alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**EXHIBIT 32.2**

 

**CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER PURSUANT TO 18U.S.C. SECTION 1350 AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THESARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Tennessee Commerce Bancorp, Inc.(the “Registrant”) on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 2008,as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”),the undersigned certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adoptedpursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

 

(1)          The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2)          The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in allmaterial respects, the financial condition and results of operations of theRegistrant.

 
|   | By:                             | /s/  H. Lamar Cox |   |   |
|--------|---------------------------------|-------------------|--------|--------|
|   | H.  Lamar Cox                   |              |   |
|   | Acting  Chief Financial Officer |              |   |
|   |                            |              |   |
|   | Dated:  May 12, 2008       |              |   |

 

----
Editorial Note on Part 2
Editorial Notes: 1. Nomenclature changes to part 2 appear at 83 FR 22178, May 14, 2018. 2. Nomenclature changes to part 2 appear at 83 FR 61310, Nov. 29, 2018 3. Nomenclature changes to part 2 appear at 85 FR 65504, Oct. 15, 2020. 4. Nomenclature changes to part 2 appear at 87 FR 44266, July 26, 2022.

§ 2.69 Director, Office of the Chief Scientist. ( a ) *Delegations.* Pursuant to § 2.21(a)(11) and (a)(12), the following delegations of authority are made by the Under Secretary for Research, Education, and Economics to the Director, Office of the Chief Scientist. ( 1 ) Provide to the Under Secretary (Chief Scientist of the Department) information on topics that can benefit from scientific input to ensure informed decision-making at the highest levels of Government.
( 2 ) Assist the Chief Scientist with facilitating the coordination and collaboration within the Department on high priority science issues that will benefit from intra-Departmental collaboration, including coordinating the assessment of the relevance, quality, performance, and impact of the Department's efforts in science.
( 3 ) Assist the Chief Scientist with building partnerships within the scientific community and with the Chief Scientist's role as point of contact for interactions with other agencies of science, universities, and other external members of the scientific community for the purpose of leveraging and promoting relationships to explore common scientific interests and shared goals.
( 4 ) Assist the Chief Scientist with developing mechanisms to address scientific integrity within the Department.
( 5 ) [Reserved]
( 6 ) Assist the Chief Scientist in carrying out sections 251(c)(2) and 251(d)(2) of the Department of Agriculture Reorganization Act of 1994 (7 U.S.C. 6971(c)(2), (d)(2)) by exercising the duties set forth in section 25 l(e)(3)(E) of that Act (7 U.S.C. 6971(e)(3)(E)) through a series of divisions organized by the following focus areas: ( i ) Renewable energy, natural resources, and environment;
( ii ) Food safety, nutrition, and health;
( iii ) Plant health and production and plant products;
( iv ) Animal health and production and animal products;
( v ) Agricultural systems and technology; and
( vi ) Agricultural economics and rural communities.
( b ) The divisions will be headed by Division Chiefs/Senior Advisors (or a similar title), and will be known collectively as the Office of the Chief Scientist.
[76 FR 10756, Feb. 28, 2011, as amended at 85 FR 65521, Oct. 15, 2020]
###### Editorial Note on Part 1924

#### Editorial Note:

Nomenclature changes to part 1924 appear at 80 FR 9870, Feb. 24, 2015.

#### §§ 1924.14-1924.48 [Reserved]
Exhibit
32.1





Certification of Principal
Executive Officer


Pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to


Section
906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002





In connection with the Quarterly Report
of SRKP 2, Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ending March 31,
2010 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof
(the "Report"), I, Richard A. Rappaport, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss.
1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to
my knowledge:





(1) The
Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2) The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





/s/ Richard A. RappaportRichard
      A. RappaportPrincipal
      Executive OfficerApril
      21, 2010
###### Editorial Note on Part 1956

#### Editorial Note:

Nomenclature changes to part 1956 appear at 80 FR 9901, Feb. 24, 2015.

#### § 1956.101 Purpose.

This subpart delegates authority and prescribes policies and procedures for debt settlement of Community Facility loans; Association Recreation loans; Rural Renewal loans; direct Business and Industry loans; Rural Development Loan Fund loans; Intermediary Relending Program loans; and the Rural Microentrepreneur Assistance Program (RMAP) loans and repayable portions of RMAP grants; and Shift-in-land-use loans. Settlement of Economic Opportunity Cooperative loans, Claims Against Third Party Converters, Non-program loans, Rural Business Enterprise/Television Demonstration Grants, Nonprofit National Corporations Loans and Grants, and 601 Energy Impact Assistance Grants, is not authorized under independent statutory authority, and settlement under these programs is handled pursuant to the Federal Claims Collection Joint Standards, 31 CFR parts 900 through 904, inclusive. In addition, this subpart does not apply to Water and Waste Programs of the Rural Utilities Service, Watershed loans, and Resource Conservation and Development loans, which are serviced under part 1782 of this title. The provisions of this subpart do not apply to any program administered by the Farm Service Agency as of June 17, 2020.

[80 FR 13201, Mar. 13, 2015, as amended at 85 FR 36714, June 17, 2020]
Searched for **https://www.ssa.gov/ssi/spotlights/spot-homeless.htm**

 

19961997199819992000200120022003200420052006200720082009201020112012201320142015201620172018201920202021202220232024

*Note:* This calendar view maps the number of captures of **https://www.ssa.gov/ssi/spotlights/spot-homeless.htm**, *not* how many times the site was actually updated.

Look Up URL in general Internet Archive web collection.
#### Acor Plasticover Co., Inc., Appellant, v Wonderful Plastics Industry Co., Ltd., et al., Respondents.

Order, Supreme Court, New York County, entered February 9, 1978, which denied appellant’s motion to substitute Cathay Plastics Industry Co., Ltd., unanimously reversed, on the law and the facts, without costs or disbursements, and the matter remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this memorandum. Plaintiff-appellant, a New York corporation, after receipt of defective goods, brought suit for breach of a sales contract against defendant-respondent Wonderful Plastics, a corporation of the Republic of China (Taiwan). Wonderful did not answer or appear and, following an inquest, a default judgment of $334,130 was entered against Wonderful on June 25, 1975. When appellant attempted to collect on the judgment, it learned that Wonderful had been merged into Cathay Plastics Industry Co., Ltd. Thereupon, appellant moved to substitute Cathay for Wonderful and to reduce the amount of the judgment to reflect its mitigation of damages to $175,000. The Supreme Court, contrary to the report of a Special Referee after a hearing, denied that portion of the motion seeking to substitute the judgment debtor on the ground that prior to merger, respondents Wonderful and Cathay were separate entities, that, therefore, service on Wonderful was not service on Cathay, and that without proper service on Cathay there was no jurisdiction over Cathay to effect substitution. Although respondent Cathay maintains that there is no jurisdiction over it to make such determination, and it appears here only to dispute jurisdiction, it has appeared for that purpose and the court has jurisdiction to determine the facts on which jurisdiction depends. (Cf. *Peterson v Spartan Inds.,*33 NY2d 463; see *United States*v *Mine Workers,*330 US 258 [analogous situation in Federal courts where jurisdiction-to-determine-jurisdiction doctrine is utilized]; cf. *State of New York v Viguerie Co.,*55 AD2d 534.) By its motion, Cathay did so submit to the court’s jurisdiction for that limited purpose. Therefore Special Term should not have dismissed the proceeding for lack of jurisdiction. Special Term should have gone on to determine the propriety of the substitution when viewed in light of the merger agreement and the language thereof, which provided for the assumption of the liabilities of Wonderful, and the question of whether, under the Taiwanese laws of merger, Cathay, as the surviving corporation after the merger, is the same corporation as Wonderful. Determination of these issues at a new hearing will enable the court to rule on the propriety of substitution. Concur—Kupferman, J. P., Fein, Sandler, Markewich and Silverman, JJ.
2006-0363.

#### Bd. of Edn. of Kettering City Schools v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Revision.

Board of Tax Appeals, No. 2004-A-1209. This cause is pending before the court as an appeal from the Board of Tax Appeals. Upon consideration of the parties’ joint motion to remand this cause to the Board of Tax Appeals,

IT IS ORDERED by the court that the joint motion to remand is granted.
Editorial Note on Part 1955
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 1955 appear at 80 FR 9895, Feb. 24, 2015.

§ 1955.128 Appraisers. ( a ) *Real property.* The State Director may authorize the County Supervisor or District Director to procure fee appraisals of inventory property, except MFH properties, to expedite the sale of inventory real or chattel property. (Fee appraisals of MFH properties will only be authorized by the Assistant Administrator, Housing, when unusual circumstances preclude the use of a qualified Rural Development MFH appraiser.) The decision will be based on the availability of comparables, the capability and availability of personnel, and the number and type of properties (such as large farms and business property) requiring valuation. For Farmer Programs real estate properties, all contract (fee) appraisers should include the sales comparison, income (when applicable), and the cost approach to value. All Rural Development real estate contract appraisers must be certified as State-Certified General Appraisers.
( b ) *Chattel property.* For Farmer Programs chattel appraisals, the contractor/appraiser completing the report must meet at least one of the following qualifications: ( 1 ) Certification by a National or State appraisal society.
( 2 ) If the contractor is not a certified appraiser and a certified appraiser is not available, the contractor may qualify or may use other qualified appraisers, if the contractor can establish that he/she or that the appraiser meets the criteria for a certification in a National or State appraisal society.
( 3 ) The appraiser has recent, relevant, documented appraisal experience or training, or other factors clearly establish the appraiser's qualifications.
[58 FR 58650, Nov. 3, 1993]
#### § 15.72 Filing.

All documents relating to a proceeding under this subpart shall be filed in an original and two copies of such document with the Office of the Hearing Clerk at Room 112, Administration Building, Department of Agriculture, Washington, D.C., 20250, during regular business hours. Regular business hours are every Monday through Friday (legal holidays in the District of Columbia excepted) from 9 a.m. to 5:30 p.m., eastern standard or daylight saving time, whichever is effective in the District of Columbia at the time.
###### Editorial Note on Part 1942

#### Editorial Notes:

Nomenclature changes to part 1942 appear at 80 FR 9878, Feb. 24, 2015.

#### § 1942.109 [Reserved]
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 9
<RESTATED> 
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1997
<CASH>                                          70,006
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                             825
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                                39,222
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                     0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                    292,625
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                         192,184
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                           200,321
<LOANS>                                      1,532,611
<ALLOWANCE>                                     21,099
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               2,191,703
<DEPOSITS>                                   1,819,967
<SHORT-TERM>                                    74,770
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                             25,007
<LONG-TERM>                                     71,026
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        13,404
<OTHER-SE>                                     187,529
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>               2,191,703
<INTEREST-LOAN>                                132,070
<INTEREST-INVEST>                               28,753
<INTEREST-OTHER>                                 2,022
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                               162,845
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                              72,155
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              79,836
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                           83,009
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                    5,179
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                                 215
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                                 56,571
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 34,039
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                      34,039
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    23,383
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     1.59
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     1.58
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                    4.46
<LOANS-NON>                                     15,973
<LOANS-PAST>                                     1,837
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                                     0
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                      0
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                                16,863
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                    2,895
<RECOVERIES>                                       623
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                               21,099
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                            21,099
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                  0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                              0
        

</TABLE>
#### David Day Realty, Inc., Respondent, v Tiebor Farras et al., Appellants.

Order of the Supreme Court, New York County, entered July 12, 1979, denying defendants’ motion for summary judgment, unanimously reversed, on the law, with costs and disbursements, and the motion for summary judgment granted. In this action for brokerage commissions, defendants, the owners of the building, are entitled to summary judgment. From the affidavits and exhibits submitted upon consideration of the motion, it is apparent that there was never an agreement for the sale of the premises. There never was a meeting of the minds of the prospective purchasers and defendants as to the purchase price, the extent of the cash required and whether the balance of the purchase price, if any, should be by purchase-money mortgage or other financing. No date for contract or closing of title was set. Moreover, it appears that the prospective purchasers conditioned the purchase upon an examination of the premises by a structural engineer which examination never occurred. Hence, there was no agreement between the prospective purchasers and sellers to "all the terms customarily encountered” in a real estate transaction. In the absence of such agreement, plaintiff did not earn any brokerage commission *(Kaelin v Warner,*27 NY2d 352, 355). Concur—Murphy, P. J., Kupferman, Birns, Markewich and Yesawich, JJ.
----

----

First Century Bancorp. 10-K

|   | 1. | The annual report of the company for the period ended December 31, 2010 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on this date (the “Report”) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and |
|--------|----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | 2. | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the company. |
|--------|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   |   | /s/ William R. Blanton  |   |
|--------|--------|-------------------------|--------|
|   |   | William R. Blanton      |   |
|   |   | Chief Executive Officer |   |

|   |   | /s/ Denise Smyth                           |   |
|--------|--------|--------------------------------------------|--------|
|   |   | Denise Smyth                               |   |
|   |   | Principal Financial and Accounting Officer |   |
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

JUDGMENT RENDERED FEBRUARY 27, 2020

NO. 03-18-00676-CR

James Manson, Appellant

v.

The State of Texas, Appellee

APPEAL FROM THE 427TH DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY

BEFORE CHIEF JUSTICE ROSE, JUSTICES BAKER AND TRIANA

AFFIRMED -- OPINION BY JUSTICE TRIANA

This is an appeal from the judgment of conviction rendered by the trial court. Having reviewed 

the record and the parties’ arguments, the Court holds that there was no reversible error in the 

trial court’s judgment of conviction. Therefore, the Court affirms the trial court’s judgment of 

conviction. Because appellant is indigent and unable to pay costs, no adjudication of costs is 

made.
PUBLIC LAW 109–210—MAR. 24, 2006 120 STAT. 319

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY—S. 1184:

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD:

Vol. 151 (2005): Dec. 22, considered and passed Senate.

Vol. 152 (2006): Mar. 14, considered and passed House.

Public Law 109–210

109th Congress

An Act

To waive the passport fees for a relative of a deceased member of the Armed

Forces proceeding abroad to visit the grave of such member or to attend a

funeral or memorial service for such member.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of

the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. PASSPORT FEES.

Section 1 of the Act of June 4, 1920 (41 Stat. 750, chapter

223; 22 U.S.C. 214) is amended in the third sentence by striking

‘‘or from a widow, child, parent, brother, or sister of a deceased

member of the Armed Forces proceeding abroad to visit the grave

of such member’’ and inserting ‘‘or from a widow, widower, child,

parent, grandparent, brother, or sister of a deceased member of

the Armed Forces proceeding abroad to visit the grave of such

member or to attend a funeral or memorial service for such

member’’.

Approved March 24, 2006.

Mar. 24, 2006

[S. 1184]
#### UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Gerardo GURROLA, Appellant.

No. 06-2140.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: Nov. 5, 2007.

Filed: Nov. 8, 2007.

Christian S. Wilton, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Minneapolis, MN, for Appellee.

Patrick Chinedu Nwaneri, Nwaneri & Associates, St. Paul, MN, for Appellant.

Gerardo Gurrola, Sandstone, MN, pro se.

Before WOLLMAN, COLLOTON, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Gerardo Gurrola appeals the 108-month prison sentence the district court1 imposed after he pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute and possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine. Gurrola argues that his sentence is unlawful because it is contrary to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) and the directions of *United States v. Booker,*543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005). The government urges that the appeal waiver in Gurrola’s plea agreement calls for dismissal of the appeal.

*615We will enforce an appeal waiver where both the plea agreement and the appeal waiver were entered into knowingly and voluntarily, the appeal falls within the scope of the waiver, and no miscarriage of justice would result. *See United States v. Andis,*333 F.3d 886, 889-92 (8th Cir.2003) (en banc). We conclude that Gurrola knowingly and voluntarily entered into his plea agreement and appeal waive. The appeal falls within the scope of the broad appeal waiver, which provided that Gurrola waived all rights to appeal his sentence unless it exceeded 188 months. *Cf. United States v. Reeves*410 F.3d 1031, 1034-35 (8th Cir.2005) (broad appeal waiver includes issues arising from *Booker).*And enforcing the waiver would not result in a miscarriage of justice. *See Andis,*333 F.3d at 891-92 (sentence within statutory range is not illegal sentence). We therefore enforce the appeal waiver and dismiss the appeal.

1

. The Honorable Joan N. Ericksen, United States District Judge for the District of Minnesota.
§ 1703.303 Eligibility criteria for deferment of loan payments. The deferment of loan payments may be granted to any borrower that is not financially distressed, delinquent on any Federal debt, or in bankruptcy proceedings. However, the deferment of loan payments will not be granted to a borrower during any period in which the Administrator has determined that no additional financial assistance of any nature should be provided to the borrower pursuant to any provision of the RE Act. The determination to suspend eligibility for the deferment of loan payments under this subpart will be based on: ( a ) The borrower's demonstrated unwillingness to exercise diligence in repaying loans made by RUS or RTB or guaranteed by RUS that results in the Administrator being unable to find that such loans, would be repaid within the time agreed; or
( b ) The borrower's demonstrated unwillingness to meet the requirements in RUS's or RTB's legal documents or regulations.