Report to Congressional Committees

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO 

May 2006 HURRICANE 

KATRINA 

Army Corps of 

Engineers Contract 

for Mississippi 

Classrooms 

GAO-06-454 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-454.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Katherine 

Schinasi at (202) 512-4841 or 

schinasik@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-06-454, a report to 

congressional committees 

May 2006

HURRICANE KATRINA 

Army Corps of Engineers Contract for 

Mississippi Classrooms 

Corps contracting officials did not expect to be buying classrooms and, in fact, 

were not assigned the task until after Hurricane Katrina had struck. With no 

prior experience, no advance notice, and the need to buy the classrooms as 

quickly as possible, Corps contracting officials lacked knowledge of the 

industry and information about classroom suppliers, inventories, and prices 

that would have been useful in negotiating a good deal. Faced with these 

circumstances, they chose to purchase the classrooms by placing an order, 

noncompetitively, on an existing agreement with Akima Site Operations, LLC. 

Because of Akima’s special status as a subsidiary of an Alaska Native 

corporation certified under the Small Business Administration’s 8(a) business 

development program, the Corps could make the award without competition. 

The Corps accepted Akima’s proposed price of $39.5 million although it had 

information that the cost for the classrooms was significantly less than what 

Akima was charging. Based on our analysis of a quote obtained by Akima from 

a local Mississippi business, the price that Akima actually paid for the 

classrooms, and prices for similar units from GSA schedule contracts, we 

believe the Corps could have, but failed to, negotiate a lower price. 

Classroom units being transported 

Source: Akima.

In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, 

the Federal Emergency 

Management Agency (FEMA) 

tasked the Army Corps of 

Engineers (the Corps) to purchase 

temporary classrooms for 

Mississippi schools. To accomplish 

its task, the Corps placed a $39.5 

million order with Akima Site 

Operations for the purchase and 

delivery of 450 such classrooms. 

GAO received an allegation on its 

Fraud Hotline that the Corps paid 

inflated prices for the classrooms, 

and in response, we reviewed the 

facts and circumstances related to 

the Corps’ issuance of the order. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO is making no 

recommendations in this report. In 

written comments, the Department 

of Army recognized that under 

trying conditions mistakes are 

possible and plans to include the 

temporary classroom procurement 

in its remedial action program 

review. In its comments, Akima 

believes that the report does not 

provide a complete picture of the 

circumstances related to the 

contract to obtain, transport, and 

set up the classrooms. Our findings 

are based on information relevant 

to the review objective. 
Page i GAO-06-454 Hurricane Katrina Contracting 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 1 

Background 2 

Circumstances Surrounding the Purchase of the Classrooms 

Resulted in the Corps Paying High Prices 4 

Conclusion 7 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 8 

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 12 

Appendix II Comments from the Army Corps of Engineers 13 

Appendix III Comments from Akima 14 

Appendix IV GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 16 

Table 

Table 1: Classroom Price Increases 6 

Figures 

Figure 1: Classroom Units at Staging Area and Units Being 

Transported. 3 

Figure 2: Timeline for Corps’ acquisition of classrooms 4 

Contents 
Page ii GAO-06-454 Hurricane Katrina Contracting 

Abbreviations 

ANC Alaska Native corporation 

BOA basic ordering agreement 

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency 

GSA General Services Administration 

MEMA Mississippi Emergency Management Agency 

SBA Small Business Administration 

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Page 1 GAO-06-454 Hurricane Katrina Contracting 

May 1, 2006 

Congressional Committees: 

In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, the Federal Emergency Management 

Agency (FEMA) tasked the Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps) to 

purchase temporary classrooms for Mississippi schools.1

 To accomplish its 

mission, the Corps awarded a $39.5 million order to Akima Site 

Operations, LLC (Akima) for the purchase and delivery of 450 temporary 

classrooms. GAO received a tip on its Fraud Hotline alleging that the 

Corps paid inflated prices for the classrooms.2

In response to the allegation, we reviewed the facts and circumstances 

surrounding the Corps’ acquisition of the classrooms to determine how the 

Corps selected Akima and negotiated the price of the classrooms. We 

reviewed government contract files and obtained pricing information on 

the classrooms from several sources, including the Corps, Akima, 

suppliers involved in the transaction, and the General Services 

Administration (GSA). The results of our review follow. Further details on 

the scope and methodology of our review are in appendix I. We conducted 

our review from September 2005 to March 2006 in accordance with 

generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Faced with a compressed time frame for acquiring classrooms and no 

prior knowledge about the classroom mission they were assigned by 

FEMA after Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast, Corps contracting 

officials chose to use an existing agreement and placed an order with 

Akima. Because of Akima’s special status as a subsidiary of an Alaska 

Native corporation under the Small Business Administration’s 8(a) 

 1

 We are using the term “temporary classrooms” in this report. The classrooms were also 

referred to as relocatable, modular, and portable. 

2

 The purpose of GAO’s FraudNET is to facilitate reporting of allegations of fraud, waste, 

abuse, or mismanagement of federal funds. Allegations are received via e-mail at 

fraudnet@gao.gov. The allegation we reviewed concerned the price paid by the 

government, not the contractor’s performance under the contract. Accordingly, we did not 

review contract performance. Both the Corps and Akima represent that Akima performed 

in accordance with the terms of the contract by delivering the required quantities of 

classrooms within the time frames agreed to by the Corps. 

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

Results in Brief 
Page 2 GAO-06-454 Hurricane Katrina Contracting 

Business Development Program, the Corps was able to make the award 

without competition even though the dollar amount of the award would 

have normally required competition under the program.3

 

The Corps accepted Akima’s proposed price of $39.5 million although it 

had information that the cost for the classrooms was significantly less 

than what Akima was charging. Based on our analysis of a quote obtained 

by Akima from a local Mississippi business, the price that Akima actually 

paid for the classrooms, and prices for similar units from GSA schedule 

contracts, we believe the Corps could have, but failed to, negotiate a lower 

price. 

We are not making recommendations in this report. In written comments 

on a draft of this report, the Department of the Army recognized that 

under trying conditions mistakes are possible and plans to include the 

temporary classroom procurement in its remedial action program review. 

The Army did not endorse our findings, but did not provide any specific 

concerns. In written comments, Akima believes that the report does not 

provide a complete picture of the circumstances related to the contract for 

the classrooms. Our findings are based on information relevant to the 

review objective. The comments from DOD and Akima, and our responses 

to them are discussed beginning on page 8 and are reproduced in their 

entirety in appendices II and III, respectively. 

On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina made landfall along the Gulf Coast, 

causing severe damage and destruction. In addition to damaging areas in 

Louisiana and Alabama, the hurricane wreaked havoc along the entire 

Mississippi Gulf Coast. In response, the Mississippi Emergency 

Management Agency, on September 8, 2005, asked for federal assistance in 

providing temporary classrooms. On September 10, FEMA delegated the 

mission for buying the classrooms to the Corps. 

 3

 Alaska Native corporations (ANCs), created under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement 

Act to help settle Alaska Native land claims and to foster economic development for Alaska 

Natives, have been accorded special advantages under SBA’s 8(a) Business Development 

Program. ANC 8(a) firms are considered small disadvantaged businesses, and as long as 

they meet relevant size standards for the procurement and other eligibility requirements, 

they can be awarded contracts noncompetitively for any dollar amount (see 13 C.F.R. § 

124.506(b)). Generally, acquisitions offered to other 8(a) businesses where the contract 

value is more than $3 million or $5 million (for manufacturing) must be competitively 

awarded. 

Background 
Page 3 GAO-06-454 Hurricane Katrina Contracting 

Figure 1: Classroom Units at Staging Area and Units Being Transported. 

Upon accepting the mission, the Corps proceeded to acquire the 

classrooms. A chronology of key events surrounding the Corps efforts is 

shown in the following timeline. 

Source: Akima.
Page 4 GAO-06-454 Hurricane Katrina Contracting 

Figure 2: Timeline for Corps’ acquisition of classrooms 

Corps contracting officials did not expect to be buying classrooms and, in 

fact, were not assigned the task until after Hurricane Katrina had struck. 

With no prior experience, no advance notice, and the need to buy the 

classrooms as quickly as possible, Corps contracting officials lacked 

knowledge of the industry and information about classroom suppliers, 

inventories, and prices that would have been useful in negotiating a good 

deal. Faced with the urgent need for classrooms, they chose to purchase 

them by placing an order, noncompetitively, on an existing agreement with 

Akima. 

Based on our analysis of a price quote obtained by Akima from a local 

Mississippi classroom supplier, the price that Akima actually paid for the 

Circumstances 

Surrounding the 

Purchase of the 

Classrooms Resulted 

in the Corps Paying 

High Prices 

Timeline for the Corps’ Acquisition of Classrooms

Source: GAO analysis.

Sat., Sept. 10th

FEMA tasking to

Corps of Engineers

(Corps)

Thurs., Sept. 8th

FEMA action request form 

signed by Mississippi 

Emergency Management 

Agency (MEMA)

Wed., Sept. 14th

Corps contract

specialist

contacts Akima

Thurs., Sept. 15th

Army contracting

agency modification

to the basic ordering 

agreement (BOA) 

to clarify use

Fri., Sept. 16th

Akima provides Corps

a rough order of magnitude estimate. Corps

Vicksburg provides

legal okay to use the 

basic ordering agreement

Tue., Sept. 20th

Corps issues

order to Akima

to purchase 450

classrooms for

$39.5 million

Wed., Sept. 21th

Modification 1 to

move 200

classrooms

Fri., Sept. 23rd

First classrooms

arrive in Gulfport,

MS staging area

Wed., Oct. 5th

Modification 2

to substitute

units and delay

shipping

Fri., Oct. 7th

Modification 3

for substitution

Sun., Sept. 18th

Corps and Akima

agree, in principle, 

to contract price. 

Corps provides

Akima with the 

notice to proceed

Sat., Sept. 17th

Akima provides

the Corps a bid

schedule in its

basis of estimate

Mon., Aug. 29th

Hurricane Katrina

makes landfall
Page 5 GAO-06-454 Hurricane Katrina Contracting 

classrooms, and prices for similar units from GSA Schedule contracts, we 

believe the Corps could have, but failed to, negotiate lower prices. 

Once Hurricane Katrina had struck, the Mississippi Emergency 

Management Agency, on September 8, 2005, identified a need for 

temporary classrooms. FEMA accepted the requirement. On September 10, 

FEMA assigned the Corps the mission of acquiring the classrooms and two 

days later set November 1, 2005, as the deadline for completing the Corps’ 

mission. According to Corps officials, the short completion date drove 

their decisions about how to acquire the classrooms and did not allow 

them to follow normal contracting procedures. 

To accomplish this task, the Corps awarded an order to Akima through an 

existing basic ordering agreement established by the Army Contracting 

Agency intended for acquiring and installing modular buildings.4

 According 

to Corps officials, the agreement was selected because it could be used to 

quickly procure the classrooms. Akima is a subsidiary of an Alaskan 

Native corporation certified under the Small Business Administration’s 

8(a) Business Development Program.5 Due to its status as an Alaska 

Native corporation under the 8(a) program, the company could be 

awarded contracts—without competition—for any dollar value.6

 While the 

agreement used by the Corps was already in place, it contained no prices, 

specifications, or other information the Corps could have used in 

negotiating the order. 

 4

 A basic ordering agreement is a written instrument of understanding between the 

government and a contractor that contains (1) terms and clauses for future contracts 

(orders) between the parties during its term; (2) a description, as specific as possible, of 

supplies or services to be provided; and (3) methods for pricing, issuing, and delivering 

future orders under the agreement. A basic ordering agreement is not a contract but is used 

to expedite contracting for supplies or services when specific items, quantities, and prices 

are not known but a substantial number of requirements are anticipated. 

5

 This program, established by section 8(a) of the Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. § 637(a), 

authorizes the Small Business Administration to enter into contracts with procuring 

agencies and award subcontracts for performing those contracts to eligible firms. These 

subcontractors, known as 8(a) contractors, must be small disadvantaged business 

concerns. SBA has delegated to DOD its authority to enter into 8(a) prime contracts and to 

award the performance of those contracts to eligible 8(a) program participants. 

6

 SBA may accept, on a sole-source basis, a requirement into the 8(a) program on behalf of 

an Alaska Native corporation even if the value of the acquisition exceeds the normal 

threshold for competitive 8(a) awards. 

Late Assignment of 

Classroom Mission 

Hampered the Corps’ 

Ability to Get a Good Price 
Page 6 GAO-06-454 Hurricane Katrina Contracting 

According to Akima officials, they were contacted by the Corps on 

September 14 to see if they could provide 450 classrooms. In response, 

Akima provided the Corps several estimates over the next few days, 

including an “order of magnitude” estimate on September 16, 2005, and a 

formal proposal for $39.5 million on September 17 (which became the 

contract price). The estimates included classroom prices, freight costs, 

project management charges, general and administrative expenses, and 

profit. The price proposal of September 17 was significantly higher than 

the “order of magnitude” from the day before. While we believe the 

increase in Akima’s price should have raised questions among Corps 

contracting officials, we found no evidence they conducted any analysis to 

determine why the prices had increased. Instead, the Corps’ contracting 

files attribute the increase to the need to expedite delivery of the 

classrooms to meet FEMA’s requirements. On the basis of a comparison of 

Akima’s September 16 and 17 estimates, though, we found the increase 

could not be attributed to expedited delivery—since we found freight 

costs remained roughly the same in both estimates. The increase was in 

the price of the classrooms, as shown in the following table. 

Table 1: Classroom Price Increases 

September 16, 2005, estimate September 17, 2005, proposal 

Classroom type Quantity Unit price Total Quantity Unit price Total

Percent 

change

Single w/ 

bathroom 100 $59,750b $5,975,000 148 $84,395 $12,490,450

Single w/o 

bathroom 100 $55,750b

 $5,575,000 52 $89,956 $4,677,734

Subtotal 200 $11,550,000 200 $17,168,184 49%

Double w/ 

bathroom 125a

 $91,288 $11,411,000 125a$108,371 $13,546,336 19%

Total 450 $22,961,000 450 $30,714,520 34%

Source: GAO analysis. 

Note: Numbers may not add due to rounding. 

Notea

: 125 double classrooms are the equivalent of 250 single classrooms. 

Noteb

: As discussed below, these unit prices reflect a quote Akima received from a local Mississippi 

classroom supplier. 

The increase in classroom estimates between September 16 and 17 was 

very substantial and should have triggered further questions on the part of 

the Corps as to the reason. For example, the increase in the price of single 

Corps Did Not Use 

Available Information to 

Negotiate a Lower Price 
Page 7 GAO-06-454 Hurricane Katrina Contracting 

classrooms was particularly significant, increasing about $5.6 million 

dollars, or nearly 49 percent. 

Akima’s September 17 proposal reflected classroom prices substantially 

higher than the quote Akima had received from a local Mississippi 

classroom supplier for existing single classrooms that were available to be 

transported from a supplier in Florida. On September 14, the local 

Mississippi business received quotes for single classrooms with and 

without bathrooms for $49,750 and $45,750, respectively. On the following 

day, the local business provided a written quote to Akima reflecting the 

quotes and its markup. Akima used the local Mississippi business’ quote as 

a basis for its September 16 “order of magnitude” estimate and provided 

the Corps a copy of the quote. However, there is no evidence that Corps 

contracting officials used the information to seek reductions during 

negotiations. 

Given that Akima’s September 16 estimate was based on a quote for 

existing single classrooms in Florida, we question why the Corps accepted 

the higher classroom prices proposed by Akima on September 17 without 

price negotiation. In addition, Akima purchased the classrooms in Florida 

directly from the supplier identified by the local Mississippi business at 

prices lower than the quote. 

In addition, we found GSA Schedule contract prices for double classrooms 

ranged from $30,000 to $54,000 each, or amounts considerably less than 

proposed by Akima and included in the price accepted by the Corps. 

Clearly, conditions post-Hurricane Katrina were anything but normal and 

thus may not have allowed the classrooms to have been ordered from the 

Schedule in the quantities and time frame required. Nevertheless, this 

information could have been useful to Corps contracting officials in 

analyzing Akima’s prices and in negotiating a lower price. 

Acquiring goods and services in any emergency situation can be difficult—

particularly in a situation where there is confusion about missions, roles 

and responsibilities—but those difficulties should not provide an excuse 

for poor pricing outcomes. By neither using information that was available 

nor seeking out additional information which would have provided a 

sound basis to negotiate price, we believe the Corps could have, but failed 

to, negotiate lower prices. 

Conclusion 
Page 8 GAO-06-454 Hurricane Katrina Contracting 

We provided a draft of this report to the Department of the Army and 

Akima for review and comment. Their written comments are included as 

appendices II and III, respectively. 

In its comments, the Army recognized that under trying conditions 

mistakes are possible and stated that it plans to include the temporary 

classroom procurement in its remedial action program review. The Corps 

plans to take steps to address deficiencies, if any, identified in after action 

reports so that future operations can be improved. The Army did not 

endorse our findings, but did not provide any specific concerns. In its 

comments, the Army also stated that the Corps was tasked with providing 

450 temporary buildings, with approximately 350 of them to be used for 

classrooms. This statement is not correct. The task order issued on 

September 20, 2005, clearly states that the contract was for 

450 classrooms. In fact Akima’s response to our report indicates that this 

was a fixed price contract to deliver 450 classrooms. 

Generally, Akima expressed concern that our report did not use 

appropriate comparative data pertaining to pricing of the contract, did not 

recognize the risks faced by Akima, did not recognize that requirements 

were changing during the negotiations, and did not adequately recognize 

its contract performance. We are not responding to every aspect of 

Akima’s comments, because our report focuses on the prices the Corp 

paid for the classrooms and the Corp’s actions in awarding the classroom 

contract to Akima. 

Our report recognizes other elements of cost under the contract, but 

focuses on classroom costs because they comprise over three-quarters of 

the price negotiated. The difference between Akima’s “order of magnitude 

estimate” and the proposal ultimately accepted by the Corps was 

significant. We believe that the about $8 million difference should have 

prompted an inquiry and price negotiation by the contracting officer. We 

found no evidence that the contracting officer attempted to negotiate for a 

better price. 

In its comments to our report, Akima has stated that its proposal reflects 

the unknowns it faced at the time of contract award. We recognize, by 

entering into a fixed price contract, a contractor assumes the risk of 

contract performance. Furthermore, the report acknowledged that 

conditions post-Hurricane Katrina were anything but normal. However, 

our review found that in spite of these difficult conditions the Corps had 

available information at the time of the contract award that quoted lower 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 
Page 9 GAO-06-454 Hurricane Katrina Contracting 

costs for classrooms, but did not use the information to negotiate a lower 

price. 

Finally, we recognize again, as we did in the report that the Corps and 

Akima told us that Akima performed in accordance with the terms of the 

contract by delivering the required quantities of classrooms within the 

timeframes agreed to by the Corps. 

We will make copies of this report available on request. In addition, the 

report will be available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at 

http://www.gao.gov. 

If you have any questions concerning this report, please contact me at 

(202) 512-4841 or by e-mail at schinasik@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the 

last page of this report. 

Katherine V. Schinasi 

Managing Director 

Acquisition and Sourcing Management 
Page 10 GAO-06-454 Hurricane Katrina Contracting 

List of Committees 

The Honorable John Warner 

Chairman 

The Honorable Carl Levin 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Susan M. Collins 

Chairman 

The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Olympia J. Snowe 

Chair 

The Honorable John F. Kerry 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Robert C. Byrd 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Homeland Security 

Committee on Appropriations 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter 

Chairman 

The Honorable Ike Skelton 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Peter T. King 

Chairman 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Homeland Security 

House of Representatives 
Page 11 GAO-06-454 Hurricane Katrina Contracting 

The Honorable Donald Manzullo 

Chairman 

Committee on Small Business 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Tom Davis 

Chairman 

The Honorable Henry A. Waxman 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Government Reform 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Martin Olav Sabo 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Homeland Security 

Committee on Appropriations 

House of Representatives 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Page 12 GAO-06-454 Hurricane Katrina Contracting 

GAO received a Fraud Hotline allegation that the Corps of Engineers (the 

Corps) had paid an inflated price for temporary classrooms for Mississippi 

in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. In response to the allegation, we 

examined the facts and circumstances surrounding the acquisition to 

determine how the Corps selected Akima and negotiated the price of the 

classrooms. 

To learn how the Corps selected Akima, we obtained information about 

the Army Contracting Agency’s basic ordering agreement and its intended 

uses. We contacted the contracting officer who had established the 

agreement at the Northern Region Contracting Center, Fort Eustis, 

Virginia. The Army Contracting Agency official provided the agreement 

and modifications, and described why and how the agreement was 

established. 

We also obtained information about the steps taken by the Corps to meet 

the requirements for acquisition of the classrooms. We obtained contract 

and related documents from the Corps of Engineers, Vicksburg District, in 

Vicksburg, Mississippi. We reviewed these documents to find out what 

information the Corps had available to acquire the classrooms. We 

interviewed Corps officials to discuss the available information and 

ascertain how classroom acquisition-related decisions were made. We also 

reviewed cost and price information included in the contract file. 

We met with representatives of Akima Management Services, Inc., the 

holding company for Akima Site Operations, LLC—the titular entity 

awarded the classroom order. Akima representatives provided pertinent 

documentation, including actual performance cost information. In 

addition, we held discussions with and collected information from local 

Mississippi businesses and some of the suppliers that eventually provided 

the classrooms to Akima. Also, we identified pricing information available 

on the General Service Administration’s Schedule contracts for similar 

classrooms and modular buildings. 

We conducted our review from September 2005 to March 2006 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 
Appendix II: Comments from the Army Corps 

of Engineers 

Page 13 GAO-06-454 Hurricane Katrina Contracting 

Appendix II: Comments from the Army Corps 

of Engineers 
Appendix III: Comments from Akima 

Page 14 GAO-06-454 Hurricane Katrina Contracting 

Appendix III: Comments from Akima 
Appendix III: Comments from Akima 

Page 15 GAO-06-454 Hurricane Katrina Contracting 
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 

Page 16 GAO-06-454 Hurricane Katrina Contracting 

Katherine Schinasi, (202) 512-4841or schinasik@gao.gov 

In addition to the contact named above, Dave Cooper, Director, 

Penny Berrier Augustine, Assistant Director, Ralph Roffo, Bob Swierczek, 

and Adam Vodraska made key contributions to this report. 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

(120500) 
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