THE CHINESE ARMED FORCES

IN THE 21st CENTURY

Edited by

Larry M. Wortzel

December 1999
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ii
iii

Introduction

James R. Lilley..................

1. Geographic Ruminations

Michael McDevitt ................

2. The Chinese Military and the Peripheral States 1

in the 21st Century: A Security Tour d’Horizon

Eric A. McVadon .................

3. PLA Capabilities in the 21st Century:

How Does China Assess Its Future Security Need

Michael Pillsbury .................

4. Advanced Military Technology and the PLA: Prior

and Capabilities for the 21st Century

Bernard D. Cole

Paul H.B. Godwin................. 

5. U.S.-Chinese Military Relations in the 21st Centu

Larry M. Wortzel ................. 

6. Taiwan’s Military in the 21st Century: Redefinitio

and Reorganization

Arthur Shu-fan Ding

Alexander Chieh-cheng Huang .......... 

7. Taiwan’s Military: A View from Afar

June Teufel Dreyer ................ 

8. Concluding Comment: The Political Angle—New 

Phenomena in Party-Army Relations

Ellis Joffe .....................

About the Authors ...................

Index .......................... 
James R. Lilley

The debate about China and Taiwan is re-emerg

the United States. The accidental bombing of the Ch

Embassy in Belgrade, of course, put on the front burn

way that nationalistic fervor has grown in China, at 

some of it as a result of manipulation by the Comm

Party. President Lee Teng-hui's comments a

state-to-state relations between Taiwan and the mai

raised the temperature of relations across the stra

among the three concerned parties (China, the U

States, and Taiwan). China threatened, China pos

and China ran political campaigns against the U

States and Lee. But the questions of military capa

security policy, and intent are rarely treated seriously

book is a serious look at the armed forces of China an

they will evolve. 

The chapters in this volume were developed from p

prepared for the eighth in a series of conferences o

People's Liberation Army (PLA). The people a

conferences were recognized experts on armed force

security matters in China and drawn from aca

government, the military, and policy think tanks. 

chapter's author was challenged to analyze some asp

the Chinese armed forces as they moved into the 

century. The goal was to contribute a realistic view o

domestic and international pressures would shape 

Beijing's and Taipei's security environment. Over a 

period at Wye Plantation, Maryland, each pape

discussed and criticized by a wider body of participan

then revised for publication. Not surprisingly, when a 

of experts of such high caliber is assembled and dia

flows freely, comments by participants at the conferen

to the development of two more papers. The 

addressing strategic geography from Michael McD

v
summarizing changes in party-army relations in C

appears as Chapter 8. The result is a highly readab

relevant publication applicable to today's politico-m

environment.

One of the participants in this series of a

conferences on the PLA refers to the event as an “az

check of trends and ideas in the community of 

watchers.” To anyone who has had to navigate the lan

or air by compass, the meaning of this analogy w

instantly clear. It is difficult to move through unch

areas, where conditions change often and in unpredi

ways, attempting to reach a common goal or objective 

others. This goal is even more difficult to reach becau

all travel on different intellectual paths. Therefore

time to time it is useful and necessary to confirm 

course. This set of conferences served that purpose. 

context of the PLA conferences held over the year

common objective is a realistic appreciation of the po

power, and operational dimensions and limitations 

PLA. The majority of the participants in this effort 

from the United States, but all of them come 

democracies with important security interests in Chin

Asia. Thus, the other common goal shared b

participants is a strong desire to ensure that the secu

their own nation is not adversely affected by even

China.

Readers of this volume should understand 

“checking one's azimuth” does not mean conforming 

ideas to match those of others. The authors of the cha

contained herein, and their interlocutors at the confe

whose comments and critiques sharpened the chapter

independent thinkers. Still, the “azimuth” analogy 

since one must check from time to time whether on

been blown or veered off course by an unperceived cha

external events. This book, therefore, is not simp

exercise in recording “group think.” Each chapter diff

tone and assessment, but the work is unified 

vi
China's security policies will look like in the coming y

The need to arrive at some kind of com

understanding of what is happening in China is c

today. The Congress, in the Committee Report on the 

Year 2000 Defense Authorization Act, has expressed s

concerns about the types of military-to-military exch

conducted between the United States and China—Cha

addresses that issue. In addition, in the same legislati

Secretary of Defense has been directed by Congr

produce a report on the current and future strategy 

People's Republic of China (PRC), including the pr

future course of military-technological developmen

subject of Chapter 4 of this book. Thus, the publishe

authors are able to provide some thoughts early tha

stimulate further thinking on these vital issues.

As noted earlier, Chapter 1 developed out of a com

at the conference. Michael McDevitt reminds us in 

chapter that there is a permanent, predictable featu

Asia's security landscape—geography. As he stat

“China's central position on the Asian mainland allow

command internal lines of communication o

continent.” Combined with other factors, this makes 

“the dominant military power on the continent of Asia

central question posed in McDevitt's reminder abou

influence of geography is whether China will choo

expand its military reach beyond the continent in way

would destabilize the rest of Asia. McDevitt cau

security analysts to distinguish between “token Ch

military capabilities intended to show the flag . . . a

attempt to create a truly dominant projection force

concludes that with the “proper mix of United States 

in the region, rimland and maritime Asia will always 

the ability to ‘trump' Chinese projection attempts.”

In Chapter 2, Eric McVadon examines the se

contacts and relationship forged or developing be

China's military and the states on its periphery. He 

vii
defense, issued by the State Council, concluding 

Beijing has strong interest “in the security aspects 

relations with neighboring countries.” Reinforcin

“geographic ruminations” of Michael McDevitt in Ch

1, McVadon also notes that China's 1998 National De

White Paper reminds the reader that China is a co

with enduring interests and a central position i

Asia-Pacific. McVadon raises another issue that will e

the other chapters of this book—the centrality of eco

factors, including oil, for China's future developmen

military power. He reminds us that for Beijing, econom

the “most important component of China's comprehe

national power.”

Michael Pillsbury, in Chapter 3, critiques methodo

to make assessments of the PLA and provides a fram

for a more objective “net assessment” of China's mi

forces. He also makes a major contribution t

understanding of how the PLA evaluates itself wi

extensive review of internal writings on security 

defense from the Chinese armed forces. Following up 

earlier work in other books, Pillsbury makes accessi

those who cannot read Chinese critical military-str

writings from institutes of higher learning in the 

Pillsbury's earlier works are seminal contributions 

understanding of how the PLA evaluates itself and t

about its future, again particularly for those who do no

Chinese. In this chapter, he synthesizes that wor

cautions the reader that a number of analysts of Ch

military capabilities inside and outside of government

variety of reasons, make the dangerous mista

systematically minimizing the war-fighting abilitie

the military-production capabilities of China. Pill

warns us of the danger of such an approach, pointin

that many Chinese military thinkers see strengths 

same characteristics that Western analysts character

weaknesses. Therefore, Pillsbury concludes, u

viii
may be a fatal mistake for the United States.

 Bernard Cole and Paul Godwin, in Chapter 4, a

unique methodology to an assessment of the 

advanced technology acquisition and develop

priorities for the future. Cole and Godwin first asse

national military strategy of China, and then they 

that assessment to a broader overview of the abil

China's high-technology and defense-industrial comp

develop and produce what the PLA needs. The yar

used by these two authors to determine what is critic

future high-technology-based warfare is the Mil

Critical Technologies List developed by the 

Department of Defense in concert with other agencie

departments of the U.S. Government. Cole and G

conclude that the shock of the allied (particularly the 

defeat of Iraqi forces in Operation DESERT STORM sh

the PLA just how far it had fallen behind when com

with the capabilities of the world's advanced indu

powers. The ambitions of the PLA in technology acqui

according to Cole and Godwin, are outlined clearly

these ambitions clearly parallel the military doc

thinking discussed by Michael Pillsbury in Chap

However, Cole and Godwin do not anticipate any 

across-the-board “great leap forward” in Ch

military-technical revolution. Instead, they expect B

to stumble through what might be an “erratic expans

the capabilities of China's military-industrial comple

Chapter 5, by Larry Wortzel, focuses on mil

to-military relations between the United States and C

Like Michael McDevitt, Wortzel first focuses on geog

and the relationship between geography and str

concluding that Beijing sees itself as the central pow

Asia, which must be considered in any geo-politica

military equation. But Larry Wortzel is not sanguine 

the future U.S.-China military relations. He pr

competition, tension, and conflict, and this predictio

made well before the accidental bombing of the Ch

ix
President Lee Teng-hui about “state-to-state” rela

between China and Taiwan. Wortzel believes that th

is working very hard to prepare itself to “fight ag

American tactics and equipment, whether employ

Taiwan, any other nation, or the United States.” Tha

according to Wortzel, China's preparations d

necessarily mean that there must be a war. He 

examines shared interests between the United State

China, such as participation in the United Nation

other international organizations, trade, and a desi

regional stability and economic growth. Mistrust be

the two countries contributes to this climate of tensio

strategic competition, and only some form of cont

contact can alleviate mistrust. But in Wortzel's view

military-to-military contact should not do anythi

improve China's ability to project force against its neig

or Taiwan, especially since China will not renounce t

of force to reunite a democratic Taiwan with the mainl

This is a book about China's armed forces, not on

military forces of the PRC. Chapters 6 and 7, ther

focus on military and national security reform in Taiw

Chapter 6, Arthur Shu-fan Ding and Alexa

Chieh-cheng Huang provide an in-depth analysis 

transformation that is taking place in Taiwan's a

forces. First, the Taiwan military has abandone

Bolshevik-inspired ideology, converting itself from an 

loyal to a single political party into the defender 

democratic state with a popularly elected govern

Second, there is a serious structural reform taking pl

the military, with a view to creating a more effective 

armed force. Meanwhile, constitutional refo

converting civil-military relations in Taiwan. T

pressures challenge Taiwan's military moderniz

plans. Thus, as Ding and Huang tell us, the futu

Taiwan's civilian-controlled military rests “less o

acquisition of new hardware and more on such ‘sof

issues as strategies, missions, doctrine, education

x
the transformation of Taiwan's military in Chapter 7

notes that challenges stemming from a combinat

procurement scandals, recruiting shortfalls, a

vulnerability to missile attack have created se

problems for the Taiwan armed forces. The major chal

however, according to Dreyer, is the ability to coun

pressures from Beijing, especially pressure on the U

States to cut off arms sales to Taiwan under the ausp

the Taiwan Relations Act. 

In the concluding comments of the book, Ellis Jo

Chapter 8, discusses party-army relations in the PR

Joffe's view, the PLA is a pivotal player in Ch

leadership politics because of the internal role i

military of Jiang Zemin. By encouraging mi

professionalism and getting the military out of bu

activities, Jiang distanced military chiefs from the po

arena. His posts as general secretary of the Comm

Party, chairman of its Central Military Commission

President give him power and keep him in the publ

The result is a mutually beneficial arrangement be

military and civilian leaders that probably can on

changed by military intervention in politics, accord

Joffe.

 In the 1997 book from that year's conference, Cr

the Taiwan Strait, I said that the events of March 

when the United States sent two aircraft carrier 

groups to the region, might repeat themselves. In 199

events almost did exactly that. In this volume, the au

have taken a serious look at the future. They have wri

book designed to wrestle with questions of what s

military force might be fielded by Taiwan and Chin

what security policy and structures these two armed 

might operate under. There is no “group think” inv

here. The reader should know that there was se

spirited debate about these chapters when they 

drafted, and the authors continue to debate the 

today. Indeed, the goal of the publishers is to stim

xi
further explore Chinese grand strategy, security str

military strategy, and operational concepts for the n

years, and this book is offered as a means to do so.

xii
GEOGRAPHIC RUMINATIONS

Michael McDevitt

Because it is so well understood among China ex

and East Asian strategists, discussions regarding C

and the future of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) 

21st century often neglect the most predictable feat

Asia's security landscape. I am referring, of cour

geography.

In Roosevelt Hall, home of the National War Coll

Washington, DC, an enormous map of the world ha

the main stairwell. Below this map is a plaque w

cautionary reminder for potential strategists. It 

“Everything changes but geography.” Applying that w

to Asia, it is important to visualize and then reflect 

Asia's distinctive geography. For me, the three 

striking features of that geography are (1) the 

distances involved, (2) the number of significant state

are totally, or very nearly, surrounded by water (J

Taiwan, the Philippine Islands, Indonesia, Singa

Malaysia—connected to the continent only by the sl

Isthmus of Kra—Australia, Papua New Guinea, and 

Zealand), and (3) the geographic centrality and ph

enormity of China. These three features, really geogr

facts, interrelate in ways that both facilitate and lim

strategic choices, in fact, the strategic circumstances, 

China. 

What are those circumstances? Starting with th

point made, the centrality and enormity of China, 

briefly comment on China's strategic geography. 

discussion is based primarily on capabilities and is 

way intended to suggest China's intentions. The purp

to illuminate an often overlooked feature of sec

planning and dialogue and to add a geographic cont

1
mainland allows it to command internal lin

communication throughout the continent. This centra

plus the military protection afforded by the Himalaya

the deserts of western China, the improving mili

useful infrastructure (roads, airports, communica

media), a large modernizing army, the demonstrated a

to absorb punishment and keep on fighting in the gue

or People's War tradition, an enormous population, 

strong sense of national identity, leads one to the conc

that China is the dominant military power o

continent of Asia.

When one considers the nations with which C

shares a common land frontier and mentally calculat

“comprehensive national power” of North Korea, Vie

Laos, Burma, Bhutan, Nepal, India, Pakistan, Tajik

Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, and Russia, it is 

that China need not worry unduly about the thr

invasion from a neighboring state. Today there a

serious continental military threats—save for nu

weapons which China deters with her own nu

weapons—to China's continental predominance. 

secure against invasion is only part of the contin

dominance equation. Being able to intimidate contin

neighbors with the capability to invade is the other s

the dominance coin.

This capability exists, but with some important ca

Although Vietnam gave China a bloody nose in 197

operational capabilities of the People's Army of Vie

(PAVN) and PLA have gone in opposite directions sinc

time. The PAVN is a shadow of its former self while th

has continued to gradually improve. If China cho

invade Vietnam and to pay a heavy price, Vietnam 

lose. It is hard to imagine how India and China coul

enough suitable terrain to get at one another in a mili

decisive way. They can punish but not conquer one ano

2
and Russia. But if we consider just the Russian Far 

the balance tips decisively in favor of China. The Ch

could seize much of the Russian Far East and hold i

very long time. The threat of nuclear war obviously m

this a fanciful proposition in terms of intentions—bu

capability is there. An important exception to being a

intimidate militarily its continental neighbors migh

united Korea. It is possible to imagine a united Repu

Korea (ROK) Army dug in along the Yalu and Tumen

the United States alongside, holding off a Chinese at

With this possible exception, this brief analysis ap

to confirm the truth of the observation that China 

dominant power on the continent of Asia. While this 

is real, it is also limited by the other realities 

geography of Asia. The vastness of the East Asian regi

major limiter, as is the fact that many of the most impo

countries of Asia, in terms of wealth, resources, techn

and military capability, do not abut China. They are 

rimland of the Asian continent or are island 

archipelagic states. They are beyond the direct gra

China's single most important military capability: its 

army.

Geography limits the ability of China to be mili

preeminent in all of Asia because the PLA is wo

unbalanced in terms of military capability. Its abi

project militarily decisive force beyond China's imm

neighbors is almost non-existent. The sort of mi

capability required to accomplish a projection mi

principally naval and air forces, is in most cases 

rudimentary, obsolete, small, or nonexistent. Forc

control the sea and airspace around and o

non-contiguous objective, to lift large numbers of troo

sea or air, to conduct surveillance around “maritime 

and to conduct sustained long-range bombardment fro

air are not in the PLA inventory. (The PLA's conven

ballistic missile force is an obvious strength and exce

to this litany.)

3
Chinese, reasons why the PLA developed as it has

threat, Japanese or Nationalist, was in China; man

was abundant, but technology and modern equipmen

not; the very nature of a revolution means that the de

military action takes place on the ground; and the fac

in Chinese military history, at least until the 19th and 

centuries, threats have come from the north.

Military historians and geo-strategists can also d

some more universal factors at work when they com

China and traditional European “continental” po

Certainly Germany, Russia, and, for much of its m

military history, France have also neglected maritim

force-projection capabilities and lavished resource

prestige on ground forces. Like China, these histor

army-dominated military cultures developed because 

geographic circumstances of the respective nations

unlike China, none of them had the luxury of mil

dominating their continent except for fleeting periods 

Napoleon, Hitler, and Stalin.

Throughout modern history the successful domina

Europe by a single power has been seen as very destab

and worth fighting unlimited wars to prevent, while C

implicit domination of Asia today is greeted with 

equanimity—certainly in the United States. (The 

geographically to China, the less equanimous, partic

if a territorial dispute is involved.) The fact that China 

dominant military power on the Asian continent 

considered destabilizing and has not triggered an 

race. Continental neighbors, following the wither

Communist solidarity, have not sought collective se

regimes to balance China's dominance, although on

make the case that Vietnam's eagerness to joi

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) w

much driven by strategic interests as by eco

considerations. Vietnam is an exception to the rule pre

because China has been militarily assertive 

competing claims in the Tonkin Gulf and South China 

4
dominance is because so many of Asia's most impo

nations lie beyond China's military reach on the contin

rimland or are separated from the continent by expan

open ocean. Because of geography and the U.S. mi

presence, Asia is considered stable today, despite th

real concerns over conflict in Korea or between Chin

Taiwan. Beyond these two pieces of unfinished Cold 

business, one other action could destabilize Asia. 

would be an attempt by China to grow from a continen

a region-wide “suzerain.” 

Geography and China's economic developmen

present China with a strategic dilemma. Should i

advantage of its continental dominance and the absen

serious neighboring threat to reallocate defense reso

in a fundamental way toward redressing the proj

shortfalls it has? Or, does it accept the fact that impo

countries of Asia will remain beyond its ability to infl

through military intimidation? Certainly, were Ch

make a choice to become truly serious about develop

region-wide projection capability, those countries cur

beyond China's reach would attempt to restabiliz

situation through the development of counter-proj

military capabilities, e.g., submarines, surveillanc

defense, and local air superiority, or through alliance 

the United States, or both.

 We see hedging by rimland and maritime Asian n

in this direction today. But realistically, it is import

appreciate that it would take decades for China to de

such a capability. Security analysts must be a

differentiate between token Chinese military capab

intended for prestige and showing-the-flag, for exam

single medium-size aircraft carrier, which has no 

strategic weight, and an attempt to create a truly dom

projection force. The most immediate example that com

mind of the latter would be Wilhelmine Germany's at

to outbuild the British Royal Navy. China has appa

decided not to take this destabilizing road. Hopefully 

5
predominance, but also presumably because i

appreciate that, with the proper mix of U.S. forces 

region, rimland and maritime Asia will always hav

ability to “trump” Chinese projection attempts.

6
THE CHINESE MILITARY

AND THE PERIPHERAL STATES1

IN THE 21st CENTURY:

A SECURITY TOUR D’HORIZON

Eric A. McVadon

Mankind is about to enter the 21st century . . . . At the turn 

the century, an important historical period, China is devot

itself to its modernization drive. China needs and cherish

dearly an environment of long-term international pea

especially a favorable peripheral environmen

[Emphasis added.]

Thus begins the White Paper on China’s Na

Defense, issued by the State Council in July 199

contrast, the November 1995 Chinese White Paper inc

these words sprinkled through its foreword:

China needs a peaceful environment in order to be able 

devote itself completely to its socialist modernizat

program. It resolutely . . . seeks to actively develop go

relations with neighboring nations . . . China does not se

world or regional hegemony.3

What conclusions might we draw from this conspi

emphasis given to the peripheral environment in the 

recent White Paper? Care should be exercised, of cou

assigning great import to the difference in wording be

1995 and 1998, especially as the 1995 paper was prim

focused on arms control matters. However, it mig

safely noted that the drafters and senior approvers 

July 1998 White Paper, cognizant of the wording 

earlier seminal paper, included prominent reference 

peripheral environment in the fourth sentence o

English version of the document. Beijing’s interest 

security aspects of its relations with neighboring cou

7
this and other official documents and statements an

from China’s actions, as this chapter will examine.

The 1998 White Paper on China’s National De

contains many direct and indirect references to C

regional security policy. The document is a propit

opened window through which we may scrutinize Be

view of prospects for security relations with perip

states in the 21st century—or at the very least the view 

Beijing wishes us to see. It includes the following 

official statement of Beijing’s regional security policy

As a country in the Asia-Pacific region, China places gr

importance on the region's security, stability, peace a

development. China's Asia-Pacific security strategy has th

objectives, i.e., China's own stability and prosperity, peace 

stability in its surrounding regions, and conducting dialo

and cooperation with all countries in the Asia-Pacific regio

The statement above begins with what might s

gratuitous “geography lesson,” as if it were necessa

remind others that China is a country in the Asia-P

region. The drafters may, appropriately in their view

directed those words toward the American audienc

audience that Beijing believes often forgets that Chin

more enduring and profound interests in Asia than do

United States. Of course, that opening phrase is a

reminder to its neighbors that China is a major 

arguably the major) country of the region—and that 

always be such. The implied message for China’s neig

is that the United States (and almost all others) do

have anything approaching that status, and 

Americans, despite their current interests and m

presence, should not be looked to and trusted over th

term for support. There is the further suggestion that 

matters should properly be handled by Asian natio

nations that understand “Asian values” and Asian me

This statement starts, therefore, with the point that 

8
security.

Although the English syntax in the translat

labored, this meaning is made clear in other words fro

same chapter:

The countries in the Asia-Pacific region rely more and more 

each other economically, and, to solve their disputes 

peaceful means, to stress the search for the meeting points 

their common interests and to strengthen cooperation a

coordination are becoming the main current of the relatio

among the countries of the region.

5

The 1998 White Paper emphasizes Chinese advoc

regional security dialogue and cooperation at various 

and in different ways, implying that the methods 

advocates are superior to those employed by o

especially outsiders to Asia. As might be expected, ph

like “participation on an equal footing,” “rea

unanimity through consultation,” and “seeking com

ground while reserving differences” are included. C

active participation in official and “Track II” foru

touted. Beijing uses the White Paper to argue forcefu

not persuasively to all, that China is a responsibl

reasonable force in regional security.

6

 In app

recognition that many will doubt or question this asse

there is the unspoken suggestion that those who prev

saw China in another light should alter their opinion

Pre-eminence of Economic Concerns.

It is noteworthy, but certainly not surprising

economic factors are featured very prominently in 

thoroughly internally coordinated 1998 state

concerning security relationships with regional coun

Although the 1995 White Paper’s words on regional se

were very near the end of that long document, ther

only slightly less prominence given to regional eco

matters.7 Economic considerations with respect to re

9
(1) the relative national priorities assigned t

development of national economic power and t

development of military power and (2) economic se

and economic interdependence as key factors in se

relations with neighboring countries.

With respect to the first category, both White P

and particularly the more recent document, c

demonstrate Beijing’s view of the relative impor

assigned to economic development compared to de

modernization. First, there is the obvious fact that 

over recent decades has achieved far greater success 

national economic development than in its mi

modernization. One of the reasons for this is that 

Chinese policy pronouncements and practical emp

have been directed to the pre-eminence of national eco

development. The foreword of the 1998 White 

essentially repeats the wording of the 1995 docume

stating:

China unswervingly . . . keeps national defense construction 

position subordinate to and in the service of the nati

economic construction. . . .

Whether or not such statements are accepted by o

observers, they appear in the 1998 White Paper altog

too many times to ignore. One may argue, for example

economic success is the most important factor in fu

modernization of the People's Liberation Army (PLA

the other hand, it is obvious that the PLA does not g

that it wants and that economic (budget) consideratio

a major factor in procurement decisions. A well-conn

and well-informed PLAN officer has stated bluntly, “If 

were enough money, the PLAN would have a carrier no

Although some may quibble about the pra

application of this oft-stated priority of econ

development over building the military, it is clear tha

category of economic consideration is a primary fac

10
both by direct budget limitations and by its inabil

acquire and assimilate technology rapidly—in signi

part a function of inadequate funding for researc

development. Consequently, Beijing necessarily vie

rise to the status of a regional (and prospective g

power more in terms of economic development than mi

capabilities. An excerpt from Chapter I of the 1998 

Paper supports the point, albeit in a slightly ob

Chinese way (by referring to others when meaning it

The political security situation in the Asia-Pacific region 

relatively stable. The development of the trend towa

multipolarity in this region is being quickened. . . . Despite t

emergence of a financial crisis in Asia, the Asia-Pacific reg

remains one of the areas with the greatest econom

development vitality in the world, and developing the econo

is the most important task for each country.9

Although the partially modernized PLA is w

question a formidable regional military force, it is 

modern, as large, or as threatening as it might have 

had Beijing given high priority to developing a 

powerful force. The regional security situation would 

been markedly different if China had devoted g

attention and resources to the PLA and if the PLA had 

able to absorb the systems and technologies it might 

received (a very big “if”).

The second category of economic consider

encompasses both economic security and econ

interdependence. When Beijing views its regional se

relations, it sees them more and more through an eco

lens. China, in an increasingly sophisticated way th

been further intensified by the Asian economic crisis, 

beyond the stark outlines of military confrontation

threats when it contemplates its neighbors, as illustra

this excerpt, also from the first chapter in the White 

entitled “The International Security Situation.”

11
security. In international relations, geopolitical, milit

security and ideological factors still play a role that canno

ignored, but the role of economic factors is becoming m

outstanding, along with growing economic contacts am

nations. The competition to excel in overall national stren

focused on economy and science and technology, is being furt

intensified; globewide struggles centered on markets, natu

resources and other economic rights and interests are d

becoming sharper; and the quickening of economic globaliza

and intensification of the formation of regional blocs render 

economic development of a country more vulnerable to outs

influences and impacts. Therefore, more and more count

regard economic security as an important aspect of st

security. The financial crisis in Asia has made the issu

economic security more prominent, and has set a new task 

governments of all countries to strengthen coordination 

face challenges together in the course of econo

globalization.

10

In other words, China’s regional security relation

cannot be framed in traditional military security t

Economic considerations, even if not seen as rep

military means, are given priority over mil

development considerations. Moreover, economic f

are seen as more important than conventional t

analysis and force comparisons or balances. Eco

security has top priority, and economic interdepende

seen as a primary tool in managing regional security. T

not because China has become benevolent or ignore

utility of military forces in the region, although those 

have been assigned a clearly subordinate, albei

significant, status. It means at least that the PLA can

all that China might wish of it, and that other me

economic and political—must be relied upon, at least 

short term. This further suggests that these may be se

Beijing as the preferable means for the long term as 

China cannot compete with Japan or even a wea

Russia, for example, and excel in a specifically m

sense, especially with U.S. forces present in the regio

it can lean much more heavily on the economic aspe

12
ties and work to minimize economic tensions wi

neighbors, all the while pursuing modernization of th

at a pace that places minimal drag on the national eco

and is not unduly upsetting to other nations.

Over the longer term, China could eventually bec

much more formidable military power, espe

regionally. There could be temptation to re-emph

military means in regional security relations. Furthe

hardly certain that the leadership in Beijing will reco

fully the implications and opportunities of China 

economic giant—and the implications of squandering 

opportunities and potential in a military adventure. D

appearances, it may not be understood or appreciated 

in Beijing that greater economic clout concomit

implies that economic security is the overwhelm

important consideration in China’s strategic relation

peripheral states and the world at large. Beijing's rh

still emphasizes force; so it is not a foregone conclusio

Beijing will continue indefinitely down its present p

Beijing were to continue into the next century t

primarily on economic considerations, it would be beca

a fuller appreciation by the Chinese leadership that C

true national power lies primarily in its national eco

development and regional economic relations rather th

its military modernization and defense “construc

Already Beijing seems to have accepted that the pench

resort to hostilities is effectively deterred when re

countries appreciate that the increasingly impo

economic ties with neighboring countries would be sev

jeopardized or even severed were military forces 

employed.

For now and for the future, the manner in which B

incorporates this sort of thinking into its strategic ca

will reveal the degree to which Chinese leaders 

recognize that China’s interests are better serv

avoiding or resolving conflicts through economic powe

political maneuver rather than employment of mi

13
seeking to gain what it sees as an appropriate m

economic, political, and military power. Of inter

whether the relative priorities assigned these three ki

power will remain as they appear now, with eco

considerations having the greatest importance. This 

offer a welcome measure of assurance that Beijing m

what it says about a strong preference for relations bas

peaceful cooperation and friendship and that, as seem

the case, Chinese strategic thinking is profoundly 

permanently influenced in a favorable direction b

economic considerations described.

Taiwan, of course, is a somewhat different matter

possibly less so than it might appear at first glance. Th

no question that Beijing gives full emphasis to its abi

cope with the military forces of Taiwan and to 

discourage, and intimidate the government and pop

However, even in this seemingly irreconcilable situ

the enormous economic factors at play in cross-

relations raise at least the faint hope that as economic 

continue to gain importance, more traditional mi

considerations will tend to wane even with respe

Taiwan.

New Affection for Multilateral Contacts, Even

Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs); Abhorr

of Alliances.

Chinese attitudes are changing in other areas. Be

favorable view of global multipolarity, as opposed 

bipolar or unipolar world, is neither new nor surprisin

1998 White Paper states:

The sustained development of the multipolarity tendency 

economic globalization has further deepened their [develop

countries’] mutual reliance and mutual condition and hel

toward world peace, stability and prosperity.

11

14
multipolarity tendency” has been accompanied 

surprising abrogation of the traditional Chinese abhor

of multilateral means to handle problems. Beijing had

recently, fostered a reputation for pursuing bila

undertakings to the virtual exclusion of multilateral e

feeling, according to most analysts, that China coul

utilize its size and weight to achieve its goals th

one-on-one methods. Further, CBMs and transpa

were seen by Beijing as means devised by outsiders to 

China’s secrets and to reveal the PLA’s backwardnes

shortcomings. Recently, changes in these attitudes 

been seen. Later in the first chapter of the 1998 White 

are these somewhat unexpected words:

Various forms of regional and sub-regional multilate

cooperation are constantly being developed, and secur

dialogues and cooperation are being carried out at many lev

and through many channels.12

Chinese officials, including many influential 

officers, have reached at least tentative conclusion

China’s interests are in some cases served b

implementation of CBMs and that there is merit to ga

trust from neighboring capitals through a signi

degree of transparency in military affairs. The W

Paper goes so far as to describe CBMs with neighb

countries as “a new kind of security concept vigo

advocated by China . . . [emphasis added].” 13

Many are not yet ready to accept these Ch

assertions at face value. The issue of CBMs is illustr

The paper asserts that the agreements that Chin

reached with neighboring countries on CBMs “embody 

principles and spirit of universal significanc

Asian-Pacific security dialogues and cooperati

Considerable attention is given in the White Pap

China’s co-sponsorship with the Philippines o

Conference on Confidence-Building Measures he

Beijing in 1996. It is noted that during the confe

15
observe exercises. However, according to personal re

that came to the attention of the author, many partic

of the conference thought they were shown very little o

interest during the visits.

It is further asserted in the White Paper that Chin

offered “constructive suggestions” in support o

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Re

Forum (ARF) exploration of confidence-building mea

However, the areas of potential CBMs listed (e.g., “m

medicine,” the “science of military law,” high-level 

and port calls) fall well short of the type of substa

CBMs that others envision.

15

 This seems to leave op

question of whether China is serious about proceeding 

worthwhile CBMs or whether its actions actuall

stalling tactics to put off indefinitely considerat

meaningful measures. At least it can be said tha

expression “CBMs” no longer causes PLA senior office

Chinese officials automatically to recoil.

There is yet something else important at work h

major component of China’s attitude toward reg

security is intensified opposition to military allia

primarily the U.S. alliance structure, which it se

pointed at China. Beijing in the White Paper allud

these bilateral alliances, without directly mentionin

the United States is a party, as pacts that c

confrontations, and Beijing also condemns arrange

“infringing upon the security interests of any 

nation.”

16

 There is the further suggestion that in pl

such arrangements, there should be a new form of m

understanding and trust. The White Paper describe

follows:

Hence China devotes its efforts to promoting equal treatm

and friendly cooperation with other countries, and attac

importance to developing healthy and stable relations with 

countries and all major forces in the region; actively participa

in regional economic cooperation and promotes an open typ

regionalism; insists on handling and settling disputes am

16
the dialogue and cooperation process aimed at region

security.

17

Further, Beijing recalls that China has sought to r

by nonmilitary means many of the enduring dispute

have plagued it. Although many may justifiably 

Beijing’s somewhat pompous proclamations with a me

of cynicism, the following are the words of the White 

in this regard:

On the basis of equal consultation, mutual understanding a

mutual accommodation, China has solved in an appropri

manner border issues with most of its neighbors. As 

remaining disputes on territorial and marine rights a

interests between China and neighboring countries, Ch

maintains that they are to be solved through consultation 

putting the interests of the whole above everything else, 

that the disputes will not hamper the normal developmen

state relations or the stability of the region. China has clea

stated that relevant disputes should be properly solv

through peaceful negotiation and consultation, in accordan

with commonly accepted international laws and mode

maritime laws, including the basic principles and le

systems as prescribed in the United Nations Convention 

the Law of the Sea.

18

Whether or not Beijing’s assertions and commit

concerning the proper manner for resolution of re

disputes are accepted as presented here, the use o

language affords others an opportunity to test Ch

resolve to use peaceful means and international la

opposed to military means, especially as regard

disputed claims in the South China Sea. More broadl

tendency of Chinese leaders to conform to interna

norms and to comply with international law offers a 

different prospect for China’s relations with perip

states compared to the relations with those states only 

years ago.

17
The White Paper asserts near the beginning 

chapter on International Security Cooperation:

China has placed the development of military contacts w

adjacent countries in a prominent position..., especi

contacts on the senior level. In 1996 and 1997 alone, China s

more than 100 military delegations to most of its adjac

countries, and hosted over 130 military delegations from s

countries.19

Beijing considers these contacts, which it terms m

diplomacy, as an important component of China’s o

diplomacy. It is noteworthy that, in addition to the h

publicized visits by PLAN combatant ships to Nort

South America in the spring of 1997, similar PLAN 

were made at the same time to the Philippines, Mal

and Thailand. Beijing asserts that its military contacts 

fostered “mutual understanding and trust between th

and other armed forces” and have contributed to ke

regional peace.

20

Summarizing Beijing’s Proclamations on Regio

Security.

Beijing’s stated overall approach to regional se

relations as the new century begins might be summa

as follows:

• Increased attention to its peripheral environ

primarily because China needs regional stabi

continue national economic development.

• More effective, but gentler, assertion of China’s r

a pre-eminent power in the Asia-Pacific region a

the appropriate permanent pillar of regional stab

• Pursuit of the conviction that China’s national 

is primarily a function of economic develop

rather than military capabilities.

18
eacceptace o, eea buddg peee

use of multilateral means and international l

settle disputes—but a hardening of opposit

alliances.

This is the picture painted by Beijing’s own 

strokes, some meant to be seen by the world as new 

others as a consequence of China’s style. It is a pict

variance with Beijing’s traditional bullying and blus

behavior toward its neighbors, and it is very differen

what many might anticipate as China’s approach to se

relations with the peripheral states in the coming ye

is, of course, not possible to forecast with confidenc

Beijing will proceed. Nevertheless, it is possible to 

this purported approach to an examination of C

relations with its various neighboring states, tes

Beijing is now proceeding by looking at current event

thereby speculate in a more informed way about wh

next century will bring with respect to the Chinese m

and the peripheral states.

A cautionary note is in order at this juncture, how

Neither the 1998 White Paper nor other Ch

statements and actions, official or otherwise, sugges

the “Taiwan problem” can be pursued along the 

suggested above for handling regional sec

relationships and resolving disputes with neighb

countries. Taiwan is painted as an internal, not a reg

issue. Similarly, Beijing would not consider that matt

contention concerning Tibet, Xinjiang, or Inner Mo

would fall within the rubric of disputes “between Chin

neighboring countries.” Beijing sees all these as in

matters, about which its attitudes have changed not 

and for which significant change is not now foreseen

The View into “West Turkestan.”

When thinking of China’s peripheral states, Weste

often tend to think last about the countries of the f

Soviet Union that lie to the northwest of China, the 

19
restive Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region.

21

 Thi

across China’s far northwestern border, compos

Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, is certain

overlooked by Beijing. Historically, it was known as 

Turkestan. The adjacent area within China that i

Xinjiang (meaning “New Territories”) was formerly k

as East Turkestan and is populated largely b

Turkic-speaking Uighur Muslim minority. The Uighu

far from content with their economic and political s

and receive sympathetic support from fellow Uighurs 

Central Asian Republics, especially Kazakhstan. The

small, but active, cross-border Islamic indepen

movement. Border disputes between China and the C

Asian states, carried over from the Soviet period, have 

an additional complicating factor.

Xinjiang has been and remains a hotbed of anti-B

unrest, especially in recent years. This Muslim diss

fueled by exacerbating factors such as the conspi

transition to independence of the Turkic Central 

nations, the rise in the region of Islamic fundamental

and unhappiness with Beijing’s domestic policies fo

“autonomous” region—one of five such regions in Chi

addition to the very large and aggravating influx of 

Chinese,

23

 for which Beijing is sharply criticized, U

feel that other Chinese policies or failures to act are ke

them in poverty. The Hans are perceived as reaping m

the benefits of exploitation of Xinjiang’s conside

natural resources and profiting from the growing eco

links with the neighboring countries. Beijing’s po

eradication measures are viewed with disdain 

considered a meager, token effort. Not surprisingly, so

the same complaints about Beijing's policies are heard 

Tibet.

Bombings, rioting, and assassinations by separ

have been met by Beijing with police raids, very large

arrests, and numerous executions of Uighurs—all 

attempt to curb terrorist actions and crush 

20
incidents and killings were provocatively timed to co

with the funeral in February 1997 of former param

leader Deng Xiaoping and the visit to China in Jun

July 1998 by U.S. President William J. Clinton. Repo

the frequent killing by separatists of police in cities ne

borders continue, with eight such deaths alleged in A

1998.

24

 Harsh action in Xinjiang by Beijing may 

included use of armored PLA units in addition t

People’s Armed Police (PAP). Stringent security mea

have been instituted to prevent further unrest and 

even spread to western Beijing where thousands of Ui

live. Although the number of actual separatists in Xin

appears to be relatively small, resentment amon

minority population is widespread. The Uighur popu

as a whole bridles under the restrictions and op

Beijing’s actions. The many highly resented Han Chin

Xinjiang remain fearful for their personal safety.

Neighboring countries' support for the disside

significant. Kazakh activists have accused Beiji

persistent human rights violations in Xinjiang a

repressing their fellow Uighurs. A pro-separ

organization in Kazakhstan

25 named the United Na

Revolutionary Front calls for the removal of Han Ch

from Xinjiang and the establishment of an indepe

Islamic Republic of East Turkestan. Beijing feels that 

support, sanctuary, and arms have been provid

sympathizers in the bordering Central Asian coun

Separatists supported in this way are seen by Ch

leaders as menacingly, and increasingly, well-arme

financed.

Despite its heavy-handed security and military a

within Xinjiang, China has met the threat from Kazak

and its Central Asian neighbors with a diplomati

economic offensive. In April 1996 in Shanghai, Pres

Jiang Zemin signed an agreement with Ru

Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan on securit

confidence-building measures on their borders

21
border tensions although no clashes had occurred in 

years, but it also serves to make clear to Washingto

nature and range of Beijing’s options and influence

three Central Asian states signed the agreement d

protests by the Uighur minorities in their countries. 

opponents argue that China is trying to oblitera

neutralize Uighurs in Xinjiang. The specific provisi

the treaty require the parties to inform each other 

military exercises within 100 kilometers of the border

military exercises directed toward another party, and 

that military forces of the five states will not attac

another.26 The treaty, it should be noted, also ser

establish solid links between Beijing and the Central 

capitals for cooperation in quelling cross-border U

dissent. 

A year after that agreement, in April 1997, foll

serious unrest in Xinjiang in February 1997, the pres

of these five countries concluded another treaty, th

signed in Moscow. It provides for troop reductio

China’s borders with these countries of the former S

Union. In an especially noteworthy step to

transparency and confidence-building, the pact limits 

within 100 kilometers of the borders and provid

mutual inspection. The agreement was also poin

described as a lasting model for regional sec

arrangements, pointing up China’s verbal cam

against alliances. Former Foreign Minister Qian said

We have tried alliance, and we have tried confrontation. B

did not work, and now we must find something else. 

relations are not confrontational, but they are not an allianc

well.

27

Several months later, as unrest in Xinjiang simm

China and Kazakhstan signed a $9.5 billion oil and pi

deal.

28

 The arrangement was evaluated by We

specialists as economically infeasible.

29

 Beijing, how

was undeterred by this projection. China’s purpose 

22
economic offensive also had as its target fostering K

cooperation in curbing Uighur separatist efforts and 

Muslim dissent.

More recently in July 1998, the “group of five,” a

gathering of the five countries was called informally, m

Almaty (still the commercial center of Kazakhstan, wi

new capital being Astana) and agreed to collabora

fighting organized crime and political separatism. O

margins of that meeting, Chinese President Jian

Kazakh President Nazarbayev signed an agree

settling border disputes, described as the final doc

concerning borders between the two countries

resolution reportedly slightly favored the smaller cou

with Kazakhstan gaining undisputed possession 

percent of the disputed areas. Of greater consequenc

agreement between Jiang and Nazarbayev to deve

15-year economic program, including a prop

automobile plant in Kazakhstan, electrical transm

arrangements, Chinese investment in the country

construction work by China in the new capital.

30

 A

significance was further confirmation by the two lead

the September 1997 oil production and transport 

although Western executives continued to express d

about the viability of the proposal.

31

These diplomatic and economic undertakings by B

suggest that in this pesky situation China is far more 

to employ military force within its borders than wi

This seems to be the case although the small cou

involved would not likely be able to repel a PLA 

dispatched to “assist” in crushing the Uighur movem

Kazakhstan, for example. Certainly, there are many 

reasons for Beijing to refrain from the use of force in 

situations with a neighbor. However, its readine

employ force in 1962 against India, in 1979 in Vietnam

on other occasions against Vietnam in the South Chin

cannot be ignored in contemplating which options Beij

prone to select. It appears there was not even the t

23
which spanned a number of years, which were desig

undermine Chinese sovereignty in Xinjiang, and 

included efforts to embarrass Beijing on the world sc

Instead, Beijing has cast its lot in the direct

cooperative arrangements with these comparatively 

neighbors. In its effort to cement bonds with the C

Asian states, Beijing took full advantage of the goo

engendered by settling border disputes and then went 

as to hold out the promise of sweeping economic 

Consequently, it seems the most likely role at the begi

of the next century for the PLA in this troublesome r

for China will be to safeguard pipeline construction as 

as to back up the PAP and the Public Security Bureau 

in their activities within Xinjiang.

Looking Northward to Russia: Strategic Partne

Potential Threat?

In April 1996, erstwhile antagonists China and R

unveiled what they termed a strategic partnership f

future. On that occasion in Shanghai, President Jiang 

“China is not posing, and will not pose in the futur

threat to Russia.” President Boris Yeltsin, with custo

unbridled enthusiasm, said, “I view the Sino-Ru

partnership . . . as a model for relations betwee

countries. . . . I can't name a single question on whi

would have different opinions.”

32

 Near the end of 1997

Moscow and Beijing reportedly described the Sino-Ru

relationship more fully as “constructive cooperation a

at strategic partnership in the twenty-first century.”

3

the more than 2 years since the term “strategic partne

was introduced, various versions of the description 

been employed. It has been called a “strategic coope

partnership” and a “strategic coordination partner

the latter expression thought by some to be favored b

Chinese. An April 1997 Sino-Russian joint statemen

might be seen as a definitive definition of the concep

24
trust,” omitting the much-discussed adjectives.

34

Regardless of the precise wording of the descript

the bilateral arrangement, its mere existence and 

pertinent factors reveal at the very least a desire in B

and Moscow to demonstrate to Washington and o

considerable confidence that the bilateral relationship 

a firm footing for the future. First and foremost, there 

repeated attention to extolling the virtues o

purportedly new form of relationship. Other rel

factors are that Presidents Jiang and Yeltsin (despi

Russian’s bad health) have conducted six summit me

in recent years and that there have been numerous bil

and multilateral security undertakings and bila

economic undertakings. This apparent mutual confi

in a stable, positive relationship is not something 

taken for granted. Recent history (certainly on the Ch

time scale) has witnessed abrupt swings in rela

between Moscow and Beijing.

Obvious to all was the very close Sino-Soviet coope

in the 1950s, which gave way to animosity and distr

the early 1960s, with good relations resumed in the 1

Less obvious is that at the end of the 1980s, 

then-President Mikhail Gorbachev visited a China o

brink of the Tiananmen Square debacle, the Soviet U

was coasting economically, and the Soviet Comm

Party seemed to have found a way to achieve reform 

remain viable. Now, the situation is quite different. 

Russia's political and economic reform in peril, unres

by the recent International Monetary Fund (IMF) ba

China can gloat over the status of its economy 

Communist Party that has stayed in power th

flexibility and adjustment during a time of great cha

Chinese society. China smoothly effected the transit

national presidents, with Jiang Zemin consolidatin

own power as he replaced Yang Shangkun, and of pre

with Zhu replacing Li. In contrast, the Russian tran

from President Gorbachev to President Yeltsin 

25
also experienced turbulence, shifting from V

Chernomyrdin to Sergei Kiriyenko and then to temp

limbo, all in a matter of 5 months. It is now the lot of Ru

leaders to be envious; yet neither that emotion nor Ch

crowing has been evident as an irritant in the relations

The Economic Victors and Vanquished. An

pertinent aspect of these events not lost on Chinese le

is that national economic developments, not compa

military prowess, have been instrumental in the reve

roles between China and Russia. The change in the mi

condition has been an indirect consequence of econom

political developments in both countries. Significant

the foreign ministers of China and Russia met in Beij

July 1998 specifically to discuss security issues and pr

for another meeting between their presidents, they ig

the IMF flurry and deteriorating political environm

Moscow and talked of ways that their countries 

cooperate to achieve a breakthrough in the Asian fin

crisis. This makes it clear that the regional security 

that are most appealing to China and Russia are eco

and not military. Foreign Minister Yevgeny Prim

reinforced that instinct among Chinese leaders wh

effusively praised China’s economic successes.

3

contrast between the countries could hardly be more 

Russia’s economic crisis deepens, and China, even 

weakening economic growth prospects, seems 

weathering the Asian crisis better by far than almost 

neighbors. China has achieved a secure relationship

something that can be termed a strategic partne

almost completely through its national economic pro

All the while, the bested partner, Russia, is ben

cooperating with China in challenging the U.S. role 

region. Many in Beijing must feel that they have succ

in subduing the bear and that China can be much 

secure when it looks northward.

America Bashing. Challenging the United Sta

another important aspect of the solidarity between B

26
bilateral bonds have been strengthened by the percept

having a common adversary on an important matter

capitals have taken great satisfaction in directing ba

Washington. In December 1996, Premier Li Peng 

President Yeltsin candidly vowed to forge closer mi

and economic ties to counter the influence of the U

States in the post-Cold War world. 36 Washing

characterized by these partners as coveting its super

status in a unipolar world, clinging to Cold War thin

and pursuing confrontation in its relations with C

while Beijing and Moscow show the world a new mod

peaceful relationships. The April 1997 China-Russia 

statement on the bilateral arrangement expresses gr

that the purpose of the partnership is “to promo

multipolarization of the world and the establishmen

new world order.” With evident reference to the U

States, it explains,

The establishment of a just and equitable new internatio

political and economic order based on peace and stability h

become the pressing need of the times and the inevita

necessity of history. . . . No country should seek hegemo

practice power politics, or monopolize international affairs

Of course, international economic disparities ar

overlooked. On this issue the joint statement reads:

It is imperative to eliminate discriminatory policies a

practices in economic relations and to strengthen and expa

on the basis of equality and mutual benefit exchanges a

cooperation in the economic, trade, scientific, technologi

fields with a view to promoting common development a

prosperity.

37

With respect to political aspects of the partne

Beijing supported Moscow’s early opposition t

eastward expansion of the North Atlantic T

Organization (NATO). The April 1997 statement said

27
applicable security concept, believing that the “Cold W

mentality” must be abandoned and bloc politics opposed.

The differences or disputes between states must be set

through peaceful means without resorting to the use or threa

force. Dialogue and consultation should be pursued to prom

mutual understanding and build confidence, and peace 

security should be sought through coordination and coopera

at bilateral or multilateral levels. . . .

38

Returning the political favor, Moscow offere

confirmation that both Tibet and Taiwan are insepa

parts of China. Russian Defense Minister Rod

reportedly went so far in an April 1997 speech in Beij

the Academy of Military Science (AMS) as to ex

readiness to support China in an armed conflict o

Korean Peninsula. He blamed the potential for co

there on alliance arrangements and said, “Russia will 

able to remain aloof.”

39

Maligning Alliances. Amidst all this blatant rhet

bashing of Americans, one detects a good measure of 

passion for this aspect of the collaboration. Moreover, 

is in all this a campaign to discredit alliances, espe

alliances involving the United States, as alluded 

Rodionov in his speech at the PLA’s AMS. The 

Sino-Russian joint statement contains these words:

It constitutes an important practice toward the establishm

of a new international order for the two countries . . . to forg

partnership that is characterized by good neighborliness 

friendship, equality and trust, mutually beneficial coopera

and common development, in strict compliance with 

principles of international law and formulation of a new typ

long-term state-to-state relationship not directed against 

third country.

40

The Roots of Partnership. China has cultivated in R

an excellent partner for the future: partly Asian, 

recently communist, residually authoritarian, pre

nonthreatening, and ready to criticize and even cha

28
convenience or whether there are qualities i

relationship that will endure into the next century. Alr

the amount of attention given by Beijing and Mosc

touting the partnership seems to have waned significa

The Role of Arms and Technology Transfers. Th

however, one area of unquestioned substance and app

durability in Sino-Russian relations: arms sales 

military technology transfer, which pre-dates the form

of the partnership. Three months before the partne

was announced, Russian Deputy Foreign Min

Aleksandr Panov said that connections with the PL

cooperation on armaments manufacture “are 

developed and will be developed.” He noted the impor

of China as a market for the deteriorating Russian 

industry. Russia's goal under the 5-year mil

cooperation agreement it signed with China in 1993, 

said, was to promote the sale of Russian military equip

without upsetting the military balance in the region.

Taking a jab at Washington, the Russian ministe

“We do not see anybody objecting to such coope

between Russia and China or fearing it," noting poin

that “it was deemed normal for Taiwan to get hundr

aircraft.” Actually, the initial Su-27 deliveries occ

before the decisions by Washington and Paris to sell Ta

F-16s and Mirage 2000-5s. Panov asserted that Washi

had been consulted and would not be concerned if the 

of the cooperation was not great and remained w

“definite limits.”

42 Washington acknowledge

conversation but said that U.S. officials were info

rather than consulted, about the sale of additional Ru

Su-27 fighter aircraft to China. An unnamed 

Department representative said, “[Panov] neither s

nor did we convey to him any approval.”

43

Although arms sales and military technology tra

seem clearly to be the most active and conspicuous asp

the strategic partnership, problems remain in that 

29
for payment in hard currency rather than large

barter—as had been the case prior to about 

Reportedly, in 1994 Beijing and Moscow signe

agreement to transition to payments in hard currenc

the degree of success of that arrangement is not yet cl

outsiders. Price, form of payment, and financing me

between the two countries remain troublesome.

In March 1998, unofficial but well-connected so

believed that contract arrangements had not yet 

concluded for the licensed production in China of 200 

fighter aircraft, despite reports concerning provisio

assembly in Northeast China.

44 Thus, 2 years aft

licensing arrangement had been revealed and a to

more than 6 years since Beijing had begun pressing M

to allow Su-27s to be assembled in China, payment me

were still under discussion. A very reliable Chinese of

with whom this author spoke, said that negotiatio

payment and financing of the Sovremenny destroyer

still in progress. That was well over a year from the 

that the deal was made public. The PLAN also wants 

than the four Kilo-class diesel submarines that Chin

purchased. It needs to buy more comprehensive tra

from the Russian Navy for the crews of the del

submarines. However, the PLAN's hopes for 

submarines and more extensive training have foun

because of the refusal of the Chinese government to p

the needed hard currency. Looking across the board at 

transfers, it is pertinent that only a fraction o

innumerable expensive items mentioned by news re

and by observers in the West has actually been del

from Russia to China. There are numerous explana

but prominent among them is the inability or unwillin

of Beijing to pay for this equipment and technology in 

acceptable to Moscow.

Russia’s deepening financial crisis is an addi

complicating factor. China, in coming years, will be n

inclined to seek favorable terms, but Russian officia

30
make greater demands for payments in hard currenc

for “normal” financing terms. On the other hand, Ru

arms industries will likely become more despera

markets abroad. Russian research scientists, techni

and others with specialized knowledge of value to th

and China’s defense industries will be more inclin

accept paying work in China, temporarily or perman

Regional neighbors and others, including the United S

will have heightened concerns; however, because M

and Beijing are now more linked to their neighbors

will take those neighbors' concerns into account in dec

about arms sales and technology transfers.

All these factors will introduce strains int

Sino-Russian military cooperative arrangements. In l

these factors, one cannot help but wonder how Beijing 

the military supply relationship. Does Russia a

reliable in the eyes of the PLA leadership as a supp

technology, training, and weapons? The PLA has 

grounds for at least some measure of concern. It was 

burned by the dissolution of the arms and techn

transfer relationship with the Soviets around 1960

PLA was emphatically reminded of that peril again in 

by the imposition of sanctions by the United States af

Tiananmen Square intervention—rupturing a bu

military supply and technology transfer relations

great value to the PLA. From a broader perspect

simply cannot be assumed that the flow of arms from R

to China will remain a major feature of their bil

relationship. It is highly likely, but hardly assured.

Other Ties That Bind. Some less conspicuous asp

the strategic partnership appear to be quite 

Long-standing border disputes have been resolved th

multilateral agreements. Many of the disputes over sp

border areas were extremely difficult to resolve 

considerable strong feelings on all sides, especially be

the Russians and the Chinese. On one occasion, Pre

Yeltsin, just before a visit to Beijing, had to inte

31
governor of the far eastern Primorsky regi

Nevertheless, both capitals had the will to resolv

contentious border problems. There have been re

biannual meetings of a high-level defense commissio

September 1996, there had been 20 rounds of tal

reduction of military forces in border areas, with succ

results. The first secure telecommunications ho

between Beijing and a foreign capital was established 

Moscow in May 1998. These seem to add up to a signi

bank of goodwill that can be drawn on in the future. 

What does all this portend for security relations 

21st century between the world’s largest nation an

world's most populous nation? Regardless of whether 

strategic partnership truly takes on the mantle 

“universal security concept that would promote 

peace,” as Xinhua termed it last year, the most per

aspect is what this partnership means for Sino-Ru

bilateral relations and the effects that has on re

security. In the early 1990s, one could not go very lo

discussion with Chinese security specialists wi

hearing about the potential threat from a reawak

Russian bear. Now, in place of fears of Ru

unpredictability, much is heard about equality and tr

the relationship. Admittedly, the tone and frequency o

pronouncements give reason to wonder whether t

whistling in the dark. Does Beijing truly see Moscow 

regional security partner in Asia? Or is Russia perceiv

seeking to protect from the Chinese hordes its tro

expanses of Siberia and the Russian Far East? Or is M

simply a convenient partner used by Beijing to cha

Washington and its alliances at a time in history 

China’s other neighbors are not inclined to do so? The

no ready answers to these questions, but this is one of 

situations where knowing the questions is of conside

value.

32
The Reciprocal Context. Despite a quarter cent

normalized relations, the security intercourse bet

China and Japan remains complex and uncertain. 

fears the economic and military rise of the other, ye

not wish the other to falter or fail. Before trying to 

together the puzzle from the Chinese perspective

helpful first to recollect the security context in which J

contemplates China. There are, of course, all the 

well-known major concerns including mil

modernization, to be covered later, but there are also 

concerns and irritants that privately trouble Jap

analysts. 

A Cataclysmic China? Some Japanese fear that C

by virtue of its size and relative backwardness, 

become an Asian nightmare in ways beyond the cu

anxiety about China's devaluing its currency and th

exacerbating the Asian financial crisis. A fractured 

rocked by social and political disorder would have 

repercussions for Japan and others in the region. C

huge population, under conditions of domestic cha

ferment, could boil over its borders and encroach up

neighbors, even reaching Japan. If its scattering popu

did not engulf neighboring countries, then its spre

uncontrolled pollutants, corruption, and other cont

might. In another scenario, a swelling China might b

the scourge of Asia as it encounters some desp

agricultural or energy crisis. It is very difficult to dete

how many Japanese still seriously harbor such co

about the consequences of an overpopulated 

underdeveloped China, but the sentiment lingers.

The Chinese Attitude. Whatever the nature of 

latent feelings, the Chinese do unabashedly hark b

World War II with a firm dislike and distrust for J

These feelings have apparently lessened little, if any

in the generations born after 1945. The Chinese fe

about the Japanese have been maintained th

33
and by Japanese reticence over the decades to acknow

full culpability. When Americans witness demonstrati

this profound animosity, there is the temptation to con

the strong statements from China as displays exagge

by emotions or possibly even staged to make some 

One might, for example, attribute the frequent voic

hateful anti-Japanese rhetoric to an attempt to disp

the close American links with Japan (and the relations

that to the Taiwan issue), suggesting that Washing

being duped by the cunning Japanese. However, the 

of feeling displayed by many otherwise measured Ch

scholars, officials, and military officers seems to cont

that possibility. Chinese antagonistic attitudes towa

Japanese seem to be deeply rooted, passed from gene

to generation, and certain to remain a persistent feat

the bilateral relationship well into the next century.

These strong feelings do not keep China from acce

Japanese investment, financial aid, and loans of va

sorts, but this investment has not erased Chinese d

and distrust. In many cases, the Japanese commercia

financial presence is accepted grudgingly or even 

loathing. Some Chinese resentfully call it “eco

imperialism.” Chinese do business with the Jap

because they feel they have no choice. The billio

Japanese yen lavished on China are not buying Ch

forgiveness for past transgressions.

Mutual Military Concerns. Tokyo watches carefu

direction that Beijing takes in modernization of the 

There is general concern about incipient Ch

aspirations to regional hegemony. China’s potentia

with respect to the Korean Peninsula is an abiding con

Enhancements to the PLAN and the Strategic Rocket 

are specifically troublesome and viewed as poten

threatening or challenging by Japan. The Ch

however, turn this issue on its head and pose the que

How can Japan justify fear of some future specter of Ch

military power? Japan, they remind, is the demons

34
temptation once more. China, Beijing argues, is n

expansionist nor threatening and has no reason to b

so. Nevertheless, Chinese concerns about pote

resurgence of Japanese militarism are mirror

Japanese concerns about Chinese development 

power-projection capability.

Like the persistent Chinese enmity for Japan

Chinese nourish the conviction that Japan is tr

potential military threat to its Asian neighbors. Ev

decorous occasions, pointed reminders can be expect

1996, when then Japanese Prime Minister Ry

Hashimoto was taking office, the People's Republic of 

(PRC) Foreign Ministry spokesman offered congratul

but quickly added that Japanese wartime actions mu

be glossed over. The spokesman said, “Mr. Hashimoto 

an old friend with whom we have had contact for 

years.” But noting Hashimoto’s reputation for natio

leanings, he remarked, “We hope Japanese politician

have real foresight and sagacity,” and that Jap

politicians should “lead the Japanese people to treat h

correctly, learn the lessons that should be learned

continue to walk the path of peaceful development.”

4

A good measure of China’s penetrating gaze t

Japan consequently dwells on the constraints on

actions of, the Japanese Self-Defense Force (JSDF). 

are no stronger advocates than the Chinese for 

Japanese compliance with Article 9 of its nat

constitution, the article that prohibits both Jap

participation in wars and the establishment of a

forces. Of course, Beijing would not like to see that a

permissively revised, as some have suggested might 

Beijing sounds the alarm each time it sees the roles 

JSDF apparently expanded to any extent whatsoeve

dispatch of JSDF forces for peace operations in Cam

and Mozambique and the deployment of Mar

Self-Defense Force (MSDF) minesweeping ships t

Persian Gulf gave rise to great concern. With respect 

35
have its troops transported part way on Russian Air 

transport aircraft. Nevertheless, these minor 

movements outside of Japan were very unsettlin

Beijing.

47

Japanese Pacifism Doubted. Most Chinese do not b

that post-World War II pacifism is deeply ingrained a

Japan’s citizenry. Many are convinced tha

often-mentioned social and constitutional constrain

Japan’s building a full-fledged set of armed forces mig

quickly overwhelmed or eliminated by militarists, wh

Chinese would stress, already show their true jing

colors in such adventures as the recurrent spats ov

Senkaku Islands (Diaoyutai in Chinese).

48

 Ther

however, diverse views in China about the seriousn

the threat of resurgent Japanese militarism. Some con

it unrealistic that any Japanese government could ov

international and domestic forces and restraints 

develop the political will, the military forces, an

defense industrial base necessary for a military that 

seriously threaten a steadily strengthening China.

New Defense Guidelines—and Unintended 

sequences? Others analyze the prospects for a remilita

Japan from a different perspective. They fea

unintentional effect on Japanese militarism of the r

tinkering with the U.S.-Japan security arrangem

These Chinese strategists consider that the pr

concern China should have about this enha

U.S.-Japanese security cooperation is the potent

fosters for more capable Japanese forces with exp

roles—rather than a more direct concern about Jap

support of U.S. forces in a conflict involving China. 

have been intense exchanges since 1996 among C

Japan, and the United States as new defense guid

were being considered for the U.S.-Japanese se

alliance. As part of this debate, Liu Jiangyong, the di

of Northeast Asian Studies at the Chinese Instit

Contemporary International Relations, said in 1997 

36
could lead to Japan’s bursting its constitutional sha

and developing essentially unrestrained military stre

He suggested that expanded guidelines for sec

cooperation would serve as justification for the expans

Japan’s military strength in Asia and asserted such a 

created more uncertainty concerning regional securit

The Ineluctable Taiwan Factor. There is, of cou

much more obvious aspect of Chinese concern about th

revision since 1978 of the so-called defense guidelin

the U.S.-Japanese security alliance: the issue o

applicability of the treaty to a conflict in the Taiwan S

This process of revising the guidelines began wit

reaffirmation of the alliance by President Clinton 

Prime Minister Hashimoto in April of 1996,

50 the 

following China’s second round of launching ba

missiles to intimidate Taiwan after President Lee Ten

visited the United States. Although the timing o

U.S.-Japanese declaration on alliance affirmation 

largely coincidental and despite visits by U.S. offic

Beijing in advance to explain the guidelines, the imp

Beijing was undiluted. The Clinton-Hashimoto m

followed several difficult years in U.S.-Japanese 

relations and the eruption of significant concer

Okinawa about the presence of U.S. forces there. B

might have hoped, under these circumstances, for 

results from a U.S.-Japanese summit at that time. In

the meeting provided renewed momentum for ideas d

back to 1994 about changes and clarifications that mi

appropriate for the defense guidelines.

51

 The Ch

reaction was prompt and pointed, the first serious co

expressed about the U.S.-Japanese alliance since the 

the Cold War. The day after the Clinton-Hash

reaffirmation statement, PRC Foreign Ministry spoke

Shen Guofang said:

The Japan-U.S. treaty on the guarantee of security is 

bilateral arrangement left over from history. And such 

37
otherwise it would complicate the situation in the region.

52

China then had a year and a half to chafe and prot

the revised guidelines were discussed, drafted, and f

presented in September 1997. As mentioned, there 

concerns expressed by the Chinese about the re

guidelines providing license for the JSDF to beco

threatening military force. However, the most in

exchanges concerned the geographic scope of the se

arrangements. The United States said that there had 

no change and that the alliance was not aimed a

country. The Japanese prime minister and a s

spokesman created consternation in Beijing by sugg

that the alliance could be considered applicable not o

the Taiwan Strait and vicinity, but also all the way 

South China Sea.53 During a visit to China, Prime Mi

Hashimoto masterfully employed ambiguity on this 

He assured then-Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng 

Japan would continue to be constrained by its constit

that it would be transparent about revisions to the se

pact with the United States, and that the alliance wa

aimed at specific countries but rather at threat

situations.

54 Hashimoto told Li that the review underw

U.S.-Japanese military arrangements was not bas

geography but on “the nature of the situation.” 

dismissed questions about Taiwan as “to

hypothetical.”

56

The Japanese leader admitted at the end of the vis

he had failed to dispel Chinese concerns about the al

and Taiwan. 57 Nevertheless, the Chinese lea

interestingly, did not press the matter inordin

choosing not to create a rift in the relationship.

58

 Mayb

as some analysts suggest, that China expects Jap

support of U.S. forces in a Taiwan intervention action

all, in March 1996, the U.S. battlegroups sent to the T

Strait were, in part, based in Japan. Many Chinese le

also expect that the support might extend to the use 

Japanese MSDF in some role, large or small. Depend

38
it clearer that Japan would act in concert with the U

States over Taiwan or added another little piece of str

ambiguity for Li Peng and Jiang Zemin to contempl

the Japanese-U.S. security alliance nears its 

anniversary and moves into the 21st century.

Alliance Bashing. The day after President Clinto

Prime Minister Hashimoto issued the “Japan-U.S. 

Declaration on Security—Alliance for the 21st Centu

Tokyo in April 1996,

59

 Clinton presented his view 

future in the first speech to the Japanese Parliamen

U.S. President since the one given by Ronald Reag

1983:

As the world's two largest economies, and two of its strong

democracies, Japan and the United States must forge 

alliance for the 21st century.60

Beijing was listening, as would be expected. How

Chinese leaders must have anticipated this messag

precisely that day, April 18, 1996, Beijing, preparing f

visit of Russian President Boris Yeltsin, announced it

form of model bilateral relationship meant to supe

alliances. Foreign Ministry spokesman Shen Guofang 

We have established a new type of good neighborly relatio

between China and Russia which are not based 

confrontation or alliance. [The relationship would] serve t

interests of the people of the two countries and contribute 

the same time to peace and stability in the region.

61

China marshaled its assault on alliances and by a 

later had developed a broader attack. In the spring of 

Zhao Jieqi, research fellow and former deputy director 

Japanese Studies Institute of the Chinese Acade

Social Sciences (CASS), said:

The short-term goal of the [strengthened U.S.-Japan a

U.S.-Australia] alliances is to deal with the “instability” in t

Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea, and on the Kore

39
“troubles” made by an economically and militarily stron

China.

62

Liu Jiangyong, director of the Department of Nort

Asian Studies of the China Institute of Contemp

International Relations (CICIR), amplified the conce

The structure [of U.S. alliances] is said to aim to maintain 

peace of this region. But it sowed seeds of friction 

instability.... It is sure to create tension among As

countries.

63

What Beijing Wants Now and What It Dreams Of 

Future. China, no doubt, is unhappy as a general m

with U.S. alliances in Asia and enamored of its toute

concept of security without confrontation and a

alliances. Nevertheless, a distinction should be 

between Chinese aspirations and efforts to achieve a d

goal on the one hand and the more pressing combinat

realistic expectations and short-term concerns on the 

Does China really want Japan “loosed on Asia,” as 

who fear Japan the most might put it? And there are 

pointed questions that an increasingly realistic and w

Chinese leadership must have begun to ponder: 

American-Japanese-South Korean-Australian enten

some permutation thereof, against China realistic 

any scenario short of the most abominable actions by 

against its neighbors? Do not Chinese leaders unders

even if they cannot say so, that none of these alliances 

act against China unless Beijing essentially forced th

do so? Furthermore, there have been private report

the current Chinese leadership gives at least some cre

to the assertion that the U.S. military presence in the r

has been beneficial, if not instrumental, both to re

stability and economic development, including th

China.

Americans in Asia Forever? Beijing is not pr

Washington to beat a hasty retreat from East Asia. Lo

at the long term, Beijing is less tolerant of a seem

40
U.S. forces would be reduced or withdrawn deliberate

as not to precipitate a crisis or foster regional instab

such as a dramatic increase in Japanese military capa

or confrontation on the Korean Peninsula. Chinese le

recognize that achieving severe reductions or com

withdrawal of U.S. forces, while avoiding these pi

would be a tricky proposition. This is reflected i

manner in which Beijing in 1996 and 1997 simultane

handled its proposal (in concert with Moscow) tha

security relations should eschew alliances and yet d

call for the dismantlement of the U.S.-Japanese all

Beijing wishes to milk alliances for their merit for Ch

interests in the short term but work deliberately tow

time when China, not the United States, is seen as the 

of East Asian security. That vision of the 21st centu

Beijing sees it, does not feature security alliances.

Some in China who have confidence in China’s abi

become a relatively stronger economic and military pow

Asia think it might be preferable in the next century to 

Japanese forces alone to confront in the region, rather 

a combined and well-coordinated U.S. and Japanese 

“Who’s afraid of the big, bad Japanese?” these 

optimistic analysts seem to say. The view is also offere

the U.S. presence in Japan will increasingly be seen 

parties, including the American public and Congress, 

anachronism. Moreover, some suggest, Japan 

subordinate itself to the United States for only so lo

other words, China need only be patient, and the Ame

will either leave of their own volition, be asked to leave

ejected. These offerings might be seen as efforts by 

Chinese strategists to cover all the bases, end up o

“right side of history,” or just as wishful thinking abo

Asia for Asians, with commensurate elevation of Be

position; but they offer insights into the Chinese view 

future. 

China’s Future Place in Asian Security. The matte

considered for the future is that China wants w

41
Asian security. That central place for China i

architecture is something Beijing can seemingly neve

as long as the U.S.-Japanese alliance retains its sta

the keystone of regional security; and there i

implication that one of the roles of the alliance is to 

China in line—or knock it back in line if it strays. C

wants its enhanced status in the region, its imp

international posture, and its potential for far g

power to be accepted and to be prime considerations 

respect to regional security in the 21st century. Put an

way, the obverse of alliance bashing in this context is 

“dignification.”

The Ballistic Missile–Theater Ballistic Missile D

Imbroglio. There is a far cruder, but very specific, w

which China is attempting to ensure its relevan

regional security. The PLA excels in very few warfare 

but one of them is its arsenal of short- and medium-

ballistic missiles—primarily (but not necessarily) t

with conventional warheads. By some definitions, t

one of the asymmetric means that China can bring to b

overcome U.S. and Japanese technological advan

Chinese leaders expect that these missiles would h

deterrent effect on any Japanese proclivity to get inv

with the United States in a Taiwan intervention. B

does not want Tokyo (and certainly not Taipei!) to atta

capability to neutralize the threat of that force—

alone or in concert with the United States. China has o

almost every conceivable argument agains

development and deployment of theater ballistic m

defense (TBMD). Beijing is also allegedly working in 

sophisticated ways behind the scenes to undermine su

of the program with the Japanese public, legislature

government to reinforce existing opposition.

64

 Jap

Defense Agency (JDA) Director General Kyuma sa

early 1997 to a committee of the Diet: “We won't be abl

ahead with the program without taking into accou

costs, the benefits and the accuracy [of the missile sys

42
regional missile defense system could be interpret

nations such as China as upsetting the regional mi

balance of power.

65

 Beijing does not wish to enter 

confrontation wherein it would launch missiles ag

Japan or U.S. bases in Japan, with all that might imp

the future of China and coveted Chinese economic gr

but it wants the concern about that threat to re

undiminished in the coming years. Beijing wants T

Washington, and Taipei to worry. 

One of the earlier Chinese lines of reasoning a

TBMD, used sparingly recently, has been called the “s

and sword” argument: Japan, behind the shield of ba

missile defense, could develop in a very short time the 

of nuclear weapons and the missiles to deliver 

Although the shield and sword argument may be hear

now, Beijing is no less determined than in the p

preclude Japanese development of nuclear weapons. 

calls attention to Japan’s technological prowess i

nuclear field and notes that its more than 50 nuclear 

plants, producing over a third of the country’s elec

power, are also a supplier of plutonium that can be u

weapons. Japan has rejected suggestions that it recon

its ambitious nuclear energy program, height

Beijing’s anxiety. The issues of the potential deploym

theater missile defense and the development of n

weapons will remain crucial, and possibly expl

matters in China’s perspective of its security relatio

with Japan and the bearing that relationship h

regional security in the coming years.

Military Relations. Tokyo has recently made ove

to Beijing for better military-to-military relations be

the two former adversaries. There have been notew

exchanges in recent years, including the April 1997 v

Japan of Chinese Defense Minister General Chi Ha

the first such visit in 13 years. Chi proposed tha

director general of the Japanese Defense Agency 

China. Before that could occur, Prime Minister Hash

43
normalized bilateral relations and attempt to ease Ch

concerns about the revised U.S.-Japanese de

guidelines that were about to be presented. While the

complained that the military contacts between Japa

China were “insufficient” compared to the burge

economic, political, and cultural ties. It seems his co

was listened to politely.66

When JDA Director General Kyuma, acting on Mi

of Defense Chi’s earlier invitation, went to China in 

1998, his visit to PLAN facilities there was 

memorable by the simultaneous sailing of a Chinese m

research ship into waters off the Senkaku Islands cl

by Japan as well as by China. The Chinese ship 

warnings by the Japanese coast guard. 67 It was no

whether this untimely rekindling of the Senkakus spa

coincidental, but personal conversations by the autho

Japanese defense specialists clearly conveye

impression that Japan’s overtures for military-to-m

contacts were being rebuffed. When the matter was 

by the author with a knowledgeable PLA officer specia

in politico-military affairs, the officer said unequiv

that the PLA does not want to proceed with such con

He explained that there were questions about how 

China might gain from such contacts, but the 

important reason, according to this officer, was that h

of the Japanese military persisted to such a degree in 

that most PLA officers did not want to participate in 

discussions. There was ample reason for Japan 

mistrusted—a lesson that had apparently been wast

Americans, he added, warming to his subject.

Trilateral Track II Talks. China has rejected pro

for official trilateral (PRC, United States, Japan) se

talks based, in part, on insurmountable dislike and di

of the Japanese. No doubt, Beijing was also loath to fa

treaty allies. However, Beijing did accept a proposal ea

1998 for Track II talks among civilian scholars. The 

session was held in the summer of 1998. Ch

44
Japanese, and there were no PLA officers present.

Shaping Future Sino-Japanese Security Rela

Japan will almost certainly begin the next century wor

about and watching a growing Chinese pre

increasingly dominating the western horizon. Chin

squint back, continuing to covet the best tha

relationship with wealthy Japan can bring to Chin

fearing the worst that Japan might bring about. W

now competition between Asia’s richest and la

countries will shift toward competition between two r

at least developed) countries, one very large and the 

not so large. That change in China's status may assu

some degree the animosity and envy that China harbo

a country it feels is morally undeserving of good fortu

A continued exchange of visits of senior officials 

make China more tolerant of Japanese actions t

currently considers unacceptable, such as visits by ca

officials each year to the Yakusuni shrine where Ja

war criminals are honored. The Japanese foreign mi

was in China in August 1998, a visit surprisingly f

rancor. Ostensibly, the worst floods in half a centu

China recently caused the indefinite postponement 

scheduled September 1998 visit of Chinese President 

Zemin to Japan. (Suspiciously, the postponemen

announced just after Tokyo had rebuffed a reported Ch

request to echo the “three no's policy” concerning T

that President Clinton elected to state publicly near th

of his June-July 1998 visit to China.)68 According 

Japanese foreign ministry, that would have been th

first visit to Japan of a Chinese president!

69 There hav

and will be other visits of varying import, such a

little-noticed meeting of the leaders of the Chines

Japanese Communist Parties in April 1998, the 

meeting in 32 years after party ties were broken durin

Chinese Cultural Revolution. If both countries weath

ongoing Asian financial crisis without suffering eco

devastation, trade and investment will continue to bon

45
security relationship. In all these aspects, the o

bilateral relationship is on a generally upward traje

even if the slope is hardly steep.

The picture is far less certain with respe

military-to-military relations. Intransigence by the 

might wane with future generations of PLA senior of

who will be younger, better educated, more worldly

more professional officers. They may conclude 

sustaining the intense hatred for Japan and its a

forces does not serve China’s interests. For now, how

the PLA tradition of hating the Japanese seems 

surviving. This emotional feature of the relationship 

communication and consequently may be reta

developments that might otherwise have taken place b

time.

The Taiwan Fulcrum. Two other factors exa

earlier matter greatly: (1) Chinese concerns that Japa

build a powerful military, and (2) what Japan would 

China used military force against Taiwan. The form

likely to simmer through the early decades of the 

century, but the latter may boil over at any time and r

East Asia to a battleground. There is ample reason 

relatively sanguine about keeping the lid on Jap

military expansion. It could be very much harder to ke

lid on a Taiwan crisis if the cross-strait situation 

becomes roiled. No expenditure or exercise of prud

sagacity, caution, and preparedness are excessive to 

this outcome. No decisions with respect to U.S.-Jap

security cooperation, TBMD, or U.S. military commi

in the region can ignore the Taiwan issue. It boils do

this: currently the only truly critical factor in C

security relationship with Japan is Taiwan, and the U

States is right in the middle. With resolution of the “T

problem,” as it is often referred to on the Chinese main

the hue of security relations between China and Japa

shift from dark and ominous tones to a much warmer 

even if hardly rosy. Then the more fundamental pr

46
remains the outsider in the framework of East 

security, it will be a troublemaker, seeking what it s

its rightful place as a major part of the architecture.

Korea: Seeing Double and Enjoying the View.

7

Chinese leaders are cautious about the process of c

on the Korean Peninsula and the implications o

impending change for China. Despite outward comp

Beijing is increasingly concerned by the developme

North Korea, a concern undoubtedly intensified b

history of disruptions to China’s security and stabilit

have originated in Korea. Chinese leaders are trouble

Pyongyang remains deaf to its suggestions for reform 

more rational conduct—advice given with Asian genti

the hope that it can be accepted more readily th

delivered with Western bluntness. However, most Ch

who follow the issue do not believe that collapse of 

Korea is imminent or that reunification or reconcilia

inevitable. Some accuse the South Koreans and Ame

who forecast an early demise of North Korea of engag

wishful thinking. Although many observers believe 

favors the indefinite division of Korea, it is not clea

Beijing has made an unequivocal choice of a pre

outcome of a change in status on the peninsula. How

Beijing objects strenuously to being publicly lumped 

box with Japan and seen as preferring permanent di

of the peninsula in order to keep Korea weak 

nonthreatening. Instead, Beijing suggests that the 

should be on preserving stability, not effecting chang

that a slow, deliberate course to some form of reunific

in the distant future, possibly 20 to 50 years from 

would be reasonable.

71

Delicately Balanced Dual Relations. Beijing has 

particularly attentive to, and ingenious in, its relation

with its two near neighbors, the Democratic Pe

Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the Republic of Korea (R

47
relations with its fellow communist (more fashio

referred to as socialist) state and yet proceed outri

establish dynamic economic and political relations wi

South. There are many complexities, inequalities

sensitivities to be dealt with carefully in this peculiar p

relationships between such dissimilar countries

Beijing must devote considerable attention to the 

Possibly the only aspect of the relationships that sma

unity of view is the intense degree of dislike for J

shared by all three. In this decade, first with burge

trade relations and then diplomatic relations in 

China’s preference with respect to the two Korea

undeniably shifted to place South Korea foremost. As 

be expected, Beijing’s careful choice of Seoul as the fa

partner was done primarily for economic rea

Somehow, however, China’s leaders have me

extraordinary challenge and kept things reasonably 

with North Korea while snuggling up to the South.

Nuclear Weapons in Korea—and the Japan 

Chinese officials say that China wants a stable, nonnu

Korean Peninsula. Beijing has expressed a preferenc

Korean Peninsula nuclear-free zone. It wants a pen

void of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the m

to deliver them. Further, Beijing does not want susp

about Korea to serve as an incentive or excuse for Jap

develop its own nuclear weapons, which would 

Beijing’s abiding fear, the resurgence of military capa

in Japan.

Reunification: Whether, When, and How. By rea

geographic proximity and political, social, and eco

vulnerability to the potential repercussions, China 

vested interest in the outcome of change on the peni

Among the reasons Beijing is in no hurry for reunificat

reconciliation is the recognition that precipitating a ch

between the Koreas has high risk, both for the Korea

for China. Beijing does not want circumstances to ar

the Koreas that ultimately will threaten the Ch

48
are often finessed when raised with Chinese officials, 

is clear that China seeks a Korea that leans more to

China than toward the United States or Japan. Both B

and Pyongyang consider a lopsided reunification p

done on Seoul’s terms unappealing. Unification 

desirable goal, Chinese officials say, but left unsaid i

for now a North Korea that is troublesome and distract

Washington is not altogether a bad thing for China. Be

naturally, wishes to avoid social and political tumu

across the Yalu and Tumen Rivers. It also does not 

Seoul’s attention and South Korea’s resources drawn 

China and redirected to resolving the problem 

collapsed, or maybe just helpless and hopeless, 

Korea. Peace and stability on the Korean Peninsu

described as essential to China’s continued eco

growth.

72

Military vs. Economic Considerations. Without s

so, China recognizes that the real potential for troub

the Peninsula lies with Pyongyang, and that ne

Washington nor Seoul is inclined to start a war. 

worked diligently to discourage foolhardy mi

adventures by North Korea and has retained at lea

semblance of a security pact with Pyongyang. Howeve

primary focus of China’s Korea policy has bee

cultivating economic and other relations with the p

Korea that really matters to China: the prosperou

progressive South. This outlook has been blurred sligh

a consequence of the ROK’s severe economic pro

during the ongoing Asian economic crisis, but China c

that South Korea will come out of the crisis wi

workforce, intellectual capital, infrastructure

democratic methods largely intact. That is the aspect 

Korean Peninsula for which China now has affinity.

South Korean investment in and trade with Sha

Province, jutting out eastward to less than 250 miles 

Seoul, and with China’s economically needy northea

provinces, adjacent to the Korean Peninsula, have pro

49
South Korea had invested $830 million in Shandon

$516 million in the rust belt of Northeast China. Tw

trade totaled almost $20 billion for 1996. As a conseq

of this important investment and trade, China now 

considerably greater anxiety over the full recovery 

important economic ties with South Korea than it 

about the presence of American troops in the ROK or 

the future presence of U.S. forces there. Military m

concerning the South are simply not on the front burn

China.

With respect to North Korea, China views that se

relationship largely in economic terms as well. Ties be

the PLA and the North Korean People’s Army (KPA) p

but are neither close nor flourishing. Beijing’s 

long-term vision for North Korea, separate or unif

that of an economic partner with China’s neighboring 

The Chinese envision mutually beneficial trade 

investment relations with the North. Chinese interlo

dismiss suggestions that preservation of another so

state or having a buffer zone between China and U.S. 

in South Korea is of any consequence. They call 

notions outdated remnants of “Cold War thinking.” In 

words, Chinese officials assert that China’s approach 

matter of reunification is largely an economic 

Consequently, the modalities of reunificati

reconciliation, in Beijing’s view, should be governed by 

implications for the South Korean economy (in the 

future) and the North Korean economy (in the quite d

future). Whether others see it as naïve or not, China d

of a Korea where prosperity is contagious and r

spread to neighboring parts of China.

China’s Actions in a North Korean Crisis. This at

on the future of North Korea is reflected in Ch

assertions that Beijing will attempt to stay out of the f

a political crisis or societal collapse in Pyongyang, 

expects the United States to do the same. The theory i

Chinese intervention would mean that Beijing wou

50
Pyongyang’s intractable political, economic, and 

problems. Moreover, Beijing insists that its d

concerning no foreign forces in another country applies 

own forces as well. Also at play is the fact that China w

its own reunification process with Taiwan to be f

outside interference. Setting a contrary precede

“interfering” in North Korea would be strongly resiste

the other hand, if Beijing sees imminent DPRK eco

collapse, supposedly it will “pull out the stops” and at

to help Pyongyang overcome the crisis by whatever m

prove necessary.

Of course, these Chinese assertions, despite determ

efforts to make the positions sound plausible, are su

Some observers doubt whether China would restri

PLA to blocking the border in order to control refugee

keep military forces out of North Korea. Questions 

about China’s likely response in the event of a frac

DRPK, if for instance a rump government in Pyongyan

faction there asked for PLA support to bring order 

deter movement north by ROK forces. Doubts are 

greater in a scenario where U.S. forces might 

northward. Beijing surely does not want U.S. forces ne

border. Surely if Washington should ask Beijing to ex

restraint in a Korean crisis, Beijing is virtually cert

ask much of Washington—probably with respect to Ta

It might seek stronger assurances concerning curbing 

transfers to Taipei and may demand a “fo

communiqué.”

74

 Despite these doubts, there is some 

to be taken from any assurances from Beijing abo

reluctance to use the PLA as a means to try to 

problems in North Korea. There is merit in having B

repeat these assurances to international interlocutor

There are also doubts about the asserted Ch

commitment to go to almost any lengths to avoid eco

disaster in North Korea. Beijing has been all too 

essentially to buy as scrap or at bargain prices 

Korea’s dismantled industrial complex—loaded onto t

51
Beijing has appeared quite reluctant to toss money 

the black hole of the North Korean economy. Given its 

interests, China has appeared as rather miserly i

provision of emergency food aid, from time to time se

tens of thousands of tons of corn and small amounts of 

grain when the needs were many times that. Other Ch

goods have been sold to North Korea when it might 

been appropriate to provide these items free to its “so

brethren.” Often the prices have been concessionar

equally often the demanded terms have been for 

transactions and not barter. As mentioned, Beijing ha

disappointed and frustrated that Pyongyang ha

instituted economic reforms. The alternative has be

China to continue patronizing trade subsidies and oth

that have kept North Korea alive but have not succee

correcting structural problems or contributed to a long

solution. How hard China is really trying is an 

question. 

It also remains open to question how far China 

really go to aid North Korea if Pyongyang were acting 

less responsibly than at present and showed no inclin

to change. The answer may well be that Beijing ha

seriously confronted that question because most Chin

not think the collapse of North Korea to be a likely sce

They profess to believe that the North Koreans are 

resilient, possibly more capable of enduring hardship 

even the Chinese themselves. To illustrate the poin

Chinese recall times of great difficulty in China, incl

the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution

did not result in national collapse. This logic may b

compelling to many, but such convictions in Chin

probably strengthened with each successive year of s

hardship in North Korea that passes withou

catastrophic results that many Westerners forecast. 

China talks about saving the day if the North begins 

under, it largely looks to South Korea, Japan, an

United States to provide the major funding for such t

52
the October 1994 Agreed Framework. As the next ce

begins, China will continue to urge Washington to e

eliminate restrictions on trade and investmen

facilitate American business in the North. It will perpe

the status quo by patiently continuing to provide mod

amounts of food aid and significant trade subsidies a

conduct “commercial transactions.”

Learning to Like Multilateralism. In April 1996, 

and Washington proposed talks to include North K

South Korea, China, and the United States. Beijin

initially quite reticent about these Four-Party Tal

they came to be known. Eventually, Chinese leaders u

reluctant Pyongyang to accept the proposal and agr

participate themselves. China’s participation i

Four-Party Talks was another signal that Beijing has 

to accept that its interests can be served by a multil

approach. The prospects are now greatly increased 

China will be a regular participant in talks of this na

Living With But Not Liking Alliances. As wit

Japanese-U.S. security alliance, Beijing has elected 

challenge directly the South Korean-U.S. alliance. In

China maintains a balanced policy toward the K

Utterances from Beijing emphasize its own conce

international security, without confrontation or allia

that Beijing has established with Moscow. Ther

obligatory statements opposing foreign forces station

another country, but responsible Chinese officers sa

Beijing will not oppose the continued presence of U.S. 

in Korea or the existence of the alliance, even 

reunification, as long as that is the desire of the K

government and people. In May 1998, a Chinese dip

said forthrightly that Beijing was taking a more concil

position on U.S. forces. Beijing would not oppose 

continued presence if they were welcomed by the 

country and if their use were limited to only “bil

matters.”

75

 Despite the Taiwan issue, China was conc

that a U.S. presence in Korea after unification wa

53
forces rather than whether they should be there.

In any event, Beijing has currently come to accep

the 37,000 U.S. troops in South Korea are tolerable. B

also seems to recognize that the American presence s

as a deterrent to imprudent action by the North and 

brake on actions by Seoul that might create instabi

bring demands from Pyongyang that China act in its b

Chinese officials describe their treaty with Pyongya

sufficiently ambiguous that Beijing can interpret the 

as it wishes. Further, Beijing seems to have made it 

that it will not come to North Korea’s aid if Pyon

initiates hostilities. Beijing frequently reminds Seou

South Korean intervention in the North would 

exacerbate rather than resolve the problem.

Beijing’s positions with respect to its treaty 

Pyongyang and the presence of U.S. forces on the K

Peninsula reflect some nuances of China’s abhorre

alliances. With respect to the pact with Pyongyan

Chinese have essentially chosen to abrogate what 

have been viewed under other circumstances as a 

commitment to come to the aid of North Korea in the 

of hostilities. The Chinese did so because they (1) 

Pyongyang to be an unreliable partner, (2) did not w

have another government in a position to obligate Ch

enter into an armed conflict, and (3) did not want to h

cope with the complications inherent in alliance 

coalition relations. In other words, China finds allian

be encumbrances rather than advantages.

Beyond all that, China wants the freedom to con

alliances on the basis that they tend to target some 

country. In Asia, China feels that it has been an uns

target of U.S. alliances, particularly in the post-Cold 

environment. To the degree that Beijing can discred

diminish the solidarity of alliances and appear to be t

a moral high road, the Chinese think they can dimini

threats they face in the region and enhance C

54
of the community of nations.

With respect to the South Korean-U.S. alliance, B

recognizes that strident objections to a continued 

presence on the peninsula would most likely be 

ignored or counterproductive. Strong Chinese obje

could arouse suspicions about why a purportedly pe

China was protesting so vociferously. Further, China 

not want to appear to be interfering in the internal aff

another country by dictating to the South Korean p

how they should arrange for their own security. In 

China wants to distance itself from alliance entanglem

eliminate or neutralize alliances against China, an

itself of the more subtle but troublesome complication

the existence of alliances in the region produce for it.

Prognosis. China expects to enter the next century 

a divided Korea composed of a crippled North an

economically recovering South. It expects that the Ch

economy will continue to benefit from trade and inves

from South Korea. Beijing does not expect North Ko

move militarily against the South because withou

support of the PLA, an attack would be tantamou

suicide for both the North Korean state and the regim

the time there is reconciliation or reunification, well in

future by Chinese calculations, Beijing strongly hope

the security framework for the region will have been a

so that China will be able to see itself as an integral p

the Northeast Asian security architecture, not a tar

alliances and no longer treated as a troublesome out

In that situation, the presence of U.S. forces in Kore

Japan will either be of little concern to China, or the 

will have been withdrawn because of domestic and po

pressures in Japan, Korea, and the United States.

Taiwan Complications Intrude Again. As in so 

other aspects of China’s regional security situation 

coming years, the issue of Taiwan is inescapable. 

Taiwan issue remains unresolved, and especially 

55
forces and alliances in Asia a matter to be accommod

Moreover, the PRC threat to Taiwan will be seen by 

countries as a demonstration of Beijing's will to res

force. This will provide a justification to keep capabl

forces in the region. While it is hard to justify the cost 

U.S. presence by a vague reference to preserving sta

and reacting to unidentified future contingenc

continuing PRC threat to Taiwan obviates the ne

contrive some compelling new justification for U.S. for

be in Asia, regardless of how valid the new reasoning 

prove to be in the long run. The Taiwan problem, once 

serves as the spoiler for China’s aspirations and as a 

complicating factor in devising a new security archite

for the region, even when the issue seemed to be Kor

Over the Boundary-Bothered South China Sea 

ASEAN.

Beijing’s motives with respect to the South Chin

may be questioned, but its increased attention 

southern periphery is clear. The most conspicuous ex

of that attention is China’s presence and participat

ASEAN and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) 

“dialogue partner.”

76

 Some accuse Beijing of particip

in bad faith and argue that China does not inte

compromise on its disputes with ASEAN coun

especially with respect to sovereignty claims in the 

China Sea. These voices also suggest that the PL

waiting over the horizon. In 1997, Carolina Herna

president of the Institute for Strategic and Develop

Studies (ISDS) in the Philippines, said, “You c

discount the possibility that [China] will exercise the 

of a Middle Kingdom.” She went on to refer to ling

doubts in ASEAN “about the possibly hegemonic amb

of China . . .”

77 Discussions by the author with official

ASEAN countries reveal concerns that China’s aspir

for big-power status are fueled by its increasingly 

relations and summit meetings with the United State

56
disbanding alliances and the reduction of the stab

U.S. influence. At the very least, there is no common 

among ASEAN nations that China’s role in the regio

be favorable.

Mischief Reef: Part of the Pattern? Though striv

foster a reputation as a partner and good neighbor 

ASEAN nations, Beijing nonetheless built structur

Mischief Reef in the eastern part of the Spratly Island

the Philippines. Following the February 1995 discov

the Chinese intrusion on the islet claimed by both C

and the Philippines, an international row ensued. B

asserted the structures there were to shelter fisherma

monitor weather conditions. Manila said they we

support PLAN operations. Chinese interlocutors 

suggested that the construction was purely a military 

and locally directed, i.e., that Beijing was not to b

China has gone so far recently as to offer use of the fac

to Filipino fishermen. 78 After 3 1/2 years, in November 

Manila once more complained of Chinese activity 

Beijing responded with the same disingenious explan

about facilities for fishermen.

Since 1995, other minor spats that smack more of 

opera than serious conflict have ensued around a cou

islets and reefs. China has backed off each time, sugg

that local forces may act out of turn but that cooler he

the central government will prevail. Meanwhile, ov

years Beijing has offered to negotiate Spratly Islands 

multilaterally and proposed to put aside sovereignty 

and proceed with joint economic development in the 

Even so, the other claimants remained unconvinc

China’s long-term intentions.

Renunciation of Force. To some observers, C

efforts appeared to be just more rhetoric from B

However, at a December 1997 meeting in Kuala Lu

(the first such meeting between just China and the AS

countries), then Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Q

57
regional differences and pursue joint development. 

said:

There is no tension in the South China Sea despite the reali

of our differences born from our historical legacy. But thro

regional cooperation, we have agreed to put aside the issu

sovereign claims and pursue joint development.

79

Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir, who had e

expressed reservations about the Chinese proposal, 

“Everybody agreed that any dispute should be s

through negotiations in a friendly manner without thr

use of force. So I think that is progress.”

80 Disbelieve

abound, but Beijing is trying very hard to convince AS

and the outside world of its good intentions with resp

cooperative economic development in the South China 

A New Approach by Beijing? One factor fuelin

disbelief is concern about the ultimate resolution 

disputed claims. There is an ominous note in C

formulation that the disputes will be shelved 

economic development proceeds, and Beijing has not 

definitive moves to ease those concerns. Indeed, a M

1998 article by Professor Ji Guoxing of the authori

Shanghai Institute of International Strategic St

restated the basis for China's claims:

China stands for the settlement of the disputes in the Spra

in accordance with international law and the U.N. Conven

of the Law of Sea. When ratifying the U.N. convention, Ch

stated it would negotiate with its neighboring countries “for 

delimitation of each other's maritime jurisdiction on 

principle of equity in accordance with international law.” N

that the countries concerned have a common basis and a uni

criterion for the settlement, they could engage in frien

negotiations, taking the related stipulations in the Conven

for an equitable, objective and workable formula of settlem

In seeking an equitable solution to the disputes, 

relevant factors such as historic title, isla

entitlements, continental shelf rights, proportional

geomorphological features, and economic intere

58
added.]

81

As the fourth anniversary of the Mischief Reef in

approaches, China continues naval operations in the 

China Sea and persists in consistent protests of perc

violations or disregard of its claimed soverei

conceivably to strengthen its claims under interna

law. However, China has not built structures on other 

set up new outposts or troop garrisons, or challenge

small garrisons of other claimants. China ha

threatened to use force or refused to renounce the 

force in the South China Sea to protect its ass

sovereignty. Beijing’s most outrageous recent actions 

been to propose, in April 1998, the development of a t

resort on Yongxing, the largest of the Paracel Islands 

than 150 miles southeast of Hainan), and to rep

rebuild the structures on Mischief Reef—after not

Manila of its intention do so.

82

 The first action, inv

Yongxing, evoked a sharp rebuke from Hanoi, w

continues to claim the Paracels.

83

 The PLA is not lik

relinquish easily its valuable foothold there, espe

given the military airfield it built on Woody Island.

The more intriguing issue is whether, if chall

somewhere in the South China Sea, Beijing will adh

its commitment to abjure the use of force. This test will 

the more meaningful because China, alone amon

disputants, has the forces needed to carry ou

island-grabbing action in the South China Sea or dis

an occupying force. If China does not use force in s

situation, it will almost certainly reflect a decisi

Beijing that China’s best interests are served by pur

solutions through other means or by avoiding confront

The trend may be in that direction. Over the last few 

China has pursued an agenda of broad cooperation wi

ASEAN countries rather than winning isolated spat

islets by employing heavy-handed military means.

59
pre-eminent role in Southeast Asia, as elsewhere in 

Asia. Beijing, however, abhors having the term he

applied to it and strives to employ its size and influe

ways that accomplish the purpose but avoid the appell

China’s cooperative participation in the various AS

fora seems to have produced some results. Cer

ASEAN considers Beijing before it acts. In January 

Singapore’s former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew op

India’s full membership in ASEAN on the ground

China would “resent” the move by ASEAN.

84

 The foll

month, Lee said if the United States and its stab

effect were gone in 20 years, “Asian leaders will tak

not to antagonize China.” Already by 1996 Beijin

ASEAN countries exercising caution and expre

concern for the effects on China of their actions. How

China’s concerns were being taken into account by AS

largely because it was to be feared. The sense was prim

one of conciliation, hardly a partnership among equa

In the following months, Beijing sought to moll

ASEAN neighbors, agreeing to multilateral negotiat

Spratlys issues and cooperative measures conce

navigation, shipping, and communications in the 

China Sea. Jusuf Wanandi, Chairman of the Cent

Strategic and International Studies in Indonesia, s

mid-1997, 

[China] still has to learn how to behave [in the region]. B

don’t think, in the longer term, China will be a bully at all. W

her opening up and her integration into the society region

and globally, she will become an important and a respons

partner.

85

Optimism began to replace obligation as the the

ASEAN attitudes toward China, although there re

considerable diversity among these nations with resp

their views of Beijing’s intentions.

Other events in mid-1997 contributed to a change o

in the relationship between Beijing and ASEAN

60
officials and others in the international community, de

to promptly admit Myanmar (Burma) to ASEAN. Chin

Myanmar were, of course, very close, and Beijing 

home that point when in the same month it conclu

broad economic and trade agreement with Ya

(Rangoon)—very soon after U.S. economic sanction

been imposed on the unelected government of Myanm

ASEAN took an approach that undoubtedly pleased 

since Myanmar’s internal affairs and pressure 

Western dialogue partners did not stop membe

Carolina Hernandez, president of the Philippine ISDS

“We don’t want to be told by Western powers on what 

We feel we have earned a right to play an independen

in the region.”

87

 Through press reports, however, B

was reminded that ASEAN membership was seen 

means to draw Myanmar away from its close politica

arms relationship with China. Hernandez also comm

on this aspect of the decision to admit Myanmar

important in the view of ASEAN countries to have B

included so that the resources and capabilities of Bur

not get under the control of only one power, and you 

China is a rising power.” 88 The admission of Laos to A

in the same year did not cause as much comment, b

purpose was the same.

Beijing’s Redoubled Offensive to Win Over AS

China’s most senior leaders then sought to convince AS

of China’s good intentions. In August 1997, Li Peng

the Chinese premier, described five proposals for prom

relations with the ASEAN countries: “respecting 

other, treating each other as equals, strength

dialogue, intensifying consultation, and seeking com

economic development.” Li said, “The potential fo

economic cooperation is indeed enormous, areas broa

prospects highly promising.”

89 A few months lat

mid-December 1997, Chinese President Jiang Z

proclaimed “the beginning of a new stage of developm

China-ASEAN relations.” “China will never 

61
neighbor, a good partner and a good friend with AS

countries.” He went on to urge the leaders of the 

ASEAN countries to “give priority to our economic rel

and trade, scientific and technological cooperation be

our two sides.”

90

ASEAN is an important target for Beijing’s efforts

nine nations as members and Cambodia soon 

admitted,

91

 it represents all the countries of the subreg

half-billion people, compared to a bit over the one

billion people in the European Union. Its total econo

roughly two-thirds that of Japan's.

92

 There are 

reasons for Chinese interest in ASEAN. Put bluntly

hard for Chinese leaders not to love an organization 

shares Beijing’s views on avoiding intrusions in the in

affairs of other countries. ASEAN endeared itself to B

when it ignored widespread disapproval and br

Myanmar into its fold, ignoring U.S. and interna

pressure over Yangon’s authoritarian actions. “The pu

of ASEAN is not to bring nice guys into a club. The pu

of ASEAN is to live at peace among ourselves,” is th

Dr. Tan Sri Noordin Sopiee, chairman of the Mala

Institute of International and Strategic Studies, pu

response to criticism of ASEAN at the time of the decis

Myanmar. At the July 1998 ASEAN foreign min

meeting in Manila, the policy of noninterference i

internal affairs of member states was reaffirmed w

Thai proposal for “flexible engagement” was rejected

ministers agreed on “enhanced interaction” on 

enforcement, the spread of smoke from fires, and ter

activities. Undoubtedly, Beijing, once more, was happy 

ASEAN’s rejection of the Thai proposal.

The ASEAN ARF, the organization’s body to d

security issues, is also important to Beijing. The 

planned at its 1994 inception to move from discuss

defense matters, to preventive diplomacy, to co

resolution. But it has hardly gone beyond the first s

was not until mid-1997 that national defense officials 

62
deliberations. At an ARF mid-year working meeti

Beijing in early 1997, consensus could not be reached 

on whether bilateral alliances made a favo

contribution to the region.

93

 Chinese Vice Foreign Mi

Chen Jian’s words at a press conference following the 

meeting demonstrate how Beijing, through its dia

partner status, was able to promote its agen

disparaging alliances:

There were efforts made to have the meeting acknowledge th

such alliances play a constructive role in regional peace. . . . W

do not think it is correct to regard bilateral military alliances 

the basis for maintaining regional security or the ARF a

supplement to such alliances.

94

Beijing appeared to support the ASEAN concepts of m

cooperative, multilateral solutions and to accept th

that security in the region could be a win-win propos

As a reflection of this, the consensus of the partici

at this meeting was that economic development had b

the focus of all countries and that expanding re

economic and trade interaction would establish a s

safety net for the Asia-Pacific region.

95

 The economic 

hit only months later, undermining for a time the str

of that safety net, but Beijing can still count on AS

leaders, especially Malaysia’s Mahathir, to remin

Americans of the value of ties among understanding 

nations and to join it in swipes at Washington. For

however, China through its links with ASEAN and i

in the ARF can exercise influence, consolidate opposit

U.S. alliances and defense policy, promote its reputat

a responsible member of the community of nations

represent itself as a constructive force in the region.

Burying the Hatchet with Vietnam? Beijing’s rel

with the capitals of ASEAN are diverse and complex. 

re-established diplomatic relations with Vietnam in 

after a gap of more than a decade following the 

disastrous 1979 invasion to “punish” Hanoi. Exchan

63
countries have become routine. Unquestionably, the 

spectacular of these was then-Premier Li Peng’s prom

attendance at Vietnam’s Eighth Communist 

Congress in June 1996. The following month Viet

Army Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Pham Va

visited Beijing and discussed regional security and m

cooperation. In August 1996, the very next month, th

Chief of the General Staff General Fu Quanyou ret

the visit. Then a month later, high-level talks were h

Hanoi on border disputes and maritime area issues. 

summer of 1997, Do Muoi, Vietnam’s party chief and 

senior official, accepted President Jiang Zemin’s invi

to visit Beijing. In June 1998, the Vietnamese Army 

again visited Beijing to talk with PRC Minister of De

General Chi Haotian.

Bilateral border disputes and tiffs over oil drillin

fishing rights have continued between China and Vie

but these disagreements have been handled rout

Regular talks on the land border issue are being held

an optimistic forecast that all issues will be resolv

2000. China has withdrawn survey and fishing vessel

disputed areas when Hanoi has protested thr

diplomatic channels. This suggests that Beijing cont

to “test the waters,” but that China does not persist 

challenged. This approach resembles its reaction ov

last 3 years to complaints from Manila over South 

Sea disputes. One interpretation is that Beijing is not 

to get its way in the South China Sea by throwing its w

around. Another explanation is that, because of Viet

substantive claims, it is useful for China to begin se

negotiated settlements there. If China settles these c

then Hanoi might not lead a coalition of the other AS

states. In any case, China is not pressing its claims by 

and gives the impression of being conciliatory.

Beijing Watches Jakarta. In mid-1998, political 

and rioting in Indonesia included mob attacks on w

ethnic Chinese,

96 repeating a pattern established 3 de

64
more capabilities at its disposal than in the 1960s, 

threaten or even hint at any action directed at Ja

Apparently no action was contemplated, not 

evacuation by air or sea of those ethnic Chinese fe

imminent murder, rape, assault, looting, and burn

property. Beijing's constraint was punctuated by prote

the Indonesian Embassy in Beijing, a reminder to Ja

that China was concerned. Demonstrations in Beijin

not permitted without the approval of the Ch

government. Mob action against ethnic Chine

Indonesia continued at least through November 199

Beijing has stuck to its policy of noninterference, 

using demonstrations and protests to remind Jakarta 

watching.

Beijing's passivity may not seem remarkable o

surface. However, it is interesting to reflect on altern

outcomes. Were Beijing in the mood to pursue terr

claims to the area that encompasses the valuable N

natural gas field north of Kalimantan, this period of ch

Indonesia would have been an opportunity to make a g

Indonesia’s military was distracted and unable to 

effectively to protect natural gas operations run by E

an area claimed by Indonesia 150 miles east of Indon

Natuna Island. China might have concluded th

interests would be served by confiscating facilities w

the limits of its historic claims, asserting that these 

should be used to pay reparations for the heavy 

sustained by ethnic Chinese abused in Indonesia. Pe

deliberations in Beijing do indeed contemplate eco

security considerations in the South China Sea 

nonaggressive light. Although Indonesian oil product

waning, Beijing almost certainly sees the advanta

preserving its own access to oil imports and not cre

antagonism in the country that controls the straits th

which oil from the Middle East flows to China.

98

Beijing and the Indian Ocean. China and Myanm

very different in size and population but have mu

65
1940s, have endured a history since then of social vol

and authoritarian rule, have remained largely poo

developing nations, and are forced to tolerate a nearby 

with which neither has particularly good relation

recent years, relations with India have been focuse

debate over the nature of Chinese facilities on Myan

Coco Islands, between the Andaman Sea and the B

Bengal less than 50 miles north of the India’s And

Islands. Allegations voiced by New Delhi and others 

ranged from the existence of a PLA surveillance stat

the island to the establishment of a naval base from 

the PLAN could conduct submarine or warship opera

which would threaten India. Yangon and Beijing deny 

allegations but do not explain persistent reports 

Chinese military activity on Coco Island.

99

The PLAN has not demonstrated a capability to co

clandestine submarine operations from a 

approximately 2,500 miles from its nearest ba

China—the submarine base at Yulin on the southern 

Hainan. Nor is there evidence of support for such opera

by the presence of a submarine tender. However, elec

monitoring of Indian naval and air operations, or a 

general form of electronic surveillance from Coco Isla

feasible. Interestingly, the other countries of ASEAN 

not publicly objected or inquired about the alleged 

presence. Perhaps the ASEAN countries do not mind h

someone else big and with growing military sophistic

watch the flank that faces giant India.

As Beijing looks to the future regarding its intere

the South China Sea and among the ASEAN countr

need not be pessimistic. It does not confront the prosp

an inevitable and endless series of confrontations 

rocks, reefs, islets, and possible oil deposits. China 

likely to remain the biggest frog in the South Chin

pond, but for now it shares the pond. Moreover, it has 

the ARF as a forum to advance its views on eco

security, cooperative security, and the five princip

66
China has also found support among ASEAN nations 

railings about the evils of U.S. hegemony and m

alliances that presuppose an adversary. This perspect

China and ASEAN may not be the popularly accepted 

of the Chinese outlook, but it seems to make sense a

serve Chinese interests far better than the ass

alternative. Whether China will continue its mod

position and realize its aspirations in the 21st century 

open question, but Beijing seems to be committed t

course.

Beyond the Himalayas to the Subcontinent: In

and Pakistan.

The May 1998 nuclear detonations set off by Indi

Pakistan had at least one positive effect. If Beijing ha

serious doubts concerning the perils of proliferatio

tests drove home the point that a nuclear arms race in 

Asia served no country’s interests, especially not th

China. Washington’s years of cajoling Beijing, imp

sanctions on Chinese companies, and painfully extra

agreements from Chinese negotiators could no long

dismissed by Beijing as efforts by the Americans to 

their own concerns down Asian throats. China’s Pres

Jiang Zemin said, “This [the South Asian nuclear test

inevitably endanger the peace and stability of South 

and the world at large and have a big impact o

international non-proliferation regime. . . .” “I wish to 

out that nuclear testing is against international tren

matter whether the test is conducted by India or Paki

Jiang continued. He urged both countries to relinquish 

nuclear weapon programs and unconditionally accede 

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and Co

hensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).

100

Amidst this supposed conversion from prof

proliferator to ardent nonproliferator, it was easy to 

the long road to Chinese accession to the NPT, a treat

67
Largely ignored in 1998 was the fact that China set 

final detonation in July 1996, after the text of the CTB

been agreed upon. Further, China was among the 

obstinate of the CTBT drafters, throwing up one ob

after another as it all the while tested warheads for it

missiles and assisted Pakistan. A statement from 

Chinese foreign ministry expressed outrage over I

tests: 

The Chinese government is deeply shocked by this and her

expresses its strong condemnation.... The internatio

community should adopt a common position in stron

demanding India immediately stop its nuclear developm

program. [The tests displayed] outrageous contempt for 

common will of the international community for 

comprehensive ban on nuclear tests.

101

The decision by Beijing to react harshly was 

foregone conclusion. Beijing had spent years denying 

has provided nuclear weapons and ballistic m

assistance to Pakistan, denials which few accepted 

which Islamabad and Beijing persist. Beijing had 

similarly attentive to finding ways to skirt commitme

Washington and the world to do better with resp

proliferation or to curb dubious sales of “dual-use” ite

Chinese entities to Pakistan. Neither India nor Pakist

these nuclear tests, had violated international agree

to which they were parties. Beijing’s decision about h

react was made all the more difficult by the Chinese po

on interference in another country’s internal affairs. 

days or so, Beijing did not react to the Indian 

reflecting the difficulty of its internal deliberations. 

probably influenced by international pressure, B

came down unequivocally on the side of a commitmen

standard of international behavior. Moreover, it adhe

that position through Pakistan’s tests, a much 

sensitive decision for Beijing. India, and then Pakista

violated what had come to be accepted by the respo

members of the community of nations as a worl

68
international responsibility by backing norm

restraints on nuclear proliferation.

This decision by Beijing was all the more signif

given China’s close ties with Pakistan and histo

confrontation with India. The decision seems to ref

significant shift in Beijing’s security perspective on 

Asia, although this shift was not as abrupt as might a

to be the case. China had for years been retreating 

overt nuclear and missile cooperation with Pakistan

no other reasons than that Washington both br

pressure to bear and made persuasive arguments. How

China also seemed increasingly concerned abo

international reputation, and in Beijing the num

officials and bureaucrats who argued that non-prolife

was responsible policy grew, as did their influence.

Moreover, Beijing was not inclined to condemn 

despite their disagreements. China’s relations with 

including security matters, had taken a decidedly po

turn, starting with Rajiv Gandhi’s 1988 visit to B

Jiang Zemin in the mid-1990s became the first Ch

president to go to New Delhi, a visit that pro

agreement to reduce troops and weapons along th

countries’ disputed Himalayan borders. The impr

relationship was not ruptured by the widely noted sca

outbursts of India’s new defense minister, G

Fernandes, after the Hindu Bharatiya Janata Party 

led a coalition and took over the government in early 

Fernandes labeled China as India’s biggest potential t

and accused Beijing of aiding the Pakistani missile pro

and stationing threatening aircraft in Tibet.

Despite these loud accusations by the co

Fernandes, Beijing did not cancel a visit to India by 

Chief of the General Staff General Fu Quanyou

leaders managed temporarily to tone down the rheto

preparation for Fu’s visit. A foreign ministry spoke

said,

69
development of a friendly, cooperative, good-neighborly 

mutually beneficial relationship with China, our larg

neighbor. Both sides have agreed to build a constructive 

cooperative relationship oriented towards the 21st century. 

We see our relationship as one in which the two sides would 

responsive to each other's concerns. Eliminating differences 

promoting understanding would contribute to the developm

of good neighborly relations. . . .

102

But the vociferous Fernandes spoke out again whe

PLA general went home. Fernandes ratcheted up the 

of rhetoric further after India’s nuclear tests, sayin

China presented an imminent nuclear threat tha

forced India to develop nuclear weapons. Beijing deni

charges but did not overreact. Now that the nuclea

has settled, both India and Pakistan are more s

considering what they have wrought. Fernandes is si

a different tune:

If China and the U.S. can have a strategic partnership wh

makes them de-target their nuclear missiles . . . despite 

several issues that divide them, there is no reason why In

and China cannot have a . . . closer relationship, while they w

towards resolving outstanding disputes between them. . . . 

have a shared past . . . both are proud of their civilizatio

heritage.

After blaming the Indian press for distorting his e

characterization of China as a threat, Fernandes a

“We will take whatever measures are needed to be ta

see that we get on to the discussion table and see th

bring our relationship on to an even keel.” 103 Fern

glibly ignored that he had been the primary boat-roc

This anecdote about Fernandes does more than de

recent events in the Sino-Indian security relationsh

illustrates that Beijing and New Delhi—after a brief w

1962, enduring disagreements, scathing condemna

and India’s nuclear challenge to China’s ally, Pakistan

pursuing the rapprochement commenced precisely a d

ago. Sino-Indian trade is not significant; geogr

70
be driven by economic factors in this case, but it is s

not inclined to teach India a lesson, as it did in the pas

interested in perpetuating the progress that has 

achieved on confidence-building measures in dis

areas, including mutual and balanced force reduction

other promising results stemming from the border 

that began in 1981. Over almost 2 decades, Chin

steered a long-term course for good relations with 

Despite the inevitable difficulties that will arise, B

appears intent on maintaining that course. Reg

stability is something in which China now has a ve

stake.

Moreover, Beijing is not inclined single-minde

stand behind Islamabad, savoring any opportunity to 

New Delhi. Pakistan has suffered China’s verbal wra

understandable as Pakistan's nuclear tests were in th

of many Chinese, Beijing did not to need the threat o

sanctions to enforce its new rules about controlling the 

of dual-use technology. China, of course, will not aba

Pakistan, and it is not likely to try to broker the Ka

dispute. But it may well pursue more balanced relatio

the South Asian subcontinent. Its policies for South 

will be far less likely to involve roguish behav

quibbling on interpretation of Missile Technology C

Regime (MTCR), viewed by many experts to be a sear

loopholes. India and Pakistan have provided China w

lesson on what constitutes responsible behavior i

world, where China wants to be accepted as a major 

and key player.

Through the Strait of Malacca—and All the Wa

Iran and Iraq.

Economic security for China, like Japan and the U

States, is largely dependent on access to crude oil. Ch

far from wholly dependent on oil imports, but it de

heavily on supplies from Iran, Indonesia, and, with

71
of petroleum products in 1993 and a net importer of cru

starting in 1996.

104

Although China has loosened price controls on dom

crude oil, cracked down on rampant domestic theft of 

oil, and begun an intensified oil search in the Lop 

nuclear testing area of Qinghai Province, its crude oil 

are beyond domestic or regional production capac

Imported crude oil topped 35 million tons in 199

percent more than in 1996;

106 and for the first qua

1998, consumption was up 18 percent over last ye

Beijing has given up hope of meeting demand th

domestic production. Prominent in its global search 1

1997 $1.2 billion deal with Iraq to develop the huge A

oil field—after United Nations (U.N.) sanctions have 

lifted.

109 Iraq’s oil minister, Lieutenant General 

Mohammad Rashid, was in Beijing in May 1998 as p

Baghdad’s effort to have the U.N. sanctions lifted.

110

The intensity of China’s quest for oil indi

recognition that its status as a net importer is a

certainly irreversible. In August 1996, there was no 

enthusiastic proponent than China for easing the pli

the Iraqi people brought about by post-Gulf War sanc

China promised that it would actively assist in prov

humanitarian aid to Iraq under the U.N. oil-fo

program. During that same month, China was discu

with Iraqi officials the conduct of seismic studies a

field development in Iraq, with contract negotia

reportedly underway.

111

 Three months later, maj

exploration contracts were reported.

112

 In September 

Beijing protested the strike on Iraq by 44 U.S. 

missiles and, urging restraint, objected to the threat 

attack by massed U.S. armed forces.

In January 1998, the speaker of the Iraqi parlia

was in Beijing. On that occasion, then Chinese Fo

Minister Qian Qichen said, “China calls on the 

community to give a just and objective evaluation 

72
Beijing displayed at least a glint of the “objectivity” 

calling for when Qian added, “China . . . hopes that Ira

continue cooperating with the U.N. Special Commit

order to alleviate and finally lift the U.N. sanctio

Later in the month, nonetheless, China joined Russia 

U.N. in calling for certification that Iraq had complet

dismantlement of its nuclear weapon program.

In February 1998, China and Russia again oppos

attack on Iraq because of Baghdad’s intransigence 

respect to U.N. weapons inspections. Xinhua reporte

Foreign Minister Qian told U.S. Secretary of 

Madeleine Albright by phone, “China does not favor th

of force against Iraq.”

114

 Later that month, then 

Ambassador to the United Nations Bill Richardso

with Qian in Beijing. Qian continued to oppose the 

force but, according to Richardson, acknowledged tha

defiance of the inspections was a grave matter.

11

Chinese government took a similar position in Nove

1998, actively encouraging Iraq to cooperate wit

United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) insp

regime but opposing the use of force.

Beijing has demonstrated repeatedly that its rel

with Baghdad extend beyond principled objections 

use of force; they are oil-fired. Certainly, there are 

reasons for China’s opposition to the application of fo

the United States inside Iraq. China is sympathetic 

countries that claim to have been oppressed and victi

by Western powers, and it opposes any precedent for th

of U.S. or U.N. forces in striking a country that has p

obstinate. Nevertheless, China focuses narrowl

optimistically on the coming decades when, after san

are lifted, large-scale exploitation of Iraq’s expandi

fields can be carried out by China. Beijing’s se

relationship with Baghdad is defined by the eco

implications of oil, and Beijing will likely be tempted 

sanctions are lifted to see if arms sales and nu

73
the share of Iraq’s oil that it desires.

In the case of Iran, arms sales and the transfer of nu

technology have been central features of a relationshi

designed to ensure that China’s rising demand for oil 

met into the next century, when consumption will q

pass 50 million tons per year and continue up

Prominent among the weapons sold in recent years to 

have been the C-802 and C-801K shipborne 

air-launched antiship cruise missiles (ASCMs), subso

speed but with considerable range and capability

transfer of these missiles did not violate the provisi

the MTCR, but the sales incensed the Pentagon. The

now have become a concern to Beijing, as China appe

have realized that the flow of oil from the Persian Gu

be more imperiled than protected by Iranian patrol 

and aircraft armed with these missiles.

There were other salient aspects of China’s supp

Iran. Beijing complained vociferously in early 1996 

the D’Amato law, which permits the United Sta

sanction foreign companies investing in Iran (and L

because of their connections with terrorists. It wa

troublesome to American defense officials that Ch

Defense Minister General Chi Haotian met his Ir

counterpart in August 1996 in Beijing to discuss imp

military relations. Chinese leaders seem determin

least, to make a show of support for Iranian causes a

improving bilateral relations. Then, to the surprise of m

at the October 1997 Jiang-Clinton summit meeting 

United States, Jiang promised to stop missile sales t

and also to cease nuclear technology transfers.

116

Such assurances of future good behavior from 

have often been subject to interpretation, so i

heartening when, in January 1998, Chinese De

Minister Chi reaffirmed to U.S. Secretary of De

William Cohen that neither ASCMs nor nuclear techn

would be transferred to Iran.

117

 Later reports tha

74
circumvent Beijing’s commitment to Washin

suggested, however, that the words were empty

National Security Adviser Sandy Berger reportedly wr

his Chinese counterpart about the issue. An uniden

U.S. official said the Chinese government had inter

and halted the transactions.

118

Washington seemed to have created a rift in rel

between Beijing and Tehran, but the seriousness of t

is uncertain. However, Beijing is not likely to give 

easily in its quest for oil from Iran. China’s Vice Prem

Trade Li Lanqing visited Tehran in May 1997 and disc

expanding economic cooperation between China 

Iran.

119

 Of greatest import was the acceptance by Ch

an Iranian proposal to equip a Chinese refinery so t

could process high-sulfur-content Iranian crude oil. L

this would allow China to buy more Iranian oil

remains to be seen whether, despite Beijing's reticen

arms sales, the oil relationship will survive. Tehran 

find Beijing to be a fair-weather friend, but probably 

understand why China yielded to American pressu

some areas. If the security relationship cools furth

would be because China can obtain sufficient oil elsew

Preserving Economic Security vis-à-vis Iraq and 

China does not yet have the navy to protect the sea 

over which its oil comes from the Middle East. Iron

China depends on the U.S. Navy to ensure freed

navigation for the oil tankers that are essential to C

steadily growing economy. China must wend its 

through perilous Iranian and Iraqi channels of intrigu

American nonproliferation “minefields.” Sales of Ch

arms are counterproductive, even when use

inducements to those nations that are considered pa

by other countries that have modern arms to sell. 

China has to contemplate its security concerns among 

states on its far southwestern periphery in new 

different terms, realizing that its security there is t

China’s new life blood: oil.

75
China sees itself emerging as a major regional powe

important global player. Among other things, Beijin

seek peaceful borders; insist on an appropriate ro

China in Northeast Asian security; pretend, at least, to 

learned humility in the South China Sea; balan

relations in South Asia and on the Korean Peninsula

hope to master the technique of getting oil without 

arms in Southwest Asia. In all of this, weapons and t

mean much less than it seemed they would only a dec

so ago. A similar situation will apply to other countr

the region. Cancelled and postponed arms purchas

China’s neighboring states, as a consequence of the 

financial crisis, pale in security significance to the m

in which those nations will restore their comp

workforces to productivity and to robust interdepe

economic relations. A modernized PLA is a m

component of China’s regional security calculi. Only 

respect to Taiwan, not a peripheral state by Be

definition but a renegade province, is a formidable 

truly a prominent part of the current picture. Even i

cross-strait contest, the odds are not bad for those wh

willing to gamble that economic considerations will p

and ultimately produce a lasting solution across the T

Strait.

There is considerable evidence that China means 

of what it says in the July 1998 Defense White P

Beijing is devoting more “quality time” and attention 

peripheral environment and doing so, althoug

perfectly, in ways that tend to build economic bonds r

than sow seeds of distrust and trepidation. Beijin

likely continue to be seen by Washington and oth

especially Taipei—as obnoxious; but as Washingto

demonstrated over the decades, it is very hard to be bo

and powerful and still universally adored. Neverth

China is learning at least the jargon of multilater

confidence-building, and how to be a pre-eminent 

76
China’s impressive national economic succes

contrasted with its mediocre military modernization

serve to reinforce the tendency in Beijing to believ

economics is the most important component in C

comprehensive national power and that military pow

at best, only complementary. That raises the intri

question of how this new Chinese attitude might be af

were the economy to take a big tumble, as has been th

with several of China’s neighbors. For now, examinat

the odds of that occurring can be postponed for a f

endeavor. At present, Beijing is making a convincin

that security relations on its periphery in the 21st ce

will turn on matters of economic security 

interdependence, elements of national power where C

is increasingly competent.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 2

1. The words peripheral states are used in the title of this p

the sense of the countries that form a rough perimeter arou

largest country in Asia, China, and not in the sense that these st

of minor relevance or importance. Taiwan is discussed extensive

not afforded a separate section, as are the states or groups of sta

are treated fully. There are two reasons: (1) This paper is intende

attempt to view the periphery from Beijing’s perspectiv

government in Beijing, of course, does not see Taiwan as a state. 

Taiwan issue has received the fulsome coverage and atten

deserves in other writings, including both papers presented at t

Wye River PLA Conference, where this paper was initially pre

and the 1996 PLA Conference at Coolfont, West Virginia, wh

devoted to the Taiwan issue and cross-strait relations. The pape

that 1996 conference, including one by the author, appear as cha

James R. Lilley and Chuck Downs, eds., Crisis in the Taiwan 

Washington: National Defense University Press, September 19

2. Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Rep

China, China’s National Defense, a White Paper, Beijing, July 199

3. Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Rep

China, China: Arms Control and Disarmament, a White Paper, 

November 1995, Foreword. Available on the Inter

www.chinanews.org/White Papers.

77
5. Ibid., p. 5.

6. Ibid., Chap. IV, pp. 36-38.

7. 1995 White Paper, Chap. VI.

8. Private conversation between the officer and the autho

spring of 1998.

9. 1998 White Paper, Chap. I, p. 5.

10. Ibid., pp. 4-5.

11. Ibid., p. 3.

12. Ibid., p. 5.

13. 1998 White Paper, Chap. IV, p. 34.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid., p. 37.

16. Ibid., Chap. I, p. 7.

17. Ibid., p. 8.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid., Chap. IV, p. 33.

20. Ibid., p. 34.

21. The Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region composes 

one-sixth of the area of China and holds important oil reserves an

natural resources. It is also the gateway to oil and gas fields 

Central Asian Republics.

22. Former Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen in an Ap

interview with Reuters said, “We are opposed to terrorist and sep

activities by some fundamentalists because religion and politics 

separate issues.” He said Chinese officials were aware of the sp

Islamic extremists and that Beijing had joined forces with its 

Muslim neighbors in the former Soviet Union. Of China

78
ethnic minorities.

23. Hans now compose about 38 percent of the Xinjiang pop

of almost 17 million. Uighurs have been reduced from almost 80 

before 1949 to as little as 48 percent now, although some thi

number is as large as 60 percent. There are probably almost 

Uighurs living in Kazakhstan and another 300,000 in other 

Asian countries.

24. Benjamin Kang Lim, “China Sings Praises of Cops K

Separatists," Reuters, Beijing, August 14, 1998.

25. Kazakhstan is by far the largest and most importan

bordering Central Asian countries. Its population of 16 m

roughly the same as that of Xinjiang; its area of slightly more 

million square miles is not quite twice that of Xinjiang.

26. Oleg Shchedrov, Reuters, Beijing, April 26, 1996; Ne

Times News Service wire report, Shanghai, April 27, 1996.

27. Associated Press, Almaty, Kazakhstan, December 14, 1

28. Gareth Jones, “Kazakh Activists Urge Chinese Resp

Uighur Rights," Reuters, Almaty, Kazakhstan, January 15, 199

29. Mike Collett-White, “Kazakhs, Chinese Vow Closer Tie

Trade," Reuters, Almaty, Kazakhstan, July 4, 1998.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid. The Collett-White article from Almaty reported 

meeting of the “group of five,” the signing of the agreement by Jia

Nazarbayev, and that Beijing has taken Kazakhstan more seriou

potential trade partner since signing oil production and transpo

worth $9.5 billion last year. President Nazarbayev, it states, s

that Jiang was firmly committed to the ambitious oil projects

Western executives have dismissed as economically un

Nazarbayev is quoted as saying, “The biggest contract b

Kazakhstan and China was signed by the oil company of the C

republic. This was called the project of the century. Today I co

with, Jiang,its importance for China."

32. Shchedrov.

33. Benjamin Kang Lim, Reuters, Beijing, November 10, 19

79
in English, April 23, 1997, in Foreign Broadcast Infor

Service-China (henceforth FBIS-CHI)-97-079, April 23, 1997.

35. Reuters, “Russia, China FMs Discuss Security Issues," 

July 22, 1998.

36. Robert Burns, Associated Press, Washington, January 14

37. “China, Russia: Text of Sino-Russian Joint Statement.”

38. Ibid.

39. Aleksandr Platkovskiy, “Rodionov Urges Chinese to S

Against Hegemonism,” Izvestiya, April 16, 1997, p. 3.

40. “China, Russia: Text of Sino-Russian Joint Statement.”

41. Alastair Macdonald, Reuters, Moscow, January 4, 1996

42. Ibid.

43. Patrick E. Tyler, New York Times News Service, February 

44. The rumors and uncertainty concerning the status of th

deal are circumstantial evidence of the problems that exist with 

to payment amounts and terms in arms sales from Russia to Chi

fact that neither side chose to dispel the uncertainty with a de

statement adds credibility to the assertion herein that cost an

are a matter of considerable contention. 

45. Reuters, Moscow, April 11, 1996.

46. Reuters, Beijing, January 11, 1996.

47. The year-long operation in Cambodia, UNTAC, in 1

consisted of two contingents of 608 personnel each, almost all o

were in civil engineering units. The 2-year-long opera

Mozambique, ONUMOZ, involved a total of 154 personnel i

contingents, almost all of whom were involved in transport ac

These data are taken from the Japan Defense Agency White 

Defense of Japan 1997 published in Japan by The Japan Times

July 1997, p. 277.

48. Although the issue of sovereignty has gotten prime atte

the confrontations over Diaoyutai, it should be noted that the c

for the confrontation in the summer of 1996 was the earlier pres

80
provocation and threat by the Japanese, especially the rig

zealots who exacerbated the situation by constructing a nav

beacon on the island, but the economic implications of China’s in

are revealed thereby. It is noteworthy that, similarly, Beijing’s f

activity in the South China Sea corresponded to widespread op

estimates of oil reserves in the area of the Spratly Islands. As 

and drilling have failed to produce significant oil and prospec

seemed less promising, China’s attitudes and actions with respe

Spratly Islands disputes have become more benign, even concil

49. Chen Yali, “U.S.-Japan Alliance not conducive to peace,

Daily, May 26, 1997.

50. Japan Defense Agency, White Paper entitled Defense o

1997 published in Japan in English by The Japan Times, Ltd., 

1997, p. 286-289. Reference 18 in this volume is the full-text un

translation of the April 1996 document entitled “Japan-U.S

declaration on Security—Alliance for the 21st Century.”

51. In 1994, then-U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defe

International Security Affairs Joseph Nye pointed out th

guidelines for U.S.-Japanese defense cooperation were dangerou

of date.

52. Patrick E. Tyler, New York Times, April 19, 1996.

53. Tokyo NHK General Television Network broadcast the fo

report on April 9, 1997:

Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto, in his meeting with t

Liberal Democratic Party’s [LDP] Policy Research Coun

Chairman Taku Yamasaki and other senior membe

explained a view that this fall’s review of the Japan-U

cooperation guideline will address possible emergencies n

only on the Korean Peninsula but also across the wide ar

surrounding Japan. At the meeting, questions were ask

regarding review of the guidelines and other issues, sayi

“Although assumptions are being made on the basis of 

emergency on the Korean Peninsula only, should one 

consider including the defense of the so-called sea-lanes 

well?” In response, the prime minister said: “In Diet deba

on the current Japan-U.S. security arrangements, questio

were asked only on issues relating to the Korean Peninsu

But, I ventured not to limit the issues on the Kore

81
considered subjects for debate.” In this way, the prime mini

explained the view that Japan-U.S. defense cooperation sho

be reviewed while assuming emergencies not only on 

Korean Peninsula but also in the Spratly Islands, Taiwan 

other areas surrounding Japan.

Reuters, Tokyo, August 19, 1997, quoted Chief Cabinet Se

Seiroku Kajiyama as saying during a news conference: “The ‘F

covered in the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty covers the area nort

Philippines . . . that includes the Taiwan Strait and the 

peninsula.” “I am not aware that the revision includes a chang

fundamentals of the security pact,” Kajiyama reportedly said.

54. Paul Eckert, Reuters, Dalian, China, September 7, 1997

55. Associated Press, New York, September 4, 1997.

56. Paul Eckert, Reuters, Shenyang, China, September 5, 1

57. Eckert, September 7, 1997.

58. Ibid.

59. Japan Defense Agency White Paper.

60. Brian Williams, Reuters, Tokyo, April 18, 1996.

61. Reuters, Beijing, April 18, 1996.

62. Chen Yali.

63. Ibid.

64. Private conversations by the author with Japanese 

specialists in the first half of 1998 revealed their belief that B

attempting quietly to subvert political and public support for T

Japan. Experts in Tokyo and Washington suggest, also private

the rather small Japanese budget allocations set aside for stud

TBMD issue are token amounts and are in reality evidence of 

support for, or at least uncertainty about, the TBMD progr

addition to the effects Chinese arguments may have had, ther

Japan “political concerns” that TBMD’s reach, the coverage the m

provide by virtue of their inherent range, would provide inc

protection for Korea, thereby violating Japanese constit

constraints. Also, there are doubts about whether the ext

82
put to sea.

65. Kyodo News Service, “Tokyo To Postpone Missile D

Decision," Tokyo, March 1, 1997, in Foreign Broadcast Info

Service-East Asia (henceforth FBIS-EAS)-97-041.

66. Eckert, Reuters, Beijing, September 4, 1997.

67. Reuters, ”Japan Defense Chief Tours China Naval 

Shanghai, May 2, 1998.

68. Kyodo News Service issued a report from Tokyo, Aug

1998, stating that a senior Foreign Ministry official said Tokyo 

it unnecessary to accept Beijing’s reported request to include th

no’s policy” in a joint statement the two governments were prepa

Chinese President Jiang Zemin’s [now-postponed] visit to Japan 

September 6-11, 1998.

69. Jiang Zemin’s 1992 visit to Japan was as General Secr

the Chinese Communist Party. The postponed visit was resched

November 25-30, 1998, and was to include calls on Emperor Akih

Prime Minister Obuchi.

70. Eric A. McVadon. For an examination and analysis of 

concerns, interests, strategy, and aspirations for the Korean Pen

see the author’s paper prepared for the 1997 PLA Conference 

Plantation. This paper, “Chinese Military Strategy for the 

Peninsula,” is a chapter in China’s Military Faces the Future

Shambaugh, ed., AEI Press and M.E. Sharpe, 1999.

71. This distant time frame was offered by a moderately sen

well-informed PLA officer in 1997. The officer is well acquaint

his country’s official position with respect to Korean issues.

72. In a late-August 1997 interview, a PLA general 

cognizant of his government’s positions with respect to Korea, g

priority to China’s continuing economic development among the 

in formulation of Beijing’s policies with respect to the Korean Pen

He emphasized that, above all, peace and stability there are esse

China’s achieving this goal.

73. McVadon, “Chinese Military Strategy for the 

Peninsula,” Tables 1 and 2. These tables and the preceding text 

the figures for South Korean investment in China.

83
in Shanghai in 1972 (by President Richard Nixon), in 1978 (by Pr

Jimmy Carter), and in 1982 (by President Reagan). President 

avoided a “fourth communique” in his 1998 visit to China.

75. A Chinese diplomat in Washington asked the author 

1998 if he had noticed Beijing’s “toned-down” approach to the 

continued presence of U.S. forces on the Korean Peninsula, ev

major change there. The new component of the Chinese position 

pointed emphasis on limiting the use of the forces to “bilateral m

This term was apparently borrowed from Chinese statement

what the U.S.-Japanese alliance should be.

76. The PRC, United States, and several other countries par

as “dialogue partners” but not as full members of ASEAN.

77. Rene Pastor, Reuters, Singapore, June 4, 1997.

78. Manila in early August rejected Chinese Foreign Minist

Jiaxuan’s late July offer. Reuters, “China says Spratlys sove

‘indisputable’,” Beijing, August 6, 1998.

79. “Countries unite on Spratlys claim," Star Malaysia

Lumpur, December 17, 1997.

80. Ibid.

81. Ji Guoxing, “China Versus South China Sea Security,” S

Dialogue, Sage Publications/PRIO, Vol. 29, No. 1, March 1

excerpted in Pacific Forum Center for Strategic and Intern

Studies (CSIS) PacNet #17, April 24, 1998.

82. Ruben Alabastro, “Computer glitch helped spark S

row—Manila,” Reuters, Manila, November 9, 1998. A 13-day d

receipt of the message from the Philippine embassy in Beijing r

in Philippine discovery of the work only 1 day after the notificat

received. Manila protested, with Defense Minister Mercado a

Beijing of conducting a “creeping invasion.” The comic opera of 

spats involving Manila continued unabated.

83. Only China, Taiwan, and Vietnam claim the Paracel Isla

countries, the three mentioned plus the Philippines, Brun

Malaysia, claim all or parts of the Spratly Islands. Of course, 

claims in the South China Sea have mirrored those of Beiji

author is not aware of changes of sovereignty claims by Taip

abandoning its position a few years back that it was the leg

government of all China, including the mainland.

84
“dialogue partner” in ASEAN meetings.

85. Pastor.

86. Washington had imposed economic sanctions on the SL

May 1997: Bill Tarrant, Reuters, Kuala Lumpur, June 1, 1997.

87. Tarrant.

88. Ibid.

89. Christina Toh-Pantin, Reuters, Kuala Lumpur, August 2

90. “China will never seek hegemony – Jiang,” Reuters, i

Kong Standard, December 16, 1997.

91. Cambodia’s entry into ASEAN has been delaye

consequence of the political strife there. Cambodia and Papu

Guinea attended the July 24-29, 1998, meeting of ASEAN 

ministers in Manila in the status of observers. Reports of reconc

between Hun Sen and the younger Sihanouk led to speculation 

1998 that Cambodia might, once more, be near to acceptan

ASEAN.

92. Noordin Sopiee, “Fulfilling Dream of Regional Unity,” 

#24, Pacific Forum CSIS, Honolulu, June 13, 1997. The ec

comparisons were obviously derived from figures pre-dat

on-going Asian economic crisis.

93. The bilateral agreements in Asia primarily involve the 

States. The Five-Power Defense Arrangement (FPDA), comp

Singapore, Malaysia, the United Kingdom, Australia, an

Zealand, is the only multilateral defense arrangement in the re

was formed in 1971 after Malaysia had suffered a confrontation 

large neighbor Indonesia. Although the FPDA conducted exercis

the Spratly Islands while China was intimidating Taiwan w

exercises in early 1996, all attention was directed to the two U.

carrier battle groups that had been dispatched to the area of T

94. Mary Kwang, “ARF Talks End with No Consensus on B

Alliances,” Straits Times, Singapore, March 9, 1997.

95. Ibid.

85
percent of the population, control a large portion of the econo

national wealth.

97. The Natuna gas field, but not the island of Natuna, app

fall within the rather imprecise dashed lines that appeared on C

maps of the South China Sea.

98. This rather fanciful scenario is presented not because it 

a likely course of action for Beijing to take during the heigh

Indonesian crisis, but rather because, when we consider it, we co

significantly, that it was indeed a very unlikely course for the C

government, as we have come to perceive it in recent years, to 

99. A PLA presence on a Myanmar island would also vio

Chinese fundamental position opposing foreign troops on the 

another nation.

100. “China urges India, Pakistan to stop nuke progr

Reuters, Beijing, June 22, 1998.

101. Justin Jin, “China, Gloves Off, Attacks India," Reuters, 

May 14, 1998.

102. “India Moves to Mollify China Over Defence Minister," R

New Delhi, May 6, 1998.

103. Narayanan Madhavan, “India Says Can Get Close to 

Despite Hurdles," Reuters, New Delhi, May 8, 1998.

104. Neil Fullick, Reuters, Singapore, January 26, 1998.

105. Neil Fullick, “China takes big step toward open oil m

Reuters, Singapore, June 5, 1998.

106. Fullick, January 26, 1998.

107. Fullick, June 5, 1998.

108. Unconfirmed reports have China seeking oil-related co

in Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, C

Papua New Guinea, Peru, Sudan, and Thailand.

109. Reuters, Beijing, November 25, 1998.

110. Associated Press, Baghdad, May 25, 1998. Of course, B

also investing in a pipeline with Kazakhstan.

86
112. Reuters, Beijing, November 11, 1996.

113. Reuters, Beijing, January 6, 1998.

114. Scott Hillis, “China Tells Albright It’s Uneasy Ov

Crisis," Reuters, Beijing, February 5, 1998.

115. Scott Hillis, Reuters, Beijing, February 14, 1998.

116. The latter step facilitated implementation of the 

Cooperation Agreement between the United States and Chin

allowing U.S. companies to compete in China’s burgeoning 

power industry.

117. A PLA general officer with considerable experience in 

with Iran told the author in August 1997 that Beijing had decide

provide Tehran with assistance in the construction of a nuclear 

planned for a site near the border with Iraq. He said that the pr

to the border had been the stated reason, but that Iran’s sup

Islamic fundamentalists in the Central Asian Republics and in X

had made the decision to halt nuclear cooperation with Tehran e

make.

118. “China Foils the Spread of Nukes . . . Probably,” Ch

Science Monitor, March 12, 1998.

119. China was reported in 1996 to be a major suppl

contractor for the Tehran subway system.

120. Associated Press, Beijing, May 4, 1997.

87
PLA CAPABILITIES IN THE 21st CENTU

HOW DOES CHINA ASSESS

ITS FUTURE SECURITY NEEDS?

Michael Pillsbury

INTRODUCTION

With the Asian financial crisis and the floods in Ch

hardly seems urgent to address the future warfig

capabilities of the People's Liberation Army (PLA)

China's military planners are patient, long-term str

thinkers, so despite the current problems, I will still p

some comments on the topic. This chapter is divided in

sections. Its purpose is to present a “net assessment” o

China may see its future military capabilities.

Section One continues a discussion, begun i

introduction, about errors to be avoided in estimating f

Chinese military capabilities. Section Two describ

way that the open souces of information available in 

assess the future security environment, includin

likelihood of war and the future trends in mi

capabilities of the major powers. Section Three narrow

focus of this chapter to China's quantitative estima

Comprehensive National Power (CNP) for 2010 and 

based on books by the Academy of Military Science an

Academy of Social Science, including a discussion o

some Chinese analysts claim these national power “s

can predict the outcome of future warfare. Section 

identifies debates among the Chinese military 

long-term modernization goals. Section Five lists C

military investment allocation priorities and attem

link some of these investment decisions to the de

debate, suggesting that the shape of the PLA by 2020 c

affected a great deal by the debate among the three sc

89
future American military capabilities to defend 

Korea and Taiwan and to pursue a potential Revolut

Military Affairs (RMA). Easily offended or h

nationalistic American readers should skip this secti

What are some of the key issues in understanding 

China's military capabilities may be in the first 2 deca

the 21st century? In spite of the hazards of straigh

projections of China's current forces to 2010 or 2020, 

still use this estimative method to arrive at a pict

future capabilities. This chapter argues that it is 

important to know in detail the objectives that C

leaders seek to pursue through military moderniz

Happily, Western analysts of the Chinese military 

have a better chance to get right the issue of C

modernization goals than whether China's mi

technology programs will succeed. After all, China's le

continue to proclaim the validity of Sun Tzu and to r

Deng Xiaoping's guidance tao guang yang hui (conce

capabilities and bide our time). China is unlikely to ra

level of transparency by inviting the U.S. defense atta

visit the research and development (R&D) progra

fields such as counter-stealth radar, laser wea

electrodynamic railguns, anti-satellite interce

precision guided missiles, and many other we

designed to focus on U.S. vulnerabilities. I believe tha

relatively easy to determine that China lacks items o

Militarily Critical Technologies List, but by p

attention to Chinese open sources, especially book

professional journals that deal with long-term f

modernization goals, we can make some sound judg

about China's military future.

Choosing Among Estimative Methods for Chin

Future Capability.

This chapter concludes that China's future m

capabilities will be based on factors that are impossi

90
estimated accurately today. They include quanti

estimates of the fundamentals of military power such 

future size of China's defense budget, its future indu

base, its access to advanced military technology

“non-equipment” factors such as the quality of its f

officer corps. Of course, it is possible to estimate t

certain specific Chinese force structure may come 

existence by 2010 by using straight-line projection. 

though this is an error-prone estimative method, it is 

and simple and perhaps can fool the gullible who ha

idea how their own nation makes defense moderniz

decisions. For example, an intelligence analyst could s

use the current numbers of Chinese ships, tanks, air

and other key indicators, then multiply these un

China's growth rate (say, 8 percent a year), perhaps a

a few new weapons systems known to be in developmen

retiring a few judged to be obsolete by 2010. Indeed, so

the U.S. intelligence community used such an approa

the Soviet Union for many years, even when it pro

incorrect results. The erroneous assumption is that Ch

on “autopilot” in pursuing its military modernizati

more likely assumption is that China's leaders will d

and adjust their military programs (perhaps many t

between now and 2020. If so, then we must t

understand these debates and these adjustments r

than straight-lining, or making up long lists of obs

that the Chinese can “never” overcome.

In a book published in 1998, a much better and 

realistic approach than straight-lining has been sugg

by John Culver who wisely points out that “most pr

analysts of the Chinese military rule out ver

scenarios.”2 Culver's recommended approach proceed

two important facts. First, he states that,

. . . a survey of analytical documents prepared by the U. 

intelligence community over the past decade reveals 

tendency toward “optimistic” assessments of developmen

91
Chinese military.

In other words, American analysts have tend

overestimate China's capability to improve its force

should be cautious not to repeat this mistake. This ch

argues that one factor in China's slow modernizatio

been a debate among the military leaders about their 

a debate that includes at least three “schools” of tho

three sets of scenarios for future warfare China may 

and three corresponding preferences for defense alloca

Unfortunately, in spite of the evidence of these Ch

“schools,” some specialists continue to impute “u

rational actor” decision-making to China as if Gr

Allison, the Kennedy School of Government, an

seminal book, Essence of Decision, never existed.

I also agree completely with John Culver's second 

namely that, 

. . . in the course of examining the spectrum of developm

possibilities of the Chinese military in the next 10 to 20 ye

two possibilities at the extreme end of the spectrum stand 

China could continue to make halting progress . . . or, Ch

could break completely with the past and exhibit unpreceden

abilities to integrate a new level of technology into its milit

Either of these development trends is possible (as are 

number of alternatives falling between these points on 

development spectrum. . . .

Culver's prudent view of the range of choice that 

faces suggests a potential policy challenge. The U

States and other major powers (especially Japan 

Russia) will have influence (if they wish to apply it) to 

China's future military capability. Along with H

Kissinger, Culver and I and many others are impress

the wide range of future Chinese military capabilitie

may hypothetically develop in the next 10 to 20 

Kissinger recently pointed that American options w

be lost by failing to confront China soon:

92
20 years, it will become perhaps the most powerful country 

Asia. Its impact on its neighbors would magnify. But do 

really want a showdown now . . . ? [W]ere Beijing, at whate

juncture, to pursue hegemonistic policies it would have 

contend around its borders with many states of considera

strength. A wise America could forge a determined resistan

among them.

3

Two Common Errors in Estimative Methods.

Unfortunately, Culver's views are not universally 

inside or outside the U.S. Government. Many analy

Chinese capabilities are overly (perhaps obsess

concerned with identifying the obstacles that C

faces in developing its future military capabilities 

exclusion of finding factors that will help China's mi

modernization. It sometimes seems to me that 

analysts of the Chinese military try to outdo each ot

see who can imagine the most potent obstacles that 

cannot possibly overcome for “decades.” Strangely, pe

for half-conscious ideological reasons, these same an

shy away from considering even the most obvious be

and advantages that China may enjoy as a technol

latecomer. They seem to ignore that Japan, in the eco

field in the 1950s and 1960s, benefited from catchi

from behind. Excessively dwelling on the obstacles 

China faces and ignoring China's advantages 

technological latecomer is a serious error. Analyst

doubt that obstacles can be overcome should read Ge

Mi Zhenyu's book, National Defense Development Str

which lists the latecomers' advantages and urges Ch

exploit them. It seems to me rather strange for 

analysts to display an almost cocky certainty that the

identify so well the obstacles to China's modernizatio

can identify so few advantages, especially in light of C

well-known secrecy about military affairs. As Ambas

James Lilley told the Senate Intelligence Committ

September 18, 1997:

93
practice of deception—when capable, feign incapacity. Thi

the way they operate. They'll throw up smoke screens. The

take you to backward factories. They'll lead you down 

garden path, and you'll always get some gullible person com

back saying their military is backward. For example they'll 

obsolete tanks. That's because that's what the Chinese wan

them to see.

Analysts of the Chinese military who make long l

obstacles are bad enough, but I fear more those an

who neglect or even completely ignore the intention

policy preferences of the Chinese military leadersh

estimate China's future military capabilities, it seems 

that a basic starting point should be to understand 

China's leaders think they ought to try to develop. 

is an especially perverse version of this error. 

committed by analysts who apparently assume the Ch

leadership to be robots in lockstep, incapable of disagr

with each other about what goals for mil

modernization should be pursued. In one of the most 

analytical findings in many years, Dennis Blasko po

out in 1996 that there seemed to be no Chinese Doctr

Local War, in spite of the fact that quite a few We

analysts had been proclaiming a “new” doctrine of 

War for a decade.

4

 A similar major contribution was 

by Ellis Joffe in The Chinese Army After Mao,

5

wh

shrewdly warned analysts of the Chinese military 

there had been no formal termination or epitap

Chairman Mao's doctrine of People's War, but that 

evolved in a very Chinese manner into something 

different.

What is the solution to the shortcomings of estim

methods? Are straight-line projections the only sol

Should we keep piling up examples of obstacles? C

ever learn what doctrine and goals are guiding C

military modernization? Despite China's veil of secrec

modest steps may be worth consideration: gr

94
China with other cases, including historical cases.

SECTION ONE: U.S. DEFENSE DEPARTMENT 

ASSESSMENT

What is strategic or net assessment?

6

 Does Chin

differently than the United States? Net assessm

sometimes confused with intelligence analysis of fo

forces and international trends. The difference is that 

strategic assessment is an analysis of the interaction 

or more national security establishments both in peac

and in war, usually ourselves and a potential enemy

the interaction of the two belligerents that is the c

concept, not an assessment of one side alone.

A number of lessons from U.S. experience may 

understand how China performs strategic assessmen

practice of strategic assessment in the U.S. Departm

Defense in the past 25 years has been divided in

following six categories of studies and analyses:

(1) efforts to measure and forecast trends in va

military balances such as the maritime balance

Northeast Asian balance, the power-projection ba

etc.;

(2) assessments focused on weapons and 

comparisons with efforts to produce judgments 

military effectiveness;

(3) historical evaluations of lessons of the past;

(4) analyses of the role of perceptions of fo

decision-makers and even the process by which fo

institutions make strategic assessments;

(5) the search for quantitative analytical tools; an

(6) identifying competitive advantages and disti

competencies of each side's military force pos

highlighting important trends that may change a long

95
military competition, and appraising the strength

weaknesses of U.S. forces in light of long-term shifts 

security environment. This sixth form of study is th

assessment” approach.7

Sources of Errors in Strategic Assessment.

In historical analysis, it is possible to examine wh

senior leaders on each side did to “assess” the outcom

nature of the coming wars in the time prior to 

outbreak. In fact, a widely praised explanation fo

causes of war is precisely that the strategic assessme

opposing sides were in conflict prior to the initiat

combat—one side seldom starts a war believing in ad

it will lose. Thus, we may presume there are almost a

miscalculations in strategic assessments according 

nature of the national leadership that mad

assessment. China may make its own miscalculation

we should be alert to this possibility.

An insightful set of seven historical examp

strategic assessment in 1938-1940, which was produc

the Office of Net Assessment of the Office of the Secret

Defense, has identified a number of serious asses

errors in Britain, Nazi Germany, Italy, France, the 

Union, the United States, and Japan.

8

 A number of le

drawn from these examples are relevant to any eff

understand how the Chinese leadership conducts str

assessment of its future security environment.

First, it is a mistake to examine static, side-by

force-on-force comparisons of numbers of weapon

military units without trying to analyze the way 

weapons and units would actually interact in f

combat. The static use of counting numbers and units w

fault in the French military assessment of a pot

German attack in 1939. The military balance, measu

quantitative terms between the German forces op

France and the French forces involved in that theate

96
fire power of France and its allies exceeded that 

Germans by one-third. Force-on-force comparisons us

the French before the war did not reveal that (

Germans would achieve a four-to-one advantage by ma

forces in the sector in which they achieved a breakthr

(2) the Germans could make rapid, deep penetratio

destroy rear areas in France, and (3) the German air 

would completely neutralize French air power and ac

absolute air superiority. Only a strategic assess

focusing on the qualities of the interaction of th

belligerents would give any indication of the outcome 

war.

9

Second, the failure to define correctly who wil

friend and who a foe in wartime is critical 

outcome. Therefore, the question of internat

alignments or alliances cannot be ignored. Professor 

Kennedy points out that Britain's pre-war pla

completely failed to identify the role the Soviet Union 

play as a second front in the war against Hitler. The F

error was similar: French security thinkers fail

consider the scenario that Germany might first co

France's East European allies, eliminating Fra

alliance, before attacking France directly.

Third, it is a mistake to deduce from an oppo

peacetime training exercises, published military doct

and peacetime military deployments what may be th

forces actually conduct themselves in a protr

war that goes beyond the original plan of war becau

longer a war, the more time for factors involving the 

national society and economy to be brought into pla

the less important the initial deployments, doctrine

plans. Professor Stephen Rosen of Harvard Universit

found that, between August 1939 and June 1940, th

Navy senior leadership's strategic assessments o

adequacy of U.S. military capabilities paid little attent

how a future war might unfold. It mainly satisfied 

Navy peacetime criteria, using simple comparisons 

97
[with] no sense of the possible wartime interaction be

the two fleets let alone between the two nations.”

10

Fourth, it is a mistake to mirror image 

assumptions of other nations. As Andrew Ma

wrote in 1982 about assessing the former Soviet Uni

A major component of any assessment of the adequacy of 

strategic balance should be our best approximation o

Soviet-style assessment of the strategic balance. But this m

not be the standard U.S. calculations done with slig

different assumptions. . . . rather it should be, to the ext

possible, an assessment structured as the Soviets wo

structure it, using those scenarios they see as most likely 

their criteria and ways of measuring outcomes . . . the So

calculations are likely to make different assumptions ab

scenarios and objectives, focus attention upon differ

variables, include both long-range and theater for

(conventional as well as nuclear), and may at the techn

assessment level, perform different calculations, use differ

measures of effectiveness, and perhaps use different ass

ment processes and methods. The result is that So

assessments may substantially differ from Ameri

assessments.

11

A fifth mistake is geographic scope or “big pi

problems. U.S. errors in the period between the two 

wars were “big picture” problems. Although the U

States eventually developed five alternative scen

(RAINBOW I to V), it initially mistakenly believed 

only one potential enemy in the Pacific (Japan

therefore assumed that, because of the Anglo-Jap

alliance of 1904, the United States might be forced to 

England in the Atlantic. Then with the rise of Hitl

years of American assessments had to be discarded 

the strategic focus shifted to winning first in Europe, 

staying on the defensive in the Pacific.

A sixth mistake may be to neglect open source

most relevant comparison for better understanding 

from among these pre-World War II case studies may 

98
Earl Ziemke describes Soviet secrecy in 1940:

The Soviet net assessment process cannot be direc

observed. Like a dark object in outer space, its probable natu

can be discerned only from interactions with visib

surroundings. Fortunately, its rigidly secret environment h

been somewhat subject to countervailing conditions. . 

Tukhachevsky and his associates conducted relatively op

discussion in print.

Ziemke's description of the Soviet assessment p

resembles in a few ways the Chinese process, includin

“open discussion in print” of some assessment issues

apparent from Ziemke's account of the way in which S

strategic assessment was performed in the 1930s t

number of similarities, at least in institutional roles an

vocabulary of Marxism-Leninism, can also be se

contemporary China. The leader of the Soviet Comm

Party publicly presented a global strategic assessm

periodic Communist Party Congresses. The authors 

military portions of the assessment came from 

institutions which have counterparts in Beijing toda

were prominent in Moscow in the 1930s: the Genera

Academy and the National War College. Another sim

was that the Soviet Communist Party leader cha

defense council or main military committee and, in 

capacities, attended peacetime military exercises an

involved in deciding the details of military stra

weapons acquisition, and war planning. As the leade

party based on “scientific socialism,” the leade

expected to pronounce openly the Party's of

assessment of the future. Sensitive details obviously 

remain secret, but open sources could provide at lea

outline of the assessment.

99
ASSESSMENT

Four superb books have laid the foundation for f

efforts to understand China's perceptions of its se

environment and the Chinese assessment process—

Shambaugh's Beautiful Imperialist, Gilbert Rozman

Chinese Debate on Soviet Socialism, Allen Whiting's 

Eyes Japan, and Carol Hamrin's China and the Challe

the Future.

12

They stress the unique premises us

Chinese analysts during the 1980s and the process of d

among both analysts and the senior leadership in Beij

Some premises are:

• China's commitment to its version of Marxism 

out the use of Western international rela

concepts to assess the future security environ

This ideology prohibits using certain conce

assess the future. Deng Xiaoping's national se

adviser on the State Council, Huan Xiang, wr

1987 that “bourgeois theories of interna

relations” were to serve the interests of impe

foreign policies.

14

 One well-known Chinese a

observed that “differing from western interna

relations theorists such as Hans Morgan

China's theory of international relations is ba

dialectical and historical materialism.”

15 Tex

of international relations in use in China, suc

recent book by Liang Shoude and Hong Yi

emphasize the interpretations of Marx, Lenin, 

and Deng.

16

 Liang asserts that the foreign poli

nations depend on whether the bourgeois o

proletariat is in power.

• Chinese textbooks state that bourgeois stat

greedy and constantly plot war and interventio

are blocked from this course only by the socialist 

who desire peace and development. Students in 

from high school on are examined on these prin

100
national syllabus in international politics f

universities. The Chinese have explicitly re

Western international relations theory, includi

school of thought known as Realism or Neo-Rea

which began to be discussed in 1982 in China.

• Consistent with their ideology, Chinese analysts 

rigid views about the causes of war. In cont

Western research that suggests miscalculatio

misperceptions may be the leading cause of 

Chinese analysts assert that “scramblin

resources” causes war. “Economic factors are . 

most fundamental cause triggering war.”

19

 S

narrow view may make it difficult for Ch

analysts to appreciate the role of miscalculatio

misperceptions in causing war.

A Multipolar World.

What geopolitical features of the future do Ch

authors consider significant? Four questions are 

addressed. Which nations will be the most powerf

2020? What kinds of international alignments will 

What kinds of war may occur for which China s

prepare? How will the RMA affect the relationships a

the major powers?

The Current Assessment, 1986-1998. China's c

assessment of the future security environment is bas

the kind of calculations Sun Zi and the Warring-S

strategist would recognize. The current assessmen

issued before the collapse of the Union of Soviet So

Republics (USSR) and the end of the Cold War. It c

dated to early 1986. It is characterized as a “new e

transition that will last several decades. During this p

many “local wars” will be fought (as large as Korea in 

or the Gulf War) as a “redivision of spheres of influ

takes place. It was reaffirmed as recently as Augu

1998, in Liberation Army Daily, when Jiang Zemin 

101
pattern of “multipolarity” will restrict “hegemonism

evolve gradually but inevitably.

 Bosnia is one example, because in Chinese docu

the Bosnia conflict is frequently called a “struggle be

the United States and the European Union for domin

of Europe.” NATO enlargement, which China oppos

another example of this “struggle to re-divide sphe

influence.”

The outcome of this transitional period of “turbulence

have the following eight features.

• After the transition period is complete, there w

longer be any “superpowers,” but inste

“multipolar world” in which five major nation

each have roughly equal CNP.

• The nations that will do “best” in competitive 

during the transitional period will pursue “peac

development” and enhance their econ

competitiveness. By avoiding Local Wars, the

decrease defense expenditures and avoid the da

of warfare. Chinese authors frequently assert th

collapse of the USSR and the decline of the U

102

Trends From 2000 to 2030:

• A turbulent transition era of many Local Wars 

natural resources.

• U.S. hegemony declines toward global multipolar

five equal powers.

• Japan and Europe re-divide the former Russian an

spheres of influence.

• U.S. security alliances fade (“Cold War relics”) as C

Five Principles are observed.
spending and declining competitiveness in CNP

• Today's “sole superpower” is in severe decline

United States risks declining so rapidly that i

not even be one of the five multipolar powers an

fall to the level of a mere “regional power.” 

continual decline of the United States in the de

ahead is an important feature of the Ch

assessment, so this study provides more deta

this subject than on China's views of other 

powers.

• After the transition to the multipolar world, 

“world system” will emerge to govern interna

affairs and that will probably resemble the cu

Chinese proposal for Five Principles of Pe

Coexistence. The Chinese authorities asser

world politics since the 1800s always has 

“system” or a “strategic pattern.” Under those 

there is a competition among powers that inclu

global division of spheres of influence. Ch

historical textbooks discuss (1) the “Vienna Sy

of 1815-70, (2) an intermediate system 

Germany and Italy each unified and Japan lau

the Meiji Reform, (3) the “Versailles Syste

1920-45, (4) the “Yalta System” of 1945-89, and 

present “transition era.”

• The new Chinese-style “world system,” based o

Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, will be 

better, they assert, because there will be harmo

“power politics” and no more “hegemony.”

2

harmonious world requires a transition away 

the capitalism of the major powers toward som

of “socialist market economy.” Just as Chin

modified the doctrines of Marx, Engels, Lenin

Stalin to produce what Deng Xiaoping c

“Socialism with Chinese Characteristics,” so w

103
ultimately develop their own socialist character

• Some Chinese military authors believe that th

now underway an RMA that will radically c

future warfare. Five recent Chinese books asser

the United States will not exploit the RMA as w

other nations in the decades ahead. 21 C

generals “plan to be better, to be ahead of everyo

and become latecomers who surpass the old-time

• A major global nuclear war is highly unlikely 

decades. This official forecast is a sharp change 

the forecasts of Chairman Mao that a global n

war was inevitable.

23

 Therefore, China claims t

cut its defense spending from more than 6 perc

Gross National Product (GNP) in the 1960

1970s, to between 2 and 3 percent when the cu

assessment came into force by the mid-1980s

down to about 1.5 percent of the GNP in the 1

This claim by China that it has drastically re

defense spending, which included cutting the 

size from seven million to three million, is bas

China's expectation to remain above the fray of 

wars” during the turbulent transition era ahea

• There are many global forces at work cre

turbulence (luan, a Chinese word which also m

translated as chaos), including the potenti

nationalist, militarist takeovers of Japan and 

The “main trend” in the world, however, is t

“peace and development,” but “potential hot 

exist which could lead to the involvement of 

powers and regional powers in direct mi

confrontation.” 24 Even in Asia,

Although the Asia-Pacific region has been relatively sta

since the end of the Cold War, there are also many uncertain

there. If certain hot-spot problems are not handled prope

they may cause conflicts, confrontations, and even war in 

104
the region.

25

Within the framework of this strategic assess

China's analysts discuss a number of subjects in 

journals and books.26 For example, the question freq

arises concerning the manner that current events f

the framework. Some Chinese authors see the foll

current examples of the “turbulent period of transiti

suggesting that former spheres of influence are 

re-divided. While not all Chinese would agree with all 

findings, the examples listed below demonstrate ho

framework of the assessment of the future is appl

practice.

• First, the United States is exploiting Ru

weakness by enlarging NATO in order to increa

domination of its European NATO allies.

• Second, the United States (“its hegemo

ambitions further inflated”) is forcing Jap

increase its financial support for U.S. bases and 

in Japan under the guise of the Defense Guidelin

• Third, the United States arranged the Bo

settlement at Dayton to further domina

European NATO allies.

• Fourth, Japan is seeking to embroil the United S

and China in a struggle that will weaken 

Washington and Beijing.

• Fifth, some in the United States are fearful of 

and seek to contain or block China's grad

increasing influence by promoting the “China t

theory.” This is wrong because “China has neith

strength nor the will to compete with the U

States and other big powers in global affairs.”

2

105
St, Cetasa ay be te ocatoopo

struggles and wars among the big powers a

former Soviet sphere of influence is re-divided.

Calculating Geopolitics: Lessons from the

Warring-States Era.

China's military authors refer often to ce

similarities between the geopolitics of the Warring-S

era and the coming multipolar world structu

representative article states that the classic book Su

The Art of War was “the product of the multipolar 

structure in China 2500 years ago,” that “there 

surprising number of similarities between Sun Zi's tim

the contemporary multipolar trend,” and that “in the 1

the world entered a multipolar era very similar to the 

of Sun Zi.”

29 The Warring-States period of ancient Ch

little known in the West. It was the source of the c

lessons of Chinese statecraft.

30

 Unfortunately, there 

guide for Westerners to Chinese traditional state

According to interviews with Chinese military officer

style of statecraft is embedded in Chinese culture just 

West has its own history, its own literature, and it

Bible stories.

31 Two studies by the late Herbert Goldh

sought to outline some of the content of Chinese stat

and China's unique perceptions, but this work has no

continued.32

One of Goldhamer's insights relevant to this study 

emphasis on the fact that China's ancient stat

demanded efforts to calculate the future. He points ou

ancient China's first minister was called The Uni

Calculator; that the philosopher Han Feizi demande

strategy be based on cost-benefit calculations; and th

philosopher Mo Zi persuaded an enemy gener

surrender by showing he could calculate through a “se

game” what the battle's outcome would be, if fought.

Warring-States era already had the equivalent of Ge

Staffs, which calculated the strengths and intentio

106
victory depended on the calculations and estima

enemy strength and weaknesses that had been ma

advance by advisers in the temple council; Mo Zi taug

students the future could be known.

35 Two of a

China's greatest advisers on statecraft, Lord Shang a

Ssu, warned of the need for calculating the future 

multipolar strategic environment. Li Ssu wrote a fa

memorandum to the ruler of Qin, the man who would 

China and become its first emperor, warning that “t

the one moment in ten thousand ages. If your Hig

allows it to slip away . . . there will form an an

alliance.”

36 With regard to calculating the fu

Goldhamer suggests that political writings from an

China contained “principled predictions,” not just int

or guess work. For example, another famous adviser i

Lord Shang warned that the price for negle

quantitative calculations would be that even a state w

large population and a favorable geographical position 

become weaker and weaker, until it is dismembered. . 

early kings did not rely on their beliefs but on 

figures.”

37 The subject of Chinese statecraft in a mult

world, explored by Goldhamer, remains importa

China's process of strategic assessment, especially ju

by the sharp increase of Chinese military publications 

the relevance of ancient statecraft in the last few yea

Ancient Chinese Strategists and Comprehensiv

National Power.

Although the phrase “comprehensive national p

was invented in 1984, it has cultural roots in Ch

ancient statecraft. In his book, Grand Strategy

Chunqiu, at the Academy of Military Science, pro

examples from Sun Zi's The Art of War, Wu Zi's The 

War, and Guan Zi to show how “the discussion of warf

Chinese ancient literature embodies . . . national 

thinking.”

39

 He writes that “China's wise ancient strat

never advocated only relying on military power to co

107
non-military power related to war in order to get the 

hand.” Sun Zi identified “five things” and “s

stratagems” which governed the outcome of war. W

wrote about six conditions which, if the other side's str

was greater, meant war should be avoided. Wu Ch

writes, “These six points . . . are relatively complete

simply are the epitome of [today's concept of] comprehe

national power.”

According to Wu Chunqiu, calculating CNP can 

nation not just for war but also to “coordinate a politic

diplomatic offensive, to psychologically disintegrat

enemy forces and subdue them.” Wu states,

Victory without war does not mean that there is not any wa

all. The wars one must fight are political wars, economic w

science and technology wars, diplomatic wars, etc. To sum u

a word, it is a war of Comprehensive National Power.

40

Section Three of this study explores CNP forecasts.

Avoiding War with Warring-States Strategy.

Within certain political limits, Chinese author

examine the challenges that China will face and su

alternative strategies. The director of the China Instit

Contemporary International Relations' (CICIR) fo

policy center, Dr. Yan Xuetong (Ph.D. Berkeley

cautioned that the ruling American hegemon can be 

from using force to contain China's rise as long as c

policy goals are maximized. These are annually incre

exports up to 9 percent and avoiding simulta

confrontation with the United States and two 

powerful nations. Using an imaginative tab

probabilities, Dr. Yan predicts that China can avoid w

at least 10 years by adopting these two policies. How

his assessment shows that as China's annual sha

export markets decline and as the number of pow

nations that China confronts increases, the proba

108
sharply. Dr. Yan adds that because of American c

support for Taiwan independence, he cannot estimate 

with the United States can be avoided for more th

years.

41

SECTION THREE: CALCULATING

COMPREHENSIVE NATIONAL POWER

Two contending scientific teams in Beijing, one fro

military and one from the civil sector, have calcu

estimates of the CNP scores of the major powers in 

Both teams claim to use very sophisticated quanti

methods which, they explain, had to be developed due 

deficiencies in the methodological techniques that are 

by the West and Japan to measure future growth ra

national power.

The military team’s quantitative results are cons

with the orthodox Chinese view that a multipolar 

structure is emerging and that U.S. hegemony is endi

particular, according to the military estimate, the 

quantitative power score by 2010 shows a decreasin

between the United States and the other major power

by 2020, the U.S. score will equal China's national 

score, assuming China's power growth rate continues 

5.8 percent, double the U.S. rate of 2.7 percent. Ger

and Japan will also have higher CNP growth rates tha

United States and will become the third- 

fourth-ranking world powers after the United State

China in 2020. If these growth rates are extended an

decade or so, China, Japan, and Germany will all 

equal or surpass the United States in CNP, but the U

States will remain ahead of Russia (which is not score

to uncertainty) and India, the sixth power in rank or

CNP.

The civilian team's results contradict the orthodox 

in China about an emerging multipolar structure. The 

striking contrast is the assessment of China. The ci

109
2020, but instead, merely number eight in the world, w

projected power score of only about half of the U.S. sc

2010 and 2020. A second contrast is that the civilian t

quantitative results place Japan not number four 

world by 2010, but equal to the United States in 2010. J

pulls ahead of the United States by 20 percent in 

China in 2020 will still rank only seventh in the w

trailing not only the United States and Japan

Germany, France, Italy, and even South Korea in CN

Interestingly, military power is only 10 percent 

total, in spite of the claim by some authors that CNP 

can determine the outcome of wars. Figure 1 show

relative CNP of five nations, including the United S

and China, in 1989, 2000, and 2020.

110

Figure 1. Comprehensive National Power Sco

1989-2020.
SECTION FOUR: FUTURE PLA CAPABILITY:

“SCHOOLS” OF FUTURE WARFARE

There is evidence that China's leadership cannot d

among several future paths that have been propos

policy analysts and is therefore allocating resources a

three distinct paths. Two of these paths represent ref

Advocates of the two reform schools seemed to be ar

against a third group of conservative traditionalist

have been losing their share of the allocation of de

investments. The muted debate among these school

affect defense resource allocations. This section des

the three schools; the next section suggests what k

future defense investments each school may prefer.

What Kind of Wars Could Affect China?

Since 1994, several dozen articles have appeared 

Chinese press and in military journals that purp

discuss China's current and future defense strategy. 

articles are not all in agreement. At least three, and po

more, schools of thought may be distinguished.

In the first school, authors refer to the enduring va

of Mao's concepts of People's War.

42 These authors 

that the 21st century may well see the outbreak of an

111

 Total Comprehensive National Power 1.00

 Natural resources 0.08

 Economic activities capability 0.28

 Foreign economic activities capability 0.13

 Scientific and technological capability 0.15

 Social development level 0.10

 Military capability 0.10

 Government regulation capability 0.08
world war, a major invasion of China, or the use of n

weapons.

43

 This “Maoist” school of thought is less frequ

seen in Chinese military journals than a second sch

thought, which can be termed “local war.”

Local War is identified by the authors' call for Ch

prepare not for a protracted People's War with na

mobilization, but for a quick, smaller scale “Loca

under high-tech conditions” or simply Local War 

zhanzheng). Such a war would be limited in scope, dur

and objective. These authors frequently cite a spee

Deng Xiaoping to the Central Military Commission in 

to explain the origins of the concept. Deng's speech 

decreed that the world would not be seeing a world wa

major nuclear war for “a long time to come.” In the d

since that speech, more than 30 conflict scenarios have 

examined in articles by Chinese authors from this sch

thought. In interviews of Chinese military officer

author conducted, it seems that the term “local war” is 

good translation of the concept that the Chinese au

have been discussing. Rather, Local War seems to inc

broad range of scenarios, encompassing, in fact, almo

war smaller in scale than a global war or a major n

war. 

112

• The enemy—United States, Russia, or Japan—

invade and seek to subjugate China.

• The war will last many years.

• China's leaders will move to alternative national cap

during the war.

• China's defense-industrial base will arm millio

militia in protracted war until the enemy can be def

by the main army.
The third school of thought probably dates only 

1994 and is represented by a few books and a num

articles. However, its proponents include several gen

who occupy or are recently retired from high positio

China's most influential military institutions. This 

school of thought recommends that China prepare for f

warfare along the lines of concepts first discuss

Russian and American authors who forecast a pot

RMA.

Chinese writers in 1995 repeatedly referred to the 

military technical revolution” without actually citin

Soviet military journals which in the past decade have 

discussing the same subject. What was new in 19

Beijing was not the subject itself, which had been disc

in books such as General Mi Zhenyu's Chinese Na

Defense Concepts.

44 It was the enthusiasm for the s

that was different. In October 1995, the official 

announced a national conference had been held to d

the implications of a potential revolution in military af

Soviet military science and its Chinese counte

explicitly require the use of “scientific” forecasts abo

changing nature of future warfare. In other words

mandated by “military science” that strategists co

themselves with the search for the emergen

“revolutionary” changes in warfare brought about m

113

• The opponent will not be a superpower.

• The war will be near China's border.

• The war will not be a deep invasion.

• China will seek a quick military decision.

• Rapid reaction forces will defeat local forces of J

Vietnam, India, Central Asia, Taiwan, Philip

Malaysia, or Indonesia.
mere evolutionary trends will continue.

According to the shared Chinese and former 

concepts, “military science” studies operational art a

as specific approaches including “the conditions and f

that determine, at any given historical moment, the n

of a future war.”

45

There seems to be no American counterpart to Ch

“military science” and its related requirement to anti

military revolutions and to “experiment scientifically

organizations, exercises, and prototype equipment. R

American studies of military innovation tend to emph

the somewhat accidental role of the relatively 

114

Revolution In Military Affairs Scenarios:

• The opponent will have advanced weapons, satellit

communications and reconnaissance, stealth air

nuclear weapons, and nanotechnology—perhap

United States, Russia, or Japan.

• China must close an “information gap.”

• China must network all forces.

• China must attack the enemy C

3

I to paralyze it.

• China must pre-empt enemy attacks.

• China must use directed energy weapons.

• China must use computer viruses.

• China must use submarine-launched munitions.

• China must use anti-satellite weapons.

• China must use forces to prevent a logistics buildu

• China must use special operations raids.
doctrinal idea, or changes resource allocations tog

with his organizational allies.

Like the RMA school, the Local War school also bo

Soviet and American concepts. After the Gulf War in 

authors writing about Local War incorporated 

aspects of the American Gulf War strategy into 

concept of this type of conflict. More than 40 books 

published by the Academy of Military Science an

National Defense University, drawing on examples 

the Gulf War in order to illustrate how China's conc

Local War should be implemented in the 21st century

of this writing focused on how the Chinese military 

have to defend against an American-style Gulf 

offensive action. In a similar fashion, the main Ch

military newspaper, Liberation Army Daily, has pub

in the last 5 years several hundred articles attempt

describe Local War doctrine and Chinese military exe

designed to cope with a “high-tech enemy.” These a

and books leave little doubt that the weapons, equip

and uniforms that will be possessed by this “hig

enemy” will be the forces of the United States or its mi

allies.

These three schools of authors cannot be e

reconciled. With a limited budget, it is hard to prepare 

three types of future warfare. The neo-Maoist or Pe

War school seems to recommend that China be prepar

a long war of many years at a low level of intensity in 

space can be traded for time, territory will be surren

initially, and the population will be mobilized for gue

warfare against the invader and in support of the re

Chinese armed forces. The authors of the Local War 

advocate preparing for a short warning attack in whi

decision will come quickly, with no opportunity to mo

the nation for a multiyear People's War. They exp

describe future “local” warfare as concluding wit

matter of days or weeks, allowing no time to mobili

population. There will instead be an intense tempo. Su

115
strikes against the enemy near or beyond China's bord

order to achieve an “early, decisive victory.”

Since the early 1980s, foreign scholars have declare

series of articles that Local War has become the o

strategic doctrine of China. These conclusions may 

been premature. Not only have the neo-Maoist a

continued to appear, but in interviews conducted b

author, senior Chinese military officers declared that 

War doctrine had not been written for China's armed f

nor has it been formally adopted by the Central M

Commission, at least as of 1998. This divergence be

published articles and military exercises, on the one 

and the lack of an authoritative declaration that Loca

is the national strategy constitutes a major puzzle.

Further complicating the confusion is the fact that 

last 3 years, observers have noted an increase in the 

attention to China's nuclear forces being further deve

a direction that does not seem connected to Loca

doctrine. Additionally, a series of books and articles 

appeared advocating a Chinese blue water navy, an

direction that also seems to have no linkage to the Loca

doctrine. Some PLA naval authors assert that Local W

sea covers two large zones of “active defense.” With

first zone out to the “first island chain,” there are 

levels, each with its own naval forces provid

“multi-level in-depth defense at sea.” The sea space be

the People's Republic of China (PRC) coast and the 

Pacific island chain” has three levels:

(1) out to 50 miles, which is defended by radar, mi

and large coastal patrol boats such as missile speed

and fast gunships, and where laying mines and cle

enemy mines is very important;

(2) from 50 to 300 miles from the coast, which is def

by missile destroyers and corvettes, including ship-

helicopters;

116
Spratly Islands, which is defended by submarines 

advanced missiles and naval attack planes.

46

The “second island chain” that the Chinese navy a

to patrol extends along a line from the Aleutians th

Guam and the Philippines. However, these “island ch

are not discussed by PLA navy (PLAN) authors who 

about the RMA.

As if this were not enough confusion, since 1994 the 

RMA school of thought has been vocal in advocacy 

that do not directly attack Local War theory, but stat

China must exploit a potential future RMA in order to 

a growing gap in its military capabilities as compa

America, Russia, and Japan. At least 30 articles 

appeared advocating development by China o

capability to conduct information operations, m

long-range precision strikes, attacks on enemy satell

space, and efforts to paralyze an enemy's comman

control system by non-nuclear attacks on his homela

Institutional Affiliations of the Three Schools.

These three schools may be seen as independent, o

linked, viewpoints which any individual could hold. 

may also reflect the institutional biases of the “h

where the schools' authors work. RMA advocates (who 

to be senior colonels and a few major generals) seem 

employed by the Academy of Military Science (AMS) 

large components of the Commission on Sci

Technology and Industry for National Defense (COST

complex, such as the China Aerospace Corporation, a

research institutes, such as the Beijing Institute of S

Engineering. This is not surprising since COSTIND an

research institutes focus on technology for their livel

The Local War authors occupy most of the hi

leadership positions of the PLA and also are employed 

National Defense University, which trains almost all f

generals. The authors of the People's War school seem 

117
Department, and senior militia and People's Armed 

(PAP) leaders who spent most of their careers 

politicized, Maoist environment.

The three schools may also to some extent refle

current state of China's existing force structure, its e

in doctrinal development, the equipment in its inve

and the types of conflict scenarios used as poin

reference. According to a concept proposed by D

Blasko, the relationship of the three schools to one an

and to Chinese force structure can be visualized 

triangle or pyramid composed of three tiers. 47 

relationship is depicted in Figure 2.

People's War: The Pyramid's Base.

The base of the pyramid consists of the People'

school—the vast majority of the PLA today. The m

thought of Mao Zedong provides the theoretical found

for this school.

48

 This doctrine is mainly defensive an

little utility beyond the borders of China, but a consid

portion of all Chinese military writing still mus

homage to the heritage of People's War. Probably abo

percent of the PLA is best suited to fight a People's Wa

118

Figure 2. Blasko Pyramid.
that would be museum pieces in many countries. This 

relies upon the use of “existing weapons to defeat an e

equipped with high technology weaponry.” These forc

trained to defend the mainland, its adjacent seas, a

space from invasion. They would fight alongside the m

and swallow up an invader, using concepts devised b

60 years ago and slightly modified to account for “m

conditions.” Stratagem and deception are particu

important in People's War. Logistics for these forces d

almost completely on the militia and a supportive, fr

local populace.

Local War School: The Pyramid's Middle Tier.

The second tier of the PLA pyramid is the Loca

school. It requires fully trained and equipped forces th

react rapidly to problems on China's periphery. May

percent of all army, navy, and air force units fall int

category and have the requisite preparation. The writi

Deng Xiaoping contain the theory that justifies 

school.49 In the 1980s, as the PLA began its moderni

program, it developed rapid reaction units, experim

forces, and what has been labeled the “Doctrine of 

War.” Local War is understood to be a limited war o

periphery of China that will be short but intense, ut

advanced technology weapons, with units fighting in a 

and combined arms effort. It envisions an element of 

projection (i.e., the ability to transport combat forces t

when necessary, beyond China's borders), but by defi

is regional, not global, in nature. Some rapid reactio

experimental units, but by no means all, have bee

recipients of the numerically-limited imports of Ru

hardware reported so vigorously by the media. Many 

in this category still are equipped with outdated indig

equipment and, like the Peoples' War school, must d

ways to use their existing weapons to defeat a 

technology opponent. This segment of the PLA pro

receives more training opportunities than do 

119
Local War as its “next war”; the Persian Gulf War is o

point of reference for this school. China has no co

experience in this type of conflict. At this time

development and dissemination of doctrine on how th

will fight such a war is limited. The number of units ac

prepared to live up to these modern standar

problematic, but this portion of the PLA is expected to 

in the future.

The RMA Advocates: Pyramid's Narrow Top.

The RMA school is represented by only a very 

portion of the PLA strategists in its premier aca

institutions, officers in what was COSTIND and wh

now probably affiliated with the General Armam

Department, some of its strategic missile units in w

known as the Second Artillery, and a few other 

equipped with modern cruise missiles.

Three Mutually Exclusive Scenarios.

Different types of conflict scenarios emerge from 

school of thought. In interviews with Chinese m

officers, there are distinctive premises and assum

made by each of the three schools of thought about 

conflict scenarios. From the viewpoint of the People'

framework, the most significant and likely scenario 

takeover of a major power by a leader who is viewed b

Chinese as a madman bent on the invasion of China to 

China into a colony.” Whether Russian, Japane

American, this madman could successfully carry ou

first phase of his invasion and penetrate several hu

miles into China along several axes of advance.

This school is obviously vulnerable to allegation

the Chinese are still planning to “fight the last war

example of a 7-year war against the Japanese invader

a loss of over 20 million Chinese lives occurred durin

lifetime of all Chinese military officers over the age 

120
to maintain a defense mobilization base and de

industry for production of weapons in the deep inter

China where an alternative command center and na

capital would be established for the years requir

repulse the madman's invading forces. Figure 3 show

main points of a People's War scenario.

In contrast to the People's War school, the Loca

school of thought focuses on entirely different scenari

concern is to repel enemy forces that infringe on Ch

territory or maritime resources. These authors re

islands already occupied by China's enemies and C

disputed borders with nearly all its neighbors, incl

North Korea. They are also concerned about separat

Tibet and western China who may receive terror

military support from China’s enemies.

Chinese military authors have never repudiated the writing

Chairman Mao. The highest leaders still proclaim t

People's War is the essence of China's military thinking.

121

Figure 3. People's War Scenarios.
being fought for limited objectives. The Local War au

include China's conflict with Vietnam in 1979 and wi

United States in northern Korea in 1950-51 as examp

February and March 1979, China mobilized at least 40

ground forces to achieve superiority over the 10

Vietnamese troops (mainly militia) and used more 

1,200 tanks and 1,500 heavy artillery pieces in supp

the attack. No air or sea forces were involved. C

suffered as many as 50,000 casualties with 10,000 d

The Chinese offer of a Chinese withdrawal from Vietn

return for a Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodi

rejected by Vietnam.

50

In Korea, China sent 260,000 troops to secretly sur

and ambush a smaller American and South Korean fo

140,000, nearly achieving a 2:1 superiority. As this 

war” continued, a massive Chinese offensive in Apri

cost 70,000 Chinese casualties. By mid-1951, 700,000 t

on the China-North Korean side faced 420,000 U

Nations (U.N.) troops. By the conflict's end in 1953, 

lost an estimated 400,000 dead.

51

 The proximate ca

Chinese intervention in Korea, as stated by C

spokesman, was

The American imperialists . . . directly threatened 

northeastern borders. . . . The aim was not Korea itself bu

invade China . . . to save our neighbor is to save ourselves 

only resistance can make the imperialists learn the lesson.

Figure 4 shows points associated with Local War doc

The third school of thought, which concerns itself w

potential RMA, seems to envision conflict scenarios 

different from the first two schools. For example, 

article “The Challenge of Information Warfare,” Ge

Wang Pufeng, after quoting Andrew W. Marshall, 

that China develop three new missions: a stra

reconnaissance and warning system, a battle

information network that brings all military branches 

122
single network for combat coordination, and long-

precision strike systems, including tactical guided mi

In an implicit rebuke to Local War analysts 

neo-Maoists, General Wang emphasizes tha

comparison with the strength of its potential enemie

information technology and information weapons o

Chinese Armed Forces will all be inferior for quite 

time.” He also warns about the need to be the first to e

a revolution in military affairs:

Those who perceive it first will swiftly rise to the top and ha

the advantage of the first opportunities. Those who perceiv

late will unavoidably also be caught up in the vortex of t

revolution. Every military will receive this baptism. T

revolution is first a revolution in concepts.

53

Other articles by this RMA school stress “the subm

will rise in its status to become a major naval warfare 

with the “appearance of underwater arsenal ships (pe

a reference to submarines capable of launching 

123

Figure 4. Local War Scenarios.

Most Chinese authors in the past decade discuss Local W

doctrine.
warfare will be conducted by navy ships and ground-

weapons which can destroy satellite reconnaissanc

other space systems. Tactical laser weapons will be n

for anti-ship defense. Long-range precision strikes a

will cause “both sides to strive to make lightning a

and raise their first strike damage rate.”

54

One theme of this RMA school is the need to chan

measures of effectiveness used to design and de

military equipment and weapons. One analyst pro

that future weapons systems and military organizatio

judged largely on the basis of the “intensity with which 

use information technology.” It is apparent from 

author's proposal that Local War weapons and equip

now being procured in China would score at a very low 

using the Information Intensity Measure of Effectiv

Thus, this article is another harsh criticism o

recommendations of both the Local War and neo-M

schools.

55 Figure 5 shows likely scenarios, according 

RMA school.

124

Chinese RMA Articles on Future Warfare:

• United States Will Fail to Exploit the RMA

• RMA requires New Measures of Effectiveness

• RMA requires New Operational Concepts

− Pre-emptive Information Warfare

− Long-Range Precision Strikes

− Primacy of Submarines

− Stealth and Counter-stealth

− Nanotechnology Weapons

− Robots

− Directed Energy Weapons
these conflicting Chinese strategic writings? The 

conflict scenarios implicit in the RMA school of th

involve China's future enemies possessing equipmen

capabilities that are not possessed by Vietnam, 

Mongolia, North Korea, India, the Central Asian s

South Korea, and Japan at this time. The missions of 

range precision strike, information warfare operation

attacks against space satellite reconnaissance sy

imply that advanced military powers, either Russia 

United States, are part of the conflict scenario.

These three Asian conflict scenarios seem mu

exclusive. Is there a “strategic debate” underway whic

125

Figure 5. RMA Scenarios.

In the 1990s, Chinese military authors began to address h

the RMA will change the nature of warfare. Their scena

envisaged attacks on China by a superpower.
military strategy:

In the 1980s there was a debate among Chinese military cir

on the following questions: How to comprehend the ex

meaning of “luring the enemy in deep”? Is it meant for battle

for the whole war? Should China fight a protracted or a qu

war? Should China fight a full-scale war or a limited L

War?56

Implicit in these questions are the views of the Loca

school, which in the 1980s probably was the “reform

as opposed to the orthodox People's War view. The pres

of the Academy of Military Science (AMS) apparently 

with the Local War view. According to interviews in Be

the AMS actually “staffed” out the formation of the 

War concepts.

Yan Xuetong of CICIR continues the story to th

1980s:

After the Cold War a consensus has basically been reached 

these questions among Chinese military circles, i.e., in orde

ensure the safety of the country's economic achieveme

against war damages, the Chinese army must commit itsel

the task of engaging the enemy outside of China's territ

Additionally, because wars China might be involved in du

the post Cold War period will most probably be high-tech L

Wars, the Chinese army must acquire the ability of winnin

high tech Local War so as to keep the enemy outside 

country's territory.

Yan here introduces an evolution of the original Loca

view that focused on border disputes—by the early 1

the view emerged that China must fight Local War b

its borders. Yan writes:

Consequently, a strategy of active defense that lays stress 

enhancing the army's rapid response capability and readin

for any high tech Local War has become China's curr

military strategy for national defense. The objective of 

126
to keep them outside of China's territory.

57

Even with these insights about the 1980s, analysis 

1990s remains difficult because the three groups 

review decline to acknowledge each other. They d

“debate” in a Western sense of the word, and positio

not always clear cut. For example, People's War m

invoked to support the importance of information wa

When outsiders inquire about apparent differe

Chinese authors decline to admit the existence of a d

preferring instead to claim there is merely a differe

“emphasis” among authors.

58

In fact, there are clearly sharp, mutually exc

differences among the three schools: one that 

champions Chairman Mao's People's War and “

defense” against likely opponents in the 21st century 

on invading China after a pre-emptive nuclear strik

that (in the name of “Deng Xiaoping's new str

thinking”) wants China to follow aspects of Soviet m

models for conventional warfare with a balance a

ground, naval, and air forces ready to repel li

aggression on Chinese territory; and a third (new and s

school that has been inspired by the writings of Ma

Ogarkov and the Soviet General Staff Academy ab

potential RMA which anticipates a world in the mid

century in which China will have the world's la

economy and be at least roughly equivalent in nuclear 

to Russia and America, a triangular nuclear equiva

never seen before, in which new measures of effectiv

will be needed to calculate the balance of military powe

These three schools of thought among military au

have counterparts among the civilian defense and fo

affairs community.60 As has been discussed in deta

civilians pursue unique techniques of strategic analy

determine where future conflicts may involve C

national interests. They use a set of analytical cate

different from their Western counterparts and d

127
intentioned security organizations will be able to 

about much.

In general, space warfare appears to be an ar

constructive debate among Chinese analysts. As wou

expected, RMA advocates see space warfare as central 

outcome of future wars. However, the advocates of 

War and People's War theories seem to view space w

as not particularly important to China. It was m

important as part of the overall military balance 

shifted back and forth during the Cold War compe

between the United States and the former Soviet U

Some have taken note of the history of American 

Russian anti-satellite developments.

How do these analysts judge the future space bala

Some have been extremely concerned about China's re

weakness in this area and have openly advocated a Ch

“space warfare headquarters” to command a f

anti-satellite capability and ballistic missile defen

break the “superpower monopoly” of space, in sp

China's current diplomatic position that anti-sa

missiles (ASATs) should be banned and no we

permitted in space.

62

China Aerospace has pub

drawings of a space station and space shuttle for the fu

128

An Example of the People's War School—Excerp

Information Warfare:

The concept of people's war of the olden days is bou

continue to be enriched, improved, and updated in 

information age to take on a brand-new form . . . on

bringing relevant systems into play and combining hu

intelligence with artificial intelligence under effe

organization and coordination can we drown our enem

the ocean of an information offensive. A people's war i

context of information warfare is carried out by hundre

millions of people using open-type modern inform

systems.
ASATs and space warfare are an important aspect o

strategic assessment. First, they look backward a

shifting balance in U.S. and Soviet efforts. Then 

remark on the importance of China's enhancing its li

ability to manufacture satellites and to continue deve

a robust launch capability at several sites with s

reliable launchers. Both a manned space program 

Chinese space station are budgeted. Articles have disc

the need to reduce satellite vulnerability by usin

example, very small satellites, the need for anti-

capabilities to defend Chinese satellites, and the ne

develop a capability to strike first at enemy 

capabilities.

SECTION FIVE: DIFFERENCES IN INVESTME

PRIORITIES AMONG THE THREE SCHOOLS

Investments Recommended by the RMA Advoc

The RMA visionaries (represented in numerous a

and five books in 1997) have been calling since at leas

for China to attempt to leapfrog the United States 

next 2 decades by investing in the most exotic adv

military technology and in new doctrines and 

organizations along the lines of American and Ru

writings on a potential RMA. Judging by the tone 

authors in this RMA school, they have not yet been 

successful. Books by these authors have warned t

China tries to match U.S. military technology in the 

term (rather than by leapfrogging), the result after 20 

will be that China will only fall further behind. 

warning has not been heeded by the second and 

influential school of thought described below.

129
Power-Projection Advocates.

A second reformist school of thought, identified by i

of the concept of Local War or power-projection

advocated evolutionary reforms. These evoluti

reformers are caught between the traditional conserv

who have the lion's share of the budget and the 

advocates who appear to be championing what are se

unrealistic goals in the eyes of the Local War reforme

Local War advocates, while satisfied at the c

direction of defense investment, seem discontent abo

level of funding the central government is providing. 

complain, for example, that all China's neighbors p

more advanced military technology. They complain 

too-slow pace of Chinese programs to develop 

refueling, at-sea replenishment, airborne warning 

control aircraft, a national command and control sy

sufficient airborne and amphibious forces, an ai

carrier program, and fighter aircraft. In the nuclear 

they express concern that U.S.-supplied theater m

defense will neutralize China's nuclear forces.

Investments Recommended by the People's Wa

Advocates.

Those who advocate the importance of People's Wa

active defense still command the lion's share of Ch

defense investment. They oppose troop cuts an

purchase of foreign weapons systems. The PLA had 

million in the early 1980s, and only after major contro

was it reduced to today's three million, with a 

promise (debated for the past 5 years) that another 50

may be cut by 2000. The People's War school also pref

maintain a disbursed national mobilization capabili

wartime defense industry (including production of 

arms and ammunition). The People's War school may 

completely antagonistic to the reforms of the Loca

advocates in the direction of limited power projecti

130
army, does not undermine a suitable defense mobiliz

base, and does not lead to dependence on foreign weap

foreign technology.

China's defense reformers of both the RMA and 

War schools need to free up resources by resolvin

threats and challenges that the programs of the Pe

War school are designed to handle. Other

conservatives will continue to dominate the de

investment process. For example, a China with a GNP 

to the United States and focused on the RMA or adv

power-projection forces would be a challenge to the U

States. In contrast, a China focused on defense invest

“turned inward” would be very different. Inste

pursuing an RMA or power-projection forces, China 

decide to focus “inward” on:

• layered strategic air defense,

• enhanced underground defense complexes,

• extensive ground forces around the national ca

• border defense forces,

• a large People's Armed Police and other forc

internal stability and counter subversion,

• inefficient defense industries located in in

provinces,

• fixed positional defenses for the largest e

project,

• hedges with air and land deployments in the 

against the revival of Russian nationalism, and

• forces tied down opposite Taiwan preparing 

short-range amphibious invasion if Taiwan de

independence.

131
defense investment, which must be sufficiently addr

before any additional resources may be allocated 

goals of the Local War and RMA advocate

power-projection forces or technological efforts to lea

the United States.

Investments in Defense of the National Capita

Area.

China's leaders appear to have invested heav

protect themselves and their national capital. As mu

40 percent of China's land, sea, and air forces m

deployed within 200 miles of Beijing. Many of the new 

missiles purchased from Russia have been deployed a

the city. In addition, former Chinese officers have des

a series of extensive underground bunkers that prote

national leadership in the Beijing area.

63

 According to 

officers, these investments date from the decisi

Chairman Mao in the 1950s to build tunnels for prot

against American nuclear attacks. This progra

underground construction was extended in the 196

include underground tunnels north of Beijing design

stop potential Soviet tank attacks along the main rou

Beijing.

To the degree that this priority has been succes

accomplished, resources would become available fo

programs for RMA and Local War advocates. Howeve

purchase and deployment from Russia of S-300 missi

systems similar to the Patriot used by the United Sta

protect Tel Aviv during the Gulf War, suggest tha

mission of strategic defense of the national capital ca

command resources. 

Investments in Denial and Deception.

China has invested heavily in concealment of 

military installations of the army, navy, air force, m

forces, and national command centers. The Chinese a

132
requires upgrading. One former PLA officer stated 

China's leaders would be astonished if an enemy 

actually target these concealed and underground fac

and would invest heavily to ensure their secrecy

indicator of this Chinese sensitivity has been C

complete refusal to permit foreigners to visit any sen

military site that might be targeted in wartime, incl

recent requests from the U.S. Secretary of Defense.

This sensitivity has required extremely expe

investments. In the 1960s, Chairman Mao ordere

relocation and concealment of almost all of the Ch

defense industry into the interior of China where it wo

supposedly out of range of the forces of the USSR an

United States. Extensive underground bunkers and 

bases, together with the relocated interior de

industries, may have cost China the equivalent of se

years of its GNP, according to Deng Xiaoping. This 

amount, in U.S. terms, to trillions of dollars.

Key future priorities will include the following po

• Maintain secrecy from U.S. targeting intellige

all China's nuclear weapons and missile storage 

The United States is assumed not to know 

locations.

• Ensure that China's national command center

vital C

3

I nodes are sufficiently concealed and 

sufficiently deeply buried to be invulnerable to a

by conventional U.S. munitions.

• Maintain sufficient military protection fo

national leadership in its deep undergr

complexes in the capital, by deploying the 

advanced surface-to-air missiles purchased 

Russia, the largest share of ground forces in the 

nation, the largest share of air defense aircra

133
forces within 200 or 300 miles of Beijing.

• Continue only limited dismantling of the de

industries in the interior provinces so tha

capacity for national mobilization is not compro

too much.

One could speculate that China's leaders would 

strongly to maintain the value of their 5 decad

investment in successful denial and deception of na

military “targets.” In other words, if China began to b

that its reliance on concealment to protect its n

deterrence as well as the bulk of its conventional force

being compromised, enormous additional investment 

be a high priority to restore this concealment. There 

be a strong disbelief that the United States or any 

power had the capability to “see through” what is pro

this first line of defense. This field is a subject for deb

Beijing today, at least in general terms. Various artic

Chinese newspapers praised Saddam Huss

underground palace complexes that have survived th

War and advocated a program to strengthen C

underground defense complex.

64

Investments in Internal Stability.

In the 1990s, Chinese military authors alluded 

need to continue to reduce the three million-strong ar

order to reallocate funds for higher quality force

technology. This is referred to as national guidan

implement the two “basic transformations” since 1994 

quantity to quality and from a low-technology 

high-technology force. There are three assumptions b

these two “basic transformations.” First, there will b

low-level threats to internal stability. Second, lightly a

police will be able to handle these threats. Third, socia

economic policies will not generate internal insta

Therefore, China can continue to:

134
educe ts tee ogoud toops at a 

gradual pace,

• maintain internal stability by transferrin

million troops to the PAP,

• assume social stability will be maintained th

appropriate economic and social policies, and

• assume there will be no successful foreign diplo

and material support for unrest among mino

such as Tibetans, Muslims, Mongols, and h

rights groups.

China would have to divert its planned allocati

defense investment away from the goals of the RMA 

Local War advocates if the leadership began to doub

internal stability could be adequately guaranteed by 

policy, if there were an end to restraints on fo

subversion in Tibet, Inner Mongolia, Muslim Xinjiang

the effectiveness of the PAP in maintaining int

stability was somehow called into question.

Investments in Protection of Maritime Natural

Resources. 

Throughout the 1990s, Chinese military journals 

featured warnings that China's national humil

during the past century has been due to failure to de

naval forces able to protect China's maritime reso

However, other writings by civilians imply that 

Xiaoping has successfully postponed the need to p

maritime resources because of his successful diplo

Foreign powers are not yet exploiting these resource

may not do so for a decade or more. Thus, the p

developing naval forces need not be hasty. The driver h

based on the assumption that foreign “imperialists” w

begin to exploit natural resources on Chinese terr

claims.

135
China's naval and power-projection forces. A challen

this assumption would require a much more rapid pac

much more extensive defense investmen

power-projection forces. A recent book by a Chinese mi

officer calls this assumption into question by assertin

Vietnam intends to begin exploiting energy reserves 

South China Seas and is illegally occupying near

Chinese islands there. At stake is the length of time 

will have available to wait to acquire these reso

China's leaders will presumably accelerate their p

investment in power-projection forces if they d

maritime resources will soon be irreversibly lost to 

nations. Conversely, China could delay or decrea

development of power-projection forces if the threat to 

maritime resources diminishes.

Investment to Protect the Three Gorges Dam.

Perhaps because the world's largest dam cann

concealed and because of its high value as a target (

supply up to one-third of eastern China's electr

several Chinese military authors have addressed the 

to defend it from a wartime attack, including a propo

deploy extensive surface-to-air missile sites and ev

anti-missile system around the dam. However, 

military authors argue that it need not be defended be

(1) no one will dare to violate international law by atta

it, (2) the water behind the dam could be released pr

any attack, and (3) such an attack is unlikely due 

world trend toward peace and development. It would a

this issue has not been resolved, but China will prob

• rely on international law and not invest heav

defense for the mega -power project at Three G

but

• continue to debate the need for positional defens

this high-value target.

136
Nationalism.

China has invested heavily since the 1960s in 

defenses against a Soviet invasion. According to interv

diplomatic agreements with Russia and three new C

Asian states have greatly reduced the need for defe

the “Three Norths,” the nickname of the three mi

regions that border on Russia. Reductions in the 

million ground forces are expected to come from these 

military regions. China will probably:

• ensure that the main axis of possible Russian 

attack through Northeastern China (Manch

continues to be garrisoned by the second l

concentration of ground forces and air forces 

entire nation, including depending on an exte

system of secret underground complexes 100 t

miles north of Beijing for ambushes, and

• continue to proceed slowly to reduce forces no

Beijing as long as Russia continues to agree 

current “strategic partnership” with China.

Investment in the Liberation of Taiwan.

Until 1996, China did not appear to be developin

capacity to conquer Taiwan by force. Nor did China d

more than symbolic land, sea, or air forces within 300 

of Taiwan. Indeed, the military command responsib

Taiwan (Fuzhou MR) since 1949 was dismantled a

1985. Similarly, there was little, if any, discussion of h

attack Taiwan in professional military journals. This 

to change after the March 1996 missile incident

deployment of two U.S. aircraft carrier battle groups 

area east of Taiwan. There is now some evidence of a d

about what military investments may be appropri

force will have to be used to prevent Taiwan independe

137
debate. The RMA advocates propose programs with 

lead times so they would presumably have lit

contribute to liberate Taiwan until after 2010. How

Local War advocates of power-projection forces coul

justify their programs by the need to dissuade or conqu

independent Taiwan. If so, the more Taiwan indepen

seems probable to China's leaders, the more invest

will have to be made in infrastructure opposite Taiwa

in forces appropriate to conquer an island of 20 m

people that lies 100 miles off the mainland coast an

may be defended by the United States.

Conversely, the less the chances are that Taiwa

need to be liberated by force, the more resources w

available to the RMA advocates for long-term techn

programs. At present, it appears that China will:

• continue to give relatively low priority to lan

and naval forces deployed within 500 miles of Ta

and

• continue to debate what military investments m

necessary to liberate Taiwan in the decade ah

reunification talks fail and trends toward inde

ence continue.

Investment in Border Defenses Near India,

Vietnam, and Central Asia.

Imagine the frustrating dilemma that faces the 

War advocates who seek to build modest power-proj

forces to enhance China's defense of its borders. Chin

fought border wars with India in 1962 and Vietnam in 

but not lately. China's diplomats have since 

successfully improved diplomatic and trade ties with 

China's neighbors. Confidence-building measures 

been agreed to with India, Russia, and three Central 

nations. There is no longer a dramatic or comp

military threat to China's borders, at least in the short 

138
priority on improving the quality and quantity of land

and air forces appropriate to border defense along C

land frontiers. This aspect of the security environmen

tend to free up Chinese defense resources for investme

maritime, air, and even space forces. Indeed, accord

interviews and military journals, China appears inst

place a high priority on coastal and harbor defense of th

ports that serve the two largest cities of Beijing 

Shanghai, historical avenues of approach used by fo

invaders.

Investment in a National Layered Air Defense

System.

As noted above, after witnessing the performance 

U.S. Air Force in the Gulf War, senior Chinese authors 

advocated construction of a nationwide air defense sy

China may believe that its C

3

 nodes and nationa

system are vulnerable to U.S. air strikes. (With little 

sea lift, China depends almost entirely on its railroad 

lines to transport its ground forces.) Traditionally

strategic intersection of the sole east-west and north-

rail lines at Shijiazhuang constitutes a decisive point 

defended from an invader. Japan seized it. Russian air

forces supposedly planned to seize it. The elite 38th G

Army defends it today. (This army was selecte

experiments with new doctrine, technology

organization in the 1980s.) Yet strategic Shijiazhuan

many high-value targets in China, is without air def

Need to Monitor the Debates.

It is in the interest of the United States at le

monitor this debate and the competition for de

resources among the three schools. For example, the 

War or Power-Projection school may eventually p

challenge to U.S. naval and air forces in the western P

Over time, the Chinese have explicitly stated they int

139
(roughly 500 to 1,000 miles from China) with 

power-projection forces. They cannot operate in this 

today. Yet Chinese authors emphasize that enor

natural resources await exploitation by China in this 

China's authors claim that in the past century Chin

humiliated by Japan and the Western imperialists be

it lacked modern military technology. China partic

lacked advanced naval forces, and so it lost Taiwan pro

and other areas. Yet this school cannot obtain the nece

resources if the programs championed by the othe

schools must also be funded.

In order to commit more resources to either 

projection or to the development of RMA technolog

doctrine, China must resolve or neglect a number of th

that will otherwise continue to claim the lion's sh

defense investment. If these kinds of threats are red

then the RMA and Local War advocates can claim a 

share of defense resources. If China's economic growt

continues to be three or four times faster than the 

economic growth rate (8 percent for China, 2.5 perce

the United States), then the estimates of Charles Wo

the World Bank suggest that in the first quarter of th

century, China will have enormous resources with wh

develop power-projection and/or RMA capabilities. In 

scenarios, the level of Chinese defense investment 

exceed that of the United States within 2 decades.

Much more would have to be known about C

secretive defense decision-making process bef

thorough understanding could be achieved about 

China's leaders may select one path instead of another

is probably worth attempting. Whether the People'

(and Local War) advocates continue to dominate C

military investment decisions may become an issue of 

importance to the United States over the long term.

140
MILITARY CAPABILITY

Three Alternative Net Assessments of Japan's

Military Power.

How would each of the three schools measur

military power of other nations? If it is correct to sep

PLA analysts into three schools of thought, it then fo

that their assessments of military power may also follo

very different main premises of each of these school

may speculate how each of the three schools w

quantitatively assess future military power. The 

schools might make very different calculations 

Japan, for example.

According to interviews with knowledgeable Ch

analysts in Beijing, there is little doubt that Japan has 

an opponent of China in a series of war games and 

simulations over the past decade at the Academy of Mi

Science. One particular Chinese nightmare apparen

that Taiwan may not be reunified with the mainla

2010, after which time Japan wi11 be able to p

strategically important role in providing a nuclear 

least a conventional umbrella over Taiwan. Ch

analysts have developed a number of scenarios invo

conflicts between Japan and its neighbors, including C

• Japan in a Taiwan conflict,

• Japan in an Association of Southeast Asian N

(ASEAN) conflict,

• Japan in a Korean Peninsula conflict.

An important part of any effort to appreciate the wa

China sees the future world security environment 

attempt to reproduce the kinds of calculations that Ch

analysts may be using to calculate future de

requirements against Japan. Each of the three Ch

141
current and future Japanese military power differen

There are probably sharp differences, perhaps 

factor of ten or more, among the three schools when it 

to measuring Japan's military capability. The People

school seems to view Chinese superiority to Japan to b

large. Japan is assessed as completely unable to perf

land invasion of China by any route. In this sense, C

historical experience of 1590s, the 1894-95 war, and th

of 1937-45 have resulted in China successfully solving 

past modes of vulnerability to a land invasion by J

This is seen as a great achievement by Chinese analys

course, the scenario of People's War against an inv

Japanese ground, sea, and air force benefits decisiv

China being the sole possessor of nuclear weapons, 

assessed vulnerability of Japan to nuclear disru

because of population and industrial density, and b

need for any Japanese forces to cross North Korea or T

(by sea) to repeat the damage of the 1580s, 1894, 

1930s.

Local war theorists, however, probably see Japan 

as roughly equivalent to China in all important inde

military effectiveness in the most common scenario

are deemed relevant. Some insight is possible abou

kinds of calculations used by these theorists because o

approval of Soviet works on operations research that 

been examined. Chinese translations of Soviet books 

the 1960s are still used in China for these calcula

according to interviews. One indicator that is used is t

in years of a weapons system multiplied by its nu

which produces a kind of depreciation in the value 

score of the ground, sea, and air units using such weapo

In sharp contrast to the first two schools, the third s

of RMA advocates apparently calculates Japan to h

potential of as high as a ten to one superiority over Ch

selected scenarios. Theorists in the RMA/future w

group advocate the use of very different measu

142
processing capability of weapons, platforms, and uni

China's Assessment of Future American Milita

Capability.

Chinese military analysts use examples from the 

War to illustrate U.S. weakness. Many authors stat

the outcome of the Gulf War would have been a U.S. de

Iraq had employed different tactics and exploited 

weaknesses. An overall assessment of the war comes 

Vice-President of the Academy of Military Science Li 

who writes that, during the Gulf War,

U.S. Armed Forces revealed many weak points. For examp

the combat consumption was too great, and it could not l

long. There was great reliance on the allied countries. T

high-tech equipment was intensive and its key links we

rather weak; once they were damaged, combat effectiven

was greatly reduced. Also if the adversary of the U.S. w

not Iraq, if the battle was not fought on the flat desert

the Iraq armed forces struck first during the pha

when U.S. armed forces were still assembling, or if Ir

armed forces withdrew suddenly before the U.S. arm

forces struck, then the outcome of the war might ha

been quite different.

65

Other areas of U.S. weakness cited by Chinese an

include the following points.

• The United States had insufficient mea

transportation.

• U.S. munitions cannot damage deep underg

bunkers.

• Various U.S. weapons systems have their own sp

weaknesses.

• The United States did not have superiority 

efforts to destroy Iraqi tanks.

143
e USoeaoocobat a

vulnerable to being divided.

Chinese analysts believe Iraq failed to exploit c

U.S. vulnerabilities by:

• not making surprise attacks on U.S. airbases an

U.S. rear;

• permitting the United States time to build up log

and to train for several months; and

• not employing pre-emptive “special measures” 

as harassing attacks.

U.S. Forces Cannot Even Defeat North Korea.

Chinese military authors also appear to devalu

effectiveness of U.S. forces in a future Korean sce

According to a colonel at the Academy of Military Sc

several factors ensure U.S. defeat “if in the next few y

Korean War erupted.” His main points are:

• The United States will not have 6 months to d

and train forces. Instead, “the Korean People's 

will surprise attack South Korean air bases, 

and communication lines.”

• “U.S. casualties will not be as low as in the Gulf W

On the Korean peninsula, the population is dense

river networks and mountains, roads are 

unsuitable to armor. . . casualties will be extr

high.”

• “North Korea's mountains are wrapped in cloud

mist, it will be difficult for the U.S. air force and 

technology weaponry to give full play to thei

superiority.”

144
epeatues o40 degees cetgade beo

“provide excellent conditions” for guerrilla wa

• North Korea will “not allow the United States t

in the rear.”

• U.S. ground forces lack the numerical strength 

once had. During the Korean War, U.S. t

numbered more than 400,000 at one point, bu

result was not victory.” During the 1960s and 

in the Vietnam War, America had 663,000 force

a great technical superiority, but “the result als

defeat.” U.S. forces in year 2000 will be reduc

percent from current levels.

66

U.S. Forces Will Fall Behind in the Competitio

Exploit the RMA.

Chinese authors emphasize several problem area

the United States faces in implementing the RMA 

maintaining its leading position:

• the U.S. interservice rivalry,

• the U.S. decreasing defense budget,

• the U.S. existing investment in technology,

• universal availability of U.S. technology aft

development, 

• easily damaged U.S. information networks, an

• greater potential of other countries to innovat

Several Chinese analysts suggest that Chin

exploit these U.S. weaknesses while pursuing its 

development of the RMA. Chinese authors define RM

they believe the United States does, emphasizin

potential invention of radical new forms of wa

145
“digitized” combat forces. However, while Chinese an

acknowledge America's current leading position, 

describe future U.S. weaknesses and how they c

exploited. The extent of negative predictions about ho

United States will implement RMA varies little amon

books published by PLA authors at the Academy of M

Science in the last 4 years.

67 Several authors emphasi

greater potential of other countries in the ar

innovation. With regard to China, Gao Chunxiang w

that U.S. weaknesses:

. . . provide us with the train of thought in future informa

warfare on how to stay clear of the enemy's main force and st

at his weak points, avoid his strengths and attack 

weaknesses, adopt his good points and avoid his short comin

use the indigenous to create the foreign, seek the cause 

respond with a plan. On future information warfare, if we o

dare to blaze new trails there will be no need to be afrai

anyone.

68

General Wang Pufeng's writings estimate that 

take until 2050 for all U.S. forces to be “digitized” and p

a “system of systems,” because of the slow pace to dat

U.S. interservice rivalry.

69

 According to Han Shengm

United States faces the following four major obstac

“establishing a digitized battlefield.” 70

First, interservice rivalry—the Air Force and Na

not want to join the Army's digital forces experiment

have a “negative-passive attitude.” Both Houses of th

Congress are also said to be obstacles. For example, “S

Armed Services Committee, Air-Land Forces 

committee Chairman John Warner believes that ‘troop

lack the technical skills to use digitized equipme

combat’.” Another Senator says that “army troops a

reliant on digitized battlefields, and as soon as a dig

network is destroyed, they would be unable to fulfil

combat missions.”

71

146
been decreasing for many years, even recently for d

forces.

Third, the technology is too complex. “If you w

build a digitized battlefield, you must resolve the foll

six technical issues: converting sensors information 

digitized coded form; processing digitized inform

making digitized connections; joining digitized syste

different combat platforms; developing digital d

equipment; and establishing digital links between 

and platforms.”72

Fourth, information networks are easily damaged

The control nodes of information networks after be

attacked are easily damaged, causing the entire system 

break down. . . . Local network systems' security is poor, a

they are easily subject to electronic attacks.

73

Another important example is America, Russia, a

New Revolution in Military Affairs, by two officers 

Academy of Military Science, who argue that the U

States will at first successfully innovate during the 

decade of the RMA but later will be surpassed by o

more) vigorous nations. They explain that the United S

will ultimately lose its status as a military super

because it will fail to exploit the RMA for several rea

including the following points.

• American military arrogance, growing out of th

War, will inhibit fundamental innovation, espe

in the area of new operational concepts whic

crucial for RMA.

• Information technology and other new mi

technologies will be universally available th

commercial enterprise and cannot be restricted 

U.S. Government, so the United States will lo

current advantage.

147
Saedeese budgets ae stocay po

more innovation than the giant U.S. budgets w

• New, innovative “measures of effectiveness” te

drive innovation, and nations other than the U

States are experimenting more in this area, 

when they have to buy weapons from more adv

nations.

74

Chinese analysts also use the most recent public r

of U.S. defense strategy, the Quadrennial Defense R

(QDR) in 1997, as the basis to suggest increasing m

challenges the United States may not be prepared to 

First, there is the issue of homeland defense. Lu D

from the China Institute of International Strategic S

writes, “It is the first time since the end of the Cold Wa

the United States emphasizes that the U.S. homeland 

free from external threats.” Second, Lu points out th

United States is only making a modest effort to explo

RMA. “How to balance investment in the present vs. f

was the fundamental contradition facing the 

Department of Defense.” The QDR examined three dif

strategic paths to solve this tough problem: the QDR c

third path—to strike a balance between present an

future “that embraces the RMA in an evolutionary wa

Continuing to exploit the RMA has been adopted a

general principle of U.S. military development o

QDR.”75

According to some Chinese military authors, the U

States already knows China can defeat it in 2020. G

Pan Junfeng states that the United States will not 

formed a full information warfare force until the mid

the 21st century. He explains three ways that in future 

American computers can be very vulnerable.

We can make the enemy's command centers not work 

changing their data system. We can make the enem

headquarters have wrong judgments by send

148
and even its entire social order.

76

General Pan states that the United States has al

realized these three points and that the magazine, D

News, on January 30, 1994, reported that war game

place at the Navy War College, Newport, Rhode Island

pitted the Chinese military against the U.S. Navy 

Pacific. In these games, the Chinese forces defeated th

forces. General Pan makes five suggestions:

• increase research on military doctrine;

• establish new operational theory;

• train high-quality officers with advanced degre

• establish combat “laboratories” and stud

laboratories that the United States has created

• create sha shou jian or “magic weapon trump car

China's Assessment of the China-Taiwan-U.S.

Balance.

Chinese open-source writings describe Tai

military strengths and weaknesses, U.S. military stre

and (mainly) weaknesses, alternative scenarios for ho

Taiwan problem can be solved, and a variety of opera

details about the land, sea, and air battles that cou

fought.

There is no guarantee that these open-source wr

reveal actual Chinese plans. They probably do not. Th

however, suggest a framework for analysis of the prob

using force against Taiwan. This is obviously a 

subject and requires further discussion. The dilemma, 

is that we have no certain knowledge of China's plan

we do have some signs of how Beijing will approa

military problems with Taiwan and the United S

Analysts must keep an open mind, avoid ethnocent

149
underestimating the Chinese.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 3

1. However, Paul Dibb, David D. Hale, and PeterPrince note 

Strategic Implications of Asia’s Economic Crisis,” Survival, S

1998, p. 5, that the crisis will bring “a shift in the regional balan

favors China.”

2. Hans Binnendijk and Ronald N. Montaperto, eds., S

Trends in China, National Defense University Press, 19

quotations from John Culver in this paragraph may be found o

3. Henry Kissinger, “No Room for Nostalgia,” Newsweek, J

1998, p. 52.

4. Dennis Blasko, “Better Late Than Never,” in C. Denniso

Mark Weisenbloom, and Dimon Liu, eds., Chinese M

Modernization, London, New York, Washington: AEI Press, 1

131.

5. Ellis Joffe, The Chinese Army After Mao, Cambridg

Harvard University Press, 1987.

6. Two colonels at the Academy of Military Science define “s

assessment” as used by Sun Zi in the Art of War. Their new tran

into English faults the well-known translation in 1963 by B

General Samuel Griffiths for “serious errors,” including using th

“estimates” instead of “strategic assessment.” See Pan Jiabin 

Ruixiang, Aft of War. A Chinese English Bilingual Reader, 

Junshi kexue chubanshe, 1993, pp. 123-124.

7. George E. Pickett, James G. Roche, and Barry D. Wat

Assessment—A Historical Review,” in On Not Confusing Ou

Andrew W. Marshall, J. J. Martin, and Henry S. Rowen, eds., B

CO: Westview Press, 1991, pp. 169-171.

8. Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, Calculatio

Assessment and the Coming of World War II, New York: Free 

1992.

9. Rosen, Assessing the Correlation of Forces. France 1940

Report for the Office of Net Assessment, June 18, 1979, pp. 296

150
Concept,” in Marshall, Martin, and Rowen, eds., p. 288.

11. Andrew W. Marshall, “A Program to Improve Analytic M

Related to Strategic Forces,” Policy Sciences, November 1982, p

12. David L. Shambaugh, Beautiful Imperialist: China P

America 1972-1990, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Pres

Gilbert Rozman, The Chinese Debate About Soviet Soc

1978-1985, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987; A

Whiting, China Eyes Japan, Berkeley: University of California 

1989; and Carol Lee Hamrin, China and the Challenge of the 

Changing Political Patterns, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 199

13. By 1986, an open-source article described many of the ke

of the current assessment of a multipolar world structure. S

Heng, “Shijie zhanlue geju zhengxiang duojihua fazhan” (“Devel

of Global Strategic Multipolarity”), Guofang daxue xuebao Vol. 

pp. 32-33.

14. Huan Xiang, Preface to the Chinese Translation of Do

and Pfaltzgraff, “Contending Theories of International Rel

Shijie zhishi (World Knowledge), No. 8, 1988, p. 12.

15. Wang Shuzhong, “The Post-War International System

China Sees the World.—Perceptions of Chinese Scholars,Harish 

ed., London: Francis Pinter Publishers, 1987, p. 22.

16. Liang Shoude and Hong Yinxian, Guoji zhengzhixue 

(General Theory of International Politics), Beijing: Zhongyang 

chubanshe, 1994.

17. See Chu Shulong, “Guangyu guoji guanxixue xueke jians

ge wenti” (“Several Issues Concerning the Establishment of the 

of International Relations”), Xiandai guoji guanxi (Contem

International Relations), No. 4, 1995, pp. 59-63; Yang Zheng

guoji guanxixue de yanjiu duixiang wenti” (“A Tentative Analys

Object of the Study of International Relations”), Xiandai guoji 

(Contemporary International Relations), No. 4, 1995, pp. 64-

David Shambaugh and Wang Jisi, “Research on International 

in the People’s Republic of China,” Political Science, Fall 19

758-64. According to an interview in Beijing with Wang Jisi 

1995, the first article on Western theory was by Chen Lemin 

“Western International Relations Theory—in Resea

International Problems,” The Journal of the CIIS. Chu has a Ph.

George Washington University, Wang from Oxford University.

151
University Press, 1950, pp. 10-11.

19. Liu Mingde, “Changes in the Forms of War,” Intern

Strategic Studies, No. 2, 1992, p. 9.

20. Chen Xiaogong, a senior military intelligence officer and 

U.S. Atlantic Council visiting fellow, has written that the questio

transition period will be “Should the world be built into a peace

stable place based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexisten

which is beneficial to economic development in an absolute maj

countries?” In Chen Feng and Chen Xiaogong, “The World Is 

Transition Period of a New Strategic Pattern Replacing th

Jiefang jun bao (Liberation Army Daily), January 4, 199

Translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service-China (he

FBIS-CHI)-91-021, January 31, 1991, pp. 11-15.

21. Chinese views of the RMA will be treated in detail inSect

22. Mi Zhenyu, Zhongguo guofang fazhan gouxiang (

National Defense Development Concepts), Beijing: Jief

chubanshe, 1988.

23. Declassified quotations from Chairman Mao and other C

leaders illustrate China’s strategic assessment in the 1970s

assessment predicted an inevitable Soviet-American war in Eu

which Soviet forces would drive NATO forces toward the Chan

result in a “Dunkirk,” or evacuation under fire of the United Stat

continental Europe.

24. Pan Zhengqiang, “Current World Military Situation,” 

ribao (People’s Daily), December 23, 1993, p. 7. Transla

FBIS-CHI-94-005, January 7, 1994, pp. 27-29. General Pan is dir

the Institute for National Security Studies of the National 

University in Beijing.

25. Zhu Chenghu, “Focus Attention on the Converging P

Interest of China and the United States,” Jiefang jun bao, (Lib

Army Daily), June 19, 1998, p. 4. Zhu is deputy director of the S

Research Institute of National Defense University, Beijing.

26. See Xi Runchang and Gao Heng, eds.,Shijie zhengzhi xin 

guoji anquan (The New World Political Structure and Intern

Security), Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe, 1996; and Chen Qim

Kua shiji de shijie geju da zhuanhuan (Major Changes in th

152
chubanshe, 1996.

27. Zhang Taishan, “New Developments in the Japan-U.S. M

Relationship,” International Strategic Studies, No. 4, 1997, pp. 

28. Chen Peiyao, “Big Power Relations in the Asia-Pacific R

Journal of the Shanghai Institute of International Studies

November 1995, p. 1.

29. Liu Chungzi, “The Art of War and Contemporary M

Struggle,” Zhongguo junshi kexue,(China Military Science). Colo

Chungyi serves in the National Defense University St

Department in Beijing.

30. The Warring-States era, 475-221 BC, was “the flowering 

the Chinese fable and exerted a definite influence on works 

centuries,” according to K.L. Nu, 10O Ancient Chinese Fables, 

Commercial Press, 1993, p. 8.

31. Gao Rui, Zhongguo shanggu junshi shi (Chinese 

Military History), Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe, 1995, p. 2

that the era is “extremely distant from modern times, but stil

with the glory of truth” and “the splendid military legacy 

through the bloody struggles of our ancient ancestors . . . [toda

radiance even more resplendent.”

32. Herbert Goldhamer, The Adviser, New York: Elsevie

Herbert Goldhamer, “Reality and Belief in Military Affairs: 

Draft,” June 1977, Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1979

33. Goldhamer, The Adviser, pp. 130-132.

34. Goldhamer, “Reality and Belief in Military Affairs,” pp. 

35. Huang Yingxu, “Manyi Zhongguo gudai junshi sixiang z

minben jingshen” (“Chinese Ancient Military Thought on 

Spirit”), Zhongguo junshi kexue (China Military Science), Sprin

pp. 121-125. Colonel Huang describes the change from divina

calculation in Spring and Autumn era. He is a research fellow 

department of Mao Zedong Military Thought at the Academy of M

Science.

36. Goldhamer, The Adviser, p. 121.

37. Ibid., pp. 135-136.

153
military writings published since 1993 on the contemporary re

of ancient Chinese statecraft, including these books: Sanshiliu 

tan tan (Ancient and ModernDiscussions on the Thirty-Six Strat

Zhisheng taolue-Sunzi zhanzheng zhixing guanlun (Strate

Superiority—Sunzi’s Views on Knowledge and Action in War); B

er qu ren zhi bing—Zhongguo gudai xinlizhan sixiang ji qi y

(Conquest without Combat—Ancient Chinese Psychological 

Thought and Usage); Zhongguo lidai zhanzheng gailan (An Ou

Warfare in Past Chinese Dynasties); Quanmou shu-Shujia yu y

jiaoliang (Power Stratagems—A Contest of Losers and Winners

bingfa yu sanshiliu ji (Sunzi’s The Art of War and The Th

Stratagems); Zhongguo gudai bingfa jingcui(The Essence of the 

Chinese Art of War); Sunzi bingfa de diannao yanjiu(Computer 

on Sunzi’s The Art of War); Ershiwu li junshi moulue gushi jing

Selection of 25 Stories on Ancient Military Strategy).

39. Wu Chunqiu, Guangyi da zhanlue (Grand Strategy), 

Current Affairs Press, 1995, p. 98.

40. Ibid., pp. 17-18.

41. Yan Xuetong, “Zhongguo jueqi de guoji huanjing pingg

Assessment of the International Environment of China’s 

Zhanlue yu guanli (Strategy and Management), No. 1, 1997, pp

The table is from page 20.

42. A recent endorsement of People’s War appeared Jan

1998, in Liberation Army Daily which quoted Defense Minis

Haotian who, at the National Defense University, stated that 

high tech conditions, we still need to insist on People’s War.” C

that People’s War “is the product of historical and dia

materialism.”

43. For examples of Chinese writing on People’s Warfare, 

Sheng’e and Mao Lin, Xiandai jubu zhanzheng tiaojian xia de 

zhanzbeng (People’s War Under the Conditions of High Tec

Warfare), Beijing: Guofang daxue chubanshe, 1996; Wang Pufe

Mao Zedong junshi zhanlue lun (On Mao Zedong’s Military St

Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe, 1993; and Xia Zhengnan, Mao 

junshi zhanlue lun (Mao Zedong’s Military Methodology), 

Junshi kexue chubanshe, 1995. See also the following six 

translated in CVFW: Chen Zhou, “Zhongguo xiandai jubu zha

lilun yu Meiguo youxian zhanzheng lilun zhi butong” (“Chinese 

Local War and U.S. Limited War”), Zhongguo junshi kexue 

Military Science), Vol. 33, No. 4, Winter 1995, pp. 43-47; Fan

154
New Era”),Zhongguo junshi kexue(China Military Science), Vol

4, Winter 1994, pp.43-49; Shen Kuiguan, “Gao jishu zhanzhen

yilieshengyou de bianzhengfa” (“Dialectics of Defeating the S

with the Inferior”), Zhongguo junshi kexue(China Military Scien

32, No. 4, Winter 1994, pp. 105-109; Wang Naiming, “Jianchi jiji 

shixing xiandai tiaojian xia renmin zhanzheng” (“Adhere to 

Defense and Modern People’s War”), in Deng Xiaoping zhanlue 

lun (On Deng Xiaoping’s Strategic Thought), Peng Guangqian a

Youzhi, eds., Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe. 1994, pp. 280-2

Jincheng, “Information War: A New Form of People’s War,” Jie

ribao, (Liberation Army Daily), June 25, 1996; Zhao Nanqi, “Xu” 

Xiaoping’s Theory of Defense Modernization”), in Deng X

zhanlue sixiang lun (On Deng Xiaoping’s Strategic Thought), p

foreword.

44. Mi Zhenyu, China’s National Defense Concepts, 1988.

45. Sokolovskiy, Soviet Military Strategy, Moscow, 1968, p. 

46. Chen Yung-kang and Chai Wen-chung, “A Study of the E

PRC Naval Strategy,” China Mainland Research, September 

pp. 7-10, 13-20.

47. Blasko, “Better Late Than Never,” passim.

48. See Liu Sheng’e and Mao Lin; Wang Pufeng; and Xia Zhen

49. Six representative articles on Local War by senior offi

Liu Huaqing, “Yi shi wei jian jiaqiang guofang xiandaihua j

(“Defense Modernization in Historical Perspective”), Zhongguo 

kexue, (China Military Science), No. 4, 1994, pp. 7-8; Fu Qu

“Wojun houqin xiandaihua jianshe de zhinan” (“Future L

Modernization”), Zhongguo junshi kexue, (China Military Scien

I, 1994, pp. 2-10; Yang Huan, “Woguo zhanlue he wuqi zhuan

fazhan” (“China’s Strategic Nuclear Weaponry”), in Hu

zhanwang (Retrospect and Prospect: Chinese Defense S

Technology and Industry), Beijing: Guofang gongye chubans

157-159; Wu Jianguo, “Gaojishu zhanzheng zhong de he yinying 

hushi” (“Nuclear Shadows on High-Tech Warfare”), Zhongguo 

kexue, (China Military Science), No. 4, 1995, pp. 107-109

Benchan, “Woguo zhuangjiabing wuqizhuangbei fazhan de hu

zhanwang” (“Research and Development of Armour”), in Hu

zhanwang (Retrospect and Prospect: Chinese Defense S

Technology and Industry), Beijing: Guofang gongye chubans

169-171; Ding Henggao, “Guofang keji gongye fazhan yu gaige 

155
Industry”), Zhongguo junshi kexue, (China Military Science)

1994, pp. 67-73. All are translated in Michael Pillsbury, ed. 

Views of Future Warfare,Washington, DC: National Defense Un

Press, 1997.

50. A proximate cause for this Chinese invasion was Vi

seizing a number of strategic hilltops inside China and shelling C

villages nearby in December 1978. Other factors were the Viet

navy’s harassing Chinese fishermen, Vietnamese expulsion of 

200,000 ethnic Chinese, Vietnam’s invasion of Cambod

liquidation of a pro-Chinese government there, and Vietnam’s g

military alliance with the Soviet Union.

51. Harvey Nelson, Power and Insecurity: Beijing and Mos

Washington, 1949-1988, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989, p

52. The source is “Declaration of all Democratic Parties,” No

4, 1950, in The Great “Opposing America, Assisting Korea” Mo

Beijing: New China Bookstore, 1954, pp. 366-367. Later, Gene

Xiuquan at the U.N. Security Council described an American 

plan to invade China that included bases and arrangement in 

South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines.

53. Wang Pufeng, “Yingjie xinxi zhanzneng de tiaozhan

Challenge of Information Warfare”), Zhongguo junshi kexue, 

Military Science), No. I, 1995, pp. 8-18. Translated in CVFW, 3

54. Shen Zhongchang, Zhou Xinsheng and Zhang Haiying, “

haizhan chutan” (“21st Century Naval Warfare”), Zhongguo 

kexue, (China Military Science), No. I, 1995, pp. 28-32. Trans

CVFW, 261-274.

55. Chang Mengxiong, “21 shiji haizhan chutan”, (Weapon

21st Century”), Zhongguo junshi kexue, (China Military Scienc

1995, pp. 19-24, 49. Translated in CVFW.

56. Song Shilun, A Preliminary Probe into Mao Zedong’s M

Thought, Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe, 1983, pp. 96-97.

57. Yan Xuetong, “China’s Post-Cold War Security Str

Contemporary International Relations, No. 5, 1995.

58. An anthropologist has observed that Chinese invo

factional disputes carry on the conflict by denying to outsiders t

other factions even exist. Few Chinese analysts footnote other a

or comment about the work of others in any article or book. See B

156
Quarterly, 1974.

59. This new third school has no senior leader like Mao or 

serve as a patron as yet. It tends to cite American specialists ab

RMA, including Andrew W. Marshall, without reference to 

Deng. It will be important if the speeches of President Jiang Zem

incorporate this school rather than continuing as they have for t

5 years, to endorse a vague mixture of both the Mao an

approaches.

60. Each of the three schools of thought identified above—"P

War, combined arms, and information warfare-RMA—has 

themes which identify it. For People’s War advocates, one clue is 

for “defense conversion,” or the production of commercial prod

assist with the politically correct goal of economic growth, b

carefully maintaining the capability to shift rapidly back to w

intensity of production of weapons in order to arm the millions w

be mobilized to defeat the invader.

61. For a strategic framework, see Peng Guangqian and 

Guangxu, Jushi zhanlue jian lun (A General Discussion of M

Strategy), Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1989, pp. 161-162; and Liu M

and Yang Chengjun, Gao jushu zhanzheng zhong de daoda

(Missile Wars During High Tech Warfare), Beijing: Guofang 

chubanshe, 1993.

62. Bao Zhongxing, “Concepts for Developing Space For

Thinking About Force Modernization, Beijing: Guofang 

chubanshe, 1988.

63. Interviews conducted by the author.

64. Liberation Army Daily, February and March, 1998, pas

65. Li Jijun, Junshi lilun yu zhanzheng shijian,in CVFW, 

66. Zhen Xi, Kelindun junshi zhanlue yu di er ci Ch

zhanzheng shexiang, pp. 66-68.

67. Wang Pufeng, Xinxi zhanzheng yu junshi geming,(Infor

Warfare and the Revolution in Military Affairs), Beijing: Junsh

chubanshe, 1995; Li Qingshan, Xin junshi geming yu ga

zhanzheng, (The New Revolution in Military Affairs an

Technology Warfare), Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe, 199

Chunxiang, ed., Xin junshi geming lun (On the New Revolu

Military Affairs), Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe, 1996; Zhu 

157
New Revolution in Military Affairs), Beijing: Junshi kexue chu

1996; Han Shengmin, ed., Zouxiang 21 shiji de waiguo jundui 

(Foreign Military Development Toward the 21st Century), 

Junshi kexue chubanshe, 1996.

68. Gao Chunxiang, p. 202.

69. Wang Pufeng, “Yingjie xinxi zhanzheng de tiaozhan

Challenge of Information Warfare”), Zhongguo junshi kexue 

Military Science), No. 1, 1995, pp. 8-18. Translated in Pillsbury, 

Views of Future Warfare, pp. 317-326.

70. Han Shengmin, p. 47.

71. Ibid.

72. Ibid., pp. 47-48.

73. Ibid., p. 48.

74. Zhu Xiaoli and Zhao Xiaozhuo, Mei-E xin junshi 

(America, Russia and The New Revolution in Military Affa

41-45.

75. Lu Dehong, “An Analysis of the U.S. New Report 

Quadrennial Defense Review, International Strategic Studies

1997, pp. 12-17.

76. Pan Junfeng, China Military Science, Summer 1996. G

Pan is director of the Foreign Military Studies Department 

Academy of Military Science in Beijing. Similar suggestions 

China can exploit U.S. weaknesses and improve its position in t

are offered in Gao Chunxiang, pp. 199-202; and Wang Pufeng i

zhanzheng yu junshi geming (Information Warfare and the Rev

in Military Affairs), pp. 201-203.

77. Ibid.

158
ADVANCED MILITARY TECHNOLOGY A

THE PLA: PRIORITIES AND CAPABILIT

FOR THE 21st CENTURY

Bernard D. Cole

Paul H.B. Godwin

Introduction.

China's military strategists and planners fa

increasingly difficult dilemma as they prepare their de

modernization plans for the 21st century. Even as 

armed forces are just beginning to acquire small amou

the technologies, weapons, and equipment designed fo

in the latter part of the 20th century, advances in mi

technology portend a potential revolution in the cond

war in the 21st century. Extensive publications by Ch

military analysts amply demonstrate their understa

of the difficulties facing their armed forces as they gr

with the implications of advanced technologies for w

the next century.

1

 Given the openness with which C

military leaders and analysts discuss the problems fa

their armed forces, this chapter focuses on four ar

inquiry. 

First, we review the implications of advanced techn

warfare, as assessed by Chinese military analysts 

years since the 1985 revision of China's national m

strategy and particularly in the period following the 

Persian Gulf War. Second, we use the evaluations fou

the Militarily Critical Technologies List Part 1: W

Systems Technologies (MCTL), released by the Office 

Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisitions and Techn

in June 1996, to assess China's military-indu

capabilities. Third, in order to determine the techno

modernization objectives and priorities of the Pe

159
assessment in conjunction with Beijing's acquisit

foreign military technologies and with analyses of the 

of military operations that, according to translatio

selected Chinese military journals, Chinese forces s

conduct over the next decade. Finally, we analyze the 

of feasible strategies and concepts of operations th

being contemplated by Chinese analysts as they sear

specific technologies to offset the advantages of pot

adversaries. 

We do not assess the implications of adva

technologies for China's nuclear force moderniz

Scholars such as Alastair I. Johnston have al

thoroughly analyzed the implications, drawn by Ch

analysts, of the technology advances in this real

Beijing's strategic doctrine and strategy.

2

 Rather, we 

on the implications for China's conventional, ge

purpose forces.

Deficiencies in the technologies of warfare are far f

new plight for the PLA. A major facet of the PLA's doc

heritage is Mao Zedong's principle, developed durin

struggle in the 1930s against a technologically su

Japanese army, that military forces can succes

compensate for their inferiority in the tools of war 

ingenious doctrine and concepts of operations. Noneth

Beijing's 1985 revision of China's national military str

and the implications of the Persian Gulf conflict 

questions within the PLA as to whether doctrina

operational ingenuity can compensate for technol

deficiency in the 21st century.

China's Changing National Military Strategy.

Revising China's national military strategy resul

the most significant transformation of PLA missions 

the founding of the People's Republic in 1949. Until 

continental defense against a massive ground assau

the PLA's primary military mission. PLA strateg

160
absorbing an attack and then conducting protr

attrition warfare to sap the enemy's strength and su

technology, leaving him weak and exposed 

counteroffensive that would eject him from Ch

territory. In the late 1960s, nuclear deterrence joine

core strategy as China deployed its first strategic fo

The wars China fought in Korea and with India 

Vietnam were “just outside the gate.” As conflicts 

bordering states, they were within the scope of a contin

defense strategy. In this strategy, pride of place was gr

to the ground forces with naval and air forces in seco

supporting roles. The PLA Navy's (PLAN) primary m

was coastal defense, while the PLA Air Force (PLAAF

devoted to air defense of the homeland.

In 1985, the PLA was given a radically new str

direction.

4

 The potential military threat against Chin

no longer perceived to be a massive assault, po

involving nuclear weaponry, designed to conquer Chin

overthrow its regime. Beijing's strategic assessment in 

saw the most likely future military threats as poten

intense, but politically and geographically limited, 

fought on China's periphery, including its mar

territories and claims.

5

 It was the requirement to ac

defend China's noncontinental territory that brought 

fore a new mission for the PLA—force projection a

maritime and aeronautical space.

PLA Post-Gulf War Self-Assessment.

6

China's 

forces were wrestling with these new requirements 

Persian Gulf War erupted. Operation DESERT ST

brought about a new awareness of the extent to 

technology had changed the conduct of war. For C

military analysts, Operation DESERT STORM mani

the advent of a probable Revolution in Military A

(RMA), based in large part on evolving inform

technology, such as microelectronics, space-based sys

and data processing. Following the Persian Gulf Wa

manner in which the PLA characterized its most 

161
“limited, local war under high-tech conditions.” 7

Particularly impressive to China's military an

were the allies' capabilities in offensive air opera

surveillance, including space systems and unmann

vehicles; precision-guided munitions, including c

missiles for long-range over-the-horizon (OTH) pre

strikes; and battlefield command and control. The 

100-hour ground war against Iraq was see

demonstrating that numerical superiority is no long

key to military victory and that the offense now 

significant edge over defense in modern warfare.

8

Although the display of military technology 

impressive, the doctrine and operational art demons

by the coalition forces, as they exploited these 

technologies for success on the battlefield, were de

equally salient. For PLA analysts, the stunning vict

coalition forces was recognized as more than the res

advanced platforms, weapons, sensors, and imp

training and doctrinal advances. The orchestration o

warfare was understood to be the critical factor m

combat effectiveness more than simply the su

individual service capabilities.

These analysts find China currently disadvantag

most areas of the technologies critical to near-term 

future warfare. Also evident is the PLA leader

understanding that China will not achieve the 

broad-based technological level as the United States' a

forces and military industrial base any time in the 

future. However, published analyses by Chinese m

researchers evidence a systematic effort to identify 

precisely those technologies within China's grasp th

critical to PLA ability to conduct war successfully 

future. A significant aspect of PLA research is the at

to link selected advanced technologies with the analy

potential strategies and/or military operations to cou

superior adversary. Those technologies that could 

162
also serve to support American allies, are specif

included in these inquiries.

Despite their understanding that advanced m

technologies are changing the conduct of war, PLA au

continue to wrestle with a “mix” of technology and ide

The icons of Mao's military theory, dependency on 

people” and “people's war,” remain even though mi

strength is no longer measured in numbers. Despite th

emphasis placed on quality-rather-than-quantity 

voiced by all of China's military leaders, this cont

obeisance to Mao Zedong suggests no small tinge of the 

dynasty reformers as they espoused the princip

zhongxue weiti, xixue weiyong—Chinese learnin

essence, Western learning for practical use. Despi

widespread understanding within China's mi

leadership that extensive reform is required to tran

the PLA into a world-class combat force in the 21st cen

military doctrines of the past still constrain reform and 

to place ideology before training and equipment in asse

combat capabilities.

Advanced Technologies and the Conduct of 

Advanced technologies of greatest interest and conc

the PLA are those contributing to significantly imp

battlespace transparency, command and control of 

military operations, long-range precision guided muni

and information warfare (IW). These technologies allo

commander to obtain and communicate near rea

information on enemy forces and permit the engagem

adversary forces at greater distances with incr

accuracy under all-weather and night condition

technologies are used to achieve information super

over the battlespace by confusing and hinderin

adversary's information collection, processing

utilization while simultaneously defending one's 

information-based systems and processes. IW capab

are often referred to as the “soft” side of warfare in con

163
defensive systems.

These military developments mirror increas

computer-intensive civilian communications and fin

systems, transportation-control networks , and power 

Disrupting these nominally civilian processes could 

have serious deleterious effects on a country's abil

sustain a war. Thus IW has added a new dimension 

appreciation by PLA analysts of technology's role in f

military conflict.

Advances in military technology demand chang

concepts of operations to exploit fully the advanta

military technology on the battlefield. Operation DE

STORM'S demonstration of technology's incre

importance convinced Chinese analysts tha

“battlefield” had expanded into space. It also showe

success in war was now crucially dependent 

coordinated plan of joint warfare that placed very 

requirements on command, control, communica

computers, intelligence, and information (C

4

I

2

). 

These implications of advanced technological w

place especially serious demands on the PLA, a m

force that lags a generation and more in the evolut

military technology and depends on a relat

unsophisticated population for its manpower. Ch

military analysts recognize that their armed forces 

integrate new technologies into concepts of opera

battlefield tactics, maintenance processes, and log

support without the experience the PLA might have g

if it had gone through earlier evolutions of 

technologies. 

Certainly there are potential benefits inherent 

requirement to make rapid, dramatic changes. The 

very backwardness may ease the leadership's ta

shedding the baggage of entrenched organizationa

operational principles. It may also mean that 

operational commanders will resist change unt

164
In either case, the PLA's lack of experience i

employment, maintenance, and logistical suppo

advanced military technologies will exact a double pe

as it transitions toward a 21st century combat force. 

leveraging technology through military opera

capability is especially difficult because technolo

advancing faster than it can be acquired, tested, deve

and applied in a military environment. Second, 

nations' militaries will continue to advance, so 

modernization efforts face moving technological goal

Similar problems confront China's weapon-design 

and defense industries when they contemplate prod

of advanced-technology weapon platforms, sensor sys

and munitions. Design teams must integrate the v

processes and technologies into coherent weapon platf

such as ships, aircraft, tanks, etc. Systems and techn

integration is a complex, demanding requirement a

heart of technologically advanced military effectiv

Only slightly less critical is the precision requir

manufacture advanced-technology systems, a capabili

well established in China's industrial base.

China's defense industries parallel the PLA's expe

in lagging a generation and more behind in 

requirements for manufacturing advanced-techn

military systems and munitions. These deficiencies c

overcome, but it could be many years before China's de

industries develop the consistent quality and precis

manufacturing required to move advanced-techn

military items from the drawing board to the battlefi

China's Military-Industrial Capabilities.

Can the Chinese military-industrial complex (C

build what the PLA thinks it needs for the next cen

high-technology warfare? The question is simple, bu

answer is not. Mark Stokes has prepared what may 

definitive monograph on what China's military res

165
but the question remains. Two decades of reform 

sought to rationalize the CMIC and its associated res

centers and universities, but priority has been plac

reducing China's defense burden, not on building a mo

effective defense research, development, and indu

base. Today, perhaps no more than 10 percent of the de

manufacturing plant is actually used for mi

production, with the remainder either idle or devo

producing goods and services for the civilian market.

Despite reforms initiated in the early 1980s, the 

remains the huge, lumbering, obsolescent behemoth 

with Soviet assistance in the 1950s. Consisting of more 

2,000 enterprises, each with multiple factories emp

three million workers, and encompassing more tha

major research institutes with 300,000 engineer

technicians, the CMIC has not yet approached the res

and production capabilities that mark a major m

power.

11

 Placing national defense fourth in the 

Modernizations” investment priorities established in 

took its toll on the defense industries as well as the PL

late as 1994, Chinese sources state that 81 perce

military producers were losing money.

12

The Commission on Science, Technology and Ind

for National Defense (COSTIND), a successor t

National Defense Science and Technology Commission

established to provide the cornerstone linking the PL

the CMIC. COSTIND's failure is evident as mi

research, development, and production remain we

down by a lack of centralized coordination and fragme

almost feudatory, CMIC fiefdoms. This condition hi

the process of translating technological innovation 

usable weapons and equipment.

13 But COSTIND, to

already been reorganized in 1998 into a Ge

Armaments Department (GAD) of the PLA and the 

COSTIND” (SCOSTIND).

166
it may facilitate the introduction of new technology, i

have exacerbated the situation as the CMIC entere

world of competitive civilian markets. Furthermore, 

early 1990s, defense conversion policies had create

situation where many plants no longer even wan

undertake defense production. Peacetime mi

manufacturing in China involves small quantities wit

production costs that leave the producer with little 

profit. Defense contracts often have to be subsidized 

revenues from civilian production, which has led to 

complaints that production plants seek to “guarantee 

not military interests.”

14

 Defense research center

suffered as central government funding was sh

reduced and institutes formerly restricte

defense-related research were required to commerc

their services. Frequently, civilian research 

development projects took priority and had to sub

military research.

15

Despite the priority the PLA places on acqu

sophisticated military technologies, it should n

assumed that research and manufacturing, emp

advanced technologies for civilian products, incl

imported technologies, automatically lead to “spin-o

military applications. Infrastructure deficiencies, com

with the lack of experience in transforming dua

technologies to military purposes, slow down wha

spin-on is derived from civilian or dual-use technologi

doubt spin-on is taking place, but COSTIND's own 

newspaper complained as late as 1998 that conv

defense industrial plants to civilian production in a 

competitive market has not resulted in centra

coordinated programs to exploit civil and dua

technologies.

16

While there may well be advances in specific res

areas and production capabilities, sometimes referred 

“pockets of excellence,” it remains to be determined wh

this progress is the result of a focused, planned respo

167
centers acting independently, without directi

coordination. Here again assessment is difficult be

failed projects are the norm in this kind of research ac

and it takes many years, especially in the CMI

transform development projects into deployed syste

The reorganization of COSTIND mandated at the 

National People's Congress in March 1998, as well a

formation of a new General Armaments Department (

to constitute a fourth General Department of the 

implicitly acknowledges COSTIND's failure.

18

Given the evidently poor state of China's indig

research, development, and production capabilitie

quickest way to embark on acquiring advanced m

technologies is foreign procurement.

19

Israel and Russ

currently Beijing's principal suppliers, with M

providing the most, but China also gets help from Ita

Great Britain. Israel is contributing to the J-10 adv

fighter project, while Russia has provided a wide var

weapon systems and military technology. The most v

signs of an expanding military technology linkage 

Moscow are the sale of four Kilo-class diesel-e

submarines, a reported contract for two Sovremenny

guided missile destroyers, and the recent agree

granting licensed production of Su-27 multiple-role fig

following the sale of some 50 completed aircraft.

20

 I

helping with avionics and shipboard systems, and 

Britain is assisting with airborne early warning.

These technologies and production capabilitie

however, at best 1980s genre. Entering the realm o

century technologies is far more complex—and expe

This is especially so in the realms of digitiza

information technologies, and the technologies requir

military space operations. Yet it is in precisely these 

that many facets of 21st century warfare require the h

degrees of production precision and reliability. This 

degree of precision and reliability is necessary because

deployed, it is not possible to maintain or repair comp

168
reconnaissance systems that are capable of prov

real-time intelligence to battlefield comman

Furthermore, these technologies must function 

extremely harsh environment after surviving the shoc

vibration of the launch-phase of deployment. To what e

China is receiving foreign assistance in these obv

strategic technological capabilities is unknown, but 

Moscow may be reluctant to provide assistance in 

realms.

Assessing China's Military Technology Capabi

In the United States, the Department of Def

(DOD) process for assessing militarily critical techno

for the MCTL involved 15 technology working g

(TWG)21 which reviewed more than 6,000 technologie

identified 2,060 as militarily significant. Significanc

determined by two sets of criteria: those that cou

enhance threats by potential adversaries of the U

States and (b) provided a measurable advantage to 

military systems. Ultimately, 656 technologies me

“militarily critical” criteria. Within the limits set by 

availability, all the world's significant defense indu

were evaluated. Although the MCTL is not a clas

document, it may be assumed to include assessments 

on classified data because each TWG incl

representation from the intelligence community as w

from industry and academe.

The TWGs assigned a numerical grade ranging fro

to “4,” reflecting their assessment of the capability 

state's industrial base to produce a specific technolog

“0” indicates that a state has no capability or th

TWG could not reach a consensus.

“1” indicates a capability in only a limited set 

critical elements of a technology.

“2” indicates a capability in some critical element

169
area's critical elements.

“4” indicates that a country is believed to hav

production capability in all elements of a technology 

Only the United States is assessed as possessing a

two of the 84 production elements for the 18 techn

areas critical to the development and production of su

weapons.

22

Of the countries included in the MCTL, we have se

five, in addition to the United States, with which to com

China. Selection was based on the principle that each 

countries selected must possess the range of technol

capabilities China is seeking to obtain. Japan, F

Germany, and Great Britain fit this criterion. Russi

included because its military technologies and de

industries were subject to considerable investment d

the Cold War and could provide some technologies 

China's defense establishment desires.

Compared with the other countries selected, Ch

relatively new to advanced military technologies, for 

not begin to develop a defense research and industria

until the mid-1950s. This first step toward a m

defense establishment came to an end in 1959-60 wh

former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U

essentially terminated all of its assistance. Wit

exception of the nuclear weapon, ballistic missile

nuclear-powered submarine programs that had s

status, internal political dislocation associated wit

Great Leap Forward and the Great Proletarian Cu

Revolution left China's defense research and indu

base essentially stagnant. By 1978, when Deng Xiaop

China's paramount leader initiated his reform prog

the defense industrial base was capable of placing 

Soviet technologies from the 1950s into series produ

Therefore, the DOD's assessment of June 1996 evalua

defense technology capability that, with few exception

emerged since 1978. Thus China's defense-industria

170
producing advanced military technologies that the oth

countries used in this analysis possess.

We note at the outset that Beijing's deliberate l

transparency about China's military capabilities m

that any assessment of the CMIC must be view

tentative. Thus, although we use MCTL assessme

technologies when evaluating China’s modern mi

capabilities and potential, we are aware that evaluatio

more transparent states will be more reliable than tho

China. Furthermore, an assessment published in 1996 

probably reflects data collected in 1994-95. Nonetheles

1996 MCTL, which forms the basis of our analysis, pro

the most substantive and accurate body of dat

analyzing China’s defense industrial capabilitie

potential, especially when used in conjunction 

information from several other sources .

China's Production and Development Capabilit

Overview. China's overall comparative standing can b

in Figure 1. In most of the 84 technology areas critical 

development and production of advanced military we

China is weak, having all necessary production capab

171

Production

Capability: CHINA U.S. RUSSIA JAPAN GERMANY U.K. F

4 3 82 14 28 20 36 

3 11 2 30 29 40 34 

2 37 0 34 19 17 12 

1 26 0 4 7 6 2 

0 6 0 2 1 1 0 

Total 82** 84 84 84 84 84 

Legend:

Production Capabilities:

0 = No Capability or no consensus 

1 = Limited

2 = Some 

3 = Majority

4 = All

** China was not evaluated in two technology areas.

Figure 1. Capabilities in the 84 Critical Milit

Technology Areas.
Those areas where China has a majority of the produ

capabilities are in armaments and energetic mat

chemical and biological systems, materials techn

power systems technologies, and in theoretical mode

signature control technology. In essentially all other 

of critical military technologies, China is extre

deficient. 

Figure 2 provides another overview of Ch

capabilities to produce advanced military hardwa

none of the technologies essential for the manufact

172

Technology CHINA U.S. RUSSIA JAPAN GERMANY U.K. F

Areas

Advanced Fabrication

 and Processing 2 4 2 4 4 4 

Bearings 2 4 2 3 4 3 

Metrology* 1 4 2 3 4 4 

Nondestructive

 Inspection and**

 Evaluation 1 4 2 3 4 2 

Production Equipment 2 4 2 4 4 3 

Robotics 1 4 2 4 2 1 

Legend: 

Production Capabilities:

0 = No Capability or no consensus 

1 = Limited

2 = Some 

3 = Majority

4 = All

*State-of-the art hardware requires precision measurement for both development 

manufacturing. The extensive list includes ships, aircraft, missiles, propellers, be

avionics, etc.

**Technologies essential for detecting problems in design and manufacture and in

delivered hardware. Additionally these technologies can provide the basis for dete

reliability and maintenance requirements.

***The level of this technology directly affects the cost, reliability, and level of mil

hardware that can be produced.

Figure 2. Manufacturing and Fabrication

Technologies.

***
advanced military equipment does China rank highe

“some” production capabilities.

Looking at China's technological capabilities in g

detail, Figure 3 lists those areas where China is eval

with a production capability of “3” or “4.” Figure 4 ind

those technology areas where China is evaluat

possessing less than a majority of developmen

production capabilities, a level of “1” or “2.”

173

Energetic Materials 

Chemical and Biological Systems Technology

Chemical/Biological Defense 

Detection/Warning Identification 

Materials Technology

Armor & Anti-armor Materials 

Electrical Materials 

Structural Material 

Special Function Materials 

Nuclear Systems Technology

Fission Reactor

Nuclear Materials Processing 

Nuclear Weapons 

Power Systems Technology

High Density Conventional Systems 

Mobile Electric Platform Power 

Sensors & Laser Technology

Obscurants 

Signature Control Technology

Theoretical Models 

Legend: 

 Production Capabilities:

 0 = No capability or no consensus

 1 = Limited

 2 = Some

 3 = Majority

 4 = All

 *Strength is defined as having the capability to produce a majority or more (levels 3-4

 military technologies.

Figure 3. China's Strengths.*
174

Aeronautics Systems Technology

Fixed Wing Aircraft......................................

Gas Turbine Engines*....................................

Human (crew) systems ...................................

Marine Systems Technology

Propulsors and Propulsion System .........................

Signature Control and Survivability ........................

Subsurface and Deep Submergence Vehicles .................

Guidance, Navigation, and Vehicle Control

Technology

Aircraft and Vehicle Control Systems .......................

Inertial Navigation Systems...............................

Radio and Data-Based Navigation Systems ..................

Directed and Kinetic Energy Systems Technology

Lasers, High Energy Chemical.............................

Supporting Technologies..................................

Weapons Effects and Countermeasures Technology

Induced Shockwave from Penetrating Weapons ...............

Sensors and Laser Technology

Acoustic Sensors ........................................

Marine Active Sonar .....................................

Marine Passive Sonar ....................................

Marine Platform Acoustic Sensors..........................

Electro-Optical Sensors...................................

Gravity Meters .........................................

Lasers.................................................

Magnetometers .........................................

Radar .................................................

Signature Control Technology

Materials ..............................................

Design Concepts ........................................

Applications to Integrated Systems.........................

Manufacturing..........................................

Logistics ...............................................

Testing ................................................

Computer Codes ........................................

Space Systems Technology

Computer and Electronics ................................

Optronics ..............................................

Power and Thermal Management ..........................

Space Systems Propulsion ................................

Space System Sensors....................................

Figure 4. China's Weaknesses.**
175

CI Systems ...........................................

CAD/CAM .............................................

High Performance Computing .............................

Human Systems Interface ................................

Information Security.....................................

Intelligence Systems .....................................

Modeling and Simulation .................................

Networks and Switching..................................

Signal Processing .......................................

Software...............................................

Transmission Systems ...................................

Information Warfare Technology

Electronic Attack........................................

Electronic Protection .....................................

Optical Countermeasures .................................

Optical Counter-Countermeasures .........................

Electronics Technology

Electronic Components ...................................

Electronic Materials .....................................

Fabrication Equipment...................................

General Purpose Equipment ..............................

Micro-Electronics........................................

Opto-Electronics ........................................

Manufacturing and Fabrication Technology

Advanced Fabrication and Processing .......................

Bearings...............................................

Metrology ..............................................

Nondestructive Inspection and Evaluation ...................

Production Equipment ...................................

Robotics ...............................................

Materials Technology

Magnetic Materials ......................................

Optical Materials........................................

Electric Power Systems

Pulse and High Power Systems ............................

* Also applies to marine gas turbine engines for naval application

** Weakness is defined as having the capability to produce only “

 “some” (levels 0-2) of the specific military technologies.

Legend: Production Capabilities:

0 = No capability or no consensus.

1 = Limited.

2 = Some.

3 = Majority.

4 = All.

Figure 4. China's Weaknesses.** (cont)
Our analysis, however, is not concerned primari

the CMIC's overall development and production capab

but with assessing China's advanced technology capa

in areas of expressed interest to the PLA: thos

contribute significantly to improved battle-space awar

long-range precision strike munitions, command and 

of joint military operations, and information warfare

capabilities can be assigned to three broad operationa

generic to all combat operations—detection, locatio

effective engagement, especially in a targe

environment.

Detection technologies may soon be able to provid

real-time information on the total battle area from 

through air to surface, to below the ocean's surface. Kn

precisely where the adversary's forces and comman

control facilities are located allows a commander to pr

and select targets. Locating the forces and facilities 

greatest significance to the battle allows a comman

employ joint forces in space and air, as well as on la

sea, to engage the adversary at the most advantageou

and place and with the most appropriate weapons. 

Detection and location capabilities can pla

adversary in a disadvantaged position, especially whe

create a relatively transparent battlefield, which per

commander to know engagement results in near rea

We will be expanding on each of these mission are

their associated technologies as we continue our ana

The three sets of technologies associated with 

operational mission areas as defined in the MCTL ar

Detection:

Space Systems Technology

Sensors and Laser Technology

Guidance, Navigation and Vehicle Control Techno

176
Sensors and Laser Technology

Guidance, Navigation and Vehicle Control Techno

Information Technology (C

4

I

2

, etc.)

Engagement (joint warfare):

Information Technology (C

4

I

2

, etc.)

Directed and Kinetic Energy Systems Technology

Information Warfare Technology

Aeronautics Systems Technology

Marine Systems Technology

Signature Control Technology

In several areas, specific technologies fit more tha

mission. Additionally, the technologies listed apply e

to offensive and defensive operations.

China's production capabilities in space system

assessed in Figure 5. Space surveillance provide

military commander with critical information 

capabilities. Beyond target detection and locatio

particular value are weather information, the abil

provide precise navigation data, and robust comman

177

Production

Capabilities: CHINA U.S. RUSSIA JAPAN GERMANY U.K. F

Computer &

Electronics* 1 4 3 1 1 3 

Optronics** 2 3 3 3 2 2 

Power & Thermal

Management*** 1 4 2 2 3 2 

Propulsion  2 4 3 2 1 1 

Sensors** *** 2 4 2 3 1 2 

Legend:

Capabilities: 

 0 = No capability or no consensus

 1 = Limited

 2 = Some

 3 = Majority

 4 = All

*Emphasis on component reliability in high stress environments: high vibration, radiat

 thermal cycling, etc.

**Emphasis on technologies enhancing target detection, identification, resolution, etc.

***Emphasis on efficiency, light weight, long duration and reliability.

 Emphasis on emerging chemical, low-thrust electrical and nuclear thermal technol

** ***Emphasis on electro-optic sensors providing “real-time” intelligence.

Figure 5. Space Systems Technologies.
space reconnaissance are optronics, for these techno

determine the parameters for detection, identification

resolution of targets. Where conditions do not p

sufficient clarity or detail, electro-optic sensors join 

laser illumination to provide the essential data.

23

Although China's interest in military survei

systems is unquestioned, its ability to design and pr

the space sensors central to wide-area reconnaissa

clearly limited. Beijing still defines its mil

reconnaissance satellites as “experimental.” China'

generation of recoverable photo-intelligence sate

(FSW-1) of the mid-1960s had an operational life of 7 

days. A later model, the FSW-2, could remain in orbit 

to 16 to 18 days. Two FSW-types were launched in

earth orbit in 1994. In March 1996, however, an FSW

satellite did not return to its Sichuan basin recovery 

but instead made an uncontrolled entry into the 

Atlantic.

24

There may be more progress with the Ziyuan-1 (

This commercial satellite joint venture with Brazi

scheduled to be launched in 1998, with an estimated 

life of 2 years. However, by May 1999, this launch ha

taken place. Given China's practice of combining civ

military functions, we assume that this satellite syste

have military missions when it eventually bec

operational. The ZY-1, with three remote sensors, 

real-time transmission capability and a ground reso

power of 19.5 meters. This is less than most comm

systems and far less than a U.S. KH-12, which 

resolution power of 1.5 to 3 meters.25 Thus, desp

30-year experience with satellites, China's abil

successfully deploy space systems that have the abi

detect and locate targets in a wide battle area and th

provide commanders with real-time intelligen

evidently some years away.

178
ground, and maritime platforms particularly adva

PLAN anti-submarine warfare capabilities (ASW)

referred to as Under Sea Warfare (USW) by the U.S. 

are limited by evident weakness in acoustic and 

sensors. Similarly, China has only a limited capabi

the electro-optical sensors used for terminal guidan

“smart” and more advanced “brilliant” munitions. In 

the CMIC is demonstrably weak in essentially all ar

technology associated with precision locating and targ

Similar deficiencies in providing precise locat

China's own and the enemy's military platforms are eq

evident, as indicated by Figure 7. In 21st century wa

continuous and accurate position data are requir

maintain real-time reconnaissance of enemy forces a

permit effective coordination of highly mobile mi

forces in joint, non-linear warfare. China is deficie

these technology areas. Furthermore, both conven

and nuclear munitions rely upon precise gui

technologies for the accuracy required to fit the wea

footprint to the target. Yet, here again China is lacki

179

Technology Areas: China U.S. Russia Japan Germany U.K. 

Acoustic Sensors 0 4 2 1 1 2 

Marine Active Sonar 2 4 3 3 3 4 

Marine Passive Sonar 2 4 2 3 3 4 

Marine Platform

 Acoustic Sensors 2 4 3 3 2 4 

Electro-Optical Sensors 2 4 4 3 3 3 

Gravity Meters 1 4 2 1 2 2 

Lasers 2 4 4 3 3 3 

Magnetometers 1 2 3 2 3 2 

Obscurants 4 3 4 4 4 4 

Radar 2 4 3 3 3 3 

Legend:

Capabilities:

0 = No capabilities or no consensus

 1 = Limited

 2 = Some

 3 = Majority

 4 = All

Figure 6. Sensors and Laser Technologies
Deficiencies in navigation and guidance are exacer

by poor command and control technologies, without 

effective engagement of joint forces becomes extr

problematic. Figure 8 indicates that China's mast

command and control technologies is inadequate.

Reliable and secure C

4

1

2 systems are essent

military operations. Today and in the next centur

seamless integration of communications, intelligence

information complements battle-space aware

providing the commander with real-time decision-m

capabilities. This is particularly significant because 

real-time assessment of the results of an engagement 

becoming critical to dominating the battle-space a

gaining tactical and operational advantage ov

adversary. China's continuing deficiencies in this c

area are reflected in the failure of its most r

second-generation military communications satellit

DFH-3. Built as a joint venture with Germ

Daimler-Benz company and using some U.S. compo

the satellite failed to become operational following it

1997 launch. This was the second DFH-3 malfunctio

first occurring in 1994 when the satellite failed to ac

proper orbit. Because of these failures, COSTIND l

two receivers on the commercial Apstar-1A for militar

180

Inertial Navigation

 Systems 2 4 3 3 3 4 

Aircraft & Vehicle

 Control Systems 2 4 3 2 3 4 

Radio & Data-Based

 Referenced Navigation

 Systems 2 4 3 2 3 4 

Legend:

Production Capabilities:

0 = No capability or no consensus

1 = Limited

2 = Some

3 = Majority

4 = All

*Accurate positioning, attitude, pointing, and control of land, sea, air, and space forces 

essential for coordinating highly mobile forces engaged in joint operations.

Figure 7. Guidance, Navigation and Vehicle Co

Technologies.*
The Apstar communications satellite was built by H

Electronics and sold to a commercial communica

company, APT of Hong Kong.

26

The PLA's use of commercial satellites for 

reconnaissance and communications demonstrate

overall pattern of weaknesses in China's mi

capabilities in space. Thus, when command and c

deficiencies are combined with detection and loc

frailties, China's hopes for achieving early in the 

century the capabilities demonstrated by the United S

in the early 1990s are slim to none. Moreover, the 

leased commercial capabilities leaves the PLA vulnera

having its information flow cut.

Countering High-Technology Adversaries. With 

collective disadvantages, it is important to assess the a

of Chinese forces to disrupt the advantages he

181

C

4

I

2

* 1 4 2 3 3 4 

Information Security** 2 4 2 2 4 4 

High Performance

 Computing 1 4 2 4 3 3 

Intelligent Systems*** 1 4 2 4 2 3 

Networks & Switching+ 2 4 2 4 4 4 

Signal Processing++ 1 4 2 3 3 3 

Transmission

 Systems+++ 1 4 2 4 4 4 

Software 1 4 2 3 3 4 

Legend:

Production Capabilities:

 0 = No capability or no consensus

 1 = Limited

 2 = Some

 3 = Majority

 4 = All

*Command, Control, Communications, Computing, Intelligence and Information (C4I

2

) S

**Cryptographic and cryptoanalytic technologies essential for keeping data secure and 

ciphertext in intelligence dissemination, global surveillance, computer and communica

networks.

***Technologies (hardware & software) allowing systems to adjust their functionality w

human operator intervention or preprogrammed logic.

+Technologies essential for maintaining communications at all times with all elements

include radiation hardened telecommunications, optical switching, and equipment capa

operating in extreme heat or cold.

++Technologies associated with ensuring the accuracy and reliability of data transmiss

environments with high levels of interference, including intentional countermeasures.

+++These technologies minimize third-party interception and neutralize electronic war

capabilities used to disrupt accurate reception of transmitted information

Figure 8. Command and Control Technolog
conflict not only fits the PLA's deeply-held doctrina

operational tradition, but it can also be ascertained 

Chinese assessments of their future strategy.

Of particular interest to China are the capabilit

high-energy lasers (HEL).

27 HEL systems can d

energy at the speed of light and show promise of bein

to provide rapid retargeting of platforms ranging 

satellites to ballistic missiles to aircraft.

28

 To achiev

promise, design is now focused on supporting techno

that will permit HEL systems to acquire and track ta

to conduct “kill” assessments, and then to move quick

accurately on to new targets. To achieve these capabi

the supporting technologies must allow the system to 

one or more targets, to sustain the beam on targe

enough to harm it, to evaluate the damage produced

then, if the level of damage is sufficient, to reorient the 

to another target.29 These are very complicated techno

to design, manufacture, and integrate into weapon sys

As Figure 9 indicates, China's assessed produ

capabilities, both in chemical lasers and the supp

technologies essential for effective engagement, ar

although clearly some progress is being made.

Chinese analysts also show a high intere

information warfare (IW),

30

 sometimes referred to as 

warfare. IW is a combination of old and new missio

182

Technology Areas CHINA U.S. RUSSIA JAPAN GERMANY U.K F

Lasers, High

 Energy Chemical 2 4 3 2 2 2 

Supporting

 Technologies

 for Directed 

 Energy Weapons 1 4 3 1 1 2 

Legend:

Production Capabilities:

0 = No capability or no consensus

1 = Limited

2 = Some

3 = Majority

4 = All

Figure 9. Directed Energy Systems Technolog
offensive and defensive capabilities. Offensive mi

seek to harm an adversary's information, inform

based processes and systems, and computer-

networks. The modes of attack used to execute 

missions are electronic warfare (EW), command and c

warfare (C

2W), physical destruction, and dece

Although “hackers” have demonstrated the capabil

break into unprotected computer-based inform

systems, the disruption of protected, hardened m

systems is more difficult. Figure 10 indicates China

technology capabilities are limited.

What is not evident from the available data are C

capabilities to attack unprotected systems, such as 

grids, civilian telephone systems, transportation netw

financial networks, and other increasingly inform

and-computer-dependent sectors of civil society. Figu

provides a broader assessment of China's inform

capabilities and exposes an even wider set of limitati

There is a wide swath of technologies involv

information systems (IS) simply because these techno

are applied over an extensive range of military applica

The applications include IS systems as part of “smart

“brilliant” weapons, aircraft, ships, tanks, armored fig

vehicles, and communications systems and netw

183

Technology Areas CHINA U.S. RUSSIA JAPAN GERMANY U.K F

Electronic Attack 1 4 3 2 3 3 

Electronic

 Protection 0 4 3 2 2 2 

Optical Counter-

 measures 0 4 4 2 3 4 

Optical Counter-

 Counter Measures 0 4 3 2 3 3 

Legend:

Production Capabilities:

 0 = No capability or no consensus

 1 = Limited

 2 = Some

 3 = Majority 

 4 = All.

Figure 10. Information Warfare Technologi
including hand-held devices. Equally important 

human-systems interface with these technologies, a

as the ability to model and simulate the engineerin

manufacturing processes. Human interface wit

technologies is central to increasing reaction tim

increasingly complex platforms, such as combat ai

and attack helicopters, and in the ability of the ope

and/or user to handle high levels of information and to 

decisions in high-stress combat situations. Here a

China's deficiencies are extensive, and the speed with 

its scientists and engineers can reach the level of adv

industrial and post-industrial states is difficult to pr

Operational Implications.

The MCTL data are particularly important for 

contribution to evaluating the military operat

applications of the technologies assessed. Given 

China's national military strategy has shifted 

184

C

4

I

2 1 4 2 3 3 4 

CAD/CAM* 2 4 2 4 4 4 

High Performance

 Computing 1 4 2 4 3 3 

Human Systems

 Interface 1 4 1 4 3 3 

Information 

 Security 2 4 2 2 4 4 

Intelligent Systems 1 4 2 4 2 3 

Modeling &

 Simulation 0 4 0 4 3 4 

Networks &

 Switching 2 4 2 4 4 4 

Signal processing 1 4 2 3 3 3 

Software 1 4 2 3 3 4 

Transmission

 Systems 1 4 2 4 4 4 

Legend:

Production Capabilities:

0 = No capability or no consensus

1 = Limited

2 = Some

3 = Majority

4 = All.

*Computer-assisted design and manufacturing.

Figure 11. Information Systems Technologie
maritime territories and claims are now of part

concern, we shall focus on technologies associated 

naval and air power and with cruise and tactical ba

missile capabilities. Because China's military analyst

future conflicts as potentially involving short-dur

high-intensity combat, the PLA's operational focu

shifted from defensive to offensive operations and the 

to gain the initiative early in any engagement. Nava

air power is of particular importance in such opera

Thus, even within a military strategy designed 

defensive, force projection is a major concern of C

military planners.

Maritime Forces. As Figure 12 indicates, the M

assigns China low ratings in most of the techno

associated with naval warfare. To recogniz

implications of these ratings, the analyst must conside

crosscheck more than one of the technology areas in or

translate MCTL evaluations into useful measur

operational capability in any area of naval technolog

weapon platform as complex as a modern surfa

subsurface naval combatant is dependent upon a sing

of technologies. Rather, to be effective, a warship 

“system of systems” and must integrate a numb

different technologies into a single fighting system.

Submarine Technology. Evaluating the military 

of China's submarines demands attention to a num

related technology areas. For example, despite C

strength in nuclear systems, its weakness in re

technology areas impedes the successful completio

modern, quiet, nuclear submarine force. This assess

together with the crudity of China's six nuclear-pow

submarines (only four of which may be operati

indicates that China is not able to make operational 

its strong rankings in nuclear systems technology. S

deficiencies impede development of a mo

conventionally-powered (diesel-electric) submarine fo

185
186

Nuclear Systems

Fission Reactor 3

Materials Processing 4

Marine Systems

Propulsion Systems 0

Survivability 1

Subsurface Vehicles 1

Signature Control

Modeling 3

Materials-Design 2

Integration 1

Manufacturing 1

Logistics 1

Testing 1

Computer Codes 1

Guidance and Navigation

Inertial 2

Sensors

Radio & Data-Based 2

Active Sonar 2

Acoustic (Terrestrial) 0

Passive Sonar 2

Marine Platform

Acoustic Sensors 2

Magnetic Materials 2

Manufacturing-Fabrication

Advanced 2

Bearings 2

Production Equip. 2

Metrology 1

Inspection & Eval. 1

Robotics 1

Legend:

Production Capabilities:

0 = No capability or no consensus

1 = Limited

2 = Some

3 = Majority

4 = All

Figure 12. Naval Systems Technologies.
a submarine must integrate a large number of adv

technologies, both to conceal its own presence and to 

its opponent's. Signature-control technology is cruc

designing a submarine with a low enough “signatu

avoid detection by opposing forces using submarine

aircraft, space, and ocean-bottom systems keyed to 

and report audio, visual, magnetic, pressure, and inf

disturbances to the environment that would indica

presence of a submarine. In sum, the less the subm

disturbs the ambient environment—the lowe

signature—the more difficult it is to detect and the 

effective it will be operationally. In these crucial 

China receives a “3” in theoretical models techniqu

only a “2” in materials and design concepts, and just “

the other five sub-areas evaluated—not a strong sho

Furthermore, while minimizing its own signatu

submarine must also be able to detect opponents. 

China has a “0” rating in the crucial acoustic sensor

and “2s” in the active and passive sonar areas.

Guidance, navigation, and vehicle-control techno

directly affect a nation's ability to design and pr

operationally effective submarines. This area includ

technologies on which are based inertial, radio

databased-referenced navigation equipment, appl

both to the submarine's ability to navigate accurately 

fire cruise and ballistic missiles with precision. Here, C

receives “2s” in inertial, radio, and databased-refer

navigation systems. In other words, the CMIC is una

provide the most advanced navigational-locating sys

and the absence of these advanced systems l

submarine navigational accuracy and hence opera

effectiveness. This shortfall can be partially alleviat

access to American global-positioning-system (

satellites and the Russian Global Navigation Sa

System (GLONASS), but the GPS system would cer

be downgraded by the United States in the even

military conflict.

187
area classified as manufacturing and fabric

technology. Here China is evaluated with a capability 

in advanced fabrication and processing, bearings

production equipment and of “1s” in both metrolog

non-destructive inspection and evaluation. Wi

importing these technologies, China will be una

construct an indigenous submarine force approaching 

of the advanced industrial states.

China's purchase of Kilo-class diesel-ele

submarines from Russia stems from these deficie

Kilos are advanced craft, more capable than 

Chinese-built Ming and Song classes. The Kilo first w

sea in 1980 and remains one of the world's b

conventionally-powered submarines. It is somewhat d

since it does not have an Air Independent Propu

system, but the Kilo still presents China with technol

sophistication not available in the CMIC.

To increase its stealthiness for both offensiv

defensive purposes, the Kilo's hull is coated with an

tiles that reduce its susceptibility to sonar detectio

diminish the noise created by its internal mach

Submarines from China's yards, especially the nu

powered Han and Xia classes, lack such a coating an

relatively noisy and easy to detect. The Kilo 

incorporates competent technologies for offe

operations, including acoustic sensors, electro-o

sensors, radar, lasers, and wire-guided torpedoes.

Clearly, by purchasing at least four and reporte

many as 20 Kilo submarines in future years, Beij

making a significant increase in submarine techno

available to the CMIC. Whether China will be able to u

these technologies in a CMIC-designed submarine 

stepping stone to leap over the development, design

implementation time represented by the 18 yea

technological advances that went into the Kilo since 

sailed is open to question. It is more likely that the C

188
in 2008 that would have been state-of-the-art in 1988

Surface Combatant Technology. China's newest s

warship is the Luhu-class guided missile destroyer (

two of which have been placed in commission. Like 

destroyers, the Luhu is designed as a multi-mission 

capable of conducting naval warfare over, on, and be

the sea. The world's most advanced destroyers ar

designed to project power ashore. How well can the 

carry out these missions, all of which draw directly o

technologies surveyed in the MCTL?

In building the Luhu, China incorporated wea

sensor, and propulsion systems from several fo

countries, including the United States, the USSR/R

France, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Spain. The 

critical of these foreign components may be the prop

system, a combined diesel-gas turbine (COD

arrangement built around U.S.-furnished LM-250

turbine engines. Five of these engines, which the U

States uses in several classes of warships and in th

aircraft, were sold to China before 1989. Four are ins

in the two Luhus.

31

Of the MCTL technology area pertinent to m

propulsion, China is evaluated as having “no” capabi

marine propulsion systems and “some” capability i

turbine engines. The CMIC apparently has been una

manufacture a viable maritime gas turbine en

although this technology was developed in Germany 

late 1930s and went to sea in 1962 in a Soviet comb

This CMIC shortcoming has presumably contributed 

hiatus in commissioning additional Luhu-class ships

Foreign designs also predominate in the L

sensor-weapons suite. The guns and associated fire c

directors are Soviet design, the torpedoes are Italian

the missiles and associated fire control systems are F

as are the ship's two helicopters. Except for the guns an

189
capability.

China's reliance on foreign systems in the L

electronic warfare and radar systems is reflected 

MCTL's evaluations of “1” and “2” for the six sub-ar

electronics technology.

33 These technology areas in

sonar, in which the Luhu's medium frequency s

reflects the MCTL's evaluation of China's capabil

marine active, marine passive, and marine pla

acoustic sensors as “2.” China shows no better capabi

technology areas related to radar development, earn

“2” in electro-optical sensors, lasers, and radar.

The Luhu also shows no apparent stealth char

istics, a judgment supported by the MCTL's sign

control technology area. Here, China is evaluat

possessing “some” (2) or “limited” (1) capability in se

the eight sub-areas, with a “3” earned for theor

modeling. 

China's front-line warship, the Luhu-class DD

multi-mission capable, but with systems based on 

technology and without the ability to project power a

As with the Kilo-class submarine, China is attempt

compensate for CMIC shortfalls by purchasing fo

ships. An agreement may have been reached with Rus

the purchase of at least two Sovremenny-class g

missile destroyers.

34 Much larger than the Luhu, disp

7,300 tons to the Luhu's 4,200 tons, the Sovremenny 

much better sea-keeping ability and a larger engage

envelope. 

The Sovremenny is a 1980s-era DDG, designed to 

as a unit in a coordinated task force against U.S. 

aircraft carrier battle groups. These ships were des

specifically for an anti-surface ship role; their anti-a

anti-submarine warfare capabilities are limited. In 

naval doctrine, these DDGs would be operating in com

with ships more capable of defending against air a

and hostile submarines.

35

 But China does not hav

190
multi-capability task force. Instead, they would like

employed as raiders or as part of a task group made up 

PLAN's best ships, Luda and Luhu destroyers and Jia

guided missile frigates. None of these ships, howeve

any more capable than the Sovremenny at com

modern air and submarine threats. Hence, the PLAN 

have to operate the Sovremennys very conservatively 

it either modified them or acquired other maritime me

operate more capably in a multi-threat environment.

These ships, however, represent a significant adva

many capabilities for the PLAN. Most newsworthy 

Sovremenny's anti-ship missile, the SS-N-22, or SUNB

in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) par

This is an extremely capable missile, with a flight p

that includes flying altitudes of less than 100 feet ov

ocean's surface, speeds in excess of Mach 2, a range f

most advanced model of over 65 miles, and possibly int

terminal flight maneuvers designed to foil defe

systems.36

Air Forces.

37

China's multiple weaknesses in the projection 

power are widely recognized. Despite China's long-sta

efforts to acquire the necessary capabilities, a ce

weakness remains the People's Liberation Army Air F

(PLAAF) and People's Liberation Army Naval Air F

(PLANAF) lack of operational aerial refueling capab

and airborne warning and control system (AW

aircraft. These two deficiencies alone limit both the ra

China's airpower to the unrefueled distance from land 

and its effectiveness in a variety of critical combat mis

We shall not go over this well-trodden ground in 

chapter.38 Rather, we will focus on the produ

capabilities of China's combat aircraft industries. Fig

provides the MCTL's overall assessment of 

technologies. Although there is a strong crossover be

191
military and commercial air-systems technologie

MCTL focuses on military-specific technol

representing “the key means to rapidly project fire 

against an adversary in the air and on land and sea.

192

Aeronautics Systems:

Aircraft Fixed Wing 2

Gas Turbines 2

Conventional Ammunition 1

Electronics:

Materials 2

G.P. Equipment 2

Micro-Electronics 2

Components 1

Opto-Electronics 1

Guidance, Navigation 2

Manufacturing-Fabrication:

Advanced Fabrication 2

Bearings 2

Production Equip. 2

Metrology 1

Inspection-Eval. 1

Robotics 1

Materials (Airframes) 3

Sensors 2

Signature Control:

Modeling 3

Materials 2

Design 2

Testing 2

Integration 1

Manufacturing 1

Logistics 1

Computer Codes 1

Legend:

Production Capabilities:

1 = Limited

2 = Some

3 = Majority

Figure 13. Air Power Technologies.
status in these broad technology areas requires a narr

of scope. Of the technologies that pertain to mode

power, China is evaluated as possessing “a majority” 

applicable technology in just two sub-areas (airframe

modeling for signature control), as possessing “some” 

technology in 13 sub-areas, and as having “lim

capability in 10 other areas.

The CMIC's inability to design and build modern co

airframes and power plants is compounded by C

deficiencies in essentially all other technology areas c

to modern air forces. In electronics, guidance, navig

and vehicle control, and sensors and signature c

technology, China is evaluated as possessing no more 

“some” of the required technologies.

Finally, in the technology area of armament

energetic materials, which refers to a nation's abili

develop and produce in quantity safe, affordable, sto

and effective conventional munitions and wea

systems,” China is assessed as having only a “lim

capability.

40

 For the purposes of air power, these in

ammunition, bombs, fusing, and missiles.

Although Beijing's Soviet-derived combat aircraf

the 1950s and early 1960s, such as the MiG-19/J-

MiG-21/J-7, have all benefited over the past 20 years 

the adaptation of Western military technologies, C

indigenous programs are best typified by th

interceptor's long and difficult development history

aircraft began development in 1964, was first flight-

in 1969, and entered service in the early 1980s. Even 

the aircraft's 20-year gestation period, the PLAAF 

found the J-8 unsatisfactory and, as late as 1989, dub

an “operational test aircraft.” PLAAF and PLA

dissatisfaction with the J-8 spanned a ran

requirements from a new fire control system to a 

powerful engine. China's aircraft industry was una

satisfy these demands and turned for assistance to We

193
“improved” J-8-2s began service with the naval air a

1992. This is a total of almost a 30-year development p

for what remains a below-par combat aircraft—not y

equivalent of a 1960s-era U.S. F-4 Phantom. 41

Unable to design and build modern combat aircra

their power plants and facing technology restrictions 

Western Europe and the United States, Beijing turn

Israel and Russia for assistance. Israel is providing d

and technology support for the J-10 multiple-role f

program. Russia became the source of military aircra

power plants, complementing its role as the pri

supplier of advanced naval combatants. Russia's assis

includes provision for a manufacturing facility in 

capable of assembling 10 to 15 Su-27s a year, with a 

inventory goal of 275.42

The Su-27SK model that China is fielding is a 

capable dual-mission aircraft, designed for bot

superiority and ground attack. There is no evidence th

Chinese have improved their ability to absorb and rep

modern aircraft, however. Additionally, all of these ai

reportedly are still returned to Russia for all but the 

routine maintenance.43 Although basically a late 

aircraft, the Su-27 embodies technology and m

facturing techniques beyond the CMIC's capabilities

When its air power capabilities and characteristi

matched against MCTL technology areas, Russia ea

“4” in fixed-wing aircraft, China a “2.” Russia als

higher ratings in gas turbine engine technology, elec

systems “hardening” against electro-magnetic p

(EMP), human (crew) interface, and navigation and c

systems. By the time China is capable of producing S

without Russian assistance, it is likely that Harlan J

assessment, made in the late 1970s, that the C

J-6/MiG-19 was “the most highly perfected obsole

combat aircraft in the world” will yet again apply.

44

194
The CMIC is credited with achieving a “pock

excellence” in missile technology.

45

 It is generally ass

that a key objective of China's defense establishmen

achieve a long-range reconnaissance/strike capability

significance of long-range precision strike was a

demonstrated to the Chinese defense establishment d

the Gulf War, especially the U.S. Navy's Tomahawk 

attack cruise missile successes . It is probable 

demonstration contributed to Beijing's decision to e

cruise and ballistic missiles in the Taiwan Strait mi

exercises of 1995 and 1996. These weapons are diffic

defend against, and their targets, beyond ships and air

include those critical to coordinating and susta

high-intensive combat: command and control node

defense systems, and air, naval, and logistic bases. 

sufficient accuracy, tactical missiles can replace ma

aircraft for precision strike on all of these targets. Figu

provides the MCTL's evaluations of China's capabilit

14 applicable technologies that apply equally to cruis

tactical ballistic missiles.

Cruise Missiles. Cruise missiles have a long h

going back to Germany's use of the V-1 in the closing y

World War II. As originally fielded by the United State

the Soviet Union in the early 1950s, cruise missiles 

little more than pilotless aircraft. Since those early 

this weapon has gained in accuracy and range and 

provides a relatively small, relatively inexpensive , fas

and forget” weapon that can be difficult to detect and 

down. Cruise missiles do, however, have drawback

include limited warhead size, dependence on reliable 

positioning data in OTH operational situations, the ne

mid-course guidance, and the requirement for pre

manufacturing and careful maintenance.

China makes extensive use of cruise missiles, a

with essentially all other areas of military technolog

CMIC's cruise missile developments originate in S

195
technology transfers. China's programs

46

 are groupe

two families: the Hai Ying (HY - Sea Eagle) and Ying J

Eagle Strike) series. Both families are given the letter 

a prefix before the number in export versions, as in C

China's first success was with the HY-1 series we

derived from the Soviet Styx. Attempts to improve o

missile began in 1974. Typically, gestation was long an

new version was not “type qualified” until December 

“Poor system integration and quality control” have 

blamed for at least part of the extensive development t

These and additional improved versions are poten

effective weapons, with the HY-2A (C-201) carry

1,129-pound warhead at sub-sonic speed (Mach .9

medium range (59 miles) using an infra-red homing s

This missile is deployed on the Luda DDG and Ji

guided missile frigate (FFG). The air-launched vers

the HY-2A (C-601) has a range of 68 miles and is deploy

PLAN H-6D bombers. An extended-range version 

196

Warheads 

Fusing 

Fabrication Materials 

Radar 

Inertial Navigation Systems 

Radio & Data-based Referenced Navigation Systems 

Gravity Meters 

Control Systems 

Microelectronics 

Electronic Components 

Electronic Materials 

Electro-optical Sensors 

Opto-electronics 

Legend:

Production Capabilities:

1 = Limited

2 = Some

Figure 14. Tactical Missile Technologies.
active radar guidance and carrying a 1,100-pound war

This system can be launched from both air and groun

The PLA's only known supersonic cruise missiles a

C-101 and HY-3/C-301 anti-ship missile. The C-101 

range of 31 miles, while the ground-launched HY-3 car

1,126-pound warhead 81 miles using active radar guid

China's follow-on generation of cruise missiles, t

series, is based on the French Exocet. The YJ-1/

entered service in 1985 and is smaller and lighter 

China's earlier systems. Although limited in rang

miles), it introduced a new capability by being deploy

the Han-class nuclear attack submarine, but a Han 

come to the surface to fire the missile. The YJ-2/C-80

active radar guidance and cruises at Mach .9 with a ra

75 miles carrying a 363-pound warhead. The most re

deployed in this series is the air-, land- and sea-lau

YJ-8A with a range of about 80 miles at an altitude 

meters. 

These are capable weapons, but they do not matc

sophistication of the Soviet-produced SS-N-22 

supplied with the Sovremenny. The SS-N-22 incorp

several technology areas evaluated by the MCTL th

more advanced than CMIC capabilities. In ene

materials, crucial to warhead construction, Rus

credited with possessing a “majority” of the req

technologies, while China is viewed as possessing 

“some.” In the areas of guidance, navigation, and v

control, the missile incorporates Russia's evaluations 

and “4” against China's assessed “2s” in these techn

areas. The MCTL data offer strong indicators th

acquiring the Sovremenny's SS-N-22 missiles, Ch

obtaining a weapon significantly more advanced tha

CMIC is able to design, build, and place into 

production.

The extent to which China can both upgrade 

capabilities and link them to the space and other r

197
the PLA desires is one of Beijing's most signi

development dilemmas. That China is seeking to ac

this capability cannot be questioned. Indeed, the PL

reportedly sought acceleration of the YJ-8A gr

launched land attack missile's development program

weapon is believed to be the first in which China is se

to incorporate GPS/GLONASS and a domest

developed Digital Scene Matching Area Correl

(DSMAC) guidance.

48

Tactical Ballistic Missiles. As with cruise mi

Germany's V-2 flown in 1944 was the first ballistic m

used in warfare. China's ballistic missile develop

originates in Soviet technology transfers in the 

1954-59. The PLA's tactical missile capability 

highlighted by the use of these systems in its mi

exercises off Taiwan in 1995 and 1996. The tactical ba

missiles deployed by the 2nd Artillery Corps ar

M-series family of surface-to-surface solid-fueled sys

The “M” designation is provided to export models, with 

(Dong Feng - East Wind) designating systems deploy

the PLA. The DF-15/M-9, with a range of 370-plus 

carrying a 1,100-pound warhead, is believed to ha

accuracy in the realm of 300 meters circular error pro

(CEP).

49

 Accuracy for the 180-mile range DF-11

carrying the same warhead is likely similar. 

Tactical ballistic missiles with conventional war

have limitations similar to cruise missiles: limited wa

size; dependence on reliable target positioning dat

terminal guidance; and the requirement for pre

manufacturing and maintenance. Once again, C

limited capabilities in all of these technologies, com

with remote sensor weaknesses, make progress tow

long-range reconnaissance/strike force a difficult task

most likely source for improving China's capabilit

these technology areas is Russia, but the extent to 

Moscow is willing to provide Beijing the extensive su

that the CMIC requires is an open question.

198
cruise and tactical ballistic missiles are target locatio

missile guidance. Real-time location is essential for m

targets and must be determined by either space or 

remote sensing systems. Of the two space-based sy

available to China, a commercial receiver using GP

determine its position within 100 meters. U.S. m

receivers receive encrypted signals that can determine 

position within 21 meters. This system can be augmen

Differential GPS (DGPS), providing an accuracy of les

one meter. It is possible for China to use GPS/GLO

commercial positioning data to adjust a cruise mi

flight to the target.

Both cruise and ballistic missiles can use ter

guidance to identify a specific point in a target 

Terminal guidance can use a variety of technol

including radar, imaging infrared, electro-optical, 

and DSMAC when the precise location of a fixed tar

known and, for DSMAC, when satellite imaging asse

available to provide the necessary scenes. 50

The extent to which the CMIC has mastered 

technologies is questionable, given that MCTL assessm

grant China only “limited” or “some” capabilities in 

technology areas (see Figure 14). Nonetheless, 

GLONASS-assisted guidance is almost certainly w

China's capabilities and is one of the technology are

CMIC is attempting to apply to its missile develop

programs. 

“Walking on Two Legs”: Future Strategy and

Operational Concepts.

China's strategists recognize that achieving 

current military security objectives in the next centur

require continuing technological innovation, reorganiz

of the PLA's force structure, and continual assessmen

development of doctrine and concepts of operations. U

Beijing is willing to dramatically increase its de

199
quickly overcome, but only partially alleviated. Assu

no dramatic improvements in overall PLA capabilitie

the next decade, how is China planning to employ th

in the early part of the 21st century?

Beijing's shift in strategic scenarios from contin

defense to limited high-technology wars on Ch

periphery is unlikely to change. Therefore the PLAN 

the PLAAF will continue their current focus on establ

and maintaining control of Beijing's maritime terri

and claims, including the air space above them, and o

ability to project power into these areas, denying th

adversaries. The primary objective will be to overcome 

China's analysts refer to as the PLA's “short arms and 

legs.” 

Organizationally, the PLA will continue followin

complementary paths: (1) cuts in manpower and equip

and (2) modifications of force structure essential to co

joint operations. Reducing manpower and equipment s

will cut the cost of sustaining what is now a b

personnel base and obsolete arms. The force structur

emerges over the next decade will be “leaner and mean

will also reflect a more appropriate balance amon

services because China's strategic planners recogniz

value of joint operations. PLAN and PLAAF manpowe

not increase, but their status within the PLA w

enhanced and their share of the budget will increase as 

training and armaments bridge the transition 

defensive operations, supporting continental defen

missions critical in the force-projection capab

required by China's revised military strategy.

 Operationally, to use a phrase from Mao's years, C

strategists appear to be “walking on two legs” by foll

paths set by two distinctly different potential scen

Beijing’s most politically sensitive territ

claims—Taiwan and the South China Sea—require C

to field a PLA able to achieve its military objectives 

200
embodies conflicts where the United States woul

necessarily be directly involved, such as pote

confrontations with Vietnam, India, or even in Centra

These possible conflict scenarios create two divers

complementary, approaches to military operations.

For conflicts not likely to involve the United S

Beijing will not hesitate to employ a force-on-force str

For such scenarios, the PLA places great emphas

speed, mobility, and lethality in joint offensive opera

Here, many of the technologies associated with the 

come into play, especially battle-space transpar

command and control, long-range precision strike

information warfare. Without direct U.S. involvemen

military confrontation, China's probable technol

advances over the next decade or so, combined w

revised force structure and improved training, will 

the PLA a close match or superior to any potential 

Asian adversary not under the American defense umb

Japan is in the secure position of being both super

China in advanced military technologies and allied wi

United States.

The PLA and Asymmetric Warfare. In con

potentially involving the United States, PLA analysts 

upon one of their strongest doctrinal traditions 

delving into the dilemmas of defeating an adversary t

superior in arms and technology. They warn again

PLA developing technophobia as it faces the challen

21st century warfare. In particular, they concentrate o

potential frailties of advanced-technology weapon

equipment and on the extent to which China's armed 

are capable of offsetting the technological advanta

potential adversaries. The U.S. term-of-art for 

approach to the conduct of war is “asymmetric strate

Intriguing as analyzing and predicting the consequ

of asymmetric strategy may be, all competent armed 

seek to develop capabilities, strategy, and mi

201
asymmetric warfare is not a magic formula known to 

few or unique to China’s military culture. Asymmetry 

conduct of war spans the history of military conflict an

been applied by armed forces across the techn

spectrum. Surely the most dramatic asymmetric ope

of recent wars was the United States' use of atomic bom

destroy Hiroshima and Nagasaki, ending World War 

this case, the United States exploited its unique posse

of atomic weapons. The reverse of technology-depe

asymmetry is Mao Zedong's strategy of “people's war

the strategy conducted by the Democratic Repub

Vietnam against French colonial forces and later ag

the armed forces of the Republic of Vietnam and the U

States. 

Asymmetry in warfare, therefore, falls into a pa

where technologically inferior forces base their asymm

strategy on the exploitation of low-technology princ

and technologically advanced forces base their asym

on technological advantage. Those equal in technology 

to enhance or develop specific technologies th

adversary has not cultivated and to introduce more eff

methods of applying these technologies through 

concepts of operations and organization. American 

Japanese development of offensive aircraft ca

operations and Germany's refinement of tank techn

and the development of Blitzkrieg operations i

interwar period are but two examples. 

Similarly, military-technical transformation i

conduct of war is a central component of warfare's hist

The possibility that a new technological transformatio

create another revolution in military affairs has attr

the attention of most major military powers because 

implications for the future conduct of war. The U

States, as the world's richest, most powerful

technologically advanced state, has moved the fu

forward in developing and evaluating these technolog

their military utility. The USSR initiated inquiry in

202
and was the first guidepost for PLA analysts. Sin

Soviet demise and the Persian Gulf War, China's m

researchers have looked to the United States for conce

applying these emerging technologies to strategy 

operations. 

Precisely what capabilities do PLA analysts se

neutralize, and what technologies and methods do the

to employ? Beijing's security analysts have been dec

for more than a decade that any war in which China is 

to be engaged will not be total, but instead it will be a co

limited in geographical scope and political obje

Beijing's advanced-technology focus appears to be on 

technologies that will hinder an adversary's abil

project and sustain military power in areas of high po

and security value to China, even if only for a limited p

of time. The implications of this focus are that, in fa

technologically superior adversary in a limited wa

PLA will seek to:

1. hinder an adversary's capability to dominat

battle-space with superior detection, location

command and control technologies; and

2. deny any navy freedom of movement in waters w

naval forces can threaten China—a sea-denial strateg

includes the airspace above the oceans.

If the PLA could accomplish these goals, it would serv

deterrent should a potential adversary not hold po

objectives important enough to warrant the risk of m

conflict with China.

The potential adversary of most concern to PLA an

is the United States, either alone or in coalition w

allies. The most likely military confrontation wit

United States would occur over Taiwan or the South 

Sea. In both cases, the PLA would confront the 

operational capabilities of U.S. naval and air power. 

the seemingly overwhelming technological advantag

203
is intent on sustaining, what options are available 

Chinese armed forces over the next decade?

It is extremely unlikely that Beijing would once 

contemplate a bolt-out-of-the-blue assault on unpre

American forces. First, U.S. reconnaissance capab

now make a repeat of China's undetected entrance 

Korean War extremely difficult to prepare and unde

Second, the consequences for China of such an act o

could be devastating. Given that a surprise atta

unlikely, our assessment will assume the usual high le

alertness sustained by Chinese and American 

operating in a high-threat environment, even if not di

engaged in hostilities.

Choosing submarine warfare as a primary instru

would immediately face U.S. Navy undersea warfare (

conducted by ships, aircraft, and submarines. Even wi

Kilo's advantages, China's submarine warfare capab

now and over the next decade will be unable to ma

defeat those of the United States. Should the P

assemble a threatening task group of surface 

submarine combatants, it simply could not survive 

face of U.S. detection, location, and engage

capabilities.

Similarly, references to saturating an American c

battle group (CVBG) with a massive missile assault

52

appear to recognize that the threatening PLAN surfac

submarine combatants could not survive to launch 

cruise missiles. U.S. space-based, airborne, and ship

detection and location sensors would identify their ta

long before any PLAN combatants could come w

engagement range to make use of their missiles. If a sh

survive, it would fire only once, because the missiles' la

and flight signatures would provide immediate targ

data to U.S. naval and air forces.

Should the PLAN or PLAAF seek to engage with

range of land-based aircraft, these aircraft wou

204
aircraft and long-range air defense missiles before 

could approach the effective range of their stand-off 

missiles. Similarly, land-based tactical ballistic m

would have great difficulty detecting and locating a C

with sufficient accuracy, because the battle group wo

operating at speed with evasive maneuvers. 

What assets does China plan to develop and dep

offset U.S. detection, location, and command and c

capabilities that provide so much of the Ame

advantage? Destroying or simply eroding U.S. space-

reconnaissance and communications systems i

potential option. MCTL assessments indicate, how

that China does not have the supporting technologie

would allow either directed or kinetic energy syste

locate, track, and engage the proper target and to asse

damage done.

Anti-satellite space systems (ASAT) face si

problems, which is why China terminated its 

program in the 1980s, although more recent liter

indicates it is still under consideration.

53

 Once agai

despite access to GPS/GLONASS systems, the com

technologies involved in successful detection, loc

engagement, and damage assessment requir

successfully attack U.S. space-based assets are not pr

in the CMIC, and these technologies will not be prese

many years without significant foreign assistance.

Information warfare (IW) is the darling of eviden

entire school of Chinese military analysts. Is IW the “k

asymmetry—the magic weapon of a future “people's 

Here again, the MCTL working groups found 

extremely limited Chinese capabilities in both IW 

information systems (IS) technologies. Furthermor

damage assessment is an extremely difficult undertak

decade from now, American capability to defend again

IW attack and the ability of the United States to use it

capabilities in such areas as command and control wa

205
Engaging USN/USAF forces under the assumption th

has significantly eroded their detection, location

engagement capabilities would be an extremely 

endeavor, especially for the PLA, which would th

required to attack and defend against forces far 

capable in all aspects of warfare.

Conclusions.

Operation DESERT STORM increased the 

leadership’s appreciation of the extent to which C

armed forces had fallen behind when compared t

capabilities of the world’s most advanced industrial p

in both military technology and the operationa

Operation DESERT STORM also presented the d

possibility that a revolution in military affairs wa

under way. Had Beijing’s national military str

remained focused on continental defense, 

developments may not have been viewed 

consequential for China’s armed forces. But the revis

China’s national military strategy 6 years before the 

War had already highlighted the PLA’s operat

deficiencies, especially the speed, mobility, and let

required for the offensive military operations de

essential to support the new strategy, particularly in 

projection.

Lacking both the technological underpinnings an

operational skills essential for joint warfare in the 

part of the 20th century, PLA analysts and senior of

perceive their armed forces as woefully unprepared fo

century warfare and the potential maturation 

revolution in military affairs. Nor is there much confi

that China’s defense-industrial complex will be capa

providing the technology base that military analyst

leaders believe the PLA requires, evidenced by the cre

of the newly created General Armaments Departmen

COSTIND’s reorganization.

206
Beijing’s lack of transparency, MCTL assessments po

a pattern of technological deficiencies that contribute 

PLA's concerns. Although the data do indicate that 

possesses a broad sweep of those technologies necess

generate effective operational military pow

submarines, surface combatants, aircraft and missi

none of these areas does the CMIC appear able to d

develop, and manufacture the systems necessary f

PLA to achieve robust, reconstitutable modern status 

of the conventional military environments. Those 

where the CMIC will improve are, and will remain, h

dependent on foreign technologies.

Even more striking is the CMIC’s still rudimentary 

of capability in the crucial 21st century “theaters” of 

and information warfare. Of particular importanc

information systems technologies, for they provide th

between contemporary warfare and 21st century wa

IS technologies furnish the critical components for 

command and control and for detection, location

engagement, whether they are used for “hard” or 

attack. Here again, as in their examination of 

operations, Chinese analysts, who are investigatin

implications of these technologies for the conduct o

primarily repeat what they have gleaned from 

sources.

54

 China's own capabilities are always view

future developments. 55 In this, they reflect the 

future-oriented pattern as those focused on high-techn

conventional arms and equipment, as when a 

Liberation Army Daily essay declared,

The strong momentum of the world's military developme

undoubtedly represents a grim challenge for our units' qual

building and military preparations against war.

56

This sense of urgency is compounded by the conno

in most of the essays by military authors that there 

consensus within the PLA on the priorities for w

viewed as a new era in combat. General Fu Quany

207
late as April 1998 in the Communist Party's pri

journal, Qiushi.

57 General Fu’s frustration can be seen 

plea that the CMIC concentrate its human, technolo

and financial resources on “coming up with several 

weapons' that can effectively stifle the enemy.” 58

Fu Quanyu’s dissatisfaction reflects a dilemma a

from the CMIC’s extensive inadequacies. Whil

technology priorities of the PLA clearly include impr

its battlespace reconnaissance; command and co

long-range precision strike munitions; and the capabi

deny information dominance to any adversary, the CM

also directed to satisfy PLA requirements acros

spectrum of modern warfare. Satisfying the PLA's dem

across such an extensive range of requirements is b

the CMIC’s capabilities, and the necessity to pur

foreign technologies for essentially all air and 

combatants, including command and control and log

support, creates a budgetary burden that Beijing’s pr

national priorities will not sustain. Thus, China’s m

leadership is caught between the pressures of curren

near-term needs and the high-technology demands of f

warfare. Certainly priorities can be established 

enforced, as China’s past focus on nuclear weapon

propulsion plants demonstrates. It is not yet ev

whether a similar decision has been made a

establishing technological priorities designed to prepa

PLA for future warfare.

Consequently, whereas the PLA’s ambitions are 

the gap between ambition and capability could w

growing with the continuing advances in mi

technologies. Although it is critical not to underestima

CMIC's future capabilities, it is equally important 

exaggerate its strengths and raise the specter 

emerging military superpower. Even acceptin

difficulties inherent in MCTL assessments, 

evaluations, when joined with analyses of the C

problematic past and at least near-term future prob

208
China is technologically ten feet tall or about to leap in

nether reaches of information warfare. 59 Rathe

evaluations tend to support the apprehension reflec

China’s military journals and in the speeches and essa

senior PLA officials. If the recent past is any indicator

should be anticipated is a slow and sometimes e

expansion of CMIC capabilities in technologies applica

the areas viewed as critical in future warfare.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 4

1. See, for example, Lieutenant General Chen Bingde, Com

of the Nanjing Military Region, “Intensify Study of Military Th

Ensure Quality Army Building,” Zhongguo Junshi Kexue, No. 3

6, 1998, in Foreign Broadcasting Information Service

(henceforth FBIS-CHI), March 10, 1998.

2. Alastair I. Johnston, “Prospects for Chinese Nuclea

Modernization: Limited Deterrence versus Multilateral Arms C

in David S. Shambaugh and Richard H. Yang, eds., China’s Mil

Transition, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997, pp. 284-312.

3. For a classic statement of this strategy see, “Nieh Jung

Nie Rongzhen August 4 Speech at the National Militia Confe

FBIS-CHI, August 9, 1979, pp. E1-10.

4. For analyses of this revised national military strategy, s

Li, “The PLA’s Evolving Warfighting Doctrine, Strategy, and 

1985-95: A Chinese View,” and Paul H. B. Godwin, “From Cont

Periphery: PLA Doctrine Strategy and Capabilities Towards 

both in Shambaugh and Yang, eds., pp. 179-223. 

5. John W. Garver, “China’s Push to the South China S

China Quarterly, December 1992, pp. 999-1026.

6. In his August 6, 1993, Jiefangjun Bao essay, “Unswe

March Along the Road of Building a Modern Army With C

Characteristics,” General Liu Huaqing, China’s then senior 

officer, specifically measured the PLA’s capabilities with thos

U.S. armed forces demonstrated in the Gulf War. Genera

assessment was that the PLA weaknesses went far beyon

associated with arms and equipment, but were equally evi

209
of modern warfare. In FBIS-CHI, August 18, 1993. 

7. One of the most useful essays analyzing Chinese doctrina

published in a U.S. journal was prepared by a researcher at t

Academy of Military Science: Yao Yunzhu, “The Evolution of M

Doctrine of the Chinese PLA from 1985 to 1995,” The Korean Jo

Defense Analysis, Vol. VII, No. 2, Winter 1995, pp. 57-80.

8. See, for example, Huang Xing, “Holding the Initiative in O

Hands in Conducting Operations, Giving Full Play to Our Adv

to Defeat Our Enemy—A Study of the Core Idea of the Oper

Doctrine of Our Army,” Zhongguo Junshi Kexue, No. 4, Novem

1996, in FBIS-CHI, November 20, 1996.

9. Mark A. Stokes, China’s Strategic Modernization: Impl

for the United States, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies In

U.S. Army War College, September, 1999.

10. John Frankenstein and Bates Gill, “Current and 

Challenges Facing Chinese Defense Industries,” in Shambau

Yang, eds., p. 132.

11. John Frankenstein, “China’s Defense Industry Conver

Strategic Overview,” in Jorn Brommelhorster and John Franke

eds., Mixed Motives, Uncertain Outcomes: Defense Conversion in 

Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997, pp. 14-15.

12. Frankenstein and Gill, p. 132. 

13. Richard A. Bitzinger and Bates Gill, Gearing Up For Hi

Warfare? Chinese and Taiwanese Defense Modernization 

Implications For Military Confrontation Across the Taiwan 

1995-2005, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Bu

Assessments, February 1996, p. 17; Frankenstein and Gill, pp. 1

14. Ka Po Ng, “Defense Conversion in the Chinese Pr

Brommelhorster and Frankenstein, eds., pp. 92-93.

15. Ibid., p. 92; Richard D. Latham, “A Business Perspect

Brommelhorster and Frankenstein, eds., pp. 165-166.

16. These issues are raised by Jiang Wanjun, “Evaluat

Analysis of the International Competitiveness of China’s Scie

Technology,” Keji Ribao, February 14, 1998, in FBIS-CHI, Ma

1998. It should be noted that Keji Ribao is published jointly by th

Science and Technology Commission, the Chinese Academy of S

210
National Defense. See also, Bitzinger and Gill, p. 20; Frankenst

Gill, pp. 154-155.

17. Frankenstein and Gill, p. 157.

18. The other three general departments are the General S

the Political and Logistics Departments.

19. Eric Arnett, “Military Technology: The Case of China,” in 

Yearbook 1995, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 395.

20. For a judicious analysis of Russian transfers, see De

Blasko, “Evaluating Chinese Military Procurement from Russia

Forces Quarterly, Autumn-Winter 1997-98, pp. 91-96

21. For Part 1, Weapon System Technologies, the TWGs ev

the 18 technology areas of Aeronautics Systems; Armamen

Energetic Materials; Chemical and Biological Systems; Direc

Kinetic Energy Systems; Electronics; Ground Systems, Gu

Navigation, and Vehicle Control; Information Systems; Infor

Warfare; Manufacture and Fabrication; Materials; Marine S

Nuclear Systems; Power Systems; Sensors and Lasers; Sig

Control; Space Systems; and Weapons Effects and Counterme

Each of these technology areas is further divided into specific tec

groups, which total 84 subsets. 

22. In the relatively simple technology of “obscurants” the 

States is evaluated at level “3.” China is assessed at level “4.” 

Sensors and Lasers FTA Summary Figure 15.0-2 p. 15-2. The 

States is evaluated at level “3" in the “optronics” group of Space S

Technology. China is assessed at level “2.” MCTL Space System

Summary, Figure 17.02, p. 17-2.

23. MCTL, pp. 17-5 and 17-11.

24. Jane’s Special Report, China’s Aerospace Industr

Industry and Its Products Assessed, Coulsdon, Surrey, United Ki

Jane’s Information Group, Inc., March 1997, pp. 135-136.

25. Chou Kuan-wu, “China’s Reconnaissance Satellites,” 

Chiao Ching, Hong Kong, No. 36, March 16, 1998, in FBIS-CHI, 

1998. (Kuang Chiao Ching (Wide Angle) is reputed to have cl

with China’s defense establishment.) Jane’s Space Director

Edition., Phillip Clark, ed., Alexandria, VA: Jane’s Information 

Inc., 1997, p. 192. See also Jeffrey Richelson, America’s Space Se

211
of Kansas, 1999.

26. Jeff Gerth, “Reports Show Chinese Military 

American-Made Satellites,”The New York Times, June 13, 1998

A8.

27. Stokes, Appendix Four.

28. MCTL, p. 4-1.

29. Ibid. p. 4-5.

30. Over the past 5 years and more, there has been a flood o

in Chinese military, industrial, and other professional j

analyzing the implications of information warfare. Most of these 

reflect the analyses found in U.S. military and academic publica

more recent example is Dai Kouhu, “Accepting the Challenge: 

Defense Information Modernization,” Zhongguo Dianzi Bao

Electronics News, October 24, 1997, in FBIS-CHI, January 12, 

31. The fifth LM-2500 is likely on a test sta

reverse-engineering purposes, used for shore-based training or a 

of spare parts, or has been accidentally destroyed.

32. Jane’s The World’s Warships 1997, Vol. 1, London: 

Publishing Group, 1998, p. 520, reports that China is attemp

procure marine gas turbine engines from the Ukraine.

33. The material technology area is also pertinent to capab

weapon guidance systems, surveillance, sensors, and electronic w

systems. In the six sub areas evaluated, the MCTL, p. 11-2, a

China with four “3s” and two “2s.”

34. Jane’s identifies these as two ships laid down in 1989 a

and scheduled for commissioning in 1997 and 1998. Availab

Sovremennys may take several different paths, however. The C

may be ordering completely new ships, which would be th

expensive path, but would give the PLAN the most control o

vessels’ characteristics and quality. They may be purchasing shi

for the Soviet/Russian navy that have already served as fleet un

would be the quickest and least expensive path for the PLAN to 

Sovremennys, but it would also allow very little flexib

customizing the ships, and PLAN would also be obtaining ships 

“used,” having been subjected to unknown stresses, and therefo

that may have incurred significant, but difficult to detect, m

defects. Finally, China could, as reported by Jane’s, buy ships th

212
cheaper than building ships from the keel up and would allow fle

in customizing the vessels, but would likely result in the 

receiving ships that have been lying idle on the building ways for 

years, a factor which normally results in many defects.

35. The Sovremenny’s role in this task force was to attack Am

capital ships using surface-to-surface missiles. The carrier 

course, the most desirable target, but Aegis cruisers were also va

for their operational destruction would create a void in the 

group’s air defenses, potentially exposing the carriers to “stream 

by Soviet aircraft.

36. “Surface to Surface Missiles,” Jane’s Naval Weapons S

1997, London: Jane’s Publishing Group, 1998, p. 15, also men

version with “an extended range” beyond 65 nm. Jane’s 1995-9

Warships gives this range as 88 nm, but this figure is not rep

later editions. Nor is Jane’s 1995-96 claim that the SS-N-22 is ca

carrying a nuclear warhead reported in later volumes. See CRS 

for Congress, China: Ballistic and Cruise Missiles, Congre

Research Service, The Library of Congress, 97-391 F, March 21, 

CRS-11.

37. For a thorough analysis of China’s air power histo

development through the early 1990s, see Kenneth W. Allen

Krummel, and Jonathan D. Pollack, China’s Air Force Enters T

Century, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1995.

38. Ibid.

39. MCTL, p. 1-1.

40. Ibid., p. 2-1.

41. For details, see Allen, et. al.

42. Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft, 1997-1998, London: 

Information Group, 1998, p. 438; Joseph C. Anselmo, “China’s M

Seeks Great Leap Forward,” Aviation Week & Space Technolo

12, 1997, p. 69. Jane’s Defense Weekly, June 10, 1998, provides th

annual production figure, which seems a more likely number t

50 reported by Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft, 1997-1998. Whe

power capabilities and characteristics are matched against 

technology areas, Russia earns a “4” in fixed-wing aircraft, Chin

Russia also has higher ratings in gas turbine technology, el

213
crew interface, and navigation and control systems.

43. Kenneth W. Allen, “PLA Force Logistics: What has cha

Unpublished manuscript.

44. Harlan Jencks quoted in Allen, et. al., p. 148.

45. The term “pockets of excellence,” characterizing 

selective approach to defense modernization, was used by Ch

Lin, “The Power Projection Capabilities of the People’s Lib

Army,” in C. Dennison Lane, Mark Weisenbloom, and Dimon L

Chinese Military Modernization, London: Kegan Paul Intern

1996, p. 110.

46. Unless otherwise noted, the data for these missiles are 

from Shirley Kan and Robert Shuey, CRS Report for Congress, 

Ballistic and Cruise Missiles, Congressional Research Servi

Library of Congress, 97-391 F, March 21, 1997. 

47. “China: Surface-to-Surface Missiles,” Jane’s Naval and 

Systems, Issue 21, 1997.

48. See Stokes, Part III, “Cruise Missiles.”

49. China’s Aerospace Industry: The Industry and Its P

Assessed, Jane’s Information Group: Coulsdon, March 1997, p. 

50. Kan and Shuey, pp. CRS-14-CRS-15.

51. See, for example, William H. McNeill, “The Struc

Military-Technical Transformation,” speech at the Sixteenth M

History Symposium of the United States Air Force Academ

Harmon Memorial Lectures in Military History, No. 37, United 

Air Force Academy, CO: 1994.

52. Sun Zian, “Strategies to Minimize High-Tech Edge of E

Xiandai Bingqi, No. 8, August 8, 1995, in FBIS-CHI, February 2

pp. 29-30.

53. Stokes, pp. 10-11, 186.

54. This was frankly admitted in 1998 by Dai Kouhu, “Accep

Challenge.”

214
Information Warfare,” Zhongguo Dianzi Bao, October 24, 1

FBIS-CHI, January 1, 1998.

56. “Implement Military Strategic Principle for the New 

Vigorously Push Forward Army Quality Building,” Jiefangju

April 1, 1997, in FBIS-CHI, April 4, 1997.

57. Fu Quanyu, “Aggressive Exploration and Deeper Ref

Promote the Comprehensive Development of Military Work,” 

No. 6, March 16, 1998, in FBIS-CHI, April 13, 1998.

58. Ibid.

59. Michael Pillsbury, for example, suggests that many, if n

U.S. assessments of China’s RMA capabilities are too skeptical. 

China and the Revolution in Military Affairs, prepared for the O

Net Assessment, Department of Defense, n.d. ca. 1997, pp. 29-3

215
U.S.-CHINESE MILITARY RELATIONS

IN THE 21st CENTURY

Larry M. Wortzel

The actions that the United States takes toda

framing the boundaries of the nation’s future rel

around the world. One of the most significant chall

facing the United States is the shaping of an Asian str

for the next 20 years. It is imperative to formulat

execute a long-range strategy that will enh

relationships in Asia while protecting U.S. na

interests. There has been a major change in the bala

power in Asia. The implosion of the Soviet Union

collapse of Russia, and the economic crises in Asia 

fundamentally changed the strategic landscape i

region. Beijing now sees China as the central power i

that must be considered in a geo-political and m

equation.

Given China’s dominant location on the Asian cont

its size, population, economy, and permanent membe

in the United Nations Security Council, this long

strategy must consider the following key questions. 

Beijing seek to dominate the Asia-Pacific region? Is t

“strategic glue” in U.S.-China relations? Are Ame

military leaders deluding themselves into thinking 

they can change the strategic culture of China and dra

Chinese military into the community of cooperating fr

armed forces? Is the Chinese People’s Liberation 

(PLA) studying American military strategy, doctrin

tactics to prepare itself to more effectively fight the U

States’ armed forces should the Chinese leadership d

that a conflict is necessary? These are the fundam

questions that must be confronted. This chapte

address these questions and attempt to characteriz

217
other in the next century.

One thing about the nature of U.S.-China relatio

the 21st century can be counted upon, there w

competition, friction, and conflict.

1

 One can safely p

that a country the size of China, with a different str

culture than the West and with its own fiercely prou

independent foreign policies, will not always see eye-

with the United States.2 Conflict does not necessarily 

war, and PLA officers avoid public utterances that ta

United States as an enemy. The leaders of the PLA t

that they admire the United States and its armed f

General after general in the PLA repeats the mantr

“the PLA has a lot to learn by studying the U.S. milit

suspect, however, that what they seek to learn is h

fight against American tactics and equipment, wh

employed by Taiwan, any other nation, or the United S

and to adopt the U.S. way of war for the PLA. No

standing the statements of peaceful intentions, the P

working very hard to prepare itself to fight the U

States, if it must, under certain circumstances.

3

 

leaders of the PLA General Staff Department an

General Political Department have threatened off-li

sidebar conversation while traveling or at dinners, a

few drinks, that “China will not be ‘embarrassed’ aga

the United States as it was during the 1996 Taiwan S

exercises.”

4

If one takes the time to socialize with the comma

deputy commanders, or chiefs of staff of the Nanj

Guangzhou Military Regions, which face Taiwan, 

leaders will say that they intend to be ready to 

American ships, if necessary, and to intercept and d

U.S. reconnaissance aircraft. Some of this is posturin

more of it is a serious statement of intent. 5 China do

want to fight the United States, but there are c

territorial imperatives that the PLA’s military leader

enforce.

6

 When it looked as if North Korea might collap

1997, the most senior leaders and military strategists 

218
approach the Yalu River, even in support of humanit

operations in North Korea, “it could look like 1950 al

again.” 7 They made it very clear that China mu

involved in the resolution of security problems in 

Korea. Thus, the Korean Peninsula becomes part 

strategic glue that binds the United States and China 

same time that, if problems on the peninsula are ha

poorly, it could become one of the most serious flash 

in the region.

 The future looks a great deal like a combinat

cooperation, confrontation, and conflict. All of this c

managed, if handled with care, and the U.S. military 

participate in the management of relations with Chin

most sensitive issues, such as technology transfer p

the strength and scope of U.S. alliances in the w

participation in international organizations; typ

confidence-building measures; interpretation of the L

the Sea; sovereignty matters; and policies conce

weapons proliferation and arms sales are also part 

glue that binds the United States and China. But 

issues are also the primary sources of U.S.-China co

and confrontation. How that conflict is managed 

depend on the way that the United States views Chi

Scholars such as Michael Pillsbury, in his collect

monographs on warfare in the next century by PLA of

imply that the PLA is carefully studying U.S. m

doctrine in an attempt to devise ways to defeat the 

armed forces. The PLA officers writing these essays se

assume that the two countries will come into con

Indeed, the PLA is using the armed forces of the U

States, their doctrine and strategic orientation, as its 

for what constitutes a modern, power-projection mi

force in the next century.

9

 Other scholars argue th

Chinese military is the “gang that can’t shoot straigh

that the PLA is not only unable to grasp modern tactic

doctrine, but also cannot produce the necessary hardw

equip a modern military.

10

Another school of thought 

219
military delegations embrace the Chinese armed for

friendship and share with them our ways and our 

(military doctrine and manuals), the PLA will accep

revealed truth, change, and become a responsible m

in a civil society.11 Finally, a school of thought about C

that must be considered, holds that for philosophica

historical reasons, in terms of intent and capability, 

will neither seek to, nor be able to, dominate the Asia-P

through the year 2015

.12

The simple fact is that by virtue of 

population, economic power, geography, differ

in strategic culture, and the size of its fo

especially ground forces, China is the dom

power in Asia. It is dangerous for the United Sta

systematically minimize assessments of China’s m

capabilities. With the collapse of Russia and the eco

crisis in Asia since summer 1997, Beijing sees itself 

benefactor of a major change in the balance of power in 

and intends to exploit this change. Moreover, it is clea

their internal writings that China’s strategists have a

grasped the intellectual and doctrinal side of build

modern military, even if the PLA lacks money 

hardware

13 .

Although we have had only glimpses of the plans 

Chinese military for future equipment, it is clear th

war-fighting debate in China has focused on impr

areas like reconnaissance and sensor systems, elec

warfare and jamming, the use of information warfar

“logic bombs” to destroy enemy command and c

systems, amphibious assault, and the use of missile

deep-strike, strategic, and operational weapon.

14

 A

1998 Defense Electronics Exhibition in Beijing, the Ge

Staff Department (GSD) of the PLA; the 

Communications-Electronic Warfare Departmen

Ministry of Electronics Industry; and the now-mo

Commission of Science, Technology and Industr

National Defense orchestrated an effort to bring to 

220
could attract.

15

 At the August 1997 displays in the M

Museum in Beijing, designed to commemorate the 

anniversary of the PLA, China teased observers w

limited view of what combat and support systems it 

like to produce in order to improve the lethality 

force-projection capabilities of its military. On display 

combination of force-projection systems th

mass-produced and fielded, would give the Chinese g

forces the ability to sustain forces away from bases of s

without relying on the old methods of “People’s War,

is, using local militia to sustain the combat forces. Inc

in the displays at the exhibition were significantly imp

field mess (kitchen) systems to feed and sustain dep

troops; forward-area refueling points for armored wa

and airmobile, or helicopter-borne forces; and the s

sensor-to-shooter target acquisition systems that depe

remotely piloted vehicles linked to a sophisti

intelligence and communications architecture. Com

with global positioning satellites, these sensor-to-sh

systems would permit the PLA to target enemy for

deeper battle space on a real-time basis with cruise mi

ballistic missiles, or air strikes. There is a substantia

between what Chinese military leaders are doing an

public utterances of senior PLA leaders about its abi

modernize.

PLA leaders want to develop a rapid rea

information-based Army supported by sensor-to-sh

systems, precision weapons, and modern combat platf

PLA leaders want a world-class, secure and re

command, control, communications, computer 

intelligence (C

4

I) system.

16 PLA leaders want the lo

capability to support deployed forces, within or o

China, without relying on help from the local popul

foraging.

There has been some very serious thinking do

future warfare within the PLA. Li Qingshan, a researc

the Academy of Military Science, for example, has pub

221
Technology Warfare.

17 Based on a detailed study of U.

European militaries and the Gulf War, Li concludes 

• Modern armies must reduce their size but increa

quality of personnel, organizations, weapons

equipment. In the balance between quality and quan

is quality that is the more important in armed forces

• Recruitment and retention of personnel should 

on education and quality (gao de wenhua shuiping).

1

• The use of specific weapon systems, such as ba

missiles, anti-missile systems, and land-attack c

missiles, has changed the nature of warfare. Succ

armies must adopt and defend against these systems, 

are important for specific targets.

20

• Armies must focus on the importance of 

projection, be prepared to get reaction forces to the co

zone quickly, and also assess the weak points of the 

deployment of forces and headquarters by air.

21

• The core target of warfare in the 1990s is the hub 

command and control system, whether of deployed co

forces or of a national command and control center. 

that, economic targets, transportation systems, and co

troops are the target.

22

• Reconnaissance-and-intelligence-gathering sy

of an enemy must be attacked, especially airborne and 

reconnaissance systems, as well as the information sy

that make all coordination possible.

23

This roadmap for future warfare, in combination 

the nation’s size and geographical position, promi

make China a major regional power in the future.

A REGIONAL HEGEMON?

Based on comments by defense and foreign mi

officials in Seoul, Hanoi, Singapore, and Kuala Lum

222
considerable portion of East Asia.

24

 Strategists at inst

in Vietnam understand this fact quite clearly. They u

term “Chinese hegemony” and explain it to mean 

because China is so much bigger than Vietnam, with s

large, powerful army and in a geographical positi

control even the flow of water into their country, H

government can do nothing to anger Beijing.

25

 The U

States, however, seeks to maintain its power, leade

and influence in the same region. This means that, s

as the Chinese state does not collapse and the United S

does not withdraw from Asia, U.S.-Chinese relations w

characterized by tension and conflict. Although the

areas where the interests and objectives of the U

States and China coincide, this tension and conflic

necessarily translate into difficulties that will ma

themselves in bilateral military ties. The resp

military establishments of each country will in

programs to support conflicting goals and to influen

other side. Internally, in Beijing and Washington, th

stimulate considerable debate over how to de

programs designed to meet national objectives. In 

chapter, the author will first analyze the long

objectives of both the United States and China, then a

the areas of conflict in goals and strategies, and, fi

offer some suggestions about how to translate these 

into military-to-military ties that will carry the U

States into the next century.

26

Conflicting Goals Over International Leadersh

Two policy documents from the U.S. Governmen

National Security Strategy and the National M

Strategy, set forth the ways that the United States’ na

security establishment seeks to exercise leadership, p

and influence around the world in the next century.

key to understanding these two strategy documents 

commitment by the United States to remain engaged 

world and to “use all appropriate instruments of na

223
powers.”

28

 In short, the United States will pressu

persuade other countries through active engagement 

world. The strategy also calls for the United Sta

“promote democracy and human rights,” as a mea

“enlarge” the community of free market democracies 

world. The instruments of national power under discu

in the National Security Strategy include diplo

economic, military, informational (or psycholog

technological, and industrial capabilities. To ensure 

the goals of the United States are met, the str

statements envision “shaping” the internat

environment to make the world a more secure place a

reduce threats to the United States. The means by 

the United States intends to shape this world includ

continuation and strengthening of alliances, s

diplomacy, forms of international assistance, arms-c

measures, efforts at deterring the proliferation of we

of mass destruction, and military activities that 

aggression and coercion directed against the U

States.

29

How should we understand what it means for a co

or an international organization to exercise leade

power, and influence? The U.S. national security str

emphasizes “keeping America strong, secure 

prosperous while encouraging a stable prosp

Asia-Pacific community built around open markets.” 

level of emphasis on increasing human rights aroun

world as a component of U.S. defense and foreign polic

vary from administration to administration. Despi

fact that China, like other authoritarian and Comm

regimes, may find these policies objectionable, it is s

say that U.S. policies will continue to support 

American values in the next century.

31

A major element of the American strategy to accom

national security objectives is the presence overse

forward deployed military forces, backed up by a r

ability to project decisive force from the United States. 

224
things. First, based on the American experience a

hands of Japan at Pearl Harbor, forward deployed 

serve as a “trip-wire” designed to warn of and abs

necessary, any future attacks. Second, forward dep

forces are visible signs of the American commitment 

peace and stability of the region. These forces sit a

both historical and potential zones of conflict

Northeast Asia, U.S. forces are on the Korean Peni

the “dagger and bridge” that has been the crossroa

conflict among Russia, China, and Japan for nearly 

years. In Japan, they provide a welcome “cork-i

bottle,” reassuring the rest of Asia that the ge

militarism in Japan will not again be loose and ca

those who fear Japan could again become an aggr

military power. The U.S. presence in Northeast Asi

inhibits China vis-a-vis Taiwan, contributing to the 

and stability of the region. In Southeast Asia, th

access agreements, U.S. forces patrol and protect vit

lines of communication that carry 67 percent of the e

supplies used by China and Japan. The U.S. armed for

the Asia-Pacific region also extend American deterre

allies, ensuring that no arms race will take plac

preventing the proliferation of nuclear, biological

chemical weapons among allies who otherwise hav

capacity to develop such weapons. This combinat

alliances with the overseas presence of U.S. force

proven effective both during the Cold War, when the fo

American policy was to contain the Soviet Union an

expansion of Communism, and in the present day. Fr

speaking, Chinese military officers do not like these 

or alliances.34 Chinese officers resent the U.S. pre

Nonetheless, they realize that without a U.S. pre

China would need to devote significantly more resour

a potentially hostile Japan.

The People’s Republic of China (PRC), on July 27, 

published its second White Paper, China’s Na

Defense.

35 This long-awaited complement to the first 

225
set forth China’s national security goals and policies f

new century and provides Beijing’s views o

international and regional security environments. M

the second White Paper contains language that s

comfort the United States and Asian nations. C

proclaimed that its defense policy will subord

“national defense construction to economic constru

and strengthen international and regional sec

cooperation.”

36 China seeks to develop confidence-bu

measures (CBMs) with the Association of Southeast 

Nations (ASEAN) and will cooperate with the AS

Regional Forum (ARF) to reduce conflict. However, 

are qualifications to this cooperation. Although China 

to counter the “China threat theory” in the White P

Beijing made no compromises with respect to what it c

as its own territory or its willingness to use force in 

territory.

37

 The PLA is charged with maintainin

capability to defend all of Beijing’s claims in the 

China Sea and the Gulf of Tonkin, and Beijing contin

expand its presence in the Spratly Islands, despite cla

its peaceful intentions.

38 There is no room for disc

regarding the status of Taiwan. China’s refusal to fore

the use of force against Taiwan and the reinforcemen

expansive territorial claims in the South China Sea 

open the possibility of confrontation with the United S

 In the first paragraph of China’s White Paper, B

stated clearly its own goals for leadership in the region

the aspiration of the Chinese government and people t

a peaceful, stable and prosperous world into the 

century.” The nations of the Asia-Pacific region, incl

the United States, should welcome this appr

Leadership is not a “zero-sum-game.” There is ple

room for leadership in Asia and the world, so long a

leadership is designed genuinely to promote peac

stability in consonance with international law 

international norms.

39

 Even the term “leader

however, was the subject of some debate among Ch

226
Science and among officers of the Military Intelli

Department, the term “leadership” ( lingda

responsibility for leadership, lingdao de zeren) carrie

it the sort of Leninist understanding in Chinese 

connotes strong, authoritarian direction, as in 

leadership of the Chinese Communist Party.” The Ch

strategists and military personnel who contributed 

White Paper preferred such terms as “sp

responsibility” (teshude zeren) to state the obligation

great power to the region. Even after deciding on the co

of leadership in the more benign, Western sense fo

White Paper, there was no such compromise by the Ch

in the understanding of peace and sovereignty. The 

Paper seems to be a call for peace under specific t

which include dominance over the territorial claim

China maintains in the South China Sea and over Taiw

This is a call for peace that asks other countries in the r

to break their security ties with the United States. 

seems to be focusing its own efforts on a program to re

the strategic balance in Asia in its own favor in a wa

diffuses American power and leadership in a “multi

world.”

41

For years Beijing was more comfortable 

bilateralism. This approach gave it an advantage 

weaker neighbors in disputes in the South China Se

the Tonkin Gulf. Now, having been pulled i

multilateral approach by ASEAN, Beijing sees its u

China’s military leaders learned from their studies 

U.S. experience in the Gulf War that operating in a coa

forced the United States to compromise many of it

goals to maintain the coalition. U.S. authority 

flexibility, therefore, was weakened in Beijing’s eyes

China emphasizes multilateral approaches to se

because strategists in Beijing believe that Ch

international position is more central in the w

relationships that characterize the multilateral co

This is perhaps an explanation for the inter-linka

227
with the Central Asian republics, Russia, Japan, Kore

United States, and the European Union.

42

 A w

“partnerships” around China conceptually place

“Middle Kingdom” at the center of the world, incre

China’s influence and status.

43

 Moreover, multilate

works to undermine the U.S. bilateral alliances in Asi

of Beijing’s main foreign policy goals.

44 China has 

frustrated in its goal of reuniting Taiwan wit

mainland, and was embarrassed by the dispatch o

carrier battle groups from the U.S. 7th Fleet to the T

Strait in March 1996. Beijing, therefore, wants to e

that U.S. forces are restrained from respondi

aggression against that island from bases in Kor

Japan. China was surprised by its inability to respo

U.S. carrier battle groups off Taiwan in 1996. PLA le

were absolutely furious about the arrival o

Independence and the Enterprise battle groups. Gene

military region and central leadership positions mad

threats against U.S. forces, promising to seek naval 

groups with cruise missiles or ballistic missiles and to 

U.S. aircraft out of the sky if the United States interve

any conflict between the mainland and Taiwan.

Drawing on Classical Chinese Military Though

China has concluded that it cannot match U.S. mi

capabilities. Every PLA leader says this. But the 

armed forces do not have a clear picture of what the Ch

military forces can do. The PLA central leadership 

very hard to conceal its own capabilities. The Air De

Command Center shown to the U.S. Secretary of Defe

1997 was a hollow shell of a local headquarters, n

equivalent of the U.S. National Military Command C

that Chinese leaders have seen.45 When the Chairm

the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John Shalikashvil

given a demonstration of the “capabilities” of the 

Airborne Army, it was pure comic opera.

46 High 

prevented an airborne jump, but what was demonstra

228
several motorcyclists jumping on a moving vehicle

“exercise” was as scripted as a Jackie Chan (or Bruc

movie in Hong Kong. It was polite to let the U.S. Air 

Chief of Staff fly a 30-year-old fighter when he v

China, but what does that tell the United States abou

China intends to employ the Su-27s it has bought, 

with the aerial refueling system it is developing an

airborne early warning radars it is putting together? S

stated, we have never seen a real Chinese military exe

We know that the PLA carries out real exercises at it

training grounds, much like those conducted at the 

National Training Center. But the most that U.S. m

personnel have seen of the operational PLA in action w

it mobilized around Tiananmen Square and attacke

Beijing against its own people. During the Tiana

Massacre, the U.S. military saw how the PLA can 

violence in the “complex terrain” of an urban area. 

The PLA is methodically developing, however, 

force that can project itself internally and regionally

also experimenting with ways to respond militarily t

forces should it need to do so, according to PLA officer

improvements in force-projection capability, comman

control, battlefield awareness, and simultane

operations shown at the exhibition in the Military Mu

in Beijing to commemorate the 70

th

 anniversary 

founding of the PLA gave foreign observers a glim

these improvements. I saw them the day the exhi

opened. Interestingly, 2 days later when the exhibitio

formally opened by invitation to foreign observer

military attachés, the display had been cha

significantly from its opening day. Many o

force-projection-related systems had been removed 

public display.

China has taken a two-pronged approach to se

relations. Notwithstanding the reactions to the bomb

the Chinese Embassy in Yugoslavia in May 1999

approach can be expected to continue. On the diplo

229
minimum it must to avoid being perceived as an adve

and to gain access to U.S. doctrine and manuals. This 

extension of classical United Front operation

Communist armies.

47

 Meanwhile, China is engaged 

diplomatic effort, designed to de-couple the United S

from its allies, and in a military effort to build up a fo

ballistics missiles it can use in the region. This is going 

the same time that the PLA is developin

over-the-horizon capability for cruise missiles that 

attack American naval forces.48

Beijing has turned one of the maxims of Sunzi into 

century security strategy. China is “attacking the en

strategy” (gu shang bing fa mou) by portraying th

policy of engagement as a new form of “containm

putting Washington and the Defense Department o

defensive in policy discussions.

49

 Then Beijing is “atta

the enemy’s alliances” (qi ci fa jiao) by seeking to unde

the system of alliances and long-standing friend

nurtured in Asia by the United States.

50

 Beijing argue

these alliances are “relics of the cold war” that ar

appropriate for the 21st century.

51

 At the same time, 

is also preparing to respond to the U.S. forces, if nece

by developing the capacity to control sea lin

communication, project regional force, and deter the U

States and other potential adversaries in creative 

without matching forces (qi ci fa bing). Recognizing i

weaknesses, however, the PLA wants to avoid a 

confrontation. If the United States and China hav

achieved a minimum level in mutual transparen

defense policies, both have laid out reasonably clearly 

strategic plans and goals. Even in these formal 

utterances, however, we see the basis for confrontatio

conflict.

230
For the United States, leadership means to ac

pursue a world of expanded democratic values an

markets, using the military as one of the tools to sha

future. This necessarily translates into a highly ideol

goal to Beijing, quite different from China’s own s

objective of “non-interference in the internal affairs of 

countries,” a phrase taken from the Five Princip

Peaceful Coexistence espoused at the Bandung Confe

For China, leadership seems to mean an effort to dism

or transform the alliances built by the United States 

World War II. Beijing’s preference for a “multi-polar w

is another way of saying that China seeks to create a 

that is able to reject the particular type of values-

leadership exercised by the United States. Beijing se

shape a world in which the U.S. position is much weake

U.S. policy is changed to take into account the other p

power. One key phrase in the Chinese White Paper, i

is Beijing’s attacks on “hegemonism.” This is a code 

used by Beijing to characterize its objections to Ame

leadership in Asia. In an article commemorating th

anniversary of the PLA, Minister of Defense Genera

Haotian emphasized that “hegemonism and power p

are still the main roots to the threat to world peac

stability . . . including the reliance of other countr

military alliances.” 52

The concept of hegemony as a concrete descript

international power, rather than as a pejorative te

helpful in understanding what I believe will be c

sources of tension between China and the United Sta

the next century.

53 Hegemony as a tenet of American f

policy is discussed by Richard Haass in The Rel

Sheriff: The United States After the Cold War. Haass 

a situation in which the United States may b

predominant power, but cannot dominate the 

world.

54

 Therefore, Haass argues, when there are no c

defined enemies, the best that the United States can h

231
institutions to regulate the world while it seeks to ha

own way in certain regions. Of course, to understand 

one really must define “hegemony.”

Edward Luttwak’s description of “armed suasion” 

1987 book, Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace, is a 

aid in understanding the meaning of the term hege

According to Luttwak, at the level of grand strategy, 

may be no visible clash of arms, but a clash of powe

derives from military strength.

55

This “armed suasion

dissuades adversaries from challenging another powe

persuades friends to persist in that friendship. 

Shambaugh’s exploration of the concept of hegemony 

Korean Journal of Defense Analysis is also usefu

working aid in understanding how the United State

China will come into conflict in the 21st cen

Shambaugh adopts a definition from Webster’s 

International Dictionary—“Leadership; or a prepond

influence or authority, especially of a government 

state.”

56 Webster’s Third New International Dict

retains essentially the same definition, leaving out the 

leadership.

57

 Quoting a study by Robert Keohane, 

Shambaugh adds that a state must be powerful enou

maintain the rules for interstate relations and be will

do so.

58

 I argue in this chapter that the United State

China really are in conflict for hegemony in Asia, a

term is used in Webster’s Third, and that the confli

necessarily influence military-to-military rela

between the two countries in the coming century.

59

China’s Dilemma: A U.S. Presence Is Still Usefu

China is in a difficult position in the near term. Bei

working hard to undermine U.S. security relationsh

the Asia-Pacific region, perhaps even the world. B

seeks to weaken or diffuse U.S. power.

60

 As par

diplomatic strategy to weaken alliances or put 

countries on the defensive, Beijing accuses Aust

232
States. At every available forum, China’s govern

leaders work to convince the representatives of 

countries that the world is no longer bipolar, tha

relationships built up with the United States are re

the Cold War, and that mutual defense treaties are a 

of the past.

61 This rhetoric, however, does little to r

China’s deeper concerns. Beijing realizes that the 

presence in Asia is a stabilizing factor. China’s pri

security concern today is the potential for a remilitariz

of Japan. 62 When a new movie opened in Tokyo in 

1998, portraying World War II Prime Minister of J

General Hideki Tojo as a war hero and a victim o

persecution at the War Crimes tribunal, the “feelings 

billion Chinese people were really hurt.” 63 Beijing has 

been pleased that, unlike Germany, which as a natio

examined and apologized for its role in World War II, J

seems to have trouble accepting responsibility a

aggressor. My colleagues in the PLA have complained 

in a nation where the transportation minister will apo

to all of the people for a collapsed bridge and whe

finance minister will appear on television offering a te

humble apology for a collapsed bank, Japan’s peopl

leaders have yet to directly acknowledge the role J

played in that war.

64 In fact, despite the fact tha

Japanese Army admitted in 1992 that it ran a syst

brothels to “comfort troops,” the Tokyo district 

rejected the claims of 46 Filipino women forced into s

slavery.

65 This continually piques Chinese leaders

reaction in Beijing to this reexamination of Jap

history, even in popular film, is not just a sense of outra

China’s part. It is the reminder of a genuine fear that J

will once more rearm and attack China, perhaps th

Korea, as it did in 1894 and in 1931. 

Although loath to admit it, China really is comfor

the presence of U.S. forces in Japan and Korea be

these forces help to maintain the status quo. Be

leaders may complain about the American presence in 

233
under the defense treaties with Tokyo and Seoul in

Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK) from bec

nuclear powers, keeps a division on the Korean Peni

giving China a buffer state in North Korea, and in

Japan from rebuilding its military. Nonetheless, Chin

work to weaken Japan’s security relationships wit

United States. Beijing’s actions are an attempt to put 

and Washington on the defensive in their relations 

China. First, this is an especially effective way to ma

U.S. military more willing to meet China’s terms in bil

contacts and negotiations. Secondly, Beijing wan

inhibit Japan from allowing the United States t

Japanese soil as a platform from which to project for

the event of China’s use of armed force against Ta

During President Jiang Zemin’s December 1998 t

Japan, Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi took a strong sta

Taiwan. Unlike the embrace of Jiang during Pre

William Clinton’s visit to China, Obuchi stiffed Jia

weakening the U.S.-Japanese defense guidelines.

66

With regard to Korea, even in the event of an eve

peaceful reunification of the peninsula, the United S

will probably seek to retain its alliance with Korea in 

form and to retain an overseas presence on the K

Peninsula. Beijing would prefer to keep a non-aligned 

state between China and Japan, keeping the status q

the peninsula with a North Korean state that depen

China. PLA senior leaders have told U.S. officials s

times that China will not simply stand by and let 

Korea collapse. More seriously, in several dialogues 

security in Northeast Asia, PLA leaders have str

hinted that if leaders in Washington or Seoul believ

their forces can simply march up north in the even

North Korean collapse, even for humanitarian reasons

are wrong. According to these PLA officers, even a 

approach to the Yalu River could trigger the same s

reaction from China that was seen in 1950.

234
the question of North Korea. In the event of an impl

where humanitarian assistance is required from U.S

ROK forces, the senior Chinese leaders with whom I 

spoken say that both South Korea and the United 

should leave the area around the Sino-North Korean b

to the PLA. Although they do not expect the North to a

the South, the Chinese officers bluntly reminded me of 

they termed “MacArthur’s mistake of ignoring C

These senior military officers have laid down some 

warnings that Beijing wants a buffer state on the K

Peninsula.

67

These are two of the most serious areas where Chin

the United States differ over their approaches to the f

security environment in Northeast Asia. In geopo

terms, the United States wants to keep its overseas for

far forward as possible, while China seeks to keep 

forces away from what it considers to be its traditional 

states and buffer states. The primary of these is Kore

Turning toward Taiwan, even if one posits some fo

political reconciliation or reunification of Taiwan wi

mainland in the next 20 or 30 years, there is still a 

room for conflict and tension between the United State

China. Strategic thinkers in Beijing may propose some 

of “confederation” as a solution for resolving the divis

the Korean Peninsula, but they adamantly 

confederation and insist on reunification between T

and the mainland. An accommodation by China allowi

a political reunification would probably maintain a sep

government on Taiwan, one that is very independe

Hong Kong is a model, then Beijing would seek to place 

military forces on Taiwan or on the outer islands. It i

unlikely that the majority party leading Taiwan

Kuomintang (Guomindang), would accede to this and 

less likely that the other major democratic parti

Taiwan, the Democratic Progressive Party or the 

Party, would accept such a resolution.

235
militaries of Taiwan and China would prove an even g

dilemma for the United States. Most seriously, the Ch

navy would be well-positioned astride major sea li

communication in the western Pacific. But U.S. se

considerations on the sale of military equipment woul

be affected. Today, the United States has been quite l

about approving the sale of advanced military techno

and weapon systems for Taiwan. One reason for this i

the U.S. defense establishment is reasonably comfo

with the fact that it is very unlikely that Taiwan 

transfer the advanced technologies to a potential ene

The United States cannot be assured that Chin

seek to resolve territorial disputes peacefully. D

Beijing’s claims that it has only peaceful, defe

intentions, China refuses to renounce the use of fo

settle territorial disputes and has used force i

international arena on a number of occasions in the 

past. Beijing has clearly stated its right to use force 

whatever area it defines as its own territory, even i

territory is in dispute. This threat bears directly on C

maritime claims as well as on disputed river boundarie

are all familiar with the sensitive, diplomatic approac

Beijing took with the Soviet Union over the dis

boundaries of the Ussuri River in 1969. As China beg

try to control the headwaters of the Mekong, Irraw

Brahmaputra, and Red Rivers, it could find itself a

with Vietnam, Thailand, Burma, Laos, Bangladesh

India.

68

 Since China reserves the right to act independ

within the territory it claims, Beijing may well igno

concerns of these other countries when it tries to contr

water and divert it within China.

69

As for maritime disputes, the 1988 naval engage

against Vietnam in the Spratly Islands come to mind

the 1974 seizure of the Paracel Islands and the 1979 a

on Vietnam. Of course, Beijing has always been care

couch its actions in terms of a “defensive counteratta

an action to regain territory that it claims.

70

 More rec

236
Philippines, and demonstrated massive force ag

Taiwan as a way to express its dissatisfaction with 

Chinese Communist Party leaders believed was a 

toward independence on that island. China is mercuri

given to what Iain Johnston has described as “parabe

behavior, choosing to escalate rapidly to high levels o

early in any conflict or disagreement as a strate

dissuade an adversary early and avoid a de

confrontation.

71

 In short, while President Clinton 

Communist Party Chairman and President Jiang Z

proclaimed that a new “strategic partnership 

between the two countries,” China is not an ally 

United States. China is a fellow power with a seat o

Permanent Five of the United Nations Security Co

That said, China may someday be an enemy, not beca

U.S. policy, but because of China’s own policies and act

The United States encourages China to seek its pl

the region as a great power and hopes that China d

peacefully.72 But we should be wary. The United S

would not like to see any of the advanced systems 

transferred to Taiwan, or to allied countries in Asia, fa

Beijing’s hands, as did the transferred aircraft c

Minsk, which went from Russia, to South Korea, to 

(for scrap?).73 Nor should Washington sell arms or adv

military technologies to the Chinese. China has a ver

record on the retransfer of defense systems an

exported items it reverse engineered to countries 

which the United States could come into serious co

Among these defense systems are the C-802 system, re

engineered from the French Exocet cruise missil

exported to Iran. Beijing has also worked with Iran to 

the C-802 to strike aircraft that pose a serious threat t

naval forces in the Persian Gulf. If China develo

airborne early warning aircraft with Russian, British

Israeli assistance, it would probably transfer that syst

Iran as well.

237
the United States. For Beijing they represent a w

further stretch already overworked American mi

forces and weaken the U.S. capabilities in East A

deputy Military Region commander in Guangzhou po

out to me that any U.S. carrier deployed to the Indian O

is not available to be used in the Taiwan Strait. In a pe

shrinking American defense assets, when U.S. force

already pushed to the limits of their operational t

China is quite willing to accommodate such countr

Iran as a means of weakening the U.S. presence in 

that are close to China’s borders. Beijing does this bec

in the event of another contingency where the United S

could get involved around Taiwan or in Korea, the PLA 

not want to be embarrassed again by two powerful 

carrier battle groups off its waters. At the more pra

level, a C-802 missile fired from a Chinese aircraft o

that can use a data link from an Su-30 or an airborne 

warning aircraft becomes an over-the-horizon missil

can really hurt U.S. forces.

The urgency of these problems does not end if the

change in the form of government in China. Whet

Communist regime or some other form of social

authoritarian regime is in control of China, U.S

Chinese interests will differ. In fact, as the Comm

Party seeks to retain its legitimacy, it has capitalize

wave of nationalism that it helped to create. The s

demonstrations against the United States in Beijing in 

1999 underscore how Beijing seeks to use nationalism 

prop to support the Communist Party. Within the 

among the junior and middle grade officers (lieut

through colonel) who will lead the Army in the next cen

nationalist feelings are especially strong. They were f

first by the U.S. response to China’s missile-firin

Taiwan in 1996 and increased in fervor by the recov

Hong Kong in 1997. Nationalism in China today is bu

what the Chinese education system has emphasize

238
the Opium War to the establishment of the PRC.”

The Outline for the Future of the Presidential

Summit.

When President Clinton and President Jiang m

Beijing in June 1998, they agreed to a seri

confidence-building steps and measures design

“increase and deepen cooperation between the 

countries.”

74

 Principal among these was the confirma

what is termed a common goal to halt the spread of we

of mass destruction. Since 1989, when Deng Xiaopin

President George Bush that “China was not exp

anything called an M-11 missile to Pakistan and if s

missile existed it would not violate the Missile Techn

Control Regime (MTCR),” the U.S. Government has ig

evidence that China armed Pakistan with these miss

Of course, this was done for reasons of expedienc

geopolitics that supported a broader trade policy and 

objectives. Later, despite evidence that China was ass

Pakistan in developing a nuclear program, the 

Government worked hard to minimize any san

against China, again to keep open avenues for expa

trade and commerce. This trade had the very positive 

of helping to improve the livelihood of a large num

Chinese people, developing a middle class that i

growing, and opening China to Western ideas 

commerce. Ignoring these transfers, however, underm

the centerpiece of the U.S. national strategy

non-proliferation policy. One might argue, in fact

India was encouraged by this history to detonate it

nuclear bomb, believing that the United States would 

soften any sanctions.

First, one wonders why Beijing can be believed 

when it says that it will cease to export the technolog

systems to develop and employ weapons of 

destruction. The PLA and the Chinese defense ind

239
leaders in the past. This represents one of the most s

matters that will affect U.S.-China military-to-mi

relations in the coming century. Can China be be

when it says it will no longer export technologies, che

precursors, and MTCR-controlled materials? The rec

the past says that Beijing will work secretly to circum

its promises and U.S. surveillance, especially whe

reasons that the United States chose to ignore pre

transfers are still valid—trade and cooperation o

Korean Peninsula. China’s leaders say that they c

keep track of all of the companies and business de

China. In August 1998, I was in China with two 

generals, an historian, and a strategist, and in one c

had 14 Chinese security people following us. Beijin

track down and arrest a single literate person who wr

letter to the editor of a newspaper. I had dozens of se

people following me around Beijing when I lived 

Perhaps if some of these security officers were used to 

illegal exports, Beijing could live up to its promises. 

The same doubts hold true of Beijing’s promise 

target nuclear weapons against the United States. Is t

bilateral surveillance regime to verify this promi

second reason that Beijing might choose to se

circumvent its agreements is that proliferation under

U.S. leadership.

76

 When India and Pakistan exp

nuclear weapons in 1998, the moral authority of the U

States was weakened, as was U.S. leadership. After a

centerpiece of U.S. security policy was shown to have f

Indeed, the world became more multipolar, reinfo

Beijing’s own goals. India was probably reasonably c

that the United States would react meekly, which 

because the United States selectively ignored C

exports to Pakistan and weakened its sanctions. So mi

relations with China will continue to be proble

because of China’s propensity to ignore its own agreem

This will affect American technology transfer policie

U.S. defense and intelligence establishments will pro

240
critical technologies to China.

The Maritime Consultative Agreement betwee

United States and China, designed to “promote ai

naval operations and to avoid incidents at sea,” ma

prove a source of more tension than agreement. If B

has not renounced the use of force against Taiwan or 

South China Sea, one must question the rationale for l

Chinese observe joint exercises that involve war fight

power projection. In fact, while the United States ma

part in or observe a search-and-rescue exercise, on vi

the United States China will see naval combat an

operations. The first such exercise on search-and-res

Hong Kong in December 1995 was quite positive, acco

to the South China Morning Post of December 5, 199

debate in the United States over the wisdom o

implementation of this agreement will be carried out 

media and in the Congress, putting the U.S. military 

considerable scrutiny and creating more room for te

and confrontation.

77

Conclusions.

There is a great deal of mutual mistrust betwee

United States and China, particularly at the senior lev

the two armed forces. American generals are polite, bu

are neither blind nor stupid. They know they are seein

little of the real PLA. These generals see the intelligen

the real PLA exercises, they know what is going on 

information warfare realm, and they know Beij

cheating on its statements with regard to prolifer

Chen Jian, a Chinese researcher at the U.S. Institu

Peace—like Deputy Chief of the General Staff Depar

(DCOGS) Lieutenant General Xiong Guangkai, DC

General Kui Fulin, Minister of Defense Genera

Haotian, and Chief of the General Staff Depar

General Fu Quanyou—tells us that it is up to the U

States to exercise patience, assist China i

241
But the military leaders of China, privately, tell us tha

are quite ready to sacrifice modernization and develop

if they believe that core issues like Taiwan indepen

require conflict. Lieutenant General Li Jijun tells u

both countries must work together so that the United S

does not create 1.2 billion enemies. Looking back 

Korean War, his veiled threat is that, if the United S

does not engage in cooperative behavior, the price w

very high.

79

 But person-to-person, he notes that h

“hundreds of American bombs dropped on him ever

with no effect,” disparaging U.S. air and naval powe

reposing supreme confidence in the power of artiller

infantry.

Cultural factors weigh heavily in the attemp

improve military-to-military relations between th

countries. Communication is useful, but it is not direc

internal writings of Chinese military leaders portra

United States as an aggressive power out to unde

China and contain the nation. Movies and brie

prepared for internal use portray the United State

potential enemy that must be placated in the near term

private utterances of PLA leaders are also not optim

Beijing must realize that while it threatens war ag

Taiwan, while it uses its army as a main tool to repre

populace, as it did during Tiananmen, and while 

refuses to renounce the use of force in the South Chin

the United States is not very likely to assist in milit

high-technology modernization. The United States s

gauge its military cooperation with China by s

standards: do nothing to improve the ability of the P

wage war against its neighbors or Taiwan; do noth

improve the PLA’s capability to project force; do noth

improve the PLA’s (or the People’s Armed Police’s) abi

repress the Chinese population.

To quote Lieutenant General Li Jijun, “it is bett

soldiers to talk and toast each other than to f

U.S.-China military-to-military contacts build m

242
crisis. The bilateral security dialogue and Ame

confidence-building agreements are useful. But a

Chinese colleagues say, “deeds must match words.”

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 5

1. It is important to remember that conflict can take many 

diplomatic, economic, and social. But neither conflict nor com

necessarily means war. U.S.-China conflict does not have to be 

conflict. Many have interpreted the book by Richard Bernstein a

Munro to mean that China and the United States are future e

The two-volume set published in China, E Zhi Zhongguo (Con

China), is an example of how the Bernstein and Munro bo

interpreted in the Chinese intellectual community. See R

Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, The Coming Conflict with Chin

York: A.A. Knopf, 1997. The conflict must be armed conflict.

2. Some of the factors over which there will be conflict are out

Yan Xuetong, ed., Zhongguo Guojia Liyi Fenxi (An Analysis of 

National Interest), Tianjin: Tianjin Renmin Chubanshe, 1997; a

Xuetong, ed., Zhongguo Chuqi: Guojin Huanjing Pingg

International Environment for China’s Rise), Tianjin: Tianjin 

Chubanshe, 1998. Yan and his colleagues conclude th

international environment at the end of the Cold-War era 

conducive to stability in the Asia-Pacific region, creating the ne

conditions for China’s rise as a power. On differences in 

strategic view see Zhu Mingquan, Meiguo Guojia Anquan Zheng

National Security Policy), Tianjin: Renmin Chubanshe, 199

assesses American security policy as a threat-based combina

realist and idealist theory that is still adjusting to a changed 

Even a capabilities-based strategy, such as the one adopted 

United States in the early 1990s, is still essentially a Co

threat-based strategy, according to Yan Xuetong. At the Novem

1998, “Conference on Strategy and Security in the Asia-P

Monterey, CA, Yan argued that China bases its own stra

perceptions of the intent of another nations, not on potential 

Lieutenant General Li Jijun, of the PLA Academy of Military S

argues that China has a security policy and strategy base

tradition of fighting “just wars” (yizhan) from a defensive mental

takes into consideration the ancient strategic texts of China 

Bingfa) and the Romance of the Three Kingdoms (San Guo Yan 

Li Jijun, Junshi zhanlue siwei (Strategic Thought), Beijing: 

Kexue Chubanshe, 1996, pp. 50-81; Chen Liheng, et.al., Junshi y

(Military Forecasting), Beijing: Junshi Kexue Chubanshe, 19

243
Essence of Contemporary Military Thinking), Beijing: Junshi 

Chubanshe, 1992.

3. Yue Shuiyu, Sunzi Bingfa yu Gao Jishu Zhanzheng 

Military Thought and High Technology Warfare), Beijing: N

Defense University Press, 1998; Xu Yongzhe, Gao Jishu Zha

Huoqin Baozhang (Guaranteeing Logistics in High Tec

Warfare), Beijing: Military Science Press, 1995; Zhu Youwen, Ga

Tiaojian Xia de Xinxi Zhan (Information Warfare Unde

Technology Conditions), Beijing: Military Science Press, 1998.

4. The PLA conducted major exercises in the military d

opposite Taiwan in 1995 and March 1996. In July and August 1

PLA conducted a missile exercise in the Taiwan Strait area. In 

and November 1995, the PLA conducted a naval demonstration 

followed by an amphibious exercise in the Taiwan Strait. Then b

March 8 and 25, 1996, the PLA conducted a series of live-fire ex

amphibious and airborne exercises, and short-range ballistic 

firings in the Strait area. These exercises were designed to int

Taiwan by demonstrating Beijing’s ability to strike Taiwa

short-range ballistic missiles, maintain air superiority and sea 

in the Strait, and conduct an amphibious invasion of Taiwa

United States responded by monitoring this activity with th

guided missile cruiser USS Bunker Hill, reconnaissance aircr

two carrier battle groups, led by the aircraft carriers USS Indep

and USS Nimitz. Office of Naval Intelligence, Chinese Exercis

961: 8-25 March 1996, Office of Naval Intelligence: Washingt

May 1996.

5. Vivien Pik-Kwan Chan, “Beijing Defends ‘Right’ to 

Taiwan,” South China Morning Post, July 28, 1998.

6. Liu Huaqiu, Shanghai Jiefang Ribao, November 3, 1997

7. Larry M. Wortzel, China’s Military Potential, Carlisle Ba

PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1998, pp

and 29.

8. Michael Pillsbury, ed., Chinese Views of Future W

Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1997; 

Pillsbury, China’s Assessment of the Future Security Envir

Washington, DC: Office of Net Assessment, Department of D

forthcoming 1999.

244
March 30, 1998, http://www.pathfinder.com/fortune/1998/

Chi.html; Duncan L. Clarke, “Selling U.S. Weapons to 

Christian Science Monitor, July 22, 1998, p. 15; “High-Tec

Stressed for China’s Army,” New York Times, March 16, 1998, p. 

Youwen, Gao Jishu xia de Xinxi Zhan (Information Warfare Und

Technology Conditions).

10. Kenneth Allen, et.al., China’s Air Force Enters the 21st C

Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1995. 

11. Eric A. McVadon, “China: An Opportunity or a Cha

Naval War College Review, Autumn 1996, pp. 75-92.

12. David Shambaugh, “Chinese Hegemony Over East 

2015?” The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Summer 1997, p

13. See Pillsbury, Chinese Views of Future Warfare, and L

Junshi zhanlue siwei. For a series of translations accessible to th

do not read Chinese, see Michael Pillsbury, ed., Chinese Views o

Warfare. For a detailed treatment in Chinese, see Li Jijun, 

Zhanlue Siwei (Strategic Thought); Chen Liheng, et.al., Juns

Xue (Military Forecasting); Yue Shuiyu, Sunzi Bingfa yu Ga

Zhanzheng (Sunzi’s Military Thought and High Technology W

Xu Yongzhe, Gao Jishu Zhanzheng Houqin Baozheng (Guara

Logistics in High Technology Warfare); Zhu Youwen, Gao 

Tiaojian xia de Xinxi Zhan (Information Warfare Unde

Technology Conditions).

14. See Wortzel, China’s Military Potential, pp. 11-14.

15. Work on this exhibition started in 1995, but in

bureaucratic wrangling for primacy and profits among the ind

delayed the event. Originally the General Equipment Depart

the PLA and the Commission of Science, Technology and Indu

National Defense (COSTIND) ran a press conference for com

and military attaches in Beijing, announcing the conference in 

was not held until 1998. Soon after the conference the new 

department” of the PLA, the General Armaments Departme

created out of COSTIND, and the civilian research compo

COSTIND was renamed “State COSTIND.” 

16. David Reeths, William Edgar, David Roessner, M

Salomone, “National Technological Competitiveness a

Revolution in Military Affairs,” a paper presented at the confe

245
November 1998.

17. Li Qingshan, Xin Junshi Geming Yu Gao Jishu Zhanzhe

New Military Revolution and High Technology Warfare), 

Junshi Kexue Chubanshe, 1995.

18. Ibid., p. 35. See also Li Jijun, Junshi Zhanlue Siwei (S

Thought), pp. 180-186.

19. Li Qingshan, p. 41.

20. Ibid., pp. 73-74.

21. Ibid., pp. 79-81.

22. Ibid., p. 91.

23. Ibid., pp. 94-95, 146.

24. In the second quarter of 1998, I visited Hanoi, Seoul, and 

for meetings with strategists associated with military and 

policies where the question of Chinese hegemony was acknowle

colleague in the Department of National Security and Strateg

U.S. Army War College, Dr. John Garofano, found the same atti

Singapore, Seoul, and Malaysia during the summer 1998.

25. Discussions with officials at the Military Strategy Inst

the Defense Ministry of Vietnam, the Central Committee of the V

Communist Party, and the Academy of Social Science, Hano

27-July 1, 1998.

26. I will stay away from the mechanical side of the exec

these policies. By this I mean that the paper will avoid “gettin

into the weeds” to discuss the “four pillars of the relationship.” So 

the United States has a coherent, comprehensive strategy, i

particularly important whether it is carried out through hig

contacts, functional exchanges, ship visits, or exercises. Regar

the form or level of contact, the substance of the contact must s

not undermine, the basic policy.

27. A National Security Strategy for a New Century, Wash

DC: The White House, October 1998, referred to hereafter as N

Security Strategy; National Military Strategy of the United S

America—Shape, Respond, Prepare Now: A Military Strategy fo

Era, Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1997, referred to he

as National Military Strategy. See also The United States S

246
Secretary of Defense, 1998.

28. National Security Strategy, p. 2.

29. Ibid., pp. 6-9.

30. Ibid., pp. i-iii.

31. China has signed the U.N. International Covenant on C

Political Rights. Like many countries, however, Beijing has def

view of human rights differently from the United States. China 

“basic needs” approach to human rights, arguing that befo

“luxuries” as freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and the fre

assemble can be granted to a people, the basic needs like fo

shelter must be met. This position has been most powerfully ar

Singapore. See Goh Chok Tong, “Social Values, Singapore 

Current History, December 1994, pp. 417-442; Melanie Chew, “

Rights in Singapore: Perceptions and Problems,” Asian Surv

XXXIV, No. 11, November 1994, pp. 933-948; also see M

Woo-Commings, “The ‘New Authoritarianism’ in East Asia,” 

History, December 1994, pp. 413-416. President Clinton explai

U.S. position at Beijing University on June 29, 1998. A full tex

speech may be found at http://www.china.com/cl

english/news/speech/speech/06290002.html. President Jiang 

comments on free speech and the arrest of dissidents 

http://www.china.com/clinton/english/news/speech/speech/

04.html.

32. National Military Strategy, pp. 3-5. 

33. The Commander in Chief of the U.S. Pacific Co

reinforced these points during a December 1998 visit to Au

Australian Financial Review, December 8, 1998, p. 9.

34. This dislike, even distrust, of alliances was heightened 

accidental bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Yugoslavia by the 

States, acting as part of NATO. See The Washington Post, J

1999, p. A16.

35. Information Office of the State Council of the People’s R

of China, China’s National Defense, Beijing, July 27, 1998. Acco

my discussions with some of the drafters of the White Paper, 

first White Paper on arms control published in 1995, this was a 

of an interagency writing and coordination process involv

247
PLA, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of State Se

36. Ibid., p. 1.

37. Li Haibo, “Imaginary Threat,” Beijing Review, March 

1999, p. 4.

38. The PLA Navy is building piers and barracks on Mischi

claimed by the Philippines, in what Philippine Defense Se

Orlando Mercado characterized as “a creeping invasion.” “R

Briefing,” Review: Far Eastern Economic Review, November 1

http://www.feer.com.

39. Zhu Mingquan makes the point that a cooperative appr

international policies becomes a “positive-sum-game,” 

emphasizes global and collective security organizations. Zhu Min

Meiguo Guojia Anquan Zhengce (U.S. Naitonal Security Pol

17-27, 110-129.

40. “Beijing Defends ‘Right’ to Attack Taiwan,” South 

Morning Post, July 28, 1998, p. 1; “China Can’t Steal What is A

China’s,” International Herald Tribune," December 4, 1998, p. 8

Baum and Susan Lawrence, “Breaking the Ice,” Review: Far 

Economic Review, October 15, 1998, http://www/feer/com.

41. See Du Gong, ed., Zhuanhuan zhong de shiji geju (The 

Structure in Transformation), Beijing: Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe, 

42. On the strategic partnerships China has established, se

Yi, “Sino-French Relations More Mature and Stable,” Beijing 

Vol. 40, No. 21, May 26-June 1, 1997, pp. 8-11; Beijing Review, 

No. 22, June 2-8, 1997, pp. 7-9; The Korea Times, November 11, 

1; China Daily, October 12, 1998, p. 1; Ministry of Foreign Affa

Japan, “Japan-China Joint Declaration on Building a Partne

Friendship and Cooperation for Peace and Development,” Novem

1998; Beijing Review, Vol. 41, No. 1, January 5-11, 1998, p

(ASEAN); The Washington Post, April 26, 1997, p. A27 (Russia); 

Review, Vol. 41, No. 10, March 9-15, 1998, p. 7 (European Unio

White House, “Fact Sheet: Accomplishments of the U.S

Summit,” October 29, 1997.

43. Shanghai Liefang Ribao, November 3, 1997, p. 5; The 

States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region, Wash

DC: The Secretary of Defense, 1998, p. 34; China’s National D

Beijing: State Council of the PRC, 1998.

248
International Herald Tribune, November 30, 1998, p. 8; Office o

Intelligence, Chinese Exercise Strait 961, pp. 1,7.

45. New York Times, January 20, 1998, p. 8. The cent

Secretary Cohen saw was a local control and monitoring cente

national command center.

46. General Shalikashvili spoke at the People’s Liberatio

National Defense University in mid-May 1997, after which he 

the 15th Group Army. Chicago Tribune, May 15, 1997, p. 7.

47. On United Front theory and temporary alliances with p

main adversaries, see Benjamin Schwartz, Chinese Communi

the Rise of Mao, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951; E

O. Clubb, Twentieth Century China, New York: Columbia Un

Press, 1964; Mao Zedong, “On the International United Front A

Fascism” Selected Works, Vol. III, Beijing: Foreign Language 

1967.

48. Wortzel, China’s Military Potential, pp. 16-17.

49. The two-volume set published in China, E zhi zh

(Containing China) is an example of this.

50. See Roger Ames, trans., Sun-Tzu: The Art of Warfare, Ne

Ballantine Books, 1993, pp. 93, 110-111. See also Wu Zhoulon

Sunzi Jiaoshi (Explaining Sunzi), Beijing: Junshi Kexue Chu

1996; Yue Shuiyu, Sun Zi Bingfa yu Gao Jishu Zhanzheng 

Military Thought and High Technology Warfare); Xu Yongzh

Jishu Zhanzheng Houqin Baozhang (Guaranteeing Logistics 

Technology Warfare); Zhu Youwen, Gao Jishu Taiojian xia d

Zhan (Information Warfare under High Technology Conditions

51. Liu Huaqiu, Shanghai Jiefang Ribao, November 3, 1997

Qingsong, “Current International Military Security Situation

Zhanlue Yanjiu (International Strategic Studies) No. 1, S

January 1998, pp. 9-15; China’s National Defense, pp. 3-7.

52. Chi Haotian, “Da Li Jiaqiang Guofang he Jundui Xian

Jianshe" (“Exert Great Effort to Strengthen National Defen

Military Building and Modernization”), Qiu Shi, No. 15, 1998, 

53. I ask the reader to distinguish here between the con

hegemony as it is described in this chapter and the concept int

Marxism-Leninism of the doctrine of hegemony espoused by the 

Soviet Union and defined by the Chinese critique of that conce

249
a policy for expansion and neo-colonialism is based on the then

Union’s claims of “limited sovereignty” for states in the “socialis

the international division of labor; and the leadership of the ‘s

camp’ by the Soviet Union.” See the critique of this doctrine in H

No. 5, 1970, pp. 13-15.

54. Haass makes this point in a few places in his book, 

discusses the thesis in the most detail in Chapter Three, “A Doc

Regulation,” pp. 49-77. See Richard N. Haass, The Reluctant 

The United States After the Cold War, Washington, DC: Cou

Foreign Relations, 1997. For a discussion of Haass’ ideas se

Urquhart, “Looking for the Sheriff,” The New York Review of Boo

16, 1998, pp. 48-53.

55. Edward N. Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic of War and 

Cambridge: The Belknap Press, 1987., pp. 190-207.

56. Shambaugh, p. 11. 

57. Webster’s Third International Dictionary, 1971 edition.

58. Shambaugh, p.11; Robert Keohane, After Heg

Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Situation Pr

Princeton University Press, 1984. Shambaugh’s point is that th

different definitions of the term, “coercive, benign, and benevole

one must be careful how the term is used. 

59. As mentioned in endnote 1, it is important to understa

conflict does not necessarily mean war. I argue that conflict w

major factor in bilateral relations between the United States an

as well as in multilateral relations in Asia because both count

vying for dominance, but that there are only a few ways that w

see armed conflict.

60. For instance, see China’s presentation at the ASEAN R

Forum Intersessional Meeting on Confidence Building Measur

in Beijing March 6-8, 1997, entitled “China’s Defense Policy Stat

61. China’s National Defense, pp. 3, 21-22; Liu Huaqing.

62. Peter Landers and Susan V. Lawrence, “Sorry, No Apolo

Eastern Economic Review, December 10, 1998, p. 21; Nich

Kristof, “Jiang Trips Over the Issue of Japanese Apology,” Intern

Herald Tribune, November 30, 1998, p. 1.

250
express outrage at some act of a foreign country. See The Japan 

June 6, 1998, p. 3; The Daily Herald, Everett, WA, April 7, 1998

Asia Magazine, May 25, 1998. “Japanese ‘Tojo’ Movie Top-G

Film in First Half of 1998,” Bloomberg News Service, Tokyo, J

1998; The Straits Times Interactive, May 11, 1998, http://web

comm.sg/archive/st/4/pages/stea4.html.

64. Prime Minister Hashimoto’s 1997 visit to Manchuria 

site of the chemical and biological experiments was not really a

in Tokyo and disavowed by some cabinet members. 

65. Associated Press, “Court Rejects Claims of WWII Sex 

The Sentinel, October 9, 1998, p. A7.

66. The Washington Post, December 6, 1998, p. C7.

67. I have been told this by several senior active duty and 

general officers in the PLA, some of whom fought in the Korea

Some of these officers are Central Committee members. The 

quite serious about this point and wants to ensure that this me

not ignored, as it was in 1950.

68. The potential for serious disputes in this area was pointe

me by Professor Sen-Dao Chang (Zhang Chengde), Geo

Department, University of Hawaii-Manda. Dr. Chang reminde

just how sensitive China can be to disputed river bounda

reminding me of the way that the Zhenbao (Damansky) Island i

was handled by the PLA in 1969.

69. See Sen-Dao Chang, “Qianyi Zhongguo Shui Ziyuan Tex

he Liyong,” (“A Preliminary Discussion of the Special Connection

Development and Use of China’s Water Resources”), Unive

Hawaii, Summer 1998.

70. “China Tells Vietnam Leave the Spratlys,” Washington 

September 11, 1998, p. 19.

71. See Alistair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic 

and Grand Strategy in Chinese History, Princeton: Princeton Un

Press, 1995. See also Allen Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of Det

Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1975.

72. Larry M. Wortzel, “China Seeks Traditional Great 

Status,” Orbis, Spring 1994; Larry M. Wortzel, “China’s M

Potential in the 21st Century,” Asia Pacific Magazine, Aus

National University, September 1998.

251
Gilley, “Scrap Value,” Far Eastern Economic Review, April 9

http://www.feer.com.

74. Fact Sheet, ”Achievements of U.S.-China Summit," Offic

Press Secretary, The White House, June 27, 1998.

75. Bill Gertz, “Beijing Continued Arms Sales to Pakistan, Ir

Year,” Washington Times, July 22, 1998, p. 1; Bill Gertz, “White 

Plays Down Test of Rocket Motor by Chinese,” Washington Tim

23, 1998, p. 16; Bill Gertz, “U.S. Protests Chinese Technology 

Iran,” Washington Times, December 7, 1998, p. 1.

76. “U.S., China Sign Military Agreement,” Washington 

September 16, 1998, p. 5.

77. “Pentagon Inquiry Faults Missile Maker’s China Aid,” N

Times, December 9, 1998, p. 1; “The Trail of Dealings with 

Rocket Gear,” New York Times, December 9, 1998, p. 14; “White 

Confirms Protest to China,” New York Times, December 8, 199

78. Chen Jian, “The China Challenge for the Twent

Century,” Washington, DC: U.S. Institute for Peace, June 1998

79. Li Jijun, Traditional Military Thinking and the D

Strategy of China, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War 

Strategic Studies Institute, 1997.

252
TAIWAN’S MILITARY IN THE 21st CENTU

REDEFINITION AND REORGANIZATIO

Arthur Shu-fan Ding

and

Alexander Chieh-cheng Huang

A giant wave is rising. The party flag is flying. This is 

revolutionary Huangpu (Military Academy). Ideology sho

be carried out. Discipline should be kept. Prepare to be 

spearhead of the struggle. We are fighting to open a road w

our blood and to lead our suppressed countrym

hand-in-hand, marching forward . . .

Song of the Chinese Military Acade

Every morning the cadets of the Chinese Mi

Academy in Kaohsiung, Taiwan, sing the same so

remind themselves of the goals of the Nat

Revolutionary Army (guomin gemingjun) (her

referred to as the Taiwan military) set forth by Dr

Yat-sen when he established the Academy in Hua

Guangdong, in 1924. Sadly, despite its lofty goal

Taiwan military was soundly defeated by the Comm

in 1949. Nevertheless, since retreating to Taiwan

Taiwan military has abandoned its Bolshevik-ins

ideology and now proudly declares itself to be the ult

defender of a young democracy. What were the reason

led to such a change? How does the Taiwan military p

transform itself in the future? What are the pro

associated with the transformation? This chapter ai

discuss the changing political and strategic environ

experienced by the Taiwan military, to examine the po

the Taiwan military adopted to cope with those cha

and to identify the challenges that the Taiwan milit

likely to face in the near future.

253
DEVELOPMENT IN A CHANGING ENVIRONM

Some observers have argued that the People’s Re

of China’s (PRC) unsuccessful war against Vietnam in 

served as the first wake-up call for the PRC’s de

modernization efforts. In the same year, Washin

de-recognition of the Republic of China (ROC) also evo

Taiwan an urgent desire to maintain a strong 

self-reliant defense capability.

1

 In the nearly 2 de

since 1979, the Taiwan military has instituted signi

modernization programs concentrating largely on we

systems acquisition. However, the real transformat

Taiwan’s military—including changes in its str

concepts, defense policies, and relationship with ci

authorities—has come only in the last 10 years, prima

response to two factors: democratization and Tai

strategic reorientation.

Democratization: From Party-Led Army to Nat

Army.

Constitutional Reform. Following the steps tak

late-President Chiang Ching-kuo to relax political con

the society in Taiwan, President Lee Teng-hui in 

terminated the “Period of Mobilization against Comm

Rebellion” and began a multi-year constitutional re

One major reform has been the switch from indirect to 

presidential elections, which strengthened the power 

of the president. In addition, the appointment o

premier as the highest official of the Executive bran

longer requires the confirmation of the Legislative br

making the premier the president’s proxy in carryin

policy. The effect of these changes has been to alte

previous separation between the “military administ

system” (junzheng xitong) and the “military com

system” (junling xitong), paving the way for str

presidential control over military affairs.

254
law and the legalization of political opposition have br

an end to the political dominance of the Kuomintang 

or Nationalist Party). Over the past 10 years, oppo

parties, particularly the Democratic Progressive 

(DPP), have been increasingly able to expand their po

support and to attract voters. Advocating Tai

independence is no longer a political taboo, an

development of a civil society has forced KMT orga

retreat from military institutions. The military, unde

circumstances, has had no choice but to transform 

from an anti-Taiwan independence force to a guard

democracy and the constitution.

Strategic Reorientation: From Offense to Defe

Redefinition of Military Strategy. After the termi

of martial law, the ROC officially recognized that the 

exercises effective control over mainland China 

abandoned the unrealistic ambition of reunifying Ch

force. Taiwan’s military strategy has since shifted f

focus on retaking the mainland by force (fangong dalu

emphasis on integrated defensive and offensive capab

(gongshou yiti) to a purely defensive strategy ( sh

fangyu). This new strategic posture rendered obsole

old forms of resource allocation, force deployment

command and personnel structures.

Changing Military Technologies. Advances in m

technology and the modernization of the People’s Libe

army (PLA) have changed the nature of the thre

Taiwan’s security. Improvements in weaponry an

increase of the PLA’s force-projection capability have 

the heavily fortified offshore islands of Quemoy and M

irrelevant to Taiwan’s defense. The PLA’s medium-

ballistic missile force has left the main island of T

virtually defenseless against a missile threat. At the 

time, advances in military technology have also al

Taiwan to improve its own firepower and force mo

255
investment. 

Beyond these great changes in Taiwan’s politica

strategic environment, the social and economic situat

Taiwan has forced a shift in military policy.

Strained Financial Resources. Two factors

increasing cost of social welfare programs and the ne

infrastructure investment, have forced a reduction 

share of the defense budget as a part of Taiwan’s 

government budget from 24.28 percent in fiscal yea

1994 to 22.43 percent in FY 1998. The defense b

measured as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product 

has also declined from 4.22 percent in FY 1994 to 

percent in FY 1998.2 Another financial reason behin

streamlining of the armed forces is the huge personne

in relation to operational costs and military investmen

the fiscal 1999 budget proposal submitted to the Legis

Yuan, the three major sections in the defense budge

50.05 percent for personnel costs, 19.09 percen

operational costs, and 30.86 percent for mil

investment.

3

 Given that personnel costs take up abou

of the total defense budget, it was no accident that C

the General Staff General Tang Fei complained 

without a streamlining of military personnel, the T

military will not be able to pay its electricity bill by 200

Decline in Available Draftees. Taiwan mainta

primarily conscript military force. The Taiwan milita

also encountered manpower problems at the basic 

level. Fewer young people of talent are interested in se

in the military when they can be better off, at 

financially, by working in the private sector. An

relatively long-term problem is the decline in net popu

growth. The 1998 ROC National Defense Report pr

that the numbers of eligible recruits will contin

decrease in the next 5 years from about 161,000 in 1

148,000 in 2002.5 Such factors as the graying of Ta

population, the out-flow of population due to incr

256
their children to study abroad have contributed t

decline of available draftees.

The factors above have created a disturbing, 

alarming, situation. If the Taiwan military doe

redefine and reorganize itself, it cannot meet the se

challenges posed by the PRC and may not survive the 

domestic political changes. In the next two section

authors discuss major measures adopted by the T

military to adapt to the changing environment.

ENHANCING CIVILIAN CONTROL: THE MAK

OF NATIONAL DEFENSE LAW

Evolution of National Security Organizations. 

During World War II, the national defense organiz

of the ROC was firmly placed under the control of the 

The Supreme Defense Council (guofang zuigao weiyua

was the highest defense policymaking body, wit

chairman of the KMT as its chairman.

6

 Afte

promulgation of the ROC Constitution in 1947

Supreme Defense Council was replaced by the Na

Defense Council (guofang huiyi) headed by the presid

the republic. However, the swift defeat of the 

government on the mainland in 1949 kept the Na

Defense Council from serving any substantial func

After the ROC government retreated to Taiwan, C

Kai-shek established a National Security Council 

(guojia anquan huiyi) following the American m

However, after the lifting of martial law an

termination of the Temporary Provisions during the P

of Mobilization against Communist Rebellion, the 

basis for the NSC was put in question. In response 

new political and security conditions, the Nat

Assembly amended the ROC Constitution in April 

establishing a new legal basis for the NSC.

257
drafting a new law on national defense as early as 195

submitted a draft of National Defense Organization 

(guofang zuzhifa) to the Legislative Yuan twice for re

in 1951 and 1954. Unfortunately, the Executive 

withdrew the drafts in 1971 without any subst

progress.

8

 Instead, the ROC government promulga

Ministry of National Defense Organizational 

(guofangbu zuzhifa) in 1970 and a Ministry of Na

Defense General Staff Organization Law ( guof

canmoubenbu zuzhifa) in 1978. According to these two 

which remain in effect, Taiwan’s national de

organization was divided into two parallel system

military administration system and military com

system. In the military administration system, m

policies are carried out through a chain comprisin

president, the premier, the minister of national de

(MND), and the chief of the General Staff. However, 

military command system, the president dir

commands the armed forces through the chief of the Ge

Staff. (See Figure 1.)

The need for formulating a basic law on national de

was revived in 1993. No significant action was t

however, until the National Assembly finished ame

the ROC Constitution in July 1997. In September 

258

Figure 1. National Command Structure of the 

(Current)
draft National Defense Organization Law to the Exec

Yuan. The proposed law contained two versions

maintaining the current two-track system and an

suggesting the convergence of the two tracks. It is rep

that the Executive Yuan preferred the second versio

that several generals privately appealed to Presiden

against the convergence. The generals are said to 

argued that the current system enables the presid

exercise his power as commander in chief more effec

and that uniting the two systems would infringe o

president’s power. The Executive Yuan felt the matte

too sensitive and sent both versions to the Office 

President for advice. Ultimately, President Lee supp

the convergence and insisted that military affairs be s

to parliamentary supervision. That decision untie

most difficult knot in the making of the new law

addition, President Lee told Defense Minister C

Chung-ling that the function of a national de

organization is not merely an organizational issu

rather it is to build appropriate defense system

capabilities. Accordingly, Lee directed the MND to dr

term “organization” and to rename the draft “Na

Defense Law” on December 30, 1997.

10

In a parallel effort, confirming Lee’s directive 

Minister of Defense, the KMT’s Central Policy Comm

(zhongyang zhengcehui) on April 23, 1998, responde

directive from Lee Teng-hui, acting in his capacity as 

chairman, and concluded that the Ministry of Na

Defense should aim to achieve the “convergence 

military administration system and the military com

system” (junzheng junling yiyuanhua) in drafting th

defense law. Accordingly, the MND submitted draft

National Defense Law (guofang fa) and the Amendme

the Ministry of National Defense Organizational 

(guofangbu zuzhifa) to the Executive Yuan on Ap

1998.

11

 The Executive Yuan formally approved both 

on May 21, 1998.

12

 The drafts were submitted t

259
September 1998.

Unique Characteristics of the New Law.

The draft of the National Defense Law is divide

seven chapters and 36 articles.

13

 It defines the goa

missions of the Taiwan military and the roles and fun

of key players in the national command structu

addition to those elements that are generic to similar l

other nations, the National Defense Law contain

elements unique to the old defense structure: firs

creation of a National Military Council (NMC) ( gu

junshi huiyi), and second, the convergence of the mi

administration system and the military command sy

(See Figure 2.)

The Creation of a National Military Council. Repor

as it redefined the national command structure, the 

always considered the NSC to be the highest de

decision-making body. However, according to the 

Organization Law promulgated following the last rou

constitutional amendments, the NSC is a consul

agency with no decision-making power. Consequentl

MND adopted a concept similar to that used by the 

260

Premier

National Military Council

Chief of the General Staff

Armed Forces

Minister of National Defense

President

Figure 2. National Command Structure of the 

(Proposed in National Defense Law)
as the highest defense decision-making organization

• Article 8: As the commander in chief, the pre

commands the army, navy and air force. In exercisin

power of commander in chief and in making mi

decisions, the president shall convene the Na

Military Council.

• Article 9: The president chairs the National M

Council and enjoys final decision power. The members 

National Military Council are the vice president, pre

secretary-general of the President’s Office, secre

general of the National Security Council, minis

national defense, chief of the General Staff and 

participants appointed by the president.

According to defense officials, the NMC is not int

to be a permanent, standing organization, but to me

hoc. The president would convene meetings of the NMC 

when there is a major defense decision to make. All 

peacetime military decisions will be made during ro

“military talks” (junshi huitan) between the presiden

military leaders.

15

System convergence. Under the current syst

military relations in Taiwan, a system which ha

changed in 50 years, the president and the chief 

General Staff have become the two most pow

government officials exempted from parliame

supervision. The draft National Defense Law seeks to 

this. The parliament or Legislative Yuan can supervi

premier, who is the highest official in the executive br

but the Legislative Yuan is not entitled to overse

president. Nor does the parliament have any super

authority over the chief of the General Staff, becaus

supervision could also be seen as infringing upo

president’s constitutional right as the commander in c

the nation. Therefore, during the past 50 years, the ch

the General Staff have always been able to d

261
affairs.

As Taiwan’s democracy matured, the refusal by the 

of the General Staff to report to the Legislative Yua

become more and more unacceptable to legislators as w

to the general public. At the formal request of 124 p

led by Legislator Ding Shou-chung (KMT), the Coun

the Grand Justices issued its interpretation of curren

on July 24, 1998, and affirmed that the chief of the Ge

Staff, as an official in the executive branch o

government, cannot refuse to report to committee me

of the Legislative Yuan. However, since the chief 

General Staff is not a member of the cabinet, accord

the constitution, he is not required to attend or a

questions at the plenary session of the Legislative Y

After learning of the interpretation from the Council 

Grand Justices, current Chief of the General Staff Ge

Tang Fei indicated that he is fully aware of the po

trend towards greater legislative supervision of m

affairs and expressed his willingness to go to the Legis

Yuan even before the Legislature reviews the draft 

new National Defense Law.17 On September 30, 

General Tang became the first chief of the General 

reporting to the Legislative Yuan and answ

questions.

18

The draft of the new National Defense Law redefin

national command structure and proposes the inclus

the defense minister in the military chain of comma

also redefines the relationship between the de

minister and the chief of the General Staff.

• Article 10: In exercising power as the comman

chief, the president commands the armed forces throu

minister of national defense.

• Article 14: The minister of national defens

position for civilians. The minister manages defense a

of the nation and is responsible for the matters of 

military administration and the command of armed fo

262
set up the General Staff Office ( canmou benbu) to fu

as both the military staff for the defense minister an

commanding organization for joint military operation

Office should have a chief of the General Staff who a

the military staff for the defense minister and comm

military operations under the minister’s instructions

• Article 16: Directly under the Ministry of Na

Defense, there should be the general headquarters 

army, the navy, the air force, the Tri-service Joint Log

the Reserves Command, the Military Police Comman

other military organizations, military schools, and tr

In the existing national command structure, the m

administration system and military command sy

converge at the Office of the President. Under the pro

law, the chief of the General Staff, who is the h

ranking person in military uniform, will be subordin

the minister of national defense, a civilian. The minis

national defense becomes the principal military advi

the president and controls both the military administ

system and military command system. Since the de

minister is required to be a civilian and is a member 

cabinet, the Legislative Yuan is therefore in a firm po

to supervise all military affairs. The new structure, 

law is enacted, would create a system similar to that 

United States, including similar National Com

Authorities.

Debates and Dissenting Views.

The Premier’s Role in the National Command Stru

The United Daily, one of the largest newspapers in Ta

issued an editorial on January 9, 1998, arguing that,

converging the systems of military administration a

military command is intended to correct the shortcomings 

the current system and restore the integrity of execut

power. But, since the premier, according to the constitution

the head of executive branch and is responsible to t

263
not the president. The establishment of the National Milit

Council is an expansion of the president’s power and 

infringe upon the premier’s executive power. Thus, the d

National Defense Law, in effect creates legislation that wo

damage the Constitution.

19

The MND was unable to give any convincing respo

such questions, but only issued a rebuttal, stating th

practice so far, the power of the commander in ch

independent from both the executive and the legis

powers.”

20

 In other words, according to the MND, 

though the new draft law gives the Executive Yua

responsibility to make defense policies,

21

 it is just

that the premier is not included in the chain of comm

The Need for a New National Military Coun

addressing the need for a NMC, the MND argued 

although the constitution does not regulate how the 

of the commander in chief is to be used, major 

decisions in most democratic nations are made 

collective fashion, and Taiwan should not be an exce

Taiwan studied the National Command Authority 

United States as a model and, given the differen

government structure, borrowed the concept. Takin

national security structure of the United States 

example, the MND proposed the establishment of a N

The MND justified the establishment of such a coun

pointing out that the NSC has no decision-making p

but only consultative functions. However, the 

conceives the NMC as a high-level, decision-m

mechanism with no permanent or fixed organization

president, through the consultative mechanism o

NMC, would make his policy decisions and comman

armed forces.

23 There are problems with the MND pr

that still must be thought through. First, if it is tru

military policies are to be decided collectively, give

existing functions of the NSC, is it necessary to s

another homogeneous organization? Second, if, as the 

argued, the national command authority goes from 

264
armed forces, it is really not an important issue wheth

NSC is a consultative agency or a decision-making 

(See Figure 3.)

Relations between the Defense Minister and the C

the General Staff. In the existing system, chiefs 

General Staff have had the difficult task of balancing 

roles as military advisers to the president (in the m

command system) and advisers to the defense ministe

the premier (in the military administration system

proposed new law plans to converge the two syste

making the defense minister in charge of both the m

administration system and the military command sy

However, problems remain. People may argue that the 

law is merely shifting the difficulties from the chief 

General Staff to the defense minister, since the minist

265

• NATIONAL SECURITY

COUNCIL

• President (Chairman)

• Premier (Vice Chairman)

• Secretary-General, Office of

the President

• Vice Premier

• Minister of the Interior

• Minister of Foreign Affairs

• Minister of National Defense 

• Minister of Finance

• Minister of Economic Affairs 

• Chairman of the Mainland

Affairs Council

• Chief of the General Staff

• Secretary-General, National

Security Council 

• Director-General, National

Security Bureau

• Participants appointed by

the President

Figure 3. Members of Taiwan’s National Secu

Authority.

• NATIONAL MILTIARY

COUNCIL

• President (Chairman)

• Premier (Vice Chairman)

• Secretary-General, Office 

President

• Secretary-General, Natio

Security Council

• Minister of National Defe

• Chief of the General Staf

• Participants appointed by 

President
premier.

24 Further, drafting a new law is easy, but m

it function well remains a big problem. In the ex

system, the Office of Defense Minister has only very 

staffs, which are responsible for manpower, material

mobilization works. The General Staff Office, on the 

hand, has a huge staff. Therefore, without an expans

the Office of the Minister of National Defense, the 

system will almost certainly invite more problems

must also ask whether there should be legislation 

regulates the size and function of these staffs.

The Roles of the Chief of the General Staff. In the na

command structure of the United States, mi

operations are carried out by the commanders in chief 

unified and/or specified commands under the direct or

the President and the Secretary of Defense. In Tai

proposed new law, the chief of the General Staff is bo

top military adviser to the defense minister an

supreme commander of joint military operations. 

though Taiwan is not a global military power, some ex

suspect that the dual role of the chief of the Genera

could cause problems. Defense Minister Chiang Chun

addressed this issue in a Military Work Review Confe

(guojun gongzuo jiantaohui or ziqiang huiyi) held on J

1998.

25

 Chiang argued that the General Staff 

functions as both military staff and military comma

organization. Unlike the United States, Taiwan ha

limited armed forces and operational space and is, in 

only one integrated military operations zone ( zh

Therefore, it should be no problem for the chief 

General Staff to wear two hats, i.e., providing m

advice to and commanding military operations on beh

the defense minister and the president.

26

 General Tan

however, indicated that the dual functions of the chief 

General Staff needed to be further clarified. Nomina

said, the chief of the General Staff should be pu

military adviser; however, it would be risky if the chief 

General Staff is granted the responsibility of comma

266
suggested it would be better to give the chief of the Ge

Staff another title such as Supreme Commander 

Armed Forces (guofangjun zongsiling), which would p

authority to oversee the military during peacetim

war.

27

Views from the Legislative Yuan. The Legislative 

stayed actively involved in the lawmaking process. 

the time that the Executive Yuan approved the MND 

members of the Legislative Yuan have proposed at lea

different versions of the draft. 28 Although both branc

the government support the concept of unifying the m

administrative and command systems, there are at 

two major differences between the Legislative 

versions and the Executive Yuan version.

• Concerning the national command structure, a

all interested legislators oppose the idea of establish

NMC. Chu Feng-chi (KMT), Lin Chou-shui (DPP), and 

Ming-hsian (DPP) have argued that the NSC already h

the functions of the proposed NMC and that there is no 

for duplication. Chu and Lin propose that any NSC de

related to military affairs should be sent to the Legis

Yuan for review. Chai wants the Chairman of the NSC

the president, to submit a report on national se

strategy to the Legislative Yuan annually. Chen Shu

(DPP) advocates the establishment of a new na

command structure by setting up a National Se

Administration ( guojia anquan zongshu) i

Presidential Office and a National Security A

Commission (guojia anquan shiwu weiyuanhui) und

premier.29

• On the scope of political activities within the m

there are also major disagreements. The Executive 

version regulates the political activities of the milita

principle, by stating “The ROC armed forces should op

beyond personal connections, local origins, or political 

affiliation, and maintain administrative neut

267
present much more detailed rules that are intend

maintain a separation between political parties an

military by restricting military personnel 

participating in party organs and political activiti

addition, some members of the Legislative Yuan pro

more interesting rules. For example, Lin Chuo-shui 

suggested that military personnel should not be allow

manage or invest in any mass media, and Edward 

(New Party) even proposed language saying that activ

military personnel should not be allowed to initia

participate in military coups.

31

STRENGTHENING MILITARY CAPABILITIES

THE JING SHI PROGRAM

The Evolution of Defense Reorganization

Programs.

The MND began streamlining military structure

manpower as early as 1985. From 1985 to 1990, accord

the General Staff Office, all services had taken ste

streamline their organizations.

32 The real, mean

defense reorganization effort began when Admira

Ho-chien was appointed chief of the General Staff. U

his auspices, the Zhong Yuan (central field) Program 

instituted. As originally conceived, the Zhong 

Program was intended to relocate and consolidat

various command headquarters of the armed forces in 

to facilitate future defense and force reorganizati

Later the Zhong Yuan Program was gradually exp

into a comprehensive military restructuring program

In August 1993, the MND issued its ROC M

Ten-Year Force Target Program ( guojun shinian 

mubiao guihua)

34

 to describe its plans to fundame

reform the armed forces in three stages. In the first st

this program, the MND sought to rationalize 

consolidate the structure and manpower ratios of the 

services. In the second stage, the MND aimed to adjus

268
the MND hoped to consolidate the General Staf

general headquarters of each service, and the mi

academies.

35 The overall objective of the reforms w

shift the Taiwan military from an offensive orientatio

defensive one. Chief of the General Staff Admiral Li

announced that Taiwan should reduce its total m

force to fewer than 400,000 men, or to 1.7 percent of th

population; and reduce the number of general

admirals to 400, a 45-percent reduction from the 1993 

Other reorganization moves anticipated under the 

Yuan Program were even more radical. They include

following adjustments:

• dissolving the general headquarters of the army

and air force and dividing Taiwan into several u

commands directly under the chief of the General St

• making the commanders in chief of the va

services vice chiefs of the General Staff (VCGS);

• downgrading the head of the General Political Wa

Department to one of the deputy chiefs of the Genera

(DCGS);

• integrating the DCGS for planning (J-5) into the D

for operations (J-3); and,

• creating a new Operations Command directly 

the chief of the General Staff.

37

 (See Figures 4 and 5

Some top generals reportedly warned that Admira

plan was a form of “shock therapy.” They argued th

military had played a key role in maintaining Tai

peace and stability and has been loyal to President Le

therefore the government should be very careful 

implementing large-scale organizational reform. Due 

lack of consensus among top military leaders as w

among the services, Chief of the General Staff Liu 

pared down his plan.

38

 Some of the strongest voices a

the Zhong Yuan Program came from army generals

ROC Army, which traditionally has been the dom

269
branch among the three services, worried that its sh

the defense budget and its ability to shape military str

would shrink substantially.

39

 Officers in the po

warfare system were likewise said to be worried 

losing influence as a result of the reorganization pro

Domestic political considerations also eroded the b

political support for the Zhong Yuan Program. Pre

Lee, in his capacity as chairman of the KMT, was conc

about the possible loss of votes in several elections a

time, particularly those votes that could only be obtain

mobilizing the political warfare system. As a r

Admiral Liu’s Zhong Yuan Program was put on ho

mid-1995, General Lo Pen-li succeeded Admiral Liu as 

of the General Staff. General Lo and Defense Mi

Chiang, both senior generals from the army, j

modified the military reorganization plan and brough

end the Zhong Yuan Program.

270

(Based on various news report and interviews with Taiwan defens

J-1 Personnel J-2 Intelligence

J-3 Operations & Planning J-4 Logistics

J-X Communications & EW J-P Political Warfare

Deputy Chiefs of the General Staff

Northern Command Central Command

Southern Command Eastern Command

Special Operations Command Offshore Islands Comma

Unified Commands

Vice Chiefs of the General Staff

Army - Navy - Air Force

Figure 4. The Zhong Yuan Program.

(Initial Concept)

(Based on various news reports and interviews with Taiwan Defense O
Under the leadership of Minister Chiang and Ge

Lo, the Ten-Year Force Restructuring Guideline, issu

1993, was changed to the ROC Military Organizatio

Force Restructuring Program ( guojun junshi zuzhi ji 

tiaozheng guihua), or in short, the Streamlinin

Consolidation (Jing Shi) Program.

40

 According t

Defense Ministry, the objective of the Jing Shi Progra

streamline the command (higher) levels and consolida

field (lower) levels of the military structure. The Jin

Program is also designed to reduce manpower by raisi

emphasis on firepower and mobility and creating a mi

force that is elite (zhi jing), small (liang xiao), and 

(zhanli qiang).

41

 (See Figure 6.)

Major Components of the Jing Shi Program.

Force Cuts. The Jing Shi Program was approv

President Lee in December 1996

42 and took effect in 

1997.

43

 The target date for the completion is set for 

2001, 2 years earlier than the estimated completion d

the previous ROC Military Ten-Year Force T

271

(China Times, January 9, 1995)

Operations Command

J-1 Personnel

J-2 Intelligence

J-3 Operations and Planning

J-4 Logistics

J-X Communications and EW

J-P Political Warfare

Deputy Chiefs of General Staff

General Headquarters of the Army

General Headquarters of the Navy

General Headquarters of the Air Force

General Headquarters of the Tri-service Joint Logistics

Executive Vice Chief of the General Staff

Vice Chief of General Staff x 2

Chief of the General Staff

Figure 5. The Zhong Yuan Program.

(Modified)
Program.

44 Upon the completion of the Jing Shi Pro

the Taiwan military’s total manpower will be trimmed 

453,000 to 400,000, nearly a 10 percent cut. The arm

remain the largest service in terms of manpower, 

200,000 men in total, while the navy and the air force 

will have 56,000 men. The remaining personnel w

allocated among the Military Police Command

Tri-Service Joint Logistics Command Headquarter

various reserve units. As for officers, the manpowe

will be around 25 percent in the army, 20 percent 

navy, and 10 percent in the air force. 45 Mobili

capabilities will be dramatically improved, and 

expected that upon completion of the program, the T

military will be able, in case of an emergency, to mo

290,000 men from the total reserve force in 1 day.

46

General Staff Cut. Senior staffs have also been ta

for reduction. The manpower of the General Staff Offic

be cut by one-third of the 1997 level. A new Bure

Communications, Electronic and Information Wa

(tongxin dianzi zixun ju) will be established by mergi

Bureau of Communication and Electronics of the Mi

of National Defense (tongxin dianzi ju) an

Management Information Center under the J-5 o

272

(Based on various news report and interviews with Taiwan defense officials)

General Political Warfare Department

J-1 Personnel

J-2 Intelligence

J-3 Operations

J-4 Logistics

J-5 Planning

Deputy Chiefs of General Staff

General Headquarters of the Army

General Headquarters of the Navy

General Headquarters of the Air Force

General Headquarters of the Tri-service Joint Logistics

Executive Vice Chief of the General Staff

Vice Chief of General Staff x 2

Figure 6. The Jing Shi Program.

(Based on various news reports and interviews with Taiwan defense officials)
of General Affairs (zongwu ju), the Bureau of M

History and Translation ( shizheng bianyi ju), and the 

of the Chief of the General Staff ( canmou zong

bangongshi) will be merged into a Bureau of Military A

(junwu ju). In the end, the present 25 departments 

the five deputy chiefs of the General Staff will be redu

16 in number.

48

Major changes will take place in the General Po

Warfare Department (zong zhengzhi zuozhan b

addition to downsizing its staff, the staff in cha

political indoctrination and civil-military relations 

the military welfare staff (P-5), and the spokesman’s 

will be reportedly merged into a new division. How

personnel staff in the political warfare system (P-1

anti-corruption staff (P-3), and the counter-intelligenc

internal security staff (P-4) will remain la

unchanged.

49

Military Education Reform. Under the reorgani

program, several military schools will be merged, an

total number of military schools will be reduced from 

20.

50

 In the army, the Transportation School, the De

Management College, and the Sanitation School w

merged into the Army Logistics College (lujun ho

xueyuan). The navy’s Navigation, Enginee

Communication and Electronics, and Ordinance S

will be merged into the Navy Navigation Techn

College (haijun hanghai jishu xueyuan). In the air for

Mechanical and the Communication and Electr

Schools will be merged into the Air Force Av

Technology College (kongjun feixin jishu xueyuan

Defense Language School will become part of the M

Intelligence School. The Chungcheng Institu

Technology and the Defense Management Colleg

merge to become the Defense Science and Techn

University (guofang keji daxue).

51

273
possibility of cutting back the time allocated for po

indoctrination in the military and to change the form

such indoctrination. At a military-wide meeting o

reform of military education held in October 1997, Ge

Lo reportedly said that, while making everybo

revolutionary fighter through political indoctrinatio

fine ideal, what the Taiwan military needs mos

professional capability in various fields. He emphat

pointed out that an emphasis on political rectitude 

professional capability has been the major obsta

modernizing the Taiwan military.

Military Training Reform. A new National M

Training Center (guojia junshi xunlian zhongxin) will 

up in southern Taiwan to provide joint warfare traini

ROC military units, focusing on the battalion level. 

training center, a mock PLA unit at battalion level wi

be set up as an aggressor. The mock PLA is expected 

equipped with PLA weapons systems and to apply 

tactics.

52

Important new offices, the Education, Training

Doctrine Development Commands (ETDDC)( j

xunlian ji zhunze fazhan silingbu) are set up und

general headquarters of all three services. The 

ETDDC is derived from the old army Opera

Development Committee ( lujun zuozhan fa

weiyuanhui).

53 The Navy ETDDC replaces the 

Training Command (jiandui xunlian silingbu).54 T

Force ETDDC is transformed from Eastern Air 

Command (kongjun dongbu zhihuibu).

55

 These e

indicate that, in addition to introducing new w

systems in recent years, high-ranking officials in Tai

military are beginning to emphasize doctrine develop

and campaign research.

Some other changes will also be made in the dif

services, depending on each branch’s unique needs

army, for instance, has merged the G-3 responsib

274
budgeting.

56

 Also, the army will merge the Air

Paratroop and Special Operations Command, wh

commanded by a lieutenant general, with the 

Aviation Command, which is currently headed by an 

major general, to form a new organization tenta

named the Army Airborne and Special Opera

Command (lujun hangkong tezhan silingbu).

57

 In the 

the Marine Corps will be downsized from two divisi

two brigades and several battalions. 58 A new departm

each service is being set up to handle communication

information by merging information centers 

communication and electronics departments.

59

Logistics Reform. The Tri-Service Joint Log

General Headquarters will also undergo some change

General Headquarters will expand its function to cent

responsibility for the common goods and services used 

three services (tongyong houqin), such as military un

and staple food. Service logistics department w

responsible for meeting service-unique logistical 

(zhuanye houqin).

60

Structural Changes. The biggest structural chang

being made in the army. The army will gradually repla

division-level units with combined arms brigades (C

(lianhe bingzhong lyu or lianbing lyu) that have ade

manpower, better mobility, and ample firepower.

6

change in the army’s force structure is related to Tai

specific geographical circumstances. First, Taiwan is 

to its principal threat and within easy range of the 

power projection. Secondly, Taiwan’s terrain i

favorable to large-scale maneuver operations

structural changes also indicate a defensive proble

Taiwan, insufficient defensive depth. With limited 

available and a coastline which runs 400 kilometers 

north to south, it is necessary to restructure combat 

and to improve mobility and power.

62

275
especially since the Gulf War in 1991, the PLA has 

preparing itself to fight a high-technology wa

illustrated by a changing military doctrine, procurem

foreign weapon systems, and training and educa

Applying the high-technology doctrine to reunify Ta

the PLA reportedly has been asked “to operationa

Taiwan invasion scenario in a way they have not done 

past.”

64

 The PLA’s rapid modernization has pres

Taiwan to respond with equal speed.

Combined Arms Brigades. The ROC army is expec

regroup its forces into five types of brigades that will f

strike force. At this stage, the composition of only two 

of its brigades has been revealed. The armored inf

brigade (zhuangbu lyu), composed of 4,300 troops, 

tanks, M-113 APCs, the M-48H main battletank, and M

artillery, is responsible for countering a PLA air

paratroop invasion and for rapid response.

65

 The ai

cavalry brigade (kongqi lyu), administered by the 

organized Army Airborne Special Operations Comm

will be equipped with AH-1s, OH-58s, UH-1Hs and B

helicopters. It will have a total of 2,000 troops a

responsible for repulsing armored attacks, riot co

countering an airborne invasion, and serving as a str

reserve unit.

66

 It is expected that three airborne ca

276

Figure 7. Combined Arms Brigade.
central, and southern Taiwan. The composition of the 

other kinds of brigades, the motorized infantry br

(bubing lyu), the special operations brigade (tezhan 

and the tank brigade ( zhuangjia lyu) have not 

revealed. (See Figure 7.)

The ROC Army has already set up the experim

formations (shiyan bianzhuang) for these five ty

brigades. Public sources indicate that, as of late Septe

1997, the army had developed experimental formati

the battalion level for all five types of brig

Experimentation at the brigade level will start in July 

By the year 2000, all five types of brigades shou

operationalized.

67

Taken together, these five types form the 12 

striking brigades (dajilyu), which will be backed up 

second-line defense brigades ( shoubeilyu). The secon

brigades will be responsible for providing training t

conscripts and for educating mobilized reserve forces d

peacetime. In case of war, the second-line brigades w

mobilized to perform combat duties.

68

Problems and Debates.

Experiments and Uncertainties. Anyone wh

interacted with high-level military officials in Taiwan 

past few years realizes that many leaders can n

describe nor predict the result of the Jing Shi Program

lack of clarity has made the general public in T

suspect that either the program is poorly defined or t

has not been clearly explained to the officer corps

military restructuring program will fail if it is not base

comprehensive assessment of future military threat

available defense resources. The MND claims to 

conducted thorough studies about the force restruct

program. If that is so, the MND and senior military le

owe the entire armed forces and the electorate a 

explanation of the objectives and missions of the prog

277
the Jing Shi Program will streamline higher

command structures and consolidate lower-level 

units, but how the program is to be implemented is un

At least three sets of hard questions should be asked. 

who decides which units are to be cut; does the MND h

convincing rationale behind those decisions; and w

reorganized military structure and operations ch

command meet the security challenges of the fu

Second, does the military have concrete plans to r

talented soldiers and noncommissioned officers to su

its missions before carrying out the consolidation pro

at the troop level? How does the military consolida

troops when conscript military service is fixed at a 2

term in all three services? And, third, does the MND e

the armed forces to perform the same mission

workloads as before with the streamlined com

structure and manpower? If not, what are the adjust

made so far and by what rationales and measures? If 

questions can not be sufficiently answered, the Jin

Program runs the risk of “streamlining wi

consolidation.”

Restructuring Logistics Support. Given Taiwan’s u

geography, one of the reasons for the military restruct

program is to enable smaller tactical units to enga

independent operations. That is the reason that log

support was moved from division level to brigade lev

addition to the emphasis on tri-service joint logistics (

the MND) and special logistics (under the service ge

headquarters) in the Jing Shi Program, a more re

approach may be to establish regional depots for 

forward logistics support. It has been rumored that an 

attack helicopter, grounded in a remote area beca

mechanical problems during a military training se

once had to wait a long time for the Army Av

Command to send in a maintenance team to fix and 

back to home base. It is said that the air fo

experiencing similar maintenance problems with dif

278
these problems.

Handling of Unneeded Weapons and Equip

Presidential reviews of newly formed military units 

brand new, advanced weapons are always m

extravaganzas. Behind the scenes, however, phasing-

decommissioning weapons and equipment afterward

major problem for the Taiwan military. The acquisit

new weapons systems and the streamlining of forces 

accelerated the need to dispose of large quantities 

equipment. When the military reduces its force struc

and establishes new units under the Jing Shi Pro

often the old or unwanted equipment will be left be

Commanders of new units will not know how to dispos

The army can keep small arms, such as rifle

warehouses, in case of future mobilization, but the 

may have to spend more money than it saved from 

streamlining just to dispose of unneeded tanks, arm

amphibious vehicles, and heavy artillery pieces.

More Command Levels. The island of Taiwan is sm

than any of the PLA’s military regions. As Defense Mi

Chiang Chung-ling has argued, all of Taiwan should b

as one integrated military operations zone. However, 

are too many layers in the military chain of comma

Taiwan’s military to be an efficient fighting force. Und

new National Defense Law, the minister of national de

will be included in the national command structure, 

the chief of the General Staff will continue to command 

military operations. Under the Jing Shi Progra

divisions continue to be the command unit for se

brigades during wartime. In structural terms, the Ji

Program increases the levels of command rather 

reducing them. Thus, it remains to be seen how s

design will affect the combat effectiveness of Tai

military.

279
As debate over the modernization of Taiwan’s d

continues to unfold, defense officials and analysts in T

should address the following issues. 

Domestic Politics.

The Taiwan military has begun the proce

transformation from a party-led army to a national 

and its support of democratization seems unquestio

However, it remains to be seen how the military would 

to the victory of an opposition candidate in a presid

election or what its position would be in case of a na

referendum on Taiwan’s independence. The formulat

the National Defense Law should be seen as the mil

effort to place itself under civilian control and fu

de-politicize itself before the DPP comes to p

Regardless of the underlying motivations, the unde

trend has been towards putting the military under ci

leadership. Consequently, the Taiwan military 

urgently to identify new allies and patrons from the ci

sector. Only by reaching out to the civilian elite ca

military protect its institutional interests in the long 

Cross-Strait Relations.

Since the Taiwan military considers the PLA its 

threat, developments in relations between Taiwan 

mainland China have a direct impact upon Tai

military strategy, missions, and equipment acquis

The Taiwan military is making every effort to prepare 

to cope with the military threat from the mainland, 

cannot rule out a possible relaxation in relations as dia

between the two sides is expected to resume soon

Taiwan military must consider what kind of impa

agreement to end the threat of hostilities between th

sides would have on Taiwan’s foreign military procure

It should also consider meeting and talking with the P

280
confidence-building measures.

National Defense Priority.

In Taiwan’s 1998 National Defense Report, the Mi

of National Defense defines “resolute defense” (fa

gushou) and “effective deterrence” (youxiao hez

Taiwan’s “strategic concept” ( zhanlue gouxiang), 

means the Taiwan military will try to build up a de

capable of deterring a PLA attack.

69

 However, the me

this end remain the subject of many debates. The nav

the air force may believe that effective deterrence req

the ability to control the sea and air space between T

and the Chinese mainland. The army tends to think th

superiority and sea denial cannot be sustained 

therefore considers the ability to win a decisive g

battle on the western shores of Taiwan as the 

deterrence.

70

 It is interesting to note that in his first 

to the Legislative Yuan, the Chief of the General 

General Tang Fei gave specific emphasis on sea an

operations, and investment in command, co

communications, and intelligence (C

3

I) and “soft

integration, without even mentioning anti-amph

operations. This raised some concerns from the army

matter what the result of that debate may be, how “eff

deterrence” is conceived will define the priorities of de

operations, the direction of military investment, an

formation of force structure.

Joint Warfare Doctrine.

While the Taiwan military has long emphasize

importance of joint operations, the Jing Shi Program 

not provide sufficient information on how the Ta

military will advance its joint-warfare doctrines. A 

military doctrine will not necessarily be develop

putting the cadets of the army, navy, and air 

academies under one roof. Even making the command

281
suggested in the Zhong Yuan Program, may not im

joint operations capability. 72 The military restruc

program now underway provides Taiwan’s defense le

an excellent opportunity to inject or incorporate the co

of joint-warfare into the program. If the Taiwan m

misses this chance, enhancing the military’s joint wa

capabilities will be even more difficult once the 

restructuring is complete.

Revolution in Military Affairs.

In the 1998 National Defense Report, estimates 

military capabilities of both the Taiwan military an

PLA were solely based on conventional warfare scen

Despite several years of intense discussion and debat

the concept of the revolution in military affairs (RM

major powers, Taiwan’s military leaders seem reluct

actively engage in related studies. Some officers 

discount the concept of the RMA entirely, arguing 

Taiwan is a democratic society and people hate any co

involving the word “revolution.” Judging from ava

information, the directions of force restructuring in th

Shi Program are not designed to counter possible elec

and information warfare waged by the PLA. 73 The T

military should actively examine the development 

new military thinking in the PLA when proceeding w

own defense modernization.

CONCLUSION

Looking through a telescope, the challenges to Tai

military modernization rest less on the acquisition o

hardware and more on such “software” issues as strat

missions, doctrines, education, and training. The T

military has spent the last decade making 

improvements in its arsenal, but the formation o

National Defense Law and the introduction of the de

reorganization program are only the first two steps 

282
these “software” issues. The relative weight given t

latter effort will continue to be the focus of deba

interested people inside and outside of Taiwan’s a

forces. If Taiwan’s defense modernization objective 

build a better civilian-controlled, professional armed 

that is small, elite, joint, mobile, retaliation-capable

alliance-ready, the painful process of redefinition 

reorganization is at least as important as fulfillin

revolutionary goals of the Huangpu Military Academ

Postscript.

This chapter was completed in September 199

indicated in the discussion, defense reform in Taiwan 

ongoing process, and several changes have been mad

cabinet reshuffle in February 1999, General Tang Fe

appointed minister of national defense, a dramatic c

of his role, if not position, in the reform of de

organization. The draft of National Defense Law was 

withdrawn by Minister Tang to incorporate various vi

legislators and defense specialists into the law. Th

draft was approved by the Cabinet on August 26, 1999

resubmitted to the Legislative Yuan. Among 

important changes in the new draft, two stand out: (

concept of establishing a National Military Counci

dropped, consolidating decision-making power i

National Security Council, and (2) the services ge

headquarters and armed forces will remain unde

defense minister’s command as proposed in the last 

The role of the chief of General Staff is further clarifie

given operational command authority in both peac

and war. Minister Tang has expressed his sincere hop

the Legislative Yuan will pass the new law soon enou

expedite the defense reform process. The author

committed to watch these developments closely 

continue vigorously their inquiry in the study of d

affairs.

283
1. Robert Karniol, “Strong and Self-reliant,” Jane’s Defense 

July 8, 1998, p. 23.

2. Republic of China National Defense Report, 1998, C

Edition, Taipei: Liming Publisher, March 1998, p. 111. The fisca

Taiwan is July 1 to June 30.

3. Ke Cheng-heng, “Examining the Budget Proposal for Fisc

1999,” Wealth Magazine (Cai Xun Monthly), May 1998, pp. 134

4. See China Times (internet interactive edition), August 

see http://www.chinatimes.com.tw/news/papers/ctimes/c

87080112.htm.

5. Republic of China National Defense Report, 1998, pp. 85

6. Members of the Supreme National Defense Council i

Standing Committee members of the KMT Central Commit

presidents and vice presidents of the five (Executive, Legi

Judiciary, Examination, and Control) Yuans, and members 

Military Council (junshi weiyuanhui). Please see Wego C

Introduction to National Defense Institutions (guofang tizhi 

Taipei: Central Publication Service, 1981, pp. 131, 168. Quot

Tien Yue, “Study on Defense Strategy,” Chinese Strategy Q

(zhonghua zhanlue xuebao), Taipei: Society of Strategic Studies

1998, p. 15.

7. Ibid.

8. Republic of China National Defense Report, 1998, p. 139

9. See China Times (internet interactive edition), June 1, 1

http://www.chiantimes.com.tw/news/papers/ctimes/cpolitic

107.htm.

10. United Daily, December 31, 1997. See also Republic o

National Defense Report, 1998, pp. 140-141.

11. Liberty Times, May 18, 1998.

12. Central Daily, May 22, 1998.

13. A member of the National Defense Committee of the Leg

Yuan provided the draft of National Defense Law. The Chapter

Law are:

284
Chapter II: Authorities, Responsibilities, and Mechanism o

 National Defense

Chapter III: Authorities, Responsibilities, and Organizatio

 MND

Chapter IV: Rights and Obligations of Military Personnel

Chapter V: National Defense Preparedness

Chapter VI: Protection of National Defense Secrecy

Chapter VII: Supplemental Provisions

14. China Times, January 4, 1998.

15. Ibid.

16. Interpretation of the Council of the Grand Jutices – Num

issued on July 24 ,1998. See China Times (internet interactive e

July 24, 1998, see http://www.chiantimes.com.tw/news/

express/xfocus/87072403.htm.

17. Ibid.

18. China Times, October 1, 1998, p. 4. In the National 

Committee session, General Tang issued a report on “The Progr

Review of Military Modernization” (guojun xiandaihua zhi 

jiantao) and answered questions from the committee membe

session was opened to the press.

19. “The Legislative Yuan should not pass the unconstit

National Defense Law," United Daily editorial, January 9, 199

20. Youth Daily, January 14, 1998.

21. See Article 11 of the draft of the National Defense Law

22. Youth Daily, January 14, 1998.

23. Ibid.

24. De-yun Lu, “Who’s the Boss? Defense Minister or the Pr

United Daily, May 22, 1998.

25. Youth Daily, June 10, 1998.

26. Ibid.

285
28. The six versions have been proposed by Ting Shou-chung 

Chen Shui-pian (DPP), Chu Feng-chi (KMT), Lin Chou-shui 

Edward Chen (CNP), and Chai Ming-hsian (DPP). See China 

June 1, 1998, http://www.chinatimes.com.tw/news/papers/

cpolitics/87060108.htm.

29. Information provided by members of Legislative Yuan.

30. A member of the National Defense Committee of the Leg

Yuan provided the drafts of National Defense Law.

31. Information provided by members of Legislative Yuan.

32. The army cut the numbers of its light divisions, i

divisions; the navy cut its amphibious warfare training center, 

craft command, 1st Marine Division, logistics command; the a

cut its training command, corps of engineers, and anti-air a

group. See Capital Morning News, August 10, 1990.

33. United Daily, November 9, 1992.

34. The program was also called the “Ten-year Force Restru

Guideline” (shinian bingli zhengjian gangyao).

35. Independent Morning News, November 4, 1993.

36. Author’s interview with Taiwan military officials.

37. China Times, January 9, 1995.

38. Ibid., January 3, 1995.

39. Ibid., May 25, 1997.

40. Republic of China National Defense Report, 1998, p. 1

also Youth Daily, December 26, 1996.

41. Republic of China National Defense Report, 1998, pp. 146

42. China Times, December 25, 1996.

43. Republic of China National Defense Report, 1998, p. 14

44. The old 10-year plan was expected to be carried ou

1993-2003. See Youth Daily, June 21, 1996.

286
46. Central Daily, June 9, 1997.

47. Ibid., June 3, 1998.

48. United Daily, March 29,1997; and China Times, Decem

1996.

49. Ibid. Based on a interview with officials from the G

Political Warfare Department in June 1998. However, nobody 

department really knows what the final result of this reorgan

will be.

50. Republic of China National Defense Report, 1998, p. 16

51. Independent Morning News, October 12, 1997.

52. China Times, June 29, 1997.

53. Liberty Times, June 17, 1998.

54. Central Daily, June 10, 1998.

55. Liberty Times, May 11, 1998.

56. China Times, April 27, 1997.

57. Independent Morning News, October 12, 1997.

58. Liberty Times, April 23, 1997.

59. United Daily, March 28, 1997.

60. Central Daily, March 6 and June 9, 1997.

61. Although the army division will be preserved in the 

command structure, it is no longer an integrated tactical comma

The streamlined army division will not be given combat and l

support duties. Its missions are confined to tactical comman

limited staff members and supporting troops. During wartim

division will command one to three defense combined arms briga

two to three striking combined arms brigades.

62. Independent Morning News, November 1 and November 

287
Richard Yang, eds., China’s Military in Transition, Oxford: Cla

Press, 1997; and Viacheslov A. Frolov, “China’s Armed Forces P

for High-tech Warfare,” Defense and Foreign Affairs Strategic 

January 1998, pp. 7-8.

64. Barton Gellman, “Reappraisal Led to New China Polic

Washington Post, June 22, 1998, p. A16.

65. Independent Morning News, November 2, 1997.

66. Central Daily, October 31, 1997.

67. Ibid., October 15, 1997.

68. Independent Morning News, November 1, 1997.

69. Republic of China National Defense Report, 1998, p. 52

70. In fact, the MND once argued that the money saved by 

back an entire army division could purchase only two F-16 

aircraft, strongly implying that it is more cost effective to buy d

than to buy jets. See United Daily, October 16, 1990.

71. China Times, October 1, 1998, p. 4.

72. Informed resources revealed that the Taiwan military ha

stressing jointness in the areas of command, control, commun

and intelligence, however, there is no publicly available informa

these efforts.

73. In addition to the establishment of the Bur

Communications, Electronic and Information Warfare in the G

Staff Office, the air force will form an Electronic Warfare 

(dianzhan dadui) composed by a fleet of C-130HEs. (See Centra

June 10, 1998.) These efforts are examples of Taiwan’s eff

emphasizing electronic and information warfare capabilities. H

they cannot be interpreted as true awareness of the important ro

RMA in future warfare by the general officers corps in Taiwan m

288
TAIWAN’S MILITARY: A VIEW FROM AF

June Teufel Dreyer

1

Introduction.

The Republic of China on Taiwan (ROC) has sou

cope with military and diplomatic pressures for unifi

from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) by revamp

military that was made up of a disproportionate num

ground-force personnel into a smaller, better-coordi

force which emphasizes air and sea operations a

embarking on a naval modernization which aims at ke

the sea lanes surrounding Taiwan open, supplyin

offshore islands under ROC administration, enha

counter-blockade activities, and, in general, preventin

People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) from gainin

control. At the same time, Taipei is enhancing the air f

ability to provide early warning of attack; to co

all-weather air combat control; to assist the na

counter-blockade endeavors, and, in general, to den

People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) air super

in the area surrounding Taiwan, while contin

modernization of ground-force equipment and impr

missile and anti-missile systems.

Although significant advances have been ma

number of problems remain. These include difficult

attracting a sufficient number of high-quality peopl

the military and retaining them; a series of accident

have cast doubt on military safety procedures

procurement scandals that dilute public support for de

budgets. Taipei also has weaknesses in equipmen

difficulty remedying them due to the PRC’s abil

dissuade third countries from selling military equip

and technology to the ROC. There are problem

coordination among the services and problems of confo

289
missile attacks on Taiwan from the mainland is a con

requiring the creation of a consensus within the RO

how best to defend itself against an attack.

The ROC government has also established chann

communication with Beijing, attempted to strength

ties with third countries, and sought solutions to c

with psychological pressures from the mainlan

continuing ability to counteract these pressures 

Beijing will be a major challenge for the Taipei govern

in the coming decade.

Background.

Relations across the Taiwan Strait in the 1990s sh

tendencies toward both conciliation and confrontatio

the conciliation side, Taipei in 1991 establishe

“unofficial” organization, the Strait Exchange Found

(SEF), which would hold talks with a mainland “unof

organization on the resolution of outstanding issues. 

months later, Beijing set up a counterpart organizatio

Association for Relations Across the Taiwan S

(ARATS). A well-publicized series of discussions be

the SEF and the ARATS took place in Singapore in 1

second round of talks was scheduled for 1995. The volu

trade between the mainland and Taiwan has increased 

year. ROC businesses also invested heavily o

mainland; by the end of 1997, these investments 

estimated to have exceeded $30 billion.

2

 A num

potentially inflammatory issues, such as the repatriat

illegal immigrants; crimes committed against Ta

businesspeople and tourists; and the falling of a 

artillery shell on a mainland coastal village, were s

with minimal rancor.

At the same time, however, each side watched the 

with great wariness. Lee Teng-hui, a Taiwanese

succeeded to the ROC presidency in 1988 and 

accelerated the process of democratization begun b

290
enhanced the power of the Taiwanese, very few of 

were in favor of unification with the mainland. In 199

ROC formally disavowed its claim to sovereignty ov

mainland. Since it did not simultaneously endorse Be

right to sovereignty over Taiwan, this could be constru

a tacit move toward independence.

In response to the mainland’s effort to reduc

number of countries that granted official diplo

recognition to Taiwan and to push it out of interna

organizations, Lee actively sought to expand his cou

global presence. Where pressure from Beijing made o

relations impossible, Taipei devised various so

unofficial arrangements. One of these was “vac

diplomacy.” For instance, Lee and other high-ra

officials, while on “private visits” to a country, 

schedule a golf date with their opposite numbers. It m

assumed that more than golf was discussed. A Taipei o

might also express a desire to see a famous museum a

and dine with the country’s dignitaries. The ROC’s in

in financing worthy developmental projects could be 

at this time. The government, goaded by its po

opposition, also applied for membership in the U

Nations, despite feeling that the chances for success 

slim. Beijing interpreted Lee’s actions to mean that h

moving the island toward independence.

Meanwhile, the Beijing leadership was smarting 

the international criticism it had received as a result 

brutal suppression of dissidents in Tiananmen Squar

elsewhere in China in 1989. Always sensitive to m

touching on sovereignty, it became hypersensitive aft

Tiananmen incident and increasingly nationalist

February 1992, the National People’s Congress pas

law unilaterally declaring the PRC’s sovereignty ov

disputed areas, including Taiwan, and asserted the ri

adopt all measures, including force, to back up its cla

291
against it as a result of the Tiananmen incident, B

sought purchases from Russia. Facing serious fin

difficulties, Russia, the inheritor of much of the arse

the recently disintegrated Union of Soviet Soc

Republics (USSR), was happy to sell. In August 

Washington announced that it would sell 150 F-16 f

planes to Taiwan. Domestic factors were operative 

United States as well. With the Cold War ended, th

defense industry was in recession, and aerospace indu

were important voting blocs in Texas and Calif

considered crucial to incumbent President George B

hopes for re-election. In what may have been an ex-pos

rationalization,

3

 the administration claimed that i

warned Beijing prior to the Chinese purchase of Su-27

the sale would activate the provisions of the Ta

Relations Act of 1979 to keep a balance in the Taiwan S

In any case, shortly after the F-16 sale was annou

France agreed to sell 60 Mirage 2000-5 planes an

Lafayette-class frigates to the ROC, causing Ch

leaders to worry that other countries might follow su

In Beijing, policy toward Taiwan continued to ha

Decisions relating to Taiwan after 1989 were believ

have been made by Deng Xiaoping and Yang Shangku

latter being head of the Taiwan Affairs Leading 

Group (TALSG) as well as president of China 

secretary-general of the party and state central mi

commissions. At the Communist Party’s 14th 

Congress held in autumn 1992, Yang was forced to r

due to factors relating to the struggle for succession to 

Xiaoping. Some months before the congress, Yang beg

be accused by rivals of planning to derail Deng’s pla

have Jiang Zemin succeed him. Yang apparently lost D

confidence and resigned from all of his formal pos

allegedly because of his advanced age. Jiang Zemin be

head of the TALSG. Shortly thereafter, Deng Xiao

health began to fail, and he withdrew from a

292
Yang asserted stronger opinions on Taiwan policy.

4

In 1993, the same year that the SEF-ARATS 

began, the mainland’s weapons procurement from 

former USSR began to be directed to the Nanjing M

Region, opposite the ROC, and military training act

in and near the Taiwan Strait increased. This patter

persisted, indicating that the ROC had become the fo

PRC military preparations.

5

 In 1993 as well, the 

adopted a new strategic doctrine: “local war u

high-technology conditions.” This was an update 

strategy of focusing on local, limited wars on C

periphery that had been adopted in 1985,

6

 an u

prompted by observation of high-technology weapon

accompanying tactics used by the United States durin

Gulf War. However, it had obvious relevance with reg

possible PLA actions toward Taiwan.

In 1995, after Lee Teng-hui made a highly publicize

to the United States, the PRC responded in July 199

March 1996 with a series of missile tests and tra

exercises in and near the Taiwan Strait. Official sour

Washington said that the number of troops and we

involved in the PLA’s exercises would have been inade

for an invasion and that therefore no invasion had 

intended. Instead, this was pressure by Beijing inten

moderate Taiwan’s search for “international space.” A 

recent American statement, however, has said that 

and the United States were closer to the brink of war a

time than they had been in 2 decades.

7

 In any 

Washington dispatched two aircraft carrier battle gro

the area. China’s military actions had forced the U

States out of its preferred strategy of strategic ambigu

one that a ranking American defense department o

has described as “strategic clarity but tactical ambig

Washington, however, quietly warned Taipei that it h

given the island an unconditional guarantee of suppo

that it would be best for all concerned if the 

293
future.

There is also ambiguity about what constitutes p

ative actions. It is not normally considered provocativ

head of state—or even a province thereof—to visit an

country. Almost any action that Taipei takes to count

slow strangulation of its international persona, how

could be construed by Beijing as provocative.

Generally speaking, foreign military analysts we

impressed with the quality of the maneuvers they obs

in the 1995-96 exercises. One of the missiles may have 

awry; a warship collided with a commercial ship leavi

harbor at the same time; some troops died of exposure 

beaches; and the air force’s Su-27s made only a 

appearance. The PLA had a difficult time carryin

exercises under stormy conditions, which are very com

in the Taiwan Strait, and the exercises were halted 

due to the weather. PLA senior leaders admitted 

shortcomings, but added that, nonetheless, they 

learned important lessons about the command and c

of joint forces.

Recent Developments.

Exercises are, of course, designed to dis

weaknesses so that they can be remedied. In recent 

the PLA has been working in a number of areas 

relevance to a Taiwan scenario. These include efforts 

following areas.

• Improving the range and guidance systems 

short-to-medium-range missiles.

• Acquiring additional Su-27 fighter planes. Alrea

planes have been received; a licensing agreement allow

PRC to co-produce 200 additional planes in China.

8

• Acquiring four Kilo-class diesel-electric subma

which are much quieter and therefore harder to detec

294
advanced sonar equipment, copies of which will be pla

the PRC’s Song-class boats. In June 1998, Russia agr

build ten submarines for the Chinese navy. 9

• Purchasing two Sovremenny-class guided m

destroyers, equipped with sophisticated Sunburn ant

missile capabilities. According to a former naval atta

Beijing, these represent technology an order of magn

beyond those of Taiwan.

10

• Adding approximately 20 principal su

combatants, including Luhu-class guided m

destroyers and Jiangwei-class guided missile frigates

naval forces.

• Announcing plans to expand the number of 

reaction units (RRUs), highly-trained and mobile 

which would be important to an invasion of Taiwan.

• Increasing attention to weapons, technical su

and logistics for the PLA. In spring 1998, at the same 

as a massive downsizing and restructuring of the Ch

government (including the PLA) was announced, a C

Military Commission directive established a 

department, the General Armaments Department (GA

the PLA. The GAD will oversee the military’s weaponr

reportedly, some of its logistics functions.

12

• Increasing its satellite reconnaissance capab

against the ROC. A Chinese source claimed that, alth

Taiwan’s Lafayette-class frigates have good st

capabilities when viewed from a horizontal position

are fully exposed to the PRC’s radar reconnais

satellites from above.

13

• Establishing offshore satellite stations, the lat

which to become public is in the South Pacific st

Kiribati. Although supposedly for civilian use, other so

have claimed that the station will allow the PLA to “

the exact location of U.S. aircraft carriers . . . as w

295
nor the Taiwan naval forces could defend themselves

• Evincing intense interest in the revolution in mi

affairs (RMA). Though there is much discussion of the 

and its implications in mainland military publication

focus of attention—and progress—seems to be in the a

information warfare. Discussions seem optimistic th

PLA will be able to successfully render inoperativ

command and control operations of a technolog

superior enemy through such methods as inse

computer viruses.

15

• Instituting a training class for top PLA office

technology and its applications in modern warfare, wi

expectation that the lessons learned will be incorpo

into comprehensive military drills.

16

• Exhibiting enhanced interest in psychological w

and unconventional operations, including infiltrat

troops for surprise attacks and/or ambushes. 17

• Increasing discussions of the ROC’s military ho

in official and semi-official sources, always denigratin

ROC’s capabilities. For example, a Hong Kong mag

known to have close ties with the PLA noted tha

island’s military helicopter transport capability was 

and that its fleet of UH-1Hs had reached the end 

service life. In any case, the article continued, Tai

narrow eastern and western plains were both within 

of the PLA’s superior naval fire capabilities. 18

Within the ROC, there is ongoing concern ove

implications of this buildup. Key questions involve, 

what form an invasion, if it comes, is likely to take. A se

and related, question is what countermeasures shou

taken to deal with the invasion. With regard to th

question, the ROC’s Ministry of National De

anticipates that an invasion would take one of four fo

• a partial naval and air blockade of Taiwan’s off

islands or certain other areas;

296
and air space around Taiwan proper and its off

islands;

• an attack on the offshore islands designed to 

Taipei to negotiate; or

• a direct, coordinated amphibious, air, and air

assault on the island of Taiwan that bypassed the off

islands.19

While none of these would be welcome developme

is generally believed that the second and fourth scen

are not within the PLA’s current capabilities. A fail

either of these two all-out attack scenarios would be v

as an international humiliation for the PRC an

military. Political forces within Taiwan that favor a f

declaration of independence would be reinforced, and s

declaration might actually be made. It might well be b

by an international wave of sympathy for the victim-st

Although the first and third scenarios cou

attempted, and would have adverse consequences f

island in terms of lost trade, skittish stock markets

public anxiety levels, their chances of success are mar

A partial blockade could be circumvented: ROC so

many years ago announced plans to convoy ships 

Taiwan ports on the east coast, where the PLA’s abi

enforce a blockade would be weaker. A blockade 

protracted affair, and the areas around Taiwa

important waterways used by the commercial shipp

dozens of states. Since these countries’ economic int

would be jeopardized, international pressure wou

brought to bear on the PRC.

Seizing the offshore islands would be costly for the 

both in terms of equipment costs and human casu

Occupying them cannot be assumed to force the T

government to the bargaining table. It could stiffen r

not to negotiate, with the argument being advanced 

this would be tantamount to appeasing aggressors. 

297
is a long list, including Japan, Vietnam, the Philip

and Malaysia—might be induced to stiffen their reso

even discuss collective defense so as not to suffer s

treatment.

Indeed, apprehension over the implications of C

behavior toward Taiwan in 1995-96 was a major fac

Japan’s willingness to enter into a stronger se

relationship with the United States in April 1996 a

agree to provide help to the United States in case of a 

in the Taiwan Strait. Beijing protested strongly 

repeatedly after a Japanese cabinet minister seem

offhandedly mentioned that contingencies invo

Taiwan would be included in the Acquisitions 

Cross-Servicing Agreement with the United States

Japanese government responded that the area involve

situational, not geographic. Beijing demanded that th

be specified and that Taiwan not be included. Tokyo h

complied. 20

For the moment, then, barring some unl

occurrence, the PLA’s military strategy must be to bu

its strength sufficiently to be able to dominate T

psychologically; to increase its capacity so that i

successfully carry out an invasion of Taiwan; or to ma

island’s successful defense against an invasion so un

that the Taipei government would be willing to co

Chinese pronouncements assume that time is on thei

and certain Western analysts appear to agree.

21

 Cave

this prognosis are rare to nonexistent. Among the f

often ignored are:

• the dichotomy between China’s announced pla

build a weapon or weapons system and its ability to se

produce the item or items, deploy them, and effective

them. While it is possible that the PRC will maste

integration of new levels of technology into its militar

also possible that the mainland will continue to 

halting and irregular progress, as it has in the past.

298
crisis on each side of the Taiwan Strait and the implic

for defense readiness,

• the effect on the PRC’s stability of growing force

as democratization, population shifts, and, in the c

some ethnic minorities, separatism. For example, an 

Uygur leader has threatened that, if the mainland w

invade Taiwan, there would be a mass uprising i

northwest province of Xinjiang in order to take advant

the PLA’s preoccupation with activities on the sout

coast,

23

• the fact that, although Taiwan’s only interna

antagonist is China, the PRC has many other pot

enemies, one of whom—India—has justified its n

tests in terms of its being slighted by the interna

community in favor of China, and

• improvements in the ROC military.

The ROC’s Response.

While the PLA has been making the above-ment

improvements to enhance its capabilities against Ta

the ROC military has been modernizing as well. Its e

have included a wide range of measures designed to 

its military an effective counter to the mainland. The 

military is addressing the mismatch between a mi

culture that derives from its past position as a contin

force and the ROC’s present strategic circumstances

involves revamping a military that contain

disproportionate number of ground-force personne

equipment into a smaller, better coordinated force 

emphasizes air and sea operations. Specific measures 

by Taiwan include the following.

• In 1998, the ROC’s Ministry of Defense anno

that the country’s military would be reduced in size 

450,000 to 400,000 by the end of June 2001. Most of th

will be from the ground forces.

24

299
the brunt of cuts: the number of generals is to be redu

one-fourth and that of other officers by 11 to 20 percen

total of 1,700 higher-ranked personnel slots are 

eliminated. The aim is to trim forces by 17 percent 

raising combat capability by 13 percent.

26

• A Warfare Headquarters has been establish

monitor potential threats and the readiness lev

military units.

• A general restructuring is taking place which inc

streamlining the chain of command and consolidat

basic structures.

27

 The general staff has been reorga

with the number of vice chiefs of staff being reduced 

four to three. The Military Affairs Bureau has absorb

General Staff Office, the General Affairs Bureau, an

History and Political Translation Bureau, to create u

management over organizations of a similar nature.

• The services are being restructured into joint b

brigades, to include helicopter, tank, and moto

infantry assets, which can be mobilized immediat

response to a threat.

29

Taiwan’s military has also embarked on a 

modernization aimed at keeping the sea lanes surrou

Taiwan open, supplying the ROC’s offshore isl

enhancing counter-blockade capabilities, and, in ge

neutralizing the PLAN’s efforts at sea control.

• The navy has taken delivery of six Lafayett

frigates from France. The ships, designated the 

Ting-class, have a 3,500-ton displacement and a 25-kn

speed; their outer hulls are coated with a special com

material to reduce radar detection. These frigates are 

fitted with Phalanx air-defense systems; Sea Chap

surface-to-air missiles; Hsiung Feng anti-ship missile

an anti-submarine warfare helicopter.

• Nine Knox (Chih Yang

30

)-class frigates have 

leased from the United States with options to purch

300
speed of 27 knots, and are equipped with MK 15 Ph

20-millimeter guns and AN/SWG-1A Harpoon ant

missile launchers and decoy launching systems. 31 The 

systems of these frigates provide the ROC navy w

most effective anti-submarine warfare capability. Sin

Chih Yang frigates are not equipped with surface

missiles, the Phalanxes serve as the sole air defens

cruise missile defense for the ships.

32

• Seven Perry-class frigates have been produc

Taiwan with the help of technology acquired from 

United States. Known as the Cheng Kung-class, the

also have anti-submarine warfare as their pri

function.

• S-70 C anti-submarine helicopters acquired fro

United States were equipped with low-frequency so

detect submarine activity in the waters near Taiwan

• Taiwan has begun producing Chin Chiang c

patrol boats. These will displace 500 tons and h

25-knot speed. Their American-made fire control sy

include laser distance measuring equipment and inf

thermal imaging facility. The boats are also equipped 

Danish-made radars. Eleven patrol boats are projec

enter the inventory, each to be armed with 20 mm. a

mm. guns and four Hsiung-Feng I anti-ship missiles

• The ROC will build four Aegis-class guided m

destroyers. Each of the Aegis-class vessels is expec

cost $NT 150 B, or US$ 4.4 billion, at current exchange 

of 34 NT to the U.S. dollar. The U.S. Arleigh Burke

destroyer, which would presumably serve as the mod

the ROC version, displaces 6,000 tons and is equipped 

the advanced MK 41 vertical-launching m

missile-launching station as well as intelligence 

information-gathering systems.

34

 Aegis-class ship

used in the United States military to vector attac

enemy planes some distance from aircraft carriers, le

301
intercept PLA aircraft earlier.

35

Although it would seem logical to conclude that the 

wanted Aegis-class destroyers to counter 

Sovremenny-class destroyers being acquired by the 

Taiwan sources interepret PLAN’s acquisiti

Sovremenny-class destroyers as aimed primar

deterring future U.S. deployments of carrier battle g

rather than at attacking ROC warships. They see the 

navy’s procurement of Aegis-class ships not in ter

countering the Sovremennys, but rather in the role of 

capable combat systems which can be use

air-and-surface command and control centers, as they 

in the Gulf War. The Aegis ships could be modif

provide limited theater missile defense (TMD) capab

as well.34 The ROC has also announced the Kwang H

project to construct a fleet of 30 150-200-ton fast-a

missile boats for use against enemy ships. The 

surfaces are to be capable of absorbing or deflecting ra

The first vessel will probably be built in a foreign cou

with the remainder to be constructed in the ROC, as w

case with the Perry/Cheng Kung-class ships.

The ROC will improve its air capabilities as well. 

call for enhancing the air force’s ability for early warn

attack, its conduct of all-weather air combat p

assisting the navy in counter-blockade endeavors, a

general, preventing the PLAAF from gaining air super

in the area surrounding Taiwan. Specific programs inc

• producing up to 130 of the Indigenous Defense F

(IDF or Ching-kuo). One wing, comprising 70 plane

commissioned in April 1997. The first squadron, 18 ID

the second wing, was deployed in February 1998, an

wing as a whole, 60 planes, is to be commissioned in 1

The military-owned Chung Shan Institute for Scienc

Technology (CSIST) is currently working on a 

generation fighter with greater combat range 

additional functions.

38

302
delivered and 60 commissioned. In June 1998, the U

States sold 28 Pathfinder and Sharpshooter pods 

ROC to improve the F-16s capabilities for low-altitud

night flights, as well as the accuracy of the planes’ we

systems.39

• acquiring a total of 60 Mirage 2000-5 fighter p

with delivery completed by the end of 1998. The Mirag

equipped with Mica intermediate-range air-to-air mi

of which 960 have been purchased. The Mica has the 

to target and hit enemy planes beyond visual rang

so-called “fire and forget” capacity which is expected 

useful against the mainland’s Su-27s. 40 Also acquir

the Mirage were 480 Magic II short-range air-

missiles, for a total purchase price, including auxiliar

tanks, ground maintenance support vehicles, tools

monitoring equipment, of NT$167.6 billion (US$4.9).

• purchasing four E-2 surveillance planes, the 

being to keep one in the air all the time for air and su

surveillance of the mainland.

• procuring locally-developed remote co

reconnaissance aircraft to boost information-gath

equipment. This unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), deve

by CSIST, has a combat radius of 50 kilometers and c

from 6 to 8 hours. It is expected to bolster coastal de

work.42

The ROC’s ground forces are also undergo

modernization program to improve equipment. In 

1998, just prior to U.S. President William Clinton’s v

the mainland, the ROC took delivery of ten M-60-A-3 

and M-109 self-propelled 155 millimeter artillery. 43

The RMA is transforming the ROC armed force

July 1, 1998, Taiwan established an electronic warfar

in response to military maneuvers on the mainla

spring 1998 in which the PLA practiced introd

computer viruses into an opponent’s command and c

303
communications and missile-firing signals. In add

Taiwan has taken the following steps.

• The air force remodeled one of its two C-

transport aircraft as an electronic warfare air

renaming it Tien Kan (“Sky Interference”) and fitted i

jamming equipment designed by CSIST. It hopes to ac

another C-130H for conversion at a later date. 44

• The four Grumman E-2T Hawkeye early wa

planes to be purchased are being more closely link

military information networks.

• Ten F-16s are to be converted into reconnais

aircraft.

• RF-104 Starfighter reconnaissance planes are 

replaced by more capable RF-5Es.

45

• The United States is strengthening military sof

exchanges with Taiwan, including data link syste

facilitate communications among the ROC’s F-16s, 

early warning/command aircraft, and its warships.

46

The overwhelming missile advantage on the PRC

is being addressed by making the following improve

in missile and anti-missile systems.

• Sky Bow IIs, based on the U.S. Patriot missile u

Israel and Saudi Arabia against Iraqi missiles but bu

CSIST, are replacing the island’s aging Nike He

missiles.

47

• An improved Hsiung Feng II anti-ship missile ha

developed that is similar to the U.S. Harpoon air-t

missile, though said to be slightly superior in reliabilit

range. It uses shipboard or airborne radars to a

targets, the Global Positioning System for initial guid

and then turns to radar guidance, radar homing infr

or image infra-red guidance in the final stage b

reaching its target.

48

304
(ATBM) system, adapted from an improved version 

Tien Kung II air defense radar system. It is estimate

the new radar system will take 3 to 4 years to develo

that several radar systems will be constructed at a c

just under U.S. $87 million each.

49

• Three Patriot II anti-missile batteries have 

purchased from the United States and installed near 

population centers in the northern part of Taiwan.

50

• A supersonic ship-to-ship missile, the Hsiung Fe

was test-fired in April 1998.

51

Problems remain for the ROC armed forces, especia

attracting qualified people into the military. Tai

economic prosperity has created many jobs that pay 

and require less sacrifice than a military career. 

young men have physically abused themselves to o

draft exemptions.

52 There have also been several ca

young recruits committing suicide due to the rig

training. While these are few in number, they are 

publicized and have a negative effect on the image 

military. Such prestigious sources as the Academia S

have suggested shortening the period of compu

military service from the current 2 years. Howeve

military argues that this would be dangerous to na

security, producing a force unable to master modern t

and equipment. At the time the plan was suggested

ground-force conscripts served for 3 years; naval an

force recruits for 4 years. The discrepancy in training 

would quickly become apparent in time of w

Subsequently, the PLA reduced the term of servic

years for all services. It now appears that a smaller nu

of ROC conscripts will serve the normal 2-year term

remainder of young males of draft age will be absorbe

social service programs with terms 6 months to a 

longer than military service; it is anticipated that the 

time that must be served for nonmilitary servic

provide an incentive for young men to choose the milita

305
declining interest in military careers by making s

efforts to attract new people. It is reaching o

aborigines55 and women; females now serve on Chih 

(Knox)-class frigates.

56

 A Reserve Officer Training Pro

was introduced in fall 1997, offering recruits the equiv

of U.S. $303 each month in tuition aid and 

allowances; the trainees must serve in the military 

years after graduation. So far, the program has attr

few young people.

57 

A spate of accidents that call military safety proce

into question has hurt the military’s efforts. Be

February and April 1998, a T-38A Talon trainer cra

killing one crewman;

58 a TH-55 training helicopter cra

killing both pilots;

59 a Knox-class frigate sideswip

anchored Perry-class frigate while maneuvering in

berth at Tsoying Naval Base;

60

 a F-16 fighter disapp

while on a routine training flight;

61

 and a Mirag

seriously damaged after apparently being hit by a p

near its base at Hsinchu.

62

 On discovering that local 

were avid pigeon-raisers, the air force appeale

cooperation. While no one was injured in the M

incident, the air force revealed that 22 of its officer

been killed in the line of duty since 1995 and promis

investigation.

63

 The accidents, however, continued. In 

a missile speedboat hit a reef on the Penghu Islands,

in September, the engine of an air force academy jet c

fire on the runway, slightly injuring the pilot.

65

Procurement scandals have also hurt the militar

its professional image. Following on the heels of 

being paid to French officials as part of the purchase 

Lafayette-class frigates mentioned above, a major ge

who was a department head at CSIST, was arres

connection with receiving kickbacks from an unn

foreign supplier.

66

 In another incident, a major genera

was head of the Combined Service Force Engine

Department, was taken into custody and charged 

taking bribes in connection with the awarding of a co

306
to light when the briber, who failed to win the con

fire-bombed the general’s home.67

Taiwan, of course, is democratized, and there i

public debate on the utility of military expenditures. 

cases had the potential to undermine public support f

defense budget, with serious implications for the R

future. In a poll taken in mid-May 1998, 60 percent 

respondents expressed dissatisfaction with corruptio

inefficiency in budget allocations, including bu

confined to those involving the military.

68

 The cou

defense minister barely survived a vote of no confiden

the Legislative Yuan. The Procurement Bureau, whic

previously reported to the General Staff, was placed di

under the Ministry of National Defense, and the Legis

Yuan was charged with supervising its budget-re

operations.

69

Despite all of these improvements, equip

weaknesses persist. The navy’s S-70 anti-subma

helicopters are not capable of detecting the PRC’s 

Kilo-class submarines.

70 The ROC would like to buy 

capable P-3 Orion anti-submarine planes with ultr

frequency sonar that would permit the detection of q

submarines such as the Kilo.

71 However, the United 

has thus far declined to sell them.

72

 Since its purchase 

submarines from the Netherlands more than a decad

the ROC has been unable to purchase additional 

These would be useful in blockade interdiction a

torpedo enemy surface ships.

Coordination among the services must also be imp

For example, the three services purchased three dif

types of air-defense missiles.

73

 Drills undertaken as p

the May 1998 Han Kuang 14 exercises revealed 

problems of coordination.

74 Weapons bought from s

different sources did not conform to uniform specifica

This is the result of mainland pressure on potential fo

suppliers and is difficult to remedy. For example, the 

307
systems for the Lafayette-class frigates from Thom

France, but it backed away because Thomson’s bid w

high. The navy then approached Israel’s Elisra com

which showed initial interest, but withdrew 

remonstrations by Beijing. The navy then asked th

indigenous system be developed within a very shor

frame. The problems are still being worked out.

75

Beijing continues to increase its shor

medium-range ballistic missile inventory. This incr

the island’s continued vulnerability to missile attack 

the mainland. As demonstrated in the 1996 Taiwan 

exercises, one of Beijing’s more effective military o

against Taiwan would be to use conventionally-a

missiles to disrupt transportation, destroy logistics 

and establish air superiority over the island. Hence, 

have been calls for a ballistic-missile defense system 

early-warning capabilities. The Theater Missile De

system (TMD), now being developed by the United S

uses satellite technology to detect enemy missile 

locations and will be able to launch missiles from eithe

or sea to destroy incoming missiles. However, the PR

put pressure on Washington not to sell the system. D

President Clinton’s visit to China in summer 199

United States reportedly told Beijing that it had “no p

to transfer the technology. This, of course, woul

preclude such action in the future. The PRC in 

announced that it had no plans to transfer m

technology to Iran.

76

 Beijing thus created a linkage be

the two issues, knowing that the Clinton administ

attaches great importance to stopping the flow of m

technology to Teheran.

A leading Taiwan newspaper expressed skep

about TMD, describing it as a “bottomless pit” of ex

whose reliability was uncertain. In the newspaper’s 

the development of medium- to long-range missiles so 

actively deter the enemy would be a better use of de

money.

77

 Military sources argue that this line of reas

308
theater high-altitude air defense (THAAD), tests of 

have resulted in several failures. They point out that 

are other ways than THAAD to defend against short-

ballistic missiles (SRBMs) and that Taiwan cann

without a defense against SRBMs. The PRC could fire 

hundred of these against ROC airfields, command 

control centers, power plants, and early warning 

sites, thus grounding the ROC’s F-16s and Mirages. T

similar to actions that the United States took against I

the Gulf War, actions studied carefully by the PLA. 7

North Korea’s late August 1998 attempt to lau

satellite—initially perceived as being a missile—re

support for TMD in Japan as well as Taiwan. 79 A 

later, the U.S. House of Representatives passed a reso

directing the Department of Defense to study the feas

of including Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea in its 

system.80 Despite considerable debate, Taipei re

officially noncommittal about whether it wish

participate. In October, the U.S. State Depart

described ROC interest in TMD as “primarily informa

at this point.” 81

Domestic politics on Taiwan also pose problems f

military. A significant number of native Taiwanese pe

the higher ranks of the military as dominate

mainlanders who are members of the Kuomintang (

and who express resentment over the size of de

budgets. At the same time, some members of the 

opposition party, the Taiwanese-dominated Demo

Progressive Party (DPP), are given to issuing provo

statements with regard to the island’s independen

long as the DPP remained a minority party, there was 

potential that such statements would escalate the thr

the ROC’s security. However, should the DPP becom

majority party, come to power, and enact constr

defense budgets while continuing its inflammatory rhe

the country’s security could be jeopardized. It is, of c

309
cause the DPP to modify its positions on these issues

ROC defense analysts and politicians frequently p

scenario in which mainland military threats to T

cause the island’s stock market to go into free fall a

population to flee the country by any means possible. 

go so far as to argue that the United States will in 

situations be obliged to come to the ROC’s defense. If 

is an alternate scenario in which a citizenry, afraid of 

the political freedoms and economic prosperity i

achieved, vows to fight bravely to keep them, then thos

hold this view have been curiously quiet. Whil

flee-rather-than-resist hypothesis is no doubt a tr

expression of the opinions of those who advance it, this 

be good news to officials in Beijing because it tells them 

the inhabitants of Taiwan are uninterested in fighti

their homeland. The same scenario is simultaneous

news for the United States because it tells Americans 

although ROC citizens will flee the country rather 

fight, they expect the United States to fight for them. 

absence of clear signals from the citizens of Taiwan 

they consider their country worth fighting for, 

unimaginable that Americans will wish to do it for th

better formula for defeat can scarcely be imagined. It 

issue that the ROC’s major parties must address in or

arrive at a consensus.

Future Trends.

In the near term, the Taiwan and mainland mili

are capable of doing considerable damage to each 

with neither side able to be certain of victory. The PRC 

not seem to be building enough amphibious la

craft—one of its major deficiencies in any invasion sce

with the ROC—to be able to land sufficient troops o

island. At present, Beijing seems to be aimi

destabilizing the island. In mid-July 1998, ROC se

officials, citing a “mainland Chinese electronic maga

310
Taiwan so that it could be annexed without invasion.

strategy was allegedly adopted by the Second Wo

Conference on Taiwan Affairs, held in Beijing in mid

and included infiltration, subversion, and sending a 

“fifth column” to the island to win the support of its p

by new propaganda tactics. The same officials sugg

that Beijing might have released the report for purpo

psychological warfare.

83 At the same time, the ROC j

ministry began a probe into suspected involveme

mainland Chinese capital in underground cur

exchanges on the island. While granting that nothing 

than flouting the rules for personal benefit may have 

the motivation, the ministry pointed out that such act

could also have been consciously designed to destabili

island’s currency.

84

Another, more transparent tactic is to demoraliz

ROC’s population by weakening the ties between the 

and its major protector, the United States. Persu

President Clinton in late June 1998, during his visit 

PRC, to state the “three no’s”—no support for Tai

independence; no support for “two Chinas” or “one C

one Taiwan”; and no support for Taiwan’s entry 

organizations composed of sovereign states—was a 

victory for Beijing. The ROC’s foreign minister said 

“unquestionably” the “three no’s” had had an ad

psychological effect on the ROC.

85 Mainland propa

quickly took advantage of the opportunity. 

Beijing-based Central People’s Radio broadcast to Ta

said that Clinton had stated the “three no’s” because, 

the “compelling international situation,” the United S

had no other choice. Therefore, the broadcast conti

Taiwan had “no other option than to pursue a more po

mainland policy.” The general tone may be summariz

“your position is deteriorating quickly. This is the bes

you can get; it had best be taken now before it is rep

with one less favorable to Taiwan.”

86 A Hong 

magazine reputed to have close ties with the PLA echo

311
ROC’s anti-missiles capabilities with the warning 

“peaceful negotiations between the two sides [are] th

way out.” 87

The ROC has its own counter-strategies. It has 

pointed out by some that the United States said only t

would not support Taiwan independence, two China

entry into certain international organizations, not t

opposed them. In addition, it notes that America re

bound to support the sale of defensive arms to the 

through the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), and that 

Houses of the U.S. Congress have reaffirmed their inte

to observe the provisions of the TRA. Within the U

States, Clinton was strongly criticized by both Dem

and Republicans for his iteration of the “three no’s

Congress passed resolutions supporting Taiwan, add

the ambiguity of the situation. All of these were h

publicized by ROC media.

In late August 1998, Washington announced the s

Stinger missiles to Taiwan for $180 million. B

denounced the sale as a violation of its sovereig

However, this announcement alleviated ROC anx

that, during his visit to Beijing, Clinton had se

promised to cut off future arms sales to Ta

Nonetheless, the development of strategies to coun

these and future pressures from Beijing will be a 

challenge for the Taipei government in the coming de

No less difficult will be coping with the internal proble

military reorganization, enhancing the attractivenes

military career to its citizens, ending the procure

scandals which have weakened support for defense bu

and developing domestic consensus on a strateg

cross-strait relations.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 7

1. The author wishes to thank Mr. Kenneth Allen, Stimson 

Dr. Edward Dreyer, University of Miami; Mr. Patrick Tyler, Ne

312
requested anonymity for their comments on an earlier draft 

paper.

2. Not all of the money that is invested is reported.

3. Patrick Tyler, New York Times, interview by author, Oc

1998. This is the conclusion reached by Mr. Tyler after intervie

relevant administration sources.

4. Tai Ming Cheung, “Chinese Military Preparations A

Taiwan Over the Next Ten Years,” in James R. Lilley and Chuck 

eds., Crisis in the Taiwan Strait, Washington, DC: National 

University Press, 1997, p. 46.

5. John Culver, “Defense Policy and Posture II,” in Hans Bin

and Ronald N. Montaperto, eds., Strategic Trends in 

Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1998, p. 7

6. Replacing a prior strategy of preparation for an “early, ma

nuclear” war with the Soviet Union, and reflecting the improve

Sino-Soviet relations that had begun in the 1980s.

7. Agence France Presse, “U.S., Beijing On Brink Of War I

Paper,” Hong Kong Standard, June 22, 1998, quoted fro

Washington Post, June 21, 1998.

8. According to a Moscow source, managers and engineers 

aviation plant in Shenyang completed a training progr

production of the Su-27s in July 1998. The Shenyang plant ex

manufacture two planes by the end of 1998. By mid-summe

China had received 48 Su-27s. Sergei Blagov, “Jet Team F

Training in Russia,” South China Morning Post, July 17, 1998

9. Ibid. 

10. “Destroyers A Threat To Taiwan,” South China Morni

April 8, 1998, quoting U.S. Rear Admiral (Retired) Eric Mc

Admiral McVadon described the Sovremenny’s SS-22 Sunburn 

as skimming the water at 2.3 times the speed of sound and very 

to detect.

11. Willy Wo-Lap Lam, “PLA Overhaul To Cut Troop

Mobility,” South China Morning Post, April 8, 1998.

12. “‘Crucial’ Weapons Unit Set Up,” South China Mornin

April 6, 1998. The functions of the PLA’s General Arm

313
Logistics Department.

13. Chou Kuan-wu, “China’s Reconnaissance Satellit

Hallmark of China’s Overall National Strength and a Securit

Kuang Chiao Ching (Wide Angle Mirror), Hong Kong, March 1

translated in U.S. Technical Information System, Foreign Br

Information System-China (henceforth FBIS-CHI)-98, April 8, 

14. Bruce Gilley, “Pacific Outpost: China’s Satellite Sta

Kiribati Has Military Uses,” Far Eastern Economic Review, A

1998, pp. 26-27.

15. See, e.g, Fan Yinhua, “The Contemporary Military Rev

and New Thinking Modes,” Jiefangjun bao (Revolutionary Army 

Beijing, March 24, 1998, p. 6, in FBIS-CHI-105, April 15, 1998

Deyong, Zhang Minghua, and Xu Kejian, “Information A

Jiefangjun bao (Revolutionary Army Daily), March 24, 1998, 

FBIS-CHI-104, April 14, 1998.

16. Reuters, “High Technology War Drills Begin,” South 

Morning Post, April 14, 1998.

17. Jia Fengshan, “Role of Special Warfare Is Underg

Change,” Jiefangjun bao(Revolutionary Army Daily), April 7, 19

in FBIS-CHI-112, April 22, 1998.

18. Yuan Lin, “Cross-Strait Military Helicopter Contest,” 

Chiao Ching,-307, April 16, 1998, pp. 24-29, in FBIS-CHI-127, 

1998.

19. Lu Te-yun, “Taiwan Officials Assess PRC Electronic W

Capability,” Lien-ho pao (Taipei), May 13, 1998, p. 3, in FBIS-C

May 21, 1998.

20. Akinori Uchida, “Japan’s Support of U.S. Forces May W

Scope,” Yomiuri (Tokyo), March 15, 1998.

21. These sentiments are expressed, e.g., in Tai Ming C

“China’s Military Agenda Toward Taiwan,” p. 18; and Mic

Swaine, “The Military Challenge to Taiwan,” p. 22, conference 

International Institute for Strategic Studies/Chinese Cou

Advanced Policy Studies Conference, Washington, DC, July 1, 

22. For skeptical views on China’s ability to achieve 

breakthrough, see Bates Gill, “China and the Revolution in M

Affairs: Assessing Economic and Socio-Cultural Factors,” and 

314
Affairs,” in China and the Revolution in Military Affairs, 

Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institu

20, 1996, pp. 1-41, 43-47, respectively; also Kenneth W. Allen

Krumel, and Jonathan D. Pollack, China’s Air Force Enters 

Century, Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 1995, pp. 1

John Culver expresses the view that, while the PLA may be 

become a modernized, potent fighting force, it is not a fo

conclusion.

23. “Uighurs Said Waiting for Opportunity To Rise Up in Xi

China News Agency, June 6, 1998.

24. Sofia Wu, “Interior Ministry Unveils Conscription 

Reform Plan,” China News Agency, July 16, 1998.

25. Agence France Presse, “Lee Commands Military to Wage 

Graft,” Hong Kong Standard, June 10, 1998.

26. See, e.g., Republic of China, 1998 National Defense 

Taipei: Li Ming Cultural Enterprise Co. Ltd., 1998, pp. 164-16

27. Deborah Kuo, “ROC Striving To Streamline Military,” 

News Agency, June 16, 1998.

28. “Taipei To Establish Military Affairs Bureau,” Chun

jih-pao (Central Daily News) (Taipei), January 1, 1998, p

FBIS-CHI-007, January 7, 1998.

29. Agence France Presse, “Military Drill To Deter Threa

Mainland,” Hong Kong Standard, June 17, 1998.

30. The Military Balance 1997/98, London: International I

for Strategic Studies, 1997, p. 194, lists this as the Chin Yang-

31. “Taipei Awaits More U.S. Frigates,” South China Morni

July 21, 1998.

32. Author’s interviews, July 1998.

33. Lilian Wu, “Coastal Patrol Vessel Launched in Kaoh

China News Agency, June 18, 1998.

34. Lin Wen-fen, “CSC Shows Strong Interest in B

Aegis-Class Frigates,” China News Agency, March 6, 1998.

35. Author’s interviews, June 1998.

315
March 9, 1998; Lu Te-yung, “Taiwan Plans To Build New Patrol 

Lien-ho pao, September 6, 1998, inFBIS-CHI-256, September 13

37. Sofia Wu, “First Squadron of Second IDF Wing For

Tainan Airbase,” China News Agency, February 19, 1998.

38. Lin Chien-hua, “CSIST Develops Third-Generation Warp

Tzu-li wan-pao (Independence Evening News), Taipei, June 7, 19

in FBIS-CHI-187, July 6, 1997.

39. Agence France Presse, “U.S. Upgrades Taiwan

Weaponry,” Hong Kong Standard, June 3, 1998.

40. Lu Chao-lung, “Taiwan Mirage Fighter Successfully La

Mica Missile,” Chung-kuo shih-pao, May 10, 1998, in FBIS-C

May 14, 1998.

41. “Taipei Asks France for Early Delivery of Mirage Fi

Lien-ho pao, July 13, 1998, in FBIS-CHI-196, July 13, 1998.

42. Lu Chao-lung, “Chungshan Institute Builds Unm

Reconnaissance Plane,” Chung-kuo shih-pao, March 29, 1

FBIS-CHI-92, April 2, 1998; Agence France Presse, “Islan

Pilotless Aircraft To Boost Reconnaissance Capability,” Hon

Standard, March 30, 1998.

43. Agence France Presse, “Taiwan Gets Arms Ahead of U.S

Hong Kong Standard, June 22, 1998.

44. Sofia Wu, “ROCT Military Strengthening Electronic W

Capabilities,” China News Agency, March 9, 1998; Agence 

Presse, “Air Force in Attempt to Jam Rivals,” Hong Kong Sta

June 15, 1998.

45. Associated Press, “Warning On PLA Electronic Ability

China Morning Post, May 18, 1998.

46. Jay Chen and Sofia Wu, “U.S. Reinforcing Military S

Exchanges With Taiwan,” China News Agency, May 24, 1998.

47. Wu Zhong, “Upgrade For Taipei Missiles,” Hong Kong Sta

January 2, 1998.

48. Associated Press, “Military Develops Missile,” Hon

Standard, July 12, 1998.

316
Systems,” China News Agency, July 21, 1998.

50. Julian Baum, “Defence Dilemma: Despite New Threats, 

Leans On Old Strategies,” Far Eastern Economic Review, May 2

p. 33.

51. Agence France Presse, “Anti-Ship Missile Test,” South 

Morning Post, April 6, 1998.

52. Juping Chang, “Social Service Work To Replace Con

National Guard Duty,” Free China Journal (Taipei), Septem

1998, p. 6.

53. Sofia Wu, “Defense Ministry To Review Conscription S

China News Agency, July 18, 1998.

54. Juping Chang, p. 6.

55. Sofia Wu, “Army To Recruit More Aboriginal Youths,

News Agency, March 18, 1998.

56. Sofia Wu, “Female Naval Officers to Serve On Kno

Frigates,” China News Agency, February 5, 1998. 

57. Deborah Kuo, “ROTC Not Selling Well In Taiwan,” Chin

Agency, May 27, 1998.

58. Associated Press, “Pilot Dies After New Air Force Ac

South China Morning Post, February 25, 1998.

59. Elizabeth Hsu, “Army Chopper Crashes, Two Killed,

News Agency, March 17, 1998.

60. Maubo Chang, “Navy Frigate Hits Anchored War

Tsoying Harbor,” China News Agency, March 19, 1998.

61. “F-16 Fighter Disappears As Air Dramas Roll On,” Sout

Morning Post, March 20, 1998.

62. Maubo Chang, “Mirage Fighter Damaged By Bird,” Chin

Agency, April 7, 1998.

63. Elizabeth Hsu, “22 Air Officers Killed in 13 Crashes I

Years,” China News Agency, March 21, 1998.

317
Agency, July 12, 1998.

65. Victor Lai, “Pilot Injured As AT-3 Training Jet Catches 

Landing,” China News Agency, September 4, 1998.

66. Jason Blatt, “Military Unit Chief Suspected of Bribery,

China Morning Post, April 6, 1998; Associated Press, “Gener

Over Kickbacks,” Hong Kong Standard, April 6, 1998.

67. Sofia Wu, “Defense Ministry Vows To Wipe Out Graft,

News Agency, March 16, 1998; Maubo Chang, “CSF Engineerin

Arrested In Graft Scandal,” China News Agency, March 17, 19

68. Sofia Wu, “Poll Finds Wide Discontent With Budget 

China News Agency, May 24, 1998.

69. Premier Hsiao Wan-chang Vincent Siew, “Excerpt

Administrative Report to the Legislative Yuan,” Chung-yang 

September 12, 1998, p. 7, in FBIS-CHI-262, September 19, 199

70. Sofia Wu, “Female Naval Officers.”

71. However, the detection operation requires sophis

coordination and is particularly difficult in the relatively shallow 

of the Taiwan Strait, due to problems of tropospheric scatter. The 

thanks retired U.S. Naval Rear Admiral Eric McVadon a

Nicholas Eftimiades, Defense Intelligence Agency, for 

observations. 

72. Sofia Wu, “Taipei to Maintain Bid For Submarine Pur

China News Agency, April 21, 1998.

73. Lu Chao-lung, “Air Force Buys Sky Swords From Chu

Institute,” Chung-kuo shih-pao, March 26, 1998, in FBIS-C

March 31, 1998.

74. Associated Press, “Taiwan Military Drills ‘Expose Weakn

South China Morning Post, May 15, 1998.

75. “Navy Has A Blind Military Ace,” Hsin hsin-we

Journalist) (Taipei), January 11, 1998, p. 29, in FBIS-CHI, A

1998.

76. Sofia Wu, “Taiwan Said Excluded From Theater Missile D

System,“ China News Agency, May 13, 1998; Susan V. La

“Sparring Partners,”Far Eastern Economic Review, July 9, 1998

318
Defend Itself,” Tzu-li wan-pao, November 9, 1997, p

FBIS-CHI-364, December 30, 1997.

78. Author’s interviews, August 1998.

79. Peter Landers, Susan Lawrence, and Julian Baum

Target,” Far Eastern Economic Review, September 24, 1998, pp. 

80. Sofia Wu, “ROC Welcomes U.S. Congress Concern For T

Security,” China News Agency, September 30, 1998.

81. Jay Chen, “U.S. Reacts Cautiously To Call For Taiwa

Study,” China News Agency, October 2, 1998. 

82. “Beijing’s Strategy To ‘Undermine Taiwan From 

Confirmed,” China News Agency, July 11, 1998; and “Beijing P

Disintegrate Taiwan From Within: Report 2,” China News Agen

13, 1998.

83. Ibid.

84. Sofia Wu, “MOJ Probing Suspected Inflow Of Ma

Capital,” China News Agency, July 9, 1998.

85. Lin Chun-te, Wang Yuen-hua, and Hsieh Hsin-yin, “Ex

Interview With Foreign Minister Hu Chih-chiang,” Chun

jih-pao, July 5, 1998, p. 2, in FBIS-CHI-190, July 9, 1998.

86. “News Square” program, Chinese People’s Radio to Taiw

8, 1998, in FBIS-CHI, July 9, 1998.

87. Yuan Lin, “Probing Capability of Taiwan’s ABMs,” Kuan

ching, No. 311, August 16, 1998, p. 61, in FBIS-CHI-252, Septe

1998. 

88. Vivien Pik-kwan Chan, “Arms Sales To Taipei ‘Assa

Sovereignty’,” South China Morning Post, August 29, 1998.

319
CONCLUDING COMMENT:

THE POLITICAL ANGLE—NEW PHENOM

IN PARTY-ARMY RELATIONS

Ellis Joffe

The uniformly illuminating papers presented a

conference looked at the People’s Liberation Army (

focusing on its policies and capabilities as it moves in

next century from several critical angles: techn

budget, concepts, external impact, and Taiwan’s mi

One angle not covered was politics—the state of party

relations and their possible future directions. The pu

of this chapter is briefly to fill this gap.

The importance of this political angle derives fro

changes that have occurred in the internal role o

Chinese military under President Jiang Zemin. 

changes have not only turned the PLA into a pivotal p

in Chinese leadership politics, but, as a result, hav

affected its capabilities in most of the areas covered b

conference monographs. 

Is China a pivotal political player? Some analysts 

the opposite argument. They suggest that the role 

PLA in politics has diminished, and its influence has w

They point to several reasons: the consolidation of J

position as paramount leader, the absence of leaders 

PLA who possess the stature to stand up to Jian

growth of military professionalism, and the strength

of China’s economic bureaucracies. 

The result, in their view, is that the civilian leade

has distanced the army chiefs from the political a

reduced their capacity to shape national decisions

brought them under tighter political control. The 

striking demonstration of this assertiveness was J

321
order that these analysts say was not only perempto

downright demeaning.

The core of this argument—the declining presence 

military in politics—is correct. However, the effects o

diminished presence, as well as its causes and implica

are debatable. The central theme of this chapter i

although the military has substantially disengaged 

the political arena, its potential and capacity for po

intervention and influence are greater than ever b

This theme is based on the assumption that each 

reasons held up as signs of the PLA’s political declin

another side to it, one open to a different interpretat

To start with the first reason, one of the big surpr

Chinese politics has indeed been the consolidation of J

position as paramount leader. In the twilight of the 

era, Jiang was viewed by many observers, in Chin

outside, as a political weakling, and he was not given 

chance of longevity at the top on his own. Howev

quickly proved his detractors wrong, a developme

which there are several explanations.

The first is doubtless personal. Whatever reall

behind his seemingly easygoing exterior, Jiang is obv

endowed with considerable political skills. First of all, 

skills have ensured his survival as Deng’s successor 

jungle of Chinese politics, although Jiang does not ha

outstanding charismatic qualities which had underp

the personal authority of both Mao and Deng. In add

Jiang has demonstrated his political skills in other 

including getting rid of rivals such as the mayor of Be

forging a firm consensus among his colleagues, workin

a beneficial relationship with the military, and reapi

domestic advantages of his efforts to improve relations 

the President of the United States.

In strengthening his position, Jiang has utilized 

resources. One is institutional—his posts as ge

secretary of the Communist Party, chairman of its C

322
him immense power, much symbolic prestige, and exte

exposure. Most importantly, these posts give Jian

unparalleled advantage of placing trusted officials i

posts, which he has done extensively in the part

government, and the PLA. In addition, he has made 

efforts to solidify PLA support by being exceptio

friendly to causes important to the PLA, especia

ardently advocating military modernization.

No one will dispute that Jiang’s impressive perform

in the political and military arenas has narrowed th

between his symbolic and real power as paramount le

This has also strengthened his position in relation to 

commanders, and his position is further augmented 

commanders’ ingrained inclination to support the lea

power as well as by their professionalism. The fore

could lead to the conclusion that the military’s supp

Jiang is assured.

Such a conclusion suffers from a fundamental flaw

simply, it is this: whereas under Mao and Deng m

support of the paramount leader was axiomati

immutable, under Jiang it cannot be taken on trus

under certain conditions may be transferred to a riva

This uncertainty exists because Jiang does not ha

unique authority in the military enjoyed by both Ma

Deng, despite the differences between them. Derived 

their political stature, Mao’s and Deng’s authorit

buttressed by military background, revolutio

antecedents, and long-standing connections, and i

invulnerable. Although Jiang has neutralized 

weaknesses—for example, by enhancing his stature o

political scene, manipulating rivalries between 

leaders, and forming personal connections in the PLA

is far from invulnerable.

To be sure, Jiang will get PLA support as long as t

are going well from the vantage point of the 

leaders—as long as, at the very least, the economic situ

323
demands of the military for modernization and fin

support are satisfied. However, if things go wrong, a

will be off. In that event, Jiang will not be able to assum

Mao and Deng could, that military support w

forthcoming. On the contrary, PLA leaders might with

it or back an opponent.

Those who disagree with this reasoning may claim 

the military’s conditional support is not more tha

assumption and that Jiang is strong enough to ensur

support in all circumstances. The response is two-fold. 

this is indeed an assumption, but it is based o

assessment of the leader’s position in the PLA relative 

predecessors. And this assessment suggests that Jian

not have an implicit carte blanche from the military, a

and Deng did. He has to work for its support an

operational latitude is limited.

This conclusion is reinforced by Jiang’s actions. Fir

has given PLA chiefs unprecedented freedom to m

their own affairs, including giving them substantial b

increases when he ordered them out of business. Seco

has made unusual concessions to the PLA, mainly i

allocations. Third, he has moved cautiously in pur

reform policies, one reason for which is pro

uncertainty about the military’s response if these p

cause a crisis. Finally, on sensitive external issues su

Taiwan, Jiang has adopted positions that conform to 

views. Neither Mao nor Deng had felt compelled to a

similar fashion in any of these areas.

The second reason given for the military’s po

decline is the absence of a PLA leader superior in per

stature to Jiang after the retirement at the 15th 

Congress of the two top commanders, Liu Huaqin

Zhang Zhen. As leaders who, unlike Jiang, belonged 

revolutionary generation and enjoyed great prestige 

PLA, they towered over Jiang in military stature. Alth

publicly they always treated him with respect, as lo

324
Jiang’s standing in the PLA. Their replacements as th

senior officers on the Central Military Commission

Haotian and Zhang Wannian, belong to Jiang’s gene

and cannot outshine him as revolutionary heroes. The

owe their promotions to Jiang.

How important is this fact? In the Chinese po

scheme of things, the personal stature of the param

leader is a central pillar of his authority i

bureaucracies and the PLA. The personal stature of th

commander is less important. The possibility that h

become a challenger for the top position can confiden

set aside, except in the most unlikely circumstances.

Short of this possibility, it may be argued tha

stature of the commander is significant in determinin

much influence the PLA can exert on the paramount le

To some extent this must be so, as in any political sy

but the influence is limited by the formal hierar

relationship of the two within the Communist Part

government. This was demonstrated by the behavior 

Huaqing and Zhang Zhen, who did not defy Jiang d

their prestige. In any case, the stature of the leader 

important than the strength of the organization b

him, and this is a function of its professionalism.

The importance of military professionalism derive

its nature as a two-edged sword: it can be a barrier ag

political intervention or an impetus to it. One thing is 

doubt: the professionalism of the Chinese military has 

greatly strengthened in the past 2 decades. At the top

commanders have undergone a basic transition fr

generation of revolutionary military-politicians 

generation of commanders whose background is s

military. At the lower ranks, officers are younger, 

educated, and more specialized. The professionalizat

the Chinese officer corps has gone hand-in-hand wi

accelerated modernization of the PLA in a mu

reinforcing process. The new officers have been s

325
by the PLA have raised their professionalism.

What are the implications for the military’s po

position? On the one hand, professionalization 

increased the inner strength of the PLA by fosteri

corporateness, cohesion, and discipline. It has 

sharpened the institutional separation of the PLA, fo

it on military pursuits, reduced political controls over i

facilitated its disengagement from politics. From 

vantage point, the growth of professionalism has re

the PLA’s political presence and influence. At the 

time, it has assured the subordination of the PLA 

political leadership.

However, there is another side to professionali

unified PLA, animated by a distinct institut

standpoint and responsive to orders from its comma

gives the military a potent power base in dealings with 

elites, including the paramount leader. A PLA th

increasingly separated from the party will find it eas

defy it if circumstances are appropriate. And a PLA 

constrained by political controls will make it easier to 

into politics against the leadership’s will. In sho

ordinary times if the state of national and military aff

satisfactory to the military, professionalism will 

against the possibility of political intervention. But if 

become extraordinary, and given the absence of const

that had existed under Mao and Deng, profession

might have the opposite effect.

What about the growing power of econ

organizations and their leaders in policymaking cou

This is not necessarily a zero-sum situation which h

cause a decline in the military’s influence. The relatio

between the military and economic organizations coul

be based on mutual interests rather than on rivalry

want the economic reforms to succeed. The milita

neither qualified nor inclined to interfere in eco

affairs, and its interests are limited to results and 

326
relative ease with which the military agreed to with

from economic activities, an agreement that accord

reports is being effectively implemented, indi

persuasively where the real interests of the military 

The result of these factors is that party-army rel

under Jiang are characterized by two trends. First, 

Jiang’s weaknesses and the military’s strengths

military has gained a capacity for political interventio

influence which it never had before. Second, this ca

has been held in check by the common interest 

political and military leaderships to keep the army 

politics.

A striking example of this common interest has be

order to the army to give up its economic activities. 

could not have given the order to do so against the wis

the PLA’s top commanders. He did give it, and the or

apparently being carried out, because, for different rea

both sides find it beneficial.

The convergence of these trends has produced a 

arrangement: the military supports the political leade

and does not intervene in politics or policymaking—e

in areas of special concern to it. In return, the po

leadership does not interfere in the management 

armed forces and pursues policies that meet the prefer

of the military: economic development that provides 

stability sufficient to avoid a major social crisis and a 

nationalistic policy on Taiwan. 

The result of this arrangement is that the militar

withdrawn from politics as never before, but it also h

potential to intervene as never before. If this arrange

breaks down, a military-initiated intervention in poli

possible, even likely. At the same time, because 

military’s new clout, intervention not initiated b

military is unlikely.

327
prevailed under Mao and Deng: military intervention 

own accord was unthinkable; on the other h

nonintervention in response to the leader’s order wa

unthinkable. These are new phenomena in Ch

party-army relations.

328
BERNARD D. COLE is Professor of Interna

History at the National War College in Washington, D

received his A.B. at the University of North Carolin

M.P.A. at the University of Washington, and his Ph

Auburn University. Professor Cole served 30 years 

U.S. Navy. His published works include Gunboat

Marines: The U.S. Navy in China (University of Del

Press, 1982) and articles in several journals.

ARTHUR SHU-FAN DING is a Research Fellow 

Institute of International Relations, National Che

University, Taiwan. He received his B.A. at the Na

Taiwan University and his Ph.D. in Political Science 

University of Notre Dame. Dr. Ding’s published 

include China’s Changing Military Theory, 1979

(Tangshan Publishing House, 1996) and articl

numerous journals.

JUNE TEUFEL DREYER is Professor of Po

Science at the University of Miami, Florida. She serv

Senior Far East Specialist at the Library of Congres

Asia adviser to the Chief of Naval Operations. Pro

Dreyer has a B.A. from Wellesley College and a M.A

Ph.D. in Government and Far Eastern Languages 

Harvard University. Among her published work

China’s Forty Millions (Harvard University Press, 

China’s Political System (3d edition, Addison W

Longman, forthcoming), and articles on the Ch

military in numerous journals.

PAUL H. B. GODWIN is Professor of Interna

Affairs at the National War College in Washington

specializing in Chinese defense and security policy. H

Visiting Professor at the Chinese People’s Liberation 

National Defense University in September-October 1

329
Hebrew University of Jerusalem and a Senior Fellow 

Truman Research Institute at that university. H

educated in Jerusalem, Hong Kong, and at Ha

University. Among Dr. Joffe’s works are Party and 

Professionalism and Political Control in the Chinese O

Corps, 1949-1964 (Harvard University, 1965), The C

Army After Mao (Harvard University Press, 1987

many articles in journals and books.

ALEXANDER CHIEH-CHENG HUANG is a S

Fellow in International Security Affairs at the Cent

Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D

is also a Visiting Research Professor at the Institu

Global Chinese Affairs, University of Maryland, C

Park. He was a Fellow in the Center for Northeast 

Policy Studies at The Brookings Institution a

consultant for the Taipei Economic and Cul

Representative Office in Washington, DC. Dr. H

specializes in Asian and Chinese security and de

affairs. His publications include “Chinese Navy’s Off

Active Defense Strategy: Conceptualization 

Implication,” U.S. Naval War College Review (Su

1994) and “Taiwan’s View of Military Balance an

Challenge It Presents,” Crisis in the Taiwan Strait (

JAMES R. LILLEY was born in China, educated a

University, and served for a number of years in Sout

Asia. He was the Director of the American Institu

Taiwan and the U.S. Ambassador to the People’s Repu

China from 1989-91 and to the Republic of Korea 

1986-89. He served as Assistant Secretary of Defen

International Security Affairs from 1991-93 a

presently Resident Fellow at the American Ente

Institute. Ambassador Lilley is the co-editor of B

MFN: Trade with China and American Interests (AEI 

1994) and has written extensively on Asian issues .

MICHAEL MCDEVITT is a Senior Fellow at 

Corporation, a not-for-profit Washington, DC, 

330
“Project Asia.” This effort is focused on U.S. security 

in East Asia. Prior to retiring from the U.S. Navy in 19

was the Commandant of the National War College. 

Asian policy-related assignments include Direc

Strategy, Plans and Policy (J-5) for U.S. CINCPAC 

Director of the East Asian Policy Office for the Secret

Defense. He had four at-sea commands, includin

aircraft carrier Battle Group. He was educated a

University of Southern Califiornia and holds a M

Degree in Amercian Diplomatic History from Georg

University. He is a graduate of the National War C

and was a CNO Strategic Fellow at the Naval War Coll

ERIC A. MCVADON, retired U.S. Navy Rear Adm

a senior consultant on East Asian security affairs for 

Associates, the Center for Naval Analyses, and se

other organizations, and Director of Asia-Pacific S

with National Security Planning Associates, a subsid

the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis. He was de

and naval attaché at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing, 19

His navy career included extensive experience 

antisubmarine warfare and politico-military af

including service as the NATO and U.S. Sub-U

Commander in Iceland, 1986-89. His recent underta

include work on the People’s Liberation Army

China-Taiwan problem, Chinese attitudes toward re

security, and diverse issues involving the K

Peninsula. He writes and speaks widely in North Am

and East Asia on security and defense matters. Ad

McVadon’s publicly available writings include an arti

China and the PLA in the Autumn 1996 Naval War C

Review and chapters in the 1997 National De

University book entitled Crisis in the Taiwan 

(published in English and Chinese in the 1999 RAND 

The People’s Liberation Army in the Information Age, 

the 1999 AEI-M.E. Sharpe, Inc., book, China’s M

Faces the Future).

331
Fellow at the Institute for National Strategic St

National Defense University, Washington, DC, a

Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council of the United S

where he is sponsored by the Office of Net Assess

Department of Defense. During the Reagan administr

Dr. Pillsbury was the Assistant Under Secretary of De

for Policy Planning; during the Bush administration, h

Special Assistant for Asian Affairs, Office of the Secret

Defense, reporting to Director of Net Assessment An

W. Marshall. He has also served as a defense analyst f

RAND Corporation and on the staffs of several U.S. S

Committees. He has taught graduate courses in Ch

foreign policy at Georgetown University, Univers

California at Los Angeles, and University of S

Carolina. Dr. Pillsbury earned his B.A. from Sta

University, studied Mandarin Chinese for 2 years 

Stanford Center in Taipei, Taiwan, under a do

dissertation fellowship of the National Science Found

and earned his Ph.D. from Columbia University.

LARRY M. WORTZEL is Director of the Asian S

Center of The Heritage Foundation, a public policy 

tank in Washington, DC. Prior to joining Heritage, he 

colonel in the U.S. Army and the Director of the Str

Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College. During t

years of his military career, he lived and worked 

Asia-Pacific region for 12 years, where he focus

intelligence, policy, and security issues. He served 

military attaché at the U.S. Embassy in China 

(1988-90 and 1995-97). Dr. Wortzel received his B.A

Columbus College, Georgia, and his M.A. and Ph.D

the University of Hawaii. His published works include 

in China (Greenwood Press, 1987), China’s Mi

Modernization (Greenwood Press, 1988), The A

Regional Forum: Asian Security without an Am

Umbrella (Strategic Studies Institute, 1996)

Dictionary of Contemporary Chinese Military H

(Greenwood Press, 1999).

332
Acad emy of Mili tary Sci ence

(AMS), 28, 89, 115, 117, 126,

141, 146, 147, 227

Acad emy of So cial Sci ence, 89

Aegis- class guided mis sile de -

stroy ers, 301–302

Air de fense sys tem, 139, 191–194

Anti- satellite mis siles (ASATs),

128, 129, 205

Anti- ship cruise mis siles

(ASCMs), 74

Anti- submarine heli cop ters, 301,

307

Anti- submarine war fare (ASW),

179

Anti- tactical bal lis tic mis sile

(ATBM) sys tem, 305

Apstar- 1A, 180–181

As so cia tion for Re la tions Across

the Tai wan Strait (ARATS),

290

As so cia tion of South east Asian

Na tions (ASEAN), 4, 56–67

Re gional Fo rum (ARF), 16, 56,

62–63, 226

Asym met ric war fare, 201–206

Aus tra lia, 1

Bei jing, in vest ments in 

of, 132

Bei jing In sti tute of Sys tem 

neer ing, 117

Burma (My an mar), and P

Re pub lic of China, 2, 

236

Bush, George, 239, 292

Cam bo dia, 35, 36, 62

Cen tral Asian states, 20–

Cen tral Mili tary Com m

(CMC), 116

C

4

I

2

, 164, 180, 221

Cheng Kung-class frig ate

Chih Yang-class fr

300–301, 306

China Aero space Corp., 1

China In sti tute of Con tem 

In ter na tional Re l

(CICIR), 40, 108, 126

Chin Chi ang coastal pa tro

301

Chi nese military- industr

plex (CMIC), 165–169

Chung Shan In sti tute for 

and Tech nol ogy (CSIS

303, 305

333
311, 312

Coco Is lands, 66

Com mand and con trol tech nologies, 163, 180, 181

Com mis sion on Sci ence, Tech nology and In dus try for Na tional

De fense (COSTIND), 117,

166–168, 220

Com pre hen sive Na tional Power

(CNP), 2, 89, 107–108,

109–110

Com pre hen sive Test Ban Treaty

(CTBT), 67, 68

C-101 anti- ship mis sile, 197

Confidence- building meas ures

(CBMs), 14–17, 226

Cruise mis siles, 195–198

C

3

I nodes, 133, 139

De fense Elec tron ics Ex hi bi tion

(1998), 220–221

Demo cratic Peo ple’s Re pub lic of

Ko rea (DPRK). See North Korea

Demo cratic Pro gres sive Party

(DPP) (Tai wan), 235, 255,

309–310

Deng Xiaop ing, 21, 90, 103, 112,

119, 239, 292–293

DF-15/M-9 tac ti cal bal lis tic mis -

siles, 198

Digi tal Scene Match ing A

re la tion (DSMAC) gu

198

Dig it ized com bat forces, 1

Dong Feng mis sile sys tem

East Turkestan, 20

Eco nomic is sues

15- year eco nomic pro gr

tween Ka zakhstan and 

23

mili tary ver sus, in Ko re

in sula 49–50

role of, 326–327

Sino- Russian re la tions 

ver sus se cu rity de vel o

9–14

E-2 sur veil lance planes, 3

Grum man E-2T Hawk e

Ex ecu tive Yuan (Tai wan

259, 267

Five Prin ci ples of Peace fu

is tence, 103, 231

Four Mod erni za tions, 166

Four- Party Talks, 53

France, 292, 295, 300

F-16 fighter planes, 29, 2

304

334
207–208, 241

Gen eral Ar ma ments De part ment 

(GAD), 120, 166, 168, 206, 295

Gen eral Po liti cal De part ment,

118, 218

Gen eral Staff De part ment (GSD),

168, 218, 220

Ge og ra phy

im por tance of, 1–6

limi ta tions of, 3

Global Navi ga tion Sat el lite System (GLONASS), 187, 198,

199

Global po si tion ing sys tem (GPS)

sat el lites, 187, 198, 199

Gor bachev, Mik hail, 25

Grum man E-2T Hawk eye early

warn ing planes, 304

Guid ance, navi ga tion, and ve hicle con trol tech nol ogy, 174,

176, 177, 179–180, 187

Hai Ying cruise mis siles, 196

Han class sub ma rines, 188

Han Kuang 14 ex er cises,

307–308

Hans, 20, 21

Har poon air- to- ship mis siles, 304

43–44

He gem ony, 222–223, 231

High- energy la sers (HEL

Hi ma la yas, 2, 69

Hsi ung Feng I anti- ship m

300, 301

Hsi ung Feng II anti- sh

siles, 304

Hsi ung Feng III anti- sh

siles, 305

HY-3/C-301 anti- ship m

197

In dia, 2, 23, 60, 65–66, 

138, 236

In dige nous De fense Fight

or Ching- kuo) fight ers

In do ne sia, 1, 64–65

In for ma tion sys tems (IS) t

ogy, 183–184, 205

In for ma tion war fare 

163–164, 177, 182–18

206

In ter nal sta bil ity, 134–13

In ter na tional Mone tary 

(IMF), 25

Iran, 71, 74–75

Iraq, 71–74, 75

335
Is rael, 168, 194

Ja karta, 64–65

Ja pan

Chi na’s as sess ment of the military power of, 141–143

ge og ra phy and, 1

re la tions with China, 33–47,

233–234

tri lat eral Track II talks between U.S., China and, 44–45

-U.S. al li ance, 36–39, 298

Japa nese De fense Agency (JDA),

42, 43, 44

Japa nese Self- Defense Force

(JSDF), 35, 38

J-8 in ter cep tor, 193–194

Ji anghu guided mis sile frig ate,

196

Ji ang wei guided mis sile frig ate,

191, 295

Ji ang Zemin, 101–102, 239, 292

ASEAN and, 61–62

In dia and, 69

Ka zakhstan and, 21, 23

Japa nese and, 45

po liti cal skills of, 322–323

South Asian nu clear tests and,

67

vul ner abil ity of, 323–325

Jing Shi pro gram, 271–2

Kang Ting-class frig ates, 

Ka zakhstan/Ka zakh ac tiv 

20, 21–23

Kilo-class sub ma rines, 16

294–295

Ki ri y enko, Ser gei, 26

Kiss inger, Henry, 92–93

Knox (Chih Yang)-class f

300–301, 306

Ko rean Pen in sula, 28, 34

Four- Party Talks, 53

im por tance of, 219

mili tary ver sus eco no

sues, 49–50

nuclear- free zone in, 48

re uni fi ca tion is sues, 48

U.S. pres ence in, re ac t

53–55, 219, 233–235

Kui Fu lin, 241

Kuomin tang (KMT) (G

dang), 235, 255, 257, 3

Kwang Hua Six proj ect, 3

Kyr gyz stan, 2, 20, 21–22

Kyuma, JDA Di rec tor G

42, 44

336
300

Laos, 2, 61

Lee Teng- hui, 37, 254, 259,

290–291, 293

Leg is la tive Yuan (Tai wan), 258,

261–262, 267–268

Li Ji jun, 143, 242

Li Peng, 25, 27, 38, 61, 64

Lo cal War doc trine, 112–113,

115–116

as sess ment of Ja pan’s mili tary

power, 142

con flict sce nar ios, 121–122, 123

in sti tu tional af filia tions of, 117

mili tary in vest ment al lo ca tion

pri ori ties of, 130

re la tion ship to other schools,

119–120

Lop Nur nu clear test ing area, 72

Luda DDG, 191, 196

Luhu-class guided mis sile de -

stroy ers, 189–190, 295

Magic II short- range air- to- air

mis siles, 303

Ma hathir, Ma lay sian Prime Minis ter, 58, 63

Ma lay sia

ge og ra phy and, 1

Mao Ze dong, 104, 118, 1

See also Peo ple’s War d

Mari time Con sul ta tive 

ment, 241

Mari time natu ral re sourc

tec tion of, 135–136

Mari time Self- Defense 

(MSDF), 35, 38

Matsu, 255

Mica intermediate- range 

 air mis siles, 303

Mili tar ily Criti cal Tech n

List (MCTL), 159, 169

Mili tary al li ances, op po s

16–17

Mili tary in stal la tions, c

ment of, 132–134

Mili tary in vest ment al l

pri ori ties of, 129–140

Mili tary pro fes sion 

325–326

Mili tary tech nol ogy

See also Tai wan mili tar

air force, 191–194

as sess ing Chi na’s ca pa 

169–175

Chi nese military- ind

com plex (CMIC), 165–1

com mand and con trol, 1

181

con duct of war and ad 

163–165

337
fu ture for, 199–206

guid ance, navi ga tion, and ve hicle con trol, 174, 176, 177,

179–180

in for ma tion sys tems (IS) tech -

nol ogy, 183–184

in for ma tion war fare (IW),

163–164, 177, 182–183

Mili tar ily Criti cal Tech nolo gies

List (MCTL), 159, 169–175

na val, 185–189

op era tional im pli ca tions,

184–191

PLA’s chang ing strat egy,

160–165

post- Gulf War self- assessment,

161–163

sen sors and la ser, 174, 176,

177, 179

space sys tems, 174, 176,

177–178

strengths, ar eas of, 173

sur face com bat ant, 189–191

tac ti cal bal lis tic mis siles,

198–199

weak nesses, ar eas of, 174–175

Mili tary tech nol ogy trans fers,

237–238

with Brit ain, 168

with Iran, 74–75

with Is rael, 168, 194

with It aly, 168

with Rus sia, 29–31, 168, 194

to Tai wan, 292, 299–310, 312

Military- to- military con tacts, 18

43–44

Mi rage 2000-5, 29, 292, 3

Mis chief Reef, 57, 59, 237

Mis siles, 195–199

Tai wan’s, 304–305

Mi Zhenyu, 93, 113

M-109 self- propelled ar 

303

Mon go lia, 2, 19

Mo zam bique, 35, 36

Mo Zi, 106, 107

M-60-A-3 tanks, 303

Mul ti lat eral con tacts

ments, 14–15, 21–22, 2

Mul ti po lar ity ten den cies, 

101–106

My an mar (Burma), 2, 61, 

Na tional Capi tal Area. S

jing

Na tional De fense Coun c

wan), 257

Na tional De fense Law (T

259–263

Na tional De fense Or gan

Law (Tai wan), 258, 25

338
Tech nol ogy Com mis sion, 166

Na tional De fense Uni ver sity

(NDU), 115, 117

Na tional Mili tary Coun cil (NMC)

(Tai wan), 260–261

Na tional Mili tary Strat egy,

223–225

Na tional Se cu rity Coun cil (NSC)

(Tai wan), 257, 260, 264–265

Na tional Se cu rity Strat egy,

223–225

NATO (North At lan tic Treaty Organi za tion), 27

Na tuna gas fields, 65

Na val sys tem tech nol ogy,

185–189

Ne pal, 2

Net/stra te gic as sess ment, 95–99

Chi na’s as sess ment of China-

 Taiwan-U.S. bal ance, 149–150

Chi na’s as sess ment of Ja pan’s

mili tary power, 141–143

Chi na’s as sess ment of fu ture

U.S. mili tary power, 143–149

New Party (Tai wan), 235, 268

New Zea land, 1

North Ko rea (Demo cratic Peo -

ple’s Re pub lic of Korea-

 DPRK)

tions to, 50–53

Four- Party Talks, 53

mili tary ver sus eco no

sues, 49–50

re la tions with China, 2

122

re uni fi ca tion is sues, 48

U.S. pres ence in, re ac t

53–55, 144–145, 234–23

Nu clear Non- Prolife

Treaty (NPT), 67–68

Nu clear test ing, 67–69, 1

Nu clear war, threat of, 10

Obu chi, Keizo, 234

Oil/pipe lines

deal with Ka zakhstan, 

im ports from Iran/Iraq

74, 75

Op era tion DESERT ST

161–162, 206

Paki stan, 2, 67–71, 239

Papua New Guinea, 1

Paracel Is lands, 59, 236

Pa triot II anti- missile ba

305

Peo ple’s Armed Po lice (PA

24, 118, 135

339
(PAVN), 2

Peo ple’s Lib era tion Army (PLA)

See also Mili tary tech nol ogy

as sess ment of Ja pan’s mili tary

power, 141–143

ca pa bili ties of, be yond im me diate neigh bors, 3

Com pre hen sive Na tional

Power (CNP), 89, 107–108,

109–110

cur rent as sess ment, 100–109

eco nomic fac tors and de vel opment of, 11

es ti mat ing the ca pa bili ties of,

90–95

long- term mod erni za tion goals,

111–129

mili tary in vest ment al lo ca tion

pri ori ties, 129–140

re cent acts to ward Tai wan,

294–299

stra te gic/net as sess ment of,

95–99

thea ter bal lis tic mis sile defense, 42–43

Peo ple’s Lib era tion Army Air

Force (PLAAF), 161, 191–194

Peo ple’s Lib era tion Army Navy

(PLAN), 116–117, 161,

185–189

Peo ple’s Re pub lic of China (PRC)

Ge og ra phy, im por tance of, 1–6

in ter nal sta bil ity, 134–135

re la tions with neigh bors, 2

111–112, 115, 128

as sess ment of fu ture U

tary power, 143–149

as sess ment of Ja pan’s m

power, 142

con flict sce nar ios, 120–

in sti tu tional af filia ti

117–118

mili tary in vest ment al 

pri ori ties of, 130–132

re la tion ship to other 

118–119

Perry (Cheng Kung)-cla

ates, 301

Per sian Gulf, Japa nese in

Per sian Gulf War, 115, 1

161–162, 206

Pha lanx air- defense sys te

Phil ip pine Is lands

con fer ence on CBMs 

with China, 15–16

ge og ra phy and, 1

Mis chief Reef, 57

re la tions with China, 1

Po liti cal sepa ra tism, 23

Poli tics, role of, 321–328

Pri makov, Yevgeny, 26

P-3 Orion anti- submarine 

307

340
(QDR), 148

Que moy, 255

Rail lines, pro tec tion of, 139

Ran goon (Yan gon), 61

Re pub lic of China (ROC). See Taiwan- Re pub lic of China (ROC)

Re pub lic of Ko rea (ROK). See

South Ko rea -R epu blic of Korea (ROK)

Revo lu tion in Mili tary Af fairs

(RMA), 90, 104, 113–114, 161,

282, 296

as sess ment of Ja pan’s mili tary

power, 142–143

con flict sce nar ios, 122–125

in sti tu tional af filia tions of, 117

mili tary in vest ment al lo ca tion

pri ori ties of, 129

re la tion ship to other schools,

120

RF-104 Star fighter re con naissance planes, 304

Rus sia, re la tions with Peo ple’s

Re pub lic of China, 2, 3, 21–22,

24–32, 137

Sat el lite sys tems

com mu ni ca tion, 180–181

sur veil lance, 178, 187

siles, 300

Sec ond Work ing Con fer e

Tai wan Af fairs, 311

Se cu rity pol icy, Bei jin

gional, 8–9

eco nomic fac tors ver sus

sum mary of, 18–19

Senkaku Is lands, 36, 44

Sen sors and la ser tech 

174, 176, 177, 179

Short- range bal lis tic m

(SRBMs), 309

Sin ga pore, ge og ra phy and

Sky Bow II mis siles, 304

South China Sea, 4, 17, 23

South Ko rea (Re pub lic of 

 ROK)

Four- Party Talks, 53

mili tary ver sus eco no

sues, 49–50

re la tions with China, 3

122

re uni fi ca tion is sues, 48

U.S. pres ence in, re ac t

53–55

Sovre menny de stroy ers, 3

190–191, 295

Space sys tems tech nol og

176, 177–178

Space war fare, 128–129

341
S-70 C anti- submarine heli copters, 301, 307

SS-N-22 (SUNBURN) mis sile,

191, 197

State COSTIND (SCOSTIND),

166

Strait Ex change Foun da tion

(SEF), 290

Stra te gic/net as sess ment, 95–99

Stra te gic part ner ship (Sino-

 Russian re la tions), 24–32

Stinger mis siles, 312

Sub ma rine tech nol ogy, 185–189

Sun Yat- sen, 253

Sun Zi, 106, 107, 107, 108

Su preme De fense Coun cil (Tai -

wan), 257

Sur face com bat ant tech nol ogy,

189–191

Su- 27 fight ers, 29, 30, 168, 194,

294

Su- 27SK, 194

Tac ti cal bal lis tic mis siles,

198–199

Tai wan (Re pub lic of China- ROC)

 Taiwan-U.S. bal ance, 1

235–236

com mand struc ture of, 2

con sti tu tional re form, 2

ge og ra phy and, 1

in va sion of, forms for, 2

Na tional De fense 

259–263

na tional se cu rity or g

tions, evo lu tion of, 257–

re la tions with China, 

137–138, 280–281, 290–

rise of po liti cal op po si ti

Tai wan Af fairs Lead ing 

Group (TALSG), 292

Tai wan mili tary

chal lenges fac ing, 280–

changes in tech nol ogy, 2

ci vil ian con trol and na ti

fense law, 257–268

de moc ra ti za tion, ef fe

254–255

Jing Shi pro gram, 271–

mili tary tech nol ogy, ef f

255–256

prob lems and de bates, 2

pro cure ment scan dals

307

re cruit ing prob lems, 30

stra te gic re ori en ta tion, 

of, 255–257

Zhong Yuan pro gram, 2

Tai wan Re la tions Act 

(1979), 292, 312

Tai wan Strait/Tai wan pro

342
fu ture and con cerns over,

46–47, 310–312

Ko rean pen in sula and, 55–56

mis sile tests/train ing ex er cises,

218, 293–294

re cent PLA acts of, 294–299

re sponse of Tai wan to PLA acts,

299–310

U.S.-Jap anese al li ance and,

37–39, 298

Tajiki stan, 2, 20, 21–22

Tang Fei, 256, 262, 266–267, 281

Tech nol ogy

See also Mili tary tech nol ogy;

un der type of

work ing groups (TWGs), 169

Thai land, 18, 236

Thea ter bal lis tic mis sile de fense

(TBMD), 42–43

Thea ter high- altitude air de fense

(THAAD), 309

Thea ter mis sile de fense (TMD),

302, 308–309

Three Gorges Dam, pro tec tion of,

136

“Three no’s” pol icy, 45, 311, 312

Ti an an men Square, 229, 291

Ti bet, 19, 20

Tien Kan (Sky In ter fer ence) electronic war fare air craft, 304

sys tem, 305

Tonkin Gulf, 4

Turkic Cen tral Asian na ti

Uighurs, 20–23

Un der Sea War fare (USW

United Na tional Revo lu 

Front, 21

United States, and Peo p

pub lic of China

Chi na’s as sess ment of 

U.S. mili tary power, 14

Chi na’s views of, 103

Four- Party Talks, 53

-Jap anese al li ance, 36–

re la tions with China, 2

Rus sian and Chi nese 

of, 26–28

tri lat eral Track II ta

tween Ja pan, China and

United States, and Re p

China

China- Taiwan balanc

150

Ef fect of U.S.-Jap anes

rity al li ance, 37-39, 46, 

Sale/trans fer of mili tary 

ment/tech nol ogy, 236-2

300-305

Tai wan Re la tions Act o

292, 312

“Three No’s”, 45, 311-31

343
(UAVs), 303

Va ca tion di plo macy, 291

Viet nam, and Peo ple’s Re pub lic

of China, 2, 3, 23, 63–64, 122,

138, 236

Warring- States era

avoid ing war with use of other

strate gies, 108–109

les sons from, 106–107

Weap ons of mass de struc tion

(WMD), 48

West Turkestan, 19–24

White Pa per (1995), 7, 9, 226

White Pa per on Chi na’s Na tional

De fense (1998), 7–9, 11–19,

225–228

Woody Is land, 59

Xia class sub ma rines, 188

Xin ji ang Uighur Autono mous Region, re la tions with China, 19,

20–24

Yan gon (Ran goon), 61

Yelt sin, Bo ris, 24, 25, 27, 31–32

Ying Ji cruise mis siles, 196

Yu lin, sub ma rine base at

Zhong Yuan pro gram (T

268–271

344
Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr.

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Interim Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Text and Production Editor

Ms. Judith O. Johnson

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Ms. Rita A. Rummel

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Mrs. Mary Jane Semple

Cover Artist

Mr. James E. Kistler