J-S24017-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: A.F., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: A.M., FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 303 WDA 2024

Appeal from the Order Entered February 14, 2024

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County 

Orphans' Court at No(s): CP-02-AP-0000007-2022

BEFORE: BOWES, J., SULLIVAN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.: FILED: SEPTEMBER 30, 2024

A.M. (“Father”) appeals from the decree1involuntarily terminating his

parental rights to his daughter, A.F. (“Child” or “the Child”), born in August 

2018.

2

 After review, we affirm. 

“Child . . . tested positive for THC and cocaine at birth. The hospital 

referred the matter to [the Allegheny County Office of Children, Youth and 

Families (“CYF” or “the Agency”)], which opened a case two days later. Father 

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 Although the trial court used the term “order,” termination of parental rights 

is accomplished by decree. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2513(d).

2 The court involuntarily terminated the parental rights of Child’s mother, A.F.

(“Mother”) via the same order. Mother likewise appealed, and we address her

appeal by separate memorandum at Superior Court Docket No. 283 WDA 

2024.
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did not live with Mother and was not yet identified as the Child’s father because 

Mother put forward Father and an alternative potential father.” Orphans’ Court 

Opinion, 4/16/24, at 2 (citations to record omitted). 

After closing the case in October 2018, the Agency re-opened it in July 

2019 and obtained protective custody of Child in January 2020, due to

Mother’s substance abuse relapse. See N.T., 1/12/23, at 16-20. The court 

confirmed Child’s commitment at a shelter care hearing on January 24, 2020; 

Father appeared at that hearing. A dependency petition was filed in February 

2020. The court adjudicated Child dependent as to Mother that month and

established a permanency goal of return to parent or guardian. The court 

continued the adjudication as to Father pending genetic testing, ultimately 

adjudicating Child dependent as to an unknown father in November 2020. 

See id. at 22, 25-28; Agency Exhibit 1.3

The Orphans’ Court summarized the testimony and evidence concerning 

Father’s participation in the dependency and involuntary termination

proceedings as follows: 

For the first two years of the case, Father did next to 

nothing. He did attend the Child’s shelter hearing in [January] 

2020. He even offered himself up as a placement option, but 

when CYF attempted to schedule a home assessment, Father 

canceled because of a death in the family and did not get back to 

CYF for six months. 

____________________________________________

3 We observe a disparity between some of the exhibit numbers placed on the 

record and that reflected on the actual documents in the certified record and 

refer to the exhibits by numbering used in the certified record.
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At that shelter hearing in 2020, Father was informed that he 

was required to undergo a random drug screen and paternity 

testing[] but did neither. He was scheduled four times for 

paternity testing, but Father did not get around to it for two years 

at which time paternity was confirmed. 

After that 2020 shelter hearing, Father’s communication 

was sporadic until it ended in November of 2021. He was ordered 

to participate with a father-engagement specialist, but the 

specialist had trouble contacting Father. 

[Subsequent to his appearance at a review hearing in April 

2022, a few days before the originally scheduled May 2022 

termination hearing], Father let the CYF caseworker assess his 

home, which was cluttered but appropriate, and . . . the 

caseworker also went over his goals. Father was to undergo a 

drug and alcohol assessment and screen and to complete 

paperwork necessary for those assessments. Rather than simply 

do it, Father focused on Mother’s drug problem as the source of 

his difficulties. He did not do a screen or reach out for visits. 

[Prior to this time], Father never sought visitation, never 

sent the Child cards, never sent the Child gifts, never sent the 

Child financial support, never asked about the Child’s well-being, 

and never asked about her medical or dental care. 

Father was called and sent mail notifications regarding 

family planning meetings[] but did not attend. Father testified 

that he had health issues, but he never explained to anyone what 

they were.

* * * * *

The first day of testimony on the present issue of Father’s 

parental rights took place in January of 2023, and just afterward, 

Father’s efforts toward his goals increased. [In April 2023, he 

engaged with a father[-]engagement specialist and completed a 

substance abuse evaluation and additional home assessments and 

began discussions regarding visitation with Child.] However, his 

late attempts to visit the Child were complicated by Father’s 

difficulty understanding and respecting CYF’s rules regarding 

confirming visits ahead of time [and other logistical 

difficulties]. . .. Father pointed to medical appointments, work 

issues, and difficulty walking to the bus and other public transit as 

the source of the problem. CYF tried offering gas cards to Father 

and explored having Father’s friend act as a supervisor. In 
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essence, Father’s scheduling preferences made for a complex 

affair.

Months passed before an arrangement was ironed out, and 

between October 19, 2023, and the final day of testimony on 

February 8, 2024 [], Father visited three times. Moreover, 

Father’s first visit started late because Father chose to use some 

of his visit time venting his frustration at what Father saw as CYF 

placing obstacles in his path.

The visit supervisors described Father’s visits as light in 

nature and with little conversation because Father and the Child 

were beginning to get to know each other. The Child did not go 

to Father for comfort or specific needs although she now called 

him her father.

Over the 13 months leading up to the final hearing, Father 

again did not send the Child financial support, gifts, cards, or 

letters. He did not ask about or attend her medical care. He did 

not ask about her schooling or extracurricular interests or 

activities. 

Father’s three eleventh-hour visits were the only ones over 

the life of the case.

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 4/16/24, at 8-11 (record citations omitted). 

In January 2022, the Agency filed a petition to involuntarily terminate

Father’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), 

and (b).4 The court held evidentiary hearings on the Agency’s petition in 

January 2023, and February 2024. Child was represented by KidsVoice.5 

____________________________________________

4 As Father’s paternity had yet to be established at that time, the Agency also 

sought to terminate the parental rights of an unknown father. Ultimately, the 

petition was withdrawn as to an unknown father.

5 Pursuant to In re Adoption of K.M.G., 240 A.3d 1218, 1236 (Pa. 2020), 

we must verify the court appointed counsel to represent Child, and if counsel 

served in a dual role, the court determined before appointment that there was 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Father testified he saw Child three times per week before the Agency’s 

involvement in 2018 or 2019, a claim Mother disputed. See N.T., 1/12/23, at 

132; N.T., 2/8/24, at 237. Father blamed his two-year failure to obtain 

paternity testing on the coronavirus and unspecified health issues, declaring 

he was “not one hundred percent in shape,” and that “old age is kicking in.” 

See N.T., 1/12/23, at 133-35. Father admitted he knew in 2020 that if he 

submitted to a drug screen and an evaluation of his home, Child could 

potentially have come live with him; he faulted the Agency for not following 

up with him, and declared a drug screen would not be “fair” to him. See id. 

____________________________________________

no conflict between the child’s best and legal interests. For children too young 

to express a preference, there is no conflict between the child’s legal and best 

interests, and the child’s right to counsel is satisfied by the appointment of an 

attorney-guardian ad litem (“GAL”). See In re T.S., 192 A.3d 1080, 1092-

93 (Pa. 2018). 

Here, in March 2022, the Orphans’ Court appointed KidsVoice, which 

had served as Child’s guardian ad litem (“GAL”) during the dependency 

proceedings, to represent Child’s legal interests in accord with 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 

2313(a). See Order Appointing Legal Counsel, 3/7/22. The court also found, 

prior to testimony, that because Child was then three years old there was “no 

divergence between her legal and her best interests.” See N.T., 3/7/22, at 

11. KidsVoice served as legal counsel and GAL throughout the hearing. See

N.T., 2/8/24, at 221-223. We discern no structural error in the dual 

representation. See In re T.S., 192 A.3d at 1092-93. KidsVoice 

subsequently filed a brief in this Court supporting the termination of Father’s 

parental rights. 
J-S24017-24

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at 136-40.

6

 Father blamed his failure to visit Child on the Agency.7 See id. 

at 140-41. Father stated he would now be willing to have a drug and alcohol 

screen but wondered if he was “being set up to where I am going to have to 

go through expectational swings like you’re putting [Mother] through. . ..” 

See id. at 142.

At the February 2024 hearing, Dr. Eric Bernstein, an expert in child 

psychology and forensic psychology, testified he conducted an interactional 

evaluation in December 2023 of Child and Foster Parents, and described the 

relationship as “healthy and secure,” permitting child to look to them for her 

needs. See N.T., 2/8/24, at 21, 54. Importantly, Dr. Bernstein observed a 

reciprocal connection from Child to foster parents. See id. 

Dr. Bernstein, who did not perform a father-child bonding analysis,

testified Father claimed in January 2024, that Child knew him “quite well.”

The doctor later learned Father had visited Child three or four times in the 

previous three to four years, see N.T., 2/8/24, at 23-24, 29, raised questions 

in the doctor’s mind about the extent of any bond between them, see id. at 

____________________________________________

6 Concerning drug testing, Father stated, “[I] refuse to go through an obstacle 

just where [Mother] has to because of her circumstances, I don’t feel it is fair 

for me to have to go through it.” See N.T., 1/12/23, at 139.

7 When asked about visits with Child, Father stated, “I haven’t been given that 

chance. I haven’t even been really not even in my home given that people 

were going on principle to not even [let that] happen . . .. I didn’t get that 

because it never took place. I was never given that chance.” See N.T., 

1/12/23, at 140-41.
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49.8 Dr. Bernstein found Father “notably guarded” and unwilling to provide 

information which would present him in a less than positive light. See id. at 

30.9 He also observed that Father’s accounts of his legal history differed from 

facts received through other sources. See id. at 36. 

Agency caseworker, Myia Weisend (“Ms. Weisend”),10 testified Father 

participated in a family plan meeting in January 2024, and had completed a 

housing assessment, a drug and alcohol assessment, and a session with a 

father-engagement specialist after two prior failures to do so. See id. at 68-

70, 91, 101. She stated that Father did not participate with the Agency until

May 2023, and thereafter failed to comply with visitation procedures on five 

consecutive occasions, and later failed to attend visits that did not satisfy his 

desired scheduling. See id. at 72-76, 92. In October 2023, Father was found 

____________________________________________

8 Dr. Bernstein testified that the lack of consistent contact between a parent 

and child with a bond was the “the equivalent of pulling a scab that constantly 

creates pain,” and if parent and child had a limited bond or no bond, that 

absence would at a minimum disrupt the Child’s daily routine. See N.T., 

2/8/24, at 52-23 (Dr. Bernstein’s testimony); id. at 240-41 (Orphans’ Court’s 

summary of Dr. Bernstein’s testimony about the detrimental effects of periods 

of prolonged or unexplained absence on a parent’s bond with a child). 

 

9 Dr. Bernstein’s diagnostic impressions were that Father had an adjustment 

disorder with depressive mood. See id. at 32. Dr. Bernstein also thought 

Father’s overly suspicious behavior merited evaluation. See id. at 33. 

10 Ms. Weisend was the assigned caseworker for this matter from December 

2019 until August 2022, and following educational leave, resumed her duties 

in January 2024. Notwithstanding, she confirmed that she “stay[ed] abreast 

of the case” while on leave. See N.T., 1/12/23, at 9; N.T., 2/8/24, at 62, 69, 

65.
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to have made minimal progress in alleviating the circumstances that brought 

Child into care; he only participated in a home assessment in the later part of 

2023. See id. at 102, 159-60. Father visited Child once per month in 

December 2023, and January and February 2024, but took forty-five minutes 

from one of those visits to complain about the Agency. See id. at 78, 138-

39, 149. Ms. Weisend stated that over the thirteen months preceding 

February 2024, Father had not sent any gift, cards, letters, or financial support 

for Child or participated in any aspect of her medical care or education. See 

id. at 79. During that time, Father, who had never been responsible for Child’s 

care, took no actions to remedy the conditions that caused him to be incapable 

of caring from Child. See id. at 80-82. Ms. Weisend opined termination of 

Father’s parental rights would give Child the desired permanency she sought

and an enhanced sense of family in her pre-adoptive home, see id. at 83-84;

Bill Bedillion, the Agency casework supervisor, agreed that termination would 

be in Child’s best interests. See id. at 162. 

Father testified he worked with a father-engagement specialist since the 

summer of 2023, but continued to have issues with the Agency. See id. at 

185-87. Father was critical of the Agency’s arrangement of visits:

Well, when I’m just being thrown days and that, at first the whole 

thing was set up, well, we both work, and it went from that to a 

demanding of days that were thrown at me that I was supposed 

to participate on when I had other things going on.

See id. at 190 (emphasis added). He also faulted the Agency for “negligence.” 

See id. at 191. Concerning the January 2024 family plan the month before,
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Father stated, “There’s so many meetings and so many this and that that is 

being thrown at us. It’s hard to even identify what particular [sic] with so 

many, so much of what’s going on when you got your own life going on, 

too. It’s a lot to collect. I can’t identify what particular because we discussed

so much.” See id. at 193 (emphasis added). 

Foster father described Child’s attendance at trauma therapy and play 

therapy and described her IEP. He expressed his and his wife’s desire to adopt 

Child and openness to continuing visitation for parents. See id. at 197-205.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the Orphans’ Court found Father had 

not paid attention to Child until she was four years old, missed four scheduled 

appointments for paternity testing, had very sporadic contact with the Agency, 

did not speak to the Agency between May 2020 and November 2021, did not 

attend a family plan meeting until January 2024, refused for multiple years to 

allow a home assessment, did not visit Child or seek information about her 

development or provide any cards, gifts, or financial support, blamed 

unelaborated health conditions and Agency negligence for his limited 

communication with the Agency, showed no concern for Child’s perspective 

when he met her in April 2022, after a prolonged absence and demanded to 

be greeted as a father, had seen Child only three or four times in the past 

three or four years, and had not been able to provide a safe life for Child. 

See id. at 225, 229-44.
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By order dated February 8, 2024, and entered February 14, 2024, the 

trial court involuntarily terminated Father’s parental rights to Child pursuant 

to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (8), and (b). Father filed a timely notice of 

appeal, along with a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal 

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). The trial court filed a responsive 

Rule 1925(a) opinion.

On appeal, Father raises the following issues for our review:

1. Did the [Orphans’ Court] abuse its discretion and/or err as a 

matter of law in granting the petition to involuntarily terminate

Father’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 2511(a)(2)

and (8)?

2. Did the [Orphans’ Court] abuse its discretion and/or err as a 

matter of law in concluding that CYF met its burden of proving by

clear and convincing evidence that termination of Father’s 

parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child 

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 2511(b)?

Father’s Brief at 4 (suggested answers omitted).11 

Our standard of review in this context is well-established:

In cases concerning the involuntary termination of parental rights, 

appellate review is limited to a determination of whether the 

decree of the termination court is supported by competent 

evidence. When applying this standard, the appellate court must 

accept the [Orphans’ Court’s] findings of fact and credibility 

determinations if they are supported by the record. Where the 

____________________________________________

11 Although stated rather baldly, Father’s challenge to the sufficiency of the 

evidence regarding grounds for termination under Section 2511(a) and (b) did 

not preclude the trial court’s review and we decline to find waiver. See In re 

J.W., 578 A.2d 952, 956 (Pa. Super. 1990) (declining to find waiver on 

procedural grounds where issue was raised and considered in trial court and 

it is in the best interests of the child to reach the merits of the claim). 
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[Orphans’ Court’s] factual findings are supported by the evidence, 

an appellate court may not disturb the [Orphans’ Court’s] ruling 

unless it has discerned an error of law or abuse of discretion.

An abuse of discretion does not result merely because the 

reviewing court might have reached a different conclusion or the 

facts could support an opposite result. Instead, an appellate court 

may reverse for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration 

of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or illwill. This standard of review reflects the deference we pay to 

[Orphans’ Courts], who often observe the parties first-hand across 

multiple hearings.

In considering a petition to terminate parental rights, [the 

Orphans’ Court] must balance the parent’s fundamental right to 

make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of his or 

her child with the child’s essential needs for a parent’s care, 

protection, and support. Termination of parental rights has 

significant and permanent consequences for both the parent and 

child. As such, the law of this Commonwealth requires the moving 

party to establish the statutory grounds by clear and convincing 

evidence, which is evidence that is so clear, direct, weighty, and 

convincing as to enable a trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, 

without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.

Interest of M.E., 283 A.3d 820, 829-30 (Pa. Super. 2022) (internal citations 

and quotation marks omitted; capitalization standardized).

Section 2511 of the Adoption Act (“the Act”) governs the involuntary 

termination of parental rights. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511. Under the Act, the 

trial court must first determine whether the parent’s conduct warrants 

termination under one of the grounds set forth at section 2511(a). Only if the 

court determines that the petitioner has established grounds for termination 

under Section 2511(a) does it engage in assessing the petition under Section 

2511(b), which focuses upon the child’s needs and welfare. See In re T.S.M., 

71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). To involuntarily terminate parental rights, the 
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petitioner must satisfy both section 2511(a) and (b) by clear and convincing 

evidence. See In re Adoption of C.M., 255 A.3d 343, 359 (Pa. 2021). 

In this case, the trial court terminated Father’s parental rights pursuant 

to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (8), and (b). To affirm the underlying decrees, 

we need only agree with the court’s decision as to any one subsection of 

section 2511(a), in addition to section 2511(b). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 

380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). As such, we limit our discussion to 

section 2511(a)(2) and (b), which provide as follows: 

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a 

child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the 

following grounds:

* * * * *

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child 

to be without essential parental care, control or 

subsistence necessary for [her] physical or mental 

well-being and the conditions and causes of the 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not 

be remedied by the parent.

* * * * *

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the 

rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare 

of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated 

solely on the basis of environmental factors such as 

inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and 

medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. 

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (b).

To prove the applicability of subsection (a)(2), the party petitioning for 

termination must establish: (1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, 
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neglect or refusal; (2) such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal caused the 

child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence; and (3) the 

causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot and will not be 

remedied. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2); In re Adoption of A.H., 247 A.3d 

439, 443 (Pa. Super. 2021). Subsection (a)(2) emphasizes the child’s present 

and future need for essential parental care, control, or subsistence, not the 

parent’s refusal to perform their duties. Thus, the statute “should not be read 

to compel courts to ignore a child’s need for a stable home and strong 

continuous parental ties. . . . This is particularly so where disruption of 

the family has already occurred and there is no reasonable prospect 

for reuniting it.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1117 (Pa. Super. 2010) 

(citation omitted) (emphasis in original). Section 2511(a)(2) is not limited to 

affirmative misconduct; it may be implicated by acts of refusal or incapacity 

to perform parental duties. See In re S.C., 247 A.3d 1097, 1104 (Pa. Super. 

2021), abrogated on other grounds by Interest of K.T., 296 A.3d 1085, 1110 

n.23 (Pa. 2023). We have long recognized that a parent is required to make 

diligent efforts towards the reasonably prompt assumption of full parental 

responsibilities. See In re M.A.B., 166 A.3d 434, 443 (Pa. Super. 2017).
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Father asserts that, despite obstacles,12 he met his goals and made 

progress, particularly after ultimately commencing work with the fatherengagement specialist. See Father’s Brief at 14-23. While acknowledging 

“miscommunication and misunderstanding” related to visitation, Father 

contends that, visitation was going well, and any issues related to logistics 

should not be an impediment to reunification. See id. at 19-21. 

In finding the Agency established the statutory grounds to terminate 

Father’s parental rights pursuant to section 2511(a)(2), the court reasoned:

[Father] made faint efforts to engage with CYF, pursue his 

goals, and interact with [the] Child except on the eve of critical 

court proceedings. . .. 

* * * * *

At the shelter hearing, he was required to undergo paternity 

testing. He took two years to do it. He was ordered to work with 

a father-engagement specialist, but then the provider had 

difficulty contacting Father – a recurring theme with Father and 

his services. Father dilly-dallied with paperwork necessary for 

basic assessments, resentfully saying that the case was about 

Mother’s drug problems.

Father’s primary contact with the Child was in court. In 

2022, he inappropriately told the Child to give her “dad” a hug, 

failing to consider what impact that might have on a little girl who 

did not know him. He only managed to visit [the] Child three 

times before his final court hearing on February 8, 2024. . .. 

Father’s priority was complaining about Mother and CYF’s failure 

to bend visitation to his complex requirements.

____________________________________________

12 Father raises his age, unspecified health issues, the COVID-19 pandemic, 

and his own past experience with child welfare agencies as a child as obstacles 

which impaired his ability to complete his reunification goals. See Father’s 

Brief at 15-24.
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Father was not even diligent in his excuses. He was so 

vague about his own life, work issues, and health challenges that 

Dr. Bernstein finally opined that Father should undergo a mentalhealth evaluation because his guardedness in disclosing any 

information was . . . disproportionate.

Father claimed that CYF put “obstacles” in his path, but if 

that were true, Father was required to “exercise reasonable 

firmness in resisting obstacles” between him and [the] Child. He 

never offered a reason why he could not offer the Child financial 

support or just call her, send her a card, or give her a birthday 

gift – ever – during all the years in which she was struggling to

settle into foster care. In hearing after hearing, this [c]ourt found 

no progress by Father. Despite this, he ended his testimony with 

the proclamation that he would take any steps necessary to be 

reunified with his daughter despite years of failing to do just that.

This [c]ourt found Father distinctly lacking in credibility. 

Father abandoned the Child. He was a ghost in her life – an 

individual who appeared in a courtroom calling himself “dad” only 

to then vanish again because he was disgruntled with the hassles 

– perceived or real – of setting up visits. Plainly, he either cannot 

or will not remedy these conditions. . ..

Father’s contention is baseless.

Id. at 21-22.

We discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court in concluding that 

termination pursuant to section 2511(a)(2) is warranted because Father’s 

repeated and continued neglect and refusal has caused Child to be without 

essential parental control or subsistence necessary for her physical and mental 

well-being, and Father cannot or will not remedy this situation. See A.H., 

247 A.3d at 443. Father failed for more than two years to establish paternity 

or even allow for his home to be assessed, simple steps that might have 

allowed Child to live with him from 2020 onward. See N.T., 1/12/23, at 15,
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22-24, 27-28, 57-58, 104-05, 114-15, 118; Agency Exhibit 1. Father did not 

visit Child between the January 2020 shelter care hearing and an April 2022 

review hearing, and thereafter visited her only three times. See N.T., 

1/12/23, at 60-61; N.T., 2/8/24, at 61, 72-75, 77, 80, 92, 97-99, 102, 108, 

120, 127-132. Father made almost no progress with his goals until October 

2023, when the court found him to be in moderate compliance, although still 

noting minimal progress. See N.T., 2/8/24, at 96, 102; Agency Exhibits 10, 

18. Father never attended a family plan meeting until January 2024, claiming 

unspecified “health conditions.” See N.T., 2/8/24, at 33, 110-12. 

Child had been placed over four years at the time of the conclusion of 

the subject proceedings and is entitled to permanency. A parent is required 

to make diligent efforts towards the reasonably prompt assumption of full 

parental responsibilities. See M.A.B., 166 A.3d at 443. “[A] child’s life cannot 

be held in abeyance while a parent attempts to attain the maturity necessary 

to assume parenting responsibilities. The court cannot and will not 

subordinate indefinitely a child’s need for permanence and stability to a 

parent’s claims of progress and hope for the future.” In re Adoption of 

R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 513 (Pa. Super. 2006). Father’s first claim does not 

merit relief. 

Having found sufficient grounds for termination pursuant to section

2511(a)(2), we must next determine whether termination was proper under

section 2511(b). Section 2511(b) affords “primary consideration to the 
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developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child.” 23 

Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). Our Supreme Court has generally outlined this inquiry, 

as follows:

[C]ourts should consider the matter from the child’s perspective, 

placing her developmental, physical, and emotional needs and 

welfare above concerns for the parent.

Accordingly, the determination of the child’s particular 

developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare must 

be made on a case-by-case basis. We have observed the law 

regarding termination of parental rights should not be applied 

mechanically but instead always with an eye to the best interests 

and the needs and welfare of the particular children involved. 

Thus, the court must determine each child’s specific needs.

Moreover, the child’s emotional needs and welfare include 

intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability. As 

further guidance, we have identified factors, i.e., specific needs 

and aspects of the child’s welfare, that trial courts must always 

consider. The courts must consider whether the children are in a 

pre-adoptive home and whether they have a bond with their foster 

parents. And, if the child has any bond with the biological parent, 

the court must conduct an analysis of that bond, which is not 

always an easy task.

K.T., 296 A.3d at 1105-06 (internal citations, quotation marks, and footnotes 

omitted). 

“In cases where there is no evidence of any bond between the parent 

and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists.” In re K.Z.S., 946 

A.2d 753, 762-763 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation omitted). Moreover, when 

evaluating a parental bond, “the court is not required to use expert testimony. 

Social workers and caseworkers can offer evaluations as well. Additionally, 

section 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding evaluation.” Z.P., 994 
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A.2d at 1121 (internal citations omitted). It is within the Orphans’ Court’s

province to consider the totality of the circumstances when performing a 

needs and welfare analysis. See M.E., 283 A.3d at 839. An Orphans’ Court 

has the discretion to prioritize the safety and security of a child over her bonds 

with her parent and we will not disturb such an assessment if supported by 

the record. See id. 

Father asserts he had a very positive relationship with Child, and foster 

father testified Child looked forward to their visits and called him “Dad.” See

Father’s Brief at 25-28.

In concluding that Child’s developmental, physical and emotional needs 

and welfare supported termination of Father’s parental rights, the Orphans’ 

Court stated:

This [c]ourt found that termination of [Father’s parental]

rights would not destroy a necessary or beneficial 

relationship. . . . Father never had a bond with [] Child, and all 

he could do is disrupt the fortunate situation in which she now 

finds herself.

Under these circumstances, this [c]ourt can only conclude 

that the Child would not suffer a serious detriment from

termination of the parent[‘s] rights.

This Child, who is in her third placement, was at risk 

of foster care drift, and she even expressed to the 

caseworker her desire for a family. What would be 

detrimental would be to leave her in limbo, while Mother 

and Father continue with goals toward which they have 

made no significant progress and of which they exhibit no 

understanding.

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 4/16/24, at 28 (emphasis added). 
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We discern no error in the Orphans’ Court’s determination. Father had 

no involvement with Child prior to removal and saw Child at the January 2020 

shelter care hearing and not again for more than two years at an April 2022 

review hearing.

13 See N.T., 1/12/23, at 22, 60-61; N.T., 2/8/24, at 82, 97-

99. Thereafter, Father participated in only three visits from December 2023

until the second evidentiary hearing in February 2024. See N.T., 2/8/24, at 

29, 77, 127, 132, 188, 203. Throughout, Father did not send Child any letters, 

cards, gifts, or money. Nor did he inquire regarding Child’s well-being. See

N.T., 1/12/23, at 62, 65; N.T., 2/8/24, at 79. Although Father’s recent

visitations with Child were positive, testimony at the hearing established their

conversation was “light” and “very surface level.” See N.T. 2/8/24, at 127-

135, 138, 149, 208. Further, Child did not approach Father for comfort or any 

specific needs. See id. at 127-129, 133.

Dr. Bernstein opined there was no evidence of a healthy or secure bond 

between Child and Father. See id. at 54-55. He testified the approximately 

four encounters Father had with Child in four years raised questions about the 

extent of any bond and how Child would be impacted if that contact ceased.

____________________________________________

13 As to Father’s interaction with Child at the April 2022 review hearing, Ms. 

Weisend observed, “. . . I wouldn’t say [it] was necessarily positive at first[,]

as Father engaged [Child] saying[,] ‘Come here, [Child]. Give daddy a hug,’

and she responded saying[,] ‘You’re not my dad.’” N.T., 2/8/24, at 99; see

N.T., 1/12/23, at 60-61.
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See id. at 23-24, 49. Dr. Bernstein further explained the disruptive quality 

of such occasional meetings on the Child:

So[,] it just essentially forces you to start back at the starting line. 

So[,] every time that there’s a level of inconsistency, assuming 

that there is no bond and you’re trying to establish one, it just 

creates further huddles to jump over for that to essentially 

crystalize into a more meaningful connection. 

See id. at 53-54.

In contrast, Child has formed a loving, safe, stable, and supportive bond 

with her current pre-adoptive foster parents (“Foster Parents”), with whom 

she had been placed approximately eight months at the time of the conclusion 

of the subject proceedings and who provide for all her needs, including her 

special needs including ADHD, for which she received and was engaged in 

services, both in school and otherwise, and has individualized educational plan 

(“IEP”) that addresses her behavioral needs. See id. at 21, 81, 103-05, 123-

24, 160-61, 198, 204. Foster Parents are involved in this care and participate 

in it. See id. at 103-105, 200-202. Foster Father also reported mutual 

affection between Child and himself and his wife, whom Child refers to as mom 

and dad. See id. at 202-203. Child has made significant progress with these 

interventions. See id. at 161.

Dr. Bernstein and Mr. Bedillion testified Foster Parents were meeting 

Child’s needs and welfare. See id. at 21-22, 160-161. Ms. Weisend testified 

that the termination of Father’s parental rights would serve Child’s needs and 

welfare by giving her permanency, stability and a sense of home and family, 
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which Child had expressed a recent wish to have. See id. at 82. Mr. Bedillion

express a similar opinion, see id. at 151, and Dr. Bernstein stated he viewed

Foster Parents as a healthy and stable permanency resource for adoption. 

See id. at 34-35. Accordingly, the record corroborates the Orphans’ Court’s 

determination termination of Father’s parental rights would not sever a 

necessary and beneficial relationship and would best serve Child’s 

developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare pursuant to Section 

2511(b). See K.T., 296 A.3d at 1113. As such, we discern no abuse of 

discretion and do not disturb the order involuntarily terminating Father’s 

parental rights.

Order affirmed.

DATE: 09/30/2024