J-S18023-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JOSEPH JOHN MADONNA, JR. 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 985 MDA 2021

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered July 22, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-36-CR-0006048-2016

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JOSEPH JOHN MADONNA, JR. 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 986 MDA 2021

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered July 12, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-36-CR-0006049-2016

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JOSEPH JOHN MADONNA, JR. 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 987 MDA 2021

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered July 22, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-36-CR-0006050-2016

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA :

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA
J-S18023-22

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v.

JOSEPH JOHN MADONNA, JR. 

Appellant

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: No. 988 MDA 2021

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered July 22, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-36-CR-0006051-2016

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., McLAUGHLIN, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED: SEPTEMBER 21, 2022

Joseph John Madonna, Jr. appeals pro se from the order dismissing his 

first Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”)1 petition as untimely. Madonna argues 

his petition is timely under the governmental interference exception, and that 

his PCRA counsel was ineffective for not advancing this argument. We affirm.

A jury convicted Madonna of rape of a child, involuntary deviate sexual 

intercourse with a child, statutory sexual assault, aggravated indecent assault 

of a child less than 13 years of age, aggravated indecent assault of a person 

less than 16 years of age, unlawful contact with a minor, indecent assault of 

a person less than 16 years of age, three counts of indecent assault of a child 

less than 13 years of age, and four counts of corruption of a minor.

2 The court 

sentenced him in 2017 to serve an aggregate sentence of 14 to 46 years’ 

incarceration. On direct appeal, this Court vacated the portion of Madonna’s 

____________________________________________

1 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.

2 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3121(c), 3123(b), 3122.1(b), 3125(b), 3125(a)(8), 6318, 

3126(a)(8), 3126(a)(7), and 6301(a)(1)(ii), respectively.
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sentence declaring him a sexually violent predator and affirmed in all other 

respects. Commonwealth v. Madonna, No. 1714 MDA 2017, 2018 WL 

3405498, at *1 (Pa.Super. July 13, 2018) (unpublished memorandum). The 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Madonna’s petition for allowance of 

appeal on January 30, 2019.

On September 20, 2019, Madonna sent a letter addressed to the 

Lancaster County Clerk of Courts, which stated the following:

I was appointed by this Court [direct appeal counsel] . . . to the 

above[-]mentioned court cases. This attorney has not contacted 

me since March 13, 2018. I told [counsel], I wanted to appeal my 

case to the Pa. Supreme Court. He has never given me a[n]

answer or sent me any paperwork on this. I have wr[itten] my 

attorney many times with no response. I am asking this Court to 

appoint me a new attorney for my appeals. I am requesting a 

response from this Court. Your response will be greatly 

appreciated.

Mot. for New Counsel, 9/20/19, at 1. The docket in the certified record reflects 

that the court served Madonna’s trial counsel with a copy of the letter via 

“eService,” but took no other action on it. Copy of Record, printed 10/29/21, 

at 16.

On January 4, 2021, Madonna filed a pro se PCRA petition. He argued

his petition was timely because it was premised on due process violations by 

trial counsel and the prosecutor and on newly discovered evidence. PCRA Pet., 

1/4/21, at 1, 3. The PCRA court appointed counsel.
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Counsel filed a motion to withdraw and a “no merit” letter.3 Counsel’s 

motion to withdraw stated he had reviewed the files and communicated with 

Madonna, and “has come to the conclusion that no issue of merit exists in this 

matter for an action under the [PCRA], as [the petition] was filed beyond the 

time limits prescribed by 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b).” Mot. to Withdraw, 6/11/21, 

at ¶ 5. In his no-merit letter, counsel explained Madonna’s petition was 

untimely because he filed it over a year after the finality of his judgment of 

sentence, and “[t]here appear to be no valid exceptions to the timeliness 

requirements of the PCRA in [his] case.” No-merit Ltr., 6/11/21, at 2 

(unpaginated). 

The court issued a Rule 907 notice informing Madonna that it intended 

to dismiss his petition for untimeliness, and that Madonna had 20 days in 

which to respond. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. The court also granted PCRA counsel 

leave to withdraw.

Madonna filed a timely pro se response. He argued the court should 

assume jurisdiction of his untimely petition, considering the miscarriage of 

justice during the trial phase of his case, and because he will otherwise be de 

facto condemned to serve a life sentence despite his innocence. Response to 

Rule 907 Notice, 7/1/21, at 2-3. Madonna also filed an amended pro se

response, in which he argued his PCRA petition was untimely due to the 

restrictions on his ability to access the prison library during the coronavirus 

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3 See Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), and 

Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa.Super. 1988) (en banc).
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pandemic. Amended Response to Rule 907 Notice of Intent to Dismiss, 

6/30/21, at 2.4 He asserted the library was inaccessible from April 8, 2020, to 

June 8, 2021. Id. He argued that holding his petition untimely under these 

circumstances is a violation of due process and equal protection.

The court dismissed the petition as untimely. Madonna appealed, and 

raises the following issues:

I. Does the Commonwealth’s failure to afford the defendant at 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 904 adequate and [meaningful] access to 

effective assistance from persons trained in the law in a first 

PCRA petition, constitute as interference by government 

officials (42 Pa.C.S. 9545(b)(1)(i)[)], and violate the 

Constitution or laws of the United States, or this 

Commonwealth, thereby depriving the defendant of the 

ability to exercise due diligence aided by [competent] 

counsel to research, [develop] and [ascertain] the facts 

upon which his claims could be predicated then filed as 

timely as PCRA claims for relief at (42 Pa.C.S. 9541-

9546)(PCRA)[?]

II. Did how [direct appeal counsel] not file a motion to 

withdraw his representation prejudice the appellant[’]s

request for new counsel in such a way where it deprived the 

appellant access to [competent] counsel in filing his 1st PCRA 

with the assistance of persons trained in the law to perform 

such tasks[?]

III. Did [direct appeal counsel’s] failure to forward to the 

appellant discovery, CYS transcripts, trial transcripts and 

other criminal proceedings prejudice the appellant[’]s ability 

to exercise due diligence by researching case fact 

circumstances to [develop], [ascertain], and file in a timely 

manner his claims for relief at (42 Pa.C.S. 9541-9546) 

(PCRA)[?]

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4 Madonna dated both documents June 27, 2021, but the Clerk of Courts timestamped and filed his Response and Amended Response on July 1 and June 

30, 2021, respectively.
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IV. Did appointed PCRA counsel’s failure to investigate and file 

the exception to [the] (1) year time-bar 42 Pa.C.S. 

9545(b)(2)(i) “Government Interference” being the 

particular case fact circumstances underlying the 

untimeliness and inadequacy of the appellant[’]s 1st PCRA 

petition, constitute a constructive denial of counsel 

(ineffectiveness per se), thereby violating the Constitution 

and laws of the United States and this Commonwealth, and 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 904 enforcements[?]

Madonna’s Br. at 6.

Madonna’s first three issues are interrelated. He argues that due to his 

age of 87 years and lack of competency in the law, he petitioned the court for 

counsel, and that he did so when he still had seven months left before the

PCRA’s one-year time-bar expired. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1) (stating 

that unless a statutory exception to the time-limit applies, a PCRA petition 

must be filed within one year of the date the judgment of sentence became 

final). Madonna claims his “clear belief and understanding was to await the 

court[’]s disposition of his request for new counsel[], and expect to be 

contacted by new appointed counsel to begin his timely PCRA procedure.” 

Madonna’s Br. at 12. However, Madonna argues, his request for counsel went 

unanswered by the court, preventing him from filing a timely PCRA petition or 

learning the facts necessary to file a petition. 

Madonna contends the court did not appoint PCRA counsel because his 

direct appeal counsel never withdrew from representation and the court never 

issued an order granting counsel leave to withdraw. Madonna asserts that had 

the court granted his direct appeal counsel leave to withdraw, counsel would 

have been obligated to forward Madonna’s case file, which would have allowed 
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Madonna to research and develop any cognizable PCRA claims in a timely 

manner. He argues he had the right to counsel on his first PCRA petition, under 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 904 and Commonwealth v. Smith, 818 A.2d 494, 501 (Pa. 

2003). He maintains that the PCRA court’s denial of this right constituted 

governmental interference in his ability to present a timely petition. He claims 

the error, by both prior counsel and the court, also violated his right to due 

process.

In his fourth issue, Madonna argues that in failing to advance the 

governmental interference exception in his amended PCRA petition, his PCRA 

counsel was ineffective. He argues that he was abandoned by counsel and/or 

completely deprived of counsel and/or that his counsel was ineffective per se.

We review the denial of PCRA relief to determine whether it is supported 

by the record and free of legal error. Commonwealth v. Hart, 199 A.3d 475, 

481 (Pa.Super. 2018). “We review the PCRA court’s legal conclusions de 

novo.” Id. When the PCRA court denied relief without an evidentiary hearing, 

we determine whether the PCRA court erred in determining there were no 

genuine issues of material fact. Id.

The PCRA’s time limitations are jurisdictional in nature and therefore 

strict adherence is required. Commonwealth v. Anderson, 234 A.3d 735, 

737 (Pa.Super. 2020). A petitioner seeking PCRA relief has one year from the 

date the judgment of sentence became final in which to petition the court

unless a statutory exception applies. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). A 
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judgment of sentence becomes final at the conclusion of direct review, or 

when the time to seek direct review has expired. Id. at § 9545(b)(3). 

Madonna’s judgment of sentence became final on April 30, 2019, when 

the time in which to seek certiorari from the United States Supreme Court 

expired.5 He therefore had until April 30, 2020, to file a PCRA petition. The 

instant petition, filed January 4, 2021, is facially untimely.

The PCRA provides three exceptions to the one-year deadline. See 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). Madonna argues his petition is timely under 

the “governmental interference” exception. This exception applies when the 

petitioner pleads and proves “the failure to raise the claim previously was the 

result of interference by government officials with the presentation of the 

claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the 

Constitution or laws of the United States.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i). A 

petitioner invoking this exception must act with due diligence in discovering 

the factual basis for his claim. Commonwealth v. Bankhead, 217 A.3d 

1245, 1248 (Pa.Super. 2019). The petitioner then must file the petition 

pleading the exception within one year of the date he could have first 

presented the claim. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2).

Neither Madonna’s pro se petition nor his pro se responses to the court’s 

Rule 907 notice mention the governmental interference exception. Nor did 

____________________________________________

5 As noted above, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Madonna’s petition 

for allowance of appeal on January 30, 2019. Madonna had 90 days in which 

to file a petition for writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. U.S.

Sup. Ct. R. 13(1).
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Madonna ever argue to the PCRA court that it should have construed his 

September 2019 letter as a timely PCRA filing or should have sua sponte

granted his direct appeal counsel leave to withdraw, and that its failure to do 

either of these things constituted governmental interference. As Madonna did 

not argue that these facts should provide a basis for the governmental 

interference exception to the time-bar to the PCRA court, his argument is 

waived. Bankhead, 217 A.3d at 1247-48; see also Commonwealth v. 

Blackwell, 936 A.2d 497, 500 (Pa.Super. 2007) (“[F]ailure to allege a 

timeliness exception in the PCRA petition itself precludes the petitioner from 

raising it on appeal”).

Even if Madonna had made these arguments to the PCRA court, they do 

not form a basis for the governmental interference exception. Madonna’s 2019 

letter to the court requesting the status of his direct appeal was not 

tantamount to a PCRA filing necessitating the appointment of counsel. And the 

court was not obligated to issue an order granting Madonna’s counsel leave to 

withdraw sua sponte, as counsel’s representation terminated when Madonna’s 

direct appeal concluded. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 122(B)(2) (“When counsel is 

appointed, . . . the appointment shall be effective until final judgment, 

including any proceedings upon direct appeal”). In addition, although 

Madonna argued to the PCRA court that the prison law library was closed from 

April 2020 to June 2021, restrictions on access to prison resources do not 

generally qualify a petition for the governmental interference exception.

Bankhead, 217 A.3d at 1248.
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Moreover, Madonna’s 2019 letter exemplifies that Madonna did not act 

with due diligence in preserving his PCRA rights. Madonna does not assert 

what other, if any, steps he took between his sentencing hearing in 2017 and 

the filing of his pro se petition in 2021 to discover whether his direct appeal 

had been resolved, the status of his representation, or the PCRA filing 

requirements. He has not offered any reason he could not have used the prison 

law library to determine the status of his case and prepare a PCRA petition 

between the time of his imprisonment and the library’s closure in April 2020. 

Madonna’s judgment of sentence became final in April 2019, and he alleges 

the library closed a year later. The fact that he filed the instant petition in 

January 2021, five months before he alleges the library re-opened, further 

belies his claim that the library’s closure deprived him of the ability to file a 

timely petition. 

Madonna has therefore failed to plead facts showing that he acted with 

due diligence in discovering any governmental interference and that he filed 

his petition within one year. As Madonna has failed to establish that the 

governmental interference exception applies to his petition, his related claim 

that his PCRA counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue the governmental 

interference exception is without merit. See Commonwealth v. Bridges,

886 A.2d 1127, 1132 (Pa. 2005) (“[C]ounsel cannot be found ineffective for 

failing to pursue a meritless claim”).

Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/21/2022