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2015

Version 1.0

TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats 

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Threat Tactics Report:

China
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This (U) Threat Tactics Report (TTR) was produced in accordance with (U) Intelligence Community Directive Number 203: Analytical Standards 

(Effective: Jan 2015). This TTR was coordinated with:

 National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) – MAJ Philip Luu, MAJ Matthew Radik, Mr. Mark Melton, Mr. Timothy Sparks

 HQDA DCS G-2 – MAJ Bryan Cleary

 FMSO – Mr. Thomas Wilhelm

 USARPAC – Mr. Darrin Bovia, CW2 Danielle Freeman

Comments and feedback are welcome.

Jon S. Cleaves

TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration

Introduction

In 2015, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) released a statement on worldwide threats and 

identified China as a threat actor currently challenging the United States (US) in its cyber, 

space/counterspace, nuclear, and territorial reclamation activities.1 These activities, China’s growing 

influence in Asia, and its continued willingness to display its diplomatic and military power present a 

significant concern for US security interests.2 Given the US’s pivot to the Pacific and the recent influx of 

US military service members, an understanding of one of the region’s largest threat actor’s military 

capabilities, tactics, and techniques is necessary.

This Threat Tactics Report (TTR) will provide an overview of China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA)

Army’s military capabilities, with an emphasis on its tactics and techniques in order to explain to the US 

Army training community how China’s military fights. In order to accomplish this, this report will include 

information on the PLA Army’s doctrine, force structure, weapons and equipment, and an analysis of its 

capabilities. 

The report contains five sections. Section 1 is an introduction that provides an overview of China’s 

military strategy. Section 2 details China’s PLA Army capabilities. Section 3 highlights tactic and 

technique examples of the PLA’s Army, complete with graphics depicting the tactics. Section 4 provides

information on key weapons and equipment available to the PLA Army that have the potential to 

challenge US Army forces. Section 5, the conclusion to this report, culminates with a discussion on 

training implications and provides a table that shows where conditions specific to the China OE are 

present in the Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE) and other training materials so that these 

conditions can easily be implemented across all training venues. 

Cover photo: Soldiers of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s 1st Amphibious Mechanized Infantry

Division, 12 July 2011.
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Executive Summary

 The United States (US) intelligence community classified China as a threat actor capable of 

challenging the US’s security interests in the Asia-Pacific region.

 There a number of issues that would likely prompt China to use its military force to protect its 

national interests. These issues are: Taiwan, territorial disputes, and internal instability.

 China has spent the past two decades modernizing its military forces. Modernization efforts 

have included the acquisition of new technologies and weapon systems, updated training 

efforts, and revamped doctrine.

 The People’s Liberation Army’s Army, China’s land forces, have focused modernization on its 

special purpose forces, amphibious, and aviation capabilities. It has also procured more modern 

armor, artillery, and air defense systems.

 The Chinese Army updated its tactics doctrine in 2009 to reflect the importance of the concept 

of informationization.

 Chinese tactics can be replicated using the TC 7-100 series of threat doctrine.

Section 1: Introduction to China

The state of China is experiencing unprecedented growth in political, economic, diplomatic, and military 

power. Because of this growth, its role in the Asia-Pacific region as a dominant regional power is 

expanding. China is capitalizing on this expansion by using its military forces to further its strategic goals 

for the state. Recent examples of this are China’s proclaimed expansion of its air space into the East 

China Sea, land reclamation activities in the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, and continued cyber 

espionage against the United States. As a result of these actions, the US intelligence community (IC) has 

classified China as a threat actor capable of challenging US interests in the Pacific region.3 This section of 

the TTR will provide an overview of China’s military strategy and goals and discuss key alliances of the 

state of China.

Strategy and Goals

China has placed great emphasis on growing its economic, military, and diplomatic powers for the past 

several decades in order to expand what it calls comprehensive national power. China’s leaders believe 

that growth in its comprehensive national power will enable China to achieve its five strategic 

objectives. These objectives are: preserving Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rule; sustaining economic 

growth and development; maintaining domestic political stability; defending national sovereignty and 

territorial integrity; and securing China’s status as a great power and reacquiring regional preeminence.4

China claims its pursuit of its strategic objectives is entirely peaceful. In 2013, the government stated 

that there are three basic ways to use military power: military deterrence, war, and military operations 

other than war.5 This indicates that China will protect its national sovereignty and national interests first 

by deterring others and only resort to warfighting when deterrence fails.

While China claims its pursuit of these strategic objectives is entirely peaceful, some of its actions have 

demonstrated that China may use these new powers in ways that many states in Asia would not view as 
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peaceful. These actions typically relate to three issues: the Taiwan issue, territorial disputes, and 

internal instability. These three issues could potentially result in China’s use of military force.

Taiwan

A potential conflict with Taiwan is China’s biggest security concern. China, and the majority of the world, 

does not recognize Taiwan as an independent nation and there are many in China that would like to see 

Taiwan reunified with the mainland, through force if necessary. China has openly stated that if Taiwan 

authorities attempt any action in pursuit of independence, China will be forced to use its military. This 

could result in mainland China using its military assets to forcefully reunify Taiwan with the mainland. 

Given the US’s standing defense agreement with Taiwan, this action would have serious implications for 

the US military.

Territorial Disputes

China is actively involved in five territorial disputes with its neighbors in the Asia-Pacific region. The first 

is China’s dispute with Taiwan as stated above. While China claims Taiwan, the Republic of China 

(Taiwan) asserts its sovereignty and resists attempts at reunification. The second territorial issue is the 

dispute over the Spratly Islands. This particular territorial dispute is extremely complex because six 

different countries claim parts of the area: Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and 

Vietnam. The third dispute China is involved in is with Vietnam and Taiwan over the Paracel Islands. The 

fourth dispute is between Japan and China over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. The last dispute is between 

India and China over two separate boundary issues along their mutual border.

Internal Instability

One of the greatest fears of the Chinese government is internal instability. As a result, the PLA has a 

secondary assigned mission to prevent instability in the regions where units are located. While its 

primary mission is to defend China, together with the local police force, the PLA’s secondary mission set 

shows that the Chinese government prioritizes preventing instability at all costs.

The People’s Liberation Army: China’s Military Force

People’s Liberation Army is the name of all of China’s military service branches. Unlike the traditional 

use of ‘army’ in American colloquialism, China’s use of the term refers to all branches of its armed 

forces, the Army, Navy, and Air Force, as well as the Second Artillery Force, an independent branch of 

the Army.

China’s armed forces, including the PLA, the People’s Armed Police (PAP), and the militia are completely 

controlled by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). China’s armed forces are often referred to as the 

“party’s army” due to the level of control the CCP has over the military. This relationship is directly 

related to the CCP’s intent on preserving its rule. To ensure the party maintains absolute control of the 

armed forces, every company and higher level unit in the PLA and the PAP has both a commander and a 

political officer who jointly share responsibility for everything the unit does.

For the past two decades, China has devoted significant time and money to modernizing its military. The 

PLA that was once known for its outdated equipment, poor training, and personnel issues has been 

revamped thanks to regular increases in defense spending. It is now a much more capable military with 
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Figure 1. China's Military Regions and Group Army locations

more advanced equipment and better training. While personnel training and reforms are partially 

responsible for this, much of the PLA’s growth in capability is due to the acquisition of new technologies 

and weapon systems. The PLA’s acquisitions have focused on information warfare (INFOWAR)

technologies, fourth-generation level platforms, and precision strike systems. The biggest capability 

advancement the PLA has demonstrated is its ability to conduct joint force operations. The PLA has 

placed significant focus on the latter area and has made great strides.6 

On a tactical level, the PLA has concentrated its advancements on its special purpose forces (SPF) and 

improving amphibious and army aviation capabilities. Additionally, it has procured more modern 
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platforms for use by its ground forces: main battle tanks (MBTs), armored vehicles, artillery, and air 

defense systems are all examples of systems that have been upgraded in recent years.

Despite the advancement of its capabilities, analysis by the RAND Corporation has shown that the PLA 

still has some significant weaknesses. These fall into two broad categories—institutional and combat 

capabilities. The institutional weaknesses stem from ineffective command structures, lack of 

professionalism among personnel, and rampant corruption. The major combat capability weaknesses 

include logistical shortfalls and strategic airlift capabilities.7

PLA Army

The PLA’s Army is a considerably large force with approximately 850,000 active soldiers and 510,000 

reserve soldiers divided into Group Armies. There are 18 Group Armies divided among seven military 

regions (MRs). Figure 1 above shows the locations of all seven of the MRs and includes the headquarters

location for each of the Group Armies. Additionally, the figure highlights the primary mission set for 

each of the Group Armies. Each army is assigned the mission of some combination of the following: 

offensive, defensive, complex terrain, mobile force, rapid reaction unit (RRU), or amphibious. With some 

exceptions, each Group Army has between 30,000 and 50,000 troops normally organized into 2–5

mechanized/motorized/infantry divisions or brigades, 1 armored brigade, 1 artillery brigade, and 1 air 

defense brigade. Additionally, most combat units are assigned with combat service and service support 

units such as engineer, communications, chemical defense, reconnaissance, and logistics and repair. 

Approximately half of the Group Armies have an Army Aviation brigade or regiment and/or an SPF 

brigade or regiment assigned to them. While most combat units are assigned directly to a Group Army, 

some are not. Those units that are not assigned to a Group Army are considered “independent” and 

assigned directly to an MR, military district, or garrison headquarters.8

Unlike US Army divisions, PLAA divisions command regiments, not brigades. PLAA infantry and armored 

brigades are subordinate to army-level organizations, either Group Army or provincial military district 

headquarters, not to divisions.

Below is a roll-up of the number of combat units currently available to the PLAA. These numbers are 

likely to change as the PLA undergoes a reorganization of its forces and command structure.

Table 1. PLA Army Combat Unit Roll-up

PLA Army

Infantry Armor Artillery Aviation Reserves

Mechanized DIVs 7 Divisions 1 Divisions 2 Brigades 5 INF DIVs 18

Mountain Mech DIVs 2 Brigades 16 Brigades 17 Regiments 5 INF BDEs 4

Motorized DIVs 14 Amphib BDE 1 ADA Brigades 21 ARTY DIVs 3

Amphibious Mech DIVs 2 ARTY BDEs 7

Infantry Brigades 23 AD DIVs 17

Mountain INF BDEs 2 AD BDEs 8

Mechanized BDEs 25 AD Regiments 8

Motorized BDEs 16
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The PLA Army (PLAA) is organized in a three-tiered structure: main forces, local or regional forces, and 

reserve forces. The main forces are the Group Armies detailed above. These forces are intended to be 

available to respond to any requirement around the country. To aid in this requirement, each Group 

Army fields at least one RRU.9Local forces are made up of active and reserve PLA units as well as the 

PAP and local militia, and are responsible for local defense, and for maintaining internal security in their 

local area.

10 The PAP has a secondary mission of defending China against external enemies.

PLA Navy

The PLA Navy (PLAN) received a disproportionate amount of focus for modernization from the Chinese 

government over the past two decades. This is mainly a result of China’s strategic efforts to provide 

military backing for its territorial claims under dispute and to create a robust anti-access/aerial denial

(A2/AD) capability, a key tenant of China’s mainland defense and offense. The PLAN is organized into 

three main fleets: the North Sea Fleet, the East Sea Fleet, and the South Sea Fleet. Each fleet contains 

surface ships, submarines, naval air, coastal defense, and marine assets. The PLAN has a small Marine 

Corp of approximately 10,000 marines organized into two brigades. The PLAN has more than 300 

surface ships, submarines, amphibious ships, and patrol craft, which amounts to more vessels in service 

than any other country in Asia.

PLA Air Force

The PLA Air Force (PLAAF), like the PLAN, has received a disproportionate amount of focus for its 

modernization also. It too is seen as integral to China’s plan to provide military backing for its territorial 

claims and is key in China’s A2/AD capability. The PLAAF is organized into seven Military Region Air 

Forces and 24 Air Divisions. The PLAAF has a surface-to-air missile (SAM) corps and it is divided into SAM 

division and brigades. According to the Chinese 2015 white paper, the PLAAF “will endeavor to shift its 

focus from territorial air defense to both defense and offense, and build an air-space defense force 

structure that can meet the requirements of informationized operations.”11

The 15th Airborne Army, depicted in the map in the “PLA Army” section of this report, is subordinate to 

the PLAAF and not the PLAA.

Second Artillery Force

The final key component of China’s A2/AD capability is the Second Artillery Force. This element of the 

PLA is responsible for the China’s strategic missile force. It controls all of China’s nuclear and 

conventional strategic missiles. The Corps is manned by approximately 100,000 personnel comprising six 

missile divisions. The divisions are independently deployed in different MRs.

Power Projection

The PLA’s modernization has focused on expanding its ability to project power. This has manifested 

primarily in its air, naval, and missile forces as they have gained capabilities specifically designed to 

support China’s emphasis on expanding its reach into blue waters. In China’s first white paper on 

strategy, release in 2015, it publicly announced that a key strategic goal for its military forces is to 

project force far from China’s coastline.12 This strategic goal has resulted in a military force that is being 
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modernized for the explicit purpose of projecting its power outside of its national boundaries. China 

often claims this effort is simply intended to protect its territory, including the disparate island chains it 

claims as territory. However it is often seen by its regional neighbors and the US as an attempt to 

expand its offensive capabilities.13

PLA Future Military Development Efforts

The PLA is likely to focus its future military development efforts on fleshing out its naval, air, missile, and 

space capabilities in addition to rectifying the weaknesses addressed earlier in this TTR. The naval 

capabilities that the PLAN is likely to focus on are those that support the expansion of its operations into 

the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Air defense, cruise missiles, and aircraft carriers are three areas that could 

enable the PLAN’s operations expansion. 14

The PLAAF is expected to receive the same emphasis as the PLAN. According to the Department of 

Defense, the PLAAF “will likely become a majority fourth-generation force within the next several 

years,” in addition to developing as many five-generation systems as possible.15 The PLAAF is also likely 

to improve its current unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) capabilities.

The final areas of emphasis for future capability growth will be in China’s strategic missile force and 

space/counterspace. China’s long-range strike capability is likely to be improved by the deployment of 

intermediate-range ballistic missile systems.16 China’s space/counterspace capability will continue 

expanding through many space-based capabilities such as intelligence, surveillance, and communication 

systems.

According to IHS Jane’s, the PLA seeks the capabilities to be able to conduct all future campaigns 

simultaneously on land, at sea, in the air, in space, and in the electronic domains.

17 The PLA’s effort to 

reach this goal is evidenced by the areas of future capability development discussed above.

Section 2: PLA Army

China’s primary purpose of military development for the PLA Army is to create capabilities that are 

characterized by mobility, proficiency at exploiting information technology, high-tech firepower, and 

seamless joint operations.18 While China’s ground forces are leagues ahead of where they were in the 

1980s and 1990s, their ability to perform the above-mentioned goals is still not at the level the 

government wants, and the armies’ ability to perform these goals varies among them. 

The PLA Army has been very successful at increasing mobility. Units are leaner and equipped with more 

motorized and mechanized equipment and have been restructured; the number of divisions has been 

downsized in order to create more brigades. The PLA Army has also been extraordinarily successful at 

increasing units’ ability to exploit information technology. New technology purchases have greatly 

influenced this.

The PLA Army is slowly improving in the remaining two goals: high-tech firepower and seamless joint 

operations. China has steadily purchased new systems to field with the ground forces; however, these 

systems are not prolific throughout the entire force, but rather concentrated in certain units. The PLA’s 

ability to conduct joint operations is improving, but joint interoperability is still one of its biggest 

weaknesses.19
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Professionalism

In the mid-1990s, the PLA was characterized by extremely poor professionalism. This was significantly 

influenced by the PLA’s active role in profitable economic ventures (such as farming) where troops were 

used to support the venture. In the late 1990s this practice was ended in an effort to increase military 

professionalism. The PLA has further advanced its professionalism efforts by recruitment changes and 

improved training programs. An example of this is the PLA’s attempts to create a professional NCO 

corps. In the late 1990s the PLA began providing NCOs with more education and training, gave them 

more responsibilities, and allowed them to complete a full 30-year career. However, despite significant 

progress, it should be noted that the PLA lacks formal combat experience and still struggles with 

rampant corruption—two very significant roadblocks to a fully professionalized fighting force.

Readiness

China has prioritized its readiness capability since the 1990s. In an effort to increase readiness, it has 

built a rapid-reaction capability. The PLA’s RRUs were initially created for the purpose of mounting rapid 

counter-Taiwan operations, but newer RRUs are designed to respond to internal crises. Now, most 

military regions in China field RRUs. 

Military Capabilities

The PLA Army has successfully transformed itself from the huge army that was designed to fight a 

protracted war of attrition to a smaller, more modern force designed to fight local, high-intensity wars 

of short duration against high-tech adversaries.20 China’s modernization of the ground forces has 

produced a more agile, lean, and mobile force that includes a “special operations force equipped with 

advanced technology; improved army aviation units using helicopters armed with precision-guided 

munitions; and C2 capabilities with improved networks providing real-time data sharing within and 

between units.”21

China’s success in this area and its efforts at refining the way it fights are partially due to its observations 

of the US Army at war over the past decade. These observations provided China with a number of 

lessons learned that it is actively implementing through training and doctrinal changes. Key lessons 

learned include:

 “The centrality of information on the battlefield, and the impact of attacking key nodes rather 

than across a broad front of activity.

 “The importance of offensive action, pre-emptive strikes, surprise, and deception.

 “The value of high-tech weaponry. Specifically, weapon systems needed to integrate 

information technology, increase firepower effects and range, higher accuracy, and greater 

mobility and survivability.

 “The importance of ‘real-time’ C4ISR [command, control, communications, computers, 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance], long-range precision strike, and advanced 

electronic warfare capabilities.

 “The combat-multiplying effect of joint operations.

 “The need for timely comprehensive logistics support.”22
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Informationization. “The PLA is convinced that systems integration is more important than individual 

high-tech hardware. Informatization is thus singled out as the driving force for PLA transformation. 

This reflects a new understanding about the type of war the PLA expects to face in the future: even if 

the combat is between conventional platforms, the key to victory is the IT systems. The idea of 

adding numbers of platforms to enhance capabilities is obsolete. Therefore, INFOWAR is no longer 

seen as only one method of combat, but the dominant form and the core of all other types of 

military engagement. Nor is IT upgrading a matter of mere technical significance—it is now 

considered the lifeline of the PLA's survival.” (You Ji, “China’s Emerging National Defense Strategy,” 

The Jamestown Foundation, 2004.)

As a result of lessons learned such as those above, two concepts now drive Chinese military thought. 

These concepts are local warfare and “informationization” warfare. While the Chinese military once 

thought it would fight protracted war on Chinese soil with guerrilla warfare, its analysis of Western 

conflicts over the past two decades has caused it to now believe it will fight what it calls “local wars.” 

These wars will be characterized by shorter conflicts, potentially lasting only one campaign; will most 

likely not entail the occupation of China; and will involve joint military operations across land, sea, air, 

cyber, and space using advanced technology, particularly information technology.23 China has adopted 

the phrase “informationization warfare” to describe this type of joint environment supported by 

advanced information technology. 

China’s emphasis on informationization is key to understanding its military capabilities. The idea of 

increasingly fielding more high-tech systems and integrating the use of those systems with its 

capabilities is a significant change for the PLA and an extremely important piece of information for those 

studying how China will fight. 

The rest of this section will detail China’s capabilities as they pertain to specific categories. It is 

important to keep in mind the concept of informationization and understand that China is actively 

pursuing systems to advance each of the following capability categories.
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Command and Control

At the national level there are four departments: the General Staff Department (GSD), the General 

Political Department (GPD), the General Logistics Department (GLD), and the General Armaments 

Department (GAD). Since there are not national military-level headquarters, these departments serve as 

a headquarters between the Central Military Commission and the forces commanded by the MRs and 

the services. As discussed above, the PLAA is completely controlled by the CCP. This control extends 

down to the lowest echelons with every company and higher level unit having both a PLA commander

and a political officer who jointly command the unit.

Figure 2. Chinese soldiers learn how to use new command and control platform

Modernization efforts have affected the PLAA’s ability to conduct command and control. This is 

primarily through increased training efforts at teaching young officers not only new C2 techniques, but 

also teaching them how to use new technology designed to enhance command and control capabilities.
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Maneuver

The PLA Army is a maneuver force. Since the 1990s, China has prioritized fielding maneuver systems to 

the troops, pushing trucks down to all units in order to ensure the entire force was at least motorized. 

Recent modernization efforts have significantly increased the number of motorized and mechanized 

units, resulting in a significant growth in units with access to armored personnel carriers (APCs). Because 

of the PLA’s heritage of light infantry, those on foot move fast and can maintain a pace of 25 miles per 

day.

24 This heritage has also caused the PLAA’s maneuver tactics to emphasize rapid tactical action and 

movement. The PLAA prioritizes retaining sufficient freedom of maneuver in order to envelop enemy 

positions and attack from the front.

INFOWAR 

China’s INFOWAR capabilities are extremely robust but are primarily focused on protection and security 

measures and computer warfare. In 2011, China confirmed the existence of an online army unit that 

exists to boost the military’s defense capabilities and improve Internet security.25 Hackers from China 

routinely engage in cyberespionage targeting the US government, the US defense industry, and other 

privately held US companies. Hackers are often seeking access to intellectual property and other 

information in the search for strategic intelligence.

Chinese hackers from PLA unit 61398 are widely known to target US corporations and government 

information in order to collect intelligence data. It was recently discovered that the PLA hackers are 

intentionally targeting a very specific set of US companies—those involved with controlling the US 

power grid, gas lines, and water works. This indicates that the PLA may be vying for access to target the 

Figure 3. 2006 motorized division exercise
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US homeland’s utility systems. Targeting such systems while the US military is engaged in conflict in the 

Pacific region could result in serious issues on the homeland which in turn could upset the effectiveness 

of any US military campaign in the Pacific.

RISTA

China has placed significant emphasis on growing its RISTA capability and is estimated to be well on its 

way to having capabilities similar to the US.26 China’s RISTA capability is provided by its growing arsenal 

of UAVs and access to information from reconnaissance satellites. China’s acquisitions and development 

efforts indicate that it is closely watching the US’s use of unmanned devices for RISTA, and is replicating 

it. China’s advancements in this area have been described as “alarming.”27 China’s RISTA capability 

advancements demonstrate its attempts to dominate the information environment and fight 

informationization warfare.

On a tactical/operational level, the PLAA has been increasingly fielding systems designed to catch up 

with the Army’s peers on the battlefield. For example, the PLAA does not have the same ability to 

conduct night operations as other countries. This is primarily due to the fact that PLAA forces are not all 

equipped with night vision goggles (NVGs) and they rarely train at night. As a result the PLAA is making 

an effort to increase training in this area.

Fire Support

One of the PLA’s biggest capability strengths is its indirect fires. PLA doctrine uses fires as a means of 

bringing war to the enemy’s territory. To this end, the PLA has placed significant emphasis on growing its 

artillery and missile arsenal. The PLA is likely to not only use its fire support assets as indirect fire 

support for conflicts that should arise on mainland China, but also as direct main force attacks on 

Taiwan, should conflict arise there. Saturated conventional missile attacks at military targets and 

communication hubs is assessed to be China’s first move in the event of war breaking out with Taiwan.28

Protection

As part of China’s effort to make the PLA more mobile, it has begun procuring systems that also provide 

for better protection. While the Army’s main battle tanks provide the most protection for soldiers on 

the field, new infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers are helping to increase 

protection force-wide. It should be noted, however, that these systems are not being procured for their 

protection capabilities, but rather for their mobility capabilities. Many of the systems are airtransportable and amphibious, characteristics that are given high priority by the PLA over heavy 

protective armor.

Logistics

Chronic resource shortages define the PLA Army’s logistics capability, leaving it extremely weak in this 

area.29 China has reorganized its units into brigades with more firepower and mobility, but it has not 

updated the logistics for those units, leaving them vulnerable.

30 Exercises have shown that the PLA 

needs to improve everything from combat uniformsi and personal protective equipment, to transport 

 

i PLA soldiers were just equipped with underpants with elasticated waistbands for the first time. Until recently, soldiers kept 

their underpants up with rope. (Peter Ford, “What China’s Army-issue underwear reveals,” CS Monitor, 8 December 2014.)
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equipment and systemization of the logistics train. Properly feeding the troops is also a challenge for the 

PLA, especially for those in more remote areas. Resupplying ammunition is a challenge, so PLA soldiers 

tend to carry more ammo on their person than soldiers in other armies. China fully recognizes these 

issues and has publicized them,

ii acknowledging that logistics is a force multiplier and without proper 

logistics the PLA will be unable to conduct sustained operations outside of China’s borders.31

Air Defense

Air defense is a key mission area for the PLA. This is in part because it plays a significant role in China’s 

A2/AD capability, but also because it plays a significant role in China’s targeting “three attacks, three 

defends” strategy that emphasizes targeting stealth aircraft, cruise missiles, and attack helicopters while 

defending against electronic attacks, precision strikes, and reconnaissance efforts. To enable this 

strategy China has developed a national-level, integrated air defense system (IADS) capable of defending 

key strategic cities, borders, and various territorial claims. China’s IADS is a multilayered defense 

composed of weapon systems, radars, and C4ISR platforms. China’s IADS and recent air defense system 

acquisitions indicate that China’s land-based air defense capability is robust.32

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

China has placed great emphasis on increasing its UAV capability in recent years. It has begun fielding 

more UAVs to its PLAA units and is expected to use these systems for more than just reconnaissance. 

China is known to have procured UAVs capable of carrying missiles designed for ground attacks, such as 

the Harpy. In January 2015, details behind the design of a new UAV under development by a Chinese 

defense manufacturer gave indications that China’s UAV capability is growing and improving. 

Modifications to the engines and air intake in this new design appear to be intended to make the UAV a 

stealth aircraft.33

UAVs at a tactical level are still primarily small and short-range. They are being used to support tactical 

reconnaissance and to support artillery fire. In addition, these systems can be used for radio-delay and 

INFOWAR. 

Special Purpose Forces

The PLAA is estimated to have around 14,000 SPF with one group assigned to each MR. China has 

prioritized development of these forces for the past twenty years and this has resulted in an SPF that is 

equipped with advanced technology, contains highly trained personnel, and is capable of being 

mobilized in the early stages of conflict to attack key personnel and infrastructure targets and to secure 

air facilities for use by follow-on forces.

The PLAA’s SPF do not have the kind of air and naval assets available to US special operations forces 

(SOF) and, as a result, the PLAA’s SPF has limited range and sustainability. SPF units train with regular 

force units and their equipment, not special equipment. It is assessed that most SPF operations would 

be conducted to support tactical or operational PLAA commanders.34

 

ii In China’s most recent white paper, released in May of 2015, it acknowledged its weakness and prioritized future 

development of its logistics capability.
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Training

Because the PLAA lacks formal experience on the battlefield, it prioritizes training in order to give its 

combat units an element of experience. The PLAA’s training program is a combination of force-on-force 

events, advanced simulation use, and practice using automated tools to aid in command decisions. The 

PLAA is taking its lessons learned from US conflicts and implementing them in their training program. As 

discussed above, these lessons learned have resulted in a shift in Chinese military planning and thought 

in addition to changes in Chinese PLAA training and doctrine. In 2009, China released updated tactics 

doctrine that reflects many of the lessons learned discussed in this TTR. PLAA training events are still 

working on implementing the new doctrine.

Chinese doctrine and military strategy assume that the PLAA will be the weak force in most encounters,

so training events are designed to teach this to PLAA units and prepare them for this environment. This 

is partially reflected by the results of the PLAA’s training events. The PLAA has a dedicated opposing 

force (OPFOR) brigade. It is often referred to as the “blue force” while the PLAA units are referred to as 

the “red force.” The dedicated brigade is a professional force and recent training events indicate that it 

significantly challenges the PLAA training units.35

Section 3: How the PLA Will Fight—Tactics and Techniques

This section of the TTR will detail the specifics of Chinese offensive and defensive tactical actions. It will 

first recount the Chinese doctrinal description of tactical actions, then provide four graphical 

representations of an analytical interpretation of sample tactical actions using TC 7-100.2, Opposing 

Force Tactics terminology and graphics.

Chinese doctrine outlines two basic tactical actions—offensive and defensive. It argues that while these 

two types of tactics are fundamentally different in nature, it is not possible to have one without the 

other. Thus, defensive actions only exist because there are offensive actions and conversely, with only 

the presence of defensive action and the absence of offensive action, the final objective of war can 

never be fully realized.36

This statement demonstrates that Chinese military philosophy necessitates offensive action in order to 

achieve victory in war. Because of this, a key tenant of Chinese military action is “gaining initiative by 

striking first.”37 This applies to local wars and is a means of gaining initiative on the battlefield. Chinese 

military thought holds that not striking first causes the loss of momentum and creates the possibility of

decisive defeat. This concept holds true for both offensive and defensive missions. Chinese doctrine 

requires that all defensive actions be planned and conducted with the aim of changing over to the 

offensive as quickly as possible.38

PLA Doctrine

Offense

Chinese military doctrine holds that victory can only be won by attacking. This is a fundamental tactical 

principle that holds true for all echelons. PLA doctrine also states that victory is more likely with 

numerical superiority. The ratio of 3 to 1 is the minimum required, but much higher ratios, such as 10 to 

1, are preferred.39
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15 UNCLASSIFIED

For the PLA, the key purpose of offensive action is to annihilate the enemy’s effectiveness and occupy 

the enemy’s important terrain and targets. To accomplish this, Chinese doctrine divides offensive 

tactical actions into offensive operations patterns. These patterns, or actions, have a number of basic 

tasks, the most important of which is annihilating the enemy.40 Table 2 below details the three types of 

operations patterns and the eight basic tasks for offensive actions.

Chinese offensive doctrine also highlights key principles for offensive actions. These principles are: 

centralize strength to form superiority; conduct full-depth offensive, partition, encirclement, and 

annihilation; keep in mind the whole situation and attack the enemy’s vital points; make changes in 

accordance with the situation and flexibly launch attacks; and fight a quickly decisive battle and 

annihilate the enemy through sudden and vigorous actions. The table below provides a description for 

each of these principles.

Table 2. PLA Army Offensive Tactics

Offensive Operations Patterns Basic Tasks

 Offensive operations toward the enemy in defense

 Offensive operations toward the enemy not wellestablished

 Offensive operations toward the enemy on the move

 Break through enemy positions

 Eliminate the enemy in defense

 Occupy important areas/targets

 Attack/annihilate enemies in stagnation or on the move

 Occupy the enemy’s key depth points

 Cut apart the enemy’s operations disposition

 Block the enemy’s route of withdrawal and reinforcement

 Contain and annihilate the enemy

Key Principles in Offensive Operations

Centralize Strength to Form Superiority Use of organic and reinforced forces and weapons systems to 

create comprehensive superiority over the enemy in both 

quantity and quality and to form absolute superiority at a 

certain time in a local space.

Conduct Full-Depth Offensive, Partition, Encirclement, and 

Annihilation

Offensive actions should unfold simultaneously in the full 

depth of the enemy’s dispositions in order to divide the 

enemy’s forces in the shortest time possible and weaken the 

enemy to the point that containment and annihilation is 

possible.

Keep in Mind the Whole Situation and Attack the Enemy’s 

Vital Points

Carry out prioritized attacks and focused assaults against key 

enemy targets based on knowledge of the enemy and the 

whole situation.

Make Changes in Accordance with the Situation and 

Flexibly Launch Attacks

Make adjustments according to change in battlefield 

conditions and use a variety of combat measures to strike at 

the enemy.

Fight a Quickly Decisive Battle and Annihilate the Enemy 

through Sudden and Vigorous Actions

Employ sudden, firm, quick, and continuous offensive actions 

to keep intense pressure on the enemy forces in order to 

ensure a positive outcome of the offensive action in the 

shortest time possible.

Defense

Chinese doctrine views defensive tactics as a means of transitioning to the offense in order to secure 

victory. The PLA Army will assume the defense in order to: preserve friendly force strength, gain time, 

economize forces, consolidate captured objectives, hold key terrain, and cover a withdrawal.41
Threat Tactics Report: China

16 UNCLASSIFIED

The main purpose of defensive actions is to cause the enemy casualties, protect a key area or target, 

delay or foil the enemy’s offensive, race against time, and preserve combat strength to set the stage for 

transition to the offense.42 To accomplish this, Chinese doctrine divides defensive actions into three 

operations patterns and identifies five basic tasks; see table 3 below.

Chinese defensive doctrine also identifies key principles for successful operations. These principles are 

full-depth, integrated defense; amassing strength to form focused resistance; close combination of 

protection, resistance, attack, and counterattack actions; and fight for initiative through firm and active 

actions. Table 3 provides a more detailed description of each of these principles.

Table 3. PLA Army Defensive Tactics

Defensive Operations Patterns Basic Tasks

 Positional Defense

 Mobile Defense

 Maneuver Defense

 Safeguard important areas or targets to foil the enemy's 

offensive

 Block the enemy's reinforcement, breakthrough or retreats, 

and delay enemy actions

 Suppress and attract the enemy to create favorable battle 

opportunities for annihilating the enemy or covering offensive 

actions of the main force

 Consolidate occupied areas, resisting the enemy's counterassault, or assure the flank safety of the main force

 Cover the centralization, maneuver, transfer, or rest and 

reorganization of the main force

Key Principles in Defensive Operations

Full-Depth, Integrated Defense Maximize use of the terrain and the capabilities of available

friendly forces to conduct an integrated defense.

Amassing Strength to Form Focused Resistance Centralize defensive forces to mass combat power and provide 

protection from the enemy’s offense. Keep the forces 

maneuverable.

Close Combination of Protection, Resistance, Attack, and 

Counterattack Actions

Conduct close protection to preserve combat power, block the 

enemy’s offensive tactics, and attrite its forces in order to 

prepare friendly forces for assuming offensive actions.

Fight for Initiative through Firm and Active Actions Fight for local superiority in generally inferior circumstances by 

using forces flexibly, planning actions smartly, and applying 

tactics with imagination.

Tactical Diagrams

The purpose of this section is to provide a picture of how the PLA Army will fight based on an analytical 

interpretation of the compilation of available PLA doctrine and intelligence community analytical 

assessments of the ground forces.

All diagrams are an analyst’s rendition of what a PLA Army action could look like. None of the diagrams 

are pulled directly from Chinese doctrine,

iii but the actions, tasks, and principles that will be identified in 

the graphic or accompanying description will be. The diagrams will depict PLAA actions, tasks, and 

 

iii ACE Threats Integration’s review of available Chinese doctrine revealed no known diagrams readily available.
Threat Tactics Report: China

17 UNCLASSIFIED

principles using TC 7-100.2, Opposing Force Tactics terminology and graphics. There are four diagrams in 

this section: two offensive actions and two defensive actions. The graphics are titled according to the 

Chinese doctrinal action but also includes the TC 7-100.2 action equivalent in parentheses.

Tactical Offense: Offensive operations toward the enemy on the move

(annihilation ambush)

In this first diagram, the PLA red force battalion is conducting an offensive action against a blue force 

company on the move. The red force comprises three infantry companies with two artillery platoons, a 

MANPAD platoon, and close air support tasked from higher. The battalion is conducting an annihilation 

ambush, in order to destroy the blue company’s headquarters and combat service support.

This diagram is an example of a Chinese offensive operation toward an enemy on the move and the 

following Chinese doctrinal tasks are depicted: attack/annihilate the enemy on the move, cut apart the 

enemy’s disposition, block the enemy’s route of withdrawal and reinforcement, and contain and 

annihilate the enemy. Additionally, this graphic demonstrates three key offensive principles: conduct 

full-depth offensive, partition, encirclement, annihilation; keep in mind the whole situation and attack 

the enemy’s vital points; and fight a quickly decisive battle and annihilate the enemy through sudden 

and vigorous actions.

Graphic Description: The blue force company, as part of a larger maneuver, is traveling along a main 

avenue of approach. The red force battalion, aware of the maneuver in advance, ambushes the 

company in order to destroy the headquarters element and the combat service support element. An 

observer post established to the east acts as an early warning system for the battalion. As the blue 

company moves west, the ambush element—two infantry companies and an attack helicopter—move 

into position and prepare to attack. When the headquarters element enters the kill zone, the ambush 

elements begin the attack. The ambush is supported by two support elements, an infantry platoon that 

engages the lead vehicles and an artillery platoon that targets the convoy with indirect fire. To stall 

reinforcements and protect the ambush elements, the battalion has three security elements, two 

infantry platoons, and an air defense platoon equipped with MANPADS.
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18 UNCLASSIFIED

Figure 4. Tactical Offense: Offensive operations toward the enemy on the move 

(annihilation ambush)

Operational Offense: Offensive operations toward an enemy in the 

defense (integrated attack)

In this second diagram the PLA red force is an amphibious armored brigade attacking an island where a 

blue battalion is in the defense. The red force is comprised of three armored battalions, one mechanized 

infantry battalion, one artillery battery, one air defense company, and one SPF company. The brigade is 

divided into smaller forces in order to facilitate the commander’s objective of destroying the blue force.

This diagram is an example of a Chinese offensive operation toward an enemy in the defense and the 

following Chinese doctrinal tasks are depicted: eliminate the enemy in the defense, occupy important 

areas, annihilate enemies in stagnation, cut apart the enemy’s disposition, block the enemy’s route of 

withdrawal and reinforcement, and contain and annihilate the enemy. Additionally, this graphic 

demonstrates four key offensive principles: centralize strength; conduct full-depth offensive, partition,

encirclement, and annihilation; keep in mind the whole situation and attack the enemy’s vital points; 

and fight a quickly decisive battle and annihilate the enemy through sudden and vigorous actions.
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19 UNCLASSIFIED

Graphic Description: The blue force battalion, in defense on an island with hilly terrain, is attacked by a 

red force amphibious brigade. The brigade has divided its assets into smaller forces in order to enable its 

main effort attack on the battalion’s combat service support element. Three battalions of armor and 

three battalions of mechanized infantry are tasked with fixing the blue battalion’s three defensive 

positions. They are supported by artillery fire. An additional fixing force, an attack helicopter, is tasked 

with fixing the blue battalion reserve. While the blue main defense force is fixed, an SPF company 

infiltrates to the enemy’s rear in order to observe the combat service support element. With the area 

under observation and the enemy battalion’s main defense forces fixed, the exploitation force—two 

armored battalions, an air defense platoon, and indirect fire from a naval vessel—seize initiative to 

attack and destroy the battalion’s combat service support.

Figure 5. Operational Offense: Offensive operations toward the enemy in the defense 

(integrated attack)

Tactical Defense: Mobile defense (maneuver defense)

For this next diagram, the PLA red force, a motorized infantry battalion, is in the defense. The blue force 

is conducting an offensive action, attacking from two avenues. The red force elects to conduct a 

maneuver defense in order to inflict as many casualties as possible while preserving its own forces. 
Threat Tactics Report: China

20 UNCLASSIFIED

This diagram is an example of a Chinese mobile defense and the following Chinese doctrinal tasks are 

depicted: suppress and attract the enemy to create favorable battle opportunities for annihilating the 

enemy and consolidate occupied areas. Additionally, this graphic demonstrates three key defensive 

principles: amassing strength to form focused resistance; close combination of protection, resistance, 

attack, and counterattack actions; and fight for initiative through firm and active actions.

Graphic description: A red force motorized infantry battalion is in the defense. In order to preserve its 

forces for a follow-on counterattack, the battalion elects to use the terrain to its advantage and conduct 

a maneuver defense. As the enemy approaches from the east, it will be engaged by the battalion’s 

disruption elements (three combat security outposts (CSOPs), concealed in the forested terrain. While 

the disruption element is engaging the enemy, the battalion’s artillery (tasked down from higher), fires 

on the enemy, targeting key components of the enemy’s combat system. The artillery barrage and 

disruption element provide an opportunity for the main defense elements to engage the enemy. After 

hitting the enemy with max firepower, the contact elements, on order, move to preplanned defensive 

positions to the west. The main defense’s shielding elements conduct ambushes along the enemy’s 

route in order to delay the enemy and provide the necessary cover for the contact elements maneuver.

Figure 6. Tactical Defense: Mobile defense (Maneuver defense)
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21 UNCLASSIFIED

Operational Defense: Positional defense (area defense)

For this final diagram, the PLA red force, an amphibious armored brigade, is in the defense after seizing 

terrain. The blue force is attacking from the east. The red force elects to conduct an area defense in 

order to deny the enemy access to the recently seized terrain.

This diagram is an example of a Chinese positional defense, or area defense, and the following Chinese 

doctrinal tasks are depicted: safeguard important areas or targets, delay enemy actions, suppress and 

attract the enemy to create favorable battle opportunities for annihilating the enemy, and consolidate 

occupied areas. Additionally, this graphic demonstrates four key defensive principles: full-depth, 

integrated defense; amassing strength to form focused resistance; close combination of protection, 

resistance, attack, and counterattack actions; and fight for initiative through firm and active actions.

Graphic Description: A red force brigade consisting of three armored battalions and one mechanized 

infantry battalion, supported with one artillery battery, one air defense company, one SPF company, and 

close air support tasked from higher is in the defense. The force is protecting recently seized terrain. As 

the enemy approaches from the east, it is engaged by the brigade’s disruption force. The disruption 

force has created three defensive positions in order to deceive the enemy into believing the main 

defense force is farther east than it actually is. The disruption force uses these positions to channelize 

the enemy. As the enemy progresses farther east, two disruption forces will block the enemy forces 

while the third disruption force will delay the enemy and on order begin movement back to the main 

defense force. The enemy, deceived into thinking the red force is retrograding, advances west and 

encounters the main defense force.

Figure 7. Operational Defense: Positional defense (area defense)
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22 UNCLASSIFIED

Section 4: PLA Army Weapons and Equipment

This section details a snapshot of the main types of weapons and equipment available in the Chinese 

arsenal. This section does not provide an exhaustive list, but rather includes the most common, most 

important, and most recently acquired systems available to China’s PLA forces.

The PLAA’s ground combat vehicles consist of main battle tanks, light tanks, and armored personnel 

carriers. The PLA is slowly modernizing these vehicles by replacing the oldest ones in service with newer, 

more modern systems. For its MBTs, the PLA still relies heavily on its Type 59 systems, first introduced 

to the PLA in the 1950s; however, these systems have been retrofitted and modernized with new 

weapon control system, infrared searchlights, and laser rangefinders.43 The second most prolific tank 

type in the PLA is the Type 96. These tanks are considered part of China’s second-generation battle 

tanks. Most recently China has been fielding the Type 99 MBT. This system is more enhanced than the 

majority of systems at the PLA’s disposal, particularly because it is equipped with explosive reactive 

armor.44 In addition to fielding more tank systems, the PLA is equipping its forces with armored 

personnel carriers (APCs) and infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), many of which are amphibious.

The PLA has a significant artillery arsenal and is believed to have more than 13,000 systems.45 It is 

following its modernization trend of motorizing its forces by seeking out self-propelled systems for 

procurement and development. Some of the PLA’s artillery pieces are specifically designed for anti-tank 

(AT) employment. The PLA’s additional AT capability is found in its AT missile arsenal. Recent PLA 

exercises have demonstrated significant AT missile proficiency with capabilities such as fire-and-forget 

features and automatic self-guidance systems.46

Table 4: Key PLA Army Weapons and Equipment

Ground Combat Vehicles in 

Service

Artillery Systems in Service AT/SAM Systems in Service

Type 59 MBT 2200 120mm Type 89 SP AT 750 HJ-9 SP AT 400

Type 96/96A 2000 100mm Type 73 towed AT 1300 HJ-12 ATGM UNK

Type 98A/99/99A 640 152mm Type 54/66 towed 2100 SA-10 UNK

Type 63/63C 1650 122mm Type 54-1 towed 3800 HQ-16 SP SAM UNK

Type 99/99A 600 122mm Type 89 SP 750 HY-6 MANPADS UNK

Type 86/86A AIFV 1250 300/370mm AR3 MRLS UNK PGZ-07 SPAAG UNK

Type 89 APC 1500

Type 92/92A/92B AIFV 1850

Type 04 AIFV 750

The PLA Army is well prepared to conduct air defense. Air defense units are equipped with anti-aircraft 

guns, self-propelled anti-aircraft guns (SPAAGs), self-propelled gun-missiles, and surface-to-air missile 

(SAM) systems.

47
Threat Tactics Report: China

23 UNCLASSIFIED

Table 5: PLA Army Aviation Assets

Rotary Wing Aircraft in Service Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in Service

WZ-10 Attack Helicopter 60+ ASN-15 (hand launched) UNK

Z-9 Family Attack Helicopters 255 ASN-104/ASN-105 UNK

Z-19 Attack Helicopter 48+ ASN-206 UNK

Mi-17 Family Transport Helicopters 202+

The PLA Army’s aviation capabilities are primarily made up of attack and transport helicopters and 

UAVs. The PLAA has been dramatically increasing the number of aircraft at its disposal, both manned 

and unmanned systems. China’s increased procurement of transport helicopters is indicative of China’s 

efforts to make the PLAA more maneuverable. China’s increased purchases of attack helicopters is 

indicative of the PLAA’s intention to utilize close air support during tactical engagements. The PLAA is 

estimated to have more than 300 unmanned systems currently in service. These systems are used for 

short-range reconnaissance missions and to support artillery targeting.48

It is important to note that despite extensive modernization efforts and significant procurement of 

modern platforms, more than half of the PLAA is still equipped with dated technology. The PLAA has 

attempted to mitigate this weakness by upgrading the dated technology with after-market upgrades. 

While these upgrades make the platform itself more capable in general, particularly versus a tier 3 or 4 

enemy, it does not make it capable versus a better-equipped enemy.

Section 5: Conclusion

Currently, there are no open source US government products that detail the PLAA. This product is 

designed to fill that gap and provide the training community with a snapshot look at conditions that 

shape China’s operational environment, and a detailed look at the PLAA’s military capabilities, tactics, 

and techniques. 

As has been featured in this report, China has prioritized the modernization of its military in an effort to 

increase its capabilities and refine its tactics and techniques. Chinese leadership has placed this 

emphasis on its military because it believes a strong military is essential to achieving great power status 

and critical to preventing other countries from damaging Chinese national interests.49

China holds a unique position in US foreign affairs because it is seen as a partner and a threat at the 

same time. This unique position exists because Chinese national interests are often times in line with 

those of the US. However, they are just as often in contradiction to the US. It is these areas of 

contradiction that should be of particular interest to the US training community. While China may not 

pose an immediate direct threat to the US and its interests today, its actions can create the potential for 

future threats to US national interests.

China recognizes this situation, and while professing to be following a peaceful rise, still takes steps to 

prepare its military to fight in an environment where the US may be present. Its military trains against 

what are perceived to be US tactics and techniques while the government prioritizes acquisition of 

systems designed to counter the US’s technological overmatch. Understanding this dynamic in a global 
Threat Tactics Report: China

24 UNCLASSIFIED

context and understanding the specifics of the PLAA’s capabilities and tactics makes the US Army more 

prepared for any and all contingencies.

REAL-WORLD CONDITIONS APPLIED TO TRAINING

The TC 7-100 Hybrid Threat series, the Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE), and the Worldwide 

Equipment Guide provide training resources for applying real-world conditions to training. The tactics 

used by the Chinese PLAA can be found as part of the composite threat model that exists in the hybrid 

threat doctrine series. The PLAA uses principles of offense and defense very similar to those present in 

TC 7-100.2, Opposing Force Tactics. Additionally, the operational environment outlined in the DATE also 

includes characteristics of the PLAA and the Chinese OE.

Replication in Training

Of the countries in the DATE, the one that can most realistically replicate China is Donovia. Like China, 

Donovia is a country intent on growing its national power through diplomatic and military means. 

Recent years of economic growth have enabled Donovia to focus on its military development and 

increase its capabilities. Donovia is not a complete representation of China however due to how its 

military is equipped. In order to portray China in a training environment, Donovia’s military equipment 

would need to be downgraded to tier 2 and tier 3 systems; Donovia’s integrated air defense system 

(IADS) could remain tier 1.

All four of the PLAA’s tactics graphically depicted in this report can be found in TC 7-100.2, Opposing 

Force Tactics. For more information on how to replicate these actions, reference the TC 7-100.2. For 

information on how to build a force structure to conduct these actions, reference TC 7-100.4, Hybrid 

Threat Force Structure Organization Guide (Chapter 3, Section VIII “Building an OPFOR Order of Battle”).

The table below contains excerpts from the TC 7-100.2 that define the tactical actions discussed in this 

report.

Table 6. Excerpts from TC 7-100.2 Opposing Force Tactics

Offensive Operations toward an Enemy on the Move

(Annihilation Ambush)

 

3-151. The purpose of an annihilation ambush is to destroy 

the enemy force. These are violent attacks designed to 

ensure the enemy’s return fire, if any, is ineffective. 

Generally, this type of ambush uses the terrain to the 

attacker’s advantage and employs mines and other 

obstacles to halt the enemy in the kill zone. The goal of the 

obstacles is to keep the enemy in the kill zone throughout 

the action. Using direct, or indirect, fire systems, the 

support element destroys or suppresses all enemy forces 

in the kill zone. It remains in a concealed location and may 

have special weapons, such as antitank weapons.
Threat Tactics Report: China

25 UNCLASSIFIED

Offensive Operations towards an Enemy in the Defense

(Integrated Attack)

3-64. Integrated attack is an offensive action where the 

OPFOR seeks military decision by destroying the enemy’s 

will and/or ability to continue fighting through the 

application of combined arms effects. Integrated attack is 

often employed when the OPFOR enjoys overmatch with 

respect to its opponent and is able to bring all elements of 

offensive combat power to bear. It may also be employed 

against a more sophisticated and capable opponent, if the 

appropriate window of opportunity is created or available.

Mobile Defense (Maneuver Defense)

4-62. In situations where the OPFOR is not completely 

overmatched, it may conduct a tactical maneuver defense. 

This type of defense is designed to achieve tactical 

decision by skillfully using fires and maneuver to destroy 

key elements of the enemy’s combat system and deny 

enemy forces their objective, while preserving the friendly 

force. Maneuver defenses cause the enemy to continually 

lose effectiveness until he can no longer achieve his 

objectives. They can also economize force in less 

important areas while the OPFOR moves additional forces 

onto the most threatened axes.

Positional Defense (Area Defense)

4-85. In situations where the OPFOR must deny key areas (or 

the access to them) or where it is overmatched, it may 

conduct a tactical area defense. Area defense is designed 

to achieve a decision in one of two ways: 

 By forcing the enemy’s offensive operations to 

culminate before he can achieve his objectives. 

 By denying the enemy his objectives while preserving 

combat power until decision can be achieved through 

strategic operations or operational mission 

accomplishment.

Additional considerations for replicating China in training environments would be replicating China’s 

capabilities in five key areas. These areas are INFOWAR, RISTA, fire support, air defense, and SPF. 

China’s capabilities in these five areas have received significant emphasis and growth in the past several 

decades resulting in capabilities worthy of replicating in training environments. The chart below details 

how training centers could replicate a capability comparable to China’s.

Table 7. How to use doctrine to replicate China

Capability (What) Actor/Order of Battle (Who) Tactic (How)

INFOWAR Donovia has an INFOWAR brigade (section 

2C-9 of the DATE) that can be used to for 

INFOWAR replication.

TC 7-100.2 Opposing Force Tactics Chapter 7

FM 7-100.1 Opposing Force Operations Chapter 5

To replicate China: Highlight strategic INFOWAR 

operations discussed in the FM.

RISTA Donovia has a very robust RISTA capability 

with a dedicated command. The order of 

TC 7-100.2 Opposing Force Tactics Chapter 8

FM 7-100.1 Opposing Force Operations Chapter 6
Threat Tactics Report: China

26 UNCLASSIFIED

Capability (What) Actor/Order of Battle (Who) Tactic (How)

battle of this command can also be found in 

the DATE section 2C-9. To replicate China: Place emphasis on satellite 

RISTA capabilities.

Fire Support Donovia has a very powerful fire support 

capability. Its units are equipped with tier 1 

fire support. To replicate China, a training 

center could use Donovia’s fire support 

orders of battle, however the systems would 

need to be reduced to tier 2 capability.

TC 7-100.2 Opposing Force Tactics Chapter 9

FM 7-100.1 Opposing Force Operations Chapter 7

To replicate China: Make prolific use of 

“annihilation fire.”

Air Defense Donovia has a robust air defense capability 

made of primarily tier 1 systems. Donovian 

air defense units can be used to replicate 

China’s air defense assets.

TC 7-100.2 Opposing Force Tactics Chapter 11 

FM 7-100.1 Opposing Force Operations Chapter 9

To replicate China: Highlight missile systems.

SPF China has placed great emphasis on growing 

its SPF capability in recent years and 

Donovia’s SPF capability can sufficiently 

represent China’s. 

TC 7-100.2 Opposing Force Tactics Chapter 15

FM 7-100.1 Opposing Force Operations Chapter 13

To replicate China: Highlight amphibious and 

airborne operations discussed in the FM.
Threat Tactics Report: China

27 UNCLASSIFIED

Related Products

See the Red Diamond Newsletter, which contains current articles on a variety of topics useful to both 

soldiers and civilians ranging from enemy tactics and techniques to the nature and analysis of various 

threat actors. 

For detailed information on weapons and equipment, see the Worldwide Equipment Guide. 

To see more products from TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration, visit the Army Training Network (ATN)

with CAC access: https://atn.army.mil/dsp_template.aspx?dpID=377.

POC

Author

Jennifer Dunn

913-684-7962 (COMM)

552-7962 (DSN)

TRADOC G-2 Analytical and Control Element Threats Integration (ACE-TI)

803 Harrison Drive, BLDG 467

Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027

Jon Cleaves, ACE-TI Director

Penny Mellies, ACE-TI Deputy Director

Jon Moilanen, ACE-TI Operations

Angela Wilkins, ACE-TI Production Integration

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2007.

Wortzel, Larry M. “The Chinese People’s Liberation Army and Information Warfare.” Strategic Studies Institute. March 2014.

Table and Figure Credits

Table 1. PLA Army Combat Unit Roll-up. Source: Source: “China – Army – Armed Forces Structure,” Military Periscope, 1 

February 2015; “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2015,” Office of the 

Secretary of Defense, 07 April 2015.

Table 2. PLA Army Offensive Tactics. Source: Cui Yafeng, “Science of Army Operations,” PLA Press, June 2009.

Table 3. PLA Army Defensive Tactics. Source: Cui Yafeng, “Science of Army Operations,” PLA Press, June 2009.

Table 4. Key PLA Army Weapons and Equipment. Source: “China – Army – Armed Forces Structure,” Military Periscope, 1 

February 2015.

Table 5. PLA Army Aviation Assets. Source: “China – Army – Armed Forces Structure,” Military Periscope, 1 February 2015.

Table 8. Excerpts from TC 7-100.2 Opposing Force Tactics. Source: TC 7-100.2 Opposing Force Tactics.

Table 9. How to use doctrine to replicate China. Source: TC 7-100.2 Opposing Force Tactics

Figure 1. China's Military Regions and Group Army Locations. Source: “Military and Security Developments Involving the 

People’s Republic of China, 2014,” Office of the Secretary of Defense, 24 April 2012.

Figure 2. Chinese soldiers learn how to use new command and control platform. Source: Asia Studies Detachment Report, 2015.

Figure 3. 2006 Motorized Division Exercise. Source: PLA's Motorized Division Launches War Exercise, 2006.

Figure 8. Tactical Offense: Offensive operations toward the enemy on the move (Annihilation ambush). Source: Analyst 

Interpretation.

Figure 9. Operational Offense: Offensive operations toward the enemy in the defense (Integrated Attack). Source: Analyst 

Interpretation.

Figure 10. Tactical Defense: Mobile defense (Maneuver defense). Source: Analyst Interpretation.

Figure 11. Operational Defense: Positional defense (Area defense). Source: Analyst Interpretation. 

Endnotes

 

1

James R. Clapper, “Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,” Office of the Director of National 

Intelligence, 26 February 2015.

2 Mark E. Manyin, Stephen Daggett, Ben Dolven, Susan V. Lawrence, Michael F. Martin, Ronald O’Rourke, and Bruce Vaughn, 

“Pivot to the Pacific? The Obama Administration’s “Rebalancing” Toward Asia,” CRS Report for Congress, 28 March 2012.
Threat Tactics Report: China

29 UNCLASSIFIED

 

3

James R. Clapper, “Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,” Office of the Director of National 

Intelligence, 26 February 2015; Vincent R. LTG Stewart, “Worldwide Threat Assessment,” Defense Intelligence Agency, 3 

February 2015.

4 “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2015,” Office of the Secretary of Defense, 07 

April 2015.

5 “The Science of Military Strategy,” Military Science Publishing House, 2013.

6 “Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - China And Northeast Asia,” IHS Jane’s, 6 April 2015.

7 Michael S. Chase, et al, “China’s Incomplete Military Transformation: Assessing the Weaknesses of the People’s Liberation 

Army (PLA),” RAND Corporation, 2015.

8 Dennis J. Blasko, “PLA Ground Forces: Moving Toward a Smaller More Rapidly Deployable, Modern Combined Arms Force,” 

RAND, 2008.

9 “Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - China And Northeast Asia,” IHS Jane’s, 6 April 2015.

10 “The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces,” Information Office of the State Council, The People’s Republic of

China, April 2013.

11 “China’s Military Strategy,” The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, May 2015.

12 “China’s Military Strategy,” The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, May 2015.

13 Clover, Charles, “China: Projections of Power,” Financial Times, 8 April 2015.

14 Michael S. Chase, et al, “China’s Incomplete Military Transformation: Assessing the Weaknesses of the People’s Liberation 

Army (PLA),” RAND Corporation, 2015.

15 “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2014,” Office of the Secretary of Defense, 24 

April 2014.

16 “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2014,” Office of the Secretary of Defense, 24 

April 2014.

17 “Jane’s World Armies – China.” IHS Jane’s. 24 February 2015.

18 “Jane’s World Armies – China.” IHS Jane’s. 24 February 2015.

19 Michael S. Chase, et al, “China’s Incomplete Military Transformation: Assessing the Weaknesses of the People’s Liberation 

Army (PLA),” RAND Corporation, 2015.

20 “Jane’s World Armies – China.” IHS Jane’s. 24 February 2015.

21 “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2014,” Office of the Secretary of Defense, 24 

April 2014.

22 Eric C. Anderson and Jeffrey G. Engstrom, “Capabilities of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army to Carry Out Military Action in 

the Event of a Regional Military Conflict,” SAIC, March 2009.

23 Dean Cheng, “China’s Active Defense Strategy and Its Regional Impact,” Heritage Foundation, 1 February 2011.

24 “Handbook of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army,” Defense Intelligence Agency, November 1984.

25 “China – Asia – Overview,” Military Periscope, 1 February 2015.

26 Shane Bilsborough, “China’s Emerging C4ISR Revolution,” The Diplomat, 13 August 2013.

27 “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2014.

28 You Ji, “China’s Emerging National Defense Strategy,” The Jamestown Foundation, 2004.

29 Michael S. Chase, et al, “China’s Incomplete Military Transformation: Assessing the Weaknesses of the People’s Liberation 

Army (PLA),” RAND Corporation, 2015.

30 Martin Andrew, “Modernizing PLA Logistics,” The Jamestown Foundation, 5 January 2006.

31 Martin Andrew, “Modernizing PLA Logistics,” The Jamestown Foundation, 5 January 2006.

32 “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2014,” Office of the Secretary of Defense, 24 

April 2014.

33 Shannon Tiezzi, “China and the Lethal Drone Option,” The Diplomat, 15 January 2015.

34 Dennis J. Blasko, “PLA Special Operations Forces: Organizations, Missions, and Training,” The Jamestown Foundation, 1 May 

2015.

35 Gary Li, “The Wolves of Zhurihe: China’s OPFOR Comes of Age,” 20 February 2015.

36 Cui Yafeng, “Science of Army Operations,” PLA Press, June 2009.

37 Nan Li, “The PLA’s Evolving Campaign Doctrine and Strategies,” RAND, 1999.

38 “Handbook of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army,” Defense Intelligence Agency, November 1984.
Threat Tactics Report: China

30 UNCLASSIFIED

 

39 “Handbook of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army,” Defense Intelligence Agency, November 1984.

40 Cui Yafeng, “Science of Army Operations,” PLA Press, June 2009.

41 “Handbook of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army,” Defense Intelligence Agency, November 1984.

42 Cui Yafeng, “Science of Army Operations,” PLA Press, June 2009.

43 “Type 59 MBT,” Military Periscope, 1 October 2014.

44 “Jane’s World Armies – China.” IHS Jane’s. 24 February 2015.

45 “China – Army – Armed Forces Structure,” Military Periscope, 1 February 2015.

46 “Jane’s World Armies – China.” IHS Jane’s. 24 February 2015.

47 “Jane’s World Armies – China.” IHS Jane’s. 24 February 2015.

48 “Jane’s World Armies – China.” IHS Jane’s. 24 February 2015.

49 “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2015,” Office of the Secretary of Defense, 07 

April 2015.