AFFIRMED and Opinion Filed December 12, 2018 

S 

In The 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-18-00725-CV 

IN THE INTEREST OF A.G. AND A.G., CHILDREN 

On Appeal from the County Court At Law No. 1 

Kaufman County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. 97715CC 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Before Justices Bridges, Brown, and Boatright 

Opinion by Justice Bridges 

V.R.D. appeals the trial court’s denial of her petition in intervention in the underlying 

proceeding that resulted in the termination of the parental rights of Mother and Father to their 

children, A.G. and A.G. In two issues, V.R.D. argues the trial court erred in striking her petition 

in intervention and appointing the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services permanent 

managing conservator of the children. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

On June 2, 2017, the Department filed its original petition seeking, among other things, 

termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights and appointment of the Department as 

permanent managing conservator of the children if the children could not be reunified with either 

parent or placed with a relative or other suitable person. 

On February 15, 2018, the trial court set this case for trial on May 24, 2018. On May 16, 

2018, V.R.D. filed her petition in intervention seeking to have herself appointed sole managing 

conservator of the children. On May 18, 2018, the Department filed its motion to strike V.R.D.’s 
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petition in intervention on the ground that the petition “asserts standing by merely referencing 

Texas Family Code Section 102.004” and therefore “wholly fails to meet the pleading 

requirements set forth by said section.” As a result, the Department argued, there was sufficient 

cause to strike V.R.D.’s petition “for lack of standing and justiciable interest under the statutory 

provisions outlined by the Texas Family Code.” 

At trial on May 24, 2018, Department caseworker Rhonda Davis reported that mediation 

in the case was unsuccessful, Father was incarcerated, and Mother had “not completed services or 

submitted to drug testing.” The children were in a foster home where, “if the children were free 

for adoption, they would wish to adopt these children.” V.R.D., twenty-four years old at the time 

of trial, testified the children were placed with her for two weeks at the beginning of the case, but 

she was told the children could no longer stay with her because she “had prior CPS history.” 

V.R.D.’s prior history involved an “altercation” between her husband and his brother. As a result, 

V.R.D. had to attend counseling. When asked why she “wait[ed] so late to hire a lawyer,” V.R.D. 

responded that she thought “there was just no hope” because she had been told she could not have 

custody of the children because of her “CPS case.” On cross-examination, V.R.D. testified her 

husband had been “hospitalized for mental health,” he had “struggled with anger,” and he “got into 

an altercation with his aunt.” V.R.D.’s husband was prescribed medications, but he no longer took 

medication because he had “gotten better.” V.R.D. testified she had been diagnosed with 

depression but did not take medication because “[t]hat was a long time ago.” V.R.D. testified she 

had a four-year-old son, a six-year-old son, and a two-year-old daughter. Both Mother and Father 

testified that they approved of V.R.D. filing a petition for intervention asking the trial court to give 

her managing conservatorship of the children. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court 

entered oral findings that the petition for intervention was untimely, and the statutory requirements 

had not been met. Therefore, the trial court denied leave to intervene and granted the Department’s 
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motion to strike the plea for intervention. That same day, the trial court signed an order granting 

the Department’s motion to strike, dismissing V.R.D. and her pleadings, and denying any and all 

relief V.R.D. requested. 

V.R.D. filed a motion to reconsider her petition for intervention. V.R.D. argued the trial 

court abused its discretion in striking her plea in intervention because she met the factors set forth 

in Guaranty Federal Savings Bank v. Horseshoe Operating Co., 793 S.W.2d 652, 657 (Tex. 1990), 

a case analyzing a party’s right to intervene under Rule 60 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 

then in effect. The motion also cited In re S.B., No. 02–11–00081–CV, 2011 WL 856963 (Tex. 

App.—Fort Worth, March 11, 2011, orig. proceeding) for the proposition that consent of both 

parents gave an intervenor standing under Texas Family Code section 102.004(a)(2). On June 5, 

2018, the trial court signed an order denying V.R.D.’s motion to reconsider. This appeal followed. 

In her first issue, V.R.D. argues the trial court erred in striking her petition for intervention. 

Specifically, V.R.D. argues she had standing to intervene under Texas Family Code section 

102.004(a)(2) because Mother and Father consented to the intervention. In addition, V.R.D. argues 

her petition was timely, and the trial court abused its discretion in striking her plea in intervention 

because she met the factors set forth in Guaranty Federal. In making these arguments, V.R.D. 

does not address the issue of whether she had standing under section 102.004(b) of the family 

code. 

In pertinent part, section 102.004 provides as follows: 

§ 102.004. Standing for Grandparent or Other Person 

(a) In addition to the general standing to file suit provided by Section 102.003, a 

grandparent, or another relative of the child related within the third degree by 

consanguinity, may file an original suit requesting managing conservatorship if 

there is satisfactory proof to the court that: 

(1) the order requested is necessary because the child's present circumstances would 

significantly impair the child's physical health or emotional development; or 
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(2) both parents, the surviving parent, or the managing conservator or custodian 

either filed the petition or consented to the suit. 

(b) An original suit requesting possessory conservatorship may not be filed by a 

grandparent or other person. However, the court may grant a grandparent or other 

person deemed by the court to have had substantial past contact with the child leave 

to intervene in a pending suit filed by a person authorized to do so under this 

subchapter if there is satisfactory proof to the court that appointment of a parent as 

a sole managing conservator or both parents as joint managing conservators would 

significantly impair the child's physical health or emotional development. 

TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 102.004(a), (b). Thus, under family code section 102.004(b), the trial 

court may grant leave to intervene to grandparents and those “deemed by the court to have had 

substantial past contact with the child.” See Id. 

We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to strike a petition in intervention for abuse of 

discretion. See Mendez v. Brewer, 626 S.W.2d 498, 499 (Tex. 1982); In re J.P., 196 S.W.3d 434, 

440 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.). A trial court abuses its discretion if it acts in an 

unreasonable or arbitrary manner, “without reference to any guiding rules or principles.” 

Beaumont Bank, NA v. Buller, 806 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Tex. 1991) (quoting Downer v. Aquamarine 

Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex. 1985)). We will not reverse a trial court for abuse 

of discretion because we disagree with its decision if that decision was within the court’s 

discretionary authority. Id. A trial court has no discretion in determining what the law is or in 

applying the law to the facts. Baylor Coll. of Med. v. Camberg, 247 S.W.3d 342, 345 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. denied). 

Generally, intervention in a lawsuit is allowed as a matter of right; permission by the trial 

court is not required. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 60; Smith v. City of Garland, 523 S.W.3d 234, 241 

(Tex. App.—Dallas 2017, no pet.); Prototype Mach. Co. v. Boulware, 292 S.W.3d 169, 172 (Tex. 

App.—San Antonio 2009, no pet.). However, in suits affecting the parent-child relationship, 

where the child’s best interest is “always” the court’s primary consideration, the circumstances 

under which a person may intervene is left to the trial court’s discretion. See TEX. FAM. CODE 
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ANN. §§ 102.004(b), 153.002 (West 2014); In re M.T., 21 S.W.3d 925, 927 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 

2000, no pet.). 

A person seeking conservatorship of a child must have standing to bring suit. In re I.I.G.T., 

412 S.W.3d 803, 805 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, no pet.); In re M.K.S.–V., 301 S.W.3d 460, 463 

(Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, pet. denied). Standing is a component of subject-matter jurisdiction and 

is a constitutional prerequisite to maintaining a lawsuit. See Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control 

Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443–44 (Tex. 1993); M.K.S.–V., 301 S.W.3d at 463. We review standing 

under the same standard we use for subject-matter jurisdiction generally: whether the pleader 

alleged facts that affirmatively demonstrated the court’s jurisdiction to hear the cause. Tex. Ass’n 

of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 446; M.K.S.–V., 301 S.W.3d at 463. 

Standing in a suit affecting the child-parent relationship (SAPCR) is governed by the 

family code, and a party bringing a SAPCR must plead and establish standing under the family 

code’s provisions. I.I.G.T., 412 S.W.3d at 806. If the party fails to do so, the trial court must 

dismiss the suit. Id. A party’s standing to pursue a cause of action is a question of law. Id. Section 

102.004(b) governs the question whether a party attempting to intervene in a pending SAPCR has 

established standing to do so. In re E.C., No. 05-17-00723-CV, 2017 WL 6505867, at *4 (Tex. 

App.—Dallas Dec. 20, 2017, no pet.); see In re Derzapf, 219 S.W.3d 327, 332 (Tex. 2007) (family 

code’s specific standing requirements control over general standing provision). Section 

102.004(b) applies to a person who seeks to intervene in a pending suit even if the person may 

have had standing to bring an original suit. In re E.C., 2017 WL 6505867, at *4. 

Here, we assume without deciding that V.R.D.’s petition was timely. V.R.D. argues she 

had standing to intervene under Texas Family Code section 102.004(a)(2) because Mother and 

Father consented to the intervention. Section 102.004(a)(2) pertains to original suits brought by 

grandparents or other persons and permits such original suits if, among other things, the person 
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bringing suit proves both parents consented to the suit. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 102.004(a). 

However, section 102.004(b) governs the question whether V.R.D., as a party attempting to 

intervene in a pending SAPCR, established standing to do so. In re E.C., 2017 WL 6505867, at 

*4. Section 102.004(b) applies to V.R.D.’s attempt to intervene in the underlying suit even if she 

may have had standing to bring an original suit. Id. Thus, Mother and Father’s consent were not 

relevant to the issue of whether V.R.D. had standing under section 102.004(b). See TEX. FAM.

CODE ANN. § 102.004(b); In re E.C., 2017 WL 6505867, at *4. Similarly, Guaranty Federal was 

not a SAPCR, and the factors set forth therein do not apply to a case under section 102.004(b). 

See Guaranty Federal, 793 S.W.2d at 657; I.I.G.T., 412 S.W.3d at 806. Under these 

circumstances, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in striking V.R.D.’s petition 

in intervention. See Mendez, 626 S.W.2d at 499. We overrule V.R.D.’s first issue. 

In her second issue, V.R.D. argues the trial court erred in appointing the Department 

permanent managing conservator of the children. However, because V.R.D. was dismissed as a 

party for lack of standing, and we have determined the trial court did not err in doing so, we will 

not consider V.R.D.’s argument concerning the appointment of the Department as managing 

conservator. See In re J.S., No. 2-04-277-CV, 2005 WL 1693537, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth

July 21, 2005, no pet.) (refusing to consider grandmother’s challenge to Department’s appointment 

as managing conservator where grandmother dismissed as party for lack of standing). 

We affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

180725F.P05 

/David L. Bridges/ 

DAVID L. BRIDGES 

JUSTICE 
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S 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

JUDGMENT 

IN THE INTEREST OF A.G. AND A.G., 

CHILDREN 

No. 05-18-00725-CV 

 On Appeal from the County Court At Law 

No. 1, Kaufman County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. 97715CC. 

Opinion delivered by Justice Bridges. 

Justices Brown and Boatright participating. 

 In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is 

AFFIRMED. 

 It is ORDERED that each party bear its own costs of this appeal. 

Judgment entered December 12, 2018.