United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Testimony 

Before the Subcommittee on Energy and 

Water Development, Committee on 

Appropriations, House of Representatives

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Views on Proposals to 

Transform the Nuclear 

Weapons Complex 

Statement of Gene Aloise, Director 

Natural Resources and Environment 

For Release on Delivery

Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT 

Wednesday, April 26, 2006

 

GAO-06-606T 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

April 26, 2006

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Views on Proposals to Transform the 

Highlights of GAO-06-606T, a testimony Nuclear Weapons Complex 

before the Subcommittee on Energy and 

Water Development, Committee on

Appropriations, House of Representatives

Over the past several years, a 

serious effort has begun to 

comprehensively reevaluate how 

the United States maintains its 

nuclear deterrent and what the 

nation’s approach should be for 

transforming its aging nuclear 

weapons complex. The National 

Nuclear Security Administration

(NNSA), a separately organized

agency within the Department of

Energy, is responsible for 

overseeing this weapons complex,

which comprises three nuclear 

weapons design laboratories, four 

production plants, and the Nevada

Test Site. 

At the direction of the

Subcommittee on Energy and 

Water Development, the Secretary 

of Energy Advisory Board’s (SEAB) 

Nuclear Weapons Complex 

Infrastructure Task Force issued a

report in October 2005 that 

provided a systematic review of the 

requirements for the weapons 

complex for the next 25 years and 

offered its vision for an agile and 

responsive weapons complex. 

GAO was asked to discuss (1) the 

current actions NNSA is taking to

address the SEAB task force’s 

recommendations and (2) the 

critical steps that will be needed to 

achieve and sustain a meaningful, 

cost-effective transformation of the 

weapons complex. 

The SEAB task force report contained the following five recommendations:

• Immediately begin to modernize the cold war nuclear stockpile by 

designing a Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW). 

• Create a Consolidated Nuclear Production Center (CNPC) that 

contains a modern set of production facilities in one location. 

• Consolidate all weapons-grade material and weapons components at 

the CNPC. 

• Aggressively dismantle the cold war stockpile. 

• Create an Office of Transformation to oversee the transformation of 

the nuclear weapons complex. 

NNSA has offered a proposal for transforming the nuclear weapons complex 

that it believes is responsive to the recommendations in the SEAB task force 

report. Specifically, NNSA officials noted, they (1) will decide on a design 

competition for the RRW in November 2006, (2) have requested an increase

of over $15 million in funding for dismantling legacy weapons in fiscal year 

2007, and (3) have requested $15 million in their fiscal year 2007 budget 

proposal to create an Office of Transformation, among other things. 

However, NNSA does not support the SEAB task force’s recommendation 

for a CNPC and the accompanying recommendation of consolidating 

weapons-grade material at the CNPC, primarily because it views these 

recommendations as too costly. Instead, NNSA has proposed building a 

consolidated center for processing plutonium, removing weapons-grade 

material from the three weapons laboratories, and modernizing the 

remaining production capabilities at their existing locations. 

Regardless of the approach chosen, any attempt to change an extremely 

complex enterprise must be based on solid analysis, careful planning, and 

effective leadership. GAO has identified the following four actions that, in 

its view, are critical to successfully transforming the weapons complex: 

• The Department of Defense will need to establish clear, long-term 

requirements for the nuclear stockpile by determining the types and 

quantities of nuclear weapons needed to provide for our nation’s 

nuclear deterrent. 

• After the Department of Defense determines the size and 

composition of the future stockpile, NNSA will need to develop 

accurate cost estimates of the proposals for transforming the 

weapons complex. Current estimates of the costs of transforming 

the weapons complex contain considerable uncertainty. 

• After NNSA selects a proposal based on accurate cost estimates, it 

will need to develop a clear transformation plan containing 

measurable milestones so that it can evaluate progress and the 

Congress can hold it accountable. 

• The proposed Office of Transformation must have authority to make 

and enforce its decisions on transformation and must be held 

accountable by the Congress for achieving timely and cost-effective 

results. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-606T.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Gene Aloise at 

(202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. 
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

We are pleased to be here today to provide our observations on the 

October 2005 report, Recommendations for the Nuclear Weapons 

Complex of the Future, prepared by the Secretary of Energy Advisory 

Board’s (SEAB) Nuclear Weapons Complex Infrastructure Task Force.1

After the end of the cold war, the United States, in 1992, began a unilateral 

moratorium on underground nuclear testing. Subsequently, in 1993, the 

Department of Energy (DOE), at the direction of the President and the 

Congress, established the Stockpile Stewardship Program to ensure the 

United States’ core intellectual and technical competencies in nuclear 

weapons without testing.2

 The National Nuclear Security Administration 

(NNSA), a separately organized agency within DOE, is now responsible for 

carrying out the Stockpile Stewardship Program through a nuclear 

weapons complex (weapons complex) that comprises three nuclear 

weapons design laboratories (weapons laboratories), four production 

plants, and the Nevada Test Site. With the creation of the Stockpile 

Stewardship Program, the mission of the weapons complex changed from 

“designing, building, and testing” successive generations of weapons to 

extending the life of the existing nuclear weapons stockpile through 

“scientific study, computer simulation, and refurbishment.” 

Several events over the past few years have made it clear that it is time for 

the United States to comprehensively reevaluate how it maintains its 

nuclear deterrent and to develop and implement a strategy for 

transforming its weapons complex. For example, the 2001 Nuclear Posture 

Review found that the nuclear weapons infrastructure had atrophied and 

needed to be repaired; it also called for the development of a “responsive 

infrastructure” that would support a smaller nuclear deterrent. 

Subsequently, the 2002 Moscow Treaty between the United States and 

Russia set a goal of reducing the number of deployed U.S. nuclear 

warheads to between 1,700 and 2,200 by 2012. More recently, NNSA, as 

directed by the conference report accompanying DOE’s fiscal year 2005

appropriations act, created the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) 

program to study a new approach to maintaining nuclear warheads over 

 1

U.S. Department of Energy, Secretary of Energy Advisory Board, Report of the Nuclear 

Weapons Complex Infrastructure Task Force: Recommendations for the Nuclear Weapons 

Complex of the Future (Washington, D.C.: July 13, 2005). 

2

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-160, § 3138

(1993). 

Page 1 GAO-06-606T 
the long term by making weapons easier to manufacture, maintain, 

dismantle, and certify without nuclear testing.3

In this context, this Subcommittee requested, and the SEAB task force has 

provided, a systematic review of the requirements for the weapons 

complex over the next 25 years. The SEAB task force report contains five 

major recommendations that, combined with numerous supporting 

recommendations, offer the task force’s vision for an agile and responsive 

weapons complex. These recommendations are as follows: 

• Immediately begin to modernize the nuclear weapons stockpile by 

designing a RRW. 

• Create a Consolidated Nuclear Production Center (CNPC) that contains a 

modern set of production facilities in one location. 

• Consolidate all Category I and Category II quantities of Special Nuclear 

Material and weapon primary and secondary components at the CNPC. 

• Aggressively dismantle the cold war stockpile. 

• Create an Office of Transformation to oversee the transformation of the 

weapons complex. 

Our testimony discusses (1) the current actions NNSA is taking to address 

the SEAB task force’s recommendations and (2) the critical actions 

needed to achieve and sustain a meaningful, cost-effective transformation 

of the weapons complex. 

To carry out our objectives, we reviewed the final SEAB task force report 

and the comments provided by various parties on the initial draft. We 

interviewed the SEAB task force members individually to obtain their 

views on the final report and NNSA’s response to it. We met with various 

NNSA officials, including the Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs

and the head of NNSA’s Responsive Infrastructure Steering Committee, 

and with the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Nuclear 

 3

The conference report accompanying the fiscal year 2005 Consolidated Appropriations

Act, Pub. L. No. 108-447, stated that the appropriations committee was providing $9 million 

“for the Reliable Replacement Warhead program to improve the reliability, longevity, and 

certifiability of existing weapons and their components.” H.R. Rep. No. 108-792, Div. C, at 

951 (2004). 

Page 2 GAO-06-606T 
Matters). We also reviewed the methods the SEAB task force used to 

develop cost estimates for options presented in its report. Finally, we 

reviewed a variety of documents, including the Nuclear Posture Review, 

and the recent Defense Science Board report, entitled Report of the 

Defense Science Board Task Force on Nuclear Capabilities.

4

 We 

performed our work between February 2006 and April 2006 in accordance

with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

In summary: 

NNSA has offered a proposal for transforming the weapons complex that 

it believes is responsive to the recommendations in the SEAB task force 

report. Specifically, NNSA officials noted, they (1) will decide on a design 

competition for the RRW in November 2006, (2) have requested an 

increase of over $15 million in funding for dismantling legacy weapons in 

fiscal year 2007, and (3) have requested $15 million in their fiscal year 2007 

budget proposal to create an Office of Transformation and to begin 

studying ways to transform the business practices of the weapons 

complex. However, NNSA does not plan to adopt the SEAB task force’s 

recommendation for a CNPC and the accompanying recommendation of 

consolidating all Category I and II quantities of Special Nuclear Material at

the CNPC, primarily because it views these recommendations as too 

costly. Instead, NNSA has proposed building a consolidated center for 

processing plutonium, removing Category I and II Special Nuclear Material 

from the three weapons laboratories, and modernizing the remaining 

production capabilities at their existing locations. 

Regardless of the approach chosen to transform the weapons complex, 

any attempt to change such an extremely complex enterprise must be 

based on solid analysis, careful planning, and effective leadership. We 

have identified four actions that, in our view, are critical to successfully 

transforming the weapons complex. As the Congress oversees NNSA’s 

future actions, it should expect to see each of these actions carefully and 

fully implemented: 

• The Department of Defense (DOD) will need to establish clear, long-term 

requirements for the stockpile. Our current stockpile comprises nine 

weapon systems, all of which were designed during the cold war. Several

 4

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, 

Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Nuclear Capabilities (Washington,

D.C.: January 2006). 

Page 3 GAO-06-606T 
of these systems—the B61, W76, and W80—are currently having their 

useful lives extended for up to 30 years through NNSA’s Stockpile Life 

Extension Program. However, these life extensions are very expensive,

and some have already experienced cost and schedule slippages. NNSA is 

now evaluating a new warhead—the RRW—which may be able to take the 

place of some existing warheads. Before any plans for a new weapons 

complex can be made final, however, in our view, DOD will need to 

determine the systems, their capabilities, their quantities, and the schedule 

it needs to provide for our nation’s nuclear deterrent. 

• NNSA will need to provide accurate estimates of the costs of 

transformation. Once a decision is made about the size and composition 

of the stockpile, NNSA can develop accurate estimates of the costs of 

proposals for transforming the weapons complex. As we have noted in 

numerous reports over the last several years on key projects such as the 

National Ignition Facility and the Stockpile Life Extension Program, NNSA 

has had difficulty estimating costs and schedules and adhering to them.5

Some cost estimates to transform the weapons complex were developed 

as part of the SEAB task force report and, according to NNSA officials, 

NNSA is currently using the same cost models for its effort. However, 

these estimates need considerable refinement. As a result, NNSA will need 

to develop credible, defensible cost estimates for transforming the 

weapons complex. 

• NNSA will need to develop a transformation plan with clear milestones

for measuring progress. Developing workable plans, with realistic, 

measurable milestones has been a continuing problem for NNSA. For 

example, as we noted in our February 2006 report on NNSA’s effort to 

develop and implement a new method for assessing and certifying the 

stockpile, NNSA does not have an integrated plan for carrying out this 

important activity or clear milestones for measuring progress.6

 Without 

question, transforming the weapons complex will be a much more 

daunting enterprise. However, without a clear transformation plan that 

contains measurable milestones, NNSA will have no way to evaluate its 

progress, and the Congress will have no way to hold NNSA accountable. 

 5

See GAO, Nuclear Weapons: Opportunities Exist to Improve the Budgeting, Cost

Accounting and Management Associated with the Stockpile Life Extension Program, 

GAO-03-583 (Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2003) and GAO, National Ignition Facility: 

Management and Oversight Failures Caused Major Cost Overruns and Schedule Delays, 

GAO/RCED-00-271 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 8, 2000). 

6

GAO, Nuclear Weapons: NNSA Needs to Refine and More Effectively Manage Its New 

Approach for Assessing and Certifying Nuclear Weapons, GAO-06-261 (Washington, D.C.: 

Feb. 3, 2006). 

Page 4 GAO-06-606T 
• Change will require a strong Office of Transformation. As we noted in a 

2003 report, one of the key practices for successfully transforming an 

organization is to ensure that top leadership sets the direction, pace, and 

tone for the transformation.7

 Through its recent reorganizations, NNSA has 

shown that it can move from what was often called a “dysfunctional 

bureaucracy” to an organization with clearer lines of authority and 

responsibility. NNSA officials have embraced the SEAB task force’s 

proposal for an Office of Transformation. However, in order for such an 

office to be effective, it must (1) report directly to the Administrator, 

NNSA; (2) have real authority to make and enforce its decisions; and (3) 

be held accountable by the Congress for achieving results in a costeffective and timely manner. 

NNSA conducts nuclear weapon and nonproliferation-related national 

security activities in research and development laboratories, production 

plants, and other facilities.8

 Specifically, NNSA operates three weapons 

laboratories—Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), 

California; Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), New Mexico; and the 

Sandia National Laboratories, New Mexico and California; and four 

nuclear weapons production sites—the Pantex Plant, Texas; the Y-12 

Plant, Tennessee; the Kansas City Plant, Missouri; and the Savannah River 

Site, South Carolina. NNSA also operates the Nevada Test Site. To 

implement its nuclear weapons programs, NNSA received about $6.4 

billion for fiscal year 2006 and has requested more than $6.4 billion for 

fiscal year 2007. Between fiscal years 2008 and 2011, NNSA is proposing to 

spend almost $27 billion for these programs. 

Over the past decade, NNSA has invested a substantial amount of money 

in sustaining the cold war stockpile and upgrading the three weapons 

laboratories with new, state-of-the-art experimental and computing 

facilities. However, as described in studies over the past decade, the 

production infrastructure of the weapons complex is aging and 

increasingly outdated. For example, a 2000 DOE Office of Inspector 

General report concluded that the postponement of repairs to aging and 

deteriorating facilities had resulted in delays in weapons modification, 

Background 

 7

GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers and

Organizational Transformations, GAO-03-669 (Washington, D.C.: July 2, 2003). 

8

The Office of Naval Reactors is managed as a separate entity within NNSA. 

Page 5 GAO-06-606T 
remanufacture, and dismantlement, among other things.9

 In addition, a 

2001 report by the Foster Panel found the state of the production facilities 

to be troubling and recommended that NNSA restore missing production 

capabilities and refurbish the production infrastructure.10 In its fiscal year 

2007 budget request, NNSA estimated that it will cost $2.4 billion to reduce 

the backlog of deferred maintenance at these facilities to an appropriate 

level consistent with industry best practices. 

Events over the past several years have served to intensify concern about 

how the United States maintains its nuclear deterrent and what the 

nation’s strategy should be for transforming the weapons complex. 

Specifically:

• The 2001 Nuclear Posture Review stated, among other things, that cold 

war practices related to nuclear weapons planning were obsolete, and few 

changes had been made to the size or composition of the nation’s nuclear 

forces. Furthermore, there had been underinvestment in the weapons 

complex, particularly the production sites. The Nuclear Posture Review 

called for, among other things, the development of a “responsive 

infrastructure” that would be sized to meet the needs of a smaller nuclear 

deterrent while having the capability to respond to future strategic 

challenges. 

• The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, led DOE to increase the size 

of its Design Basis Threat, a classified document that identifies the size 

and capabilities of terrorist forces. This increase in the size of the Design 

Basis Threat has greatly increased NNSA’s cost for protecting its weaponsgrade nuclear material. 

• The 2002 Moscow Treaty between the United States and Russia set a goal 

of reducing the number of deployed U.S. nuclear warheads to between 

1,700 and 2,200 by 2012. However, a significant number of existing 

warheads would be kept in reserve to address potential technical 

contingencies with the existing stockpile. 

• NNSA, at the Congress’ direction, created the RRW program to study a 

new approach to maintaining nuclear warheads over the long term. The 

 9

DOE Office of Inspector General, Management of the Nuclear Weapons Production 

Infrastructure, September 2000, DOE/IG-0484. 

10John S. Foster, Fr., et. al, FY 2000 Report to Congress of the Panel to Assess the

Reliability, Safety, and Security of the United States Nuclear Stockpile, Feb. 1, 2001. 

Page 6 GAO-06-606T 
RRW program would redesign weapon components to be easier to 

manufacture, maintain, dismantle, and certify without nuclear testing, 

potentially allowing NNSA to transition to a smaller, more efficient 

weapons complex. A design competition between LANL and LLNL is 

scheduled to end in November 2006.

• Finally, in recent congressional testimony, the Secretary of Energy and the 

Administrator of NNSA emphasized to the Congress that while they 

believe stockpile stewardship is working, the current cold war legacy 

stockpile is the wrong stockpile for the long term, and the current nuclear 

weapons infrastructure is not responsive to unanticipated events or 

emerging threats. 

Current NNSA plans call for substantial funding to operate the existing 

weapons complex. For example, according to NNSA’s fiscal year 2007 

budget request, over the next 5 years, NNSA plans to spend about $7.4 

billion to operate and maintain the existing infrastructure of the weapons 

complex. In addition, NNSA plans to spend $1.8 billion on new 

construction projects. These construction projects include 

• the Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility at the Y-12 Plant, which is 

estimated to cost $335 million and be completed in fiscal year 2007;11

• the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement facility at LANL, 

which is estimated to cost $838 million and be completed in fiscal year 

2013; and 

• the proposed Uranium Processing Facility at the Y-12 Plant, which is 

projected to cost between $600 million to $1 billion. 

During testimony before this Subcommittee in March 2004, the Secretary 

of Energy agreed to conduct a comprehensive review of the weapons 

complex. Subsequently, in January 2005, the Secretary of Energy 

requested the SEAB to form the Nuclear Weapons Complex Infrastructure 

Task Force to assess the implications of presidential decisions on the size 

and composition of the stockpile; the cost and operational impacts of the 

 11NNSA’s fiscal year 2007 budget request states that detailed design, cost, and schedule 

assessments for incorporating facility improvements to meet the new Design Basis Threat 

and facility start-up activities are still in progress. It is anticipated that when these 

assessments are complete, the baseline “total estimated costs” of the Highly Enriched 

Uranium Materials Facility will increase substantially, and the completion date will slip. 

Page 7 GAO-06-606T 
new Design Basis Threat; and the personnel, facilities, and budgetary 

resources required to support a smaller stockpile. The review was also to 

evaluate opportunities for consolidating Special Nuclear Material, 

facilities, and operations across the weapons complex in order to 

minimize security requirements and the environmental impacts of 

continuing operations. The SEAB task force formally transmitted the final 

report to the Secretary of Energy in October 2005.

According to the report, the SEAB task force assessed the impact of its 

recommendations on near-term funding requirements, as well as total 

costs, for the weapons complex over the next 25 years. The report stated 

that implementing all of the recommendations will increase near-term 

costs substantially but would result in a substantial reduction in future 

operating costs after the CNPC is in full operation. The SEAB task force 

estimated that the long-term cost savings would be approximately twice 

the near-term cost increases. 

Initially, NNSA officials did not provide us with any detailed information 

concerning their plans for transforming the infrastructure of the weapons 

complex and for addressing the recommendations in the SEAB task force 

report. Instead, NNSA officials described to us the following process they 

were using to establish a detailed vision for the future weapons complex 

and to identify a “path forward” for achieving that vision: 

NNSA Actions to 

Implement the SEAB 

Task Force

Recommendations 

• In March 2005, NNSA established a Responsive Infrastructure Steering 

Committee and created a position within the Office of Defense Programs 

to lead this effort. 

• In October 2005, NNSA received the final SEAB task force report. NNSA 

officials said that they have reviewed the recommendations from this 

report, along with recommendations from other advisory bodies, such as

the Defense Science Board. 

• In November 2005 and January 2006, NNSA held two meetings for seniorlevel officials within the weapons complex to establish a broad range of 

planning options, which NNSA refers to as its “preferred infrastructure 

planning scenario.” 

• In January 2006, NNSA held a 3-week session for about 50 key midlevel 

managers within the weapons complex to evaluate the proposed planning 

options. 

Page 8 GAO-06-606T 
As a result of this process, NNSA recently offered a proposal for 

transforming the weapons complex that it believes is responsive to the 

recommendations in the SEAB task force report. Specifically, NNSA 

officials stated that 

• NNSA will decide on the RRW design competition in November 2006 and, 

assuming that the RRW is technically feasible, will seek authorization to 

proceed to engineering development and production; 

• NNSA is requesting an additional $15.6 million in its fiscal year 2007 

budget request to dismantle legacy weapons material at the Pantex Plant; 

and 

• NNSA is requesting about $15 million for fiscal year 2007, as well as over 

$30 million annually from fiscal years 2008 through 2011, to support the 

implementation of its responsive infrastructure strategy, including the 

creation of an Office of Transformation within the Office of Defense 

Programs. 

However, NNSA does not plan to adopt the SEAB task force’s 

recommendation for a CNPC and the accompanying recommendation of 

consolidating all Category I and II quantities of Special Nuclear Material at

the CNPC. NNSA believes that these recommendations are not affordable

or feasible. For example, in recent congressional testimony, the Deputy 

Administrator for Defense Programs said that the SEAB task force report’s 

recommendation on the timing for a CNPC—i.e., that a CNPC could be 

designed, built, and operational by 2015—is not plausible and 

underestimates the challenges of transitioning a unique and highly skilled 

workforce to a new location. He also stated that the recommendation does 

not recognize the challenge of meeting near-term requirements of the 

current stockpile and transforming the weapons complex infrastructure at 

the same time. In addition, he stated that it may be decades before all 

existing legacy weapons are fully removed from the stockpile and 

dismantled. 

Instead, NNSA has proposed the following plan for the 2030 weapons 

complex, which it states will achieve many of the benefits of the SEAB 

task force’s approach in a way that is technically feasible and affordable 

over both the near and longer term: 

• Consolidated plutonium center. All research and development (except 

certain experiments at the Nevada Test Site), surveillance, and production 

activities involving Category I and II quantities of plutonium would be 

Page 9 GAO-06-606T 
transferred to a consolidated plutonium center. The center would have a 

baseline production capacity of 125 pits per year by 2022 and would be 

situated at an existing Category I and II Special Nuclear Material site. In 

the interim, NNSA would upgrade the plutonium facility at Tech Area 55 at 

LANL to produce 30-50 pits per year and operate the Chemistry and 

Metallurgy Research Replacement facility at LANL as a Category I and II 

Special Nuclear Material facility. 

• Consolidation of Category I and II Special Nuclear Material. This 

material would be consolidated to fewer sites, and to fewer locations 

within sites. Specifically, NNSA would remove all Category I and II Special

Nuclear Material from Sandia National Laboratory by 2008 and from LLNL 

by 2014, and would cease all activities involving this material at LANL by 

2022. The remaining NNSA sites with Category I and II Special Nuclear 

Material would include the consolidated plutonium center, the Nevada 

Test Site, the Pantex Plant, the Y-12 Plant, and the Savannah River Site. 

• Modernizing the remaining production sites. The planned Uranium 

Processing Facility at the Y-12 Plant would consolidate existing highly

enriched uranium contained in legacy weapons, dismantle legacy warhead 

secondaries, support associated research and development, and provide a 

long-term capacity for new secondary production. Tritium production and 

stockpile support services would remain at the Savannah River Site. All 

weapons assembly and disassembly would be carried out at a Pantex Plant 

modernized for increased throughput for the long term. In addition, NNSA 

would build a new, nonnuclear component production facility by 2012 at 

an unspecified location. Finally, the Nevada Test Site would become the 

only site for large-scale hydrodynamic testing, which measure how 

stockpile materials behave when exposed to explosively driven shocks.

Regardless of the approach chosen to transform the weapons complex, 

any attempt to change such an extremely complex enterprise must be 

based on solid analysis, careful planning, and effective leadership. We 

have identified four actions that, in our view, are critical to the successful 

transformation of the weapons complex. As the Congress oversees NNSA’s 

future actions, it should expect to see each of these actions carefully and 

fully implemented. 

Four Actions Will Be 

Critical to 

Successfully 

Transforming the

Complex 

Page 10 GAO-06-606T 
DOD Will Need to 

Establish Clear, Long-Term 

Requirements for the 

Stockpile 

The U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile consists of nine weapon types. (See 

table 1.) The lifetimes of the weapons currently in the stockpile have been 

extended well beyond the minimum life for which they were originally 

designed—generally about 20 years—increasing the average age of the 

stockpile and, for the first time, leaving NNSA with large numbers of 

weapons that are close to 30 years old. 

Table 1: Nuclear Weapons in the Enduring Stockpile 

Warhead or bomb type Description Date of entry into stockpile Laboratory Military service

B61 3/4/10 Tactical bomb 1979/1979/1990 LANL, SNL Air Force 

B61 7/11 Strategic bomb 1985/1996 LANL, SNL Air Force 

W62 ICBM warheada1970 LLNL, SNL Air Force 

W76 SLBM warheadb1978 LANL, SNL Navy

W78 ICBM warheada1979 LANL, SNL Air Force 

W80 0/1 Cruise missile warhead 1984/1982 LLNL, SNL Air Force / Navy 

B83 0/1 Strategic bomb 1983/1993 LLNL, SNL Air Force 

W87 ICBM warheada1986 LLNL, SNL Air Force 

W88 SLBM warheadb1989 LANL, SNL Navy

Source: NNSA. 

Note: The dates of entry into the enduring nuclear stockpile are based on when the weapon reached 

phase 6 of the weapons development and production cycle. As of 2005, responsibility for the W80 0/1 

was transferred from LANL to LLNL. 

a

ICBM = intercontinental ballistic missile. 

b

SLBM = submarine launched ballistic missile. 

NNSA is currently rebuilding several of these weapon types through the 

Stockpile Life Extension Program. Already, the W87 has been refurbished. 

In addition, the B61, W76, and W80 are well into their respective 

refurbishments. The first production unit for the B61 is scheduled for 

September 2006, while the first production unit for the W76 is scheduled 

for September 2007 and for the W80 for January 2009. These are costly and 

difficult undertakings. According to NNSA’s fiscal year 2007 budget 

request, over the next 5 years, the agency will need $118.4 million for the 

B61 life extension, $669.9 million for the W76, and $581.5 million for the 

W80. These efforts place considerable demands on the computational and

experimental facilities of the weapons laboratories, as well as the 

production facilities. Finally, some of the life extensions have experienced

Page 11 GAO-06-606T 
significant cost and schedule overruns.12 For example, the total cost of the 

W80 life extension has increased by almost $600 million, while the first 

production unit date has slipped from February 2006 to the current date of 

January 2009. 

In its 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, DOD described the need to 

substantially reduce operationally deployed strategic warheads through 

2012. These reductions were subsequently reflected in the Moscow Treaty 

between the United States and Russia, which was signed in May 2002. As

part of this strategy, DOD has stated its support for the development of an 

RRW, which could enable reductions in the number of older, nondeployed 

warheads maintained as a hedge against reliability problems in deployed 

systems and assist in the evolution to a smaller and more responsive 

nuclear weapons infrastructure. Currently, LANL and LLNL are developing

competing designs for an RRW deployed on a submarine-launched ballistic 

missile, with the first production unit planned for fiscal year 2012. 

However, since the RRW design competition will not be completed until 

November 2006, more information on the viability of the RRW program 

will be necessary before any firm plans can be drawn up, budgeted, and 

implemented. In particular, it is not clear at this point whether the RRW 

can achieve the military characteristics, such as yield, provided by the 

current stockpile. Some NNSA officials have indicated that the military 

characteristics may need to be relaxed in order to design a warhead that is

safer, easier to build, and easier to maintain. 

Producing an RRW warhead, while at the same time refurbishing a 

significant portion of the stockpile and continuing to dismantle retired 

weapons, will be a difficult and costly undertaking. Given NNSA’s 

performance to date with the life extension programs and the current 

unresolved questions about the RRW, in our view, DOD will need to 

establish clear, long-term requirements for the nuclear stockpile before 

NNSA can make any final decisions about transforming the weapons 

complex. Specifically, DOD, working with NNSA through the Nuclear 

Weapons Council, needs to determine the types and quantities of nuclear 

weapons that will provide for our nation’s nuclear deterrent over the long 

term. To facilitate this process, and to provide a foundation for 

transforming the weapons complex, the Congress may wish to consider 

 12For information on cost and schedule overruns associated with the W87 life extension 

program, see GAO, Nuclear Weapons: Improved Management Needed to Implement 

Stockpile Stewardship Program Effectively, GAO-01-48 (Washington, D.C.: Dec.14, 2000). 

Page 12 GAO-06-606T 
setting firm deadlines for DOD, NNSA, and the Nuclear Weapons Council 

to determine the future composition of the nuclear stockpile.

NNSA Will Need to Provide 

Accurate Estimates of the 

Costs of Transformation 

Once a decision about the size and composition of the stockpile is made,

NNSA will need accurate estimates of the costs of proposals for 

transforming the weapons complex. However, historically, NNSA has had 

difficulty developing realistic, defensible cost estimates, especially for 

large complex projects. For example, in our August 2000 report on the 

National Ignition Facility,13 we found that NNSA and LLNL managers 

greatly underestimated the costs of creating such a technically complex 

facility and failed to include adequate contingency funding, which virtually 

assured that the National Ignition Facility would be over budget and 

behind schedule. Similarly, as noted in a March 2005 NNSA report, 

inadequate appreciation of the technical complexities and inadequate

contingency funding directly contributed to the cost overruns and 

schedule slippage experienced by the Dual Axis Radiographic 

Hydrodynamic Test facility.14 As noted earlier, NNSA has experienced 

similar cost and schedule problems with some of its life extension efforts. 

Some cost estimates to transform the weapons complex were included in

the SEAB task force report. Specifically, using the results of computer 

models developed at LANL and LLNL, the SEAB task force estimated that 

NNSA would need about $175 billion between now and 2030 to support its 

current baseline program and modernize the current weapons complex in 

place, while NNSA would need only $155 billion to carry out the task 

force’s recommendations. According to NNSA officials, NNSA is currently 

using the same cost models to evaluate its proposal. 

However, according to SEAB task force and NNSA and laboratory 

officials, while the LANL and LLNL models are useful for analyzing overall 

cost trends and evaluating the cost implications of alternative strategies, 

they are not currently designed to provide overall life-cycle cost estimates. 

In addition, we found, among other things, that the cost data used in the 

models have a high degree of uncertainty associated with them and that 

the models do not currently have the ability to provide any confidence 

intervals around their estimates. Several of the SEAB task force members 

 13GAO, National Ignition Facility: Management and Oversight Failures Caused Major

Cost Overruns and Schedule Delays, GAO/RCED-00-141 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 8, 2000).

14NNSA, DARHT Construction Project Lessons Learned Report, March 2005. 

Page 13 GAO-06-606T 
told us that they recognize the limitations associated with their cost 

estimates. Since they did not have the time to fully analyze the costs and 

implementation issues associated with their recommendations, they 

expected that the proposed Office of Transformation would perform the 

necessary, detailed cost-benefit analyses of their recommendations in 

order to make the most informed decisions. 

As previously mentioned, NNSA officials have stated that they do not 

support building a CNPC because they believe that it is neither affordable 

nor feasible. However, until NNSA develops a credible, defensible method 

for estimating life-cycle costs and performs detailed cost analyses of the 

recommendations contained in the SEAB task force report, as well as its 

own proposal, it will not be possible to objectively evaluate the budgetary 

impact of any path forward. 

NNSA Will Need to 

Develop a Transformation 

Plan with Clear Milestones 

for Measuring Progress 

According to one count, NNSA has established over 70 plans with 

associated performance measures to manage the Stockpile Stewardship 

Program. Nevertheless, over the last 6 years, we have repeatedly 

documented problems with NNSA’s process for planning and managing its

activities. For example, in a December 2000 report prepared for this 

Subcommittee, we found NNSA needed to improve its planning process so 

that there were linkages between individual plans across the Stockpile 

Stewardship Program and that the milestones contained in NNSA’s plans 

were reflected in contractors’ performance criteria and evaluations.15

However, in February 2006, we reported similar problems with how NNSA 

is managing the implementation of its new approach for assessing and 

certifying the safety and reliability of the nuclear stockpile.16 Specifically, 

we found that NNSA planning documents did not contain clear, consistent 

milestones or a comprehensive, integrated list of the scientific research 

being conducted across the weapons complex in support of the Primary 

and Secondary Assessment Technologies programs. These programs are 

responsible for setting the requirements for the computer models and 

experimental data needed to assess and certify the safety and reliability of 

nuclear warheads. We also found that NNSA had not established adequate

 15See GAO-01-48. 

16GAO, Nuclear Weapons: NNSA Needs to Refine and More Effectively Manage Its New 

Approach for Assessing and Certifying Nuclear Weapons, GAO-06-261 (Washington, D.C.: 

Feb. 3, 2006). 

Page 14 GAO-06-606T 
performance measures to determine the progress of the weapons 

laboratories in developing and implementing this new methodology. 

However, the need for effective planning applies to more than the 

Stockpile Stewardship Program. One of the major recommendations of the 

SEAB task force is to consolidate Category I and II Special Nuclear 

Material at the CNPC. In our July 2005 report, we noted that the successful

consolidation of Special Nuclear Material into fewer locations is a crucial

component of several DOE sites’ Design Basis Threat implementation 

plans.17 Such consolidation requires the cooperation of a variety of entities,

including NNSA’s Office of Secure Transportation, which moves weaponsgrade material from site to site. In our report, we recommended that DOE 

develop a departmentwide Design Basis Threat implementation plan that 

includes the consolidation of Special Nuclear Material. However, while 

DOE has established a Nuclear Material Disposition Consolidation and 

Coordination Committee, it has yet to develop such a comprehensive plan. 

The process of transforming the weapons complex will take a long time to 

complete—as long as two decades, according to some estimates. As a 

result, NNSA will need to develop a transformation plan with clear 

milestones that all involved can work toward and that the Congress can 

use to hold NNSA accountable. For example, as we stated in a 2003 report, 

one key practice in successful transformations is to set implementation 

goals and a time line to build momentum and show progress from day 1.18

In addition, given the demand for transparency and accountability in the 

public sector, these goals and time lines should be made public. We would 

note that NNSA should be able to establish milestones for some activities

quickly, while others will take more time. For example, NNSA’s Deputy 

Administrator for Defense Programs has indicated a willingness to 

establish an Office of Transformation and to implement other SEAB task 

force recommendations, such as developing a consistent set of business 

practices across the weapons complex. In these situations, the Congress 

should expect NNSA to move quickly to establish specific milestones 

needed to create the Office of Transformation, select key staff to fill this 

office, and implement key initiatives. 

 17GAO, Nuclear Security: DOE’s Office of the Under Secretary for Energy, Science, and

Environment Needs to Take Prompt, Coordinated Action to Meet the New Design Basis 

Threat, GAO-05-611 (Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2005). 

18See GAO-03-669. 

Page 15 GAO-06-606T 
We recognize that NNSA will not be able to establish specific milestones in 

some areas until after the Office of Transformation has performed a 

detailed, cost-benefit analysis of both the recommendations in the SEAB 

task force report and of NNSA’s own preferred approach. However, once 

this analysis is complete, the Congress should expect to see specific, 

detailed plans and accompanying milestones for the RRW program, the 

establishment of a pit production capability, and the other adopted 

recommendations from the SEAB task force report. 

Change Will Require a 

Strong Office of 

Transformation 

Many of the recommendations in the SEAB report are not new. A number 

of studies over the past 15 years have stressed the need to transform the 

weapons complex. However, for a variety of reasons, DOE and NNSA have 

never fully implemented these ideas. One of the key problems that NNSA 

has experienced during this time has been its inability to build an 

organization with clear lines of authority and responsibility. As we noted 

in our June 2004 report, NNSA, through its December 2002 reorganization, 

made important strides in providing clearer lines of authority and 

responsibility.19 However, we also noted problems in certain oversight 

functions, such as safety. We are currently evaluating NNSA’s management 

effectiveness for the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces of the House 

Committee on Armed Services. 

The Congress, and Chairman Hobson in particular, have offered leadership 

in supporting the creation of the SEAB task force and in funding the RRW 

program. However, as we stated in a 2003 report, organizational 

transformation entails fundamental and often radical change.20 As a result, 

top leadership must set the direction, pace, and tone for the 

transformation, while simultaneously helping the organization remain 

focused on the continued delivery of services. One key strategy is to 

dedicate a strong and stable implementation team that will be responsible 

for the transformation’s day-to-day management. Accordingly, this team 

must be vested with the necessary authority and resources to set 

priorities, make timely decisions, and move quickly to implement 

decisions. Therefore, in our view, it is imperative that the proposed Office

of Transformation (1) report directly to the Administrator of NNSA; (2) be 

 19GAO, National Nuclear Security Administration: Key Management Structure and

Workforce Planning Issues Remain as NNSA Conducts Downsizing, GAO-04-545 

(Washington, D.C.: June 25, 2004). 

20See GAO-03-669. 

Page 16 GAO-06-606T 
given sufficient authority to conduct its studies and implement its 

recommendations; and (3) be held accountable for creating real change 

within the weapons complex. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to

respond to any questions that you or Members of the Subcommittee may 

have. 

For further information on this testimony, please contact me at (202) 512-

3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional 

Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this 

statement. James Noel, Assistant Director; Jason Holliday; and Peter 

Ruedel made key contributions to this testimony. 

GAO Contact and 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Page 17 GAO-06-606T (360672) 
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