of 

the following DoD capabilities and missions:

• Anti-Submarine Warfare

• Anti-Surface Warfare

• Battle Management Command and Control

• Electronic Warfare
7

• Explosive Ordnance Disposal

• Force Protection

• Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

• Maritime Domain Awareness

• Mine Warfare (Naval)

• Organic Mine Countermeasures (Naval)

• Precision Strike

• Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target 

Acquisition.19

As can be seen, the U.S. military is now heavily invested in UAVs for numerous warfighting capabilities 

with over 70 years of learning experience associated 

with their fielding and use. Sovereign state militaries—both allies and potential belligerents—increasingly are now deploying these systems in an attempt 

to catch up to the superior U.S. capabilities in this 

technological area. In the following section on terrorist and insurgent use of UAVs, however, it can be seen 

that their fielding of these devices is much more of a 

haphazard and limited affair. These groups are still 

very much in an experimental phase of using these 

craft and possess relatively few of them, and—when 

they do have them in their inventories—they tend to 

be inferior commercial models (as opposed to military 

grade UAVs). Still, their drone use is now increasing 

as are the capabilities of the systems being deployed. 

Terrorist and Insurgent Use of UAVs.

The use, and attempted use, of UAVs by terrorists and insurgents can at least be dated back to the 

pre-June 1994 attempts by the Japanese apocalyptic 

cult Aum Shinrikyo to conduct dry runs to release 

the nerve agent sarin by means of remote controlled 
8

helicopters with aerial spray systems.20 The attempts 

failed as the mini-helicopters crashed during testing, 

with that terrorist group going on to utilize different 

dispersal methods when they launched their sarin attacks on a Matasumoto courthouse and later on the 

Tokyo subway system.21 The latter attack resulted in 

about a dozen people killed and 5,500 injured by this 

nerve agent. 

The next incident related to UAV threatened use 

was that of a pre-July 2001 improvised explosive device (IED) attack upon G8 Summit leaders (Canada, 

France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the UK, and the 

United States) in Genoa, Italy, by al-Qaida. This plot 

may have only entered the “what if” stage of conceptualization with Osama bin Laden musing about its 

potentials as discrepancies exist as to whether the plot 

was actually ever put into place.22 Two more al-Qaida 

based plots followed: one pre-February 2002 originating out of Pakistan, and the other in June 2002 from 

an unspecified location. The first plot tied to Mozzam 

Begg sought to launch a drone filled with anthrax 

against the English House of Commons. He was sent 

to Guantanamo Prison for his involvement but was 

later released from custody in January 2005 because 

the original charges became questionable.23 The second plot revolved around IED-carrying remote controlled planes being utilized against passenger airlines—though the plot was never said to get beyond 

the concept stage.24 

Then, in August 2002, a Colombian Army unit 

seized nine remote controlled planes from a camp 

deep in the jungle belonging to the Fuerzas Armadas 

Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) guerrilla group. 

The intended use of these planes is unknown, but some 

speculation existed that they may have been intended 

to carry IEDs.25 This was followed by a Fatah Pales-
9

tinian plot in December 2002 to conduct IED model 

airplane attacks on Jewish sections of Jerusalem. The 

plot, which was to involve hundreds of such model 

airplanes, never got beyond the flight test stage.26

Three linked incidents in which UAVs were to be 

utilized for attack, reconnaissance, and protest purposes subsequently took place. The initial one from 

August through December 2003 was a joint effort by a 

Hizbollah cell that was supporting the Al Aqsa Martyrs brigade, an arm of Fatah. The intent was to launch 

an IED UAV attack on Jewish settlers in Gaza, however, the plot was interdicted by Israeli security forces.27 

Then, on November 7, 2004, a Hizbollah drone was 

launched from southern Lebanon and engaged in a 

20-minute reconnaissance over Nahariya in northern 

Israel. The Mirsad-1 drone, provided by Iran, was of 

military grade quality with conflicting reports of its 

either crashing in the sea off the Lebanese coast or returning back to its Hizbollah base after its reconnaissance flight.28 The final incident took place on April 

11, 2005, and involved another Mirsad-1 drone flown 

by Hizbollah from southern Lebanon. In this incident, 

the drone overflew the northern Israeli city of Acre 

as a protest of Israeli airspace violations of Lebanon, 

according to Hizbollah. The drone was able to complete its mission successfully and return back to its 

Hizbollah base.29

Two Pakistani terrorist group linked incidents then 

took place on September 13-14, 2005. In the first, the 

Pakistani Army raided an al-Qaida hideout in North 

Waziristan. In the raid, they seized a Chinese made 

remote control model airplane which was said to be 

used for the reconnaissance of Pakistani security forces 

prior to attacking them. IED weaponization potentials 

of this model aircraft were also mentioned.30 The next 
10

day, Ala Asad Chandia (Abu Qatada) was arrested in 

Fairfax County, VA, for obtaining an MP 1OOOSYS 

electronic automatic pilot system for model aircraft. 

This Lashkar-e-Taiba trained individual was federally 

indicted and subsequently convicted for attempting 

to send this technology to that terrorist group for its 

drone use in Pakistan.31

In what may or may not be considered a major escalation of terrorist and insurgent drone capabilities, on 

August 13, 2006—during the Second Lebanon War—

three Ababil (military grade) Iranian drones supplied 

to Hizbollah were launched against Israel from southern Lebanon. Each drone was said to be carrying a 40-

50 kilogram explosive warhead and was intended for 

use against a “strategic target,” according to Hizbollah. The threat was taken seriously enough that F-16 

Israeli fighters shot down these UAVs near Tyre in 

Lebanon and near Haifa and Western Galilee in Israel. 

Upon inspecting the wreckage of some of these craft, 

Israel claimed that they were not carrying warheads.32

Between 2006 and May 2012, two al-Qaida incidents and one Taliban UAV incident occurred. In Columbus, OH, during the 2006-07 period (exact dates 

unspecified), al-Qaida trained Christopher Paul was 

conducting drone research, utilizing a 5-foot-long 

model helicopter, for terrorism purposes. He was arrested by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in 

August 2007 and was subsequently convicted in June 

2008 (he took a plea deal that resulted in a shorter sentence).33 In the next incident, which took place on September 28, 2008, Rezwan Ferdaus—an al-Qaida affinity adherent—was arrested by the FBI in Ashland, MA. 

He was caught in a terrorist sting operation related to 

his plot to drive F-86 Sabre and F-14 Phantom scale 

models (with Global Positioning System [GPS] capa-
11

bility) loaded with C-4 explosives into the Pentagon 

and Capitol buildings. He was convicted for this plot 

in 2012 and also took a plea deal, like Paul, for shorter 

sentencing purposes.34 Finally, on May 19, 2012, an allied raid on a Taliban base in Helmand Province, Afghanistan, turned up a small drone—possibly a North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Desert Hawk—

along with some IEDs and small arms. The intended 

Taliban use of the drone was unknown, quite possibly for reconnaissance purposes, though it appeared 

slightly damaged in a photo of the arms cache and no 

control unit was found along with it.35

Four more escalatory Hizbollah and Hamas UAV 

incidents took place between the latter part of 2012 

and mid-2014. On October 6, 2012, Hizbollah sent an 

Iranian Ayoub drone over Dimona, Israel—a restricted area which contains that nation’s nuclear weapons 

facilities—for reconnaissance purposes. The timing of 

the drone incident coincided with Israeli military exercise preparations. Given the sensitivity of this area, 

the drone was shot down by an Israeli F-16, although 

not until after it had been aloft for some hours.36 Another Hizbollah drone, the type not specified, was 

then shot down by an F-16 10 kilometers out to sea 

west of Haifa on April 22, 2013. What mission this 

UAV was engaging in is unknown.37 A Hamas plot at 

a local university to send a UAV carrying explosives 

into Israel in October 2013 was then interdicted by the 

Palestinian Authority in Hebron.38 In the last of these 

incidents, on July 14, 2014, a homemade Hamas drone 

was shot down over Ashdod, Israel, by a patriot missile. This 5-foot-long drone was outfitted with small 

air-to-ground rockets (per unconfirmed Hamas video 

images) and was on its way to engage an undisclosed 

Israeli target.39
12

The Islamic State (IS) joined the nonstate threat 

drone proliferation club with three successful UAV 

operations in August and September 2014. The first 

incident was on August 23, 2014, near Raqqa province 

in northern Syria. It involved the use of a commercial 

system—a DJI Phantom FC40 quadcopter—to recon 

Syrian Army Base 93 prior to an IS ground assault on 

the base. The quadcopter video imagery was subsequently used in IS propaganda videos.40 On August 

30, 2014, an unspecified IS drone was used over Falluja, Iraq, to provide imagery of attacks on the city for 

online propaganda purposes.41 In the last IS operation 

on September 12, 2014, in Kobani, northern Syria, another unspecified drone was used to capture video 

imagery of suicide bomber and ground attacks on that 

city for propaganda purposes.42

Hizbollah then engaged in a successful drone 

strike operation against the al-Nusra Front—an alQaida linked group—near Arsal in northeastern Lebanon on September 21, 2014. Twenty-three al-Nusra 

terrorists were said to be killed in this attack, which 

was followed up by a group assault—an incident that 

has now ushered in terrorist-on-terrorist group based 

drone warfare.43 Whether the drone utilized in the attack carried an explosively tipped warhead or carried 

air-to-ground rockets (or missiles) is unknown.44 A 

final incident involving terrorist and insurgent use of 

UAVs occurred on around March 16, 2015, near the 

city of Fallujah, Iraq. In that incident, an IS militant 

flew a small model aircraft for about 20 minutes. After 

the drone landed, the IS operative placed the drone 

in the trunk of a car and proceeded to drive off, at 

which point U.S. coalition military forces launched an 

airstrike destroying the insurgent, the drone, and the 

vehicle.45 This incident and all of the earlier ones summarized in this section can be viewed in Table 1.46
13

Major Chronological Sources: Michael Gips, “A Remote Threat,” 

Security Management Online, October 2002; Eugene Miasnikov, 

Threat of Terrorism Using Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Technical Aspects, Moscow, Russia: Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies at Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology, June 2004, translated into English March 2005, available from 

www.armscontrol.ru/uav/report.htm; Jay Mandelbaum and James 

Ralston et al., Terrorist Use of Improvised or Commercially Available 

Precision-Guided UAVs at Stand-Off Ranges: An Approach for Formulating Mitigation Considerations, ADA460419, Alexandria, VA: 

Institute for Defense Analysis, October 2005, available from oai.

dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=

ADA460419; Milton Hoenig, “Hezbollah and the Use of Drones 

as a Weapon of Terrorism,” Public Interest Report, Vol. 67, No. 2, 

Spring 2014, available from www.fas.org/pir-pubs/hezbollah-usedrones-weapon-terrorism/.

Table 1. Terrorist and Insurgent Use/Attempted 

Use of UAVs.

Date Location Perpetrator UAV Type Use Outcome 

Pre-June 1994 Japan Aum Shinrikyo

Remote 

Controlled 

Helicopters

Spray Chemical 

Agent (Sarin)

Crashed During 

Testing

Pre-July 2001 Genoa, Italy

Osama bin 

Laden, al-Qaida 

Leader

Remote 

Controlled 

Airplanes

IED Attack on G8 

Summit Leaders

Considered Only; 

Not Attempted

(Alleged)

Pre-February 

2002 Pakistan

Moazzam Begg, 

al-Qaida 

Operative

Drone

Launch Drone 

from Suffolk with 

Anthrax Against 

House of Commons

Alleged Plot; Sent to 

Guantanamo Prison; 

Released in January 

2005

June 2002 Not Specified al-Qaida

Remote 

Controlled 

Airplanes

IED Attack on 

Passenger Airliners

Considered Only; 

Not Attempted

(Alleged)

August 2002 Colombia FARC

9 Remote 

Controlled 

Airplanes

Unknown; Possibly Weaponized 

(IED)

Recovered by Colombian Army Unit 

from Remote Camp

December 2002 Jerusalem, 

Israel Fatah

Hundreds 

of Model 

Airplanes

IED Attacks on 

Jewish Sections 

of Jerusalem

Conducted Flight 

Tests Only

August and 

December 2003 Gaza, Palestine

Hizbollah Cell 

(Linked to Al 

Aqsa Martyrs 

Brigades; Fatah)

UAV

IED Attack on 

Jewish Settlers in 

Gaza

Interdicted by Israeli 

Security Forces
14

7 November 2004 Nahariya, 

Northern Israel Hizbollah

Iranian 

Mirsad-1 

Drone

20-Minute Reconnaissance

Mission

Either a) Crashed 

in the Sea Near 

Lebanese Shore or 

b) Returned Back to 

Hizbollah Base

11 April 2005 Acre, Northern 

Israel Hizbollah

Iranian 

Mirsad-1 

Drone

Overflight of 

Israeli Communities (Stated as a 

Protest of Lebanese Airspace Violations)

Successful Operation; Returned Back 

to Hizbollah Base

13 September 

2005

North 

Waziristan, 

Pakistan

al-Qaida

Chinese 

Made Remote 

Control Model 

Airplane 

To Recon 

Pakistani Security 

Forces Prior to 

Attack; Also Weaponized (IED)

Seized in Major Raid 

of al-Qaida Hide 

Out by the Pakistani 

Army

14 September 

2005

Fair Fax 

County, 

Virginia

Ala Asad Chandia 

(Abu Qatada); 

Lashkar-e- Taiba 

Trained

Obtained MP 

1OOOSYS—

Electronic Automatic Pilot 

System for 

Model Aircraft 

in April 2002

For Lashkar-eTaiba Terrorist 

Group Drone Use 

in Pakistan

Indicted and Subsequently

Convicted 

13 August 2006

Near Tyre, 

Lebanon; Near 

Haifa, Israel; 

Western Galilee, Israel

Hizbollah

3 Ababil 

Drones, Each 

With 40-50 

Kilogram 

Warhead

Against 

"Strategic Targets"

All 3 Shot Down by 

Israeli F-16s

2006-2007 Colombus, 

Ohio

Christopher Paul 

(al-Qaida trained)

5-Foot-Long 

Model Helicopter

Conducted Drone 

Research for Terrorism Purposes

Arrested by FBI and 

Convicted (Plea in 

2008)

28 September 

2011

Ashland,

Massachusetts Rezwan Ferdaus 

(al-Qaida Affinity)

Scale Models 

of F-86 Sabre 

and F-14 

Phantom Jets 

(GPS capability)

IED (C-4 Explosive) Attack on 

Pentagon and 

Capitol Buildings

Arrested

By FBI and Convicted (Plea in 2012); 

Sting Operation

19 May 2012

Helmand 

Province, 

Afghanistan

Taliban

Might be 

Recovered 

NATO UAS 

(Desert Hawk 

Drone)

Unknown Use - 

Possible Recon. 

Found with IED 

Materials and 

Small Arms

Captured in Raid

6 October 2012 Dimona, Israel Hizbollah Iranian

Ayoub Drone

Recon of 

Israeli Nuclear 

Weapons Complex & Military 

Exercise Preparation

Shot Down by Israeli 

F-16 Jet

Table 1. Terrorist and Insurgent Use/Attempted 

Use of UAVs. (cont.)
15

22 April 2013

Over the Sea 

10 Kilometers 

West of Haifa, 

Israel

Hizbollah Unmanned 

Drone; Type 

Not Specified

Mission Unknown

Shot Down by Israeli 

F-16 Jet at an Altitude of 6,000 Feet

October 2013 West Bank, 

Palestine Hamas

Plot Centered 

at Hebron 

University to 

Place Explosives on UAV

Fly into Israel to 

Engage Unknown 

Target(s)

Palestinian Authority 

Arrested Plotters 

Prior to Launch

14 July 2014 Ashdod, Israel Hamas

5-Foot-Long 

Homemade 

Drone Aircraft 

with Small 

Rockets 

(Unconfirmed 

Hamas Video 

Image)

Fly into Israel to 

Engage Unknown 

Target(s)

Shot Down by Israeli 

Patriot Missile

23 August 2014

Near Raqqa 

Province, 

Northern Syria

Islamic State (IS)

DJI Phantom 

FC40 

Quadcopter

Recon of Syrian Army Military 

Base 93 Prior to 

Ground Assault; 

Imagery Provided 

via IS Propaganda 

Video on YouTube

Successful 

Operation

30 August 2014 Falluja, Iraq Islamic State (IS) Unspecified 

Drone

Propaganda 

Purposes; Video 

of Attacks in the 

City

Successful 

Operation

12 September 

2014

Kobani, 

Northern Syria Islamic State (IS)

Unspecified 

Drone

Propaganda 

Purposes; Video 

Footage of Suicide 

and Ground 

Attacks

Successful 

Operation

21 September 

2014

Near Arsal, 

Northeastern 

Lebanon

Hizbollah Armed 

Drones

Killed 23 al-Nusra 

Front (al-Qaida 

Linked) Fighters at 

Base; Followed by 

Ground Assault

Successful 

Operation

Appx. 16 March 

2015

Near Fallujah, 

Iraq Islamic State (IS) Unspecified Drone

Unknown; Possible Reconnaissance or Propaganda PurposesOperator and Drone 

Destroyed in Car by 

U.S. Coalition Air 

Strike

Table 1. Terrorist and Insurgent Use/Attempted 

Use of UAVs. (cont.)
16

BASELINES AND TRENDING ANALYSIS

Derived from the overview of the historical and 

contemporary use (and attempted use in plots) of 

UAVs by terrorists and insurgents in the preceding 

section, the following capabilities gained by using this 

technology have been identified.

Reconnaissance and Surveillance.

Initially, the reconnaissance of fixed facilities and 

military units was gained by UAV deployment, as 

was evident with Hizbollah drone use in November 

2004 and October 2012 against Israel. Also, an al-Qaida drone was seized in September 2005 in Pakistan 

which would be used prior to launching an attack 

(possible use) as was a Taliban drone seized in May 

2012 in Afghanistan (possible use). An IS drone was 

also used in a reconnaissance role as recently as August 2014 against a Syrian army base in northern Syria 

prior to a ground assault upon it. The use of drones for 

real time surveillance appears to be a far less common 

UAV occurrence for violent nonstate actors, although 

real time drone imagery of IS attacks on Falluja, Iraq, 

in August 2014 and Kobani, Syria, in September 2014 

used for propaganda purposes could conceivably also 

be used for command, control, and coordination purposes—but, in those examples, this was probably not 

exploited.47

Messaging.

Various forms of messaging (communicating information to others) exist related to UAV use. At the 
17

most basic level, this can take the form of making a 

protest. It was thought that the April 2005 Hizbollah 

use of a drone to overfly Israeli communities was primarily meant to signal that an earlier Israeli violation 

of Hizbollah airspace in southern Lebanon would not 

be tolerated.48 Another form of messaging is that of 

propaganda. Propaganda can be directed at both internal and external audiences in terms of drone use 

capability and actual use. The use of such propaganda 

has been readily capitalized on by al-Qaida, Hizbollah, Hamas, and IS in their online postings and videos. 

A third form of messaging is to give a warning. This 

is very much akin to the old “shot across the bow,” 

which means that deadly force will likely be used next 

unless the targeted audience accedes to one’s requested demands. Providing a warning to the other side in 

such a manner may also serve as a form of future deterrence against unwanted actions. The October 2012 

Hizbollah drone reconnaissance of the Dimona, Israel, 

nuclear weapons complex as well as the propaganda 

component of the July 2014 Hamas drone incident 

(both physical and online) in Ashdod, Israel, that “we 

now, too, have armed drones” were meant to threaten 

Israel for deterrence and behavioral shaping purposes. 

IED Delivery. 

Since pre-July 2001, al-Qaida leaders have been 

musing about using drones equipped with IEDs for 

terrorist attack purposes against Western leaders. AlQaida plots via affinity nodes have also included targeting passenger airliners (June 2002), general testing 

(2006-07), and use against key governmental buildings in Washington, DC (September 2011). A Fatah 

plot (December 2002) and one intertwined with Hiz-
18

bollah (in August and December 2003), along with an 

actual Hizbollah incident involving explosive payload 

drones (August 2006) shot down before hitting their 

targets, have also been identified. More recently, in 

September 2014, a Hizbollah drone was used to attack 

the al-Nusra Front (an al-Qaida linked group) near 

Arsal in northeastern Lebanon (assumed on the Syrian 

side of the border). In this successful operation—quite 

possibly the first of its kind for a nonstate group—

some 23 al-Nusra fighters in a base were said to be 

killed in the attack that was then followed up by a 

ground assault. It is unknown if the drone was carrying an explosive payload or utilized an air-to-ground 

weapon to destroy the command facility the al-Nusra 

personnel occupied.49

Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Delivery. 

The pre-June 1994 attempt by Aum Shinrikyo to 

weaponize a UAV to spray the sarin nerve agent, and 

the alleged pre-February 2002 plot by al-Qaida operatives to release anthrax against the House of Commons 

in London, UK, suggest that this potential drone capability has long been identified by terrorist groups. The 

delivery of radiological materials by means of a UAV 

would represent another component of such WMD 

capability, though it has not been linked to any known 

terrorist plots. Still, such drone WMD use potentials 

are widely recognized by security analysts: “Drones 

could potentially carry and launch some weapons of 

mass destruction—biological and chemical weapons 

and even radioactive ‘dirty’ bombs.”50
19

Weapons Platform. 

Placing rockets and missiles on drones (to mimic 

far more robust U.S. drone capabilities) represents 

another violent nonstate actor capability that can be 

derived from UAV employment. This trend appears 

to be relatively recent and may be evident in the 

homemade Hamas drone outfitted with small rockets 

under its wings in the July 2014 Ashdod incident. This 

capability may already be possessed by Hizbollah via 

the possible transfer of the armed “Hamaseh” Iranian 

produced drone. Since Hizbollah has already utilized 

a number of other Iranian drone types in the past, it 

takes little imagination to see this new drone ending 

up in Hizbollah’s armory. A photo of this drone was 

taken in May 2013 and serves as a weapons platform 

for two air-to-ground attack munitions.51 Another 

more basic capability—that of placing a firearm on a 

UAV and using it to shoot at a target—has already taken place. This can be seen in an online advertisement 

for smart phone shields in which a pistol attached to a 

drone fires at various items, including a smart phone 

utilizing the advertised product.52 To date, the placing 

of firearms on UAVs has not been tied to any known 

terrorist or insurgent plots or incidents, but the potentials are being discussed in online media.53

Other UAV Capabilities.

Other UAV capabilities presently existing that 

have not been tied to terrorist and insurgent use or 

plots are:

Smuggling: Since at least 2009, numerous examples 

exist globally of UAVs being used by criminals and 

organized crime to smuggle goods such as narcotics, 
20

cigarettes, and cell phones into fixed installations such 

as prisons, and even across national boundaries.54 Reports suggest that one of the major regions in which 

such smuggling has taken place is along the U.S. and 

Mexican border. It is being carried out by the Mexican 

cartels, with well over 100 incidents said to have taken 

place.55 This UAV capability would allow for the raising of revenues via narcotics smuggling by terrorists 

and insurgents. 

ELINT Capability (Limited): In 2014, a drone was 

created to hack mobile devices specifically by means 

of finding those with open Wi-Fi network connections 

and tricking them into providing data by mimicking 

networks they have accessed in the past. This was 

done by equipping the drone with the Snoopy software capability.56 This form of ELINT drone can be 

used for illicit fundraising (eg., bank account access), 

to engage in identity theft in order to compromise 

cyber and physical security systems, and for gaining intelligence against individuals for kidnapping 

purposes. 

Logistical Resupply: The first UAV combat resupply 

took place in December 2011 when a K-Max helicopter 

adapted by Lockheed brought in supplies to a Marine 

base in Afghanistan.57 This program has since continued and now progressed to where a software application (app) is being developed to allow Marines to summon resupply UAVs via tablets and smart handheld 

devices. The experimental program is funded through 

2018 and, if successful, we could see more widespread 

introduction of this system in the 2020s.58 Such a basic 

UAV resupply capability would mean that frontline 

advancing or besieged insurgent fighters could also 

potentially benefit from food and ammunition supplies being flown into them via modified commercial 

UAV systems.
21

Surrender of Opposing Force Personnel: During the 

Gulf War, in late-February 1991, a small group of Iraqi 

troops surrendered to a U.S. Pioneer RQ-2A drone on 

Faylaka Island near Kuwait City rather than face another bombardment of 16-inch shells from the U.S.S. 

Missouri. The low flying drone was being used as a 

spotter via a video link back to the Missouri for targeting and battlefield damage assessment of the defending Iraqi forces.59 This was the first time in history that a group of soldiers have ever been known 

to surrender to a robot in war. While a terrorist group 

may or may not find such a UAV capability useful, 

it may have utility for an insurgent group that is 

attempting to capture a city. 

Recent technology trends that may bolster UAV 

functionality suggest that the following enabling 

technologies may also influence future terrorist and 

insurgent potential uses.

Smart Glasses and Virtual Reality Goggles: UAVs 

are typically flown using handheld controllers like 

those used for model airplanes, with the pilot observing the drone from a distance. This form of stand-off 

piloting is functional when the UAV is being flown 

in noncomplex terrain such as in open fields, and to 

a limited extent over urban areas, when pilot line-ofsight is maintained. An immediate drawback to this 

method of UAV control is pilot perspective—they 

are viewing the drone from afar—which reduces its 

tactical maneuverability and handling. To overcome 

this limitation, hobbyist and commercial UAV pilots 

have taken to using smart glasses (with see-through 

lenses that have computer imagery projected on 

them) and virtual reality goggles and visors that create computer-generated three-dimensional (3D) simu-
22

lations of what a drone sees in front of it via a video 

camera system.60 This merges the perspective of the 

stand-off pilot with the UAV—in essence, placing him 

in the drone or allowing him to become the drone (as 

a “virtual martyr”)61 for flight control purposes. The 

end result is that tactical mobility greatly increases as 

can been seen in a clip of drone races through a forest 

in Argonay, France, which was posted on YouTube in 

September 2014 and has been widely viewed.62

Apps and Modular Payloads: The trend towards 

open architecture systems—“Plug-N-Play”—will 

mean that UAVs can be quickly configured for different uses via apps and payload modularity (hardware). 

One off-the-shelf method in this regard is to attach a 

smart phone (eg., iPhone or Galaxy) to a UAV in order 

to gain new forms of functionality for various uses.63

Novel smart phone apps of interest include GPS fencing which would designate a limited geographic area 

that a drone could only fly within for patrol or seeking purposes64 and an infrared video attachment that 

would allow a drone to be flown under the cover of 

darkness and also pick up target body heat signatures.65 Payload modularity means that a drone could 

transition from cargo hauling through reconnaissance 

through serving as a weapons platform or as an actual 

aerial IED as required. 

Expert Systems and Artificial Intelligence: One of the 

limitations of UAV use is that the systems have to be 

constantly monitored and controlled by human beings. 

It is expected that expert systems (“if-then statement” 

decision point) and artificial intelligence (scenario 

maximizing) drone controllers will also be employed. 

The mission value is in some ways equivalent to utilizing a wire-guided missile that the operator needs to 

keep on target as opposed to a fire-and-forget weapon 
23

that can be launched and then does not require human 

interaction to guide it to the target. The ability to send 

out an autonomous UAV to complete a simple mission 

already exists—such as for a computer program to fly 

a drone and take some form of basic action.66 The use 

of such semi-independent and independent systems 

would also get around limitations in controller signal 

range—extending drone flying distances—and would 

likely allow for far quicker reaction cycles to changing operating conditions (e.g., machine decisionmaking and flight corrections are faster than that of human beings).Additionally, machine based groups and 

swarms of drones can operate together in coordinated 

(intelligent) networks, which is beyond the capability 

of groups of human controlled UAVs.67

3D Printing: Entire UAVs, except for certain motor 

and command and control parts, can now be created 

by 3D printers. The first printed drone parts—in this 

instance, for a model aircraft—were created in 2011 by 

Southhampton University and took a week to print.68

By 2014, drone components could be printed in less 

than 24 hours, as was done by a Sheffield University 

team.69 Later that year, a military grade fully autonomous drone (with an Android phone brain), the Razor 3, was printed for the MITRE Corporation, a DoD 

contractor, with off-the-shelf parts for $2,500 in just 

over a day by the University of Virginia.70 In tandem 

with these developments is the 3D printing of a firearm, which took place in 2013 based on a primitive design (the plastic Liberator) while, in November 2013, 

a metal M1911 pistol was printed using an industrial 

3D printer.71 A projected capability to regularly print 

higher strength metal components, in addition to plastic and composite components, is expected once the 

technology to do so becomes economically feasible.
24

This will mean that the 3D printed core components of 

a drone outfitted with various forms of weaponry will 

at some point become a reality. An urban street culture 

video linking 3D printed guns and drones, gangsters, 

narcotics, and violence together should also be noted. 

It can be found in the video, Double Bubble Trouble, 

released by rap singer Mathangi “Maya” Arulpragasam, known as M.I.A., in her 2013 album, Matangi.72

The concern, of course, is that these technology linkages are being spread to demographics that may include disenfranchised Western youth susceptible to 

ongoing terrorist radicalization initiatives. 

POTENTIALS—THREAT SCENARIOS

Transitioning from present baselines of terrorist 

and insurgent use of UAVs, along with technology 

trends influencing their potential uses, three red teaming threat scenarios have been created for early warning purposes: 1) Single UAV—human controlled, 2) 

Groups of UAVs—human controlled or semi-autonomous, and 3) Swarms of UAVs—autonomous to highlight the projected evolution of this weaponry use (See 

Table 2.). Each threat scenario will be discussed, along 

with the expected time frame in which it may take 

place and its probable significance to U.S. national 

security and military operations.
25

Table 2. Terrorist and Insurgent UAV 

Use Threat Scenarios.

Threat Scenario 1: Single UAV—Human controlled.

In this threat scenario, a single human controlled 

UAV is utilized in a tactical action for terrorism purposes. Precedent exists for such an incident derived 

from past terrorist plots and activities tied to al-Qaida 

and its wider web of affinity-linked individuals. Such 

a scenario is presently achievable with current offthe-shelf technologies. Three scenario variants will be 

provided to showcase the diversity of terrorist attacks 

that can be carried out via a single human operated 

UAV.

Drone-up Shooting. 

In this scenario variant, a low and slow flying drone 

is utilized for assassination purposes in order to kill a 

political leader, general officer, or other very imporThreat Scenario Time Period Description Significance

1: Single UAV—

Human Controlled

Present Day Tactical action utilized to create a 

terrorism incident. Scenario variants: 

Drone-up Shooting, IED Crowd Targeting, and Aircraft Takedown

Tactical (+Terrorism 

Disruptive Potentials)

2: Group of UAVs— 

Human Controlled 

or Semi-autonomous

Present Day

Near Futures 

(Some Years)

Force-on-force engagement in insurgency environment. Scenario variants: 

Squad-sized Virtual Martyrs Unit and 

Semi-autonomous Drone Squadron

Operational

3: Swarm of 

UAVs—

Autonomous

Futures (A Few 

Decades)

Robotic targeting of human personnel, 

materiel, vehicles, aircraft, and vessels 

in conflict and war. Scenario variants: 

Swarms and Micro-Swarms

Strategic
26

tant person. Since a firearm was successfully placed 

and fired from a small UAV in 2013; the only difference this scenario would require is the engagement of 

a human rather than an inanimate object. The requirements to conduct this attack would be to determine 

the route and time frame of the targeted individual 

in order to send the drone out to the appropriate outside ambush location. A video link can be maintained 

between the operator and drone, and the simple command of having the trigger of the firearm pulled can 

be sent digitally. A laser pointer can also be added for 

accuracy purposes. 

IED Crowd Targeting. 

The second variant represents an area rather than 

a point target type of drone attack. As in the previous example, a video link and a simple command—in 

this instance, that of detonation—can be utilized with 

a UAV carrying an IED. The intent would be to have 

the drone fly into a crowd of individuals and detonate 

among them. This would mimic the effects of a terrorist grenade or IED attack on a grouping of people. An 

effective use of this form of attack would be to attack 

crowds in a sports stadium or along a parade route in 

order to generate panic and create a stampede and/or 

crowd crush-type situation. Follow-on drones, even if 

unarmed, could be utilized to create the illusion of a 

coordinated attack for terror generation purposes. 

Aircraft Takedown.

Of the three highlighted variants, this one—targeting a passenger airliner or military jet or transport—

could be said to best maximize single human operator 
27

UAV capabilities. Rather than utilizing a quad or other 

form of slow commercial drone, it would draw upon 

the speed and kinetic ability of hobbyist scale model 

jets. The intent of this form of attack is to simulate a 

“bird strike” on an aircraft engine while an airliner or 

jet aircraft is taking off and most vulnerable to catastrophic flight failures.73 Such a UAV strike would be 

far more serious than a bird strike due to superior kinetic effects. Model jets can achieve speeds well over 

100 mile per hour and have more mass than birds74 and 

can be augmented with a penetrator rod (composed of 

a metal or composite material) running the length of 

a hobbyist jet.75 As no explosive or form of armament 

would be required for such an attack—other than a 

video link for engine targeting purposes—it would be 

considered a pre-existing off-the-shelf capability.

The significance of this threat scenario (and its variants) ranges from minimal to low in its implications. 

A drone-up shooting simply represents a variant of 

a political assassination, while IED crowd targeting 

mimics a traditional bombing, both of which can be 

utilized for terrorist (against civilians) and insurgency 

(against police and military) purposes. The difference, 

of course, is a standoff between the perpetrator, i.e., 

the UAV operator, and the UAV being utilized as a 

weapons platform to carry a firearm or as a delivery 

system to carry an IED. The flight ability of a UAV, 

however, may allow it access to venues, such as a 

sports stadium, where an armed human attacker cannot gain entrance due to security screening protocols.76

The aircraft takedown variant, however, is different in 

that a human attacker is precluded from gaining access to an aircraft during takeoff due to both airport 

and airbase security and the fact the aircraft is in its 

initial flight stage. This means that utilizing a drone to 
28

engage in such an attack represents a new capability 

that can be directed against civilian airliners for terrorism purposes within the continental United States 

(CONUS) and against military aircraft for insurgency 

purposes outside CONUS deployed areas.77 Ultimately, however, all of these scenario variants leverage the 

disruptive potentials terrorism has to offer and, while 

based upon tactical actions, should be considered terrorist attacks first and foremost in their effects.

Threat Scenario 2: Group of UAVs—

Human Controlled or Semi-autonomous.

No groups of UAVs have as of yet been utilized 

together in a conflict setting by violent nonstate actors, such as terrorists or insurgents, so no historical 

precedent for this threat scenario exists. Rather, it is 

based on a linear trend projection derived from hobbyist racing for human controlled UAVs and commercial applications derived from various apps being 

integrated into semi-autonomous drone systems. The 

first variant, based on the virtual martyrs concept,78

pertaining to this threat scenario is viewed as a current capability (which may or may not be exploited by 

Jihadist insurgent groups), while the second variant, 

highlighting the use of a group of semi-autonomous 

drones, is expected to become technically feasible in 

the near future. These scenario variants include the 

following. 

Squad-sized Virtual Martyrs Unit.

This is a squad-sized UAV unit composed of racing 

drones outfitted with IEDs controlled by virtual reality linked human controllers. The intent of this unit is 

to attack U.S. and allied soldiers and security person-
29

nel by detonating the IED drones once they come into 

the proximity of their targets. A sub-variant of such 

drones would be ones outfitted with either shaped 

charges or explosively formed projectiles (EFP) that 

would be utilized for the precision targeting of U.S. 

and allied armored vehicles.79 Inhibitors to the use of 

such virtual martyr drones include video feed and 

controller communication range limitations, signal 

dead zones, short drone battery life, and IED weight 

restrictions. This unit can be utilized in a stand-alone 

mode with only virtually controlled IED carrying 

drones involved or in a combined arms fashion as ad 

hoc support to human insurgent fighters and/or integrated with a semi-autonomous drone squadron. 

Semi-autonomous Drone Squadron. 

Such a squadron represents a small grouping of 

drones launched together in an assault wave. It would 

draw upon both the drone-up shooting (firearm carried) and IED crowd targeting (bomb carried) single 

UAV scenarios, with the addition of autonomous 

drone capability. The drones can be sent against police and military personnel located at a GPS coordinate. The drones would be provided with GPS fencing 

instructions to patrol within certain physical boundaries and engage (via weapons firing or IED detonation) humans and/or moving objects that they come 

across using human form or motion sensors. Human 

controllers have the option of taking over individual 

drones for engagement purposes as required. An ambush variant of this scenario variant would be to have 

these UAVs resting in a “drone nest” (essentially a box 

buried at ground level) that would open when opposing troops lacking identification friend or foe tags trip 

sensors during entry into an area. 
30

This scenario and its variants are not about creating terror per se—which may still occur as a secondary outcome—but instead focus on the generation of 

combat power in force-on-force engagements found 

in insurgency environments.80 As a result, the direct 

implications of this scenario are at the military operational level in which groups of drones serve as 

a) physical avatars for humans virtually controlling 

them, or b) machine soldiers controlled by expert systems, both of which directly engage human soldiers in 

combat. This scenario is thus meant to be reflective of 

the changing patterns of conflict and war in which the 

5th dimension of cyberspace (via physical space-time 

manipulation)81 and unmanned systems are beginning 

to increasingly influence operations.82 The significance 

of this scenario would likely be limited in scope initially with increasing importance up to a moderate 

level of threat represented by the semi-autonomous 

drone variant when (or if) it is realized.83

Threat Scenario 3: Swarm of UAVs—Autonomous.

While this threat scenario may sound like something from a science fiction novel, the technologies that 

would allow swarms of autonomous drones to operate 

on the future battlefield are already being developed. 

One experiment in this regard is being conducted by 

Hungarian civilian researchers with the COLLMOT 

Robotic Research Project who have “created 10 drones 

that self-organize as they move through the air.”84 In 

one example, these drones overcome an obstacle by 

maneuvering in line through a choke point. While 

the researchers strive that this experimentation is for 

peaceful pursuits, the military benefits of increasingly larger groups of drones that can self-organize in 
31

order to fulfill mission requirements is readily apparent. Similar experimentation is ongoing with U.S. Office of Naval Research experiments, which are presently up to 13 autonomous and remote controlled 

swarming robot boats. As for the desired project counterterrorism end state, “The Navy officials envision 

swarms of unmanned surface vehicles . . . being used 

to form a defensive perimeter around larger ships and 

to surround enemy ships.”85 Based on this projected 

threat scenario, two variants, utilizing swarms of 

normal and micro-sized drones, are foreseen.

Drone Swarms.

The full-sized autonomous UAVs incorporated 

into this scenario variant are meant to destroy major 

elements of U.S. power such as the military aircraft 

situated at an air base, the armored vehicles belonging to a brigade combat team, or a major capital ship 

such as an aircraft carrier. A massive drone swarm—

with each semi-intelligent drone networked together 

and outfitted with an explosive warhead—would be 

launched against such military targets in this scenario 

variant. In the case of the targeting of an aircraft carrier, this eventual threat may be considered equivalent in scale to the sinking of captured German battleship Ostfriesland in July 1921 by U.S. Army Air Service 

aircraft under the command of Brigadier General 

William “Billy” Mitchell. This experiment helped to 

prove that aircraft carriers would eventually eclipse 

battleships as the principle capital ship of navy forces 

and suggests, in the present case of drone swarm potentials, that some sort of stealthy drone carriers may 

at some point eclipse aircraft carriers as major surface 

naval combatants.
32

Micro-drone Swarms.

The micro-drones that form the basis of this threat 

scenario variant are meant to be utilized for anti-personnel rather than anti-materiel purposes. Such UAVs 

range in size from small flying insects to that of palmsized devices equivalent in size to small birds.86 Such 

micro-UAVs can be outfitted with a host of traditional 

weapons—small guns and explosives—as well as unconventional armaments such as incapacitators, poisons, and nerve agents.87 In this scenario variant, these 

devices would be intended for urban terrain with the 

micro-swarms utilized against opposing U.S. soldiers.

Of concern is the Anti-Access/Area Denial potentials 

of such projected micro-drone swarms; however, these 

UAVs are presently far too sophisticated for insurgent 

groups to develop, much less field.

It is assumed that over time the dozen or so autonomous drones that can presently self-organize will continue to increase in size into larger and larger groupings. At what point a large enough grouping of drones 

technically becomes a “swarm” is undefined. From a 

biological perspective, honeybee swarms range from 

a few thousand bees into the low tens of thousands. 

As an arbitrary threshold, real drone swarms might 

therefore be said to require at least a thousand or so 

individual UAVs. The operational fielding of such 

swarms on the battlefield may be viable within 2 decades.88 While the threat represented by a few hundred weaponized drones is significant, thousands of 

autonomous self-organizing UAVs operating on the 

battlefield would have immense U.S. national security 

implications. 
33

It should be noted, however, that the futures represented by Threat Scenario 3 may or may not be beyond the capability of a terrorist or insurgent group 

devoid of state or multinational sponsorship. As a 

result, this capability from a threats perspective may 

only be available to advanced states such as China or 

Russia, technologically sophisticated multinational 

corporation equivalent powers, or their terrorist or 

insurgent proxies.

MILITARY IMPLICATIONS AND

POLICY RESPONSE

Derived from the UAV use threat scenarios, three 

levels of military significance are foreseen with terrorist and insurgent activities associated with these devices. Because of the technologies that will eventually 

be associated with UAVs—robotics and expert (and 

artificial intelligence) systems networked together—

their significance is projected to increase over time 

from the tactical to the operational and then to the 

strategic levels of concern. These levels of military implication and the suggested policy responses related 

to them follow. 

Tactical.

The impact of even singular terrorist UAV use at 

this level is viewed as an immediate- and near-term 

problem. It may represent more of a domestic security 

issue than an overseas basing or deployment threat—

although such weaponized devices could just as easily be utilized for terrorism purposes overseas against 

service personnel and their families as they could be 

used against civilians in the United States. The tactical 
34

level threat derived from the drone-up shooting, IED 

crowd targeting, and aircraft takedown scenario variants will be of concern to domestic law enforcement, 

homeland security, and FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force 

elements. 

For the U.S. Army, the tactical implications of such 

UAV use will fall within force protection, counterterrorism, and defense support of civil authorities’ missions. It will focus on UAV detection, countermeasures, 

and tactical response. Like civilian law enforcement, 

the Army will be required to generate new capabilities 

to mitigate this potential threat. Such response may be 

as simple as utilizing shotguns in a skeet shooting role 

that substitute a hostile UAV for a clay disk and/or 

the inclusion of slightly more involved shotgun ammunition modifications such as less-lethal rounds (eg., 

baton or multiple-impact with wire lines) for use in 

urban environments. Stringing up wires to stop access 

into open venues or in flight choke points may prove 

to be other hasty anti-drone protocols that may need 

to be considered if hostile UAV use becomes evident 

in an area of operations. More advanced measures 

being considered by the Army in this regard include 

a new Barrett 25 millimeter anti-drone rifle that has 

been developed, and electronic warfare systems that 

had initially been created for counter-IED use, while 

the Marine Corps is developing a vehicle mounted 

high power laser.89

Since such UAV threat potentials represent a common problem for local, state, and federal law enforcement as well as the Army and other services, it would 

be prudent for such groups and agencies to form joint 

working groups to address the tactical concerns such 

terrorist use could pose. Allied military and federal 

policing bodies, such as those belonging to Canada, 
35

should be considered for inclusion in such working 

groups. Additionally, from an Army perspective, the 

Combating Terrorism Center at West Point might 

represent a natural choice to track ongoing terrorist 

and insurgent UAV interest and use while the various branch bulletins (e.g., Infantry and Military Police) 

could promote UAV countermeasures and response 

thinking.

Operational.

This level of impact is insurgency environment focused and pertains to the use of groups of human controlled and semi-autonomous UAVs. The virtual martyrs and drone squadron scenario variants portrayed 

the various types of flying IED, weapons platform, 

and human insurgent fighter combined arms hybrid 

threats that could be encountered at this level of concern. While conceivably representing a present-day 

operational risk scenario as the technologies exist for 

insurgents to utilize UAVs in this way, this is much 

more likely a near futures issue that could still be 

some years out on the horizon before nonstate opposing forces even contemplate or attempt such attacks. 

Since no terrorism component is readily foreseen 

but rather force-on-force engagements are being focused upon, this is not viewed as a domestic law enforcement and homeland security concern. Rather, it 

is an Army and allied services expeditionary concern, 

bridging the tactical into the operational level of impact. This means that experimentation and red teaming is warranted related to threat forces use of UAVs 

in insurgency type environments. Small scale exercises 

in which red team virtual martyr and drone squadron 

groups (utilizing UAVs containing paintball grenades 

and simulated small arms firing) are pitted against 
36

Army infantry squads and platoons (also armed with 

marking rounds). These exercises are advocated for 

threat baseline and projection determination purposes. 

Competitions between Army personnel with the technical skills to create such commercial threat system 

based quads and related drone systems and the development of the red team concepts to utilize them operationally should also be considered to support such an 

effort.

Given the foreseen impact at the operational level, 

the Army effort to develop such small scale UAV red 

team exercises might best be initially coordinated via 

programs at the U.S. Army Command and General 

Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, and supported 

by writings meant to generate awareness, discussion, 

and debate at the Military Review level of professional 

writing.90 Given ongoing U.S. Naval Postgraduate 

School interest in UAV experimentation, a liaison to 

their programs should also be established. Ultimately, the limited scale red teaming exercises advocated 

could be held at any number of Army training venues such as the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, CA, or the Muscatatuck Urban Training Center, 

Butterville, IN.91 

Strategic.

While the drone swarms of normal and micro-sized 

UAVs projected in this threat scenario may still be a 

few decades out, and possibly even beyond the capacity of terrorist and insurgent forces to field on their own 

without state sponsorship, now is the time to attempt 

to get ahead of such developments and help shape the 

future combat environment.92 At a minimum, we may 

presently be in an inter-war period, as experienced 
37

between World Wars I and II, when the various elements leading to a revolution in military affairs took 

place with the evolution of the tank and supporting 

arms that resulted in the mass armor and mechanized 

formations that fought in World War II. In this instance, similar disparate elements, involving robotics, expert systems, artificial and collective (cloud-like 

based) intelligence, network communications, and 3D 

and 4D replicators may be ushering in another revolution in land warfare involving both ground and aerial 

based unmanned vehicles and systems. 

Given the strategic impact potentials of such aerial 

(and ground) drone swarms on the future conduct of 

war, research and writing is required to be vested at 

the U.S. Army War College level of analysis and policy formulation. Papers derivative from this present 

effort and earlier ones are needed, as well as shorter 

essays written for Parameters, to highlight concerns, 

debates, and insights related to robot autonomy and 

Landpower.93 Considerations need to be made concerning arms control regimes related to such autonomous, intelligent, and lethal robotic systems94 as well 

as their integration with human soldiers into future 

force structures if that Army unit composition is elected to be followed, as presently appears to be the national trajectory. Further, given the Joint Force nature 

of American warfighting, the debate on such autonomous robotic systems and drone swarms needs to be 

expanded to the other senior service war colleges as 

well as equivalent level allied nation defense educational institutions.95
38

ENDNOTES

1. The term UAV (unmanned aerial vehicle) is now being used 

with the newer term UAS (unmanned aerial system) to describe 

these devices. For the purposes of this monograph, the term UAV 

and drone will be used interchangeably. However, drones are 

typically viewed as being fixed wing unmanned aircraft, while 

many would contend that UAVs have rotors and fly more like a 

helicopter.

2. About 200,000 drones are sold each month commercially—

at about $720 million in sales in 2014—with the market projected 

to double in 2015. See Barbara Booth, “Is It Time to Buy Your Kid 

a Drone for Christmas?” CNBC News, December 22, 2014, available from www.cnbc.com/id/102280825.

3. Roger Pigott, “Heathrow Plane in Near Miss with Drone,” 

BBC News, December 7, 2014, available from www.bbc.com/news/

uk-30369701; and Justin Davenport, “Police Alert over Unmanned 

Drones ‘Being Flown Illegally Around London’s Landmarks’,” 

London Evening Standard, January 6, 2015, available from www.

standard.co.uk/news/london/drone-flying-london-police-alert-landmarks-illegal-london-eye-tower-bridge-9959511.html.

4. Caroline Wheeler, “Terror Threat Alert: UK’s Nuclear Plants 

Are at Serious Risk of Terrorist Drone Strikes,” Express, February 

23, 2015, available from www.express.co.uk/news/uk/559718/Nclearplants-are-at-risk-from-a-terrorist-strike-by-unmanned-drones.

5. Jim Acosta and Jeremy Diamond, “U.S. Intel Worker 

Blamed for White House Drone Crash,” CNN News, January 27, 

2015, available from www.cnn.com/2015/01/26/politics/white-housedevice-secret-service/; and Faine Greenwood, “Man Who Crashed 

Drone on White House Lawn Won’t Be Charged,” Slate, March 18, 

2015, available from www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2015/03/18/

white_house_lawn_drone_the_man_who_crashed_it_there_won_t_be_

charged.html/.

6. See “Charlie Hebdo Attack: Three Days of Terror,” BBC 

News, January 14, 2015, available from www.bbc.com/news/worldeurope-30708237; “Mysterious Drones over Paris Cause Panic,” 

The Telegraph, February 24, 2015, available from www.telegraph.
39

co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/11431330/Mysterious-dronesover-Paris-cause-panic.html; and “Al Jazeera Journalists Arrested 

in Connection with Drones over Paris,” NBC News, February 

25, 2015, available from www.nbcnews.com/news/world/al-jazeerajournalists-arrested-connection-drones-over-paris-n312776.

7. The initial documents concerning the emerging UAV terrorism threat are from the 2004-05 period: Michael Gips, “A Remote Threat,” Security Management Online, October 2002; Eugene 

Miasnikov, Threat of Terrorism Using Unmanned Aerial Vehicles:

Technical Aspects, Moscow, Russia: Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies at MIPT, June 2004, Translated 

in English—March 2005, available from www.armscontrol.ru/uav/

report.htm; and Jay Mandelbaum and James Ralston et al., Terrorist Use of Improvised or Commercially Available Precision-Guided 

UAVs at Stand-Off Ranges: An Approach for Formulating Mitigation 

Considerations, ADA460419, Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense 

Analysis, October 2005, available from oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=get

Record&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA460419.

8. Significant contributions in these areas include Manuel 

Castells, Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture trilogy—The Rise of the Network Society (1996), The Power of Identity

(1997), and End of Millennium (1998)—Cambridge, MA: Blackwell 

Publishers; and the more recent Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew 

McAfee, The Second Machine Age: Work, Progress, and Prosperity in a Time of Brilliant Technologies, New York: W. W. Norton & 

Company, 2014.

9. One of the dominant works in this area is from a Brookings Institute scholar. See P. W. Singer, Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the 21st Century, New York: Penguin, 

2009. The Center for New American Security has also been involved in a more recent series on robots on the battlefield. See 

Paul Scharre, Robotics on the Battlefield - Part I: Range, Persistence 

and Daring, Washington, DC: Center for New American Security, May 21, 2014, available from www.cnas.org/range-persistencedaring#.VRR4yEuIzFI; Robert O. Work and Shawn Brimley, 20yy: 

Preparing for War in the Robotic Age, Washington, DC: Center for 

New American Security, January 2014, available from www.cnas.

org/sites/default/files/publications-pdf/CNAS_20YY_WorkBrimley.

pdf; and Paul Scharre, Robotics on the Battlefield Part II: The Coming Swarm, Washington, DC: Center for New American Securi-
40

ty, October 2014, available from www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/

publications-pdf/CNAS_TheComingSwarm_Scharre.pdf.

10. Steven Metz, “Strategic Insights: The Landpower Robot 

Revolution Is Coming,” Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army 

War College (USAWC) website, December 10, 2014, available 

from www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/index.cfm/articles//Land

power-Robot-Revolution/2014/12/10. Recent Strategic Studies Institute interest in this topic dates to at least the Robotics & Contemporary/Future Warfare panel, 20th Annual Strategy Conference, 

“Strategic Implications of Emerging Technologies,” USAWC, 

Carlisle, PA, April 14-16, 2009. Earlier USAWC works on this topic include Mark L. Swinson, Battlefield Robots for Army XXI, 1997; 

and Vincent J. Van Joolen, Artificial Intelligence and Robotics on the 

Battlefield of 2020? 2000.

11. P. W. Singer, Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and 

Conflict in the 21st Century, New York: Penguin Books, 2009, 

pp. 196-197.

12. Medea Benjamin, Drone Warfare: Killing by Remote Control, 

London, UK: Verso, 2013, p. 13.

13. Paul J. Springer, Military Robots and Drones: A Reference 

Handbook, Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2013, pp. 11-12.

14. Singer, pp. 54-56.

15. Springer, pp. 177-178, 189-196.

16. Ibid., pp. 209-210.

17. Of these UAVs, 5,346 are RQ-11 Ravens utilized by the 

Army, Navy, and Special Forces. Overall estimates are derived from 

Dyke Weatherington, Current and Future Potential for Unmanned 

Aircraft Systems, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (OUSD[AT&L]), Unmanned 

Warfare, briefing, December 15, 2010. See Jeremiah Gertler, U.S. 

Unmanned Aerial Systems, R42136, Washington, DC: Congressional 

Research Service, January 3, 2012, pp. 2, 11-12. For more on these 

systems, see Office of the Secretary of Defense, Unmanned Aircraft 

Systems Roadmap: 2005-2030, Washington, DC: Department of 

Defense, 2005.
41

18. Greg Miller, “CIA Seeks to Expand Drone Fleet, Officials Say,” The Washington Post, October 18, 2012, available from 

www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/cia-seeks-to-expand-drone-fleet-officials-say/2012/10/18/01149a8c-1949-11e2-bd10-

5ff056538b7c_story.html.

19. Gertler, pp. 7-9.

20. See Gips; and James M. Smith, “Aum Shinrikyo,” Eric A. 

Croddy, James J. Wirtz, and Jeffrey A. Larsen, eds., Weapons of 

Mass Destruction: An Encyclopedia of Worldwide Policy, Technology, 

and History, Santa Barbara, CA: ABC Clio, 2005, p. 32.

21. Prior to the March 1995 subway attack, an earlier sarin 

gas attack occurred in Matsumoto in June 1994 when the agent 

was placed in the back of a truck—likely this was the actual attack in which helicopters would have been used had they not 

failed in testing. See Kenneth Pletcher, “Tokyo Subway Attack of 

1995,” Encyclopedia Britannica, November 2, 2014, available from 

www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1669544/Tokyo-subway-attackof-1995.

22. Gips.

23. Eugene Miasnikov, Threat of Terrorism Using Unmanned 

Aerial Vehicles: Technical Aspects, Moscow, Russia: Center for Arms 

Control, Energy and Environmental Studies Moscow Institute of 

Physics and Technology, 2005, p. 26; and Testimony of Dennis M. 

Gormley, Senior Fellow, Monterey Institute’s Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Before the Subcommittee on National Security, 

Emerging Threats, and International Affairs of the U.S. House of 

Representatives Committee on Government Reform, March 9, 

2004, available from cns.miis.edu/testimony/testgorm.htm.

24. Miasnikov. The notation is “In June 2002, quoting a German intelligence official, the Reuters news agency reported that al 

Qaeda might be planning to attack passenger aircraft using model 

airplanes.” Cited by Gips.

25. “Colombia - FARC Drones Discovered,” EFE News 

Service, August 28, 2002, in Miasnikov, p. 25.
42

26. Ibid. Also see “Arafat’s New Terror Weapon: Exploding 

Toy Planes,” Debka File, January 14, 2003, available from www.

debka.com/article/2785/Arafat-s-New-Terror-Weapon-Exploding-ToyPlanes. 

27. “Leaders Reschedule Summit for Next Week,” The Washington Times, March 10, 2014, available from www.washingtontimes.com/news/2004/mar/10/20040310-101149-4514r/?page=all. The 

specific passage reads: 

Israel’s Shin Bet security service said it has arrested a Hezbollah operative who was planning to use a remote-controlled airplane packed with explosives to attack a Jewish 

settlement. Shadi Abu Alhazin, 22, a resident of the Khan 

Younis refugee camp in Gaza, began building the plane in 

2002, the agency said in a statement. He was arrested in 

December.

28. Associated Press, “Hezbollah Says It Has Capability to 

Bomb Israel from the Air,” Haaretz, November 12, 2004, available from www.haaretz.com/news/hezbollah-says-it-has-capability-tobomb-israel-from-the-air-1.139975.

29. Reuters, “Hezbollah Flies Drone over Northern Israel,” ABC News, April 12, 2005, available from www.abc.net.au/

cgi-bin/common/printfriendly.pl?http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/200504/s1343190.htm.

30. Riaz Khan, “Pakistan Army Destroys al-Qaida Hide-Out,” 

Free Republic, September 13, 2005, available from www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1483677/posts.

31. United States v. Ali Asad Chandia, also known as Abu 

Qatada and Mohammed Ajmal Khan, also known as Abu Khalid. 

Indictment. Criminal No. 1:05CR401, The United States District 

Court of Virginia, Alexandria Division. Filed September 14, 2005.

32. David Eshel, “Israel Intercept Two Attack UAV Launched 

by Hezbollah,” Defense Update, August 7, 2006, available from 

defense-update.com/2006/08/israel-intercept-two-attack-uav.html.
43

33. “Ohio Man Pleads Guilty to Conspiracy to Bomb Targets in Europe and the United States,” Washington, DC: U.S. 

Department of Justice, June 3, 2008, available from www.justice.

gov/archive/opa/pr/2008/June/08-nsd-492.html; and Paul Cruickshank and Tim Lister, “Analysis: Model Planes as Weapons of 

Terror,” CNN News, September 29, 2011, available from www.

cnn.com/2011/09/29/opinion/model-plane-attack/. See also the 3:19 

minute video embedded in the article.

34. Cruickshank and Lister. Also see Denise Lavoie, “Rezwan 

Ferdaus Admits Guilt in Plot to Blow Up Pentagon and U.S. Capitol,” Huffington Post, July 20, 2012, available from www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/20/rezwan-ferdaus-capitol-pentagon_n_1690755.

html.

35. David Cenciotti, “Photo: Is This the First Taliban-Made 

Drone, Ever?” The Aviationist, May 19, 2012, available from 

theaviationist.com/2012/05/19/taliban-drone/.

36. Yaakov Lappin, “IAF Shoots Down UAV in Northern Negev,” The Jerusalem Post, November 6, 2012, available from www.

jpost.com/landedpages/printarticle.aspx?id=286845; and “Hezbollah 

Drone Photographed Secret IDF Bases,” The Jerusalem Post, October 14, 2012, available from www.jpost.com/Defense/Hezbollahdrone-photographed-secret-IDF-bases.

37. “IAF Intercepts UAV in Israeli Airspace,” IDF Website, April 25, 2013, available from www.idf.il/1283-18842-EN/

Dover.aspx.

38. Avi Issacharoff, “PA Forces Thwart Hamas Attack Drone 

Plot in West Bank,” The Times of Israel, October 25, 2013, available 

from www.timesofisrael.com/pa-forces-uncover-hamas-attack-droneplot/.

39. Peter Enav, “Hamas Boasts New Level of Sophistication, Releasing Video Showing One of Its Drones for First Time,” 

National Post, July 14, 2014, available from news.nationalpost.

com/news/israel-says-it-shot-down-hamas-launched-drone-fourpalestinians-killed-in-separate-airstrike; and Gili Cohen, “Hamas 

Has More Drones Up Its Sleeve, Defense Officials Say,” Haaretz, 

July 15, 2014, available from www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacydefense/.premium-1.605140.
44

40. Peter Bergen and Emily Schneider, “Now ISIS Has 

Drones?” CNN News, August 25, 2014, available from www.cnn.

com/2014/08/24/opinion/bergen-schneider-drones-isis/; and Yasmin 

Tadjdeh, “Islamic State Militants in Syria Now Have Drone Capabilities,” National Defense, August 28, 2014, available from www.

nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/Lists/Posts/Post.aspx?ID=1586.

41. Scott Shane and Ben Hubbard, “ISIS Displaying a Deft 

Command of Varied Media,” International New York Times, August 30, 2014, available from www.nytimes.com/2014/08/31/world/

middleeast/isis-displaying-a-deft-command-of-varied-media.html?_

r=0. See IS drone footage—0.55 minute embedded video.

42. John Hall, “ISIS Propaganda, Call of Duty-Style: Latest 

Footage Shows Drone’s View of Battle-Ravaged Streets of Kobane before Swooping in to Show Gun Battles on the Ground,” 

Daily Mail, December 12, 2014, available from www.dailymail.

co.uk/news/article-2871389/ISIS-propaganda-Call-Duty-style-Latestfootage-shows-drone-s-view-battle-ravaged-streets-Kobane-swoopinggun-battles-ground.html.

43. Adiv Sterman, “Hezbollah Drones Wreak Havoc on Syrian Rebel Bases,” The Times of Israel, September 21, 2014, available 

from www.timesofisrael.com/hezbollah-drones-wreak-havoc-on-syrianrebel-bases/; and Peter Bergen and Emily Schneider, “Hezbollah 

Armed Drone? Militants’ New Weapon,” CNN News, September 

22, 2014, available from www.cnn.com/2014/09/22/opinion/bergenschneider-armed-drone-hezbollah/index.html?sr.

44. In December 2014, an army ground forces commander in 

Iran, the supplier of Hizbollah UAVs, said that a “suicide drone” 

capability was now being promoted and, for the first time ever, 

saw its use in an exercise to attack aerial and ground targets taking place. See “Iran Presents Its Suicide Drones,” Special Dispatch 

6019, MEMRI, April 10, 2015, available from www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/8515.htm.

45. David Alexander, “U.S. Has Flown 2,320 Strikes against 

Islamic State at a Cost of $1.83 Billion: Official,” Reuters, March 

19, 2015, available from www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/19/us-mideast-crisis-usa-idUSKBN0MF2HC20150319.
45

46. This listing may represent only a sampling of the actual 

incidents that have taken place. According to March 2004 Congressional testimony, “One recent accounting of terrorist activity 

notes 43 recorded cases involving 14 terrorist groups in which 

remote-controlled delivery systems were ‘either threatened, developed or actually utilized’,” Testimony of Dennis M. Gormley, 

Senior Fellow, Monterey Institute’s Center for Nonproliferation 

Studies, Before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging 

Threats, and International Affairs of the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Government Reform, March 9, 2004, available from cns.miis.edu/testimony/testgorm.htm.

47. Where a potential real time surveillance capability has also 

been noted is with the domestic U.S. Occupy Movement “Occucopter” which has been utilized during protests since about December 2011. See hackerspaces.org/wiki/OccuCopter. Still, the dominant 

use of both the IS drones and the Occupy drone in these examples 

appears to be for propaganda purposes.

48. On the hooligan (criminal) side, an example of using a 

UAV as a form of protest took place at a European 2016 qualifier 

soccer match in October 2014 between Albania and Serbia. In that 

match, a drone with a “Greater Albania” flag flew onto the field, 

which resulted in a riot breaking out. See Tony Manfred, “AlbaniaSerbia Soccer Brawl Is Unlike Anything You’ve Seen at a Sporting 

Event,” Business Insider, October 15, 2014, available from www.

businessinsider.com/albania-serbia-brawl-2014-10#ixzz3MYdxH5Sh.

49. Not only do we have a discrepancy in the videos of the 

attack itself but also in whether this was an explosive tipped 

drone or a drone mounted standoff weapon. One source of imagery from this incident can be found at “Watch: Hezbollah uses 

drones against Syrian rebels,” The Jerusalem Post, September 21, 

2014, available from www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Watch-Hezbollahuses-drones-against-Syrian-rebels-375986. This suggests an airto-ground weapon. A second video attributed to this attack on 

YouTube and Liveleak is longer, and shows an attack against individuals rather than a facility. See “Hizbullah Uses (Ayoub) Drone 

in Arsal (Syrian-lebanon) Border to Attack Al-Nusra Front,” 

Live Leak, November 1, 2014, available from www.liveleak.com/

view?i=50f_1414833936. While a standoff weapon may be plausible, it would be far simpler to utilize an explosive tipped drone. 
46

This new suicide drone capability has been proclaimed by Iran, 

from whom Hezbollah is acquiring its drones. See Associated 

Press, “Iran’s Army Tests Suicide Drone in Drills,” Military Times, 

December 27, 2014, available from www.militarytimes.com/story/

military/2014/12/27/iran-suicide-drone/20938863/.

50. Milton Hoenig, “Hezbollah and the Use of Drones as a 

Weapon of Terrorism,” Public Interest Reports, Vol. 67, Spring 2014, 

posted June 5, 2014, available from fas.org/pir-pubs/hezbollah-usedrones-weapon-terrorism/. A still developing story at the time of the 

writing of this monograph for publication was a UAV with a radioactive substance on it (cesium) found parked on the roof above 

the Japanese prime minister’s office. See Jake Adelstein, “Drone 

with Radioactive Material Found on Japanese Prime Minister’s 

Office Roof,” The Los Angeles Times, April 22, 2015, available from 

www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-japan-drone-20150422-story.html.

51. This Iranian drone image can be found at “Experts on New 

Iranian Drone: It Can Fly, But that Is It,” The Algemeiner, May 12, 

2013, available from www.algemeiner.com/2013/05/12/experts-onnew-iranian-drone-it-can-fly-but-that-is-it/. Basic forensic analysis 

from the photo by an associate—stand-off weapons expert David 

Kuhn— provided on November 21, 2014, via email, is as follows: 

This may be a prototype weapon. There are a couple of possibilities. It could be a wire command guided rocket used for 

low level attack—hence the robust launch canister. We have 

used tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided (TOW) 

missiles aboard aircraft. This might be a logical start if they 

are working on a future guided weapon. If that is a launch 

tube for that or any other purpose, it would be opened ended at the rear. This tube would also keep the rear fins folded 

until the rocket/missile is fired. The warhead appears to 

be fused, and part of the fire control system appears to be 

mounted up on the wing; possibly a sensor. I suspect that 

their ultimate goal is to create a pylon mounted weapon that 

has a punch approaching a Hellfire missile. It looks like this 

drone has a modified ‘off the shelf’ 360 degree radar under 

the fuselage, down-looking cameras on the wings, and landing gear that is designed for rough field landings.
47

52. The video, which shows the successful use of a drone as 

a platform for a pistol, can be found at Annalee Newitz, “This 

Video of a Drone with a Gun Will Freak You the Hell Out,” 

io9, June 14, 2014, available from io9.com/this-video-of-a-dronewith-a-gun-will-freak-you-the-hel-513442074. The original YouTube posting was on June 13, 2013. See ClearPlexCorp, “Drone 

vs Phone: Samsung Galaxy S IV - Drone Strike,” YouTube, 

available from www.youtube.com/watch?x-yt-ts=1421914688&x-ytcl=84503534&v=jxThXvuP4Vo. A paintball system mounted on a 

drone that shoots multiple targets in quick succession also exists. 

It could conceivably be said to mimic the mounting of a sub-machine gun (utilizing pistol rounds) on a drone. This video can be 

found at Milo Danger (pseudonym), “Citizen Drone Warfare—

Dangerous Information,” YouTube, December 10, 2012, available 

from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jplh7uatr-E. Note—the operator is using virtual reality (VR) googles for drone flying and 

weapon targeting purposes.

53. See, for example, Eric Markowitz, “NYPD Scanning the 

Sky for New Terrorism Threat,” CBS News, October 29, 2014,

available from www.cbsnews.com/news/drone-terrorism-threat-isserious-concern-for-nypd/. The article includes an embedded video 

of the newscast related to the topic.

54. A cursory overview shows UAV smuggling incidents taking place at Elmley Prison in Sheerness, Kent, UK (January 2009), 

a prison in the Tula region south of Moscow, Russia (February 

2011), across the Straight of Gibraltar into Spain (Nov 2011), a Brazilian prison (June 2012), various prisons across Quebec, Canada 

(2013), a prison in Calhoun, Georgia, United States (November 

2013), a prison in Melbourne, Australia (March 2014), and in the 

Kaliningrad region from Lithuania into Russia (May 2014).

55. Robert J. Bunker, “Mexican Cartel Tactical Note #21: 

Cartel Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs),” Small Wars Journal, 

August 1, 2014, available from smallwarsjournal.com/blog/mexicancartel-tactical-note-21.

56. Erica Fink, “This Drone Can Steal What’s on Your 

Phone,” CNN Money, March 20, 2014, available from money.cnn.com/2014/03/20/technology/security/drone-phone/index.

html?section=money_technology&utm_source=feedburner&utm_
48

medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+rss%2Fmoney_

technology+%28Technology%29; and Lauren C. Williams, “New 

Drone Can Hack into Your Smartphone to Steal Usernames and 

Passwords,” Think Progress, March 20, 2014, available from thinkprogress.org/home/2014/03/20/3416961/drones-hack/.

57. John Reed, “Marines Get First-Ever Combat Resupply by 

Drone,” Defensetech. December 21, 2011, available from defensetech.

org/2011/12/21/marines-get-first-ever-resupply-by-drone/.

58. Mark Odell, “US Marines Pilot App to Offer Drone Deliveries for Combat Troops,” Financial Times, May 26, 2014, available 

from www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/a4cfe44a-e1e0-11e3-915b-00144feabdc0.

html#axzz3MlgIjF8T.

59. See “Pioneer RQ-2A UAV,” Smithsonian National Air and 

Space Museum, no date, available from airandspace.si.edu/collections/artifact.cfm?id=A20000794000; and Lawrence Burr, US Fast 

Battleships 1938-91: The Iowa Class, New York: Osprey Publishing, 

2010, p. 44.

60. A transitional step between line-of-sight to the drone and 

wearing eyewear is to use a tablet or smart phone as the controller 

on which the drone video is fed.

61. Robert J. Bunker, “Virtual Martyrs: Jihadists, Oculus Rift, 

and IED Drones,” TRENDS Research & Advisory, Terrorism Futures Series, December 14, 2014, available from trendsinstitution.

org/?p=762.

62. Herve Pellarin, “Drone Racing Star Wars Style Pod Racing 

Are Back!” YouTube, September 30, 2014, available from https://

www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZwL0t5kPf6E. Also see Elliot Williams, 

“Quadrotor Pod Racing,” Hackaday, October 6, 2014, available 

from hackaday.com/2014/10/06/quadrotor-pod-racing/.

63. One example is the use of a storm drone with an iPhone 4 

attached to it for aerial video purposes that was for sale on eBay. 

See www.ebay.co.uk/itm/STORM-DRONE-RC-QUADROTOR-RTFWITH-DEVO-7-TX-FPV-AERIAL-FILIMING-/121109659563. Bidding ended on this item on May 22, 2013.
49

64. The topic of GPS fencing and its application to drone use 

was discussed by participants at the 2nd Annual Behavioral Informatics and Technology Studies (BITS) research workshop in relationship to a presentation given by the author on threats related 

to the use of small unmanned aerial vehicles, at the FBI Behavioral 

Research and Instruction Unit, Critical Incident Response Group, 

FBI Academy, Quantico, VA, August 25-28, 2014.

65. See the FLIR ONE attachment for IOS and Android devices at flir.com/flirone/. The author was given an overview of this 

device and handled it at the LA Drone Expo that took place on 

December 13, 2014, in Los Angeles, CA. For the recent case of a 

police UAV detecting a person via their body heat signature, see 

Eliot Sefton, “Unmanned Police Drone Is Grounded after Arrest,” 

The Week, February 16, 2010, available from www.theweek.co.uk/

politics/16585/unmanned-police-drone-grounded-after-arrest.

66. Flight software exists so that humans are not required to 

pilot drones—the only requirement is for the user to know how 

to utilize the software that comes with these systems. See, for example, TOR Universal Control Software, available from torrobotics.com/post/services/ground-station-software/.

67. The Naval Postgraduate School is seeking to conduct a 

large rival swarm-on-swarm demonstration as a proof of the concept. See Debra Werner, “Drone Swarm: Networks of Small UAVs 

Offer Big Capabilities,” Defense News, June 12, 2013, available 

from archive.defensenews.com/article/20130612/C4ISR/306120029/

Drone-Swarm-Networks-Small-UAVs-Offer-Big-Capabilities. The creation of such networks will be boosted by U.S. Naval unmanned 

boat swarming advances. See Brendan McGarry, “Navy Reports 

Breakthrough in Drone ‘Swarming’,” Defense Tech, October 7, 

2014, available from defensetech.org/2014/10/07/navy-reports-breakthrough-in-drone-swarming/. Such swarming capability is already 

rapidly progressing among civilian researchers, with Hungarian academics having created 10 self-organizing drones. See Bill 

Chappell, “Robot Swarm: A Flock Of Drones That Fly Autonomously,” National Public Radio, February 26, 2014, available from 

www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2014/02/26/283090909/robot-swarma-flock-of-drones-that-fly-autonomously.
50

68. “Industrial Revolution. 3D Printing Ushers in a New Age,” 

not dated, Southampton, UK: University of Southampton, available from www.southampton.ac.uk/promotion/3d_printing_02.shtml. 

YouTube video of the printed aircraft was posted on September 

20, 2011. See “Southampton Engineers Fly SULSA the World’s 

First Printed Aircraft,” YouTube, available from https://www.youtube.com/watch?x-yt-ts=1421828030&x-yt-cl=84411374&v=nxAjjKkqAQ.

69. James O’Toole, “Now This Exists: A 3-D-Printed Drone,” 

CNN Money, July 8, 2014, available from money.cnn.com/2014/07/08/

technology/innovation/3d-print-drone/.

70. Jordan Golson, “A Military-Grade Drone That Can Be Printed Anywhere,” Wired, September 16, 2014, available from www.

wired.com/2014/09/military-grade-drone-can-printed-anywhere/; and 

University of Virginia, “The Razor: UVA’s 3D-printed U.A.V.,” 

YouTube, 29 August 2014, available from https://www.youtube.com/

watch?x-yt-cl=84411374&x-yt-ts=1421828030&v=FwRD7UBGecg. 

The professor leading this project had earlier 3D printed out a 

jet engine.

71. Andy Greenberg, “Meet The ‘Liberator’: Test-Firing The 

World’s First Fully 3D-Printed Gun,” Forbes, May 5, 2013, available from www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2013/05/05/meetthe-liberator-test-firing-the-worlds-first-fully-3d-printed-gun/; and 

Doug Gross, “Texas Company Makes Metal Gun with 3-D Printer,” CNN News, November 8, 2013, available from www.cnn.

com/2013/11/08/tech/innovation/3d-printed-metal-gun/index.html.

72. See Michael Molitch-Hou, “M.I.A.’s New Video Features 

3D Printed Guns, Drones,” 3D Printing Industry, May 21, 2014, 

available from 3dprintingindustry.com/2014/05/21/m-s-new-videofeatures-3d-printed-guns-drones/.

73. For a couple of recent bird strike incidents, see Aaron 

Brown, “Terror Flight: Flybe Jet Loses Engine on Take-Off (but 

Pilot Flies to Destination Anyway),” Express, November 11, 2014,

available from www.express.co.uk/news/uk/534219/Flybe-PassengerPlane-Engine-Bird-Strike; and “Flight from Sacramento Makes 

Emergency Landing after Striking Birds,” Reuters, January 9, 

2015, available from www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/09/usa-flight-
51

california-idUSL1N0UO1V520150109. Bird strikes, while serious 

affairs, typically pose very low threats to aircraft survivability 

because the possibility of such strikes are engineered into engine 

designs and the birds being ingested by the engines are composed 

of nondense materials. See, for example, Mark Atwater, “Engineering the Danger Out of Airplane Bird Strikes,” Engineering.

com, November 13, 2013, available from www.engineering.com/

DesignerEdge/DesignerEdgeArticles/ArticleID/6635/Engineering-thedanger-out-of-airplane-bird-strikes.aspx.

74. These radio controlled hobbyist aircraft can be purchased 

for less than $1,000.00. For the F-86 craft (1/9 scale) that Rezwan 

Ferdaus was going to utilize, see www.jethangar.com/Aircraft/

Sabre/F86.html.

75. A kinetic energy penetrator rod is used to pierce tank armor. It looks like a large pointed steel projectile or dart. In this 

instance, such a rod would be secured to a hobbyist drone aircraft 

that would then be used to deliver it into an aircraft engine by 

flying into it.

76. Such concerns over drones flying over sports arenas have 

been made known by domestic policing and governmental agencies. See, for instance, Amanda Vicinanzo, “NYPD Developing 

Strategy to Counter Terrorist Drone Use,” HSToday.us, November 

3, 2014, available from www.hstoday.us/briefings/daily-news-analysis/single-article/nypd-developing-strategy-to-counter-terrorist-droneuse/4bf0cd619bc5981119cb390b9894968f.html; and Sean Lawson, 

“Drone Fear and the FAA Ban on Model Aircraft Near Stadiums,” 

Forbes, December 5, 2014, available from www.forbes.com/sites/

seanlawson/2014/12/05/drone-fear-and-the-faa-ban-on-model-aircraftnear-stadiums/.

77. Such an attack capability traditionally would be carried 

out using rocket propelled grenades (RPGs) at very low altitudes 

and surface to air missiles at much higher altitudes. Anti-material 

(such as .50 caliber) rifles and heavier armaments could also be 

utilized. None of these are viewed as offering the precision and 

kinetic mass that a drone strike against a jet engine guided by a 

video link can provide.

78. Bunker, “Virtual Martyrs.”
52

79. Uncertainty exists if a drone could be rigged with an EFP 

due to higher weight requirements. A shaped charged variant 

could conceivably utilize an RPG round-like device, however, inflight arming safety features would need to be bypassed.

80. If used for terrorism purposes, the multiple drones in these 

scenario variants would potentially generate much more “terror” 

than singular drones in the first two variants of Threat Scenario 1.

81. Robert J. Bunker and Charles “Sid” Heal, eds., Fifth Dimensional Operations: Space-Time-Cyber Dimensionality in Conflict 

and War—A Terrorism Research Center Book, Bloomington, IL: 

iUniverse, 2014.

82. For example, see David McNally, “Army Focuses on Autonomous System Development,” Army Homepage, November 10, 

2014, available from www.army.mil/article/137718/Army_focuses_

on_autonomous_system_development/.

83. We may see this variant utilized on the battlefield by nonstate forces first, or it may be simply skipped over by nonstate or 

state militaries that engage in a disruptive technology capability 

leap and directly field projected swarm forces.

84. Bill Chappell, “Robot Swarm: A Flock Of Drones That Fly 

Autonomously,” NPR, February 26, 2014, available from www.

npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2014/02/26/283090909/robot-swarm-aflock-of-drones-that-fly-autonomously. See the 4:23 minute video.

85. Thomas Claburn, “Navy Tests Swarming Autonomous 

Boats,” InformationWeek, November 7, 2014, available from www.

informationweek.com/government/mobile-and-wireless/navy-testsswarming-autonomous-boats/d/d-id/1316410. See the 6:38 minute 

video. The U.S. Navy’s Low-Cost Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 

Swarming Technology (LOCUST) program with its aerial drone 

launcher represents another advancement in this area. See Dan Lamothe, “Watch LOCUST, the Navy’s Prototype Launcher to Send 

Drones into the Sky,” The Washington Post, April 14, 2015, available from www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2015/04/14/

watch-locust-the-navys-prototype-launcher-to-send-drones-into-thesky/. Includes a 1:20 minute video.
53

86. For a summary of the communication requirements (four 

building blocks) to create network capabilities for these devices, 

see Alpen-Adria, “Applications of networked micro-drones,” 

Phys.org, March 4, 2015, available from phys.org/news/2015-03-applications-networked-micro-drones.html.

87. The U.S. Air Force is presently working on micro-air vehicles for covert access, reconnaissance, targeting, and launching 

attacks on opposing troops. This service has a “micro-aviary” 

laboratory in which these robots are being developed. See Conor 

Friedersdorf, “Like a Swarm of Lethal Bugs: The Most Terrifying 

Drone Video Yet,” The Atlantic, February 19, 2013, available from 

www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/02/like-a-swarm-oflethal-bugs-the-most-terrifying-drone-video-yet/273270/. See the 4:26 

minute video.

88. This general projection is based on a Moore’s law estimate 

derived from increasing computing power that, in turn, doubles 

autonomous drone swarm size from a base of 12 from 2015 onward. Even this projection may be conservative. A 50-on-50 drone 

battle was set for later in 2015 at the U.S. Naval Post Graduate 

School as part of the wider Consortium for Robotics and Unmanned Systems Education and Research (CRUSER) initiative. 

The current status of this competition is unknown. See Berenice 

Baker, “Dogfighting Drones—Swarms of Unmanned Battle-Bots 

Take to the Skies,” Airforce-technology.com, July 23, 2013, available 

from www.airforce-technology.com/features/featuredogfight-dronesunmanned-battle-bot-swarms/. For DoD views on swarm Autonomous Capability Levels from 1-10 and time frames, see Office 

of the Secretary of Defense, Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap: 

2005-2030, Washington, DC: Department of Defense, p. D-10.

89. Brendan McGarry, “Barrett Unveils Drone-Killing Rifle,” KitUp! September 26, 2013, available from kitup.military.

com/2013/09/barrett-unveils-drone-killing.html; “Army Eyes Electronic Warfare Systems to Take Aim at Aerial Drones,” Inside 

the Army, October 10, 2014; and Mark Prigg, “The Jeep that Can 

Down a Drone: US Navy Reveals Anti-UAV Weapon that Can 

Fire Lasers from a Moving Vehicle,” Daily Mail, April 16, 2015, 

available from www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-3042633/Thejeep-drone-Navy-reveals-anti-UAV-weapon-fire-lasers-moving-vehicle.

html#ixzz3Xa8vCsSl.
54

90. The Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, 

KS, is also tracking this issue. See their “Special Look: Counter 

UAV” section in OEWatch, Vol. 5, No. 4, April 2015, available 

from fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/OEWatch/201504/index.html.

91. Additionally, these exercises could be integrated with the 

field testing of new technologies to combat WMD carrying UAVs 

being solicited by the Pentagon. See Patrick Tucker, “The Military 

Wants New Technologies To Fight Drones,” Defense One, November 6, 2014, available from www.defenseone.com/technology/2014/11/

military-wants-new-technologies-fight-drones/98387/.

92. Such drone swarms are now becoming a recognized threat 

to future Army operations. See Michael Peck, “How the U.S. Army 

Plans to Defeat the Unthinkable: Drone Swarms,” The National Interest, January 18, 2015, available from nationalinterest.org/feature/

how-the-us-army-plans-defeat-the-unthinkable-drone-swarms-12057.

93. Very little has been written in Parameters on this topic over 

the last 15 years. The most significant work is probably Thomas 

K. Adams, “Future Warfare and the Decline of Human Decisionmaking,” Parameters, Winter 2001-02, pp. 57-71, available from 

strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Articles/01winter/

adams.htm. That author’s discussion of projected developments 

in autonomous warfighting systems is derived from information 

provided in the prophetic U.S. Department of the Army, STAR 21: 

Strategic Technologies for the Army of the 21st Century, Washington, 

DC: National Academy Press, 1996.

94. International deliberations on the fielding of such lethal 

robots is ongoing: 

This week [April 2015], a ban on lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS) is being debated at the Convention 

on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) in Geneva. The 

U.S. delegation has been non-committal on such a ban, and 

U.S. policy currently permits the Department of Defense 

(DoD) to pursue the development of LAWS in a responsible 

manner.

See Steven Groves, “U.N. Conference Debating a Ban on Autonomous Weapons: Understanding Key Issues,” Issue Brief 
55

#4385 on National Security and Defense, Washington, DC: The 

Heritage Foundation, April 16, 2015, available from www.heritage.org/research/reports/2015/04/un-conference-debating-a-ban-onautonomous-weapons-understanding-key-issues.

95. A recent example of Canadian and American bilateral 

cooperation concerning the exploration of the challenges related 

to robotics and autonomous systems in land warfare is the KCIS 

2015: Robotics and Military Operations conference held May 11-13, 

2015, in Kingston, Canada, available from www.queensu.ca/kcis/

index.html.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General William E. Rapp

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

and

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE PRESS

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Steven K. Metz

Author

Dr. Robert J. Bunker

Editor for Production

Dr. James G. Pierce

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil