No

No. 98-098

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

1998 MT 256

CROWELL ANDREW CARDNEAUX, 

a Minor Child,

CATHY C. CARDNEAUX,

Petitioner and Respondent,

v.

CHRISTOPHER CARDNEAUX,

Respondent and Appellant.

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No

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial 

District,

In and for the County of Yellowstone,

The Honorable Russell C. Fagg, Judge presiding.

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For Appellant:

Chris J. Nelson; Nelson Law Firm, Billings, Montana

For Respondent:

Joan Meyer Nye; Nye & Meyer, Billings, Montana

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Submitted on Briefs: July 29, 1998

Decided: October 27, 1998 

Filed:

__________________________________________

Clerk

Justice Karla M. Gray delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶ Christopher Cardneaux (Christopher) appeals from the order entered by the 

Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County, concluding that he 

consented to the court's jurisdiction in the underlying child support case and, on that 

basis, denying his motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. We affirm.

¶ The sole issue on appeal is whether the District Court erred in concluding that 

Christopher had submitted to its exercise of personal jurisdiction by consent. 

BACKGROUND

¶ A Louisiana court dissolved the marriage of Christopher and Cathy Cardneaux 

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(Cathy) on November 15, 1989. In accordance with the parties' stipulated joint 

custody plan, that court's judgment awarded joint custody of their minor child, 

Crowell Andrew Cardneaux (Andrew), and designated Cathy as the domiciliary and 

residential parent, with specified visitation rights in Christopher. Christopher was 

ordered to pay child support monthly. 

¶ On February 8, 1991, Cathy filed a "Petition for Modification of Custody (Foreign 

Decree/Judgment)" in the Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County, 

Montana. Her petition sought adjustment of the visitation schedule, child support, 

and health care obligations contained in the Louisiana court's judgment. Christopher 

moved to dismiss Cathy's petition insofar as it sought modification of the child 

support and health care obligations contained in the Louisiana judgment, claiming 

the District Court lacked personal jurisdiction over him. On August 7, 1991, the 

District Court granted Christopher's motion. It concluded that, while it had 

jurisdiction as to custody and visitation matters pursuant to the Uniform Child 

Custody Jurisdiction Act, it lacked jurisdiction over Christopher, a nonresident 

parent, to modify the child support and related health care obligations ordered by 

the Louisiana court. 

¶ Thereafter, Christopher and Cathy entered into a stipulation to modify the 

Louisiana judgment by increasing the amount of child support, modifying their 

obligations for Andrew's health care and amending the visitation schedule. They filed 

the stipulation and, on September 17, 1991, the District Court issued an order 

adopting the stipulation and modifying the Louisiana judgment accordingly.

¶ In 1997, Cathy filed a motion to amend the court's 1991 order to alter 

Christopher's obligations for Andrew's health care. In response, Christopher filed a 

special appearance seeking dismissal of Cathy's motion on the basis that the District 

Court did not have personal jurisdiction over him. After the parties briefed the 

jurisdiction issue, the District Court concluded that Christopher's 1991 stipulation 

constituted submission to its jurisdiction by consent under § 40-4-210(2), MCA, and 

denied his motion to dismiss. The District Court ultimately granted Cathy's motion 

to amend and increased Christopher's health care obligations for Andrew. Judgment 

was entered accordingly and Christopher appeals from the District Court's denial of 

his motion to dismiss.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

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¶ A motion to dismiss is construed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party 

and should not be granted unless it appears beyond a doubt that the nonmoving 

party can prove no set of facts in support of its claim which would entitle it to relief. 

Stenstrom v. State (1996), 280 Mont. 321, 325, 930 P.2d 650, 652 (citing Hilands Golf 

Club v. Ashmore (1996), 277 Mont. 324, 328, 922 P.2d 469, 471-72). Here, the District 

Court denied Christopher's motion to dismiss based on its conclusion that it had 

personal jurisdiction over him. We review a district court's conclusions of law to 

determine whether the interpretation of the law is correct. Carbon County v. Union 

Reserve Coal Co. (1995), 271 Mont. 459, 469, 898 P.2d 680, 686 (citation omitted). 

DISCUSSION

¶ Did the District Court err in concluding that Christopher had submitted to its 

exercise of personal jurisdiction by consent?

¶ A court of this state must have in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident parent 

prior to entering a judgment ordering--or modifying--child support. See Heinle v. 

Fourth Judicial Dist. Court (1993), 260 Mont. 489, 493, 861 P.2d 171, 174 (citation 

omitted). Personal jurisdiction can be obtained pursuant to specific situations 

enumerated in § 40-4-210, MCA, one of which authorizes a district court to exercise 

personal jurisdiction to modify child support-related aspects of a foreign decree if 

"the individual submits to the jurisdiction of this state by consent, by entering a 

general appearance, or by filing a responsive document that has the effect of waiving 

any contest to personal jurisdiction[.]" Section 40-4-210(2), MCA. Where none of the 

specified situations exist, personal jurisdiction can be exercised over a nonresident 

parent only if "there is any basis consistent with the constitutions of this state and the 

United States for the exercise of the personal jurisdiction." Section 40-4-210(8), 

MCA. Where subsection (8) is asserted as the basis for exercising personal 

jurisdiction, our analysis proceeds under the long-arm jurisdiction conferred by Rule 

4B, M.R.Civ.P. See Heinle, 260 Mont. at 493-94, 861 P.2d at 174.

¶ In this case, the District Court concluded that the stipulation Christopher entered 

into in 1991 constituted consent to the District Court's jurisdiction as provided in § 

40-4-210(2), MCA. That stipulation, filed in the District Court, specifically recited 

that: 

[T]he Petitioner, CATHY C. CARDNEAUX, and the Respondent, 

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CHRISTOPHER CARDNEAUX, . . . hereby stipulate and agree that the court 

may modify the joint custody plan, order and decree of the Fifteenth Judicial 

District Court, LaFayette Parish, Louisiana, docket number 88-2640-C and 

this Court's order dated August 7, 1991 . . . .

Among other things, the stipulation and the District Court's order adopting it increased 

Christopher's child support and modified his health care expense obligations relating to the 

child originally set forth in the Louisiana judgment.

¶ Christopher contends that the plain meaning of the recitals in the stipulation is that 

he and Cathy agreed to allow the Louisiana court, not the District Court, to modify 

the child support-related obligations. He argues that his contention is reinforced by 

the last portion of the recitals where the parties distinguished between the Louisiana 

court and "this Court's" order dated August 7, 1991. Christopher's position is 

without merit.

¶ The recitals in the stipulation clearly constitute an agreement by Christopher and 

Cathy to allow the District Court to modify both the 1989 Louisiana judgment and its 

own order dated August 7, 1991, which concluded that personal jurisdiction over 

Christopher was lacking. The first reference to "the court" can only refer to the 

District Court, since that is the court in which the stipulation was filed by the parties 

and in which Cathy's petition to modify the Louisiana judgment was pending. This 

plain reading of the language to which the parties agreed is further buttressed by the 

fact that Christopher did not object to, or appeal from, the District Court's order 

adopting the stipulation and modifying the financial aspects of the Louisiana 

judgment accordingly. Thus, we conclude that the stipulation reflects Christopher's 

consent to the District Court's exercise of in personam jurisdiction over him for 

purposes of modifying both the child support-related aspects of the Louisiana 

judgment and the District Court's earlier order declining to modify those portions of 

the Louisiana judgment for lack of personal jurisdiction over Christopher. 

¶ Christopher also argues that he could not have stipulated to the District Court's 

exercise of personal jurisdiction over him because the District Court previously had 

refused to modify the child support and health care obligations contained in the 

Louisiana judgment. This argument borders on the frivolous.

¶ In its order dated August 7, 1991, the District Court responded to Christopher's 

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jurisdictional challenge by concluding that it lacked personal jurisdiction over 

Christopher--a nonresident parent--to modify the child support-related provisions of 

the Louisiana judgment. Nothing in that order prevented Christopher from later 

submitting himself to the personal jurisdiction of the District Court via consent, as he 

did by entering into the stipulation. While it is true that Christopher's initial 

jurisdictional challenge would have been preserved and remained effective absent his 

subsequent consent to the District Court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over him 

(see Spencer v. Ukra (1991), 246 Mont. 430, 433, 804 P.2d 380, 382; 

Foster Apiaries, Inc. v. Hubbard Apiaries, Inc. (1981), 193 Mont. 156, 160, 630 P.2d 

1213, 1215), the fact remains that he did submit himself to the District Court's 

jurisdiction by consent for purposes of modifying the child support-related portions 

of the Louisiana judgment and the District Court's earlier order. 

¶ We hold that the District Court did not err in concluding, under § 40-4-210(2), 

MCA, that Christopher submitted to its exercise of personal jurisdiction over him by 

consent and in denying his motion to dismiss on that basis. 

¶ Affirmed.

/S/ KARLA M. GRAY

We concur:

/S/ J. A. TURNAGE

/S/ WILLIAM E. HUNT, SR.

/S/ TERRY N. TRIEWEILER

/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART

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