No. 81-43 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1981 

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF 

SUSAN MARIE (HAACK) SLAYTON, 

Petitioner and Respondent 

and Cross-Appellant, 

ROBERT DALON SLAYTON, 

Respondent and Appellant. 

Appeal from: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Yellowstone, 

The Honorable Diane G. Barz, Judge presiding. 

Counsel of Record: 

For Appellant: 

Berger, Sinclair & Nelson, Billings, Montana 

For Respondent: 

Moses Law Firm, Rlllings, Montana 

Filed: 

Submitted on Briefs: April 22, 1981 

Decided: November 9, 1981 
Mr. Justice Daniel J. Shea delivered the Opinion of the 

Court. 

Robert Dalon Slayton (husband) appeals that portion 

of a 1980 Yellowstone County District Court dissolution 

decree distributing the marital assets and liabilities 

and requiring him to pay child support. Susan Marie 

Slayton (wife) cross-appeals, and claims that the trial 

court erred by not awarding her maintenance which would 

allow her to continue her college education. 

The parties were married on November 6, 1968, and 

had two sons, ages five and three. Before their marriage, 

the wife attended five quarters of college and then completed 

an airline attendant course. After their marriage, she 

worked fulltime until their first child was born, and then 

worked parttime until their second child was born. She 

then devoted herself to being a fulltime housewife and mother 

until she and her husband separated in April 1980. After 

their separation, she accepted temporary employment with 

the Census Bureau. When that job was terminated, she 

enrolled as a fulltime accounting student at Eastern 

Montana College. At the time of trial, she was receiving 

an education grant of $331 per quarter and had taken out 

a $2,000 student loan to provide food and babysitters for 

the children. 

At the time of their marriage, the husband was 

attending an electronics school and then served in the 

military. At the time of trial, he was employed as an 

engineering superintendent, receiving a net salary of 

$1,223 per month, but often receiving nearly $1,500 per 

month, depending upon the availability of overtime work. 
He also receives approximately $300 per quarter as the 

recipient of dividends from a stock portfolio trust fund. 

The trust was established for the duration of his father's 

life. Upon the death of his father, he will receive 50 

percent of the trust corpus. His father is presently 58 

and in good health. The wife did not ask to include these 

trust dividends in the marital estate. 

The parties have stipulated that the net value of 

their marital estate at the time of trial amounted to 

approximately $31,592. During their marriage, the parties 

accumulated $63,850 in assets and incurred liabilities of 

$32,258. The District Court awarded the wife $21,220 of 

the net estate, consisting of the following assets: onehalf the value of the family home ($25,000), one Ruick 

automobile ($6OO), the household furniture and appliances 

($9,000), and consisting of liabilities in the amounts of 

one-half the mortgage on the family home ($13,250) and 

miscellaneous debts ($130). 

The husband received only $10,372 of the marital estate, 

consisting of assets in the amounts of one-half of the value 

of the family home ($25,000) , one Jeep automobile ($250), 

and a boat and trailer ($4,000), and consisting of liabilities 

in the amounts of one-half the mortgage on the family home 

($13,250), and the remainder of the parties' marital debts 

($5,367). The trial court expressly found that the husband 

had agreed to assume these liabilities. In accordance with 

the parties' wishes, the court ordered that the family home 

be set aside for the wife and children's use until the wife 

remarries or the children are emancipated, at which time the 

home will be sold and the proceeds split equally by the 

parties. The trial court also required that the husband pay 
$200 per child per month for their support and that he 

maintain health insurance coverage for the children. 

The husband contends that the trial court's order 

distributing the marital estate was inequitable and done 

without considering the criteria set forth in section 

40-4-202, MCA. In particular, he argues that there is no 

evidence to support a finding that he agreed to assume the 

majority of the marital liabilities. On the child support 

order that he pay $200 a month for each of the two children, 

he argues that the trial court failed to make findings regarding 

the needs of the children, as required under section 40-4-204, 

MCA. In her cross-appeal, the wife argues that the trial 

court should have ordered the husband to pay her maintenance 

so that she can complete her college education. 

In regard to the husband's claim that the property 

division was inequitable, we find that merely because the 

wife received two-thirds of the net marital estate while the 

husband received only one-third, the division is not inequitable. 

We have previously affirmed a property division where one 

spouse has received a lesser proportion of the net marital 

estate because he has been ordered to assume all marital 

liabilities. Bailey v. Bailey (1979) , - Mont . - , 603 

P.2d 259. Here, both spouses were apportioned nearly equal 

values of the marital assets--the wife receiving approximately 

$34,600 in value (less the value of the household furnishings 

in the husband's possession) and the husband receivinq 

approximately $29,250 in value (plus the value of the household 

furnishings in his possession). Each received half the value 

of the home and an automobile. The wife, who it was agreed 

was to retain the family home in which to raise the children, 

received the majority of the household furnishings and 
appliances, and the husband received the boat and trailer. 

We find this to be an equitable apportionment of the assets. 

We will uphold an unequal apportionment of the marital 

liabilities where there are good reasons for doing so and 

where the trial court has clearly identified those reasons. 

But here, the trial court found, with no evidentiary support 

that the husband had agreed to assume the great majority 

of the marital liabilities. It is clear from his affidavit 

filed pursuant to Rule 32, M.R.Civ.P., and his proposed 

findings that any agreement to assume these liabilities was 

conditional upon the trial court's acceptance of the remainder 

of his findings. The husband proposed that he would assume 

- all the marital liabilities (including the full value of the 

home mortgage) in exchange for the wife's acceptance of the 

duty, as custodian, to support the children. Therefore, it 

was error for the trial court to order the husband to assume 

these liabilities solely upon the finding that he agreed to 

assume them. Because there is no other clear indication of 

the reason the trial court awarded the marital liabilities to 

the husband, we reverse the property distribution and remand 

this case to the trial court for further findings. 

We also agree with the husband that the trial court, 

in awarding $200 per month child support for each of the two 

children, failed to consider the statutory criteria set forth 

in section 40-4-204, MCA. The record is barren of any 

evidence to support the trial court's conclusion that $200 

would not only sufficiently maintain the children's standard 

of living, but also allow enough money for the husband to 

meet his reasonable needs. We therefore also reverse the 

child support order and remand it to the trial court for 

further findings. 
As to the wife's cross-appeal contention that she 

should have been awarded maintenance to allow her to 

continue her education, the trial court properly found that 

the husband's financial resources will not allow him to meet 

that request at this time. However, because we are remanding 

for further evidentiary proceedings, we leave this issue 

open so that the trial court may again consider this request 

in light of possible changed circumstances occurring between 

the time of the trial court's order and the time that another 

hearing is held. 

The judgment is vacated and this cause is remanded to 

the District Court for further proceedings. 

Justices