United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted March 28, 2016*

Decided April 7, 2016

Before

       DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge

       MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

       DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

No. 15‐2641

CONNIE S. MADDOX,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

STATE AUTO PROPERTY &   

CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY,

Defendant‐Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Southern District of Indiana,

Indianapolis Division.

No. 1:13‐cv‐01551‐RLY‐DML

Richard L. Young,

Chief Judge.

O R D E R

Connie Maddox appeals from the dismissal at summary judgment of her

discrimination suit against her former employer, State Auto Property & Casualty

Insurance Company. Because Maddox neither established a prima facie case of

discrimination nor adequately supported her state‐law theories, we affirm the district

court’s judgment.

                                                 

* After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral

argument is unnecessary. Thus the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record.

See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 15‐2641    Page 2

Except as noted, the following facts are not disputed. State Auto hired Maddox

in 2009 to work as a claims adjustor in Indianapolis, Indiana. Maddox twice sought

promotions in 2011, but her supervisor did not recommend her for either position

because of concerns about carelessness and poor customer relations. Following a

lackluster annual review in February 2012, Maddox was placed on a 90‐day

performance‐improvement plan and warned that she could be fired unless she

corrected the deficiencies.

Just two days later Maddox requested and received approval to take leave under

the Family and Medical Leave Act. She explained that she had developed posttraumatic

stress disorder after suddenly recalling a repressed memory of a traffic accident she had

witnessed decades earlier. Maddox’s FMLA leave expired in May 2012, and she

returned to work without any medical restrictions, at which time the 90‐day remedial

period resumed.

That period ended in July 2012 with another poor review. Maddox then

scheduled herself for wrist surgery, and State Auto approved her request for short‐term

disability leave. But while Maddox was on leave, State Auto notified her that declining

business was forcing the company to eliminate all of its positions in Indianapolis for

claims adjustors. Maddox responded by applying for another promotion, but State Auto

turned her down and eliminated her job in October when her disability leave expired.

The following year she filed a claim for worker’s compensation based on her wrist

impairment, but that claim was denied.

Maddox then brought this action claiming that State Auto had refused to

promote her because of her medical conditions and sex, in violation of the Americans

with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 to 12213, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

1964, id. §§ 2000e to 2000e–17. Maddox also asserted claims under Indiana law for

retaliatory discharge and intentional infliction of emotional distress. (A further claim

under the FMLA was voluntarily dismissed).

Both parties moved for summary judgment. In her submissions, Maddox

conceded that she had been placed on a performance‐improvement plan but asserted

that her supervisor had “set her up to fail” and falsely attributed to her the mistakes of

other employees. But these submissions did not comply with the district court’s local

rules, and so the court adopted as undisputed State Auto’s statement of material facts.

See S.D. IND. L.R. 56‐1(a–b), (f); Flint v. City of Belvidere, 791 F.3d 764, 767 (7th Cir. 2015)

(recognizing discretion of district courts to enforce local rules implementing Federal
No. 15‐2641    Page 3

Rule of Civil Procedure 56); Bradley v. Work, 154 F.3d 704, 707–08 (7th Cir. 1998) (same).

After disregarding factual assertions that Maddox had not presented properly, the

district court concluded that State Auto was entitled to summary judgment on all of

Maddox’s claims.

On appeal Maddox first challenges the district court’s decision to disregard her

factual assertions. But a district court is entitled to enforce its local rules, even against

pro se litigants. See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993); Patterson v. Indiana

Newspapers, Inc., 589 F.3d 357, 360 (7th Cir. 2009); Cady v. Sheahan, 467 F.3d 1057, 1061

(7th Cir. 2006). Most of Maddox’s factual allegations were immaterial, and she violated

Local Rule 56‐1 by relying on unintelligible citations to voluminous, unorganized

exhibits instead of specifically citing admissible evidence. Counsel for State Auto had

explained to Maddox what the rule requires and warned her about the consequences of

disregarding it, see Timms v. Frank, 953 F.2d 281, 285 (7th Cir. 1992), and so the district

court acted within its discretion by striking her factual allegations and deeming State

Auto’s statement of material facts admitted, see Ciomber v. Cooperative Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d   

635, 643–44 (7th Cir. 2008).

Maddox next challenges the grant of summary judgment on her ADA and

Title VII claims, but we agree with the district court that a jury could not reasonably

find that State Auto discriminated against Maddox on the basis of her medical

conditions or sex. Maddox does not contest the district court’s conclusion that she

lacked direct evidence of discrimination. And she fares no better under the indirect

method, which requires evidence that Maddox had been meeting State Auto’s

legitimate job expectations and that the company had treated similarly situated

employees more favorably. See Hooper v. Proctor Health Care, Inc., 804 F.3d 846, 852–53

(7th Cir. 2015) (discussing use of indirect method of proof in ADA cases); Sklyarsky v.

Means‐Knaus Part., L.P., 777 F.3d 892, 896–97 (7th Cir. 2015) (discussing use of indirect

method of proof in Title VII cases). The record contains no such evidence. To the

contrary, the record shows that Maddox began receiving negative feedback about her

performance in 2011, which culminated in her being placed on a performance‐

improvement plan in February 2012. The record also shows that Maddox continued

having performance issues until the company laid her off for business reasons, along

with all of its other Indianapolis‐based claims adjustors. Without evidence of

satisfactory performance, and lacking evidence that State Auto treated other

under‐performing claims adjustors more favorably, Maddox’s claims of disability and

sex discrimination could not survive summary judgment.
No. 15‐2641    Page 4

Maddox’s failure to respond properly to State Auto’s statement of material facts

was also fatal to her state‐law claims. To succeed on her claim of retaliatory discharge,

Maddox needed evidence that State Auto fired her for seeking worker’s compensation,

see Hudson v. Wal‐Mart Stores, Inc., 412 F.3d 781, 785 (7th Cir. 2005); Frampton v. Central

Ind. Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425, 428 (Ind. 1973), but Maddox did not apply for worker’s

compensation until six months after State Auto had eliminated her position. As for her

claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, Maddox needed evidence that State

Auto intentionally or recklessly caused her severe emotional distress through

outrageous conduct. See Alexander v. United States, 721 F.3d 418, 424 (7th Cir. 2013);

Williams v. Tharp, 914 N.E.2d 756, 769 n.4 (Ind. 2009). She presented no such evidence,

however. We therefore AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.