[Cite as State v. Arega, 2018-Ohio-3137.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

State of Ohio, : 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, : 

 No. 17AP-909 

v. : (C.P.C. No. 11CR-1145)

Tizazu F. Arega, : (ACCELERATED CALENDAR) 

 Defendant-Appellant. : 

 

D E C I S I O N 

Rendered on August 7, 2018 

 

On brief: Ron O'Brien, Prosecuting Attorney, and 

Barbara A. Farnbacher, for appellee. 

On brief: Tizazu F. Arega, pro se. 

 

APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas 

KLATT, J. 

{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Tizazu F. Arega, appeals a judgment of the Franklin 

County Court of Common Pleas that denied his motion to vacate his conviction. For the 

following reasons, we affirm that judgment. 

{¶ 2} On March 1, 2011, a grand jury indicted Arega on two counts of rape, 

violations of R.C. 2907.02, and one count of sexual battery, a violation of R.C. 2907.03. 

After a trial, a jury found Arega guilty of Count 1 of the indictment, rape by vaginal 

penetration, as well as Count 3, sexual battery. The jury found Arega not guilty of Count 2 

of the indictment, rape by anal penetration. In the March 2, 2012 sentencing entry, the trial 

court merged Count 3 with Count 1 and sentenced Arega to nine years' incarceration for 

Count 1. 
No. 17AP-909 2 

{¶ 3} Arega appealed his convictions to this court. We affirmed Arega's rape 

conviction, but reversed the conviction for sexual battery. State v. Arega, 10th Dist. No. 

12AP-263, 2012-Ohio-5774, ¶ 31. On remand, the trial court entered a judgment of 

acquittal on the sexual battery charge. 

{¶ 4} Subsequently, Arega has filed multiple postconviction motions with the trial 

court.1 This appeal concerns his November 2, 2017 motion, entitled "Motion to Vacate a 

Void Judgment for Lack of Jurisdiction and Contrary to Crim.[R.] 7(A) and R.C. 2941.021 

and Not Authorized by Law, Request for Evidentiary Hearing, Issue Finding[s] of Facts and 

Conclusions of Law under R.C. 2953.21 and Issue or Order Clerk of Court to Issue a Final, 

Appealable Order under Cri[m.R.] 32(C) and S Ct. Pra. R. [sic] 12.04." The trial court 

denied that motion in a judgment entry dated December 11, 2017. 

{¶ 5} Arega now appeals the December 11, 2017 judgment, and he assigns the 

following errors: 

[1.] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO ALLOW AN 

EVIDENTIARY HEARING WHEN NO OPPOSING 

EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED TO CONTRADICT THE FACT 

AND CONCLUSION OF LAW PERTAINING TO 

APPELLANT'S MOTION TO VACATE A VOID JUDGMENT 

FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION AND CONTRARY TO LAW 

UNDER CRIM.R. 7(A) AND AND [sic] R.C. 2941.021 AND 

NOT AUTHORIZED BY LAW. 

[2.] THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSABLE [sic] 

ERROR AND DEPRIVED APPELLANT OF DUE PROCESS OF 

LAW AND LIBERTY INTEREST AS GUARANTEED BY THE 

FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE 

UNITED STATES CONSTITUION AND ARTICLE ONE 

SECTION TEN OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION WHEN IT 

DENIED DEFENDANT-APPELLANT'S MOTION TO VACATE 

A VOID JUDGMENT FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION AND 

CONTRARY TO CRIM.R. 7(A) AND R.C. 2941.021 AND NOT 

AUTHORIZED BY LAW. 

{¶ 6} We will address Arega's second assignment of error first. By that assignment 

of error, Arega argues that his conviction is void because the trial court lacked subject-

 

1 Arega has appealed some of the trial court's rulings on his postconviction motions to this court. See State 

v. Arega, 10th Dist. No. 17AP-112, 2017-Ohio-5610; State v. Arega, 10th Dist. No. 16AP-455, 2016-Ohio8074. 
No. 17AP-909 3 

matter jurisdiction when it entered judgment against him, and consequently, the trial court 

erred in not vacating the conviction. According to Arega, the trial court did not possess 

subject-matter jurisdiction due to two defects in the indictment: (1) the indictment did not 

charge him with the rape offense the jury found him guilty of committing, and (2) the 

indictment failed to state the specific sexual conduct by which he committed rape. 

{¶ 7} The State urges this court to treat Arega's motion as a petition for 

postconviction relief filed pursuant to R.C. 2953.21. However, in his motion, Arega denied 

that he filed such a petition. Arega instead asserted that his motion invoked the trial court's 

inherent power to vacate a void judgment. 

{¶ 8} As Arega correctly points out, a judgment rendered by a court lacking subjectmatter jurisdiction is void. Patton v. Diemer, 35 Ohio St.3d 68 (1988), paragraph three of 

the syllabus. Because a void judgment is a nullity and may be challenged at any time, the 

doctrine of res judicata cannot defeat an attack on a void judgment. Lingo v. State, 138 

Ohio St.3d 427, 2014-Ohio-1052, paragraph two of the syllabus, ¶ 46; State v. Wilson, 73 

Ohio St.3d 40, 45 (1995), fn. 6. A court has the inherent authority to vacate its own void 

judgments. Lingo at ¶ 48, paragraph three of the syllabus. 

{¶ 9} Here, Arega contends that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, 

which rendered the judgment of conviction void, because the indictment did not sufficiently 

state the charges against him. However, "[t]he question of the sufficiency of the indictment 

does not relate to the jurisdiction of the court to try [a defendant] for the crime for which 

he was convicted." Chapman v. Jago, 48 Ohio St.2d 51 (1976). "The manner by which an 

accused is charged with a crime is procedural rather than jurisdictional." Orr v. Mack, 83 

Ohio St.3d 429, 430 (1998).2 Consequently, the alleged insufficiency of the indictment 

could not deprive the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction. The judgment of conviction, 

therefore, is not void, and the trial court did not err in refusing to vacate it for voidness. 

{¶ 10} Additionally, given the failure of Arega's voidness argument, there is no bar 

to the application of res judicata to Arega's motion. Under the doctrine of res judicata, a 

 

2 Arega cites State v. Cimpritz, 158 Ohio St. 490 (1953), for the proposition that a trial court lacks subjectmatter jurisdiction without an effective indictment. However, it appears that the Supreme Court of Ohio 

has abrogated the portion of Cimpritz that held that a judgment of conviction based on an indictment that 

does not charge an offense is void for lack of jurisdiction. Midling v. Perrini, 14 Ohio St.2d 106, 107 (1968); 

accord State v. Camara, 6th Dist. No. L-14-1159, 2015-Ohio-3802, ¶ 13; State v. Batich, 11th Dist. No. 2006-

A-0031, 2007-Ohio-2305, ¶ 24-25. 
No. 17AP-909 4 

defendant cannot raise an issue in a postconviction motion that he raised or could have 

raised at trial or on direct appeal. State v. Jackson, 141 Ohio St.3d 171, 2014-Ohio-3707, 

¶ 92; State v. Ketterer, 126 Ohio St.3d 448, 2010-Ohio-3831, ¶ 59. Here, Arega could have 

raised his challenges to the indictment prior to the entry of the judgment of conviction or 

on direct appeal. Consequently, the doctrine of res judicata bars him from asserting those 

challenges now. 

{¶ 11} Finally, Arega's attack on the indictment has no merit. The sufficiency of an 

indictment is subject to the requirements of Crim.R. 7 and the constitutional protections of 

the United States and Ohio Constitutions. State v. Childs, 88 Ohio St.3d 558, 564 (2000). 

These provisions guarantee an accused that the indictment will include the essential facts 

constituting the offense for which he is tried. State v. Jackson, 134 Ohio St.3d 184, 2012-

Ohio-5561, ¶ 12. Here, Count 1 of indictment against Arega stated: 

The Jurors of the Grand Jury of the State of Ohio, duly selected, 

impaneled, sworn, and charged to inquire of crimes and 

offenses committed within the body of Franklin County, in the 

State of Ohio, upon their oath do find and present that Tizazu 

Fekadu Arega late of said County, on or about the 1st day of 

September in the year of our Lord, 2010, within the County of 

Franklin aforesaid, in violation of Section 2907.02 of the Ohio 

Revised Code, did engage in sexual conduct, to wit: vaginal 

penetration, with [N.B.], not his spouse, and the said Tizazu 

Fekadu Arega having purposely compelled [N.B.] to submit by 

force or threat of force. 

(Mar. 1, 2011 Indictment.) This count tracks the language of R.C. 2907.02(A)(2), thus 

satisfying the requirements of an indictment. See Jackson at ¶ 14, quoting State v. Childs, 

88 Ohio St.3d 194, 199 (2000) (" 'Generally, the requirements of an indictment may be met 

by reciting the language of the criminal statute.' "). 

{¶ 12} Arega argues that the indictment is insufficient because he was charged with 

rape in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(2), but tried and convicted of rape in violation R.C. 

2907.02(A)(1)(c). The transcript and the signed verdict form belie this argument. The jury 

was instructed on the elements of the offense of rape as charged in Count 1 and found Arega 

guilty of rape as charged in Count 1. (Tr. at 247, 294-95; Feb. 3, 2012 Verdict Form for 

Count One.) The instruction to the jury, based on R.C. 2907.02(C), that "[t]he state need 
No. 17AP-909 5 

not prove that the victim physically resisted" did not alter the elements of the rape offense 

on which Arega was charged, tried, and convicted. (Tr. at 247-48.) 

{¶ 13} Arega also argues that Count 1 of the indictment failed to specify the sexual 

conduct he committed. We reject that argument. Count 1 of the indictment explicitly 

alleged that Arega raped N.B. by "vaginal penetration." (Mar. 1, 2011 Indictment.) 

{¶ 14} Because the judgment of conviction is not void and Arega's arguments are 

barred by res judicata and lack any merit, the trial court did not err in denying Arega's 

motion to vacate. Accordingly, we overrule Arega's second assignment of error. 

{¶ 15} By Arega's first assignment of error, he argues that the trial court erred in 

refusing him a hearing on his motion. As a general rule, in the absence of a specific 

requirement to the contrary, a decision on whether to hold a hearing on a motion is a matter 

entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Francis, 104 Ohio St.3d 490, 

2004-Ohio-6894, ¶ 56. Here, because no statute or rule required the trial court to hold a 

hearing, the trial court exercised its discretion in deciding to forgo a hearing. We find no 

abuse of discretion in that decision. Accordingly, we overrule Arega's first assignment of 

error. 

{¶ 16} For the foregoing reasons, we overrule Arega's assignments of error, and we 

affirm the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas. 

Judgment affirmed.

LUPER SCHUSTER and HORTON, JJ., concur.