IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-60177

Summary Calendar

GUADALUPE MUNOZ,

Petitioner

v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Respondent

Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

BIA No. A73 971 600

Before BARKSDALE, DENNIS, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

*

Guadalupe Munoz, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of

an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing the appeal of an

order of removal and an order of the BIA denying her motion to reconsider and

reopen. Munoz asserts that the BIA erred by engaging in impermissible

factfinding when it stated that Munoz claimed on appeal that the Immigration

Judge (IJ) improperly denied voluntary departure and that no evidence existed

in the record that Munoz had applied for this form of relief. Asserting that,

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

August 12, 2010

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

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under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(iv), the BIA lacks the power to make findings of

fact in the first instance, she requests that this court vacate the BIA decisions

and remand the matter to the BIA for further consideration.

A court can review a final order of removal only when “the alien has

exhausted all administrative remedies available to the alien as of right”.

8 U.S.C. § 1252(d); Omari v. Holder, 562 F.3d 314, 318 (5th Cir. 2009).

“Petitioners fail to exhaust their administrative remedies as to an issue if they

do not first raise the issue before the BIA, either on direct appeal or in a motion

to reopen.” See Omari, 562 F.3d at 318 (citing Heaven v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 167,

177 (5th Cir. 2006); Wang v. Ashcroft, 260 F.3d 448, 452-53 (5th Cir. 2001)). An

exception to the exhaustion requirement exists for claims of due-process

violations, “except for procedural errors that are correctable by the BIA”. Roy

v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 132, 137 (5th Cir. 2004).

Contrary to Munoz’ assertions, her motion to reconsider and reopen

neither reasserted her initial due-process claim relating to voluntary departure

nor asserted the claim she now presents to this court—that the BIA engaged in

impermissible factfinding when it determined that no evidence existed in the

record that Munoz had applied for voluntary departure. Munoz’ motion to

reconsider and reopen was an available and adequate means of presenting this

claimed error to the BIA before asserting it here, which is required under §

1252(d). See Omari, 562 F.3d at 320-21. “Because [Munoz] has failed to exhaust

[her] administrative remedies as to this issue, § 1252(d) jurisdictionally bars

[this court] from addressing it.” Id. at 321.

Munoz also asserts that the BIA erred in denying cancellation of removal

and in not addressing certain challenges concerning the IJ’s bias and Munoz’

asylum application. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), this court generally does

not have jurisdiction to review any judgment regarding the granting or denying

of discretionary relief in the form of cancellation of removal. Where the appeal

involves constitutional claims or questions of law, this court does have

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jurisdiction. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). Although Munoz attempts to claim

otherwise, essentially, she disagrees with the discretionary decision to deny

cancellation of removal. Munoz’ appeal does not involve a constitutional claim

or a question of law. Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction to review this issue. See

Rueda v. Ashcroft, 380 F.3d 831, 831 (5th Cir. 2004)

Munoz also contends that, because the BIA failed to specifically address

certain issues, it failed to give meaningful consideration to her appeal and

motion to reconsider and reopen. Even if the BIA’s decision does not touch on

every disputed fact, it does not mean that the BIA did not consider all of Munoz’

presented facts and allegations. See Osuchukwu v. INS, 744 F.2d 1136, 1142-43

(5th Cir. 1984) (“[The BIA] has no duty to write an exegesis on every contention.

What is required is merely that it consider the issues raised, and announce its

decision in terms sufficient to enable a reviewing court to perceive that it has

heard and thought and not merely reacted”.). The BIA considered Munoz’ stated

issues.

Finally, to the extent Munoz claims her due-process rights were violated

because the IJ exhibited bias against her, her claims are unavailing. Munoz has

failed to demonstrate that the IJ either held a personal bias against her or

demonstrated pervasive bias and prejudice. See Matter of Exame, 18 I & N Dec.

303, 306 (BIA 1982); see also Brinkmann v. Dallas County Deputy Sheriff Abner,

813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1987).

DISMISSED.

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