STRATEGIC EFFECTS OF THE CONFLICT

WITH IRAQ: EUROPE

Raymond A. Millen

March 2003
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ISBN 1-58487-114-8

ii
FOREWORD

War with Iraq will signal the beginning of a new era in

American national security policy and alter strategic

balances and relationships around the world. The specific

effects of the war, though, will vary from region to region. In

some, America’s position will be strengthened. In others, it

may degrade without serious and sustained efforts.

To assess this dynamic, the Strategic Studies Institute

(SSI) has developed a special series of monographs entitled

Strategic Effects of the Conflict with Iraq. In each, the

author has been asked to analyze four issues: the position

that key states in their region are taking on U.S. military

action against Iraq; the role of America in the region after

the war with Iraq; the nature of security partnerships in the

region after the war with Iraq; and the effect that war with

Iraq will have on the war on terrorism in the region.

This monograph is one of the special series. SSI is

pleased to offer it to assist the Department of Army and

Department of Defense in crafting the most effective

strategy possible for dealing with the many consequences of

war with Iraq.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute

iii
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

RAYMOND A. MILLEN is currently assigned as the

Director of European Security Studies at the Strategic

Studies Institute. A lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Army, he

graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in 1982, was

commissioned as an infantry officer, and has held a variety

of command and staff assignments in Germany and

Continental United States. He commanded a light infantry

company during Operation JUST CAUSE, the invasion of

Panama in 1990. Lieutenant Colonel Millen has also served

as the U.S. Army Infantry School Liaison Officer to the

German Infantry School at Hammelburg, Germany;

Battalion Executive Officer, 3-502d Infantry, Fort

Campbell, Kentucky; and Chief of Intelligence Section and

Balkans Team Chief, Survey Section, SHAPE, Belgium. He

is a graduate of the U.S. Army’s Command and General

Staff College, and holds an M.A. degree in National Security

Studies from Georgetown University. He is a Foreign Area

Officer for Western Europe. Lieutenant Colonel Millen has

published articles in a number of scholarly and professional

journals, including Infantry Magazine and the Swiss

Military Journal. His book, Command Legacy, was

published by Brasseys in April 2002.

iv
STRATEGIC EFFECTS OF THE CONFLICT

WITH IRAQ: EUROPE

For all the bluster and acrimony regarding the U.S.-led

coalition against Iraq, the European Union (EU) (with the

exception of Germany) will strive to extract the greatest

economic and political benefits in post-war Iraq. The reason

is hardly profound. The EU does not wish to be placed on the

margins regarding the future of the Middle East, and will

seek to secure a foothold in democratized Iraq in order to

increase its influence in the region while simultaneously

limiting the influence of the United States.

The rift between the EU and the United States cannot be

played off as a difference of opinion regarding the approach

to the Iraqi problem. Rather, it represents a fundamental

struggle between the EU and United States for leadership

1

Conclusions:

The vast majority of European states will contribute to

the peacekeeping mission in Iraq if asked bilaterally.

Given its proximity, the European Union can provide

substantial economic and diplomatic resources for

stabilizing the region.

The European Union will seize upon the opportunities

of greater regional democratization to practice

diplomacy and crisis resolution.

The post-Iraqi war era provides an opportunity for

NATO to reorient towards the Middle East.

European active participation on the global war on

terrorism is predicated on clear success in the Middle

East. Failure will result in a period of European

isolationism.
in Europe, specifically, and in foreign affairs, generally. The

EU not only seeks greater independence from the United

States but also greater legitimacy and influence in the

international community. Paradoxically, the EU has

diminished the role of the military in its quest for relevancy.

Whereas the United States regards the use of military force

as fundamental to the interaction among the instruments of

power, the EU views it as detrimental and dangerous to

conflict resolution.

A successful conclusion to the Iraq war and consequent

stability to the Middle East will not stifle EU criticism of the

U.S. initiative, though. The EU will insist sullenly that its

diplomatic approach would have achieved the same results

at less cost and bloodshed. The eventual exposure of Iraq’s

cache of WMD and the suffering of the Iraqi people under

Saddam Hussein will merely shift the rhetoric from antiwar to anti-imperialism with oil as the leitmotiv. Barbed

references to the United States as an arrogant cowboy will

continue, while the EU exploits the newly created stability

to promote its own diplomatic and economic agenda.

But what is the EU? It has yet to reach the stage of

representative government if it ever will, and remains a

deliberative body with common security policy aspirations.

In security matters, Europe does not speak with one voice.

Individual European states still matter, and as has become

apparent in the wake of the recent French-German attempt

to dominate the EU, the smaller European countries will

resist any attempts of a few ministers to speak for the rest.

European states adamantly retain control of their own

foreign policy and regard relations with the United States

as more important than promoting the political agenda of

the EU. Behind the backdrop of EU rhetoric, individual

European countries will be profoundly grateful for

American leadership and perseverance in the war against

terror and its strategy branch, the war against Iraq and

subsequent stabilization of the Middle East.

2
European Interests.

Regardless of the reluctance to wage a war with Iraq,

participation in the coalition will be critical for European

countries seeking to reap the political benefits of a

successful campaign and the economic opportunities of a

revitalized Iraq. Once the peace is assured, European

governments will descend upon post-war Iraq to secure

economic agreements and enduring treaties with the new

government. Specifically, France, Russia, and Turkey, each

with substantial investments in Iraq as well as Iraqi

promissory notes, will want their just returns. Moreover,

once the coalition secures Iraq, the EU will want an equal

hand in stabilizing and reforming the Middle East.

The United Kingdom will staunchly support the

peacekeeping effort, but because of its troubled history with

Iraq will likely seek a low profile or maintain a token force in

the Middle East so as not to excite the passions of the

populace. The British people are unlikely to view a victory in

Iraq with anything greater than mild approval. Given its

loyal support during the events leading to the war and the

political penalty that Prime Minister Blair may suffer as a

result, the United Kingdom may limit its long-term

engagement in the region.

Russia’s reluctance is likely posturing rather than a firm

opposition. Although conflicted over the loss of oil revenues

once Iraqi oil re-enters the market in force, Russia will not

hesitate to send peacekeepers into the region. The logistical

link between the Chechen rebels and Persian Gulf Islamic

radicals provides a powerful incentive to support any

initiative that strangles the Chechen rebels and helps

Russia end this festering conflict. Domestically, after a

decade of frustrations in Chechnya, Russia needs an

unequivocal success it can point to. Additionally,

maintaining access to the Middle East and recovering some

of the Iraqi debt demand active participation in the

post-war Iraq.

3
Despite France’s vociferous objections regarding the

possible war with Iraq, it will readily abandon its alliance

with Germany and join the coalition once it feels it has

extracted the maximum political capital from its position.

Several factors weigh in this decision. France routinely

serves as a counterweight to U.S. leadership in Europe. As a

permanent member of the UN Security Council (UNSC), it

can use the threat of veto to ensure France’s views are duly

considered. Concerning the Iraqi crisis, France will not

overplay its hand though. If the United States perceives the

UNSC is unreasonably obstructing its foreign policy, the

United States will act unilaterally, thereby damaging the

credibility of the UNSC. France seeks European prestige by

resisting the United States, but does not want to create

another League of Nations in the process.

France has likely calculated that the U.S.-led coalition

against Iraq will be a decisive victory and will want to share

in the victory. Non-participation in the coalition and

post-conflict operations would endanger France’s status as

a relevant security partner with the United States and

perhaps negatively impact on its standing as a preeminent

continental power. Prestige and influence aside, France has

substantial commercial interests in Iraq and participation

in the war and subsequent peacekeeping operations will

guarantee those interests are safeguarded.

France has a substantial political investment in the EU.

As the EU’s Praetorian Guard, France does not want to

embark on any course that will weaken the relevance of the

EU. The recent French-German alliance was probably a

power-play for preeminence in the EU, while ostensibly

attempting to enhance the moral authority of the EU at the

expense of NATO and the United States. For France, an

unintended but welcome consequence of the alliance was a

further erosion of U.S.-German relations and, hence,

Germany’s political standing in Europe. In contrast to

Germany, France has plenty of political maneuver room and

can join the coalition without any political consequences.

Germany, on the other hand, has painted itself into a corner.

4
The French-German coup failed, but France can rebound

from it. France is pragmatic if nothing else.

Turkey remains concerned with the effect the war will

have on its Kurdish conflict as well as the sensibilities of its

own Muslim citizens. Turkey has every incentive to insure

that Iraq remains whole to prevent an independent

Kurdistan and to prevent a repeat of the 1991 flood of

Kurdish refugees into Turkey. To these ends, Turkey will

contribute peacekeepers. Re-establishing economic

agreements with Iraq permits Turkey to recoup the

enormous losses in revenue as a result of the first Gulf War

and the subsequent sanctions against Iraq. Turkey must

contend with the wrath of the EU though. Siding with the

United States in this war will bring EU retribution

regarding EU membership. Since the EU views Turkey with

xenophobic lens and is unlikely to accelerate EU

membership even if Turkey rejects the war, Turkey is better

off seeking economic prospects in the Middle East than the

continued courting of the EU. Although Turkey probably

does not realize it yet, the opportunities in post-war Iraq can

propel Turkey to prominence in the Middle East, and make

it indispensable to Europe. As the land bridge between

Europe and the Middle East, Turkey can parlay its

influence with both regions as the power broker. Certainly,

the lure of greater prestige and economic returns in the

Middle East is far greater than as a second-class citizen in

the EU. To secure this position, Turkey must portray its role

as a war against the Iraqi autocracy and not a war against

fellow Muslims. The United States must remain sensitive to

this position or risk losing a coalition partner.

Germany may prove the exception to the U.S.-led

enterprise, but its self-imposed isolation is not preordained. The Schroeder government has consigned

Germany to the political wasteland and will likely find itself

frozen out of Iraq, and possibly the Middle East, due to its

militant opposition to the war. Certainly the liberated Iraqi

people and neighbors of the Iraqi regime will not welcome

German emissaries and businessmen with open arms. If

5
Germany is against the war purely as a matter of principle,

then it will eventually recover its standing in Iraq. If

evidence reveals significant collusion between German

companies and Iraq’s pursuit of WMD, then Germany will

suffer enormous political and economic consequences.

Nevertheless, the German elections in Hesse and Lower

Saxony on February 2 may result in a regime change in

Berlin since the Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) swept

both Laender from Schroeder’s Social Democrats (SPD). At

a minimum, Chancellor Schroeder’s government is

significantly weakened enough to permit the CDU/CSU to

push its political agenda. The German government is not

likely to participate in the war actively, but it might

reconcile enough with the United States to permit a

contribution to the subsequent peacekeeping operations. As

a reliable and modern military partner, the Bundeswehr

contribution can pave over the cracks in U.S.-German

relations, so the United States should not discount a

German contribution later on.

Of all the Alliance members, the new NATO members,

Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia

(although mercurial), Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Rumania,

and Bulgaria, will be the most supportive of the war against

Iraq and will remain as peacekeepers. As new members,

their respect and gratitude to the United States override

any hesitancy they have over a war with Iraq. Although

they lack sufficient air- and sealift, they can move the bulk

of their forces via rail through Rumania, Bulgaria, and

Turkey to staging areas in Iraq and beyond. Despite limited

military capabilities and interoperability with NATO, their

manpower contribution alone will pay big dividends to the

peacekeeping operation. All have experience in peacekeeping and most have operated with the United States in the

Balkans, so cooperation will be practically seamless.

The United States will likely receive a favorable

response from Partnership for Peace (PfP) and non-NATO

EU countries as well. The United States will need to secure

6
agreements bilaterally for peacekeeping contributions

rather than sending a blanket request through the EU or

PfP though. Given U.S. superb relations with PfP countries,

securing sufficient volunteers for long-term peacekeeping

operations should not be a significant problem.

Allaying European Fears through Action, Not Talk.

European demilitarization appears inexplicable to the

United States, which views the military as integral to

national security and admonishes Europe for reneging on

burden sharing obligations. The extreme reluctance to use

military force, not to mention waging a war in the Middle

East, reflects a deeply rooted fear that permeates European

politics. Both world wars and the period of de-colonization

eviscerated Europe of self-confidence and trust in its own

moral rectitude. The failures of the past century have

convinced many Europeans that the use of force solves

nothing and that the best course for conflict resolution is

solely through diplomacy and addressing the roots of

conflict (e.g., poverty, religious friction, ethnic strife,

government oppression, and so forth). All the high-minded

rhetoric about war reflecting a failure of diplomacy and

personifying war as evil rather than holding state and

non-state actors accountable for their heinous activities is

merely a cover for their fear and provides an excuse to

ignore their armed forces.

Fear of provoking a terrorist backlash petrifies Europe.

Europeans worry that a war with Iraq may cause further

instability in the Middle East, ignite a regional conflict, and

thereby unleash a wave of terrorism against European

states. Due to its proximity and accessibility, European

fears of Middle East and North Africa terrorism are not

unfounded. With 15 million Muslims living in Europe, the

risk of terrorism emanating from or through its Muslim

community is daunting. Unlike the United States, which

has a tradition of assimilating emigrants, European

countries maintain tacit segregation of their émigrés.

7
Consequently, ethnic groups feel little national affiliation or

patriotism to their host countries. Contrast this situation

with the United States where an uprising among its Muslim

community would be unheard of. European states could

defuse this potential powder keg if they regarded their

émigrés as citizens and not guest workers, but current

domestic politics hinders naturalization reforms.

The United States cannot allay many of these fears by

explaining how the dynamics in the Middle East will change

in the post-Saddam Hussein era. Only through action and

success will the Europeans conclude that stability in the

Middle East and consequent eradication of the regional

terrorism was the proper course of action. Anxiety over

sparking a firestorm of terrorist retribution within Iraq in

the form of car and human bombs, ambushes, and raids is

overblown. The threat situation in post-war Iraq will be far

different than what the Israelis must combat daily or even

the conditions which led to the attack on the Marine Beirut

compound in October 1983. Force protection, intelligence,

and law enforcement measures by peacekeeping forces and

the new government will hamstring terrorist activities.

Peacekeeping troops in conjunction with reformed Iraqi law

enforcement agencies will exercise sufficient control in Iraq

to thwart, root out, and destroy residual terrorist cells.

Terrorist acts will occur, just as they occurred in Bosnia and

Kosovo, but the vigilance of the peacekeepers will soon

create a stable environment for diplomatic, social,

economic, and informational initiatives to take effect.

The informational initiatives are the most important

factor in securing gains in the Middle East. The EU and the

United States must make a concerted effort to counter the

rhetoric of the radical firebrands and instigators of violence.

Overwhelming resources must be devoted to exposing the

lies of the fanatics and enlightening the citizenry. The EU

and United States must also support the regional

governments when they arrest religious leaders for sedition

and other criminal activities. Alone, these governments

cannot risk a domestic backlash, but they can punish these

8
radicals if they are permitted to fob off the responsibility on

the EU and the United States.

Once the core terrorist organizations in the Middle East

are eradicated, the domestic terrorist threat in Europe will

diminish. Without funding, host nation support, or access to

arms, terrorists will find it more difficult to retaliate in

Europe. Certainly, terrorist organizations can relocate to

another country if they can find one, but their level of

sophistication will plummet. Europeans understand that

WMD is what makes terrorism so dangerous to them, and if

the global war on terror can maintain the pressure, the level

of sophistication can be kept to primitive levels.

To bolster the peacekeeping operations, the United

States can serve notice to Middle East countries that

providing sanctuary to terrorists will be grounds for swift

military action. Terrorist organizations will find themselves

persona non grata in the Middle East within a matter of

weeks since neighboring countries will be anxious not to

incur the wrath of the United States. Additionally, the

extensive use of ground, air, and naval assets to strangle the

arms trade to terrorist organizations can only have a

positive effect.

Activating the European Forte.

The EU may loath war but it is enchanted with

diplomacy and nation building. The United States can use

this strength towards stabilizing the region rather than

focusing solely on European military capabilities. Given the

series of failed EU initiatives in the past decade, the EU will

seek a success in Iraq and the Middle East to enhance its

image. The EU will regard post-war Iraq as a test bed for EU

diplomacy by focusing its efforts on the roots of discontent

and instability. The Europeans are fond of asserting that

humanitarian aid, as well as economic, social, and political

reforms, creates fallow ground for Islamic radicals and

terrorists, and rightly so. Prosperous free people with a

hopeful future pay little heed to the rants of fanatics. The

9
Europeans excel at these activities, and with the U.S.

military to bolster diplomatic efforts, these initiatives have

a superb chance of succeeding.

European and American statesmen will find fertile

ground for the revitalization of the peace process between

Israel and the Palestinians as well. The Europeans will find

the Palestinian leadership, politically isolated from its

benefactors and without access to funds and arms, more

amenable to the peace process. Working in tandem, the

United States will also be in a better position to force the

Israelis to abandon their West Bank settlements and

withdraw to the pre-1967 borders. The Israelis and the

Palestinians will not like the solution, and the agreement

will likely require peacekeepers; however, breaking the

cycle of violence and injecting substantive economic

incentives will soon return this troubled land to normalcy.

Perhaps this solution more than any other will convince the

Europeans that the war against Iraq was worth the risk.

There is a good chance that neighboring countries to

democratic Iraq, particularly Syria and Saudi Arabia, will

feel compelled to institute deep reforms or face domestic

turmoil. With an established foothold in the Middle East,

the EU will be in a position to render assistance with

progressive democratic reforms. Building on success

ensures Europe remains engaged in the Middle East and

undercuts the isolationist tendencies that pervade Europe.

As a corollary to diplomacy, the Europeans are very

comfortable with peacekeeping operations. Any

expectations that the war with Iraq will convince EU

countries to devote more funds for defense is forlorn in the

foreseeable future. The decline of military capabilities is not

just a reflection of a loss of national will. Focusing national

resources to shore up flagging social welfare systems,

staunch growing deficits, and spur economic growth to the

detriment of military readiness has accrued significant

advantages for these states. Without the capability to

project power, Western Europe has not had to worry about

10
becoming embroiled in a war outside of its borders. Except

for France and Great Britain, Western European defense

expenditures are declining to 1.5 percent and below of GDP.

Germany is the worse offender and, as the largest power in

Europe, its example radiates outwardly to the rest. As long

as this trend continues, and the Western Europeans do not

appear willing to reverse course, such initiatives as the

ESDP Rapid Reaction Corps are moribund or will remain

paper tigers at best. Nevertheless, the Middle East will be

more in need of peacekeepers, perhaps many more than are

now anticipated, than war fighters and the Europeans are

in a greater position to fill that void than the United

Nations.

Perhaps subconsciously, European diplomats will use

the “good cop, bad cop” dynamic as a part of their new

diplomatic initiatives. European statesmen can sympathize

with the grievances of regional factions or states but can add

that they cannot control the United States, which is quite

willing to use force if they do not fall into line. So in this

sense, the Europeans can put their diplomatic skills to

work, providing the carrot while pointing out that the U.S.

stick is poised if negotiations fail.

A successful conclusion to the war with Iraq and the

possible, subsequent stabilization of the Middle East will

have a significant impact on Europe’s active participation in

the war on terror (WOT). More to the point, European

willingness to engage in future coalitions is predicated on

clear success. Europe’s natural tendency is not to take

action, but success will embolden it to exercise military force

more readily in the future.

For Europe to recognize the benefits, success must bring

distinct resolutions to many of Europe’s problems

emanating from the Middle East and North Africa. The

stabilization of the Middle East and eradication of the major

terrorist organizations must result in fewer cases of

terrorism, criminal acts in support of terrorism, and the

flow of refugees and asylum seekers. The spread of

11
democracy and open markets must raise the standard of

living, and increase human rights and individual freedoms

of the Arab people. Autocracy and oppression must

disappear. Success means that Europe’s émigré population

will stabilize and even decline as job opportunities and

living conditions in the home countries improve. With such

concrete benefits resulting from this coalition in the Middle

East, Europe will continue to contribute to the WOT. Hence,

a secondary goal of the United States is to use this

enterprise in the Middle East to bring back Europe’s selfconfidence and make it an active partner in global security

matters.

The European Hedge.

The resistance to the war against Iraq serves a very

practical purpose for the EU in case of failure. If the war

against Iraq drags on with substantial casualties and

collateral damage or the Middle East erupts into regional

conflict, the EU will be quick to condemn the United States,

and a failure of this magnitude in the Middle East will

extinguish European participation in subsequent WOT

coalitions.

Pointing to its earlier resistance to war, the EU will seek

to insulate Europe from Middle East retribution. It will

initiate immediate diplomatic overtures to mend fences

with Middle East countries, falling back on soothing words,

increased funding, and appeasement. Given the parliamentary style of European governments, American allies may

melt away as governments fall through lack of confidence

votes.

The media backlash from Western Europe will be swift

and vociferous. Encouraged, opposition parties within each

country will attempt to force their governments to withdraw

support from the U.S. initiative in the Middle East and

perhaps from the WOT. Acts of civil disobedience, such as

blockading U.S. bases and casernes, demonstrations, and

disrupting activities, are highly likely to occur. Terrorist

12
acts within Europe will add fuel to the fire to oppose the

United States and brand it as an arrogant, irresponsible

power. The odds of failure are remote, but the United States

should suffer no illusions regarding the capriciousness of

Europe during a crisis.

Implications on the U.S. Military in Europe.

Clearly, the focus of NATO is shifting to the Middle East

and North Africa rather than the East. Because of the

greater threat from terrorism and the festering instability

of the Middle East, the new orientation is inevitable. With

the change in the regional security environment, the

necessity to maintain U.S. ground forces in Germany is no

longer imperative, and a shift eastward provides significant

advantages. The stationing of ground forces in Bulgaria and

Romania permits quick access to the Middle East via sealift

(Black Sea) and rail. The United States can contract for

modern new division-sized casernes (or cluster casernes)

contiguous to large maneuver training areas. In terms of

energy and maintenance, the casernes will be more cost

effective in the long term than any renovations in Germany,

where the facilities are pre-World War II vintage and

generally in very poor condition. The proximity of maneuver

training areas precludes rail-head and convoy requirements, which are an unnecessary drain on the annual

budget. Additionally, the United States can conclude a

Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) that permits greater

exercise freedom and more reasonable maneuver damage

penalties as well as anti-noise and environmental

regulations than currently are enjoyed in Germany.

Germany will view the move as a retaliation for its anti-war

stance, so the United States can assuage Germany’s

sensibilities by keeping the U.S. Air Force in place. Besides,

the ease with which the Air Force can deploy obviates any

reason to relocate. Shifting European Command to

Hungary and proposing a shift of SHAPE to the Czech

Republic would complement the reorientation and signal

that a new era for NATO has arrived.

13
Recommendations.

To extract the greatest benefit from the war with Iraq

and to win the peace in the Middle East, the United States

must set a bold agenda that goes beyond the immediate war

aims:

Inform all European states that their participation in

the coalition and subsequent peacekeeping

operations is absolutely essential to success and

highly sought by the United States.

Develop an information campaign to overwhelm the

rhetoric of the religious and political ideologues

throughout the Middle East. If the West loses the war

on information, peace in the Middle East will be

threatened.

Prepare a roadmap for stabilizing the Middle East to

include resolving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict,

developing measures and incentives that encourage

democratic reforms in Middle East countries, and

establishing a robust rapid reaction force in Iraq to

respond to major acts of terrorism.

Use this opportunity of success in the Middle East to

bring back Europe’s self-confidence and make it an

active partner in global security matters.

Build on the success in the Middle East to encourage

European countries to tailor and modernize their

armed forces for expeditionary operations.

Reorient NATO towards the Middle East and shift

U.S. forces and headquarters to Eastern Europe in

response.

14
Conclusions.

The tone of this analysis is positive for two reasons.

First, optimism is contagious and fuels success. The

European contagion of pessimism has done nothing to

resolve the conflicts in the Middle East or to curb the growth

of regional terrorists. Europe has already predicted disaster

and failure. Only American leadership can shake its

European allies from their defeatist attitude. Second, action

is preferred to inaction. Again, European inattention and

appeasement of Middle East violence have brought the

international community to this predicament. As long as

Europe takes counsel of its fears, it will shrink from action.

The EU will never admit this, but this makes it no less true.

Inaction has never brought success to any human

enterprise. Action incurs risk, but it also presents enormous

opportunities. Again, through leadership, America can

energize Europe to action and restore its self-confidence and

belief in its moral rectitude.

The American-led war against Iraq and post-war

initiatives will provide the catalyst for Europe to break out

of its continental-centric doldrums. Iraq will serve as a

platform for the Europeans to practice their style of

diplomacy and conflict resolution. The EU will not thank

the United States let alone admit the U.S. approach was

correct, nor will it hesitate to promote its agenda while

denigrating the efforts of the United States.

This is how the EU behaves, and its demeanor supports

the self-delusion of European relevancy in international

affairs. Behind the scenes, the prestige and admiration of

the United States will remain unchallenged. More

importantly, success in Iraq and the Middle East will

provide enormous capital for future security initiatives

against the WOT between the United States and Europe.

The EU will not create an expeditionary force as touted.

At best, the ESPD rapid reaction corps will eventually

become a formalized peacekeeping force. Success in the

15
Middle East will require nothing greater than a peacekeeping force, so the issue becomes academic. As in the past,

the United States will need to rely on bilateral agreements

when building coalitions, but with the stability in the

Middle East, the world will be a safer place.

16
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Robert R. Ivany

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Steven Metz

Author

Lieutenant Colonel Raymond A. Millen

Director of Publications

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Ms. Kimberly A. Rockwell-Jacoby