United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Testimony before the Committee on 

Homeland Security, 

U.S. House of Representatives 

FEDERAL EMERGENCY 

MANAGEMENT AGENCY 

Factors for Future Success 

and Issues to Consider for 

Organizational Placement 

Statement of William O. Jenkins, Jr., Director 

Homeland Security and Justice Issues 

For Release on Delivery

Expected at 2:00 p.m. EDT

Tuesday, May 9, 2006 

 

GAO-06-746T 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

May 9, 2006

FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 

AGENCY 

Factors for Success and Issues to 

Consider in Organizational Placement 

Highlights of GAO-06-746T, a testimony 

before the Committee on Homeland 

Security, House of Representatives 

The size and strength of hurricane 

Katrina resulted in one of the 

largest natural disasters in our 

nation’s history and raised major 

questions about our nation’s 

readiness and ability to respond to 

catastrophic disasters. GAO has a 

large body of completed and 

ongoing work on a range of issues 

relating to all phases of the 

preparation, response, recovery, 

and rebuilding efforts related to 

hurricane Katrina as well as a

wealth of historical experience in 

reviewing the federal government’s 

response to disasters and 

catastrophic events.

A great deal of attention has been

focused on lessons learned from

the 2005 hurricane season and 

many recommendations have been

advanced on how to improve the 

nation’s preparedness and ability to 

effectively respond to catastrophic 

disasters. GAO’s testimony today 

describes some factors for success 

and other issues that Congress may

wish to consider as it determines 

what changes to make, including 

those of the Federal Emergency

Management Agency’s (FEMA) 

organizational placement, to 

improve the nation’s readiness and 

ability to respond effectively to 

major disasters, including

catastrophic disasters, regardless 

of cause. 

Because of FEMA's mission performance during hurricane Katrina, 

questions have been raised regarding the agency's organizational placement, 

including whether FEMA should be disbanded and functions moved to other 

agencies, remain within the Department of Homeland Security, or again 

become an independent agency. 

The history of the federal government’s approach to emergency management 

reflects experience with specific disasters and differences in opinion 

regarding the most effective structure for this function. Prior to 1979, 

emergency management was led by the Federal Disaster Assistance 

Administration within the Department of Housing and Urban Development. 

FEMA was established as an independent agency in 1979. Based on 

recommendations following the response to Hurricane Andrew in 1992, 

FEMA was elevated to a cabinet level agency whose director reported to the 

President. In March 2003, FEMA became part of DHS. 

As Comptroller General Walker has noted previously, a number of factors 

may be ultimately more important to FEMA's success in responding to and 

recovering from future disasters than its organizational placement. These

include 

• the clarity of FEMA's mission and its related responsibilities and 

authorities; 

• the experience of and training provided to FEMA leadership; 

• the adequacy of its human, financial, and technological resources; and 

• the effectiveness of planning, exercises, and related partnerships. 

As Congress considers changing FEMA’s organizational placement, it may 

also wish to consider key issues affecting organizational structure, including

• the relevance of FEMA’s mission to the broader organization in which it 

resides; 

• the extent to which goals and objectives are shared; 

• the ability to leverage effectively the resources of other agencies and 

programs; and 

• gains in efficiency and effectiveness through eliminating duplications 

and overlaps. 

The nation’s next major response and recovery challenge, whether natural or 

man-made, will provide another important test of FEMA’s efforts to improve 

its preparedness and capability. Although organizational structure is 

important, future success is likely to principally depend upon focus, skilled 

leadership, clear roles and responsibilities, operational plans realistically 

exercised, and key resources appropriately and effectively deployed. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO is not making

recommendations at this time. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-746T.

To view the full product, click on the link 

above. For more information, contact William 

O. Jenkins, Jr., at (202)-512-8757 or 

jenkinswo@gao.gov. 
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: 

I appreciate the opportunity to participate in today’s hearing to discuss the 

future of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). My 

remarks today are grounded in the work GAO has done to date on FEMA’s 

performance in the days, weeks, and months after hurricane Katrina as 

well as our completed work on FEMA’s role in responding to and 

recovering from prior disasters and catastrophes before and after its 

incorporation into the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). My 

remarks are also fully consistent with Comptroller General Walker’s 

previous testimony on this subject matter. 

The events of hurricane Katrina graphically demonstrated the limitations 

of the nation’s ability to respond to a catastrophic disaster. FEMA, within 

DHS, has the primary responsibility for coordinating and implementing 

key aspects of the federal emergency response and, as a result, has come 

under fire for shortcomings in its mission performance after the disaster. 

Reports from the House, Senate, White House, DHS Inspector General, and 

FEMA all identified problems in FEMA’s leadership and capabilities in the 

preparation for, response to, and short-term recovery from hurricane 

Katrina.1

 These reports, along with our own observations, indicate that

there were concerns about FEMA’s leadership of the federal response and 

questions regarding the missions, roles, and responsibilities of FEMA and 

other federal, state, and local officials and organizations in preparing for 

and responding to hurricane Katrina. FEMA’s capabilities were stretched 

to the limit and beyond, as reflected by, for example, a limited ability to 

marshal, transport, and track the delivery of commodities to areas of 

greatest need; difficulties in providing the number of emergency response 

staff with the knowledge and experience to meet the needs of thousands 

of disaster victims; and the inadequate capacity of FEMA’s information 

systems. Finally, the reports and our own work identified concerns 

regarding the effectiveness of planning, exercises, and related 

 1

These reports are: House Select Committee, A Failure of Initiative: Final Report of the 

Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation For and Response to 

Hurricane Katrina (Washington, D.C.: February 2006); The White House, The Federal

Response to Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned (Washington, D.C.: February 2006); DHS 

Office of Inspector General, A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management 

Activities in Response to Hurricane Katrina (Washington, D.C.: March 2006); FEMA, 

DHS/FEMA Initial Response Hotwash: Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana (Washington,

D.C.: February 2006); and Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Hurricane

Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared (Washington, D.C.: May 2006). 

Page 1 GAO-06-746T 
partnerships, functions traditionally supported by FEMA emergency 

preparedness, response, and recovery programs. 

The observations in this statement are based on prior GAO reports, our 

ongoing work on hurricanes Katrina and Rita, and GAO field visits to the 

affected Gulf Coast areas. We also have done a great deal of work on prior 

disasters. In 1993, we conducted several reviews examining the federal

response to hurricane Andrew. All of these reviews focused on the unique 

challenges involved in responding to catastrophic disasters. These reviews 

defined catastrophic disasters as a subset of other disasters requiring 

federal assistance. Unlike the bulk of disasters requiring FEMA to respond, 

catastrophic disasters can overwhelm the ability of state, local, and 

voluntary agencies to adequately provide victims with essential services, 

such as food and water, within 12 to 24 hours. We also conducted 

extensive work following the events of September 11, 2001.2

 These prior 

GAO reports focused on improving the immediate response to 

catastrophic disasters, and we made various recommendations within this 

context, many of which continue to apply and help form the basis of our 

views on the issue of FEMA’s future organizational placement today. 

GAO teams have visited the areas most affected by hurricanes Katrina and 

Rita—Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas. We interviewed officials 

and analyzed information from the various involved federal agencies, such 

as FEMA and the Department of Defense (DOD); state and local 

organizations, including state emergency management agencies; state 

adjutant generals; local officials; and representatives from 

nongovernmental agencies. Additionally, we have closely followed the 

hearings conducted by the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental

Affairs Committee, the House’s Select Committee to Investigate the 

Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, and other 

congressional committees on hurricane Katrina issues. We have studied 

the House Select Committee report, the White House report on lessons 

learned from the federal response to hurricane Katrina, the Department of 

Homeland Security’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) report, FEMA’s 

initial response assessment of the agency’s performance during hurricane 

Katrina, as well as the report released last week by the Senate Committee 

on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. We discussed our 

 2

GAO, Disaster Assistance: Information on FEMA’s Post 9/11 Public Assistance to the

New York City Area, GAO-03-926 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 29, 2003) and GAO, September 

11: Overview of Federal Disaster Assistance to the New York City Area, GAO-04-72

(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 31, 2003). 

Page 2 GAO-06-746T 
preliminary observations with the Deputy Secretary of the Department of 

Homeland Security in March 2006 before testifying on our observations of 

federal preparation, response, and recovery efforts related to hurricane 

Katrina.3

A catastrophic disaster, such as hurricane Katrina, almost immediately 

overwhelms state and local response capacity, degrading the ability of 

state and local personnel to respond effectively. Hurricane Katrina 

destroyed or crippled essential communications infrastructure in the 

hardest-hit areas, further exacerbating the ability of state and local 

personnel to respond. In preparing for and responding to any major 

disaster, but particularly a catastrophic one, the roles, responsibilities, and 

lines of authority for the preparation and response at all levels of 

government must be clearly defined and communicated in order to 

facilitate rapid and effective decision making. At the same time, effective 

decision making depends on having trained and experienced leaders 

equipped with the resources and capabilities needed to implement those 

decisions. Capabilities—the ability to carry out specific tasks with desired 

results—are built upon the appropriate combination of resources 

including people, processes, funds, and technology. Ensuring that those 

capabilities are available and effective requires planning, coordination, 

training, and exercises in which the capabilities are realistically tested, 

problems identified, and issues subsequently addressed in partnership 

with other federal, state, and local stakeholders.

Summary 

Because of FEMA’s mission performance during hurricane Katrina, 

questions have been raised regarding the agency’s organizational 

placement, including whether it should be disbanded and functions moved 

to other agencies, remain within DHS, or again become an independent 

agency. In our view, taking actions to improve the weaknesses identified 

in after-the-fact analyses of FEMA’s performance before, during, and after

hurricane Katrina may be more important to FEMA’s success in 

responding to and aiding the recovery from future disasters, most 

importantly the 2006 hurricane season, than its organizational placement. 

Factors that might affect performance include 

 3

GAO, Hurricane Katrina: GAO’s Preliminary Observations Regarding Preparedness, 

Response, and Recovery, GAO-06-442T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 8, 2006). 

Page 3 GAO-06-746T 
• the clarity of FEMA’s mission and its related responsibilities and 

authorities; 

• the experience of, and training provided to, FEMA leadership; 

• the adequacy of its human, financial, and technological resources; and 

• the effectiveness of planning, exercises, and related partnerships. 

If a change in FEMA’s organizational placement is considered, we believe

certain other issues should be considered to assess alternative 

approaches. These include issues such as mission relevancy and shared 

goals and objectives, as well as leveraging effectiveness and gains through 

consolidation. 

In considering FEMA’s future, it is useful to understand its past. Before the 

establishment of FEMA and its placement within DHS, federal disaster 

response and recovery was also managed by an agency within an 

executive department. The 1960s and early 1970s brought massive 

disasters requiring major federal response and recovery operations by the 

Federal Disaster Assistance Administration, established within the 

Department of Housing and Urban Development. Hurricane Carla struck 

in 1962, hurricane Betsy in 1965, hurricane Camille in 1969, and hurricane 

Agnes in 1972. The San Fernando earthquake rocked Southern California 

in 1971, and the Alaskan earthquake hit in 1964. To respond to national 

concern regarding these events, the Congress passed the 1974 Disaster 

Relief Act that established the process of Presidential disaster

declarations. 

However, emergency and disaster activities were still fragmented. Many 

parallel programs and policies existed at the state and local level, 

compounding the complexity of federal disaster relief efforts. In 1979, 

President Carter issued an executive order that merged many of the 

separate disaster-related responsibilities into a new, independent Federal

Emergency Management Agency. Among other agencies, FEMA absorbed

the Federal Insurance Administration, the National Fire Prevention and 

Control Administration, the National Weather Service Community 

Preparedness Program, the Federal Preparedness Agency of the General 

Services Administration, and the Federal Disaster Assistance

Administration activities from HUD. Civil defense responsibilities were 

also transferred to the new agency from the Defense Department’s 

Defense Civil Preparedness Agency.

FEMA led the federal response to hurricane Andrew, which slammed into 

and leveled much of South Florida in August 1992. In 1993, we conducted

Background 

Page 4 GAO-06-746T 
several reviews examining the federal response. The reviews focused on 

the unique challenges involved in responding to catastrophic disasters and 

raised questions about whether and how national disaster response efforts 

had incorporated lessons from experiences with hurricane Hugo in 1989.4

These prior GAO reports focused on improving the immediate response to 

catastrophic disasters, and we made various recommendations within this 

context. While some of our prior recommendations were acted upon, 

others were not. For example, President Clinton elevated the FEMA 

director to cabinet status in 1996, providing the type of direct 

communication and lines of responsibility we had recommended. 

However, we also recommended that FEMA improve its catastrophic 

disaster response capability by using existing authority to aggressively 

respond to catastrophic disasters, assessing the extent of the damage, and

then advising state and local officials of identified needs and the federal 

resources available to address them. One criticism of the FEMA response 

to hurricane Katrina was that FEMA officials were more reactive than 

proactive in identifying the emergency needs of communities in the 

immediate days after the disaster. 

The Homeland Security Act of 2002,5

 which established DHS, created new 

requirements for emergency preparedness and response, including 

developing a comprehensive National Incident Management System 

(NIMS) and a comprehensive National Response Plan (NRP). NIMS is 

intended to provide a consistent framework for incident management at

all jurisdictional levels regardless of the cause, size, or complexity of the

situation and to define the roles and responsibilities of federal, state, and 

local governments and various first responder disciplines at each level

during an emergency event. NIMS established the Incident Command 

System (ICS) as a standard incident management organization with five 

functional areas—command, operations, planning, logistics, and 

finance/administration—for management of all major incidents. It also 

prescribes interoperable communications systems and preparedness 

before an incident happens, including planning, training, and exercises. 

The NRP is intended to be an all-discipline, all-hazards plan establishing a 

single, comprehensive framework for the management of domestic 

 4

See, for example, GAO, Disaster Management: Improving the Nation’s Response to 

Catastrophic Disasters, GAO-93-186 (Washington, D.C.: July 23, 1993) and GAO, Disaster 

Management: Recent Disasters Demonstrate the Need to Improve the Nation’s Response

Strategy, GAO-93-46 (Washington, D.C.: May 25, 1993). 

5

Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002). 

Page 5 GAO-06-746T 
incidents where federal involvement is necessary. It is to operate within 

the framework of NIMS. 

On March 1, 2003, FEMA became part of DHS pursuant to the Homeland 

Security Act of 2002. FEMA retained its authority to administer the 

provisions of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency

Assistance Act (the Stafford Act),6

which sets forth the primary programs 

and processes for the federal government to provide major disaster and 

emergency assistance to states, local governments, tribal nations, 

individuals, and qualified private nonprofit organizations. Among its 

missions within DHS, FEMA is to lead the effort to prepare the nation for 

natural and man-made disasters and effectively manage federal response 

and recovery efforts following any presidentially declared incident. FEMA 

is also to initiate proactive mitigation activities, train first responders, and 

manage the National Flood Insurance Program. FEMA shares

responsibility for preparing the nation for natural and man-made disasters 

with other organizations within DHS, including the Office of Grants and 

Training that administers federal homeland security grants for state and 

local first responders. 

Organizational changes, such as separating FEMA from DHS, are often 

viewed as a fix to address performance issues. Our institutional 

knowledge regarding organizational performance factors suggests that 

organizational changes alone may not adequately address underlying 

systemic conditions that result in an organization’s performance problem. 

Hurricane Katrina was one of the largest natural disasters in our nation’s 

history; its size and strength will have effects for years to come. It exacted 

terrible human costs with the loss of significant numbers of lives and 

resulted in billions of dollars in property damage, clearly overwhelming 

the capabilities of several federal, state, and local agencies. Nevertheless, 

after-the-fact analyses point to improvements needed in (1) the clarity of 

FEMA’s mission and related responsibilities and authorities to achieve 

mission performance expectations; (2) the experience and training of 

FEMA leadership; (3) the adequacy of FEMA’s human, financial, and 

technological resources; and (4) the effectiveness of FEMA’s planning, 

exercises, and related partnerships. If successfully implemented, such 

improvements may obviate the need for major organizational changes. 

Factors Other Than 

Organizational 

Placement May Affect 

FEMA’s Performance 

 6 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5206.

Page 6 GAO-06-746T 
In the event of a catastrophic disaster, the leadership roles, 

responsibilities, and lines of authority for the response at all levels must be 

clearly defined and effectively communicated in order to facilitate rapid 

and effective decision making, especially in preparing for and in the early 

hours and days after the disaster. In the aftermath of hurricane Andrew in 

1992, we discussed the critical importance of clearly defining and 

communicating leadership roles, responsibilities, and lines of authority for 

catastrophic response in advance of such events. Based on our 

assessments of the federal response, we recommended that in a 

catastrophic disaster a single individual directly responsible and 

accountable to the President should be designated to act as the central

focal point to lead and coordinate the overall federal response when a 

catastrophic disaster has happened or is imminent. President Clinton’s 

elevation of the position of FEMA director to cabinet status in 1996

provided the direct lines of communication and accountability envisioned 

in our recommendation. The subsequent incorporation of FEMA into DHS 

changed the direct reporting relationship between FEMA and the 

President. With the passage and subsequent implementation of the 

Homeland Security Act of 2002, the Secretary of DHS, rather than the 

FEMA Director, became the cabinet-level focal point for natural and manmade crises and emergency planning. The incorporation of FEMA into 

DHS raised questions during hurricane Katrina regarding lines of authority 

with respect to not only the DHS Secretary and the FEMA Director, but 

also the key officials reporting to them, the Principal Federal Official 

(PFO) and the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO), respectively. 

During incidents of national significance, including catastrophic disasters, 

the overall coordination of federal incident management activities is 

executed through the Secretary of Homeland Security under the Homeland 

Security Act of 2002, Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5 (HSPD5), and the NRP. There are three key leadership roles defined under the 

NRP needed to manage a catastrophic disaster. First, the role of the 

Secretary of Homeland Security is to provide strategic, national leadership 

as the focal point for federal response and coordination. Second, the role 

of the PFO is to act as the Secretary of Homeland Security’s formally 

designated representative locally to oversee, coordinate, and execute the 

secretary’s incident management responsibilities. Third, the FCO is a 

position created by the Stafford Act and is appointed by the FEMA 

Director to manage federal resource support activities related to Stafford

Act disasters and emergencies. The FCO is responsible for coordinating 

the timely delivery of federal disaster assistance resources and programs 

Clarity of FEMA’s Mission 

and Related 

Responsibilities and 

Authorities 

Page 7 GAO-06-746T 
to the affected localities by making mission assignments to specific federal 

agencies that have needed resources and capabilities. 

FEMA’s incorporation into DHS appears to have introduced some 

uncertainty regarding the respective roles and responsibilities of the DHS 

secretary and the PFO relative to the FEMA director and the FCO. The 

questions raised by the various assessments of the federal response during 

hurricane Katrina highlight the importance of clarity in FEMA’s mission 

and related responsibilities and authorities, as the following examples 

illustrate: 

• The White House report recommended that the PFO be given operational 

authority to manage and coordinate federal response, assets and, in a 

multi-state disaster, to oversee the multiple federal coordinating officers 

operating in the various states and make any operational decisions 

necessary, within the law, without having to obtain approval from 

headquarters. 

• The DHS OIG recommended that FEMA clarify the roles of the PFO, the 

FCO, the Federal Resource Coordinator, and the Disaster Recovery 

Manager to provide a clear distinction for the types and levels of response 

activities that warrant a combination or modification to those roles; 

develop procedures for the timely activation of each role; and, ensure that 

these officials be provided with the necessary training to complement their 

qualifications for serving in these positions. Similarly, the OIG

recommended that FEMA establish clear roles and responsibilities for the 

Housing Area Command and define its reporting requirements and chain 

of command relationships with the FEMA headquarters, Joint Field 

Offices, and Technical Assistance Contractors. 

• FEMA’s internal assessment identified the need for senior management to

develop doctrine to provide a single, simplified command structure for 

operations in temporary joint field offices created to lead federal response 

and recovery efforts. 

• The Senate report recommended that the Stafford Act should be amended 

to clarify the roles and responsibilities of the FCO, and the NRP should be 

revised to eliminate the PFO position for Stafford Act-declared 

emergencies and disasters. 

More explicit authority is needed to enhance federal leadership in 

situations when it is possible to respond to incidents maturing to 

catastrophic magnitude in a more proactive manner. In our July 1993 

report on the federal response to hurricane Andrew, we also noted that 

Page 8 GAO-06-746T 
encouraging agencies to do as much catastrophic disaster preparation as 

possible in advance of a Stafford Act declaration could reduce the federal

response time to the ensuing catastrophe. We stated that when there is 

early warning, as there usually is with hurricanes, federal agencies must 

mobilize resources and deploy personnel before the catastrophe strikes. 

However, the Stafford Act did not, and still does not, explicitly authorize 

such predeclaration activities. As a result, federal agencies may fail to

undertake extensive predeclaration preparations because of uncertainty 

over whether FEMA will request their assistance under the Stafford Act 

and ultimately reimburse their predeclaration costs. Therefore, we 

continue to believe that Congress should consider giving federal agencies, 

including FEMA, explicit authority under the Stafford Act to take actions 

to prepare for a catastrophic disaster when there is warning. 

In order to effectively fulfill the leadership roles and responsibilities and to

exercise lines of authority for the response at all levels to facilitate rapid 

and effective decision making in the event of a catastrophic disaster, 

leaders should have the experience and training needed to perform 

effectively, especially in the early hours and days after the disaster. In the 

aftermath of hurricane Andrew in 1992, we discussed the critical 

importance of the quality of leadership during catastrophic disasters. For 

example, we noted that leadership creates a powerful, meaningful 

perception that the federal government recognizes an event is 

catastrophic, is in control, and is going to use every means necessary to 

meet the immediate mass-care needs of disaster victims. Assessments of 

FEMA’s performance during and after hurricane Katrina have raised 

similar issues and resulted in recommendations related to the experience 

and training of FEMA leadership, as illustrated in the following examples: 

Experience and Training of 

FEMA Leadership 

• The House Select Committee concluded that federal agencies, including 

DHS, had varying degrees of unfamiliarity with their roles and 

responsibilities under the NRP and NIMS. According to the Committee’s 

report, senior officials were ill-prepared due to their lack of experience 

and knowledge of the required roles and responsibilities prescribed by the 

NRP, and FEMA lacked adequately trained and experienced staff for the 

hurricane Katrina response. The report noted that, since 2002, FEMA had 

lost a number of its top disaster specialists, senior leaders, and 

experienced personnel and that even before hurricane Katrina, FEMA 

suffered from a lack of sufficiently trained procurement professionals. 

• The White House report included recommendations to enhance DHS 

expertise and experience and to develop DHS regions that would be fully 

Page 9 GAO-06-746T 
staffed, trained, and equipped to manage and coordinate all preparedness 

activities and any emergency that may require a substantial federal 

response. The report also recommended the establishment of a formal 

training program on the NIMS and NRP for all department and agency 

personnel with incident management responsibilities, noting that each 

Regional Director should have significant expertise and experience, core 

competency in emergency preparedness and incident management, and 

demonstrated leadership ability. 

• FEMA’s assessment of the agency’s performance during and after 

hurricane Katrina resulted in a recommendation that emergency 

management personnel at all levels should be required to have training on

ICS and the NRP and recommended the creation of a rotational training 

program for field personnel to spend time at FEMA headquarters and for 

FEMA managers at headquarters to train in the field on simulated and

actual disaster events. The assessment also recommended that FEMA 

identify and name qualified personnel with leadership ability and 

emergency response experience as FEMA liaison officers for counties, 

parishes, or boroughs in advance of disasters. Further, it recommended a 

more comprehensive training program to prepare existing and new 

personnel for Disaster Recovery Center assignments. 

• The Senate report concluded that training and exercises were needed to

ensure that everyone involved in disaster response understands their roles 

and responsibilities and is prepared to carry them out. 

Even trained and experienced leaders who share a clear and common 

understanding of their mission and authorities across a community of 

federal, state, and local emergency management officials cannot 

effectively implement those authorities or exercise leadership without 

access to the human, financial, and technological resources needed to take

action. For noncatastrophic disasters, the federal government should be in 

a support and assist role, providing resources and other assistance to 

enable state and local governments to carry out their responsibilities. 

However, for catastrophic disasters that can overwhelm the ability of state 

and local and voluntary agencies to adequately provide victims with 

essential services, the federal government should be more proactive, 

anticipating state and local needs, pre-positioning resources, and 

providing selected resources where they are needed or likely to be needed.

The federal government must develop more capabilities and expertise to 

respond proactively when a catastrophic disaster is imminent or occurs. 

Adequacy of FEMA’s

Human, Financial, and 

Technological Resources 

Page 10 GAO-06-746T 
When we reviewed FEMA’s response to hurricane Andrew in 1992, we 

concluded that FEMA’s National Preparedness Directorate had many of 

the people and resources needed, with people skilled in such areas as 

strategic and tactical planning, logistics, command and control, and 

communications, and resources including communications, 

transportation, life support, as well as sophisticated computer-modeling 

equipment. At that time we reported that, through constant planning and 

exercising, the directorate had maintained a high level of readiness and 

was able to quickly deploy people and resources from a number of 

locations to anywhere in the United States (although we identified a 

number of shortcomings in FEMA’s response that primarily reflected the 

magnitude of the disaster.) Unfortunately, the various reports and our own 

work on FEMA’s performance before, during, and after hurricane Katrina

suggest that FEMA’s human, financial, and technological resources were 

insufficient to meet the challenges posed by the unprecedented degree of 

damage and the resulting number of disaster victims of the hurricane, as 

the following examples illustrate: 

• The Senate’s report concluded that FEMA did not have the resources to 

fulfill the mission and respond effectively in a catastrophic event and 

recommended that DHS must develop the national capabilities—especially 

surge capacity—it needs to respond to catastrophic disasters, ensuring it 

has sufficient full-time staff, response teams, contracting personnel, and 

adequately trained and sufficiently staffed reserve corps to ramp up 

capabilities, as needed. In terms of technology, the Senate report 

recommended that DHS complete and/or adopt technology and 

information management systems to effectively manage disaster-related 

activities and develop an efficient ordering system that minimizes delays 

and provides order status and accurate, timely commodity tracking as well

as a transportation protocol that moves commodities and resources 

directly from the supplier to the users. The report concluded that 

resources are needed for staffing and preparation of regional strike teams, 

better development of a trained cadre of reservists, and the development 

of new logistics capabilities. 

• DHS’s OIG report included a number of recommendations related to 

enhancing human and technological resources and capabilities. The 

recommendations directed FEMA to: 

• develop a disaster workforce plan for standing capability for 

permanent, temporary, and reserve staff responsive to previous 

disaster needs and also develop a plan that is scalable to other events 

irrespective of cause, size, or complexity; 

Page 11 GAO-06-746T 
• provide training to additional National Processing Service Center staff 

and contractors to enhance FEMA’s capability to perform applicant 

assistance and case management activities responsive to the needs of 

applications; 

• develop a more comprehensive program to recruit, train, and retain 

local hires for use in augmenting FEMA’s disaster assistance 

employees and permanent staff; 

• determine and fill requirements to provide emergency responders with 

communications equipment capable of performing in austere 

conditions; and 

• develop and implement a resource-tracking system that is capable of 

documenting whether resources were delivered and the efficiency with 

which the resource was provided. 

• FEMA’s initial response assessment concluded that the agency needs to 

lead an audit of current staffing capability and workforce demands for 

staff in a severe or catastrophic event and determine the number of 

personnel available to serve in each position or unit for such a disaster. 

This information is to be used to develop and implement a strategy for 

addressing any identified staffing gaps. The assessment also concluded 

that FEMA needs to develop a communications suite that operates 

independently of normal communications infrastructure and is able to be 

moved into disaster locations. 

• The White House report identified the need for each homeland security 

region to have access to the resources, equipment, and personnel needed 

to establish a self-sufficient temporary Joint Field Office to direct response 

and recovery efforts anywhere within the region.

• The House Select Committee also concluded that despite extensive 

preparedness initiatives, DHS was not prepared to respond to the 

catastrophic effects of hurricane Katrina. For example, the report noted 

that FEMA’s logistics and contracting systems did not support a targeted, 

massive, and sustained provision of commodities; long-standing 

weaknesses and the magnitude of the disaster overwhelmed FEMA’s 

ability to provide emergency shelter and temporary housing; and the 

readiness of FEMA’s national emergency response teams was inadequate 

and reduced the effectiveness of the federal response. 

Page 12 GAO-06-746T 
Fewer federal resources are needed to respond to a catastrophic disaster 

if state and local governments’ response capabilities are greater. The goal 

of emergency planning is simple: to have the skills and resources to 

respond, when needed, with well-planned, well-coordinated, and effective 

efforts to save lives and property and aid recovery from the emergency or 

disaster—regardless of the size or nature of the emergency. However, 

because FEMA is not a first responder, state and local government 

officials and emergency and homeland security managers must take the 

lead in developing strategic and operational plans and identifying the basic 

capabilities each jurisdiction might need to meet local, regional, and state 

prevention, mitigation, response, and recovery expectations—whether 

defined by federal guidance or by state and local assessments. That is 

because local officials are most knowledgeable of their communities, 

including their needs and capabilities. In addition, local emergency first 

responders—police, fire fighters, emergency medical personnel, and

others such as public health and hospital personnel—will still be the first 

on the scene of an incident. 

Regular training and periodic exercises provide a valuable way to test 

emergency management plans. It is important that exercises be designed

to be both as realistic as possible and stress the emergency management 

system as almost any major event will. The training should also be linked 

to the essential capabilities and emphasize identifying, developing, and

sustaining baseline capabilities for prevention, preparedness, response, 

and recovery. This would involve defining baseline capabilities at each 

level of government—federal, regional, state, and local—and surge 

capabilities in the event of a catastrophic disaster, based on risk to an 

individual jurisdiction and what would be required to support mutual aid 

compacts. 

In our previous work on hurricane Andrew, we identified the critical 

importance of conducting strong advance planning and robust training and 

exercise programs and the need for the federal government to upgrade 

training and exercises for state and local governments specifically geared

toward catastrophic disaster response. Our review uncovered 

shortcomings both in the way FEMA helps state and local governments 

train and conduct exercises in anticipation of catastrophic disasters and in 

the way it monitors state and local preparedness. Thus, we concluded that 

FEMA could do more to ensure that state and local governments prepare 

for catastrophic disaster response. 

Hurricane Katrina demonstrated the potential benefits of applying lessons

learned from training exercises and experiences with actual hurricanes as

Effectiveness of FEMA’s

Planning, Exercises, and 

Related Partnerships 

Page 13 GAO-06-746T 
well as the dangers of ignoring them. For example, confusion with 

emergency plans complicated the evacuations and everything that 

followed. Clearly, plans were not implemented or were only partially 

implemented, and state officials requested aid early but in some cases 

were slow to deploy their own resources. Our own work and assessments 

of FEMA’s performance during and after hurricane Katrina have made a 

variety of recommendations intended to improve the effectiveness of 

federal planning, exercises, and related partnerships, as the following 

examples show: 

• The White House report recommended that DHS (1) develop and 

implement homeland security regions that are fully staffed, trained, and

equipped to manage and coordinate all preparedness activities and any 

emergency that may require a substantial federal response and (2) conduct 

training and exercises for key state and local officials. 

• The Senate report recommended that (1) national emergency response 

plans be reviewed and coordinated with the states and on a regional basis 

to ensure the plans are understood, trained, and exercised prior to an 

emergency; (2) officials in emergency agencies at the federal, state, and 

local levels of government, as well as first responder groups outside of 

government receive regular training on NRP and NIMS; (3) DHS consider 

tying future cost-share requirements for preparedness grant funds to 

performance and results of these exercises; (4) DHS establish regional 

strike teams and enhance regional operations—building on FEMA’s 10 

existing regional offices—to provide better coordination between federal 

agencies and the states in preparing for and responding to disasters; and 

(5) resources be provided for additional planning and more frequent and 

ambitious training and exercises. 

• The DHS OIG report recommended that FEMA (1) develop and implement 

a system that automates and tracks the selection, deployment, training, 

and demobilization of responders; (2) develop more effective and efficient 

plans for the delivery of assistance to address long-term housing issues, 

and test these plans in a simulated environment before application in 

actual disasters; (3) request an appropriation or provide other funding, 

resources, and institutional support to agency components and to state 

and local partners to complete draft or proposed catastrophic planning

initiatives for natural disasters; (4) develop a formal mechanism to ensure 

continuity between preparedness, response, and recovery by including 

FEMA regional staff in the Preparedness Directorate’s relationships with 

state emergency management agencies for grants, exercises, planning, 

technical assistance, and training. 

Page 14 GAO-06-746T 
• The House report observed that the hurricane Pam exercise reflected

recognition by all levels of government of the dangers of a category 4 or 5 

hurricane striking New Orleans. Implementation of lessons learned from

hurricane Pam was incomplete. 

• FEMA’s initial assessment concluded that FEMA must develop a concept 

of operations for logistically supporting Emergency Management 

Assistance Compact resources that are requested for disaster response 

efforts. 

In summary, the difficulties described above would not, we believe, be 

fixed by simply moving FEMA to an independent status. Indeed, we know 

that many of lessons learned from hurricane Katrina were acted on for 

hurricane Rita, with a much better response effort, indicating that 

organizational change is not the primary key to success. 

Taking actions to improve these operational weaknesses in FEMA’s 

performance before, during, and after hurricane Katrina may be more 

important to FEMA’s success in responding to and recovering from the 

next hurricane season, than its organizational placement. Of course, FEMA 

will need financial and other resources to address the problems that have 

been identified in the wake of hurricane Katrina.

A number of alternative organizational changes are now being considered

in response to hurricane Katrina. For example, the White House report 

recommended keeping FEMA within DHS, but would preserve FEMA as 

an independent operating agency to perform its response and recovery 

mission while making other organizational changes, such as transferring 

the National Disaster Medical System from DHS to the Department of 

Health and Human Services. The Senate report recommended creation of a 

new, comprehensive emergency management organization within DHS 

that would fuse DHS’s emergency management, preparedness, and critical 

infrastructure assets into a new organization. Other observers have 

proposed removing FEMA from DHS completely. 

If an organizational change remains under consideration, our past work 

could be helpful. Before the formation of DHS, the Comptroller General 

testified before the House Select Committee on Homeland Security that 

reorganizations of government agencies frequently encounter start-up 

problems and unanticipated consequences and are unlikely to fully 

Issues for 

Consideration of a 

Change in FEMA’s

Organizational 

Placement 

Page 15 GAO-06-746T 
overcome obstacles and challenges and may require additional 

modifications in the future.7

 He also asked a number of questions related 

to mission relevancy and shared goals and leveraging effectiveness and 

gains through consolidation that could be used to evaluate whether 

individual agencies or programs should be included or excluded from the 

proposed department. Some of these questions are appropriate today for 

discussing FEMA’s future, and I would suggest that they might be useful if

a change in FEMA’s organizational placement is under consideration. 

• Is homeland security a major part of the agency or program mission? Is it 

the primary mission of the agency or program? 

• Does the agency or program being considered for the new department 

share primary goals and objectives with the other agencies or programs 

being consolidated? 

Congress might consider whether or how moving FEMA out of DHS would

impact DHS’s mission, as stated in the Homeland Security Act of 2002, of 

acting as a focal point for natural and man-made crises and emergency 

planning. DHS’s Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate— 

primarily FEMA—was to help ensure the effectiveness of emergency

response providers to terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other 

emergencies. Removing FEMA from DHS might impact the ability of the 

department and its remaining components and FEMA itself in fully 

addressing the close links between preparedness, prevention, response, 

and recovery for all hazards. 

Mission relevancy and 

shared goals 

Leverage Effectiveness 

and Gains Through 

Consolidation 

• Does the agency or program being considered for the new department 

create synergy and help to leverage the effectiveness of other agencies and 

programs or the new department as a whole? 

• Does the agency or program being considered for the new department 

improve the efficiency and effectiveness of homeland security missions 

through eliminating duplications and overlaps, closing gaps, and aligning 

or merging common roles and responsibilities? 

 7

 GAO, Homeland Security: Critical Design and Implementation Issues, GAO-02-957T

(Washington, D.C.: July 17, 2002). 

Page 16 GAO-06-746T 
The dispersion of responsibility for preparedness and response across 

more than one federal agency was a problem we identified during the 

formation of DHS.8

 As I mentioned earlier, FEMA was established in 1979 

to consolidate federal emergency preparedness mitigation and response in 

a single federal agency. Its responsibilities were to include, among other 

things, the coordination of civil defense and civil emergency planning and 

the coordination of federal disaster relief. FEMA was responsible for 

responding to a wide range of disasters, including floods, hurricanes, 

earthquakes, hazardous material accidents, nuclear accidents, and 

biological, chemical, and nuclear attacks.9

 However, when Congress 

created DHS, it separated FEMA’s responsibilities for preparedness and 

response activities into two directorates. Responsibility for preparedness 

for terrorism disasters was placed in the department’s Border and 

Transportation Security Directorate, which included FEMA’s Office of 

National Preparedness. Other types of FEMA disaster preparedness and 

response efforts were transferred to the department’s Emergency 

Preparedness and Response Directorate. In January 2003, we observed 

that this organizational arrangement would challenge FEMA in ensuring 

the effective coordination of preparedness and response efforts and 

enhancing the provision and management of disaster assistance for 

efficient and effective response.10

A division of responsibility remains under the recent DHS reorganization 

resulting from Secretary Chertoff’s Second Stage Review with 

preparedness efforts—including planning, training, exercising, and 

funding—consolidated into a Preparedness Directorate. FEMA reports 

directly to the Secretary of Homeland Security for response and recovery 

missions. Secretary Chertoff has stated the reorganization would focus 

FEMA on its historic mission of response and recovery. We believe this 

division of responsibility should be reconsidered. 

 8

GAO, Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Homeland

Security, GAO-03-102 (Washington, D.C.: January 2003). 

9

 GAO, Disaster Management: Improving the Nation’s Response to Catastrophic 

Disasters, GAO/RCED-93-186 (Washington, D.C.: July 23, 1993). 

10 GAO, Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Federal Emergency

Management Agency, GAO-03-113 (Washington, D.C.: January 2003). 

Page 17 GAO-06-746T 
The next response and recovery challenge this nation will face, whether 

natural or man-made, will provide another important test of FEMA’s 

efforts to improve its preparedness and capability. To encourage agility 

and innovation in preparing for the next major disaster event, focused, 

skilled leadership is essential, and these leaders must have clear 

operational plans, realistically exercised, evaluated, and adapted with key

resources identified, provided, and appropriately deployed. Organizational 

changes, while important, may not by themselves necessarily produce 

these desired results. Incentives and sanctions are also important as well 

as the responsibilities and resource commitments of all levels of 

government and nongovernment entities. 

As the administration and the Congress assess if further organizational 

changes are immediately necessary, we suggest they use the questions 

discussed above as a basis for consideration to evaluate whether 

individual agencies or programs, including FEMA, should be included or 

excluded from DHS. 

This concludes my statement. I would be pleased to respond to any 

questions that you or other members of the committee may have at this 

time. 

Concluding 

Observations 

Page 18 GAO-06-746T (440516) 
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