United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee 

on Foreign Operations, Export 

Financing and Related Programs, 

Committee on Appropriations, House of 

Representatives 

FOREIGN 

ASSISTANCE 

USAID Completed 

Many Caribbean 

Disaster Recovery 

Activities, but Several 

Challenges Hampered 

Efforts 

May 2006 

 

GAO-06-645 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

May 2006

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE 

USAID Completed Many Caribbean 

Disaster Recovery Activities, but Several 

Challenges Hampered Efforts 

Highlights of GAO-06-645, a report to the 

Chairman, Subcommittee on Foreign 

Operations, Export Financing and Related 

Programs, Committee on Appropriations, 

House of Representatives

In September 2004, Hurricane Ivan 

and Tropical Storm Jeanne passed

through the Caribbean, taking lives 

and causing widespread damage in

several countries. After initial U.S. 

emergency relief, in October 2004

Congress appropriated $100 million 

in supplemental funding, primarily 

for Grenada, Jamaica, and Haiti, 

which were significantly affected. 

The U.S. Agency for International 

Development (USAID), leader of 

the U.S. recovery programs, agreed, 

in consultation with the Office of 

Management and Budget, to

complete the programs by

December 31, 2005, giving the

agency a 1-year time frame. GAO 

was asked to (1) review the nature

and status of the programs in

Grenada, Jamaica, and Haiti as of

December 31, 2005; (2) identify

factors that affected the programs’ 

progress; and (3) assess USAID’s 

use of guidance and lessons

learned from previous similar 

programs and efforts to draw

lessons from the current programs. 

 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the USAID 

Administrator (1) develop disaster

recovery and reconstruction

guidance that incorporates lessons 

learned from the current and 

previous programs and (2) revise 

staffing procedures to facilitate the 

rapid reassignment or hiring of

needed personnel for postdisaster 

recovery and reconstruction

programs. USAID agreed with our

recommendations. 

As of December 31, 2005, USAID had spent about 77 percent of funds 

allocated for assistance in Grenada, Jamaica, and Haiti and completed many

disaster recovery activities, such as providing business and agriculture 

grants. However, the agency significantly reduced its targets for building and 

repairing houses, in part because of cost increases, and granted contractors 

extensions to complete some of these projects. 

Severe weather delayed the progress of recovery activities in Jamaica and 

Haiti—for example, two hurricanes in the summer of 2005 disrupted 

Jamaican housing repairs. In addition, difficulty coordinating activities with 

the Grenadian and Jamaican governments hampered housing construction. 

Further, other construction-related challenges—for example, shortages of 

cement—delayed projects in Grenada and Jamaica. Finally, frequent security

problems in Haiti hindered contractors’ progress. 

USAID has not issued guidance that incorporates lessons learned from 

previous recovery and reconstruction programs, such as ways to mitigate 

challenges commonly faced in rebuilding after disasters. USAID staff 

inexperienced with disaster recovery efforts said that this made it difficult to 

design and implement the programs. Further, in agreeing to complete the 

programs within 1 year, USAID faced challenges in designing a broad 

spectrum of activities that would help rebuild residents’ lives and that could 

be sustained after the programs ended. In addition, the agency did not adopt 

recommendations from GAO and USAID reviews of past recovery programs

that could have helped it more rapidly hire and transfer staff for the 

Caribbean programs. Although the agency contracted with a management 

firm to quickly staff its program in Grenada and Jamaica, this led to 

additional challenges, such as confusion about the management firm’s roles 

and responsibilities in relation to USAID staff and other contractors. USAID 

staff and contractors are recording lessons learned from the programs in 

each country. 

New Housing Construction in Jamaica (left) and Grenada 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-645.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact David Gootnick 

at (202) 512-3149 or gootnickd@gao.gov. 
Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 2

Background 5

USAID Completed Numerous Recovery Efforts within 1 Year but 

Granted Extensions for Many Construction Projects 8 

Various Factors Slowed USAID’s Implementation and Completion 

of Program Activities 16 

Lack of Formal Program Guidance, Time Frame, and Staffing

Issues Contributed to Implementation Problems 19 

Conclusions 27

Recommendations for Executive Action 27 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 27 

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 30 

Appendix II Summary of Lessons Learned from USAID 

Disaster Recovery and Reconstruction Efforts 34 

Appendix III Comments from the U.S. Agency for International 

Development 42 

Appendix IV GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 45 

Related GAO Products 46 

Tables 

Table 1: USAID Key Nonconstruction-Related Recovery Activities 

in Grenada, Jamaica, and Haiti, as of December 31, 2005 10 

Table 2: USAID Key Construction-Related Recovery Activities in 

Grenada, Jamaica, and Haiti, as of December 31, 2005 13

Table 3: Number and Types of Activities at Project Sites GAO 

Visited in Grenada, Jamaica, and Haiti 31 

Page i GAO-06-645 Foreign Assistance
Figures 

Figure 1: Areas and Extent of Hurricane Damage in Grenada, 

Jamaica, and Haiti 6 

Figure 2: Recovery and Reconstruction Allocations by Country 7 

Figure 3: USAID Allocation and Expenditure for Disaster Recovery 

Assistance for Grenada, Jamaica, and Haiti, as of 

December 31, 2005 9 

Figure 4: USAID-Supported Drainage Canal Cleanup in Haiti 12 

Figure 5: USAID-Funded School Repair in Grenada 15 

Abbreviations 

Hurricane Ivan Program Hurricane Ivan Recovery and Rehabilitation 

 Program 

NGO nongovernmental organization 

OFDA Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance

OMB Office of Management and Budget 

ONR Office of National Reconstruction, Jamaica 

RIG Regional Inspector General 

Tropical Storm Program Tropical Storm Jeanne Recovery Program 

USAID U.S. Agency for International Development 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further 

permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or 

other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to 

reproduce this material separately. 

Page ii GAO-06-645 Foreign Assistance
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

May 26, 2006

The Honorable Jim Kolbe 

Chairman 

Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, 

 Export Financing and Related Programs 

Committee on Appropriations 

House of Representatives 

Dear Mr. Chairman: 

In September 2004, Hurricane Ivan struck several Caribbean islands, 

including Grenada and Jamaica, where it killed 59 people and inflicted 

damage of about $1.4 billion. In the same month, Tropical Storm Jeanne 

struck parts of Haiti with heavy rains, causing flash floods that killed more 

than 2,000 people, affected an estimated 300,000 others through loss of 

homes, schools, and livelihoods, and caused an estimated $300 million in 

damage. The United States and other donors1

 responded initially to these 

disasters by providing emergency relief, such as food, water, medical 

supplies, and temporary shelter. In October 2004, recognizing the need for 

longer-term recovery and reconstruction assistance, Congress passed a 

supplemental appropriation allocating $100 million for additional 

hurricane recovery efforts in the Caribbean.2

 The U.S. Agency for 

International Development (USAID), designated to lead the U.S.-funded 

assistance, initiated the Hurricane Ivan Recovery and Rehabilitation 

Program (Hurricane Ivan Program) in Grenada and Jamaica and the 

Tropical Storm Jeanne Recovery Program (Tropical Storm Program) in 

Haiti in January 2005.3

 Following discussions with the Office of

Management and Budget (OMB), USAID agreed to complete the programs 

by December 31, 2005—that is, within 1 year of initiating the programs; 

this time frame is shorter than for previous USAID disaster recovery and 

 1

Other donors’ pledges for recovery assistance amounted to about $177 million in Grenada 

and about $23 million in Jamaica. In Haiti, pledges amounted to about $16 million. 

2

Emergency Hurricane Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2005, Pub. L. 108-324, Div. B,

Chapter 5 (Oct. 13, 2004). 

3

USAID allocated most of the appropriated funds to Grenada, Jamaica, and Haiti, which 

sustained the heaviest damage in the storms; this report focuses on the agency’s work in 

these countries. 

Page 1 GAO-06-645 Foreign Assistance
reconstruction programs, such as USAID’s program in Central America 

following Hurricane Mitch. In addition, instead of transferring or directly

hiring staff, as it has done in the past, USAID hired a management firm, 

Wingerts Consulting, to quickly staff and establish the programs in 

Grenada and Jamaica. 

Having previously examined U.S. efforts to provide disaster recovery

assistance,4 we were asked to monitor USAID’s delivery of the assistance 

in the Caribbean. In this report, we (1) review the recovery and 

reconstruction activities in Grenada, Jamaica, and Haiti, including the 

status of the activities as of December 31, 2005; (2) identify factors that 

affected USAID’s ability to implement and complete the programs within 

the 1-year time frame; and (3) assess USAID’s use of guidance and 

application of lessons learned from similar previous programs and its 

efforts to draw lessons from the current programs. 

To address these matters, we reviewed USAID’s objectives and oversight 

strategy for the Hurricane Ivan and Tropical Storm Programs. We made 

several trips to Grenada and Jamaica and one trip to Haiti.5

 In all three 

countries, we reviewed program documents and interviewed USAID staff, 

private contractors, and host government officials. We visited 80 project 

sites, most of them randomly selected, in Jamaica and Grenada as well as

nine project sites in Haiti that were not randomly selected. We also 

analyzed program expenditure and activity data, having assessed the data’s 

reliability and finding it sufficient for our purposes. We conducted our 

work from March 2005 through May 2006 in accordance with generally

accepted government auditing standards. (See app. I for a more detailed

discussion of our scope and methodology). 

USAID completed many of the activities that it implemented in Grenada, 

Jamaica, and Haiti within the 1-year time frame, but the agency required

additional time to finalize many construction-related projects. Of the $92.4 

Results in Brief 

 4

For example, see GAO, Foreign Assistance: Disaster Recovery Program Addressed

Intended Purposes, but USAID Needs Greater Flexibility to Improve Its Response

Capability, GAO-02-787 (Washington, D.C.: July 24, 2002); and Foreign Assistance: 

USAID’s Earthquake Recovery Program in El Salvador Has Made Progress, but Key

Activities Are Behind Schedule, GAO-03-656 (Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2003). See Related 

GAO Products. 

5

After our initial trip to Haiti in March-April 2005, the Department of State restricted access 

to emergency personnel because of security concerns. 

Page 2 GAO-06-645 Foreign Assistance
million allocated for recovery and reconstruction in the three countries, 

USAID expended $71.3 million, or about 77 percent. In Grenada and 

Jamaica, USAID completed a range of non-construction-related recovery 

activities, including providing business and agriculture recovery grants, 

technical assistance to farmers, and grants to fisherfolk or artisans. In 

Haiti, USAID’s completed nonconstruction activities included restoring 

irrigated farmland and hillsides, removing mud from streets and canals, 

and issuing household support grants. USAID also initiated constructionrelated projects, including repairing houses and public facilities and 

building new homes in Grenada and Jamaica and repairing homes, public 

facilities, and infrastructure in Haiti. However, in part because of increases 

in the cost of materials and labor, USAID lowered initial targets for many 

of these projects—for example, reducing new housing targets in Grenada 

from 150 to 55, house repair targets in Jamaica from 3,450 to 932, and 

house repair targets in Haiti from 3,000 to 600. However, USAID 

contractors did not achieve the adjusted targets for 11 of the 14 

construction activities. In November 2005, USAID granted the contractors 

in Grenada and Jamaica a 6-month extension to complete approximately 

240 new houses and finish other construction activities. In September 

2005, contractors in Haiti received an 18-month extension to complete 

housing and infrastructure repairs but expected to finish these projects by 

June 2006.6

Several factors hampered USAID’s ability to implement and complete 

program activities within the 1-year time frame. First, periods of severe 

weather delayed construction and some agriculture activities in Jamaica 

as well as some construction projects in Haiti. Second, coordination 

challenges in Grenada and Jamaica negatively affected USAID’s 

implementation and completion of construction projects. For example, the 

Grenadian government lacked a central agency to identify needs and 

coordinate hurricane recovery efforts, and Jamaica’s Office of National 

Reconstruction did not complete certain construction activities it had 

agreed to, delaying USAID’s completion of new houses. Third, 

construction-related challenges, including difficulty in identifying housing 

recipients who could demonstrate land ownership, delayed construction 

activities in the three countries. Finally, according to USAID officials, 

ongoing security challenges disrupted the work in Haiti, leading, for 

 6

The extensions that USAID granted to contractors in Grenada, Jamaica, and Haiti entailed 

no additional cost to the agency. 

Page 3 GAO-06-645 Foreign Assistance
example, to the temporary evacuation of some USAID staff during the 

summer of 2005. 

USAID staff reported that a lack of guidance incorporating lessons learned 

from previous USAID recovery and reconstruction programs led to design 

and implementation challenges; further, the agency did not adopt prior 

recommendations regarding time frames and staffing, resulting in 

additional problems. Although USAID has managed several recovery and 

reconstruction programs since 1999, it has not issued guidance that 

incorporates lessons learned from designing and implementing such 

programs. For example, if USAID officials had had access to lessons 

learned regarding likely increases in postdisaster demand for construction 

materials and labor, it might have helped them to establish more realistic 

targets for activities to be achieved within a 1-year time frame. Staff who 

designed the activities told us that they applied some lessons from prior 

reconstruction programs—for example, hiring monitoring firms to assist 

with technical and financial oversight of program activities. However, in 

agreeing to complete activities by December 31, 2005, USAID did not take

into account lessons learned regarding implementation time frames. It also 

faced trade-offs in trying to complete a broad spectrum of activities within 

1 year while ensuring that activities had the intended impact of helping 

beneficiaries find jobs in the postdisaster environment and could be 

sustained by host government staff after the programs were completed. 

For instance, to finish activities within the 1-year time frame, USAID 

contractors in Grenada designed job skills training to last 6 weeks, but 

participants later reported that the training had been too brief to develop 

some skills, such as those needed for construction work. The contractors 

told us that a longer time frame would have allowed them to assess and 

adjust the training to make it more sustainable. In addition, at the time of 

our review, the agency had not adopted prior GAO and USAID 

recommendations for revising agency procedures to quickly hire or 

reassign staff with technical skills to manage disaster recovery activities. 

In order to quickly staff its program in Grenada, which has no USAID 

mission, the agency hired a management and oversight firm to manage 

program activities. However, USAID staff and contractors told us that the

use of this firm led to several implementation problems, such as confusion 

about roles and responsibilities and redundant layers of oversight. USAID 

staff and contractors in all three countries are recording lessons learned 

that could be valuable in future efforts. 

Page 4 GAO-06-645 Foreign Assistance
We are recommending that, to better facilitate the design and 

implementation of USAID’s disaster recovery and reconstruction programs 

and address ongoing staffing issues, the USAID Administrator develop

guidance that incorporates lessons learned from the Hurricane Ivan,

Tropical Storm Jeanne, and other USAID recovery and reconstruction 

programs and revise staffing procedures to facilitate the rapid 

reassignment or hiring of needed personnel for longer-term recovery 

programs. We provided a draft of this report to USAID, the Department of 

State, and OMB. We received a formal comment letter from USAID (see 

app. III), in which they agreed with our recommendations. USAID and 

OMB provided technical comments that we incorporated, as appropriate.

The Department of State provided no comments. 

In September 2004, four major hurricanes and storms, including Ivan and 

Jeanne, caused extensive damage in the Caribbean, particularly in 

Grenada, Jamaica, and Haiti. Figure 1 shows the paths of Hurricane Ivan

and Tropical Storm Jeanne and describes the extent of damage in the 

three countries. 

Background 

Page 5 GAO-06-645 Foreign Assistance
Figure 1: Areas and Extent of Hurricane Damage in Grenada, Jamaica, and Haiti 

Source: GAO analysis of USAID data and 2004 World Bank statistics.

Hurricane Ivan

Tropical Storm Jeanne

Caribbean Sea

Atlantic Ocean

JAMAICA

HAITI

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Port-au-Prince

St. George's

GRENADA

Kingston

September 7, 2004

Hurricane Ivan took 28 lives, injured 700 people, 

destroyed 30 percent of the housing stock, 

and damaged an estimated 90 percent of all 

houses—causing an estimated $815 million in 

damage, about twice the country’s annual GDP. 

Population: 105,700

GDP: $436.1 million

September 10, 2004

Hurricane Ivan claimed 31 lives, 

directly affected 370,000 

people, and damaged 102,000 

households—causing an estimated 

$580 million in damages. 

Population: 2.7 million

GDP: $8 billion

September 17-18, 2004

Tropical Storm Jeanne claimed over 2,000 

lives, injured over 2,600 people, and 

affected an estimated 300,000 or more 

through loss of homes, schools, health 

posts, crops, and livelihoods—causing over 

an estimated $300 million in total damages. 

Population: 8.6 million

GDP: $3.5 billion

Note: Map is not drawn to scale. 

U.S. Emergency Relief and 

Immediate Recovery 

Assistance 

USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) provided 

emergency relief, such as food, water and sanitation, and shelter, to 

address the urgent needs of those affected by the storms. Following 

OFDA’s relief efforts in response to Hurricane Ivan, USAID directed 

existing agency funding to Grenada and Jamaica—$3.2 million and $7.3 

million, respectively—for immediate recovery activities, including clearing 

farmland, cleaning up communities, and repairing houses and schools, that 

were carried out through June 30, 2005. Soon after Tropical Storm Jeanne 

struck Haiti, the U.S. government provided $11.8 million for immediate 

Page 6 GAO-06-645 Foreign Assistance
emergency relief and recovery assistance, including emergency food and 

water, as well as for cleaning up communities. 

U.S. Recovery and 

Reconstruction Assistance 

Of the $100 million supplemental assistance that Congress approved for 

hurricane recovery and reconstruction activities in the Caribbean, USAID 

allocated $92.4 million to Grenada, Jamaica, and Haiti.7

 Figure 2 shows the 

amount and percentage allocated to each country. 

Figure 2: Recovery and Reconstruction Allocations by Country 

Source: GAO analysis of USAID data.

44%

37%

19%

Grenada ($40.3 million)

Haiti ($34 million)

Jamaica ($18 million)

Note: Dollar amounts do not add due to rounding.

Lacking a mission in Grenada, the agency administered the Hurricane Ivan

Program from its Jamaica mission and Barbados satellite office, and it 

administered the Tropical Storm Program from its Haiti mission. Using a 

new approach to its program staffing, rather than reassign USAID staff or 

 7

USAID also allocated about $5.6 million to OFDA as reimbursement for relief efforts and 

$2 million to the Bahamas, Tobago, and the Caribbean Community islands, which sustained 

some damage from Hurricane Ivan. 

Page 7 GAO-06-645 Foreign Assistance
hire personal services contractors,8

 the agency hired Wingerts Consulting 

to manage and oversee project activities in Grenada and Jamaica. 

Wingerts’s responsibilities included monitoring program activities, 

reporting progress to the USAID mission in Jamaica, and coordinating 

USAID’s efforts with the Grenadian and Jamaican governments and with 

other donors. 

USAID created special objectives for each country that defined the target

areas for the recovery and reconstruction funding. For Grenada and 

Jamaica, the supplemental funding expanded the initial emergency, or a 

short-term response and aimed to help people quickly rebuild their 

communities, enhance and improve their skills, provide limited income 

support, and resume their path of sustainable development through 

activities that provide immediate income, skills training and employment 

opportunities. In Haiti, supplemental funds aimed to meet the immediate 

needs of Haitians affected by the tropical storm, help them regain sources

of economic activity, and help them prepare for future natural disaster 

threats. According to USAID, recovery and reconstruction programs are 

essentially development programs with short time frames but share the 

same objectives of sustainable growth and prosperity. 

USAID completed many activities it implemented in Grenada, Jamaica, 

and Haiti by December 31, 2005. Of the $92.4 million allocated for recovery 

and reconstruction across the three countries, the agency expended $71.3 

million. The agency implemented a variety of non-construction-related 

activities—for example, providing business rehabilitation grants in 

Grenada and Jamaica and implementing community cleanup activities in 

Haiti—and met or exceeded its targets for these projects within the 1-year 

time frame. In addition, it implemented a number of construction-related 

projects, such as repair and building housing and infrastructure. However, 

although USAID reduced targets, in part because of cost increases for 

these projects in all three countries, USAID contractors did not complete 

USAID Completed 

Numerous Recovery 

Efforts within 1 Year 

but Granted 

Extensions for Many 

Construction Projects 

 8

USAID defines its workforce as comprising individuals with whom it has an employeremployee relationship. The Federal Acquisition Regulations define a personal services 

contract as one that makes the contractor appear as a government employee by the nature

of the relationship that is established. USAID is authorized by section 636(a)(3) of the 

Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, to contract with individuals for personal 

services abroad. USAID’s personal services contractors may be U.S. citizens, host country

nationals, or third country nationals. 

Page 8 GAO-06-645 Foreign Assistance
many of them by December 31, 2005—in particular, new housing 

construction—and required extensions to finish these projects. 

As of December 31, 2005, USAID had expended approximately 77 percent

of the $92.4 million that it allocated for recovery efforts in the three 

countries. Figure 3 shows program allocation and expenditure by country.

Figure 3: USAID Allocation and Expenditure for Disaster Recovery Assistance for 

Grenada, Jamaica, and Haiti, as of December 31, 2005 

USAID implemented a variety of non-construction-related activities to help

hurricane and storm survivors in Grenada, Jamaica, and Haiti recover from

the disasters, completing most of them within the 1-year time frame. 

USAID generally reached or exceeded its targets for nonconstruction 

recovery activities, despite having raised many of these targets after 

initiating the activities. We visited a total of 37 non-construction-related 

sites to observe USAID’s progress and interview beneficiaries. Table 1 

shows a selection of USAID’s initial and revised nonconstruction targets 

USAID Expended Majority 

of Recovery Funds within 

1 Year 

USAID Implemented 

Various Nonconstruction 

Recovery Activities

Page 9 GAO-06-645 Foreign Assistance
and its completed activities, in Grenada, Jamaica, and Haiti as of 

December 31, 2005. 

Table 1: USAID Key Nonconstruction-Related Recovery Activities in Grenada, Jamaica, and Haiti, as of December 31, 2005 

Key nonconstruction recovery activities 

Initial targets 

(January 2005)

Revised targets 

(as of 

December 2005) 

Completed 

activities (as of

December 31, 2005)

Grenada 

People trained in tourism, construction, and other skills 

Grants for small and medium-size enterprises

Grants and technical assistance for farmers 

Grants and technical assistance for fisherfolk

Government supported operations (dollars in millions) 

Primary schools resupplied and re-equipped 

1,600a

200

450

35

$8

18

1,800 

200 

1,327 

155 

$8

21 

2,402

192

1,427

100

$8

24

Jamaica 

Grants to small and medium-size enterprisesb

Technical assistance for farmers 

Grants for fisherfolk 

Grants for artisans 

Primary schools and colleges resupplied and re-equipped 

2,500

2,300

1,500

100

219

2,451 

2,447 

2,700 

100 

52 

11,478

2,479

2,855

120

56

Haitic

Irrigated land restored to full production 

Land protected with conservation methods 

Communities trained in watershed management 

Water associations trained in watershed management 

Mud removed from urban streets and canals

Asset restoration grants 

Communities trained in disaster preparedness and 

mitigation 

5,600 acres

4,960 acres

16

61

48,000 m3

3,000

27

6,474 acres 

4,960 acres 

16 

51 

48,000 m3

3,000 

21 

5,264 acres

4,975 acres

19

0

69,734 m3

3,023

21

Source: GAO analysis of USAID data. 

Notes: The table shows USAID’s primary nonconstruction-related recovery activities in the three 

countries; the agency conducted other nonconstruction-related activities that are not shown. 

a

Initial target reflects tourism and construction skills only; other skills were added later in the program 

and are reflected in the revised target number. 

b

Grants to small and medium-size enterprises included assistance to business owners and farmers. 

c

Initial targets for Haiti according to USAID’s February 2005 Tropical Storm Recovery Program report.

In all three countries, USAID provided assistance to revitalize businesses 

and agriculture. In addition, in Haiti, USAID also helped communities clear 

Page 10 GAO-06-645 Foreign Assistance
away flood debris and take steps to prevent similar disasters in the future. 

Following are descriptions of several USAID nonconstruction activities in 

the three countries: 

• In Grenada, USAID provided grants averaging about $6,300 to small 

businesses (those with 5 to 24 employees) and grants averaging about 

$15,000 to medium-sized businesses (those with 25 to 75 employees) to 

reimburse them for hurricane-related repairs. We visited five grant 

recipients, each of whom reported using the grants to pay for repairs or 

purchase equipment. According to a survey conducted by the contractors 

that implemented these grants, about half of the businesses receiving

assistance estimated that they reopened at least 6 months sooner than if 

they had had to finance the repairs themselves. Fisherfolk received grants 

averaging about $1,900 to replace fishing gear and equipment and repair 

boats. Many of the farmers and fisherfolk also received technical 

assistance—for example, farmers were taught techniques for turning 

backyard yam production into commercial production. 

• In Jamaica, USAID grants to poultry farmers allowed them to buy egg 

grading and cold storage equipment, which in turn will enable them to 

increase production and incomes. We visited six horticultural farmers who 

received grants from USAID consisting of a technology package, such as 

seedling nurseries, drip irrigation systems, or integrated pest management 

systems. According to USAID staff, they were able to provide an 

unexpectedly large number of grants (11,478 versus the revised target of 

2,451) to small and medium-size enterprises because the implementing 

team decided to make several grants to individual beneficiaries as an 

incentive for beneficiaries to continue to adopt various new technologies 

and practices. According to a November 2005 USAID report, agricultural 

production for farmers who received grant and technical assistance 

through the program was estimated to have increased by 41 percent 

compared with pre-Hurricane Ivan production levels. USAID also 

conducted workshops that taught artisans how to improve and develop 

products, procure goods and services, and package and label their 

merchandise. In addition, fisherfolk in Jamaica received grants and 

disaster preparedness training. For example, training courses in “Safe 

Seamanship and Environmental Management” were delivered to 295

fisherfolk. 

• In Haiti, USAID cleared streets of mud and improved urban drainage that

had been damaged from flooding. In addition, USAID implemented a cashfor-work program that paid local workers about $2 per day for assisting 

with various activities throughout the program, including road and schools 

repair, mud removal, and clearing of urban drains (see fig. 4). Further, 

Page 11 GAO-06-645 Foreign Assistance
USAID funded training in disaster preparedness and response that, 

according to a report by a USAID contractor, aimed to “raise disaster 

awareness, reduce risks, and prepare for contingencies in vulnerable local 

communities and municipalities.” Among the topics covered were forming 

community emergency response teams, designating first responders to 

coordinate emergency activities, and developing risk management and 

mitigation plans. 

Figure 4: USAID-Supported Drainage Canal Cleanup in Haiti 

USAID initiated construction-related projects to repair or replace 

hurricane and storm-damaged structures in each of the three countries. 

However, USAID contractors did not complete a number of these projects, 

although USAID reduced its targets for many of the projects. According to

USAID staff and contractors, rising costs in all three countries were a 

factor in USAID’s decision to reduce construction targets. According to an 

April 2006 Regional Inspector General (RIG) audit of the Hurricane Ivan 

Program,9

 the high cost of housing construction was due, in part, to the 

Source: USAID.

USAID Began Many 

Construction-Related 

Projects but Did Not 

Complete All 

 9

USAID, Office of the Inspector General, Audit of USAID/Jamaica’s Hurricane Recovery

and Rehabilitation Activities, Audit Report No. 1-532-06-004-P (San Salvador, El Salvador,

April 2006). 

Page 12 GAO-06-645 Foreign Assistance
contractor’s unfamiliarity with the local market, which led to the 

negotiation of unfavorable subcontracts. The report also indicated that the 

cost of houses financed by USAID in Grenada was 37 percent to 49 percent 

higher than comparable houses built by the Grenadian Housing Authority; 

and, in Jamaica, USAID-funded houses were more than double the cost of

houses built by the Jamaican government. In addition, in Haiti, USAID staff 

indicated that a detailed needs survey found that the costs of material and

labor needed to make repairs had more than doubled since the initial 

estimates. Table 2 shows a selection of USAID’s initial and revised 

construction targets and its completed activities, in Grenada, Jamaica, and

Haiti as of December 31, 2005. 

Table 2: USAID Key Construction-Related Recovery Activities in Grenada, Jamaica, and Haiti, as of December 31, 2005 

Key construction-related recovery activities 

Initial

targets

(January 2005)

Revised targets 

 (as of 

December 2005) 

Completed 

activities (as of

December 31, 2005)

Grenada 

Houses repaired or rebuilt 

New houses built 

Tourist sites repaired

Schools repaired 

Community colleges repaired

1,675

150

3

12

1

650 

55 

5 

17 

0 

1,100

0

7

20

0

Jamaica 

Houses repaired

New houses built 

Sanitation and septic systems repaired

Primary schools and colleges repaired 

Teachers colleges repaired

3,450

200

440

219

3

932 

186 

200 

47 

2 

762

0

66

46

2

Haiti 

Roads repaired

Bridges constructed 

Schools repaired 

Houses repaired

32 km

0

20

3,000

32 km 

2 

20 

600 

0

0

13

476

Source: GAO analysis of USAID data. 

Note: The table shows USAID’s primary construction-related recovery activities in the three countries; 

the agency conducted other construction-related activities that are not shown. 

In Grenada and Jamaica, USAID negotiated 6-month extensions of the 

bilateral agreements with the respective host governments in December 

2005 and, subsequently, granted contractors extensions of varying lengths 

Page 13 GAO-06-645 Foreign Assistance
based on the expectation that they could complete activities by June 30, 

2006. In Haiti, USAID granted the contractor an 18-month extension in 

September 2005 to complete major infrastructure repair on a road and 

bridge; however, USAID officials managing the program said they 

expected to complete these activities by June 2006.10

In Grenada and Jamaica, USAID’s construction efforts have focused 

primarily on repairing and rebuilding houses and building new homes, and 

in Haiti, on repairing infrastructure, public facilities, and houses. 

Following are descriptions of several of USAID’s construction-related 

projects. 

• In Grenada, USAID is building 55 new houses on the sites of homes that 

had been destroyed by the hurricane. The new houses consist of lumber 

over a concrete slab and include septic systems and electrical

connections. Of the 55 homes, 36 have an area of 400 square feet and 19 

have an area of 650 square feet, with the size of the house depending on 

the size of the household. We visited 11 housing construction sites in 

August 2005 and revisited five of them in December, at which time, for the 

most part, construction was just beginning. In addition, USAID has 

initiated repairs of houses, tourist sites, and schools, among other 

buildings (see fig. 5). 

 10USAID reported that the extensions in all three countries imposed no additional program

costs.

Page 14 GAO-06-645 Foreign Assistance
Figure 5: USAID-Funded School Repair in Grenada

Source: GAO.

• In Jamaica, USAID is constructing 220-square-foot concrete-block houses 

in two sites provided by the Jamaican government. The Jamaican Office of

National Reconstruction agreed to provide septic systems and electrical 

connections for the houses. Most of the beneficiaries are families whose 

houses were destroyed by the hurricane because they were close to the 

shore; the new housing sites are near the old sites but a safe distance from

the shoreline. We visited the two sites in the early stages of construction 

and several months later, after construction had begun. As of January 

2006, construction was well under way in the two communities, but none 

of the houses were complete. 

• In Haiti, USAID funded the construction of a bridge and the repair of a 

national road that runs from Gonaives to Cap-Haitien. According to 

USAID’s contractor implementing infrastructure activities, repairs to the 

road will have a significant impact on the local economy by restoring farmto-market transportation and supporting USAID’s other rehabilitation 

projects in the area. According to USAID staff, as of December 2005, 60 

percent to 70 percent of the road was completed. 

Page 15 GAO-06-645 Foreign Assistance
USAID’s implementation and completion of recovery activities in Grenada, 

Jamaica, and Haiti within the 1-year time frame were hampered by several 

factors. Severe weather in 2005 delayed the progress of some activities, in

particular the reconstruction of houses in Jamaica and infrastructure in 

Haiti. Coordination challenges in Grenada and Jamaica contributed to 

delays in the implementation and completion of program activities. In 

addition, USAID contractors encountered various construction-related 

challenges, such as shortages of materials and labor, and difficulty in 

fulfilling USAID requirements. Haiti faced continued security challenges 

that limited access to recovery sites, consequently delaying progress. 

Hurricanes and heavy rains in 2005 affected the progress of USAID 

reconstruction and recovery activities in Jamaica and Haiti. In Jamaica, 

two hurricanes during the summer of 2005, as well as heavy rain in 

October and November, contributed to delays in housing reconstruction 

and some agriculture activities, including the training of farmers. In Haiti, 

a heavier than usual rainy season delayed some USAID construction 

activities. Some structures that protected ongoing work on riverbank 

repair and irrigation pumps were washed away, and protective dikes had

to be rebuilt. The heavy rain also damaged roads in many of the project 

areas, making it difficult to transport construction materials and field staff.

USAID faced several coordination challenges in Grenada, owing in part to

the agency’s lack of a permanent presence in the country, which affected 

its ability to implement recovery activities. In Jamaica, USAID 

encountered challenges in coordinating with the government, which 

negatively affected its ability to complete new housing. 

Various Factors 

Slowed USAID’s

Implementation and 

Completion of 

Program Activities 

Severe Weather Delayed 

Program Activities in 

Jamaica and Haiti 

Coordination Challenges 

Hindered USAID’s 

Implementation and 

Completion of Activities in 

Grenada and Jamaica 

• Coordination challenges in Grenada. Grenada lacked a central 

coordinating agency immediately following the hurricane to facilitate 

disaster recovery within the country. Because USAID has no mission in 

Grenada, staff and contractors had to work with various government 

ministries to initiate the recovery process. To address the lack of a central 

agency, USAID and other donors provided funds to help Grenada establish 

the Agency for Reconstruction and Development to coordinate donor 

hurricane recovery efforts; however, establishing the agency took several 

months, contributing to delays in certain activities, such as developing 

criteria for, and identifying, beneficiaries to receive housing repairs and 

reconstruction. 

• Coordination challenges in Jamaica. The government of Jamaica did 

not complete certain construction activities as agreed with USAID, 

Page 16 GAO-06-645 Foreign Assistance
delaying USAID’s completion of new houses. Jamaica’s Office of National 

Reconstruction (ONR), established by the government to coordinate 

Hurricane Ivan recovery activities, verbally agreed to provide, by 

December 31, 2005, concrete bases and install water, roads, and drainage

infrastructure at the two sites selected for new USAID housing 

construction. However, USAID did not sign a memorandum of agreement 

with the Jamaican government that clearly designated the construction 

responsibilities of each party and deadlines for completion.11 According to 

USAID officials and our observations during site visits, ONR made slow 

progress in fulfilling its part of construction activities and as of January 

2006 had not installed electricity and septic systems, although USAID’s 

construction of many houses was close to completion. As of March 2006, 

ONR had not completed the construction activities that it had agreed with 

USAID to complete by December 31, 2005. 

USAID contractors encountered several challenges that slowed the 

agency’s implementation and completion of construction projects in all 

three countries. These challenges included shortages of materials, USAID’s 

policies regarding land titles and bank guarantees, and difficulties working 

with nongovernmental organizations (NGO) and subcontractors. 

Construction-Related 

Challenges Led to Delays 

in Grenada, Jamaica, and 

Haiti 

• Materials shortages. In Grenada, disruptions following the hurricane, as 

well as the island’s relatively remote location, led to shortages of 

construction materials that periodically delayed housing repairs and new 

housing construction. According to USAID, obtaining building materials in 

Grenada became more challenging following Hurricane Emily in 2005. In

Jamaica, according to USAID, increased duties on imported cement, heavy

rains that soaked the cement quarries, and a labor strike that occurred in

the country’s only cement factory led to shortages that delayed housing 

repairs and construction. As of March 2006, USAID reported that 

construction in Jamaica continued to be slowed by a shortage of cement 

because the production site that supplies the region shut down after 

producing low-quality cement. 

• Difficulty in establishing land titles. In Grenada, difficulties in 

establishing land title or ownership caused construction delays. A USAID 

housing contractor in Grenada told us that although it originally identified

 11In responding to a draft of this report in May 2006, USAID commented that, in response to

issues raised by GAO and USAID’s RIG, the Jamaica Mission was in the process of

developing a memorandum of understanding for negotiation and signature with the 

government of Jamaica’s Office of National Reconstruction.

Page 17 GAO-06-645 Foreign Assistance
400 to 500 prospective beneficiaries who met selection criteria established 

by the Grenadian government, many of these people lacked the land titles

or proof of ownership, which USAID required of new-housing 

beneficiaries.12 Because the process of verifying ownership was so time 

consuming, the contractor eventually ran advertisements soliciting 

respondents who met the selection criteria and had proof of land 

ownership. 

• Delays in obtaining bank guarantees. In Haiti, delays encountered by 

contractors seeking bank guarantees contributed to implementation 

delays of some construction projects. USAID staff in Haiti explained that

the agency requires construction contractors to provide a bank guarantee 

in order to receive advance disbursements to buy materials and pay for 

labor, which USAID officials said is common commercial practice. 

However, Haiti’s economic situation made it difficult for local contractors 

to obtain bank guarantees, even when the contractors were reputable and 

had a valid contract with an international organization. Because 

contractors could not begin work without the guarantees, some 

construction activities were delayed. For example, according to USAID 

officials, one highway construction contractor lost a month and a half of

work time and another contractor lost 2 months while obtaining bank 

guarantees.

• NGO-related and subcontractor challenges. In Grenada, contractors 

encountered challenges in working with local NGOs and subcontractors. 

The implementing contractor in Grenada relied on NGOs to help identify 

people who met government criteria to receive housing support. However, 

according to the contractor, the NGOs had difficulty quickly selecting 

beneficiaries and, as a result, housing construction was delayed. In 

Jamaica, USAID worked with NGOs to perform housing repairs. According 

to USAID staff, it was difficult to attract NGOs that could fulfill the 

agency’s documentation and reporting requirements in order to receive

grants for the housing repairs. In addition, according to an April 2006 RIG 

report, the sole subcontractor hired to build houses performed poorly, 

which also contributed to construction delays. 

 12According to USAID officials, agency policy does not prohibit beneficiaries without land

titles from receiving recovery assistance; however, USAID staff managing the Caribbean 

programs determined that to avoid land disputes, land titles were necessary for

beneficiaries of new-housing construction. 

Page 18 GAO-06-645 Foreign Assistance
In Haiti, kidnappings and continued violence in areas affected by the 

tropical storm presented security challenges that disrupted USAID’s 

recovery work. According to USAID officials, most security issues that 

delayed program activities occurred in Haiti’s capital, Port-au-Prince, 

where frequent kidnappings and violence made the port zone extremely 

dangerous. In addition, attacks on port officials prompted them to strike 

for better security, and sometimes delayed distribution of materials. 

USAID officials told us that the lack of security required USAID’s 

contractors to take precautionary measures, such as daily monitoring of 

the security situation, and invest additional resources to protect staff and 

activity sites before undertaking activities. In addition, security concerns 

led to the temporary evacuation of most direct-hire USAID staff from Haiti 

during the summer of 2005. Security concerns also limited USAID staff’s 

and contractors’ access to project sites and ability to provide assistance in

certain areas. For example, U.S. embassy security policies required special 

approval for travel to Gonaives—one of the areas most affected by the 

tropical storm and a target for USAID assistance—because of continued 

violence there. 

USAID has not issued recovery and reconstruction program guidance that 

incorporates lessons learned from previous programs; as a result, USAID 

staff were challenged to find information to guide the design and 

implementation of the Hurricane Ivan Program, leading to an ad hoc 

design process and implementation delays. In addition, although it applied 

some lessons learned from its Hurricane Mitch and other past programs, 

USAID did not apply lessons and recommendations regarding time frames 

and staffing, and as a result, USAID staff tasked with managing the 

Caribbean disaster recovery programs faced challenges similar to those 

encountered in prior programs. USAID staff and contractors stated that 

they are currently recording lessons learned from the Hurricane Ivan and

Tropical Storm Programs. 

Security Problems 

Disrupted Program 

Activities in Haiti 

Lack of Formal 

Program Guidance, 

Time Frame, and 

Staffing Issues 

Contributed to 

Implementation 

Problems 

Page 19 GAO-06-645 Foreign Assistance
Although USAID has managed several large disaster recovery and 

reconstruction programs since 1999,13 USAID has not provided guidance 

specific to these programs that includes lessons learned from previous 

programs. USAID has issued guidance for OFDA emergency assistance14

that serves as a reference both for OFDA staff and for the private and 

public organizations that work with OFDA in providing emergency

assistance. However, this guidance does not address the design and 

implementation of the recovery and reconstruction activities that USAID 

provides following OFDA’s emergency response. In addition, the agency 

has not issued guidance that incorporates lessons learned from designing 

and implementing its prior recovery and reconstruction programs. For 

example, for our 2002 report on USAID’s assistance after Hurricanes Mitch 

and Georges,

15 USAID staff and other federal agencies involved in the 

recovery efforts in Latin America provided us with some lessons learned 

and ideas for improving the delivery of future disaster recovery assistance, 

such as the need to establish accountability mechanisms as part of 

program design, hire firms to provide technical oversight, and develop

fixed-amount reimbursable contracts. Although USAID recorded some 

lessons learned from its Hurricanes Mitch and Georges recovery program, 

this document, unlike its OFDA guidance, has remained in draft form since 

2002, has not been formally issued or approved by the agency, and may not

be readily available to all staff.16

USAID staff assigned to manage the Hurricane Ivan Program, who did not 

have prior experience in managing recovery and reconstruction activities, 

reported that the lack of guidance and access to lessons learned created 

challenges in planning and managing a wide range of activities. According 

to USAID staff designing the Hurricane Ivan Program, the lack of ready 

access to lessons learned from previous recovery and reconstruction 

Lack of Guidance That 

Includes Lessons Learned 

Contributed to Program 

Design and 

Implementation 

Challenges 

 13In addition to administering the $100 million that Congress appropriated for Caribbean

disaster recovery in 2004, USAID administered about $525 million for disaster recovery 

assistance following Hurricanes Mitch and Georges in 1999 and $159 million for recovery 

assistance in El Salvador following the 2001 earthquakes. USAID’s efforts to assist with 

reconstruction in Asia following the 2004 tsunami, which are ongoing, received $908 

million in funding.

14USAID, Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and 

Humanitarian Assistance, Disaster Reduction: A Practitioner’s Guide (Washington, D.C., 

November 2002). 

15GAO-02-787. 

16USAID, Lessons Learned from Planning and Implementation of the Hurricane Mitch

Supplemental Reconstruction Program (draft report) (Washington, D.C., June 27, 2000). 

Page 20 GAO-06-645 Foreign Assistance
programs resulted in an ad hoc approach to planning recovery activities. 

USAID headquarters officials told us that no formal agency guidance was 

available to assist them in planning the recovery effort; consequently, they

had to search for documents and contact staff involved in previous USAID 

disaster recovery efforts to understand how previous programs were 

implemented. 

Officials at USAID headquarters told us that some program planning 

during disaster recovery situations is by necessity country specific and

based on the political, economic, and disaster situation in the affected 

country. However, a USAID official stated that operational guidance would 

have facilitated the design process and that ready access to lessons 

learned could have prevented some mistakes. For example, if USAID 

officials had had access to lessons learned regarding likely increases in 

postdisaster demand for construction materials and labor, it might have 

helped them to establish more realistic targets for activities to be achieved

within a 1-year time frame. With regard to construction and repair, 

important lessons from prior USAID disaster recovery programs include 

the need to account for the difficulties involved with hiring and 

supervising contractors unfamiliar with USAID requirements, selecting 

beneficiaries and verifying land titles. 

In designing and implementing recovery efforts in Grenada, Jamaica, and

Haiti, USAID applied some lessons from previous disaster recovery 

programs. However, the agency did not apply lessons and 

recommendations regarding time frames and staffing for recovery 

programs. As a result, USAID staff tasked with managing the Caribbean 

disaster recovery programs faced challenges that could have been avoided 

if they had had access to lessons learned from prior programs; in addition,

staffing issues remain unaddressed. 

Despite lacking ready access to lessons learned, USAID headquarters 

officials that designed the recovery programs gained access to draft 

documents that they said allowed them to apply some lessons learned 

from USAID’s Hurricane Mitch recovery program. For instance, referring 

to lessons regarding accountability and sustainability, officials involved 

the Regional Inspector General to ensure that appropriate accountability 

mechanisms were in place and incorporated the concept of “build back 

better,” such as rebuilding hurricane-affected infrastructure to better 

withstand future natural disasters. According to USAID, the team 

implementing business, agriculture, and training activities in Jamaica 

followed lessons learned from Hurricane Mitch regarding hiring 

USAID Applied Some 

Lessons from Previous 

Disaster Programs but Did 

Not Follow Prior 

Recommendations on 

Time Frame and Staffing 

USAID Applied Some Lessons 

Learned from Previous 

Programs 

Page 21 GAO-06-645 Foreign Assistance
contractors with proven track records. USAID staff in Haiti also reported 

that some lessons learned from the Hurricane Georges recovery program, 

which included projects in Haiti, had been incorporated into their 

program’s design, including 

• simplifying the task order approval process for hiring contractors, 

• working with community-based organizations to implement recovery

activities, and 

• hiring monitoring firms to assist with technical and financial oversight of 

program activities. 

In agreeing to a 1-year time frame for the Hurricane Ivan and Tropical 

Storm Programs, USAID may have limited the impact and sustainability of

some activities and did not take into account lessons learned from the 

Hurricanes Mitch and Georges effort. According to OMB officials 

responsible for foreign affairs programs, the 1-year time frame was 

developed to speed its completion of recovery activities relative to 

previous USAID disaster recovery efforts and, in response to concerns 

expressed by members of Congress that these emergency supplemental 

resources be expended in a timely manner, to assist with recovery efforts 

and not divert funds to regular long term development programs.17

However, our recent interviews with USAID staff and contractors, as well 

as previous GAO work, suggests that in agreeing to the December 31, 2005, 

deadline, USAID faced a trade-off in trying to complete a broad spectrum 

of activities within the 1-year time frame and ensure that activities 

supported through these programs have the intended impact in helping 

beneficiaries recover, rebuild, and find jobs in the postdisaster 

environment and can be sustained by host government staff after the 

programs end. 

One-Year Time Frame May 

Have Limited Impact and 

Sustainability of Some 

Activities and Conflicted with 

Prior Lessons Learned 

• In Grenada, USAID provided training in various trades and also paid 

participants a stipend while they attended 6-week courses. However, in a 

later evaluation of this program component, the contractors conducting 

the training reported that participants had commented that 6 weeks was 

too short to fully develop some skills, such as those needed for 

construction; however, because the contractor did not assess the training 

 17OMB staff indicated that they encourage USAID to consult with OMB on any difficulties 

the 1-year time frame may have posed on program implementation, but USAID did not seek 

additional consultation. 

Page 22 GAO-06-645 Foreign Assistance
until the end of the 1-year time frame, they were unable to modify the 

training design. The contractor reported that a longer program time frame, 

such as 18 months, would have allowed them to assess the training’s 

results—for instance, by tracking the number of people that found jobs 

after being trained—and adjust the design to increase its impact. The

contractors also found that the time frame limited their ability to assess 

the results of training in hotel services, because many of the islands’ hotels 

were still closed for repair during the year that training was provided. We 

interviewed 19 persons who participated in USAID’s skills training in 

Grenada and found that fewer than half were employed 3 to 6 months after 

completing it.

18

• In Haiti, USAID officials said that although they tried to select projects 

that fit the needs of affected areas, the 1-year time frame had implications 

for the sustainability of some program activities. For example, the officials 

explained that their activities included hillside stabilization and the 

development of an early warning system to be transferred to the 

government of Haiti at the program’s conclusion. However, the USAID 

officials said that 1 year was not enough time to implement and test some 

activities, and train government staff to take them over. USAID officials 

said that 2 years would have been a more reasonable time frame. 

Our prior assessments of the agency’s Hurricane Mitch recovery program 

highlighted some of the trade-offs in trying to design activities that are 

sustainable and can be completed within a short time frame. In our 2002 

assessment of USAID’s administration of disaster recovery assistance after 

Hurricanes Mitch and Georges,19 we reported, based on responses from 

USAID staff and other agencies involved in providing the assistance, that 

“the December 31, 2001, deadline was a major factor in how they planned,

designed, and implemented their disaster recovery activities, and it also 

affected the extent to which sustainability could be built into the 

program.” For example, one agency involved in the Mitch recovery 

reported that the deadline limited project sustainability because it did not 

allow enough time to complete training for local entities. Another agency 

said future projects should have follow-on activities to assess the 

implementation of technical guidance and training provided. USAID 

officials in the Dominican Republic acknowledged that they selected some 

 18This was partially owing to limited employment opportunities for women who took

construction courses but had difficulty obtaining jobs in this field. 

19USAID had agreed to expend all of the appropriated funds by December 31, 2001, about 

30 months from enactment of the supplemental appropriation. See GAO-02-787. 

Page 23 GAO-06-645 Foreign Assistance
activities because they knew they could complete them by the program 

deadline, despite recognizing that other activities might have achieved 

greater sustainability. 

USAID did not adopt several prior recommendations that could have 

helped it to more rapidly hire and transfer staff in response to recovery 

and reconstruction needs, and as a result of hiring Wingerts Consulting to 

quickly staff the Hurricane Ivan Program in Grenada and Jamaica, the 

agency encountered additional challenges. In our 2002 report,20 we 

observed that USAID did not have the “surge capacity” to quickly design

and initiate a large-scale infrastructure and development program with 

relatively short-range deadlines (2.5 years) while providing emergency 

relief and initial reconstruction assistance and managing its regular 

development program. Based on these findings, we recommended that 

USAID develop and implement procedures that would (1) allow it to 

quickly reassign key personnel in postemergency and postcrisis situations 

and (2) allow missions to hire personal services contractors to augment 

staff on an expedited basis.21 In addition, USAID’s draft document 

outlining lessons learned from its Hurricane Mitch program indicates that 

a shortage of qualified engineering and technical staff constrained the

implementation of the program; the document recommends designating an 

official to identify staffing needs quickly and take action to address them.22

USAID agreed with the recommendations in our 2002 report but as of April 

2006 had not taken steps to respond to them; it also had not implemented 

the recommendations in its 2002 draft lessons-learned report. In addition, 

we recently reported that USAID had not staffed several positions that it 

considered critical to essential technical oversight of its tsunami 

reconstruction programs in Indonesia and Sri Lanka, indicating that 

staffing these types of programs remains a challenge.23

USAID decided to hire Wingerts Consulting to manage and oversee the 

program in Grenada, where USAID has no permanent presence, and assist 

USAID Did Not Implement 

Some Prior Staffing 

Recommendations and 

Encountered Challenges 

Related to Use of Management 

Firm 

 20GAO-02-787. 

21GAO-02-787. 

22Lessons Learned from Planning and Implementation of the Hurricane Mitch

Supplemental Reconstruction Program.

23GAO, Foreign Assistance: USAID Has Begun Tsunami Reconstruction in Indonesia

and Sri Lanka, but Key Projects May Exceed Initial Cost and Schedule Estimates, 

GAO-06-488 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 14, 2006). 

Page 24 GAO-06-645 Foreign Assistance
with oversight in Jamaica. According to USAID’s Mission Director in 

Jamaica and other staff, factors influencing the decision included the 

following: 

• The mission needed assistance in initiating recovery activities and 

personnel with technical skills to oversee disaster recovery activities, 

particularly construction. 

• The agency’s process for hiring personal services contractors can take up

to 6 months, and given the 1-year time frame, staff were needed quickly.

• Hiring a consulting firm provided the agency the flexibility to acquire 

short-term staff with skills needed for specific program activities as well 

as to replace staff when their skills were no longer needed. 

According to USAID’s Regional Inspector General, USAID staff, and 

contractors, the agency’s decision to hire Wingerts Consulting to oversee 

the program in Grenada and Jamaica led to additional challenges. 

• In its April 2005 report, USAID’s RIG found that Wingerts’s roles and 

responsibilities in monitoring the program’s implementation had not been 

clearly defined, making it difficult for contractors to implement the 

program, and for USAID staff to manage program activities. USAID 

subsequently refocused Wingerts’s responsibilities primarily on providing 

technical oversight and supporting the USAID permanent staff responsible 

for various program components in Grenada and Jamaica. It took two 

months after the Wingerts contract was signed to more clearly define each 

party’s roles and responsibilities.24

• USAID staff and contractors told us that they were uncertain about 

Wingerts’s role in managing the program. In addition, according to USAID 

contractors, the added layer of oversight that Wingerts provided 

sometimes created tension and confusion because contractors were still 

required to report to USAID staff overseeing their program activities in 

Jamaica and Barbados. In its April 2006 follow-up audit, the RIG noted that

the Wingerts oversight model was problematic in that USAID’s other 

contractors were not accustomed to having Wingerts perform functions 

 24USAID, Office of the Inspector General, Audit of USAID/Jamaica’s Hurricane Recovery

and Rehabilitation Activities, Audit Report No. 1-532-05-008-P (San Salvador, El Salvador,

April 2005). 

Page 25 GAO-06-645 Foreign Assistance
that USAID staff would normally perform, and as a result, working 

relationships were uncomfortable.25

Although USAID staff and contractors reported some challenges in 

working with Wingerts, USAID officials in Jamaica noted that the mission 

has benefited by engaging a contracting firm to fulfill specific functions, 

rather than hiring staff. According to USAID, by using a contractor to 

provide a range of management and oversight support, the mission created 

a structure that was highly flexible and allowed for quick responses to 

changing needs throughout the program. USAID also noted that in 

Grenada, where USAID has no presence, the contracting firm served an

essential function of handling day-to-day interaction with the government 

in addition to managing the $8 million allocated for direct government 

support. While the use of Wingerts provided USAID with flexibility, USAID 

staff and the U.S. embassy in Grenada said that temporarily relocating 

USAID permanent staff or personal services contractors to manage

recovery efforts in the country would have been more efficient than using 

the management firm. 

As part of its internal evaluation of the Hurricane Ivan reconstruction, 

USAID staff and contractors are recording lessons learned, including an 

assessment of the program’s economic impact and whether the program 

helped the countries to “build back better” and prepare for future 

disasters. The staff and contractors told us in December 2005 that they

would incorporate this information into their final program summary, 

which they expected to complete in May 2006. Staff at the Haiti mission 

told us that they were recording lessons learned from the Tropical Storm 

Program disaster mitigation activities and that overall lessons learned will 

be included in the final program report. However, we have not yet learned 

whether USAID headquarters intends to incorporate lessons learned from

the Caribbean programs into guidance that would be available to staff 

implementing future recovery and reconstruction programs. (See app. II 

for our summary of lessons learned reported by U.S. officials and 

contractors involved in the Hurricane Ivan and Tropical Storm Programs 

as well as for lessons culled from our and USAID’s reviews of its previous 

disaster recovery programs.) 

USAID Staff and 

Contractors Are Recording 

Lessons Learned 

 25USAID, Office of the Inspector General, Audit of USAID/Jamaica’s Hurricane Recovery

and Rehabilitation Activities, Audit Report No. 1-532-06-004-P (San Salvador, El Salvador,

April 2006). 

Page 26 GAO-06-645 Foreign Assistance
Disaster recovery and reconstruction assistance is an important 

component of USAID’s development assistance portfolio, providing a 

bridge between its emergency relief efforts and its long-term development 

assistance. In responding to the Caribbean disasters, USAID provided a 

wide range of recovery and reconstruction support. However, despite 

having administered several large-scale disaster recovery programs in 

Latin America, the Caribbean, and Asia since 1999, USAID has not issued 

guidance for recovery and reconstruction programs that incorporates 

lessons learned from its prior efforts, leading to challenges in designing 

and implementing the recovery and reconstruction activities discussed in 

this report. In addition, although USAID and GAO have previously 

documented USAID’s difficulties in quickly staffing its recovery and 

reconstruction programs and have made recommendations to assist 

USAID in correcting these problems, these issues remain unaddressed. As 

a result, the agency is likely to be unprepared to rapidly recruit and 

mobilize technically skilled staff for its next disaster recovery program. 

To better facilitate USAID’s ability to design and implement future disaster 

recovery programs and address its previously documented recurring 

staffing challenges, we recommend that the USAID Administrator take the 

following two actions: 

• Develop disaster recovery and reconstruction program guidance that 

incorporates lessons learned from the Hurricane Ivan Recovery and 

Reconstruction Program and Tropical Storm Jeanne Recovery Program as 

well as previous disaster recovery programs. 

• Revise staffing procedures to allow the agency to more quickly reassign or 

hire key personnel, either to augment staff responsible for disaster 

recovery efforts in countries with a USAID mission or to manage efforts in 

countries where USAID does not maintain a permanent presence. 

We provided a draft of this report to USAID, the Department of State and

OMB. We received a formal comment letter from USAID (see app. III), in

which they agreed with our recommendations. USAID and OMB provided 

technical comments that we incorporated into the report, as appropriate. 

The Department of State had no comments. 

USAID agreed with our first recommendation and indicated it has 

established an agency task force for complex emergency and stabilization 

responses to allow it and other U.S. government agencies to undertake a 

Conclusions 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

Page 27 GAO-06-645 Foreign Assistance
structural approach based on past experience to provide an integrated and 

effective response to future disasters. Further, as part of its technical 

comments, USAID indicated that the Jamaica Mission has taken steps to 

document a draft list of lessons learned that will be included in the final 

report at the conclusion of the Hurricane Ivan program. USAID said these 

reports will be shared with USAID officials in Washington for developing

guidelines for future disaster recovery programs and for inclusion in 

USAID’s Center for Development and Evaluation databases. 

USAID also agreed with our second recommendation. The agency 

acknowledged that recent large-scale natural disaster and complex 

emergencies, including the Asian tsunami and conflicts in Afghanistan and 

Iraq, have revealed glaring gaps in the U.S. capacity to respond effectively,

particularly for stabilization and reconstruction programs. In technical 

comments, USAID’s Jamaica mission noted that its use of a management 

and oversight firm provided a highly flexible structure to respond quickly 

to changes in staffing needs throughout the program; however, USAID 

further recommended that any adjustment to the agency’s policy address 

ongoing urgent needs to change staffing under projects with a short time 

horizon. To respond to staffing challenges, USAID has proposed the 

development of a “civilian surge capacity,” which, if approved and funded,

would give USAID over a 3-year time period to develop short- to long-term 

staff on an as-needed basis, focusing on skill sets that USAID has 

identified as lacking sufficient capacity. 

We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional 

committees as well as the Administrator, USAID; Acting Director, OMB; 

and the Secretary of State. We will also make copies available to others 

upon request. In addition, this report will be available at no charge on the 

GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

Page 28 GAO-06-645 Foreign Assistance
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me 

at (202) 512-3149 or gootnickd@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are 

listed in appendix IV. 

Sincerely yours, 

David Gootnick 

Director 

International Affairs and Trade 

Page 29 GAO-06-645 Foreign Assistance
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 

Methodology 

We were asked to periodically monitor the delivery of assistance under 

USAID’s Hurricane Ivan Recovery and Reconstruction Program (Hurricane 

Ivan Program) and Tropical Storm Jeanne Recovery Program (Tropical 

Storm Program). In this report, we (1) review the recovery and 

reconstruction activities in Grenada, Jamaica, and Haiti, including the 

status of activities as of December 31, 2005; (2) identify factors that 

affected USAID’s ability to implement and complete the programs within 

the 1-year time frame; and (3) assess USAID’s use of guidance and 

application of lessons learned from similar previous programs as well as 

its efforts to draw lessons from the current programs. 

To determine the status of the programs, we initially reviewed the 

supplemental appropriation language passed in 2004 and USAID 

documents that outline special objectives for each country and 

interviewed program officials regarding program goals. We also made 

three monitoring trips to Grenada, two trips to Jamaica, and one trip to 

Haiti.1

 The information on foreign law in this report does not reflect our 

independent legal analysis but is based on interviews and secondary 

sources. After our initial monitoring trip to Haiti, our ability to travel there 

was curtailed when, because of security concerns, the U.S. Department of 

State restricted country access to emergency personnel only. Therefore, 

after the initial trip, we reviewed monthly reports and held periodic 

conference calls with USAID staff and contractors to discuss the status of 

the recovery program in that country. During our monitoring trips to 

Grenada and Jamaica, we conducted document reviews and held 

interviews with USAID staff as well as contractors to discuss program 

progress, determine compliance with established requirements set by 

audit entities, and learn how funding allocation decisions were made and 

tracked. We also met with private contractors and subcontractors, and 

host government officials involved in the recovery efforts to discuss 

program implementation and progress. In Grenada, we interviewed 19

attendees of the skills training program to get a sense for the skills that 

were taught and the extent to which the training provided employment 

opportunities for the attendees. In addition, we conducted field visits to 

various project sites to observe the progress of activities and verify the 

extent to which objectives and timelines were being met. We visited a 

random selection of 80 project sites in Jamaica and Grenada, and 9 project 

sites in Haiti that were not randomly selected due to security restrictions 

 1

GAO did not visit the Caribbean islands of Bahamas, Tobago, and Caribbean Community 

islands, which received a total of $2 million for small-scale hurricane recovery efforts. 

Page 30 GAO-06-645 Foreign Assistance
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

and our inability to visit following our initial information gathering trip. 

(See table 3.) 

Table 3: Number and Types of Activities at Project Sites GAO Visited in Grenada, 

Jamaica, and Haiti 

Country Type of activity at project site Number 

Community rehabilitation 

Housing repairs 

New housing construction

Community centers 

Water and sanitation 

8 recipients 

11a recipients 

2 projects 

1 project 

School repairs 10 schools 

Grenada 

Business recovery 

Agriculture grants 

Fishery grants

Small to medium-size business 

grants 

Skills training 

4 recipients 

2 recipients 

5 recipients 

4 centers 

Community rehabilitation 

Housing repairs 

New housing construction

10b recipients 

2 sites with total of 186 houses 

School repairs 7 schools 

Jamaica 

Business recovery 

Agriculture grants 

Fishery grants

Craft grants 

10c

 recipients 

1 community 

3 recipients 

Haiti Community revitalizationd

School repairs

Disaster preparedness training

Asset restoration grants 

River-widening project 

Canal cleanup

1 school 

1 community 

5 recipients 

1 project 

1 project 

Total 89 

Source: GAO.

a

We visited 11 sites in August 2005 and revisited 5 of these sites during December 2005 to assess 

progress.

 bWe randomly selected housing repair sites, which then were used by USAID to coordinate visits 

based on their proximity to Kingston.

c

Two of these sites were not randomly selected. 

Page 31 GAO-06-645 Foreign Assistance
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

d

Site visits in Haiti were not randomly selected. 

We assessed factors affecting the implementation and completion of 

program activities by reviewing USAID monthly reports and interviewing 

USAID staff, contractors, and host government officials overseeing the 

various program activities during our monitoring trips to Grenada and

Jamaica. For Haiti, during our periodic conference calls, we discussed 

implementation and completion challenges with USAID staff and 

contractors with oversight responsibility for the various program 

components. 

To assess USAID’s application of lessons learned from previous disaster 

recovery programs, we reviewed reports from prior USAID recovery

efforts and interviewed agency officials in Washington, D.C., Grenada, 

Jamaica, and Haiti as well as contractors. We reviewed documentation on 

lessons learned that USAID officials had compiled following the Hurricane 

Mitch recovery program in Central America. We further reviewed reports 

on disaster relief from various international organizations, such as the 

World Bank, that detailed lessons learned from other disaster recovery 

efforts. Two members of our audit team also attended a Caribbean Basin 

conference that highlighted disaster preparedness and mitigation 

strategies, including strategies for funding reconstruction, whether 

building codes should be regionally or nationally applied, and how the 

private sector can contribute to effective disaster preparedness and 

mitigation strategies. Finally, we collated lessons learned in a separate 

appendix (see app. II) based on interviews with staff and contractors 

administering the Hurricane Ivan and Tropical Storm Jeanne Programs 

and lessons documented in previous GAO and USAID assessments of 

disaster recovery programs in Latin America, the Caribbean, and Asia. 

To ensure that appropriate internal controls were established to account

for program funds, we interviewed USAID financial management staff in 

Jamaica and reviewed program documents that described USAID’s 

mechanisms for ensuring accountability. We also coordinated with 

USAID’s Regional Inspector General to determine the Inspector General’s 

involvement with establishing internal controls and monitoring how well 

USAID maintained controls throughout the program. 

For this report, we relied primarily on USAID’s data reported to date in the 

agency’s monthly reports on expenditures and progress in each country. 

We assessed the reliability of this data by (1) interviewing USAID program 

staff and its contractors to determine how data were collected and 

reported and what quality assurance mechanisms were in place, (2) 

Page 32 GAO-06-645 Foreign Assistance
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

reviewing a sample of USAID’s program files as well as its contractors’ 

files in Grenada and Jamaica, and (3) collaborating with USAID’s Regional

Inspector General on the reliability of expenditure data. During our trip to 

Grenada in August 2005, we found errors and a misrepresentation of data 

in USAID’s monthly reports, which we reported to USAID staff and 

contractors responsible for the collating the data. USAID corrected the 

data errors and made changes to certain indicators that we had found to 

be misleading. Overall, we found that USAID’s data as corrected were 

sufficiently reliable for the purposes of addressing our reporting 

objectives. We conducted our work from March 2005 through May 2006 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Page 33 GAO-06-645 Foreign Assistance
A

from USAID Disaster Reco

Rec

ppendix II: Summary of Lessons Learned

very and 

onstruction Efforts 

Page 34 GAO-06-645

Appendix II: Summary of Lessons Learned 

from USAID Disaster Recovery and 

Reconstruction Efforts 

We reviewed USAID’s recovery efforts following the 1998 hurricanes in 

Latin America and 2001 earthquakes in El Salvador, as well as its ongoing

efforts in response to the 2004 tsunami in Asia. Following is a compilation 

of lessons reported by U.S. officials and contractors involved in USAID’s 

Hurricane Ivan Recovery and Rehabilitation Program and Tropical Storm 

Jeanne Recovery Program as well as lessons from GAO and USAID 

reviews of previous disaster recovery programs. Although this list is by no 

means exhaustive, it summarizes some common lessons and examples of 

USAID’s efforts to address disaster recovery challenges and is intended as 

a tool for future disaster recovery programs. 

Lessons Learned for 

Program Planning and 

Implementation 

• Set appropriate time frames. Disaster recovery program time frames 

should be based on a needs assessment of the activities that best aid 

recovery and should be undertaken in phases, if necessary. In our 2002 

report on USAID’s Hurricane Mitch and Georges recovery program, 

various agency officials said the program’s time frame influenced how 

planning, design, and implementation of recovery activities affected 

program sustainability. For example, the Dominican Republic mission 

reported that it selected some activities it knew could be completed by the 

expenditure deadline despite recognizing that other activities may have 

achieved greater sustainability, especially those with more cost sharing 

with the host government and other implementing organizations. Other 

agency officials involved in the recovery suggested that future efforts 

include time for follow-on activities, such as training, to ensure better 

sustainability. USAID staff and contractors implementing the Caribbean 

programs’ activities discussed in this report stated that the 1-year time 

frame influenced the types of activities they selected and may have limited

the sustainability of some projects. One contractor explained that in a 

previous program, activities were divided into different phases (e.g., 

immediate recovery activities were implemented in less than 1 year, while 

road construction was given a 1.5-year time frame and railroad 

reconstruction was planned for 2 years but completed in 3). In the 

Hurricane Ivan Program, USAID was able to identify beneficiaries for 

business and agriculture recovery grants and expend the majority of 

program funds allocated to these activities within a 1-year time frame, 

while reconstruction of houses in Jamaica and Grenada required an 

extension several months beyond December 31, 2005. Based on their 

experience in the Hurricane Mitch and Georges recovery program, USAID 

officials designing and implementing the Tropical Storm Program in Haiti 

said that program staff should not attempt to complete activities in an 

arbitrarily short time frame. USAID staff and contractors we interviewed 

stated that 15 to 18 months is a more reasonable time frame for 

reconstruction activities. 

Foreign Assistance
Appendix II: Summary of Lessons Learned

from USAID Disaster Recovery and 

Reconstruction Efforts 

• Conduct thorough cost assessments. USAID should ensure that initial cost 

estimates are based on specific information about site conditions. Due to 

inadequate estimates in the Caribbean programs regarding the cost of 

labor and materials for reconstruction activities, USAID originally targeted 

an unrealistically high number of activities that later had to be reduced. 

Part of this lesson includes anticipating increases in construction 

materials and labor due to increases in demand for construction after a 

disaster. For example, in Indonesia, USAID’s initial cost estimates for a 

road to be rebuilt after the tsunami were based on limited information 

about site conditions. Because of the uncertainty about the site conditions, 

the Army Corps of Engineers included a 20 percent contingency in its cost

estimate. However, actual costs may still exceed this estimate because 

plans for the road have changed. 

• Look beyond restoration of the status quo and aim to improve 

infrastructure and livelihood opportunities. In the planning of 

Hurricanes Mitch and Georges recovery efforts, the U.S. and its 

international partners agreed on an approach that would not simply 

replace what was destroyed, but would “build back better” with a lasting 

impact. This approach was adopted in the Caribbean programs. For 

example, in the rehabilitation of schools, USAID repaired schools to their 

pre-Ivan condition or better in compliance with the building codes and 

hurricane resistance standards. In Haiti, USAID also provided household

restoration grants as well as created a cash-for-work program to help 

those affected by the storm to rebuild their livelihoods and decrease their 

vulnerability to future floods. 

• Establish a host government agency to coordinate the international 

response to the disaster. USAID worked with the governments of Grenada 

and Jamaica to establish independent coordination entities separate from 

those countries’ ministries to facilitate the recovery process and 

streamline working with the government. A central agency to coordinate

disaster recovery between donors is important for ensuring that activities

are not duplicated; however, USAID and other donors should take into 

account the time needed to establish these agencies when developing 

implementation schedules and setting program completion time frames. 

For example, USAID reported that the Agency for Reconstruction in 

Development in Grenada, funded by USAID and other donors, did not take 

over coordination responsibilities until March 2005, about 3 months into 

USAID’s program. In Jamaica, USAID coordinated with the Office for 

National Reconstruction to identify recipients for recovery assistance as 

well as to build new housing communities. The Indonesian government 

established the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency to coordinate 

the international response to the tsunami. The entity has produced a 

Page 35 GAO-06-645 Foreign Assistance
Appendix II: Summary of Lessons Learned

from USAID Disaster Recovery and 

Reconstruction Efforts 

master plan for reconstruction that it has used to attempt to control and 

track organizations involved in reconstruction. 

• Channel assistance through organizations and contractors with proven

track records and a history of working in the affected country. USAID 

officials administering Haiti’s Tropical Storm Jeanne Recovery Program 

reported that they selected contractors that had a history of working there

as a means of strengthening coordination and ensuring implementation of 

program activities. This was particularly critical given Haiti’s security 

challenges and USAID’s inability to travel to many of the project sites 

regularly. In El Salvador, USAID contracted with at least five private 

voluntary organizations that it had previously worked with to implement 

earthquake recovery projects. According to USAID officials, using 

organizations that have proven to be capable and reliable reduces the 

likelihood of misuse of funds and corruption. 

• Involve community-based organizations in program implementation. 

Noting that this was a successful approach in Hurricane Georges, USAID 

officials in Haiti worked with community-based organizations in 

implementing the Tropical Storm Jeanne Recovery Program. For example, 

one contractor worked with local management committees it had worked 

with during a previous program in Gonaives several years before. These 

groups were one of the few functioning civil society organizations in 

Gonaives immediately after the flooding and served as program partners 

and liaisons on community issues, security, and sustainable maintenance 

efforts. Another contractor worked with already existing water user 

groups organized around irrigated parcels in the Plaine des Gonaives and 

Trois Rivieres areas. The use of community-based organizations also 

allowed the contractor to mobilize the local population rapidly to execute 

short-term employment generation activities, such as tertiary roads and 

ravine protection structures. In addition, school rehabilitation frequently 

was organized around parent and teacher groups that supported the 

school in preflood periods. 

• Avoid overlap between host governments and community-based 

organizations to avoid inefficiencies. To avert potential future overlap 

with nongovernmental organizations in Sri Lanka during tsunami 

reconstruction, USAID participated in weekly meetings with the 

government coordinating entity and NGOs, among others, to designate 

responsibility for different geographic areas. 

Lessons Learned for 

Staffing 

• Identify staffing needs quickly and designate someone to manage the 

staffing process. USAID officials involved in Hurricane Mitch recovery 

Page 36 GAO-06-645 Foreign Assistance
Appendix II: Summary of Lessons Learned

from USAID Disaster Recovery and 

Reconstruction Efforts 

activities drafted lessons learned recommending that, when responding to 

disaster recovery, USAID mission and Washington officials need to quickly 

identify staffing needs and that an appropriate official should be charged 

with tracking staff issues to facilitate the response. For example, in our 

2002 report of Hurricane Mitch and Georges, we reported that the number 

of USAID direct-hire staff in general, and contracts officers in particular, 

has declined and USAID had difficulty finding qualified personnel to 

manage the large-scale emergency program on an expedited basis. In the 

same report, USAID’s Honduran mission reported serious constraints due 

to the absence of a contracts and grants officer needed to negotiate and

sign agreements and ensure that implementation and acquisition 

mechanisms are in place. The mission in the Dominican Republic reported 

that the majority of staff hired for its reconstruction effort had no prior 

USAID experience and that implementation slowed as new staff learned 

the agency’s management system. As stated earlier in this report, the lack

of experienced staff was also a challenge in the Hurricane Ivan program. 

• Create a mechanism to quickly hire staff for recovery and reconstruction

programs. In addition, a draft document in which contractors assessed 

USAID’s Hurricane Mitch program reported that lengthy personal service 

contract hiring practices added to staffing bottlenecks, and some USAID 

staff recommended that waiver authorities should be made available to 

hire staff quickly on a noncompetitive basis. In addition, the Honduras 

Mission stated that USAID needs to do a better job of immediately 

identifying staff with the skills needed for reconstruction activities rather 

than relying on staff within the mission or region. In the tsunami program,

to establish technical oversight, USAID reassigned and hired experienced

staff, such as engineers, and acquired additional technical expertise 

through interagency agreements but had difficulty filling some positions it 

considered critical to technical oversight. 

Lessons Learned for

Recovery Activities

• Provide disaster preparedness and mitigation training to communities. 

In Haiti, 222 participants in seven communities were trained in disaster 

preparedness and mitigation, including the designation of emergency

responders and the development of local action plans focused on risk 

assessment, disaster mitigation, and preparedness. In Jamaica, fisherfolk 

received training in “Safe Seamanship and Environmental Management.” 

USAID also developed training to ensure sustainability and provide local 

capacity building through a course on “General Safety and Survival at 

Disaster Preparedness and 

Mitigation 

Page 37 GAO-06-645 Foreign Assistance
Appendix II: Summary of Lessons Learned

from USAID Disaster Recovery and 

Reconstruction Efforts 

Sea,” which was taught to 60 participants from three local NGOs, in 

coordination with the Caribbean Maritime Institute. Participants received

safety equipment and an emergency response guide developed for the 

fisheries sector, including specific measures to reduce vulnerability with 

regard to small boat safety, search and rescue, sinking vessels, fires, bad 

weather, and survival at sea under different distress situations. 

• Ensure quality control of construction and follow building codes 

appropriate to type of disaster sustained. USAID has difficulty ensuring 

that contractors build houses correctly and completely. For example, in 

our review of the El Salvador earthquake program, we reported problems 

such as roof supports that were improperly connected to walls, and metal

windows and doors that were not functioning properly. Following the 

GAO visit, USAID issued detailed procedures that Army Corps of 

Engineers Officials and contractors were required to complete following 

their work. USAID also conducted additional quality control training that

contractors, NGOs, and other entities involved in implementing the 

program were required to attend. USAID officials stated that the training 

was useful in reinforcing the principle of “building back better” and that,

following the training, the quality of construction improved. Contractors in 

the Hurricane Ivan program followed local building and hurricane 

resistance codes, including the use of hurricane straps and Caribbean 

Disaster Mitigation Standards for wood and concrete houses. 

Construction 

• Understand the local land tenure system. In El Salvador, many 

Salvadorans whose houses were destroyed had no legal proof that they 

owned the property on which their house had stood. Housing starts were 

delayed because contractors had to wait weeks for approvals to begin 

construction. The USAID contractor responsible for housing in Grenada 

also encountered challenges due to land title issues. The contractor told us

that although it originally identified 400 to 500 prospective beneficiaries 

who met selection criteria established by the Grenadian government, many

of these people lacked the land titles or proof of ownership that USAID 

required of new-housing beneficiaries. Because the process of verifying 

ownership was so time consuming, the contractor eventually ran 

advertisements soliciting respondents who met the selection criteria and 

had proof of land ownership. 

• Establish memorandums of understanding or formal agreements if 

reconstruction efforts are shared with the host government. In Haiti, 

USAID officials established a memorandum of understanding with the 

government for road and bridge construction activities. Conversely, in 

Jamaica, USAID did not establish a memorandum of understanding with 

the government in its coordination for new-housing construction. 

Page 38 GAO-06-645 Foreign Assistance
Appendix II: Summary of Lessons Learned

from USAID Disaster Recovery and 

Reconstruction Efforts 

According to USAID, when the Jamaican government did not fulfill its 

obligation to install electricity and septic systems and to provide other 

infrastructure for the housing communities, USAID had to grant 

extensions to complete activities that were impacted by the delays and, as 

a result, delayed the delivery of new housing to beneficiaries. 

• Address warranties and liabilities for construction projects before 

building. Warranty and liability responsibilities should be detailed in the 

contract agreements and determined prior to construction. In the 

Hurricane Ivan Program, USAID did not determine who would fulfill 

warranty and defects liability responsibility early on in the program, and 

such issues were still being resolved, in some cases, after construction of 

schools and other buildings were already completed and the contractor 

considered the project closed. 

• Coordinate with local industry boards and organizations to identify 

recipients and community leaders. USAID contractors in Grenada 

worked to improve tourism services after Hurricane Ivan left 50 percent of 

the persons previously working in this sector unemployed and another 40 

percent underemployed. The contractor formed partnerships with several 

local tourism associations, including hotel, airport, taxi, and smallbusiness organizations. The contractors developed skills training courses 

to improve hospitality and tourist services. For example, after some 

participants were trained in craft making, the contractors organized a “Buy

Grenada” fair to showcase the participants’ work. In addition, the 

contractors partnered with several community-based organizations to 

deliver training in small business management, food vending, ecotourism, 

and professional tour guiding. 

Nonconstruction 

• Coordinate with government for education or skills training. USAID’s 

skills training program in Grenada provided needed income support and 

skills development, but was not designed in consultation with the 

government’s Ministry of Education. Moreover, the government does not

recognize the training certificates issued to participants. Also, contractors 

and participants recognized that the 6-week training period was not long 

enough to develop certain skills, such as construction, and that it would 

have made more sense to develop fewer, but longer, courses to adequately 

train participants. 

Lessons Learned for 

Ensuring Accountability 

• Establish accountability mechanisms. Concerns over public and private 

corruption due to the wide dispersion of activities following Hurricane 

Mitch influenced USAID to take extra precautions to safeguard program 

funds. USAID’s Regional Inspector General (RIG) and GAO monitored the 

Page 39 GAO-06-645 Foreign Assistance
Appendix II: Summary of Lessons Learned

from USAID Disaster Recovery and 

Reconstruction Efforts 

Hurricane Mitch and El Salvador earthquake reconstruction programs and 

briefed USAID staff as well as Congress on a regular basis on key issues 

that USAID needed to correct. In the Caribbean program, USAID involved

RIG officials early in the design to ensure proper accountability 

mechanisms were established and audits were performed early in the 

program. 

• Hire third-party monitoring firms. USAID officials in Haiti contracted 

with an engineering firm to monitor construction activities and with a 

financial management firm to validate performance reports, report on the

quality of activities executed by the contractor, and identify problem 

areas, and ensure flexibility in implementation. USAID officials reported 

that the oversight and recommendations from the two firms have proven 

to be invaluable. Specifically, the engineering firm was instrumental in 

providing several good recommendations on urgent needs that had not 

been identified in the damage survey; additionally, the firm provided early

warning on a number of occasions where work needed immediate 

correction and collaborated closely with the implementing firms and 

quickly gained their confidence for sound recommendations. It served as a 

capable arbiter on several disputes between implementers and their 

subcontractors. Both the engineering and financial firms served a critical

function at a time when USAID direct hires were unable to travel freely in 

Haiti to monitor progress due to poor security. In its El Salvador 

earthquake recovery program, USAID required that a private accounting 

firm conduct a concurrent audit of a USAID-funded health clinic being 

implemented by AmeriCares, a U.S.-based private voluntary organization

that provides medical supplies overseas. This was done because 

AmeriCares had no experience implementing a USAID-funded program 

and was working through a Salvadoran nongovernmental organization to 

carry out the construction. 

In Grenada and Jamaica, USAID also contracted engineering expertise to 

monitor the completion and quality of implementing contractors’ 

construction activities. The USAID Mission in Jamaica obtained these 

services by augmenting the engineering staff of Wingerts Consulting. The 

work of the engineers engaged through Wingerts was similar to that 

typically performed by a USAID staff engineer, including monitoring and 

reviewing the processes utilized by the implementing contractor to assure 

reasonable costs, quality control, and delivery of a final product that is 

consistent with the expected results specified in the contract. According 

to USAID, the Wingerts staff served as an extension of the mission, given 

that the mission needed to move swiftly to implement construction and 

renovation activities and the mission did not have internal staff with 

sufficient expertise to effectively implement the activities under a short 

Page 40 GAO-06-645 Foreign Assistance
Appendix II: Summary of Lessons Learned

from USAID Disaster Recovery and 

Reconstruction Efforts 

time frame. The engineers engaged by the Jamaica Mission through 

Wingerts worked collaboratively with USAID’s technical staff and the 

implementing contractors to provide technical approval of contract award 

processes and certifications and to perform site visits and environmental 

monitoring during execution of construction contracts and grants. 

• Conduct monthly progress reviews and provide interim reports. In its 

April 2005 report, the Regional Inspector General recommended that 

USAID staff responsible for the Hurricane Ivan Program monitor the 

program by maintaining a spreadsheet of target due dates for each activity

and verify that all activities are completed on time. USAID provided 

monthly reports of its Caribbean recovery efforts that summarized the 

progress of program activities, challenges in implementing and completing 

activities, and the programs’ expenditures to date. According to USAID 

officials responsible for the Hurricane Ivan Program, the contractor hired 

to assist with oversight, Wingerts Consulting, played a role in ensuring 

regular and timely progress reporting and program analysis, including 

capturing cross-country and cross-program implementation issues, and 

providing program-level financial analyses. USAID also reported that 

Wingerts conducted various site visits and served as a liaison between 

USAID’s technical staff and implementing contractors to better assess the 

status of activities “on the ground” and report back to the mission, the 

bureau, and other stakeholders. USAID officials acknowledged that these 

reports might have been prepared by mission staff rather than Wingerts if 

USAID had a mission in Grenada or had sufficient staff in Jamaica to 

compile and produce the reports. 

Lessons Learned for 

Monitoring and Evaluation 

Page 41 GAO-06-645 Foreign Assistance
Appendix III: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International Development 

Page 42 GAO-06-645

Appendix III: Comments from the U.S. 

Agency for International Development 

Foreign Assistance
Appendix III: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International Development 

Page 43 GAO-06-645 Foreign Assistance
Appendix III: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International Development 

Page 44 GAO-06-645 Foreign Assistance
Appendix IV: 

A

GAO Contact and Staff 

cknowledgments 

Page 45 GAO-06-645

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

David Gootnick, (202) 512-3149 or gootnickd@gao.gov 

In addition to the contact named above, Phillip Herr (Assistant Director), 

Francisco Enriquez, Adrienne Spahr, Reid Lowe, Shana Wallace, and Mark 

Dowling made key contributions to this report. 

GAO Contact 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Foreign Assistance
Related GAO Products 

Page 46 GAO-06-645

Related GAO Products 

Foreign Assistance: USAID Has Begun Tsunami Reconstruction in 

Indonesia and Sri Lanka, but Key Projects May Exceed Initial Cost and 

Schedule Estimates. GAO-06-488. Washington, D.C.: April 14, 2006. 

Foreign Assistance: Strategic Workforce Planning Can Help USAID 

Address Current and Future Challenges. GAO-03-946. Washington, D.C., 

August 22, 2003. 

Foreign Assistance: USAID’s Earthquake Recovery Program in El 

Salvador Has Made Progress, but Key Activities Are behind Schedule. 

GAO-03-656. Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2003. 

Foreign Assistance: Disaster Recovery Program Addressed Intended 

Purposes, but USAID Needs Greater Flexibility to Improve Its Response

Capability. GAO-02-787. Washington, D.C.: July 24, 2002. 

Foreign Assistance: AID Strategic Direction and Continued 

Management Improvements Needed. GAO/NSIAD-93-106. Washington: 

D.C.: June 11, 1993. 

(320336) Foreign Assistance
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