alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 222 (Thursday, November 18, 2010)]
[Notices]
[Page 70739]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-29033]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

 [Docket No. ER11-2021-000]


Domtar A.W. LLC; Supplemental Notice That Initial Market-Based 
Rate Filing Includes Request for Blanket Section 204 Authorization

November 8, 2010.
    This is a supplemental notice in the above-referenced proceeding of 
Domtar A.W. LLC's application for market-based rate authority, with an 
accompanying rate tariff, noting that such application includes a 
request for blanket authorization, under 18 CFR Part 34, of future 
issuances of securities and assumptions of liability.
    Any person desiring to intervene or to protest should file with the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street, NE., 
Washington, DC 20426, in accordance with Rules 211 and 214 of the 
Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure (18 CFR 385.211 and 
385.214). Anyone filing a motion to intervene or protest must serve a 
copy of that document on the Applicant.
    Notice is hereby given that the deadline for filing protests with 
regard to the applicant's request for blanket authorization, under 18 
CFR Part 34, of future issuances of securities and assumptions of 
liability, is November 29, 2010.
    The Commission encourages electronic submission of protests and 
interventions in lieu of paper, using the FERC Online links at http://www.ferc.gov. To facilitate electronic service, persons with Internet 
access who will eFile a document and/or be listed as a contact for an 
intervenor must create and validate an eRegistration account using the 
eRegistration link. Select the eFiling link to log on and submit the 
intervention or protests.
    Persons unable to file electronically should submit an original and 
14 copies of the intervention or protest to the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426.
    The filings in the above-referenced proceeding are accessible in 
the Commission's eLibrary system by clicking on the appropriate link in 
the above list. They are also available for review in the Commission's 
Public Reference Room in Washington, DC. There is an eSubscription link 
on the Web site that enables subscribers to receive e-mail notification 
when a document is added to a subscribed docket(s). For assistance with 
any FERC Online service, please e-mail <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#175152455458797b7e797244626767786563577172657439707861"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="d79192859498b9bbbeb9b284a2a7a7b8a5a397b1b2a5b4f9b0b8a1">[email protected]</span></a> or 
call (866) 208-3676 (toll free). For TTY, call (202) 502-8659.

Nathaniel J. Davis, Sr.,
Deputy Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2010-29033 Filed 11-17-10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-P


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§ 1778.13 Set-aside. ( a ) At least 70 percent of all grants made under this grant program shall be for projects funded in accordance with § 1778.11(a).
( b ) At least 50 percent of the funds appropriated for this grant program shall be allocated to rural areas with populations not in excess of 3,000 inhabitants according to the most recent decennical Census.
[68 FR 46078, Aug. 5, 2003, as amended at 80 FR 9863, Feb. 24, 2015]
###### Editorial Note on Part 1948

#### Editorial Note:

Nomenclature changes to part 1948 appear at 80 FR 9888, Feb. 24, 2015.

#### § 1948.95 Grant monitoring.

Each grant will be monitored by Rural Development to ensure that the Grantee is complying with the terms of the grant and that the project activities are completed as approved. This will involve on-site visits to the project area and review of quarterly and final reports by Rural Development.
#### Howard Golden et al., Individually and Constituting the Board of Estimate of the City of New York, Respondents, v Edward I. Koch, Individually and as Mayor of the City of New York, Appellant.

— Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County, entered March 9, 1979, granting summary judgment to plaintiffs and denying defendant’s motion for summary judgment, unanimously reversed, on the law and the facts, without costs or disbursements, and summary judgment granted in favor of defendant declaring that the Mayor may vote as a member of the Board of Estimate on New York City Charter (§ 124, subd b) modifications. Section 120 of the New York City Charter sets forth the procedure for the initial submission and approval of the annual budget. Its subdivision d states that "The mayor shall not participate in any action or vote of the board of estimate on the budget”. Section 124 deals with budget modification procedures. Its subdivision b provides for the transfer of part or all of one unit of appropriation to another unit, subject in certain instances to disapproval by the board. By their complaint the members of the board seek a judgment declaring the defendant Mayor is prohibited by subdivision d of section 120 from voting as a member of the board on transfers under subdivision b of section 124. We agree with Special Term that construction of a charter is to be measured by the perception of the "intelligent, careful voter” called upon to pass it *576
      *(Matter of Kuhn v Curran,*294 NY 207, 217). We cannot agree that that voter would find the word "any” in subdivision d of section 120 so all encompassing as to render it forceful beyond the confines of the section of which it is a part. The voter would perceive that the restriction at issue was drafted, not as an independent section implying general application, but as a subdivision of a section concerned only with one aspect of the entire budgetary process (cf. McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes, § 97). He would find the restriction rational in its application to the submission and approval of the budget because subdivision b of section 120 grants the Mayor veto power (cf. *MVAIC v Eisenberg,*18 NY2d 1, 3). Finally, the intelligent, careful voter would perceive that sections 121, 122 and subdivision f of section 124 prohibit the Mayor from voting on certain other budgetary actions, and he would realize then, if he had not before, that subdivision d of section 120 could not be all encompassing because it would render these other sections redundant (cf. McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes, § 231; *Matter of Albano v Kirby,*36 NY2d 526). Concur— Murphy, P. J., Kupferman, Lane, Lupiano and Lynch, JJ. [98 Misc 2d 972.]
<PAGE>
 
                                                                    EXHIBIT 21.1

                       Subsidiaries of Registrant
                       --------------------------

Subsidiary
----------

Hospital Management Associates, Inc., a Kentucky Corporation 
Health ManagementAssociates, Inc., a Kentucky Corporation 
Sebring Hospital Management Associates,Inc., a Florida Corporation 
Mooresville Hospital Management Associates, Inc., a North Carolina Corporation 
Marathon HMA, Inc., a Florida Corporation 
Louisburg HMA, Inc., a North Carolina Corporation 
Orlando HMA, Inc., a Florida Corporation 
Biloxi HMA, Inc., a Mississippi Corporation 
Health Management Investments, Inc.,a Delaware Corporation 
Gaffney HMA, Inc., a South Carolina Corporation 
Durant HMA, Inc., an Oklahoma Corporation 
Van Buren HMA, Inc., an Arkansas Corporation
Hamlet HMA, Inc., a North Carolina Corporation
Health Management Associates of West Virginia, Inc., a West Virginia Corporation
Paintsville Hospital Company, a Kentucky Corporation 
Coffee Hospital Management Associates, Inc., a Tennessee Corporation 
Riverview Regional Medical Center, Inc., an Alabama Corporation 
Topeka HMA, Inc., a Kansas Corporation 
Haines City HMA, Inc., a Florida Corporation 
Natchez Community Hospital, Inc. a Mississippi Corporation 
Sebastian Hospital, Inc., a Florida Corporation 
Punta Gorda HMA, Inc., a Florida Corporation 
Hartsville HMA, Inc., a South Carolina Corporation
Statesboro HMA, Inc., a Georgia Corporation 
Clarksdale HMA, Inc., a Mississippi Corporation 
Midwest City HMA, Inc., an Oklahoma Corporation 
Brandon HMA, Inc., a Mississippi Corporation 
Anniston HMA, Inc., an Alabama Corporation 
Little Rock HMA, Inc., an Arkansas Corporation 
Meridian HMA, Inc., a Mississippi Corporation
Meridian HMA Nursing Home, Inc., a Mississippi Corporation 
River Oaks Hospital, Inc., a Mississippi Corporation 
ROH, Inc., a Mississippi Corporation 
River Oaks Management Company, a Mississippi Corporation 
Hernando HMA, Inc., a Florida Corporation

                                      53
**Exhibit 32.1**

 

**CERTIFICATION OF THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF GLOBAL PARTNERS LP PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350**

 

In connection with the accompanying report on Form 10-Q for the period ended March 31, 2011 of Global Partners LP (the “Partnership”) and filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Eric Slifka, President and Chief Executive Officer of Global GP LLC, the general partner of the Partnership, hereby certify, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

 

1.               The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

2.               The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Partnership.

 

 
| Dated:   May 6, 2011 | By:    | /s/   Eric Slifka                     |
|---------------------------|--------|---------------------------------------|
|                      |   | Eric Slifka                           |
|                      |   | President and Chief Executive Officer |
|                      |   | of Global GP LLC, general partner     |
|                      |   | of Global Partners LP                 |

 

----
#### § 1901.502 Policy.

It is the current policy to sell all certificates of beneficial ownership to the Federal Financing Bank for financing activities from the Agricultural Credit Insurance Fund and the Rural Development Insurance Fund. Sales from the Rural Housing Insurance Fund will be made to the Federal Financing Bank to the extent necessary to service certificates of beneficial ownership held by the Federal Financing Bank. Sales in excess of those needed for servicing requirements will be made to the public. In addition to sales, this subpart provides policy for the servicing of outstanding certificates of beneficial ownership, insurance contracts, and insured notes held by investors.

[51 FR 24301, July 3, 1986]
EXHIBIT 32.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                       AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906
                        OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

         In connection with the Quarterly Report of Ithaka Acquisition Corp.
(the "Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ending March 31, 2006 (the
"Report"), as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date
hereof, I Paul A. Brooke, Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of
the Company, certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Sec. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

      1. The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

       2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the
Company.

By:  /s/ Paul A. Brooke                                      Dated: May 15, 2006
  ----------------------------------------------------------
        Paul A. Brooke
        Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer
        (Principal Executive Officer)
Appeal No. 79-163.

#### Blanche Dessert *v.*Roger Dessert.

*Raymond A. Thomas,*for petitioner. *Leo T. Connors,*for respondent.

On February 27, 1980, respondent was ordered to show cause on Monday, April 7, 1980, why his appeal in the above-entitled case should not be dismissed by reason of failure to comply with Rule 16 as to time of filing a brief. After hearing argument of counsel for respondent, it is hereby ordered that said appeal shall be dismissed unless respondent files his brief on or before April 14, 1980.
EXHIBIT 32.2





CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C. SS.1350,


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with the Annual Report of IR BioSciences Holdings, Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2010 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, John N. Fermanis, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss.1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





1. The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;and





2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





IR BIOSCIENCES HOLDINGS, INC.Date: May 24, 2011
By:
/s/ John N. FermanisJohn N. FermanisChief Financial Officer





A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, an other document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906, has been provided to Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
March 28, 1980.

C. A. No. 79-218.

#### State Ex Rel Harry Sunderland *v.*Bryan William Jennings.

*Dennis J. Roberts II,*Attorney General, *Stephen Lichatin III,*Special Assistant Attorney General, Chief, Appellate Division, for plaintiff, *Aram K. Berberian,*for defendant.

This case came before the court on March 7, 1960, on the state’s motion under Rule 16(g) to affirm the judgment of conviction below of the defendant of driving under the influence of liquor. After hearing arguments of counsel we are of the opinion that questions raised by defendant have been settled by this court in *State*v. *Jennings,*117 R.I. 291, 366 A.2d 543 (1976). The motion to affirm the judgment below is hereby granted.
** **

**Exhibit 32.1**

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

In connection with theaccompanying report on Form 10-Q for the period ended March 31, 2007 of GlobalPartners LP (the “Partnership”) and filed with the Securities and ExchangeCommission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Eric Slifka, President andChief Executive Officer of Global GP LLC, the general partner of thePartnership, hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adoptedpursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

1.               theReport fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2.               theinformation contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,the financial condition and results of operations of the Partnership.
| Dated: May 10, 2007 | By:    | /s/ Eric Slifka                                                                                                |
|---------------------|--------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|                |   | Eric Slifka                                                                                                    |
|                |   | President and Chief Executive Officer  of Global GP LLC, general partner  of Global Partners LP |

 

----
###### Editorial Note on Part 1948

#### Editorial Note:

Nomenclature changes to part 1948 appear at 80 FR 9888, Feb. 24, 2015.

#### §§ 1948.99-1948.100 [Reserved]
EXHIBIT 32.2

Certifications of Chief Financial Officer pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350 as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the

Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Ruths
Chris Steak House, Inc. for the quarter ended July 1, 2007, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), the undersigned, the Senior Vice President, Chief Financial Officer and Assistant
Secretary of Ruths Chris Steak House, Inc., certifies pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1) the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of
operations of Ruths Chris Steak House, Inc.

Date: August 2, 2007



/S/ THOMAS J. PENNISON, JR.Thomas J. Pennison, Jr.Senior Vice President, Chief Financial Officer and Assistant Secretary


A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to Ruths
Chris Steak House, Inc. and will be retained by Ruths Chris Steak House, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
#### Mona La Pommeray, Respondent-Appellant, v Luc La Pommeray, Appellant-Respondent.

— In a matrimonial action, the defendant husband appeals from a judgment and seven orders of the Supreme Court, Westchester County, as follows: (1) as limited by his brief, from so much of a judgment of divorce entered October 10, 1978, as granted the plaintiff wife $200 per week alimony and $87 per week child support and awarded a counsel fee of $11,500, plus disbursements; (2) as limited by his brief, from so much of an order dated December 28, 1978, as, upon reargument, adhered to the original determination in the judgment as to alimony, child support and counsel fees; (3) an order dated December 29, 1978, which, *inter alia,*granted plaintiff’s motion to amend the judgment of divorce and directed a hearing with respect to increased child support; (4) an order dated November 8, 1978, which, *inter alia,*appointed a receiver of defendant’s interest in his partnership with a medical group to satisfy a judgment entered in favor of plaintiff; (5) as limited by his brief, from so much of an order dated January 12, 1979, as, upon granting reargument, adhered to the original determination with respect to the appointment of a receiver of defendant’s interest in the medical group; (6) an order entered May 3, 1979, which, *inter alia,*charged the interest of defendant in the medical group and appointed a receiver; (7) an order dated July 25, 1979, which, *inter alia,*denied his motion for leave to reargue the charging order entered May 3, 1979; and (8) an order dated July 2, 1979, which, *inter alia,*denied his motion to vacate restraining notices and to limit the charging order against his income. The plaintiff wife cross-appeals, on the ground of inadequacy and as limited by her notice of appeal and brief, from so much of the judgment of divorce, entered October 10, 1978, as fixed child support. Appeal from so much of the order dated July 25, 1979 as denied reargument dismissed. No appeal lies from the denial of a motion for reargument. Order otherwise afiirmed. Appeal and cross appeal from the judgment, and appeal from the order dated November 8, 1978, dismissed as academic. The judgment and said order were superseded by the orders dated December 28, 1978 and January 12, 1979, respectively. Orders dated December 28, 1978 and January 12, 1979 afiirmed insofar as appealed from. Orders dated December 29, 1978 and July 2, 1979, and order entered May 3, 1979 afiirmed. Plaintiff is awarded one bill of costs to cover all appeals. We have examined the contentions of the defendant and find them to be totally without merit. The child support award was proper under the circumstances. Hopkins, J. P., Damiani, O’Connor and Rabin, JJ., concur.
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###### Editorial Note on Part 1951

#### Editorial Notes:

1. Some of the exhibits referenced in this part 1951 are not published in the Code of Federal Regulations. Exhibits are available in any Rural Development office.

2. Nomenclature changes to part 1951 appear at 80 FR 9890-9894, Feb. 24, 2015.

#### §§ 1951.26-1951.49 [Reserved]
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 00-41199

Summary Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

ANTONIO VALDEZ-GUERRERO,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

(L-00-CR-511-1)

--------------------

June 4, 2001

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, WIENER, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:*

Defendant-Appellant Antonio Valdez-Guerrero was sentenced

following his conviction on his plea of guilty to possession with

intent to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1)

and 841(b)(1)(B). He appeals the district court’s refusal to

depart downward from the Sentencing Guidelines for his alleged

aberrant behavior. We dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

Valdez argues that we should remand for resentencing in light

of an amendment to the United States Sentencing Guidelines

(U.S.S.G.) that added § 5K2.20 effective one month after Valdez was
2

sentenced. Under both the version of the Guidelines that was in

effect at the time Valdez was sentenced and the version that became

effective afterwards and included § 5K2.20, Valdez’s conduct was

not aberrant behavior. Regarding the pre-amendment version, we

have held that aberrant behavior is generally a spontaneous and

seemingly thoughtless act, not one resulting from substantial

planning. See United States v. Williams, 974 F.2d 25, 26-27 (5th

Cir. 1992). Here, the district court found that Valdez had ample

time to consider his actions over the course of approximately three

and one-half days between the time he was approached regarding the

crime and the time he was arrested. The court also found that his

actions resulted from substantial planning. The same finding would

apply to the amended version of the Guidelines: Valdez’s actions

do not constitute aberrant behavior as defined by § 5K2.20. 

The record demonstrates that, under either the pre-amendment

or post-amendment versions of the Guidelines, Valdez’s actions were

committed with significant planning and were not spontaneous or of

limited duration. Thus, a downward departure for aberrant behavior

would not appear to be warranted. As the court did not

misapprehend its authority under either version of the Guidelines,

we lack jurisdiction to hear this appeal. See United States v.

Reyes-Nava, 169 F.3d 278, 280 (5th Cir. 1999). As such, Valdez’s

appeal is 

DISMISSED.

S:\OPINIONS\UNPUB\00\00-41199.0

5/22/01 9:49 AM