Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee 

on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, 

Committee on Armed Services, U.S. 

Senate 

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

November 2004 NUCLEAR 

NONPROLIFERATION

DOE Needs to 

Consider Options to 

Accelerate the Return 

of Weapons-Usable 

Uranium from Other 

Countries to the 

United States and 

Russia 

GAO-05-57 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-57.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Gene Aloise at 

(202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-05-57, a report to the 

Chairman, Subcommittee on Emerging 

Threats and Capabilities, Committee on 

Armed Services, U.S. Senate 

November 2004

NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION

DOE Needs to Consider Options to 

Accelerate the Return of Weapons-Usable 

Uranium from Other Countries to the 

United States and Russia 

For a number of reasons, including the cost of converting reactors from HEU

to LEU fuel, DOE has not reached agreement with reactor operators in 11 of 

the 23 countries that still have U.S.-origin HEU to return all of the HEU to 

the United States. In contrast, reactor operators in 12 of the countries either 

have signed contracts with DOE to return all of their U.S.-origin HEU or are 

developing their own means of disposal. DOE is considering offering 

incentives to foreign research reactors to return their HEU to the United 

States but so far has not determined what incentives it will offer and to 

which countries. DOE has not revised the fees imposed on high-income 

countries since establishing the fuel acceptance program in 1996. However, 

DOE reserved the right to change the fees in response to changes in 

circumstances. While lowering the fees for returning HEU may encourage 

additional reactors to participate in the program, DOE could recover a 

greater portion of the disposal costs by raising the fees for accepting LEU. 

DOE plans to complete the Russian fuel return program by 2009 and 

estimates the program could cost about $100 million, but this estimate and 

time frame may not be reliable because of uncertainties associated with 

planning future shipments. The shipments to date have all consisted of fresh 

(unused) HEU fuel, which DOE considers the highest priority for returning 

to Russia because it is more vulnerable to theft. DOE is facing delays in 

returning spent HEU fuel, which has been used in a reactor, in part because 

Russia is planning to conduct an environmental assessment for each 

shipment. DOE has asked Russia to conduct a single environmental 

assessment for the spent HEU fuel in all of the countries participating in the 

program to expedite future shipments of spent fuel, but so far Russia has not 

agreed to this. DOE is considering ways to accelerate the program that 

could also increase the cost of the program by more than $30 million. 

Spent Research Reactor Fuel in Transport to a U.S. Disposal Facility 

Many foreign nuclear research 

reactors use highly enriched 

uranium (HEU) fuel. Because HEU 

can be used in nuclear weapons, 

the Department of Energy (DOE) 

has two programs to return HEU 

from foreign reactors to either the 

United States or Russia. The U.S. 

fuel acceptance program includes 

HEU exported by the United States 

to 34 countries, 11 of which have 

returned all of their HEU. The 

program also includes low enriched 

uranium (LEU) fuel, which would 

be very difficult to use in a nuclear 

weapon. DOE imposes a fee on 

high-income countries to partially 

offset the cost of disposing of HEU 

and LEU fuel in the United States. 

Under the Russian fuel return 

program, DOE assists in the return 

of Russian-origin HEU from 14 

countries to Russia. GAO was 

asked to examine (1) the status of 

DOE efforts to recover remaining 

inventories of U.S.-origin HEU and 

the extent to which the fees 

imposed on high-income countries 

support these efforts, and (2) the 

cost and time frame for completing 

the Russian fuel return program. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that DOE (1) 

consider offering incentives to 

foreign research reactors to return 

HEU to the United States, including 

lowering fees for accepting HEU 

from high-income countries; and 

(2) evaluate raising fees for 

returning LEU to the United States 

to offset as much of the disposal 

costs as possible. DOE concurred 

with our recommendations. 
Page i GAO-05-57 Nuclear Nonproliferation 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 6 

Background 7 

Eleven of the 23 Countries with U.S.-Origin HEU Do Not Have 

Plans to Return It to the United States or Dispose of It 

Domestically 12 

DOE Plans to Complete the Return of HEU to Russia by 2009 at a 

Cost of about $100 Million 19 

Conclusions 22 

Recommendations for Executive Action 24 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 24 

Scope and Methodology 24 

Appendix I Details of HEU and LEU Fuel Returned to the 

United States 28 

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Energy 29 

Tables 

Table 1: Shipments of Fresh HEU Fuel to Russia 12 

Table 2: Countries That Do Not Currently Have Plans to Return All 

U.S.-Origin HEU 14 

Table 3: HEU and LEU Fuel Returned to the United States, by 

Country, and Fees Paid by Research Reactor Operators in 

High-Income Countries 28 

Figures 

Figure 1: Example of a Research Reactor Fuel Assembly 3 

Figure 2: 34 Countries with U.S.-origin HEU Included in DOE’s Fuel 

Acceptance Program 9 

Figure 3: Facility in the Netherlands for Storage of Spent Fuel from 

Research and Power Reactors 17 

Contents 
Page ii GAO-05-57 Nuclear Nonproliferation 

Abbreviations 

DOE Department of Energy 

FRR SNF Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel Acceptance 

 program 

HEU highly enriched uranium 

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency 

IG Office of Inspector General 

LEU low enriched uranium 

MCC Material Consolidation and Conversion project 

NNSA National Nuclear Security Administration 

RERTR Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors 

 program 

RRRFR Russian Research Reactor Fuel Return program

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further 

permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or 

other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to 

reproduce this material separately. 
Page 1 GAO-05-57 Nuclear Nonproliferation 

November 19, 2004 

The Honorable Pat Roberts 

Chairman, Subcommittee on 

 Emerging Threats and Capabilities 

Committee on Armed Services 

United States Senate 

Dear Mr. Chairman: 

Civilian nuclear research reactors around the world use and store highly 

enriched uranium (HEU) fuel. The reactors are used in medicine, 

agriculture, and industry and for basic scientific research. The United 

States and the Soviet Union began providing the HEU used by many of 

these reactors in the 1950s. HEU can also be used as a key component in 

making a nuclear weapon. As a result, the United States has a longstanding nonproliferation goal of reducing the amount of HEU that is used 

and stored at these reactors. To accomplish this goal, the Department of 

Energy (DOE) has established three programs: one program to convert the 

reactors from HEU to low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel, which is 

considered to be less of a proliferation threat because it is very difficult to 

use in nuclear weapons, and two related programs to take back HEU from 

foreign research reactors for safe storage and disposal in either the United 

States or Russia, depending on the HEU’s origin. 

We reported on DOE’s progress in implementing the first program—the 

Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) program—

in July 2004.1

 Since 1978, the goal of this program has been to get research 

reactors around the world to convert from HEU fuel to LEU fuel. In our 

report, we found, among other things, that 66 of the 105 research reactors 

included in the program continue to use HEU fuel for a number of reasons, 

including lack of funding for conversion to LEU and technical setbacks in 

developing LEU fuels to replace HEU. We recommended that DOE 

evaluate the costs and benefits of providing additional incentives to 

foreign research reactor operators to convert to LEU. DOE’s two related 

 1

GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE Needs to Take Action to Further Reduce the Use of 

Weapons-Usable Uranium in Civilian Research Reactors, GAO-04-807 (Washington, D.C.: 

July 30, 2004). 

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 
Page 2 GAO-05-57 Nuclear Nonproliferation 

programs for returning HEU to the United States or Russia are the Foreign 

Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel Acceptance (FRR SNF) program, 

created in 1996, and the Russian Research Reactor Fuel Return (RRRFR) 

program.2

 DOE began discussions with Russia on the Russian fuel return 

program in 1999 and signed a bilateral agreement in 2004. Figure 1 shows 

an example of a fuel assembly used in a research reactor. 

 2

In this report, we refer to the FRR SNF program as the fuel acceptance program and the 

RRRFR program as the Russian fuel return program. 
Page 3 GAO-05-57 Nuclear Nonproliferation 

Figure 1: Example of a Research Reactor Fuel Assembly 

DOE’s fuel acceptance program is designed to return U.S.-origin HEU from 

34 countries to the United States for safe storage and disposal and to 

encourage foreign research reactors to convert to LEU fuel. Currently, 11 

Source: GAO.

Research reactor

fuel assembly
Page 4 GAO-05-57 Nuclear Nonproliferation 

of the 34 countries have returned all of the HEU to the United States, and 

23 still possess U.S.-origin HEU fuel. The scope of the fuel acceptance 

program includes an estimated 5,000 kilograms of HEU that the United 

States exported to research reactors in the 34 countries as well as an 

estimated 15,000 kilograms of LEU. DOE included LEU fuel in the scope of 

the program, even though LEU does not pose the same proliferation risk 

as HEU, because operators of many foreign research reactors had no other 

way to dispose of LEU fuel. Reactor operators need a means to dispose of 

spent fuel, and by including LEU in the fuel acceptance program, DOE 

provides operators of foreign research reactors with an assured means of 

disposing of spent fuel even after converting to LEU. 

DOE imposes a fee on research reactors in high-income countries (as 

defined by the World Bank), such as the Netherlands and Japan, to offset 

as much as possible the cost of fuel disposal in the United States. The fees 

were not intended to cover the full cost of managing foreign research 

reactor spent fuel or the long-term cost of permanent disposal; DOE kept 

the fees low to encourage research reactor operators to participate in the 

program. DOE reserved the right to modify the fees at any time in 

response to a change in circumstances, including the cost of managing the 

fuel in the United States. The fees charged to reactors in high-income 

countries, which were established in 1996, do not exceed $3,750 to $4,500 

per kilogram of LEU (depending on where in the United States the LEU is 

shipped) and $4,500 per kilogram of HEU. DOE generally charges less for 

LEU fuel to avoid penalizing foreign reactors that convert to LEU. DOE 

does not impose fees on research reactors in non-high-income countries 

and, in addition, pays for most of the cost of transporting their spent fuel 

to the United States in order to encourage them to participate in the 

program. 

DOE originally planned for the fuel acceptance program to end in 2009. 

DOE had anticipated that by 2009 operators of foreign research reactors 

would have made their own arrangements for managing U.S.-origin spent 

fuel, such as commercial reprocessing (a method for treating fuel prior to 

final disposal) or development of domestic disposal facilities, thereby 

eliminating the need to return the fuel to the United States. However, one 

of the LEU fuels developed by the RERTR program cannot be easily 

reprocessed, hindering efforts to dispose of spent LEU fuel other than by 

returning it to the United States. To assist foreign research reactors in 

developing other spent fuel management options, DOE’s RERTR program 

is working to develop a new reprocessable LEU fuel that foreign reactor 

operators can switch to once it is developed and available commercially. 

In 2003, a group of foreign research reactor operators petitioned DOE to 
Page 5 GAO-05-57 Nuclear Nonproliferation 

extend the program beyond 2009, citing technical setbacks in the 

development of a reprocessable LEU fuel. The reactor operators feared 

the expiration of DOE’s fuel acceptance program and the delay in 

developing a new LEU fuel would leave reactors without a way to dispose 

of spent fuel. In April 2004, the Secretary of Energy announced his 

intention to extend the U.S. fuel acceptance program beyond the original 

2009 end date. DOE is considering extending the program by 5 or 10 years 

to support the reactor operators that have converted their reactors to LEU. 

DOE’s final program, aimed at facilitating the return of HEU to Russia, has 

identified research reactors in 17 countries (mostly in the former Soviet 

Union and Eastern Europe) that have Russian-origin fuel. DOE pays the 

cost of transporting and disposing of HEU fuel in Russia. The Secretary of 

Energy has estimated that there are about 4,000 kilograms of Russianorigin fuel in the 17 countries.3

 So far, DOE has provided assistance to 

return about 100 kilograms of fresh (unused) HEU fuel from 5 countries 

(Bulgaria, Libya, Romania, Serbia, and Uzbekistan) for storage at two 

nuclear facilities in Russia—Dmitrovgrad and Novosibirsk. In addition, 

DOE plans to pay Russia to “blend down” the HEU returned to 

Dmitrovgrad to LEU, thereby reducing the risk that the material could be 

used in a nuclear weapon. In return, operators of foreign research reactors 

with Russian-origin HEU fuel must agree to shut down or convert their 

reactors to LEU. 

In response to your request, we examined DOE efforts to recover HEU 

fuel from foreign research reactors and assessed (1) the status of DOE 

efforts to return remaining inventories of U.S.-origin HEU for storage and 

disposal in the United States and the extent to which the fees DOE 

imposes on high-income countries support these efforts, and (2) DOE’s 

estimate of the cost and time frame for completing the Russian fuel return 

program. 

To address these objectives, we analyzed documentation from both 

programs, including inventories of HEU fuel and data on fuel returned to 

date. We also analyzed DOE data on expenditures in support of the fuel 

acceptance program and fees paid by reactors in high-income countries to 

return their fuel to the United States. To obtain information on how the 

program is working, we interviewed operators of research reactors in 

Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, and 

 3

According to a DOE official, this estimate includes LEU fuel in Serbia. 
Page 6 GAO-05-57 Nuclear Nonproliferation 

Ukraine. We discussed the status of the programs with DOE and Russian 

officials and with officials in the other countries we visited. We conducted 

our review from July 2003 to October 2004 in accordance with generally 

accepted government auditing standards. 

DOE has not reached agreement with research reactor operators in 11 of 

the 23 countries that still have U.S.-origin HEU to return all of the HEU to 

the United States. Reactor operators in the 11 countries have not made 

arrangements to return the HEU for a number of reasons, including the 

cost of conversion to LEU. For example, some reactor operators are 

planning to use their HEU, despite DOE’s efforts to encourage them to 

convert their reactors to LEU fuel and return the HEU fuel to the United 

States, because they do not want to incur the expense of paying for 

conversion. In addition, in some high-income countries such as Austria, 

the cost of returning the HEU (including transportation) may be a factor in 

not making plans to return the material to the United States. DOE is 

considering offering further incentives to reactor operators to convert to 

LEU and return their HEU to the United States but thus far has not 

determined what incentives it will offer and to which countries. Finally, 

informal diplomatic approaches to discuss the return of HEU from 

research reactors in Iran and Pakistan have been unsuccessful. In contrast, 

operators of reactors in 12 of the 23 countries that still have U.S.-origin 

HEU either have signed contracts with DOE to return all of the HEU to the 

United States by 2009 or are developing their own means to dispose of 

HEU fuel. We recommend that DOE consider offering incentives to foreign 

research reactors to return HEU to the United States, including lowering 

the fees for returning HEU. 

Furthermore, while DOE has proposed extending the time frame of the 

fuel acceptance program by 5 or 10 years, it has not revised the fees it 

charges to research reactors in high-income countries since establishing 

the program in 1996. DOE set the fees at a level to encourage the reactors 

to convert to LEU fuel and return HEU rather than to cover the disposal 

cost in the United States. However, when DOE set the fees, it reserved the 

right to change them in response to changes in circumstances. For 

example, with the proposed extension of the program, the United States 

would accept larger quantities of LEU from foreign research reactors than 

originally planned. According to DOE and State Department officials, 

failure to extend the fuel acceptance program would penalize operators of 

research reactors that the United States encouraged to convert to LEU 

because the only currently available option for disposing of the type of 

LEU fuel used by some reactors is returning it to the United States. 

Results in Brief 
Page 7 GAO-05-57 Nuclear Nonproliferation 

Nevertheless, the proposed extension could justify an increase in the fees 

charged to high-income countries. While lowering the fees for returning 

HEU may encourage additional countries to participate in the program, 

DOE could recover a greater portion of the cost of the program by raising 

the fees for accepting LEU. We recommend that DOE evaluate raising the 

fees for countries returning LEU to the United States. 

DOE plans to complete the Russian fuel return program by 2009 and 

estimates the program could cost about $100 million, but this estimate and 

time frame may not be reliable because of uncertainties associated with 

planning future shipments. The shipments to date have all consisted of 

fresh (unused) HEU fuel, which DOE considers the highest priority for 

returning to Russia because it is less radioactive than spent fuel and 

therefore easier to handle and potentially steal. DOE has targeted four 

more countries for removal of fresh HEU by 2005. However, DOE has not 

provided assistance to return spent HEU fuel to Russia from any of the 

countries. The Russian fuel return program is facing delays in returning 

spent fuel because Russia is planning to conduct an environmental 

assessment for each shipment, and complex negotiations are needed to 

arrange some shipments. DOE has asked Russia to conduct a single 

environmental assessment for all spent fuel in all the countries that are 

participating in the program, which would help expedite future shipments 

of spent fuel, but so far Russia has not agreed to this. DOE officials said 

they expect shipments of spent fuel, which is more difficult to dispose of, 

to cost more than fresh fuel shipments. While DOE has spent about $1.5 

million in support of four of the shipments of fresh HEU fuel, Russia’s 

estimate of the transportation and disposal costs for the first shipment of 

spent fuel, from Uzbekistan, is $5.7 million. Furthermore, according to 

DOE officials, Russia has not agreed to a fixed fee for accepting future 

shipments of spent fuel because the costs of managing the fuel in Russia 

could increase. DOE is considering ways to accelerate the Russian fuel 

return program, such as purchasing a cask with a larger capacity for 

transporting HEU fuel than currently available casks and developing a new 

technology to dilute spent HEU fuel into LEU before shipping it to Russia. 

DOE officials estimate that these options could also increase the cost of 

the program by more than $30 million. 

Civilian nuclear research reactors located throughout the world contribute 

to the development of nuclear power, basic and applied science, and 

isotope production for medicine and industry. While many of the reactors 

use LEU fuel, others use or have inventories of HEU. The fuel acceptance 

program and Russian fuel return program are part of the Global Threat 

Background 
Page 8 GAO-05-57 Nuclear Nonproliferation 

Reduction Initiative announced by the Secretary of Energy in a speech on 

May 26, 2004, to secure, remove, or dispose of a broad range of nuclear 

and radiological materials that are vulnerable to theft. The programs also 

benefit foreign research reactors by providing them with a way to dispose 

of spent fuel. 

DOE’s fuel acceptance program identified 34 countries with U.S.-origin 

HEU eligible for return to the United States. Research reactors in 11 of the 

34 countries have returned all of the HEU to the United States. In the 

remaining 23 countries, 11 have returned a portion of their U.S.-origin 

HEU, and 12 have not returned any HEU (see fig. 2). In total, DOE 

estimates it has recovered 914 kilograms of HEU fuel, enough to build an 

estimated 20 nuclear weapons.4

 (See app. I for a list of the countries that 

have returned HEU and LEU fuel to the United States and the amount 

returned.) 

 4

The estimate of the number of nuclear weapons is based on the amount of the isotope 

uranium-235 in the HEU fuel. 
Page 9 GAO-05-57 Nuclear Nonproliferation 

Figure 2: 34 Countries with U.S.-origin HEU Included in DOE’s Fuel Acceptance 

Program 

Notes: In addition to the 34 countries with U.S.-origin HEU, the United States exported LEU (but not 

HEU) to 7 countries—Bangladesh, Congo, Finland,a

 Malaysia, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. The 

amount of HEU exported to some of the countries is small. For example, Indonesia has a small 

amount of HEU used for the production of medical isotopes as well as LEU fuel (but not HEU fuel), 

and the research reactor in Jamaica has only a small amount of HEU fuel located in the core of the 

reactor. 

a

High-income countries at the beginning of the fuel acceptance program in 1996. According to DOE 

officials, Greece, Portugal, and South Korea are now also considered high-income countries. 

The fuel returned to the United States is mostly stored at DOE’s Savannah 

River Site, with a small portion also stored at DOE’s Idaho National 

Engineering and Environmental Laboratory. DOE anticipates that it will 

ship the fuel to the geologic repository at Yucca Mountain in Nevada for 

final disposal, assuming the facility is completed as planned. DOE 

completed an environmental impact statement and established the fuel 

acceptance program in 1996.5

 The fuel acceptance program is a 

 5

Prior to DOE’s establishment of the fuel acceptance program, GAO issued a report in 

March 1994 recommending that DOE complete environmental requirements and begin 

accepting spent fuel from foreign research reactors. See GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation: 

Concerns with U.S. Delays in Accepting Foreign Research Reactors’ Spent Fuel, 

GAO/RCED-94-119 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 25, 1994). 
Page 10 GAO-05-57 Nuclear Nonproliferation 

continuation of previous programs that allowed foreign research reactors 

to dispose of U.S.-origin fuel in the United States. 

In a February 2004 review, DOE’s Office of Inspector General (IG) found 

that DOE was likely to recover about half of the HEU eligible under the 

fuel acceptance program, in part because the participation of countries 

with U.S.-origin fuel is voluntary and some countries have chosen not to 

participate.6

 Furthermore, the IG found that the program did not include 

another 12,300 kilograms of HEU that the United States had exported 

because DOE, when establishing the fuel acceptance program in 1996, 

limited the types of fuel that would be eligible for return. The IG 

recommended that DOE determine whether the fuel acceptance program 

should be expanded to include all HEU exported by the United States and 

whether improvements could be made to encourage greater participation 

of countries that have HEU fuel covered by the program. The IG also 

recommended that DOE determine whether the National Nuclear Security 

Administration (NNSA) could more effectively manage the program, which 

is currently being managed by DOE’s Office of Environmental 

Management. In response, the Secretary of Energy announced that the 

program would be transferred to NNSA and combined with DOE’s Russian 

fuel return program, already being managed by NNSA. According to DOE 

officials, DOE plans to address, through a separate program, the IG 

recommendation regarding U.S.-origin HEU not currently covered under 

the fuel acceptance program because returning additional inventories of 

HEU to the United States would require an analysis of environmental 

impacts, including how the material would be stored. DOE officials said 

they do not want to delay the proposed extension of the fuel acceptance 

program in order to allow time to conduct such an analysis. 

DOE has identified 17 countries with Russian-origin fuel, 14 of which have 

HEU fuel that DOE has included under the Russian fuel return program. 

The 14 countries are Belarus, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Germany, 

Hungary, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Libya, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Ukraine, 

 6

DOE IG, Recovery of Highly Enriched Uranium Provided to Foreign Countries, DOE/IG0638 (Washington, D.C.; Feb. 9, 2004). 
Page 11 GAO-05-57 Nuclear Nonproliferation 

Uzbekistan, and Vietnam.7 Two countries, Germany and Romania, have 

both U.S-origin and Russian-origin HEU fuel. 

DOE has provided funding and technical assistance for shipments of about 

100 kilograms of fresh HEU fuel to Russia from 5 countries—Bulgaria, 

Libya, Romania, Serbia, and Uzbekistan. (The State Department and the 

Nuclear Threat Initiative, a private foundation, also participated in the 

removal of HEU from Serbia.) The fresh HEU fuel from Bulgaria, Libya, 

Serbia, and Uzbekistan was shipped to the Research Institute of Atomic 

Reactors in Dmitrovgrad for downblending into LEU to reduce the risk of 

the material being used in a nuclear weapon.8

 As of October 2004, DOE 

had signed a contract with Dmitrovgrad to downblend the HEU from 

Serbia and was negotiating contracts to downblend the HEU from 

Bulgaria, Libya, and Uzbekistan. A DOE official estimated that 

Dmitrovgrad would complete the downblending of the HEU from Serbia 

by spring 2005, after resolving technical difficulties encountered in the 

downblending process. DOE officials said that the HEU fuel from Romania 

was sent to the Novosibirsk site in Russia, because the Dmitrovgrad 

facility did not have the technical capability to downblend the HEU fuel 

from Romania. (Table 1 summarizes the five shipments of fresh HEU to 

Russia.) 

 7

According to DOE officials, three other countries—China, Egypt, and North Korea—have 

Russian-origin research reactor fuel but are not likely candidates for the program—China 

because it is a nuclear weapons state, Egypt because it possesses only LEU, and North 

Korea because of its development of nuclear weapons. 

8

The downblending is part of DOE’s Material Consolidation and Conversion (MCC) project, 

which pays to downblend HEU currently stored at sites in Russia into LEU. For more 

information on the MCC project, part of DOE’s program for improving the security over 

weapons-usable nuclear material in Russia, see GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation: Security 

of Russia’s Nuclear Material Improving; Further Enhancements Needed, GAO-01-312

(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28, 2001). 
Page 12 GAO-05-57 Nuclear Nonproliferation 

Table 1: Shipments of Fresh HEU Fuel to Russia 

Country Date shipped 

Amount 

(kilograms) Status 

Serbia August 2002 48 In storage at Dmitrovgrad 

Anticipated to be downblended to 

LEU by spring 2005 

Romania September 

2003 

14 Cannot be downblended at 

Dmitrovgrad; sent to Novosibirsk 

instead 

Bulgaria December 

2003 

17 In storage at Dmitrovgrad 

Contract for downblending under 

negotiation 

Libya March 2004 16 In storage at Dmitrovgrad 

Contract for downblending under 

negotiation 

Uzbekistan September 

2004 

3 In storage at Dmitrovgrad 

Contract for downblending under 

negotiation 

Sources: DOE and International Atomic Energy Agency. 

Unlike DOE’s fuel acceptance program, the Russian fuel return program 

does not include LEU fuel because DOE does not consider LEU a 

proliferation risk. DOE cooperates with the International Atomic Energy 

Agency (IAEA) and the State Department to implement the Russian fuel 

return program. For example, IAEA conducts fact-finding missions in 

preparation for fuel shipments with assistance from DOE. 

DOE has not reached agreement with research reactor operators in 11 of 

the 23 countries that still have U.S.-origin HEU to return all of the HEU to 

the United States. The reactor operators have not made arrangements to 

return the HEU for a number of reasons, including the cost of conversion 

to LEU. DOE is considering offering incentives to reactor operators to 

convert to LEU and return their HEU to the United States but thus far has 

not determined what incentives it will offer and to which countries. In 

contrast, reactor operators in 12 of the 23 countries that still have U.S.-

origin HEU either have signed contracts with DOE to return all of the HEU 

to the United States by 2009 or are developing their own means to dispose 

of HEU fuel. 

DOE has proposed extending the fuel acceptance program by 5 or 10 

years, but the fees imposed on research reactors in high-income countries 

Eleven of the 23 

Countries with U.S.-

Origin HEU Do Not 

Have Plans to Return 

It to the United States 

or Dispose of It 

Domestically 
Page 13 GAO-05-57 Nuclear Nonproliferation 

have not been changed since 1996. According to DOE and State 

Department officials, DOE’s proposed extension of the time frame of the 

fuel acceptance program would benefit operators of research reactors that 

the United States encouraged to convert to LEU because the only 

currently available option for disposing of the type of LEU fuel used by 

some reactors is returning it to the United States. The extension of the 

program will primarily result in more LEU being returned to the United 

States by reactors that have converted to LEU fuel that cannot be 

reprocessed. DOE set the fees at a level to encourage reactor operators to 

convert to LEU fuel and return HEU rather than to cover the disposal cost 

in the United States. However, DOE reserved the right to change the fees 

in response to changes in circumstances. 

Operators of research reactors in 11 of the 23 countries that still have U.S.-

origin HEU have not made arrangements to return the HEU for a number 

of reasons. (Table 2 lists the 11 countries that do not have plans to return 

all of their U.S.-origin HEU and the current status of any decision to 

participate in the fuel acceptance program.) Research reactors in some of 

the countries do not plan to continue using the HEU but have not reached 

an agreement with DOE on returning it to the United States. For example, 

according to a DOE official, the operator of a university research reactor 

in Austria would like to return its HEU to the United States but lacks 

funding for transportation. According to the official, DOE hopes to 

combine Austria’s remaining HEU with a shipment of spent fuel from 

Greece or Turkey to reduce the transportation cost to the operator of the 

Austrian reactor. 

Countries Are Not 

Returning All of the HEU 

because They Are Planning 

to Use It in Research 

Reactors or Lack Funding 
Page 14 GAO-05-57 Nuclear Nonproliferation 

Table 2: Countries That Do Not Currently Have Plans to Return All U.S.-Origin HEU 

Country Status 

Austria One research reactor has returned all of its HEU to the United States, but two additional reactors still have HEU—

one has shut down but not finalized plans for returning HEU, and another has not made a decision to complete 

conversion to LEU and return HEU 

Indonesia Research reactor has agreed to stop using HEU for medical isotope production by 2006 and return LEU fuel, but 

plans for returning HEU are not finalized 

Iran Research reactor has converted to LEU but there are no plans to return HEU 

Israel No plans to convert research reactor to LEU and return HEU 

Jamaica No plans to convert research reactor to LEU and return HEU 

Japan Most Japanese research reactors are returning HEU, but two reactors do not have plans to convert to LEU and 

return HEU 

Mexico No plans to convert research reactor to LEU and return HEU 

Pakistan Research reactor has converted to LEU but there are no plans to return HEU 

South Africa Conversion of research reactor to LEU is under consideration 

South Korea Research reactor has shut down and returned spent HEU fuel but not agreed to return fresh HEU 

Turkey Conversion of research reactor to LEU is under consideration (reactor has partially converted) 

Sources: DOE and State Department. 

Other research reactor operators have not made a decision to convert 

their reactors to LEU. For example, operators of research reactors in 

Jamaica and Mexico may continue using their HEU fuel, which is sufficient 

to last many years. Similarly, while most research reactors in Japan have 

returned U.S.-origin HEU fuel, two Japanese research reactors have not 

made plans to convert to LEU fuel and participate in the fuel acceptance 

program. As we reported in our July 2004 review of the RERTR program, 

while operators of some foreign research reactors have agreed to fund 

conversion of their reactors from HEU to LEU, others either do not want 

to incur the additional cost of conversion or do not have the necessary 

funding.9

 Research reactor operators in South Africa and Turkey are 

considering converting to LEU, which could lead to returning U.S.-origin 

HEU to the United States. (The research reactor operator in Turkey has 

partially converted the reactor to LEU fuel but must completely convert 

before it can return its HEU. However, the reactor operator does not 

currently have the LEU fuel needed to complete the conversion process.) 

 9

Many research reactors are designed to operate on a small amount of fuel meant to last the 

life of the reactor, and conversion would require purchasing LEU fuel and disposing of 

HEU fuel that the reactor operator already purchased and is still usable. 
Page 15 GAO-05-57 Nuclear Nonproliferation 

In Iran, Israel, and Pakistan, DOE relies on State Department diplomatic 

efforts to encourage the countries to participate in the fuel acceptance 

program. Each of the three countries has one research reactor with U.S.-

origin HEU fuel. The research reactors in Iran and Pakistan have 

converted to LEU fuel, but according to a State Department official, 

informal approaches to discuss the possible return of HEU from these two 

countries have been unsuccessful. The official said that recovering the 

HEU from Iran and Pakistan would require a political breakthrough 

similar to ones that enabled DOE to facilitate the removal of HEU from 

Serbia and Libya under the Russian fuel return program in August 2002 

and March 2004, respectively. The State Department official said that the 

operators of the Israeli research reactor have expressed interest in 

converting their reactor to LEU, which would be the first step in possibly 

returning the HEU to the United States. However, the Nuclear Suppliers 

Group, the international body that governs the export of nuclear 

technologies, prohibits the export of LEU fuel to Israel.10 Therefore, unless 

the reactor shuts down, it will likely continue to use its supply of HEU fuel 

rather than return it to the United States. 

DOE is considering whether to offer additional incentives to the reactor 

operators that have not agreed to return HEU to the United States to 

encourage their participation in the fuel acceptance program. According to 

a State Department official, such incentives could influence some research 

reactors that are not participating in the fuel return program to return 

their HEU to the United States. For example, DOE could offer to purchase 

LEU fuel to replace HEU fuel that is still being used in the reactors. The 

State Department official said that if a research reactor agrees to shut 

down rather than convert to LEU, DOE could offer other incentives, such 

as research grants. 

Operators of research reactors in 12 of the 23 countries that still have U.S.-

origin HEU fuel have either agreed to return the material to the United 

States or are developing alternative disposal options. DOE officials said 

they have signed contracts with reactor operators in Australia, Germany, 

Greece, Portugal, Romania, and Taiwan to return their U.S.-origin HEU to 

 10The aim of the Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines is to ensure that nuclear trade for 

peaceful purposes does not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The 

guidelines stipulate that certain items, including LEU, not be transferred to countries such 

as Israel that have not agreed to full-scope IAEA safeguards. For more information, see 

GAO, Nonproliferation: Strategy Needed to Strengthen Multilateral Export Control 

Regimes, GAO-03-43 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 25, 2002). 
Page 16 GAO-05-57 Nuclear Nonproliferation 

the United States by 2009, the original end date of the fuel acceptance 

program. As part of these arrangements, the reactor operators in these 

countries have agreed to convert to LEU fuel or shut the reactors down by 

2006. For example, Australia is building a new research reactor that uses 

LEU fuel to replace an older research reactor, scheduled to be shut down, 

that previously used HEU. The reactor operator in Romania has agreed to 

return its HEU after it receives new LEU fuel, which is currently being 

manufactured, to replace the HEU. Six countries—Argentina, Belgium, 

Canada, France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom—are 

developing alternatives to disposing of U.S.-origin HEU in the United 

States. DOE officials said they support the efforts of these countries to 

develop their own means of disposal. For example, Argentina has reached 

an agreement with DOE to blend down part of its remaining inventory of 

U.S.-origin HEU for fabrication into LEU fuel for use in Argentina’s 

research reactors. As part of this agreement, the one remaining research 

reactor in Argentina that currently uses HEU fuel will convert to LEU fuel 

and ship its HEU fuel to the United States. In Belgium, a reactor operator 

is sending spent U.S.-origin HEU fuel to France for reprocessing, which 

includes diluting the HEU into LEU and returning radioactive waste to 

Belgium for long-term disposal in an underground repository. As another 

example of a country that is developing an alternative means of disposal, 

the Netherlands has returned some of its U.S.-origin HEU and also 

completed a storage facility in 2003 for the disposal of nuclear waste, 

including spent fuel from research and power reactors located in the 

country. The facility is designed to store the spent fuel for 100 years (see 

fig. 3). 
Page 17 GAO-05-57 Nuclear Nonproliferation 

Figure 3: Facility in the Netherlands for Storage of Spent Fuel from Research and 

Power Reactors 

DOE has not revised the fees it charges to research reactors in highincome countries since 1996. DOE reserved the right to change these fees 

if circumstances changed, and in fact, a number of changes will affect the 

costs of the program.11 Among the changes that will affect the costs of the 

fuel acceptance program is the proposed extension of the program, which 

would primarily result in more LEU being returned to the United States by 

reactors that have converted to LEU fuel that cannot be reprocessed. 

According to DOE and State Department officials, DOE’s proposed 

extension will help reactor operators that the United States encouraged to 

convert to LEU because the only currently available option for disposing 

of the LEU fuel (other than in countries such as the Netherlands that have 

developed their own means of disposal) is returning it to the United States. 

For example, research reactor operators in Australia, Germany, Japan, and 

Sweden petitioned DOE to extend the program beyond 2009, so that they 

would have a way to dispose of LEU fuel. A number of the reactor 

operators have either converted to LEU fuel or, in the case of Australia, 

 11The fees do not cover all of the costs of managing spent fuel from foreign research 

reactors, including the long-term cost of maintaining the fuel in storage at the facilities in 

South Carolina and Idaho and transporting the fuel to the planned final repository at Yucca 

Mountain. 

DOE Has Not Revised Fees 

to Account for Changes in 

the Fuel Acceptance 

Program 
Page 18 GAO-05-57 Nuclear Nonproliferation 

are building a new research reactor that uses LEU fuel to replace an older 

reactor that used HEU fuel. 

DOE’s primary objective when setting the fees in 1996 was to keep them 

low enough to encourage research reactors to return HEU to the United 

States rather than to cover the full cost of disposing foreign research 

reactors’ spent fuel in the United States. For example, DOE set the fees at 

a rate competitive with the estimated cost of reprocessing, so that reactor 

operators would choose to participate in the program rather than 

reprocess spent fuel. Furthermore, DOE set the fees it charges for 

accepting LEU from research reactors in high-income countries at a level 

to encourage the reactors to convert to LEU. However, DOE also decided 

when setting the fees that it would try to recover as much of the cost of 

managing spent fuel from foreign research reactors as possible. For this 

reason, DOE reserved the right to revise the fees in response to changes in 

circumstances, including the cost of managing spent fuel in the United 

States. The fees paid by research reactors in high-income countries have 

covered about 84 percent of DOE’s expenditures for the fuel acceptance 

program through fiscal year 2004. From fiscal year 1996 through fiscal year 

2004, DOE received $97.3 million in fees from research reactors in highincome countries for disposal of HEU and LEU fuel in the United States.12

In comparison, DOE estimates that it spent $116.1 million from fiscal year 

1996 through fiscal year 2004 to implement the fuel acceptance program. 

These expenditures include the cost of transporting spent fuel from 

research reactors in non-high-income countries and part of the cost of 

operating the facilities where fuel is placed in interim storage but not the 

permanent disposal costs. (See app. I for a list of the fees paid by research 

reactors in high-income countries.) DOE officials agreed that given 

changes in the fuel acceptance program, including the proposed extension 

of the program by 5 or 10 years, reassessing the fees charged to research 

reactors in high-income countries is warranted. 

 12Dollars are in constant fiscal year 2004 dollars. 
Page 19 GAO-05-57 Nuclear Nonproliferation 

DOE plans to complete the Russian fuel return program by 2009 and 

estimates the program could cost about $100 million, but this estimate and 

time frame may not be reliable because of uncertainties associated with 

planning future fuel shipments. The program is facing delays in returning 

spent HEU fuel because Russia is planning to conduct an environmental 

assessment for each shipment of spent HEU fuel, and complex 

negotiations are needed to arrange some shipments. DOE supports 

Russia’s efforts to examine the environmental impacts of returning spent 

HEU fuel to Russia. DOE has asked Russia to conduct a single 

environmental assessment for all spent fuel in all of the countries 

participating in the program, which would help expedite future shipments 

of spent fuel, but so far, Russia has not agreed to this. Furthermore, 

according to DOE officials, Russia has not agreed to a fixed fee for 

accepting future shipments of spent fuel because the costs of managing 

the fuel in Russia could increase. DOE is considering ways to accelerate 

the Russian fuel return program that could also increase the cost of the 

program by more than $30 million. 

DOE’s estimate for completing the program for $100 million is subject to a 

number of uncertainties, including the cost of returning spent HEU fuel to 

Russia. DOE officials said they expect shipments of spent fuel, which is 

more difficult to dispose of, to cost more than fresh fuel shipments. For 

example, Russia’s estimate of the transportation and disposal costs for the 

shipment of spent fuel from Uzbekistan is $5.7 million. This amount 

includes the cost of transportation, security, and storage of the spent HEU 

fuel in Russia as well as a spent fuel management fee, which pays for 

improvements to store the fuel in an environmentally safe manner. 

According to DOE officials, Russia has not agreed to a fixed fee for 

accepting future shipments of spent fuel because the costs of managing 

the fuel in Russia could increase. While DOE officials said the fees paid to 

Russia do not include profit, the terms of the agreement between DOE and 

Russia stipulate that the United States or a third party will pay the costs of 

returning HEU to Russia. 

On the other hand, the cost of returning fresh HEU fuel to Russia is more 

certain. DOE officials estimate that each shipment generally costs about 

$400,000. In addition, the DOE official in charge of the Material 

Consolidation and Conversion project, which pays for downblending the 

HEU fuel shipped to Dmitrovgrad in Russia, said that DOE has a stable 

DOE Plans to 

Complete the Return 

of HEU to Russia by 

2009 at a Cost of 

about $100 Million 

DOE’s Cost Estimate Is 

Uncertain because Russia 

Plans to Set the Price for 

Shipments of Spent HEU 

Fuel on a Case-By-Case 

Basis 
Page 20 GAO-05-57 Nuclear Nonproliferation 

price that it pays for downblending the fuel into LEU. DOE’s Russian fuel 

return program has so far spent about $1.5 million in support of four of the 

shipments of fresh HEU fuel to Russia.13

One of the main uncertainties in DOE’s plan to complete the Russian fuel 

return program by 2009 is the schedule for shipping spent HEU fuel to 

Russia. DOE has not yet provided assistance to return spent HEU fuel.14

According to DOE officials, the main obstacle is Russia’s requirement that 

an environmental assessment be conducted prior to each shipment of 

spent fuel, which has been irradiated in a reactor and is therefore more 

radioactive and difficult to dispose of than fresh fuel. For example, DOE 

signed an agreement with Uzbekistan in March 2002 to begin work on 

returning spent HEU fuel to Russia, but as of July 2004, the Russian 

government had not completed the environmental assessment for the 

shipment. Russian officials told us that future environmental assessments 

would take less time. However, if a similar amount of time is required for 

future assessments, spent fuel shipments could be delayed. DOE officials 

said they have asked the Russian government to conduct a single 

environmental assessment for the entire scope of the program in order to 

expedite future shipments of spent fuel. Such an assessment could be 

similar to the one DOE conducted prior to initiating the U.S. fuel 

acceptance program. DOE’s assessment conducted for the fuel acceptance 

program identified the major components required to complete the 

program, including the total amount of HEU fuel, U.S. ports where the fuel 

would be shipped, and where and how the fuel would be disposed of. 

However, so far the Russian government has not agreed to such an 

assessment. 

The schedule for the Russian fuel return program also depends on the 

level of cooperation in the countries where Russian-origin HEU fuel is 

located. In coordination with Russia and IAEA, DOE prioritized shipments 

 13The State Department also provided about $2 million to return fresh HEU from Serbia. 

This amount included the cost of transportation as well as funding for Dmitrovgrad to 

conduct research to overcome technical difficulties with downblending the material to 

LEU. The Nuclear Threat Initiative, a private foundation, contributed $5 million to address 

safety and environmental problems at the facility in Serbia where the HEU was stored in 

exchange for participating in the Russian fuel return program. DOE did not provide 

information on its expenditures in support of the shipment of fresh HEU fuel from 

Uzbekistan. 

14The five shipments to date have all consisted of fresh HEU fuel. 

Environmental 

Assessments and Other 

Factors Could Cause 

Delays 
Page 21 GAO-05-57 Nuclear Nonproliferation 

of fresh HEU to Russia based on the amount of HEU located at a facility 

and security concerns in the region. However, DOE officials said they have 

acted quickly to take advantage of opportunities that arise to remove HEU 

fuel from a facility. For example, DOE removed fresh HEU fuel from Libya 

in March 2004, after the country unexpectedly agreed to participate in the 

program. Similarly, Romanian officials told us that high-level support 

within the Romanian government for the Russian fuel return program 

resulted in the shipment of HEU taking place very quickly. DOE officials 

said that other countries with Russian-origin HEU might be reluctant to 

participate in the Russian fuel return program. For example, DOE officials 

said they had encountered difficulties in negotiating with Belarus and 

Kazakhstan on returning their inventories of HEU to Russia. A Russian 

official also told us that Belarus has no intention of returning fresh HEU to 

Russia. Similarly, according to DOE officials, a facility in Ukraine hopes to 

build a new research reactor that would be fueled by its inventory of 

Russian-origin HEU. If the facility decides not to return its HEU to Russia, 

DOE would try to work with the facility to downblend it into LEU. 

Another factor that affects DOE’s schedule for the Russian fuel return 

program is the development of new LEU fuels to replace HEU in research 

reactors that cannot convert to currently available LEU fuels. In our July 

2004 report on the RERTR program, we identified several research 

reactors that use Russian-origin HEU fuel that cannot currently convert to 

LEU. For example, a research reactor in Poland is waiting for the 

development of a new LEU fuel before it can convert. However, the 

projected completion of a replacement LEU fuel has been delayed from 

2006 until 2010 as a result of technical setbacks in the development 

process. DOE officials said that rather than try to return the fresh HEU 

fuel from these reactors to Russia before a replacement LEU fuel is 

available, the Russian fuel return program would return the HEU as spent 

fuel, after it is used up in the reactors. Consequently, although DOE 

officials have said they plan to return all fresh HEU to Russia by 2005, 

some Russian-supplied research reactors that cannot convert to currently 

available LEU fuels could continue to store fresh HEU fuel after that date. 

(DOE has identified 4 countries for removal of fresh HEU by 2005—

Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.) 

DOE has developed proposals for accelerating the Russian fuel return 

program that could increase the cost of the program by over $30 million. 

DOE would like to complete the program by 2009, 4 years sooner than its 

original time frame of 2013. According to DOE officials, one possibility is 

to purchase casks that could be used to transport spent HEU fuel by air 

DOE Is Considering Ways 

to Accelerate the Return of 

HEU to Russia 
Page 22 GAO-05-57 Nuclear Nonproliferation 

rather than by train and would also be able to hold more fuel, requiring 

fewer shipments. While the shipments of fresh HEU fuel to date have all 

been by air, currently DOE and Russia do not have access to casks that are 

qualified according to IAEA standards for shipment of spent fuel by air. 

Without the high-capacity casks, DOE must transport spent fuel by train. 

DOE estimates that the high-capacity casks would require a one-time 

expenditure of $5.5 million. 

DOE officials also said they are considering a “mobile melt-and-dilute” 

system for transforming spent HEU fuel into blocks of LEU. The 

equipment for this system could be transported to reactors that possess 

spent HEU fuel and be used to blend down the HEU on site, without 

returning the fuel to Russia. DOE would use the system as a stopgap 

measure in response to potential delays in returning spent HEU fuel to 

Russia, alleviating security concerns at foreign research reactors with 

Russian-origin spent HEU. DOE officials said they anticipate that the LEU 

blocks could then be returned to Russia at a later date. Development of 

the system has begun at DOE’s Savannah River Site, but DOE has not yet 

decided whether to seek funding for this proposal. 

DOE had hoped to facilitate the return of spent HEU fuel to Russia by 

using casks that are currently used to store Russian-origin spent HEU fuel 

in Germany. DOE officials said that, with Germany’s cooperation, the 

Russian fuel return program would first provide assistance for returning 

spent HEU fuel from Germany to Russia and then reuse the casks for 

shipments of spent HEU from other countries. However, the German 

government has not agreed to participate in the Russian fuel return 

program. In a December 2000 letter to IAEA, Germany cited a number of 

issues that would require clarification before it would agree to participate 

in the program, including how spent HEU fuel returned to Russia would be 

safeguarded and disposed of. Officials at the site in Germany where the 

HEU is stored said they would be willing to participate in the Russian fuel 

return program and that returning the HEU would reduce the need for 

security at the facility. However, German government officials told us that 

Germany plans to dispose of its Russian-origin spent HEU fuel 

domestically and keep the casks for long-term storage of the fuel. One 

official said that concerns over Russia’s ability to secure the HEU played a 

role in Germany’s decision to not participate in the Russian fuel return 

program. 

DOE’s efforts to recover U.S.-origin HEU for safe storage and disposal in 

the United States have resulted in the return of enough HEU to build more Conclusions 
Page 23 GAO-05-57 Nuclear Nonproliferation 

then 20 nuclear weapons. However, despite DOE’s intention of 

accelerating the fuel acceptance program, there are still 11 countries that 

have not made plans to return all of their U.S.-origin HEU to the United 

States. Lack of funding for conversion to LEU is one of the reasons foreign 

research reactors continue to use HEU. Foreign research reactors that do 

not plan to convert to LEU generally also do not have plans to return HEU 

fuel to the United States. In our July 2004 report on DOE’s RERTR 

program, we recommended that DOE evaluate the costs and benefits of 

providing incentives to foreign research reactors that use U.S.-origin HEU 

to convert to LEU. If DOE decides to provide such incentives, operators of 

some foreign reactors may decide to return their HEU fuel to the United 

States as well as convert to LEU. We encourage DOE to consider the 

increased likelihood of recovering additional amounts of HEU as one of 

the benefits of providing additional incentives to foreign research reactors 

to convert to LEU. Similarly, lowering the fees for accepting HEU could 

encourage additional research reactors in high-income countries to return 

the nuclear material to the United States. These actions could support 

DOE’s efforts to accelerate the fuel acceptance program. 

When DOE implemented the fuel acceptance program in 1996, it reserved 

the right to adjust the fees to meet changing circumstances. Currently, one 

of the biggest potential changes in the program is DOE’s proposed 

extension of the program to continue providing operators of research 

reactors that converted to LEU fuel with a means of disposing of spent 

fuel. While we support DOE efforts to assist foreign research reactors that 

have converted to LEU in accordance with U.S. nonproliferation 

objectives, the original intent of DOE’s fuel acceptance program was not 

to indefinitely accept spent LEU fuel at below the full cost of disposal. 

DOE has not revised the fees that research reactors in high-income 

countries pay for returning their spent fuel to the United States since 1996. 

Continuing the current fee structure through the end of as much as a 10-

year program extension would mean keeping the 1996 fees set at the same 

level for 23 years. While lowering the fees for returning HEU may 

encourage additional countries to participate in the fuel return program, 

re-evaluating the fees for accepting LEU fuel, taking into account DOE’s 

proposed extension of the program, may show that DOE could raise the 

fees and recover a greater portion of the total disposal costs for accepting 

LEU from high-income countries. DOE may be able to raise the fees while 

still encouraging operators of foreign research reactors to convert to LEU 

fuel and without unduly penalizing foreign reactors that have already 

converted. 
Page 24 GAO-05-57 Nuclear Nonproliferation 

DOE faces a complex set of issues for each shipment of HEU to Russia, 

such as environmental requirements in Russia and negotiations with the 

countries that are returning their HEU to provide them with incentives to 

participate in the program. While DOE would like to accelerate the return 

of HEU to Russia, these issues have the potential to cause delays. For DOE 

to complete the program as quickly and as efficiently as possible, the 

cooperation of Russia and countries that have Russian-origin HEU is 

essential. We support DOE’s efforts to work with Russia to resolve issues 

that stand in the way of returning HEU as quickly as possible and to 

pursue options such as purchasing high-capacity casks that support DOE’s 

objective of accelerating the Russian fuel return program. 

We recommend that the Secretary of Energy and the Administrator of the 

National Nuclear Security Administration take the following two actions: 

• consider offering incentives to foreign research reactors to return HEU to 

the United States, including lowering the fees that DOE charges for 

accepting HEU fuel from high-income countries; and

• evaluate raising the fees for accepting LEU fuel from research reactors in 

high-income countries to recover as much of the cost for disposing of the 

fuel in the United States as possible, if doing so would not adversely affect 

the conversion of reactors to LEU and the return of HEU or create 

unmanageable financial burdens for the reactors.

We provided draft copies of this report to the Departments of Energy and 

State for their review and comment. In its written comments (presented as 

app. II), DOE concurred with our recommendations. State did not provide 

written comments. Both DOE and State provided technical comments, 

which we incorporated into the report as appropriate. 

To review the progress of DOE’s fuel acceptance program, we analyzed 

program documentation including DOE’s February 1996 Final 

Environmental Impact Statement on a Proposed Nuclear Weapons 

Nonproliferation Policy Concerning Foreign Research Reactor Spent 

Nuclear Fuel, the May 1996 Record of Decision establishing the program, 

and the DOE IG’s February 2004 audit report on the program. In addition, 

we analyzed documents outlining the structure of fees DOE imposes on 

research reactors in high-income countries for returning HEU and LEU 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

Scope and 

Methodology 
Page 25 GAO-05-57 Nuclear Nonproliferation 

fuel to the United States and how the fees were derived. We analyzed data 

from DOE on the amount of HEU and LEU fuel returned to the United 

States, the plans of countries that still have U.S.-origin HEU for 

participating in the program, and the amount of fees paid by research 

reactors in high-income countries. We also interviewed key officials at 

DOE; the State Department; the DOE facilities in South Carolina and Idaho 

where HEU and LEU fuel from foreign research reactors is being placed in 

interim storage; and DOE’s Argonne National Laboratory, which has 

expertise on the amount and type of U.S.-origin HEU and LEU at foreign 

research reactors. 

We visited five countries that have U.S.-origin HEU—Belgium, Germany, 

the Netherlands, Portugal, and Romania. We selected a nonprobability 

sample of countries based on a number of criteria. In particular, we 

selected three countries that have returned HEU to the United States 

under the fuel acceptance program (Germany, the Netherlands, and 

Romania) and two countries that have not returned HEU to the United 

States (Belgium and Portugal). In addition, we selected three high-income 

countries (Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands), one non-high-income 

country (Romania), and one country that transitioned into a high-income 

country (Portugal). During our site visits, we met with research reactor 

operators and government officials responsible for regulating the research 

reactors and the disposal of spent research reactor fuel. We asked a 

standard set of questions concerning reasons for participating or not 

participating in DOE’s fuel acceptance program, plans for participating in 

the future, options for disposing of spent fuel other than returning it to the 

United States, and the potential extension of the fuel acceptance program 

beyond 2009. In addition to visiting five countries with U.S.-origin HEU, we 

interviewed representatives of the Australian, Jamaican, and Swedish 

research reactor operators and the group of research reactors that 

petitioned DOE to extend the fuel acceptance program beyond 2009. 

We assessed the reliability of data obtained from DOE on the amount of 

HEU and LEU fuel returned to the United States and the amount of fees 

paid by research reactors in high-income countries. In particular, officials 

at the DOE facilities in South Carolina and Idaho where the fuel is stored 

provided responses to a standard set of data reliability questions covering 

issues such as data entry, access, and quality control procedures. We 

asked follow-up questions whenever necessary. We also performed a 

series of checks on the data to ensure that it was complete and accurate. 

We found several errors in the data that we brought to the attention of 

DOE officials, who then reviewed the data and provided corrections. 

Based on our assessment, we determined that the data provided by DOE 
Page 26 GAO-05-57 Nuclear Nonproliferation 

was sufficiently reliable for our purposes. We converted dollar amounts of 

DOE expenditures for the fuel acceptance program and fees received from 

research reactors in high-income countries into constant fiscal year 2004 

dollars. 

To review the progress of DOE’s Russian fuel return program, we analyzed 

program documentation on the amounts and locations of Russian-origin 

HEU at foreign research reactors; reports on DOE fact-finding missions to 

research reactors in seven countries included in the Russian fuel return 

program; DOE’s agreements with Russia and Uzbekistan on the program; 

and letters between the IAEA and countries with Russian-origin HEU on 

their potential participation in the program. In addition, DOE provided 

documentation on shipments of fresh HEU it has supported to date. We 

discussed the program with key DOE and State Department officials. We 

also traveled to Russia to discuss the program with Russian officials 

responsible for implementing the program with DOE and reviewing the 

environmental assessment for returning spent HEU fuel. 

We visited four countries that have Russian-origin HEU—Germany, 

Poland, Romania, and Ukraine. We selected a nonprobability sample of 

countries based on a number of criteria. In particular, we selected one 

country that had returned HEU to Russia under the Russian fuel return 

program (Romania) and three that had not returned HEU. In addition, we 

selected the two countries that are eligible to participate in both the U.S. 

fuel acceptance program and the Russian fuel return program (Germany 

and Romania). During our site visits, we met with research reactor 

operators and government officials responsible for regulating the research 

reactors and the disposal of spent research reactor fuel. We asked a 

standard set of questions concerning reasons for participating or not 

participating in the Russian fuel return program, plans for participating in 

the future, and options for disposing of spent fuel other than returning it to 

Russia. 

As part of our review of both programs, we also analyzed NNSA’s 2004 

Global Research and Test Reactor Security Initiative Report and attended 

an annual international conference organized by DOE’s RERTR program. 

For technical expertise, we relied on GAO’s Chief Technologist, who 

participated in meetings with officials at Argonne National Laboratory. 

We conducted our work from July 2003 to October 2004 in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Page 27 GAO-05-57 Nuclear Nonproliferation 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Energy; the 

Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration; the Secretary of 

State; the Chairman, NRC; the Secretary of Homeland Security; the 

Director, Office of Management and Budget; and interested congressional 

committees. We will also make copies available to others upon request. In 

addition, this report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at 

http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please call me at 

(202) 512-3841. Key contributors to this report include Joseph Cook, 

Jonathan McMurray, Mehrzad Nadji, Kirstin B.L. Nelson, Judy Pagano, 

Peter Ruedel, F. James Shafer Jr., and Keith Rhodes, GAO’s Chief 

Technologist. 

Sincerely yours, 

Gene Aloise 

Acting Director, Natural 

 Resources and Environment 
Appendix I: Details of HEU and LEU Fuel 

Returned to the United States 

Page 28 GAO-05-57 Nuclear Nonproliferation 

Table 3: HEU and LEU Fuel Returned to the United States, by Country, and Fees 

Paid by Research Reactor Operators in High-Income Countries 

Country 

HEU

(kilograms)

LEU 

(kilograms) Fees (millions)

Argentina 29 

Australia 34 $2.2

Austria 3 71 1.3

Brazil 5 62 

Canada 11 1.6

Chile 8 

Colombia 3 

Denmark 6 309 5.7

Germany 102 301 21.9

Greece 5 

Indonesia 206 

Italy 23 47 5.3

Japan 537 298 36.9

Netherlands 21 2.6

Philippines 3 20 

Portugal 29 

Romania 6 

Slovenia 5 35 

South Korea 20 33 

Spain 4 12 0.9

Sweden 47 296 12.4

Switzerland 34 73 3.4

Taiwan 4 23 1.6

Thailand 4 

United Kingdom 17 1.5

Uruguay 16 

Venezuela 39 

Total 914 1,887 $97.3

Source: DOE. 

Notes: The amount of HEU returned, 914 kilograms, is based on the total uranium in the fuel after 

being used in a research reactor. It is equivalent to 1,159 kilograms of total uranium before being 

used in a reactor. 

Dollars are in constant fiscal year 2004 dollars. 

Appendix I: Details of HEU and LEU Fuel 

Returned to the United States 
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Energy 

Page 29 GAO-05-57 Nuclear Nonproliferation 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Energy 

(360496) 
GAO’s Mission The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and 

investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its 

constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and 

accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO 

examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; 

and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help 

Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO’s 

commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of 

accountability, integrity, and reliability.

Obtaining Copies of 

GAO Reports and 

Testimony

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no cost 

is through GAO’s Web site (www.gao.gov). Each weekday, GAO posts 

newly released reports, testimony, and correspondence on its Web site. To 

have GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted products every afternoon, go to 

www.gao.gov and select “Subscribe to Updates.”

Order by Mail or Phone The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2 each. 

A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent of 

Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or 

more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. Orders 

should be sent to:

U.S. Government Accountability Office

441 G Street NW, Room LM

Washington, D.C. 20548

To order by Phone: Voice: (202) 512-6000 

TDD: (202) 512-2537 

Fax: (202) 512-6061

To Report Fraud, 

Waste, and Abuse in 

Federal Programs

Contact:

Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm

E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov

Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470

Congressional 

Relations

Gloria Jarmon, Managing Director, JarmonG@gao.gov (202) 512-4400

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7125 

Washington, D.C. 20548

Public Affairs Susan Becker, Acting Manager, BeckerS@gao.gov (202) 512-4800

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 

Washington, D.C. 20548