PUBLISH UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee,

v. ROBERT ANDREW BLECHMAN, Defendant - Appellant. No. 10-3034

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Kansas (D.C. No. 5:08-CR-40008-JAR-2)

Christopher M. Joseph (Stephen M. Joseph wi th him on the briefs), Joseph & Hollander, P.A., Topeka, Kansas, fo r Defendant-Appellant. Christine E. Kenney, Assistant United States Attorney (Barry R. Gr issom, United States Attorney, and James A. Brown, Assistant Unite d States Attorney, w ith her on the brief), Topeka, Kansas, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Before MURPHY, EBEL, and HARTZ, Circuit Judges.

EBEL , Circuit Judge.
In January 2009, Defendant-Appellant Robert Andrew Blechman and a codefendant, Itsik (“Issac”) Yass, were tried t ogether in the District of Kansas on charges FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### September 14, 2011
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 of mail fraud, aggravated id entity theft, and conspiracy to commit mail fraud and aggravated identity theft. Evidence introduced at trial showed that Yass operated a business that he used to temporarily halt ho me foreclosures by “attaching” foreclosure properties to fraudulent bankruptcy cases in or der to take advantage of the Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay provision. Severa l different pieces of evidence connected Blechman to Yass’s scheme, including e-mails sent from “rablechman@aol.com” to Yass, Public Access to Court Electronic Re cords (“PACER”) reco rds suggesting that Blechman accessed fraudulent bankruptcies using both Ya ss’s PACER account and his own PACER account, postal money orders th at Blechman filled out and mailed to bankruptcy courts to pay f iling fees on behalf of fictitio us debtors, and Yass’s trial testimony explaining Blechman’s role in the scheme. After a two-week trial, the jury found Blechman and Yass guilty of all of the co unts charged against them. The district court granted Blechman’s motion for judgment of acquittal on the identity theft counts and ultimately sentenced Blechm an to a total of eighteen months’ imprisonment on the remaining counts. Blechman now appeals, challenging the dist rict court’s admission of an America Online (“AOL”) record that connected him to the e-mail address “rablechman@aol.com” and three PACER records revealing that he accessed fraudulent bankruptcy cases in Tennessee that were similar to the Kansas bankruptcies identified in the indictment. Blechman argues that these records contained double hearsay and that the district court erroneously admitted them under the business re cords exception to th e hearsay rule. See3 Fed. R. Evid. 803(6). Exerci sing jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we hold that the district court erred in admitting the cha llenged AOL and PACER records under Rule 803(6). Nevertheless, because we conclude that the erro r was harmless, we AFFIRM Blechman’s convictions. I. BACKGROUND On June 11, 2008, a federal grand jury in Kansas returned a thirteen-count first superseding indictment against Defendant-App ellant Robert Blechman and Issac Yass. The indictment charged both defendants w ith conspiracy to commit mail fraud and aggravated identity theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (Count 1); mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 1341 (Counts 2–7); and aggravated identify theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 1028A (Counts 8–13). In January 2009, Blechman and Yass were tried together in a two-week jury trial in the District of Kansas. In this section, we detail the trial proceedings that are relevant to the evidentiary i ssues raised in this appeal. A. Overview of the Forec losure Stopping Scheme At trial, Yass admitted to operating a California-based business named Stopco, the sole purpose of which was to temporarily st op foreclosure sales on homes. Yass would obtain public information about financially troubled homeowners who had received notice from their lenders that th ey were in default under deeds of trust and that their properties were subject to foreclosure. Yass would then solicit these homeowners by4 sending them a letter stating that he could he lp them keep their properties for up to two years for a monthly fee of $499.99. When homeowners responded to Yass’s solicitation, he would follow up by sending an information package explaining his services and containing thank you letters from previous customers. The package informed pr ospective customers that [w]e attach your Property, (NOT your name ) to an EXISTING BANKRUPTCY , and TEMPORARILY, (O NE TO TWO (2) YEARS) buy you more time. You, yourself, NEVER need to file for Bankruptcy! We email you documents, along with in structions, you file them, fax back to us, we get you about ONE MONTH, an d we repeat this process monthly! (Record on Appeal (“ROA”), vol. XI at 86 (Gov’t Ex. 1-VVV – Stopco information package).) The pack age also told customers how to de posit Yass’s initial fee into a Wells Fargo checking account held in the name of Stopco. In order to stop foreclosures, Yass w ould “attach” his clients’ properties to bankruptcy cases that were filed in the Dist rict of Kansas in the names of fictitious individuals who purpor ted to be doing business as fic titious companies (“DBAs”). Yass accomplished this by preparing a Sh ort Form Deed of Trust conv eying a partial interest in the foreclosure property to a DBA in one of the fraudulent bankruptcy cases. The homeowner would then execute the Short Fo rm Deed of Trust and file it with the appropriate county recording o ffice. After receiving a stampe d copy of the deed from the homeowner, Yass would fax a copy of the Shor t Form Deed of Trust, along with a copy5 of the Notice of Bankruptcy Filing for the ca se involving the DBA lis ted in the deed, to the person in charge of the foreclosure sale. Because th e Bankruptcy Code provides for an automatic stay of all collection efforts ag ainst property of the bankruptcy estate during the pendency of a bankruptcy case, see 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), the creditor would cancel the foreclosure sale upon receipt of the documen ts from Yass showing that an entity in bankruptcy held an interest in the property. Th e Government identified eleven fraudulent bankruptcy cases in the District of Kansas that Yass used to carry out this scheme, although in two of those cases the petitions we re intercepted before they were filed. B. Evidence Connecting Blechman to the Scheme Both the Government and Yass, as part of his defense, offered various types of evidence to prove that Blechm an played a role in the fo reclosure stopping scheme. 1. AOL Record, Yahoo! Record , and E-mails Between Yass and “rablechman@aol.com” a. Exhibit 1-BBB – The AOL Record Early in the trial, the G overnment sought to introduce an AOL account record, Exhibit 1-BBB, through Patricia Johnson, an investigator w ith AOL. The purpose of the exhibit was to “show[] that an individual us ing the screen name ‘Rablechman’ who listed a name and address of ‘Robert Blechman, 10736 Jefferson Blvd., Culver City, CA 90230’ established an acco unt with AOL.” (Aple. Br. at 11–12; see also Aplt. Br. at 17 (stating that the purpose of the exhi bit was “to link the email address ‘rablechman@aol.com’ to Blechman”).) Exhib it 1-BBB consisted of three pages. The6 first page showed that someone using the sc reen name “rablechman” logged on to AOL on December 5, 2008, from a Cox Communica tions IP address. The second page indicated that the screen name “rablechman” was associated with a free AOL account. This page also featured a description of free AOL accounts, which read, in part, “Registration information is r ecorded but not verified. Fic titious names and addresses are common.” (ROA, vol. XI at 13 (Gov’t Ex . 1-BBB – AOL accoun t information for “rablechman”).) The third pa ge contained registration in formation for the account corresponding to the screen name “rablechman. ” This page showed that the account was created on May 20, 1998, and that the account was registered to Robert Blechman in Culver City, California. Johnson testified that Exhibit 1-BBB wa s an AOL record kept in the regular course of business, made at or near the tim e of the information recorded, and made by a person with knowledge of AOL’s business. Sh e also testified that AOL regularly records the activity reflected in Exhibit 1-BBB and cr eates reports of that activity. When questioned by defense counsel, however, Johnson admitted th at AOL did not verify who originally input the “subscriber information” contained on the third page of the exhibit and that it could have been “anybody in the world who could access a computer.” (Id. vol. V at 329.) For this reason, Blechman ob jected to admission of Exhibit 1-BBB on hearsay grounds. But the district court overruled the objection, concluding that the exhibit fell within the business records exception to the he arsay rule set forth in Federal Rule of Evid ence 803(6).7 b. Exhibit 1-AAA – The Yahoo! Record Immediately after the district court ad mitted Exhibit 1-BBB, the Government called Yahoo! employee Tracy Hart. The Gove rnment used Hart to introduce Exhibit 1- AAA, a Yahoo! record containing informatio n about two accounts with the log-in names “stopco” and “rablechman,” respectively. This record established that Yass had two email accounts with Yahoo!: “StopCo@yahoo.com” and “iyy101@yahoo.com.” (ROA, vol. V at 349–51; id. vol. XI at 1–2 (Gov’t Ex. 1-A AA – Yahoo! account management tool for “stopco”).) It also showed that Blechman had a Yahoo! e-mail address, “rablechman@yahoo.com,” and an alternate e-mail address, “r ablechman@aol.com.” 1 (Id. vol. V at 352–53; id. vol. XI at 9–10 (Gov’t Ex . 1-AAA – Yahoo! account management tool for “rablechman”).) The di strict court admitted Exhibit 1-AAA without objection. c. E-mails Between Yass and “rablechman@aol.com” Later in the trial, the Government introduc ed a series of e-mail exchanges between Yass (using his e-mail address “iyy101 @yahoo.com”) and the AOL e-mail address “rablechman@aol.com” that took place between June 6, 2006, and August 6, 2007. Collectively, these e-mails tended to show that whoever was using the e-mail address

1 Interestingly, Exhibit 1-AAA indicated that the “rablechman” Yahoo! account was registered to a Ms. Robert Blechman in Culver City, California. Furthermore, whoever originally registered the account purported to be a female. Neither party has attempted to explain this oddity, but it appears to be irrelevant for our purposes since no one disputes that Blechman was the owner of the “rablechman” Yahoo! account.8 “rablechman@aol.com” was an active participant in Yass’ s scheme. For instance, “rablechman@aol.com” answer ed Yass’s questions pertaining to deeds and trustee’s sales, provided the website address where Ya ss could sign up for a PACER account, and supplied Yass with documents such as a revise d Short Form Deed of Trust. Each e-mail from “rablechman@aol.com” featured the following electronic signature block: Robert A. Blechman – Real Estate Agent & Financing Specialist; Case Manager & Paralegal American Realty & Financial Services; and, Michael N. Sofris, A Professional Law Corporation 10736-666 Jefferson Boulevard – Culver C ity, California 90230-4969 [or 90230-4933] Telephone (310) 945-5924 – Facsimile (310) 362-0307 – E-Mail: rablechman@aol.com (ROA, vol. XI at 32–55 (Gov’ t Exs. 1-FFF, 1-GGG, 1-HH H, 1-III, 1-JJJ, 1-KKK, 1-LLL, 1-MMM, 1-NNN, and 1-OOO).) 2 Blechman objected to th ese e-mails on the grounds that any statements by Yass in the e-mail chai ns were not admissible against Blechman as party admissions. The district court gave a limiting instruction to address Blechman’s

concern, 3 and Blechman made no further objec tions (although he did continue his

2 In his Opening Brief, Blechman states th at he was employed as a legal assistant to Michael Sofris, a California attorney.

3 The district court’s instruction prov ided, in pertinent part, as follows: Now, ladies and gentlemen of the jury , this exhibit [1-G GG] is an e-mail from someone using an address that I think the evidence shows belongs to Mr. Yass. There’s—there’s e-mails back and forth. And I think this one is an e-mail message from Mr. Yass or someone using Mr. Yass’ e-mail and then a response e-ma il from Mr. Blechman or somebody using Mr. Blechman’s e-mail account. Now, Mr. Yass’ e-mail to Mr. Blechm an are statements by Mr. Yass. You can consider . . . what Mr. Yass says against Mr. Yass, but you can’t9 original objection). Accordingl y, the district court admitted all of the e-mails offered by the Government. Near the end of the trial, Yass took th e stand in his own defense. On crossexamination of Yass, Blechman’s counsel in troduced a different series of e-mails between Yass and “rablechman@aol.co m.” Some of the e-mails from “rablechman@aol.com” included attachments or links with materials relevant to California real estate practice and foreclos ure law. Others referenced apparently unrelated business transactions. Blechman’s counsel elicited testimony from Yass that Yass received each of these e-mails from Blec hman. The purpose of the e-mails was to show that Blechman was merely providing accurate legal advice to Yass rather than participating in an unlawful scheme. 4

consider it against Mr. Blechman. Conversely, the response e-mail from Mr. Blechman, statements by Mr. Bl echman, you can consider what Mr. Blechman says against him . . . . Yo u can’t consider what Mr. Blechman says against the interest of Mr. Yass. (ROA, vol. V at 719.) Blechman did not object to this instruction.

4 For example, before introducing one of the e-mails, Blechman’s counsel questioned Yass as follows: Now we were talking about your rela tionship with Mr. Blechman and Mr. Sofris. Mr. Blechman gave you some simple legal advice, didn’t he? . . . Your legal assistant essentially? . . . A nd as part of that role, he gave you advice about what was legal and what was not legal in the foreclosure business, right?10 2. PACER Records and Fraudulent Tennessee Bankruptcy Cases a. Blechman’s Use of Yass’s PACER Account The Government’s evidence demonstrated that Yass used the PACER system to assist in carrying out the sc heme to stop foreclosures. 5 PACER records admitted over Blechman’s relevancy objection 6 established that Yass regi stered for a PACER account on June 6, 2006, 7 and was assigned account “ISO725.” These records also showed that account “ISO725” searched all eleven of the fraudulent Kansas bankruptcy cases. (ROA, vol. V at 1514.) When explaining the re levance of this same e-mail to the judge, Blechman’s counsel stated, Mr. Yass is testifying that Mr. Blechm an is engaging in this fraud, yet at the same time he is providing him E-mails about the law that sets out exactly what a foreclosure consultant can do and cannot do . . . . And so Mr. Blechman is providing him inform ation about what he legally can do and what he legally cannot do, which is completely inco nsistent with the idea that he is just this fraudster ignoring the law. (Id. at 1516.)

5 PACER “is an electronic public access se rvice that allows users to obtain case and docket information from fe deral appellate, district an d bankruptcy courts.” P UBLIC A CCESS TO C OURT E LECTRONIC R ECORDS , http://www.pacer.gov/ (last visited Aug. 2, 2011).

6 Blechman objected that the records, which related only to Yass’s PACER account, were irrelevant as to Blechman unless the Government could establish a conspiracy between Blechman and Yass. The di strict court determined that the records were not being offered as coconspirator statements and overruled the objection. Blechman does not appeal that ruling.

7 On that same day, Yass received a blank e-mail from “rablechman@aol.com” with the PACER website addres s in the subject line.11 According to Edward Walsh, a senior analys t with the United States Trustee’s office, Yass needed PACER to access th e Notices of Bankruptcy Filing in the fraudulent cases because the notices could not be mailed to th e invalid addresses listed for the fictitious debtors in the ba nkruptcy petitions. Yass was arrested on February 28, 2008 . But the Government introduced a PACER record, Exhibit 21, showing that someone using account “ISO725” accessed three of the Kansas bankruptcy cases on Ma rch 2, 2008, from IP address 76.87.252.123. 8
This same IP address was associated w ith Blechman’s Yahoo! account—specifically, Exhibit 1-AAA revealed that someone logge d in to the “rablech man” Yahoo! account from this IP address five times between January 29, 20 08, and August 26, 2008. Moreover, Yass testified that he provided Bl echman with his PACER password and that he had an agreement with Blechman whereb y Blechman would use PACER to monitor the bankruptcy cases. b. Blechman’s Connection to Fraudulent Bankruptcy Cases in Tennessee The Government also introduced ev idence showing that Blechman’s mother mailed two bankruptcy petitions to the U.S. Ba nkruptcy Court for the Western District of Tennessee and that Blechman later used his own PACER account to access one of these cases, in addition to other cases filed in th e Western and Eastern Districts of Tennessee.

8 Blechman made the same relevancy objecti on to Exhibit 21 as he did to the other PACER records relating to Yass’s PACER account. See supra note 6. But the district court overruled that objection, and Blechma n does not challenge that ruling on appeal.12 On February 28, 2008, a surv eillance video taken at the post office in Alla Vista, California, captured a woman later identified as Blechman’s mother sending two express mail items to the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Tennessee. These mailings were ostensibly from “Murphy Inve stments” in Bartlett, Tennessee, and “Samuels Productions” in Jack son, Tennessee, respectively. On February 29, 2008, a bankruptcy petition listing “Sean Michael Mur phy” d/b/a “Murphy Investments” as the debtor was filed in the Western District of Tennessee and a ssigned case number 08- 22001. Then, on March 3, 2008, a bankru ptcy petition listing “Martin Ronald Samuels” d/b/a “Samuels Productions” as the debtor was filed in the same court and assigned case number 08-10804. During the early stages of the trial, the Government called Ted Willmann, the manager of the PACER service center in Sa n Antonio, Texas, for the purpose of identifying and establishing a foundation for the admission of three PACER records labeled as Exhibits 22, 23, and 24. Thes e records related to the activity of PACER account “RB1071,” and the Government sough t conditional admission of the records, subject to a later showing of relevancy, in anticipation of placing them before the jury later in the trial to prove that Blechman used PACER to access the Murphy bankruptcy filed by his mother, as well as other bankr uptcies filed in the Western and Eastern Districts of Tennessee.13 i. Exhibit 22 Willmann explained that Exhibit 22 was a “screen capture” from PACER’s “account maintenance application.” (ROA, vol. V at 216; id. vol. XIV at 152 (Gov’t Ex. 22 – PACER account maintenance application for “RB1071”).) Acco rding to Willmann, the record identified the name of an individua l who maintained an ac count with PACER. As Edward Walsh, the analyst in the U.S. Trustee’s office, later clarified, Exhibit 22 specifically showed that PA CER account “RB1071” was re gistered in the name of “Michael N. Sofris, Apc [A Professional Corp oration]”; that “Robert A. Blechman” was the contact person on the account; and that the primary e-mail address for the account was “robert@sofris.com.” (Id. vol. V at 1182–83.) On di rect examination, Willmann testified that Exhibit 22 was a PACER record that was created and kept in the regular course of business. Accordingly, the Go vernment moved for conditional admission of the exhibit under the business records exception to the hear say rule; however, Blechman objected on the grounds that the Government failed to lay an ade quate foundation under Rule 803(6). The district court overrule d the objection and conditionally admitted the exhibit. On cross-examination by Blechman’s counsel, Willmann admitted that the information contained in Exhibit 22 was entered by someone accessing PACER on the Internet and that PACER could not verify th e accuracy of the information: “We do some verification, but I don’t know who filled it out is the person th at they said they were.” (Id. at 228.) The “some verification” mentio ned by Willmann consiste d of (1) sending a14 mailing to the address entered at the time of registration to make sure that the mailing was not returned and (2) checkin g to see if any of the data entered was already associated with another account. Willmann conceded th at this procedure did not verify the authenticity of the user-input information. Although the Government secured cond itional admission of Exhibit 22, the Government never sought to introduce the ex hibit later in the trial. Yass, however, moved for unconditional admissi on of Exhibit 22 when he was cross-examining Walsh during the Government’s case-in-chief. Altho ugh Blechman objected that the exhibit was outside the scope of the Govern ment’s direct examination of Walsh, he did not renew his hearsay objection. The district court ov erruled Blechman’s ne w objection and fully admitted Exhibit 22. ii. Exhibits 23 and 24 Willmann similarly testified that Exhibits 23 and 24 were business records of PACER. According to Willma nn, these exhibits showed that a specific account, “RB1071,” accessed particular cases through PA CER. (ROA, vol. V at 218, 220; id. vol. XIV at 159–60, 166 (Gov’t Exs. 23, 24 – PACER account activity records for “RB1071”).) The exhibits also included the sa me registration and contact information for account “RB1071” as did Exhibit 22. Additionally, both exhibits featured lists of all of the accounts that accessed certain cases th rough PACER. Finally , as Walsh later explained, the last page of each exhibit wa s a summary that he had prepared showing only activity for account “RB1071.”15 Walsh also clarified the content and purpose of these exhibits: Exhibit 23 contained information for bankruptcy cases in the Western District of Tennessee, while Exhibit 24 contained informa tion for bankruptcy cases in the Eastern District of Tennessee. Furthermore, according to Wals h, the Tennessee bankruptcies “matched a similar pattern as these cases in Kansas.” (Id. vol. V at 1313.) Thus, these exhibits showed that someone using PACER accoun t “RB1071,” which was associated with Michael Sofris and Robert Blechman, accessed Tennessee bankruptcy cases similar to the Kansas bankruptcies involved in the scheme described in the indictment. One of the cases that account “R B1071” accessed in the Western District of Tennessee was case number 08-22001, the Murphy bankruptcy that Blechman’s mother filed. The Government moved for conditional ad mission of Exhibits 23 and 24 under Rule 803(6) based on Willmann’s testimony. Blechman lodged the same hearsay objection to these exhibits as he did to E xhibit 22, but the district court conditionally admitted both exhibits, finding that the Government laid an adequate foundation under the business records exception. As with Exhibit 22, how ever, the Government never moved for unconditional admissi on of Exhibits 23 and 24. Instead, Yass did so when Walsh was testifying as a witness for Yass duri ng Yass’s defense-in-chief. At that time, Blechman’s counsel informed the court that he had no objection to the admission of the exhibits. Thus, the district court fully admitted Exhib its 23 and 24.16 3. Postal Money Orders The Government called Karen Thompson, an employee at the post office in Alla Vista, California, to testify regarding Blechman’s purchase of postal money orders corresponding to three of the fraudulent bankruptcy cases in Kansas. Thompson identified a series of still photos printed from a post-office surveillance video taken on January 10, 2008, between 1:52 P.M. and 1:59 P.M. These photos depicted a heavyset man with glasses at “Clerk No. 7’s” window in the post office. Thompson also identified four money orders, two of which were purch ased from “Clerk No. 7” on the same date and at the same time when the surveillance video was taken. 9 Three of the four money orders were made payable to bankruptcy courts in Kansas in the amount of $54.00 and contained notations indicating that the money was intended as an in stallment payment for the bankruptcy filing fee. 10 Each of these three money orde rs purported to be from one of the fictitious debtors in the fra udulent bankruptcy cases. The individual who purchase d the money orders on January 10, 2008, also sent priority mail items to Wichita, Kansas, and Ba ltimore, Maryland, at the same time and as part of the same purchase transaction. Barry Rausch, an investigator with the U.S. Postal Inspection Service, identified Blechman as th e individual in the su rveillance video and

9 The other two money orders were purchased on December 11, 2007.

10 The fourth money order was made paya ble to the U.S. Bankruptcy Court in Baltimore, Maryland, and was intended as the first instal lment payment for case number 08-10557.17 photos who purchased the two mo ney orders and sent the prio rity mail packages. Rausch further testified that the mailing to Wichita, Kansas, was associated with the filing of a fraudulent bankruptcy petition. Debra Cam pbell, an expert in forensic document examination, also testified on behalf of th e Government. Having compared Blechman’s handwriting samples to the writing on the four postal money orders identified by Thompson, she opined that Blechman pr epared all of the money orders. 4. Yass’s Trial Testimony As noted above, Yass testified in his ow n defense during the trial. During his testimony, he blamed Blechman for all of the fraudulent bankruptcies: I’m innocent. . . . And I want to sh ow how Mr. Robert Blechman has used my trust in him to plant a virus within my business in order to crash it. And the way he did that was by provi ding me with fake, fraudulent bankruptcies. Instead of giving me real ones like he was purchasing businesses and then filing them into bankruptcies, he just gave me fraudulent ones. Like time bombs that are exploding now. (ROA, vol. V at 1347.) Yass cl aimed that he did not know that any of the bankruptcies were fraudulent until he was arrested. Inst ead, he believed that Blechman was putting real companies into bankrup tcy and allowing him to use the company names to stop foreclosures. Yass testified that he paid Bl echman $500 per bankruptcy and that part of Blechman’s role was to keep track of th e bankruptcies, which is why he provided Blechman with his PACER password. Yass also stated that Blechman acted as his “legal counselor.” (Id. at 1514.)18 C. Verdict and Post-trial Proceedings On January 16, 2009, the ju ry found both defendants guilty of all thirteen counts charged in the indictment. On January 22, 2009, Blechman m oved for judgment of acquittal on the identity theft co unts (Counts 8–13) and on the conspiracy count (Count 1) to the extent that it charged conspiracy to co mmit aggravated identity theft. The district court granted the motion on July 6, 2009, and vacated Blechm an’s conviction as to those

counts. 11 On January 4, 2010, the district cour t sentenced Blechman to eighteen months’ imprisonment on each of the remaining counts, to be served concurrently. This appeal followed. III. DISCUSSION On appeal, Blechman argues that the dist rict court erred in admitting Exhibit 1- BBB (the AOL record) and Exhibits 22, 23, and 24 (the PACER records) under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6), the business record s exception to the hearsay rule. He contends that because the critical, user-identifying info rmation in all of these records was input by a third party over the Internet and was not verified by AOL or PACER, the exhibits contained inadmissible double hearsay and sh ould have been excl uded. Further, he argues that he was harmed by admission of the exhibits because they constituted the primary evidence linking him to Yass’s scheme . Although we agree with Blechman that

11 The basis for Blechman’s motion for ju dgment of acquittal and the district court’s order granting that motion is not relevant to this appeal.19 the district court erroneously admitted the challenged exhibits u nder Rule 803(6), we conclude that the error was harmless to Blechman. 12

12 Blechman also claims that the district court erroneously admitted the e-mails from “rablechman@aol.com” to Yass that the Government offered to show that Blechman was an active participant in Yass’ s scheme. According to Blechman, if Exhibit 1-BBB had been excluded, there woul d have been insufficient foundation for the admission of these e-mails. Blechman did not object to the admission of the e-mails on foundation grounds below, so we review this argument only for plain error. See United States v. Hasan , 526 F.3d 653, 660–61 (10th Cir. 2008) (“[W]hen a party fails to preserve an issue before the district court, our review is . . . limited to ascertaining whether the error charged on appeal qualifies as plain erro r.”). For several reasons, we conclude that Blechman has not come close to meeting his heavy burden of demons trating plain error. First, in his briefs to this Court, th e entirety of Blechman’s discussion of the foundation issue consists of a conclusory st atement at the end of the section of his Opening Brief concerning the impropriety of admitting Exhibit 1-BBB under Rule 803(6): Because the exclusion of Exhibit 1-BBB would have eliminated the evidentiary link between the name “Robert Blechman” and the e-mail address “rablechman@aol.com,” then there would not have been a sufficient foundation fo r the admission of th e e-mails marked as Government Exhibits 1-FFF, 1-GGG, 1-HHH, 1-III, 1-JJJ, 1-KKK, 1-LLL, 1-MMM, 1-NNN, 1-OOO. Therefore, the admission of those e-mails was also error. (Aplt. Br. at 31–32.) Blechman has neither mentioned the plain-error standard nor made any attempt to show how he can satisfy that standard. “[T] he failure to argue for plain error and its application on appeal . . . sure ly marks the end of th e road for an argument for reversal not first presented to the dist rict court.” Richison v. Ernest Grp., Inc. , 634 F.3d 1123, 1131 (10th Cir. 2011). Second, it is not clear that Exhibit 1-B BB constituted the founda tion (or even part of the foundation) for the admission of the e- mails. Blechman has cited no portion of the record to support this assertion.20 A. Standard of Review “We review a district court’s evidentia ry rulings for an abuse of discretion, considering the record as a whol e.” United States v. Ledford , 443 F.3d 702, 707 (10th Cir. 2005). Given the fact- and case-specifi c nature of hearsay determinations, “our review of those decisions is ‘especially deferential.’” United States v. Hamilton , 413 F.3d 1138, 1142 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Chavez , 229 F.3d 946, 950 (10th Cir. 2000)). Moreover, “if a party objects to a district court’s hearsay ruling based solely on the Federal Rules of Evidence, we review for nonconstituti onal harmless error.” Ledford , 443 F.3d at 707. Because Blechman timely objected to the introduction of Exhibit 1-BBB on hearsay grounds, the parties ag ree that we review the distri ct court’s ruling admitting that exhibit under the abuse-of-discretion standa rd. With regard to the PACER records (Exhbits 22, 23, and 24), however, the Gove rnment argues that we should review

Third, and on a related note, Blechman has not addressed whether sources other than Exhibit 1-BBB may have provided an adequate foundation for the admission of the e-mails, including, for example, the “dis tinctive characteristics” of the e-mails themselves. See United States v. Safavian , 435 F. Supp. 2d 36, 39–40 (D.D.C. 2006) (explaining that e-mails may be authenticat ed by examination of their “distinctive characteristics,” including e-mail addresses “contain[ing] the name of the person connected to the address” and the appearance of “the name of the sender or recipient in the bodies of the e-mail, in the signature blocks at the end of the e-ma il, [or] in the ‘To:’ and ‘From:’ headings” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Under these circumstances, the district c ourt did not plainly e rr in admitting the emails introduced by the Government. Accord ingly, we assume that the e-mails were properly admitted.21 Blechman’s challenge for plain error beca use Blechman failed to renew his hearsay objection to these exhibits when Yass offered them for full admission after the Government had already ach ieved conditional admission un der Rule 803(6). We disagree. We begin our analysis by brie fly recapping the sequence of events that led to the admission of the PACER records. After Te d Willmann, the PACER manager, testified that Exhibits 22, 23, and 24 were business records of PACER, the Government moved for conditional admission of those exhibits subject to a later showing of relevance. In other words, the Government sought a ruling from the district court th at Willmann’s testimony established an adequate foundation for the ad mission of the exhibits under Rule 803(6) and that the exhibits could come in upon a sh owing of relevance. Blechman objected to the admission of each of the exhibits on the grounds that the Government had not demonstrated that the exhibits met the require ments of Rule 803(6). But the district court overruled Blechman’s objections and conditionally admitted th e PACER records “subject to later determination of relevance or later s howing of relevance.” (ROA, vol. V at 216.) Later in the trial, Yass, not the Government , sought full admission of Exhibit 22 so that he could publish it to the jury. At that time, Blechman did not renew his hearsay objection. Even later, Yass moved for uncond itional admission of Ex hibits 23 and 24. Again, Blechman did not re new his hearsay objection. Federal Rule of Evidence 103 states th at “[o]nce the court makes a definitive ruling on the record admitting or excluding evidence, . . . a party need not renew an22 objection . . . to preserve a claim of error for appeal.” Fed. R. Ev id. 103(a). Under the circumstances described above, we conclude that the district court’s ruling on the issue of the admissibility of Exhibits 22, 23, and 24 under Rule 803(6) was sufficiently “definitive” that Blechman was not required to renew his hearsay obj ection in order to preserve that issue for appeal. Although th e district court did not decide the ultimate admissibility of the records at the time of Blechman’s objec tion, reserving the relevancy determination for a later point in the tria l, the court unequivocally ruled that the Government had laid an adequate founda tion for the admission of the PACER records under Rule 803(6). That determinati on was not conditioned upon subsequent developments at trial, nor did the district court suggest that it would be open to reconsidering the matter later. Thus, any re newed objection by Blechman to the district court’s hearsay ruling “would [have been] in the nature of a formal exception and therefore unnecessary.” United States v. Mejia-Alarcon , 995 F.2d 982, 986 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding, in the analogous context of motio ns in limine, that a lthough “[a] pretrial motion in limine to exclude evidence will not always preserve an ob jection for appellate review,” such a motion “may pr eserve an objection when the issue (1) is fairly presented to the district court, (2) is the type of i ssue that can be finally decided in a pretrial hearing, and (3) is ruled upon without equivo cation by the trial judge”). Furthermore, a renewed objection may have am ounted to “a needless provoca tion of the trial judge, not to mention a distracting interru ption during the trial.” Id. ; see also United States v. Harrison , 296 F.3d 994, 1002 (10th Cir. 2002) (hol ding that although the district court’s23 pretrial ruling admitting hearsay statements u nder an exception to the hearsay rule “was conditional, rather than defin itive, because it still required the prosecution to establish the credentials and methods of [the testifying ag ent],” the defendant was not required to renew his hearsay objection at trial because “the court made clear to defense counsel that it did not wish to hear repetitive argument on the matter”). Accordingly, we hold that Blechman adequately preserved his hearsay challenge to the ad mission of the PACER records, and so we review th at ruling by the district court under the abuse-of-discretion standard as well. B. Layered Hearsay and th e Business Records Exception The Federal Rules of Evidence define “h earsay” as “a statem ent, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the tr ial or hearing, offere d in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Fed. R. Ev id. 801(c). Hearsay is generally inadmissible unless it falls within a specific ex ception to the hearsay rule. See Fed. R. Evid. 802. In this case, it is undisputed that the AOL record and PACER records were offered to prove the truth of the matters asserted in these documents—namely, that Blechman was the registered owner of the “rablech man@aol.com” e-mail address and that Blechman was associated with PACER accou nt “RB1071,” which someone used to access fraudulent bankruptcy cases in Tennessee. Accordingly, th e records constitute hearsay. Nevertheless, the district court admitte d the records under the business records exception to the hearsay rule, which provides that certain records of regularly conducted24 business activity are admissible fo r their truth even though they contain hearsay. Fed. R. Evid. 803(6). 13 To satisfy the business re cords exception, a record must (1) have been prepar ed in the normal course of business; (2) have been made at or near th e time of the events record ed; (3) be based on the personal knowledge of the entrant or of a person who had a business duty to transmit the information to the entrant; and (4) indicate the sources, methods and circumstances by whic h the record was made were trustworthy. United States v. Ary , 518 F.3d 775, 786 (10th Cir. 2008 ). Blechman argues that Exhibit 1-BBB and Exhibits 22, 23, and 24 do not meet these requirements because the records feature “double” or “layered” hearsay in the fo rm of unverified user-input information.

13 Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6) provides as follows: The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule . . . .:

. . . . (6) Records of Regularly Conducted Activity. --A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in a ny form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity , and if it was the regular practice of that business activity to make the memorandum, report, record or data compilation, all as shown by the te stimony of the custodian or other qualified witness, or by certification th at complies with Rule 902(11), Rule 902(12), or a statute permitting cer tification, unless the source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness. The term “business” as used in this paragraph includes business, institution, association, pr ofession, occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or not conducted for profit.25 “Double hearsay in the context of a busin ess record exists wh en the record is prepared by an employ ee with information supplied by anot her person.” United States v. Gwathney , 465 F.3d 1133, 1141 (10t h Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). If the person who provides the in formation is an outsider to the business who is not under a business duty to provide accurate information, then the reliab ility rationale that underlies the business records exception ordi narily does not apply. See Ary , 518 F.3d at 787 (“The essential component of the busin ess records exception is that each actor in the chain of information is under a business duty or compul sion to provide accurate information. If any person in the process is not acting in the re gular course of business, then an essential link in the trustworthiness chain fails.” (ellip sis, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also United States v. Snyder , 787 F.2d 1429, 1433 –34 (10th Cir. 1986) (“The business records exception is based on a presumption of accuracy, accorded because the information is part of a regularly conducted activity, kept by those trained in the habits of precision, and customarily ch ecked for correctness, and because of the accuracy demanded in the conduct of the na tion’s business. The reason underlying the business records exception fails, however, if any of the participants is outside the pattern of regularity of activity.” (citation and intern al quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, the general rule is that “[a] ny information provided by . . . an outsider to the business preparing the record[] must itself fall within a hearsay ex ception to be admissible.” Gwathney , 465 F.3d at 1141; see also Fed. R. Evid. 805 (“He arsay included within26 hearsay is not excluded under the hearsay rule if each part of the combined statements conforms with an exception to the hearsa y rule provided in these rules.”). This Court, however, has recognized one exception to the general rule: information provided by an outsider that is included in a business record may come in under the business records exception “[i]f the business entity has adequate verification or other assurance of accuracy of the informati on provided by the ou tside person.” United States v. McIntyre , 997 F.2d 687, 700 (10th Cir. 1993); see also United States v. Cestnik , 36 F.3d 904, 908 (10th Ci r. 1994). In the context of iden tity information provided by an outsider, we have identified “two ways to demonstrate this ‘guarantee[] of trustworthiness’: (1) proof that the business has a policy of verifying [the accuracy of information provided by someone outside the business]; or (2) proof that the business possesses ‘a sufficient self-interes t in the accuracy of the [reco rd]’ to justify an inference of trustworthiness.” Cestnik , 36 F.3d at 908 (some altera tions in original) (quoting McIntyre , 997 F.2d at 700). Applying these principles, we conclude that the distri ct court erred in admitting Exhibit 1-BBB and Exhibits 22, 23, and 24 under Rule 803(6). It is undisputed that the crucial information in the AOL and PACE R records—specifical ly, the information concerning the identity of the user of th e “rablechman” AOL account and the user of PACER account “RB1071”—was pr ovided by a third pa rty over the Internet, not by an employee of AOL or PACER. Thus, the G overnment was required to demonstrate the trustworthiness of the info rmation in one of the two ways mentioned above. See United27 States v. Samaniego , 187 F.3d 1222, 1224 (10th Cir. 1999) (“The obligation of establishing the applicability of a hearsay exception for these re cords falls upon the government as the proponent of the evidence.”). But the record makes clear that neith er AOL nor PACER made a meaningful attempt to verify the identity of the person who submitted the information. Beginning with AOL, Patricia Johnson, the AOL investig ator, admitted that AOL did not verify who input the “subscriber informatio n” contained on the third page of Exhibit 1-BBB and that it could have been “anybody in the world who could access a computer.” (ROA, vol. V at 329.) Moreover, Exhibit 1-BBB states in no uncertain terms that AOL made no effort to verify the identity of the individual who registered the “rablechman” account: “Registration information is r ecorded but not verified. Fic titious names and addresses are common.” (Id. vol. XI at 13 (Gov’t Ex. 1-BB B – AOL account information for “rablechman”).) With respect to PACE R, Ted Willmann, the PACER manager, acknowledged that PACER did no more than ensure that whoever created account “RB1071” entered a valid mailing address and did not provide iden tifying information matching that of an existing user. PACE R took no steps, however, to verify the authenticity of the identifying information. Furthermore, nothi ng in the record suggests—and the Government does not ar gue—that either AOL or PACER “had a sufficiently compelling self-int erest in ensuring the accuracy of information filled out by [their] customers to justify an in ference of reliability.” Cestnik , 36 F.3d at 908. If anything, the record reveals that AOL and PACER were unint erested in the accuracy of28 the user-input information. For these re asons, the district c ourt improperly admitted Exhibit 1-BBB and Exhibits 22, 23, 24 und er the business record s exception to the hearsay rule. 14

14 The Government raises one alternative gr ound for affirming the district court’s admission of Exhibit 1-BBB. Specifically, the Government argues that Exhibit 1-BBB was transformed from hearsay into admissible no n-hearsay under Rule 801(d)(2)(B) later in the trial when Blechman allegedly manifest ed his belief in the tr uth of the information contained in that exhibit. Rule 801(d)(2)(B) pr ovides that “[a] statem ent is not hearsay if . . . [t]he statement is offered against a party and is . . . a statement of which the party has manifested an adoption or belief in its truth.” According to the Government, [T]he defendant’s introduction of six e-mails from rablechman@aol.com to Yass during his cross-examination of Yass, along with his eliciting from Yass that each e-mail came from the defendant, ma nifested a belief in the truth of the information in Exhibit 1-BBB establishing an evidentiary link between the name “Robert Blec hman” and the e-mail address “rablechman@aol.com.” Thus, once th e defendant introduced his first email from rablechman@aol.com . . . and solicited from Yass that this email came from the defendant, Governme nt’s Exhibit 1-BBB ceased to be hearsay, and the basis for the defenda nt’s objection evaporated altogether because an adoptiv e admission under Rule 801( d)(2)(B) “is not hearsay.” (Aple. Br. at 31–32 (citation omitted).) This Court may , of course, uphold the district c ourt’s admission of evidence “on any ground that finds support in the record, even where the lower court reached its conclusion[] from a different or even erroneous course of reasoning.” Ledford , 443 F.3d at 707 (internal quotation marks omitted). In this case, however, we need not decide whether Exhibit 1-BBB “ceased to be hearsay” at some point after the district court’s erroneous admission of the exhibit under Rule 803(6), as we can affirm Blechman’s convictions on harmless-error grounds. See United States v. McHorse , 179 F.3d 889, 901 (10th Cir. 1999) (“We may a ffirm if the evidence was ad missible on any ground or if the erroneous admission of the evidence was ha rmless error.” (emphasis added)).29 C. Harmless Error That the district court erroneously ad mitted Exhibit 1-BBB an d Exhibits 22, 23, and 24 as business records does not automatically entitle Blech man to relief. We will not reverse a defendant’s convicti on on the basis of the district court’s erroneous admission of hearsay evidence if the error was harmless to the defendant. See Ledford , 443 F.3d at 712. As mentioned above, when a defendant objects to a district court’s admission of hearsay “based solely on the Federal Rules of Evidence,” we apply the nonconstitutional harmless error standard. 15 Id. at 707. Under that standard, “[ a] harmless error is one that does not have a substantial influence on the out come of the trial; nor does it leave one in grave doubt as to whether it had such effect.” United States v. Collins , 575 F.3d 1069, 1073 (10th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Cestnik , 36 F.3d at 910 (“A nonconstitutional error, such as the erroneous admission of evidence under a well-established exception to the hearsay ru le, is harmless unless it had a substantial influence on the outcome or l eaves one in grave doubt as to whether it had such effect.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). We “r eview[] the record as a whole de novo to evaluate whether the error [was] harmless, ex amining the context, timing, and use of the erroneously admitted evidence at trial and how it compares to properly admitted

15 If a defendant objects to a hearsay statem ent on the ground that admission of the statement violates his rights under the Confrontation Clause , “we apply the constitutional harmless error standard of review.” United States v. Joe , 8 F.3d 1488, 1497 (10th Cir. 1993). Under that standard, “[a] constitutional error may be deemed harmless only if it was ‘harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id. (quoting Chapman v. California , 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)).30 evidence.” United States v. Hanzlicek , 187 F.3d 1228, 1237 (1 0th Cir. 1999); see also United States v. Flanagan , 34 F.3d 949, 955 (10th Cir. 19 94) (“[W]e must perform our harmless error analysis by judg ing the evidence in the contex t of all of the evidence presented at trial.”). The burden is on the Government to prove that the nonconstitutional error was harmless. Ledford , 443 F.3d at 712. 1. Exhibit 1-BBB We first consider the improperly admitte d AOL account record. Blechman argues that the admission of Exhibit 1-BBB harmed him because the exhibit linked him to the email address “rablechman@aol.co m,” which allowed the jury to conclude that he was the person who was sending incriminating e-mail s to Yass. The Government contends, however, that the admission of Exhibit 1-BBB could not have influenced the outcome of the trial because other overwhelmi ng evidence linked Blechman to the “rablechman@aol.com” e-mail address. We are persuaded by the Government’s argument. Several other pieces of evidence that were properly adm itted during the course of the trial connected Blech man to the “rablechman@aol. com” e-mail address, which undermines his claim that Exhibit 1-BBB in fluenced the outcome of the trial. See United States v. Clifton , 406 F.3d 1173, 1179 (10th Cir. 2 005) (“Where the wrongly admitted evidence was cumulative of ot her properly admitted evidence, it is less likely to have injuriously influenced the ju ry’s verdict.” (alteration a nd internal quotation marks omitted)); Flanagan , 34 F.3d at 955 (concluding that the district court’s erroneous admission of testimony indicating that the de fendant was involved in a prior scam was31 harmless because “evidence of [the defendan t’s] involvement in the [prior] scam was properly admitted elsewh ere in the record”). We start with the e-mails themselves. 16 Not only is Blechman’s name in the “rablechman@aol.com” e-mail address, but each e-mail from “rab lechman@aol.com” contained the following signature block, whic h plainly identifies Blechman as the sender: Robert A. Blechman – Real Estate Agent & Financing Specialist; Case Manager & Paralegal American Realty & Financial Services; and, Michael N. Sofris, A Professional Law Corporation 10736-666 Jefferson Boulevard – Culver C ity, California 90230-4969 [or 90230-4933] Telephone (310) 945-5924 – Facsimile (310) 362-0307 – E-Mail: rablechman@aol.com (ROA, vol. XI at 32–55 (Gov’ t Exs. 1-FFF, 1-GGG, 1-HH H, 1-III, 1-JJJ, 1-KKK, 1-LLL, 1-MMM, 1-NNN, and 1-OOO).) Thus, the e- mails provided some evidence that Blechman was the user of the “rable chman@aol.com” e-mail address. Furthermore, Exhibit 1-AAA, the Yahoo! account record, contained the exact same information that Blechman finds objec tionable in Exhibit 1-BBB. Specifically, Exhibit 1-AAA showed that Blechman ma intained “rablechma n@aol.com” as an alternate e-mail address to his “rablechman@ya hoo.com” address. (ROA, vol. XI at 9– 10 (Gov’t Ex. 1-AAA – Yahoo ! account management tool for “rablechman”).). Blechman did not object to the district court’s admission of this exhibit, nor does he challenge its admission on appeal.

16 As noted above, Blechman has not show n plain error in the admission of the emails, so we assume that they were properly before the jury. See supra note 12.32 Finally, Blechman himself introduced evidence indicating that “rablechman@aol.com” was his e-mail address. When cro ss-examining Yass, Blechman offered a series of e-mails from “rablech man@aol.com” to Yass for the purpose of showing that he did no more than provide accurate legal advice to Yass. Blechman elicited testimony from Yass that each of thes e allegedly exculpatory e-mails was sent by Blechman. Thus, Blechman affirmatively put before the jury evidence of the link between himself and “rable chman@aol.com” in order to advance his defense. In light of all of the properly ad mitted evidence linking Blechman to the “rablechman@aol.com” e-mail address, we c onclude that the Government has met its burden of demonstrating that the district c ourt’s erroneous admission of Exhibit 1-BBB was harmless to Blechman. 2. Exhibits 22, 23, and 24 We next turn to the PACER records. Blechman contends that the admission of Exhibits 22, 23, and 24 harmed him because th ey showed that he was the individual using
PACER account “RB1071” to “mon itor[] fraudulent [bankruptc y] petitions in Tennessee that mirrored the content and form of the [Kan sas] petitions that were the subject of the Indictment.” (Aplt. R. Br. at 7.) The G overnment, by contrast, argues that the evidence against Blechman was overwhelming and that “[ t]he introduction of records showing that [Blechman] accessed fraudulen t bankruptcy cases in Tenn essee with his own PACER account did not appreciably add to the collective weight of th is overwhelming evidence.” (Aple. Br. at 41.) We agree with the Govern ment. Given the amount of other evidence33 in the record that more directly linked Blechman to Yass’s sc heme and the Kansas bankruptcies identified in the indictment, we must reject Blechman’s argument that admission of these exhibits influe nced the outcome of the trial. Our cases recognize that the probative va lue of the erroneously admitted evidence and the overall strength of the other evidence against the defe ndant are critical factors in the harmless-error analysis. See, e.g. , United States v. Pursley , 577 F.3d 1204, 1227 (10th Cir. 2009) (holding that admission of an exhibit was harmless where, among other things, the exhibit “offered little probative ev idence” of the defendant’s guilt); United
States v. Perez , 989 F.2d 1574, 1583–84 (10th Cir. 1 993) (en banc) (holding that the district court’s erroneous admission of h earsay statements was harmless because the evidence of the defendant’s guilt was “ove rwhelming”). Here, the challenged PACER records showed that Blechman was involved w ith fraudulent bankruptcies in Tennessee, but they did not connect him to the fraudulent Kansas cases that formed the basis for the charges against him. Thus, as Blechman hi mself acknowledges, the records had “slim (if any) evidentiary relevancy.” 17 (Aplt. Br. at 16.) Moreov er, all of the following, more probative evidence demonstrated Blechman’s i nvolvement in the scheme described in the indictment: (1) Blechman’s e-mails to Yass; (2) the photos, other documentary evidence, and testimony indicating that Blechman filled out and mailed money orders in the names

17 This may explain why th e Government never moved for full admission of the exhibits.34 of fictitious debtors in the Kansas bankru ptcy cases; (3) a different PACER record, Exhibit 21, revealing that someone using Yass’s PACER ac count after Yass’s arrest accessed three of the Kansas bankruptcies from an IP address associated with Blechman’s Yahoo! account; and (4) Yass’s trial testimony de scribing Blechman’s role in the scheme. In view of this evidence and the minimal pr obative value of Exhib its 22, 23, and 24, we are convinced that the admission of th ose exhibits was harmless to Blechman. 18
IV. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM Blechman’s convictions for mail fraud and conspiracy to commit mail fraud.

18 Although Blechman does not use the term , his Opening Brief can be read as raising a cumulative-error argument. (See Aplt. Br. at 33 (“The exhibits from AOL and PACER, and the other exhibits for which th ey served as foundation evidence, taken together had a substantial infl uence on the outcome of the tr ial.”).) “A cumulative-error analysis merely aggregates al l the errors that individua lly have been found to be harmless, and therefore not reversible, and it analyzes whether thei r cumulative effect on the outcome of the trial is such that collectively they can no longer be determined to be harmless.” United States v. Rivera , 900 F.2d 1462, 1470 (10th Cir. 1990) (en banc). We conclude that the district court’s errors in admitting Exhibit 1-BBB and Exhibits 22, 23, and 24 were harmless even wh en considered collectively.10-3034 - United States v. Blechman HARTZ , Circuit Judge, concurring: I fully join Judg e Ebel’s opinion. I write separate ly only to point out that if the challenged documents had been properly o ffered for admission, the embedded-hearsay problem could have been av oided. Although the documents were not admissible as assertions that the e-mail address was Blechman ’s, they were admissible to show that the e-mail address belonged to someone who claime d to be Blechman and provided his name and street address. I recognize that almost 20 years ago in United States v. McIntyre , 997 F.2d 687 (10th Cir. 1993), we rejected the view of the Second Circuit in United States v. Lieberman , 637 F.2d 95, 101 (1980), which upheld the admission of a hotel guest card for the nonhearsay purpose of showing that th e person who registered used a particular name (not that the person who registered was the person named). We said that there was no distinction between (1) offering a motel re gistration card to prove that the defendant herself checked into the hotel and (2) offering the card to pr ove that someone claiming to have the same name as the defe ndant checked in to the motel. See McIntyre , 997 F.2d at 699 n.9. Since then, we have explained our holding in McIntyre as based on a concern “that offering an asserted id entity to prove that the name d individual took the action in question, or merely to prove that someone cl aiming to be the named individual took the action in question, was simply an artificial, semantic distinction that factfinders would2 likely find indistinguishable.” United States v. Cestnik , 36 F.3d 904, 908 n.3 (1994); see United States v. Moreno , 94 F.3d 1453, 1455 (10th Cir. 1996). In recent years, however, the public ha s been bombarded with tales of identity theft. What might have been a subtle distin ction in decades past, is now almost a matter of common sense. Jurors would be likely to use the documents only for their proper nonhearsay purpose. They will know very well that someone other than Blechman may have opened an email account in Blechman’s name. They will want additional evidence before deciding that the person who opened the account was indeed Blechman. But when they make their decision, th ey should be permitted to consider the identification information used by whoever opened the account. Indeed, our opinion in this case recognizes that the presence of sufficient identifying information (the signature block on Blechman’s e-mail, see Op. at 31) would suggest that the person providing that information was the identified pe rson. In sum, I do not think that a district court would be abusing its discretion in admitting such evidence for th e nonhearsay purpose if it found that the likelihood of ju ry confusion was minimal.