## In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth

___________________________ N o. 02

- 23

- 00304

- CR

___________________________

On Appeal from County Criminal Court No. 7 Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 17 24153
Before Sudderth, C.J.; Kerr and Wallach, JJ. M emorandum Opinion by Justice Wallach 

### T ONY 

### S TATURE 

### , Appellant

V



### . T HE 

### S TATE OF 

### T EXAS2 MEMOR ANDUM OPINION Appe llant Tony Stature appeals his conviction for driving while intoxicated (DWI) , second offense

. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 49.04 , 49.09(a) . In six issues,
Statur e argues that the trial court erred by: (1 ) failing to grant his motion to suppress (first issue) , (2) admitti ng blood evidence because the chain of custody was
insufficient (second issue) and because the blood evidence was obtained throu gh an
invalid search warrant in violation of hi s rights under the United States and Texas
Constitutions (fourth and fifth issue s ) , (3) denying his motion for mistrial af ter the State pres ented evidence of a gun (third issue) , and (4) den ying his motion fo r directed verdict (sixth issue) . We affirm. I. Background On March 25, 2022, Euless police officer Jacob Shoemate was working patrol
when he observed a black truck ’s weaving within its lane. Officer Shoemate followed the vehicle, and he saw the driver, w ho m he identified as Stature, commit two traffic
offenses

— failure to signal a lane chan ge and failure to stop at a designated stop. Officer Shoemate stopped Stature’s ve h icle for the traff ic violations, and when he approached , he saw two beer cans inside S tature’s vehicle

. According to Officer Shoemate, Stature’ s eyes were red and watery, and he had an odor of alcohol on his
person. Officer Shoe m ate asked Stature to get out of his vehicle so that he could administer field sobriety tests.3 Officer Shoemate o bserved that on the walk

- and

- turn test Stature exhibited six out of the eight clues of intoxication. Officer Shoemat e believed that Sta ture had lost the use of his mental faculties based upon that test, but he did not f ind a loss of physical faculties at t hat time. Stature next performed the one

- leg stand test, and
Officer Shoemate determined from that test t h at Stature had los t the use of his mental and physical faculties. A video of Stature’s walk

- and

- turn test and one

- leg stand test was played for the ju ry. Based upon the totality of the tests and his personal observations, Of f icer Shoemate arre sted Stature for DWI. Officer Shoemate transported Stature to the Euless Police Department and read him his statutory warnings. Stature did not consent to give a blood sample, so Officer Shoemate had to request a s earch warrant for the blood draw

. After getting
the search warrant, Officer Shoemate took Stature to the hospital for a blood draw.
Micha el Bankhead drew Stature’s blood at the Texas Health HEB Emergency Department and sealed the via l with a tamper

- pro of seal. Officer Shoemate took the blood sample to the police property room, and it was later sent to a third

- party toxicology lab for testing. Jacklyn Merson, a senior analyst and laboratory supervisor
at Ar mstrong Forensics Labo r atory, tested Stat ure’s blood sample and testified that he
had a blood alcohol concentration of 0

. 21 1

— above the legal limit in Texas. See id

. § 49.01 (2)(b)

. Before trial , Stature moved to suppress “ all evidence subsequent to the red and blues coming on , ” arguing “that there wasn’t the requisite reasonable suspicion of4 probab le cause to justify the detention.” T he trial court denied the motion , and the case proceeded to trial

. At the close of the State ’ s case , Stature reurg ed his moti on to suppress
. He
made thre e suppression requests based upon evidence (1) that Officer Shoemate’s testimony was not credible, (2) that ther e was no probable cause to arrest for DWI
because the officer did not ad minister the field sobr iety tests correctly, and (3) that there was no probable cause to obtain the search warrant for the blood draw. The trial court denied the requeste d motions to suppress. The trial court also denied Stature’s request for a dir ected verdict on the element of intoxication. The jury convicted Stature of DWI and assessed his punishment at 30 days ’ confinement in the county jail and a $2,000 fine. The trial court suspended imposition
of the confi nement portion of the s entence and placed Stature on community supervision for 18 months. This appeal followed. II. Motion to Suppress In his first issue, Stature argues that the trial court erred by failing to grant his
pre- trial motion to suppre ss. Stature does n ot ch allenge the trial court’s rulings on his motions to suppress made at the c lose of evidence at trial.
A. Standard of Review
We review a trial court ’ s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence under a
bifurcated standard of review. Ama dor v. State , 221 S.W.3 d 666, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Guzman v. State , 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). We give almost5 total deference to a trial court ’ s rulings on quest ions of historical facts and application

- of

- law

- to

- fact questions that tu rn on an evaluatio n of credibility and
demeanor , but we review de novo application

- of

- law

- to

- fact q uestions that do not turn on credibility and demeanor. Amador , 221 S.W.3d at 673; Estrada v. State , 154 S.W.3d 604, 607 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); Johnson v. State , 68 S.W.3d 644, 652

– 53 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
B. Applicable Law An officer may make a warrantl ess traffic stop if he has reasonable suspicion to
do so. Jaganathan v. State , 479 S.W.3d 244, 247 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). Reasonable suspicion exists when, based on the totali ty of the circumstances, the officer shows specific, articulable facts at the su ppression hearing that, when combined with rational inferences from those facts, woul d lead him to reasonably conclude that a person is engaging in criminal a ctivity. State v. Torre z , 490 S.W.3d 279, 283 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth 2016, pet. ref ’ d). This is an objective standard that disregards any subjective intent of the detaining officer and looks solely to whether an objective basis for the stop exists. Id.
Whet her a traffic stop was based on reasonable suspicion does not depend upon showing that an actual offense was committed; it is enough to show that the officer reasonably believed an of fense was in progress. Id. Thus, at the suppression hearing, the State ne ed not establish t hat a crime occurred prior to the stop but must elicit testimony showing suffici ent facts to prove tha t reasonable suspicion existed6 that the person stopped was enga ging in criminal activity. Id. at 28 3–8 4. Reasonable suspicion requires only a “minimal level of ob jective justification” for the stop. Hamal

v. State , 390 S.W.3d 302, 306 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) ; see also Daniel v. State , 683 S.W.3d 777, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024) (holding that an officer’s reasonable misinterpretation of state criminal law will no t undermine the reasonable suspicion required to conduct a traffic stop ).
C. Discussion At the suppression hearing, Officer Shoemate testified that he stopped Statu re for two traffic violations : (1) failure to signal a lane change, and (2) failure to stop at a designated point. On cross

- examination, Officer Shoemate was unable to identify the specific statute for either of the traffic violations. Section 545.104 of the Transportation Code requires an operator to use a signal
to indic ate a n intention to turn, change lanes, or start from a parked position. Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 5 45.104(a). Officer Shoemate specifically testified that he
observe d Stature change lanes without using a signal and that such failure to si gnal
was a traffic viol ation.
Section 544.007 of the Transportation Code states that an operator of a vehicle facing a steady red signal shall stop at a clearly ma rked stop line. Id

. § 544.007(d). In the absence of a stop line, the operator shall stop be fore entering the cross walk on
the near side of the intersection. Id

. Officer Shoemate testified that the traffic sig nal was red the entire time Stature was approac hing and that Stature stopped his vehicle7 seven to eight feet into the cr osswalk

. Officer Shoemate stated that Stature’s failure to stop at the designated stop was a traffic offense. The trial court observed t he dash

camera video t hat showed where Sta ture stopped his vehicle at the traffic signal.
S tatur e argued at the hearing that the State did not provide evidence of reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop because Officer Shoemate’s testimony was

not credi ble and was the only e vidence that supported the failure to signal a lane change violation and because the eviden ce sh ow ed that he did not completely pass the
line of the crosswalk. The trial court determined that there was reasonable suspicion
to initiate the traf fic stop based upon Officer Shoemate’s testimony and the dash

camera vide o. Alth ough he could not identify the appropriate statutory reference s , Officer Shoemate testified unequivocally that he had observed Stature commit two traffic
violations. His testimony provided sufficient facts to prove that he reas onably
believed an offe nse was in progress

. See Torrez , 490 S.W.3d at 284. On appeal, Stature argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress because the articul ated facts di d not match the reason for the stop. He

conte nds that Officer S hoema te testified the traffic stop was for failure to stop at a designated place

— a violation of Section 544.010 , 1 which deals with stop signs and

1 Section 544.010 provides that an operator of a vehicle approaching a s top sign or a yield sign shall stop at a c learly marked line. Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 544.010 (a)

– (c). In the absen ce of a clearl y ma rked stop line, the operator shall8 yield signs,

— and th ere was no evidence he faile d to stop at a stop sign or yield sign

. We di sagree. Officer Sh oemat e specifically testified that the traffic signal light was red and that Stature stopped seven to eight feet into the crosswalk

— a violation of Section 544.007(d)

. Even though he could not i dentify the specific statute , h is testimony was
suff icient to establish that he reasonably believed Stature had committed a traffic
violation. See id

. Stature next argues that there was no evidence Officer Shoem ate considered exception s to the law requiri ng a signal to indicate a lan e change citing , S tate v. Cortez , 543 S.W.3d 198, 206

– 08 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). In Cortez , the trial court granted the defendant’s motion to suppress concluding that the re was no evi dence of a traffic
violation. Id . at 202. Th e court of criminal appeals noted that even if the defendant
had committed the traffic violation

— driving on an improved shoulder

— he was statutorily permitted to do so based upon circumstances listed in the statu te allowing a driver to drive on an improved shoulder. Id . at 207. Statur e contends that fo r the offense of failure to signal a lane change, Officer Shoemate should have considered
the circumstances in which that action was permissible. Unlike the statute considered
in Cortez , Section 545.104 does no t provide for circumstances in which failing t o sig nal a lane change is permissible. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 545.104. Thus, there were no statutory exceptions Officer Shoemate was required to consider.
stop before entering the cross walk o n the near side of the intersection. Id. § 544.010 ( c).9 Sta ture finally argues that Officer Shoemate was not reliable because there were
inconsistencie s be tween his report and his testimony at the hearing. He specifically notes that Officer Shoemate indicated in his report that Stature was leaving a business
that sold alcohol , but at the suppression hearing h e stated he did no t observe Stat ure leave such a b usiness. Officer Shoemate stated that this was a clerical error in his
report. He further points out that Officer Shoemate’s report indicates there was a
911 dispatch tape included, but at the suppre ssion h earing he stated to his knowledge
there was no 911 call

. O fficer Shoemat e st ated that he had misun derst oo d , and he was under the impression that the 911 dispatch tape was referring to the “ recording of the traffic stop

. ” At a suppression hearing, the trial court is the sole trier of facts and judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. Wie de v.
State , 2 14 S.W.3d 17, 24

– 2 5 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). The trial court observed the demeanor and appearance of Officer Shoemat e and was able to resolve any
inconsistencies. See id . at 24.
Officer Shoemate testified that he observed Stature commit two traffic
violati ons, and the t rial court found there was reasonable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s r uling, we hold that the trial court did not err by denying Statu re’s motion to suppress at t he
p re

- trial hearing . We overrule his first issue.10 III. Blood Evidence In his second issue, Stature argues that the trial court erred by admitting the
blood eviden ce because the chain of custody was insufficient. In his fourth and fifth
issu es , he argues that the trial court erred by failing to exclude the blood evidence
because the search warrant to obtain the blood s ample was invalid under the United
States and Te xas Constitutions.
A. Standard of Review We review a trial judge ’ s admissibil ity decision f or a n abuse of discretion. Johnson v. State , 490 S.W.3d 895, 908 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). The trial court abuses its discretion when its decision falls outside the zone of reasonable disagreement. Id. But if the evidentiary ruling is correct u nd er any appli cabl e theory of law

— even if the trial court gave a wrong or insufficient reason for the ruling

— we will not disturb i t. Id.
B. Chain of Custody
The State offered St ate’s Exhibit 8 (the box for the blood kit sample) and
State’s Exhibits 8A and 8B (the blood tub es). The trial court admitted State’s Exhibit 8 for record purposes only and admitted State’s Exhibits 8A and 8B for all purposes

ove r Stature’s predicate and Fourth Amendment objections.
Stature arg ue s on appeal that the chain of custody was insufficient to support the admission of the blood evidence. He further contends that the evidence was not properly authentic ated unde r Rule 901(a) of the Texas Rules of Evidence. See Tex. R. Evid. 901(a) (“To sa tisfy the requ irem ent of authenticating or identifying an item of11 evidence, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that
the item is what the proponen t claims it is.”). We have reviewed chain

- of

- custody complaints as complaints that evidence was not authenticated under Rule 901 even when the appellant’s objection did not mention authentication or the rule. See Preston v. State , No. 02

- 22

- 00024

- CR , 2023 WL 4630625 , at *3 (Tex. App. —Fort Worth Jul y 20, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for pub lication ). Proof of the beginning and
the end of the chain of custody will support admission of the evidence barring any showing of tampering or alter ation. Id

. at *4.
Officer Shoemate took Stature to the hospital for the blood draw , and he prepared t he s eals for the blood vials containing Stature’s identifying information as well as the date and the time of the blood draw. Bankhead drew Stature’s blood and placed a tamper

- proof seal over the top of the vials . T he vials were pl aced in protective sleeves and put into protective containers. The protective containers were put into the blood kit box and sealed. Office r Shoemate took the blood kit box to the
Euless Police Department property roo m and placed it in a refrigerated locker. According to Officer Shoemate, after he leaves the sample in the property room, it is

sent off to a toxicology lab for tes ting.
Merson ide ntified the blood kit box

. She testifie d that when she rece ived the
blood sample kit, there was no indication of tampering and that the vials containing
the blood were sealed. Merson reviewed the information on the blood kit box against12 the lab’s chain of custody to confirm identifying informat ion. After confirming she
had the correct information, Merson conducted th e tests on Stature’s blood sample.
The beginning of the chain of custod y was established by Officer Shoema te’s testimony that he was present during Stature’s blood dra w, the b lood vi als were sealed
and labeled with Stature’s identifying information, and the evidence was placed in the police property room. See id

. Merson’s tes timony identifying Stature’s blood sample kit

as the one she received and tested estab lishes the end of the cha in of custody

. See
Durrett v. State , 36 S.W.3d 205, 210 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.).
S tature contends, however, that the State did not establish the end of the c hain
of custody because Officer Shoemate did not pe rsonal ly b ring the eviden ce to trial.
Officer Shoemate testified that a detective brought the blood sample kit to court for
him because he forgot it. Even if we agreed with Stature’s argument that the chain of custody did not end with Merson ’s t esting the blood s ample, the State is not required

to prove a chain of custody if a witness could authenticate the exhibit by other means. Preston , 2023 WL 4630625 , at * 5. Officer Shoemate identified his signature and badge
number on the blood samples. Tes timony t hat an item is what it is claimed to be and
about its distinctive characteristics satisfies the requirements of authenticating or identifying an item of evidence. Id .; Tex. R. Evid. 901(b)(1), (2), (4). “Absent evidence of tampering, issue s rega rdin g the ch ain of custody bear on
the we ight, rather than on the admissibility, of evidence.” Davis v. State , 313 S.W.3d 317, 348 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Stature c ontends that there was evidence of13 tampering because the dates on the blood evidence d o not matc h. Merso n testified
that she tested t he blood sample on April 1, 2022, but her lab analysis report is dated April 6, 2022. Stature argues that it is possible the lab confused two separate blood samples. A mer e show ing of the o pportunity for tampering, absent affirmative evidence of such, is n ot sufficient to require exclusion of the evidence. Patel v. State , No. 2

- 08

- 032

- CR, 2009 WL 1425219 , at *2 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth May 21, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op, not desig nated for publicat ion). Merson specifically testified that
there was no evidence tha t anyone had tampered wit h the blood samples. There is no
evidence in the re cord of tampering. We hold that the State established a proper chain of custody and th at the re w as

no ev idence of tampering. Officer Shoemate authenticated the evidence by identify ing the blood vials and his signature and badge number on the seals. See Tex. R. Evid. 901(b)(1), (2), (4). Thus, the trial court did not err by admittin g the bloo d eviden ce over Stature’s chain

- of

- custody objections

. We overrule the second issue.
C. Invalid Search Warrant In his fourth issue, Stature argues that the tr ial court erred by failing to exclude the blood evidence because it was obtained through an inva lid sear ch warrant in
violation of his Fourth A mendment rights. In his fifth issue, he argues th at admitting the blood evidence obtained through an invalid sear ch warrant violated his rights
under Article 1 , Section 9 of the Texas Constitution an d Arti cle 38.23 of the Texas
Code of Criminal Procedure.14 On appeal, Stature specifically complains that t here was no probable

- cause affidavit attached to the warran t an d that there was no probable cause presented to the magistrate who signed the warrant

. The State counters that Stature has not preserved this complaint for review. When the State offered the blood evidence, Stature’s counsel objecte d, “W ell, foundation and predicate I don’t believe have been properly laid. That will be our fir st obje ction, in addition to . . . So our objection as of right now is, foundation and predicate have not been properly laid and 4 th Amendment, 38.23, blood - - unlawful
blood search without a warrant. ” The trial court sustained th e found atio n and
p redicate objection s and overruled the Article 38.23 objection

. Officer Shoemate then testified that he was able to identify th e blood vials because his signature and badge number were on them as well as Bankhead’s signature

a nd the date and ti me of the blood draw

. The State again offered State’s Exhibit 8 and
State’s Exhibits 8A and 8B. Stature’s counse l “renewed [his] objections .” The trial
court admitted State’s Exhibit 8 f or reco rd p urposes only and admitted State’s Exhibits 8A and 8B for all purposes over Statur e’s predicate and Fourth Amendment objections. The State argues that the heart of Stature’s complaint was the lack o f predicate and chain of custody fo r the e vide nce, an d although he referenced the Fourth Amendment, he did not argue at any point that the search warrant lacked an affidavit or that the warrant was not supp orted by probable cause.15 To preserve a complaint for appellate review, a p arty mu st make a timely request, objection, or motion with sufficient specificity to apprise the trial court of the complaint. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a); Saldano v. State , 70 S.W.3d 873, 886

– 87 (Tex. Crim. App

. 2002) ; Vafaiyan v. Sta te , 279 S.W.3d 374, 383 ( Tex. Ap p.

— Fort Worth 2008 , pet. ref’d. )

. Th e complaint made on appeal must comport with the complaint made in the
trial court or the error is forfeited. Heidelb erg v. State , 144 S.W.3d 535, 537 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); Vafaiyan , 279 S.W.3d at 383

. Sta ture ’s argu ment at trial was that the State had failed to lay the proper foundation and predicate for the blood evidence. Stature’s counsel referenced the
Fourth Amendment and Article 38.23, but only stated “unlawful blood search witho u t

a wa rrant.” State’s Exhibit 5 (the search warrant) was admitted for record purposes without objection. Stature did not object or make the trial court aware that the re was no probable cause affidavit attached to the warrant. At n o time did Stature object that there was no probable cause for the warrant. At the close of evidence, Stature orally
moved to suppress “on the probable cause contained within the search warrant, specifically the times.” However, he does not challenge the denial of that motion to
suppress on appeal

. Because Stature failed to preserve his argument that the search warrant was invalid because there was no probable -c ause affidavit attached to it and no probable cause presented to the magistrate, he h as waiv ed his comp laint for review. Te x. R.16 App. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A); see Vafaiyan , 279 S.W.3d at 383 . We overrule Stature’s fourth
and fifth issues.
IV. Gun Evidence
In his third issue, Stature argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion
for mistrial w hen the Sta te offered evidence of a gun.
A. Standard of Review
We review the denial of a motion for mistrial for an abuse of discretion, and we must uphold the rul ing if it was within the zone of reasonable disagreement. Coble v. State , 330 S.W.3d 253, 29 2 (T ex. Cri m. App. 2010). A mist rial is appropriate only in extreme circumstances for a narrow class of prejudicial and incurable errors. See
Hawkins v. State , 135 S.W.3d 72, 77 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). We balance three factors in reviewing whether a mistri al w as warr anted: (1) the miscon duct ’ s severity (the magnitude of the testimony ’ s prejudicial effect); (2) the measures adopted to cure the misconduct (the efficacy of any cautionary instruction by the judge); and (3) the certainty of conviction abs ent the mis conduct (the strength of the evidence supporting the conviction). Archie v. State , 221 S.W.3d 695, 700 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Ordinarily, a prompt instruction to disregard will cure error associated with an improper question and answer. Ovalle v. Stat e , 1 3 S.W.3 d 774, 783 (Tex. Crim . App. 2000) (holding that a prompt instruction to disregard, coupled with the case ’ s circumstances, may render an error harmless). This is because a jury is presume d to17 follow an instruction to disregard unless something in the record suggests that it cou ld
not follow the instruction. Coble , 330 S.W.3d at 292

– 93.
B. Discussion On redirect examination, the State asked Officer Shoemate questions about the inventory of Stature’s car. When the State asked Officer Shoem a te what items he p ut in inventory, he res ponded “Item 1 was a Ruger LCP .380.” The trial court sustained Stature’s relevance objection and instructed the jury to disregard Officer Shoemate’s

ans wer. The trial court denied Stature’s req u est for a mistrial

. The testimony concerning the gun was very brief and consisted only of the name of the gun found in Stature’s vehicle. Stature conten ds that the testimony imp lies that he also committed the crime of unlawfully carrying a weap on , but there

was no other testimony concerning the gun, its association with Stature, or any other possible offenses. The trial court promptly instructed the jury to disregard the

statement , and the jury i s presumed to follow the trial court’s instruction

. Id

. Officer
Shoema te testified that he believed Stature had lost his mental and physical faculties, and the jury observed Stature’s performance on the field sobriety tests. Merson’s testimony that Stature’s blood alcohol concentration was 0. 21 1 provided stron g evidence for conviction. The gun evidence was not so prejudicial that it was an extreme circumstance warranting a mistrial. See Hawkins , 135 S.W.3d at 77. We overrule Stature’s third issue.18 V. Directed Verdict In his sixth issue, S ta tu re argues that t he trial court erred by denying his motion
for directed verdict.
A. S tandard of Review
A motion for directed verdict is essentially an evidenti ary

- sufficiency challenge.
See Madden v. State , 799 S.W.2d 683, 686 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). In o ur evidentiary

s ufficiency review, we view all evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational factfinder could have found the crime’s essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. V irginia , 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979) ; Queeman v. State , 520 S.W.3d 616, 622 (Tex. Cri m. App. 2017) . Th e factfinder alone judges the evidence’s weight and credibility. See Tex. C ode Crim.
Proc. Ann. art. 38.04 ; M artin v. State , 635 S.W.3d 672, 679 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). We
may not re

- evaluate th e evidence ’ s weight and credibility and substitute our judgment
for the factfinder ’ s. Queeman , 520 S.W.3d at 622 . Instead, we determine whether the necessary inferenc es a re reasonable ba sed on the cumulative force of the evidence when viewed in the light m ost favorable to the verdict. Braughton v. State , 569 S. W.3d
59 2 , 608 (Tex . Crim. App. 2018); see V il

la v. State , 514 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) ( “The court conducting a sufficiency review must not engage in a ‘d ivide and conquer’ strategy but must consider the cumulative force of all the evidence.”). We must presume tha t th e factfinder resolved any conflicting inferences in favor of the verdict, and we must defer to that resolution. Braughton , 569 S.W.3d at 608.19 B. Applicable Law A person commits the offense of DWI if the person is intoxicated while operating a vehicle in a public place. T ex. Penal Code Ann. § 49.04(a). Intoxicated is
defined as “ not having the normal use of mental or physical faculties by reason of the
introducti on of alcohol ” or “ having an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more.”
Id . § 49.01(2)(a) , (b).
C. Dis c ussion
Stature first argues that the evidence is insufficient because the blood evi dence should not have been admitted without probable cause for the warrant. Even if the
trial court had erred by admitting the blood evidence, we must consider all evid ence , even improperly admitt ed evidence, when conducting a legal sufficiency analysis.
G ardner v. State , 306 S.W.3d 274, 285 n.6 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).
Stature al so argues that Officer Shoemate’s testimony was contradictory and
inaccurate a nd that the fi eld sobriety tests were administered incorrectly

. The jury, as factfinder, was free to judge the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the
witness’s testimo ny and resolve any conflicting inferences therefrom. Ybarra v. State , No. 02 -23- 00115

- CR, 20 24 WL 1100785 , at *3 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth Mar. 14, 2024, pet. ref’ d) (mem. op., not des ignated for publication); see Bra ughton , 569 S.W .3d
at 608

. Officer Shoemate obser ved Stature commit two traffic offenses

. He testified
that he dete rmined Stature ha d lost the use of his mental and physical faculties after20 observing him perform the field s obriety tests. The jury was able to view Stature perform th e field sobriety tests from Officer Shoemate’s dash

- camera video. In
additio n, M erson testified that Stature had a blood alcohol concentration of 0.211, which is greater than the 0.08 required for intoxication. See Tex. Penal Code . Ann. § 49.01(2)(b). We hold that the evidence is sufficient to support Statu re’s DWI
convi ctio n and that the trial court did not err by overruling his motion for directed
verdict. We overrule his sixth issue.
VI. Conclusi on Having overruled all of Stat ure’s issues on appeal, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

/s/ Mike Wallach Mike W allach Justice
Do Not Publish Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
Delivered : July 18, 2024