MULTINATIONAL LAND FORCES

AND THE NATO FORCE STRUCTURE REVI

Thomas-Durell Young

June 2000
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ISBN 1-58487-025-7

ii
One should empathize, if not sympathize, with N

force planners. Since 1991, standing and mobilization 

made available by nations to the Alliance have been st

reduced. This particularly has been the case for land f

Equally important have been the structures the Al

has created into which national contributions would f

deployment. Military Committee (MC) 317, accept

nations in 1991, provides the framework by whic

Alliance organizes its forces.

However, the author of this study argues tha

structures and envisaged deployment framework for 

forces are a hopeless muddle. While there are arg

sufficient reaction forces to support NATO Minis

Guidance, there are numerous weaknesses that would

indeed have, inhibited the efficient and effe

deployment of land forces in crises. More specifically, 

are insufficient deployable reaction headquarters, b

the corps and component command level, that w

support a commander of a NATO Combined Joint 

Force. And perhaps even more vexatious is the cont

existence of what has become atavistic “practices” of na

that impede and inhibit the employment of multina

land forces by an Allied commander.

The author observes that the NATO Force Stru

Review offers nations an opportunity to review these 

structures, organizations, and practices. To be su

argues, this, like the Long-Term Study of which this cu

review is the third and final part, is likely to be protr

and difficult. After all, the Alliance finds itself in 

situation by its own consensus of actions and po

However, collectively, the Alliance will soon have 10 ye

experience deploying forces to international crises 

should have had a salutatory effect on the think

planners and senior level officials as well. Since the 

iii
monograph will be useful to those dealing with Al

affairs, as the review develops. The Strategic St

Institute is pleased to offer this report to better inform 

with an interest in improving NATO force structure.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR

Director

Strategic Studies Institute

iv
DR. THOMAS–DURELL YOUNG is at the Cent

Civil-Military Relations, Naval Postgraduate S

Monterey, California. From 1992 until 2000, he w

Research Professor at the Strategic Studies Institute

Army War College. He received his Ph.D. from 

University of Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland, and is a 

graduate of the U.S. Army War College.

v
AND THE NATO FORCE STRUCTURE REV

It is becoming increasingly obvious to NATO nation

Alliance officials that the multinational land 

structures created since 1991 are not well-suited to 

Allied strategy.

1

 Three major problems predominate. 

most existing multinational land headquarters and 

were created with a view toward Article 5 missions 

collective self-defense) and, in their present configur

are unsuited to undertake other new missions

non-Article 5 (e.g., peace-support operations). Se

operating practices under which these headquarter

currently “commanded” do not allow commande

exercise the command authorities required to prepare 

forces for their stated missions in peacetime, let 

deploy them effectively in crisis and war. Third, the

currently an insufficient number of reaction headqu

and similar forces capable of supporting the force stru

benchmarks established by Ministerial Guidance for 

planning.

In the fall of 1994, an important initiative was lau

to begin the process of the Alliance’s internal adapt

This effort has become known as the Long-Term 

(L-TS) of which the first stage consisted of the review 

guidance for the implementation of the Alliance’s 

Strategic Concept (Military Committee—MC 400)

400/1 was endorsed in November 1995.

2

 The second 

of the L-TS was the long and laborious effort to “reform

integrated command structure, which was fi

implemented on September 1, 1999.

3

 The third and 

aspect of this effort to effect internal adaptation, the 

Structure Review, aims to review force stru

requirements to support the new command structur

ministerial guidance for defense planning.

1
address some of the issues that have led to the cu

situation where force structure and practices d

adequately support the “Alliance’s Strategic Con

released at the Washington Summit in April 1

However, for the review to help solve the three pro

listed above, strict parameters need to be establish

ensure that the review produces the results requir

realign multinational headquarters and forces decla

the alliance. In this respect, addressing the pro

uniquely associated with multinational land headqu

and declared forces needs to predominate. Land forc

the most difficult to command in a multinational s

given the requirement for multinational land 

commanders to exercise greater command authority 

the forces than is required for naval and air multina

forces.

Therefore, the Alliance needs, for the first tim

establish new parameters under which multinationa

headquarters and forces are organized, commanded

operated. It is not sufficient to review only “force

headquarters.” For without an examination of cu

command practices (for want of a better word), little 

way of real reform can result. In consequence, a num

important questions need to be addressed.

1. What should be the basis of mission requiremen

multinational land forces declared to the Alliance?

2. Is there a level at which national contribution

multinational land force produce diminishing opera

returns?

3. Do current national practices for declaring for

multinational formations result in mismatches be

requirements and capabilities?

4. Where should existing multinational headqua

roles and missions be changed to improve the Alli

overall capabilities to meet Ministerial Guidance?

2
leaner force structure that better supports Alliance str

and Ministerial Guidance?

Mission Requirements of Multinational Land

Forces.

NATO does not suffer from a lack of multinationa

headquarters and formations declared to the All

There are currently six multinational corps (which inc

the ambiguously declared EUROCORPS) and 

multinational divisions declared to NATO. Added t

body is an ever growing number of headqua

established by nations and Partnership for Peace 

members (e.g., Multinational Peace Force South Ea

Europe Brigade). However, the latter are predomin

oriented to undertake peace-support operations, as op

to Article 5 missions. Significantly, they are not decla

the Alliance, subject to the integrated defense pla

process, and therefore fall outside of the terms of refe

of the Force Structure Review.

Alliance strategy strongly endorses the conce

multinationality. That said, the effective u

multinational land forces is fiendishly difficult to achi

political sensitivities, national laws, and fina

regulations impede granting an allied commande

command authorities normally given to a nat

commander.

5

 Given the steep diminution in the s

NATO armies since the end of the Cold War, the Al

now heavily depends upon the existence and eff

functioning of the headquarters, should it ever d

forces. That said, the Alliance should insist, at a mini

that multinational land headquarters and subordi

forces are made capable of undertaking the core miss

the Alliance, i.e., Article 5 (collective self-defense)

recognizes that peace support operations have taken 

increasingly important role in Alliance defense pla

since the end of the Cold War and this venue offers a u

3
benefit. Nonetheless, headquarters and forces decla

the Alliance do not exist solely for the purpose of engag

peace-support operations, either exclusive of its partn

with them.

6

The Force Structure Review, therefore, should est

the baseline requirement that all multinational 

formations declared to the Alliance must be capa

conducting collective defense missions. Any move 

from this standard might encourage nations to refocus 

attention and orientation away from the basis o

Alliance.

7

 Moreover, a headquarters and subordi

forces capable of conducting collective self-de

operations should also be capable of carrying out 

support operations. Thus, the association of pa

multinational headquarters linked to exi

NATO-declared headquarters, while desirable 

worthwhile from the long-term perspective of the All

should not be allowed to interfere with their pr

mission of preparing to conduct collective de

operations. Partners should be encouraged to contr

but they should be seen strictly as complementing, v

lieu of, forces declared for collective defense.

What is the Lowest Appropriate Level

for Multinational Land Formations?

National land forces declared to the Alliance range 

national corps (e.g., IV German Corps, Potsda

companies contributed to the Immediate Reaction 

(Land), an independent brigade-size formation (for

known as Allied Command Europe [ACE] M

Force—Land).

8

 Since one of the principal objectives 

Alliance’s raison d’être is that nations declare for

members’ collective self-defense, allied commander

ill-positioned to refuse national declarations of f

irrespective of size. That said, sound military judg

must be proffered that explains to nations and Al

4
having formations made up of too many small contribu

The simple reason for this is that nations have yet to co

terms with the fact that multinational land formation

by their very nature, less efficient and less effective 

similar pure national formation. Differences in lang

weapon systems, organization, logistics, and procedur

hinder the operation of multinational format

Compounding this truism is the added problem tha

procedures by which national armies are declar

multinational headquarters have not changed appre

since the Cold War when nations’ contributions i

Central Region were made at the national corps leve

self-contained organizations. Thus, the nettlesome iss

command authority requirements of a multinational 

commander, transfer of command authority from a na

to allied commander, establishing logistics and tra

standards and priorities, etc., have yet to be revisi

depth since the wide-spread introduction of multina

forces in the Central Region. As a result, the Alliance 

itself in the situation where it has transforme

diminished land forces in the Central Region 

multinational formations that are largely unwield

difficult to prepare for war in peacetime and comma

war.

9

Notwithstanding these limitations, the Allian

hardly in the position to refuse forces declared by natio

collective self-defense. Nonetheless, the Alliance s

establish more strict guidelines and measures that e

declared forces are capable of contributing to the Alli

common objectives. In this respect, the suitable de

multinational formations should be determined by a 

of influencing factors, as opposed to arbitrary stan

nations are likely to oppose. The factors that determi

smallest size of a land force contribution to a multina

land formation are: (1) size of declared unit, and (

command authorities granted by nations to the m

national force commander.

5
minimum effective size of a force, the minimum s

suitable forces declared to the Alliance should be, in 

part, a function of their intended mission, and r

readiness levels. Thus, the political value of a na

contribution to an Immediate Reaction Force (3-7 

readiness), no matter how “small,” should be an over

concern, while mobilization forces can be expected 

contributed in larger formations. A proposed ge

minimum standard might be:

1. Immediate Reaction Forces: select platoons, com

and battalion;

2. Rapid Reaction Forces: independent brigades 

organic logistics;

3. Main Defense: divisions with corps combat su

and combat service support; and,

4. Augmentation: divisions and corps.

Command Authorities.

The delegation of command authorities to multina

land force commanders remains one of the least deve

areas of Alliance force employment policy (see Tab

Nations have been loath to give up command autho

over land forces to foreign commanders out of fear that

alia, they will be “fragmented” or improperly comma

Yet, multinational land commanders require gr

command authority than they currently have over 

due to the complex nature of land forces, as opposed to 

and naval units. More specifically, the mission

inherent operational limitations of aircraft and ships 

function of their very design. Land forces, on the other 

are combined-arms teams that need to be organiz

execute a mission. Thus, cross-assignment of forces 

task-organization), the need oftentimes to change mi

rapidly to respond to a developing situation, an

legitimate need for a commander to establish log

6
reluctant to give up to an allied commander.

7

1. Corps LANDJUT/"Multinational OPCON/OPCOM*(in 

 Corps Northeast" wartime 

2. I German/Netherlands Corps+ OPCON (in peacetime

OPCOM (when emplo

3. V U.S./German Corps OPCON (in wartime)

4. II German/U.S. Corps OPCON (in wartime)

5. ACE Rapid Reaction Corps

a. National Divisions OPCON (in wartime)

b. Multinational Division (Central)+ OPCOM>^

6. 1st United Kingdom Armored Division OPCON (in wartime)

Danish International Coordinating Authorit

Mechanized Brigade (in peacetime)

7. 3rd United Kingdom Division OPCON (in wartime)

Italian Ariete Coordinating Authorit

Mechanized Brigade (in peacetime)

8. 3rd Italian Division OPCON (in wartime)

Portuguese Independent Airborne Coordinating Authorit

Brigade (in peacetime)

9. European Corps (EUROCORPS)+ OPCOM (when deploy

10. European Rapid Operational Force OPCON (when deploy

(EUROFOR)+

____________

* By agreement, Commander Corps LANDJUT has OPCON of 

under his command. However, in exercises, it has been the tradition 

30 years for Commander Corps LANDJUT to exercise OPCOM.

+ “Force Answerable to the Western European Union (FAWEU

#The Corps Commander also now has “Integrated Directing an

Control Authority." This authority provides the Commander with p

that are identical or similar to those vested in a commander of a na

corps or with powers that are altogether new. Note that sovereign r

(in the narrowest sense) are excepted. That said, the Corps Comma

has the right to give instructions to all subordinate military and civ

personnel and may issue directives to the binational and national

elements of the Corps and set priorities.

> Multinational Division (Central) headquarters is OPCOM to

Commander ARRC in peacetime.

^Assigned brigades are under OPCON to Commander ARRC in

peacetime.

Table 1. Command Authorities of NATO 

European Bi-/Multinational Formations.
a multinational force commander requires (employin

methodology employed by the 1994/5 Central Region-C

of Army Staff Talks [CR-CAST] Working Grou

Command Authorities Required by a Multinat

Commander—the only methodology developed to d

this area) is with the assigned mission and an examin

of the mission-essential tasks (stated and im

therein.

10

 (See Table 2 for definitions of NATO com

authorities.) Employing the CR-CAST methodology r

in the following minimum requirements for a multina

corps commander.

1. Article 5 collective defense: operational com

(OPCOM).

2. Non-Article 5 peace-support operations:

a. Peace enforcement: OPCOM,

b. Conflict prevention: operational control (OPCO

c. Peacemaking: OPCON,

d. Peacekeeping: OPCON,

e. Humanitarian aid: OPCON,

f. Peace building: OPCON.

The rationale for the requirement of a higher com

authority (OPCOM) in collective defense and 

enforcement is due to the need to carry out co

operations (the most difficult and demanding) and f

commander to be capable of protecting the force. One s

note that under current NATO procedures, OPCOM c

be delegated by a Strategic Commander (he can 

delegate OPCON), without prior political approval b

contributing nation.

11

In sum, given that multinational land forces decla

the Alliance must be capable of conducting Art

collective self-defense missions, it is clear that the 

governing the delegation of command authority 

8
9

The authority granted to a commander to assign missions or ta

subordinate commanders, to deploy units, to reassign forces, a

retain or delegate operational and/or tactical control as m

deemed necessary. It does not of itself include responsibili

administration or logistics. May also be used to denote the f

assigned to a commander. 01/08/74

Operational Control:

The authority delegated to a commander to direct forces assign

that the commander may accomplish specific missions or 

which are usually limited by function, time, or location; to d

units concerned, and to retain or assign tactical control to 

units. It does not include authority to assign separate employ

of components of the units concerned. Neither does it, of 

include administrative or logistic control. 01/06/84

Tactical Command:

The authority delegated to a commander to assign tasks to 

under his command for the accomplishment of the mission ass

by higher authority. 01/09/74

Tactical Control:

The detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movem

or maneuvers necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assi

01/11/80

Coordinating Authority (N.B: Not a command authority):

The authority granted to a commander or individual ass

responsibility for coordinating specific functions or acti

involving forces of two or more countries or commands, or t

more services or two or more forces of the same service. He ha

authority to require consultation between the agencies involv

their representatives, but does not have the authority to co

agreement. In case of disagreement between the agencies invo

he should attempt to obtain essential agreement by discussio

the event he is unable to obtain essential agreement he shall 

the matter to the appropriate authority. 01/07/85

Source: MC 57/3, Overall Organization of the Integrated N

Forces; and, AAP-6(U), NATO Glossary of Terms and Defin

(English and French), January 1995.

Table 2. Definition of NATO Command Author
caveats), vice OPCON, with provision for revisions 

definition to include new authorities over peac

training priorities and standards.

Multinational Practices Requiring Review.

Current Alliance procedures and the conditions 

which nations declare forces and headquarters t

Alliance have not changed substantively since the end 

Cold War, when multinational land formations wer

rare exception. As a result, a number of debilit

practices and conditions combine to make succ

peacetime planning challenging and wartime ope

problematic.

An obvious weakness is the lack of sufficient Co

Service Support (CSS) capabilities declared to forma

With the sole exception of the ACE Rapid Reaction 

and Multinational Division (Central), no 

multinational land headquarters has specific corps/di

combat service support formations declared t

headquarters. Given that logistics remain a na

responsibility (notwithstanding the efforts of CR-CAS

Allied Commander Land Forces Central Eu

[LANDCENT] to introduce concepts of multinationa

logistics),

12

 the practice of not declaring sp

corps/division CSS formations limits effective peac

planning and, potentially, wartime operation. Nations 

had good reason not to declare specific CSS formatio

that they are often cross-assigned to other multina

formations, or are treated as rare national treasures 

parceled out grudgingly only when absolutely required

Alliance needs to consider establishing minimum 

standards by which nations declare forces to multina

formations. As the conflict in the former Yugos

demonstrates, combat forces without organic logistic

CSS are of limited operational utility to the Alliance.

10
minimum requirements for the command autho

required by a multinational land force commander 

addressed in the previous section. However, the 

Structure Review should examine the definitio

command authorities. The four recognized com

authorities (i.e., OPCOM, OPCON, Tactical Comman

Tactical Control) have not been revised since the end 

Cold War.

13

 For example, two important issues fo

success of a multinational force are not covered by cu

definitions. First, peacetime training remains a nat

vice Alliance, responsibility. A compromise solution 

be for the Alliance to establish an agreed set of 

conditions, and standards. The Military Comm

therefore, should direct the development of a r

“mission-essential task list” for land forces which cou

used by multinational force commanders to va

established training standards.

14

While perhaps only applicable to the 1 Ger

Netherlands Corps where deep integration has 

established as an essential political objective

development by those two nations of “Integrated Dir

and Control Authority” may provide a useful exam

what can be accomplished in this area. This u

command authority provides the Corps Comma

General with powers that are identical or similar to 

vested in a commander of a national corps or with p

that are altogether new. Of course, sovereign rights (

narrowest sense) are excepted from the comman

purview. That said, the Corps Commander has the ri

give instructions to all subordinate military and ci

personnel and may issue directives to the binationa

national elements of the Corps and set priorities.

15

Second, closely related to the issue of com

authorities and training is the question of when do 

“transfer” (“transfer of authority—TOA) from nation

multinational land force commander? It is unrealis

assume that nations will surrender the operat

11
Indeed, greater clarity in doctrine is needed as to 

forces should transfer to a multinational force comma

i.e., prior to, or immediately upon, arrival in the thea

operations. Frictions between multinational 

commanders and nations can be expected until such 

that important issues like training priorities and stan

are addressed.

A final question relates to the lack of “interoperabil

multinational land headquarters. There remai

standard organizational “template” to which 

multinational land headquarters declared to the Al

adhere. As demonstrated in the Stabilization Force (S

experience, three NATO division headquarters 

deployed to the theater under the Allied Command E

Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC). These divisions inc

subordinated forces with which these headquarters ha

no peacetime habitual training relationships (to in

units from non-NATO nations). Headquarters decla

the Alliance, therefore, should be required to adher

number of basic standards, the better to enable th

integrate forces with which they do not have a peac

planning and exercising relationship.

1. Headquarters declared to NATO should have N

international legal personality to facilitate 

employment by the Alliance.

16

 The NATO Status of F

Agreement should serve as the basis to govern the sta

foreign forces.

2. Headquarters declared to NATO should adop

minimum those procedures and practices establish

formal Military Committee guidance to NATO Mi

Authorities, NATO Standardization Agreem

(STANAGS), Allied Tactical Publication 35 (Land 

Tactical Doctrine), and the planning guidelines eme

from Bi-Major NATO Command working groups supp

Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept develop

e.g., “MNC’s Guidelines for Operational Planning (GO

12
the headquarters’ official language, with greater pro

for the use of French when requested.

Changing Roles and Missions of Existing

Headquarters and Forces.

Multinational corps in the Central Region 

established in the early 1990s to provide nations the a

to operate competently within a corps structure, bu

smaller force structures. With the obvious exception 

ARRC, all other multinational corps have an Alliance 

defense mission. Notwithstanding the fact that some 

the ability to engage in peace-support operations, the A

remains the Alliance’s sole reaction corps.

There are currently insufficient suitable headqu

and forces capable of supporting the force stru

benchmarks established by Ministerial Guidanc

defense planning. For example, the Alliance has cr

three Commander, Joint Task Force (CJTF)-desig

headquarters (Regional Commander North, Reg

Commander South, and Commander Striking 

Atlantic). Additionally, guidance from ministers an

Defense Review Committee hold that Strategic Com

Europe must be prepared to undertake two non-Art

contingencies, as well as a collective defense continge

Yet, the Alliance has available for rapid reaction mi

only two land component commands to support a CJT

ACE Rapid Reaction Corps and the Immediate Re

Force-Land (the later of which is only capab

commanding and controlling a large brigade). Fo

reason, the Alliance has been forced to accept the use 

EUROCORPS as a follow-on headquarters in K

(Kosovo Force—KFOR)

19

 due to the lack of suitable re

headquarters declared to the Alliance. Thus, ther

need for additional multinational land headqua

declared to the Alliance, with a reaction focus, vice la

less useful headquarters and forces with main de

13
quarters for the entire ground operation in Kosov

singled out by Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces Sou

Europe Admiral James Ellis as constituting a 

mistake in the conduct of the campaign against Ser

1999.

20

Six points should guide the designation and creat

new reaction corps headquarters.

1. There are existing corps-size multinational 

defense headquarters that could be redesignat

command reaction forces.

2. There are sufficient reaction force divisions dec

to the Alliance generally to meet current Minis

Guidance 1999 requirements.

3. Reaction force divisions and corps CSS sho

declared to newly designed reaction corps headquart

ensure the development of habitual working relationsh

4. Efforts to create effective multinational 

formations heretofore have been almost exclusively li

to Region North armies. The Force Structure Review 

nations the opportunity to establish potentially s

structures that offer many non-defense advantag

Region South. Region North nations and armie

particular, should participate more actively in a R

South reaction force headquarters and to declare rea

forces and corps CSS in order to bring their technol

expertise and to contribute to establishing a cond

working and operating environment.

5. The designation of certain headquarters as “ligh

“heavy” oriented would result in limiting All

deployment options as opposed to increasing them. Re

force headquarters, perforce, must be capable of oper

within the full spectrum of missions and conditions.

6. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, any 

reaction force headquarters must adhere to the princip

14
integrating subordinated forces and serving effectivel

CJTF’s multinational land component command 

quarters.

The Alliance should consider a multifaceted appro

meeting the requirement for an increased numb

headquarters capable of serving as a land comp

headquarters under a CJTF. Major political decisions 

to be made by nations and financial resources commit

this objective if the Alliance is to achieve this amb

goal.

Options for Reform.

ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC).

21

 The A

(Mönchengladbach) has a proven record as a multina

reaction force headquarters (Implementation Force [I

and KFOR operations) and is the only one with de

corps CSS. That it remains largely British-dominate

percent of the headquarters is British) is a po

weakness that can be overcome by an increase in 

corps-sized reaction force headquarters. That 

additional reaction force corps, perforce, should draw 

the current unwieldy 11 divisions declared to it sinc

only capable of commanding four divisions.

V US/II German Corps. The U.S. Army in Europe 

best prepared to conduct reaction force missions in Eu

However, its corps headquarters, being national, 

require the most internal reform. Currently, in warti

US Corps (Heidelberg) has a wartime arrangeme

cross-assign divisions with II GE Corps (Ulm). The Al

would be very well-served indeed if V US and II GE 

were merged, with the United States as the lead natio

transformed into an Alliance reaction force headqu

with international personality. Divisions currently dec

to the ARRC could be reassigned to the new corps.

22

15
Münster) was initially designed for main defense mi

and, in effect, to merge the two armies. However, the 

Netherlands Army is undergoing a significant re

turing and reorganization, the better to enable it to e

in power-projection missions. The German Army ha

made progress in creating crisis reaction forces. 

nations should strongly consider reorientin

headquarters primarily toward a reaction force

headquarters’s strong adherence to NATO standard

the use of English make it a highly suitable headqua

Divisions declared to the ARRC could be reassigned t

it greater force structure depth. To be sure, it wou

unique in that it would not be a lead nation formatio

rather bi-national.

EUROCORPS. Because this formation (locat

Strasbourg) includes the French Army, it o

considerable operational advantages to the All

especially given France’s extensive experien

power-projection. However, the French Army rem

equally unfamiliar with basic NATO procedure

example of its heretofore “distant” relationship with N

is that only as of September 1, 1999, was English ma

operational language of the headquarters. Moreove

corps is multi-roled, is not combat ready for use as a re

force, and enjoys, at best, an ambiguous relationship 

the Alliance.

23

 The nations participating in this form

could make a major contribution to the Alliance if they 

to: (1) clearly declare the headquarters to the Allian

reorganize the headquarters to adhere to stan

outlined above, and (3) adopt, unambiguously, a re

force mission and orientation.

Probably the Alliance’s biggest challenge is to estab

reaction force headquarters that fosters imp

interoperability among Region South armies. Traditio

the armies of this region have had limited opportun

work together in a peacetime multinational settin

alone on deployment. And, indeed, the decision b

16
Regions North and South (whereas there are air an

component commanders) places obstacles in the pa

improving this situation. As a result, there will no

suitable land-focused headquarters acting to inte

armies during peacetime, let alone providing a capabi

the Alliance to act as a land component command un

CJTF. Nonetheless, at the level of forces and headqua

the Alliance can work to overcome this current la

multinationality. The most obvious option relates 

European Rapid Operational Force (EUROF

Florence), a division-size headquarters currentl

declared to the Alliance. Participants include Italy, F

Spain, and Portugal. As is the case with the EUROCO

the current status of EUROFOR contributes lit

Alliance preparations and planning, although i

potential. Being in Italy, it is located in the ce

Mediterranean and enjoys modern and exte

infrastructure. Greece and Turkey should be encoura

declare reaction forces to it. The headquarters should: 

expanded eventually to the size of a corps staff, 

declared to the Alliance, (3) be reorganized to adh

standards for headquarters outlined above, (4) assign 

American and Region North staff officers t

headquarters, and, in time, (5) declare to it North Ame

and Region North forces.

Rationalization of Headquarters?

The above analysis intentionally did not addres

suitability of Multinational Corps North East (Stettin

IV GE Corps (Potsdam). There is merit in maintain

number of multinational corps with largely a main de

orientation. However, those formations that retain 

mission-orientation would contribute greatly t

Alliance’s main defense capabilities by inviting the a

of the new members to declare forces to the formation

participate in the headquarters’ staffs. Other Al

17
formations and contribute to their operation.

The Way Ahead.

Nations face considerable challenges in reformin

structures and practices regulating the operation 

command of multinational land headquarters. The 

Structure Review offers a unique opportunity for nati

reexamine these problems and lacunae in stated Al

strategy and Ministerial Guidance on the one han

current structures and capabilities on the other. O

negative side of the task, nations have traditionally 

reluctant to offer up land forces to foreign commander

national laws make a multinational land force comma

influence over such issues as logistics, challenging at 

However, on the positive side, there is little need for na

to create new forces and headquarters. Rather, they n

reexamine the missions of current existing headqua

That said, let there be no doubt that without a fresh r

of the practices and authorities under which multina

land force commanders currently command their for

mere redesignation of headquarters’ missions will 

naught.

ENDNOTES

1. For a superb historical analysis of the NATO force p

system, see John S. Duffield, Power Rules: The Evolution of 

Conventional Force Posture, Stanford, CA: Stanford University 

1995. See particularly pp. 269-273 for a description and analysis 

structure reforms of the early post-Cold War era.

2. MC 400/1, “MC Directive for Military Implementation 

Alliance’s Strategic Concept,” NATO CONFIDENTIAL, June 1

MC 400/1 contains:

. . . a description of the security situation and

pronouncements about the military contribution to

the execution of the tasks of NATO, the classified

document contained basic principles which the

future command and forces structures would have

18
document was, however, devoted to the military

contributions to Alliance roles and missions, the

mission requirements and basic principles for the

command and force structures.

The principal differences between the first and second iteration 

key planning document is that MC 400/1 has replaced the 

document’s specific principal mission elements by more 

principle mission areas. Rob De Wijk, NATO on the Brink of t

Millennium: The Battle for Consensus, Brassey’s Atlanti

mentaries, London: Brassey’s (UK) Ltd., 1997, p. 105, as wel

101-106. For an unclassified description of the first iteration 

document see Ibid., pp. 40-44, BASIC Reports on Europea

Control, No. 20, February 19, 1992, pp. 6-7; and Ad Hoc Gr

Review of NATO’s Military Strategy, “Public Line to Take on M

Guidance for the Implementation of the Alliance’s New S

Concept,” SRG(91)59, Bruxelles, NATO, December 10, 1991.

3. For an analysis and critique of the new command struct

author’s essay, “NATO’s Double Expansion and the Chall

Reforming NATO’s Military Structures," in Europe in Chan

Tiers or Two Speeds. The European Security Order and the Enla

of the European Union and NATO, edited by James Sp

Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999, pp. 103-120.

4. See “The Alliance’s Strategic Concept,” Press Comm

NAC-S(99)65, Bruxelles, NATO Press Service, April 24, 1999, p

This point was stressed in stronger language in the 1991 versio

Strategic Concept. See “The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept

Communiqué S-1(91)85, Bruxelles, NATO Press Service, Nove

1991, point 47.

5. See Jon Whitford and Thomas-Durell Young, “Co

Authorities and Multinationality in NATO: The Response of the 

Region’s Armies," in Command in NATO after the Cold War: A

National and Multinational Considerations, ed. by Thomas

Young, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 19

53-73.

6. For an analysis of new missions and tasks for Alliance for

author’s monograph entitled Multinational Land Formatio

NATO: Reforming Practices and Structures, Carlisle Barrack

Strategic Studies Institute, 1997, pp. 11-13.

7. This point is admirably argued in David S. Yost, 

Transformed: The Alliance’s New Roles in International S

19
295-296.

8. For greater details of the formations discussed he

Multinational Land Formations and NATO, Appendixes A thro

9. Albeit written subtlety, the frustrations of a former Com

of the ARRC are evident in Michael Walker, “ARRC in Action," 

Sixteen Nations, Vol. 41, No. 2, 1996, see particularly p. 44.

10. Thomas-Durell Young, Multinational Force Com

Authorities Handbook: Proceedings of the Central Region-C

Army Staff (CR-CAST) Working Group on Command Aut

Required for a Multinational Force Commander, Carlisle Barrac

U.S. Army War College, September 1, 1995.

11. For greater discussion of command authorities, see W

and Young, “Command Authorities and Multinationality in NAT

55-64.

12. For a brief survey of the issue of multinational logist

Multinational Land Formations and NATO, pp. 21-22.

13. MC 57/3, “Overall Organization of the Integrated 

Forces," July 23, 1981, NATO CONFIDENTIAL.

14. An initial first effort of this type of document can be foun

Bi-NMC draft document, “NATO Task List," 1st Draft, March 13

15. 1 (GE/NL Corps), Sankt Augustin: CPM Commun

Presse Marketing GmbH, 1999, pp. 8-9.

16. They should all fall under the “Protocol on the St

International Military Headquarters set up pursuant to the 

Atlantic Treaty," Paris, August 28, 1952.

17. See Mario da Silva, “Implementing the Combined Join

Force Concept," NATO Review, Vol. 46, No, 4, Winter 1998, pp

18. Anthony J. Faith, OBE, “A New Military Command St

for NATO: But at what expense?” NATO at 50: Special Edition

Andrew Dorman and Thomas-Durell Young, Defense Analysis, 

No. 3, December 1999, pp. 273-82. Additional criticism is fo

“NATO Double Expansion and the Challenge of Reforming 

Military Structures,” in Europe in Change, pp. 103-120; and 

Estrella, “CJTF and the Reform of NATO,” Bruxelles, North A

Assembly, Defence Committee, AN 230, October 24, 1996, poin

20
20. Admiral James O. Ellis, U.S. Navy, Commander-in-Chi

Naval Forces, Europe; Commander, Allied Forces Southern 

and Commander, Joint Task Force Noble Anvil during Operatio

Force, “A View from the Top,” unclassified briefing slides, n.d.

21. To reiterate, details on these formations can be fo

Multinational Land Formations and NATO.

22. For additional justification for this proposed reform, se

pp. 47-49.

23. The corps can be transferred (OPCOM) to the St

Commander Europe for both Article 5 and peace support operati

the coordination agreement among the Chiefs of Defense of Fra

Germany and the Strategic Commander Europe. That said, Fran

not participate in the integrated military planning process 

Alliance. A copy of this agreement is available in G

(“SACEUR-Abkommen”) in EUROKORPS und Europäische Ei

Bonn: Kunst & Kommunikation Ernst Martin, 1996, pp. 600-6

21
Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr.

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr.

Author

Dr. Thomas-Durell Young

Director of Publications and Production

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

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Mrs. Christine A. Williams

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