UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

MUNEERAH U. SABIR, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.  No. 01-1750 TOMMY G. THOMPSON, Secretary of

the United States Department of

Health and Human Services,

Defendant-Appellee. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.

Benson E. Legg, District Judge.

(CA-00-1196-L)

Submitted: February 26, 2002

Decided: March 28, 2002

Before WILKINS, WILLIAMS, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

COUNSEL

Muneerah U. Sabir, Appellant Pro Se. Michael Anthony DiPietro,

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore,

Maryland, for Appellee. 
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c). 

OPINION

PER CURIAM: 

Muneerah U. Sabir sued her employer, the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), alleging discriminatory

treatment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42

U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (West 1994 & Supp. 2001), and the

Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-

12213 (West 1995 & Supp. 2001).* The district court granted

DHHS’s motion for summary judgment, finding Sabir’s claims

untimely, procedurally defaulted, and meritless. We affirm. 

Sabir, an African-American female of Muslim religious beliefs,

began her employment in August 1995 as a secretary/receptionist for

the Department of Social Work of the National Institute of Health for

DHHS. Sabir filed EEO claims and ultimately this lawsuit alleging

discriminatory treatment for DHHS’s failure to retroactively grant her

approved leave for a religious holiday for which she had not obtained

prior approval, for DHHS’s suspension of her for violating official

time and attendance regulations and submitting a falsely recorded

leave document in connection with the unapproved leave, and for

DHHS’s criticism of her handling of situations in her department precipitating her lateral transfer. 

This Court reviews an award of summary judgment de novo. Higgins v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 863 F.2d 1162, 1167 (4th Cir.

1988). Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine

issue of material fact, given the parties’ burdens of proof at trial. Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-

*Prior to filing the present claim, Sabir filed seven Equal Employment

Opportunity (EEO) complaints, alleging various violations of Title VII,

the ADA, and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 701-7961 (West

1999 & Supp. 2001). 

2 SABIR v. THOMPSON
49 (1986). In determining whether the moving party has shown that

there is no genuine issue of material fact, a court must assess the factual evidence and all inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light

most favorable to the non-moving party. Id. at 255; Smith v. Virginia

Commonwealth Univ., 84 F.3d 672, 675 (4th Cir. 1996). 

The MSPB affirmed DHHS’s denial of Sabir’s retroactive leave

approval and her suspension on May 6, 1998, and denied her petition

for review on July 9, 1998. The EEOC affirmed the MSPB’s findings

on October 9, 1998. Sabir did not file her complaint in federal court

until July 26, 1999, almost nine and one-half months after the decision became final, by which time the statute of limitations had

expired. See 5 U.S.C.A. § 7703(b)(2) (West 1996); 42 U.S.C.A.

§ 2000e-16(c); Baldwin County Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S.

147, 150-52 (1984). Thus, Sabir’s claims involving DHHS’s refusal

to retroactively grant approved leave and the subsequent suspension

are time-barred.

Sabir’s claims of discrimination and retaliation involving criticism

of her handling of two situations in her department and her subsequent transfer from the department were properly dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies because the Administrative

Law Judge dismissed the claims for failure to prosecute. See 42

U.S.C.A. § 2000e-16(c); Zografov v. V.A. Med. Ctr., 779 F.2d 967,

968-69 (4th Cir. 1985). Moreover, in the alternative, the claims were

properly dismissed on the merits because the actions complained of

did not amount to redressable adverse employment actions. See

Brown v. Brody, 199 F.3d 446, 457 (4th Cir. 1999); Page v. Bolger,

645 F.2d 227, 233 (4th Cir. 1981). Therefore, the district court did not

err in granting summary judgment in favor of DHHS, dismissing

Sabir’s claims of discrimination based on race, religion, disability,

and reprisal. 

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order granting summary

judgment to DHHS. We dispense with oral argument because the

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

before the court and argument would not aid in the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

SABIR v. THOMPSON 3