United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Testimony before the Committee on 

Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 

U.S. Senate

AVIATION SECURITY

Enhancements Made in 

Passenger and Checked 

Baggage Screening, but 

Challenges Remain 

Statement of Cathleen A. Berrick, Director, 

Homeland Security and Justice Issues 

For Release on Delivery

Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT 

Tuesday, April 4, 2006

 

GAO-06-371T 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

April 4, 2006

AVIATION SECURITY

Enhancements Made in Passenger and 

Checked Baggage Screening, but 

Challenges Remain 

Highlights of GAO-06-371T, a testimony 

before the Committee on Commerce, 

Science, and Transportation, U.S. Senate 

Securing commercial aviation is a 

daunting task—with hundreds of 

airports, thousands of aircraft, and 

thousands of flights daily carrying 

millions of passengers and pieces

of checked baggage. It has been 

over 3 years since the

Transportation Security

Administration (TSA) assumed

responsibility for passenger and 

baggage screening at commercial

airports. This testimony focuses on 

the progress TSA is making in 

strengthening airline passenger and 

checked baggage screening and the 

challenges that remain. 

Particularly, this testimony 

highlights TSA’s efforts to 

(1) enhance the performance, 

management, and deployment of

the transportation security officer 

(TSO) workforce; (2) strengthen 

procedures for screening 

passengers and checked baggage; 

and (3) leverage and deploy 

screening technologies. 

What GAO Recommends

In prior reports, GAO has made

numerous recommendations

designed to strengthen aviation 

security, to include passenger and 

checked baggage screening

operations. TSA generally agreed

with our recommendations and is 

taking actions to implement them.

GAO also has several ongoing

reviews related to the issues 

addressed in this testimony, and 

will issue separate reports related 

to these areas at later dates, with 

additional recommendations as 

appropriate. 

TSA has taken steps to enhance the TSO workforce’s performance, 

management, and deployment, yet continues to face challenges in allocating

staff and ensuring that training is available. For example, TSA developed a 

Screening Allocation Model to determine TSO staffing levels at commercial

airports. However, some assumptions in the model—such as that 20 percent 

of the TSO workforce will be part-time—may be flawed, given that federal 

security directors (the lead TSA authorities at U.S. airports) have had 

difficulty filling this quota and some said they have not been able to hire up 

to their authorized staffing levels. In addition, while TSA has taken steps to 

improve the training offered to its TSO workforce, insufficient staffing and a 

lack of electronic connectivity to access on-line learning have prevented 

TSOs from taking full advantage of training opportunities. 

TSA is proposing changes to its screening procedures to enhance detection 

capabilities in part based on risk assessments, as GAO has previously 

advocated. Since April 2005, TSA has gathered, vetted, and tested a variety of 

new procedures for passenger and baggage screening. Some passenger 

screening procedure changes are based on risk-related factors, including 

results of covert (undercover, unannounced) tests that are designed to 

reveal system vulnerabilities. Our ongoing work on how TSA makes these 

changes indicates that TSA could do more evaluation to ensure the changes 

achieve the desired results. 

TSA has taken steps to develop and deploy technologies to strengthen 

commercial aviation security; however, challenges in funding and planning 

have created impediments to implementation. For example, TSA has 

deployed explosives detection systems—either stand-alone or incorporated 

in-line with baggage conveyor systems—to detect explosives in checked 

baggage. A TSA cost-benefit analysis of the in-line systems being installed at 

9 airports showed that they could yield significant savings for the federal 

government. However, their deployment has been hampered by a lack of 

planning and funding strategies. TSA is currently assessing financing options 

to support the deployment of in-line systems and has begun prioritizing 

which airports would benefit from their deployment. 

Source: FAA.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-371T.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Cathleen A. 

Berrick at (202) 512-3404 or

berrickc@gao.gov. 
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: 

I appreciate the opportunity to participate in today’s hearing to discuss the 

progress made and challenges remaining in the physical screening of 

airline passengers and their checked baggage, and in the deployment of 

explosive detection technologies. Securing commercial aviation is a 

daunting task—with hundreds of airports, thousands of aircraft, and 

thousands of flights daily carrying millions of passengers and pieces of 

checked baggage. The Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), 

enacted on November 19, 2001, created the Transportation Security 

Administration (TSA) and mandated actions designed to strengthen 

aviation security, including requiring that TSA assume responsibility for 

conducting passenger and checked baggage screening at over 

400 commercial airports in the United States by November 19, 2002. It has 

been over 3 years since TSA assumed this responsibility, and the agency 

has spent billions of dollars and implemented a wide range of initiatives to

strengthen the key components of its passenger and checked baggage 

screening systems—people, processes, and technology. These components 

are interconnected and are critical to the overall security of commercial 

aviation. 

My testimony today focuses on the progress TSA is making in 

strengthening airline passenger and checked baggage screening, and the 

challenges that remain. In particular, my testimony highlights four key 

areas, including TSA’s efforts to (1) enhance the performance of the 

transportation security officer (TSO—formerly referred to as screeners) 

workforce and manage and deploy the TSO workforce; (2) strengthen 

procedures for screening passengers and checked baggage on passenger 

aircraft; (3) leverage and deploy screening technologies; and (4) measure 

the effectiveness of its passenger and checked baggage screening systems. 

My comments are based on issued GAO reports and testimonies 

addressing the security of the U.S. commercial aviation system and our 

preliminary observations from ongoing work on TSA’s passenger 

checkpoint screening procedures and staffing standards for TSOs. We did 

our work in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Appendix I contains a list of related GAO products released 

since September 11, 2001. 

TSA has taken steps to enhance the performance, management, and 

deployment of its TSO workforce, but it continues to face staffing and 

training challenges. Acknowledging imbalances in the screener workforce, 

TSA developed standards for determining TSO staffing for all airports at 

Summary 

Page 1 GAO-06-371T 
which federal screening is required and developed a Screening Allocation 

Model (SAM) to determine airport staffing levels. In determining staffing 

allocations, the SAM takes into account not only flight and passenger data, 

but also data unique to each airport—including flight schedules, load 

factors, passenger and baggage distribution curves, and TSA passenger 

and baggage screening configurations. However, in interviewing several 

Federal Security Directors (FSD)—the ranking authorities responsible for 

the leadership and coordination of TSA security activities at the nation’s 

commercial airports—we identified some preliminary concerns about the 

SAM. For example, one assumption of the SAM is that 20 percent of the 

TSO workforce at airports will be part-time. However, FSDs whom we 

spoke to said that it has been a challenge to attract, hire, and retain TSA’s 

part-time TSO workforce, which has made this goal difficult to achieve. 

Further, several of the FSDs we interviewed stated that they had not been 

able to hire up to their authorized staffing levels, and that the SAM did not 

take into account that TSOs were also being routinely used to carry out 

non-screening and administrative duties. TSA has established the National 

Screening Force to provide screening support to all airports in times of 

special need, and implemented a number of initiatives to reduce attrition

among its TSO workforce. In addition to having an adequate number of 

screeners, effective screening involves screeners being properly trained to

do their job. TSA has taken numerous steps to expand training beyond the 

basic training requirement to include self-guided courses on its Online 

Learning Center; a recurrent training requirement of 3-hours per week, 

averaged over a quarter; and training on threat information, explosives 

detection, and new screening approaches. However, insufficient TSO 

staffing and a lack of high-speed Internet/intranet connectivity create

impediments to the TSO workforce taking full advantage of training 

opportunities. 

TSA is proposing changes to its screening procedures to enhance 

detection capabilities, but could strengthen its evaluation of these 

procedures. Since April 2005, TSA has gathered proposals for passenger 

screening procedural changes from a variety of sources within the agency. 

Based on preliminary observations from our ongoing review, we found 

that most of these proposed changes for passenger screening were 

intended to improve efficiency or TSA’s ability to detect prohibited items. 

Other security-related changes to passenger screening procedures are 

made based on several risk-based factors, including results of covert 

(undercover, unannounced) tests that are designed to reveal 

vulnerabilities in the screening system. TSA also recently piloted 

additional procedures that would incorporate unpredictability into the 

screening system and allow TSOs to determine the level of screening 

passengers should receive based on suspicious behavior. TSA vets 

Page 2 GAO-06-371T 
proposed screening procedural changes through various TSA offices and 

tests significant proposed changes in an operational environment. 

However, our preliminary observations indicate that TSA’s evaluation of 

procedural changes could be strengthened to include how the procedure 

would reduce vulnerability to a terrorist attack. 

TSA is supporting the development and deployment of technologies to 

strengthen commercial aviation security but faces management and 

funding challenges. Effective screening depends on having the right 

technology in place to detect threats, and TSA has taken steps to deploy 

and develop technologies to strengthen commercial aviation security. 

However, challenges in funding and planning created impediments to the 

technology’s implementation. For example, to improve explosives 

detection at some passenger screening checkpoints, TSA has deployed

explosives trace portal machines, which use puffs of air to help detect the 

presence of explosives on individuals. The Department of Homeland 

Security’s (DHS) fiscal year 2007 budget request states that about 

434 explosive trace portal machines will be in operation throughout the 

country during fiscal year 2007. 

However, limited progress has been made in fielding other explosives 

detection technology at passenger checkpoints. At baggage screening 

checkpoints, TSA has been effective in deploying explosive trace detection 

systems (in which TSOs collect samples by rubbing bags with swabs, 

which are chemically analyzed to identify any traces of explosive 

materials) and the more efficient explosive detection systems (in which 

probing radiation is used to examine objects inside baggage and identify 

characteristic signatures of threat explosives). Now that the initial 

deployment of this equipment has been completed, however, TSA must 

focus on deploying enhanced explosive detection systems, including larger 

or smaller models depending on the needs of a particular airport, and on 

incorporating explosive detection systems in-line with baggage conveyer 

systems, to further enhance efficiency and security. In looking to the 

future, DHS has agreed with our recommendations to improve its research

and development (R&D) management and planning, including completing

basic research, strategic planning, and risk assessment efforts; 

coordinating R&D efforts with transportation stakeholders; and assessing 

the costs and benefits of deploying explosive detection systems—either inline or stand-alone at the nation’s airports. In February 2006, TSA took a 

positive step forward by completing a strategic framework for its checked

baggage screening operations that will help ensure the efficient allocation

of limited resources to maximize technology’s effectiveness in detecting 

threats. However, additional work will be needed to determine funding 

Page 3 GAO-06-371T 
and deployment strategies to support the implementation of in-line 

baggage screening systems. 

TSA has measures in place to assess the effectiveness of passenger and

checked baggage screening systems. TSA headquarters has conducted 

covert testing of passenger and checked baggage screening by having

inspectors attempt to pass threat objects through checkpoints in order to 

measure vulnerabilities and identify systematic problems affecting TSO 

performance in the areas of training, procedures, and technology. These 

tests have identified that, overall, weaknesses and vulnerabilities exist in 

the passenger and checked baggage screening systems. Implemented in 

September 2002, the testing protocols for passenger and checked baggage

screening changed in September 2005 to implement a more risk-based 

approach and focus on catastrophic threats to aircraft. Additionally, in

February 2004 and February 2005, for passengers and checked baggage, 

respectively, TSA issued protocols to help FSDs conduct covert testing of 

local airport screening activities. Other ways TSA tests the effectiveness of 

passenger and baggage screening include the use of the Threat Image 

Projection system, which projects threat images onto a screen as the bag 

is screened to test the screener’s ability to positively identify the threat; 

annual screener recertification testing; and passenger and checked 

baggage performance indexes. These performance indexes reflect 

indicators of effectiveness, efficiency, and customer satisfaction. 

However, due to a lack of targets for each component of the index, TSA 

may have difficulty performing meaningful analyses of the parts of the 

index. 

Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, the President signed the 

Aviation and Transportation Security Act into law on November 19, 2001,

with the primary goal of strengthening the security of the nation’s aviation 

system. To this end, ATSA created TSA as an agency with responsibility 

for securing all modes of transportation, including aviation.1

 As part of this 

responsibility, TSA oversees security operations at the nation’s more than 

400 commercial airports, including passenger and checked baggage 

screening operations. Prior to the passage of ATSA, the screening of 

Background 

 1

ATSA created TSA as an agency within the Department of Transportation (DOT) with 

responsibility for securing all modes of transportation, including aviation. Pub. L. No. 107-

71, § 101, 115 Stat. 597 (2001). The Homeland Security Act of 2002, signed into law on 

November 25, 2002, transferred TSA from the DOT to the new Department of Homeland 

Security Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 403, 116 Stat. 2135, 2178. 

Page 4 GAO-06-371T 
passengers and checked baggage had been performed by private screening 

companies under contract to the airlines. The Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA) was responsible for ensuring compliance with 

screening regulations. Today, TSA security activities, including passenger

and checked baggage screening at airports, are overseen by Federal 

Security Directors—the ranking authorities responsible for the leadership 

and coordination of TSA security activities at the nation’s commercial 

airports. Each FSD is responsible for overseeing security activities, 

including passenger and checked baggage screening, at one or more 

commercial airports. 

TSA reported that between October 2004 and September 2005, about 

735 million passengers were physically screened. In addition, 550 million 

bags were screened using explosive detection systems with standard 

screening procedures. 

Passenger and Checked 

Baggage Screening 

In addition to establishing TSA and giving it responsibility for passenger 

and checked baggage screening operations, ATSA set forth specific 

enhancements to screening operations for TSA to implement, with 

deadlines for completing many of them. These requirements included 

• assuming responsibility for screeners and screening operations at more 

than 400 commercial airports by November 19, 2002; 

• establishing a basic screener training program composed of a minimum of 

40 hours of classroom instruction and 60 hours of on-the-job training; 

• conducting an annual proficiency review of all screeners; 

• conducting operational testing of screeners;2

• requiring remedial training for any screener who fails an operational test;

and 

• screening all checked baggage for explosives using explosives detection 

systems by December 31, 2002.3

Passenger screening is a process by which authorized TSA personnel 

inspect individuals and property to deter and prevent the carriage of any

unauthorized explosive, incendiary, weapon, or other dangerous item 

 2

TSA defines an operational screening test as any covert test of a screener conducted by

TSA, on any screening function, to assess the screener’s threat item detection ability or 

adherence to TSA-approved procedures. 

3

Pursuant to the Homeland Security Act, the deadline for screening all checked baggage

using explosive detection systems was, in effect, extended until December 31, 2003. 

Page 5 GAO-06-371T 
onboard an aircraft or into a sterile area.4

 TSOs (formerly referred to as 

screeners) must inspect individuals for prohibited items at designated 

screening locations.5

 The four passenger screening functions are (1) X-ray

screening of property, (2) walk-through metal detector screening of 

individuals, (3) hand-wand or pat-down screening of individuals, and 

(4) physical search of property and trace detection for explosives. 

Checked baggage screening is a process by which authorized security 

screening personnel inspect checked baggage to deter, detect, and prevent

the carriage of any unauthorized explosive, incendiary, or weapon 

onboard an aircraft. Checked baggage screening is accomplished through 

the use of explosive detection systems6

 (EDS) or explosive trace detection 

(ETD) systems,7

 and through the use of other means, such as manual 

searches, canine teams, and positive passenger bag match,8

 when EDS and 

ETD systems are unavailable. 

The conference report accompanying the fiscal year 2006 DHS 

appropriations act allocates about $3.6 billion to TSA for passenger and 

checked baggage screening operations, of which about $2.4 billion is for 

the TSO workforce and the remaining amount is for private sector TSOs,9

 4

Sterile areas are areas located within the terminal where passengers wait after screening 

to board departing aircraft. Access to these areas is generally controlled by TSA screeners 

at checkpoints where they conduct physical screening of passengers and their carry-on 

baggage for weapons and explosives. 

5

TSOs must deny passage beyond the screening location to any individual or property that 

has not been screened or inspected in accordance with passenger screening standard

operating procedures. If an individual refuses to permit inspection of any item, that item 

must not be allowed into the sterile area or aboard an aircraft. 

6

Explosive detection systems use probing radiation to examine objects inside baggage and 

identify the characteristic signatures of threat explosives. EDS equipment operates in an

automated mode. 

7

Explosive trace detection works by detecting vapors and residues of explosives. Human 

operators collect samples by rubbing bags with swabs, which are chemically analyzed to

identify any traces of explosive materials. 

8

Positive passenger bag match is an alternative method of screening checked baggage that

requires that the passenger be on the same aircraft as the checked baggage. 

9

ATSA required that TSA begin allowing all commercial airports to apply to TSA to 

transition from a federal to a private TSO workforce. To support this effort, TSA created 

the Screening Partnership Program to allow all commercial airports an opportunity to 

apply to TSA for permission to use qualified private screening contractors and private 

sector screeners. Currently, private screening companies provide passenger and checked

baggage screening at six airports. 

Page 6 GAO-06-371T 
equipment purchase, installation and maintenance, and support functions 

associated with the TSO workforce, such as training and other human 

resource functions.10 The President’s fiscal year 2007 budget request 

includes about $3.5 billion for passenger and checked baggage screening, 

of which about $2.5 billion would support the TSO workforce.

TSA has taken and has planned actions to strengthen its management and 

deployment of the TSO workforce, but it continues to face challenges in 

hiring and deploying passenger and checked baggage TSOs. To accomplish 

its security mission, TSA needs a sufficient number of passenger and 

checked baggage TSOs trained and certified in the latest screening 

procedures and technology. We reported in February 2004 that staffing 

shortages and TSA’s hiring process had hindered the ability of some FSDs 

to provide sufficient resources to staff screening checkpoints and oversee 

screening operations at their checkpoints without using additional 

measures such as overtime.11 TSA has acknowledged that its initial staffing 

efforts created imbalances in the screener workforce and has since been

taking steps to address these imbalances over the past 2 years. 

The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 required 

TSA to develop and submit to Congress standards for determining the 

TSA Has Taken Steps 

to Strengthen the 

Management and 

Performance of Its 

TSO Workforce, but 

Continues to Face 

Challenges 

TSA Has Taken Steps to 

Better Manage Its TSO 

Workforce, but Faces 

Challenges in Hiring, 

Deploying, and Retaining 

TSOs 

 10Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-90, 119 Stat. 

2064 (2005); H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 109-241, at 49-50 (2005). 

11GAO, Aviation Security: Challenges Exist in Stabilizing and Enhancing Passenger and

Baggage Screening Operations, GAO-04-440T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 12, 2004). 

Page 7 GAO-06-371T 
aviation security staffing for all airports at which screening is required.12

The act also directed GAO to review these standards, which we are doing. 

These staffing standards are to provide for necessary levels of airport 

security, while also ensuring that security-related delays experienced by

airline passengers are minimized. In June 2005, TSA submitted its report 

on aviation security staffing standards to Congress. Known as the 

Screening Allocation Model (SAM), these standards are intended to 

provide an objective measure for determining TSO airport staffing levels, 

while staying within the congressionally mandated limit of 45,000 full-time 

equivalents (FTE) screeners. 13

Whereas TSA’s prior staffing model was demand-driven based on flight 

and passenger data, the SAM model analyzes not only demand data but 

also data on the flow of passenger and baggage through the airport and the 

availability of the workforce. In determining the appropriate TSO staffing 

levels, the SAM first considers the workload demands unique to each 

individual airport—including flight schedules, load factors and connecting 

flights, and number of passenger bags. These demand inputs are then 

processed against certain assumptions about the processing of passengers 

and baggage—including expected passenger and baggage processing rates, 

required staffing for passenger lanes and baggage equipment, and 

equipment alarm rates. Using these and various other data, the SAM 

determines the daily workforce requirements and calculates a work 

schedule for each airport. The schedule identifies a recommended mix of 

full-time and part-time staff and a total number of TSO FTE needed to staff 

the airport, consistent with a goal of 10 minutes maximum wait time for 

processing passengers and baggage. 

For fiscal year 2006, the SAM model estimated a requirement of 

42,170 TSO FTEs for all airports nationwide. In order to stay within a 

43,000 TSO FTE budgetary limit for fiscal year 2006, TSA officials reduced

the number of FTEs allocated to airports to 42,056, which allowed it to 

fund the 615 TSO FTEs in the National Screener Force—a force composed 

of TSOs who provide screening support to all airports------and to maintain a

contingency of 329 TSO FTEs in reserve to meet unanticipated demands, 

 12Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 4023, 

118 Stat 3638, 3723-24. 

13One full-time-equivalent is equal to one work year or 2,080 non-overtime hours.

Page 8 GAO-06-371T 
such as a new air carrier coming on line at an airport.14 As of January 2006,

there were 37,501 full-time TSOs and 5,782 part-time TSOs on board 

nationwide, representing an annualized rate of 41,085 TSO FTEs. 

According to TSA headquarters officials, the SAM can be adjusted to 

account for the uniqueness of particular airport security checkpoints and 

airline traffic patterns. Further, it is up to the FSDs to ensure that all of the 

data elements and assumptions are accurate for their airports, and to bring 

to TSA’s attention any factors that should be reviewed to determine if 

changes to the SAM are appropriate. The President’s fiscal year 2007 

budget requests a total of 45,121 FTEs for TSO personnel compensation 

and benefits. 

As part of our ongoing review of the SAM model, we have identified 

several preliminary concerns about TSA’s efforts to address its staffing 

imbalances and ensure appropriate coverage at airport passenger and 

checked baggage screening checkpoints, which we are continuing to 

assess. At the five airports we visited, FSD staff raised concerns about the 

SAM assumptions as they related to their particular airports.15 Among 

other things, they noted that the recommendation for 20 percent part-time 

TSO workforce—measured in terms of FTEs—often could not be reached, 

the expected processing rates for passenger and baggage screening were 

not being realized, non-passenger screening at large airports was higher 

than assumed, and the number of TSO FTEs needed per checkpoint lane

and per baggage screening machine was not sufficient for peak periods. 

Regarding the SAM assumption of a 20 percent part-time TSO FTE level 

across all airports, FSD staff we visited stated that the 20 percent goal has 

been difficult to achieve because of, among other things, economic 

conditions leading to competition for part-time workers, remote airport 

locations coupled with a lack of mass transit, TSO base pay that has not 

changed since fiscal year 2002, and part-time workers’ desire to convert to

full-time status. According to TSA headquarters officials, while the 

nationwide annual TSO attrition rate is about 23 percent (compared to a 

rate of 14 percent reported in February 2004), it is over 50 percent for part-

 14This budgetary FTE limit is not to be confused with the 45,000 FTE screener cap imposed 

by Congress in the FY2006 DHS Appropriations Act that limits the total number of FTE 

screeners available to TSA. 

15We interviewed FSD staff at 3 category X airports, 1 category I airports, and 1 category III 

airport. TSA classifies the commercial airports in the United States into one of five 

security risk categories (X, I, II, III, IV, and V) based on various factors, such as the total 

number of takeoffs and landings annually, and other special security considerations. In

general, category X airports have the largest number of passenger boardings, and category

IV airports have the smallest. 

Page 9 GAO-06-371T 
time TSOs. TSA has struggled with hiring part-time TSOs since it began 

actively recruiting them in the summer of 2003. In February 2004, we 

reported that FSDs at several of the airports we visited stated that they

experienced difficulty in attracting needed part-time screeners, which they 

believed to be due to many of the same factors, such as low pay and 

benefits, undesirable hours, the location of their airport, the lack of 

accessible and affordable parking or public transportation, and the high

cost of living in the areas surrounding some airports.16 These FSDs stated 

that very few full-time screeners were interested in converting to part-time 

status—a condition that still exists—and TSA officials stated that attrition 

rates for part-time screeners were considerably higher than those for fulltime screeners. 

At two of the five airports we visited as part of our ongoing review of the 

SAM model, FSD staff told us that they had not been able to hire up to 

their authorized staffing levels. In February 2004, we reported that many of

the FSDs we interviewed expressed concern that TSA’s hiring process was 

not responsive to their needs and hindered their ability to reach their 

authorized staffing levels and adequately staff screening checkpoints. 

Specifically, FSDs expressed concern with the lack of a continuous hiring 

process to backfill screeners lost through attrition, and their lack of 

authority to conduct hiring on an as-needed basis. We reported that TSA 

was taking steps to make the hiring process more responsive to FSDs’ 

needs. Since then, TSA has provided FSDs with more input into the hiring

process in an effort to streamline the process and enable FSDs to more 

quickly meet their staffing needs. 

During our five airport visits, some FSD staff also cited another limitation 

of the SAM—specifically, that the model does not account for screeners 

who are performing administrative or other duties. The officials also noted 

that, because they are not authorized to hire a sufficient number of 

mission support staff, TSOs are being routinely used—in some cases full 

time—to carry out non-screening and administrative duties, including 

supporting payroll, scheduling, uniform supplies, legal support, logistics, 

and operations center activities. At the five airports we visited in January 

and February 2006, out of a total of 2,572 TSO FTEs on-board at those 

airports, roughly 136 FTEs (just over five percent) were being used for 

administrative duties. FSD staff stated that some of these TSOs are being 

used on a part-time basis, while others are used on a full-time basis. The 

 16GAO-04-440T. 

Page 10 GAO-06-371T 
use of TSOs in these support functions could adversely affect the ability of 

FSDs to adequately staff their screening checkpoints. 

To compensate for screener shortages and to enable operational flexibility 

to respond to changes in risk and threat, in October 2003, TSA established 

a National Transportation Security Officer (TSO) Force (formerly known 

as the Mobile Screening Force established in November 2002) to provide 

screening support to all airports in times of emergency, seasonal demands, 

or under other special circumstances that require a greater number of 

screeners than regularly available to FSDs. In February 2004, we reported 

that the National Screening Force consisted of over 700 full-time 

passenger and baggage TSOs. TSA officials stated that while these 

screeners have a home airport to which they are assigned, they travel to 

airports in need of screening staff approximately 70 percent of the year. 

TSA budgeted for 615 FTEs for the National Screening Force in fiscal year 

2006. The President’s fiscal year 2007 budget request includes $35 million

for operational expenses of the force (not including salaries and benefits

of force members). According to the budget request, in fiscal year 2007, 

the National Screening Force will generally be deployed only to those 

airports experiencing significant staffing shortfalls associated with 

increased seasonal traffic or when a special event, such as a Super Bowl 

or a large national conference, occurs requiring an immediate influx of 

additional TSO support. At one category X airport we recently visited, the 

FSD stated that because of challenges in hiring and retaining TSOs for this 

airport, he currently had 59 members of the National Screening Force 

deployed to his airport, and had been relying on this force since 2004. The

President’s fiscal year 2007 budget request states that TSA will continue to 

review methods for reducing costs associated with this force, including 

ensuring that each airport has a sufficient staffing program in place to 

address short-term needs. 

In February 2006 in the President’s fiscal year 2007 budget request, TSA 

identified a number of initiatives it has under way to address the 

management of the TSO workforce, including 

• requesting $10 million to support TSO retention programs, including 

utilizing workforce retention flexibilities to potentially include pay for 

performance, performance bonuses, retention allowances, college credit

reimbursement, and flexible staffing; and 

• establishing retention incentives for part-time screeners. 

Page 11 GAO-06-371T 
We will continue to examine these efforts as part of our ongoing work on 

TSA’s aviation security staffing standards. 

Since we reported on TSO training in September 2003,17 TSA has taken a 

number of actions designed to strengthen training available to the TSO 

workforce as part of its efforts to enhance the performance of TSOs. 

Additionally, TSA’s Office of Inspections (OI, formerly the Office of 

Internal Affairs and Program Review) makes recommendations to TSA 

leadership in its reports on covert (undercover, unannounced) testing 

results. These recommendations address deficiencies identified during 

testing and are intended to improve screening effectiveness. As of 

December 2005, OI had issued 29 reports to management on the results of 

its checkpoint and checked baggage covert testing. In total, the reports 

include 19 distinct recommendations related to passenger and checked 

baggage screening.18 Of these 19 recommendations, 11 relate to screener 

training. 

In September 2003, we reported that TSA had not fully developed or 

deployed a recurrent training program for passenger TSOs. At that time, 

little training was available to TSOs once they completed their basic TSO 

training. Since then, TSA has expanded training available to the TSO 

workforce, such as introducing an Online Learning Center that makes selfguided courses available over TSA’s intranet and the Internet and 

expanding training available to supervisory TSOs. TSA also established a 

recurrent training requirement of 3 hours per week, averaged over a 

quarter, and provided FSDs with additional tools to facilitate and enhance 

TSO training, including at least one modular bomb set kit—containing 

components of an improvised explosive device (IED)—and at least one 

weapons training kit. TSA has also instituted a program called “Threat in 

the Spotlight” that, based on intelligence TSA receives, provides screeners 

with the latest in threat information regarding terrorist attempts to get 

threat objects past screening checkpoints. Additionally, in December 2005,

TSA reported completing enhanced explosives detection training for over 

18,000 TSOs. This training included both classroom and hands-on 

experiences, and focused particularly on identifying X-ray images of IED 

component parts, not just a completely assembled bomb. TSA plans for 

TSA Has Strengthened 

TSO Training but Faces 

Challenges in Delivering 

the Training 

 17GAO, Airport Passenger Screening: Preliminary Observations on Progress Made and

Challenges Remaining, GAO-03-1173 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 24, 2003). 

18Some recommendations appear repeatedly in multiple reports issued by OIAPR. 

Page 12 GAO-06-371T 
the remaining TSO workforce to receive this training by June 2006 through

the Online Learning Center or other delivery methods. TSA also has 

developed new training curricula to support new screening approaches. 

For example, TSA recently developed a training curriculum for TSOs in 

behavior observation and analysis at the checkpoint to identify passengers 

exhibiting behaviors indicative of stress, fear, or deception. 

However, as we reported in May 2005, insufficient TSO staffing and a lack

of high-speed Internet/intranet connectivity to access the Online Learning

Center have made it difficult for all TSOs at many airports to receive

required training and has limited TSO access to TSA training tools.19 As 

previously discussed, TSA is taking steps to address the TSO staffing 

challenges. However, it is too soon to determine whether TSA’s efforts will 

address TSA’s ability to provide required training while maintaining 

adequate coverage for screening operations. In terms of access to the 

Online Learning Center, TSA plans to complete the deployment of highspeed Internet/intranet connectivity to airports during fiscal year 2007.

TSA established its Online Learning Center to provide passenger and 

baggage screeners with online, high-speed access to training courses. 

However, effective use of the Online Learning Center requires high-speed

Internet/intranet access, which TSA had not been able to provide to all 

airports. In May 2005, we reported that as of October 2004, about 

45 percent of the TSO workforce did not have high speed Internet/intranet 

access to the Online Learning Center. The President’s fiscal year 2007 

budget request reports that approximately 220 of the more than 400 airport 

and field locations have full Information Technology (IT) infrastructure 

installation, to include high-speed network connectivity, while the rest of 

the airports operate with dial-up access to TSA systems. According to the 

budget request, TSA will use $120 million in fiscal year 2006 to deploy 

high-speed connectivity to all category X and I airports and preliminary 

high-speed connectivity to all category II, III, and IV airports. The budget

request includes a request for a total of $90 million to support this effort in 

fiscal year 2007, of which $54 million is needed to complete the 

deployment of high-speed connectivity at category II, III, and IV airports.20

 19GAO, Aviation Security: Screener Training and Performance Measurement 

Strengthened but More Work Remains, GAO-05-457 (Washington D.C.: May 2, 2005). 

20According to the budget request, the remaining $36 million is needed to support 

operations and maintenance costs, including recurring costs for routers, switches, circuits,

cabinets, racks, and network monitoring. 

Page 13 GAO-06-371T 
TSA Is Making 

Changes to Its 

Passenger Screening 

Procedures to 

Enhance Detection 

Capabilities Based on 

Risk and Other 

Factors, but Could 

Strengthen Its 

Evaluation of 

Proposed Procedures 

Our preliminary analysis of TSA data indicates that since April 2005, TSA 

has considered 70 proposed changes to passenger checkpoint screening 

procedures.21 Most of these proposed changes were generated by TSA 

airport officials and TSA’s Security Operations division, which is 

responsible for developing and overseeing the implementation of 

checkpoint screening procedures. TSA headquarters also formally 

solicited input from TSA airport staff by initiating a field review of 

standard operating procedures (SOP), which involved representatives 

from airports across the nation. This review resulted in 120 suggested 

revisions to the passenger checkpoint screening procedures. To a lesser 

extent, changes to checkpoint screening procedures are recommended by 

TSA senior leadership, such as the Assistant Administrator of Security 

Operations or the Assistant Secretary. Congress has also proposed and 

subsequently mandated changes to checkpoint screening procedures, such 

as adding lighters to the list of items prohibited on aircraft. According to a 

senior TSA official, recent suggestions for procedural changes, such as 

removing small scissors from the prohibited items list to allow TSOs to 

focus on higher risk items, were generated by a TSA task force focused on

improving the agency’s ability to detect explosives at the screening 

checkpoint.

Proposed Passenger 

Checkpoint Screening 

Procedural Changes Are 

Generally Based on 

Operational Experience 

and Risk-Based 

Assessments 

 21In April 2005, TSA began documenting proposed changes to passenger checkpoint

screening procedures.

Page 14 GAO-06-371T 
Based on our preliminary analysis, the majority of proposed SOP changes 

considered by TSA in April 2005, August 2005, September 2005, and

December 2005 were not specifically designed to enhance the security of 

the screening process.22 Of the 70 proposed checkpoint screening SOP 

changes considered by TSA, 23 were intended to improve the efficiency of

the screening process (e.g. passenger flow) such as modifying the HazMat 

reporting requirements to exclude torch lighters and pepper spray in 

quantities less than 4 ounces. Seven of the 70 proposed changes 

considered by TSA during this period were intended to specify or clarify 

procedures for passengers requiring special consideration, such as law 

enforcement officers. Ten of the proposed changes were specifically

intended to improve TSA’s ability to detect prohibited items. Sixteen 

proposed changes were intended to enhance customer service or clarify 

the wording of the SOP. Fourteen of the 70 proposed changes were not 

included in these categories.23 

According to TSA, security-related proposed changes to checkpoint 

screening procedures are based on risk-based factors, including previous

terrorist incidents, threat information, vulnerabilities of the screening 

system, as well as operational experience and stakeholder concerns. For 

example, according to TSA officials, the initial change to the pat-down 

procedure in September 2004 was based on the attacks carried out on two 

Russian aircraft. According to TSA, the pat-down procedure was further 

revised in response to passenger concerns that the procedure was too 

invasive. TSA officials stated that the pat-down procedure was changed a 

third time based on additional threat information. TSA also informed us 

that reported threat information led them to further amend the pat-down 

procedure in December 2005. 

Recommended changes to passenger checkpoint screening procedures are 

also generated based on the results of covert testing conducting by TSA’s 

Office of Inspections and the DHS Office of Inspector General (OIG). 

Covert tests are designed to assess vulnerabilities in the checkpoint 

screening system to specific threats, such as vulnerability to the various 

 22TSA does not review proposed SOP changes on a regular basis. Rather, the administration 

accumulates proposed changes and reviews them periodically on an as-needed basis. Since 

TSA began documenting proposed changes to checkpoint screening procedures, the agency 

has conducted three reviews of proposed changes, which took place in April 2005, August 

2005, and September 2005. 

23TSA attributed nine proposed changes to senior leadership direction, and TSA did not 

categorize five proposed changes from 2005. 

Page 15 GAO-06-371T 
methods by which terrorists may try to conceal hand guns, knives, or 

IEDs. OI and the DHS OIG identified vulnerabilities in the checkpoint 

screening system, which existed, in part, due to deficiencies in screening 

procedures. To address these vulnerabilities, since March 2005, OI and the 

DHS OIG recommended four changes to the passenger checkpoint 

screening procedures.24 TSA has also made procedure changes in response 

to operational experience and stakeholder concerns. For example, TSA 

changed the SOP to specify the “individual tester” instead of “supervisor” 

to alleviate field confusion that supervisors were the only ones allowed to

perform a particular task. Also, based on field input, TSA is changing the 

SOP to allow TSOs to instruct passengers with long hair to hold their hair 

during the explosives trace portal (ETP) screening process. TSA also made 

changes due to stakeholder concern, such as modifications to the patdown procedure. After passengers expressed discomfort with the invasive 

nature of the procedure, TSA modified it to be less invasive while 

maintaining its security effectiveness. 

As previously mentioned, TSA airport staff and headquarters officials 

suggest changes to checkpoint screening procedures to generally improve 

the efficiency, effectiveness and clarity of screening procedures. These 

proposed procedural changes are periodically gathered and vetted through 

various TSA offices, and ultimately the Assistant Administrator of Security

Operations, for approval. The offices involved in the review process for 

SOP changes include Security Operations, Office of Chief Counsel, and the 

Office of Training. As required, proposed procedural changes are also 

evaluated by other offices including the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, 

Office of Civil Rights, and Office of Passengers with Disabilities. 

Representatives of these component divisions meet informally or formally 

to discuss proposed changes and determine whether the changes should 

be incorporated into the checkpoint screening SOP. 

In addition, TSA officials informed us that the agency evaluates all 

significant proposed changes in an operational environment prior to 

determining whether such changes should be implemented nationwide. 

Specifically, under the current Assistant Secretary, TSA pilot tests changes 

that require substantial training or that may generate concerns from the 

traveling public. The significant changes implemented in December 2005 

TSA Could Strengthen Its 

Evaluation of Proposed 

Screening Procedural 

Changes Based on our 

Preliminary Observations 

 24Office of Inspections recommended two additional changes to checkpoint screening 

procedures prior to March 2005. 

Page 16 GAO-06-371T 
include revisions to the pat-down procedure, the procedure for searching 

carry-on luggage, the process for screening selectee passengers,25 and the 

list of items prohibited on aircraft. The major changes also include a new 

procedure for screening passengers for IEDs. While TSA evaluated these 

procedures in an operational environment, our preliminary analysis 

suggests that the evaluations primarily focused on the operational 

feasibility of the procedures, and less on how these procedures would 

reduce vulnerability to a terrorist attack. TSA assesses the vulnerability of 

the existing checkpoint screening system by conducting covert tests in 

which persons attempt to carry prohibited items through the checkpoint

without the items being detected. However, TSA officials questioned 

whether covert testing could be used to assess statistically whether new 

procedures would decrease the vulnerability of the screening system. For 

example, TSA officials stated that since some procedures are only piloted 

in the operational environment for a few days, TSA could not run enough 

covert tests for the results to allow for comprehensive analysis of reduced 

vulnerability. TSA officials also stated that because the agency implements 

a layered approach to passenger screening, it would be difficult to 

determine the extent to which any one layer reduces vulnerability of the 

checkpoint screening system. 

During the course of our review, we met with five aviation security 

experts, four of which identified covert testing as the best way to assess 

the security effectiveness of new and existing procedures. However, they 

also acknowledged the difficulty of using covert testing to assess the 

extent to which specific procedures would reduce vulnerabilities, 

especially considering that the effectiveness of a procedure also relies on 

the capability of TSOs and screening equipment. 

TSA also recently piloted additional procedures that would incorporate 

unpredictability into the screening system and that would allow TSOs to 

determine the level of screening passengers should receive based on 

suspicious behavior. While TSA has not yet determined whether to 

incorporate these new procedures into the SOP, our preliminary 

observations indicate that TSA did not have a formal evaluation plan in 

place when piloting these procedures. Regarding screening passengers 

based on suspicious behavior, TSA officials stated that this method has 

been successful for law enforcement officials, including those operating in

 25A selectee is a person identified for additional screening by a computer-assisted 

passenger screening system or another process as determined and approved by TSA. 

Page 17 GAO-06-371T 
airports, as well as aviation officials in other countries such as Israel. FSD 

staff at three airports that participated in the piloting of these procedures 

identified factors TSA headquarters should consider prior to implementing 

these procedures, one of which is the lack of TSOs to conduct these 

procedures. FSD staff at one airport said that they had to close a screening 

lane in order to have a sufficient number of TSOs to implement the piloted 

procedure. FSD staff at all three airports also reported that some TSOs 

had to work overtime so that other TSOs could be trained to implement 

these procedures. TSA headquarters staff stated that the prohibited items 

list and changes to other programs would offset the additional TSO 

resources needed to implement these procedures. However, FSD staff 

with whom we spoke at 2 of the airports that piloted these procedures 

stated that the changes made did not free up screening resources as was 

planned. 

DHS’s and TSA’s research and development efforts for passenger and 

checked baggage screening are part of a broader DHS program focused on 

researching and developing technologies to detect, prevent, and mitigate 

terrorist threats. History has shown that terrorists will adapt their tactics 

and techniques in an attempt to bypass increased security procedures, and 

are capable of developing increasingly sophisticated measures in an 

attempt to avoid detection. This ever changing threat necessitates the need 

for continued R&D of new technologies and the fielding of these 

technologies to strengthen aviation security. 

TSA Is Supporting the 

Development and 

Deployment of 

Technologies to 

Strengthen 

Commercial Aviation 

Security, but Faces 

Management and 

Funding Challenges 

DHS and TSA Are Taking 

Steps to Develop and 

Deploy Technologies for 

Screening Passengers and 

Checked Baggage, but 

Further Planning Is 

Needed to Focus R&D 

Efforts 

Page 18 GAO-06-371T 
In March 2005, the DHS OIG reported that significant improvement in 

screener performance may not be possible without greater use of new 

technology. The DHS OIG encouraged TSA to expedite its testing 

programs and give priority to technologies that will enable the screening 

workforce to better detect both weapons and explosives. In addition, the 

President’s fiscal year 2007 budget request states that checkpoints do not 

currently have the ability to accurately and quickly detect explosives on all 

passengers, and only a minimal number of airline passengers are directed 

to a selectee lane for further inspection in which they are manually 

searched for explosives. The request further states that “many travelers 

are allowed to pass through the checkpoints without complete testing and

detection,” and recognizes the importance of filling this detection gap. 

TSA officials stated that the agency is addressing this issue through a 

variety of security measures. TSA has recently put increased focus on the 

threats posed by IEDs and is investing in technology for this purpose. For 

example, about 60 explosives trace portal machines have been installed at

over 20 airports. This new technology uses puffs of air to help detect the 

presence of explosives on individuals. DHS’s fiscal year 2007 budget 

request states that TSA expects that about 434 explosive trace portal 

machines will be in operation throughout the country by September 2007.

TSA is also developing backscatter technology, in which backscatter 

signals interact with explosives, plastics and metals, giving them shape 

and form and making them easy to visually interpret. However, limited 

progress has been made in fielding this technology at airport passenger 

screening checkpoints. We will soon begin a review of DHS’s and TSA’s 

progress in planning for, managing, and deploying their R&D programs in 

support of passenger checkpoint screening operations. 

To enhance checked baggage screening, TSA is developing and testing 

next-generation EDS machines. Most of the currently deployed EDS 

technology was developed prior to the passage of ATSA and was based on 

criteria set forth by Congress in the Aviation Security Improvement Act of 

1990. According to TSA, since the large-scale deployment of EDS 

machines in 2002 and 2003, manufacturers have only marginally improved

false alarm rates and throughput capabilities of the equipment. The 

maximum number of bags an EDS machine can screen per hour is 

500, which can be achieved only when the machines are integrated in-line 

with the baggage conveyor system. New EDS equipment was certified in 

2005, including a smaller EDS machine designed to replace ETD machines 

used for primary screening and an upgraded large EDS machine. In 

September 2005, TSA entered into a $24.8 million contract to purchase 

72 smaller EDS machines to be installed at 24 airports. The President’s 

fiscal year 2007 budget request for TSA includes funding to support 

Page 19 GAO-06-371T 
research and development for EDS machines that can operate at up to 

900 bags per hour and employ new threat detection concepts. In its 

February 2006 strategic framework for checked baggage screening, TSA 

identified development of high-throughput EDS machines and lowering of 

false alarm rates as key arenas for improving investment management of 

next-generation technologies. 

We reported in September 2004 that DHS and TSA have made some 

progress in managing transportation security R&D programs according to

applicable laws and R&D best practices. However, we found that their 

efforts were incomplete in several areas, including preparing strategic 

plans for R&D efforts that contain measurable objectives, preparing and 

using risk assessments to select and prioritize R&D projects, and 

coordinating with stakeholders—a condition that increases the risk that 

their R&D resources will not be effectively leveraged. We also found that 

TSA and DHS delayed several key R&D projects and lacked both estimated 

deployment dates for the vast majority of their R&D projects and adequate

databases to effectively manage their R&D portfolios. We recommended 

that DHS and TSA (1) conduct some basic research in the transportation 

security area; (2) complete their strategic planning and risk assessment 

efforts; (3) develop a management information system that will provide 

accurate, complete, current, and readily accessible project information for 

monitoring and managing their R&D portfolios; and (4) develop a process 

with the Department of Transportation to coordinate transportation 

security R&D efforts and share this information with transportation 

stakeholders. DHS and TSA agreed that the recommendations were key to

a successful R&D program. We will examine DHS’s and TSA’s efforts to 

implement these recommendations as part our upcoming review of TSA’s 

checkpoint R&D program. 

TSA has made substantial progress in installing EDS and ETD systems at

the nation’s airports—mainly as part of interim lobby screening 

solutions—to provide the capability to screen all checked baggage for 

explosives, as mandated by Congress. Although TSA made progress in 

fielding EDS and ETD equipment at the nation’s airports, TSA placed this 

equipment in a stand-alone mode—usually in airport lobbies—to conduct 

the primary screening of checked baggage for explosives, rather than 

integrating EDS machines in-line with airports’ baggage conveyor systems. 

TSA officials stated that they employed these interim solutions because of

the significant costs required to install in-line systems and the need to

reconfigure many airports’ baggage conveyor systems to accommodate the 

equipment. These interim screening solutions led to operational 

TSA Is Focusing Its 

Checked Baggage Strategic 

Planning Efforts on 

Deployment of In-line EDS 

Systems, but Faces 

Challenges in Funding 

These Systems on a LargeScale Basis 

Page 20 GAO-06-371T 
inefficiencies, including requiring a greater number of screeners and 

screening fewer bags for explosives each hour, as compared with using 

EDS machines in-line with baggage conveyor systems. Performing primary 

screening using ETD machines, as is the case for more than 300 airports, is

more labor intensive and less efficient than screening using the EDS 

process. TSA’s placement of stand-alone EDS and ETD machines in airport 

lobbies also resulted in passenger crowding, which presented unsafe 

conditions and may have added security risks for passengers and airport 

workers. In May 2004, TSA conducted a retrospective cost-benefit analysis 

on nine airports with agreements to install in-line screening systems and 

found that significant savings and other benefits, including reduced 

screener staffing requirements and increased baggage throughput, may be 

achieved through the installation of in-line systems. TSA estimated that inline baggage screening systems at these nine airports would save the 

federal government about $1 billion over 7 years,26 compared with standalone EDS systems, and that initial investment would be recovered in a 

little over 1 year.27 TSA’s analysis also showed that a cost savings may not 

be achieved for all airports. According to TSA’s data, federal cost savings 

varied from about $50 million to over $250 million at eight of the nine 

airports, while at one airport, there was an estimated $90 million loss.28

With the objective of initially fielding this equipment largely accomplished, 

TSA is shifting its focus from equipping airports with interim screening 

solutions to systematically planning for the more optimal deployment of 

checked baggage screening systems, although identifying the resources to 

fund the systems on a large-scale basis continues to be a challenge. To

assist TSA in planning for the optimal deployment of checked baggage

screening systems, we recommended in our March 2005 report that TSA 

 26This figure refers to the net present value saved over 7 years if received up front. 

27For a basis of comparison, Office of Management and Budget Circular A-94 stipulates

using a 7 percent real discount rate to compute the present value of cost savings. TSA used 

a 4 percent real discount rate. Following Office of Management and Budget guidance, cost

savings are $1.14 billion. In addition, in TSA’s analysis, the federal government does not pay

for $319 million, or 25 percent, of project costs. Accounting for these costs to reflect total 

costs, as recommended by Circular A-94, lowers overall savings to $820 million. 

28The relatively large costs for upfront in-line EDS at one airport are not offset by the 

modest amount of estimated operation and maintenance cost savings; therefore, the in-line 

EDS system may be more costly than EDS stand-alone. By contrast, at another airport the

upfront costs of in-line EDS are lower than for stand-alone EDS, and there is a substantial 

amount of estimated operation and maintenance cost savings. Therefore, the in-line EDS 

system for this latter airport may be less costly than stand-alone EDS. 

Page 21 GAO-06-371T 
systematically evaluate baggage screening needs at airports, including the

costs and benefits of installing in-line baggage screening systems—

explosive detection systems integrated in-line with airport baggage 

conveyor systems—at airports that do not yet have in-line systems 

installed. We suggested that part of such planning should include analyzing 

which airports should receive federal support for in-line EDS baggage 

screening systems based on cost savings that could be achieved from more 

effective and efficient baggage screening operations and on other factors, 

including enhanced security. Also, for airports where in-line systems may 

not be economically justified because of high investment costs, we 

suggested that a cost-effectiveness analysis be used to determine the 

benefits of additional stand-alone EDS machines to screen checked 

baggage in place of the more labor-intensive ETD machines. We also 

recommended that TSA consider the costs and benefits of the new 

technologies being developed through its research and development 

efforts, which could provide smaller EDS machines that have the potential

to reduce the costs associated with installing in-line EDS baggage 

screening systems or to replace ETD machines currently used as the 

primary method for screening at over 300 airports nationwide. DHS agreed 

with our recommendations and stated that TSA had initiated an analysis of 

deploying in-line EDS machines and was in the process of formulating 

criteria to identify those airports that would benefit from an in-line EDS 

system. DHS also stated that TSA had begun conducting an analysis of the 

airports that rely heavily on ETD machines as the primary checked 

baggage screening technology to identify those airports that would benefit 

from augmenting ETDs with stand-alone EDS equipment. 

On February 8, 2006, TSA issued a report to Congress outlining a 

framework for a strategic plan for its TSA Checked Baggage Screening 

Program. TSA plans to finalize the plan, including funding and cost-sharing 

strategies for in-line baggage screening systems, in Spring 2006. The 

framework introduces a strategy intended to increase security through 

deploying EDS to as many airports as practicable, lower life-cycle costs for 

the program, minimize impacts to TSA and airport/airline operations, and 

provide a flexible security infrastructure for accommodating growing 

airline traffic and potential new threats. The framework addresses the 

following issues: 

• Optimized checked baggage screening solutions—finding the ideal mix of 

higher-performance and lower-cost alternative screening solutions. 

• Funding prioritization schedule by airport—which airports should receive 

funding for an in-line baggage screening system based on quantitative 

modeling of security, economic, and other factors. 

Page 22 GAO-06-371T 
• Deployment strategy—a plan for the acquisition of next-generation EDS 

systems, the redeployment of existing EDS assets, and investment in lifecycle extension programs. 

• EDS Life-Cycle Management Plan—structured guidelines for EDS R&D 

investment, procurement specifications for next-generation EDS systems, 

and the redeployment of existing EDS assets and investment in life-cycle 

extension programs that minimize the cost of ownership of the EDS 

systems. 

• Stakeholder collaboration plan—TSA plans to work closely with airport 

operators and other key stakeholders to develop airport-specific screening 

solutions, refine the nationwide EDS deployment strategy, and investigate

alternative funding programs that may allow for innovative as well as nonfederal sources of funding or financing, including formulas for sharing 

costs between different government entities and the private sector. 

This strategic framework is a positive step forward in systematically

planning for TSA’s checked baggage screening program. The completion 

of a strategic plan for this program should help TSA ensure that it is 

efficiently allocating its limited resources to maximize the effectiveness of 

its checked baggage screening operations. However, it will be important 

for TSA to complete their analysis and plans for the funding of in-line EDS 

systems, which has been the primary obstacle to the deployment of these 

systems over the past few years. 

TSA has strengthened its efforts to measure the performance of the 

various components of the passenger and checked baggage screening 

systems—people, processes, and technology—but results of covert testing 

identified that weaknesses and vulnerabilities continue to exist. In 

November 2003, we reported on the need for TSA to strengthen its efforts 

to measure the performance of its aviation security system.29 At that time, 

TSA had collected limited data on the effectiveness of its aviation security

programs and initiatives. Specifically, limited covert testing had been

performed, the Threat Image Projection (TIP) system30 was not fully 

operational at passenger screening checkpoints and was not available for

checked baggage screening systems, and TSA had not fully implemented a

TSA Has 

Strengthened Its 

Efforts to Measure the 

Effectiveness of 

Screening Systems 

 29GAO, Aviation Security: Efforts to Measure Effectiveness and Address Challenges, 

GAO-04-232T, (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 5, 2003). 

30The Threat Image Projection system is designed to test TSOs’ detection capabilities by 

projecting threat images, including images of guns and explosives, into bags as they are 

screened. TSOs are responsible for positively identifying the threat image and calling for 

the bag to be searched. 

Page 23 GAO-06-371T 
congressionally mandated annual screener proficiency review (referred to 

as the recertification program). Since then, TSA has implemented and 

strengthened efforts to collect performance data in these areas. 

In the area of covert testing, TSA headquarters increased the amount of 

passenger and checked baggage screening covert tests it performs and 

recently changed its approach to covert testing to focus its resources on 

catastrophic threats—threats that can take down an airplane or blow up 

an airplane. These tests, in which undercover OI inspectors attempt to 

pass threat objects through passenger screening checkpoints and in 

checked baggage, are designed to measure vulnerabilities in passenger and 

checked baggage screening systems and to identify systematic problems 

affecting performance of TSOs in the areas of people (training), processes 

(procedures), and technology. OI began conducting covert testing in 

September 2002, conducting test scenarios for the passenger checkpoint 

and for checked baggage. These scenarios were carried over from tests 

developed and conducted under FAA, but OI reported using more updated 

weapons than those used by FAA and more robust tests. TSA considers its 

covert testing as a snapshot of a TSO’s ability to detect threat objects at a 

particular point in time, as one of several indicators of systemwide 

screener performance, and as an important mechanism for identifying 

areas in passenger and checked baggage screening needing improvement. 

In September 2003, we reported that OI had conducted limited covert 

testing, but planned to double the amount of tests it conducted during 

fiscal year 2004, based on an anticipated increase in its staff from about 

100 full-time equivalents to about 200 full-time equivalents.31 TSA officials 

stated that based on budget constraints, OI’s fiscal year 2004 staffing 

authorization was limited to 183 full-time-equivalents.32 Despite a smaller 

than expected staff increase, by the end of the second quarter of fiscal 

year 2004, OI had already surpassed the number of tests it had performed 

 31GAO-03-1173 . 

32Covert testing is an ancillary duty and not a full-time assignment for the majority of OI 

staff. According to OI, 14 full-time-equivalent positions in headquarters are dedicated fully 

to the covert testing program, which includes covert testing of all modes of transportation,

not just airports. These 14 full-time-equivalents are in a special group that forms the core of

team leaders for the covert testing trips. 

Page 24 GAO-06-371T 
during fiscal year 2003—conducting a total of 836 tests in fiscal year 2003 

and 1,233 in the first two quarters of fiscal year 2004.33

Our analysis of TSA’s covert testing results for tests conducted between 

September 2002 and September 2005 identified that overall, weaknesses 

existed in the ability of screeners to detect threat objects on passengers, in 

their carry-on bags, and in checked baggage. Covert testing results in this 

analysis cannot be generalized either to the airports where the tests were 

conducted or to airports nationwide.34 

During the first 3 years of covert testing, OI decided to maintain the same 

test scenarios and same level of difficulty so that test results would be 

comparable over time.35 In July 2005, OI began revamping its covert testing 

program based on the results of the Secretary of DHS’s Second Stage 

Review—a review of the department’s programs, policies, operations, and 

structure.36 Specifically, the Assistant Secretary of DHS, TSA, instructed OI 

to implement a more risk-based approach and focus its resources on 

catastrophic threats—threats that can take down an airplane or blow up 

an airplane. In August 2005, the Assistant Secretary of DHS, TSA, further 

instructed OI to discontinue its former covert testing program and 

implement the revamped covert testing program. OI began implementation

of its revamped testing in September 2005. OI conducted 117 tests over a 

1-week period at one airport focusing on catastrophic threats and 

incorporated additional testing elements that had not previously been 

included. According to OI officials, this testing involved over 50 personnel 

 33OI conducted a total of 2,369 passenger and checked baggage covert tests in fiscal year 

2004. 

34Test results cannot be generalized because sample tests were not identified using the

principles of probability sampling. In a probability sample to assess screener detection of 

threat objects, each screening of a passenger or baggage would have to have a chance of 

being selected. A well-designed probability sample would enable failure rates to be

generalized to all airports. However, for cost and operational reasons, probability sampling 

may not be feasible for passenger and checked baggage screening because it would require 

a very large sample size and an exhaustive examination of each sampled passenger or

baggage to determine if there was a threat object to detect. 

35In August 2004, OI began piloting various enhanced covert test scenarios based on more

current threat information. 

36The review examined elements of the Department of Homeland Security in order to

recommend ways that DHS could better manage risk in terms of threat, vulnerability, and 

consequence; prioritize policies and operational missions according to this risk-based 

approach; and establish a series of preventive and protective steps that would increase

security at multiple levels. 

Page 25 GAO-06-371T 
from various TSA components. Since then, OI has conducted tests at three 

additional airports.37 OI officials stated that TSA leadership is considering 

these initial tests in making final determinations regarding the revised 

testing program that OI will implement, and that final decisions regarding 

the structure, content, and frequency of these tests have not yet been 

made. 

In February 2004, TSA provided protocols to help FSDs conduct their own 

covert testing of local airport passenger screening activities—a practice 

that TSA had previously prohibited.38 Between May 2004 and April 2005, 

FSDs conducted a total of 17,954 local covert tests at 350 airports; as of 

February 2006, TSA reported that FSDs had conducted a total of 48,826 

local covert tests. In February 2005, TSA released a general procedures 

document for local covert testing at checked baggage screening locations. 

Between March 2005 and September 2005, 1,370 local tests of EDS 

screening were conducted at 71 airports. TSA headquarters officials stated 

that a key challenge FSDs face in conducting local testing is the lack of 

available federal staff to conduct the testing, particularly at smaller 

airports. In May 2005, we reported that TSA officials stated that they had

not yet begun to use data from local covert testing to identify training and 

performance needs because of difficulties in ensuring that local covert 

testing is implemented consistently nationwide.39 TSA officials stated in 

March 2006 that data is available for use by FSDs to identify training needs 

and TSO performance. 

Covert testing is one method TSA uses to measure the security

effectiveness of passenger and checked baggage screening procedures and 

technologies in the operating environment in addition to other TSA 

measures that assess the performance of passenger and checked baggage 

TSOs. One other source of information on TSO performance in detecting 

threat objects is the results from the TIP system. TIP is designed to test 

passenger screeners’ detection capabilities by projecting threat images, 

including images of guns, knives, and explosives, onto bags as they are

screened during actual operations. TSOs are responsible for identifying 

the threat image and calling for the bag to be searched. Once prompted, 

 37OI conducted testing at two of the three airports twice during September 2005 through

December 2005. 

38The local covert testing protocols were updated in June 2004 and August 2004 to provide 

information on alternative testing methods. 

39GAO-05-457. 

Page 26 GAO-06-371T 
TIP identifies to the screener whether the threat is real and then records 

the TSO’s performance in a database that could be analyzed for 

performance trends.40 TIP threat detection results in conjunction with OI 

covert test results and local testing are intended to assist TSA in 

identifying specific training and performance improvement efforts. 

In May 2005, we reported that in October 2003 TSA reactivated TIP as 

planned with an expanded library of 2,400 images at all but 1 of the more 

than 1,800 checkpoint lanes nationwide. In December 2005, TSA reported 

that it has further expanded the image library to include additional images 

of IEDs and IED components as part of its effort to improve TSOs’ 

detection of explosives. Additionally, the President’s fiscal year 2007 

budget request states that TSA plans to maximize the training benefits of

the TIP system by tailoring TIP sessions to address individual TSO 

weaknesses revealed in user performance data. For example, if a TSO has 

particular difficulty identifying IEDs, the TIP would trigger the projection 

of a higher proportion of simulated IEDs while that TSO was operating the 

machine than under standard circumstances. While there have been 

improvements in TIP for passenger screening, TIP is not yet available for 

checked baggage screening. In April 2004, we reported that TSA officials 

stated that they were working to resolve technical challenges associated 

with using TIP for checked baggage screening on EDS machines and have 

started EDS TIP image development.41 However, in December 2004, TSA 

officials stated that because of severe budget reductions, TSA will be 

unable to begin implementing a TIP program for checked baggage in fiscal

year 2005. Officials did not specify when such a program might begin. 

Another measure of TSO performance is the results of annual 

recertification testing. ATSA requires that each TSO receive an annual 

proficiency review to ensure he or she continues to meet all qualifications

and standards required to perform the screening function. To meet this 

requirement, TSA established a recertification program. The first 

recertification program—which was conducted during the period October 

2003 through March 2004—was composed of two assessment components, 

 40The TIP database records both the TIP hit rate and TIP false alarm rate. These two results 

are used to determine the probability of detection and probability of false alarm, which 

determine overall TIP performance. The TIP performance measure is classified as sensitive 

security information. 

41GAO, Aviation Security: Private Screening Contractors Have Little Flexibility to 

Implement Innovative Approaches, GAO-04-505T (Washington, D.C.: April 22, 2004). 

Page 27 GAO-06-371T 
one of TSOs’ performance and the other of TSOs’ knowledge and skills. 

During the performance assessment component of the recertification 

program, TSOs are rated on both organizational and individual goals, such

as maintaining the nation’s air security, vigilantly carrying out duties with 

utmost attention to tasks that will prevent security threats, and 

demonstrating the highest levels of courtesy to travelers to maximize their 

levels of satisfaction with screening services. The knowledge and skills 

assessment component consists of three modules: (1) knowledge of 

standard operating procedures, (2) image recognition, and (3) practical

demonstration of skills. 

Across all airports, TSOs performed well on the recertification testing for 

the first 2 years the program was in place, with about 1 percent of TSOs 

subject to recertification failing to complete this requirement. In both 

years, TSOs faced the greatest difficulty on their first attempt to pass the 

practical demonstration of skills module—a hands-on simulated work 

sample used to evaluate a screener’s knowledge, skill, and ability when 

performing specific screener tasks along with the ability to provide 

customer service.42 According to TSA officials, at the completion of 

recertification at an airport, TSA management has access to reports at 

both the individual TSO and airport level, which identify the specific areas 

that were missed during testing. National level reports are also available 

that isolate areas that need improvement and can be targeted in basic and 

recurrent training. In fiscal year 2004, TSA established a performance 

measure for the recertification program.43 

During the first year of recertification testing, dual-function TSOs who 

were actively working as both passenger and checked baggage TSOs were 

required to take only the recertification test for passenger TSOs. They 

were therefore not required to take the recertification testing modules 

required for checked baggage, even though they worked in that capacity.44

TSA’s second annual recertification testing, which began in October 2004,

included components for dual-function TSOs, but did not include an image 

recognition module for checked baggage TSOs—which would include 

dual-function screeners performing checked baggage screening. TSA 

 42We cannot reported on the specific results of the testing due to the security classification 

of this testing. 

43Information related to the measures is sensitive security information. 

44As of January 7, 2005, TSA reported that its workforce included approximately 25,947 

dual-trained TSOs who were certified to serve as passenger or baggage TSOs. 

Page 28 GAO-06-371T 
officials stated that a decision was made to not include an image 

recognition module for checked baggage TSOs during this cycle because 

not all checked baggage TSOs would have completed training on the 

onscreen resolution protocol by the time recertification testing was 

conducted at their airports.45 In October 2005, TSA released guidance for 

screener recertification that included an image recognition module for 

checked baggage and dual-function screeners trained in the onscreen 

alarm resolution protocol. 

In addition to enhancing its efforts to measure the performance of TSOs, 

TSA also has developed two performance indexes to measure the 

effectiveness of the passenger and checked baggage screening systems. 

These indexes measure overall performance through a composite of 

indicators and are derived by combining specific performance measures 

relating to passenger and checked baggage screening, respectively.

Specifically, these indexes measure the effectiveness of the screening 

systems through machine probability of detection and covert testing 

results;46 efficiency through a calculation of dollars spent per passenger or 

bag screened; and customer satisfaction through a national poll, customer 

surveys, and customer complaints at both airports and TSA’s national call

center. We reported in May 2005 that the screening performance indexes 

developed by TSA can be a useful analysis tool, but without targets for 

each component of the index, TSA will have difficulty performing 

meaningful analyses of the parts that make up to the index. For example, 

without performance targets for covert testing, TSA will not have 

identified a desired level of performance related to screener detection of 

threat objects. Performance targets for covert testing would enable TSA to

focus its improvement efforts on areas determined to be most critical, as

100 percent detection capability may not be attainable. In January 2005, 

TSA officials stated that the agency planned to track the performance of 

individual index components and establish performance targets against 

which to measure these components. 

 45TSA’s onscreen resolution protocol requires that when an EDS machine alarm goes off, 

indicating the possibility of explosives, TSA screeners, by reviewing computer-generated 

images of the inside of the bag, attempt to determine whether or not a suspect item or 

items are in fact explosive materials. If the screener is unable to make this determination, 

the bag is diverted from the main conveyor belt into an area where it receives a secondary 

screening by a screener with an ETD machine.

46According to TSA, the machine probabilities of detection are established by the 

certification standards for each particular model of machine, and machines are not 

deployed unless they have met those standards. 

Page 29 GAO-06-371T 
Concluding 

Observations 

Since its inception, TSA has achieved significant accomplishments in 

meeting congressional mandates related to establishing passenger and 

checked baggage screening operations. With the initial congressional 

mandates now largely met, TSA has turned its attention to assessing and 

enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of its passenger and checked 

baggage screening systems. As threats and technology evolve, it is vital 

that TSA continue to enhance training and procedures for the TSO 

workforce. Over the past several years, TSA has strengthened its TSO 

training program in an effort to ensure that TSOs have the knowledge and

skills needed to successfully perform their screening functions. However, 

without addressing the challenges to delivering ongoing training, including

installing high-speed connectivity at airport training facilities, TSA may 

have difficulty maintaining a screening workforce that possesses the 

critical skills needed to perform at a desired level. TSA is also revising 

existing screening procedures and developing new procedures to enhance

security effectiveness, many of which are risk-based, as we have 

previously advocated. Additionally, TSA has developed a staffing model 

intended to provide the necessary levels of TSOs to support security 

activities at the nation’s airports. However, given the challenges TSA faces

in determining appropriate staffing levels at airports—to include hiring the 

appropriate mix of part-time TSOs needed to support screening 

functions—it is critical that TSA carefully consider how it strategically

hires, deploys, and manages its TSO workforce to help strengthen its 

passenger and checked baggage screening programs. 

As TSA works towards improving the performance of individual TSOs and 

screening operations, it will also be important that the agency deploy and 

leverage screening equipment and technologies, sustain its research and 

development efforts, and strengthen its R&D management and planning 

efforts. We are encouraged that TSA is currently undertaking efforts to 

systematically analyze the cost and benefits of in-line baggage screening 

systems and to identify innovative funding and financing options. This 

planning should help TSA support future funding requests by 

demonstrating enhanced security, improved operational efficiencies, and 

cost savings to both TSA and the affected airports. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer 

any questions that you or other members of the Committee may have at

this time. 

For further information on this testimony, please contact Cathleen A. 

Berrick at (202) 512-3404 or berrickc@gao.gov. Contact points for our Contact Information 

Page 30 GAO-06-371T 
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the 

last page of this statement. 

In addition to the contact named above, Kristy Brown, Philip Caramia, 

Kevin Copping, Katherine Davis, Christine Fossett, Tom Lombardi, 

Laina Poon, and Maria Strudwick made key contributions to this 

testimony. 

Page 31 GAO-06-371T 
Page 32 GAO-06-371T 

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Affect Implementation of the Transportation Security Administration’s 

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Program Testing in Initial Privacy Notes, but Has Recently Taken Steps

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Checked Baggage Screening Systems. GAO-05-896T. Washington, D.C.: 

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May 2, 2005.

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but Risks Should Be Managed as System Is Further Developed. GAO-05-

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Deployment of Checked Baggage Screening Systems. GAO-05-365. 

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Resources. GAO-05-357T. Washington, D.C.: February 15, 2005. 

Aviation Security: Preliminary Observations on TSA’s Progress to Allow 

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Commercial Airport Perimeters and Access Controls. GAO-04-728. 

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Page 36 GAO-06-371T (440483) 
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