The next day, 2 September, the

nearest enemy vehicle was at least

3,000 yards away and we could take

no action other than harassing fire

by the artillery and occasionally by

the tanks. Watching the enemy's

movement closely through binoculars it was quite clear that he was

pulling out. Most of his vehicles

were facing west, a number of vehicles were towing others in a westerly direction and very little fire was

directed against us.

In the wider sphere, as soon as it

was clear to Gen Montgomery that

the German armored attack had

been firmly held on the Alam Halfa

position, he ordered planning to begin with a view to obtaining the

initiative by closing the gap in our

minefields. XXX Corps in the north

was to be thinned out to provide

reserves for an operation to be developed southwards from the New

Zealand sector. This operation was

finally planned to start on the night

3/4 September and its urgency was

apparent when at first light on the

3d September it was clear that the

enemy had withdrawn from contact

south and west from Alam Halfa,

leaving the area they had vacated

strewn with vehicles- some derelict

and some short of fuel.

Strict instructions were issued that

main bodies should not move from

the main defended areas. This was

in pursuance of the Army Commander's appreciation that units,

r

were now devoted to preparing for

this offensive.

Fortunately, owing to the proximity of our bases, there were no

serious logistical problems. Alexandria was only 60 miles away and

Cairo a little over 100 miles beyond.

Both these two cities had large

stores, depots and repair facilities.

The Germans on the other hand

were at the end of a long line of

communication, a situation which

we knew only too well ourselves,

having twice previously been well

away from our bases, and well appreciated all the problems involved

in feeding and supplying an army

across the Desert. Now, however,

right back on our bases the whole

situation, from that point of view,

seemed very simple. The detailed

arrangements in the individual brigades were, however, much as usual;

and it might be of interest if I outlined very briefly the method of supply of the Armored Brigade in battle.

Regimental Transport was divided into three Echelons, B, A and

AI. Echelon B consisted of vehicles

such as store lorries, spare lorries,

office lorries, in fact all those vehicles

which did not need to go up and

down daily in order to supply their

units. Echelon A consisted, in the

main, of fuel, ammunition and

ration lorries. Echelon AI was a very

small party consisting of about 8

lorries, including one medical officer's truck, one fitters' truck and 5

or 6 fuel and ammunition lorries,

varying in proportion as between petrol and ammunition depending on

the type of battle which it was anticipated would be fought. Echelons

B and A were brigaded. The former

being directed as to its movements'

by the senior Q Staff Officer of the

Brigade from Rear Brigade Headquarters, and the A Echelon commanded by a Brigade Transport Officer, who was at the same time one

of the Regimental Transport Officers. This A Echelon, as has already

been mentioned, travelled daily between a supply point or refilling,

point and the individual units.

AI Echelon was under Regimental

control, in fact, under the direct

control of the Commanding Officer,

who kept it with him in battle, anywhere from 2 miles to 200 yards behind his fighting tanks. When reand armored units in particular,

were neither sufficiently well trained

nor mechanically sound enough to

undertake a mobile battle. Furthermore, having repulsed the enemy

with heavy losses at comparatively

slight cost, he was most anxious not

to lose the advantage which had

been gained by fighting the battle

on ground of our own choosing.

Harassing attacks were stepped up

both by the RAF and 7th Armd Div

in the south. By the afternoon of 3

September, columns of the enemy

were reported moving west from the

gaps in the minefields.

The attacks south from the New

Zealand positions went in as planned

on the night 3/4 September and met

with fierce and stubborn resistance.

Heavy and repeated counterattacks

were made by the Germans on the

4th September to repel our attempts

to cut them off. Fighting continued

for the next two days between our

two minefield belts and it was clear

that the enemy was prepared to

fight hard for this area.

Early on 7 September the battle

was called off and fresh defensive positions were organized to the east of

the area of fighting near the minefields. For the further plans which

Gen Montgomery had for a future

offensive, later to be known as the

Battle of Alamein, there were definite advantages in containing a

strong enemy force in the south. The

whole of Eighth Army's energies

-14-

After the battle Brigadier Roberts points out salient features to

Gen Montgomery and Gen Gatehouse from his command tank
KODerIS

Inspecting an abandoned enemy SP

howitzer

plenishment of ammunition was necessary, the tanks would probably

withdraw from the fighting line 200

or 300 yards and rearm direct from

these lorries, one troop per squadron at a time. Sometimes, if the terrain was suitable it was possible for

the lorries to go straight up to the

tanks and this, in fact, did happen

in a number of instances in the

battle of Alam Halfa. However, it

will be appreciated that the lorries

were completely unarmed and,

therefore, quite apart from the danger to personnel, there was a grave

danger of losing all the reserve ammunition if the lorries themselves

got hit. However, in those days there

was no other solution, apart from

bringing these "soft" lorries right up

into the battle, so that the risk had

to be accepted. It might be added,

that when lorries in AI Echelon had

been emptied, it was frequently the

case that they would be replaced

from A Echelon or sometimes from a

pool of ammunition lorries held at

Rear Brigade Headquarters.

So much for supply; as to communications, these were entirely by

wireless, except when the battle got

entirely static; then lines were laid

to units and sub-units. In the armored units it was seldom that this

state of affairs lasted for very long.

It is important to note that the wireless was used personally most of the

time by the officers in command of

units or sub-units and even as far as

brigade and division. It may be said

that at the time of the battle of

Alam Halfa, wireless communications were at a very high standard,

particularly in the Armored Corps.

The control that can be achieved

over a large force of tanks and guns

was very considerable, and the reaction to orders almost immediate.

The personal use of wireless by commanders at all levels was, and still is,

a vital factor in the control of armored formations in battle.

Before concluding this story of the

Battle of Alam Halfa it might be of

interest to tell the story of the "going map." This was a plan largely

devised by the Chief of Staff of

Eighth Army, Gen de Guingand, to

confuse the enemy and induce him

to plan his advance over ground

which was unsuitable for large-scale

movement. "Going Maps" were in

general use in Eighth Army and

were ordinary maps colored in a certain way to indicate the type of desert insofar as it affected vehicle

movement. Many of these had been

captured by the enemy and it was

therefore planned to "plant" one on

the enemy which would indicate that

certain areas were good, hard "going," but which were, in fact, very

soft sand. In particular an area selected for this treatment was situated

south of Alam Halfa; whereas it was,

in fact, perfectly feasible to find a

suitable route by which to approach

Alam Halfa from the south and

west, it was also possible, if misled, to

get into some very "sticky going."

The fake "going" map was planted

on the enemy by means of a scout

car which was intentionally blown

up one night on an enemy mine;

the map, stuffed in a haversack, was

found to have been removed the following day. During their advance

the enemy certainly went through

this area of bad going and thereby

indubitably increased his fuel consumption, but the extent to which

the fake going map was responsible

has never been fully estabished.

I have endeavored to tell the

story of this battle in the atmosphere

in which it was fought, although it

must inevitably be from a somewhat

limited point of view. In so doing, I

hope that the reader, who will also

have the benefit of reading the German account, may be able to judge

and criticize the actions of those taking part in the light of the situation

pertaining at the time. It is so easy

when considering a battle from the

comfort of an armchair some years

after the event, to forget entirely

such important points as morale,

level of training, mechanical efficiency, fuel and ammunition supply, air superiority and other factors

which play such an enormous part in

influencing the conduct of affairs at

the time.

In retrospect, I have only one

point which I welcome this opportunity of stressing. The view has

been expressed fairly widely that

Gen Montgomery's success in the

Western Desert of Egypt was mainly

a result of his superiority over the

enemy in men and equipment; a superiority not enjoyed by any of his

predecessors. However true this may

be of the later stages of the campaign, at Alam Halfa our strength in

relation to the enemy was rather

worse than it had been earlier in the

summer. The speed with which he

appreciated the essentials of the

situation when he arrived in the

Desert, the firm plan he at once

introduced and the inflexibility of

purpose with which he conducted

the battle itself, had such a profound

effect on the whole of the Eighth

Army that within a few weeks he

turned a "brave but baffled" force

into a conquering army.

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