i

REFORM, CONFLICT, AND SECURITY IN ZAIRE

Steven Metz

June 5, 1996
ii

*******

The views expressed in this report are those of the author

and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of

the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the

U.S. Government. This report is cleared for public release;

distribution is unlimited. The author would like to thank

Ambassador Marc Baas, COL Dan Henk, and Dr. Kent Butts for

comments on earlier drafts of this study, and Ms. Mary Beth

Leonard, LTC Gregory M. Saunders, Mr. Bruce Whitehouse, LTC John

S. Wilson, and Mr. David C. Peters for valuable insights on the

situation in Zaire.

*******

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be

forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army

War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050. Comments also may

be conveyed directly to the author. Dr. Metz can be reached by

calling (717) 245-3822, FAX (717) 245-3820, or via the Internet

at metzs@carlisle-emh2.army.mil. Copies of this report may be

obtained from the Publications and Production Office by calling

commercial (717) 245-4133, DSN 242-4133, FAX (717) 245-3820, or

via the Internet at rummelr@carlisle-emh2.army.mil. Other SSI

publications on Africa can be found on the Internet at

http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usassi/

ssipubs/catalogs/catarsa.htm.

*******

All 1995 and later Strategic Studies Institute (SSI)

monographs are available on the SSI Homepage for electronic

dissemination. SSI's Homepage address is: http://carlislewww.army.mil/usassi/.
iii

FOREWORD

During the Cold War, the U.S. Army developed a deep

institutional understanding of the politics, economics, security

concerns, and cultures of the areas where it was heavily engaged,

particularly Europe, the Asia-Pacific region, and Latin America.

But as the global security environment changes, the Army is

increasingly involved in regions where it has less experience.

Sub-Saharan Africa is a classic example. The Army is likely to

play an important role there in the coming years, whether through

humanitarian relief and peace operations or military-to-military

contacts in Africa's new democracies. To prepare for this, the

Army must augment its understanding of the African security

environment.

U.S. foreign policy in Sub-Saharan Africa seeks stability,

democracy, and economic development. Despite recent positive

trends, it is clear that not all African countries will move in

this direction; some will sink into greater violence and misery.

In the central part of the continent, Zaire is the linchpin.

Because of its great size and natural wealth, Zaire has the

ability to serve as either the locomotive of development or an

agent of destabilization.

If Zaire collapses, the U.S. Army may become involved in a

major humanitarian relief operation. On the other hand, if Zaire

succeeds at political reform and democratization, the Army may be

tasked to reinvigorate military-to-military contacts. This study

is designed to offer Army planners and leaders an understanding

of the current crisis in Zaire and provide recommendations on

future U.S. policy and Army activities.

RICHARD H. WITHERSPOON

Colonel, U.S. Army

Director, Strategic Studies Institute
iv

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

STEVEN METZ is the Henry L. Stimson Professor of Military Studies

at the U.S. Army War College. He has been a research professor at

the War College's Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) since 1993.

Before that, he taught at the Air War College, the U.S. Army

Command and General Staff College, and several universities. Dr.

Metz has testified before the Senate Africa Subcommittee and

written on Africa for journals such as Comparative Strategy,

Political Science Quarterly, Joint Force Quarterly, African

Affairs and Journal of Modern African Studies. He holds a B.A.

and M.A. in international studies from the University of South

Carolina, and a Ph.D. in political science from the Johns Hopkins

University. Dr. Metz's most recent Africa-related SSI study is

Armies and Democracy in the New Africa: Lessons From Nigeria and

South Africa.
v

SUMMARY

To a great extent, the larger states in Sub-Saharan Africa

will shape the region's future security environment. Among

Africa's giants, none is more crucial than Zaire. Since Zaire has

the potential either to lead regional development or drag the

process down, helping stabilize that nation is a pressing task

for all states and organizations interested in Africa.

For nearly 10 years, Zaire has experienced a sustained

political and economic crisis. In April 1990, President Mobutu

Sese Seko, who had ruled Zaire since the 1960s using a

combination of corruption, patronage, and repression, announced

the beginning of political reform and democratization. When it

became clear that the reform process would destroy Mobutu's

personal power, he attempted to derail it. The result has been

five years of political stalemate, economic collapse, and

violence. But in 1995, Mobutu and some of his opponents hammered

out a compromise. Today, movement toward democracy is underway

again, with national elections scheduled for 1997.

U.S. Policy.

 Although Mobutu was the most important American ally in

Sub-Saharan Africa during the Cold War, both the Bush and Clinton

administrations recognized that his regime was a source of great

danger for both Zaire itself and for Central Africa. The primary

objective was preventing wide-scale violence that could spill

over to neighboring states and spark a massive human disaster.

Recent U.S. policy toward Zaire has been to support reform

and democratization. Washington's limited leverage prevented this

from being effective. But today, the chances of real reform in

Zaire are the best they have been for some time. The United

States should thus undertake a major review of its policy toward

Zaire. Such a review must answer a number of key questions:

What is the appropriate extent and form of U.S. involvement?

The United States should play a major but not dominant role in a

Zaire support coalition or contact group. Washington should work

to broaden the support coalition as much as possible, with

particular stress on the role of other African democracies. The

support coalition should focus on helping Zaire build democratic

institutions before and after the 1997 elections. The United

States should publicly repudiate Mobutu during the campaign, but

should not intervene in the election using covert means.

How should the United States respond if Mobutu wins the 1997

elections? Mobutu is likely to win the election. If he does,

Washington should continue to keep him at arm's length. If he
vi

allows the consolidation of democratic institutions, relations

should be cool but normal. If he does not, current restrictions

on aid and travel to the United States by Mobutu should remain in

place.

How should the United respond if the electoral process

collapses? If this process fails, the United States, in concert

with democratic African states, should engineer a complete

economic and political quarantine of whoever seizes power.

How should the United States respond if Zaire disintegrates?

The United States should not encourage the division of Zaire. But

if Zaire dies of its own volition, the United States would have

little choice than to accept any new states that emerge while

encouraging them to eventually consider reunification. If the

central government fails to reform and a break-away province

clearly committed to democracy appears, the United States should

accept and help the democratizers but make clear that it prefers

eventual reunification in a single democratic state rather than

permanent division.

The Army Role.

The U.S. Army's current role in Zaire is limited to

providing analysis and recommendations for policymakers. If,

however, the situation in Zaire either gets better or worse, the

Army's involvement could escalate.

To prepare for a multinational peace support or humanitarian

relief operation in Zaire, the Army should:

• Identify potential coalition partners, encourage American

policymakers to open channels of communications and begin

consensus-building, and begin the writing and refinement of

plans. EUCOM should, of course, take the lead on planning but the

Army staff and USAREUR can provide vital support.

• Strengthen cooperation with African militaries that might

participate in a peace support or humanitarian relief operation.

This should include the holding of regular staff exercises

dealing with a potential peace support or humanitarian relief

operation in Zaire.

• Encourage an increase in the number of defense attaches in

Africa and that liaison officers be assigned to key African

militaries.

• Explore the possibility of pre-positioning vital but

difficult-to-transport equipment necessary for relief operations.
vii

If democratization and reform in Zaire stays on course, the

Army should:

• Recommend the quick reopening of military-to-military

ties.

• Develop a plan for using such ties to cultivate greater

professionalism and political neutrality in the Zairian officer

corps.

• Recommend that American policymakers press Zaire to move

toward a reserve-based military and to undertake a wholesale

reconstruction of its officer corps.

Conclusions.

The United States must approach Zaire in a strategic fashion

and plan for the long term. Political and economic conditions in

that nation are so dire that fundamental change will take

decades. Ultimately, only Zairians can determine the fate of

their nation. But Zaire is at a crucial point today where a welldesigned American policy might be able to tip the scales in favor

of reform. To do so would diminish the chances that the United

States might be forced to participate in an expensive peace

support or humanitarian relief operation if reform in Zaire

fails. Preemption and preparation should thus be the focus of

U.S. strategy as Zaire struggles to emerge from its time of

crisis.
1

REFORM, CONFLICT, AND SECURITY IN ZAIRE

Introduction.

Sub-Saharan Africa is at a crossroad. For several decades

economic decay, corrupt and repressive governance, and violent

conflict dominated the region. Then Africa seemed to turn a

corner. Some long-running conflicts lurched toward resolution

due, at least in part, to the end of the Cold War. A tide of

democracy swept away some of the region's longest ruling

dictators.1 And, according to the World Bank, economic policies

in Africa are getting better with discernible payoffs.2 This is

all good news, but it is much too early to predict a rosy future:

in Africa, instability, conflict, and violence always lurk one

step behind progress. Great efforts will be required to 

consolidate recent gains.

Understanding the security environment of Sub-Saharan Africa

is the first step toward finding permanent solutions to the

region's conflicts. For instance, security must be viewed from a

regional perspective rather than a country-specific one. The

continent is characterized by permeable borders with ethnic

groups overlapping national boundaries and extensive flows of

people and goods--whether legal or illegal--between states. This

makes stability in any one nation contingent on conditions in

neighboring countries. Instability, conflict, and violence have

repercussions outside the state where they originate. The larger

countries in particular serve as bellwethers for wider trends and

tendencies. An old African proverb holds that when elephants

fight, the grass gets trampled. This certainly applies to the

security environment: if the continent's giants stumble, small

nations also suffer the consequences.

Among Africa's giants, none is more crucial than Zaire. Even

on a continent that has experienced more than its share of crises

and conflicts, Zaire is particularly tragic. Unlike many of the

small African nations that seem doomed to poverty, Zaire is

potentially rich. It has large reserves of cobalt, industrial

diamonds, and copper as well as substantial deposits of zinc,

tin, manganese, gold, tungsten-bearing wolframite, niobium, and

tantalum.3

 It also has coastal petroleum reserves, some coal

deposits, and immense agricultural and hydroelectric potential.

Zaire is Sub-Saharan Africa's third most populous state and one

of the largest, sharing borders with nine other countries. (See

Figure 1 and Figure 2.) Its despair is strictly man-made: where

it could be the economic locomotive of Central Africa, corrupt,

incompetent, and repressive leadership have driven it to the edge

of disaster.

Given Zaire's potential to either lead regional development
2

or drag the process down, helping stabilize that nation is a
3

pressing task for all states and organizations interested in

Africa. Ultimately, only Zairians can decide their future, but

outsiders can facilitate reform and conflict resolution. Because

of this, encouraging stability in Zaire should be a centerpiece

of U.S. policy in Africa. But few problems anywhere on earth are

more complex or frustrating. As the United States simultaneously

seeks to prod Zaire on the path of reform and plan for the
4

failure of reform, coherent and creative strategy is imperative.

If the United States is to both encourage reform in Zaire and

prepare for multinational relief if reform fails, the U.S. Army

may have an important role and thus should actively seek to

augment its understanding of reform, crisis, and security in

Zaire.
5

The Roots of Crisis.

The eminent Africanist Crawford Young called Zaire "the

crippled, ill-starred giant of Central Africa."4 To a large

extent, this condition was inevitable given that nation's grim

history. Zaire was born when Belgium's King Léopold II hired

explorer Henry Morton Stanley to form a colony under the auspices

of the International Association of the Congo. At the Conference

of Berlin in 1884-85, the European powers recognized the Congo

Free State as Léopold's personal fiefdom, beginning a period of

ruthless, often brutal, exploitation immortalized in Joseph

Conrad's The Heart of Darkness.5 This changed only slightly when

Belgium annexed the Congo in 1908 in response to international

criticism of the way the colony was administered.6

Among the colonizers of Africa, the Belgians matched the

Germans in their disregard for the development and well-being of

their subjects. Several characteristics of Belgian rule set the

stage for Zaire's post-colonial conflicts. One was basing the

modern sector of the economy almost solely on the export of

minerals. This had several adverse effects. For instance, it gave

foreign companies and individuals a central role in Zaire's

economy, thus stifling development of local technical and

managerial skills. Second, it made the national economy heavily

dependent on world commodity markets without giving Zairians much

of a role in determining the price their minerals brought. A

small change in something like the world price of copper could

have a tremendous effect on the Zairian economy. And third,

reliance on mineral exports caused uneven development within

Zaire. Mineral producing regions like Shaba (formerly Katanga)

saw the building of a relatively extensive transportation and

communications infrastructure, while most of the country did not.

This heightened inter-regional competition and later sparked

intense political conflicts as less-developed regions sought a

greater share of power and national wealth.

The Belgian style of imperialism had other detrimental

effects as well. Colonial administrators relied on a group of

"modernized" Zairians--the evolues--to assist with running the

colony while paying very little attention to the education or

development of the rest of the citizens. Even though the evolues

were only minimally educated and filled menial positions rather

than important ones, this process helped open an immense gap

between the Zairian elite and mass public that persists today.

And, the Belgians based the security of their colony on the Force

Publique which combined Belgian officers with enlisted personnel

from what the colonial administrators considered "martial" ethnic

groups like the Ngala and Tetels. This began a pattern of

antagonistic relations between the security forces and the
6

Zairian public with the army more a repressor of the citizens

than their protector.7

The way the Belgian Congo was decolonized further propelled

it toward disaster. While Britain and France cultivated educated

elites in their African colonies, Belgium did not, assuming

instead that preventing the emergence of a Zairian elite would

stifle any desire for independence. This proved wrong. With

independence movements gaining steam all over Africa, riots in

Leopoldville led to an agreement granting the Belgian Congo

independence as the Republic of the Congo on June 30, 1960. The

fragile new state, born without an educated elite, plunged

immediately into crisis as the Force Publique mutinied against

its Belgian officers while Katanga and, later, Kasai seceded. In

the capital, a power struggle between leftist Prime Minister

Patrice Lumumba and President Kasavubu sparked further violence.

Led by Moise Tshombe, the Katanga secession posed the most

serious threat. International support from Belgian commercial

interests and other sources gave Tshombe the means to resist the

central government. Reflecting Secretary-General Dag

Hammarskjold's activist approach to peacekeeping and conflict

resolution, a United Nations force, initially invited by both

Lumumba and Kasavubu, arrived in the Congo seeking to prevent

full-scale civil war and assist with the reintegration of

Katanga.8 When confronted by government and U.N. troops as well

as an insurgency from the Balubas of North Katanga, Tshombe hired

a mercenary force from ex-French Foreign Legion paratroopers left

unemployed by the end of the war in Algeria and English-speaking

soldiers recruited through Rhodesia.9 However much this might

have added to the military effectiveness of Tshombe's government,

it eroded any international backing he had outside Rhodesia and

South Africa.

Eventually the United States assumed an active role in

quelling the violence. In fact, the Congo crisis represented the

first serious entry of the United States into African affairs.10

The Kennedy administration was convinced that chaos and conflict

in the newly independent parts of the world offered rich

opportunities for the spread of Soviet influence. The problem was

finding a way to shape events in a region with no tradition of

American involvement in security affairs. Kennedy approved the

use of U.S. aircraft, a small military mission, and a CIA element

to assist U.N. forces and government forces in suppressing the

Katanga rebels in 1963.11 This established a precedent for

Washington's preferred method of dealing with instability in

Africa: a combination of CIA activities, military airlift,

security assistance, and surrogates--whether African or European-

-to support a regional client or ally.

Unfortunately, defeat of the Katanga secession did not end
7

the Congo's time of danger. Almost as soon as Tshombe was

defeated, insurgencies broke out in Kwilu and other regions.

Again, total collapse seemed imminent. Rebel forces controlled

much of the eastern part of the country; other areas had no

government at all.12 Ironically, Moise Tshombe, who had been

recalled from exile in 1964 and named prime minister, was the

central figure in defeating the rebellions. He reconstructed his

force of Katanga gendarmes and white mercenaries, and launched an

offensive against the eastern rebels. After Belgian forces using

American airlift attacked the rebels in their capital of

Stanleyville to free a number of European hostages, the

insurgency quickly disintegrated.13 Despite this tactical success,

the use of foreigners discredited Tshombe and exacerbated the

conflict between the prime minister and president Joseph 

Kasavubu. By the latter part of 1965, the government was almost

totally paralyzed. On November 25, the army commander JosephDesire Mobutu removed both Kasavubu and Evariste Kimba, who had

been nominated to replace Tshombe, and assumed power. The United

States (and many other African states) breathed a sigh of relief

and concluded that finally a figure had emerged who was strong

enough to control the Congo's fractious tendencies.

A Long March To Crisis.

Once in power, Mobutu undertook two broad tasks. First was

to forge a sense of national identity in the Congo--something

that the Belgians deliberately resisted during their rule. Zaire

was an artificial entity from the beginning, cobbling together

diverse and sometimes hostile ethnic groups. Like many African

states, it lacked the normal bases of nationhood, whether a

shared language, culture, religion, or economic system. To

transcend this, Mobutu attempted to invent a national identity by

blending elements of local traditions with components of the

emerging ideology of Pan-Africanism. Initially this was

manifested in a rather straight-forward nationalism, but by the

1970s had evolved into a more radical program called

"authenticity." Symbolic remnants of Belgian rule were expunged.

Every street, location, individual, and the country itself was

renamed. Congo became Zaire, Leopoldville became Kinshasa, and

Joseph-Desire Mobutu became Mobutu Sese Seko. Western business

dress was banned. By the late 1970s, "authenticity" had mutated

into "Mobutuism," which attempted to create a cult of personality

glorifying the acts and sayings of the president. While the more

extreme components of "Mobutuism" were not taken seriously by the

educated elite, Zaire was clearly more a nation after a decade of

Mobutu's rule than it was before.

The second of Mobutu's broad tasks was to establish order in

a country that had undergone 5 years of violence and nearanarchy. Because the Belgians had prevented the formation of an
8

experienced administrative and managerial elite during their rule

of the Congo, Mobutu had little to build on. His solution was

consolidation of power in his own hands by placing members of his

ethnic group in many key positions, banning opposition political

activity, and ruling by decree. To create an institutional

framework for this, Mobutu formed the Popular Revolutionary

Movement (MPR) and, out of admiration of the success that the

Bolsheviks and Chinese communists had in forging stable states

out of large, heterogenous nations, proclaimed it Zaire's only

political party. In 1974, all public institutions became

subsidiaries of the MPR.

Mobutu's primary tools for concentrating political power in

his own hands were patronage and fear. Loyalty was lucrative.

Opposition brought exclusion from opportunities for personal

enrichment, often exile, and sometimes torture or death. To fuel

this process, Mobutu accumulated and disbursed one of the largest

personal fortunes on earth, largely by controlling the state's

finances and contracts, particularly those dealing with the

extraction of Zaire's massive mineral wealth. The state was seen

as the "personal fiefdom of the president."14 Mobutu played the

role of puppet master, frequently shuffling officeholders and

administrators to allow as many sycophants as possible their time

at the money trough, and to make perfectly clear that the

president could take power and wealth away as easily as he

distributed them. According to Shawn H. McCormick, "By careful

manipulation of the players on the political stage, Mobutu was

able not only to solidify his own power base but to eliminate any

prospective challengers. Senior statesmen were exiled, posted

abroad, or given local sinecures where they could be closely

monitored."15 And to further reinforce his support, Mobutu played

on primal ties, allocating offices and contracts to family

members and ethnic kinsmen.16 Eventually, there was no political

opposition in the normal sense.

For the short-term, this ruthless combination of carrots and

sticks proved effective. The only important organization that

remained outside the system of corruption and patronage was the

Roman Catholic Church.17 Due to the success of missionaries during

the colonial period, Zaire has one of the highest proportions of

Catholics in Africa. In most of the country, the Church was the

most important or only provider of schools and health services,

making it an integral part of daily life and further augmenting

its popularity. But Mobutu's cultural nationalism quickly led to

conflicts with the Church leadership. At the height of the

friction in 1974, Mobutu nationalized the Church's schools and

hospitals. He reversed this when the state proved incapable of

operating them, but throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, Church

leaders were the only group inside Zaire able to criticize Mobutu

and his regime. When Mobutu's authority began to slip in the late

1980s, the initial opposition leaders thus emerged from the
9

Catholic clergy.

Patronage and corruption were not Mobutu's only tools.

Control of the security forces was also crucial. As is common

among personalistic dictators, Mobutu created a web of competing

and overlapping security forces, each with its own prisons,

informer networks, and resources. These were designed as much to

balance, control, and watch each other as to deal with

dissidents.18 The most important of the internal security forces

descended from the small, special police force created by the

Belgians. Its name changed several times--from the National

Documentation Centre (CND) to the National Documentation Agency

(AND) to the National Service for Intelligence and Protection

(SNIP). SNIP communicated directly with Mobutu rather than

reporting to any other government agency or official. The

disciplinary arm of the official party--the "Corps of Activists

for the Defense of the Revolution" (CADR)--also played a role in

internal security and the intimidation of opponents.

Reflecting its roots in the Belgian Force Publique, the

Zairian military was designed more to safeguard the regime than

to defend the national borders or counter insurgents. "Rather

than protecting the Zairian people," Meditz and Merrill write,

"the armed forces and security forces prey upon them and are

perceived, justifiably, as instruments of repression."19 In fact,

the Zairian military largely failed when faced with traditional

military missions, whether the suppression of guerrillas in the

east during the 1980s or repelling invasions of Shaba province

(former Katanga) from Angola-based forces in 1977 and 1978. This

was not surprising: most military units were poorly trained,

equipped and led despite substantial American, Belgian, French,

and Israeli security assistance. Pay was erratic; the result was

low morale, predatory behavior such as imposing "taxes" on

travellers and businesses, and sometimes outright mutiny.

For Mobutu, the regular armed forces (FAZ) were less

important than several well-equipped, regularly-paid, and

foreign-trained special units. Again, Mobutu created several of

these to check each other, thus preventing the emergence of a

praetorian guard. The most important of the elite units were the

Civil Guards, the French-trained 31st Parachute Brigade, and the

Israeli-trained Special Presidential Division (DSP). To assure

the loyalty of the DSP, Mobutu paid it regularly and saw that his

own ethnic group--the Ngbandi--predominated.20 While this

structure of counterbalancing forces did not prevent coup

attempts, it kept them from succeeding. In general, the Zairian

military was a secondary player in political machinations rather

than a dominant one as elsewhere in Africa. As with Mobutu's

"divide and conquer" approach to the civilian political elite,

the way he built and used and the Zairian military succeeded in

protecting his regime over the short-term but set the stage for
10

eventual political crisis.

The Edifice Collapses.

By the late 1970s, Mobutu's blend of patronage and

repression, in combination with his personal charisma, had led to

one of the most effective dictatorships in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Every plot and coup--and there were many--was quashed. Toward the

end of the 1980s, though, the authoritarian edifice began to

weaken under pressure from several directions. One important

factor was Zaire's continued economic decay. Despite the nation's

great natural wealth, the inefficiencies inherent in Mobutu's

system of statism and corruption hindered economic development.

Poor decisions exacerbated the problem. In the early 1970s, for

instance, a visit to China and North Korea inspired Mobutu to

nationalize the Belgian-owned businesses and industries which

formed the bedrock of the modern sector of the Zairian economy.21

When economic chaos ensued, Mobutu reversed his decision but

could not undo the damage to international investor confidence.

Reflecting the economic development programs of several other

African states, Mobutu then attempted large-scale

industrialization. This also failed, leaving Zaire with a massive

foreign debt when the industrial projects proved uncompetitive

and world prices for copper--the commodity that provided much of

Zaire's foreign exchange--dropped precipitously.

As debt mounted, creditors became important players in

Zaire's politics. In 1976, the International Monetary Fund (IMF)

designed the first of a series of economic stabilization

programs. Each was supposed to reduce corruption, rationalize and

control government expenditures, limit imports, boost production,

improve the transportation infrastructure, eliminate arrears on

interest payments, ensure that principal payments were made,

improve financial management, and facilitate economic planning.

Private creditors also rescheduled Zaire's debt several times

between 1976 and 1987. None of these structural adjustments or

debt rescheduling schemes worked. Admittedly, Zaire was

victimized by a long-term decline in the price of the primary

products it exported relative to the manufactured goods it

imported. More importantly, though, the reforms necessary for

economic stabilization were antithetical to Mobutu's patronage

system. Corruption was the lifeblood of his rule. Mobutu thus

continued his Dorian Gray bargain, mortgaging Zaire's long-term

economic health to sustain political power.

By the end of the 1980s, Zaire's private creditors as well

as international financial institutions began to lose patience

with Mobutu's unending and unmet promises of economic reform. In

1991, the IMF announced that Zaire was behind in payments of

about $81.7 million to the organization and could no longer
11

borrow.22 Three years later, the IMF expelled Zaire. With nearly

all commercial credit dried up, Zaire had no source of new

capital to improve its decaying infrastructure. While this did

not touch Mobutu personally--his palaces and luxury riverboat

provided sanctuary from the decay--it did undercut his ability to

reward loyalty, thus taking away one pillar of his power.

The second major blow to Mobutu's power was the end of the

Cold War. After Angola became independent and pro-Soviet in 1976,

Mobutu solidified his position as the closest ally of the United

States in Sub-Saharan Africa--a role that brought him both

prestige and personal satisfaction. American security assistance,

economic aid, and political support, which were the price Mobutu

exacted for allowing the Central Intelligence Agency to use Zaire

as a conduit for support of Jonas Savimbi's Union for the Total

Independence of Angola (UNITA), became an important element of

the dictator's power. Mobutu also followed other policies that

garnered favor with Washington. He was, for instance, the first

African leader to reestablish ties with Israel after the Six Days

War and sent troops to Chad in an effort to counter Libyan

expansionism.23

So long as the Soviets and Cubans were active in Africa, the

United States, along with Belgium and France, tolerated Mobutu's

corruption and repression. But after the end of the Cold War,

U.S. concern with Angola evaporated. South Africa, the Soviet

Union, and Cuba lost their willingness or ability to support

their Angolan allies and the war in that country moved toward

settlement, due in part to the prodding of U.S. Assistant

Secretary of State Chester Crocker.24 As the Cold War receded from

Africa, Mobutu's strategic significance declined and his western

backers lost their tolerance for his faults. The Bush

administration attempted to communicate this. For instance,

Secretary of State James Baker personally urged Mobutu to open

and reform the Zairian political system during a trip to Africa.25

The U.S. Congress evinced even less stomach for the Zairian

despot and, in 1990, ignored lobbying by the Bush administration

and cut off all military and economic aid to Zaire.26 This further

diminished the resources Mobutu could use to reward political

loyalty.

As the pressure mounted, the fragility of Mobutu's

authoritarian edifice became clear. By 1990, the Zairian

president faced the most intense challenge of his tenure in

power. All across Africa, old-line dictators were giving way to

political reform and elected governments--a point not lost on

Zairians. "Mobutuism" had faltered in the face of economic decay

and was increasingly held in contempt. Mobutu's patronage system

eroded as the money to fuel it became scarcer. But what had not

changed was Mobutu's phenomenal political skill. With his power

and popularity disintegrating, the beleaguered dictator embarked
12

on the most radical change of strategy seen in his 25 year rule.

Reform Stillborn.

Faced with pressure from his external allies such as the

United States and internal disintegration, Mobutu declared an end

to single party rule in Zaire and the beginning of a transition

to democracy on April 24, 1990. While similar steps were taking

place throughout Sub-Saharan Africa, few nations faced a more

daunting task than Zaire with its deeply ingrained corruption and

repression. Nonetheless, Mobutu's announcement generated great

excitement, particularly among educated Zairians. Throughout the

country, open political debate erupted for the first time.

Opposition figures returned from exile to participate in the

transition process. With the political floodgates open, over 200

political parties had registered by mid-1991.

Announcing a transition to democracy proved much easier than

making it happen. For guidance, Mobutu looked to his neighbors.

Following a precedent which had been established in Benin and

then become popular elsewhere in French-speaking Africa, Mobutu

created a broad-based national conference to craft a new

constitution and oversee the process of political reform. Many

Zairians were particularly influenced by the national conference

in the neighboring Republic of Congo. Zaire's Sovereign National

Conference, which opened in August 1991, included 2840 delegates

representing a cross-section of society. Archbishop Laurent

Monsengwo Pasinya was selected the leader of the Conference,

largely due to his neutrality and lack of further political

ambition. The ultimate goal was the revolutionary reconstruction

of Zairian political life. Twenty-three committees were

established to attempt the transformation of not only the

government but of Zairian political culture. The debates were

carried live on radio and television.27 In August 1992, the

Sovereign National Conference passed the Transitional Act to

serve as a provisional constitution, created a provisional

legislature called the High Council of the Republic (HCR),

offered Mobutu a power-sharing arrangement, and elected Etienne

Tshisekedi wa Mulumba--whom the U.S. State Department called

Mobutu's "most implacable foe"--transitional prime minister.28

Almost immediately, Mobutu showed misgivings about the

political forces he had unleashed. "It was evident from the

outset," write Shawn McCormick and Bruce Whitehouse, "that Mobutu

had convened the conference out of expediency rather than a

commitment to democratic principles."29 Mobutu soon showed that he

would go to great lengths to protect his remaining power. With

few "carrots" available, he relied on the "stick." Only weeks

after the announcement of political reforms in 1990, violence

broke out during anti-Mobutu demonstrations at the University of
13

Lubumbashi and government security forces killed up to 150

students.30 Mobutu tried--with limited success--to control and

manipulate the deliberations of the Sovereign National

Conference. While only about 900 of the delegates represented the

opposition, this proved to be a determined group. By the

beginning of 1992, the opposition controlled the conference and

Zairian politics had become rigidly bipolar, with pro-Mobutu and

anti-Mobutu forces locked in an apparent death struggle.31

After a few months of increasingly hostile maneuvering,

Tshisekedi attempted to gain control of Zaire's Central Bank.

This exceeded the limits of Mobutu's tolerance. Losing control of

the bank would have endangered his remaining access to the flow

of money and thus been the coup de grace of his regime.32 Mobutu's

reaction was to announce the dismissal of Tshisekedi (even though

he had no legal authority to do so). The dictator had clearly

decided by this point that the challenges to his power and

prerogative arising from democratization were greater than the

costs of derailing the process. Mobutu found, however, that

stopping reform once it is unleashed is an extraordinarily

difficult job. His strategy for political survival combined

direct confrontation with Tshisekedi with kindling violence

throughout Zaire to make the point that only his leadership

brought stability to the country.33 But the opposition refused to

submit. Its three principal groups formed a coalition called the

Sacred Union that became the vanguard of the anti-Mobutu forces.

The Sacred Union received some international recognition, but

could not force Mobutu and his allies from power without control

of key institutions like the Central Bank, the state-owned media,

and the security forces. The result was near-anarchy as Zaire was

cursed with two parallel, rival governments, each more intent on

countering the other than running the country.

Nadir.

Zaire's political stalemate made an already-bad economic

situation worse. In September 1991, unpaid troops went on a

rampage in Kinshasa. While elite security forces such as the

Civil Guard and DSP were able to quell the uprising, this made

Mobutu aware of how dangerous conditions had become and was the

first indication that popular discontent could threaten or even

unseat him as had happened to his friend Nicolae Ceausescu in

Romania.34 The violence also exterminated the remaining modern

industry in Kinshasa and drove away 20,000 foreigners, including

many key medical, educational, industrial, and aid workers.35 Four

months later a coup attempt by rebel soldiers required a violent

response.36 Mobutu's core support coalition of elite security

forces and close cronies remained intact, but he could no longer

count on the backing of institutions like the FAZ.
14

In 1990, Mobutu had abandoned all attempts at economic

reform.37 In response, Belgium and France suspended development

assistance, leaving only humanitarian relief flowing into Zaire.

But Mobutu still needed money to fuel the patronage system and

preserve his tattered power base. His solution was to print more

money. In 1992 he purchased 31 tons of bank notes from a German

company to pay restive troops.38 With exports, revenues, and

industrial production all at record lows, there was nothing to

back the currency. The inevitable result was hyperinflation and a

free-fall in exchange rates. During one 3-month period in 1993,

the zaire fell from 8 million per U.S. dollar to 110 million.39

Inflation was so bad that senior government ministers could not

make a living on their salaries. Teachers demanded payment from

students in empty bottles rather than currency and even elite

security units like the DSP were forced into rackets.40 Urban

transportation was so expensive that passengers often hijacked

buses rather than attempting to pay the fare.

Gecamines, the state-owned mining company which had once

been one of the world's largest, fell into such disrepair that

its only output was scavenged scraps of copper, thus choking off

another potential source of income for the beleaguered government

(or governments).41 The major remaining source of foreign exchange

was diamond exports, most outside official channels and therefore

not a source of government revenue (although a substantial

proportion of the proceeds found their way to Mobutu or his

cronies).42 In general, the formal economy vanished.43 Many parts

of the country returned to the barter system.44 The Central Bank

had no reserves, most other banks were closed, and those that

remained open dealt only in cash. The tax system was defunct.

Most state institutions, including hospitals and schools, closed.

Unpaid civil servants, teachers, and health care workers quit in

large numbers. Unemployment was pervasive; up to 80 percent of

Zairians lived in dire poverty, most subsisting on one meal a

day.45 As the medical system eroded, AIDS, malaria, sleeping

sickness, and other diseases reached epidemic proportions. The

only thing that prevented wholesale starvation was the fact that

most Zairians were involved in subsistence agriculture. But even

the countryside was not immune from the economic crisis, and

malnutrition spread.46

As central authority collapsed, ethnic conflict, which had

been controlled during the height of Mobutu's power, flared. This

was not coincidence. "President Mobutu," writes Bill Berkeley,

"fighting for his political survival, has managed to exploit

well-founded bitterness toward his own rapacious regime by

deflecting it on to others."47 Ethnic conflict reached its peak in

Shaba with violence directed against the minority Kasai people

who had been brought to the region as mineworkers in the early

20th century.48 Since Tshisekedi's family was of Kasai origin,

inflaming resentment on the part of the Katangese natives of
15

Shaba provided Mobutu a way to strike at his major enemy. In

October 1992 the provincial governor Gabriel Kyungu Wa Kumwanza,

who was a Mobutu ally, publicly called for Kasaians to leave

Shaba.49 In what Amnesty International labeled a deliberate policy

of ethnic cleansing, over 200,000 Kasaians were forced from their

homes and either fled the province or clustered in wretched

refugee camps.50 And, there were other, less publicized ethnic

conflicts. For instance, Amnesty International also reported that

about 7,000 people had died in ethnic violence in North Kivu by

1993.51

Against this backdrop, the political stalemate in Kinshasa

dragged on with both Mobutu and Tshisekedi claiming the right to

rule Zaire.52 The two sides negotiated continuously, but so long

as each of the major antagonists demanded the ouster of the

other, there seemed to be no ground for compromise. Because of

Mobutu's long-standing program to prevent the emergence of

political rivals through cooptation and outright repression, no

individual or group had the popular support and image of

objectivity necessary to play the role of arbitrator. All were

either pro-Mobutu or anti-Mobutu. Eventually Mobutu, in another

attempt to outflank the opposition, resurrected his old singleparty parliament.53 This political "conclave" was composed of

Mobutu cronies and charged with drafting a new constitution. It

named Faustin Birindwa as prime minister and announced that

Tshisekedi was removed from the premiership. While Tshisekedi

refused to recognize the authority of the "conclave" to remove

him, control of the security forces allowed Mobutu to evict

opposition ministers from their offices. The end result was that

neither Mobutu nor Tshisekedi could develop and sustain anything

close to the degree of legitimacy necessary to effectively govern

Zaire.

 In January 1993, a dispute between Mobutu and Tshisekedi

led to another mutiny by the armed forces. Again, control of the

currency was the proximate cause. Mobutu had ordered the Central

Bank to introduce a new 5 million zaire note. Tshisekedi demanded

that these be withdrawn. When this was ignored, he called on

merchants to refuse the new notes.54 The troops found their pay

worthless and went on a rampage of looting. This led to an

estimated 1000 deaths, mostly FAZ soldiers killed by the DSP.55

Among the other casualties was Philippe Bernard, the French

ambassador to Zaire, killed by a stray bullet as he stood on a

balcony.56 Many of the remaining foreign merchants and aid workers

left.

Bernard's death while he helplessly watched the violence in

Kinshasa was symbolic. As Zaire disintegrated, the United States,

France, and Belgium could do little.57 All had cut off aid and

seen the withdrawal of most of their commercial firms leaving

them few political tools. In addition, none of the three saw a
16

clearly preferable option. On one hand, all had clearly lost

faith in Mobutu. In a July 1993 meeting, U.S. Assistant Secretary

of State George E. Moose told Mobutu that by refusing to

relinquish power, he endangered not only the lives of his

countrymen, but also the stability of all of central Africa.58 On

the other hand, Tshisekedi was not an attractive alternative. The

French were particularly disillusioned with the autocratic and

rigid opposition leader.

This combination of confused objectives, limited interests,

and minimal tools of influence led to ineffective policy on the

part of the Western "troika." According to an anonymous writer

for Africa Confidential:

Western governments . . . remain ambivalent about

whether to go for Mobutu's jugular. For some

(particularly the USA) there is still the hope that

Zaire's descent into the economic and political abyss

can be halted by reasoned diplomatic intervention and

that a Somalia-style intervention will not be

necessary. For others (particularly elements in the

Belgian, French and South African governments) there is

the belief that the chaos in Zaire brings economic

opportunities in a resource-rich area of the continent.

Until this ambivalence is resolved, Western policy will

be an irritation rather than an obstacle to Mobutu and

give him the room for manoeuvre he requires.59

Thaw.

In 1994, Mobutu's prestige and power underwent something of

a renaissance. One reason was the civil war and genocide in

Rwanda.60 As millions of refugees flowed into Zaire, Mobutu was

again a necessary ally for the international community--a

position he had lost with the end of the Cold War--and used this

to revive his domestic and international reputation.61 The

international aid flowing to the Rwandan refugee camps also

provided opportunities for Zairian officials to take a cut, thus

partially reinvigorating the patronage system for Mobutu and some

of his key cronies in the eastern regions. Mobutu's involvement

in the reinvigorated negotiations to end the civil war in Angola

also helped repair his image.62

Within Zaire, the intransigence that characterized the

opposition eased somewhat in 1994, opening the way for

compromise. Tshisekedi's refusal to make concessions and 

inability to bring concrete results caused the opposition

coalition to erode. Many of its members shifted their allegiances

in a search for a new leader capable of striking a bargain with

Mobutu and reinvigorating the transition to democracy. According
17

to Africa Confidential, "Once rich in personalities and ideas,

the radical opposition is increasingly beginning to look like one

man and his entourage: Etienne Tshisekedi."63 Several opposition

parties finally admitted that their showdown with Mobutu was a

failure, and signed an accord with the "conclave" to form a

government of national reconciliation and merge the two rival

parliaments.64 While Tshisekedi denounced this, the High Council

of the Republic gave its approval.

In June 1994 the transitional parliament formed by the

accord between the HCR and the "conclave" named Leon Kengo wa

Dondo prime minister. Despite protests from Tshisekedi's radicals

who insisted that the new organization had no legitimacy, Mobutu

approved the deal and Kengo assumed office.65 He was widely

regarded as a centrist and a technocrat with limited personal

political ambitions.66 The key question was the extent to which

Mobutu would allow Kengo to change the system. Kengo certainly

did try. He immediately took steps designed to check Zaire's

debilitating corruption, decentralize political power, control

the military, remove restrictions on the media, and bring a

degree of fiscal responsibility to the government. At the same

time, he sought to end Zaire's diplomatic isolation, reform the

vital Central Bank, and rehabilitate the nation's collapsed

infrastructure, especially the transportation system, schools,

and hospitals. Kengo was able to fire the Mobutu-appointed,

blatantly corrupt director of the Central Bank.67 He then severely

rebuked senior officials of a number of state companies.68 Enraged

by the deliberate ethnic violence in Shaba, he travelled there in

August 1994 to reprimand Kyungu, the governor.69 And, in early

1996, Kengo removed Mungul Diaka, the governor of Kinshasa, for

mismanagement and abuse of power.70 But despite his good

intentions, Kengo could not bring a sea change to Zairian

politics. Problems that had accreted over more than three decades

could not be swept away so easily.

Overall, Kengo's constraints and problems dangerously

outweighed his political capital. His lack of an ethnic power

base, for instance, made him an acceptable leader to the major

groups, but also weakened him. The majority of Kengo's ministers

remained strong Mobutu supporters. Ministerial budgets were

meaningless in the face of an inflation rate as high as 24,000

percent.71 In an attempt to resurrect Zaire's international

financial and credit standing, Kengo presented an austerity

budget in late 1995 but, with the relentless downward spiral of

the currency forcing daily adjustments in the exchange rate, it

was impossible to know whether the budget was being implemented.72

The collapse of Zaire's formal economy during the early 1990s

meant that most of the nation's economic activity was beyond the

ability of the government to regulate or tax. The ineffectiveness

of the provisional parliament also hampered reform. A year after

its formation, it had failed to pass of the key legislation
18

called for in the 1994 accord.73 And, more than anything, Kengo

has had trouble finding effective and uncorrupt lieutenants. In

May 1996, for instance, the transitional parliament recommended

the inidictment of a former finance minister and governor of the

central bank--both appointed by Kengo--on corruption charges.74

In some ways, these were not even the most dangerous

problems Kengo faced. Early in 1995, tension was high in the

armed forces over a new salary scheme that further widened the

gap between enlisted soldiers and commissioned officers, fueling

rumors of another round of looting.75 In the spring of 1995, Shaba

governor Kyungu was arrested and charged with importing arms to

be used in a secession attempt.76 As if to exacerbate these

already serious difficulties, Mobutu and Tshisekedi insisted on

roiling the political waters. The radical opposition stuck to the

position that Tshisekedi rather than Kengo was the legal prime

minister.77 Some of their most intense condemnations were aimed at

Kengo's foreign backers. According to Tshisekedi, "We were

shocked when the troika lent its support to Kengo. No mention was

made of Zairian public opinion, of the people, of the law."78

Overall, Zaire's political and economic situation in 1996 seemed

rosy compared to what it had been two or three years earlier, but

was still grim by any objective standards.

Reform Again.

Zaire's national elections are now scheduled for July 1997.

While this date represents a postponement arising from

disagreement over the composition of the electoral commission,

the elections are more likely to actually take place than at any

time since the reform process began.79 Talks are underway to gain

support from international organizations to help finance and

manage the process.80 A plethora of groups have arisen within

Zaire to help increase public understanding of democracy. There

are, however, many hurdles still to be cleared. The procedures

for the elections and the exact form of government that is to

emerge remain vague. At this point the focus of both Zairians and

external actors is simply on holding elections rather than longterm objectives. Moreover, the slate of candidates is not yet

clear. In February, the radical opposition stated that Tshisekedi

would be its candidate and called on other groups to rally behind

him rather than dividing the anti-Mobutu vote.81 This is unlikely

since Kengo has indicated he will not run. It remains to be seen

whom, if anyone, the moderate opposition will back.

Mobutu remains the lodestar of Zairian politics despite the

best efforts of both internal and external opponents to

marginalize him. "He is the great survivor," one diplomat said,

"after everything that has been thrown at him he is still on

top."82 Even at the nadir of his power, Mobutu retained control
19

of key institutions like the Central Bank, state radio and

television, security police, and the Special Presidential

Division. In a state bereft of a unified opposition, a

politically mobilized populace, or an economically strong middle

class, these were enough to sustain power, even if just barely.

There were probably times in the early 1990s when concerted

effort by the "troika" could have toppled Mobutu or enticed him

to leave, particularly during the 1993 troop mutiny, but none of

the three were willing to run the risk. By 1996, Mobutu's

tarnished international reputation was largely revived. When the

United States sent an ambassador to Zaire in 1995 after leaving

the post vacant for 2 years, it was the first step.83 In April

1996, Mobutu paid a discreet visit to French President Jacques

Chirac in Paris to discuss a resumption of aid.84 Despite

criticism from Belgium, Mobutu continued to express optimism that

he would be able to re-open ties with Brussels, thus

reconstituting the key elements of his Western support.85

With national name recognition, charisma, and vast network

of clients and allies, Mobutu is the clear frontrunner in the

electoral process. Divisions within the opposition have allowed

Mobutu's party to retain its domination of the state apparatus

and provincial governments, thus giving him a ready-built

political machine to mobilize support.86 Bayona Bameya, who was

named president of the electoral commission in March 1996, is a

Mobutu loyalist (although one of Bameya's two vice presidents

backs Tshisekedi) and is likely to do all within his power to

skew the rules in favor of his patron.87 Essentially, the

elections will be a popular referendum on Mobutu. As is typical

in Zairian politics, personalities rather than ideologies or

issues will matter most. Rather than pitting parties with

competing ideas or visions of the future, the campaign will

simply be one more battle between Zaire's two major political

"families"--that of Mobutu and that of Tshisekedi. The victors,

along with their cronies, relatives, and ethnic kinsmen, will

control the state and the economy while the losers fade into at

least temporary political insignificance or resign themselves to

exile.

The Balance Sheet.

No one knows whether Zaire has truly turned the corner and

can now extricate itself from crisis and decay, or is simply

experiencing a pause in the ongoing process of self-destruction.

Some factors suggest that successful reform is possible. All of

Zaire's leaders, for instance, know that relatively free and open

elections are the quid pro quo for international acceptance, a

resumption of aid, and renewed access to loans and investment.

Both Mobutu and Tshisekedi may have concluded that holding

constrained political power in a recovering nation is better than
20

holding absolute power in a pariah state with no functioning

economy or chance of building one. There are also signs that

Zairians themselves are losing their tolerance for political

stalemate, and thus will mobilize behind the reform process. The

rapid growth of civil society and the explosion of

nongovernmental political groups supports this argument.

Unfortunately, the obstacles to reform are even deeper and

more ingrained than the motives for it. At the most basic level,

Zaire totally lacks the sort of political culture necessary to

sustain democracy. The notion that political leaders have both

the right and the responsibility to use state resources to reward

their family, ethnic kinsmen and political supporters is common.

Every nation experiences some degree of political corruption but

in Zaire it is the norm. The public would be surprised if

political leaders did not skim state resources rather than being

shocked or outraged when they do. The rewards of restraint cannot

match the potential rewards of corruption. Along the same lines,

Zaire has never developed the clear distinction between partisan

and nonpartisan political activity that democracy requires. Even

the nongovernmental organizations undertaking political education

are widely seen as members of one or the other of the political

"families." The media, which has experienced explosive growth

during the reform process, is unabashedly partisan. So, too, are

most elements of the government. Without a bedrock of nonpartisan

organizations, whether educational institutions, security forces,

or the judiciary, it may be impossible to build a democracy.

In open political systems, voters must look for some way to

identify candidates to support. In stable democracies, the

educational system, the political parties, and the media help

voters gather enough information to gauge which party or

candidates most closely match their own beliefs and preferences.

Zairians have never received the political education to make such

judgements. They are likely, then, to vote based on one element

of identity that they do understand--ethnicity. And, so long as

the state dominates the economy, elections will degenerate into

winner-take-all contests whereby the victor's ethnic group gains

control of the nation's wealth. Zaire would then discover, like

many other African states, that the ethnicization of politics

does not allow the compromise, bargaining, and acceptance of

electoral defeat that forms the lifeblood of democracy.

The fact that there are powerful individuals and

institutions in Zaire that would see their influence shrink if an

effective national government emerged also hinders the reform

process. Many regions and provinces today are nearly autonomous.

Local leaders, whether civilians or military officers, have

developed their own sources of wealth, whether through the

smuggling of diamonds or arms, direct taxation, or skimming off

international assistance.88 For the various warlords and regional
21

satraps around the country, an end to the political crisis in

Kinshasa would pose a challenge, perhaps an unacceptable one.

They are likely to hinder the emergence of an effective central

government.

The state of the Zairian economy also complicates the

consolidation of stable democracy. Most economic activity is in

the informal sector, whether day-to-day barter or sophisticated

smuggling schemes. It would take a massive capital influx to

reinvigorate the formal economy. Zaire is unlikely to attract

this. The nations, international organizations, and

nongovernmental organizations involved in crisis resolution and

nation assistance all undertake some form of triage,

concentrating their assets where there are expected payoffs. For

them, Zaire is seen as such a basket case that it is not worth

great expenditures. Many Zairians believe or hope that the world

community will eventually extricate them from their political and

economic crises. This simply will not happen. There will be no

shortage of advice, but a dearth of money. Without adequate

revenues, the ability of the state to build infrastructure and

provide basic services (including security) is limited. Even a

government chosen through fair and open elections might be

essentially irrelevant to most Zairians. Like the Queen of

England, the new central government might be tolerated, perhaps

even popular, but have little real power. The various power

barons might encourage the emergence of an elected government to

attract renewed foreign aid, but leave it bereft of any real

power.

What, then, are the possible outcomes? When the elections do

take place, Tshisekedi is unlikely to win. Even though he

currently has the widest national recognition after Mobutu, he

has never had access to the amount of money and power it takes to

build a political machine. Few if any foreign organizations are

willing to fund his campaign. Even more importantly, he has

alienated much of Zaire's political elite, even those opposed to

Mobutu, through his stridency and autocratic methods. In May

1996, even the Sacred Union rejected Tshisekedi as their leader,

leaving him no institutional base of support.89 There is also the

possibility that a moderate anti-Mobutu candidate might emerge

and galvanize the public. But Zaire's recent political history,

with its tendency to push political leaders either into the

Mobutu camp or into the radical opposition, has not encouraged

the emergence of popular moderates. There is no Zairian Nelson

Mandela.

Most Zairians as well as foreign observers assume that

Mobutu will find a way to win the election. He would probably

prefer to do it cleanly, relying on his charisma and stockpile of

political debts. But if there appears to be the slightest chance

that he might lose a fair election, he would probably pursue
22

other routes to victory. In fact, evidence is already mounting of

a campaign of coercion and dirty tricks. According to an April

1996 letter by the International Human Rights Law Group, ". . .

President Mobutu has not taken meaningful steps to ensure the

neutrality of the Zairian security forces . . . Despite repeated

promises not to obstruct his country's transition to democracy .

. . President Mobutu continues to do just that."90 So long as

Zairian politics remains a winner-take-all game where the victors

control both power and wealth and the losers have neither,

candidates will be pushed toward intense, unrestrained campaigns.

The stakes are simply too high to not take all possible steps to

assure victory. Reform of this distorted political system will

take decades.

Finally, there is always the possibility that the electoral

process might spark such bitterness and conflict that it cannot

be completed and the groups and individuals whose power would be

threatened by the emergence of an effective central government

act to derail the process. There is always the possibility of a

military coup d'etat but the chances are fairly slim. During his

dictatorship, Mobutu went to great lengths to defend against

military intervention in politics. He did this by creating

overlapping and competing security forces, and by carefully

preventing the emergence of strong and politically active senior

military leaders. With only one exception, officers were not

placed in positions of authority in Mobutu's regime.91 Today, the

various security forces and the cliques that subdivide them

counteract each other and make it difficult for any ambitious

general to muster enough force to gain control of the country.

Moreover, most army leaders probably recognize that the economic

and social recovery of Zaire is contingent on international

support which a military government could never attract.

Even if an organized coup is unlikely, Mobutu has made

enough enemies that assassination is always a possibility. There

is simply no way to assess what impact this might have on the

reform process. Zaire has yet to overcome the deleterious impact

of Mobutu's strategy of linking the nation's stability to his

personal power. His death might conceivably remove the obstacles

to democratization, but it is just as likely to spark civil war.

Whatever the cause, if the election process collapses,

disintegration is a real possibility as various provinces and

regions abandon the central government altogether. Recognizing

that the centralization of power that characterized Mobutu's rule

does not reflect Zaire's conditions, the draft constitution

completed in May 1996 proposed moving toward a federal system.92

This may be only a stopgap. Many analysts hold that Zaire is such

an artificial nation that unity is ultimately impossible.93 This

is a depressing but persuasive argument. The upcoming elections,

then, may be the final test of Zaire's viability and the last

chance for unity and stability.
23

Policy Choices.

From Zaire's independence until the late 1970s Washington's

overriding concern was stability. The United States did not ask

much of Mobutu other than to hold his nation together. His

eccentricities and repressive behavior were not unusual among

African leaders of that time, and tolerating him was seen as the

best way to contain communist influence in Africa and assure

Western access to Zaire's strategic minerals. Mobutu, in other

words, was seen as the least of the available evils. After the

withdrawal of the Portuguese from Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea

Bisseau in 1976, American policymakers concluded that a major

Soviet strategic offensive was underway in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Mobutu's active cooperation was needed on a range of issues. The

United States sought to assure this by increasing his security

assistance and augmenting his prestige. Toleration was thus

replaced by outright embrace. Since the end of the Cold War, the

West has less need for African allies and Zaire's geostrategic

importance has faded. At the same time, the collapse of the

Zairian mining industry means that it is no longer an important

supplier of strategic minerals. With the exception of the Rwandan

refugee problem, there are no issues where the United States

needs Kinshasa's active cooperation. Ironically, then, Zaire's

ability to influence the United States has declined just as

radically as Washington's ability to influence Zaire.

Today, Washington's primary concern is preventing Zaire's

political and economic crisis from generating widescale violence

that could tax the world's capabilities to provide assistance and

derail reform in Zaire's neighbors.94 The core dilemma is finding

a way to balance short-term and long-term considerations. Actions

and policies that might lead to long-term gains can be

destabilizing in the short term. The goal for U.S. policymakers

is thus to push as hard as possible for fundamental reform

without causing outright collapse. It has taken several decades

of U.S. relations with Zaire for this to become clear. Until the

1990s, U.S. policymakers accepted the argument that Zaire

required a strong figure like Mobutu and subscribed to the

condescending argument that Africans were "not ready" for

democracy and thus their dictators should be tolerated. Today,

American policymakers recognize that the stability Mobutu brought

was ultimately self-defeating and unsustainable, his reliance on

patronage and repression spawned the economic and political

crises of recent years. But Washington is caught in the classic

dilemma associated with unseating a dictator, whether a Castro, a

Hussein, or a Mobutu. Skilled dictators prevent the emergence of

effective challengers. Mobutu's talent for co-opting, dividing,

and weakening Zaire's political elite left no obvious successor.

American policymakers and U.S. allies thus agree that Zaire needs
24

fundamental change, but there is less consensus on how to bring

this about without unleashing violence.

Early in the Clinton administration, Assistant Secretary of

State Herman Cohen began talks with France and Belgium to

coordinate pressure on Mobutu.95 In October 1993, an interagency

working group chaired by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State

Edward Brynn prepared a report which stressed the limits of U.S.

leverage in Zaire and warned of the danger of anarchy if Mobutu

were precipitously removed.96 But the group offered no real

alternative to the existing policy of encouraging reform,

refusing aid, and ostracizing Mobutu. The emergence of Kengo

seemed to offer a solution by providing the United States the

opportunity to pursue what is almost always its preferred option

in such situations: strengthening the political middle. The

Clinton administration considered Kengo a sincere reformer and 

framed a new strategy designed to help him sever his ties to

Mobutu and build an independent power base.97 Soon after assuming

office, Kengo visited the United States to seek a resumption of

bilateral aid and to begin rebuilding bridges with the

International Monetary Fund and World Bank. In October 1994

Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott visited Zaire and hinted

at a resumption of U.S. aid. The thaw in relations continued with

the appointment of the new U.S. ambassador in 1995 and a 1996

visit to Washington by Kengo.

Recent U.S. policy toward Zaire is probably the best that

could be expected. Washington could do little to decisively

change the iron logic of Zairian history given the relatively

limited economic and political resources the United States could

bring to bear. Today, that may have changed: Zaire is more ripe

for fundamental change than at any time since this 1960s. With a

carefully constructed strategy, the United States might be able

to make a difference with even limited economic and political

resources. In terms of strategic triage, Zaire may have pulled

itself from the "basket case" to the "could go either way"

category. To form the sort of cogent approach necessary to draw

the greatest utility from the resources the United States can

devote to Zaire, the Clinton administration should instigate a

comprehensive review to adjust American policy. This review must

grapple with several key questions.

What is the appropriate extent and form of the U.S.

involvement? U.S. interests in Zaire, whether economic or

geostrategic, remain limited in comparison to many other parts of

the world.98 With American political, economic, and military

resources taxed by global commitments and responsibilities, risks

must be accepted in lower priority areas. Sub-Saharan Africa is

one of these. While Zaire is critical to the security of SubSaharan Africa, the security of Sub-Saharan Africa is important

but not critical to the United States. This means that there is
25

almost no chance of Washington pouring resources into Zaire for

any contingency other than a Rwanda-type human disaster. But the

United States should not abandon Zaire all together. Since

Washington supported Mobutu as he was laying the foundation for

the current crisis, the United States does bear a moral

responsibility to encourage reform. Moreover, well-designed

policies today can lessen the chances that an expensive relief

operation will be needed later.

Some analysts contend that the United States should lead a

multinational coalition to support reform in Zaire.99 A more

appropriate level of involvement might be to retain the role of

full but not dominant partner in a support coalition or contact

group--a "first among equals." Coordination with Belgium and

France should continue. The role of the United Nations should

expand. In the vital process of reforming Zaire's economy and

reviving the mining industry, the United States should do what it

can to aid the World Bank and other international organizations.

More importantly, Washington should actively seek to broaden the

coalition supporting democratization in Zaire by encouraging the

involvement of other African states who have taken a similar

path. African leaders have long sought African solutions to

African problems while, in reality, relying on outside

assistance. Today new leaders like Nelson Mandela seem intent on

truly taking control of their continent's destiny. This should

have the full backing of the United States. Assuming Mandela can

abandon South Africa's traditional support for Shaba secession,

Pretoria could assume a leading role in the Zaire support

coalition or contact group. The United States should encourage

and support this.

At a minimum, the "troika" of the United States, Belgium,

and France should instigate a regular series of meetings of the

Zaire support coalition or contact group involving foreign

minister-level representatives from as many African democracies

as possible. Other nations in Latin America, Eastern Europe, and

Asia which have undergone the difficult transition to democracy

should be encouraged to help the Zaire support coalition or

contact group. Often such states are more sensitive to the

pitfalls of democratization than are long-standing democracies

like the United States, France, and Belgium.

Many Zairians still associate the United States with Mobutu

and blame Washington for their political and economic woes.100

This attitude is an encumbrance to reform since it allows

Zairians to hold the United States responsible for solving the

nation's problems rather than placing the onus on the Zairian

elite itself.101 To begin overcoming the association between

Washington and Mobutu in the mind of Zairians, the United States

should never waver in its insistence on democratization. Still,

the monumental obstacles Zaire faces in building and sustaining
26

democracy should not be underestimated. Altering something as

ingrained as a political culture is extraordinarily difficult.

There will be some regression. The best that can be expected is

that there are two steps forward for every one back. While the

United States cannot insist that Zaire be a democracy in the

short-term, Washington can insist on continuous movement in that

direction.

Within Zaire, the United States should coordinate

multinational efforts to build democratic institutions before and

after the 1997 elections. Zaire is a nation with no tradition of

an independent judiciary, apolitical military, effective and

unbiased civil service, free press, and autonomous political

parties. Without these, it can hold an election but not sustain

democracy. The U.S. Government, along with the other states in

the Zaire support coalition or contact group, international

organizations like the United Nations, the Organization of

African Unity, and the European Community, and institutions like

the National Endowment for Democracy, can help cultivate these

vital building blocks of democracy.102 Again, a central role

should be accorded other states which have recently undergone the

transition from closed to open political systems and better

understand the process than Americans. And, because the Zairian

security forces, more than any other institution (or collection

of institutions), can derail democratization, the United States

should consider re-opening military-to- military ties during the

run-up to the election.

A more thorny issue is whether the United States should

support a particular candidate in Zaire's upcoming elections.

This is a dilemma with which American policymakers have struggled

for decades. On one hand, support for a candidate constitutes

meddling in the internal affairs of another state. On the other

hand, there have been candidates ranging from French and Italian

communists in the late 1940s to Roberto d'Aubuisson in El

Salvador's 1984 elections whose victory would have proven

inimical to the sustainment of democracy. Zaire is likely to

repeat this. Neutrality in the elections of other countries is

generally a good idea but not an immutable rule. The situation in

Zaire is more desperate than most. Given this, the United States

should publicly repudiate Mobutu during the campaign. Kengo and

the moderates now have enough legitimacy that the available

choices are no longer to either support Mobutu or accept anarchy.

Even if Mobutu alters what appears to be his current strategy,

campaigns cleanly, and wins a clear victory, his commitment to

real reform and the institutionalization of open government will

remain highly questionable. Put simply, the United States should

seek the electoral victory of almost anyone except Mobutu if it

wants a permanent resolution of the Zairian crisis. The electoral

defeat of Mobutu will not assure successful reform, but his

victory would likely prevent or postpone it.
27

In any case, long-term concerns must take priority. If

Mobutu's opponent or opponents in the campaign are committed to

reform and democratization, the United States should break with

recent tradition and endorse them. But Washington should abandon

tradition and eschew covert intervention in the election.

Perceptions of the Central Intelligence Agency throughout SubSahara Africa border on the paranoid with the organization seen

as near-omnipotent and directly responsible for many of the

region's problems. To begin dispelling this myth, the United

States must abandon covert involvement, however appealing it

might seem.

How should the United States respond if Mobutu wins the 1997

elections? Electoral success by an ex-dictator is not

unprecedented in Africa--witness the 1996 campaign of former

Marxist military leader Mathieu Kerekou in Benin.103 In part, this

is due to simple recognizability. In societies new to open

political competition, candidates often find that even infamy is

better than being unknown. But political success by ex-dictators

also reflects the longing for stability that emerges from the

turbulence of democratization. Stalin might do quite well in a

Russian election today. People facing the trauma of fundamental

political, social, and economic change often conclude that

stability without political rights is preferable to the 

possession of rights in an atmosphere of instability. If this

pattern holds in Zaire, Mobutu will win the 1997 election. The

United States would have to accept the results of open and free

elections. Should Mobutu win, however, Washington should keep him

at arm's length. If he hinders further reform, the building of

democratic institutions, and planning for future elections, all

American aid except for humanitarian relief should remain frozen.

If he does allow these things, Washington's treatment should be

cool but normal with a focus on long-term efforts to build

democratic institutions and reform civil-military relations in

Zaire.

How should the United States respond if the electoral

process collapses? In Zaire, the coalition of individuals and

groups in favor of open elections is fragile. If any of the major

components of this group become frustrated and bolt the

coalition, the process may collapse. In February 1996, for

instance, the rift between pro-Mobutu forces and moderate

reformers in the Kengo government was so large that it threatened

to reignite the political crisis of a few years earlier.104 There

is also the chance that a group that feels excluded or threatened

by the democratic process may derail it. The military comes to

mind. Finally, there is always the chance that electioneering in

Zaire will become a surrogate for ethnic competition as it has in

so many other parts of Sub-Saharan Africa. If this happens,

Zaire's elite may conclude that democracy in untenable and
28

abandon the political transition.

If the electoral process fails, the U.S. response should be

contingent on the conditions surrounding the collapse. If an

individual or discernible group derails a process that otherwise

appeared on course, the United States, in concert with democratic

African states which have a vested interest in seeing the

consolidation of open government on their continent, should

engineer a complete economic and political quarantine. It is

often argued that economic sanctions are much harder on the poor

than on their intended targets--the elite--which has enough money

to find ways to acquire the goods and services that sanctions

seek to deny. This is probably less true in Zaire than elsewhere.

Most of the poor are already outside the formal economy, so

sanctions similar to those already in place that allow the

continuation of humanitarian aid would not substantially increase

their misery. Sanctions are always a blunt tool but, if properly

applied, could inflict pain on the elite. In any case, the United

States should continue its program of denying travel visas to any

Zairian who hinders democratization and encourage all other

nations to do the same. Experience has shown that this is a

fairly effective and low-cost way of pressuring anti-democratic

or corrupt elites accustomed to international travel.

How should the United States respond if Zaire disintegrates?

Disintegration and ethnic violence remain possible in Zaire. Even

while the electoral process is proceeding, struggles are underway

as various ethnic groups compete for control of vital state

agencies like the secret service.105 Some observers feel that

today Zaire no longer exists as a nation--Kivu has redirected

most of its economic activity east, East Kasai refuses to accept

the national currency, and Shaba has been described as "a virtual

extension of South Africa."106 There is always the chance that

such de facto disintegration will give way to formal secession.

U.S. policy should not encourage secession or the division

of Zaire. But if Zaire suffers a total collapse of central

authority leading to a declaration of independence or autonomy by

various provinces or regions, the United States would have little

choice than to accept any new states that emerge from it, offer

diplomatic support to minimize the violence that would accompany

national disintegration, and open channels of communication with

the governments of the new states. Washington would face a more

difficult situation if a province or region committed to

democracy and economic reform chooses to abandon a central

government that remains mired in stalemate, corruption, or

repression. In the past, Zaire's stability and unity have taken

priority over reform and democracy in American policy. This

approach may now have reached the point of bankruptcy. If the

central government fails to reform and a break-away province

clearly committed to democracy appears, the United States should
29

accept and help the democratizers but make clear that it prefers

eventual reunification in a single democratic state rather than

permanent division. Supporting a break-away province or region in

order to fuel reform would be an extraordinarily risky policy

that might increase the chances of civil war. But if the other

alternative is stalemate and a slow slide into anarchy, the

United States might be forced to throw the dice and take the

riskier route.

The U.S. Army Role.

With no security assistance program and no military-tomilitary contacts beyond those of the defense attache attached to

the embassy, the U.S. Army's current role in Zaire is limited to

providing analysis and recommendations for policymakers. If,

however, the situation in Zaire either gets better or worse, the

Army's involvement could escalate. For instance, if the reform

process collapses and Zaire lapses into Rwanda-style ethnic

conflict, civil war, or insurgency, the U.S. Army could be called

on to lead humanitarian relief or peace operations. Because of

the Army's tremendous performance in Rwanda and its wide range of

capabilities, American policymakers would think of it first as

they frame a response to any sort of wide scale disaster in

Zaire.

If a major relief operation became necessary, the United

States should seek to minimize its role. But if this proved

untenable, extensive U.S. involvement could pose a significant

challenge for the Army. Scarce human resources would have to be

squeezed from a force already pressed by the Bosnia operation.

And, Zaire would be an even more difficult environment than the

Balkans because of its distance from established U.S. bases, lack

of infrastructure, and the many health risks to U.S. personnel.

If a Zaire relief operation were funded out of an existing

defense budget without supplemental money, the repercussions for

readiness and modernization would be immense.

Unfortunately, the Army itself can do little to preempt the

need for a large-scale relief or peacekeeping operation in Zaire.

Only Zairians can determine whether their nation moves forward or

slides into disaster. The best the Army, the Joint Staff, and the

European Command (EUCOM) can do at this time is prepare.

Potential coalition partners should be identified now and

channels of communication opened. Plans should be developed,

refined, and tested through simulations, exercises, and wargames.

Admittedly the European Command cannot develop detailed plans for

every conceivable African conflict, but disaster in Zaire is

probable enough and the potential repercussions immense enough to

warrant attention. The Army Staff and the U.S. Army in Europe

(USAREUR) should encourage and support this.
30

The Army should also strengthen cooperation with the

militaries of African states that might play leading roles in any

sort of Zaire operation. This would include augmented training

and assistance focused on improving the skills and infrastructure

needed for large-scale relief and peace operations. The Army

should instigate regular staff exercises dealing with a crisis in

Zaire. It could, for instance, use the simulation facilities of

its Center for Strategic Leadership at Carlisle Barracks to

perform a Zaire relief exercise involving U.S., European, and

African military leaders and planners. To improve cooperation

with African militaries, the Army should take the lead in seeing

that the number of defense attaches in Africa expands beyond the

handful now there. While the attaches do yeoman work, the

assignment to key African states of liaison officers outside the

attache system should be explored.107 Liaison officers can do much

more to augment interoperability than attaches. Strengthening the

foreign area officer program would help the Army provide experts

to fill these sorts of positions and to aid planning staffs. And,

in cooperation with the United Nations and the Organization of

African Unity, the United States should look into the possibility

of pre-positioning heavy equipment required for humanitarian

relief and peace support operations in Africa (even though such a

program would entail immense political complications concerning

the location and type of stocks that would be prepositioned).

The U.S. Army might also become more deeply involved in

Zaire if reform and democratization succeed, primarily through

expanded military-to-military contacts and security assistance

programs. The Army has the most natural affinity with the armydominated Zairian military and is developing extensive expertise

in programs designed to help states in the midst of a democratic

transition reform their civil-military relations. To help

policymakers decide on the wisdom of renewing military-tomilitary contacts during the lead up to the election, the Army

Staff should draft a plan for this which would include specific

activities designed to educate Zairians on the need for political

neutrality and the role of a military in an open political

system. The Army should encourage policymakers to re-open

military-to-military ties as soon as possible during the reform

process.

If American policymakers renew Zaire's security assistance

after the election, the Army should recommend the near-wholesale

reconstruction of the Zairian armed forces rather than simply

improving the capabilities of the FAZ and other existing units.

The current senior leaders of the Zairian security forces are

incapable of shedding their tradition of corruption and

repression. In fact, the Zairian military has consistently proven

incompetent when faced with what might be considered "normal"

military missions such as defending the nation against periodic
31

invasions from Shaba separatists living in Angola or quelling

insurgencies in the eastern regions. To sustain any form of

democracy, Zaire must develop a model of civil-military relations

that stresses civilian control of the military and military

professionalism.108 The relationship must be one of mutual respect

rather than the sort of master-lackey relationship that existed

during Mobutu's dictatorship. The current security forces are

unlikely to mutate into an apolitical professional organization,

so the only viable solution is to start from scratch and form a

new military retaining only officers who can demonstrate a record

clear of corruption or human rights abuses, and a commitment to

political neutrality.

At the same time, the U.S. Army should advise American

policymakers to urge Zaire to adopt a reserve-based force.

Reflecting its roots in the Belgian colonial force and its

tradition of serving more for repressing internal dissent than

protecting the nation, the Zairian military has eschewed

reserves. But a military based on a very small permanent force

and a somewhat larger body of reserves would have a number of

advantages. First, it would help with national reconstruction by

having reservists trained by the military working in their

villages where their skills are most needed. Second, it would

improve civil-military relations by helping the military become

the protector of the people rather than their repressor. A strong

reserve system is one of the reasons that American civil-military

relations have been cordial throughout the nation's history.

Others can emulate this. And, a reserve system could help Zaire

control military spending by giving it the potential to mobilize

military forces when threatened without having to bear the

expense of a large standing force. Members of a smaller officer

corps could be adequately remunerated, thus diminishing the

temptation for corruption. Should Zaire adopt such a reservebased model, the U.S. Army, with its deep tradition of reliance

on reserve components, could play a central role in educating and

training Zairian civilian policymakers and military leaders to

build, sustain, and use military reserves.

Conclusions.

Zaire faces a crucial time in it history. Decisions made

over the next few years will have far-reaching effects. If

democratization and reform continue and take root in Zaire, its

neighbors will have an easier time preserving their own programs

of stability, reform, and development. But if Zaire regresses or

disintegrates, great strains will be placed on the stability of

Central Africa and movement toward reform and development

endangered. In the broadest sense, Zairians may choose from three

paths. One leads toward reconciliation, reconstruction, reform,

and democracy. Another leads toward more-or-less peaceful
32

fragmentation of the nation, whether through deliberate agreement

or through simple admission that unity is impossible. The third

path is that of violence, whether insurgency, militia-based

ethnic conflict, or civil war involving regions, ethnic groups,

or the personal armies of warlords. The United States should seek

the first outcome, accept the second if necessary, and prepare

for the third. While Washington should push for elections and

make them the quid pro quo for the resumption of normal relations

(including security and economic assistance), it is unrealistic

to expect an immediate, revolutionary transformation of Zaire's

political culture and system. The current one took nearly a

century to form and will take years, perhaps decades, to change

in any fundamental way. On the day after the 1997 elections Zaire

will look very much like it did the day before.

Given these realities, the United States must approach Zaire

strategically, taking a long-term perspective. The crux of the

matter is not simply holding elections in 1997, but encouraging

the fundamental transformation of a dysfunctional political

culture and system. The success or failure of American policy

toward Zaire in the 1990s will not be clear for 20 years. In

addition, a strategic approach requires preparing for disaster.

The chances that Zaire can avoid disintegration and wide scale

violence are at best even. The United States and its allies

should not stumble into another Rwanda-type situation where all

planning must be done on the fly. The more done now and the

greater the involvement of other African nations, the better. For

the United States in general and the U.S. Army in particular, a

moderate investment in the short-term will at least slightly

lower the chances that a major effort will be required later.

And, should disaster occur and a major relief or peace support

effort become necessary, time and effort devoted to early

planning will pay off. Preemption and preparation should thus be

the focus of U.S. strategy as Zaire struggles to emerge from its

time of crisis.

ENDNOTES

1. For a brief overview, see Steven Metz, "Africa," in Earl

H. Tilford, Jr., ed., Worldview ‘96, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S.

Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1996.

2. Adjustment in Africa: Reform, Results, and the Road

Ahead, A World Bank Policy Research Report, Oxford: Oxford

University Press, 1994, pp. 3-7.

3. Sandra W. Meditz and Tim Merrill, eds., Zaire: A Country

Study, Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Federal Research

Division, 1994, p. xxxv.

4. Crawford Young, "Zaire: The Shattered Illusion of the
33

Integral State," Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 32, No.

2, June 1994, p. 247.

5. See Jean Stengers, "The Congo Free State and the Belgian

Congo Before 1914," in L.H. Gann and Peter Duignan, eds.,

Colonialism in Africa, 1870-1960, London: Cambridge University

Press, 1969; and Ruth Slade, King Leopold's Congo: Aspects of the

Development of Race Relations in the Congo Independent State,

London: Oxford University Press, 1962, pp. 171-192.

6. Roger Anstey, King Leopold's Legacy: The Congo Under

Belgian Rule 1908-1960, London: Oxford University Press, 1966,

pp. 37ff. By contrast to the mainstream emphasis on the

exploitative nature of Belgian rule, Georges Brausch argues that

its benefits far outstripped its costs (Belgian Administration in

the Congo, London: Oxford University Press, 1961).

7. Meditz and Merrill, p. xxxviii.

8. See Ernest Lefever, Crisis in Congo: A United Nations

Force in Action, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1965.

9. Anthony Mockler, The New Mercenaries, New York: Paragon

House, 1987, pp. 40-91.

10. Henry F. Jackson, From the Congo to Soweto: U.S. Foreign

Policy Toward Africa Since 1960, New York: William Morrow, 1982,

pp. 21-42.

11. John M. Collins, America's Small Wars: Lessons for the

Future, Washington, DC: Brassey's, 1991, p. 149.

12. Meditz and Merrill, pp. 39-43.

13. On the rescues, see Thomas P. Odom, Dragon Operations:

Hostage Rescues in the Congo, 1964-1965, Leavenworth Papers

Number 14, Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General

Staff College, Combat Studies Institute, 1988.

14. Meditz and Merrill, p. xlii.

15. Shawn H. McCormick, "Zaire II: Mobutu, Master of the

Game?" Current History, May 1994, p. 224.

16. Bill Berkeley, "An African Horror Story," Atlantic

Monthly, August 1993, p. 28.

17. Meditz and Merrill, pp. 241-243.

18. Ibid., pp. 319-321.
34

19. Ibid., p. xlvii.

20. Ibid., p. 297.

21. Ibid., p. xliv.

22. "I.M.F. Cuts Off Zaire," New York Times, September 11,

1991, p. D14.

23. Clifford Krauss, "U.S. Cuts Aid to Zaire, Setting Off a

Policy Debate," New York Times, November 4, 1990, section 1, p.

21.

24. See Chester A. Crocker, High Noon in Southern Africa:

Making Peace in a Rough Neighborhood, New York: W.W. Norton,

1993.

25. Interview with Ambassador Marc Baas, May 3, 1996,

Carlisle Barracks, PA. Baas was Deputy Chief of Mission in Zaire

at the time of Baker's visit.

26. Krauss, p. 21.

27. Georges Nzongola-Ntalja, "Zaire I: Moving Beyond

Mobutu," Current History, May 1994, p. 220.

28. Zaire Human Rights Practices, Washington, DC: U.S.

Department of State, January 31, 1994, n.p. (electronic

download). Tshisekedi spent time in prison and exile for

opposition to Mobutu. For a brief biography, see Africa

Confidential, August 9, 1991, p. 3.

29. Shawn McCormick and Bruce Whitehouse, Zaire at the

Crossroads, CSIS Africa Notes Number 166, November 1994, p. 5.

30. McCormick, "Zaire II," p. 225.

31. McCormick and Whitehouse, Zaire at the Crossroads, p. 5.

32. Berkeley, p. 22.

33. Meditz and Merrill, p. 218; Berkeley, p. 22.

34. McCormick and Whitehouse, Zaire at the Crossroads, p. 5.

35. Kenneth B. Noble, "As the Nation's Economy Collapses,

Zairians Squirm Under Mobutu's Heel," New York Times, August 30,

1992, p. 14.

36. "Military Revolt Fails to Oust Rulers in Zaire," New

York Times, January 24, 1992, p. 2.
35

37. Assistant Secretary of State Herman I. Cohen, "US Policy

and the Crisis in Zaire," statement before the Subcommittee on

Africa of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC,

November 6, 1991, reprinted in Department of State Dispatch,

November 11, 1991, p. 828.

38. Africa Confidential, June 5, 1992, p. 8.

39. Kenneth B. Noble, "Zaire Is In Turmoil After the

Currency Collapses," New York Times, December 12, 1993, p. 3.

40. Africa Confidential, April 5, 1991, p. 6.

41. Kenneth B. Noble, "Zaire's Rich Mines Are Abandoned to

Scavengers," New York Times, February 21, 1994, p. 3.

42. Zaire Human Rights Practices, January 31, 1994,

Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, n.p. (electronic

download).

43. Meditz and Merrill, p. liv.

44. Zaire Human Rights Practices, 1995, Washington, DC: U.S.

Department of State, March 1996, p. 1.

45. John Darnton, "Zaire Drifting Into Anarchy as Authority

Disintegrates," New York Times, May 24, 1994, p. A1.

46. Kenneth B. Noble, "Zaire Is in Turmoil After the

Currency Collapses," New York Times, December 12, 1993, p. 3.

47. Berkeley, p. 22.

48. Kenneth B. Noble, "Tens of Thousands Flee Ethnic

Violence in Zaire," New York Times, March 21, 1993, p. 3.

49. Africa Confidential, December 16, 1994, p. 3.

50. McCormick, "Zaire II," p. 226.

51. Zaire: Collapsing Under Crisis, London: Amnesty

International, 1994, p. 3.

52. Kenneth B. Noble, "Zaire: Two Leaders, Many Problems,

Few Hopes," New York Times, March 9, 1993, p. A3.

53. "Zaire President Reneges on Multiparty Pact," New York

Times, March 20, 1993, p. A3.

54. Makau Wa Mutua, "Permanent Anarchy?" Africa Report,
36

May/June 1993, p. 54.

55. Africa Confidential, February 5, 1993, pp. 4-5; "1,000

Said to Die in Mutiny in Zaire," New York Times, February 2,

1993, p. 6.

56. "French Envoy to Zaire Killed in a Shooting," New York

Times, January 29, 1993, p. 6.

57. Mark Huband, "Pressure From Abroad," Africa Report,

March/April 1992, pp. 41-44.

58. "U.S. Bluntly Tells Zairian President to Yield," New

York Times, July 22, 1993, p. A7.

59. Africa Confidential, April 16, 1993, p. 6.

60. For background, see Steven Metz, Disaster and

Intervention in Sub-Saharan Africa: Learning From Rwanda,

Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies

Institute, 1994, pp. 2-9.

61. Meditz and Merrill, p. lvii.

62. McCormick and Whitehouse, Zaire at the Crossroads, p. 1.

63. Africa Confidential, December 16, 1994, p. 4.

64. Ibid., p. 6.

65. AFP (Paris), broadcast of June 17, 1994, transcript in

FBIS (Foreign Broadcast Information Service)-AFR-94-119, June 21,

1994, p. 6; Africa No. 1 (Libreville), broadcast of June 14,

1994, transcript in FBIS-AFR-94-115, June 15, 1994, pp. 15-16.

66. McCormick and Whitehouse, Zaire at the Crossroads, p. 7.

67. Voix du Zaire (Bukuvu), broadcast of July 23, 1994,

transcript in FBIS-AFR-94-142, July 25, 1994, p. 9.

68. AFP (Paris), broadcast of December 28, 1994, transcript

in FBIS-AFR-94-256, December 29, 1994, p. 1.

69. Zaire Human Rights Practices, 1994, Washington, DC: U.S.

Department of State, February 1995, n.p. (electronic download);

Tele-Zaire Television Network (Kinshasa), broadcast of August

31, 1994, transcript in FBIS-AFR-94-170, September 1, 1994, p. 4.

70. "Zaire Government Suspends Kinshasa Governor," Reuters

electronic newswire, January 20, 1996.
37

71. Africa Confidential, December 16, 1994, p. 1.

72. "Zaire Parliament Approves Modified Austerity Budget,"

Reuters electronic newswire, January 1, 1996.

73. "Zaire: Troika Demarche to Political Leadership,"

statement by State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns, April 24,

1995, reprinted in Department of State Dispatch, May 8, 1995,

n.p. (electronic download).

74. "Zaire Parliament Seeks Indictment of Ex-Ministers,"

Reuters electronic newswire, May 18, 1996.

75. BBC World Service (London), broadcast of February 5,

1995, transcript in FBIS-AFR-95-026, February 8, 1995, p. 3.

76. Africa No. 1 (Libreville), broadcast of April 2, 1995,

transcript in FBIS-AFR-95-064, April 4, 1995, p. 1.

77. See, for instance, Africa No. 1 (Libreville), broadcast

of July 23, 1995, transcript in FBIS-AFR-95-141, July 24, 1995,

p. 4.

78. Quoted in L'Echo (Brussels), January 5, 1995, reprinted

in FBIS-AFR-95-006, January 10, 1995, p. 5.

79. Matthew Tostevin, "Zaire's Mobutu Says He Could Wait For

Elections," Reuters electronic newswire, January 1, 1996.

80. "Zaire Seeks Outside Help With Planned Election,"

Reuters electronic newswire, March 11, 1996.

81. "Zaire's Radical Opposition Agrees on Election Stance,"

Reuters electronic newswire, February 21, 1996.

82. Quoted in Matthew Tostevin, "Zaire's Mobutu Still Going

Strong 30 Years On," Reuters electronic newswire, November 24,

1995, p. 2.

83. "To Back Reform, Envoy Is Named to Zaire," New York

Times, June 17, 1995, p. A3.

84. "Zaire's Mobutu In Controversial Talks With Chirac,"

Reuters electronic newswire, April 27, 1996; Francois Raitberger,

"Mobutu Hails ‘Courageous' French Aid to Zaire," Reuters

electronic newswire, April 27, 1996.

85. "Belgium Differs With France Over Zaire," Reuters

electronic newswire, April 27, 1996; "Zaire: Hopes For New

Diplomatic Ties With Belgium," All Africa Press Service

electronic newswire, December 4, 1995.
38

86. Africa Confidential, December 16, 1994, p. 1.

87. "Zaire Electoral Commission Names President," Reuters

electronic newswire, March 18, 1996.

88. For instance, in March 1996 the United Nations condemned

the Zairian government for helping rearm the former Rwandan Armed

Forces (Carter Center, Update on World Conflicts, March 29,

1996, p. 9). The Zairian government strongly denied these charges

(Reuters electronic newswire, April 9, 1996).

89. Arthur Malu Malu, "Election Rift in Zaire's Opposition

Deepens," Reuters electronic newswire, May 6, 1996.

90. Letter from the International Human Rights Law Group to

President Jimmy Carter, April 19, 1996, distributed via Africa

News Online at

http://ww1.nando.net/ans/central/central.zaire.80039573999. html.

91. Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, Personal Rule in

Black Africa: Prince, Autocrat, Prophet, Tyrant, Berkeley:

University of California Press, 1982, p. 170.

92. "Zaire to Opt for Federal System," Reuters electronic

newswire, May 18, 1996.

93. For instance, Young, "Zaire: The Shattered Illusion of

the Integral State."

94. Cohen, "US Policy and the Crisis in Zaire," p. 829.

95. Africa Confidential, December 16, 1994, p. 2.

96. Ibid.

97. Steven Greenhouse, "U.S. Trying New Tactic With Zaire,"

New York Times, November 8, 1994, p. A9.

98. United States Security Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa, Washington, DC: Department of Defense, Office of International

Security Affairs, August 1995, p. 3.

99. For instance, McCormick, "Zaire II," p. 227.

100. Kenneth B. Noble, "U.S. Reaping Zairians' Anger Toward

Mobutu," New York Times, March 30, 1992, p. A5.

101. For example, the author has been told by Zairian

military officers that "The United States made Mobutu so it is

your responsibility to remove him."
39

102. The National Endowment for Democracy is a nonprofit,

bipartisan, grantmaking organization created in 1983 to

strengthen democratic institutions around the world through

nongovernmental efforts. Funded by an annual congressional

appropriation, the Endowment's worldwide grants program assists

organizations abroad—including political parties, business,

labor, civic education, media, human rights and other groups—that

are working for democratic goals. In addition to promoting U.S.

non-governmental participation in democratic institution building

abroad, the Endowment's purposes, as set forth in the National

Endowment for Democracy Act passed by Congress in 1983, include:

strengthening democratic electoral processes in cooperation with

indigenous democratic forces; fostering cooperation with those

abroad dedicated to the cultural values, institutions and

organizations of democratic pluralism; and encouraging the

establishment and growth of democratic development in a manner

consistent both with the broad concerns of U.S. national

interests and with specific requirements of democratic groups in

other countries. (Information from the National Endowment for

Democracy's Internet home page at

http://www.ned.org/page_1/gen_info.html.)

103. See the transcript of the BBC World Service show

"Network Africa," hosted by Julian Marshall, broadcast of March

21, 1996, in FBIS-AFR-96-056, March 21, 1996, p. 22.

104. Africa No. 1 (Libreville), broadcast of February 13,

1996, transcript in FBIS-AFR-96-031, February 14, 1996, p. 3.

105. Marie-France Cros, "Secret Services: Who Will Control

Them?" La Libre Belgique (Brussels), February 1, 1996, reprinted

in FBIS-AFR-96-023, February 2, 1996, pp. 1-2.

106. Howard W. French, "Mobutu, Zaire's ‘Guide,' Leads

Nation Into Chaos," New York Times, June 10, 1995, pp. A1, A5.

107. This idea was suggested to the author by LTC John S.

Wilson.

108. For detail on this idea, see Kent Hughes Butts and

Steven Metz, Armies and Democracy in the New Africa: Lessons From

Nigeria and South Africa, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War

College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1996, pp. 29-39.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Richard A. Chilcoat

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

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Colonel Richard H. Witherspoon

Director of Research

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Author

Dr. Steven Metz

Director of Publications and Production

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

Secretaries

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