NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. 

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE 

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

MICHAEL OWEN MCKENZIE, Appellant. 

No. 1 CA-CR 15-0341 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County 

No. S8015CR201300309 

The Honorable Lee Frank Jantzen, Judge 

AFFIRMED 

COUNSEL 

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix 

By Joseph T. Maziarz 

Counsel for Appellee 

Mohave County Legal Advocate’s Office, Kingman 

By Jill L. Evans 

Counsel for Appellant
STATE v. MCKENZIE 

Decision of the Court 

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION 

Judge Kenton D. Jones delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Diane M. Johnsen and Judge Patricia A. Orozco joined. 

J O N E S, Judge:

¶1 Michael McKenzie appeals his convictions and sentences for 

one count of fraudulent schemes and artifices, two counts of arson of an 

occupied structure, and two counts of theft. He challenges the sufficiency 

of evidence supporting his convictions and argues the trial court erred in 

denying his motion in limine, effectively precluding impeachment evidence 

against a State’s witness. For the following reasons, we affirm. 

FACTS1 AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 McKenzie’s mobile home caught on fire in November 2011, 

and again in February 2012. After each incident, McKenzie sought and 

received insurance proceeds to pay for the resulting damages. Following 

an investigation, the State charged McKenzie with one count of fraudulent 

schemes and artifices, two counts of arson of an occupied structure, and 

two counts of theft, alleging he, on two separate occasions, knowingly or 

intentionally set his home on fire and filed false insurance claims to receive 

insurance proceeds. 

¶3 The jury found McKenzie guilty as charged, and the court 

imposed aggravated concurrent prison terms, the longest of which is ten 

years. McKenzie timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 

Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) sections 12-120.21(A)(1),2 13-4031, and 

-4033(A)(1). 

 

1 We view the facts in the light most favorable to upholding the 

verdicts and resolve all reasonable inferences against the defendant. State 

v. Harm, 236 Ariz. 402, 404 n.2, ¶ 2 (App. 2015) (citing State v. Valencia, 186 

Ariz. 493, 495 (App. 1996)).

2 Absent material changes from the relevant date, we cite a statute’s 

current version. 
STATE v. MCKENZIE 

Decision of the Court 

3

DISCUSSION

I. Sufficiency of Evidence 

¶4 McKenzie argues the evidence is insufficient to establish he 

intentionally set his home on fire because the experts who investigated the 

incidents could not opine as to his intent. We review challenges to the 

sufficiency of evidence to sustain a conviction de novo. State v. Bible, 175 

Ariz. 549, 595 (1993) (citing State v. Landrigan, 176 Ariz. 1, 4 (1993)). We do 

not reweigh the evidence and will reverse only if “there is a complete 

absence of probative facts to support the conviction.” State v. Scott, 113 

Ariz. 423, 424-25 (1976) (citing State v. Riggins, 111 Ariz. 281, 284 (1974)); see 

also State v. Cid, 181 Ariz. 496, 500 (App. 1995) (“The finder-of-fact, not the 

appellate court, weighs the evidence and determines the credibility of 

witnesses.”) (citing State v. Pike, 113 Ariz. 511, 514 (1976)). 

¶5 As an initial matter, expert testimony is not only unnecessary 

to prove a person’s mental state, it is expressly prohibited where a requisite 

mental state constitutes an element of the charged offense. Arizona Rule of 

Evidence 704(b) specifically states, “In a criminal case, an expert witness 

must not state an opinion about whether the defendant did or did not have 

a mental state or condition that constitutes an element of the crime charged 

or of a defense. Those matters are for the trier of fact alone.” (Emphasis 

added). Indeed, the trial court sustained McKenzie’s objection for this very 

reason when the State asked one of the investigators, “So in your opinion, 

if you have two fires in the same place in a very short period of time, what 

does that basically show [about] the intent of the person who is involved in 

these fires?” 

¶6 Moreover, evidence of a person’s mental state “will rarely be 

provable by direct evidence.” State v. Noriega, 187 Ariz. 282, 286 (App. 

1996). Instead, “the jury will usually have to infer [a defendant’s mental 

state] from his behaviors and other circumstances surrounding the event.” 

Id.; see also In re William G., 192 Ariz. 208, 213 (App. 1997) (recognizing that, 

“absent a person’s outright admission regarding his state of mind, his 

mental state must necessarily be ascertained by inference from all relevant 

surrounding circumstances”). 

¶7 At trial, investigators testified the fires were suspicious, and 

the only reasonable explanation for their cause was human intervention. 

McKenzie’s neighbor, Sandy C., testified that on the morning of the 

November 2011 fire, she observed McKenzie sitting on a rock outside his 

home and returning a number of times to open the front door. At one point, 
STATE v. MCKENZIE 

Decision of the Court 

4

McKenzie opened the door, closed it, and told Sandy to “keep [her] kids 

back because his house was on fire.” Sandy then noticed smoke coming 

from the home. McKenzie returned to the rock and called 9-1-1. 

¶8 Additionally, Sandy’s live-in boyfriend, Michael L., testified 

that McKenzie admitted to him the first fire “was no accident, he wanted to 

smoulder it for money.” McKenzie then offered to pay Michael $5,000 to 

“smoulder” McKenzie’s home; Michael refused the offer. Another man, 

Rocky B., also testified that McKenzie offered him money “to burn down 

the house again.” Having failed to convince others to set a second fire, 

McKenzie left for an overnight trip leaving three space heaters running next 

to a flammable sofa and recliner, causing the February 2012 fire. 

¶9 Based upon this evidence, the jury could reasonably conclude 

McKenzie knowingly or intentionally set his house on fire in both 

November 2011 and February 2012. McKenzie’s convictions are therefore 

supported by the evidence. 

II. Denial of Motion in Limine

¶10 McKenzie also argues the trial court erred in denying his 

motion in limine seeking to introduce impeachment evidence against 

Michael pursuant to Arizona Rule of Evidence 608(b). We review a trial 

court’s decision to preclude impeachment evidence of a witness’s character 

for truthfulness under Rule 608(b) for an abuse of discretion. See State v. 

Woods, 141 Ariz. 446, 450 (1984) (holding trial court has discretion under 

Rule 608(b) to allow cross-examination of witness regarding specific acts of 

misconduct if they are probative of truthfulness). 

¶11 Rule 608(b)(1) provides: 

Except for a criminal conviction under Rule 609, extrinsic 

evidence is not admissible to prove specific instances of a 

witness’s conduct in order to attack or support the witness’s 

character for truthfulness. But the court may, on crossexamination, allow them to be inquired into if they are 

probative of the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of . . . 

the witness. 

(Emphasis added). Here, McKenzie sought introduction of statements 

Michael made to a police officer during an investigation of a domestic 

violence incident between Michael and Sandy. McKenzie alleges the police 

report documenting the incident indicates Michael told the officer he 

suspected Sandy was using methamphetamine and posed as Sandy in order 
STATE v. MCKENZIE 

Decision of the Court 

5

to confront her “drug addict friend” with his suspicions, gave an 

inconsistent statement regarding the source of a lump on Sandy’s head, and 

lied about taking Sandy’s food stamp card. The trial court denied 

McKenzie’s motion, finding Michael’s statements were made in a “different 

situation[]” and were “not probative enough . . . to be admissible in a trial 

about statements that were made three years earlier.” 

¶12 On appeal, McKenzie argues the trial court erred in 

precluding Michael’s statements because “[f]alsely accusing someone of a 

felony is highly relevant to a witness’[s] credibility.” The record does not 

support this assertion. Rather, McKenzie’s offer of proof indicates only that 

Michael believed Sandy used methamphetamine, and both Sandy and her 

friend denied it — not that Michael intentionally made the accusation 

knowing it was false. 

¶13 Regardless, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s 

conclusion that Michael’s statements were not probative of his truthfulness 

in this case. The statements Michael made in connection with the domestic 

violence incident occurred during an emotionally charged dispute with his 

live-in girlfriend. In contrast, his salient testimony at trial amounted to 

recollections of incriminating statements made by McKenzie 

approximately three years earlier. We agree with the court that the two 

“situations [are] different,” and find no error in the denial of McKenzie’s 

motion in limine. 

CONCLUSION

¶14 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.