1 

2024 IL App (5th) 240353 

NO. 5-24-0353 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIFTH DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the 

 ) Circuit Court of 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Christian County. 

 ) 

v. ) No. 24-CM-16 

 ) 

JARAD A. CHALLANS, ) Honorable 

 ) Amanda S. Ade-Harlow, 

Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

JUSTICE CATES delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 

Justices Welch and Sholar concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

¶ 1 The defendant, Jarad A. Challans, appeals the March 5, 2024, order of the circuit court of 

Christian County, denying the defendant’s pretrial release pursuant to article 110 of the Code of 

Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/art. 110 (West 2022)).1 The defendant argues that 

the circuit court erred when it detained the defendant because he was not charged with a detainable 

offense as provided in section 110-6.1(a) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a) (West 2022)). For 

the following reasons, we reverse the circuit court’s order and remand for a new hearing to allow 

the circuit court to consider those mandatory conditions for defendant’s pretrial release, pursuant 

1As amended by Public Act 101-652 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023), commonly known as the Safety, 

Accountability, Fairness and Equity-Today (SAFE-T) Act (Act). See Pub. Act 101-652, § 10-255 (eff. Jan. 

1, 2023); see also Pub. Act 102-1104, § 70 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023) (amending various provisions of the Act); 

Rowe v. Raoul, 2023 IL 129248, ¶ 52 (lifting stay and setting effective date as September 18, 2023).

NOTICE

This order was filed under 

Supreme Court Rule 23 and is 

not precedent except in the 

limited circumstances allowed 

under Rule 23(e)(1).

NOTICE

Decision filed 05/28/24. The 

text of this decision may be 

changed or corrected prior to 

the filing of a Petition for 

Rehearing or the disposition of 

the same.
2 

to section 110-10 (725 ILCS 5/110-10 (West 2022)) and any other conditions deemed necessary 

under the particular facts of this case.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 On March 5, 2024, the defendant was charged by information with one count of aggravated

assault, a Class A misdemeanor (720 ILCS 5/12-2(b)(1) (West 2022) (miscited in the charging 

instrument as “720 ILCS 5/12-2(a)(1)”)). On the same day, the State filed a verified petition to 

deny the defendant pretrial release. The State alleged in its verified petition that the proof is evident 

and the presumption great that the defendant committed an offense listed in section 110-6.1(a) of 

the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a) (West 2022)) and that the defendant is charged with an offense 

under section 110-6.1(a)(1), (1.5), or (3) through (7) (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(1), (1.5), (3)-(7)

(West 2022)) and the defendant posed a real and present threat to the safety of any person or 

persons or the community. The State’s verified petition was supported by a police report from the 

defendant’s arrest, which also described previous interactions between the police and the 

defendant. The victim in this case was James Challans, the defendant’s father. The police report 

details that there was an extensive history between James and the defendant because James was 

the payee for the defendant’s social security benefits. The defendant had a history of complaining 

that he had not received his money from James. Each time there was a complaint, police officers 

verified that James had given the defendant his money. They had determined in the past that James 

had given the defendant his money, only withholding enough money to keep the bank account 

active. Officers had previously witnessed the defendant yell and threaten to kill James on numerous 

occasions. The defendant had been arrested for criminal damage to James’s door and was currently 

suspected of attempting to burn down James’s house. That case was still under investigation. 

Following two separate incidents between the defendant and James, the defendant was
3 

involuntarily admitted to Springfield Memorial Hospital for a mental health evaluation. Both 

times, the defendant was released from the hospital after about a week.

¶ 4 Also, on March 5, 2024, the circuit court held a hearing on the State’s petition to deny the 

defendant’s pretrial release. During the State’s proffer it detailed the events that occurred on March 

4, 2024, where officers were dispatched to the home of James Challans to remove the defendant 

from James’s home. The defendant left James’s home as requested by the officers and reported to

the police department to make a statement. While at the police department, the defendant screamed

and threatened to kill James to get his money. The defendant specifically threatened that he would 

kill James with a knife if he had to. The State noted that the defendant had been involuntarily 

committed twice for a mental health evaluation after displaying deeply concerning behavior, which 

officers described as “manic with delusional thoughts of rage and harm.” The State asked that the 

court find probable cause for aggravated assault against James because the report listed James’s 

age as 70 years old. The State alleged that the defendant was aware of James’s age because he was 

the defendant’s father. Based on the defendant’s history, the State argued that the defendant’s 

statements to officers and James would place James in a reasonable apprehension of receiving a 

battery. The State then proceeded to discuss the factors of dangerousness. The State noted that the 

defendant had not participated in the pretrial investigation report. As a result, there was no 

information regarding the defendant’s mental health treatment or any relevant information on how 

to safely help the defendant. In addition, the State asked the court to take judicial notice of the 

defendant’s criminal history, which included convictions for burglary in 2008 and domestic battery 

in 2012. The State then argued that while there was no physical contact with the victim in this case, 

the offense was of a violent nature as the defendant threatened to kill James. In further support of 

its position, the State argued that the defendant’s criminal history and mental health history were 
4 

issues of concern, especially the mental health history because it displayed a pattern of behavior. 

The State stated that the main person at risk if the defendant was released was James, as there were

ongoing incidents and they lived next door to one another. Additionally, the State argued that there 

was a potential that the defendant may seek retribution against James. There was no history that 

the defendant possessed or had access to weapons, but the State presumed that he had access to 

knives because of the threats he made against James. Due to the prior issues between the defendant 

and James, their proximity to each other, and the lack of information in the pretrial services 

investigation report, the State argued that there were no conditions or combinations of conditions 

that could mitigate the real and present threat to any person or persons or the community posed by 

the defendant. In conclusion, the State requested that the circuit court grant its petition to detain 

the defendant.

¶ 5 Defense counsel then argued that the defendant was not charged with a detainable offense. 

The State responded that section 110-6.1(a)(7) stated that any person that attempts to inflict harm 

upon another can be detained, which would include attempted domestic battery. Defense counsel 

replied that the defendant would need to be charged with that offense, and the defendant was not 

charged with domestic battery or attempted domestic battery. The circuit court was not persuaded 

by the defense counsel’s argument regarding whether aggravated assault in this case was a 

nondetainable offense. 

¶ 6 Defense counsel continued with its argument against the State’s verified petition. 

Regarding the dangerousness factors, defense counsel asked the court to consider that the most 

recent criminal charge was from 2012. Defense counsel also requested that the court not view the 

defendant’s failure to meet with pretrial services negatively because the defendant was maintaining 

his right to remain silent. Lastly, defense counsel believed that there were conditions that could 
5 

mitigate the real and present threat alleged by the State, including mental health treatment, a no 

contact order, and electronic monitoring. 

¶ 7 After considering the proffers and arguments from counsel the circuit court found that 

“even if aggravated assault to an individual 60 years of age or older is not a qualifying offense for 

which detention can be ordered, the defendant could be charged with attempt domestic battery.” 

The circuit court did not think that it was appropriate to increase or enhance charges against the 

defendant when the State had charged the defendant with an offense it believed appropriate under 

the circumstances. In addition, the court found that the proof was evident and the presumption 

great that the defendant committed the offense charged. Further, the circuit court found that it was 

proved by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant posed a real and present threat to James

and the community and that no conditions or combination of conditions could mitigate the threat 

posed by the defendant’s release. The defendant was ordered detained. Following the hearing, the 

circuit court entered a written order that detained the defendant and found that by clear and 

convincing evidence that the proof is evident or the presumption great that the defendant had 

committed a qualifying offense listed in paragraphs (1) through (7) of section 110-6.1(a) of the 

Code (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(1)-(7) (West 2022)) and the defendant posed a real and present threat 

to the safety of any person or persons or the community, based on the specific articulable facts of 

the case and no condition or combination of conditions could mitigate the real and present threat 

to the safety of any person or persons. 

¶ 8 The defendant filed a timely notice of appeal on March 6, 2024. On appeal, the defendant 

argues that the circuit court’s March 5, 2024, order should be reversed because the charged offense 

in this case was not detainable under section 110-6.1(a). The State filed a memorandum in 

response. The State argues that the defendant’s risk to any person or the community warrants 
6 

detention despite not being charged with an explicitly detainable offense. In support, the State 

contends that the purpose of the Code is to allow the circuit court to be proactive when determining 

dangerousness and remanding this case for a new hearing or to require the State to recharge the 

defendant with detainable offense would not be what the legislature intended. Also, the State 

argued that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered the defendant to be 

detained.

¶ 9 II. ANALYSIS 

¶ 10 Pretrial release is governed by article 110 of the Code (725 ILCS 5/art. 110 (West 2022)), 

as amended by the Act. Under the Code, a defendant’s pretrial release may only be denied in 

certain statutorily limited situations. See 725 ILCS 5/110-2(a), 110-6.1 (West 2022). Upon filing 

a timely, verified petition requesting denial of pretrial release, the State has the burden to prove by 

clear and convincing evidence that the proof is evident or the presumption great that the defendant 

has committed a qualifying offense, that the defendant’s pretrial release poses a real and present 

threat to the safety of any person or the community or a flight risk, and that less restrictive 

conditions would not avoid a real and present threat to the safety of any person or the community 

and/or prevent the defendant’s willful flight from prosecution. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e), (f) (West 

2022). The trial court may order a defendant detained pending trial if the defendant is charged with 

a qualifying offense, and the trial court concludes the defendant poses a real and present threat to 

the safety of any person or the community (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(1)-(7) (West 2022)) or there is 

a high likelihood of willful flight to avoid prosecution (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(8) (West 2022)).

The sole issue on appeal is whether the charged offense was a detainable offense as defined in 

section 110-6.1(a). Resolution of this issue requires us to interpret section 110-6.1(a) of the Code.
7 

¶ 11 Statutory interpretation presents a question of law that is subject to de novo review. People 

v. Smith, 2016 IL 119659, ¶ 15. The primary object of statutory construction is to ascertain and 

give effect to the true intent of the legislature, and all other rules are subordinate to this principle. 

People v. Jamison, 229 Ill. 2d 184, 188 (2008). “The most reliable indicator of legislative intent is 

the language of the statute, given its plain and ordinary meaning.” People v. Clark, 2019 IL 

122891, ¶ 20. “A court must view the statute as a whole, construing words and phrases in light of 

other relevant statutory provisions and not in isolation.” Clark, 2019 IL 122891, ¶ 20. “Each word, 

clause, and sentence of a statute must be given a reasonable meaning, if possible, and should not 

be rendered superfluous.” Clark, 2019 IL 122891, ¶ 20. 

¶ 12 The Code allows the circuit court to detain the defendant if “the defendant is charged with 

an attempt to commit any charge listed in paragraphs (1) through (6.5), and it is alleged that the 

defendant’s pretrial release poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons 

or the community, based on the specific articulable facts of the case.” 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(7) 

(West 2022). The State suggests that the defendant is eligible for detention because he could have 

been charged with attempted aggravated stalking or attempted domestic battery, which are charges 

listed in paragraphs (2) and (4) respectively, and the defendant’s dangerousness warrants 

detention. However, in this case, the defendant was not charged with either offense, but rather was 

charged with aggravated assault. Aggravated assault is not included in the vast list of detainable 

offenses contained in the Code. The language of the Code requires that the defendant “is charged 

with” with a detainable offense or an attempt of a detainable offense. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a) (West 

2022). The legislature did not include language that allows for the possibility of a charge, e.g., 

“could be charged with.” We cannot read any additional, permissible language into the Code. 

People v. Gorss, 2022 IL 126464, ¶ 10 (“[W]here the language used is plain and unambiguous, we 
8 

may not ‘depart from its terms’ or read into the rule exceptions, limitations, or conditions that 

conflict with the drafters’ intent.” (quoting Acme Markets, Inc. v. Callanan, 236 Ill. 2d 29, 38 

(2009))). As a result, the court erred when it detained the defendant because the offense as charged 

is not a detainable offense. 

¶ 13 Therefore, we reverse and remand for further proceedings. Upon remand, the circuit court 

is instructed to hold a prompt hearing to consider the mandatory conditions listed in section 110-

10 and to impose any additional conditions necessary to ensure the defendant’s appearance as 

required for the safety of the person or persons or the community. 

¶ 14 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 15 For the reasons stated, we reverse the circuit court’s judgment and remand with directions 

that the court promptly set the case for hearing to address the defendant’s pretrial release.

¶ 16 Reversed and remanded with directions. 
9 

People v. Challans, 2024 IL App (5th) 240353 

Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Christian County, No. 24-CM16; the Hon. Amanda S. Ade-Harlow, Judge, presiding. 

Attorneys

for 

Appellant:

James E. Chadd, State Appellate Defender, Carolyn R. 

Klarquist, Director of Pretrial Fairness Unit, Benjamin 

Wimmer, Assistant Appellate Defender, Office of the State 

Appellate Defender Pretrial Fairness Unit, of Chicago, for 

Appellant. 

Attorneys

for 

Appellee:

David Joseph Robinson, of State’s Attorneys Appellate 

Prosecutor’s Office, of Springfield, State’s Attorney Appellate 

Prosecutor, Pretrial Fairness Act Unit, of Springfield, for the 

People.