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95–980 PDF 2004

HOMELAND SECURITY JURISIDICTION: THE

PERSPECTIVES OF COMMITTEE LEADERS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON RULES 

OF THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

MARCH 24, 2004

Serial No. 108–42

Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Homeland Security

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/house
SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

Christopher Cox, California, Chairman 

Jennifer Dunn, Washington 

C.W. Bill Young, Florida 

Don Young, Alaska 

F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Wisconsin 

W.J. (Billy) Tauzin, Louisiana 

David Dreier, California 

Duncan Hunter, California 

Harold Rogers, Kentucky 

Sherwood Boehlert, New York 

Lamar S. Smith, Texas 

Curt Weldon, Pennsylvania 

Christopher Shays, Connecticut 

Porter J. Goss, Florida 

Dave Camp, Michigan 

Lincoln Diaz-Balart, Florida 

Bob Goodlatte, Virginia 

Ernest J. Istook, Jr., Oklahoma 

Peter T. King, New York 

John Linder, Georgia 

John B. Shadegg, Arizona 

Mark E. Souder, Indiana 

Mac Thornberry, Texas 

Jim Gibbons, Nevada 

Kay Granger, Texas 

Pete Sessions, Texas 

John E. Sweeney, New York 

Jim Turner, Texas, Ranking Member 

Bennie G. Thompson, MississPpi 

Loretta Sanchez, California 

Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts 

Norman D. Dicks, Washington 

Barney Frank, Massachusetts 

Jane Harman, California 

Benjamin L. Cardin, Maryland 

Louise McIntosh Slaughter, New York 

Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon 

Nita M. Lowey, New York 

Robert E. Andrews, New Jersey 

Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of Columbia 

Zoe Lofgren, California 

Karen McCarthy, Missouri 

Sheila Jackson–Lee, Texas 

Bill Pascrell, Jr., North Carolina 

Donna M. Christensen, U.S. Virgin Islands 

Bob Etheridge, North Carolina 

Ken Lucas, Kentucky 

James R. Langevin, Rhode Island 

Kendrick B. Meek, Florida 

Ben Chandler, Kentucky

JOHN GANNON, Chief of Staff 

STEPHEN DEVINE, Deputy Staff Director and General Counsel 

THOMAS DILENGE, Chief Counsel and Policy Director 

DAVID H. SCHANZER, Democrat, Staff Director 

MARK T. MAGEE, Democrat, Deputy Staff Director 

MICHAEL S. TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk

SUBCOMMITTEE ON RULES

Lincoln Diaz-Balart, Florida, Chairman 

Jennifer Dunn, Washington 

F. James Sensenbrenner, Wisconsin 

David Dreier, California 

Curt Weldon, Pennsylvania 

Porter Goss, Florida 

John Linder, Georgia 

Pete Sessions, Texas 

Christopher Cox, California, ex officio 

Louise McIntosh Slaughter, New York 

Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi 

Loretta Sanchez, California 

Zoe Lofgren, California 

Karen McCarthy, Missouri 

Ben Chandler, Kentucky 

Jim Turner, Texas, ex officio

(II) 
(III)

CONTENTS 

MEMBER STATEMENTS 

The Honorable Christopher Cox, Chairman 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 4

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 6

The Honorable Diaz-Balart, a Representative in Congress, From the State 

of Florida, and Chairman of the Subcommittee on Rules 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 1

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 3

The Honorable Louise M. Slaughter, a Representative in Congress, From 

the States of New York ........................................................................................ 20

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Mississippi ....................................................................................... 10

The Honorable Jim Turner, a Representative in Congress, From the State 

of Texas ................................................................................................................. 9

The Honorable Curt Weldon, a Representative in Congress, From the State 

of Pennsylvania .................................................................................................... 7

WITNESSES 

Committee on Agriculture 

The Honorable Bob Goodlatte, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Virginia, and Chairman 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 29 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 32 

The Honorable Charles W. Stenholm, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Texas, and Ranking Member 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 34

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 36

Committee on Appropriations 

The Honorable C.W. Bill Young, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Florida, and Chairman 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 133

Committee on Energy and Commerce 

The Honorable Joe Barton, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Texas, and Chairman 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 44 

The Honorable John D. Dingell, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Michigan, and Ranking Member 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 48

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 50

Committee on Financial Services 

The Honorable Michael G. Oxley, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Ohio, and Chairman 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 123 

The Honorable Barney Frank, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Massachusetts, and Ranking Member 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 123

Committee on Government Reform 

The Honorable Tom Davis, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Virginia, and Chairman 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 64

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 66 
Page

IV

The Honorable Henry A. Waxman, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of California, and Ranking Member 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 68

Committee on International Relations 

The Honorable Henry J. Hyde, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Illinois, and Chairman 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 121 

The Honorable Tom Lantos, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of California, and Ranking Member 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 121

Committee on the Judiciary 

The Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., A Representative in Congress 

From the State of Wisconsin, and Chairman 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 92 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 95

Committee on Science 

The Honorable Sherwood Boehlert, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of New York, and Chairman 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 118 

The Honorable Bart Gordon, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Texas, and Ranking Member 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 119

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 

The Honorable Don Young, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Alaska, and Chairman 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 77 

The Honorable James L. Oberstar, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Minnesota, and Ranking Member 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 80

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 81 

The Honorable John Mica, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Florida, and Chairman of the Subcommittee on Aviation 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 76

Committee on Ways and Means 

The Honorable William M. Thomas, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of California, and Chairman 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 114 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 115 

The Honorable Charles B. Rangel, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of New York, and Ranking Member 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 131

Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 

The Honorable Porter Goss, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Florida, and Chairman 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 12 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 14 

The Honorables Jane Harman, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of California, and Ranking Member 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 15 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 17 
(1)

HOMELAND SECURITY JURISDICTION: THE 

PERSPECTIVES OF COMMITTEE LEADERS 

Wednesday, March 24, 2004

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON RULES, SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, Washington, D.C. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 12:59 p.m., in Room 

2237, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Lincoln Diaz-Balart, 

the chairman of the subcommittee presiding. 

Present: Representatives Dunn, Weldon, Goss, Cox (ex officio), 

Sensenbrenner, Slaughter, Lofgren, McCarthy and Turner (ex officio). 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. We would like to welcome Members of the subcommittee and the Chairman of the Intelligence Committee as well 

as Chairman Cox who is here from the full committee today with 

us. 

While this is our first hearing of this year, our staff has been 

working very hard to continue the important work of this subcommittee. As you all know, we have been authorized and directed 

to conduct a thorough and complete study of the operation and implementation of the Rules of the House, including Rule X, with respect to the issue of Homeland Security. And we will submit our 

recommendations to the House Rules Committee by September 

30th. 

Today’s hearing will serve as an additional step in that process. 

In the summer and fall of 2003, we heard testimony from some the 

foremost experts on Congress. These witnesses included five academics from various institutions, two former committee chairmen 

with superior knowledge of the House rules, two former Speakers 

of the House, and the very first Secretary of Energy. This was a 

very distinguished bipartisan group of witnesses. 

These witnesses have very different experiences to qualify them 

as experts on the Congress, yet they all share a common belief. 

And that belief is that the Select Committee on Homeland Security 

should be made permanent. Speakers Gingrich and Foley have 

both endorsed a permanent standing committee with primary legislative jurisdiction, and both have called for a joint statement from 

Speaker Hastert and Minority Leader Pelosi announcing their intent to make the committee permanent as soon as possible. 

Speaker Gingrich explained, in part, his rationale for a permanent committee with the following words, ‘‘Congress cannot meet 

its Constitutional responsibilities unless it shows the same courage 

as the President in forcing through a real reorganization that does 
2

not entangle the Department of Homeland Security in a web five 

times more complex than the Department of Energy deals with. It 

is urgent that Congress also reorganizes its own structure now.’’ 

Former Speaker Gingrich went on to say, ‘‘In fact, being effective 

at homeland security could prove to be, literally, a matter of life 

and death in terms of the security and freedom we have grown accustomed to as Americans. Life and death is not a rhetorical term. 

It is conceivable some of the threats of the 21st century could kill 

many times the 3,000 who were killed on September 11, 2001.’’ 

Both former members, Lee Hamilton and Bob Walker also supported the creation of a permanent standing committee. Mr. Hamilton explained his rationale with the following statement, ‘‘The 

issue of Homeland Security is not temporary. The threat of terrorism is long term, as are the related challenges that will confront 

our government. Thus, necessary oversight cannot be supplied on 

an interim basis nor can it be effectively and efficiently disbursed 

among the current 13 full committees and 60 subcommittees in the 

House.’’ 

While some may give less weight to the opinions of academics as 

not practical, these four men served in this institution with distinction and honor. They have a unique perspective having served in 

Congress but are no longer caught up in the day-to-day struggles 

of committee jurisdictions. 

Secretary Schlesinger also gave a very poignant testimony before 

our committee. As the Director of Central Intelligence, Secretary of 

Defense and the first Secretary of Energy, Secretary Schlesinger 

has a very clear understanding of what a department or agency 

needs from Congress in the form of oversight and resources to be 

successful, especially a newly created department. 

Here are just a few of Secretary Schlesinger’s words from when 

he testified, ‘‘A new Government department does not spring like 

Athena from the brow of Zeus, full blown and ready for action. Organizing the department is not instantaneous. It takes time. There 

are many organizational challenges and organizational gaps, especially in the early days of a new department. The Department of 

Homeland Security is in a sense a start-up organization. Contrary 

to the expectations of too many, there will be unavoidable growing 

pains as the overall organization gradually comes together. Anything that the House can do to help the new Department rather 

than promote additional perches from which the Department can 

be criticized would serve the national interest.’’ 

These five men, all of whom were very clear, and all of our other 

witnesses made compelling cases for the permanency of the Committee on Homeland Security. 

However, our study, obviously, is not complete. Today, we will 

hear testimony from committee leaders, each with a very unique 

understanding of their committee jurisdictions. 

I am open—and, I am sure, all Members of this committee—to 

any option as long as it will help the fledgling Department of 

Homeland Security succeed in its mission of protecting American 

lives. 

I am open to any suggestion, as long as it will help the House 

of Representatives to be as prepared as possible to act in the case 
3

of a future terrorist event. The effectiveness of this House and the 

Department of Homeland Security must be our primary goal. 

I would like to thank you, Chairman Goss, Ranking Member 

Harman, as well as all of the witnesses who will honor us with 

their testimony today. 

When Ms. Slaughter arrives I will ask if, at the appropriate time, 

if she has an opening statement. And I would, at this point, yield 

to any members who may wish to make an opening statement.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE LINCOLN DIAZ-BALART, 

CHAIRMAN 

I would like to welcome the members of the Subcommittee and the Chairmen and 

Ranking Members that will be testifying before us today. While this is our first 

hearing of the year, our staff has been working behind the scenes to continue the 

important work of our subcommittee. 

As you all know, we have been ‘‘authorized and directed to conduct a thorough 

and complete study of the operation and implementation of the rules of the House, 

including rule X, with respect to the issue of homeland security,’’ and we will submit 

our recommendations to the House Rules Committee by September 30, 2004. Today’s hearing will serve as an additional step in that process. 

In the Summer and Fall of 2003, we heard testimony from some of the foremost 

experts on Congress. These witnesses included five academics from various institutions, two former committee chairmen with superior knowledge of the House Rules, 

two former Speakers of the House, and the very first Secretary of Energy. This was 

a very distinguished bipartisan group of witnesses. 

These witnesses have very different experiences that qualify them as experts on 

the Congress, yet they all share a common belief. They all believe that the Select 

Committee on Homeland Security should be made permanent.Speakers Gingrich 

and Foley have both endorsed a permanent standing committee with primary legislative jurisdiction, and both have called for a joint statement from Speaker Hastert 

and Minority Leader Pelosi announcing their intent to make the committee permanent as soon as possible. 

Speaker Gingrich explained, in part, his rational for a permanent committee with 

the following words: 

‘‘Congress cannot meet its constitutional responsibilities unless it shows the same 

courage as the President in forcing through a real reorganization that does not entangle the Department of Homeland Security in a web five times more complex than 

the Department of Energy deals with. It is urgent that Congress also reorganizes 

its own structure now.’’

Speaker Gingrich went on to say: 

‘‘In fact being effective at Homeland Security could prove to be literally a matter 

of life and death in terms of the security and freedom we have grown accustomed 

to as Americans. Life and death is not a rhetorical term. It is conceivable some of 

the threats of the 21st century could kill many times the 3,000 who were killed on 

September 11, 2001.’’

Both former Members Lee Hamilton and Bob Walker supported the creation of 

a permanent standing committee. 

Mr. Hamilton explained his rational with the following statement:‘‘The issue of 

homeland security is not temporary. The threat of terrorism is long-term, as are the 

related challenges that will confront our government. Thus necessary oversight cannot be supplied on an interim basis, nor can it be effectively and efficiently disbursed among the current 13 full committees and 60 subcommittees in the House.’’

While some may give less weight to the opinions of academics as not practical, 

these four men served in this institution with distinction and honor. They have a 

unique prospective of having served in Congress, but are no longer caught up in the 

day to day struggles of committee jurisdictions. 

Secretary Schlesinger also gave very poignant testimony before our Subcommittee. 

As the Director of Central Intelligence, Secretary of Defense, and the first Secretary 

of Energy, Secretary Schlesinger has a very clear understanding of what a department or agency needs from Congress, in the form of oversight and resources, to be 

successful, especially a newly created department. Here are a few of Secretary 

Schlesinger’s words from when he testified before us: 

‘‘A new government department does not spring, like Athena from the brow of 

Zeus, full blown and ready for action. Organizing the department is not instantaneous; it takes time. There are many organizational challenges and organizational 
4

gaps, especially in the early days of a new department. The Department of Homeland Security is, in a sense, a start-up organization. Contrary to the expectations 

of too many, there will be unavoidable growing pains—as the overall organization 

gradually comes together.’’

He went on to say that, 

‘‘Anything that the House can do to help the new department, rather than provide 

additional perches from which the department can be criticized would serve the national interest.’’

These five men, and all of our other witnesses, have made compelling cases for 

the permanency of Select Committee on Homeland Security. However, our study is 

not complete. Today we will hear testimony from Committee Leaders, each with a 

very unique understanding of their committees’ jurisdictions. 

I am open to any option as long as it will help the fledgling Department of Homeland Security succeed in its mission of protecting American lives. I am open to any 

suggestion as long as it will help the House of Representatives to be as prepared 

as possible to act in the case of a future terrorist event. The effectiveness of this 

House and of the Department of Homeland Security must be our primary goal. 

I would like to thank all of our witnesses for testifying today, but before we begin, 

I would ask Ms. Slaughter, my distinguished Ranking Member if she would like to 

make an opening statement.

Mr. COX. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, first, for holding this hearing today and, second, for your sustained work in this area, which 

is an important portion of the charter of the Select Committee on 

Homeland Security. 

We are to report to the Rules Committee and to the House this 

September on our recommendations for going forward with both 

authorization and oversight of the Department of Homeland Security and the House of Representatives. 

I agree with you that we need to hear directly from the other 

chairmen of House committees as to how they think the issue of 

Homeland Security should be handled from a congressional, legislative and oversight perspective. And I thank all the chairmen and 

ranking members who have agreed to testify today, beginning with 

Porter Goss and Jane Harman, who will be our first witnesses. And 

I thank those who have submitted written testimony as well. 

This is our fourth hearing on this topic. Previously, we have received testimony from former House leaders, as you point out Mr. 

Chairman, including speakers from both parties, as well as outside 

experts on congressional accountability, on the subject of how Congress should best organize itself, and on the subject of the terrific 

barriers to sensible oversight and authorization of the new Department because of turf jealousy in the Congress. 

And we have heard from Executive Branch officials, such as 

James Schlesinger, the first Secretary of Energy and a former CIA 

Director and Secretary of Defense, about the difficulties of creating 

a new cabinet department with national security responsibility and 

the risks to the country of balkanized and diffused authorization 

and oversight in Congress. All of these witnesses—without exception, Republicans and Democrats—supported reforming the current 

House rules to create a permanent Committee on Homeland Security with primary legislative and oversight responsibility for the 

new Department of Homeland Security. 

Today, I am certain we will hear some on the other side. It is 

important to strike the right balance between the jurisdictional responsibility of a new Homeland Security Committee and the very 

legitimate jurisdictional interests of more than a dozen committees 

that have historically had jurisdiction over the 22 legacy agencies 

transferred to Homeland Security. 
5

There is in place a good congressionally-created road map to jurisdictional reform. It is the Homeland Security Act. That act, focused as it is on the structure, organization, capabilities and mission of the Department, itself offers a blueprint. Just as important 

as ensuring accountability by having one committee responsible for 

authorization and oversight of Homeland Security is ensuring that 

both the Department and the committee overseeing it are strictly 

limited in their mission to prevent terrorist attacks, reduce our vulnerability to terrorist attacks, and prepare for and respond effectively to such attacks. 

By reconsidering the jurisdiction and responsibility of the Department, we can best rationalize the jurisdiction and responsibility of committees in the Congress. For example, we don’t need 

a Homeland Security Committee looking at how FEMA responds to 

floods and tornados. 

We don’t need a Homeland Security Committee looking at how 

the Coast Guard clears ice from waterways or supports recreational 

boating. And we don’t need a Homeland Security Act looking at immigration quotas or citizenship rules. 

This is true despite the fact that all of these functions were 

transferred into the Department of Homeland Security. Considerable expertise with respect to those issues resides in the current 

standing committees of the Congress, and there is no reason to 

recreate it elsewhere. 

But we do need a Homeland Security Committee looking at the 

fusion of foreign intelligence, domestic intelligence, domestic and 

foreign watch lists and the Federal and State and local law enforcement response to this information. 

We do need a Homeland Security looking at the integration of 

several border security entities that were transferred into the Department last year from multiple Federal departments. We do need 

a Homeland Security Committee looking at the effectiveness of information-sharing on infrastructure threats and vulnerabilities 

both within the Department and between the Department of Homeland Security and other Federal, local and State governmental entities, as well as within the private sector. 

We do need a Homeland Security Committee looking at the integration of the myriad of terrorist and other law enforcement and 

intelligence databases within DHS and across the Federal Government. We do need a Homeland Security Committee looking at how 

best to fund, prepare, train and re-equip our first responders in the 

battle against terrorism, and we do need a Homeland Security committee to ensure that the sum of the various parts of the Department of Homeland Security adds up to something much greater, 

much more focused than a collection of legacy agencies, doing what 

they have always done. 

Most important, we need a Homeland Security Committee looking at the development of a comprehensive and dynamic threat and 

vulnerability analysis to guide strategic Homeland Security planning, resource allocation and infrastructure protection. The Congress must look at the Department as a unified whole in order to 

set congressional priorities and give congressional direction 

through a regular annual appropriations process and authorization 

process. 
6

But currently, in each of these areas, jurisdiction is scattered 

among many House committees, and in some cases, it is nonexistent. 

Imagine if the Department of Defense did not have a primary authorization and oversight committee? 

If we are talking about the security of the United States of America, the most essential function of our national Government, to give 

Homeland Security the attention it demands from us as a separate 

Department in the Executive Branch of Government and an entirely new discipline, Congress, too, must be restructured. 

Chairman Bill Young of the Appropriations Committee noted in 

his written testimony today that when he created a single Homeland Security Appropriation Subcommittee, quote, ‘‘The imperative 

for the committee and the Department presumably from the outset 

was to provide a structure for the legacy agencies to coalesce into 

a single department with a coordinated unified mission.’’ 

He also states that his committee, quote, ‘‘Would find it equally 

difficult to provide consistent oversight and appropriate funding 

levels if the myriad of the departments, programs and activities 

were scattered across seven subcommittees.’’ 

It was obvious to me early that we needed to reorganize to provide structure to ourselves and for the new Department that we 

were to oversee and fund. If this makes eminent sense, Mr. Chairman, for the appropriations side, which I believe it does, then it 

makes equally good sense for the authorization and oversight side. 

I look forward to exploring these issues today with our witnesses 

and to working with them as this year progresses. Thank you Mr. 

Chairman.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER COX 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing today. I, too, think that we 

need to hear directly from the other chairmen of House committees as to how they 

think the issue of homeland security should be handled from a congressional legislative and oversight perspective. And I thank all of the chairmen that have agreed 

to testify today and those that have submitted written testimony as well. 

This is our 4th hearing on this topic. Previously, we have received testimony from 

former House leaders, including Speakers from both parties, as well as outside experts in Congressional accountability, on the subject of how Congress should best 

organize itself. . .and the terrific BARRIERS to sensible oversight and authorization 

of the new department because of turf jealousy. And, we heard from Executive 

Branch officials, such as James Schlesinger, the first Secretary of Energy, and a 

former CIA, Sec. Def. about the difficulties of creating a new cabinet department 

with national security responsibility, and the risks to country of Balkanized and diffused authorization and oversight in Congress. All of these witnesses, without exception, Republicans and Democrats, supported reforming the current House rules to 

create a permanent Committee on Homeland Security with primary legislative and 

oversight responsibility for the new Department of Homeland Security. Today, we 

will hear from the other side.

Crafting the right balance between the jurisdictional responsibility of a new 

Homeland Security Committee and the very legitimate interests of the > dozen committees that have historically had jurisdiction over the 22 LEGACY agencies transferred to Homeland Security. But, the congressionally created road map to jurisdictional reform—the Homeland Security Act—that focuses on the structure, organization, capabilities, and mission of the Department itself, offers a blueprint. 

Just as IMPORTANT as insuring accountability by having ONE committee responsible for AUTHORIZATION AND OVERSIGHT of Homeland Security, is insuring that BOTH the department and the Committee overseeing it, are STRICTLY 

LIMITED in their mission to prevent terrorist attacks, reduce our vulnerability to 

terrorist attacks, and prepare for and respond effectively to such attacks. 
7

By reconsidering the jurisdiction and responsibility of the Department, we can 

best rationalize the jurisdiction and responsibility of Committees in the Congress. 

For example, we don’t need a homeland security committee looking at how FEMA

responds to floods or tornados We don’t need a homeland security committee looking 

at how the Coast Guard clears ice from waterways or supports recreational boating. 

And we don’t need a homeland security committee looking at immigration QUOTAS 

or citizenship procedures. at backlogs in the processing of legal immigrants or other 

immigration services. This is true, despite the fact that all of these functions were 

transferred into DHS. Considerable expertise with respect to those issues resides in 

the current standing committees of the Congress, and there is NO REASON to recreate it ELSEWHERE. 

But we do need a homeland security committee looking at the fusion of foreign 

intelligence, domestic intelligence, domestic and foreign watch lists, and Federal, 

state and local law enforcement response to this information. Integration of the several border security entities that were transferred into the Department last year 

from multiple Federal departments. We do need a homeland security committee 

looking at the effectiveness of information sharing on infrastructure threats and 

vulnerabilities, both within the Department and between DHS and other Federal, 

state, and local government entities, as well as with the private sector. We do need 

a homeland security committee looking at the integration of the myriad terrorist 

and other law enforcement and intelligence databases within DHS and across the 

Federal Government. We do need a homeland security committee looking at how 

best to fund, prepare, train and equip our first responders in the battle against terrorism. And, we need a homeland security committee to ensure that the sum of the 

various parts of DHS adds up to something much greater, much more focused, than 

a collection of legacy agencies, doing what they always have done. 

Most important, we need a homeland security committee looking at the development of a (comprehensive and dynamic) threat and vulnerability analysis to guide 

1. strategic homeland security planning, 2. resource allocation, and 3. infrastructure 

protection. The Congress must look at the Department as a unified whole, in order 

to set congressional priorities, and give congressional direction through a regular 

ANNUAL authorization process.

Currently, in each of these areas, jurisdiction is scattered among MANY House 

committees, and in some cases it is non-existent. Imagine if the Department of Defense did not have a primary authorization and oversight committee. Yet we are 

talking about the security of the USA, the most essential function of our National 

Government. To give homeland security the attention it demands from us as a separate DEPARTMENT in the Executive branch of Government, and an ENTIRELY 

NEW DISCIPLINE, Congress must be structured so as to give it sustained and expert attention. 

Chairman Bill Young of the Appropriations Committee noted in his written testimony today that, when he created a single homeland security appropriations subcommittee: 

‘‘The imperative for the Committee (and the Department presumably) from the 

outset was to provide a structure for the legacy agencies to coalesce into a single 

department with a coordinated, unified mission. . .’’

He also states that his committee: ‘‘would find it equally difficult to provide consistent oversight and appropriate funding levels if the myriad of the department’s 

programs and activities were scattered across seven subcommittees. It was obvious 

to me early that we needed to reorganize—to provide structure to ourselves and for 

the new agency that we were to oversee and fund.’’

If this makes eminent sense for the appropriations side—which I believe it does—

then it must also make good sense for the authorization side. 

I look forward to exploring these issues today with our witnesses and to working 

with them as this year progresses to rationalize and improve this House’s homeland 

security oversight and legislative activity. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Weldon? 

Mr. WELDON. Thank you Mr. Chairman. I don’t have a prepared 

statement, but I would like to make a few comments. 

I think this is the most important task that we will undertake 

this year. And I am overwhelmingly in favor of creating a full permanent committee, as I said before the Rules Committee last year 

when I testified or, actually, last session when I testified before the 
8

Rules Committee on the House Republican Policy Committee on 

the need to have an individual authorization and appropriation 

committee in both the House and the Senate. We have taken the 

first step with the select committee, but it hasn’t solved the problem. 

As my colleagues and as you have pointed out Mr. Chairman, it 

is impossible, it is unthinkable to have one agency report to—and 

if my staff will put the chart up on the easel—88 committees and 

subcommittees in the House and the Senate. 

If you add up all of the membership of these 88 committees and 

subcommittees, you will find out that there are 505 Members of 

Congress who can claim jurisdiction over Homeland Security. 

How in the world can one agency answer the phone calls, the 

staff inquiries and the other efforts to inquire with 505 Members 

of Congress claiming they have jurisdiction over this or that issue 

in Homeland Security? 

It is absolutely unthinkable we would have this kind of arrangement, and we wonder why the Homeland Security Department 

spends the bulk of their time answering questions for the Congress 

as opposed to doing their number one problem and priority, which 

is protecting the homeland. 

And there are some very specific things that have happened over 

the past 2 years, Mr. Chairman, I would like to focus on as examples of what we are talking about. We had the Homeland Security 

Technology Transfer Bill. When it was introduced, it was referred 

to four to six committees and the Select Committee with expertise 

on the matter. 

Four to six of the five different House committees that this bill 

was referred to, each one of them refused to act on it because they 

know collectively that none of them will be able to—or all of them 

won’t be able to act on it before the end of the session, so therefore, 

none of them act on it. 

Meanwhile, the Senate, with one committee, has already passed 

the bill. We will not act on that bill this year. We look at the Select 

Committee not being given important jurisdiction. 

And I see my good friend Jane Harman is here. And a good example is the bill that she and I introduced on Homeland Emergency Response and Operations or the HERO bill. She knows full 

well that one of our distinguished authorizing committees will not 

allow this committee to have any say on that very important subject, which is the number one priority for our first responders and 

that is public safety frequency spectrum allocation. Another example of where we will not act this year, yet we have this jurisdiction. 

A third is the first-responder bill, which the Chairman has done 

a fantastic job on in a bipartisan way with Congressman Turner, 

we have marked up the bill. It is referred to three other committees, and there will probably not be enough time to pass the bill 

this year. 

So we have to be very careful not to offend other committees 

when we draft it, and some of the provisions still will be removed 

before the bill finally moves to the House floor. 

Mr. Chairman, I can tell you that I have worked closely for the 

past 18 years with the first-responder community. I have been to 
9

all 50 states. I have spoken to all of their groups. They consider 

me one of them because I used to be one of them. 

Every first-responder group in America, every one, supports one 

committee for authorization. Now, I would think the people who we 

task to protect the homeland know best. The International Association of Fire Chiefs, the International Association of Fire Fighters, 

the National Volunteer Fire Council, the State Fire Marshals, 

International Arson Investigators, the National Fire Service Instructors, all of the other myriad of groups who represent the 1.2 

million men and women who respond to our homeland security situations, all have gone on record and have said we need one authorization committee. 

Well, then why then can’t we move it? Perhaps, we will hear in 

this hearing today the reasons. But I would argue and I would 

make the point, Mr. Chairman, that I am going to be listening to 

the people who want the Homeland Security Department to respond to their needs. And they unequivocally and overwhelmingly 

say we should do on the authorization side what Bill did on the appropriations side and have one committee of jurisdiction. And I 

hope that our hearings will, in the end, be able to allow us to make 

that recommendation. Thank you. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Thank you, Mr. Weldon. 

I ask unanimous consent that all written statements of our witnesses today as well as those chairmen and ranking members who 

could not be here to testify, be included as part of the hearing 

record. 

Being no objection, so ordered.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JIM TURNER 

I have said previously and will repeat again today: If you take homeland security 

seriously, you must reach the conclusion that there needs to be one Committee in 

the House of Representatives with oversight and legislative jurisdiction over the 

functions of the Department of Homeland Security.There are a number of reasons 

I have reached this conclusion. 

First, we need to do whatever we can in the Congress to help the Department 

of Homeland Security to be successful. Right now, we have dozens of full committees 

and scores of subcommittees overseeing the Department. We call senior Department 

officials to duplicative hearings. And we push the Department in multiple, sometimes conflicting policy directions. 

Congress is making the Department’s substantial challenges more difficult. 

Secretary Ridge agrees. At a hearing before our Committee he said, ‘‘I think it 

goes without saying that a streamlined process of oversight and accountability, in 

my judgment, would do both the executive branch and the legislative branch a world 

of good. 

Let me provide one example. The Department launched an initiative called ‘‘One 

Face At the Border,’’ which attempts to merge the functions of the former customs 

and former immigration inspectors at our ports of entry. Without a Homeland Security Committee, the Ways and Means Committee and Judiciary Committee would 

both have jurisdiction over that small program, as would the Appropriations Committee and possibly the Government Reform Committee as well. The people who run 

‘‘One Face At the Border’’ have to deal with many faces here in Congress. 

My second main reason for advocating for a permanent Homeland Security Committee is that I do not believe effective oversight over the Department can be accomplished with multiple Committees having responsibility for different sections of the 

Department. To illuminate this, let me describe the effort of the Select Committee, 

under Chairman Coxs leadership, to do a thorough review and authorization of the 

Department of Homeland Security’s budget. This is a very important task, especially 

for a new Department. 

Who would do this if we don’t have a single homeland security committee? Who 

would look at the tradeoffs that every Department must make when developing a 
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budget? Who would look at the cross-cutting issues that affect the Department at 

large rather than individual components—issues such as developing a comprehensive threat and vulnerability assessment? Who would focus on the serious management challenges facing the Department, such as those pointed out by the Department’s Inspector General today? The answer is, frankly, no one. 

It appears to me that the witnesses today who argue that a new Committee is 

not necessary are disregarding the decision made by Congress and the President to 

create a Department of Homeland Security. This decision reflected a determination 

that it was critically important to bring diverse agencies under the direction of a 

Secretary whose focus—24/7—would be on security. Even though the Attorney General had tremendous expertise in immigration, and the Treasury Department had 

tremendous experience with customs, and the Transportation Department had tremendous knowledge of aviation security—these functions were placed in the Department of Homeland Security. For Congress to approve this reorganization, and the 

philosophy behind it, but fail to reorganize itself to deal effectively with the new 

reality, would be, to put it bluntly, the height of hypocrisy. 

Does this mean that committees with years of experience and expertise in areas 

such as bioterrorism or aviation security should be stripped of any influence over 

these subjects? No. There are ways to have shared jurisdiction over issues where 

more than one committee has something to contribute. This is accomplished in 

many other areas. Jurisdictional arrangements can also be made for how Congress 

should handle non-homeland security responsibilities of the new Department. 

Finally, I would like to deal head on with the idea that has been put forward that 

homeland security could be handled through a subcommittee on the Government Reform Committee. I served on the Government Reform Committee so I am familiar 

with the tremendous work it does on oversight and issues that affect government 

operations across the board. But I see no reason why we should consolidate jurisdiction over homeland security in the Government Reform Committee any more than 

we should provide it jurisdiction over health care, highway construction, or education. 

Such a consolidation has not occurred in the Governmental Affairs Committee in 

the Senate and we have no way to predict whether it will. Rather than trying to 

mimic an illogical approach that may or may not happen in the Senate, I believe 

it would be far better to lead the way with the right approach. I also believe that 

if we create a strong Committee on Homeland Security in the House, the Senate 

will have no choice but to follow suit. This is exactly what happened with respect 

to the Appropriations Committee. The House took the right step of creating a separate appropriations subcommittee for the Department of Homeland Security. The 

Senate soon did the same thing. 

I also want to express some skepticism about another idea—continuing the Select 

Committee in its current form for another Congress. While I believe we have made 

a positive contribution this year in a number of ways, this structure is not a permanent solution. In some ways, by creating yet another committee to which the new 

Department must report, we are part of the problem this year rather than the cure. 

And without meaningful authority and jurisdiction, the Select Committee is hamstrung in its efforts to legislate and conduct oversight. 

I am certain that the right thing to do for the national security of our country 

is to create a permanent Homeland Security Committee. That Committee should 

have oversight with respect to all homeland security activities of the Federal Government. It should also have legislative jurisdiction over the full range of the Department of Homeland Security’s operations. While I will not be serving in the next 

Congress, I do fear that if the Congress fails to take decisive action on this topic, 

and we suffer additional terrorist attacks in the United States, Congress will be 

held accountable for this failure.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE BENNIE THOMPSON 

I greatly appreciate the opportunity to express my views on the future of the Select Committee on Homeland Security. It has been said time and time again that 

we now live a new age. . .an age of uncertainty. We have come face-to-face with 

terrorism and must prepare our homeland for future engagements. There is no 

doubt that this is a challenge of the greatest magnitude. In fact, the argument can 

be made that this is one of the greatest and most unique challenges that faces our 

great nation. We face an enemy that is unquestionably dedicated to the destruction 

of this free nation. Given this fact, we continue to be unquestionably dedicated to 

protecting freedoms and principles on which this nation was founded. 

On September 11, 2001, people around the world wept and grieved deeply over 

the lives lost on that tragic day. On that same day our nation and many of our allies 
11

vowed to go the distance in bringing those who carried out the horrible attacks on 

September 11th. As our military continues to carry out our nation’s campaign 

against terrorism it is incumbent upon the house to do its part to ensure that such 

ferocious attacks never again take place. 

After the attacks of September 11, and after considerable pressure, President 

Bush finally understood the need for a unified national homeland security effort. 

After understanding the wisdom of this course of action, the president approved the 

consolidation of 22 domestic agencies into the Department of Homeland Security. 

The idea behind the consolidation of nearly two dozen domestic agencies would 

breath life into the national goal of fighting terrorism, foreign and domestic, create 

a greater harmony between the agencies, and reduce the chances of future attacks. 

The decision to create the Select Committee on Homeland Security was a solid first 

step towards better preparing the country to defend against terrorism. 

We, as a deliberative body, must resist the temptation to continue in a ‘‘pre-9/ll’’ 

mind set that creates unfathomable scenarios that could severely limit our effectiveness to combat terrorism in the legislative arena. As representatives of the people, 

it is our responsibility to contribute to the war on terrorism through effective legislation and oversight. Unfortunately, some in this body and on this panel have failed 

to see the benefits to consolidating the legislative and oversight responsibilities into 

one committee. A number of congressman and congresswomen have voiced strong 

concerns stating that the Select Committee on Homeland Security has done its job 

and should be dissolved. Some have even suggested that the committee be allowed 

to continue its existence without the needed legislative and oversight authority. 

They contend that myriad committees would be better suited to deal with the special needs of Homeland Security. They site legislative and institutional experience 

as the reason other committees would be more effective in the realm of homeland 

security oversight and legislation. Given these claims, one must ask the question, 

‘‘Where were the legislative and institutional experience and the preventative accomplishments on and leading up to 9/11’’ 

It is possible to make the argument that the many committees and subcommittees 

that have legislative and oversight jurisdiction over the Department of Homeland 

Security lacked the vision and foresight to effectively legislate against a terrorist attack. 

The same committees that claim that they should be gifted with this incredible 

responsibility have not produced for the American people. How can so many different committees and subcommittees promise the American people that they will 

commit effective resources and time to the issues of homeland security when their 

committees have other important responsibilities. It is irresponsible to allow this decentralized legislative and oversight responsibility. Anything less than a centralized 

legislative and oversight body with authority has the potential to indirectly assist 

terrorist and make preventing terrorist attacks more difficult. A single legislative 

committee must exist, not only to provide effective oversight and legislative action, 

but also to ensure accountability. The authority must not ebb and flow between 

committees and subcommittees with the changing of the political wind. The American people deserve better than that. They deserve greater protection from terrorists, political opportunism, and turf battles. Responsibility and accountability must 

come from concrete, not liquid, authority. Decentralized authority means decentralized accountability. 

It is crucial that Members of Congress understand what the nation already understands and that is how real and how imminent these threats are. In the eyes of the 

terrorist, September 11th was just an example of their hatred. 

Creating a single legislative body to deal with horrible events is consistent with 

congressional responses. I strongly endorse making the current Select Committee on 

Homeland Security a permanent committee with clear legislative and oversight jurisdiction over the Department of Homeland Security. The ability of the House to 

engineer comprehensive legislation in advance and in response to crisis, over see the 

administration of laws and carry out our constitutional responsibility to represent 

the people of the United States people depends a great deal upon the organization 

and management of the committee system. The only way to ensure that the Department of Homeland Security is effectively addressing the nation’s needs with respect 

to terrorist threats is to make the committee permanent and give it all of the legislative and oversight authority as traditional standing committees.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE LOUISE M. SLAUGHTER 

I thank the many Members who are taking the time out of their full schedules 

to speak with us today. There are many demands on everyone’s time, not the least 
12

of which this week is the Federal budget for FY05. Your time and insights are 

greatly appreciated. 

The creation of the Department of Homeland Security has raised many issues. 

Congress has a responsibility over the new department itself, and Congress has a 

heightened responsibility to respond to the threat of terrorism. The question that 

this subcommittee continues to consider today is what structure is best for the 

House and best for the nascent department. 

Some structural changes have already been made. The Appropriations Committee 

created a homeland security appropriations subcommittee. The Senate has incorporated its homeland security duties into its Government Affairs Committee, instead of creating a separate homeland security committee. 

Last year this subcommittee heard from a series of distinguished scholars, former 

Members, former Speakers, and others. consensus seemed to emerge from those 

hearings that the House should have a A committee on homeland security. These 

recommendations are helpful, but not conclusive. Parliamentary and practical 

issues, such as committee jurisdiction, referral, oversight, legislative authority, and 

subject-matter expertise, are important parts of the equation in determining the 

utility, necessity, and desirability of a homeland security. This is where your experience and expertise is invaluable to the subcommittee’s deliberations. 

The big questions continue to be debated. Should the House have a homeland security committee? Should it be permanent, select, or permanent select? Should it 

have oversight jurisdiction over the Department of Homeland Security? Should it 

also have legislative authority for the Department? Should the committee have jurisdiction over homeland security programs or jurisdiction over all of the entities 

that have been moved into the Department? 

I look forward to hearing from the distinguished panelists today. The Chairmen 

and Ranking Members of the committees with jurisdiction over programs and entities within the Department of Homeland Security will be able to provide special insight into the daily workings of the House and our collective response to terrorism 

and the creation of the Department of Homeland Security.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Chairman Goss and Ms. Harman, thank you 

so much for being here today. I would ask that you proceed with 

a summary of your written statements, and we will stick to the 5-

minute rule. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. We will begin with Chairman Goss. Welcome. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE PORTER GOSS, AND CHAIRMAN PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE 

Mr. GOSS. Thank you very much Mr. Chairman. I have A formal 

statement for the record which I would ask be included, and I 

would summarize very briefly. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Without objection. 

Mr. GOSS. First of all, the issue before us: Is the House organized 

efficiently to handle Homeland Security oversight including the department of Homeland Security? Should there be a Homeland Security committee? 

I believe the answer is, of course, yes. We are going to have 

Homeland Security, and we have to have oversight and authorization, and we have to have knowledgeable people doing the advocacy 

for that. So there is no question that in my view that decision has 

been made. 

What it is going to look like is really what the issue is about, I 

believe. And I can argue that, under Rule 10, there are advantages 

to proceeding to set up a regular standing committee or I could say 

a permanent select committee patterned on the template that we 

use in our Intelligence Committee might work as well. I think 

there are pluses and minuses to both. I am not going to dwell on 

the how to. It is just that it needs to be done. 

With regard to some observations I would make and coming at 

it from the perspective of the intelligence aspect, which is, as you 
13

noted in your opening remarks, Mr. Chairman, a small part of the 

Homeland Security but, in my view, a necessary part. I believe intelligence is the nerve center. I believe it is the trigger. I believe 

it is the thing without which the rest becomes basically a huge burden on the people that Mr. Weldon has just spoken to, the responders. 

I would like to put the responders out of business. I want them 

all to become Maytag people. I love them. I just don’t want to use 

them. I would like to have good information so we stop the bomb 

before it goes off. We stop the incident before it goes off. And that 

is where intelligence comes into Homeland Security, goes into some 

type of a process, gets turned around and goes out to action, agents 

who are properly authorized to go out and forestall, preempt, prevent any kind of mischief happening. That, to me, would be a successful Department of Homeland Security. 

I do believe that the present committee, the acting committee 

that we have is too large a committee. I say that because there are 

many interests that need to be considered and it is entirely appropriate to have a large committee at this point. I would hope that 

it could be more focused when the organizational aspects are refined down. 

With regard to jurisdiction and overlapping areas, I know there 

has been a lot of discussion about that, and everybody wants to 

guard their turf. And it will come as no surprise to you that I believe that intelligence, the way we have it set up in our oversight, 

both in the Senate and the House, under the present conditions has 

gone through an evolutionary process that has finally brought us 

a result that is actually working quite well. 

There are some who suggest that, perhaps, we should combine 

the Senate and the House, and there are some other sort of proposals on the table. But I can assure you that we now have a system that is working and providing both the advocacy and the oversight of our intelligence communities. 

We act as the 1–800-number for keeping the intelligence community in all its aspects in, bounds and we act also as the advocacy 

by doing the authorization for all activities by statute. We may not 

indulge in intelligence activities in this country, even with appropriated funds, unless they are authorized by the oversight committee. That is a special and unique role for the Permanent Select 

Committee on Intelligence and for a good cause. 

I believe that nevertheless HPSI takes on—Intelligence Committee takes on the understood responsibility we do have to reach 

out to the other chairmen where there are combined interests. And 

we have 15 agencies that are in other Cabinet areas and secretary 

areas that fall under other oversight areas. And we do reach out 

to Chairman Sensenbrenner, Chairman Hyde, Chairman Duncan 

Hunter of the Armed Services, the appropriate committee. 

We also try and have membership on our committees through 

the leadership appointment process where we bridge to some of 

those committees so that we are efficient. So these things are resolvable, I believe, without having open turf wars. And I would 

suggest that there is plenty of history on the books of how we can 

proceed on that. 
14

I do believe that the relationship we have with the intelligence 

community is built on a clear understanding of how we handle classified information for the intelligence community and our portfolio. 

And I would not like to change that because I do believe it does 

work well and serve our objectives extremely well. 

I would also point out, we work with different appropriations 

people and will have no trouble working with the different appropriations committees as authorizers whether it is the defense appropriations committee or some other one in the various manifestations that might come through Homeland Security that nevertheless have an intelligence component, which we would expect to be 

in our portfolio. 

And finally, the last thing I was going to say, goes back to Pearl 

Harbor. Interestingly enough, as horrible as Pearl Harbor was, that 

6 years after Pearl Harbor when we set up a national intelligence 

program in our country—it was a national foreign intelligence program. We do not have a domestic intelligence agency. Americans do 

not spy on Americans. 

That gets us to the question of how do we integrate or fuse information that comes from our local law enforcement people in a way 

that does not confound that objective of free and fair democratic 

open society, all the hallmarks of being an American in a way that 

we do not impose a domestic intelligence agency on the people of 

the United States of America. 

And I suggest that the way we are doing it now is working quite 

well, using the foreign intelligence program manifest through 

TTIC. Happy to answer any questions on TTIC.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE PORTER J. GOSS 

In the year since the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security and 

the three and half years since September 11th, the Federal Government has moved 

substantial resources to break down stovepipes and better protect the nation. The 

House has undertaken, in this Committee, an exercise in reviewing our own capabilities to conduct oversight of the Department of Homeland Security and related 

areas. 

As Chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), 

I have a unique perspective because the Committee is a unique Committee. HPSCI 

has been the only standing select Committee in Congress for many years now, and 

I would like to provide my insights into the authorization and oversight process we 

undertake to fulfill Congress’ responsibility to provide vigorous oversight of the Intelligence Community in the most responsible manner possible. HPSCI’s creation 

was intended to provide Congress with the ability to oversee disparate departments 

and organizations throughout the Federal Government. 

As you are aware, HPSCI has sole jurisdiction over US intelligence and intelligence related activities. This means that we oversee the national intelligence agencies and the military intelligence entities—yet we also oversee the intelligence components of many other agencies, such as the State Department, Treasury, and the 

FBI. We are very focused on intelligence and we are able to do our oversight in a 

thorough and constructive manner without redundancy or the interference of other 

House oversight committees. 

HPSCI’s exclusive jurisdiction over the intelligence and intelligence-related activities is a critical element of our ability to conduct complete, across-the-board, nonpartisan oversight. The unique nature of HPSCI protects sensitive intelligence 

sources and methods associated with intelligence collection and analysis. Congress, 

as a whole, can review and benefit from finished analytic product, but the discussion 

of where and how that information was acquired is reserved for the closed-door sessions with HPSCI. This is the balance that was struck with the Executive Branch 

when the committee was created, and I believe it continues to serve us well today. 

HPSCI has conducted vigorous oversight of the Intelligence Community including 

the intelligence elements of counterterrorism and homeland security. In fact, prior 
15

to the events of September 11th, the HPSCI in January 2001 created a working 

group to examine the terrorist threat and the US homeland. After September 11th, 

2001 this working group was elevated to a subcommittee. Today, that subcommittee 

continues to examine many of the issues that the newly established Select Homeland Security Committee has sought to clarify with respect to intelligence. 

HPSCI will continue to advocate for its proper jurisdiction to oversee and authorize intelligence community elements including the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) and the Department of Homeland Security’s Information Analysis (IA) 

Division in the same way it oversees and authorizes other Intelligence Community 

elements such as the FBI’s Office of Intelligence and the Counterintelligence Division, the Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), the Department of Treasury’s Office of Intelligence, and the Department of Energy’s Counterintelligence Office and Office of Intelligence. 

I believe the best defense is a good offense and that the role intelligence plays 

in protecting the nation is vital, but there is more to homeland security than intelligence. I would note that the Homeland Security Committee has spent considerable 

time examining the intelligence portion of homeland security and in questioning the 

intelligence community’s ability to function and communicate with other governmental departments, specifically the Terrorist Threat Integration Center and the 

CIA. I welcome the questioning of the Intelligence Community and the dialogue between our Committees, and believe that collectively we can better protect and prepare the nation to defend itself from the terrorist threat. 

The greatest capability that the Select Committee on Homeland Security can and 

should provide to Congress is its focus on a single—albeit enormous—Department 

within the Government and the integration of that Department’s many, many functions. It can pass its findings on to the relevant Committee, or Committees that will 

be charged with the long-term task of DHS. 

The Select Committee also has the opportunity to define, for House purposes, the 

term ‘‘homeland security,’’ and I hope we will make the most of this opportunity. 

While there appears to be an ever-increasing number of ‘‘intelligence experts’’ these 

days, the definition of intelligence is generally understood. I think, however, Congress and the country as a whole, are still working on an answer to ‘‘What is homeland security?’’

To conclude my remarks, I would highlight the important role intelligence plays 

in the protection of our nation and the strong relationship that must develop between the Intelligence Community and the Department of Homeland Security. We 

must work to bolster the resources of both, this is not an ‘‘either or’’ proposition.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Thank you. And we will have questions. Thank 

you so much for your testimony. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mrs. Harman? 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JANE HARMAN, RANKING 

MEMBER, PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE 

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you Mr. Chairman. 

It is good to see you and to see several members of the select—

Permanent Select Committee on Homeland Security here as well. 

And I do agree with my colleague, Congressman Weldon, that it 

has been enormously frustrating trying to get one interoperable 

communications system adopted for our country, which is a critical 

building block to an effective Homeland Security system. And a 

problem is the way Congress is organized. Let me submit my comments for the record, too, and just hit a few high points. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Without objection. 

Ms. HARMAN. I do agree with much that chairman Goss has said. 

I would only add that the intelligence committees in Congress, our 

jurisdiction and our focus could use A little tune up, too. We should 

be more mission-based. 

The mission is, at this point, counter-terrorism and more effective efforts to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 

Those are the big threats, and I hope that our committee will tack-
16

le them on a mission-based program, rather than the kind of analog way we have dealt with them in the past. But that is something 

he and I have discussed. 

Turning to this subject, in 2000, I was a member of the National 

Commission on Terrorism, chaired by Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, 

also known as Jerry Bremer, now the civil administrator in Iraq. 

Our charter was international terrorism, not specifically homeland 

security. But we did recommend that Congress develop mechanisms for coordinated review of the President’s terrorism policies 

and budgets. 

Similarly, I supported the establishment. In fact, I called myself 

one of its godmothers, of the Department of Homeland Security, to 

bring greater focus to the Government’s efforts to protect the homeland. As I have often said, this effort was not to rearrange the deck 

chairs, but to build one deck. 

If we were serious about the Department of Homeland Security 

and if we are serious about Congress developing better mechanisms 

for coordinated review of terrorism, then we need to establish an 

effective committee of homeland security. I think it should be permanent. I don’t know what its size should be. But it should be certainly a streamlined version of what we presently have. And it 

should have some clear jurisdiction to act. 

I can see at least three reasons why doing this makes sense. 

First, having at least two sets of eyes can strengthen congressional 

oversight. I agree with Chairman Goss that there are areas where 

the intelligence committees should have primary and possibly exclusive jurisdiction. Nonetheless, the eyes that this committee can 

put on things, like the integration of watch lists and the intelligence function, inside the Department of Homeland Security, help 

augment the role of the House and Senate intelligence committees. 

Second of all, this committee can ease the burden on the Department of Homeland Security, which already is having some organizational—early organizational struggles in terms of testifying before Congress and dealing with Congress. It is unreasonable to expect Secretary Ridge and his top folks to testify before 88 committees and subcommittees. It makes a lot more sense to have the 

focal point be here. 

Third, this committee, as reorganized and streamlined, can, I 

think, best deliver some important messages to the Department of 

Homeland Security. One of them that Chairman Cox and I strongly 

agree on is that we urgently need one nationally-integrated threat 

and vulnerability assessment to drive our resources. We have to 

harden the right targets, put the resources against those targets 

and stop the squeaky wheel theory of homeland security funding. 

And if we have one effective streamlined committee, we can deliver 

that message better. 

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, since I have 48 seconds left, I 

would just like to say that many people in Congress have worked 

very hard on this problem and care very much about it. That is the 

message we want to send to Curt Weldon’s first responders. We 

care very much. We do hear them. We want to do better. 

But that chart, that congressional organization chart is a nightmare. And in order to do better for the people we represent, we 

have to overcome our own internal turf battles, organize ourselves 
17

more efficiently and then really add value to dealing with the 

toughest targets in the world, terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JANE HARMAN 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Slaughter, and my colleagues on the 

Select Committee on Homeland Security, for the invitation to appear before you 

today. 

I am a Member of the full Committee on Homeland Security, so am speaking both 

from the Intelligence Committee perspective, but also as someone who has paid 

close attention to the way this committee has worked. I understand that Chairman 

Goss is not only a member of this full committee as well, but is even a Member 

of the Subcommittee that he is now testifying before. I’m not sure if that constitutes 

a conflict of interest, but we can be sure that at least one member of this Subcommittee will agree with his testimony. 

We have been asked to speak about how the House should conduct oversight over 

the Department of Homeland Security and handle legislation concerning homeland 

security in future Congresses. My recommendation is that the House create a permanent committee with primary oversight and legislative authorities over the homeland security activities of the Department of Homeland Security. 

The intelligence reports that I receive tell me the same thing that your witnesses 

in past hearings have told you: the threat of terrorism will be with us for the foreseeable future, and Congress needs to make permanent structural changes to account for it. Homeland security is not only a hot button issue in the aftermath of 

September 11, 2001, and something on the nation’s mind following terrorist attacks 

overseas, like the recent tragic bombings in Spain. Homeland security is a new way 

for our government, our private sector, and our citizenry to live. 

I believe, and the past year’s experience has shown, that a dozen House committees cannot effectively oversee or legislate on homeland security. Like every other 

witness that will appear before you today, I believe that my committee, the House 

Intelligence Committee, has done excellent work this Congress and in the last, to 

address homeland security challenges. 

The Intelligence Committee Members and staff have held hearings and authorized 

activities of the Department of Homeland Security’s Directorate for Information 

Analysis and Infrastructure Protection, which is a statutory member of the National 

Intelligence Community. We have worked closely with DCI Tenet, Secretary Ridge, 

Director Mueller, Attorney General Ashcroft, and others on the Terrorist Threat Integration Center and the Terrorist Screening Center. 

Moreover, the Intelligence Committee will continue to include part of DHS’ budget 

in our annual intelligence authorization bill, and will oversee the intelligence products and processes of IAIP. 

However, the excellent work of the Intelligence Committee, even if matched by 

every other committee, does not translate to effective, comprehensive Congressional 

action over homeland security. For example, a Homeland Security Committee has 

an important role to play to determine how intelligence from IAIP is used by the 

rest of DHS. That, while potentially within the purview of the Intelligence Committee, could not be adequately studied in the absence of a dedicated committee. 

The work of the Select Committee on overseeing the functions of the Department 

also demonstrate the Committee’s value. Reports produced by the Democratic Members and staff on smallpox preparedness, terrorist watch lists, and the anniversary 

report of the Department, all of which I have been proud to sign, are valuable contributions. 

Mr. Chairman, your subcommittee is clearly facing the ugliest four letter word—

turf. I’d like to speak briefly about the interactions that we, at least on the Democratic side, have had between Intelligence and Homeland Security. 

As mentioned before, the Intelligence Committee has jurisdiction over all intelligence programs in the federal government, including those within DHS. We have 

been able to work with the Homeland Security Committee to claim single jurisdiction over certain issues, for example, the inner workings of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center within the Intelligence Committee. We have collaborated closely in 

other areas, such as information sharing, the quality and access of intelligence sent 

to the IAIP Directorate, and the integration and use of terrorist watch lists. 

This interaction among committees is standard practice for Intel Committee members. By House Rules, we have formal ties and shared membership with the Committees on Appropriations, Armed Services, International Relations and Judiciary. 
18

This practice is longstanding and effective, and I would hope to have a similar relationship in future Congresses with the Homeland Security Committee. 

Finally, I know this Subcommittee has heard views on whether a permanent 

Homeland Security Committee should be a Standing or a Select Committee. As 

Chairman Goss and I have some distinct experience with this issue, I have a few 

comments on this. 

I thank the Subcommittee and will be happy to answer any questions you have.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Thank you Ms. Harman. 

Thank you both. 

Chairman Goss, in your written testimony, you pointed out, in 

your opinion, the greatest capability that the select committee, that 

this committee can and should provide to Congress is its focus on 

a single Department and the integration of the Department’s many 

functions. Why is that so important in your opinion? 

Mr. GOSS. Well, I think we have had testimony on that already. 

I think Ms. Harman just said it, and Mr. Weldon hit it with his 

chart very brilliantly. The issue of keeping the coordination of the 

various agencies properly working is clearly one of the main 

threads of our 9/11 review—the coordination, the horizontal coordination of the various Federal agencies—and we only do the intelligence community. 

The Kean Commission is now doing the rest of them. And clearly 

there was a problem. And the President of the United States has 

spoken to that problem between the working relationship between 

the FBI as a law enforcement people in our country versus the 

overseas intelligence people. There is actually an interpretation of 

the statutes that there was a wall that forbid them from talking 

to each other, which we have done our best to make sure is a broken-down wall. 

So I believe that we have learned by the mistakes of the past. 

We are able to—using our focus on the intelligence of over 15 agencies and reaching out to chairmen of other areas where we have jurisdictions to share, where we have similar matters, classified and 

unclassified, we have found good working arrangements that have 

prospered, I think, because we do have a focus on the national security of what we are trying to protect and what we are trying to 

do. 

I think also the saving of time and so forth is very critical. The 

one area that I perhaps would also say with regard to Ms. Harman’s point, I certainly agree there are some targets we should 

harden. And there are some very obvious vulnerabilities that we 

need to focus on. 

But I think the President has also made it abundantly clear that 

defense alone does not work. You have to have the offense. You 

have to have a progressive, forward-leaning, how do we get the information to prevent, to preempt. That means getting information. 

And I want to make darn sure there are a bunch of overseers who 

are totally focused on that balance between getting necessary information and not intruding on Americans. 

And it seems to me a lot of that is going to land in the Department of Homeland Security and the overseers, which I would assume would be some carry-on of this committee. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. In your testimony, which we so much appreciate, we appreciate so very much, you support permanence for 

this. 
19

Mr. GOSS. Yes, I do. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. As you pointed out, the intelligence committee 

is a permanent select committee which is a little bit different— 

Mr. GOSS. Yes. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Than, obviously, the standing committees, 

which are more numerous. 

The select committee, the permanent select committee, obviously, 

has U.S. Government-wide jurisdiction over intelligence and intelligence-related activities. In your experience, can you point to any 

pros and cons of a permanent select in dealing with such broad 

subject matters, such a broad subject matter? 

Mr. GOSS. Yes. I certainly can Mr. Chairman. I would say it is 

broad, but it is not so far as to bridge the separation of powers between the branches of government. There in no case has been, that 

I am aware of in our intelligence committee, a situation where the 

national security advisor would come and testify under oath before 

Congress or in fact even bring written documents. 

But there has been a behind-the-scenes, comfortable working relationship with every Administration of being able to work things 

out that are of critical national security. And that is part of the 

beauty of the permanent select committee, which leads me to what 

the distinction between a Rule 10 committee, a standing committee 

and a select committee. 

The advantage of the select committee is that the leadership of 

the minority and majority leadership select the people to be on a 

select committee. That, therefore, means that there is a closer wiring to the leadership, and the leadership put the people on those 

committees that are ready to go to do that work, to make the obligation, to make the commitments, to do the hard and very focused 

work of the select committee. 

It is different than getting on the committee through the seniority and voting process of the regular standing committees. And I 

believe that that extra element of selectness, as it were, by leadership appointment very much aids and abets that close working relationship that you have to have to reach into the Executive 

Branch of Government to deal with the business that is necessary 

for our national security, even though we don’t put it on the record, 

and we don’t go under oath with each other. I think that is absolutely critically essential. 

Ms. HARMAN. If I could just add to that Mr. Chairman? 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Yes, Ms. Harman. 

Ms. HARMAN. I agree, with respect to the Intelligence Committee. 

I think that element of selectness and the small size of the committee and the fact that most of our hearings and meetings are in 

closed session because we are dealing with classified information 

makes it different. 

But I would not carry that over to the new version, the sleek, 

slimmed-down, more permanent version of that committee. I think 

this should be a regular standing committee of the House. I am not 

sure whether Mr. Goss was saying that or not. 

Mr. GOSS. I was only answering the Chairman’s question. Not 

making a preference. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Right. Ms. Harman certainly made a preference. 
20

And Ms. Harman, obviously, are you supportive of permanency? 

And we have had the opportunity to read, and we will certainly 

hear later on today testimony from other committee leaders who 

have a different point-of-view. 

Why do you think that your viewpoint is so different than the 

committee leaders who are going to basically support the status 

quo today in their testimony? Is it—do you think it is your intelligence experience or, perhaps, your exposure to the select committee? 

Ms. HARMAN. I think it is my exposure to the issues that are involved here. Homeland Security is our number one priority as far 

as I am concerned. It is our number one vulnerability as well. 

And if we don’t think anew in this Congress, we are not going 

to protect the people we represent. You know, the dirtiest four-letter word in government is spelled T-U-R-F. 

And I worry, and I am guilty of this as well, that if all we do 

up here is resist, build barricades and insist on doing business the 

old way, we keep America vulnerable. 

So just as we insisted that the Executive Branch, by forming the 

Department of Homeland Security and breaking a lot of china to 

get there, I think we have to insist that Congress change to match 

the threats and help add value to defeating the threats of the 21st 

century. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Well, I want to welcome, at this point, Mrs. 

Slaughter, our distinguished ranking member who was tied up. Do 

you have any comments at this point? 

Ms. SLAUGHTER. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First, I want to apologize. The Rules Committee, as the Members 

here know, is now working on the budget. And my staff told me 

that I was urgently needed there. So the word urgent drew me 

right to the committee. Only I realized that my urgency is needed 

here. 

I am sorry I did not hear your testimony. Both of you are people 

I highly respect and highly regard on all issues and certainly including this one. 

I have been told that you have both supported a permanent committee. And I think I would agree with you. If that agency is going 

to be out there working, I think it is going to require a great deal 

of oversight. The committee, I think, has worked well together, and 

I appreciate what we are doing. 

It is very difficult, again, without the threat assessment. I know 

I met just last week with a group of my first responders, and I 

keep trying to explain to them that they are not going to get the 

money until everything gets straightened out and we know where 

we need to go. But that is wearing really thin on them. Their overtime and the money they have spent is really extraordinary. 

Ms. SLAUGHTER. But tell me, if they do decide to do a permanent 

committee, how do you think it ought to be done? Would it remain 

a select committee—and can’t be if its permanent—but would we 

keep the same members? What are your recommendations? 

Mr. GOSS. I suggested that there are pluses and minuses to either using Rule 10 and going with the standing committee. 

My concern on the standing committee, obviously, is that you 

have people going on the committee more on the basis of seniority 
21

rather than on the basis—or the voting system of the way we put 

people on standing committees that may not get exactly the people 

who are exactly the right, most qualified people to go to the committee. 

I worry a little bit about the size of the committee, and I certainly worry about the turf wars that would go on between standing committees. I think those are all problems. 

On the other hand, the cache of having a standing committee 

does help. If it becomes just another authorizing committee and 

doesn’t have the proper linkage with the Appropriations Committee, however, then it runs the risk of becoming somewhat irrelevant, as the authorizing committees sometimes do, it seems, on the 

strong appropriations process we have here now. 

Those are considerations. They don’t lead to you one conclusion 

or the other. On the select committee, I tend to believe the smallness, the focus of the select committee, allowing the leadership to 

appoint the members is a very critical factor. It gives the flexibility 

and a certain responsiveness to the top leadership and keeps the 

top leadership of the House, minority and majority, involved in the 

process. I think that is a very important benefit. 

So I am not prepared to say which is the best. But I do believe 

it ought to be one or the other. 

Ms. SLAUGHTER. One or the other. 

Ms. Harman? 

Ms. HARMAN. Well, I think it should be smaller. Looking at all 

of these Floridians, I would recommend the South Beach Diet for 

this committee. And I think it should be designed in a way that 

it becomes a desirable place to serve, a destination for many of the 

ambitious and smart Members of the House. 

And so I think, as we do this, we might reconsider some of the—

I know how hard this is—but some of the jurisdiction of some of 

the older committees. And we should make our House look like the 

landscape of the 21st century. 

And when we think about this, the large—second largest department in the Government is the Department of Homeland Security. 

The largest is the Department of Defense. And the largest set of 

threats against our country are ones that this Department has 

major jurisdiction to deal with. 

So I think this should be a major committee, a major focus of a 

redesigned committee structure in the Congress. 

Ms. SLAUGHTER. Well, I know that, in putting this together, they 

put most of the committee chairs on so that we could try to control 

any unruliness there. But given the fact that many of them have 

jurisdiction already over parts of this, are you both recommending 

that that be taken away from them and put into Homeland Security? 

Mr. GOSS. Well, speaking for the Rules Committee, I don’t think 

there is much jurisdictional quarrel. 

Ms. SLAUGHTER. No. We don’t have much of a dog in that fight, 

do we? 

Mr. GOSS. And I don’t think we need to worry about that. 

Speaking for the Intelligence Committee I did testify that I felt 

we have a very unique working arrangement worked out with the 

intelligence community about how we manage classified informa-
22

tion which has evolved over a great number of decades since we 

put the National Security Act together in 1947. 

I think it is working extremely well, and I would not want to 

change that. You may call that guarding turf. I think it is just common sense. If you have something that is, working why break it? 

Ms. SLAUGHTER. You wouldn’t care to comment on the Committees of Appropriations and Transportation, Ways and Means, any 

of the rest of them? 

Mr. GOSS. On the turf? 

Ms. SLAUGHTER. Yes. 

Mr. GOSS. Actually, I did comment, in my opening comments and 

in my aside remarks as well. We have reached out. I mean, we do 

business with 15 separate agencies that are in various cabinet secretary agencies around. So I am dealing with secretaries of this or 

that, the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, Treasury, Attorney General, so forth, all these people on a regular basis. 

We don’t have any problem reaching out either into the Executive Branch on our business. We don’t get into other people’s business. We just do the classified intelligence piece of that. 

And we also don’t have any trouble reaching out to the various 

chairmen and ranking members of those authorizing committees, 

and we do work very closely with the appropriators. We have to. 

Ms. SLAUGHTER. And that is fine. But do you see that this could 

be translated over to a select committee on homeland security? 

Mr. GOSS. To a select committee on homeland Security? 

Ms. SLAUGHTER. Or a permanent committee. One or the other. 

How do you think it will work? 

Mr. GOSS. I think it will work. I think it will work better with 

a select committee because we have been able to make it work that 

way, and I notice it hasn’t worked quite that way with some of the 

standing committees. 

But it also has worked with some standing committees, so you 

can take that either way. It depends a little bit on the relationships 

and leadership of the various committees and where the chemistry 

is. 

But my view is, it is easier with a permanent select committee 

specifically. That is not a preference, it is just a view that that aspect is easier with the select committee. 

Ms. HARMAN. I would just add that the goal is to make Congress 

more effective in overseeing the Department of Homeland Security 

and to make our homeland security effort more effective. And that 

is what we should focus on, not how do I keep as much turf as I 

already had, wherever it is that I may be. 

I do agree with Chairman Goss that there are some unique aspects to the House Intelligence Committee that couldn’t easily be 

transferred, but I don’t want to be heard to say every ounce of turf 

as is has to be protected. I really think as we have organized, reorganized the Executive Branch, we have to be prepared to consider 

seriously reorganizing Congress. 

Ms. SLAUGHTER. Thank you. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Chairman Cox? 

Mr. COX. Thank you. And I want to thank you as much for your 

response to the questions as for your formal prepared testimony 

and your opening because it is really helpful, to us and the inter-
23

section between your responsibilities as Members of the Homeland 

Security Committee and your permanent jobs on the Permanent 

Select Committee on Intelligence couldn’t be closer and more important. 

I just want to begin by recognizing the complete agreement that 

I have with Chairman Goss, and his testimony concerning the importance of defining homeland security. It is a work in progress, as 

you know. It is still under definition. And I think that if we are 

to succeed in protecting the country, we have to get away from that 

notion that Homeland Security is in the eye of the beholder, that 

it is meaning is as meaning does and that we can morph it into 

anything convenient particularly for the purposes of funding programs. 

That is one of the reasons I think there needs to be rigorous congressional focus, not just from an oversight standpoint, but from a 

legislative standpoint and authorization standpoint on what this 

Department does. And particularly, I say that because, while the 

Department can be and we intended it to be when we just wrote 

the Homeland Security Act a short while ago, a bulwark against 

a parade of horrible things that might happen to us, it also has a 

dystopian future if we let it become what it might in our worst 

imaginings, a Department of Homeland Security that is bound to 

grow. 

Long after we are gone, the Department will still be there. Several decades from now it will still be growing. It will be much bigger, and it is going to grow into something. The importance of our 

job right now is that we are going to orient it and maybe a few degrees this way, a few degrees that way, and it will have profound 

consequences 10, 20 years down the road. 

So this definition is just absolutely essential. But here is part of 

the dystopian vision of what Homeland Security Department run 

amuck would look like. First, it would be a threat on all of our civil 

liberties. Second, it would be a regulator of every corner of American life and every aspect of American commerce. Third, it would 

be the excuse for federalizing virtually every State function and 

every private sector function. And fourth, it would be the ruin of 

the Federal budget. 

It can be all of these things if we let it stray from its mission 

as stated clearly, which is threefold: First, to protect; second, to 

prevent; and, third, to respond. Those three must, it seems to me, 

define the Department and thus the jurisdiction of any committee 

that oversees it to the exclusion of all else. 

If you let other things—it is just as important to keep things out, 

not only of congressional jurisdiction but also the Department’s 

own jurisdiction, as it is to put all these 22 agencies together and 

to make them work together. 

So I think we have to recognize the importance of the job we are 

doing here in Congress, because it isn’t just about our turf. It isn’t 

just about how we organized ourselves. How we make these choices 

will have immediate and long-lasting consequences for real life over 

the Department of Homeland Security and us there for the rest of 

the country. 

The first mission, which is the most important of the three, preventing terrorism relies heavily on an intelligence component. 
24

Rather clearly in the charter that we wrote for the Homeland Security Department there isn’t a foreign intelligence collection responsibility at all. 

So for starters, one of the things that is squarely within your jurisdiction should be not only squarely outside the jurisdiction of 

any future homeland security committee, but also outside the jurisdiction of, now or in the future, the Department of Homeland Security. We don’t want them in that business. 

Second, the Department of Homeland Security really doesn’t collect much in the way of domestic intelligence. I suppose if we have 

an asterisk or a footnote, we should acknowledge that the Coast 

Guard probably collects some foreign intelligence, and certainly, 

the Secret Service receives foreign intelligence. 

But, you know, in the collection area, the responsibilities of the 

Department are very slim and for the most part, we have chartered 

it to focus on the fusion of intelligence from all sources and the 

analysis of that intelligence. And just as importantly, although it 

is not expressed in precisely these terms in the act, the Department has the authority and the responsibility to place requirements on the intelligence community. 

So the intersection, from a jurisdiction standpoint, occurs at this 

fusion place. And the reason that we have the Department of 

Homeland Security with an IA directorate is that we thought, as 

a Congress, the House and the Senate, the Democrats and Republicans, about leaving this in the intelligence community as presently comprised. 

And it frightened us, as we looked over that precipice, to think 

about what would happen to the walls that we have built so carefully about the collection of, particularly, foreign intelligence as we 

define in the intelligence community and what we expect Homeland Security to be all about, back to this definition, which is our 

own back yard. 

And we are talking about getting in touch with our mayors, with 

our law enforcement. We are talking about, you know, placing requirements to collection, not just overseas, but with the FBI, all of 

the FISA concerns that you have already with the Judiciary Committee, all of those things are going to go on at the same time that 

foreign intelligence is being analyzed and in the same place. 

Better to put that in a Department of Homeland Security with 

a strong civil liberties protection component than to expand the notion of intelligence collection based on the old model, given all of 

that history and the fact that the Homeland Security Act, which I 

have in front of me, amends the National Security Act, by definition, including within the intelligence community, the foreign intelligence analysis component of DHS, not the domestic analysis and 

not any collection. 

I just want to place before you both the question about where 

you think the Department belongs in this picture, first, and whether you agree with my assumption that, at a maximum, the jurisdiction of this committee should not extend beyond the Department 

itself. 

You know, obviously, there are major aspects of Homeland Security that fall outside the Department, and I don’t know whether 

anybody has in mind suggesting that the Department’s jurisdiction 
25

be only the minimum and not the maximum of what the committee 

would look at. So I would ask you both to opine on both of those 

questions. 

Mr. GOSS. I think it is the hardest question. The debate is going 

on in our country about—most Americans, on a given day, count 

on the United States Government as a certain amount of protection 

depending on what the threat is of the day, whether there is a 

sniper loose or something else. Mood swings on that. And equally, 

most Americans are in distress over the thought that somebody 

might be checking their library records. 

So you have this balance problem which is why the oversight is 

so important. Now, I believe the essence of Homeland Security and 

national security is preemptive. It is preventative. I think that if 

we are very good at cleaning up after the bomb goes off, that’s terrific. And Thank God we have the men and women who do that 

and have done it so well. 

But honestly, the mission should be to stop the bomb from going 

off. That means having the information. Okay. The foreign intelligence pattern is pretty clear. It works. We have the template. It 

is set up. 

The problem is, where do you plug it in to Homeland Security, 

since we don’t have a domestic intelligence agency? That has always been the point where we have not found a plug that fits the 

receptacle. 

Some of us thought when we put together the Department of 

Homeland Security, we would do it all in Homeland Security. We 

would create a fire hose that came in from domestic intelligence 

and foreign intelligence. It would go into a room where there were 

analysts, and they would be able to task either local or foreign assets, and they would be able to preempt doing that. 

For whatever reasons, we didn’t set it up that way. We set it up 

differently. The bill that came out, the bill that was signed by the 

President came out and the—what I call the nerve center is now 

dependent on outside forces, TTIC, which are basically now the foreign intelligence program led by a CIA person. 

Now that is very helpful to preserve the myth that Americans 

don’t spy on Americans. But it is also—the camel’s nose is well into 

the tent on the subject. So let’s forget that and stop kidding ourselves and just get to the point and say, how are we going to get 

domestic information so that we can provide American security 

and, at the same time, provide them the safeguards that that is not 

being abused, that their liberties and freedoms are not being preempted by the Federal Government under the guise of giving them 

protection? 

I don’t think that is as much an organizational question as a 

question of efficiency, is, how can you get that job done? I think, 

down the road, we may change our mind on that, on how we are 

doing it right now. 

I was skeptical that the way the TTIC was set up would work 

very well. Actually, it seems to be pulling itself together fairly well 

because we have such a huge difference between the size of fire 

hoses coming in to the fusion center. I believe that will change in 

time, after we get a better definition of what Homeland Security 
26

is and what we are allowed to do under the PATRIOT Act and 

other type things. 

Because if we are going to have preemptive law enforcement, I 

am not quite sure, just from a practical point of view, forget the 

legal problems, how I explain this in my town meeting when I go 

home. 

What is preemptive law enforcement? How do I know you are 

about to break the law until you have broken the law? And if it 

is setting off a bomb, it is a big breaking of the law. 

Those are the issues. I don’t think they solve organizationally. I 

don’t think your answer lies in the organization. But there has to 

be resolve. 

And I will go on to answer your question specifically and say, 

yes, I think it is the Department of Homeland Security’s responsibility to respond to the issue of how you handle domestic information that is preemptive to a bad action, how you task to get more 

of that information and how you have an action element all in 

Homeland Security that can actually go arrest those people before 

they pull the trigger. 

I think that is what I see is the future of Homeland Security. But 

I still see the major component of the intelligence processing component being in the foreign intelligence program because it is the 

dominant, hugely dominant, partner of the information and probably always will be, given our sensitivity to our civil liberties. 

Mr. COX. Mr. Chairman I don’t want to ask any additional questions. But if you would permit, I would just ask for further clarification on that one point. 

TTIC, right now, is essentially funded out of the foreign intelligence budget, all be it getting funded. 

Mr. GOSS. Yes. 

Mr. COX. But are you suggesting that TTIC actually belongs 

within the foreign intelligence construct even though it is supposed 

to be—

Mr. GOSS. I think that we have actually come up— 

Mr. COX. Domestic and foreign. 

Mr. GOSS. I think it is meant to bridge the gap. I think that is 

the purpose of TTIC. The Terrorist Threat Intelligence Center, the 

Terrorist Threat Information Center, when does information become intelligence, and is that where the line gets crossed and it is 

a no go? 

I mean, we have been very cute about how we have handled this. 

I think, actually, we have stumbled into something that is working 

fairly well and can work for a while. I think it is the least of our 

problems right now. I am not prepared to answer your question for 

all times. For where it is now, I think it is working right, and I 

think we have it set up about right. 

Ms. HARMAN. If I could just add for 30 seconds to that comment? 

I think TTIC is one of the success stories of the moment. We 

didn’t intend that it exist. The President took the initiative in his 

State of the Union message in 2003, and I give him great credit 

for coming up with something that would work in this moment. 

So I think that TTIC actually can inform our efforts to reform 

the intelligence community. Fusion and integration are the way we 
27

have to go in the intelligence community. That is not the subject 

for today. 

All I wanted to say to Chairman Cox was that your notion of 

simplifying the jurisdiction, limiting the jurisdiction here and, perhaps, limiting the focus of the Department of Homeland Security 

over time so that they are congruent is, I think, an excellent idea. 

If this committee has a more limited jurisdiction it will fit better 

in the organization of Congress, and I think it then will have a better shot at becoming a destination committee for Congress, which 

we want. We want the most talented people in Congress to want 

to serve on this committee. 

But I also think that limiting the jurisdiction of this behemoth 

Department of Homeland Security that we are trying to cobble together will help it succeed and perform its critical missions and you 

have defined them very well. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. I have been informed about your meeting at 

2:00. I would like to recognize Mr. Weldon, who has been here patiently, and I know he will be brief. 

Mr. WELDON. Two questions. First of all, on the jurisdictional 

areas. I have spent the past 5 years with a very frustrating challenge that resulted from a 1999 trip that 11 Members of Congress 

took to Vienna with me, five Democrats and five Republicans, to 

try to work out with the Russians a compromise that would end 

Milosevic’s reign. The Russians brought with them a Serbian who 

they claimed could assist them. I called George Tenet up and asked 

for a profile of this family and this man, and he called me back and 

said, well, Congressman, we don’t have much on him. We can give 

you a couple of lines. And they did. 

I later got a memo, which I still have, from a CIA employee who 

told me he checked the internal files of the agency, and they didn’t 

have anything at all except for this one person in the family, which 

wasn’t the person we were meeting with. 

I was then the chairman of the Research and Development Committee for the military and supporting the Army’s Information 

Dominance Center known as LIWA down at Fort Belvoir, and 

asked them to unofficially run a profile for me of this person, and 

they gave me five pages of information. Now, granted the process 

wasn’t very sophisticated, it wasn’t a full vetting process, which 

was a problem. But here, they gave me five pages of information 

about this family because they had data mining and data fusion capability. I came back, and the CIA and the FBI both called me and 

asked me to brief them on the family I had met with, and I told 

them everything they asked to know, four agents in 2 hours. And 

when I finished, I said, you know where I got my data from? Well, 

yeah, you got it from the Russians. No. You got it from the family. 

No. I said, before I left I went to the Army’s Information Dominance Center where they have a prototype with Raytheon and 

other companies, and they gave me five pages of information. And 

the CIA and FBI people said, what is the Army’s Information 

Dominance Center? 

From that point, working with intelligence people we put together what was then called the NOAH, National Operations Analysis Hub, a nine-page brief to create what is now called the TTIC. 

But this was back in 1999. We put language in two successive de-
28

fense bills that called for DOD to support with money the creation 

of this entity, the 2000, 2001 defense bills. 

John Hamre, then Deputy Secretary of Defense, told me, Congressman, I will pay for it, but you have got to get the other agencies to agree. He suggested I have a meeting in my office with his 

counterparts, the CIA and the FBI, which I did 1 year before 9/11. 

I have the date and I have the people who attended. And for 1 

hour, four of us, John Hamre, Deputy Director of CIA, Deputy Director of FBI, talked about creating a NOAH. And the response by 

the agencies—other agencies were, we don’t need it. 

So my question is, from the standpoint of data fusion and data—

I am glad we have the TTIC and I was glad the President mentioned it in the State of the Union speech last year. We should 

have had that back in 1999 and 2000 when people from the Intelligence Community knew full well that there was a need to have 

this data fusion and data mining capability. And so the process 

then was to link together 33 classified systems that our various 

agencies have. 

I want to ask you both for the record or now, are you satisfied 

that TTIC in fact has done that? And are you satisfied that in your 

committee as it currently stands you have enough jurisdiction over 

those 33 systems? 

Mr. GOSS. The answer is I am not satisfied with the system at 

all. It has a long way to go for secure coms and other matters. 

There is still some residual, what I will call cultural problems. It 

is much improved. I think there is clearly a mission objective now 

that is understood, there is a vision about it. 

Do I feel we have the jurisdiction to deal with it? I do. I have 

the same frustration that you do, because we have been banging 

on this particular thing for as long as you have. And we appreciate 

your assistance on it. I know the work you have done. 

Part of the problem, incidentally, with the Dominance Center 

was it scared the heck out of some people about the civil liberties 

question, which is still part of the debate and still going on. So, and 

that debate is going to go on. So that does create an extra obstacle? 

But, no, it is not as good as it needs to be. It is clear, we understand what we need to do. Now all we have to do is get it done. 

But we haven’t got it done yet, and that is one of the things I believe DHS can do. 

Mr. WELDON. Perhaps I could ask my second question to Ms. 

Harman, if she would take it. And that is, are you satisfied that 

the Intel Committee is going to be able to deal with the integration 

of—vertical and horizontal integration of intelligence for the first 

responder, which is a big challenge? Are you satisfied that that is 

a role that you all can play? 

Ms. HARMAN. It is certainly a priority for us. Info sharing was 

one of the big problems leading up to 9/11. And I only wish your 

meeting had resulted in TTIC, standing up TTIC in the year 1999 

or 2000. It would have made a huge difference. But we do focus on 

it. I have paid certainly visits to TTIC; I recommend that to others. 

I know Chairman Cox has been there. Its focus is not just to fuse 

the data, but then to get it out vertically down to our hometowns, 

and not only to get it down but to get data from our hometowns 

up. And the methods of communication are impressive because 
29

they can strip out sources and methods, which means that the local 

cop on the beat without the security clearance can get the information he or she needs to know what to do. 

And I think we are a lot farther along in that effort now than 

we were a year ago. And I do think that the new streamlined, 

smaller, more effective, permanent in some form committee focusing on homeland security should keep a focus on information sharing, should make sure that first responders have tools in the event 

that we can’t prevent the attack in the first place. In fact, let me 

amend that. They may be the ones who prevent the attack if they 

have the right information. 

Mr. WELDON. Thank you. 

Mr. GOSS. May I add just to that, we have actually seen a successful example of that. It turned out we were wrong, but we had 

a person overheard a conversation in a restaurant in Georgia, 

phoned ahead to some police people in Florida; they got down to 

the local sheriff in my county down in Collier County, and they 

shut down I–75. They actually arrested a car full of people. Now, 

as it turned out, they were on a benign mission, but they had been 

saying some things to try and create a little story, more like a 

prank, and the system worked. Everybody played by the rules and 

the system worked. As I say, it turned out to be wrong. But if they 

had been real terrorists, it would have been a very easy takedown. 

As it turned out, they weren’t, and it caused us the inconvenience 

of shutting down I–75. 

Mr. WELDON. Well, but you have also prototyped the JRIES system, which does that both in New York and California, and that 

is working extremely well from the standpoint of local responders. 

Mr. GOSS. We have the solution. It is just a question of doing it. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Thank you, Chairman and Ranking Member. 

Thank you so much. You have been very helpful and you have been 

very kind.

We are honored with the presence of the chairman and the ranking member of the Committee on Agriculture. We welcome both of 

our distinguished colleagues. Again, welcome to both of you. And, 

Chairman Goodlatte. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE BOB GOODLATTE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF VIRGINIA, 

AND CHAIRMAN 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Thank you very much Mr. Chairman. It is a 

pleasure to be with you and the other members of the subcommittee and Chairman Cox of the full committee. 

We appreciate the invitation to provide testimony on how existing House rules and procedures may affect appropriate consideration of homeland security matters. I often hear cited the difficulty 

that will be faced by the newly created Department of Homeland 

Security by having to be responsive to upwards of 88 committees 

and subcommittees of the Congress and the exercise of their legislative oversight and appropriations responsibilities. 

Some have said that this would be too daunting a task and have 

subsequently recommended that the new Department be relieved of 

the burden of so many prying eyes. I disagree. This is not an exercise in marking one’s territory. Jurisdiction of the various commit-
30

tees and the subcommittees of the House of Representatives is divided not because of the cynic’s view that Members of Congress 

seek to establish and hold onto bases of power. The jurisdiction of 

the various congressional committees and subcommittees have been 

established over time to mirror the complexity of the various issues 

with which the Congress has to deal. The fundamental responsibility of the committees and subcommittees of the House of Representatives is to ensure that the expertise exists to properly oversee the functioning of our Government. The process of dividing jurisdiction is dynamic, as it rightly should be. Changes, when they 

are made, are made to take into account the complexities of Federal programs we create and oversee. In most cases, this means 

that additional committees or subcommittees are created to provide 

additional perspective on issues. Seldom does this process engage 

to minimize the accountability of the Federal bureaucracy as would 

be the outcome if a new permanent standing Committee on Homeland Security were to be created. 

When the Congress authorized the creation of the Department of 

Homeland Security, we vested in this new Department numerous 

diverse and complex programmatic responsibilities. We provided for 

the transfer of up to 3,200 employees from the Department of Agriculture, whose job it is to conduct inspections of people and commercial goods coming into our country that may intentionally or 

unintentionally be carrying pests or diseases that could be detrimental to U.S. agriculture. 

Over the years, this function has involved the investment of billions of taxpayer dollars and had countless staff hours, education, 

and experience devoted to it. 

While some may believe that the first and only responsibility of 

the Department of Homeland Security is protection of our Nation 

against acts of terrorism, I would underscore the fact that in the 

Agriculture Committee we are, and rightly should be, at least as 

concerned about the unintentional incidents since they are a constant threat. At risk is a food production system which is truly 

priceless. Those with experience in this field understand the old 

adage: An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. If an accidental introduction of foot and mouth disease were to occur, it 

would cost our economy tens of billions of dollars. 

In our zeal to focus attention on the intentional threat to America, we simply cannot neglect to protect ourselves from the historical threats that continue. 

Let me be clear. In the Agriculture Committee we are concerned 

about both intentional and unintentional threats. My fear is that 

a standing Committee on Homeland Security, whose purpose it is 

to focus on the mitigation of terrorist threats, might not pay attention to or recognize the damage that is caused by unintentional introductions of plant or animal pests or disease. 

In a hearing held to evaluate the proposed one-face-at-the-border 

proposal I used these examples to illustrate the importance of having sufficient expertise not only at our border inspection points but 

also in our oversight function. And before I show you these examples, I want to introduce a couple of people who are on the Agriculture Committee staff. 
31

Now, when new Members of Congress become chairmen of committees, they have the discretion to change the entire committee 

staff or keep the committee staff. I must tell you that my approach, 

because of the nature of the Agriculture Committee, was to keep 

the, in some cases, decades of experience in very fine points on agriculture. Two of those folks are with me today. Elizabeth Parker, 

who is a veterinarian, and John Goldberg, who has a Ph.D. in animal and food science and is a microbiologist. These folks are involved on a day-to-day basis with the Department of Agriculture, 

with the agricultural community, and America’s farmers and 

ranchers and food processors, to make absolutely certain that the 

fine-tuning of how our Government responds to threats to American agriculture of a wide variety of kinds are understood by the 

Department. The committee oftentimes is pointing out things to 

the Department that they haven’t taken into consideration themselves. We are talking about the Department of Agriculture, not 

even the Department of Homeland Security. 

So this is a very grave concern to us, that this kind of expertise 

will be lost if this jurisdiction is changed over to someplace else. 

I have a few examples of the kinds of things that come up. 

These seeds that appear to be a matchbook, this is an item that 

is prohibited in passenger luggage without a phytosanitary certificate. The product is designed to look like a matchbook and could 

easily be overlooked. The risk is to plant pests and diseases. 

This is a bonsai tree with silk flowers. The tree was declared as 

artificial, but is actually a live bonsai with the leaves removed and 

replaced with silk flowers. The risk is the live plants in the soil, 

and such importation can harbor diseases, insects, and nematodes. 

This is a phytosanitary certificate dealing with prohibited nursery stock. It prohibited plum tree cuttings imported with a valid 

phytosanitary certificate. A phytosanitary certificate only attests to 

the origin and apparent freedom from pests and diseases. It cannot 

be used to determine enter-ability. Detailed regulatory knowledge 

is essential when conducting even seemingly routine inspections. 

This is a prohibited melon seed from the Middle East misrepresented as pistachios, and the risk is a beetle that comes in these 

seeds. 

This is a decorative bird’s nest made from rice straw, and this 

is one of many types of handcrafts made from prohibited rice and 

wheat straw. These are typically declared as souvenirs, and a number of fungal and bacterial diseases may be contained in the rice. 

This is a handicraft containing raw cotton, cotton litter, and cotton seed. Souvenirs such as stuffed toys and handicrafts contain 

prohibited agriculture materials. The risk is to pink bollworm, golden nematode, and flag smut. 

This is canned soup from England that could pass as a U.S. product. It is Heinz Big Soup. The item is a product of England. It is 

prohibited because the ingredients include lamb, a ruminant, which 

is at risk for transmitting mad cow disease, and the risk of BSE, 

as we all know for the last several months, is a serious problem. 

It is heat resistant and survives the canning process, and is listed 

as a select agent under the Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection 

Act. 
32

I don’t want to bore you with too many of these, but let me show 

you one that is boneless duck from Taiwan, deceptively labeled as 

jerry fish. Packaging can sometimes be misleading. At a glance, 

this appears to be labeled as fish. Actually, this is boneless duck 

from Taiwan. Animal products must be carefully examined to ensure that they are what they appear to be. The risk here is exotic 

Newcastle’s disease. It was a serious problem in southern California last year. END is listed as a selected agent under the Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act. 

Mr. Chairman, with nearly 170,000 employees and countless missions and responsibilities, the function of the Department of Homeland Security lends itself to a functionally diverse oversight mechanism. I cannot see how a single standing committee with a normal 

staff can ever amass the expertise necessary to completely properly 

oversee this new Department. The Congress has a constitutional 

responsibility to ensure that sufficient resources are provided to review and analyze each of our Federal programs. A single standing 

committee on Homeland Security would have great difficulty in fulfilling this responsibility, and as such I would be skeptical of any 

effort to establish such a permanent standing committee. 

I urge the subcommittee to be very cautious in considering 

changes to be made to the underlying jurisdictional structure of the 

House of Representatives. I would be pleased to answer any questions after you hear from my distinguished colleague.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE BOB GOODLATTE 

Mr. Chairman, and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the invitation 

to provide testimony on how existing House rules and procedures may affect appropriate consideration of homeland security matters. 

I often hear cited the difficulty that will be faced by the newly created Department of Homeland Security by having to be responsive to upwards of 88 Committees 

and Subcommittees of the Congress in the exercise of their legislative, oversight and 

appropriations responsibilities. Some have said that this would be too daunting a 

task and have subsequently recommended that the new Department be relieved of 

the burden of so many prying eyes. I disagree! 

This is not an exercise in marking one’s territory. Jurisdiction of the various Committees and Subcommittees of the House of Representatives is divided, not because 

of the cynic’s view that Members of Congress seek to establish and hold onto bases 

of power. The jurisdiction of the various Congressional Committees and Subcommittees has been established over time to mirror the complexity of the various issues 

with which the Congress has to deal. The fundamental responsibility of the Committees and Subcommittees of the House of Representatives is to ensure that the expertise exists to properly oversee the functioning of our government. 

The process of dividing jurisdiction is dynamic, as it rightly should be. Changes, 

when they are made, are made to take into account the complexities of Federal programs we create and oversee. In most cases, this means that additional Committees 

or Subcommittees are created to provide additional perspective on issues. Seldom 

is this process engaged to minimize the accountability of the Federal Bureaucracy 

as would be the outcome if a new permanent standing Committee on Homeland Security were to be created. 

When the Congress authorized the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, we vested in this new department numerous diverse and complex programmatic responsibilities. From the Department of Agriculture, we provided for 

the transfer of up to 3,200 employees whose job it is to conduct inspections of people 

and commercial goods coming into our country that may intentionally or unintentionally be carrying pests or diseases that could be detrimental to US agriculture. 

Over the years, this function has involved the investment of billions of taxpayer dollars and had countless staff hours, education, and experience devoted to it. 

While some may believe that the first and only responsibility of the Department 

of Homeland Security is protection of our nation against acts of terrorism, I would 

underscore the fact that in the Agriculture Committee, we are, and rightly should 
33

be, at least as concerned about the unintentional incidents since they are a constant 

threat. 

At risk is a food production system which is truly priceless. Those with experience 

in this field understand the old adage: ‘‘An ounce of prevention is worth a pound 

of cure.’’ If an accidental introduction of Foot and Mouth Disease were to occur, it 

would cost our economy tens of billions of dollars. In our zeal to focus attention on 

the intentional threat to America, we simply cannot neglect to protect ourselves 

from the historical threats that continue. 

Let me be clear, in the Agriculture Committee we are concerned about both intentional and unintentional threats. My fear is that a standing Committee on Homeland Security, whose purpose it is to focus on the mitigation of terrorist threats, 

might not pay attention to or recognize the damage that is caused by unintentional 

introductions of plant or animal pests or disease. 

In a hearing held to evaluate the proposed ‘‘One Face at the Border’’ proposal, 

I used these examples to illustrate the importance of having sufficient expertise not 

only at our border inspection points, but also in our oversight function. 

PREPARED SLIDES: COPIES ARE MAINTAINED IN COMMITTEE FILES 

Nursery Stock 

Example 1—Seeds that Appear to be a Matchbook 

Seed for propagation—The item is prohibited in passenger luggage without a 

phytosanitary certificate. The product is designed to look like a matchbook and 

could easily be overlooked. 

RISK: Plant pests and diseases. 

Example 2—Bonsai tree with Silk Flowers 

The tree was declared as artificial, but is actually a live bonsai with the leaves 

removed and replaced with silk flowers. 

RISK: Live plant in soil. Such importations can harbor diseases, insects, and 

nematodes. 

Example 3—Nursery Stock and CITES 

This nut can be mistaken for a small coconut and released. Actually, this is a 

palm nut that is an endangered species (CITES II). The correct action is to authorize movement to a plant inspection station. 

RISK: Plant diseases and violation of CITES regulations. 

Example 4—Prohibited Nursery Stock Accompanied by a Phytosanitary 

Certificate 

Prohibited plum tree cuttings imported with a valid phytosanitary certificate. A 

phytosanitary certificate only attests to the origin and apparent freedom from pests 

and diseases. It can not be used to determine enterability. Detailed regulatory 

knowledge is essential when conducting even seemingly routine inspections. 

RISK: Plum pox virus (listed as a select agent under the Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act) 

Nonpropagative Plant Imports 

Example 1—Misrepresented Melon Seed. 

Prohibited melon seed from the Middle East misrepresented as pistachios. 

RISK: Khapra beetle. 

Example 2—Decorative Bird’s Nest Made from Rice Straw 

This is one of many types of handicrafts made from prohibited rice and wheat 

straw. These are typically declared as souvenirs. 

RISK: A number of fungal and bacterial diseases of rice. 

Example 3—Handicrafts Containing Raw Cotton, Cotton Litter, and Cotton Seed 

Souvenirs such as stuffed toys and handicrafts can contain prohibited agricultural 

materials. 

RISK: Pink Bollworm, Golden Nematode, Flag Smut 

Animal Products 

Example 1—Canned Soup from England That Could Pass for a U.S. Product 

Heinz Big Soup. The item is a Product of England and is prohibited. Ingredients 

include lamb (a ruminant) which is a risk for transmitting BSE. 

RISK: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE). BSE is heat resistant and survives the canning process. BSE is listed as a select agent under the Agricultural 

Bioterrorism Protection Act. 

Example 2—Boneless Duck from Taiwan Deceptively Labeled as ‘‘Jerry 

Fish’’

Packaging can sometimes be misleading. At a glance, this appears to be labeled 

as fish. Actually, this is boneless duck from Taiwan. Animal products must be carefully examined to ensure that they are what they appear to be. 
34

RISK: Exotic Newcastle’s Disease (END). END is listed as a select agent under 

the Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act. 

Example 3—Cheese with Meat. 

Cheese with embedded salami originating in Europe is prohibited without a proper certificate of processing. Hard cheeses, which are normally enterable, may contain meat which changes the entry status. Knowledge of animal products and the 

associated risks is key to making correct regulatory decisions and preventing the 

entry of a foreign animal disease. 

RISK: Foot and Mouth Disease(FMD). FMD is listed as a select agent under the 

Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act. 

CLOSING COMMENTS: 

With nearly 170,000 employees and countless missions and responsibilities, the 

creation of the Department of Homeland Security lends itself to a functionally diverse oversight mechanism. I cannot see how a single standing Committee with a 

nominal staff can ever amass the expertise necessary to properly oversee this new 

Department. The Congress has a Constitutional responsibility to ensure that sufficient resources are provided to review and analyze each of our Federal programs. 

A single standing Committee on Homeland Security would have great difficulty in 

fulfilling this responsibility and as such, I would be skeptical of any effort to establish such a permanent Standing Committee. I urge this Subcommittee to be very 

cautious in considering changes be made to the underlying jurisdictional structure 

of the House of Representatives. 

I would be pleased to answer any questions you may have.

Mr. Diaz-Balart. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and we will hear 

from the distinguished ranking member and then open to questions. 

Mr. Stenholm. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CHARLES W. STENHOLM, A 

REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF 

TEXAS, AND RANKING MEMBER 

Mr. STENHOLM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Ranking 

Member Slaughter, members of the committee, thank you for allowing me to testify today. And let me first say I associate myself 

completely with the chairman’s remarks. 

The Agriculture Committee has a longstanding tradition of bipartisanship, and today is no exception. So I associate myself with his 

remarks, and would add a couple of others. 

Mr. Chairman, last year testifying in favor of a Permanent Committee on Homeland Security, one of your outside witnesses justified his position by asking the question: Is the issue of homeland 

security important enough to warrant a separate committee focused exclusively on the policies, programs, and problems of homeland security? 

In point of fact, I believe the correct question should have been: 

Is the issue of homeland security important enough to warrant getting our policies right? The answer there is clearly yes. 

Mr. Chairman, creating the Department of Homeland Security 

was a major change in the organization of our government. The Department’s success in every area is crucial to the security of our 

people. The Agriculture Committee has an interest in the transfer 

of functions of the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service to 

the Department of Homeland Security. We understand the reason 

for the transfer. APHIS personnel have long performed a key border security role. The agency work is done under statutes developed over the years by the Agriculture Committee to address the 

many pests and diseases, as the chairman has shown you, that 

threaten our food and fiber production system. APHIS has done 
35

that job well. We feel that the Agriculture Committee oversight of 

the agency provides the stability needed to ensure the ongoing success of this mission. 

Mr. Chairman, you are more familiar than I with the various 

problems that have confronted the Department of Homeland Security in its infancy. However, I will provide an instance relating to 

the agriculture functions and how congressional oversight came 

into play. 

Agriculture inspectors are stationed at ports and airports 

throughout the U.S. These 3,000-plus inspectors formerly with 

APHIS are responsible for screening arriving passengers and cargo 

for materials that might produce plant or animal diseases or pests. 

This work has been going on for more than a century and is a complex task. While the agency work is not focused solely on terrorism, 

as some have noted, a catastrophic animal disease doesn’t care if 

it is introduced by a malicious terrorist or by a careless tourist. The 

effect is pretty much the same. However, the Department of Homeland Security proposed to eliminate the agriculture inspectors altogether and to disburse their duties among the uniformed Customs 

and Border Patrol officers. 

This was a well-intended attempt at gaining efficiency for taxpayers. However, had that plan been implemented the impact on 

American agriculture and the subsequent cost to the taxpayers 

could have been astronomical. Our agricultural inspectors are highly trained professionals with years of science training. Many hold 

advanced degrees in disciplines like entomology or plant pathology. 

They undergo extensive training in disease identification, technical 

lab analysis, and interview methods. Under the DHS plan, the replacements would have had only 72 hours of training in agriculture 

disease and pest identification. 

When members of the House Ag Committee learned of this plan, 

we immediately began the process of educating the DHS about the 

implications of their proposal. They came to understand the unworkable nature, even the danger of their plan, and ultimately 

scrapped it altogether, opting instead to keep the agriculture inspectors. In fact, DHS now plans to increase their total numbers. 

This is a clear example of the critical need to keep the expertise 

of the committees of jurisdiction actively involved. Had the attention and oversight of our committee not been present in the case 

just mentioned, we might have left exposed to billions of dollars of 

damage the U.S. agricultural economy. 

One example would be if an illness such as foot and mouth disease had unintentionally slipped into the country under the proposed DHS inspection plan. 

Mr. Chairman, while I don’t recommend the creation of a Permanent Homeland Security Committee, I do want to make clear that 

we need to increase our efforts to make sure the job of homeland 

security is done right. One thing history shows is this: While every 

proposal to realign jurisdiction sets out to solve the problem of jurisdictional overlaps, no plan can really get this job done. 

In the early 1990s, the Joint Committee on the Organization of 

Congress provided the idea of using ad hoc committees to deal with 

crucial cost-cutting matters. I supported this. As you consider proposed changes to House rules, I urge you to consider giving more 
36

life to the Speaker’s little used rule 12 authority to refer matters 

to ad hoc committees. 

Finally, Mr. Chairman, it was a good idea when House rules 

were amended to limit each Member to two committee assignments. Unfortunately, this rule has been thoroughly ignored. Today 

125 Members of the House serve on three or more committees. We 

should strive to achieve the goal of the two-committee limit. Establishing another permanent committee will only make reaching that 

goal more difficult. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you once again for this opportunity to testify.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CHARLES W. STENHOLM 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Slaughter, and members of the Subcommittee, 

thank you for holding this hearing and giving us the opportunity to testify. The Select Committee has been directed to conduct a study of the operation and implementation of the rules of the House with respect to homeland security, and I commend 

you for seeking the testimony of interested committees. 

Mr. Chairman, let me say that I am in complete agreement with the testimony 

of Chairman Goodlatte. The Agriculture Committee has a long-standing tradition of 

bipartisanship and takes very seriously its responsibility to work together to improve our nation’s food and fiber production policies. Our colleagues believe this 

work is one of the most important jobs they have in this House. 

Clearly, the task of the Select Committee on Homeland Security is equally important. I am encouraged by the bipartisan manner in which you’ve undertaken your 

effort to explore possible needed changes to House Rules, and I know that you will 

give every consideration to the many issues that will be raised as you proceed. 

Mr. Chairman, testifying in favor of a permanent Committee on Homeland Security last year, one of your outside witnesses justified his position by asking the question: ‘‘Is the issue of homeland security important enough to warrant a separate 

committee focused exclusively on the policies, programs, and problems of homeland 

security’’ In point of fact, I believe the correct question to be: ‘‘Is the issue of homeland security important enough to warrant getting our policies right?’’ The answer 

there is clearly ‘‘Yes.’’

Mr. Chairman, creating the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was a major 

change in the organization of our government. The Department’s success in every 

area is crucial to the security of our people. The Agriculture Committee has an interest in the transfer of functions of the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service 

(APHIS) to the DHS. We understand the reason for the transfer; APHIS personnel 

have long performed a key border security role. The agency’s work is done under 

statutes developed over the years by the Agriculture Committee to address the 

many pests and diseases that threaten our food and fiber production system; APHIS 

has done that job well. We feel that Agriculture Committee oversight of the agency 

provides the stability needed to ensure the ongoing success of this mission. 

Mr. Chairman, you are more familiar than I with the various problems that have 

confronted DHS in its infancy. However, I will provide an instance relating to its 

agriculture functions and how Congressional oversight came into play: 

Agricultural inspectors are stationed at ports and airports throughout the US. 

These 3000+ inspectors—formerly with APHIS—are responsible for screening arriving passengers and cargo for materials that might introduce plant or animal diseases or pests. his work has been going on for more than a century and is a complex 

task. While the agency’s work is not focused solely on terrorism, as some have 

noted, a catastrophic animal disease doesn’t care if it is introduced by a malicious 

terrorist or by a careless tourist; the effect is pretty much the same. 

However, DHS proposed to eliminate the agricultural inspectors altogether and to 

disperse their duties among the uniformed Customs Border Patrol officers. This was 

a well-intended attempt at gaining efficiency for the taxpayers. However, had that 

plan been implemented the impact on American agriculture, and the subsequent 

cost to the taxpayers, could have been astronomical. Our agricultural inspectors are 

highly trained professionals with years of science training. Many hold advanced degrees in disciplines like entomology or plant pathology. They undergo extensive 

training in disease identification, technical lab analysis and interview methods. 

Under the DHS plan, the replacements would have had only 72 hours of training 

in agricultural disease and pest identification. 
37

When members of the House Agriculture Committee learned of this plan, we immediately began the process of educating the DHS about the implications of their 

proposal. hey came to understand the unworkable nature, even the danger, of their 

plan and ultimately scrapped it altogether, opting instead to keep the agricultural 

inspectors. In fact, DHS now plans to increase their total numbers. 

This is a clear example of the critical need to keep the expertise of the committees 

of jurisdiction actively involved. ad the attention and oversight of our Committee not 

been present in the case just mentioned, we might have been left exposed to billions 

of dollars of damage to the US agricultural economy. One example would be if an 

illness such as foot and mouth disease had unintentionally slipped into the country 

under the proposed DHS inspection plan. 

Mr. Chairman, while I don’t recommend the creation of a permanent Homeland 

Security Committee, I do want to make clear that we need to increase our efforts 

to make sure the job of homeland security is done right. One thing history shows 

is this: while every proposal to realign jurisdiction sets out to solve the problem of 

jurisdictional overlaps, no plan can really get this job done. In the early 1990’s, the 

Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress revived the idea of using ad hoc 

committees to deal with crucial, cross-cutting matters; I supported this. As you consider proposed changes to House Rules, I urge you to consider giving more life to 

the Speaker’s little-used Rule 12 authority to refer matters to ad hoc committees. 

Finally, Mr. Chairman, it was a good idea when House Rules were amended to 

limit each Member to two committee assignments. Unfortunately, this rule has been 

thoroughly ignored. Today, 125 Members of the House serve on three or more committees. We should strive to achieve the goal of the two-committee limit. Establishing another permanent committee will only make reaching that goal more difficult. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you once again for the opportunity to testify. I look forward 

to working with the Select Committee as it continues its process of reviewing House 

Rules.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Thank you, Mr. Stenholm, and thank you, 

Chairman Goodlatte. 

Following up on one of the points that you brought out, Chairman Goodlatte, let me say first for the record that I do not believe 

that any of this subcommittee’s previous witnesses in prior hearings nor anyone on the dais today have supported creating a Permanent Committee on Homeland Security without the necessary 

member and staff expertise necessary to get the job done right. 

In Chairman Bill Young’s submitted written statement, for example, he explains that when his committee reorganized they also 

shifted key members and staff to the new Subcommittee on Homeland Security Appropriations. Certainly, a shift of jurisdiction 

among standing committees would necessitate a similar shift in 

members and staff. I certainly would not support a proposal that 

does not account for the need to harness the expertise, some of 

which you have referred to with very brilliant members of your 

staff, of each of the current standing committees. 

If we remove that argument, thus, Mr. Chairman, are you still 

testifying today that a permanent committee with a primary focus 

on homeland security issues, including integration and coordination, would not be of benefit to the fledgling Department of Homeland Security and the American people? 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Chairman, first of all, I don’t think you can 

remove that argument because these folks—and there are many, 

many more on the committeess staff who have expertise in various 

areas for this one small segment from the Department of Homeland Security’s perspective some 3,000 employees out of 170,000. 

These commmittee staff are used not just for this area, but they 

are used for all of the different issues that the Department of Agriculture and the Agriculture Committee have to deal with related 
38

to animal and plant health science. There would be an enormous 

duplication of that, and, quite frankly, a waste of resources if these 

folks were duplicated on the Department of Homeland Security for 

the purpose of fulfilling that purpose. 

I believe that the Agriculture Committee, which spends every 

minute of every day living and breathing these issues, and looking 

at it from a comprehensive standpoint from the chairman of the 

committee and the ranking member right through the committee’s 

staff to deal with these things could not be replicated in a new 

committee that has so many other responsibilities unrelated to this 

major concern for agriculture, but I believe not major concern for 

the Department of Homeland Security. I think the evidence of that 

is in the approach they took before we spoke out, as Congressman 

Stenholm said, toward designing the one-face-at-the-border program. They have made a number of improvements to it, and I applaud that. But that was not their perspective on how to proceed. 

The oversight capability of poking holes in that comes about 

through the expertise of the Agriculture Committee and is not likely to be duplicated in a segment of a new Homeland Security Committee. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Chairman, according to most homeland security experts, one of the most critical issues facing the Nation is 

the threat of agro-terrorism. Do you believe that it is important for 

Congress to focus on that threat? 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Absolutely. And we focus on that, and as a 

member of the Homeland Security Committee I work to make sure 

that the committee focuses on that. We are certainly very much 

dedicated to the Department of Agriculture focusing on it, and they 

do focus on it. Frankly, agro-terrorism is not simply an issue that 

is going to be detected and stopped at our borders. It is something 

that can take place in the interior of our country, and we have to 

have every member of the Department of Agriculture’s staff and 

America’s farmers and ranchers all working in coordination to fight 

agro-terrorism, because it can happen on anybody’s farm anywhere 

and then spread rapidly around the country. 

So, again, I think the focus needs to be where the large numbers 

of experts are that, again, can’t be replicated by the Department 

of Homeland Security to contribute to that effort on agro-terrorism, 

which certainly the Department of Homeland Security has an interest in as well, and we support. But we think that the oversight 

of that effort with these agricultural agents at the border ought to 

be overseen by the Agriculture Committee. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Chairman, has the Agriculture Committee 

held any hearings in the area of agro-terrorism? 

Mr. GOODLATTE. We meet on a daily basis met with the folks 

with the Department of Agriculture. But holding hearings on an 

issue where the public knowledge about what can and could happen here is not always desirable. We have had private briefings on 

this issue, but we have not had public hearings on it that I am 

aware of, at least not in the 1 year that I have been chairman. If 

we saw the necessity of holding public hearings on the issue in 

such a way that we did not feel that we were educating terrorists 

on how to carry out their attacks, we would certainly do so. But 

we think that most of this needs to be done in a different fashion. 
39

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. I am glad you do see the importance of the 

issue to the safety of the Nation. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Absolutely. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. And I would like to ask, I am thinking about, 

Ranking Member Stenholm, the thrust of your testimony, for which 

I thank you both for your kindness and your time. 

I guess what I was hearing through your testimony, Mr. Stenholm, is your concern that a new committee focused on homeland 

security would, or certainly might, lead to the ignoring of traditional missions of some of the agencies now within the Department 

of Homeland Security, and you were concerned. Certainly I think 

I heard that in your testimony. 

Mr. STENHOLM. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman. That was the concern. 

And as I pointed out, we have—animal and plant diseases can be 

introduced under agro-terrorism, or they can be introduced naturally, or they can be brought in innocently by humans. And, therefore, the overall function of our inspectors is, yes, to be helpful in 

providing, as Chairman Cox mentioned a moment ago, finding the 

bad guys before they do the bad deed. That is one function. But 

also it is also internal, as the chairman has pointed out, that it is 

an ongoing, everyday occurrence, an everyday responsibility that 

we have for purposes of protecting our Nation’s food supply. And, 

therefore, the division of responsibilities in that area could be very 

detrimental. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. I certainly sensed, as I say, the thrust of your 

argument. I guess the flip side is continuing the status quo perhaps 

could result in the opposite problem. In other words, you focused 

in on the danger that there might be some traditional missions ignored. The flip side is that the opposite could result. 

I guess, what do you think is the greater risk, Mr. Stenholm? 

That we focus too heavily on homeland security, or not enough on 

homeland security? 

Mr. STENHOLM. The greatest risk would be not enough. That is 

something the House Agriculture Committee—we held a hearing 

on individual animal identification as part of our food safety concerns devoted on BSE, for example, just a couple of weeks ago. A 

lot of concern in this country in the beef industry about that, and 

making sure that we do everything humanly possible to continue 

to assure the American public consumer that our food supply is 

safe. That takes many different directions, as we do. But the danger to all of us is not doing enough and making sure that the resources we have are used efficiently. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Ms. Slaughter. 

Ms. SLAUGHTER. Thank you very much. 

There was a meeting here sometime this week that one of my—

a fellow in my office attended about BSE. And one of the questions 

she brought up, since they have come up with this freon technology, was could they be adapted as a terrorist tool to infect the 

agriculture in the United States? And the response from the expert 

was, yes, they could. I wonder if your committee has given any 

thought to anything like that? 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Well, we have had hearings on BSE in addition 

to the hearing that Congressman Stenholm referred to. I wouldn’t 

want to offer my personal expertise on whether it could be trans-
40

missible, but I think it could be a terrorist issue because the introduction of animals with BSE into the country could be deliberately 

done. The economic impact of doing so could be devastating, far 

worse than the one incident that we have had which brought about 

a 20 percent reduction in beef prices upon learning that the one 

cow had come here from Canada. 

Ms. SLAUGHTER. This was not necessarily a cow. This was the 

agent that is associated with BSE which could be adapted itself to 

infect many kinds of animals. But anyway, I just wanted to bring 

that to your attention, is something that I would appreciate if you 

could kind of give a look at. 

Have you provided any oversight to the Animal and Plant Health 

Inspection Service? 

Mr. GOODLATTE. We have indeed, and we have done that at the 

full committee level and at the subcommittee level. And I stand 

corrected by my staff. We did hold a hearing on this subject, my 

predecessor did, following September 11, and it was very much related to this issue of what is the best way to conduct oversight and 

to utilize the expertise both of the Department of Agriculture and 

the committee’s expertise in overseeing what is being done to combat bioterrorism. 

Ms. SLAUGHTER. How do they feel their integration is going into 

DHS? 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Well, a hearing was held in this committee, at 

which I expressed very grave concerns about to the director of the 

one-face-at-the-border program about the initial plans. This was 

following several other discussions that had taken place at the 

member level and the staff level in order to impress upon them our 

grave concern that they were overlooking a number of things in the 

establishment of that program. And, as Congressman Stenholm 

notes, substantial changes were made to preserve the animal inspection system as an independent system, merged in with the oneface-at-the-border, but nonetheless have that distinct agricultural 

expertise preserved. But as has been noted, and you have noted, 

Congresswoman Slaughter, this is not just a problem at the border, 

it is a problem everywhere in the country. We have 100,000 Department of Agriculture employees who all play a role on a regular 

basis in educating farmers and making sure that they are aware 

of necessary precautions that need to be taken not only for the deliberate introduction of biological agents that could cause serious 

harm, but for the much more likely introduction inadvertently of 

these things. Because that happens on a regular basis, and finding 

it and rooting it out, destroying it and dealing with it is one of the 

principal jobs of many sectors of the Department of Agriculture. 

Ms. SLAUGHTER. Absolutely. But one of the things I mentioned 

then is the border security inspections functions of APHIS from 

this initial thing. Do you think that there is a disadvantage to—

as you pointed out, you have asked that that be kept separate? 

How does—they separate—this party is separated from the actual 

Department of Agriculture, is that correct? 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Yes. APHIS was effectively split. I voted for the 

creation of that after the assurances were made that the policy regarding agricultural issues would remain with the Department of 

Agriculture and the policy setting jurisdiction would remain with 
41

the Agriculture Committee in the Congress. And I think that is a 

good arrangement. 

I can see that there are certain advantages to having a coordinated effort at the border, and we recognize that, as long as the 

expertise that is needed for agriculture is not lost in that coordination. We were concerned, but I think the process worked in that the 

Agriculture Committee, both the staff and the members, stepped 

up to the plate and complained about that, and that brought about 

a change that has improved that one-face-at-the-border program. 

Ms. SLAUGHTER. You don’t think that portends any problem with 

other committees if we were to make this a permanent select, select or permanent committee? Not being able to give up the jurisdiction? 

Mr. GOODLATTE. I can’t speak for the individual problems of 

other committees. I am aware of the specific concerns that we have. 

I can envision that there would be other concerns expressed by 

other committees, but as to whether those can be worked through 

or not, I wouldn’t want to offer my testimony. 

Ms. SLAUGHTER. Mr. Stenholm? Any comment? 

Mr. STENHOLM. Yes. I have 25 years of experience dealing with 

the frustrations of the bureaucracy as it influences my decisions in 

what I recommend to you today. It has been extremely difficult getting the various agencies of the United States Department of Agriculture to cooperate together. There is this stovepiping, this constant turf battles that go on that is extremely frustrating. 

But in this case, for this committee, I too join and support it, as 

the chairman did, the movement, because it made sense to have 

the authority placed in Homeland Security, but provided you didn’t 

lose the oversight and the expertise of the specific functions that 

did not necessarily deal with human terrorists but with the agroterrorism. That made sense and still makes sense, provided you 

continue that type of an arrangement, and that is what we are 

here testifying today for. 

But you—this create—when we created the biggest bureaucracy 

in the history of our country, that bothered me a little bit, because 

the idea of how do you control that? How does any one committee 

maintain the knowledge base, both staff-wise as well as memberwise, over that? And that is why I am a little bit reluctant. In fact, 

I join the chairman in saying, please think twice and sleep on this 

before you do it, because I think a dividing of the responsibilities 

with the proper focused committee is the best way to go, rather 

than the idea you can create a super committee that can in fact 

take care of all of the responsibilities. In the case of agriculture, 

I think it would be a colossal mistake. 

Ms. SLAUGHTER. Thank you both. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Chairman Cox. 

Mr. COX. Thank you. 

I want to take the opportunity to thank you for not only your 

prepared testimony but for your opening statements and your very 

helpful responses to questions. And I want to ask you right off the 

bat if there is any way that you would—since that is the jurisdiction currently of the select committee, if there is any way that you 

would rewrite the Homeland Security Act with respect to either 
42

topics that are within the jurisdiction of your committee or topics 

that are of concern to your committee. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Well, I don’t know if I would have the opportunity, but I would want to go back and review the sections as they 

pertain to agriculture to see how much authority we would have to 

alter, for example, legislatively the kind of action that was originally proposed by the Department of Homeland Security with regard to agriculture inspection at borders. My understanding was, 

and still is, that we would be able to undertake that in the jurisdiction of our committee. If I found we could not, then I would want 

to change that to even further strengthen that committee authority. 

Mr. COX. Mr. Stenholm? 

Mr. STENHOLM. I would take my own advice on that one and 

sleep on it before I would give you an answer. 

Mr. COX. But I think it would be helpful as a follow-up perhaps 

to your testimony here today if you could or have your staff think 

about that question. I say that in response to something that you 

both said in the last half hour that I strongly agree with, and that 

is that there is more than turf here. This is about policy. And, you 

know, to the extent that people are making arguments about how 

Congress should or shouldn’t organize itself based on sound policy, 

it seems to me that the same would hold true for the Department 

itself. If it is not wise for the Congress to organize itself in a certain way because of loss of focus or expertise, then perhaps it is 

no more wise for the Department to be organized that way. We are 

making an argument in behalf of the Homeland Security Committee within the House on the basis that we have already created 

this Department and therefore we need something to track it. But 

if we have found flaws in that when we look at it from a policy 

standpoint and the Congress, maybe the same problem exists at 

the Department and we should revisit what we put in there. It is 

certainly very much what I think our committee responsibility here 

on the select committee is all about, looking at that statute, revisiting it constantly, and making sure that the decisions that we 

made in practice turn out to be sound. 

Mr. STENHOLM. Mr. Cox, if I might, I would say I think you have 

asked a very pertinent question that all of us need to think of, both 

sides, whether the Department itself needs to be reconfigured before we permanentize it any more than it is, and the same way is 

the jurisdiction and the oversight of the Congress. I think that is 

a very good question. 

Mr. COX. Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. I have one final question I would like to ask 

Mr. Stenholm based on something that he referred to. 

Mr. Stenholm, you suggested in your testimony that the Speaker 

should utilize his authority to have the House create an ad hoc 

panel to deal with homeland security, I assume. What should be 

that panel’s jurisdiction, in your opinion? Both legislative and oversight, or just oversight? 

Mr. STENHOLM. I think it would be both. And therein, if this 

oversight committee should have a concern in the area of agriculture, that it would—they would then call on the agriculture appropriate people, staff, members, et cetera, to respond. If it is an 
43

ad hoc committee, it is at the Speaker’s direction, and it is for a 

purpose similar to what Mr. Cox was asking just a moment ago. 

That is the way I would view that. 

Now, I think that could be what could be very helpful and something that we ask you to seriously consider. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. I want to thank both of you for being here 

today, for your thoughtful testimony, and we are grateful. Mr. 

Goodlatte, Mr. Stenholm, thank you very much. 

I believe the next witnesses are Mr. Barton and Mr. Dingell. And 

we are informed that they are on their way. Hopefully, they will 

be here shortly. 

At this point we want to ask of the distinguished ranking member, since she was detained for a few minutes at the Rules Committee at the beginning of our hearing, if she would be so kind as 

to give her opening statement. 

Ms. SLAUGHTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would be happy to. 

I thank the many members who are taking the time out of their 

full schedules to speak with us today. There are many demands on 

everyone’s time, not the least of which this week is the Federal 

budget for fiscal year 2005. Your time and your insights are greatly 

appreciated. 

The creation of the Department of Homeland Security has raised 

many issues. Congress has the responsibility over the new Department itself, and Congress has the heightened responsibility to respond to the threat of terrorism. The question that this subcommittee continues to consider today is what structure is best for 

the House and best for the nascent Department. 

Some structural changes have already been made. The Appropriations Committee created a Homeland Security Appropriations 

Subcommittee. The Senate has incorporated its homeland security 

duties into its Government Affairs Committee, instead of creating 

a separate Homeland Security Committee. 

Last year, this subcommittee heard from a series of distinguished 

scholars, former Members, former Speakers, and others. A consistence seemed to emerge from those hearings that the House should 

have a Committee on Homeland Security. These recommendation 

are helpful but not conclusive. Parliamentary and practical, issues 

such as committee jurisdiction, referral, oversight, legislative authority, and subject matter expertise are important parts of the 

equation in determining the utility, necessity, and desirability of a 

Homeland Security Committee. 

This is where your experience and expertise is invaluable to the 

subcommittee’s deliberations. The big questions continue to be debated: Should the House have a Homeland Security Committee? 

Should it be permanent? Select? Or permanent select? Should it 

have oversight jurisdiction over the Department of Homeland Security? Should it have legislative authority for the Department? 

Should the committee have jurisdiction over homeland security programs, or jurisdiction over all of the entities that have been moved 

into the Department? 

I look forward to hearing from the distinguished panelists today. 

The chairmen and ranking members of the committees with jurisdictions over programs and entities within the Department of 

Homeland Security will be able to provide special insight into the 
44

daily workings of the House and our collective response to terrorism and the creation of the Department of Homeland Security. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Thank you, Mrs. Slaughter. 

I will at this point, since we do expect them to be here shortly, 

let us recess the committee for just a few minutes, subject to my 

calling the committee back into order. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. The hearing will reconvene. At this point I 

would ask the chairman and the ranking member, the Honorable 

Joe Barton and the Honorable John Dingell, of the Committee on 

Energy and Commerce to come up to the table, if you will be so 

kind, and testify. 

We are honored by your presence, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Ranking Member. This is the fourth hearing of this Subcommittee on 

Rules of the Select Committee on Homeland Security, and we are 

completing, as you know, a very important study required by law, 

and we will report to the Rules Committee our recommendation 

with regard to our study of rule 10 as it relates to the issue of 

homeland security.

Welcome, both of you. Chairman Barton. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOE BARTON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS, 

AND CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE 

Mr. BARTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Chairman Cox. Thank you, Congresswoman McCarthy. I am delighted to 

testify before this committee that I am actually a member of, also, 

although not this subcommittee.

Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I would ask that 

my formal statement be in the record. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Without objection. 

Mr. BARTON. And I am going to briefly elaborate on it. 

I think you all know that I am a new chairman of the Energy 

and Commerce Committee. I have been on the job about a month. 

So I am an overnight success after 20 years in the Congress, and 

I am looking forward to being a chairman and taking the wisdom 

of Chairman Dingell to my right, who has served this same committee as chairman. I believe he served it for 14 years. 

I believe that the work of this select committee has been good. 

You have got good staff, you have helped the focus of Congress on 

some of the most important issues facing America and the American democracy. 

With all respect, and I mean that respectfully, my opinion is that 

this select committee’s work is either done or will be done by the 

end of this Congress. 

Because of the work of this subcommittee, I think the House has 

our house in order. I have attached to my testimony the work that 

the Energy and Commerce Committee has done both immediately 

before and immediately after and after 9/11 to protect our homeland security. The Energy and Commerce Committee has conducted 

over two dozen homeland security-related hearings in the recent 

years, worked our will on over a half a dozen pieces of major legis-
45

lation directly related to homeland security. We—and I mean we, 

being the Energy and Commerce Committee—on a bipartisan basis 

have demonstrated that the homeland matters in our jurisdiction 

will get the time, the attention, and the resources that they need. 

The select committee has brought the broader perspective together. 

It has done an excellent job. But it is my opinion that to make this 

a permanent committee would not further progress. 

And why do I say that? The problem, in my opinion, is that there 

is no way over time to discuss the jurisdiction of the Energy and 

Commerce Committee as on homeland security and the jurisdiction 

that this select committee, if it were to become a permanent committee, would have on homeland security issues. 

Let me give you a few examples. The Energy and Commerce 

Committee has jurisdiction for security at commercial nuclear 

power plants. Everybody, regardless of where your committee is, 

agrees that securing these facilities from a terrorist attack or any 

kind of attack is a very good idea. The conference report on H.R. 

6, the comprehensive energy bill, contains very strong new requirements in that respect. These requirements were developed in our 

committee on a bipartisan basis. Congressman Markey of Massachusetts was a leading proponent of increased security for nuclear 

power plants. 

How do you distinguish the need to keep our nuclear plants secure from terrorism versus the need to secure them against sabotage or something done by a former disgruntled employee? And the 

answer is you really can’t. The Energy and Commerce Committee’s 

bill that is in the Senate right now legislates for both these contingencies. 

Let me give you another example. The Energy and Commerce 

Committee has jurisdiction over the public health, and we have the 

same issue there. When we look at how to deal with outbreaks of 

dangerous and contagious diseases, we certainly take terrorists 

using the ability through the airways, through the waterways, to 

spread some contagion that would create a contagious disease very 

seriously. 

But are those potential terrorist attacks any more different or 

any more dangerous that the spread of an infectious disease that 

is spread by normal means, such as the SARS virus last year? 

When it comes right down to it, Mr. Chairman, there is really no 

way to distinguish between the consequences. And if you have two 

committees doing the same thing, it may muddy the water, so to 

speak. 

I want to address one last issue. One of the primary reasons that 

has been raised as to why the Department of Homeland Security 

should have its own committee before the Congress is that the Department of Homeland Security shouldn’t have to answer to numerous congressional committees and subcommittees, that its work 

will be compromised by having too many bosses in the Congress. 

Well, the answer to that concern is not to the formation of another 

committee. The answer is just the opposite: To get somebody to coordinate jurisdiction between the existing committees and consolidate, not to expand. 

A brand new committee, no matter how well formed and with the 

right people, with new members and new staff is not going to do 
46

a better job than the existing committees if we do our job. And I 

will submit for the record the hearings and the legislation that we 

have done in the Energy and Commerce Committee over the last 

several years. 

So with all due respect, I would hope that at the end of this Congress, the Speaker and the minority leader wish to make this a select committee for another Congress, that would be one thing. But 

to make this a permanent committee would be something that I 

would have to oppose. 

And I would now yield to back to the Chair.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOE BARTON 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Slaughter, and Members of the Subcommittee, 

thank you for this opportunity to testify before you on the future of the Select Committee. 

I’m new to this game, as you know. I’ve been a Committee Chairman, oh, about 

a month now. It’s good. I recommend it to anyone who gets re-elected ten times. 

I very strongly believe that the work of the Select Committee has been good. 

You’ve had some good staff. You’ve helped to focus the Congress on some of the most 

critical issues facing America and American Democracy. 

But, with all due respect, the Select Committee’s work here is done. The fact of 

the matter is that the House has its house in order. I have attached to my testimony 

the incredible work that my Committee has done—pre 9/11 and after—to protect the 

homeland. We have conducted over two dozen Homeland-related hearings in recent 

years, and worked our will on half a dozen major pieces of Homeland-related legislation. We have demonstrated that the Homeland matters in our jurisdiction will get 

the time, attention, and resources they need. And, frankly, the Select Committee 

has become an impediment to further progress. 

The biggest part of the problem is that there really is no way to distinguish the 

jurisdiction that my Committee has - and others too, I’m sure - between homeland 

security-related issues and issues that we would otherwise act on. Let me give you 

a couple of examples. Take security at commercial nuclear plants. We all agree that 

securing these facilities from attack is a good idea - in fact, the conference report 

on H.R. 6, the comprehensive energy bill, contains very strong new requirements in 

that respect. But how do you distinguish the need to keep plants secure from terrorism versus the need to secure them against sabotage by a disgruntled former employee? Well, you really can’t. We legislate for both those contingencies. 

My Committee’s jurisdiction over public health is very much the same way. When 

we look at how to deal with outbreaks of dangerous and contagious diseases, we certainly take terrorist attacks seriously. But are those potential attacks any more different than the spread of the SARS virus last year? When it comes down to it, not 

really—both require the Congress’s full attention. 

Mr. Chairman, I’d like to address one last issue. Many have said that the Department of Homeland Security shouldn’t have to answer to dozens and dozens of Congressional Committees - that its work will be compromised by having too many 

bosses in Congress. Well, the answer to that concern is not the formation of a whole 

new committee. The answer, very simply, is to ensure that someone coordinates the 

needs of Congress with the Department. A new committee with 50 Members won’t 

do any better job than a liaison staffer in the Speaker’s office - and it would be a 

whole lot less expensive. 

We don’t need a new Committee. We really need fewer Committees. What we 

need is to consolidate the wisdom, and competition, and experience, and excellence 

of the Members in the existing standing Committees that have the dedication to get 

the homeland security job done. 

Mr. Chairman, I hope that my views are clear. And I hope that view prevails in 

your deliberations. 

I am, of course, happy to answer any questions the Subcommittee may have. 

March 24, 2004

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE HOMELAND SECURITY ACCOMPLISHMENTS 

LEGISLATION 

107TH Congress 
47

• USA PATRIOT Act (H.R. 3162/Pub. Law No. 107–56). Included an amendment 

to the Communications Act of 1934 clarifying the scope of permissible governmental 

access to the communications of certain cable subscribers. • Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act (H.R. 

3448/Pub. Law No. 107–188). Ensures that a sufficient number of drugs and vaccines are available to the public in the event of a terrorist attack. Also provides 

framework for greater protection of food and drinking water supplies. Includes provisions expediting the approval of life-saving drugs for all Americans. • Homeland Security Act (H.R. 5005/Pub. Law No. 107–188). Committee drafted 

provisions relating to Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection 

(cybersecurity), Research Development and Technology Systems, and Emergency 

Preparedness and Response. Committee continues to exercise jurisdiction over critical homeland security aspects of the Department of Energy, the Department of 

Health and Human Services, and associated departments and agencies. • Price-Anderson Act Reauthorization Act (H.R. 2983/Became part of H.R. 4, the 

Securing America’s Future Energy Act, which died in conference). Included rigorous 

new anti-terrorism requirements on commercial nuclear energy plants and nuclear 

material transporters.

108th Congress 

• Project BioShield Act (H.R. 2122/Stalled in Senate). Provides HHS with 

broad new powers to prepare for and react to bioterrorist threats. • E–911 Implementation Act (H.R. 2898/Stalled in Senate). Grant program to 

ensure that wireless phones have the technology to provide location information to emergency call centers. • H.R. 6, the Energy Policy Act of 2003. Included rigorous new anti-terrorism 

requirements on commercial nuclear energy plants and nuclear material 

transporters. Pending in the Senate. 

HEARINGS 

106th Congress 

• Internet Posting of Chemical ‘‘Worst Case’’ Scenarios: A Roadmap for Terrorists. 

(Joint hearing between the Subcommittee on Health and Environment and the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations) February 10, 1999 • The Threat of Bioterrorism in America: Assessing the Adequacy of the Federal 

Law Relating to Dangerous Biological Agents. (Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations) May 20, 1999 • The Chemical Safety Information and Site Security Act of 1999. H.R. 1790. 

(Subcommittee on Health and Environment) May 19, 1999 and May 26, 1999 • The Security and Freedom through Encryption (SAFE) Act. H.R. 850. (Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer Protection) May 25, 1999 • The Rudman Report: Science at its Best, Security at its Worst. (Full Committee) 

June 22, 1999 • Results of Security Inspections at the Department of Energy’s Lawrence Livermore laboratory. (Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations) July 20, 1999 • The State of Security at the Department of energy’s Nuclear Weapon Laboratories. (Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations) October 26, 1999 • Safety and Security Oversight of the New Nuclear Security Administration 

(Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations) March 14, 2000 • Legislation to Improve Safety and Security in the Department of Energy. H.R. 

3383, H.R. 3906, and H.R. 3907. (Subcommittee on Energy and Power) March 22, 

2000• Computer Insecurities at DOE Headquarters: DOE’s Failure to Get Its Own 

Cyber house in Order. (Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations) June 13, 

2000

• Weaknesses in Classified Information Security Controls at DOE’s Nuclear 

Weapon Laboratories. (Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations) July 11, 

2000

107th Congress 

• Protecting America’s Critical Infrastructure: How Secure Are Government Computer Systems? (Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations) April 5, 2001

• Ensuring Compatibility with Enhanced Calling Systems: A Progress Report. 

(Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the Internet) June 14, 2001

• How Secure is Sensitive Commerce Dept. Data and Operations? A Review of the 

Dept’s Computer Security Policies and Practices. (Subcommittee on Oversight and 

Investigations) August 3, 2001

• Reauthorizing of the Price-Anderson Act. (Subcommittee on Energy and Air 

Quality) September 6, 2001
48

• A Review of Federal Bioterrorism Preparedness Programs From a Public Health 

Perspective. (Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations) October 10, 2001

• A Review of Federal Bioterrorism Preparedness Programs: Building an Early 

Warning Public Health Surveillance System. (Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations) November 1, 2001

• Bioterrorism and Proposals to Combat Bioterrorism. (Full Committee) November 15, 2001

• Cyber Security: Private-Sector Efforts Addressing Cyber Threats. (Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection) November 15, 2001

• Electronic Communication Networks in the Wake of September 11. (Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection) December 19, 2001

• Creating the Department of Homeland Security. (Subcommittee on Oversight 

and Investigations) June 25, 2002 and July 9, 2002

• Securing America: The Federal Government’s Response to Nuclear Terrorism at 

Our Nation’s Ports and Borders. (Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations) 

October 17, 2002

108th Congress 

• A Review of NRC’s Proposed Security Requirements for Nuclear Power Plants 

(Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations) March 18, 2003

• Furthering Public Health Security: Project BioShield (Subcommittee on Health 

joint hearing with the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness and Response of 

the Select Committee on Homeland Security) March 27, 2003

• Nuclear Terrorism Prevention: A Review of the Federal Government’s Progress 

toward Installing Radiation Detection Monitors at U.S. Ports and Borders (Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations) September 30, 2003

• Port Security: A Review of the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection’s Targeting and Inspection Program for Sea Cargo (Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations Field Hearing in Camden, New Jersey) December 16, 2003

• Nuclear Security: A Review of the Security at DOE Nuclear Facilities and the 

Implementation of the Revised Design Basis Threat (Subcommittee on Oversight 

and Investigations) March 4, 2004

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. You have 

been very frank. We appreciate your frankness. 

Mr. Dingell. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOHN D. DINGELL, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, AND RANKING MEMBER COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND 

COMMERCE 

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Chairman, thank you. It is a privilege to appear before you today. I would like to thank you and my colleagues 

and members of the committee for this opportunity.

I would like to begin by asking unanimous consent to revise and 

extend my remarks in the record. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Without objection. 

Mr. DINGELL. Second of all, I would like to endorse everything 

that our chairman has said to you. He has talked good sense. And 

I would point out this committee has done useful work during this 

session of Congress, and I commend you for it. It was necessary 

that we have an overview of the entirety of the business of the national security. I think you have accomplished that with the cooperation and the assistance of the standing committees which 

have their responsibilities. 

I would note that the standing committees have taken their responsibilities as seriously as have you ladies and gentlemen here, 

and we have moved cooperatively with you and with the others 

who are concerned with these matters and with each other to see 

to it that we have accomplished the legislative purposes that were 

needed. I do not believe that the Congress is well served by con-
49

stantly multiplying the number of standing committees. It tends to 

increase the budget, it tends to increase the confusion, it tends to 

create additional workload for the Members, and it doesn’t seem to 

result in any significant benefits in terms of either higher quality 

or greater and more important legislative production. 

I would note that our committee has dealt with all of the concerns which we have in this question of national security. I would 

point out that we have done the oversight which is needed, and 

that this is not a new thing that began to happen when Mr. Bliley 

or Mr. Tauzin or my good friend our current chairman took office 

as chair. I would note that these things were going on before, that 

we had very extensive hearings on safety at nuclear power plants, 

safety at other power plants, questions related to public health, 

matters that were associated with possible spread of disease or 

epidemics or problems of that sort, and addressing also the question of the safety at the nuclear facilities. And we have forced a 

number of clean-ups, including at the national laboratories and at 

the colleges and universities which address these questions, and 

have a long history going back to the days of my predecessors, Mr. 

Chairman, of this committee. 

Now, I would be happy to submit for the record additional information over and above that which our able chairman has submitted to you. 

We have addressed the problem of SARS, and anthrax and chicken flu. We have also talked about how these have come to be and 

how they should be addressed and whether they are dealt with by 

foreign terrorists, common criminals, or just normal natural events. 

We have a long history of having worked with the agencies under 

our jurisdiction, whether they are the Department of Homeland Security with the work that they are doing, or the Public Health 

Service or the Centers For Disease Control or whomever or whatever they might happen to be, as well as the former Atomic Energy 

Commission and now the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

And our work has been not only of high quality, but it has been 

done on the basis of much experience, long association with those 

agencies, and with a generally friendly relationship. 

I would say that, as our chairman indicated to you, that the idea 

of having a single committee to which the agencies would report on 

homeland security doesn’t make very good sense to me. I went 

through the energy crisis, in the 1970s, and I have gone through 

a number of other problems of similar character, and I never found 

that there was anything other than benefit to be achieved by having a large number of committees viewing these questions from the 

standpoint of their own experience and expertise. And I would say 

that this happened very much during the time of the 1970s when 

the Energy Administrator or the chairmen of the regulatory bodies 

or later the head of the Department of Energy would come up to 

report to different committees about how they were conducting 

their business. When there was need to get together on a large single energy bill, it was always possible to work out the agreements 

amongst the different committees that had responsibilities, and it 

was always possible to work with the leadership of the Congress, 

the Speaker, the minority leader, the majority leaders, and the others so as to achieve a unified legislative consequence to this. And 
50

I see no reason why we should be apprehensive that that will not 

work again. And I would say this having written a number of large 

energy bills, clean air bills, and things of that kind that involve the 

jurisdiction of many committees having to work together under 

somewhat difficult, time-consuming but nevertheless successful 

problems they confronted. 

In any event, I think that the Committee on Homeland Security 

has served the Congress well. I think that they can, quite frankly, 

terminate their affairs with the thanks and the appreciation of the 

Congress, and the understanding that the standing committees 

that now having jurisdiction over these matters will continue to do 

their work well as they always have and that there is no great reason for setting up a single committee which would, quite frankly, 

achieve I think perhaps an excessively cozy relationship with the 

Department of Homeland Security, which very frankly seems to 

need some rather hard and questioning supervision. And I will be 

happy to talk about them and the dissatisfaction that people at the 

border region happen to feel, and I think my good friend the chairman is nodding affirmatively that he has had similar problems 

with them not doing the job they should, not having the budget 

that they should, and needing, quite frankly, a long period of patient, tolerant supervision from more than just one committee. 

And so I would suggest that you have my thanks for the good 

work which you have done, you have my good wishes for the future, you have my hope that you will succeed in your other undertakings within this body. But I am going to observe that we have 

capacity within the standing committees to address the problems 

that exist, and I would hope that we would thank you, I bid you 

farewell, and look forward to your continuing success, but understand that your presence has been helpful but is no longer required.

PREPATED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOHN D. DINGELL 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, for this opportunity 

to testify before you on the subject of possible changes to the House Rules relating 

to jurisdiction over homeland security. 

I made no secret of my sense that a new Department of Homeland Security would 

create as many problems as it was intended to solve. Without going into all of my 

reasoning, I was particularly concerned that public health entities, such as the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, could be damaged by moving all or part 

of their activities to the Department. 

Let’s look at our recent health outbreaks—SARS, anthrax, chicken flu—you name 

it. Whether produced by foreign terrorists, common criminals, or more often, natural 

events, all can have devastating effects. Yet the role of public health officials is the 

same throughout. And they must be prepared to respond without first determining 

whether the initial cause was terrorist activity or natural occurrences. 

As a result, working on a bipartisan basis, the Committee on Energy and Commerce attempted to limit any harm that could be caused in the legislation establishing the Department of Homeland Security, and I think we did so. We must now 

be sure that we do no harm to our Committee’s jurisdiction over ‘‘health and health 

facilities’’ and ‘‘public health and quarantine,’’ which enables us to address threats 

to the public health regardless of the source. 

I would add that our Committee has always taken its responsibilities in this field 

very seriously. For example, we held hearings on the threat of bioterrorism in America in May 1999. This was followed by three more hearings in 2001, and we took 

the lead role in crafting the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness 

and Response Act. We took the lead in this Congress on the Project Bioshield Act. 

The potential for overlap between our Committee and a Homeland Security Committee abounds in a variety of other areas, such as nuclear facilities, oil pipelines, 
51

chemical security, electricity transmission, and telecommunications security. In each 

of these areas, our Committee and its staff have developed expertise that predate 

the events of 9/11. 

This should come as no surprise. For example, the regulation of nuclear powerplants must take into account security issues, whether the threat is a disgruntled 

employee or a terrorist attack. And the regulation of electric transmission lines 

must take into account the effects of overhanging trees as well as a terrorist attack. 

Our Committee has been thorough and relentless in holding hearings, seeking 

GAO reports, and enacting legislation to make all of these facilities more secure. 

The actions we take in ensuring security at critical facilities must be broad-based, 

taking into account a variety of scenarios from acts of God, human error, or human 

malfeasance. We cannot and should not try to split these important security issues 

based upon their root cause. 

I would also like to briefly anticipate two arguments in support of revising Committee jurisdictions to recognize the new Department of Homeland Security. First 

I am sure that the Administration would prefer that it answer to just one Committee. My experience over many years suggests that such a cozy relationship rarely 

advances accountability. For example, many have cited intelligence lapses for September 11, but I note that the intelligence agencies report just to the Intelligence 

Committee and the FBI reports to the Judiciary Committee. It is hard to see how 

that scheme improved accountability. 

Second, some might suggest that a Homeland Security Committee would somehow 

place a greater emphasis on homeland security issues than other standing committees. Again, I would refer you to the record of this Committee and our lead role in 

investigating matters of bioterrorism, nuclear weapons security, and other matters 

to suggest that is not the case. On the other hand, while I commend all the efforts 

your Committee has made in this area, I strongly believe that the accumulated expertise of our Members and staff in these areas would be wasted if jurisdiction were 

changed to place these issues in a new committee. 

In summary, we are providing you with just a recent glimpse of our activities on 

homeland security issues. They show that we have looked at these matters for many 

years, and when we recognized the need for increased activity, we have been the 

first to act. I strongly urge you not to recommend either limiting our Rule X jurisdiction in any fashion, or establishing any new jurisdiction that will duplicate or 

overlap our actions.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Thank you Mr. Dingell. We also thank you for 

your frankness 

Mr. BARTON. Mr. Chairman, we have Mr. Waxman, Mr. Hall and 

Mr. Upton, I think. If you would like for them, I don’t know what 

the protocol is but they are willing to testify if you wish them to 

or be available for questions. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. They are certainly welcome, certainly welcome. 

The objective here is to listen and to get input, so you are not foreclosed from bringing up your ideas. So if you would like to speak 

now, I mean, you are more than welcome. 

Mr. UPTON. I am just sitting behind them for support. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Well, your support is noted and is most important. 

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Barton, you make a valid point about how 

critical infrastructure protection efforts cannot be focused solely on 

the terrorist threat. But your analysis does not seem to account for 

the interdependencies among critical infrastructure and key assets 

and the integrated threat and vulnerability assessment that the 

Department of Homeland Security is charged with performing. 

These cut across many committee jurisdictions, financial services, 

agriculture, energy and commerce, transportation and infrastructure, resources, et cetera. Do you not see that Congress seems to 

need some committee focusing on such interdependencies and the 

overall strategy? Who will do it otherwise? 

Mr. BARTON. Well, Mr.Chairman, I think that is an excellent 

question. My answer is I think to the extent that the Energy and 
52

Commerce Committee has jurisdiction in these interagencies, in 

these interdependencies, we are doing that. I will not deny that a 

special committee that focuses just on one department can also do 

it. I mean, I don’t think it is a question whether a select committee 

if it were to become a permanent committee couldn’t do it. But I 

do think and I will put into the record all of the hearings and the 

laws and the testimony that we have done on the Energy and Commerce Committee in the last three Congresses, and it is fairly extensive. As Mr. Dingell pointed out in his prepared remarks, over 

time, if you have one committee that oversees one agency, it is 

human nature to develop, as he put it, a cozy relationship. By having several committees that each independently oversee that, the 

Homeland Security Department, you are much more likely to get 

all these interdependencies covered. I mean, just by—you are getting multiple views and multiple hearings and quite honestly multiple personalities. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Do you have a comment, Mr. Ranking Member, Mr. Dingell, on that question? 

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Chairman, I agree with our chairman here. In 

a nutshell, if there is a large problem which needs to be addressed, 

the committees now of jurisdiction have the capacity to do that, to 

address that problem, especially if they have the support and the 

assistance of the Speaker and the leadership. We have done this 

over the years, going back into the 1970s and the 1980s where the 

leadership would work with the different committee chairmen and 

the different ranking members to see to it that we all work together, and the end result was that sometimes as many as 27 different committees would be working together on legislation, working together very well. The end result was that we passed legislation, which had the unique advantage of having the special expertise and experience of each and every one of these committees 

working together with the Speaker occasionally facilitating and assisting them in seeing to it that a unifiable and satisfactory conclusion was achieved. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Thank you. Miss McCarthy. 

Ms. MCCARTHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to my chairman and ranking member for being here to share their thoughts 

today, and I have read both of your testimonies and I can’t take 

issue with anything that you share because at least 70 Percent of 

all of the matters in the House come through the very committee 

you are chairman and ranking member of, and I am honored to 

serve there, so it has held me in good stead in this new role. But 

I want to toss out a—expand upon your idea, Mr. Chairman, Chairman Barton, and ask you, Mr. Dingell, to weigh in on it. 

In Mr. Barton’s written testimony he spoke about the need not 

so much for this committee as a liaison that would work with all 

the committees, as you mentioned, that are—you know have some 

jurisdiction already on this matter. The committee that has the 

most jurisdiction, as you point out, Mr.Dingell, is the Commerce 

Committee, both from our work on weapons depositories and 

health. I think about all the joint jurisdiction we already have with 

Judiciary, with Ways and Means, but perhaps an expanded role on 

the Commerce Committee with the liaison, Mr. Barton, that you 

mentioned someone, from the Speaker’s office that interfaces with 
53

the other committees could see to it that there be joint referrals to 

the Commerce Committee and expand the role of the Commerce 

Committee to tackle additional matters beyond what we already 

do. I just would love your thoughts on that kind of concept. I do 

think there—well, while there may not need to be a Homeland Security Committee, there needs to be one place that coordinates it 

all from the other committees that have jurisdiction, whether that 

be the Speaker’s office, in conversation with the minority leader’s 

office, so there is input, or whether a committee as vast already as 

Commerce whose jurisdiction covers almost all of these matters 

anyway. I would just love your thoughts on that as a possible solution to the matter. 

Mr. BARTON. Well, Congresswoman, I think that is a very valid 

point. I am glad that you read the testimony. It is to your tribute. 

You always do that. 

Ms. MCCARTHY. I try. 

Mr. BARTON. I would like to point out I think the obvious. The 

chairman of the committee, Mr. Cox, is also a member of this committee, the Energy and Commerce Committee. He was my vice 

chairman when I chaired the Oversight and Investigation Subcommittee, and the young man that is briefing him was one of the 

Oversight and Investigation Subcommittee staffers. So they were 

trained well on Energy and Commerce to be the chairman and the 

staffer on this committee, and if the Speaker wanted to, in addition 

to appointing a senior staff member of his personal staff and the 

Speaker’s office to serve as the liaison with all the committees and 

wanted to appoint Mr. Cox and Mr.DiLenge to assist on that, Mr. 

Cox as the congressman and Mr. DiLenge as the staff assisting the 

Speaker’s staff, I think that would be a great compromise, or Mr. 

Diaz-Balart, who is a distinguished member of the Rules Committee. I mean I am not going to sit here and tell you folks that 

you don’t need to have some coordination. But to have a full blown 

committee, with all the staff and all of the jurisdictional issues that 

would arise from that, to my mind is self defeating. 

Mr. DINGELL. I would like to echo what the chairman said, but 

I would like to go further. This issue of the committee having jurisdictional borders which cause difficulty is not a new thing around 

here. Our committee has jurisdictional borders with Ways and 

Means; Public Works has similar situation. We have it on Superfund and Medicare and Medicaid. They have it on highways and 

other things of that sort. We have a jurisdictional border with Agriculture, where we have to address together the questions of food 

safety. And these things are done regularly and although they are 

sometimes a little bit of difficult, they always are worked out and 

I think satisfactorily over time. And if you look you will find we 

have had a long and interesting relationship with our colleagues at 

the Science Committee, where questions there have been dealt 

with, I think, without too much difficulty simply because the chairmen understand how these things are done by working together. 

And if questions arise that require greater effort and a major piece 

of legislation, which I don’t think is needed at this time, then the 

leadership of the House can pull this all together. The chairmen 

can get together and the committees can get together and the busi-
54

ness that needs to be addressed can be done, and I think expeditiously as well. 

And I would point out that all of these committees have two 

things. One is a familiarity with the issues. And I would point out 

that in a major terrorist attempt involving health matters, such as 

some kind of bacterial agent or something of that kind, are not 

matters that could not be addressed in just about the same way 

whether it involves terrorism or just as a naturally unfortunate 

event. Similar situations with regards to a major problem such as 

a huge spill of hazardous substance or an emission, a massive 

emission of some kind of air pollutant or water pollutant or something of that type. And with all respect to this committee, you have 

done great work. But sitting committees have the capacity to address these things and have never been found wanting in their addressing of the problems. 

Mr. BARTON. I might just—if I may, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Yes, you may. 

Mr. BARTON. And based on what Chairman Dingell said, just 

give you some examples. Health and Human services, whose Cabinet Secretary has already testified before my committee on budget 

priorities and policy issues, also is subject to the Budget Committee, the Ways and Means Committee, obviously the Appropriations Committee, the Government Reform Committee. So they are 

going to multiple committees. The Environmental Protection Agency, which is one of the major agencies that we have jurisdiction 

over, they also have to report to the Transportation Committee, 

again the Appropriations Committee, Ag Committee, the Government Reform Committee, and the Science Committee. Department 

of energy, in addition to being responsible to the Energy and Commerce Committee has issues for, Armed Services, Government Reform, Science Approps, Resources. So most of the Cabinet agencies 

do report to multiple congressional committees, and I don’t see why 

Homeland Security should be any different, especially if we are 

doing our job. Now if we are not doing our job, that is a whole different ball game. 

Mr. DINGELL. They can fire you then. 

Mr. BARTON. Yeah. But I don’t see, I don’t sense on these issues, 

nobody has said the Energy and Commerce Committee has not 

done its job and again we are blessed because the chairman of this 

committee is also a member of our committee, as is the distinguished lady asking the questions. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Ms.Dunn. 

Ms. DUNN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you 

gentlemen for coming to testify before us today. I think it is very 

useful to have you as a member of the committee and to get your 

honest appraisal of the direction in which we should be going, and 

that is why we wanted to have this hearing today. I have a concern 

with the number of committees that the Homeland Security Department has to report too. I think it might be useful to have a resolution outlining exactly whom they should report to. Maybe we 

could cut that 88 committees and subcommittees down to a point 

where they would have more time to do the job that they were 

put—that administration has put to them. That could be useful and 

it could be done in a separate motion. 
55

My support for making the responsibilities of the Department of 

Homeland Security Select Committee permanent has a lot to do 

with focus on the problem. Things are different since 9/11. And in 

every area of the administration there are pockets of responsibilities that really need focus. ‘‘Focus’’ is the word that always makes 

me realize how important it is to put together a committee that has 

a laser like approach to the responsibilities that this select committee has taken, and that is to oversee the department and to prevent terrorism, to reduce the vulnerability of the United States and 

then to respond to acts of terrorism if they were to occur. That is 

what I fear we lose when we spread these responsibilities out over 

20 or so committees and additional subcommittees. I think it is 

very easy to say, and I remember being part of a wonderful bicameral group called the Organization of Congress when I first 

came here as a freshman. This committee looked at all the responsibilities of the different committees, and in fact in 1995 we did reduce the number of committees by two or three, and that was appropriate. But on the other side of that, if we are not able as a Congress to respond to the new issues as they come into being, the 

problems, as we did when we formed the Energy Committee a few 

decades ago, then I think that we are getting behind the ‘‘8’’ ball, 

behind the private sector, behind the sort of movement that we 

want in this country to preserve the safety of our citizens, which 

I believe is the first and primary responsibility of all of us who represent constituents. I think it is easy to say keep the jurisdiction 

as we have it now, and so we have to push ourselves to see if there 

is a way that we could bring focus to this new and disastrous responsibility of the Congress without ransacking all the other committees that have done a very fine job, certainly exemplary job on 

most of these responsibilities up to 9/11. 

My problem is with the additional responsibilities. I don’t know 

how much time percentage-wise can you spend on the prevention 

and the response of terrorism and the assessment of the 

vulnerabilities. Maybe you can do that by setting up an 

antiterrorism oversight subcommittee on each committee. Maybe 

that is possible. 

I just would really like to go into your thinking, both of you, and 

I would like to ask you if you see any responsibility within your 

jurisdiction that you think could be set aside. I think that is an important question for you to look at and answer. 

I am on Ways and Means. There may be some things we could 

do with Customs to bifurcate its responsibilities, maybe not. The 

Commissioner of the Customs doesn’t want to separate the revenue 

raising, trade-related responsibilities of Customs away from the responsibilities they have. But on this committee, we have subcommittees that are looking every single day at the safety of ports 

and borders and cyber security and infrastructure, and that is our 

specific focus, and I think this committee does it very well with 

very responsible people in charge of the subcommittees, and so I 

would like to ask you, is there a responsibility that you currently 

have that you think could be set aside in a committee that would 

focus in a laser like way on the security of the people we represent? 

Would you see a subcommittee being the answer to that problem? 

Or do you think things are fine the way they are now and the per-
56

centage of your time you have that you could allocate to this new 

responsibility is adequate? 

Mr. BARTON. Let me see if I can address that, Congresswoman. 

I would like to point out that the task force that you served on 

when the Republicans became the majority in 1994 recommended, 

and it was enacted in the rules, the elimination of the District of 

Columbia Committee. We do that now at the—one of the subcommittees on appropriations. We eliminated the Merchant Marine 

and Fisheries Committee, put those jurisdictional issues I believe 

in the Resources Committee. Maybe some of them are in Transportation. There was some debate at the time about eliminating the 

Small Business Committee. We thought those issues were broad 

enough that we kept that committee. We also discussed briefly consolidation of the Veterans’ Committee in the Armed Services Committee, and so we decided to keep Veterans’ as a separate committee. 

So when the Republicans became the majority and initially in 

1994, and became into power in 1995, we went both ways. We kept 

two committees to focus on specifics, Veterans’ and Small Business, 

but in the District of Columbia and Merchant Marine and Fisheries 

we consolidated. So you can argue that issue on focus either way. 

In terms of jurisdictional issues, that we wanted to create a permanent Homeland Security, are there some jurisdictional—is there 

some jurisdiction in the Energy and Commerce Committee that 

should automatically go to Homeland Security? My answer to that 

would be not unless it is proven that it would—that we, i.e. the Energy and Commerce Committee, have failed. Now if there is some 

issue that we have failed to act on, failed to give the focus that you 

alluded to, I have only been chairman for a month but you tell me 

what it is and, by golly, there will be some focus. In terms of general oversight, I still have to get things approved and cleared by 

the membership and the leadership, but I have outlined to my subcommittee chairmen that in the next Congress if the Republicans 

are still in the majority, I am thinking of asking every subcommittee chairman to be a member of the Oversight Subcommittee and I am going to do oversight not only at the Oversight 

Subcommittee, but also have every subcommittee chairman do 

oversight on their authorization subcommittees. 

So if your question is if we do not create a permanent Homeland 

Security Committee, should the Energy and Commerce Committee 

create a Homeland Security Subcommittee? I am very willing to do 

that, if we change the rules to allow more subcommittees than are 

currently allowed in the current House rules. It is my understanding that the current House rules only allow for five subcommittees at each standing committee. I would not want to give 

up one of the existing subcommittees and I certainly am not going 

to give up the Oversight Subcommittee, but if we would expand the 

House rules so that you could have six subcommittees, I would be 

very willing to create a Homeland Security Subcommittee on Energy and Commerce, if that is your question. 

Mr. DINGELL. I think you have to ask yourself, and I say this 

with great respect, what would have been done differently in Congress than was done if there had been a different committee structure. First of all, when the committees, the standing committees 
57

were asked to work on legislation, they did so with all vigor and 

it was done. It came then to the Committee on Homeland Security, 

and I found very small changes made, if any, in the work that was 

done by the Commerce Committee. And I think you would find a 

similar situation obtained with regard to every other committee 

which submitted its process to the oversight of the Homeland Security Committee. The matter then went to the Rules Committee and 

the work product of all the committees was put together and accepted. 

Now, my question is, how do you sort out—let’s say that you 

have got a question that relates to public health, SARS or anthrax 

or chicken flu or whatever it is or some kind of biological agent 

that is released. The Commerce Committee deals with these questions every day. We know all about it, and we know what has to 

be done and we know the agencies that do it. We know what existing law is and we have that expertise. And the question is, how 

much different would the approach that would be taken, for example, by the Homeland Security Committee be from that which the 

Commerce Committee would suggest because we deal with these 

things in a holistic way. We don’t just deal with homeland security, 

but we deal with all the impacts to this. We would have the advice 

of the Federal agency that has responsibility over this, the Department of Homeland Security. And I don’t see us departing significantly from their suggestions, but I do see us having a keen awareness of how an attempt to address a particular problem that might 

relate to homeland security or terrorist activity would impact on 

the broad overall policies we have with regard to health or dangerous biological agents that might be naturally introduced into the 

society or might be introduced by terrorists. I see a similar situation with regard to poisons or hazardous substances or toxic substances. I see things that would relate to other matters of jurisdiction of the Commerce Committee, and I don’t see any of the sitting 

committees or standing committees that address these matters that 

would behave any differently working with the Department of 

Homeland Security and I don’t see any difference between what 

they did or would do because of the presence of the Homeland Security Committee. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Chairman Cox. 

Mr. COX. I want to thank you formally. I have already had a 

chance to thank you informally for appearing and for providing 

both formal testimony and your opening statements and illuminating answers to questions. And as you know, I am a very 

proud member of the Energy and Commerce Committee myself, as 

the chairman mentioned, that he and I used to be the chairman 

and vice chairman respectively of the Oversight and Investigation 

Subcommittee, and because of that long service on the Energy and 

Commerce Committee I am very familiar with the broad jurisdiction of the committee and also the intersection between the focus 

of the Energy and Commerce Committee and the mission of Homeland Security. At Energy and Commerce we are responsible for energy and air quality, one of the subcommittees on which I serve 

and which you used to chair, Mr. Chairman, EPA, which is, you 

know, virtually a Cabinet department, the Department of Energy, 

FERC, NRC. We have a separate Subcommittee on the Environ-
58

ment where we focus on things like Superfund and drinking water 

and RCRA, and we have a Subcommittee on Telecommunications 

and the Internet, which is very active and focused on the activities 

of the FCC and NTIA. We have a Subcommittee on Commerce, 

Trade, and Consumer Protection, which, among other things, includes jurisdiction over the Department of Commerce. We have a 

Subcommittee on Health, which is responsible for Medicare and 

Medicaid and HHS and FDA and CDC and NIH, and we have a 

Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, which as I mentioned I was vice chairman of under your chairmanship, which doubles down from an oversight perspective in all those areas. 

Having spent a year and a half, actually longer than that, because of the time we spent in Energy and Commerce with our referral on the Homeland Security Act, going through that act and 

understanding it fully and now watching the Department grow according to that blueprint, I am pleased to say that the Energy and 

Commerce Committee has almost the least amount of conflict of 

any major committee from a jurisdictional standpoint, and to the 

extent we do have overlap we have worked very closely together, 

most notably on the BioShield legislation. But even there, the statute makes it very clear that the Department of Homeland Security 

acquired no jurisdiction over the human health aspects countermeasure, and so the reason for the collaboration was essentially because the legislation itself was collaborative between the Department of Homeland Security and HHS. That is a dual function. 

There was no government agency within the jurisdiction of Energy 

and Commerce transferred to the Department of Homeland Security. There were some very small programs and a small number of 

them, but no government agency, you know, unlike other committees. The whole Coast Guard got transferred, the whole INS got 

transferred, and so on. That didn’t happen with Energy and Commerce. 

And so we have, I think, two premises from which to work. First, 

there is already a very broad and important jurisdiction at Energy 

and Commerce which we want to maintain continued focus on. And 

second, there is a discrete and severable function of this new Department that at least heretofore has been largely without the jurisdiction of the Committee on Energy and Commerce. I appreciate 

the notional offer that was made to acquire the jurisdiction and as 

a proud member of the Energy and Commerce Committee, that is 

my committee, I recognize that and I am here to say that I am 

proud of—

Mr. BARTON. I can make it more than notional if there is any interest. We can have a proposal to this committee or the Speaker’s 

office within 48 hours if there is interest in that. 

Mr. COX. I recognize that Texas deal maker there. We are happy 

to do this acquisition. But I think what is really important, and I 

just mention in a side bar before we begin, is that the Congress, 

the House and the Senate, keep a focus on the Department of 

Homeland Security’s mission, its purpose for being, because in the 

same way that we have jurisdictional concerns because of all the 

overlap here in the House, there is a potential at least for the Department of Homeland Security to grow into areas where it doesn’t 

belong. 
59

The Department of Homeland Security has a very important mission, and I think it is vitally important that it keep focused on that 

mission. Number one in its mission statement is preventing terrorism. Number two is protecting us against potential terrorist acts 

so that if they occur we minimize their damage. And number three 

is, and last, it is the only missions they have, those three, is to respond, to be prepared to respond in the event terrorism does occur, 

which inevitably some time in our future history it will, and then 

help the country recover thereafter. 

If the Department of Homeland Security, however, morphs into 

the regulator of every aspect of American life in every corner of 

American enterprise, then it is going to encroach not only into missions which were not assigned it by the Homeland Security Act, 

but also into the jurisdiction of the Energy and Commerce Committee, where it doesn’t belong. If it grows to federalize every State 

and local and private sector function because homeland security 

touches everything, then inevitably it will also encroach directly 

into the traditional jurisdiction of the Energy and Commerce Committee, and if it grows in that fashion it probably will be the ruin 

of the Federal budget and also encroach in the jurisdiction of the 

Budget Committee in a big way, where we hope that it does not. 

So I would just ask you, if not at this moment as a follow-up, ask 

the professional staff of the Energy and Commerce Committee to 

focus on this question. Given that the Congress and at least for 

this Congress, this select committee has jurisdiction over the 

Homeland Security Act itself, what recommendations would you 

make, given the experience that we now have with a real department, based on the blueprint we wrote not that long ago, to change 

the Homeland Security Act with respect to things that went in that 

perhaps should come out or, if you are so inclined, things that 

didn’t go in that ought to have in the first place, perhaps instead 

of some things that did? And if you want to respond off the cuff 

to that, I would accept anything you have to offer by way of wisdom right now. But you know, recognizing that that is the sort of 

thing that would also require some study and some professional 

staff work, I would welcome it as a follow-up. 

Mr. BARTON. I think you make a valid point, Chairman Cox. I 

would reserve the right to staff it appropriately and respond officially instead of commenting off the cuff. But the ability of any department to grow is limited only by its ability to get resources from 

the Congress in which to do that growth. And I think on an issue 

like homeland security, since it covers everything in a technical 

sense, there is a tremendous impetus to become larger and larger, 

so I don’t—if I understand your theory correctly. I don’t dispute the 

theory. But I would like to allow—be given the time to respond in 

writing to the specifics of the question. 

Mr. COX. I make the kind of question because I am so convinced 

that if the Department does grow like Topsy that it will lose its 

focus and we will be less safe. So we have got to keep it focused 

on this mission. 

Mr. BARTON. I agree with that. 

Mr. COX. I also make the comment because in your prepared remarks you mentioned that it might be difficult to distinguish between what is homeland security and what is everything else, and 
60

I think we have got to get past that. We have got to come up with 

a definition. 

Chairman Goss was here earlier and made the point in his formal testimony, you know, one of the things that Congress needs to 

do and the Department needs to do increasingly a better job of is 

defining what is homeland security. It can’t be in the eye of the beholder. It can’t be whatever we say it is and change our mind constantly. It has to be focused. 

Mr. BARTON. I can tell you in my congressional district, everybody—almost every municipality and their subdivisions thereof 

now have a grant asking me to support for some effort that they 

classify as homeland security. And I don’t think my district is 

unique. You know, I am besieged. I won’t say overwhelmed, but I 

am—I have probably hundreds of requests for specific grants that 

are categorized as homeland security because we have funded that 

and it has been a high priority, as it should be, to focus on it. 

Mr. DINGELL. I would like to make a couple of observations. One, 

if that is a deep concern and you feel the committee must be kept, 

there is nothing to say that this committee could not continue to 

be a select committee and that it could serve in that fashion. But 

if there is a need to have that be focused on by the standing committees, that could be inserted into the rules and the Speaker can 

see to it then that the rules are carried forward by the committees 

which have the jurisdiction. 

I don’t see anything which has transpired during this session of 

Congress or the prior one which was any different really because 

of the presence of this committee. It was a response by the Congress, and I of course have some concern about the fact that the 

Congress keeps getting bigger and bigger. We keep getting castigated more and more for the multiplication of efforts and the 

amount of work and friction in bureaucracy and wasted time, 

money and energy that goes into this body. And a major part of 

that is by the fact that the committees keep getting larger and 

larger and we keep getting more and more of them. 

And I want just to give you some history, and I apologize for this, 

but when I came here, the Committee on Energy and Commerce 

was smaller than most of its subcommittees. A subcommittee had 

three to five members. Five members was a big subcommittee. 

When we got done with the hearings, which went expeditiously because we didn’t have, what is it 44 or 46 members—

Mr. BARTON. We have 57 members of the Energy and Commerce 

Committee. 

Mr. DINGELL. Making opening statements at 5 nutes a head. We 

could dispose of the hearings on a piece of legislation in a day and 

have time for proper inquiry of the witnesses. And the end result 

was that we would then close the doors, take off our coats, roll up 

our sleeves and have a huge Donnybrook, and sharp words were 

used and everything else. But the result was that we came forward 

with legislation upon which we were in agreement. And that legislation then went through the Congress without any real difficulty 

because it wasn’t so complicated and we hadn’t made ourselves so 

muscle bound that we really had problems in legislating. 

And you can keep on increasing the number of committees. The 

Peter principle says every time you have a problem you set up a 
61

committee or you set up a study group or you do something else 

like that. But that doesn’t address or focus upon the problem that 

you confront. 

So my statement to you, and my prayer to you would be let us 

not increase the complexity of the Congress. Let us not increase the 

number of committees. Let us not increase the amount, the number 

of units of work that must be done to a unit of accomplishment because that is simply to invite more delay and more disaster and 

more problems for the Congress. And with all due respect, and I 

say this sincerely, the members of this committee have tried hard 

and I believe you have served well and you have served honorably. 

But we are going to get so big around here in terms of the number 

of committees and number of responsibilities the Members have 

that we are going to have to have one of these searing, tearing reorganizations that takes place, causes no end of trouble, and leaves 

a lot of Members adrift without things to do, that distorts the function of the Congress for years. 

That happens every time we have a reorganization, and it also 

happens every time you reorganize the executive, because I find no 

real benefit that has been accomplished by setting up a Department of Homeland Security. They simply moved a lot of agencies 

over there. They don’t get along with each other. We had a similar 

situation when we set up the Department of Energy. Everybody 

hated each other inside the Department of Energy. It was 20 years 

before we got them to work together. A similar situation with regard to the Department of Education. And I would just say that the 

simpler we can make this business of ours the more successful we 

will be, and more committees are not going to contribute to that. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. You have both been very patient and helpful— 

Mr. COX. Mr. Chairman, if I might just—

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Yes. 

Mr. COX. Just as a member of both committees, I observe that 

first with respect to your comment, Mr. Dingell, that you are not 

sure what difference has followed from the Select Committee’s 

work. As a result of over 35 hearings of the Select Committee, we 

put forward a dramatic restructuring of first responder grants already, and the Department has changed very much the way that 

it is focusing its first responder grant money. We are putting in a 

very strong emphasis on intelligence threat and vulnerability. We 

have focused a great deal of attention on the threat advisory system and that has become much more refined as a result. We have, 

after the Senate committee of jurisdiction, without question gone 

forward with BioShield as an entitlement program. We drew to the 

attention of the Energy and Commerce Committee the importance 

of stopping that as an entitlement program, and as you know, we 

have now passed in the House collaboratively between Energy and 

Commerce and our committee not as an entitlement program because we so strongly believe, and Energy and Commerce was in 

agreement on this point, that this not be unsustainable. And I 

think very importantly, we put a very strong focus on the Infrastructure Protection and Information Analysis Directorate. There is 

a different person running that now following the hearings that we 

have had, over 35, as I mentioned, on these subjects alone. 
62

In contrast with that, the list that the committee provided the 

Energy and Commerce Committee to this hearing of all of the entirety of the work that has been done during the 108th Congress 

lists not a single full committee hearing, and one of the five hearings that was conducted was a joint hearing with our committee. 

There is just not time nor the jurisdiction with Energy and Commerce to reach all the things that the Department of Homeland Security is doing, and I would just tell you that I have made it my 

priority to attend all of my subcommittee meetings and hearings 

not to mention markups and full committee hearings and markups 

in Energy and Commerce, and I see very little overlap with the 

work that—the very important and substantial work we do in Energy and Commerce as what we are doing in the select committee. 

I just think they are as different as night and day. But that is my 

observation. 

I would also, with respect to the growth of Congress point, just 

add that historically whenever we have created a significant new 

department we have also assigned authorization and oversight responsibility to a committee in the Congress. It is true for the Department of Defense, true for the Department of Education, true 

for the Department of Energy, and it is not clear why with a national security mission as important as protecting the country it 

should be different for the third largest Cabinet department, the 

Department of Homeland Security. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. You both have been very patient, but I would 

like to ask one last question, based on something that you both 

stressed. You both testified that the jurisdictional overlap is inherent in the committee system and that a new committee would not 

reduce the overlap, but would rather create many new and untested overlaps. Also, you have both testified that in your opinion a 

new committee is not needed. 

Former Speakers Gingrich and Foley testified before us that 

there should be a standing permanent committee with authorization jurisdiction to provide simple, focused, centralized and efficient 

oversight of the Department of Homeland Security. Both Speakers, 

as I am sure you recognize, have an intimate understanding of the 

House committees and jurisdiction. They both rejected the notion 

that a new standing committee would increase overlap if it were 

done right. They both also said that while overlapping jurisdiction 

may be acceptable or even desirable on some issues, as you both, 

I believe, pointed out, it is not for such a critical mission as homeland security. 

Why do you believe Speakers Foley and Gingrich are wrong? 

They both suggested that opposition is based on turf issues. How 

do you respond? 

Mr. BARTON. Well, I would respond, Mr. Chairman, that if you 

had asked them whether there should be reorganization of the entire House or a consolidation, they would have also responded in 

the affirmative to that, because they are both former Speakers and 

they know that over time things grow and, as they grow, they develop some of the discontinuities that Chairman Cox alluded to. My 

recollection, and I didn’t read their testimony, but I did watch 

snippets of it that was presented through the media, at least with 

regard to the Energy and Commerce Committee, I don’t remember 
63

any specific failures that they alluded to in our mission statement. 

So I think, you know, I wouldn’t say they were wrong. I think they 

were just responding kind of in a natural fashion that here is a 

specific issue that is a hot issue right now. We ought to focus on 

it. I think we are focusing on it through the select committee, but 

I think it is an open question whether it should be made a permanent committee. 

I also, before I yield to Mr. Dingell, want to respond to something 

that Congresswoman Dunn said because I misresponded. I thought 

the rules of the House allowed five subcommittees on each committee. The rules of the House allow five subcommittees plus an 

oversight subcommittee if you choose to have it, which is what the 

Energy and Commerce Committee has chosen. So her suggestion 

that we create a Homeland Security Subcommittee I would support 

either for my committee or for all committees that have jurisdiction 

over homeland security if we could go to six authorization subcommittees plus an oversight subcommittee. I think that would be 

a good idea. 

Ms. DUNN. May I comment, please? That was not my suggestion. 

That was my question to you if you felt that that would adequately—I am a supporter of a standing committee. 

Mr. BARTON. Yeah. But I mean I would certainly, you know, one 

way to focus, in my committee on the homeland security issues, 

and Mr. Cox alluded to it, would be to have a specific Subcommittee on Homeland Security and I am fine with that if I can 

maintain the ones that I already have. I wouldn’t want to give one 

up to get that one. 

Mr. COX. Will the gentleman yield? 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Yes, and I am trying wrap up this panel. 

Mr. COX. I would just note doing the arithmetic that if there is 

a concern about Congress growing, then if we were to add a Homeland Security Subcommittee to each of the standing committees 

that have jurisdiction we would quickly move from 88 committees 

and subcommittees to over a hundred. 

Mr. BARTON. Well, but if want to focus, you know, that is the 

way to do it and you are going to get—I guarantee you if y’all put 

that before the conference, the Republican Conference, I will let 

Mr. Dingell speak for the Democratic Caucus, but if you put it before the Republican Conference the creation of an additional subcommittee on each committee is going to pass overwhelmingly because that means there is an additional subcommittee chairman or 

chairwoman. 

Mr. COX. But if you have over a hundred committees and subcommittees with jurisdiction over something then I think the analog to socialism is perfect. If something is owned by everyone, it is 

the responsibility of no one. 

Mr. BARTON. You give us that and I guarantee you we will take 

ownership. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. We are going to—you have been very patient. 

We are going to wrap this up. Ms. McCarthy had a final point she 

wanted to make briefly. 

Ms. MCCARTHY. It was just on this point that is being discussed 

now, that the Commerce Committee, having vast jurisdiction already over the homeland security issues expand the Oversight Sub-
64

committee, Mr. Chairman, to include homeland security. Because 

so much of it goes, comes to our committee anyway it would make 

a lot of sense. 

Mr. BARTON. I agree with that. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Thank you both very much. You have been 

very patient. Appreciate your testimony. 

Mr. DINGELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Davis and Mr. Waxman. We welcome the 

chairman and the ranking member of the Committee on Government Reform, Mr. Davis, Mr. Waxman, and you are free to proceed 

with your testimony. Mr.Davis. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE TOM DAVIS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF VIRGINIA, AND 

CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM 

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member 

Slaughter, and on behalf of the Government Reform Committee I 

want to thank you for holding these important hearings on whether 

the House is appropriately organized to consider homeland security 

matters or do we need to add another appendage, which in my 

opinion is kind of a backsliding from where we were with the Contract with America, where we came in and we abolished committees, we didn’t add committees to the House, trying to streamline 

the procedures. 

My friend and the ranking member, Mr. Waxman, and I are here 

to testify that with positive changes the House will be organized 

to ensure that Homeland Security receives the resources and scrutiny it deserves. Because the success of the Department is vital to 

the continuing economic recovery and winning the war on terrorism, we all want it to succeed. Congress must provide the Department with the proper resources while at the same time maintaining aggressive oversight to ensure that this massive reorganization and commitment of resources succeeds. 

We must ask if the House, as currently organized, has and will 

continue to aggressively oversee this new Department. More importantly, I believe a major congressional reorganization will only 

hinder oversight and legislative priorities. In the past others have 

testified that without a permanent committee exclusively devoted 

to DHS Congress would drop the ball. The past year and a half has 

shown that this is I think wrong. There has been no lack of oversight or legislative activity to make sure that we get homeland security right. 

Our committee maintains an aggressive posture when it comes 

to overseeing DHS. Whether through legislation or oversight hearings the Government Reform Committee is fulfilling its role as the 

primary oversight and investigation committee of the House. With 

the cooperation of all of our members, our subcommittees and the 

full committee, we have held numerous oversight hearings, field 

visits and markup actions pertaining to the Department. 

For example, the committee held oversight hearings on topics related to FEMA, TSA, first responders, critical infrastructure, visa 

policy, preparedness standards, DHS financial accountability, border management, port security and product litigation management, 

to name just a few. We held markups on Project BioShield, the 
65

Presidential Vacancy Act and the DHS Financial Accountability 

Ability Act. We are fulfilling our role and no one should question 

whether DHS would escape scrutiny if there weren’t a committee 

in Congress under the same name. 

The existing committee structure has been criticized for the number of committees with jurisdiction over agencies and programs 

that contribute to homeland security, but the creation of a permanent homeland security panel would only exacerbate the program 

of jurisdictional overlap. Jurisdictional overlap is inherent in the 

committee system. The new committee won’t reduce the overlap. It 

only creates many new and untested overlaps. It will not reduce jurisdiction overlap if we increase the number of committees responsible for transportation, emergency management, law enforcement, 

public health, immigration and the many other matters involved in 

ensuring homeland security. 

As I know too well, jurisdictional conflicts happen. It is the responsibility of committee chairman to manage these conflicts. 

When the overlap is well understood and tested through precedent, 

committees can focus on solutions, not turf. New and undefined 

overlaps too often result in turf battles that delay and even prevent 

positive outcomes. 

A new full Committee on Homeland Security would generate 

many new jurisdictional overlaps and conflicts. Each of the conflicts 

would be untested and unsettled. It is my experience that these 

gray areas are the source of unproductive jurisdictional squabbles 

among committees, not overlap which exists under any committee’s 

structure. 

Ensuring that DHS remains strong and that Congress is appropriately organized to oversee this Department requires only minor 

adjustments. With a few tweaks the current committee structure 

would be well prepared to support and oversee DHS in its critical 

mission. I suggest that the House agree upon an organizational 

map. You could do it similar to the Senate model. As in the Senate, 

current committees would continue to oversee their legacy agencies, 

while Government Reform, like Governmental Affairs in the Senate, would oversee the administration of the Department’s headquarters and departmentwide policies as well as White House efforts to coordinate homeland security policy. 

The Government Reform Committee already has jurisdiction over 

these matters through its authority over agency organization, 

human capital, IT security, Federal-State relations, procurement 

and the management and efficiency of government organizations. 

Reenforcement of this authority along with any clarifications between the other committees where the combination of agencies or 

functions may have muddied the existing jurisdictions would preserve our present strength and let the House focus on DHS and its 

mission, not turf battles. 

The committee I chair was at the center of the last major reorganization in the House when Government Reform absorbed the D.C. 

Committee and the Post Office and Civil Service Committee. These 

moves had their doubters who most of the time thought they would 

result in the neglect of those issues. I am pleased to report that 

neither has been forgotten. In fact, since the reorganization the 

Government Reform Committee has passed landmark legislation 
66

affecting the District of Columbia, more so than when it existed as 

a committee by itself. The Federal Civil Service legislation we 

passed, the major civil service reform this last year for the Department of Defense, which is over half of civil service, and hopefully 

with the help of many here today we are going to pass major postal 

reform this year even though we don’t have a dedicated committee 

just for that. 

Our committee is living proof you don’t need a marquis committee name to make sure your agency is highlighted in the halls 

of Congress. I know this existing structure works because this is 

how the House oversees and coordinates our Nation’s drug policy, 

which is also—our committee has jurisdiction. The Office of National Drug Policy, ONDCP, created by Congress in 1988 partly 

through leadership of then Government Reform Subcommittee 

Ranking Member Danny Hastert, established policies, priorities 

and objectives for the Nation’s Drug Control Program. The Committee on Government Reform holds jurisdiction over ONDCP, but 

the Committees on Judiciary and Energy and Commerce oversee 

the major components of national drug policy, including law enforcement and public health. 

As I have worked this Congress on reauthorizing ONDCP, we 

have been pleased with the working relationship among the committees involved. This model can work for homeland security as 

well. This proposal would maintain existing areas of expertise and 

relationships with executive branch agencies. The proposal 

strengthens the parallel structures of House-Senate relations. 

And, finally, by designating Government Reform as the lead committee on cross-agency proposals when no other committee could 

naturally receive the primary referral ensures that homeland security efforts will be coordinated. I believe that framework will work 

and that the issue of whether homeland security is adequately addressed will be protected. 

In closing, I want to stress how important the issue of homeland 

security is to me in my congressional district across the river from 

here and to members of my committee. I am confident that if organized correctly no one will question our ability to oversee and contribute to the security of our great Nation.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE TOM DAVIS, A 

REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS, FROM THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 

Mr. Chairman, and Ranking Member Slaughter, on behalf of the Government Reform Committee, I would like to thank you for holding these important hearings on 

whether the House is appropriately organized to consider homeland security matters. 

My friend and Government Reform’s ranking member, Mr. Waxman, and I are 

here to testify that with positive changes the House will be organized to ensure that 

homeland security receives the resources and scrutiny it deserves. Because the success of the Department is vital to the continuing economic recovery and winning the 

war on terrorism, we all want to see it succeed. 

Congress must provide the department with the proper resources while at the 

same time maintaining aggressive oversight to ensure that this massive reorganization and commitment of resources succeeds. 

We must ask if the House, as currently organized, has and will continue to aggressively and effectively oversee this new department. More importantly, I believe 

a major congressional reorganization will only hinder oversight and legislative priorities. 

In the past others have testified that without a permanent committee, exclusively 

devoted to DHS, Congress would drop the ball. The past year and a half has shown 
67

that this is, quite simply, wrong. There has been no lack of oversight or legislative 

activity to make sure that we get homeland security right. 

My committee maintains an aggressive posture when it comes to overseeing DHS. 

Whether through legislation or oversight hearings, the Government Reform Committee is fulfilling its role as the primary oversight and investigation committee of 

the House. With the cooperation of all our Members, our subcommittees and the full 

committee have held numerous oversight hearings, field visits and markup actions 

pertaining to the Department. 

For example the committee held oversight hearings on topics relating to FEMA, 

TSA, first responders, critical infrastructure, visa policy, preparedness standards, 

DHS financial accountability, border management, port security and product litigation management to name just a few. We held markups on Project Bioshield, the 

Presidential Vacancy Act, and the DHS Financial Accountability Act. We are fulfilling our role and no one should question whether DHS would escape scrutiny if 

there weren’t a Committee in Congress under the same name. 

The existing committee structure has been criticized for the number of committees 

with jurisdiction over agencies and programs that contribute to homeland security. 

The creation of a permanent Homeland Security panel, however, would only exacerbate the problem of jurisdictional overlap. 

Jurisdictional overlap is inherent in the committee system. A new committee 

wouldn’t reduce that overlap—it would only create many new and untested overlaps. 

We will not reduce jurisdictional overlap if we increase the number of committees 

responsible for transportation, emergency management, law enforcement, public 

health, immigration, and the many other matters involved in ensuring homeland security. 

As I know only too well, jurisdictional conflicts happen. It is the responsibility of 

committee chairmen to manage these conflicts. When the overlap is well understood 

and tested through precedent, committees can focus on solutions—not turf. New and 

undefined overlaps too often result in turf battles that delay and even prevent positive outcomes. A new full committee on homeland security would generate many 

new jurisdictional overlaps and conflicts. Each of the conflicts would be untested 

and unsettled. It is my experience that these gray areas are the source of unproductive jurisdictional squabbles among committees—not overlap, which exists under 

any committee structure. 

Ensuring that DHS remains strong and that Congress is appropriately organized 

to oversee this department requires only minor adjustments. With a few tweaks, the 

current committee structure would be well prepared to support and oversee DHS 

and its critical mission. I suggest that the House agree upon a organizational map 

that resembles the Senate model. As in the Senate, current committees should continue to oversee their legacy agencies—while Government Reform, like Government 

Affairs, would oversee the administration of the department’s headquarters and department wide policies as well as White House efforts to coordinate homeland security policy. 

The Government Reform Committee already has jurisdiction over these matters 

through its authority over agency organization, human capital, IT security, Federalstate relations, procurement and the management and efficiency of government operations. Reinforcement of this authority along with any clarifications between the 

other committees, where the combination of agencies or functions may have muddied the existing jurisdictions, will preserve our present strengths and let the House 

focus on DHS and its mission, not turf battles. 

The Committee I chair was at the center of the last major reorganization in the 

House when Government Reform absorbed the DC Committee and the Post Office 

and Civil Service Committee. These moves had their doubters and most at the time 

thought they would result in the neglect of those issues. I am pleased to report that 

neither has been forgotten. In fact, since the reorganization, the Government Reform Committee has passed landmark legislation affecting the District of Columbia, 

the Federal civil service and hopefully with the help of many here today, major postal reform. My committee is living proof that you don’t need a marquee committee 

name to make sure your agency is highlighted in the halls of Congress. 

I know this existing structure works because this is how the House oversees and 

coordinates our nation’s drug policy. 

The Office of the National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), created by Congress in 

1988 partly through leadership of then Government Reform subcommittee ranking 

member Denny Hastert, establishes policies, priorities, and objectives for the Nation’s drug control program. The Committee on Government Reform holds jurisdiction over ONDCP; however, the Committees on the Judiciary and Energy and Commerce oversee the major components of national drug policy including law enforcement and public health. As I have worked this Congress on reauthorizing ONDCP, 
68

I have been very pleased with the working relationship among the committees. This 

model will work for homeland security as well. 

This proposal would maintain existing areas of expertise and relationships with 

executive branch agencies. The proposal strengthens the parallel structure of HouseSenate relations. Finally, by designating Government Reform as the lead committee 

on cross-agency proposals when no other committee would naturally receive the primary referral, ensures that homeland security efforts will be coordinated. I believe 

this framework will work and that the issue of whether homeland security is adequately addressed will be protected. 

In closing, I want to stress how important the issue of homeland security is to 

me and to the members of my committee. I am confident that if organized correctly 

no one will question our ability to oversee and contribute to the security of our great 

nation.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Thank you, Mr. Davis. 

Mr. Waxman. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE HENRY A. WAXMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, AND RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM 

Mr. WAXMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased to have 

this opportunity to come before this Subcommittee on Rules and 

give you my thoughts about whether we ought to have a continuation of a Select Committee of Homeland Security or a new standing Committee on Homeland Security. All of us share the goal of 

ensuring that the Department of Homeland Security operates as effectively as possible on security matters. The question is how can 

the Congress promote that end in the most efficient way possible? 

One of the key contributions Congress can make is conducting 

oversight, and there is no question that good congressional oversight helps agencies do the job, the best job they can. The problem 

we face now is that there are too many committees reviewing 

homeland security matters. The Transportation and Infrastructure 

Committee, the Ways and Means Committee, the Energy and Commerce Committee, the Agriculture Committee, Judiciary Committee, the Government Reform Committee, and others all conduct 

oversight of homeland security activities. Sometimes from different 

perspectives, but nevertheless all these committees are potentially 

involved in one way or another. 

The continuation of a select or standing Committee on Homeland 

Security compounds the problem. It adds another committee and 

another layer of oversight. We literally have a situation where 

three committees have authorities regarding every program in the 

Department. One is the traditional authorizing committee, one is 

Government Reform, which has governmentwide oversight responsibilities, and one is the present select committee, and that is simply too many. 

Now there is a better model. The better model is what the Senate 

is doing with this very same issue. There the existing committees 

with relevant jurisdiction conduct oversight over the agencies in 

their jurisdiction and the Governmental Affairs Committee oversees issues such as coordination of homeland security activities. 

They were wise enough to figure out how to do the job of oversight 

in the Senate without creating another layer of bureaucracy, setting up more committees is another layer of bureaucracy. 
69

I was amused to hear Chairman Barton say that the Republican 

Conference, that members there would like to create more subcommittees so there could be more subcommittee chairmen and 

women. Well, to me that doesn’t sound like what I thought the Republicans were all about. I thought we were supposed to be shrinking government, not expanding the number of committees and subcommittee just so members could be chairmen of committees. That 

is not what our job is all about. Our job is to make sure the government functions appropriately. 

Now we had a special committee create the Homeland Security 

agency, and that was done in the past when legislation brought together all the different committees of jurisdiction to develop the energy policy in the 1970s. But I don’t recall ever a committee being 

created solely for the purpose of responding to a new Cabinet level. 

The Department of Energy was created in the late 1970s. There are 

five standing committees in the House that have some aspect of jurisdiction over Energy. 

Mr. WAXMAN. There wasn’t an energy committee created. There 

was already the Energy and Commerce Committee that had its primary jurisdiction on energy issues. The other cabinet level agency 

that was created was the Department of Education. Well, we didn’t 

create a new Committee on Education in the House, we already 

had a Committee on Education in the House, and that committee 

does it job. We have a Department of Health and Human Services. 

Well, we have ways and means with jurisdiction over Health and 

Human Services, we have the Energy and Commerce Committee 

with jurisdiction over some of those issues, we have the Infrastructure Subcommittee, which has jurisdiction, and the committee we 

used to call Education and Labor, whatever it is called now, they 

have some jurisdiction over these matters. Should we create a new 

Committee on Health and Human Services to do the job that is already being done by these other committees? It seems to me the 

question answers itself. 

My remarks should not be interpreted as questioning the commitment and effort of current members of the select committee on 

Homeland Security. Rather, my point is that it is not in the longterm interests of the Department of Homeland Security and the 

taxpayers to have duplicative congressional oversight. The continuation of a select committee or a standing committee on Homeland 

Security would result in spending more money, devoting more resources to activities that other committees, other standing committees already are doing, and they are certainly competent to continue to do that work. 

I urge my colleagues to consider terminating the committee on 

Homeland Security and to let the committees of jurisdiction that 

are the standing committees do the job of oversight to help make 

sure this agency performs appropriately. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Thank you both. 

I would point out, Mr. Waxman, we were informed by some of 

the experts that testified earlier before us that, after the creation 

of the Department of Defense, the Armed Services Committee was 

created. I think you pointed out, never has it been done. 

Mr. WAXMAN. I don’t know that any of us were here, but I am 

certain there was maybe a committee on the war policy. So they 
70

changed the name to the Committee on Armed Services in the 

House. But I am not sure, and none of us were here at the time. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. We weren’t here, but we received testimony on 

that. 

Mr. WAXMAN. But that is certainly an important area of expertise. And I think the history of where the committees have conducted that responsibility is clear. But to point out the other examples that we have had with energy and education, which are the 

two most recent cabinet level positions. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Those are more recent. But I didn’t want the 

record not to reflect the creation of the Armed Services Committee 

after the— 

Mr. DAVIS. Could we supplement our testimony on that point? 

Because I think when you go back, you are going to find there was 

a committee that dealt with this, as Mr. Waxman said. I didn’t 

bring any documentation, but— 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. No, but we went through World War II without one. 

Mr. DAVIS. That is our whole point. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. What Mr. Waxman said was it had never been 

done. 

Mr. WAXMAN. I would like to research and put an addendum in 

the record, which may be an apology, because you may be right and 

we are wrong. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. You are more than welcome to submit any 

supplementary. 

Mr. COX. Would the chairman yield? 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Yes. 

Mr. COX. I would just point out, I think we are confusing two different concepts. One is whether or not there was a responsibility 

in the Congress antedating the of a cabinet department. And the 

other is whether or not our House rules have ever been changed 

to give a committee of Congress primary jurisdiction over a cabinet 

department. 

And that has happened not only repeatedly, but it has happened 

each of the last three times we have created a new cabinet department, so that the House rules specifically recognize the cabinet department in Rule 10 with respect to the Department of Energy 

where primary jurisdiction is within the Energy and Commerce 

Committee; with respect to the Department of Education where 

primary jurisdiction is within the Committee on Education and the 

Workforce; and with the Department of Defense where primary jurisdiction is within the Committee on Armed Services. 

Mr. WAXMAN. So I think in those cases, they designated a committee that was already in existence to be the primary committee. 

And what we are suggesting is we don’t need another one. 

Mr. COX. It is not my time, but that would be a useful point. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. We certainly heard what you are suggesting, 

and we appreciate your testimony. 

Given the Government Reform Committee’s responsibilities for 

all of the various elements of its existing Rule 10 jurisdiction, I 

guess the key question or the most important question would be, 

how can we best ensure that sufficient attention is being devoted 

to oversight of the Department of Homeland Security and the crit-
71

ical task of overseeing and authorizing the functions of the third 

largest department of the Federal Government charged with the security of our population from the domestic terrorism? That is the 

key, and that is what we try to focus on in this and other hearings. 

Mr. DAVIS. We have held over 35 hearings on matters pertaining 

to this department this year in our committee, just for the record. 

We have been active in legislative markups that affected it, on bioshield and other areas that also affect the committee. I don’t think 

there is any problem that they are doing it. The Senate committee 

has stepped up to the same thing, I might add, without additional 

staff. 

Our concern is simply this: Some of the biggest issues that face 

a new department that is put together with different cultures from 

different agencies and the like go to human capital functions, procurement functions, bringing those together. That is what our committee deals with. That is at the core of what the government committee does. To write us out of this thing and move it over to another committee I think would be a huge error at this point. And 

that is basically where the committee needs most of its oversight, 

immigration. 

I think the Judiciary Committee has the expertise in this. They 

have been guarding law in that area for a long time. Bioterrorism, 

the CDC, NIH are under the jurisdiction of Commerce. We don’t 

have to lose those jurisdictions by moving for a new committee 

where I think we are going to have jurisdictional fights up and 

down. 

And, also just to go to the tendency sometimes where the committees get very cozy with the departments. Mr. Waxman and I 

simply went through this with mad cow disease where dealing with 

one of the local committees with oversight, very cozy with the leadership and not wanting to hold a hearing. And it turns out the 

cow—I mean, we got some concessions that some of the investigation we had done turned out to be correct. 

So that is my observation, if you really want us to be proactive 

in terms of the oversight on that. I don’t think you lose a thing by 

using the Senate model in this case. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Ms. Slaughter. 

Ms. SLAUGHTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Given your wide jurisdiction over other parts of the government, 

how would you handle the authorization process for DHS? 

Mr. DAVIS. Well, you have different authorization process. I don’t 

know that you would have a DHS authorization bill. We don’t have 

authorization bills for a lot of departments. You potentially could 

do that. I would think immigration would probably stay over where 

it is at this point. 

But in terms of focusing on the core mission, which is what Mr. 

Cox addressed, that is the thing our committee does through 

GPRA, the Government Performance and Results Act, an Act 

passed by this Congress where we had agencies define their mission and what were they doing to carry out that versus what were 

they doing extra to that. Those are the kinds of things our committee would do. But I wouldn’t expect to take CDC away from the 

Commerce Committee, who has had it a long experience in oversight on that. 
72

Ms. SLAUGHTER. We heard that before today on Agriculture, that 

AFIS and other things have been retained in the Agriculture Department, which I believe sort of flies in the face of the idea of putting a humongous agency together in the first place. Do you believe 

that creating the agency was a bad move? 

Mr. DAVIS. I will give you my view. I think, I wish that we had 

permanent reorganization authority, which is a bill that we are 

going to be taking up later this year. That allows the executive 

branch to come in with how they think an agency ought to be run, 

reorganize it, and send it to Congress with an up or down vote 

without amendment. Presidents from 1932 to 1984 had that authority. We didn’t have it in this case. So instead of a thoroughbred 

agency, since it has to go through Congress and all the jurisdictional fights, we ended up with a camel. 

And I think the way it is organized right now is going to be a 

continuing work in progress for many years. But I don’t think the 

creation of a new committee helps that. I think we are probably 

better off dealing with the jurisdictions that have the expertise in 

these areas and letting the government committee take the lead in 

some of the aspects of bringing these areas together. 

Ms. SLAUGHTER. Mr. Waxman. 

Mr. WAXMAN. Well, I voted against creating a new Department 

of Homeland Security. I didn’t see that it made a lot of sense to 

take all these different functions, some of which had nothing to do 

with national security, and put them in one department, but not 

have intelligence in that. You have the FBI separate, you have the 

CIA in a separate agency. But I lost. I voted on the losing side of 

that fight. Now we have a department. 

Your question was an interesting one. Who would do the authorization bill? There is not going to be an authorization bill as such 

now that it is created. We don’t have an authorization bill for the 

Department of Health and Human Services, we don’t have an authorization for other cabinet departments. But there are different 

issues that come up. So we would, let us say, defer to the intelligence committee on some of the intelligence issues affecting 

Homeland Security. Our committee would defer to the Energy and 

Commerce Committee when it comes to those issues that are before 

that committee. 

But we have jurisdiction over, as Chairman Davis pointed out, 

all these different governmental functions and structure and civil 

service issues. And we would continue to look at that as well as our 

general oversight jurisdiction which covers everything and even duplicates at the present time the oversight that the standing committees have. 

So as I pointed out, we don’t have oversight; the standing committees have oversight. And now we are going to create another 

committee that will have oversight jurisdiction. 

Ms. SLAUGHTER. Well, I think what we want to do is take theirs 

away. Isn’t it? From the other standing committees. 

Mr. WAXMAN. I think that would be a serious mistake. 

Ms. SLAUGHTER. Well, I agree. We would probably be hand to 

hand combat, I would think. 

Mr. DAVIS. Well, on procurement and civil service issues, that 

would be precedential in this House, to give one agency exclusive 
73

jurisdiction over those areas for their agency, and I think it would 

ruin the civil service. 

Mr. WAXMAN. And we haven’t done that for the military. There 

is an Armed Service Committee that shares jurisdiction with us on 

the civil service questions that affect the military. We had a bill 

last year that we all went to combat over and had disagreements. 

But it is important to have different committees that develop different expertise. When you have only one committee—I think that 

the point has been made over and over again. When you have only 

one committee, that committee tends to get to be quite comfortable 

with the bureaucracy, and you don’t get that kind of oversight that 

you need when you have multiple committees looking at it from different perspectives. At least that is my point of view. We may have 

a disagreement. But I am here just to share with you my views. 

Ms. SLAUGHTER. And it is what we want. And I agree with you 

that—it never occurred to me at the beginning of this that the intelligence agencies wouldn’t be a part of it. It would seem to me 

that they would be the backbone of it. 

Mr. WAXMAN. You would have thought. 

Ms. SLAUGHTER. And I was really quite struck with the fact that 

they did not care to join. And I do think that that weakens the 

whole Department. Nonetheless, we have it, and we do need to 

know what to do with it. Thank you both very much. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Ms. Dunn. 

Ms. DUNN. Thanks for being here. We are interested in getting 

your perception on how this should move. Who would you say, 

which committee would you say that should be the primary, the 

committee of primary jurisdiction over Homeland Security? 

Mr. DAVIS. I think, I mean, as in the Senate model, the Senate 

Government Affairs Committee has the primary jurisdiction. Now, 

when I say primary jurisdiction, we are talking about agency reorganization issues, issues that occur when you are taking 27 different agencies and 170,000 people, putting them together, keeping 

them to their mission, something that Chairman Cox mentioned 

earlier. That is what we do. Those are the kinds of governance 

issues that we do. 

When it comes to individual jurisdictional issues like the Center 

for Disease Control, Immigration, some of those issues, we would 

obviously defer to the committees on expertise. 

Mr. WAXMAN. Could you tell me who has primary jurisdiction 

over the Department of Health and Human Services under the 

House rules? I know that the Ways and Means Committee has a 

lot of say over the various aspects of that committee’s jurisdiction, 

as does the Energy and Commerce Committee, and the Ag Committee. I don’t know what would be—what benefit there would be 

in saying any which one of those committees should be the primary 

committee. They should be the—they should have jurisdiction over 

those issues where they had written into the rules as their overview on those policy issues and as it affects the Department of 

Health and Human Services, and that is how they interact. 

So I am not convinced that we need a single primary committee 

to be designated with primary jurisdiction. 

Ms. DUNN. There are some people who have told our committee 

in testimony, former speakers, for example, but also others includ-
74

ing the Chairman and the Ranking Member of the House intel 

community, that this responsibility is of the primary importance, 

like the top responsibility now of the United States Congress. Do 

you believe that we can carry out this responsibility adequately 

with the committee system that we have now, and bring to it adequate focus to make sure that we are taking on the responsibilities 

that our constituents expect us to carry on their behalf, considering 

this is something that is really quite new in our lexicon since 9/

11? 

Mr. DAVIS. Ms. Dunn, I would start in saying I think you would 

do a better job under the older system than the existing for this 

reason: You keep—the Intelligence Committee isn’t woven into the 

new Homeland, Security Committee. That is a central function of 

the agency, to kind of correlate some of those areas. They have all 

the different intelligence agencies, but they have got to collate it 

and put it together. 

On issues pertaining to bioterrorism, those kind of issues, those 

are issues that you need to bring the CDC in some of those areas. 

Congress pays a lot of attention, they have held more hearings 

this year on those issues than they ordinarily would because of the 

bioterrorism effect and the homeland. It is good to have a lot of 

people engaged in this, not a select group. And I think there is a 

tendency when you assign a cabinet department to a committee to 

get a certain coziness up there on these issues that you don’t get 

when you have a lot of other committees that can participate in the 

process. 

You are going to continue to have jurisdictional fights even as 

this is envisioned, but we have precedent for a lot of these fights 

at this point. This brings whole new areas of precedents. One of the 

biggest controversies for this committee right now is on its civil 

service aspects and its human capital issues. Are you going to give 

it to that committee, or does it stay with Government Reform who 

deals with this across government? Those are the kind of issues 

that I think still aren’t addressed by setting up a new committee. 

And, in fact, I think you set up some needless clashes. I mean, that 

is just my reaction to it. 

Mr. WAXMAN. I certainly agree with that point of view. And I 

think we can do the job effectively with using the Senate model, 

which is, as we pointed out, to use the existing committees of jurisdiction, not to create a new one. If every time we have a new problem in this country we create a new committee and overlapping jurisdictions, it seems to me that there is no end to it. And I think 

we ought to decide what is the rational way to handle this thing 

without spending taxpayers’ money. 

We have got to use that money—we have got to spend less 

money here so we can give more tax breaks to billionaires. And, 

therefore, I don’t want us to waste that money on another standing 

committee called Homeland Security if it is not going to give us 

any more benefit in dealing with the oversight that Congress 

should be exercising. Of course, I say that tongue in cheek. 

Mr. DAVIS. I wanted to clarify that. I am not for protecting billionaires. Well, they all live in your district. 
75

Mr. WAXMAN. I also don’t want the deficits that we are going to 

see with this attitude of let us just keep spending and keep borrowing. 

Ms. DUNN. You are staying right on message, Ranking Member. 

I think the comment that is obvious on your comment that why 

start a new committee for every problem that comes along. This is 

a unique problem and it is a serious problem, and it could very well 

be the most serious problem we have ever faced in the history of 

our Nation, and I think it is very important to have a strong response. And I would simply ask you, as a follow-up, which committee would be the coordinating committee of all the responsibilities? For example, as we try to establish inner communication 

among agencies, the sort of thing that is necessary that we felt we 

had a lack of under 9/11? 

Mr. DAVIS. That is under the purview of Government Reform. All 

government organizational issues come under the Government Reform Committee. That is traditionally what has happened. So on 

those kind of issues where you don’t need specific expertise but 

really the expertise in governance, those are the issues we deal 

with every day because we have jurisdiction and oversight over 

every agency of government in calling attention to those kind of 

things. 

You don’t necessarily make the problem better by throwing a 

committee at it. In some ways, you can make it worse. And that 

is—I mean, I guess if I say anything to you, we need to think very 

carefully about by adding another committee on here on top of everything else, are you discouraging other committees from having 

oversight, from taking an interest in this, taking an outside perspective, by putting it within a committee? I think this could work 

very well under the Senate model. And I usually don’t say that, but 

I think in this particular case it works. 

Ms. DUNN. And I would say, Mr. Chairman, on the other hand 

I think it works far better when you have a committee of jurisdiction with focus on the problem being the committee in charge working with committees of other jurisdictions in combined efforts on 

authorization bills, for example. Thank you. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Thank you both very much. 

I believe we have on behalf of the Committee on Transportation 

and Infrastructure, Mr. Mica. Welcome. The ranking member Mr. 

Oberstar will be coming? 

Mr. MICA. I think he is on his way. But if you wanted, I could 

proceed. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Thank you for being here, and we welcome and 

look forward to your testimony. 

Mr. MICA. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member 

Slaughter and members of the committee. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Oberstar, please, welcome. 
76

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOHN MICA, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA, AND 

MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE 

Mr. MICA. Mr. Oberstar and I are pleased to be here to share our 

views about the future of the Homeland Security Committee with 

you today. 

Last year, I did not believe a Homeland Security Committee was 

necessary for the House to use to specifically address terrorism. 

Not much has happened since that time to change my mind. Any 

time you combine 170,000 Federal employees and some 22 agencies, it raises my concern and eyebrows. 

Some have argued that a separate committee focused solely on 

Homeland Security is necessary to address terrorism. This assumes 

that the standing committees are incapable or uninterested in oversight and producing effective legislation. It also presumes that a 

new committee with little subject matter, expertise, or institutional 

knowledge can produce better Homeland Security legislation. I am 

afraid this argument is flawed, and the evidence points to exact opposite conclusion. 

The standing committees have the—first of all, the standing committees do have the expertise to address terrorism. We had been 

focused on the terrorist threat long before the country woke up to 

terrorism on September 11th, and the standing committees have 

drafted almost all of the Homeland Security legislation. Several 

chairmen and ranking members have testified the House needs the 

standing committee’s expertise to address terrorism. Their advice 

should not be taken lightly for they know their issues better than 

anyone. 

This isn’t about turf, it is, in fact, about which committees and 

what organization can best prepare our country for terrorism. 

Members can’t be experts on everything. We all know that. And 

that is why we have in Congress committees. And that type of expertise takes years and years and decades to develop. The Senate 

recognizes this fact, and it has not changed its existing committee 

structure. 

To use aviation as an example, I can safely say that nobody in 

the House knows more about aviation or aviation security than our 

subcommittee and its members. Just between the members that we 

have on the committee now, I will bet we have close to 50 years 

experience with aviation issues, not to mention the expertise of a 

staff that has dealt with these issues and actually drafting most of 

the legislation that deals with terrorist threat in aviation and 

transportation. 

It should be no surprise that a thorough understanding of the 

aviation system is required to produce effective aviation security 

legislation. The aviation system is based on a careful balance of 

highly complex regulations, procedures, infrastructure, engineering. 

And this system in fact has produced the world’s safest aviation industry. Preserving that balance is impossible without the expertise 

that comes from working on these issues for years. 

And I tell you, I have been on that subcommittee for 12 years, 

I have had the honor to serve for 4 years as the Chair. I served 

under Mr. Oberstar when he chaired that subcommittee. And we 
77

may or not always agree, Mr. Oberstar and myself, but I am telling 

you that we know these subjects unlike anyone else in the House, 

and you lose that expertise if you move this jurisdiction away. 

The problem has never been a lack of focus or interest by the 

standing committees. Rather, the missing ingredient was a national consensus that terrorism should be a top priority. Congress 

as a whole reflected the national will and has been unable to make 

the tough choices terrorism required. And that, we know, is a part 

of our history, unfortunately, today. 

9/11 changed that, and within days or a few weeks the standing 

committees had legislation ready. Back in 1990, we mandated 

background checks for aviation personnel, began deploying bomb 

detection devices at our airport; we built FEMA, which helped New 

York and Washington respond to 9/11 and much of the rest of the 

country. We created TSA, fortified cockpit doors, armed pilots, put 

marshals back in the sky, developed a whole host of comprehensive 

approaches not only to aviation, but also to transportation security. 

We stabilized the aviation industry, passed the Maritime Security Act, and created port security grants. 

In a few days, we will introduce legislation that will protect airliners from another threat, and that is one of shoulder-launched 

fired missiles. 

The standing committees have always led the way on terrorism 

and will continue to do so. Legislative jurisdiction should not under 

any circumstances be wholly transferred from the standing committees to a permanent Homeland Security Committee. This would severely limit the House’s ability to produce effective terrorism legislation. 

In closing, there is no substitute for expertise, institutional 

knowledge, and experience. You need all of that to get results. And 

the standing committees and their staffs with years and years of 

expertise again looking at systems rather than—and the whole 

problem that we face and challenges that we face rather than little 

parts of it is the type of and depth of knowledge and experience 

that we should have. 

I would like to turn now to Mr. Oberstar, and I am sure he has 

comments.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DON YOUNG, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS, FROM THE STATE OF ALASKA, AND CHAIRMAN, 

COMMITTE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to 

share my views about the future of the Select Homeland Security Committee with 

you. 

Some have argued that a separate standing committee, focused solely on homeland security, is necessary for the House to perform its oversight role on the new 

Department of Homeland Security. This assumes that the standing committees 

aren’t up to this important task; that somehow the standing committees are either 

incapable or uninterested in oversight and producing effective homeland security 

legislation. t also presumes that a new committee, with little subject matter expertise or institutional knowledge can produce better legislation than the standing committees. 

This argument is flawed, and the evidence points to the exact opposite conclusion. 

An fact, only the standing committees have the expertise and institutional knowledge necessary to address terrorism. Other than the Homeland Security Act and its 

technical corrections bill, the standing committees have drafted every single piece 

of homeland security legislation. And we were focused on the terrorist threat long 

before the country woke up to terrorism on 9/11. 
78

The standing committees have always led the way on terrorism, and they still do. 

The Senate recognizes this fact, and has not changed its existing committee structure. 

As most of you know, I did not believe a Homeland Security Committee was necessary for the House to address the terrorist threat last year, and not much has 

happened since then to change my mind. 

Homeland security is an important issue and terrorism is a serious threat, but 

the standing committees are best prepared to address these threats. The standing 

committees have the Member expertise, institutional knowledge, and a proven track 

record of homeland security legislation. 

Member expertise and institutional knowledge are absolutely essential to producing effective legislation. Members can’t be experts on everything. That’s why we 

have committees. And that type of expertise takes years and even decades to develop. 

The homeland security role of the agencies that make up the department is not 

a separate and distinct function from their traditional missions; rather, it can only 

be effectively accomplished within the context of those missions. 

It should be no surprise that a thorough understanding of the aviation system is 

required to produce effective aviation security legislation, or that one needs to understand the pharmaceutical industry and our health care system to draft an effective bioterrorism bill. Only members with a thorough understanding of these traditional missions will be able to craft effective legislation that addresses the homeland 

security aspect of these agencies. 

To use aviation as an example, I can safely say that nobody in the House knows 

more about aviation. . .. or aviation security, than Subcommittee Chairman Mica 

and Ranking Member Oberstar. Collectively those two Members have close to fifty 

years experience with aviation. 

The U.S. aviation system is based on a careful balance of highly complex rules, 

regulations, procedures, infrastructure, and engineering. This system has produced 

the world’s safest aviation industry. Preserving that balance is impossible without 

the expertise that comes from having dealt with these issues for many years, as the 

members of the Transportation Committee have. 

Aviation safety and security are closely linked, especially in such areas as air traffic control, aircraft maintenance, missile threats, passenger control, and aircraft operating procedures. Even minor policy changes can have wide-ranging negative impacts on other aspects of aviation. 

The point I’m making with aviation is true in other areas as well. The agencies’ 

traditional and homeland security missions are intertwined, and you need to understand one to effectively address the other. 

While you may be able to draw a distinction between these missions in the House 

Rules, it doesn’t exist on a Coast Guard cutter patrolling our coasts or on the street 

with first responders. In the real world, those missions are linked, and our policy 

in Washington should reflect that reality. 

In addition to having the expertise to address terrorism, the standing committees 

have focused on this threat for years. 

At this point, I would like to read part of a statement that was given by a colleague of mine on the House floor. The issue at hand was preparing our first responders for a terrorist attack. 

‘‘The pictures of that awful day are a sobering reminder of the new threats of evil 

that Americans face, but they also remind us of how grossly unprepared our Nation 

was and still is to respond to such a disaster. 

‘‘This bill will not prevent a terrorist attack. However, it will help us prepare for 

the inevitable and ensure that our emergency personnel have the right training and 

equipment to save lives.’’

Chairwoman Tillie Fowler of our Emergency Management Subcommittee made 

those remarks on July 25th, 2000. The House passed the Preparedness Against Terrorism Act that day, by unanimous voice vote, but it never made it out of the Senate. 

The standing committees have a long history of focusing on terrorism and crafting 

legislation to address it. The problem has never been a lack of focus or interest by 

the standing committees; rather, the missing ingredient was a national consensus 

that terrorism should be a top priority. And Congress, as a whole, reflected the national will and was unable to commit sufficient resources or make the tough policy 

choices terrorism required. 

9/11 changed that, and within days or a few weeks the standing committees had 

legislation ready. This was possible because the standing committees had worked 

on these issues for years. They knew what the major problems were and how to 

solve them. 
79

The Transportation Committee has a long and proven record of protecting the nation from terrorism. For your review, I have included a list of bills produced by our 

committee with my testimony. They range from the Aviation Security Act of 1989 

to the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Authorization Act of 2004. 

Similarly, the other standing committees have produced a long list of bills protecting the country from terrorism. 

In short, the standing committees have the expertise and institutional knowledge, 

they’re focused on the threat, and they have moved virtually all of the homeland 

security legislation. 

If the Rules Committee, the Leadership, and the House ultimately decide to have 

a permanent Homeland Security Committee, then so be it. It won’t be the first time 

they’ve ignored my advice, but please don’t ignore the expertise of the standing committees. The House and the nation need them to meet the challenge of terrorism. 

If the House must have a permanent committee, then a select committee with 

oversight jurisdiction could focus the House’s oversight over the Department without 

diminishing its ability to produce effective legislation. 

If the House creates a permanent committee with legislative jurisdiction, then it 

must preserve the standing committees’ jurisdiction to ensure their expertise is utilized in drafting homeland security legislation. 

While not ideal, shared jurisdiction is quite common and manageable in the 

House. The Parliamentarian has already testified that the Speaker has all the authority he needs to manage overlapping jurisdiction. In this case, the negative procedural aspects of shared jurisdiction are far outweighed by the substantive requirement to produce effective legislation. 

Likewise, the perceived burden of having DHS report to multiple committees is 

far outweighed by the need for congressional expertise and effective legislation. 

Most departments report to multiple committees without impact on their ability to 

fulfill their missions. 

Exclusive legislative jurisdiction should not be transferred from the standing committees to a permanent homeland security committee. This could severely limit the 

House’s ability to effectively address terrorism through legislation. 

In closing, let me say that addressing terrorism is first and foremost a question 

of substance, not process. We must have the right Members and committees working 

on the problem, and then make sure the process enables them to get the job done. 

There is no substitute for expertise, institutional knowledge, and experience. You 

need them to get results, and the standing committees are the only place where that 

depth of knowledge and experience exists. 

The stakes are too high to cast them aside. 

Thank you. 

The following is a list of major terrorism legislation produced by the Committee 

on Transportation and Infrastructure: 

The Aviation Security Act of 1989

The Aviation Security Act of 1990

The Railroad and Transit Sabotage Prevention Act of 1995

The Federal Protective Service Reform Act of 1999

The Preparedness Against Terrorism Act of 2000

The Airport Security Improvement Act of 2000

The Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act of 2001

The Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001

The Arming Pilots Against Terrorism Act of 2002

The Extended Unemployment Assistance Act of 2002

The Federal Property Protection Act of 2002

Title 14 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002

The Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002

The Dam Safety and Security Act of 2002

The Wastewater Treatment Works Security Act of 2003

Over-the-Road Bus Security and Safety Act of 2003

Title 6 of the Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act of 2003

The Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Authorization Act of 2004

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Oberstar. 
80

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JAMES OBERSTAR, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MINNESOTA, AND RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCUTE 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I thank the Chair 

of the Aviation Subcommittee, Mr. Mica, for a splendid presentation. Chairman Young and I have concurred in the views just expressed and the views that I will express. 

As Chairman Mica said, I spent a great deal of time on aviation 

issues, and in my role as chair of the Investigations and Oversight 

Subcommittee held first hearings in the House in closed session, I 

would say, on aviation security in 1987 and 1988, and in the aftermath of Pan Am 103, at the request of the Bush administration, 

introduced legislation, created a commission, a Presidential Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism, on which I served and 

the ranking member of the full committee at the time, Congressman John Paul Hammersmith of Arkansas and Senators D’Amato 

and Lautenberg, as well as three public members appointed by the 

President. 

We followed the route of Pan Am 103, we talked to all the international security experts in the European Community and in the 

UK, and all the way through Scotland Yard to a constable at 

Lockerbie, and crafted legislation—also from our own national security interests. We crafted legislation that is the basic bill on aviation security that formed this Nation’s view of matters, until the 

major transformation and the aftermath of September 11th. 

Regrettably, not all of the recommendations of the Commission 

were fully enforced and carried through by the various agencies of 

the Department of Transportation. 

The point is, it began with our committee, Aviation Security. And 

when September 11th struck, as Chairman Mica said, we took this 

whole issue to a much higher level where most of us members of 

the Pan Am 103 Commission wanted to go but couldn’t because of 

various institutional resistance. 

The point is, you bring to bear the experience, the history, the 

knowledge, the understanding of multiplicity of security issues to 

bear on the issue before you as a member of the standing committee. 

In the aftermath of the aviation security bill, we worked together 

on our committee to craft the maritime security, which was called 

the port security bill. And we took many of the experiences from 

aviation and applied them to ports. Again, what was missing from 

the port security bill was a mechanism for funding the port security initiatives that were necessary, unlike aviation where we do 

have an aviation security fee that provides a steady stream of funding. Again, had our committee’s experience and recommendations 

been followed, there would have been a port security fee applied 

and a revenue stream for ports to carry through. 

So, now your select committee is in the process of deciding where 

to go in the future; and with Chairman Mica, I urge you to consider 

this wealth of expertise and continuity of service and understanding of substantive issues in security and the interrelationship 

between safety matters and security. We drew considerably on 

aviation safety in crafting aviation security, layering redundancy, 
81

backup systems in order to develop a sound safety and security system. 

Our committee also has jurisdiction over the Coast Guard. The 

Coast Guard has been absorbed into the Department of Homeland 

Security despite the objections of Chairman Young and myself. We 

met with the President, appealed to him to keep the Coast Guard 

out of the Department of Homeland Security. Why? Because Coast 

Guard has responsibilities not directly related to security: Commercial safety inspections, licensing of mariners, registering vessels, 

maintaining buoys, navigation aids, recreation boating recalls, and 

search and rescue functions. We pointed out, who is going to delineate for the Coast Guard when a search and rescue mission morphs 

into or becomes diverted to a security mission? That is a matter 

that our committee needs to understand, needs to deal with, because we under the interrelationships. We have the staff, we have 

the institutional memory, we have the understanding to deal with 

those. 

FEMA is another one. FEMA deals with disasters of all kinds, 

both natural disasters and manmade such as September 11th. We 

felt that FEMA should be kept separate, but if not, at least our 

committee’s jurisdiction should prevail both with Coast Guard and 

with FEMA. We believe that we understand the interrelationship 

of various functions of the agencies of which we have jurisdiction 

and how best to coordinate security and safety and other mainline 

missions of the various agencies that have been subsumed into 

Homeland Security. 

Some security measures in aviation will have an adverse impact 

on travel times. Secretary Mineta has said he wants world class security with world class service. How to get there? I think our committee understands how to do that. We have contributed a great 

deal of time to the deliberation on these issues. And while we 

might start out with differing viewpoints, we generally come to a 

consensus position on the underlying legislation and then work to 

ensure that it is well carried out. 

So I urge this committee to keep in mind this body of expertise, 

that not only ours but other authorizing committees, standing committees have in matters such as the one you are considering and, 

more importantly, the interrelationship with other functions of 

these departments and agencies that are not security but may have 

relationship to security, and let us continue to attend to the needs 

and craft the legislation and shape the future missions of these 

agencies in a way that will be supportive of security but also respectful of the historic functions of say, Coast Guard, aviation, 

FEMA, and our maritime system. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Thank you both. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. And Ranking Member Slaughter.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JAMES L. OBERSTAR 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Slaughter, and Members of the Committee, I’m 

pleased to have this opportunity to discuss with you how we should organize our 

Committee structure to deal with the new Department of Homeland Security (the 

Department). 

During my 29 years in Congress I have given high priority to security, particularly the security of our transportation system. 

In 1988, after the terrorist attack on Pam Am Flight 103, I authored legislation 

creating the President’s Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism. I was priv-
82

ileged to serve as a Member of that Commission. When the Commission completed 

its work, I introduced legislation embodying its recommendations, and these recommendations were the basis for the landmark Aviation Security Improvement Act 

of 1990. 

Following the tragic events of Sept. 11, 2001, I was actively involved in developing 

the Aviation & Transportation Security Act of 2001, which transferred security responsibilities from the airlines and private contractors to the Federal Government. 

I was actively involved in developing the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 

2002, which established a new security system for vessels and facilities along the 

navigatable waters of the United States. 

Today’s hearing focuses on the future role of the Select Committee on Homeland 

Security. Your Committee provided badly needed oversight as the new Department 

of Homeland Security began the difficult task of moving and integrating scores of 

government departments, with more than 180,000 employees. The Select Committee 

did a commendable job of overseeing the process of organizing the new Department, 

but the decisions on policy should remain—as it currently does—with the Committees that have the history and expertise in these areas. 

Recently, there have been proposals to expand the jurisdiction of the Select Committee, to give it primary jurisdiction over all legislation affecting the Homeland Security Department and all of the agencies incorporated in the Department. I strongly oppose this change because I believe it would undermine our effectiveness in 

overseeing the Departments and its agencies. 

A first difficulty is that the agencies making up the Department have many responsibilities that are not related to security. I will focus on agencies within the 

Transportation and Infrastructure Committee’s jurisdiction; I expect that the other 

Committees with jurisdiction over Homeland Security issues will do the same for 

their agencies. 

The Transportation and Infrastructure Committee (T&I Committee) has legislative responsibility over several agencies with both security and non-security functions that have been transferred to the Department of Homeland Security. For example, the Coast Guard has numerous responsibilities that are not directly related 

to security. The Coast Guard conducts commercial safety inspections; it licenses 

mariners; it has a system for registering vessels; it establishes and maintains buoys 

and other navigation aids, and it has responsibility for recreation boating recalls. 

The issues involving these responsibilities are complex, having evolved over many 

years. The T&I Committee has the Member expertise, the staff and the institutional 

memory to deal with these issues. I believe that the quality of Congressional oversight and legislation on these issues would be diminished if a new Committee was 

simply given responsibilities for all these issues. It could take years for the new 

Committee to develop the institutional background and expertise that currently resides in our Committee. 

The T&I Committee also has legislative responsibility over the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), which was transferred to the Department of 

Homeland Security and split in two. FEMA has the responsibility to prepare for and 

respond to disasters of all kinds—both natural, such as hurricanes and floods, and 

manmade. Since FEMA’s creation in 1979, the Transportation Committee has prepared and reported numerous pieces of legislation designed to further FEMA’s allhazards mission. I am concerned that this history and experience would be lost if 

oversight of FEMA is permanently transferred to the Select Committee, and that, 

in a Committee focused on terrorism and security issues, FEMA’s traditional, and 

critically important, mission of preparing for and responding to natural disasters 

may not receive the attention and oversight that they deserve. 

Our Committee is also the best equipped to deal with security issues affecting 

transportation. As I have already mentioned, our Committee developed the landmark Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990 (P.L. 101–604), which mandated 

background checks for airline and airport employees and the deployment of bomb 

detection equipment for baggage at our nation’s airports. During the 1990’s, our 

Committee continued to respond to the changing security needs through oversight 

and legislation. In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, the T&I Committee 

drafted and marked-up the Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001 

(ATSA). ATSA established a new Transportation Security Administration (TSA), 

Federalized the screening workforce, and required the screening of all checked baggage to protect against terrorist threats. 

While TSA was transferred to the newly created Department of Homeland Security, our Committee retained its jurisdiction over TSA’s transportation security activities. Since September 11th, our Aviation Subcommittee has held 16 hearings focusing on all aspects of security, including the deployment and use of security technology, general aviation, checked baggage screening systems, the computer assisted 
83

passenger pre-screening system, flight deck officer program, defense systems against 

missiles, and the financial impact of security on the aviation industry. Clearly our 

Committee has the expertise and the commitment to deal with aviation and other 

transportation related security. It would take a new Committee years to develop the 

background and expertise necessary to effectively deal with these issues. 

Moreover, it is important to have a single Committee balance the needs of security with those of safety, and the efficiency of our transportation system. The safety 

and efficiency of our transportation system are the responsibility of the Department 

of Transportation and the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure oversees 

these programs. 

To illustrate these interrelationships, some aviation security decisions have safety 

implications, and there is a need to balance possible security benefits against possible safety risks. For example, there may be safety risks if pilots are armed and 

fire shots which damage the aircraft. Similarly, if equipment is added to the body 

of aircraft to counteract missiles fired from the ground there may be an effect on 

aerodynamics and safety. 

There is also a need to balance security needs with the continued viability of our 

transportation system. Some security measures will add greatly to the time required 

for passengers to travel, or limit the ability of our transportation system to provide 

for the efficient movement of cargo. These needs must be balanced with security 

benefits and weighed against the costs of benefits and alternative measures. Aviation is an $800 billion sector of the U.S. national economy and the cornerstone upon 

which all other sectors rely to make economic progress. The opportunity, both in the 

U.S. and abroad, to travel for business has fostered a tremendous growth in electronics and aircraft manufacturing, communications, and tourism, which supports a 

$1.6 billion sector worldwide. 

Much of our economy depends on a ‘‘just in time’’ delivery system using all modes 

of transportation. If security measures undermine the effectiveness of this system, 

factory lines may shut down and retail stores may find it difficult to obtain the 

goods that Americans need in their daily lives. The Transportation and Infrastructure Committee has a long history of dealing with the tradeoffs between safety, security and economics. Again, I am concerned that a new Committee would lack the 

background and expertise to most effectively deal with these issues, and that we 

could lose the expertise that has developed over the years, or in may case, the nearly three decades of working with these issues. It is not enough to say that Members 

with particular areas of expertise will have an opportunity to be heard on these 

issues. The most effective way to influence policy is to be part of the debate and 

discussion in the early stages of policy formation; simply voting yes or no when legislation makes it to the House floor is generally not sufficient participation to craft 

policy. 

Supporters of consolidating all jurisdiction over the Department in one congressional committee argue that it is inefficient and distracting for the Department to 

have to deal with several committees. These arguments ignore the fact that the system of Committees we have established in the House is not based on an exclusive 

one to one relationship between each Committee and a cabinet agency; rather our 

Committee system is based on subject matter such as, science, small business, government reform, international relations, or infrastructure. These issues are spread 

over a number of different cabinet agencies. 

In short, we have developed a system in which each cabinet agency is within the 

jurisdiction of several congressional committees. I have attached a chart to my testimony that lists which House Committees oversee the different cabinet agencies. It 

indicates that most departments are responsible for reporting to at least 10 congressional committees. A number of departments have different committees overseeing 

major portions of their responsibilities. Keeping the status quo for the Department 

of Homeland Security would not place the Department in a different position than 

other cabinet agencies. 

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, Ms. Slaughter and Members of the Subcommittee, 

I strongly believe that congressional role in security will be most effective if we continue the Committee jurisdiction which is now in place. 

AGENCY: 

HOUSE COMMITTEES HAVING JURISDICTION:

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE 

- Agriculture Committee 

- Resources Committee 

- Government Reform Committee 

- Financial Services Committee 

- International Relations Committee 
84

- Small Business Committee 

- Select Com. On Homeland Security 

- Budget Committee 

- Appropriations Committee

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 

- Energy & Commerce Committee 

- Financial Services Committee 

- Ways & Means Committee 

- Science Committee 

- Resources Committee 

- International Relations Committee 

- Government Reform Committee 

- Judiciary Committee 

- Transportation & Infrastructure Com. 

- Budget Committee 

- Appropriations Committee

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

- Armed Services Committee 

- Veterans Affairs Committee 

- Judiciary Committee 

- Education & the Workforce Committee 

- Financial Services Committee 

- Government Reform Committee 

- Intelligence Committee 

- International Relations Committee 

- Transportation & Infrastructure Com. 

- Budget Committee 

- Appropriations Committee

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION 

- Education & the Workforce Committee 

- Financial Services Committee 

- Ways & Means Committee 

- Government Reform Committee 

- Agriculture Committee 

- Resources Committee 

- Science Committee 

- House Administration Committee 

- Budget Committee 

- Appropriations Committee

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

- Energy & Commerce Committee 

- Science Committee 

- Resources Committee 

- Government Reform Committee 

- Small Business Committee 

- Ways & Means Committee 

- Financial Services Committee 

- International Relations Committee 

- Transportation & Infrastructure Com. 

- Budget Committee 

- Appropriations Committee

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES 

- Energy & Commerce Committee 

- Ways & Means Committee 

- Government Reform Committee 

- Financial Services Committee 

- Energy & Commerce Committee 

- Science Committee 

- Resources Committee 

- Judiciary Committee 

- Select Com. on Homeland Security 

- Budget Committee 

- Appropriations Committee

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

- Select Com. On Homeland Security 
85

- Judiciary Committee 

- Transportation & Infrastructure Com. 

- Energy & Commerce Committee 

- Armed Services Committee 

- International Relations Committee 

- Science Committee 

- Financial Services Committee 

- Government Reform Committee 

- Education & the Workforce Committee 

- Intelligence Committee 

- Budget Committee 

- Appropriations Committee

DEPARTMENT OF HOUSE AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT 

- Financial Services Committee 

- Small Business Committee 

- Government Reform Committee 

- Transportation & Infrastructure Com. 

- Agriculture Committee 

- Judiciary Committee 

- Budget Committee 

- Appropriations Committee

DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR 

- Resources Committee 

- Science Committee 

- Agriculture Committee 

- Energy & Commerce Committee 

- Resources Committee 

- Transportation & Infrastructure Com. 

- Government Reform Committee 

- Justice Committee 

- Budget Committee 

- Appropriations Committee

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 

- Education & the Workforce Committee 

- Ways & Means Committee 

- Small Business Committee 

- Financial Services Committee 

- International Relations Committee 

- Veterans Committee 

- Judiciary Committee 

- Government Reform Committee 

- Resources Committee 

- Transportation & Infrastructure Com. 

- Budget Committee 

- 

Appropriations Committee

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 

- Judiciary Committee 

- Select Com. On Homeland Security 

- Energy & Commerce Committee 

- Financial Services Committee 

- Small Business Committee 

- Ways & Means Committee 

- Education & the Workforce Committee 

- Resources Committee 

- Government Reform Committee 

- Science Committee 

- Transportation & Infrastructure Com. 

- Agriculture Committee 

- Intelligence Committee 

- International Relations Committee 

- Budget Committee 

- Appropriations Committee

DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

- International Relations 
86

- Financial Services Committee 

- Intelligence Committee 

- Armed Services Committee 

- Resources Committee 

- Science Committee 

- Judiciary Committee 

- Transportation & Infrastructure Com. 

- Energy & Commerce Committee 

- Small Business Committee 

- Ways & Means Committee 

- Government Reform Committee 

- Select Com. on Homeland Security 

- Budget Committee 

- Appropriations Committee

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

- Transportation & Infrastructure Com. 

- Select Com. on Homeland Security 

- Science Committee 

- Small Business Committee 

- Government Reform Committee 

- International Relations Committee 

- Education & Labor Committee 

- Ways & Means Committee 

- Judiciary Committee 

- Resources Committee 

- Armed Services Committee 

- Budget Committee 

- Appropriations Committee

DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY 

- Financial Services Committee 

- Ways & Means Committee 

- Government Reform Committee 

- Agriculture Committee 

- Education & the Workforce Committee 

- Intelligence Committee 

- Small Business Committee 

- Transportation & Infrastructure Com. 

- Veteran’s Affairs Committee 

- International Relations Committee 

- Judiciary Committee 

- Select Com. on Homeland Security 

- Budget Committee 

- Appropriations Committee

DEPARTMENT OF VETERAN’s ADMINISTRATION 

- Veteran’s Affairs Committee 

- Armed Services Committee 

- Financial Services Committee 

- Government Reform Committee 

- Budget Committee 

- Appropriations Committee 

* Resources used: Congressional Quarterly’s Washington Information Directory,

Agencies’ Congressional Testimony and phone calls to Agencies’ Congressional Affairs offices. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Mica, you made emphasis on aviation, of 

which you both have tremendous expertise in that area. The attacks of September 11th, 2001 revealed, among other things, a lack 

of integration between Federal agencies involved with aviation security and those involved with border and immigration issues. 

Could you educate us on what your committee has done to address 

the integration of aviation security with other relevant Homeland 

Security missions? 

Mr. MICA. Well, that is a good example, Mr. Chairman. 
87

The Homeland Security agency that—our department we created 

really doesn’t do much to protect us. In fact, I think it has bogged 

the process down for the most part. It is at best an ineffective cumbersome additional layer of bureaucracy. 

Let me give you a good example. What say do you have over the 

State Department? None. Who issued the visas for the terrorists? 

The State Department. Who got the information—who should have 

had the information about bad guys and gotten it to the State Department employees who were issuing the visas? That would be the 

CIA. You don’t have any say over the CIA, the State Department; 

you dragged in Secret Service, but you don’t have the FBI included. 

What is the purpose of this Homeland Security committee? 

Shouldn’t—and the Department? Shouldn’t it be, first of all, prevention? And then, secondly, it should be coordination of all of the 

Homeland Security things that protect us. And I submit it doesn’t 

do it. 

Just in the aviation area, it has created another layer of bureaucracy. I haven’t been able to get a damned answer out of anybody 

in Homeland Security since they took over. In fact, now you have 

this game of Under Secretary or assistants to Tom Ridge, and then 

you have Ridge up here. Try to get something done with TSA, and 

it is almost impossible to get anyone to move because of the new 

layers of bureaucracy that we go through. 

So I am telling you that rather than improve the situation, I 

think it has complicated the situation and we are less safe as a result of the new bureaucracy and impediments that have been in 

place. 

If the committee is looking for something to do, look at coordinating some of these government activities. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Let me supplement, if I may, the Chairman’s response in two points. In the report of the Presidential Commission 

on Aviation Security and Terrorism, the Pan Am 103 Commission, 

we recommended the establishment within the Executive Branch of 

a central entity whose job would be to coordinate intelligence gathered at home and abroad, and to disseminate that intelligence on 

aviation security matters to all relevant agencies. We also proposed 

the establishment within the Department of Transportation of an 

Assistant Secretariat for Aviation Security. That latter was objected to by the administration, so Mr. Hammersmith and I agreed 

on an advisor to the Secretary, an assistant to the Secretary For 

Aviation Security. 

Second, and we were way ahead. Had that recommendation been 

implemented, there would have been coordination of information 

from all of the relevant security and intelligence agencies in advance of September 11th, and the ability to evaluate and disseminate information properly. 

Secondly, in the transportation security bill that we wrote in our 

committee, we required at the—because that was our jurisdiction, 

Department of Transportation, coordination among all the modes of 

transportation for security purposes. It would be up to the—we anticipated it would be up to the, if there were a Department of Security, to coordinate with the intelligence agencies. But we foresaw 

that need, and we crafted the language to require coordination 

within the Department of all the modes on all aspects of transpor-
88

tation security so that there would be cross-fertilizing, if you will, 

one another. 

Mr. MICA. Might I just add something here. We crafted in the 

original TSA bill, we worked on this together, exactly what Mr. 

Oberstar said. We saw that you needed a coordination of information about bad guys and intelligence. That is one thing that was 

lacking. That was in the TSA bill. When you created the Homeland 

Security bill, it was transferred over there. So what we started was 

transferred over there. They have since created, I guess, an agency 

to do something on that. We had them in last week. They still don’t 

have a watchlist, they still do not have a coordinated list that we 

asked for when we created the original TSA entity. And who is in 

charge of that? Are you in charge? Is Homeland Security in charge 

of that? 

You see, what we have created hasn’t gotten us to where we 

should have been a year ago. It actually delayed the process, and 

now it is sort que pasa as far as who is responsible. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mrs. Slaughter. 

Ms. SLAUGHTER. I just have one question I would like to ask of 

both of you. If the legislative authority for DHS is given to a committee, standing committee, how would you deal with the authorization of, let us say, Coast Guard and FEMA which has both the 

DHS responsibilities as well as domestic responsibilities of other 

types? 

Mr. MICA. Again, I think you need to go back and look at the 

core of how we created Homeland Security. It should be for prevention, it should be for coordination. Coordination across the board. 

And then for oversight. I think those are the important missions. 

Leave the standing jurisdiction with the committees and their expertise, and your folks are—your folk’s mission or the folks on this 

committee, if we have a committee, a select committee or whatever 

it is, standing committee, is a coordinating effort to see that things 

are moving forward, or at least some better oversight of what has 

been created and pushed into Homeland Security. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. I would supplement that comment and in support 

of it by saying that not all cabinet departments have a single authorizing committee over all the jurisdiction within that department. For example, within DOT in the National Highway Traffic 

Safety Administration where we do the roadway rules for road 

physical safety matters, the Energy and Commerce Committee has 

jurisdiction over the vehicle that goes on that roadway. And not all 

cabinet agencies have a single authorization bill for the entire department. We do a separate authorization within our Committee 

for FAA, a separate one for the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, we are doing a separate authorization for the Federal 

Highway and Transit Administration. We do a separate authorization bill for pipeline safety and so on. I need not cite all of them. 

So in some cases there, as in the case of highway safety on vehicle side, we share that with the Energy and Commerce Committee 

with whom we work, we share some aspects of pipeline safety with 

the Energy and Commerce Committee with whom we work those 

matters out. So I think leaving the authorization process in the 

hands of the standing committees has worked very well. It also 

provides multiplicity of oversight. 
89

Ms. SLAUGHTER. Thank you both. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Chairman Cox. 

Mr. COX. Thank you. 

I want to congratulate both of you for giving very cogent testimony, and thank you for being here and for the work that went 

into preparing the testimony for the rules subcommittee. As you 

know, the Chairman of the subcommittee has done a lot of work 

over a period of a year and a half really examining this question 

from a big picture standpoint. And the contribution that you have 

made today I think is very, very helpful. And I agree with much 

of it. 

In particular, Chairman Mica, I agree with your dichotomy between the functional responsibility of the standing committees that 

have long existed in the House to deal with all the pre-9/11 real 

world, and the industries that are allocated committee by committee within their respective jurisdictions. We will hear from the 

chairman of the Ways and Means Committee shortly that he supports the creation of a permanent committee, provided that the jurisdiction of Ways and Means with respect to Customs, specifically 

the Customs missions as they relate to trade and revenue is preserved. And that makes sense if you have got a focus on Homeland 

Security, because Homeland Security is not about trade, except 

with a really expansive and I think dangerous definition. 

It is not about revenue. And that is what Ways and Means is all 

about. We may have a more difficult nut to crack with aviation 

simply because the mode of attack on 9/11 was airplanes, and as 

a result Congress rather rapidly passed what we thought was remedial legislation. But it may not provide the model for what we 

want to do everywhere. I mean, we may have learned some things 

about our response that we wish we could improve upon. And I 

would hope that it would be the responsibility, the continuing responsibility of the Transportation Infrastructure Committee to be 

responsible for those things. 

Specifically, I would hope that even though we deregulated aviation in 1978, as you know, it is heavily regulated, and I would hope 

it would be the continuing responsibility of the Committee on 

Transportation and Infrastructure to be responsible for regulation 

of that industry. I would hope that it would be the continuing responsibility of the Committee on Energy and Commerce to look 

after regulation of the nuclear industry and the chemical industry, 

and so on, all the way through the Congress, because that expertise 

has been developed over a long period of time and because it involves so much more than Homeland Security. 

So your formula is one that at least insofar as I understand your 

presentation of it agrees with mine, and that is, that you have got 

a Department of Homeland Security that is focused on prevention, 

protection, and response, and is not going to become the regulator 

of every aspect of American life; it is not going to become the regulator of every aspect of American commerce. But, as I have said, 

before other panels have testified today, I think there is a risk the 

Department could morph into those things. 

And that is one of the reasons that we want very, very strenuous 

oversight from the Congress that created it so recently, because if 

the Department, which surely is going to exist indefinitely, if the 
90

new cabinet department history suggests they don’t go away, is 

going to grow. And if it is going to grow and last indefinitely, then 

it needs to stay focused, and it needs to stay focused on protecting 

Americans and our security and not get into all these other areas. 

And we will lose our competitiveness in all these industries if we 

regulate them not with a view to the big picture, which includes 

competition of global commerce, job creation, investment, in the 

case of transportation safety and all these other things. 

If we have on the blinders of security and that is all, and then 

we become—we, the Department of Homeland Security in this case, 

become the regulators of all these industries, then the regulation 

will suffer, the industries will suffer, the country will suffer, and 

it won’t work. So I think that dichotomy makes a great deal of 

sense. And it is just as important that we circumscribe the mission 

of the Department of Homeland Security as it is that we respect 

the traditional jurisdictions of the committees. And I think they go 

hand in hand. 

But I would appreciate any further comment you want to make 

on that. I am just trying to, I guess, express my gratitude for and 

agreement with much of what you said. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. If the Chairman permit. Chairman Young was 

particularly insistent on addressing vigorously the Coast Guard 

matter, and it falls in line with what you have said, Chairman Cox. 

I would call your attention to the authorizing language for the U.S. 

Coast Guard. It is what I call an itinerant agency. It started out 

as the revenue cutter service in 1789, the oldest agency of the Federal Government. But the authorizing language says or refers to 

the agent in conferring power: The Secretary of the Department in 

which the Coast Guard resides. Every other authorization refers to 

the Secretary. 

FAA, we mean by that, the Secretary of Transportation. But the 

Coast Guard has moved around so many times. But when it has 

moved from an independent entity to the Naval Department, and 

then to the War Department and then to the Commerce Department, and to the Treasury Department, and then back to Commerce and then to the Department of Transportation, it has moved 

intact. Jurisdiction over its functions was not shared among committees of either the House or the Senate. And that is what Chairman Young wants to see, is this jurisdiction remains intact and as 

you suggested. So we can address all these other responsibilities of 

the Coast Guard in the context of security and weave security into 

the total role of the Coast Guard. 

Mr. MICA. If I may. There are some functional responsibilities 

that Homeland Security, the Department has inherited that they 

are responsible for, and that is important and I think your committee should look at some of those things. 

Let me say that I have great concern about the Homeland Security Committee and also the Department we created. It has huge 

gaps in it. For example, let me give you just two practical examples 

that I have worked on this week. Biometric standards. And Ms. 

Slaughter talked—we were talking about, you know, what happened before September 11th. We still do not have an acceptable 

biometrics standard that is acceptable by all agencies. I have 328 

agencies that have various fire—carrying firearms on airplanes. I 
91

have no biometric identification standard. What is interesting, this 

week I found out State Department through their Visit U.S.A., is 

developing a biometric standard to be put in passports and visas. 

Who the hell is coordinating this stuff? We are 2 years out. We 

don’t have an ID card for people who work at an airport because 

nobody will make or coordinate a decision. And I have got one 

agency hung out here making those kinds of decision. And I am 

thinking, well, if they adopt that and it doesn’t go with this, somebody needs to be in charge of this stuff, folks. 

This morning I had a briefing with the CIA—I can’t go into all 

the details, but we are concerned with the terrorist threat. They 

blow some more planes out of the sky. You ain’t seen nothing compared to what happened at the economy on 9/11. And this is the 

kind of threat that we deal with. I don’t deal as much with it as 

much with Mr. Oberstar as I do with the Ranking Member of the 

Aviation Subcommittee, but we talk about this all the time. 

As of this morning, when I talked to CIA, FBI still is out of the 

loop on a lot of the terrorist threat. I can’t go into specifics here. 

Who the hell is coordinating this stuff? And I am just chairman of 

aviation, so I am looking at a little bit, and this one doesn’t know 

what the other one is still doing. 

So you have this committee, if we have a select committee on a 

permanent committee, it has some important responsibilities of coordinating Federal agencies, some that were left out here, that we 

pieced this together. So you have an important responsibility. And 

then coordinating some of these things among—and there is turf 

among the committees and the jurisdictions that they have—in seeing that this all comes together. Without being expertise, putting 

together expertise that each committee, standing committee has 

and all of that. 

So coordination is important. It is lacking. And your jurisdiction, 

I am here to tell you, you are not looking at enough of the picture 

and Homeland Security I don’t think is. Sorry. Frustrating. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Further questions? 

Mr. COX. I appreciate that, and my red light is on. Thank you, 

Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Well, Mr. Mica has made a series of extraordinarily important points that are very helpful to us. 

Ms. Lofgren Thank you both for— 

Ms. SLAUGHTER. Just one other question before you go. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Yes. 

Ms. SLAUGHTER. Because I agree with you that the Agency is not 

working well. We don’t have a threat assessment after all this 

time, and they are waiting for each State to make them own and 

go over them to make sure they are accurate. So it could be a year 

or more. 

But the one thing that is most troubling, I just got a notice that 

the governor of my State has managed to get some money from 

somewhere, 500,000 to give one of my small counties on the border 

that protects one of the—the only power system in the United 

States. And yet I think in your committee we can’t get the grant 

money out for first responders. So can we make a complaint about 

that as well, and tell me where in the world that money is and 

what we plan to do about that? 
92

Mr. OBERSTAR. That goes back to my comments about FEMA, 

that I didn’t think it was an appropriate step to take FEMA into 

the Department of Homeland Security because it would be buried 

in with a whole group of other agencies and its response to natural 

disasters confused without any clear delineation lines a responsibility for counterterrorism actions. And the funding has indeed gotten merged with the other programs. And I think if you look at the 

total funding for first responders, particularly firefighters, you will 

find that funding level is less than when we started because of the 

fundability of dollars within that department, and it has been 

moved around. 

Ms. SLAUGHTER. Well, FEMA responds to national emergency 

and they pay money out, but for some reason, the money to these 

first responders, which has been paid out by them and that they 

longingly wait for reimbursement just doesn’t come. And we were 

wondering if you could, and your committee seems to be where it 

is bottled up, what you can do about it. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. We can certainly work together with the majority 

to inquire into that matter. 

Ms. SLAUGHTER. I can promise you that I don’t think any of us 

go home to find anything more disconcerting than the fact that 

budgets are broken or the money that they have spent is more than 

they can afford and have no way to cover it. And we just really 

have to deal with that. That is as frustrating to me as the fact that 

we have no threat assessment, which makes no sense to me. 

Ms. LOFGREN. Would the gentlelady yield for just—I don’t have 

a question. I do think the question you have asked is an important 

one, and obviously no one committee has all the responsibility as 

collectively the government has fallen short and we need to fix it. 

I just wanted to note, if I could indulge the committee, that I have 

another committee meeting at 5:00 over in the Capitol that I cannot avoid. And I see the Chairman of my other committee is here, 

and I want to assure the Chairman that I have read every word 

of his testimony and beg his forgiveness for having to leave. 

Thank you. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Thank you. Thank you both very much. 

It is our privilege to welcome the chairman of the Committee on 

the Judiciary, Mr. Sensenbrenner.

Mr. Chairman, welcome. We look forward to your testimony. Of 

course your entire testimony will be part of the record, and we look 

forward to studying it. If you could perhaps, as we have been asking witnesses, to summarize your testimony in 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JAMES SENSENBRENNER, A 

REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF WISCONSIN, AND CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. I am very happy to summarize my testimony. But first let me explain the props that are in front of me. 

This is the work product of the Judiciary Committee since September 11th relative to Homeland Security Activities and other 

matters within the jurisdiction of the committee. We have this 

stack of hearings, this stack of legislative reports on bills that have 

become law, and this stack of oversight reports that were either 
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done directly by the committee, by the General Accounting Office, 

or by the inspector generals of various agencies. 

The Judiciary Committee, I think, has an unprecedented work 

product in dealing with these issues that are within our jurisdiction. 

I am pleased to appear before the Subcommittee on Rules to testify on the topic you have under discussion. I believe that, given 

our track record—and you see the paper there, and a lot of hours 

were put into developing that paper—that the Judiciary Committee 

should retain its jurisdiction over all the matters it currently it 

has. While I am not opposed to a Committee on Homeland Security 

as such, I believe that the proponents of such a committee have the 

burden of proving that a distinct Homeland Security Committee is 

an overall benefit to Congress and to our country. To date, I do not 

believe that burden has been met. 

The Committee on the Judiciary has actively participated in the 

response to the 9/11 attacks. This is entirely appropriate because 

our jurisdiction includes ‘‘the judiciary and judicial proceedings, 

civil and criminal,’’ ‘‘espionage and counterfeiting,’’ ‘‘civil liberties,’’ 

‘‘immigration and naturalization,’’ and ‘‘subversive activities affecting the internal security of the United States.’’ 

I believe that the Judiciary Committee’s record demonstrates 

that we are best able to meet that challenge in those areas that 

have been traditionally within our jurisdiction. We have the expertise, we have the staff, we have been active, and we have produced 

results. 

The creation of the Department of Homeland Security touches on 

the jurisdiction of the committee on the judiciary in three principal 

areas: Law enforcement agencies at DHS, Federal and State law 

enforcement training, and immigration. The committee has unique 

expertise in each of these areas, and it should continue to exercise 

jurisdiction over them. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The first aspect of the Homeland Security 

Act that implicates the jurisdiction of the Committee on the Judiciary is the transfer of law enforcement agencies and their training 

activities. The HSA transferred several criminal and law enforcement agencies to DHS—the Secret Service, the Immigration and 

Naturalization Service, the Customs Service, the Transportation 

Security Administration, the Federal Protective Service and the 

Coast Guard. 

The Committee on the Judiciary has general jurisdiction over the 

Secret Service and the successors to the INS. It has jurisdiction 

over the successors to the Customs Service, TSA, FPS, and the 

Coast Guard to the extent that these agencies enforce criminal law 

and exercise criminal law enforcement powers. The committee has 

jurisdiction over the functions of the former National Infrastructure Protection Center, the Domestic Energy Response Team and 

the law enforcement training activities of the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center and the Office of Domestic Preparedness. 

The Committee on the Judiciary has had jurisdiction over criminal law enforcement since 1880. This tradition largely derives from 

the jurisdiction over ‘‘the judiciary and judicial proceedings, civil 

and criminal,’’ and ‘‘subversive activities affecting the internal security of the United States.’’ The committee has played the lead 
94

role in the House in criminal law enforcement policy. We have an 

extensive record of legislative and oversight activity that is set 

forth at in full in my written statement. Our committee has the expertise and experience in those areas, and it simply cannot be 

matched by a new committee, with a short history and a new staff. 

There is more to law enforcement and training than just security. There is an important balancing to be done between security 

and civil liberties. It is dangerous to put that balancing task in a 

committee, the primary focus of which is security. I fear that civil 

liberties interest will be sacrificed. 

Finally, I believe that the Committee on the Judiciary should retain jurisdiction over the Department of Justice, its prosecutorial 

activities, and its primary law enforcement agencies, including the 

FBI. Jurisdiction over the law enforcement agencies in DHS should 

remain in the same committee as the DOJ law enforcement agencies. There should be one unified approach that takes into account 

the complex balancing act that must occur. 

Having some agencies under the jurisdiction of a committee that 

has traditionally carefully balanced civil liberties concerns with law 

enforcement concerns and having others under a committee that is 

focused solely on security is a prescription for disaster. 

The Committee on the Judiciary has had jurisdiction over immigration and naturalization since 1946. Since that time, the committee has played an integral role over immigration policy. It has 

essentially created modern immigration law. It has an extensive 

record of oversight and legislative activity that is set forth in great 

length in my written statement. 

As the record in my written statement shows, the Committee on 

the Judiciary has unparalleled experience and expertise in the immigration area and has demonstrated its ability to identify and 

remedy the vulnerabilities in our immigration system that expose 

our nation to risk. For decades it has done this work. Since 9/11, 

it has responded to the call to further strengthen our immigration 

policy. 

There is another reason why immigration jurisdiction should remain with the Committee on the Judiciary. Although countering 

the terrorist threat is of significant importance in implementing 

our immigration laws, it is certainly not the only issue. Rather, immigration involves much more than homeland security, reuniting 

families, providing needed workers for American businesses, offering havens to refugees, and deporting those aliens who have broken 

our laws. 

Security and legal immigration must be balanced. We must use 

our immigration enforcement powers to both protect our people 

from those who break our laws as well as to facilitate the admission of lawful entrants. 

Another complexity in immigration policy is that authority over 

immigration is spread across four departments—Homeland Security, Justice, State, and Labor. The Judiciary Committee currently 

has jurisdiction over each of those components as well as over other 

agencies of limited jurisdiction that are charged with carrying out 

our immigration laws. 

The variety of concerns involved here cries out for the experience 

and expertise of the committee that I chair. This committee has 
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long had the responsibility of balancing immigration, law enforcement, terrorism, and civil rights issues involved. A committee narrowly focused on security with a much shorter history is not the 

best place to try to balance the many complex interests involved. 

Rather, the Judiciary Committee’s experience in dealing with the 

various immigration components counsels in favor of its continued 

jurisdiction. 

I also want to address the argument that the DHS cannot function effectively if it must report to multiple committees. 

First, DHS reports to several committees now; and while there 

is always room for improvement, the committee operation is effectively functioning now. 

Secondly, every agency reports to at least four committees—a 

House authorizing committee, the House Appropriations Committee, a Senate authorizing committee and the Senate Appropriations Committee. Moreover, many existing agencies report to more 

than one authorizing committee in the House. All of these agencies 

are able to function effectively within these arrangements. 

Third, the Committee on the Judiciary and the Select Committee 

on Homeland Security have already shown an ability to work together effectively on projects of mutual interest. We have already 

had one joint hearing, and another one will be held tomorrow. We 

are currently working on first responder legislation. Regardless of 

how this matter is resolved, if there is a Committee on Homeland 

Security, either select or permanent, I expect this working relationship to continue. 

In short, the DHS is functioning effectively under the current 

committee system, and it can continue to do so in the future. 

However the question regarding the future of the House Homeland Security Committee is resolved, I emphatically believe that 

the Committee on the Judiciary should retain jurisdiction over all 

the matters it now has. This is what we have done. It ain’t broke, 

and it doesn’t need fixing. We have the experience and the expertise. Over the years, we have shown the ability to apply the unified, balanced approach that these issues require; and this successful formula should not be altered. 

Thank you. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JAMES SENSENBRENNER 

Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to appear before the Subcommittee on Rules to testify concerning ‘‘Homeland Security Jurisdiction: The Perspective of Committee 

Leaders.’’ To state my position briefly, I believe that the Committee on the Judiciary 

should retain jurisdiction over all matters that it currently has. In addition, while 

I am not opposed to a Committee on Homeland Security as such, I believe that the 

proponents of such a committee have the burden of proof, and that burden has not 

yet been satisfied. 

Now let me explain that in more detail. As you know, Rule X sets forth the jurisdictional parameters of the various committees of the House. In general, I believe 

that Rule X is working well. However, the challenges brought on by the murderous 

terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 require us to reexamine all that we are 

doing, including the operation of Rule X, to ensure that we are doing all that we 

can to protect our national security. 

The Committee on the Judiciary has actively participated in the response to the 

9/11 attacks and the new world that we face. That is entirely appropriate because 

our jurisdiction includes: ‘‘the judiciary and judicial proceedings, civil and criminal;’’ 

‘‘. . . espionage and counterfeiting;’’ ‘‘civil liberties;’’ ‘‘immigration and naturalization;’’ and ‘‘subversive activities affecting the internal security of the United States.’’ 
96

See generally Clause 1(k) of Rule X. Among other things, the Committee was heavily 

involved in the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act and the Homeland Security Act. 

I believe that our record demonstrates that we are best able to continue to meet 

the challenge in those areas that have traditionally been within our jurisdiction. Let 

me now discuss that in more detail. 

I. THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

On November 25, 2002, President Bush signed the Homeland Security Act 

(‘‘HSA’’) creating the new Department of Homeland Security (‘‘DHS’’) by combining 

numerous existing agencies that deal with various aspects of homeland security. 

Pub. L. No. 107–296. Section 1503 of the HSA provided that it is the sense of Congress that the House and the Senate should review their respective committee structures in light of the creation of the Department. In addition, § 4(b)(3) of House Resolution 5 requires the Select Committee to conduct a study of the operation and implementation of the House Rules with regard to homeland security. 

The creation of DHS touches on the jurisdiction of the Committee on the Judiciary 

in three principal areas: immigration, law enforcement agencies at DHS, and federal 

and state law enforcement training both at the Federal Law Enforcement Training 

Center (‘‘FLETC’’) and through grants to state and local law enforcement administered by the Office for Domestic Preparedness (‘‘ODP’’). The Committee has unique 

expertise in each of these areas, and it should continue to exercise jurisdiction over 

them. 

II. IMMIGRATION

The Committee on the Judiciary has jurisdiction over ‘‘immigration and naturalization’’ under clause (1)(k)(8) of Rule X. The HSA transferred the functions of 

what had been the Immigration and Naturalization Service (‘‘INS’’) to DHS and divided those functions between what are now known as the Bureau of Customs and 

Border Protection (‘‘CBP’’), the Bureau of Immigration and Citizenship Enforcement 

(‘‘ICE’’), and the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services (‘‘CIS’’). See HSA 

§§ 401 et seq.

A. HISTORY

Beginning in 1893, the House had a standing Committee on Immigration and 

Naturalization. That committee had general jurisdiction over immigration and naturalization matters, but between 1893 and 1906, it also shared some matters in this 

area with the Committee on the Judiciary. In the Legislative Reorganization Act of 

1946, the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization was abolished, and its jurisdiction was transferred to the Committee on the Judiciary. 

Since that time, the Committee on the Judiciary has had exclusive jurisdiction 

over immigration and naturalization matters, and it has played an integral role in 

immigration policy. Specifically, the Committee has played a major role in a number 

of major immigration bills that have created and recreated modern immigration law: 

the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, the Immigration and Nationality Act 

Amendments of 1965, the Refugee Act of 1980, the Immigration Reform and Control 

Act of 1986, the Immigration Act of 1990, and the Illegal Immigration Reform and 

Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996. 

In addition, since 1946, it has held hundreds of legislative and oversight hearings 

on these matters. Indeed, the Committee’s Subcommittee on Immigration, Border 

Security, and Claims recognized the threat posed by alien terrorists well before 9/

11. Two particularly notable hearings that foreshadowed the attacks were entitled 

‘‘Terrorist Threats to the United States’’ on January 26, 2000, and ‘‘Law Enforcement Problems at the Border Between the United States and Canada, Focusing on 

the Issues of Drug Smuggling, Illegal Immigration, and Terrorism’’ on April 14, 

1999. 

B. THE RECORD SINCE 9/11

Currently, the Committee deals with most immigration matters in its Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims. The Subcommittee’s initial 

investigation of the September 11 attacks established that alien terrorists have 

studied our immigration system and they have identified and exploited weaknesses 

in that system in planning and carrying out their attacks. For that reason, the Subcommittee has focused special attention on the legislative, procedural, and technological vulnerabilities in our nation’s immigration system, so that those 

vulnerabilities can be identified and remedied. The Subcommittee has also worked 
97

to ensure that our immigration enforcement officers have the resources and authority to protect the United States from those aliens who would come to our country 

to harm the American people. 

Since 9/11, the Subcommittee has conducted 35 hearings on immigration matters. 

Among the most important of these are hearings entitled: ‘‘US VISIT: A Down Payment on Homeland Security’’ on March 18, 2004; ‘‘Funding for Immigration in the 

President’s 2005 Budget’’ on March 11, 2004 and February 25, 2004; ‘‘War on Terrorism: Immigration Enforcement Since September 11, 2001’’ on May 8, 2003; ‘‘Department of Homeland Security Transition: Bureau of Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement’’ on April 10, 2003; ‘‘The Immigration and Naturalization Service’s 

Interactions with Hesham Mohamed Ali Hedayet’’ on October 9, 2002; ‘‘The Role of 

Immigration in the Department of Homeland Security’’ on June 27, 2002; ‘‘The Risk 

to Homeland Security From Identity Fraud and Identity Theft’’ on June 25, 2002; 

‘‘The INS’s March 2002 Notification of Approval of Change of Status for Pilot Training for Terrorist Hijackers Mohammed Atta and Marwan Al-Shehhi’’ on March 19, 

2002; ‘‘The Implications of Transnational Terrorism for the Visa Waiver Program’’ 

on February 28, 2002; and ‘‘Using Information Technology to Secure America’s Borders’’ on October 11, 2001. 

The Committee has also conducted effective oversight through other means. For 

example, a Committee oversight letter to the former INS requesting the immigration file of Hesham Hedayet, who killed two and wounded several others at Los Angeles International Airport on July 4, 2002, revealed that the INS had failed to investigate the possible terrorist connections of this asylum applicant who claimed 

that he was suspected of terrorism in his home country. Committee requests 

brought this issue to the attention of the Attorney General, who ordered INS to review all existing asylum files ‘‘to ascertain whether other individuals may be 

present in the United States who have admitted that they have been accused of terrorist activity or terrorist associations.’’ Such a review had not been previously undertaken despite other aliens having been able to use the asylum system to plan 

and carry out terrorist attacks in the United States, including Ramzi Yousef, mastermind of the first World Trade Center bombing, and Mir Aimal Kansi, who killed 

two CIA employees outside CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia. 

A Committee request for information about the INS’s erroneous waiver into the 

United States of four Pakistani nationals, who were crewmen on a vessel that 

docked in Chesapeake, Virginia and who later absconded, led to the issuance of an 

order that all INS employees follow agency directives. The Committee’s subsequent 

request for those directives helped spur the consolidation of those directives for the 

use of INS employees. Prior to this incident, those directives filled ‘‘roughly one-half 

dozen boxes . . . and several volumes of electronic materials.’’ Today, most of this 

information has been consolidated and updated electronically and is available to employees of INS’s successors at headquarters via CD–ROM and the intranet, and we 

understand that in the near future all internal directives will be accessible to all 

employees including those in the field. 

The Committee’s investigation and requests for information into the activities of 

John Allen Muhammad and Lee Boyd Malvo, convicted in connection with sniper 

shootings in the Washington, D.C. area in October 2002, has revealed loopholes in 

the policies and procedures for readmitting U.S. citizens to the United States when 

they return from countries in the Western hemisphere—loopholes that could be exploited by alien terrorists and criminals. The Committee is evaluating possible legislative fixes to these problems. 

Committee oversight of the detention and release of alien criminals brought the 

problem of alien criminal recidivism to the attention of the INS. In working for the 

passage of Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 

the Committee dramatically increased the number of criminal aliens detained and 

deported by the INS. The Committee’s continued attention to the threat posed by 

alien criminals has contributed to a restructuring of staffing of the Institutional Removal Program, and a reassessment of the entire manner in which ICE identifies 

criminal aliens in the United States. When this restructuring is completed in 2005, 

ICE should be able to identify many, if not most, aliens in criminal detention in the 

United States. 

Nor has our oversight work been limited to simple letters to the agencies. We 

have also requested a wide variety of General Accounting Office and Inspector General investigations to support oversight on Homeland Security and Immigration topics. 

Committee hearings and oversight investigations in 2001 determined that one of 

the root causes of weak internal enforcement against immigration absconders was 

the breakdown of voluntary alien registration record updates at the INS. Voluntary 

status updates by registered aliens have been required by law since the Alien Reg-
98

istration Act of 1940 introduced the first national requirement that all aliens in the 

United States be registered with the government. It required registration, 

fingerprinting, and reports of changes of address, but fell into disuse in the 1990s. 

To confirm and document our findings, on April 10, 2002, we requested and received the following report from GAO: ‘‘Homeland Security: INS Cannot Locate 

Many Aliens Because It Lacks Reliable Address Information’’ dated November 2002. 

The report detailed INS’s negligence with regard to address and status updates. 

With the report in hand, we scheduled a series of high level meetings with immigration officials in December, 2002 and in January, 2003. As a result, INS’s successors 

at DHS agreed to reinvigorate their enforcement of the registration law, and told 

us that the GAO study provided valuable guidance that would be used both to address policy and to improve management of information technology to update and 

maintain alien registration address and status records. 

In 2001, I became deeply concerned after Committee hearings revealed indifferent 

oversight by the Department of Justice of INS’s systems planning, procurement, and 

project management that led to failures in INS enforcement systems. I requested 

GAO to investigate DOJ’s oversight of INS with regard to four specific systems used 

to track non-immigrant entry and exit information (Automated I–94 system), alien 

criminal records (ENFORCE), criminal alien fingerprints and photos (IDENT), and 

alien identity cards and Border Crossing Cards (ICPS). 

The resulting report, ‘‘Information Technology: Justice Plans to Improve Oversight 

of Agency (INS) Projects’’ dated November 2002, has been extremely helpful not only 

to continuing oversight by this Committee, but also to the appropriators as they 

evaluate costs and benefits and agency performance at DHS, where these immigration functions are now located. 

In 2002, Judiciary subcommittee hearings regarding identity theft and the ease 

with which the 9/11 terrorists were able to obtain drivers’ licenses using fraudulent 

information led to our recognition that a key factor in confirming identity is whether 

the states employ information available from the Social Security Administration 

(‘‘SSA’’). After staff investigations determined weaknesses with the SSA process, I 

requested that the GAO investigate, resulting in the study ‘‘Social Security Numbers: Improved SSN Verification and Exchange of States’ Driver Records Would Enhance Identity Verification’’ dated September 2003. The study led to three important 

recommendations that, if implemented by SSA, would lead to a reduction in driver’s 

license fraud. 

The Committee’s oversight of both law enforcement information sharing and compliance with the Privacy Act led me to request that the GAO investigate whether 

complaints by the federal and state law enforcement agencies regarding the SSA’s 

lack of cooperation are valid. Because SSA did not have a clear or consistent policy, 

I asked GAO to describe SSA’s disclosure policy for law enforcement and how it 

compares with the Privacy Act and the policies of other federal agencies and to 

evaluate SSA’s actual sharing of information with law enforcement. The resulting 

study ‘‘Disclosure Policy for Law Enforcement Allows Information Sharing, but SSA 

Needs to Ensure Consistent Application,’’ dated September, 2003, included convincing evidence that SSA has not done enough to educate law enforcement agencies 

and its own employees about disclosure policies. More importantly, the SSA Commissioner, as a result of this study, agreed to update its policy manuals to clarify 

the rules for SSA law enforcement disclosures. 

We plan to continue to pursue oversight of the SSA’s responsiveness to the conclusions of both of these reports because of the critical importance of SSA records with 

regard to prevention of immigration fraud and identity theft. The SSA’s policies and 

practices are particularly important with regard to enforcement of employer laws 

barring employment of illegal immigrants. As part of our ongoing oversight into federal agencies’ failure to enforce employer related immigration laws, on June 26, 

2003 together with Representative Shaw of the House Subcommittee on Social Security, I requested a GAO report addressing SSA’s management and policy practices 

for employers who employ large numbers of illegal aliens. The study is looking at 

SSA’s records of erroneous or fraudulent W–2 and W–4 earnings statements submitted by employers, as reflected in the Suspense Files for Earnings associated with 

invalid Social Security Numbers. 

I also asked GAO to look at whether SSA has effective procedures to prevent 

aliens and identity thieves from fraudulently obtaining SSA cards. Ongoing meetings with the GAO investigative team indicate that there are numerous problems 

with SSA’s policies that the Committee plans to examine in 2004 in the context of 

taking concrete steps to reduce illegal immigration and identity fraud—two issues 

that are intrinsically linked. 

Within the context of the Committee’s oversight of problems with SSA benefits 

fraud, in 2003, I became concerned about the SSA’s announced intention of con-
99

cluding an Agreement with Mexico regarding ‘‘totalization,’’ and requested the GAO 

to evaluate whether the SSA was accurately estimating the cost of the anticipated 

agreement. The GAO report, ‘‘Social Security: Proposed Totalization Agreement with 

Mexico Presents Unique Challenges’’ dated September, 2003, concluded that the 

SSA’s estimates did not take into account the millions of Mexicans who have earned 

social security ‘‘quarters’’ working illegally in the United States. This Committee 

continues to conduct active oversight on the potential downstream effects of this 

Agreement, with regard to the potential it may have for increasing illegal immigration from Mexico once the totalization agreement provides assurance that illegal 

workers will receive Social Security benefits they are now denied. The Committee 

plans to continue to work with the House Subcommittee on Social Security to conduct active oversight of the Totalization Agreement practices of the SSA to prevent 

such agreements to become incentives for illegal immigration. 

Our plans for the remainder of the 108th Congress regarding immigration enforcement include following up on anticipated results from a variety of other pending requests to GAO. One such project addresses overall statistical information on 

the number of illegal aliens in the United States, from a request dated April 16, 

2002. This request has already produced testimony addressing the significant number of illegal immigrants who enter this country legally, but then overstay their 

visas to remain here indefinitely. The GAO research team anticipates delivery of a 

report in the next several months addressing the visa overstay problem more completely. 

A request by Ranking Member Conyers and me to the GAO for an investigation 

regarding INS procedures for passenger transit and security at airports on July 12, 

2002, led to a report which we used to meet with airport security officials regarding 

the need to improve the design of airports regarding the control of arriving international passengers. The report was not produced for public access because the security weakness disclosures might afford terrorists vital information. 

Members of the Committee became concerned about news accounts of the issuance 

of consular identification cards by several nations to their citizens residing illegally 

in the United States and the policy position of the U.S. Department of State that 

it was powerless to prevent the issuance of these cards. The House passed a provision that would require the Department of State to actually regulate the issuance 

of such cards by foreign countries. 

I requested that GAO gather information on the use of consular identification 

cards on April 29, 2003. The Committee plans to use this information to assist in 

legislative deliberations and in oversight of the Department of State. In particular, 

the Committee plans to examine whether the issuance of consular identity cards 

contributes to additional illegal immigration and whether reported loose practices 

by foreign nations may actually result in criminals who are not actually citizens of 

the issuing countries assuming false identities. Many States have revised their laws 

regarding the use of consular identity cards to bar the cards as valid identification 

for obtaining drivers’ licenses, citing testimony by FBI and DHS officials at hearings 

conducted by Judiciary Subcommittees in 2003. 

Concerned about reports of state budgets being overburdened by the cost of illegal 

immigration, in December, 2002, I requested a GAO study of the state costs of educating illegal alien school children. That study’s release is due within the next several months, and it will figure into this Committee’s plans to examine the previously 

undisclosed costs of the federal government’s failure to enforce immigration laws. 

The Committee has also requested the assistance of a number of the Offices of 

Inspector General (‘‘OIG’’) of federal agencies to address homeland security issues. 

For example, beginning in 2001, the Committee requested a series of briefings from 

the Inspector General of the SSA regarding: (1) how terrorists associated with the 

9/11 attacks were able to obtain valid social security numbers that they then used 

to create fraudulent identities; (2) how the SSA could improve controls over Social 

Security numbers to guard against criminal and terrorist use of SSNs; (3) how the 

SSA could improve information sharing and prosecutorial cooperation with federal 

law enforcement, especially with regard to the increasing number of criminal organizations that obtain valid SSNs through fraud for resale to illegal aliens. 

Since the establishment of the DHS OIG in 2003, the Committee has requested 

a series of investigations of alleged mishandling of detained illegal aliens that led 

to the release of criminal aliens who went on to commit aggravated felonies, such 

as murder, rape and kidnapping. These DHS OIG investigations are now ongoing, 

some of which will lead to public reports. The Committee has also asked the DHS 

OIG to look into alleged mishandling of equipment pertaining to improved border 

security and into DHS’s internal investigative units charged with identifying and 

prosecuting corruption by DHS employees. 
100

The Committee has generally had a particularly active relationship with the DOJ 

OIG, leading to investigations highly relevant to immigration, border security, and 

information sharing among federal agencies pertaining to terrorist watch lists. 

Among the more prominent of public reports that were generated as a result of 

Committee requests are: 

— A series of reports addressing the lack of integration between the INS (now 

ICE) and FBI fingerprint systems, among which the most notable are: IDENT/

IAFIS: The Batres Case and the Status of the Integration Project (March 2004) and 

The Rafael Resendez-Ramirez Case: A Review of the INS’s Actions and the Operation of Its IDENT Automated Fingerprint Identification System (March 2000). 

— A May 2002 report entitled, ‘‘The Immigration and Naturalization Service’s 

Contacts With Two September 11 Terrorists: A Review of the INS’s Admissions of 

Mohamed Atta and Marwan Alshehhi, its Processing of their Change of Status Applications, and its Efforts to Track Foreign Students in the United States.’’

— Follow up March, 2003, ‘‘Followup Review on The Immigration And Naturalization Service’s Efforts to Track Foreign Students in The United States Through The 

Student And Exchange Visitor Information System, (March 2003). 

— ‘‘INS’s Use of Re-employed Annuitants’’ (2002). 

— A follow-up review on the visa waiver program—and a series of other INS programs that affect national security—addressing weaknesses in programs previously 

identified that could facilitate illegal entry of criminals and terrorists into the 

United States (December 2001). 

— An Investigation of the Immigration and Naturalization Service’s Citizenship 

USA Initiative (July 2000). 

In addition, since becoming Chairman of the Committee, I have made eight trips 

to border areas within the United States and our consular offices and embassies 

overseas to learn personally how our immigration laws are being implemented. 

These trips include: California, Michigan, Florida, Texas, the United Kingdom, 

France, Thailand, Mexico, Germany, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Belgium. 

While the Committee has worked closely with the agencies over which it has oversight to craft responses to the vulnerabilities in our immigration laws and their implementation, there are limits to administrative action. For this reason, where necessary, the Subcommittee has drafted and worked to enact legislation to address the 

most serious immigration issues facing our country. 

For example, the USA PATRIOT Act was the initial response to the 9/11 terrorist 

attacks, and it included a number of important tools to the federal government to 

combat alien terrorists. Before passage of the PATRIOT Act, there was no general 

prohibition against an alien contributing funds or other material support to a terrorist organization. The PATRIOT Act provides that an alien is inadmissible and 

deportable for contributing funds or other material support to an organization that 

has been designated as a terrorist organization by the Secretary of State, or for contributing to any non-designated terrorist organization, unless the alien can demonstrate that he did not know and should not reasonably have known that the funds 

or other material support or solicitation would further terrorist activity. 

The PATRIOT Act also provides a mechanism whereby the Attorney General can 

certify an alien as a suspected terrorist and detain him for up to seven days before 

placing him in removal proceedings or charging him with a crime. If no charges are 

filed by the end of this period, the alien must be released. Otherwise, the Attorney 

General shall maintain custody of the alien until the alien is removed from the U.S. 

or is found not to be inadmissible or deportable. 

The HSA included a version of the Committee’s INS restructuring legislation. This 

legislation created a framework for handling the enormous task of keeping terrorists 

and criminals out while also treating legal aliens with the courtesy and respect they 

deserve. 

The INS restructuring legislation was no small effort. Rather, it was the culmination of years of work by the Committee. The Immigration and Naturalization Service had been a beleaguered bureaucracy for decades. Appropriators continually increased the INS’s budget, hoping that additional resources were what was needed 

to solve the agency’s shortcomings. Just in recent times, the INS’s budget increased 

from $1.4 billion in fiscal year 1992 to $5.5 billion in fiscal year 2002. Notwithstanding this budgetary expansion, the INS’s performance did not improve. 

The magnitude of the INS’s problems was extraordinary—it had a backlog of millions of applications to be adjudicated, forcing aliens trying to play by the rules to 

wait in limbo for years. Millions of illegal aliens resided in the United States. Hundreds of thousands of criminal and deportable aliens ordered removed by immigration judges had absconded. Much of the INS’s failure stemmed from the conflict between its enforcement and service missions. 
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The Immigration Act of 1990 established the U.S. Commission on Immigration 

Reform to review and evaluate our immigration system. The Commission, chaired 

by the late Barbara Jordan, concluded that the INS suffered from mission overload. 

The Commission explained that the INS was required to give equal weight to more 

priorities than any one agency can handle: ‘‘[i]mmigration law enforcement requires 

staffing, training, resources, and a work culture that differs from what is required 

for effective adjudication of benefits or labor standards regulation of U.S. businesses.’’ The agency moved from one crisis to the next, with no coherent strategy 

of how to accomplish both missions successfully. Time and time again it attempted 

to cure itself with internal reorganizations that cured little and often made the patient worse. 

In 1995, the Judiciary Committee began to examine management problems in the 

INS and ‘‘radical’’ proposals to break apart and remake the agency. In February, 

1995, the Immigration Subcommittee held a hearing on management practices at 

the INS. In May, 1998, the Subcommittee held a hearing examining alternative proposals to restructure the INS. In July, 1998, the Subcommittee for the first time 

approved legislation to break apart the enforcement and service functions of the 

INS. 

Representative Hal Rogers, then chairman of the Commerce, Justice, State Subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee, introduced this legislation. Mr. Rogers 

worked closely with Immigration Subcommittee Chairman Lamar Smith to fundamentally reform INS. The Committee’s goal was finally achieved last Congress. 

I was scheduled to introduce the Barbara Jordan Immigration Reform and Accountability Act when September 11 intervened. However, after a delayed introduction, the House approved my legislation in April, 2002 by an overwhelming margin. 

This bill would have broken the INS apart into a Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services and a Bureau of Immigration Enforcement, both within the Department of Justice. Then President Bush decided to seek creation of a Department of 

Homeland Security. When the HSA was sent to the President for signature in November, 2002, it included the bifurcation of immigration functions that the Committee had been seeking for so long—only now within the newly created department. The Committee is proud of this accomplishment and wants to assist the new 

immigration agencies in fulfilling their promise. 

The Committee was also instrumental in passing the Enhanced Border Security 

and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 which took several steps to tighten our border 

and visa policies including: requiring biometric identifiers (i.e., fingerprints, retinal 

scans, etc.) for visas; requiring biometric scanners at all U.S. points of entry; requiring DHS to implement an entry-exit tracking system; strengthening the reporting 

requirements for the foreign student tracking system; providing DHS and consular 

officials access to the databases of U.S. law enforcement and the intelligence community; authorizing an additional 200 immigration investigative personnel and 200 

immigration inspectors for each of the next 5 years; and providing a pay raise and 

additional training for immigration personnel, including Border Patrol agents. 

Finally, the Committee reported H.R. 1954, to provide various immigration benefits to members of the Armed Forces fighting in Iraq and their families. A version 

of this legislation was incorporated in the Department of Defense authorization bill 

for FY 2004. 

Going forward, the Judiciary Committee’s immigration oversight will continue to 

focus on making America safer. The terrorist threat against us is composed almost 

entirely of persons who came to the United States from abroad. We cannot ignore 

the link between our immigration system and our vulnerability to terrorism. It is 

not just a matter of fixing the student visa program or the tourist visa program. 

Every aspect of our immigration system has been used by foreign terrorists to gain 

access to, and a safe haven in, the United States. Let me cite a report issued by 

the Center for Immigration Studies that tracked how 48 foreign-born militant Islamic terrorists, including the 9/11 hijackers, entered the U.S. over the last decade. 

The Center found that: 

[The terrorists] used almost every conceivable means of entering the country. 

They have come as students, tourists, and business visitors. They have also been 

[legal permanent residents] and naturalized U.S. citizens. They have snuck across 

the border illegally, arrived as stowaways on ships, used false passports, and have 

been granted amnesty. Terrorists have even used America’s humanitarian tradition 

of welcoming those seeking asylum. 

The Committee will work continuously to ensure that no aspect of our immigration system can be used by terrorists to strike at America. 

The Committee will also strive to ensure that the great promise of a restructured 

immigration service is fulfilled. The Committee is concerned about the continuing 

poor manner in which legal immigrants are treated by CIS. The backlog of applica-
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tions waiting to be adjudicated has exceeded the six million mark. This disrupts the 

lives and dreams of aliens who are playing by the rules and deserve to be treated 

better. Committee oversight will focus on righting this wrong. 

The Committee also will continue to apply stringent oversight to DHS’s efforts to 

enforce our immigration laws. The Committee will continue its ongoing supervision 

of DHS initiatives to curtail immigration fraud, to ensure that all deportable criminal aliens are identified, detained, and removed, to secure our northern and southern borders from illegal aliens and alien terrorists, to prevent illegal aliens from 

finding employment in the U.S., and to ensure that aliens ordered removed are actually removed. 

More specifically, for the balance of the 108th Congress, a major activity will be 

oversight of DHS’s compliance with the Border Security Act and the USA PATRIOT 

ACT. We plan hearings that address the complex and intertwined requirements to 

establish clear requirements for security upgrades to U.S. passports and visas, as 

well as to nations whose citizens may enter the country without visas under the 

Visa Waiver Program (‘‘VWP’’). 

The first of these hearings will examine the capability of VWP countries to meet 

two deadlines that become effective on October 26, 2004: (1) the countries must 

issue tamper resistant machine readable passports after that date; and (2) their 

passports must contain a biometric identifier in a form that can read by U.S. inspectors. The Committee will also make an assessment of DHS’s preparations for reading the new passports and for reading the new biometric, tamper resistant visas 

that the State Department is scheduled to begin issuing in advance of the deadlines. 

The Committee plans an additional hearing that will examine whether the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security have met the requirements 

of the Border Security Act with regard to establishing a clear set of standards for 

machine readable travel documents based on the National Institute of Standards 

and Technology’s research and recommendations. Further, the hearing will address 

what kind of notice should be provided to foreign countries who have publically 

state that they will try to comply with the U.S. deadlines. 

Another hearing planned for late in the 108th Congress will address DHS’s deployment of identity card scanners at more than one hundred ports of entry to validate the identities of foreign travelers who present the border crossing cards, by 

testing the biometric photo and fingerprints stored on the card against the bearer. 

This important milestone, first set by the 1996 Act, was further specified in the Border Security Act. The DHS Executive Director of Border Security and Facilitation 

testified before the Subcommittee last week that CBP will deploy these scanners beginning in June, 2004, and will have inspectors trained in using them well before 

the October 26th deadline. The Committee will assess DHS’s compliance with this 

deadline, and its effect on identifying imposters and protecting our country from 

criminals and terrorists attempting to use fraudulent information to enter the 

United States. 

Major oversight objectives planned by the Committee for the remainder of the 

108th Congress and the 109th Congress are to examine the nexus between money 

laundering and the financing of large scale alien smuggling into the United States, 

as well as how money laundering here continues to fund terrorism throughout the 

world. Within that context, the Committee plans to address the organization of 

DHS’s Office of Inspector General to ensure that the process of assembly of auditors 

and inspectors to compose this new office has not led to gaps in performance audits. 

Importantly, the components of the Treasury OIG which have traditionally audited 

the Secret Service with regard to money laundering and counterfeiting investigations were transferred to the DHS OIG. The Committee plans to assess whether the 

DHS OIG is performing its required role of assessing the performance of DHS 

money laundering investigators. This plan aligns with the GAO study request I 

made in December, 2003 to study the Department of Treasury’s remaining money 

laundering enforcement team and its coordination with DHS’s ICE. The GAO is 

tasked to identify faster and more effective means to bring Treasury’s capabilities 

to bear in money laundering. This study will also address whether the Treasury is 

directing the Internal Revenue Service and other Treasury agencies to use the PATRIOT Act provisions to share information to pursue terrorist and alien smuggling 

organizations. 

In the 109th Congress, the Committee also plans to use information derived from 

a GAO study request I made in November, 2003, to look at Treasury’s enforcement 

of money laundering prevention provisions of the PATRIOT Act. Although Treasury’s role is often overlooked by others, it contributes both to DOJ and to DHS efforts to prevent terrorist acts here in the United States. It is the Treasury which 

has the predominant authority with regard to gathering and assessing Suspicious 

Activity Reports (SARs) provided by banks. We intend to examine whether Treasury 
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is effective in telling banks what to look for with regard to potential terrorist or 

alien smuggling money laundering. We will also examine whether Treasury is providing useful sorting and filtering of the thousands of reports so that DOJ and DHS 

enforcement officers can take timely action to prosecute criminals and prevent terrorist acts. 

In the remainder of the 108th Congress and the 109th Congress, we intend to look 

intensively at whether the Internal Revenue Service is performing its mission to enforce immigration laws, including specifically INA provisions that apply to the IRS. 

To assess what the IRS is doing as a basis for this oversight, Rep. Hostettler, Chairman of the Immigration Subcommittee, requested that the GAO evaluate the IRS 

pilot penalty program for employers who are problem filers of wage reports. We 

want to know whether the IRS has the resources and the will to enforce employer 

penalties, or whether that function should be transferred through legislation to a 

more aggressive agency. 

In the remainder of the 108th Congress and the 109t h Congress, we will conduct 

active oversight into the cost of incarcerating alien criminals and the potential role 

of local law enforcement in assisting federal agencies with the prosecution of criminal aliens. To that end, I requested the GAO to prepare a detailed study of the number of criminal aliens incarcerated in federal and state correctional facilities, the 

types of crimes they committed and the costs of incarceration. This oversight is consistent with the Committee’s concerns about unrecognized costs of illegal immigration and the need to bring more resources into coordination with DHS’s mission of 

internal immigration law enforcement. We intend to use information from this study 

to hold one or more hearings on the scale of the criminal alien problem and what 

needs to be done about it through targeted legislation. 

C. JURISDICTION OVER IMMIGRATION SHOULD REMAIN IN THE COMMITTEE ON THE

JUDICIARY

As the foregoing record shows, the Committee on the Judiciary has unparalleled 

experience and expertise in the immigration area, and it has demonstrated its ability to identify and remedy the vulnerabilities in our immigration system that expose 

our nation to risk. For decades, it has done this work. Since 9/11, it has responded 

to the call to further strengthen our immigration policy. 

But there is another reason that immigration jurisdiction should remain with the 

Committee on the Judiciary. Although countering the terrorist threat is of significant importance in implementing our immigration laws, it is not the only issue. In 

fact, only a small fraction of aliens in the United States have any connection to terrorism. Rather, immigration involves much more than homeland security—reuniting 

families, providing needed workers for American businesses, offering haven to refugees, and deporting those aliens who have broken our laws. Lawful immigrants to 

the United States should not be viewed by the American people as a threat to be 

contained, and our country cannot afford to be viewed as an unwelcoming host to 

those who would come here lawfully to make a contribution to our way of life. Immigration is America’s past, present, and future. 

Two projects in which the Committee has played a leading role illustrate this 

need for balance. In the mid-1990s, Committee members became concerned about 

the admission and presence of alien students in the United States. In 1996, the 

Committee worked to secure passage of a provision for a tracking system for such 

students during their stay in the United States. Administrative delays and competing interests slowed the development of that system. 

The Committee’s foresight on this issue became all too clear following 9/11 when 

it was revealed that the pilot who flew American Airlines Flight 11 into the Pentagon was an alien student who failed to show up at school, and that two of the 

other pilots received visas to take their flight training in the United States. The 

Committee again pushed, through the PATRIOT Act, for full implementation of that 

system. 

Recognizing the possible delays that such a system could pose and the economic 

and academic value of foreign students to the United States, the Committee worked 

closely with INS, and then with DHS, as it implemented that program to ensure 

that the concerns of students and schools, as well as national security concerns, 

were considered during the design and deployment of the system. Committee staff 

met with school administrators and associations for feedback during the development of the system, now known as SEVIS. The Committee held two separate oversight hearings during the development and implementation of that system, to allow 

school officials and the Justice Department’s Inspector General to confront government officials with their concerns and complaints about the system. 
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Finally, the Committee pressed DHS to start collecting the fee required for funding of that system; the Department issued a proposed rule for collection of that fee 

in October 2003, and final regulation is pending. Once DHS starts collecting that 

fee, it will save the American people an estimated $50 million in enforcement costs 

that they currently pay. All in all, notwithstanding some bumps in the road, I believe that SEVIS has been a success and that this system has made the United 

States safer without imposing an onerous burden on either foreign students or 

American schools. The Judiciary Committee’s balancing of the needs of both security 

and the needs of the students and the schools has played no small role in that success. Likewise, the Committee was concerned about tracking of non-immigrant aliens 

in the United States. Section 110 of IIRIRA required the development of an entryexit system that would track non-immigrants who overstayed their visas. Active 

oversight by the Committee following IIRIRA determined that virtually no progress 

was made to plan for needed improvements in legacy systems to improve entry inspections, and no progress at all was made to establish exit controls for travelers. 

This led to the Committee’s initiative to establish the Data Management Improvement Act of 2000 (‘‘DMIA’’), which further amended section 110 to require the basic 

system to collect electronic data on the arrival of aliens with the capability of 

matching that data with an alien’s departure data. The DMIA did much more than 

establish the requirement—it also required INS to establish a DMIA task force to 

include other federal government agencies, state and local government representatives, and private industry groups representing businesses. DMIA charged the Task 

Force with intensively studying the problems and issues related to establishing a 

comprehensive entry exit system and publishing the results. The Committee pursued aggressive oversight with the INS to get the Task Force established and operating, participating in meetings and site visits as the required DMIA work was undertaken. 

In late 2001, recognizing the continued delays by the Department of Justice, including INS, and the Department of State in sharing information and the failures 

to coordinate data between entry systems and visa systems, I drafted the Enhanced 

Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 to mandate improvements in 

data sharing, entry controls, and international travel documents. Working with 

other Members of the House and with the Senate, hard deadlines were established 

by which real change had to be completed. 

Since the Act became law, the Judiciary Committee has aggressively worked to 

ensure that all elements of the federal government were working together to meet 

the Act’s requirements. The Committee’s work entailed hundreds of hours of meetings pursuing the detailed plans, pilot programs, technology tests, and procurement 

actions necessary to get the job done. It included meetings with the National Institute of Standards and Technology team, coordinating with industry and government 

to establish practical standards for biometric identifiers in documents, and meeting 

with federal government delegates to the International Civil Aeronautics Machine 

Readable Travel Document groups to insure that there was parallel progress at the 

international level. Both in 2003 and 2004, the Committee hosted briefings for Congress by the DMIA task force, the most recent of which was a March 15, 2004 presentation to which staff of the Select Committee on Homeland Security was invited. 

These two examples show the need for balance between security and facilitating 

legal immigration. It was to balance out immigration enforcement and services that 

the Committee proposed splitting those functions which had long been joined in the 

former INS. We must use our immigration enforcement powers to protect our people 

from those who break our laws. We must also, however, continually exert our best 

efforts to facilitate the admission of lawful entrants. 

Another complexity of immigration policy is that authority over immigration is 

spread across four departments—Homeland Security, Justice, State, and Labor. 

From the issuance of a visa to removal from the United States, an alien could interact with no fewer than nine components in those four departments. The Judiciary 

Committee currently has jurisdiction over each of those components, as well as over 

other agencies of limited jurisdiction that are charged with carrying out our immigration laws. Even with the formation of the Department of Homeland Security, the 

Attorney General’s opinion with respect to all questions of law involving the Immigration and Nationality Act is controlling, and he has final authority over the decisions in our nation’s immigration judiciary system. 

The variety of concerns involved in these many conflicting and overlapping interests cries out for the experience and expertise of the Committee on the Judiciary. 

This Committee has long had the responsibility for balancing the immigration, law 

enforcement, terrorism, and civil rights issues involved. A committee narrowly focused on security and with a much shorter history is not the best place to try to 
105

balance the many complex interests involved. Rather, the Judiciary Committee’s experience in dealing with the various immigration components should tip the scales 

in favor of its continued jurisdiction. 

III. LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES AT DHS 

Another aspect of the HSA that implicates the jurisdiction of the Committee on 

the Judiciary is the transfer of law enforcement agencies. The HSA transferred several criminal law enforcement agencies to DHS: the Secret Service, the Immigration 

and Naturalization Service (‘‘INS’’), the Customs Service, the Transportation Security Administration (‘‘TSA’’), the Federal Protective Service (‘‘FPS’’), and the Coast 

Guard. The Committee on the Judiciary has general jurisdiction over the Secret 

Service and the successors to the INS. It has jurisdiction over the successors to the 

Customs Service, TSA, FPS, and the Coast Guard to the extent that these agencies 

enforce criminal law and exercise criminal law enforcement powers. The Committee 

also has jurisdiction over the functions of the former National Infrastructure Protection Center, which was formerly part of the FBI, and the Domestic Emergency Response Team, which formerly advised the FBI when there was an emergency. 

A. HISTORY

The Committee on the Judiciary has long had jurisdiction over criminal law enforcement. This tradition largely derives from the Committee’s jurisdiction over ‘‘the 

judiciary and judicial proceedings, civil and criminal’’ under clause (1)(k)(1) of Rule 

X and ‘‘subversive activities affecting the internal security of the United States’’ 

under clause (1)(k)(18) of Rule X. The Committee has had jurisdiction over criminal 

law under the House Rules since 1880. It acquired jurisdiction over subversive activities when the Committee on Internal Security was abolished in 1975. 

In that period, the Committee has played the lead role in the House in criminal 

law enforcement policy. For example, the Committee was instrumental in passing 

the most important terrorism bill to become law before 9/11, the ‘‘Antiterrorism and 

Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,’’ which was Congress’s response to the murderous terrorist attack on the federal building in Oklahoma City. 

Over the more than 100 years of its jurisdiction in this area, the Committee has 

held hundreds of legislative and oversight hearings on these matters. Indeed, the 

Committee’s Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security had begun 

considering the terrorist threat even before 9/11 holding hearings entitled: ‘‘The 

Threat Posed by the Convergence of Organized Crime, Drug Trafficking, and Terrorism’’ on December 13, 2000, ‘‘Breaches of Security at Federal Agencies and Airports’’ on May 25, 2000, ‘‘Prohibition on Financial Transactions With Countries Supporting Terrorism Act of 1997’’ on June 10, 1997, and ‘‘The FBI Investigation into 

the Khobar Towers Bombing in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia and the Foreign Investigative Activities of the FBI in General’’ on February 12, 1997. 

B. THE RECORD SINCE 9/11 

Since 9/11, the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security has 

held 29 hearings on law enforcement matters. Among the most important of these 

are hearings entitled: ‘‘Law Enforcement Efforts Within the Department of Homeland Security’’ on February 3, 2004, ‘‘Homeland Security-the Balance Between Crisis 

and Consequence Management through Training and Assistance (Review of Legislative Proposals)’’ on November 20, 2003, ‘‘Terrorism and War-Time Hoaxes’’ on July 

10, 2003, ‘‘The Proposal to Create a Department of Homeland Security,’’ on July 9, 

2002, ‘‘The Risk to Homeland Security From Identity Fraud and Identity Theft’’ on 

June 25, 2002, the ‘‘Antiterrorism Explosives Act of 2002’’ on June 11, 2002, and 

the ‘‘Homeland Security Information Sharing Act’’ on June 4, 2002, the ‘‘Cyber Security Enhancement Act’’ on February 12, 2002, the ‘‘Implementation Legislation for 

the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings and the 

International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism’’ on November 14, 2001, and the ‘‘Anti-Hoax Terrorism Act of 2001’’ on November 7, 2001. 

In addition to these hearings, the Judiciary Committee, in the spirit of cooperation, has held a joint hearing with the Select Committee on Homeland Security on 

the Terrorism Threat Integration Center (‘‘TTIC’’) on July 22, 2003, and jointly sent 

letters with post-hearing questions to the relevant agencies on the implementation 

of TTIC. Tomorrow, on March 25, 2004, the Judiciary Committee and Homeland Security Committee will hold another joint hearing. This one will focus on the integration of terrorism watchlists at the Terrorism Screening Center. 

The Committee on the Judiciary has also conducted oversight through other 

means. It has sent two major oversight letters to the Attorney General on the imple-
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mentation of the USA PATRIOT Act. These letters were aimed at ensuring that the 

Department of Justice maintains a proper balance between security and civil liberties in implementing the Act. 

The Committee has also closely monitored the activities of DHS recently sending 

letters to Directors of ICE and FPS regarding their law enforcement missions at the 

Department of Homeland Security. The Committee will soon send a letter to FLETC 

on its law enforcement mission. Additionally, it has sent a letter to the Federal 

Communications Commission and will soon send a letter to DHS regarding the Administration’s efforts to ensure the ability of first responders to communicate with 

one another with interoperable equipment. I have also traveled to New York personally to observe the operations of the Secret Service there. 

In addition, the Committee has requested several GAO reports in this area including: ‘‘Combating Terrorism: Funding Data Reported to Congress Should be Improved’’ dated November 2002; ‘‘Social Security Administration: Disclosure Policy for 

Law Enforcement Allows Information Sharing, But SSA Needs to Ensure Consistent 

Application’’ dated September 2003; and ‘‘Firearms Control: Federal Agencies Have 

Firearms Controls, But Could Strengthen Controls in Key Areas’’ dated June 2003. 

The Subcommittee has played a central role in passing legislation in response to 

the 9/11 attacks. The Committee reported out the legislation that became the USA 

PATRIOT Act in a 36–0 bipartisan vote. That Act was Congress’s initial response 

to the 9/11 attacks. It provides new tools for law enforcement and for improved information sharing among Federal agencies to address terrorist threats. It also authorizes the sharing of information between the intelligence and law enforcement 

communities and makes it easier to begin investigations of foreign intelligence subjects. 

The Subcommittee has also moved a variety of other legislative responses to the 

attacks. It reported implementation legislation for the International Convention for 

the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings and the International Convention for the 

Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism that became law on June 25, 2002. This 

legislation helped to implement treaties the U.S. and dozens of others countries 

have signed to suppress terrorist bombings and the financing of terrorism. 

Several other pieces of legislation developed by the Subcommittee were incorporated into the HSA. They include: the Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2002 

that enhanced protections against cyber attacks by terrorists; the Homeland Security Information Sharing Act that enhanced intelligence and law enforcement information sharing among federal, state, and local governments to help protect against 

terrorist attacks; and the Anti-Terrorism Explosives Act of 2002 that places common 

sense requirements on those purchasing, transporting, or using explosive materials. 

The Committee is continuing this work with the Anti-Hoax Terrorism Act and legislation to adequately fund first responders. 

Some additional oversight efforts in the law enforcement area that the Judiciary 

Committee plans to pursue in the near future include border corruption, financing 

of terrorism activities, transportation security, and background checks for security 

personnel and others that affect the national security or public safety. 

First, the Committee will be looking at corruption of government officials on the 

border. The Committee is concerned by reports of bribes of officials who allow contraband and persons to be smuggled into the United States. The Committee has already sent oversight requests in this area and plans to a review this problem further. Second, the Committee will be holding hearings on how terrorists are financing their activities, what law enforcement is doing to stop that financing, and 

whether law enforcement needs further legislative support. Third, the Committee is 

reviewing transportation security and container security issues, e.g., H.R. 4008, the 

‘‘Anti-Terrorism Protection of Mass Transportation and Railroad Carriers Act of 

2004,’’ was referred solely to the Judiciary Committee. This legislation would increase penalties for terrorism against mass transportation and railroads and enhance law enforcement tools to combat and prevent such attacks. Fourth, the Judiciary is examining the various laws authorizing criminal history background checks 

and new legislation to provide such background checks for private security guards. 

C. CRIMINAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AT DHS 

The Committee on the Judiciary has long been the authorizing committee for the 

Secret Service. Indeed, the Committee reported the first modern authorization of the 

Secret Service in 1951. Pub. L. No. 82–79. It has remained the authorizing committee for the Secret Service since that time. 

The HSA provided for the Secret Service to become a separate agency within 

DHS—i.e., it is not within any of the directorates of DHS. See—1703 of the HSA. 

It has two missions: law enforcement, particularly with respect to counterfeiting, a 
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matter within the Committee on the Judiciary’s jurisdiction, and the protection of 

the President, the Vice President, their immediate family members, and others. 

The HSA also established the Border and Transportation Security Directorate 

(‘‘BTS’’), and it is responsible for maintaining the security of our nation’s borders 

and transportation systems. BTS is comprised of law enforcement and other employees from the former INS, the former Customs Service, TSA, FPS, and the Coast 

Guard. 

CBP consists of elements of the former INS and the former Customs Service. In 

addition to its immigration responsibilities, CBP plays a critical role in confronting 

the law enforcement challenges facing our nation. CBP’s Interdiction and Security 

(Outbound) enforces criminal export laws and regulations that prevent weapons of 

mass destruction from falling into the hands of terrorists. As part of this responsibility, the agency interdicts illicit proceeds from narcotics and other criminal activities in the form of unreported and smuggled currency. 

Another new agency within BTS is ICE, which is the largest investigative arm 

of DHS. It also includes elements of the former INS and the former Customs Service. Assistant Secretary Michael J. Garcia, then Acting Assistant Secretary for ICE 

stated that ‘‘[t]hrough this reorganization, ICE is building a foundation to become 

one of the world’s preeminent law enforcement agencies—one that provides unparalleled investigation, interdiction, and security services to the public and to our partners at DHS.’’ Department of Homeland Security announcement entitled ICE Announces Agency Reorganization Plan dated May 16, 2003. Outside of its immigration role, the responsibilities of ICE range from law enforcement intelligence work 

to investigating child pornography. 

TSA is also part of BTS. TSA’s primary mission is to provide for the security of 

the civil aviation system, including all domestic cargo and passenger air transportation, as well as the civil aviation infrastructure. TSA has authority to receive, assess, and distribute intelligence information and assess threats to transportation facilities. 49 U.S.C. § 114(f). 

TSA’s budget request described part of its mission as ensuring that it builds a 

strong enforcement presence on-site at the nation’s commercial airports. TSA negotiates long-term agreements with state and local enforcement agencies to provide 

uniformed officers at passenger security checkpoints. 

TSA includes the National Explosives Detection Canine Team Program to provide 

local law enforcement officers with the right equipment, technical assistance, and 

partial reimbursement costs for security. It also supports Federal Flight Deck Officer training for pilots at FLETC to train pilots on the use of firearms. 

FPS is responsible for law enforcement protection of federal employees and property. According to its web page, the mission of FPS is ‘‘to provide law enforcement 

and security services to over one million tenants and daily visitors to all federally 

owned and leased facilities nationwide. FPS’s protection services focus directly on 

the interior security of the nation and the reduction of crimes and potential threats 

in federal facilities throughout the nation.’’

The Coast Guard is also a law enforcement agency with a mission divided into 

four major roles—maritime law enforcement, maritime safety, marine environmental protection, and national defense. The Coast Guard’s law enforcement functions include maritime narcotics enforcement. See 46 U.S.C. App. § 1903, 14 U.S.C. 

§ 89, 16 U.S.C. § 2409. 

At a February 3, 2004 hearing before the Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on 

Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, Admiral Thomas Collins testified that 

the Coast Guard has extensive regulatory and law enforcement authorities. He further stated that Maritime Safety and Security Teams of the Coast Guard have provided critical port security, deterrence, and response capability. These efforts include the use of canines and divers to detect narcotics and explosives hidden on 

board vessels. Interdiction of narcotics is a primary law enforcement mission of the 

Coast Guard both directly and through law enforcement partnerships. 

The National Infrastructure Protection Center (‘‘NIPC’’) was created in May of 

1998 through Presidential Decision Directive 63 as an interagency center housed at 

the FBI Headquarters. At the FBI, NIPC served as the focal point for the governments efforts to warn of, and respond to, cyber threats. NIPC was also part of the 

FBI’s Counterterrorism Program the mission of which was to detect, deter, prevent, 

and swiftly respond to terrorist actions that threatened U.S. national interests at 

home or abroad. Briefing Book of General Information on the FBI, (2000) at 84. The 

FBI used NIPC to assist in the coordination of ongoing computer crime investigations and identification of threats against the nation’s critical infrastructure. The 

HSA transferred NIPC to the Department of Homeland Security and it was placed 

into the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Division (‘‘IAIP’’). The 

functions of NIPC have been assumed into various components of IAIP. 
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The HSA transferred the Domestic Emergency Support Team (‘‘DEST’’) from the 

Department of Justice to the Department of Homeland Security where it is now referred to as the Domestic Emergency Response Team. DEST was an interagency 

team responsible for providing the FBI, the lead Federal agency for crisis management, with expert advice and support concerning the U.S. Government’s capabilities 

in resolving the terrorist threat or incident. When such a threat or incident occurred, this rapidly deployable interagency team was activated to provide crisis and 

consequence management assistance, technical or scientific advice, and contingency 

planning guidance tailored to situations involving chemical, biological, or nuclear 

weapons. The DEST was managed by the FBI’s Critical Incident Response Group. 

Its mission was to provide expert advice and assistance to the FBI On-Scene Commander related to the capabilities of various federal agencies depending on the type 

of terrorist attack. This task force was not an office and did not have assets or resources. Its sole responsibility was to advise the FBI during the response to an attack. 

In short, the Committee on the Judiciary has general jurisdiction over the Secret 

Service and the successors to INS (ICE, CBP, and CIS). It has jurisdiction over the 

successors to the Customs Service, TSA, FPS, and the Coast Guard to the extent 

that they enforce criminal laws and exercise criminal law enforcement authorities. 

It also has jurisdiction over the functions of the former NIPC and the former DEST. 

D. JURISDICTION OVER THE LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES AT DHS SHOULD REMAIN

IN THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

The Committee on the Judiciary has a long and vast history of jurisdiction over 

law enforcement agencies. It has the expertise and the experience in these areas. 

That expertise and experience simply cannot be matched by a new committee with 

a short history. 

As with immigration, there is more to law enforcement than just security. There 

is important balancing to be done between security interests and civil liberties interests. Indeed, during consideration of the HSA itself, the Committee reported several 

civil liberties provisions, including heightened whistleblower protections, a more 

independent Inspector General at DHS, and the creation of a privacy officer to ensure against the unauthorized disclosure or dissemination of personally-identifiable 

information. The Committee on the Judiciary has been at this balancing task for 

years. It is dangerous to put that balancing task in a committee the primary focus 

of which is security. I fear that civil liberties interests would be sacrificed. 

Finally, I believe that under any scenario, the Committee on the Judiciary will 

retain jurisdiction over the Department of Justice and its primary law enforcement 

agencies, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives. In addition, the 

Committee on the Judiciary will retain jurisdiction over the various prosecutorial 

activities of the Department of Justice. Jurisdiction over the law enforcement agencies in DHS should remain in the same committee as the DOJ law enforcement 

agencies. There should be one unified approach that takes into account the complex 

balancing that must occur. Having some agencies under the jurisdiction of a committee that has traditionally carefully balanced civil liberties concerns with law enforcement concerns and having others under a committee that is focused solely on 

security is a prescription for disaster. Jurisdiction should be based on function—not 

agency carrying out the function. 

IV. LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING AT DHS 

The HSA transferred two major law enforcement training programs to DHS: 

FLETC and ODP. 

A. HISTORY

The Committee on the Judiciarys history of jurisdiction over law enforcement 

training derives from the same sources and has the same history as its jurisdiction 

over law enforcement agencies. See III.A, above. Before 9/11, the Subcommittee on 

Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Security had considered the predecessors to ODP 

within broader oversight hearings on May 15, 2001 and July 22, 1999. 

B. THE RECORD SINCE 9/11

As noted above, since 9/11, the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland 

Security has held 29 hearings on law enforcement matters. Several of these have 

included discussion of law enforcement training. A three-part hearing on the effec-
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tiveness of the Office of Justice Programs, which then included ODP, occurred on 

March 5, 7, and 14, 2002. More recently, the Subcommittee has conducted hearings 

on ‘‘Law Enforcement Efforts Within the Department of Homeland Security’’ on February 3, 2004, and ‘‘Homeland Security-the Balance Between Crisis and Consequence Management through Training and Assistance (Review of Legislative Proposals)’’ on November 20, 2003, both of which dealt with law enforcement training. 

I have traveled personally to Vermont to observe the training of law enforcement 

agents there. 

Due to press reports of mismanagement of first responder grants, on January 21, 

2004, the Committee on Judiciary sent letters to the Secretary of the Department 

of Homeland Security and the Inspector General of the Department of Homeland 

Security requesting a review. It appears that this letter has been effective. According to a FCW.com March 9, 2004 article, ‘‘Officials from the Homeland Security Department’s Office of Domestic Preparedness are putting in place several policies to 

oversee and enforce how state and local agencies are spending their federal funding, 

according to an ODP official.’’

Right now, the Committee on the Judiciary is working with this Committee on 

Chairman Cox’s first responder funding bill, H.R. 3266. We are not in total agreement on all of the issues, but we have reached agreement on many of our differences 

and we will continue to work cooperatively to produce a good bill in this critical 

area. 

Additionally, the Committee is reviewing all law enforcement training, including 

homeland security training, provided by all Federal law enforcement agencies. The 

Committee is also examining the training and authority of public and private uniform security officers protecting Federal buildings and critical infrastructure. As 

part of this review, the Committee has written oversight letters to FLETC and FPS. 

C. THE FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING CENTER

According to the FLETC web page, the stated mission of FLETC is ‘‘to serve as 

the Federal government’s leader for and provider of world-class law enforcement 

training. We prepare new and experienced law enforcement professionals to fulfill 

their responsibilities in a safe manner and at the highest level of proficiency. We 

also ensure that training is provided in the most cost-effective manner by taking 

advantage of economies of scale available only from a consolidated law enforcement 

training organization.’’ 

D. THE OFFICE FOR DOMESTIC PREPAREDNESS

Until passage of the HSA, the Office for Domestic Preparedness was an office 

within the Department of Justice responsible for establishing domestic preparedness 

programs and activities to assist state and local governments to prepare for, and 

respond to, terrorist incidents, including attacks involving weapons of mass destruction. The Judiciary Committee, through the enactment of the USA PATRIOT Act, 

authorized the Office (formerly the Office for State and Local Domestic Preparedness Support of the Office of Justice Programs) in the Department of Justice. The 

Committee on Judiciary changed the name of this office to the Office for Domestic 

Preparedness, in the ‘‘21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act’’ and further authorized the ODP to assist states and localities. 

E. JURISDICTION OVER LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING AT DHS SHOULD REMAIN IN

THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

The Committee on the Judiciary should retain jurisdiction over law enforcement 

training for much the same reasons that it should retain jurisdiction over law enforcement agencies. It has the experience and expertise in this area. Training, like 

other law enforcement activities, requires a careful balancing of interests that a 

committee focused solely on security is not likely to handle well. Other law enforcement agencies will remain with the Committee on the Judiciary under any scenario, 

and the training of those agencies, as well as the DHS agencies, should remain 

under one committee that can provide a unified, balanced approach. 

With respect to ODP, under any scenario, the vast majority of grants to state and 

local law enforcement agencies will be made through the Office of Justice Programs 

and that Office will remain with the Committee on the Judiciary. It makes no sense 

to split off one grantmaking office, ODP, and give it to another committee. Again, 

we need a balanced, unified approach in this area. 
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V. DHS CAN FUNCTION EFFECTIVELY WHILE REPORTING TO MORE THAN ONE

COMMITTEE OF JURISDICTION

Some argue that DHS cannot function effectively if it must report to multiple 

committees. I disagree for a variety of reasons. First, DHS reports to several committees now, and while there is always room for improvement, it is functioning effectively now. 

Second, every agency reports to at least four committees: a House authorizing 

committee, a House appropriations committee, a Senate authorizing committee, and 

a Senate appropriations committee. Despite this, most of our agencies function effectively. Moreover, many existing agencies report to more than one authorizing committee now. For example, the Secret Service and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 

Firearms, and Explosives always reported to the Committee on the Judiciary when 

they were at the Department of Treasury while the rest of the Department generally reported to the Committee on Ways and Means. The Federal Trade Commission reports to the Committee on Energy and Commerce for its consumer protection 

mission, but to the Committee on the Judiciary for its antitrust mission. The Commerce Department reports to the Committees on Energy and Commerce, Science, 

Resources, and the Judiciary. The Energy Department reports to the Committees 

on Energy and Commerce, Science, and Armed Services. All of these agencies are 

able to function effectively within these arrangements. 

Third, as outlined above, the Committee on the Judiciary and the Select Committee on Homeland Security have already shown an ability to work together effectively on projects of mutual interest. We have already had one joint hearing, and 

another one will be held tomorrow. We are currently working together on first responder legislation. Regardless of how this matter is resolved, if there is a Committee on Homeland Security, either select or permanent, I expect this working relationship to continue. In short, DHS is functioning effectively under the current committee system, and it can continue to do so in the future. 

VI. CONCLUSION 

I believe that the proponents of a Committee on Homeland Security, select or permanent, in future Congresses have the burden of proof, and to date, they have not 

carried it. However that question is resolved, I emphatically believe that with the 

Committee on the Judiciary should retain jurisdiction over all the matters that it 

now has. We have the experience and the expertise. Over the years, we have shown 

the ability to apply the unified, balanced approach that these issues require. For 

those reasons, I believe we should retain our jurisdiction over these matters.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Chairman, in your testimony you talk 

about what you consider to be Federal law enforcement agencies, 

the Legacy agencies of Customs and INS now, and the Customs 

and Border Protection and the immigration and enforcement—the 

citizenship and the immigration services, the Legacy agencies and 

the TSA and the FPS, which is the Federal Protective Service and 

the Coast Guard. 

However, the Department of Homeland Security and its agencies 

are not just solely law enforcement agencies. Rather, as the act 

itself describes, these agencies must work to prevent terrorist attacks and reduce the Nation’s vulnerability to terrorism. These 

agencies have a much broader mission than just law enforcement. 

Are you arguing that, for example, on the Customs, Border Protection and the ICE are actually law enforcement agencies and 

therefore you should have sole jurisdiction over those agencies because you have jurisdiction over the Federal law enforcement? 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Certain functions of the Customs Service 

have always been under the jurisdiction of the Judiciary Committee, and certain functions have not. My testimony argues in 

favor of keeping the existing arrangement as it is. We on the Judiciary Committee don’t want to deal with the enforcement of the tax 

laws or the tariff laws. The Ways and Means Committee has had 

jurisdiction over that. But in terms of the actual arrest of people 
111

who are smuggling, Judiciary has had jurisdiction and done oversight over that, and I think it should remain that way. 

Similarly, we have had general jurisdiction over the INS and its 

successor agencies. 

I don’t think you can separate some enforcement functions from 

some service functions. The people who check passports at the 

ports of entry don’t actually enforce a law until they think that 

somebody is trying to break the immigration laws. On the other 

hand, what types of visas there are that are stamped in those passports and presented to immigration inspectors at the ports of entry, 

is a part of the immigration jurisdiction that has nothing to do 

with law enforcement. It has something to do with terrorism. 

But to put whether or not applicants for visas ought to be interviewed and put that in one committee while putting the underlying 

law on who qualifies for a visa in another committee would make 

no sense. In terms of doing the oversight, too many cooks will spoil 

the broth. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Ms. Slaughter. 

Ms. SLAUGHTER. Mr. Sensenbrenner, I don’t have any questions. 

Thank you. I appreciate your testimony. It was most enlightening. 

Thank you. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Chairman Cox. 

Mr. COX. Thank you. I wanted to be sure to be here so I could 

on the public record thank the chairman of the Judiciary Committee for the extraordinary working relationship that the Judiciary Committee has established with the Select Committee during 

the 108th Congress. I agree with the representation that you have 

laid before this subcommittee about the volume and quality of work 

that the Judiciary Committee has done and about the importance 

of maintaining the Judiciary Committee’s central roles in each of 

these areas of expertise, because so much of it is irreplaceable and 

simply couldn’t be replicated from scratch or otherwise we would 

attempt to do so. 

Prior to your arriving, I had the opportunity to make a point 

with other chairmen about my concern, first for the importance of 

the mission of the Department of Homeland Security, which is protecting us all from annihilation at the hands of terrorists, but, derivative of that, the importance of keeping the Department of 

Homeland Security focused on its mission. I believe there is an opportunity for the Department of Homeland Security to be distracted from that mission by either expanding its current role beyond what it already is with respect to many parts of our social life 

in America, or by essentially taking on other functions that follow 

from Congress having put more in the Department, perhaps, than 

was necessary strictly for purposes of fighting terrorism. 

So I think that defining the mission of the Department and specifically defining homeland security, something Chairman Goss 

mentioned in his testimony, is just as important as our allocation 

of responsibility within the Congress. 

To the extent that we lose sight of the essential mission of homeland security in the Department, we are going to create even more 

overlap and conflicts among standing committees of jurisdiction 

here in the Congress. 
112

Conversely, if we have a good, clear, sharp focus in the Department of Homeland Security, what we are trying to accomplish 

there, the basis for creating that new Department, then we will 

have fewer conflicts as we try to oversee that Department here in 

the Congress. 

I also want to congratulate the Judiciary Committee and your 

leadership of it, Mr. Sensenbrenner, for your emphasis on the importance of and authorization process for the Department of Justice. It is one of the major responsibilities of Judiciary, and it is one 

of the reasons I think that a homeland security committee could 

meet the burden that you place before it of helping make the country safer and of keeping the Department of Homeland Security focused on its mission. 

I think there needs to be a committee whose primary responsibility it is to look after what is the biggest reorganization of our 

Federal Government since the creation of the Department of Defense, but I take very, very seriously and understand very clearly 

the caveats that you have laid out about duplication of jurisdiction. 

You are absolutely right that every committee has—pardon me—

every Cabinet department has at least four committees that it has 

to report to. The problem that we have with Homeland Security is 

that number is up to 88, and it needs some simplification. 

I think that what we could best benefit from at this point, in addition to your testimony, which has been very clear and helpful, is 

perhaps the help of the professional staff, unless you care to answer it off the cuff, on a question of the Homeland Security Act 

itself. Because at least in this Congress that lies within the oversight of jurisdiction of this Select Committee. I would ask specifically which things that have been tentatively placed by the Congress within the jurisdiction of the Department of Homeland Security do you think should be excised, if any, and if you are so inclined, are there things that were left out of the Homeland Security 

Department thank you ought to have gone in? 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Well, let me say, first of all, Mr. Chairman, 

that I appreciate your comments about the work the Judiciary 

Committee has done. And it is not just the chairman. It is all the 

members of the committee and the staff. 

To answer your question specifically about whether we need to 

make changes in the Homeland Security Department creation act, 

I think it is too early to say. It has been a major reorganization 

of government agencies. I think the Department has been slower 

in getting up and running than all of us had hoped when it was 

created. 

The best example, I think, is the fiasco of the first responder 

grants. There is over $5 billion in the pipeline and our first responders are waiting to get that money to do what that money is 

supposed to do in terms of training and equipment and making us 

better able to respond to a terrorist strike. 

I don’t think that there is a problem in the law on this. I think 

there is a problem in the implementation of the law, and this is 

perhaps where the Homeland Security Committee can do a good job 

in doing oversight and getting on the back of those who have 

caused this backlog and to get the money flowing as the Congress 

intended it to do. 
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As you know, I do believe that authorization bills ought to be 

passed. The DOJ authorization bill that the President signed in 

November of 2002 after being passed by a voice vote in both 

Houses was the first DOJ reauthorization in 23 years. We have another one out of the committee, and I hope to have that on the floor 

relatively soon. We have still got some rough edges to negotiate 

out, but I intend to continue doing this. 

Finally, I was present for the tail end of the testimony of the representatives from the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee where they talked about biometrics in travel documents, 

specifically U.S. passports and visas. That was a part of the Visa 

and Border Security Act which the Judiciary Committee wrote, 

which was unanimously passed in both Houses and signed by the 

President May of 2002. The State Department was given some 

deadlines on this. They don’t like them, and we will be hearing 

from the Secretary of State and I believe Secretary Ridge after the 

Easter break on why they need more time to get this done. 

I can tell you that with the U.S. VISIT program, with the pictures and the fingerprint scans, within the first month when visa 

holders were required to do that, there were 30 people against 

whom criminal warrants were pending that tried to get into the 

United States using forged travel documents that were apprehended, and 6 of those 30 were wanted for murder. So the Visa and 

Border Security Act I think is not only making our borders more 

secure, but finding some people that law enforcement has been 

looking for for a while. 

Mr. COX. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Thank you. 

Chairman Sensenbrenner, as always, your testimony has been 

very impressive. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Thank you. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. I want to add my commendation to the work 

of your committee, because it is not only evident but it is well 

known and it is important, and so I simply wanted to add my commendation. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Thank you. 

Ms. SLAUGHTER. No comment. I am going to ask Zoe Lofgren, Mr. 

Sensenbrenner, if she has bet all the props. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Well, I will put on the record that I have. 

But even though I presided over most of that or made the request, 

these reports in particular, Representative Slaughter, have really 

given the bureaucracy their marching orders on where things are 

wrong and how to correct them. No executive branch agency likes 

oversight being done, regardless of who is the President, who is the 

Secretary, and who is in Congress, but I think the framers made 

our oversight functions as important as giving us the power of the 

purse, because if the agencies don’t spend the money we give them, 

wisely and appropriately, then egg is on our face as well as theirs. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Thank you very much. We are waiting for the 

chairman of the Ways and Means committee. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Welcome the chairman of the Ways and Means 

committee, Mr. omas, my good friend. Thank you for being here 

this afternoon, and we look forward to your testimony. 
114

Mr. THOMAS. Thank you, Mr.Chairman. I would ask unanimous 

consent that my written testimony be made a part of the record. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Without objection, so ordered. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE WILLIAM M. THOMAS, A 

REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, AND CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS 

Mr. THOMAS. Just briefly to comment on the question in front of 

us. Many of us are on committees. I have the privilege of chairing 

the Ways and Means committee, which is the oldest committee. 

One of the first functions established by the government, as you 

might guess, was the Customs Service to be able to raise revenue 

to run the country. 

As the economy of the world has gotten more complex, the job 

of Customs has become more complex. I find it rather interesting 

at this point in the country’s history that we have gone through—

oh, just pick it up from the Civil War period—the Civil War, Spanish American war, World War I, World War II, the Korean War, 

the Vietnamese war, and no one ever thought of the restructuring 

as we are talking about doing today. 

I agree that the threat to national security is somewhat unique 

versus those earlier historical periods, but these sorts of threats—

not to diminish the threat—tend to be cyclical or periodic, and I am 

a little concerned that we are talking about a fundamental restructuring not only of the committees of jurisdiction perhaps, because 

all we do is monitor what the executive branch does to a very great 

extent, but the way in which duties that have been developed over 

two centuries would be mixed and handled. 

I will say that we were as cooperative as I think we could have 

been in trying to merge the commercial concerns that run through 

the executive department of the Treasury with the genuine concern 

that our border security was threatened because you had a number 

of different individuals performing distinct and different duties at 

the border without overall coordination. 

What has occurred in terms of the coordination of activities at 

the border I think was overdue, and it probably took a crisis such 

as this to require the rethinking and the integration of those border duties. 

I just have to tell you that the period in which we have negotiated with the homeland security structure has been one that I 

fully anticipated. That is, when your primary title is security, you 

make decisions differently than beings who are in the process of attempting to facilitate commercial intercourse and have been doing 

it for several hundred years. The question of whether or not a potential threat to, say, a port or an airport would require it to be 

shut down oftentimes is on the teeter-totter between public security 

and freedom. Those people who have security in their title hastily 

move to make sure that the place is secure. 

You will recall around the Capitol that if we had no movement 

whatsoever, our security would be much higher. In discussing with 

the Sergeant At Arms and others, I said, well, gee, if we were 

never here, we would be even more secure, so that if we weren’t 

here and we did nothing, we would have maximum security. The 

problem is we wouldn’t get much done. 
115

So this relationship is one that will always be in need of observation, oversight and adjustment. 

We had a period where seniors in this country had a number of 

needs that weren’t being met. We had some Federal programs for 

them, but many of their real needs weren’t being met. The House 

in its wisdom created a committee called the Committee on Aging. 

It had no legislative jurisdiction, but it had the ability to focus concerns about a distinct group, seniors, so that the committees of jurisdiction could carry out changes in the law in a more coordinated 

way through the general observations of the Committee on Aging; 

and I think the Committee on Homeland Security would be a similar structure if it were to work most successfully. 

The idea of focusing on security and having that as your primary 

concern, not even necessarily having the ability to legislate in the 

area but the ability to coordinate those efforts with those committees of jurisdiction, I think would make some sense. 

You are always going to have a bit of edge and conflict where security wants to trump the legitimate other functions, but having an 

understanding and a need to continue to coordinate is I think a 

very useful and necessary role that the Committee on Homeland 

Security could perform. I don’t know that you necessarily have to 

have a jurisdictional structure. I don’t know that you necessarily 

have to have the legislative capability. What you need is the focus 

on a problem by virtue of the committee’s name ‘‘Homeland Security’’ and the need to maintain coordination among those other 

committees of jurisdiction. 

So I come down on the side of I think it was overdue. I think 

what we have done was a useful and needed step. I would be very 

concerned if we created a Committee of Homeland Security and 

gave them control from a security point of view of all of the key 

points of commerce, not just on our borders but internally, because 

I know the decision that would be made more often than not, the 

answer would be to stop, slow down, shut down commerce that is 

necessary. 

So the function could be one of coordination, of concern, of observation, of assistance, but I would be strongly opposed to a committee that was created with jurisdiction in ways that would interfere with a structure that has been successful through a number 

of other threats to our security and has worked marvelously in coordinating those activities over the last 200 years of the Customs 

office and duty and service. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE WILLIAM M. THOMAS 

TESTIMONY OF BILL THOMAS 

Chairman Diaz-Balart, Ranking Member Slaughter, and Subcommittee members, 

thank you for inviting me to testify on the role of the Select Committee. 

The Committee on Ways & Means has oversight responsibilities over all functions 

relating to customs and customs administration, including tariffs and import fees, 

classification, valuation, special rules for imports, and special tariff provisions and 

procedures. These functions cover most of the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and a substantial part of the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). 

The oversight of the Committee on Ways & Means has a long history. The Customs Service was the first agency of the federal government to be created over 220 

years ago to collect revenue and to ensure that imports flow smoothly across the 

border. Today, Customs collects more than $20 billion in revenue each year. 
116

Over the years, Customs has taken on many other functions because of its unique 

border presence. Fighting against illegal drugs, transshipped t-shirts, and Rolex 

knockoffs are just a few of these other functions. In the wake of the terrorist attacks 

on the United States, the role of Customs in guarding our borders against chemical, 

biological, and conventional weapons has become more prominent. 

While I supported the creation of the new Department, I was concerned that this 

move could damage the critical trade function of Customs. To address those concerns, I worked with many of you, Mr. Rangel, the Administration, and the Senate 

to transfer customs functions to the new department but, at the same time, to maintain statutory revenue authority within Treasury and to prohibit consolidation, discontinuation, or diminishing of customs functions, resources, or staffing. 

It is my understanding that this arrangement has functioned fairly smoothly, but 

I believe that continued oversight by the Committee on Ways & Means is necessary 

to constantly reinforce the importance of trade functions. Consider this example: At 

a recent briefing, the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection presented us with 

its mission statement. The first three bullet points were entirely devoted to security. 

Trade concerns were not mentioned until the fourth point, and even there, the focus 

was on enforcing laws rather than facilitating trade, stating ‘‘We steadfastly enforce 

the laws of the United States while fostering our nation’s economic security through 

lawful international trade and travel.’’

I know it is only natural that when a Department’s central mission is homeland 

security, the agencies of that Department will be judged on their ability to support 

that central mission and will shift their focus accordingly. However, with international trade comprising nearly 25% of our gross domestic product, CBP’s mission 

to move goods across the border in a smooth, efficient, and predictable manner cannot be accorded a mere minor role—instead, it is a vital part of our economic 

strength and viability. For that reason, continued active oversight by Ways & 

Means is essential. 

Oversight by Ways & Means is also important for reasons of competency. The tremendous range of functions that the border agency performs requires enormous 

technical expertise not only of the customs officials themselves, but also within 

Ways & Means. Relying on our expertise, we have exercised considerable oversight 

on customs matters since the Customs Service was incorporated into DHS, such as: 

• Coordination with the Administration to draft an Executive Order giving the 

Homeland Security Department general authority over Customs revenue functions 

but allowing the Treasury Department to retain final authority over regulations concerning Customs revenue functions, and the authority to review, modify, or revoke 

specified determinations or rulings. 

• Markup and passage of the Miscellaneous Trade and Technical Corrections Act, 

legislation which makes significant changes to certain Customs rules. 

• Passage of legislation to temporarily extend customs user fees, and examination 

of whether the level of such fees is commensurate with the level of services provided. Tracking the user fees in the new Department to ensure that they are used 

for commercial functions is required by our World Trade Organization obligations. 

• Passage of legislation addressing textile transshipment, including allocation of 

funding for 70 new positions, travel, training, and outreach, and a GAO audit of textile transshipment monitoring. 

• Oversight of highly technical customs classification decisions, based on the over 

800-page Harmonized Tariff Schedule. 

• Oversight of the development of the Automated Commercial Environment, 

which is designed to fully automate the process of moving goods across the border, 

a massive undertaking that will not be completed until 2007. The General Accounting Office has issued over a dozen reports on various aspects of this system. 

• Finally, the Committee plans to hold a hearing on Customs-related issues in the 

spring in preparation for our legislation to reauthorize Customs functions. 

The Select Committee on Homeland Security has been a useful coordinator of the 

efforts and oversight of the many committees that have some role in the Department of Homeland Security and can continue to play an important coordinating role 

with respect to the work of these committees. However, oversight over the customs 

functions performed by the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection and the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement should remain with Ways and 

Means as the Committee with jurisdiction over the underlying laws. Accordingly, I 

support making the Select Committee permanent only if we are assured that the 

ability of Ways & Means to carry out its customs oversight functions would not be 

jeopardized. The focus of the Select Committee on Homeland Security has, quite appropriately, been on security issues and not the perhaps more mundane, but still 

critical, trade and revenue functions. We provide that expertise and oversight.
117

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. You say in your written testimony that you 

also appreciate—you state that you would support a permanent 

Committee on Homeland Security as long as the Ways and Means 

Committee could retain the facility to carry out its Customs functions. 

I guess what I would seek from you is a clarification on what you 

consider Customs oversight functions and what—if you could give 

us some specificity, some specific roles that you would envision for 

a permanent homeland security committee in those areas. 

Mr. THOMAS. Well, obviously, if I envision a permanent homeland 

security committee but not with the jurisdiction of Ways and 

Means, and every other committee that had jurisdiction asserted 

the same thing, what you would create would be a committee that 

had the theme, much like the Committee on Aging, of homeland security. That would be their focus, and they would be working on 

coordinating to make sure that things worked. 

I would be very concerned if you created a committee of homeland security with jurisdiction and you provided the Customs duties to that committee, moving them out from under Treasury, in 

which the committee makes a decision and has the total capability 

of making a decision of shutting down a port because there was a 

telephone call and the port was shut down for 4 days and the argument was that it was for national security. It would have a devastating effect on the economy of this country if that were the way 

in which decisions were to be made. 

So I am very concerned about losing the knowledge and the ability in a continually growing, complicated area of intercourse. It is 

not bright-lighted. It is not a big area, but, boy, is it necessary to 

function smoothly as the world’s largest importer and the world’s 

largest exporter. The point at which those activities occur have to 

be allowed to go forward in a very smooth and efficient manner, 

with the full understanding of the concerns of security today different than previously, that we are more than willing to take into 

consideration on a negotiated basis with Treasury retaining the 

structure that it has, with the ability to consult and make adjustments. That is where we are today. That arrangement seems reasonable to me. 

But if the option of a permanent committee on homeland security 

is to take jurisdiction from other committees and put it together 

under the rubric of security and expect, for example, the Customs 

fees and duty collection function to continue would be rather naive. 

They would be submitted to security restrictions which I think 

would make it virtually impossible for them to do their historic job. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Ms. Slaughter. 

Ms. SLAUGHTER. Mr. Thomas, I have no questions, but thank you 

very much for very interesting testimony. I appreciate both hearing 

it and reading it. Thank you very much. 

Mr. THOMAS. Thank you. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Thank you, Chairman Thomas. Thank you 

very much. 

The hearing record will remain open for 10 days to allow for additional testimony and questions. I thank all of the members who 

sat through the questions, of course all those who testified, and at 

this point we hereby are ending—I hereby end this hearing. 
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[Whereupon, at 5:35 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

ADDITIONAL PREPARED STATEMENTS 

THE HONORABLE SHERWOOD BOEHLERT, CHAIRMAN, OF THE 

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you today. The Science Committee 

played a central role in the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 

and we have vigorously exercised our oversight since its creation. 

The Science Committee contributed to every title of the Homeland Act, but we are 

especially proud of having created the Science and Technology Directorate—an entity that was missing from the President’s original proposal—and most of the language in Title III came directly from the legislation reported by our Committee. We 

also wrote the language in Title III creating the Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency, which was added after the House passed its initial version 

of the bill. 

We have actively overseen the new Department, paying special attention to the 

Science and Technology Directorate, cybersecurity, programs for firefighters and 

visas for scientists. Some of our Committee staff are dedicated almost exclusively 

to overseeing the Department, and we have had numerous hearings on, and including, the Department. For example, at our annual full Committee hearing that looks 

at proposed R&D spending across the Federal Government, Under Secretary Chuck 

McQueary is one of our witnesses. 

We have worked closely with Chairman Thornberry’s subcommittee on your Select 

Committee, and our staffs have frequently met jointly with Homeland officials. We 

have discussed holding joint hearings. 

So it is without any animosity and with the utmost respect for the Select Committee that I turn to the primary questions you have posed to me. And I hope no 

one will take any offense at the directness of my answers. 

I do not believe the House needs a committee devoted exclusively to Homeland 

Security. In fact, I believe that such a committee is likely to prove counter-productive. Let me explain why. 

First, I think that Republicans are rightly proud that we reduced the size of 

House staffs and the number of Committees when we became the majority. Since 

1995, we’ve recognized the need for some increases, but creating a new Committee 

would be a wholesale reversal. At a time of budget deficits and spending freezes, 

this seems unwise. 

It seems especially unwise because there is no demonstrated need for a permanent committee. There are two opposing sets of arguments for such a committee—

the first is that the existing committees won’t give homeland security the attention 

it deserves, and the second is that the existing committees will pay too much attention, thereby tying down the new Department, like Gulliver, with 88 Lilliputian subcommittees. 

Both of these seem plausible in theory—even though they’re contradictory—but 

neither has proven to be the case in fact. Standing Committees, like ours, have exercised rigorous oversight without having tied down the Department with conflicting 

demands. Moreover, there are ways to deal with ‘‘turf issues’’ without creating a 

new Committee, which I’ll get to in a moment or so. 

But the main reason not to create a permanent Homeland Committee is that it 

will impede, not assist, proper Congressional oversight. How could that be? Well, 

in at least two ways. 

First, homeland security is not a single task, but a collection of tasks—and each 

task needs to be looked at in the context of how the Federal Government as a whole 

is carrying out that job. For example, we can’t evaluate what the Homeland Department is doing in science and technology without a full understanding of what the 

Federal Government as a whole is doing in that area. The same is true for transportation, emergency response, cybersecurity, indeed for each and every responsibility 

of the Department—and even more so for DHS responsibilities unrelated to its 

homeland mandate. The only way to properly oversee DHS is through the standing 

Committees that have the government-wide purview and expertise to assess the Department’s work in context. 

Second, it’s an unfortunate fact of institutional life that Committees can tend to 

become captives of the agencies they oversee. This would be especially unfortunate 

in the case of DHS, which we gave unusual latitude in the Homeland Act. A Committee whose entire existence depends on a single Department is more likely to become a captive of that Department. Congress is much more likely to rigorously exer-
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cise its oversight of DHS if we do so through a variety of Committees, none of whose 

existence depends solely on DHS. 

But then how to prevent a hopeless proliferation of Committees pestering DHS? 

There are many options, but I would suggest giving primary legislative jurisdiction 

over each directorate of DHS to the appropriate standing Committee and having the 

Committee on Government Reform exercise its traditional jurisdiction across the 

agency. 

Such a system would be clear and would save DHS from Congressional chaos—

while still subjecting the Department to strong oversight by Committees with broad 

expertise in the department’s functions. There may be other ways to achieve that 

goal, but a permanent Homeland committee is not one of them. 

Let me close by saying that I know that any testimony by any chairman against 

a new Committee can be dismissed as petty turf fighting. I hope the arguments I’ve 

made today make clear that protecting turf is not my motivation. 

And I would point out that with term limits, testifying on the basis of turf is especially pointless. Chairs only have their turf for a relatively short period of time; 

we’re talking here about changing Congress for years to come. 

Finally, I would say that in the writing of the Homeland Act and in overseeing 

the DHS, the House has been remarkably, even uncharacteristically, free of turf battles. That’s a tribute to the Committees and especially to the Leadership. I think 

a sensible system of DHS oversight can continue that peaceable and collegial situation. A new permanent Committee is more likely to create turf battles than prevent 

them. 

I urge this Subcommittee to take these arguments seriously. I would be happy to 

answer any questions. 

THE HONORABLE BART GORDON, RANKING MEMBER, OF THE COMMITTEE 

ON SCIENCE 

Thank you for inviting me to testify regarding changes to Rule X and the future 

of the Select Committee. The growing pains of the Department have been echoed 

to a lesser degree by some of the experiences of the Select Committee. That is understandable. Growing a Committee from scratch is an appreciably difficult task. I 

think that Chairman Cox and Ranking Member Turner have done an excellent job 

at their core task of keeping track of the progress the new Department has made 

in establishing itself and carrying out the terms of the law creating the Department. 

All of the Members and staff of the Select Committee are to be congratulated. 

Now we begin to wrestle with the tough question of how we go forward as an institution. It seems to me that the core rationale for the creation of the Select Committee—oversight of the messy and tumultuous process of bringing a new department into being—is eroding by the day. Beyond that core rationale, there seems to 

be one central argument for keeping the Select Committee: it will enhance the efficiency of the workings of the House. I believe that claim is based on a faulty understanding of the House, its Committee structure and operations. In fact, I think the 

effect of maintaining the Select Committee would have a generally deleterious effect 

on the House for reasons that I will elaborate upon. 

My testimony is informed by having been a Member of Congress for twenty years, 

and from sitting on two Committees that share jurisdiction with the Homeland Security Committee. I can say from experience that the Homeland Security-related jurisdiction of both the Commerce Committee and the Science Committee, where I 

have the honor of being the Ranking Minority Member, can be more than adequately covered by those Standing Committees. 

In fact, both Committees have been active in tending to their oversight responsibilities related to Homeland Security. I believe they would be even more active in 

the future were the Select Committee not in place. 

The jurisdiction of the Science Committee involves the work of the Under Secretary for Research and Development. The creation of that office, and the entire 

R&D title of the organic act, was the product of the Committee on Science. Those 

provisions were not in the original proposal that came from the White House, but 

were added by my Committee under the leadership of Chairman Boehlert. Mr. 

Armey and Ms. Pelosi both endorsed retaining those elements in the final bill. It 

is hard to imagine a more fundamental argument for jurisdiction, or competence to 

cover it, than the fact that we created the organic language based on our own Committee’s expertise in the area. 

The core logic for creating the Select Committee was the need for specific, ongoing attention to the Executive as the new Department was brought together. That 

process is well underway now so the logic for the Select Committee begins to slip 
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away. The standing Committees are more than capable of handling, as they have 

continued to oversee, the activities of this newest established Department. 

But one also hears that even with the Department becoming established, the need 

for the Select Committee continues. The core claim is that the Select Committee will 

enhance the efficiency of the House. This is a curious claim. There is only one condition under which maintaining the Select Committee might enhance our efficiency—

that being that all other standing Committees be stripped of their legislative and 

oversight jurisdiction over Homeland Security. I will return to why such a step 

would be a folly, but will first address what inefficiencies attach to keeping the Select Committee without stripping all other Committees of their jurisdiction. 

The first flavor of an efficiency argument is that having the Select Committee will 

enhance the House’s ability to handle authorizing legislation. This is an ill-considered argument. Simply designating a lead Committee from among the standing 

Committees is a perfectly reasonable solution. That is the solution the Senate settled upon. The Senate’s reaction to the creation of the Department was to designate 

the Government Affairs Committee as the lead for handling legislation related to 

the Department, but standing Committees retained their discrete expertise and responsibilities. Any legislation coming out of the House that hopes to survive the 

Senate process will have to take that into account. 

Further, the underlying premise of those who worry about the need for a lead 

Committee is that we will move reauthorizations for the entire Department all in 

one move. The huge, multi-function, multi-Committee bill that created the agency 

is unlikely to be repeated in future authorizations for a variety of reasons, not least 

of which will be the need to give somewhat more frequent legal guidance to this 

emerging agency and the difficulty of negotiating such a huge package either 

through the House Committee process or, just as importantly, the Senate Committees of jurisdiction. 

My own suspicion is that the authorizations we move will be more along functional or sub-agency lines. The current standing Committee’s with their legislative 

jurisdictions will be more than adequate for handling such legislation. I can imagine 

an R&D authorization that could move as a stand-alone bill; or a customs piece or 

an immigration service piece; or a coast guard authorization. Such targeted authorizations seem a far more reasonable expectation for future legislation than an Omnibus authorization. 

If we do need to do a more sweeping authorization, the Speaker has plenty of 

tools to deal with the current overlapping jurisdictions. In such an event, it would 

be easy enough to adopt the Senate model and designate one Committee as the lead 

and let other Committees get referrals as their jurisdiction is engaged. This is how 

we handle all major pieces of authorization. Frankly, unless Rule X is amended to 

strip all the Standing Committees of their legislative responsibilities for the functions that have been rolled into the new Department, this is what would happen 

if the Select Committee was made permanent and given legislative authority. Such 

a step would add one more Committee to the mix for referrals—the very opposite 

of the stated goal of achieving efficiencies. 

Another argument for the need to have a Select Committee rests on the claim that 

such a Committee will streamline the oversight process on the Hill. This is usually 

attached to some claim that the Department has to answer to dozens upon dozens 

of Committees and Subcommittees of the House and Senate. It always baffles me, 

absent stripping the Standing Committees of their jurisdictions, how adding a Committee and its requisite Subcommittees would do anything but inflate the number 

of Committees with jurisdiction; a counterintuitive outcome to the claim that the Select Committee represents an efficiency enhancement. 

Further, the notion that an agency answers to multiple Committees as an unnecessary burden on both the Executive and Congress always confuses me. The Science 

Committee in the House shares jurisdiction with at least 8 other House Committees 

on Energy Department issues. Other Committees, such as International Relations 

or the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence may also have reason to take 

testimony from the Department of Energy. There is a similar array of Committees 

in the Senate with some claim on the Department. Yet in his over 3 years in office, 

Secretary Abraham has only come to the Hill 27 times since his confirmation hearing. I can only recall the Secretary appearing before the Science Committee on one 

occasion, and on that occasion he was testifying in support of the President’s energy 

initiative. It doesn’t seem to me as if these multiple, overlapping jurisdictions are 

creating an unnecessary burden on the leadership of the Department of Energy, nor 

do I expect it would for the Department of Homeland Security. 

Let me return to the one method by which retaining the Select Committee could 

lead to a streamlining of work for the House, that is: through a complete re-writing 

of Rule X to center all legislative and oversight responsibility in the hands of this 
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one Committee. I don’t believe anyone is advocating this, and the problems with 

such a step are probably manifest to all. However, I seriously believe that is the 

only way to gain any ‘‘efficiency’’. 

If we strip the standing Committees of their legislative and oversight responsibilities efficiency will be purchased at the price of sacrificing our existing expertise. 

That expertise resides in the Standing Committees. The Department was not made 

of whole cloth. It is instead largely a bundle of pre-existing agencies and programs 

brought together because they broadly share in the mission of protecting our borders. The Committees of the House have generally overseen those programs from 

Administration to Administration stretching back over long years. Expertise on the 

programs at the Department of Homeland Security resides today in the same Committees that helped in the creation of that Department, and it would be foolhardy 

to diminish their role in the future work of the Department. 

The whole philosophy of organizing the House into Committees of jurisdiction 

rests upon a belief that the activities of the Executive, and the challenges to our 

nation, are so diverse that we must develop very specific expertise to be an effective 

partner and watchdog of the Executive. Members serve on just a few Committees 

in their tenure in the House, no matter how long, and the professional staffs of 

those Committees largely stay on with each change in Chairman or Ranking Member because the institutional knowledge that resides in the staff is indispensable to 

the House in carrying out our Constitutional functions. To strip standing Committees of their jurisdiction in pursuit of some chimera of efficiency would undercut the 

source of strength that resides in the Committee structure. 

There is another, more philosophical objection to the pursuit of efficiency by the 

House. In the debate surrounding the proposed Constitution, the Federalists clearly 

viewed efficiency, energy, action as an attribute to be attached to the Executive. 

However, the legislature was to be a deliberative body designed to examine, challenge, consider. 

In Federalist #70, Alexander Hamilton directly addresses these differing natures. 

As to the legislature, he wrote, ‘‘(P)romptitude of decision is oftener an evil than 

a benefit. The differences of opinion, and the jarring of parties in that department 

of the government, though they may sometimes obstruct salutary plans, yet often 

promote deliberation and circumspection, and serve to check excesses in the majority (The Federalist Papers, edited by Clinton Rossiter, p. 427).’’

It is against the nature of the House, against the intent for how we should conduct business, that we pursue ‘‘efficiency’’ as an over-riding goal in how we organize 

our business. I would argue that clear lines of legislative jurisdiction for the Standing Committees, and clear guidance from the Speaker, will be more than adequate 

efficiency when it comes to moving legislation. When it comes to oversight, I think 

a little obscurity is a good thing to create a sense of competition among the Committees in examining the workings of the Department, challenging the claims that come 

up to us and in asking hard questions. More oversight is better than less oversight, 

and you purchase that through the ‘‘inefficiency’’ of multiple Committees having a 

stake in the Department’s operation. 

This last observation opens the door to the possibility that a Select Committee 

for Homeland Security limited to oversight alone might be an enhancement of the 

powers of the House. After all, it would add one more Committee into the mix that 

could watch the Executive in this very important area. I truly believe that the current array of Standing Committees is more than adequate to create an environment 

for aggressive oversight if Congress is of a mind to engage in that duty. If Congress 

is not interested in carrying out that function, no number of Committees, no matter 

how large, will be sufficient to spur the work forward. 

I thank the Subcommittee for considering my testimony and your time. 

THE HONORABLE HENRY J. HYDE, CHAIRMAN, AND THE HONORABLE TOM 

LANTOS, RANKING MEMBER, OF THE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL 

RELATIONS 

Thank you Mr. Chairman. We appreciate your accepting this statement for consideration by the Subcommittee on Rules. 

Mr. Chairman, as you know, the legislation creating the Department of Homeland 

Security has created a major reorganization of the U.S. Government. When that legislation came before the Committee on International Relations, however, the Committee had only a relatively small aspect of that reorganization: the relationship between the Department of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security. 

Mr. Chairman, the immigration function, prior to the creation of the Department 

of Homeland Security, was shared between the Department of State’s consular service and the Department of Justice’s Immigration and Naturalization Service. The 
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Committee on International Relations was regularly involved in overseeing the activities of the Consular Affairs Bureau at the Department of State and providing 

authorities and authorization of its activities, such as the application of visa policy 

implementation of programs related to international abductions of U.S. children and 

the implementation of the Hague Convention on Inter-Country Adoption. 

The International Relations Committee was also involved in decisions regarding 

the designation by the Secretary of State of Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO5), 

a provision contained in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), and the impact 

of such designations on other areas of international affairs legislation, such as prohibitions on dual-use exports to FTOs and on U.S. assistance. In addition, there are 

a number of other immigration-related authorities committed to the Secretary of 

State by the 1NA. The Committee conducted oversight over virtually all these areas. 

In this context we worked closely with the Judiciary Committee on these matters, 

particularly where there was joint jurisdiction. 

The ‘‘Homeland Security Act of 2002’’ continues to provide for substantial authority within the Department of State. Under that Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security has authority over visa policy, has the authority to refuse visas, and can develop training programs for consular officers. In addition, the ‘‘Homeland Security 

Act of 2002’’ maintained certain immigration authorities exclusively under the Secretary of State and kept the Bureau of Consular Affairs and all overseas consular 

officers in the Department of State. 

In this context, the Committee on International Relations maintains a significant 

interest in the continued oversight of these activities. In addition to any number of 

briefings and hearings in these areas since the enactment of that statute, the Committee has exercised legislative jurisdiction over a number of consular issues, particularly through the ‘‘Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2004 

and 2005.’’ We continue to have an abiding interest and expertise in all the issues 

that we described above relating to the Department of State. 

We would oppose any effort to transfer jurisdiction over the Bureau of Consular 

Affairs or the Committee’s role in the Secretary’s authority over immigration activities to any other committee, whether it to be a new standing committee on homeland security or to any other standing committee.Assuming that such a transfer 

does not happen, when it comes to the question of amending Rule X of the House 

to create such a standing committee, the Committee on International Relations 

could undoubtedly adapt to such a new situation. If such a committee is created and 

includes jurisdiction over the immigration function, we are sure that the Committee 

could work with a new standing committee in a way similar to how it works with 

the Judiciary Committee. If such a committee was created through an amendment 

to Rule X, we would also strongly recommend that, in order to clarify the relationship between the two committees, the jurisdiction of the Committee on International 

Relations should be clarified by specifically adding ‘‘the Department of State’’ to the 

matters for which the Committee on International Relations is responsible. 

We are cognizant of the many competing concerns which must be weighed in the 

course of this study of the future of the Select Committee on Homeland Security. 

The primary consideration should be to establish the most efficient oversight, investigative, and legislative processes. However, we would be remiss if we did not raise 

some concerns regarding the creation of a new standing committee on the basis of 

efficiency. There is, of course, logic in centralizing all oversight of the new Department in one committee, an effort which would have obvious benefits. We need to 

recognize, however, that currently the several committees that have jurisdiction 

over the Department of Homeland Security have a wide range of highly-skilled and 

experienced members and staff who have developed real expertise in the particular 

areas under their jurisdiction, including immigration, customs, safety of life at sea 

and other functions which now reside in Department. 

The creation of a standing committee with new members and staff risks losing 

this valuable expertise. Indeed, over the short or medium term, the creation of a 

single standing committee may actually reduce the ability of the House to properly 

oversee this new Department just as it continues to face the normal challenges from 

the reorganization. One option that the Committee may want to consider is postponing the decision to create a new standing committee on homeland security until 

the beginning of the 0th Congress, giving the current structure two more years to 

help oversee the Department as it works through these challenges. In any case, 

careful consideration must be given to finding ways to preserve the current expertise if the creation of a new standing committee is to be given serious consideration. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
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THE HONORABLE MICHAEL G. OXLEY, CHAIRMAN, AND THE HONORABLE 

BARNEY FRANK, RANKING MEMBER, OF THE COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES

WASHINGTON, DC 20515

March 22, 2004 

The Honorable Lincoln Diaz-Balart, Chairman 

The Honorable Louise Slaughter, Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Rules 

Committee on Homeland Security 

2244 Rayburn House Office Building 

Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Chairman Diaz-Balart and Ranking Member Slaughter:

Thank you for your recent invitation to appear before the Subcommittee on Rules 

on the effect of the Rules of the House on consideration of homeland security matters. While we will not be appearing before the Subcommittee, we have enclosed our 

joint written statement on the subject, and would appreciate it being made a part 

of the hearing record. 

Again, we appreciate the invitation to testify, and look forward to working with 

you as the Subcommittee continues its work. Should you or your staff have any 

questions, please contact either of us, or Mr. Hugh Halpern of the Majority staff at 

extension 5–7502, or Mr. Jaime Lizarraga of the Minority staff at extension 5–4247.

Yours truly,

MICHAEL G. OXLEY 

Chairman

BARNEY FRANK 

Ranking Member 

JOINT STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN MICHAEL G. OXLEY AND RANKING 

MEMBER BARNEY FRANK BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON RULES SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

MARCH 24, 2004

Chairman Diaz-Balart, Ranking Member Slaughter, and Members of the Subcommittee, we appreciate this opportunity to offer our views on the future of the 

Select Committee on Homeland Security. Our comments for the Subcommittee will 

not address the issue of whether the Select Committee should be added to the list 

of permanent standing committees of the House in the 109th Congress or beyond; 

rather, they will lay out the important work done by the Committee on Financial 

Services in the post–9/11 era, and express our view that any changes to Rule X 

should permit our committee to continue our work on those issues. 

THE COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES 

Established in the 107th Congress, the Committee on Financial Services represents the latest effort on the part of the House to rationalize Rule X with the evolution of the modern economy. With the passage of Gramm-Leach-Bliley and the ongoing modernization of the financial services industry, the House recognized the 

need to merge the jurisdiction of the old Committee on Banking and Financial Services with jurisdiction over securities and exchanges and insurance previously exercised by the Committee on Commerce. This combination was intended to better reflect the realities of the marketplace, and we believe that our track record demonstrates the wisdom of that decision. 

In the 3 short years since the Committee came into existence, we have been forced 

to respond to a series of crises which threatened the economic well-being of the Nation. The Committee was only 9 months old when Manhattan was attacked on September 11, 2001. Yet the Committee’s oversight and coordination played an important role in ensuring that banks never closed, the money supply was safe, and the 
124

capital markets reopened within days of the attacks, despite many of those markets 

being based within blocks of Ground Zero. 

In the weeks following the attacks, the Committee authored legislation to assist 

the Department of the Treasury and law enforcement to track and shut off the 

sources of terrorist financing and to provide a temporary Federal backstop to ensure 

that businesses could continue to get insurance coverage for acts of terrorism. The 

most recent piece of financial services legislation responding to the September 11 

attacks was enacted last year, ensuring that payments can continue unimpeded, 

even if the transportation system is crippled. 

At the same time, the Committee was forced to respond to a crisis in confidence 

created by a series of corporate scandals, further undermining the resilience of our 

capital markets. The Committee responded on several fronts, culminating in enactment of the Sarbanes Oxley Act, and recent work to address abuses found in the 

mutual fund industry. 

All of these activities occurred outside of the Homeland Security Act and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), yet no one would argue that they were any 

less important to the long-term security of the Nation, or that they should have occurred in any other venue. 

CREATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

During the consideration of the legislation to create DHS, Chairman Armey of the 

first Select Committee solicited the views of the committees of jurisdiction. Chairman Oxley and then-Ranking Member LaFalce submitted their views on HR. 5005, 

the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (see attachment). In that letter, they identified 

several agencies either within the jurisdiction of the Committee on Financial services or which have important roles with regard to matters within the Committee’s 

jurisdiction. While the attached letter discusses the programs in more detail, they 

are briefly described below. 

Federal Emergency Management Agency 

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) administers 3 programs 

which fall under the jurisdiction of the Committee on Financial Services: (1) the National Flood Insurance Program, (2) the Emergency Food and Shelter Program, and 

(3) the Defense Production Act (DPA). The first 2 programs fall within the Committee’s jurisdiction over public and private housing (ci. 1(g)(8), Rule X), and the Committee is explicitly given jurisdiction over defense production (cl. 1(g)(2), Rule X). 

While each of these programs is related to FEMA’s core mission of preparation, 

response, and prevention of disasters, they are relatively small elements of the 

agency’s portfolio. For instance, the Emergency Food and Shelter Program places 

FEMA in a coordination role with charitable third-parties to ensure that food and 

shelter resources can be dispatched where they are needed most. Similarly, FEMA’s 

role under the Defense Production Act is to coordinate Federal agencies’ decisions 

regarding transportation services and the availability of civil defense resources in 

times of national emergency, while other agencies such as the Department of Commerce and the Department of Defense implement other aspects of the DPA. The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), while wholly administered by FEMA, is a 

program which permits homeowners to purchase flood insurance, a product private 

insurers refuse to provide due to problems with the traditional economics of insurance underwriting when applied to flooding. Unlike much of the post disaster aid 

provided by FEMA, NFIP is a premium-supported system, with the full faith and 

credit of the United States providing the ultimate backstop. The program’s primary 

purpose is to ensure that home buyers can obtain the insurance demanded by lenders when the property is located within a flood plain. 

United States Secret Service 

While the Secret Service and its activities do not fall directly within the jurisdiction of the Committee on Financial Services, it’s origins in the Department of the 

Treasury and mission have led to its historic close working relationship with this 

Committee, its predecessors, and other financial regulatory agencies. Since the Secret Service’s founding in 1865, it has been the primary protector of the Nation’s 

currency, and has developed extensive expertise in the protection of the Nation’s 

payments system. This mission was expanded with the passage of the Omnibus 

Crime Control Act (Public Law 98–473) which gave the Service jurisdiction over 

crimes involving credit cards, identity theft, and computer crime. This jurisdiction 

was expanded again in 1994 when the Service was given additional jurisdiction to 

investigate fraud against financial institutions. 
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RECENT ACTIVITY IN THE COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES 

INVOLVING DHS FEMA 

FEMA Programs 

The transfer of FEMA to DHS has not affected the legislative or oversight activities of the Committee on Financial Services. During the last session of the 108th 

Congress, the Committee reauthorized the Defense Production Act. On March 19, 

2003, a witness from DHS appeared alongside witnesses from the Department of 

Commerce and the Department of Defense at a hearing on reauthorization of the 

DPA. The Committee reported legislation reauthorizing the DPA on April 2, 2003 

(H.R. 1280; H. Rept. 108–56). The DPA was reauthorized through September 30, 

2008 with enactment of the companion legislation from the Senate (S. 1608; Public 

Law 108–195). 

Similarly, the Committee reported legislation reforming and reauthorizing the National Flood Insurance Program. The Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2003 (H.R. 253; 

H. Rept. 108–266) passed the House on November 20, 2003 by a record vote of 352 

yeas and 62 nays, and is currently pending in the Senate. The Committee has also 

had to shepherd a number of short-term extensions of the program in the 108th 

Congress (See H.R. 11, H.J. Res. 2, H.R. 2555, 5. 1768). 

Secret Service 

While the Committee has not reported legislation giving new responsibilities to 

the United States Secret Service since its transfer to the Department of Homeland 

Security, the Committee continues to enjoy a close working relationship with the Secret Service as it oversees the safety and security of the Nation’s currency. The Secret Service worked closely with the Treasury Department’s Bureau of Engraving 

and Printing (BEP) in the design of the new $20 bill released last year, and is continuing its work with the redesign of the $50 and $100 bills, scheduled for release 

in 2004 and early 2005. With the Secret Service on the front lines of the battle 

against currency counterfeiting, their expertise is essential in the BEP’s efforts to 

design currency which thwarts counterfeiters using increasingly sophisticated and 

readily-available technology. 

OTHER HOMELAND SECURITY-RELATED ACTIVITIES IN THE 107TH AND 

108TH CONGRESSES 

One of the primary lessons of the post–9/11 era is that ‘‘homeland security’’ is not 

a monolithic concept. DHS was designed to be multi-disciplinary, incorporating elements to address border and transportation security, emergency preparedness and 

response, and critical infrastructure protection. Yet, while DHS is one of the lead 

agencies in the Nation’s fight against terrorism, it does not carry out that fight 

alone. 

One of the key elements in stopping terrorist attacks before they begin and catching the perpetrators in their aftermath is tracking terrorist financing. The Committee has engaged in vigorous oversight of the Department of the Treasury, the 

lead agency in this effort, as well as all of the other financial regulators to ensure 

that terrorist financing activities cannot escape detection, and that our financial 

system is not abused by terrorists. 

Similarly, while DHS is the coordinating agency in the protection of the Nation’s 

critical infrastructure, the Department of the Treasury and the other financial regulators, including the Federal Reserve, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the 

FDIC, and others, have the day-to-day responsibility for securing the payments system and capital markets against all manner of attack. The rapid recovery of the 

capital markets and limited disruption of the banking and payments system was 

one of the great success stories from the events of September 11. 

The Committee on Financial Services has pursued a legislative and oversight 

agenda intended to reinforce those elements in the tracking of terrorist financing 

and protection of our critical financial infrastructure, while seeking improvement in 

those areas where weaknesses have been found. What follows is a brief description 

of the Committee’s activities in this regard. 

Money Laundering and Tracking Terrorist Financing 

What began as an effort to track the activities of drug traffickers and organized 

crime has evolved into one of the most essential tools in the war on terrorism. The 

Committee and its predecessors have held a long-standing interest in the matter, 

and it has been the subject of legislative and oversight activities since the early–

1980’s. 

Jurisdictionally, money laundering and terrorist financing enforcement efforts fall 

into two categories: (1) criminal enforcement provisions, which fall within the juris-
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diction of the Committee on the Judiciary, and (2) coordination and regulation of 

activities at financial institutions, securities firms, and other financial intermediaries to track and reduce money laundering, which fall within the jurisdiction 

of the Committee on Financial Services. 

The Department of the Treasury has long been the central coordinating authority 

in the effort to track and disrupt the money flows to terrorists and criminals. Since 

the establishment of the Committee on Financial Services in the 107th Congress, 

it has held a number of hearings on the subject, including: • Internet gambling and its use as a money laundering conduit (7/11/2001); • The design and security of the Nation’s currency (7/24/2001); • Dismantling the financial infrastructure of global terrorism (10/3/2001); • Preventing identity theft by terrorists and criminals (11/8/200 1); • Oversight of the USA PATRIOT Act and investigating patterns of terrorist financing (2/12/2002; 9/19/2002); • Recovering monetary assets stolen by dictators (5/9/2002); • Progress since 9/11 in tracking terrorist financing (3/11/2003); • Freezing, seizing, and repatriating funds stolen by Saddam to Iraq (5/14/2003; 

3/18/2004); and, • The Hamas asset freeze and other efforts to curtain terrorist financing (9/24/

2003); 

Additionally, the subject of terrorist financing and efforts to curtain money laundering are often the subject of questions during Chairman Greenspan’s twice-yearly 

appearances on the state of monetary policy and the economy, as well as during routine oversight hearings on the other financial regulators. 

Legislatively, the Committee has also been active in efforts to curtain money laundering. The most substantial effort in this regard was the Financial Anti-Terrorism 

Act of 2001 (H.R. 3004, 107th Congress), enacted as title III of the USA PATRIOT 

Act (Public law 107–56). This measure contained a wide-variety of provisions addressing activities commonly associated with money laundering. It gave the Treasury Department important new authorities to reduce the traditional avenues of terrorist financing, such as hawala and other informal money-transfer systems which 

operate outside of the traditional banking system. 

Additionally, the Act strengthened already existing elements with the Treasury 

Department to ensure that they were suited to the job of tracking terrorist financing. Most notably, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) was elevated from an office to a bureau within the Treasury, and it was given significant 

new standing and resources. FinCEN draws on the expertise of a number of different agencies to serve as an ‘‘early warning’’ system for terrorist financing, attempting to discover efforts by criminals and terrorists to move money through the 

system before it can be used to finance criminal acts. The Committee continues to 

closely monitor FinCEN’s progress, and is actively engaged in making its efforts successful. 

Similarly, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is an entity within the 

Treasury Department which receives regular scrutiny from the Committee. OFAC’s 

mission is to freeze, seize and assist in the repatriation of foreign assets found in 

the U.S. banking system. OFAC and FinCEN, when taken together, are the frontline organizations in the Nation’s battle against money laundering, representing the 

consolidation of expertise on the matter.Critical Infrastructure of the Nation’s Financial System 

One of the lessons arising from the events of September 11 was the importance 

of protecting the critical infrastructure of the Nation’s financial system. The planes 

which hit the World Trade Center were a direct attack on the Nation’s capital markets. The New York and American stock exchanges were temporarily shut down 

after the attacks, and a number of large market-makers, clearing operations, and 

other financial intermediaries were actually located within the towers themselves. 

However, the New York Stock Exchange was only closed for 4 business days, and 

the market infrastructure demonstrated an astounding degree of resilience given the 

magnitude of the destruction. 

Much of the credit goes to preparations made by the financial services sector in 

their effort to avoid problems associated with the Y2K bug. During those efforts, 

many of the exchanges, firms, and financial institutions took the opportunity to 

build redundancy and backup systems, and perfect their disaster recovery procedures. Those efforts were invaluable in ensuring that the quick recovery of the markets. 

However, those same events revealed other weaknesses in the system which the 

Committee continues to pursue. While critical infrastructure protection has many 

common elements across industries, such as the need to protect important telecommunications or transportation arteries, the financial services sector has dem-
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onstrated that if other assets peculiar to that industry aren’t protected, the results 

can be disastrous. By way of example, after the completion of a sales transaction 

for equities, the transaction goes through a ‘‘clearing’’ process which can take up to 

5 days. If the records of those transactions are lost during the clearing process, literally billions of dollars could disappear from the economy in the blink of an eye. 

In the event of an emergency, the markets and their associated sales and clearing 

systems must be shut down in an orderly process so as to minimize the potential 

economic effects of a catastrophic failure. 

Through a pattern of cooperation with the financial regulators and their regulated 

firms, the Committee has had a record of successful identification of problem areas, 

and efforts are under way to address those flaws. For instance, on February 12, 

2003, the Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored 

Enterprises held a hearing entitled ‘‘Recovery and Renewal: Protecting the Capital 

Markets Against Terrorism Post 9/11.’’ This hearing featured the testimony from the 

General Accounting Office (GAO) highlighting their work on the financial services 

critical infrastructure issue, entitled ‘‘Potential Terrorist Attacks: More Actions 

Needed to Better Prepare Critical Financial Markets’’ (GAO as well as other testimony from the Securities and Exchange Commission, the New York Stock Exchange, NASDAQ, and the Bond Market Association. The Committee’s efforts to address problem areas is ongoing both in public and non-public oversight efforts. 

Through the work of this study and the Committee’s other work on the subject, it 

is apparent that a high level of expertise in the operation of the markets is necessary to protect its unique infrastructure. 

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE SUBCOMMITTEE 

Most of the preceding material described the Committee’s interaction with DHS 

on those programs within its jurisdiction and the Committee’s other activities which 

might be characterized as ‘‘related’’ to homeland security. However, as you can see 

from those descriptions, our work has focused on the aspects of homeland security 

which are financial in nature, and essential to the proper functioning of the financial services sector. 

In general, should the House decide to add the Homeland Security Committee to 

the roster of standing committees of the House, we believe that those matters that 

currently fall within the Financial Services Committee’s Rule X jurisdiction are distinct enough so as to avoid any interference with the current or future work of the 

Homeland Security Committee. The Committee on Financial Services and its predecessors have a demonstrated expertise in the increasingly complex financial services 

sector which we should be permitted to continue to exercise. 

Specifically, should the House decide to reorganize Rule X to better define the 

Homeland Security jurisdiction in the House, we recommend:

1. Programs administered by FEMA which currently fall within the jurisdiction 

of the Committee on Financial Services should remain within its jurisdiction. Those 

programs include the Defense Production Act (which FEMA shares with the Departments of Defense and Commerce), the Emergency Food and Shelter Program, and 

the National Flood Insurance Program. All of these programs are directly related 

to the core jurisdiction of the Committee on Financial Services, in either the areas 

of housing or defense production, price controls, or industrial policy. The Committee’s legislative efforts on these matters have not been impeded by the transfer of 

FEMA to DHS. Similarly, other committees have always been FEMA’s authorizing 

committees, and their efforts have similarly been unimpeded.

2. Jurisdiction over money laundering and terrorist financing should remain with 

the Committee on Financial Services. Despite the importance of money laundering 

and terrorist financing regulation to the efforts to protect the homeland, those programs are closely related to the regular operations of financial institutions and similar firms. The Department of the Treasury continues to be the lead agency in tracking, freezing, seizing, and repatriating illegal financial assets, and the Committee 

on Financial Services should maintain its traditional role in overseeing those operations.

3. Any grant of critical infrastructure protection to a Committee on Homeland Security should only be ‘‘general’’ While there is a role for a committee to play in formulating overall critical infrastructure protection policy, the oversight of specific 

sectors should remain with the committees of jurisdiction. This is similar to the 

grant of jurisdiction over insurance to the Committee on Financial Services, where 

the Financial Services Committee is granted jurisdiction over ‘‘insurance, generally’’, 

while other committees have jurisdiction over health insurance, crop insurance, and 

other similar matters. In the case of the Committee on Financial Services, oversight 
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of the critical infrastructure efforts specific to the financial services sector should 

remain with the Committee on Financial Services.

We hope that you have found these explanations and recommendations helpful in 

your deliberations. We stand ready to assist the Subcommittee and the Select Committee further should you require our assistance. 

ATTACHMENT 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES

WASHINGTON, DC 20515

July 11, 2002

The Honorable Richard K. Armey, Chairman 

Select Committee on Homeland Security 

U.S. House of Representatives 

Washington, DC 20515

Dear Chairman Armey:

The terrorist attacks of September 11 demonstrated the need for improved security and prevention measures to combat acts of violence against U.S. citizens. The 

Financial Services Committee has contributed to the fight against terrorism by cutting off funding for organizations that finance terrorist activities and strengthening 

existing money laundering laws through the USA PATRIOT Act (P.L. 107–56). Additionally, the Committee has sought to prevent catastrophic economic losses from 

such attacks through the passage of the Terrorist Risk Protection Act (H.R. 3210). 

The Financial Services Committee has done an extensive review of its jurisdiction 

as it relates to the President’s proposal to create a Department of Homeland Security (H.R. 5005). The Committee strongly supports the efforts of the President and 

the Select Committee on Homeland Security to create a new executive department 

that will coordinate resources in an effort to prevent attacks on the United States. 

While the Committee will not mark up H.R. 5005, it would like to identify its jurisdiction over this legislation and reserve its right to consider the issues within our 

jurisdiction in the future. The Committee believes that it is in the best position to 

continue oversight of these programs, regardless of what executive department they 

are located. 

The following represents our views about how the programs within our jurisdiction will integrate into the new Department of Homeland Security: 

FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY 

The Committee has jurisdiction over three programs within the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) that would become the responsibility of the new 

department created through H.R. 5005. These programs are: the National Flood Insurance Programs, the Defense Production Act and the Emergency Food and Shelter 

Program. FEMA’s mission is to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from 

disasters of all types. The, Committee believes that the expertise of FEMA in consequence management is critical to the function of the proposed Office of Homeland 

Security

National Flood Insurance Program—The National Flood Insurance Act of 

1968 (42 USC 4001 et seq.) created the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) 

and authorized the Director of FEMA to administer the Federal Insurance Administration (FIA). The FLA provided insurance protection for properties which are vulnerable to floods, but not insured by the private sector. Prior to passage of this act, 

insurance companies generally did not offer coverage for flood disasters because of 

the high risks involved. The legislation as amended in 1973 and 1994 authorized 

the FIA and Mitigation Directorate to administer the NFIP. In 2001, the FJA and 

the Mitigation Directorate were brought together into a single organization, the 

Federal Insurance and Mitigation Administration (FIMA). 

FIMA has expertise in risk assessment, mitigation or loss prevention and insurance. Efforts such as resident education and flood mapping enable FEMA to reach 

out to residents in flood prone regions and protect against preventable losses. These 

services work in conjunction with the NFIP and have proven successful in building 

relationships in regions where floods are a threat to property and lives. The Committee understands that FIMA’s risk assessment programs are now being designed 
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to assist local communities to identify and address their vulnerabilities from natural 

and man-made disasters.The Committee views FEMA’s efforts to prevent and mitigate damage from floods as critical to the protection of lives and property. The Committee further believes that it is important that the NFIP and the FIMA to work 

together efficiently in the prevention of losses from floods and from other disasters 

and for that reason should for the time being remain within FEMA as it is transferred to the Department of Homeland Security. FEMA’s programs may be reviewed 

by the Committee in the future in an effort to improve their operation and to ensure 

that users are properly served.

The Defense Production Act—The goal of the Defense Production Act of 1950 

(50 USC App. 2062) (DPA) is to ensure that the United States has the ability to 

mobilize industrial and other civilian resources in support of national defense an 

civil emergency preparedness maintain military readiness when there is a threat to 

national security. The DPA is essential to the protection of the United States in so 

far as it uses economic tools to provide uninterrupted supplies of industrial resources in times of military crisis and civil emergency. 

The DPA authorizes FEMA to coordinate Federal agencies’ decisions concerning 

the provision of transportation services, the priority availability of civil defense resources, materials, services and facilities to ensure the dispersal of such resources 

in the interest of national defense. The DPA was reauthorized by the Financial 

Services Committee in 2001 for two years (F.L. 107–47). 

The Committee believes the DPA is an important mechanism for the protection 

of the United States and should be located in the new Department of Homeland Security. Through the President’s proposal, the DPA will be very important to mobilize 

national defense and civil emergency preparedness resources in the event of a terrorist attack or in an effort to ensure that there is adequate preparation to prevent 

such an attack. 

T2The Emergency Food and Shelter Program—The Emergency Food and Shelter 

Program (EFSP) (P.L. 100–77) is governed by a national board consisting of several 

charitable organizations and is chaired by FEMA. The goal of this program is to allocate Federal funds for the provision of food and shelter. The national board 

awards funds to jurisdictions based upon a formula. Further, a small portion of the 

overall award is allocated by formula to state set-aside committees which then allocate funds to jurisdictions based upon the criteria they feel is most appropriate. The 

EFSP seeks to ensure that allocations are quickly made to neediest areas of the 

country, that the public and private sectors cooperate, and that decisions are made 

at the local level. In 2001, $140 million in aid was distributed through this program. 

It can be argued that the operation of food and shelter programs has little to do 

with the protection of the United States from terrorist activities. However, the 

EFSP is a critical program which supplies food and shelter to needy people in emergency situations, and to ensure that the program remains effective and functional, 

the Committee recommends that it remain within FEMA at this time. The President’s 2003 budget proposal calls for the EFSP to be moved from FEMA to the Department of Housing and Urban Development. This could be an effective allocation 

of Federal resources to aid those in need, and the Committee may examine the viability of such a move in the future. 

UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE 

The Committee commends the President for his proposal to move the United 

States Secret Service (USSS) to the new Department and maintain it as a ‘‘distinct 

entity’’ outside the four major jurisdictional cylinders established under the new 

Secretary. The Committee believes that the long dual-role history of the Service—

investigative and protective—combined with its more recently developed expertise 

in preventing and investigating cyber crimes and its core mission of protecting the 

financial system of the United States, make the USSS uniquely suited to draw from 

and augment the work of the other component agencies of the new Department. 

Since its founding in 1865 as the first investigative arm of the United States government and the protector of the integrity of U.S. currency, the Service has been 

the primary guardian of the country’s financial services—banks, currency and payment systems. The added mission of personal protection, dating to 1901 following 

the assassination of President William McKinley, built on the Service’s expertise at 

preventing crimes. That mission statement was expanded again in 1984 with passage of the Omnibus Crime Control Act (P.L. 98–473), adding jurisdiction over new 

crimes involving identity theft, access devices such as credit cards, and computer 

crimes. In 1994, further jurisdiction was added, recognizing USSS expertise investigating fraud against financial institutions. Today, the Secret Service has over 
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6,000 employees, an annual budget of just over $1 billion and 125 field offices across 

the United States and around the world.

Infrastructure Protection— Springing from the Service’s personal-protection role is the unique and important duty to protect critical infrastructures of the United States. The Committee believes this role should become 

an enhanced portion of the Service’s duties at the new Department. 

The events of September 11 reinforce lessons the Committee learned in efforts to 

protect against financial-system and infrastructure failures due to the Year 2000 

problem: that in an increasingly computerized and inter-connected world, the failure 

of a seemingly innocuous system can cause panic, deaths or economic calamity. Recent news stories indicating that Al Qaeda operatives have been probing the cyber 

security of U.S. power systems and dams as well as banks and defense systems 

show that the lesson has not been lost on terrorists, either. A serious compromise 

of these electronic networks could wreak havoc on our economy, law enforcement, 

military, health care, transportation and emergency services.

Cyber Crime—Cyber criminals have devised sophisticated programs and techniques to defraud both consumers and private industry through electronic means. 

In response, the Secret Service has developed new tools to combat the growing areas 

of cyber terrorism, financial crime and computer fraud. These techniques include the 

widely respected Electronic Crimes Special Agent Program and the series of task 

forces modeled on the New York Electronic Crimes Task Force that are now under 

development. The former program provides specialized training to select agents in 

all areas of electronic crimes, qualifying those personnel as experts in the forensic 

examination of electronic evidence. The USA PATRIOT Act, to which the Committee 

contributed a major title, authorized the Secret Service to establish a nationwide 

network of cyber crime task forces, based on the New York model that uses an innovative approach allowing local, state and national law enforcement agencies to combine their resources and experience with those of prosecutors, the private sector and 

academic institutions to deter electronic crimes of all sorts. In recent months, the 

Service has launched similar task forces across the country. The Committee strongly 

supports these efforts and believes they can be instrumental in preventing crimes 

that could disrupt the financial systems of the United States.

Anti-Counterfeiting—The Service’s original mission in 1865 was to block the 

counterfeiting of the newly issued national currency, and while the mission does not 

today have the profile of protecting the President, it remains a core function. Indeed, the USSS anti-counterfeiting efforts may be even more important today than 

they were a century ago, as the U.S. dollar is the reserve currency of the world, 

is the official currency of a number of countries, and is the default currency of many 

more. The public’s faith in the integrity of the dollar is at the heart of the stability 

of the U.S. economy. 

Thus, the Committee believes that the Service’s efforts to combat counterfeiting 

deserve continued and enhanced emphasis. Recent discoveries in Colombia of credible counterfeits of the new U.S. one-dollar coin and in both Colombia and in areas 

of Eastern Europe of counterfeit plants producing or ready to produce both U.S. 

banknotes and the new Euro banknotes indicate the magnitude of the problem. The 

Committee believes that the continued growth of counterfeiting by personal computer in the U.S. eventually will be mirrored overseas, where counterfeiting still 

mostly is done on presses and is thus somewhat easier to interdict. Also, the Committee believes that the establishment of more overseas field offices so that agents 

can gather and act on information first-hand—rather than relying on other Federal 

law agencies or other countries’ law-enforcement—will increase the ability to stop 

counterfeiting. 

Given the demonstrated nexus between counterfeiting, drug-running, arms-smuggling and terrorism, the Committee strongly believes that trying to staff anti-counterfeiting and other anti-crime and threat-assessment efforts for all of Central and 

South America and the Caribbean (except Colombia) from a single office in Miami 

is simply not practical anymore. 

The Committee further believes that the Service’s recent agreement with Europol 

to jointly police against counterfeiting is an important move and a model for other 

law enforcement that should be encouraged. The Committee stands ready to enhance other anti-counterfeiting law, as appropriate.

Financial Crimes—The Service’s pedigree as the only Federal investigative unit 

until some of its agents were detailed to help form the Federal Bureau of Investigation in 1907, and its position within the Department of the Treasury, naturally led 

to a good relationship with the financial services industry and successes in stopping 

financial crimes. In the 1 980’s, with the advent of relatively new technologies such 

as computers and credit cards came a wave of an entirely new sort of bank and fi-
131

nancial fraud, and the 1984 Act created three new criminal statutes—Title 18, Sections 1028, 1029 and 1030—to deal with fraud in conjunction with identity documents, access device fraud arid computer crimes, giving the Service major new authorities and clear jurisdiction. The USA PATRIOT Act cemented the Service’s jurisdiction over Sections 1030 and 1344. The Committee believes that the Service’s role 

in these areas, as well as the assessment of threats against financial services companies and the protection of that infrastructure—communications, power, etc.—vital 

to those companies, is invaluable and should be emphasized.

Monetary Security—While the President’s legislative proposal for the new Department does not suggest consolidating the Treasury Department’s monetary security forces into the new Department, the Committee believes that this could be an 

important step that should be closely examined. Currently the United States Mint 

and the Bureau of Engraving and Printing (BEP) maintain separate security forces 

that over the years have had varying degrees of success. The Committee feels that 

transferring this mission to the Secret Service in the new Department would have 

important benefits both to the security of the facilities that produce the country’s 

currency and coins, and also to the security of U.S. gold reserves held at Fort Knox, 

currently under the supervision of the Mint. Noting that the BEP currently relies 

on the USSS heavily for consultations on its security arrangements, the Committee 

further believes that moving this mission to the Service may allow the currencyproduction arms of the Treasury to concentrate on what they do best and allow the 

Service to train its newest agents in a different form of protection detail, ultimately 

enhancing their abilities. 

The Financial Services Committee strongly supports the efforts of the President 

and the Select Committee on Homeland Security to protect our citizens from terrorist attacks. While the Committee waives its referral of H.R. 5005, its Members 

stand ready to assist in the structuring of the envisioned Department of Homeland 

Security if such assistance is requested.

Yours truly,

MICHAEL G. OXLEY 

Chairman

BARNEY FRANK 

Ranking Member 

THE HONORABLE CHARLES B. RANGEL, AND RANKING MEMBER OF THE 

COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS 

Chairman Diaz-Balart and Ranking Member Slaughter, I appreciate the invitation to present my formal views to Members of the Subcommittee on Rules regarding the Select Committee on Homeland Security (‘‘the Select Committee’’). Establishment of the Select Committee for the 1 08 Congress was necessary to insure effective oversight and coordination in the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Without question, the Committee played a valuable role in implementing the Homeland Security Act of 2002, monitoring the activities of the DHS, 

and providing a meaningful Congressional forum for discussion of our homeland security activities, problems, and concerns. 

On the issue that is the subject of this hearing, the future of the Select Committee, I believe that there could be a continued role for the Select Committee to 

play, particularly with regard to coordinating the oversight and authorization activities of the various House committees that retain primary jurisdiction over elements 

of the Department of Homeland Security. That said, I do believe that the Committee 

on Ways and Means continues to have an important role in directly overseeing the 

customs activities of DHS, and in particular, the Customs and Border Protection 

(CBP) division. Much of the customs work done at CBP directly relates to revenue 

measures (e.g., collection of duties and implementation of U.S. trade laws, including 

laws related to U.S. trade agreements). 

My current view is consistent with the position I took during passage of the 

Homeland Security Act of 2002. There I expressed strong reservations about the 

movement of the former U.S. Customs Service (USCS), which dealt with the movement of people, goods and cargo across our borders, from the Department of the 

Treasury to the new Department of Homeland Security. 

My reservations stemmed, in large part, from the simple fact that the USCS 

played a unique role among all of the border agencies. USCS had a two-fold mandate—it was an enforcement agency and trade facilitation agency. On the enforcement side, USCS policed the borders to prevent the entry of contraband (drugs, haz-
132

ardous materials, terrorist implements, etc). On the trade facilitation side, USCS 

processed imports, collected duties, produced trade statistics, determined classification of products, and monitored and prevented the illegal transshipment of goods. 

During the debate over the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, I 

wanted to make clear, if the USCS were moved from Treasury, that whatever reconstituted agency emerged would not be dominated by a focus on enforcement activities to the detriment of trade facilitation. The compromise eventually adopted in the 

Committee on Ways and Means, which preserved certain core trade positions from 

USCS at Treasury, attempted to address part of that concern, albeit imperfectly. I 

say imperfectly because many elements of the USCS were still moved to DHS, even 

though they are involved in what I view as essentially trade facilitation activities. 

As you know, the Committee on Ways and Means’ jurisdiction on trade- related 

issues includes ‘‘customs and customs administration . . .procedures which relate to 

customs operations affecting exports and imports. . .budget authorizations for the 

U.S. Customs Service. . . .’’ Given the continued trade focus of aspects of the CBP, 

the Committee on Ways and Means should continue to have primary jurisdiction 

over the trade facilitation aspects of the agency. Committee on Ways and Means 

oversight is necessary to ensure that trade facilitation does not become a secondary 

function of the CBP but rather continues as a tier-one priority along with border 

security and enforcement, as it was under the former USCS. 

The trade-related nature of many of CBP’s activities is evident from many of the 

primary projects CBP is pursuing as part of its core operations. 

First, take the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C–TPAT) which is 

a partnership between the Federal Government and industry. Under the program, 

participating companies agree to adopt ‘‘best practices’’ to improve the security of 

their shipments from the factory floor to the foreign loading docks to the U.S. border 

points of entry. Those companies meeting security standards are then given a fast 

lane through border crossings and sea ports. 

C–TPAT obviously serves two purposes. First, it helps CBP ensure that incoming 

cargo to the United States contains legitimate trade and has not been compromised 

by terrorists or smugglers of contraband. Second, and equally important, C–TPAT 

faciliates trade. It allows companies importing goods into the United States to get 

those goods processed in a timely, efficient manner. In this era of just-in-time delivery, this is crucial to the survival of any company. 

Second, take the Automated Commercial Environment (ACE) which is the new 

trade processing system that will enable CBP to track, control, and process all commercial goods imported into and exported out of the United States. ACE was developed to replace the former USCS’s existing, outdated automation system, which 

could not handle the massive increase in the volume of United States trade. A recent U.S. General Accounting Office study reported that the benefits of ACE include 

‘‘speeding the flow of legitimate commerce into and out of the United States . . . 

and providing a single interface between the trade community and the Federal Government for trade data.’’

Third, consider how the CBP’s core mission is described in the President’s fiscal 

year 2005 budget justification materials: ‘‘CBP . . . implements and enforces the 

international trade agreements, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement 

. . ., the African Growth and Opportunity Act . . ., the Andean Trade Act, and the 

Caribbean Basin Initiative. In some instances, CBP officials are involved in trade 

negotiations on trade agreements. Other issues that CBP is involved in are the enforcement of the Trade Act of 1930 This can include taking enforcement action for 

any forced child labor or anti-dumping countervailing violations Also in support of 

domestic industry, CBP enforces . . . laws pertaining to intellectual property rights 

. . . . CBP administers and enforces any quotas on specific products such as textiles.’’

Finally, consider that in fiscal year 2003, CBP processed 26.1 million import entries, valued at over $1.2 trillion, and collected $24.7 billion in duties and fees. 

I understand that CBP has other responsibilities. After all, the agency is not just 

comprised of the former USCS. It has immigration inspectors from the former Immigration and Naturalization Service, agricultural border inspectors from the Agriculture Department, and the entire Border Patrol. The total number of employees 

in CBP is 40,000. The Ways and Means Committee, of course, does not have jurisdiction, nor would I argue we should have, over these other elements of CBP. Other 

standing Committees have the requisite expertise to handle such matters. 

As I indicated from the outset, I do believe that the Select Committee could have 

a role to play in coordinating the activities of the standing committees of jurisdiction 

and in providing technical support on a bipartisan basis. Further, continued oversight of DHS priorities and decisions will undoubtedly create balanced, ‘‘good government’’ analyses that will benefit all Members of the Congress. 
133

In conclusion, I want to again support the efforts of the Select Committee on 

Homeland Security. It is only with our commitment and cooperation that, together, 

we can fight international terrorism and protect our borders at home. 

THE HONORABLE C.W. BILL YOUNG, CHAIRMAN OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE 

ON RULES 

Ladies and Gentlemen of the Subcommittee on Rules, I am pleased to share with 

you today my observations and reflections of the House Committee on Appropriations’ oversight structure for homeland security programs and activities. These observations are based upon my experience of reorganizing the House Committee on 

Appropriations last year. I believe that the House Committee on Appropriations is 

the only committee of the House that has permanently reorganized in the wake of 

the tragic events of September 11, 2001, and the establishment of the Department 

of Homeland Security. Doing so was no small task. In fact, the last reorganization 

of the Committee on Appropriations was some 3 decades ago and is indicative of 

the difficulty in proposing and implementing change in this institution. 

The Committee was guided by several principles in developing and implementing 

its reorganization plan: firstly, the committee needed to provide a structure of oversight to the Department of Homeland Security. The department itself lacked an institutional structure; it was a conglomeration of several disparate agencies. Secondly, we had to create a subcommittee that was comprised of members and staff 

that had the credibility and tenacity to provide effective oversight over a nascent 

department with arguably some of our government’s most important programs. We 

had to move quickly, without regard to political turf, and we had to move unilaterally. I would like to expound on each of these points briefly. 

The imperative for the Committee (and the department presumably) from the outset was to provide a structure for the legacy agencies to coalesce into a single department with a coordinated, unified mission. The vast number of agencies, accounts and programs that were transferred to the new Department of Homeland Security cut across the majority of our thirteen subcommittees. Clearly, it would not 

be physically possible for the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security to 

testify before each of seven appropriations subcommittees, an equal number of authorizing committees, and to organize a new department, and most importantly, to 

improve our nation’s security. And just as the Secretary could not focus on his new 

job at hand and testify and report to several different subcommittees, the Committee would find it equally difficult to provide consistent oversight and appropriate 

funding levels if the myriad of the department’s programs and activities were scattered across seven subcommittees. It was obvious to me early that we needed to reorganize—to provide a structure to ourselves and for the new agency that we were 

to oversee and fund. 

Like national defense, homeland security should be above political infighting. To 

that end, we decided that the new subcommittee should be an ‘‘exclusive’’ subcommittee, comprised of members with previous oversight experience of the programs of the new department and had who proven themselves to be thoughtful, deliberative and above the political fray. We felt that these traits were important for 

the members to serve on this subcommittee since, in the absence of a single permanent committee with exclusive jurisdiction of homeland security programs, this subcommittee would be the sole committee providing continuing oversight without regard to inter-authorizing committee jurisdictional concerns. Just as it was important 

to ensure that the members of the subcommittee had oversight experience, we drew 

from the senior committee personnel to staff the new subcommittee. The staff has 

extensive program management, administrative and legislative experience. Members 

and senior staff were moved from our old transportation, energy and water, and 

treasury/postal subcommittees. Doing so ensured effective oversight and a structure 

to produce a bipartisan bill in a timely manner. 

Lastly, the decision was made to act decisively and unilaterally. I briefed the 

chairmen of the affected subcommittees and my leadership of the planned reorganization. I selected the new chairman. And I acted. Broad discussion with stakeholders would have proven fatal to a reorganization that had to be in place quickly 

to ensure our government’s newest department was up and running quickly with 

proper and effective management controls in place and robust and continuing oversight conducted by the Appropriations Committee. Within a few short weeks, the 

Senate replicated the House Committee on Appropriations’ reorganization. 
134

I hope that my experience in reorganizing the Committee on Appropriations 

proves useful to you as you consider the appropriate authorizing structure of the 

programs of the Department of Homeland Security.

Æ