UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-1346

TERESA BREWER LAMONDS,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

J. T. PIERCE, In his official capacity as an officer with 

the Candor, North Carolina Police Department,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle 

District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Catherine C. Eagles, 

District Judge. (1:09-cv-00962-CCE-LPA)

Submitted: November 27, 2013 Decided: January 6, 2014

Before DUNCAN, DAVIS, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Duane K. Bryant, LAW OFFICES OF DUANE BRYANT, High Point, North 

Carolina, for Appellant. Dan M. Hartzog, Kari R. Johnson, 

CRANFILL, SUMNER & HARTZOG, LLP, Raleigh, North Carolina, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Theresa Brewer Lamonds appeals the district court’s 

order granting summary judgment in favor of Sergeant J. T. 

Pierce and dismissing her state law malicious prosecution claim 

and her excessive force claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

(2006). Finding no error, we affirm.

We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary 

judgment, “viewing the facts and the reasonable inferences drawn

therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” 

Emmett v. Johnson, 532 F.3d 291, 297 (4th Cir. 2008). Summary 

judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

Lamonds first contends that the district court erred 

in granting summary judgment in Sergeant Pierce’s favor on her 

malicious prosecution claim. To prove a malicious prosecution 

claim in North Carolina, a plaintiff must establish: 

“(1) defendant initiated the earlier proceeding; (2) malice on 

the part of defendant in doing so; (3) lack of probable cause 

for the initiation of the earlier proceeding; and 

(4) termination of the earlier proceeding in favor of the 

plaintiff.” Best v. Duke Univ., 448 S.E.2d 506, 510 (N.C. 

1994). Here, the dispute is over whether Sergeant Pierce had 

probable cause to charge Lamonds with disorderly conduct for an 
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incident at the town hall* and for assault on a government 

official. 

We conclude that, considering the facts and 

circumstances underlying each charge that were known to Sergeant 

Pierce at the time, the district court did not err in finding 

that, as a matter of law, Sergeant Pierce had probable cause to 

bring the charges against Lamonds. See Best, 448 S.E.2d at 510

(“Whether probable cause exists is a mixed question of law and 

fact, but where the facts are admitted or established, the 

existence of probable cause is a question of law for the 

court.”); Martin v. Parker, 563 S.E.2d 216, 218 (N.C. Ct. App. 

2002) (discussing probable cause); see also N.C. Gen. Stat. § 

14-288.4(a)(2) (2011) (defining crime of disorderly conduct); 

State v. Noel, 690 S.E.2d 10, 13 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010)

(enumerating elements of assault on a government official); 

State v. Mitchell, 592 S.E.2d 543, 547 (N.C. 2004) (defining 

criminal assault). Thus, we affirm the district court’s grant 

of summary judgment in Sergeant Pierce’s favor on Lamonds’ 

malicious prosecution claim. 

Turning to the excessive force claim, Lamonds asserts 

that her Fourth Amendment rights were violated as the result of 

 * Lamonds was charged with two counts of disorderly conduct 

for her actions on the day in question; however, Sergeant Pierce 

brought only one of those charges against her. 
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an official policy or custom of the municipality or the police 

department. However, she names neither the town nor the police 

chief as a defendant. Thus, this claim must fail. 

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED