FINNISH SECURITY AND EUROPEAN SECURITY POLICY

Stephen J. Blank

September 27, 1996
ii

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distribution is unlimited. The author wishes to express his

gratitude to the Institute for National Security Studies of the

U.S. Air Force Academy which supported the research and

interviews cited here.

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iii

FOREWORD

In 1995 Finland joined the European Union (EU). This action

culminated several years of a fundamental reorientation of

Finnish security policy as Finland moved from the neutrality

imposed on it by the Soviet Union to a policy with a priority on

European integration through the European Union. Finland, in

joining the EU, has retained its independent defense and security

posture, even as it seeks to strengthen its standing abroad and

gain added leverage, through the EU, for dealing with Russia.

Finland's odyssey indicates much about two fundamental issues in

European security: coping with Russia's crises, and the

interrelationship between the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization as providers of security for small states in Europe.

Furthermore, Finland's proximity to Russia and the difficult

history of Fenno-Russian relations have imposed on Finnish

policymakers the need for penetrating and sober analysis of

Finland's and Europe's security situation. Therefore, Finland's

evolution from an imposed neutrality to overt participation in

European integration merits our careful scrutiny and attention.

RICHARD H. WITHERSPOON

Colonel, U.S. Army

Director, Strategic Studies Institute
iv

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

STEPHEN J. BLANK is the Douglas MacArthur Professor of Research

at the U.S. Army War College and has been an Associate Professor

of Russian/Soviet Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute

since 1989. Prior to this appointment, Dr. Blank was Associate

Professor for Soviet Studies at the Center for Aerospace

Doctrine, Research, and Education of Air University at Maxwell

Air Force Base. Dr. Blank's M.A. and Ph.D. are in Russian history

from the University of Chicago. He has published numerous

articles on Soviet/Russian military and foreign policies, notably

in the Third World, and is the author of The Sorcerer as

Apprentice: Stalin's Commissariat of Nationalities, 1917-1924

(Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1994).
v

SUMMARY

When Finland joined the European Union (EU) in 1995, it

completed a fundamental transformation of its security policy.

Until the end of the Cold War, Finland's position in Europe

derived from its treaty with the Soviet Union which imposed

neutrality upon it and debarred Finland from any security

cooperation with Scandinavia, Western Europe, and the United

States. The end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union

allowed Finland to move towards European integration through the

EU while preserving its own independent defense posture. Other

reasons for moving towards the EU stemmed from Finland's new

economic vulnerability to trends in the European economy, and its

determination that current security challenges no longer included

the Cold War threat of military invasion. Rather, current dangers

involved the risk of a collapse of Russia's social or political

infrastructure which could then confront Helsinki with challenges

that it could not meet alone.

Therefore, Finland needed to find ways of associating with

other states to meet those nonmilitary challenges and, at the

same time, terminate its erstwhile political isolation by

participating in European integration. It chose the EU over the

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) because the expansion

of NATO to its border would have alarmed Moscow and because

Helsinki viewed the threats to Europe as being essentially

nonmilitary, and thus outside NATO's mandate or purview. Also, as

Finland emerged from the Cold War, it found itself exposed to

severe economic dislocations, if not crises, that forced

integration upon both it and Sweden (whose international economic

lead Finland had to follow).

But, by opting for EU and European integration, Finland

stimulated fears at home that it was abandoning its reliance on

self-defense and chasing what might prove to be an elusive form

of indirect political guarantees in future crises. Other domestic

groups worried that Finland might be drawn into European crises

of others' making where it had no say in decisionmaking since it

was outside the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).

As a result, the decision to join the EU forced a major domestic

debate which was won in 1994 by supporters of membership, and

which also led to publication of a White Paper on Finnish

security in 1995.

The Finnish Government published the 1995 White Paper to

educate Finnish elites and masses as to the purposes behind

Finland's policy and in order to give it a formal public

statement. The White Paper retains Finland's commitment to

independent defense. It also reflects Finland's support for a

strengthened EU/WEU capability for crisis management, peace

operations, and for dealing with the challenges posed by Russia's
vi

current crisis. The White Paper lists the threats that could

engage Finland due to Russia's crisis. These threats pertain

mainly to the possible breakdown of socio-political order in

Russia, the consequences of which would rapidly spread towards

Finland and the Baltic states while overwhelming those states'

ability to confront those challenges.

 The White Paper both reaffirmed and carried forward the

policy perspectives that had developed in 1992-1994 as Finland

prepared for accession to the EU. It also reflected Finnish

policymakers' belief that EU membership opened the way to

overcome Finland's prior political isolation and even attain

indirect security guarantees. At the same time, Finland preserved

its independent defense capability.

But by 1995, when the White Paper came out, other Finnish

statements indicated a belief that the Western European Union

(WEU), the military arm, so to speak, of the EU, could become an

institution devoted to peace operations and crisis management and

that Finland could safely associate with the WEU for such

operations. The WEU, combined with NATO's Partnership for Peace

program that began in 1994, could become vehicles for Finland's

military integration with Europe and progress towards achieving

real, as opposed to indirect, security guarantees from Europe and

even, possibly, from the United States.

Finland has apparently come around to advocating this

position. It participates in the Partnership for Peace program

and accepts the EU/WEU as a security provider for instances where

peacemaking or peacekeeping forces are needed or for purely

political or economic issues. At the same time, Finland rejects

the idea that the WEU could be a parallel pillar or alternative

to NATO. As for self-defense, Finland remains as strongly

committed as before to providing its own robust self-defense

against threats to its integrity or sovereignty. One reason for

Helsinki's position is its belief that Finnish adhesion to the

WEU would again unnecessarily provoke Russia since Russia has

clearly indicated its apprehension about Finnish membership in

any European military alliance system.

However, Finland has crafted its evolving position with such

care that if its perspective on its role in European security

issues is accepted abroad, then Finland could come as close as

possible to NATO membership without formal membership in it.

Similarly Finland could come as close as possible to real

political, if not necessarily defense guarantees from either the

WEU or even NATO in the future. Its objectives are to maximize

Finnish room for maneuver and flexibility, while avoiding any

directly provocative actions against Moscow. Thus self-defense

remains the foundation of its position in Europe even as Helsinki

aspires to membership in the overall process of European
vii

integration.

Finland's subtle and evolving policy represents a

substantial departure from its previous, Cold War posture; this

is especially true in regard to NATO membership. Since avoiding

conflict and direct confrontation with Russia are Finland's top

priorities, and NATO expansion would spark such confrontation,

Finland must balance deterrence against Russia with reassurance

that it will not become a hostile base for anti-Russian

activities and the need to pursue European integration further

(to secure itself against nonmilitary threats and gain support if

such threats do emerge). For Finland, therefore, NATO expansion

should take place with maximum transparency, consultation, and

gradualness so that Finland does not become "a front-line state."

Similar goals apply to Finland's relationship with the

Baltic states. Finland's nuanced approach to Russia is not always

appreciated in those states whose emotional recollections of

Soviet/Russian oppression distort their policies. But, Finland is

working with them and other Nordic and Western states to relieve

sources of tension and subject them to international mediation

processes, and to bring the Baltic states into Europe in a

nonprovocative fashion that emulates Finland's own odyssey. Just

as Finland wants Russia integrated into as many European channels

as possible, so, too, does it want the Baltic states equally

enmeshed in those European networks as a means of preserving

regional peace in the Baltic. To the degree that Baltic security

issues are internationalized, peace remains secure, everyone is

consulted, and the Baltic states are not left face to face with

Russia.

Obviously not everyone will appreciate Finnish goals and

perspectives which contradict the vision of the WEU as a

"European pillar" that provides for Europe's defense as distinct

from NATO. Nonetheless, Finland's policy and vision combines

self-defense, a nonprovocative policy that sponsors Russia's

integration into Europe, and Finland's own integration with

Europe into a cohesive whole. For small states which must operate

in the shadow of a status quo set by others and where subregional organizations cannot provide defense against potential

threats, Finland might well become a model of how to proceed in

building individual, regional, and even European security.
1

FINNISH SECURITY AND EUROPEAN SECURITY POLICY

Introduction.

In 1992 Finland applied to join the European Union (EU). It

formally entered the EU 3 years later. This decision to join the

EU reflected several fundamental changes in Finnish policy. By

applying to, and joining, the EU, Finland renounced the Cold War

policy of neutrality imposed by the 1948 Fenno-Soviet Treaty of

Friendship Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (FCMA) and embraced

integration with Europe. Membership in the EU also represents

Finland's newly-gained ability to think about its security in

broader terms than from 1944, when the Union of Soviet Socialist

Republics (USSR) defeated Finland and compelled it to leave World

War II, until 1991, when the Soviet Union fell apart. From 1944-

1991, "defense" and "security" were almost synonymous in Finnish

thinking; policy focused almost solely upon not provoking Moscow.

Issues of economic security and economic integration with Europe

had relatively little significance for Helsinki compared to the

need to define a working relationship with Moscow and safeguard

Finnish independence. Once the Soviet Union collapsed and the

Cold War ended, Helsinki sought to defend Finnish independence by

joining Europe. Finnish goals were to obtain more freedom of

action, a broader sense of security, and political support from

the EU and, more generally, from the West.

Finland's strategic importance to Russia, Scandinavia, and

the Baltic littoral imparts considerable relevance to its

evolving outlook on European security; therefore, Helsinki's

thinking merits serious attention abroad. Thus, the evolution of

Finnish views from the time it applied to the EU (1992) to the

present has considerable significance for both regional security

in the Baltic and for European security more generally. The

decision to join the EU resulted from both a long internal debate

and the changed international situation at the end of the Cold

War. To grasp Finland's policies we must examine the decision to

join the EU, its internal debate and what Finland hopes to gain

from joining, its views on European integration and security

organizations (i.e., the Western European Union (WEU) and the

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)), the future of

European security, and Finnish policy towards Russia and the

Baltic states.

The Decision to Enter the EU.

Finland's application to the EU owes much to its situation

at the end of the Cold War and to the fact that in 1991 Sweden

applied to the EU first.1

 Before that, Finland was not part of

any bloc, and its formal ties to the Soviet-bloc Baltic littoral

states were quite limited. There were no formal political
2

relations with the Baltic republics, which had yet to gain their

independence.

Instead, the 1947 Peace Treaty, the 1948 FCMA Treaty, and

Finland's proximity to the USSR determined the contours of its

policy. The 1947 Paris Peace Treaty set limits to the size of

Finland's armed forces (although it did not prohibit a large

reserve force) and excluded military equipment of an "offensive

nature."2 The FCMA treaty conceded Finland's right to selfdefense, but debarred it from joining any bloc and becoming a

base for foreign armed forces against the Soviet Union. Thus, the

FCMA treaty offered Moscow numerous opportunities to press

Finland to abandon neutrality and forced a highly circumspect

policy upon Helsinki. Finland had to choose neutrality of a

special sort that both blocs would accept.

Neutrality, a distinct and defining attribute of the Cold

War division of Europe, was an impediment to a truly independent

security policy for Finland. Helsinki had a very circumscribed

field of maneuver. Finnish neutrality precluded significant

regional defense cooperation with Sweden, other Scandinavian or

Baltic littoral states, the EU and NATO. Thus, Finland was

outside regional defense systems such as NATO, which guaranteed

Scandinavian states like Norway and Denmark against attack, and

which Sweden also believed provided an indirect guarantee of its

defense. Finland also acted with great caution towards the

emerging Baltic independence movements in the Soviet Union, only

beginning a very low-level cooperation with them in 1990.3

As the Cold War faded, neutrality became irrelevant when

there were no longer any hostile European blocs. As Soviet

pressure ebbed after the late 1980s, Finland also could act more

independently in foreign policy. Thus, in 1990 it unilaterally

renounced the terms of the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty relating to

restrictions on its armed forces stemming from its cooperation

with Germany in World War II (Part III of the treaty) so that it

could act on its own to end all claims upon the reunified

Germany. The other sections of the treaty, dealing with postwar

border changes and reparations, were left intact, but Finland

nevertheless showed its growing interest and ability to obtain

more freedom of action abroad.4

As neutrality waned, other forces pushed Finland toward EU

integration. It became clear after 1991 that Eastern Europe

wanted a return to Europe, not neutrality, and that the only

available form of European integration seemed to be the EU. The

crises since 1991--Yugoslavia, the abortive Soviet coup of 1991,

Russia's long-term instability, and the general European economic

recession after 1992--all forced Finland to realize that its

previous policies had been superseded and were now risks to its

security.5
3

The end of the Cold War opened a new era for Finland, but in

1992 it appeared to Helsinki as if Cold War polarity would be

replaced by division into center versus periphery or rich nations

versus poor. As Finland had been outside the Cold War blocs, it

now risked being consigned to Europe's periphery if it did not

move closer to the EU. At least publicly, Finland also had to

cede more importance to economic issues in its overall security

policy or risk becoming part of Europe's economic periphery.6

Nevertheless, it remained a captive of its location:

Traditional neutrality no longer has the same

significance as it had during the cold war--Finland's

foreign policy leadership wants our country to be

outside the European periphery both economically and

politically. The many elements of uncertainty in

Russia's development have also forced Finland to

participate more closely in European economic,

political, and military integration. Still, Finland's

future choice of policy will be determined not so much

by the fear of the negative effects of Russia's

unstable development as by a positive desire to forge

close links with the economically and militarily strong

central area of Europe. Our relationship with Russia

is, however, the most important single factor as far as

Finland is concerned, owing to its geographical

position.7

The recession of 1992-1995, partly caused by the 1992 crash

of European currencies due to the Bundesbank's deflationary

policies, also pushed an end to neutrality. It forced Finland to

reorganize its economic policy and commit itself more fully to

European integration and domestic restructuring. Due to earlier

mistaken economic policies, Finland, by 1994, was the hardest hit

of all European economies, making fundamental reforms necessary.8

Meanwhile, the end of the Soviet Union and the FCMA treaty regime

led to a new Russo-Finnish Treaty that stressed a common support

for market economies and, thus, greater equality vis-a-vis

Russia. Finnish analysts noted that normal economic actors in a

market relationship do not need an FCMA treaty that was an

instrument of subordination; rather, they meet as equals. They

claimed that Finland's existing market economy actually gives it

an advantage vis-a-vis Russia.9 Therefore, for all these reasons

(Finland's economic security, the need to overcome international

economic threats, the changed dimensions of the European security

agenda, and the changed environment for relations with Russia),

Finland deemed it necessary to approach the EU.

European integration through the EU entails some sacrifice

of autonomy in economic and (potentially) security policy since

the EU's Maastricht Treaty calls for integrated economic policies
4

and currencies, as well as common foreign and security policies

(CFSP), but there are compensations. There are those who claim

that for Western European states, "membership in the European

Union--is in itself a major security guarantee and even a

sufficient security guarantee for almost any country."10 While

this claim is almost certainly exaggerated, EU membership surely

enhances political integration and indirect assurances of

political security by creating a climate where Finland is

regarded as a member of the club and is integrating into Europe.

In 1994, Alpo Rusi, a key advisor to President Martti

Ahtisaari, presented a public rationale for joining the EU. He

observed that because the EU is becoming the framework for

European integration, EU membership offers small states a chance

to influence European developments rather than being passive

objects of European trends.11 At the same time, only the EU can

help stabilize the neighboring Russian provinces of St.

Petersburg and Karelia and contribute thereby to Finnish and

Russian security.

The EU is the preferable organization to join because the

regional threats to Finnish stability are essentially nonmilitary in origin and nature.12 These threats relate to a

potential economic breakdown, ecological dangers, social

upheaval, crime, uncontrolled immigration, etc. Because NATO

relates primarily to issues of military defense, Rusi argued, its

expansion could destabilize Russian reform and is harmful, if not

irrelevant, to the real security challenges around Finland.13

Rusi supported preservation of the Northern European balance

because that status quo contributes to regional security.

Although NATO's posture guarantees the region, expanding NATO

could provoke Russia into more confrontational postures and

policies and deflect it from resolving its domestic problems--the

real threat to security. He also refuted NATO expansion by

claiming that Norway's membership in NATO (and the ensuing

guarantee to its defense) already indirectly strengthen Finnish

and Swedish security.14 Since applicants to the EU like Finland

are satisfied with the status quo, the EU's evolution into a

military power is therefore not to their interests, but quite the

contrary. Instead, Rusi claimed, the EU's expansion would offer

the Baltic and Scandinavian countries more leverage vis-a-vis

Russia.15

Finally, Rusi argued more broadly that the post-Cold War era

is usually typified by new threats that generally cannot be

deterred by military means. While deterrence is still needed

against armed attacks, the real threat is Europe's economicsocial cleavage into rich and poor. Cooperative solutions that

involve new institutions are also necessary, but they cannot

overcome that division of Europe. Only the EU can do that.
5

Therefore, applicants need the EU not so much for military

security, but precisely for its stabilizing potential. The EU's

enlargement becomes the royal road to overcome fundamental socioeconomic challenges and stabilize European security.16

Rusi's ideas also became or reflected the official

consensus. After 1992 official rationales for joining the EU

moved from stressing economic security. Instead, they focused on

a vision of the EU as the center of a greater process of European

integration where Finnish security was more broadly conceived.17

Of course, policy does not emerge solely on the basis of a

logical analysis. Finland still faces a formidable neighbor.

Northern Europe's military division has not changed. Russia still

faces the West here. Indeed, the North is more crucial than ever

to Russia because its nuclear-fuelled ballistic missile submarine

(SSBN) fleet is essentially concentrated there and strategic arms

treaties appear to be forcing Russia to deploy ever greater

percentages of its strategic weapons at sea. Russian conventional

forces are also more concentrated in the Leningrad Military

District as a result of the evacuation of Central Europe.

Outside events can also affect policy. Sweden's 1991

application to the EU forced Helsinki's hand. To balance the

earlier forced military-political inclination to Moscow, Helsinki

had devised a cardinal policy principle that it could not afford

to remain outside any economic organization involving Sweden and

Finland's main customers, Germany and Great Britain. Otherwise

Swedish paper and metalworking industries would capture those

markets and marginalize Finnish exports (and presence) in Western

Europe. This principle led Finland to join free trade agreements

such as the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and the

European Economic Community Organization (the EU's parent

organization) in Sweden's wake. Swedish neutrality was also the

western anchor that allowed Finland to preserve its neutrality

under Soviet pressure since it could argue that since Sweden,

too, was neutral, there was no regional threat to Moscow and,

therefore, no need for Finland to compromise its neutrality.

Thus, Sweden's 1991 application to the EU deprived Finland of

security options other than increased defense spending or

reorientation to either of Europe's two major blocs; this

underscored Finland's isolation from the Nordic community and its

key markets.18 Although major domestic lobbies benefitting from a

relatively privileged trading position with Moscow still hoped to

continue that relationship, Sweden forced Finland's hand before

it was ready.19 Luckily, the Soviet collapse allowed Finland to

apply to the EU, which it then did with alacrity in 1992.

Nevertheless, the decision to enter the EU has serious

consequences for Finland's overall security policy. It forces

Helsinki at some future point to rely for its security on the
6

EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the WEU, NATO, or

some other, as yet unseen, alternative. The EU, too, worried that

Finland's attachment to neutrality could put Finland and it at

odds, a concern that probably led Finland in 1993 to pledge its

support to work for a CFSP, as agreed at Maastricht.20

But, this decision led to domestic attacks on the government

for not having a security doctrine that spelled out how Finland

would evade the CFSP and keep a viable independent defense. One

critic observed,

It looks as though Finland's inverse strategy tends to

be the avoidance of making strategic decisions, not

participating in strategic decisions, not committing

ourselves to the solution of problems, being satisfied

with military "service-level" missions, but nonetheless

entertaining indirect hopes of aid from union countries

(WEU/NATO) if our own security fails us . . . . Thus

Finland is now joining the EU without a clear-cut

doctrine on its own security.21

This criticism also overlooked the fact that the decision to join

the EU indicated the government's desire to integrate with Europe

and its belief in the efficacy of doing so as a hedge against any

future threats that might ensue from Russia--not just an

invasion, but the potential collapse of Russia's civil

infrastructure, or action against the Baltic states.22 At no time

did the government contemplate giving up its doctrine of a

robust, independent defense. But these charges had to be answered

at home, making membership in the EU the subject of a national

referendum in 1994. Thus, the decision to join the EU, especially

as its rationale moved from economics to security, triggered a

grand debate over Finnish security policy, rival views of

European security, and Finland's place in Europe.

The Finnish Debate over the EU.

The Finnish debate over the EU was part of a greater debate

within European circles. One Continentalist school of thought

placed its faith in the evolution of the EU and the WEU as

Europe's primary security agent, while another Atlanticist school

emphasized NATO and the Transatlantic connection. While the

Continentalists argued on the basis of Europe's ever-deepening

security integration, the Atlanticists pointed to the reality of

NATO's function as a force for stability.23 Although sectoral or

economic concerns about the restructuring imposed by membership

in the EU--and dramatized by the concurrent economic crisis--were

expressed, apparently both groups' main concern in this debate

was for neutrality and independence.
7

At home many analysts worried that by remaining an

uncommitted observer at the WEU, Finland would be isolated from

Europe and could be drawn into conflict situations with Russia.

Or, it might be dragged into EU conflicts of little concern to it

and where it had no control over the previous decisionmaking

process, e.g., Yugoslavia.24 Some feared that Finnish selfdefense capability and/or aloofness from distant European

conflicts could then be weakened without compensating gains.

The debates that now opened up the first open public

discussion of security policy since 194825 revolved around the

Continental or Atlantic defense options, those who believed that

Russia was a threat that must be confronted, those who argued

that Russia was a state that could be managed, and those who

wanted to keep all options open.26 Alternatively the debate could

be depicted as dividing those who claimed that neutrality had

been a "pragmatic" way to defend Finnish interests and those who

felt neutrality was a fundamental "principle" applicable to all

foreign policy questions other than actual self-defense. For the

pragmatists, the real challenge to the concept of neutrality was

Europe's unceasing economic integration, not the current security

situation. In a Europe where that integration led to a decline of

military factors' importance in policy, Finland could become part

of the interdependent whole only by finding a way other than

neutrality to defend its national interests.27 Opposing this

reasoning, "fundamentalists," like former Foreign Minister Paavo

Vayrynen, argued for universalizing the neutrality principle.

In foreign trade policy Finland has developed special

neutrality policy principles in the form of a balanced

integration with neighbouring areas as well as global

principles of universality and non-discrimination.

These principles also include the policy of nonparticipation in supra-national decision-making.28

That stand would, of course, have precluded joining the EU.

Three other factors complicated Finland's debate. One was

the fact that after Carl Bildt's Conservative Swedish Government

renounced neutrality in 1992-1994, going so far as to say it

would participate in defending the Baltic states against a

Russian invasion, the succeeding Swedish Socialist government in

1995 returned to an even stricter policy of military

nonintervention and neutrality. This nullified the effectiveness

of any NATO membership for Finland (since NATO's ability to help

Finland would be greatly limited by Sweden's neutrality) and it

restricted Swedish military planning, even though the Swedish

military has long sought more formal cooperation with Finland.29

The second factor is that until NATO decides who will join and

when it will admit new members, Finland cannot afford to apply

and be rejected. So, Finland was consigned to watchful waiting
8

and reliance on the EU as Europe's situation clarifies.30 A third

factor, one that could never be fully stated in public yet is

understood by all, is that failure to join the EU could leave

Finland isolated and next to Russia. At present the whole object

of Finnish policy is to prevent that possibility without giving

Russia grounds for threats to Finland or its interests.

Therefore, "the prevailing strategy is to strengthen collective

actions which also improve the European institutional structure

and its ability to deal with the challenge of Russia without

adding confrontational elements to relations between Russia and

Europe."31 Under these conditions, it follows that membership in

the EU and an independent defense remain Finland's best options.

This debate presented Finnish leaders with novel challenges,

especially as the vital questions of Russia's orientation and the

security of the new Baltic states remained undecided in 1992.

But, the government's report to parliament then stressed that

military neutrality, i.e., Finland's exemption from foreign bases

and reliance on its own robust forces and command and control

would not be impugned by joining the EU.32 In 1992-1993, Defense

Minister Elisabeth Rehn and CINC Admiral Jan Klenberg first

defended the applications to the EU and for observer status in

the WEU because they preserved neutrality in foreign conflicts,

safeguarded Finland's independent defense capability, reassured

Moscow that its enemies were not approaching, and provided

political support against the possibility of being marginalized

or isolated in Europe.33 Nonetheless, the debate lasted through

1994 and the height of the economic crisis when the referendum

decided positively for membership.

Finland and the Future of European Security.

To meet the pressure for a public statement and to state

their goals, Finnish officials went public both individually and

in the form of the 1995 White Paper on Security Policy. The ideas

in the White Paper are not new; they match statements developed

in 1992-1994 by President Ahtisaari and the then-Esko Aho

government. Many of those policy statements were carried forward

when Paavo Lipponen's Social Democrats came to power in the 1995

elections. As early as 1993, Jaakko Blomberg, Undersecretary of

State for Political Affairs in the Foreign Ministry, forecasted

many points in the White Paper and outlined Finland's cautious

European policy.

Blomberg noted, first of all, that Finnish policy is shaped

within the triangle "Moscow-Berlin-Stockholm," and that Helsinki

now also had to add the Baltic states to the crucial and complex

framework of its security policy. Second, the new importance of

Russia's north--the heart of its naval strategic potential--had

made the area more important to both superpowers and to Finland
9

by bringing the United States, in particular, closer to it. While

Cold War political rivalry had ended, mutually deterrent military

structures still prevailed in Northern Europe. Third, Finland

expected united Germany to play a much greater role in the

Baltic. Fourth, helping to stabilize Russia's transition was a

vital Finnish interest. Fifth, neutrality was not relevant in a

Europe increasingly committed to the common security project

inherent in the CSCE (after 1995 OSCE), the 1975 Helsinki Treaty,

and subsequent documents of the CSCE process.34

Therefore, Blomberg argued that Finland, by applying to the

EU, was not renouncing its independent defense and nonalignment.

Nor was it threatening Russia. As before, Finland would defend

against Russia, but not threaten it or actively join a hostile

anti-Russian bloc. But, by joining the EU, Finland would be

better able to support peaceful democratic change in Europe on

the basis of prosperity and common security. As an EU member,

Finland "would support the independence and security of the

Community and its members in a spirit of solidarity, and would

expect similar support in return for its own independence and

security."35 At the same time, by retaining its independent

defense, Finland neither renounced its own capacities nor

excluded future changes based on the 1996 Inter-Governmental

Conference (IGC) of the EU. Any such change would be a result of

the EU's unanimous decision.36 Though self-defense would remain

the basis of its policy, Finland could get greater and

unprecedented political support for itself through European

integration.

By 1995, Blomberg, however cautiously, was ready to go

further. Not only were Finnish defense interests compatible with

the EU's framework, it also was "not impossible that we could,

with such an agreement, obtain credible security guarantees

without a dangerous state of antagonism arising at the same time

on Finland's borders."37 If this outcome truly materialized, it

would give Finland more freedom of action and true security than

it ever had enjoyed--even if these guarantees were only indirect

and not commitments to mutual defense. Blomberg further contended

that the EU's evolution towards a CFSP under the Maastricht

framework was now occurring in an unexpected direction, i.e.,

within the Partnership for Peace (PfP) framework. NATO now talked

about a distinct European security and defense identity (ESDI).

Functioning as its core, there is the entity made up of

the EU and WEU, which concentrates on developing

preparedness for peacekeeping and crisis management.

This requires increased military cooperation . . . . No

defence alliance is required for the union to develop

its security identity for crisis management.38

Blomberg clearly implied that by contributing its forces and
10

experience in peace operations and crisis management to the WEU

and by participating in the PfP, Finland could achieve more

military-political integration with Europe in a nonthreatening

form that gave it hope for having more credible political

guarantees (if not binding alliance commitments) than before. It

is not for nothing that some Finnish officials call the PfP a

"genius program of military cooperation."39

Moreover, other Finnish officials supporting Blomberg stress

that Helsinki under an evolutionary EU/WEU still retains its

freedom of action and all its options. Indeed, it is now

possible, under Finnish law's stringent provisions on when forces

can be used abroad, to use Finnish troops (as in Bosnia) under an

OSCE or UN mandate.40 General Gustav Hagglund, Finland's

Commander-in-Chief and the former commander of United Nation (UN)

forces in Lebanon, has called for a crisis reaction brigade that

can be mobilized and deployed, including reservists, active

troops and NCOs, similar to Finland's UN forces. Those forces

could be used for peace operations abroad or for Finnish

defense.41 Thus, the EU/WEU's current evolution, especially

regarding peace operations, could offer Finland unprecedented

security advantages and eventually (potentially) real defense

guarantees.

The views of Blomberg and his supporters quickly became

those of the government as a whole. In May 1995, Premier Paavo

Lipponen suggested that the WEU become an organization devoted

primarily to peacekeeping and crisis management.42 In November

1995, he reiterated Finnish willingness to help plan such

operations, noting "It is unrealistic to replace NATO with

something European."43 Earlier, in October, the Cabinet had

proposed creating special standby forces within the military for

utilization abroad in international crisis management. Risto

Penttila, a member of Parliament and former researcher for the

Defense Ministry, gave the rationale for this policy, namely

that,

During a time of peace Finland should conduct a policy

that would take our country as close to NATO membership

as possible without Finland's formally joining the

alliance. This means that Finland's defense

organization is consistent with that of other EU and

NATO countries, and that Finland has a preparedness for

participating in the operations of a European mercenary

army with its own mercenary troops.44

It also is clear that the PfP provides an international

basis for doing so and facilitates Finnish military integration

with Europe. Indeed, by autumn 1995, the Finnish media were

proclaiming that Sweden and Finland were technically ready and

eligible for NATO membership; only the political decision needed
11

to be made by both governments and NATO, they claimed.45

While NATO membership may be too precipitate a step for

Finland, it is clear that Finnish views about membership in the

EU and the WEU's mission contradict the idea that the WEU can and

should supplant NATO. Therefore Finland had to clarify its views

on Europe's evolving security structures. This is another reason

why the government issued a White Paper on Finland and European

security.

The White Paper.

The White Paper explicitly tries to define Finnish interests

and perceptions in a still violent world where, nevertheless, a

common security order is emerging in Europe on the basis of

democracy and human rights.46 Even so, the White Paper places a

much greater stress on local security issues, such as Russia and

the Baltic, rather than on general European themes. Clearly local

concerns shape Helsinki's broader security vistas.

The White Paper forthrightly defends Finland's military

policy of nonalliance and independent defense. Finnish military

capability must ensure that Finland does not become the target of

military speculation, let alone military force. The aim is to

make use of force a nonoption even in crises smaller than war.47

Europe's changing military situation has,

. . . not prompted any need to alter Finland's defence

solution which relies on territorial defence of the

whole country and a large reservist army based on

universal military service, an arrangement dictated by

the country's large size, small population, and limited

resources.48

This point politely reminds Europe and the Finnish public

that although the OSCE project endorses the indivisibility of

European security, it has failed in Yugoslavia and vis-a-vis

Russia. While the OSCE is acknowledged to be a norm-setting

institution for Europe, the White Paper notes that security

organizations have a practical significance based on their past

record and the expectations attached to them. Ultimately their

influence depends on states' political will to use them to solve

security problems. Yugoslavia has tested all the European

security institutions' credibility and found them wanting.49 As

General Owe Wiktorin, Chief of Sweden's General Staff, said,

Yugoslavia taught small states (like Finland) that,

As a result of Bosnia and other armed conflicts we have

come to accept war on European territory. The message

is, in particular for a small nation, that if you do
12

not take care of your security no one else may care.50

Despite guarantees to the contrary, small European states in

Central and Eastern Europe have to defend themselves because they

are alone. European security, despite contrary claims, is, or has

been until now, divisible. Multilateralism or collective security

here are indeed of little value. The repercussions of this

divisibility of European security are immense. In the White Paper

and recent statements on continuing Finland's robust independent

defense posture, one finds an undercurrent of unease about the

failure of EU/WEU to move on security issues and on the

divisibility of European security.

What then are the implications for Finland of the EU's

failures? They are the need to find broader venues of political

support abroad while preserving its independent defense

capability. As the White Paper repeatedly indicates, Finland

promotes Nordic collaboration.51 It also insists that its defense

posture and status in the EU contribute to its ability to foster

cooperative security in Europe.52 Nevertheless, the White Paper

spells out the concept or vision for the EU/WEU that Blomberg and

other officials outlined in earlier statements or articles.

The primary task of the Union's defence dimension in

the short term is to develop a capability for crisis

management. The means to this are the strengthening of

the WEU's operational and structural capabilities and

cooperation between the WEU and NATO within the

Combined Joint Task Forces model. Further building of

the institutional relations between the EU and WEU in

the light of the crisis management role can be

discussed at the intergovernmental conference of the EU

in 1996.53

While Finland will defend itself against attack or threats,

the WEU should limit itself to crisis management and peace

operations. Although President Ahtisaari does not see such EU/WEU

integration as discussed by Blomberg as occurring anytime soon,

he does favor these organizations' closer cooperation on the

basis of their current evolution.54 At the same time, he noted

that the development of a rapid reaction force for use in Bosnia

or other similar contingencies also strengthens Finland's own

defense capability.55 In fact, Paavo Lipponen observed that if

the WEU decided to confine itself to peacekeeping and crisis

management, Finland might change its attitude and join it. But

that would mean the WEU renounced all hope of becoming a separate

European pillar that somehow substituted for NATO or replaced it

when Washington would not act.56 The WEU then would only be the

European pillar of NATO, which would remain the only indisputably

effective military organization for European security.57
13

Finland must therefore confront the question of what happens

if the WEU and/or the EU fails to develop as intended. Or to put

it differently, Helsinki must confront the lessons Wiktorin draws

from Yugoslavia. For President Ahtisaari, the ideal of common or

cooperative security for Finland is based on first, economic and

political integration and bilateral ties among states, then

preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, and crisis management through

the OSCE, North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), PfP, WEU,

and NATO, and finally Finland's reliance upon its independent

military capability. That structure will be undone if the EU/WEU

continues to fail to evolve a credible defense policy.58 Up to

now the EU option supposedly gave Finland the maximum available

indirect security guarantees of a collective European response to

threats to it, consonant with Russian willingness to accept

Finland's integration into Europe.59 But if the EU fails to

develop along such lines, Finland will then have no credible

option other than self-defense when confronted by Russia.

One must agree with defense analyst Tomas Ries concerning

the stakes of the game for Helsinki. Ries notes that by joining

the EU Finland has slammed the door on its past policies whose

priority was, above all, good relations with Russia. While

membership in the EU is intended to help Finland cope with

challenges stemming from Russia, it also indicates that Finland

will now first exercise its European option in dealing with

Russia, and not face Russia alone, as before. Since Russia today

is evidently in an anti-Western phase,

Finland has very heavy stakes in the security-political

vigor of the organization she is joining. In this

respect Finland is--more than any other Nordic

applicant--strongly dependent on the political as well

as economic success of the European Union. For without

a politically strong European Union Finland risks being

stranded in a very dangerous situation. From this

perspective Finland should be one of the strongest

proponents of the continued political deepening [of the

EU]--including in the area of the CFSP of the EU.60

Finland and NATO.

Finland's relationship to NATO becomes a difficult political

issue that must be faced. Finnish thinking about the WEU and NATO

offers both a possible answer to Ries' analysis of potential

threats to Finland if the EU fails to evolve as hoped and a

chance to develop military-political collaboration, and even

integration, with all other European agencies, including NATO,

through the PfP.61 At the same time, apart from its highly

negative impact on Russia, a NATO guarantee to Finland would be

extremely difficult to realize in view of Swedish neutrality.62
14

While Finland accepts that preserving NATO's ability to defend

its core members is a basic prerequisite for Northern European

and continental security, Finland must be able to count on solid

guarantees and to defend its own interests.63

The question of Finnish membership in NATO or security

guarantee is directly related to Finland's geographical location.

As General Gustav Hagglund observed, Finnish membership in the EU

makes Finland's border with Russia the EU's border. Any tension

between the EU and Russia could bring that border into focus.

Avoiding such political conflict is Finland's "top priority."

While Russia welcomed Finland's membership in the EU, Hagglund

rightly noted that Russia has said that Finnish membership in

NATO "would force Russia to reassess its policy and increase its

military forces in those areas bordering on Finland."64 Hagglund

argues that Finnish defense policy currently produces a robust

independent defense; therefore, Finland does not now need a NATO

membership or guarantee. What it does need is a well-oiled

mechanism for dealing with local crises and, therefore, the

enhancement of a reliable European crisis management and peace

operations agency. He expressed concern about U.S. willingness to

intervene in purely domestic European conflicts and about NATO's

expansion producing a new division of Europe. Instead, he

strongly favored continuing the PfP which could increase security

without isolating Russia. Custom-made and clearly defined

security guarantees could be added to PfP without estranging

Russia or diminishing the security of any PfP member who might

experience threats. Indeed, Finland's defense model merits

emulation by Central and East Europe under the PfP, while

simultaneously expanding the EU would not increase instability in

Europe. Expanding NATO would be provocative and actually lessen

Finland's ability to deal with future local crises.65

In a series of 1995 statements, Lipponen further refined

this stance towards NATO. Replying to Russia's public concerns

about Finnish membership in NATO, he noted that Finland had many

options, and that the existing balance in its relations with

Moscow and Europe is a function of its membership in the EU (a

fundamental reversal of the whole 1948-1991 policy of thinking

about Russia first that surprisingly evoked little response at

home or abroad). Moreover, Finland does not now need NATO

membership thanks to this balance in its foreign relations. Thus,

Finland's options depend on Russian developments. In other words,

the onus is on Russia, not Finland, to maintain security.66

Discussions of Finland's NATO membership are, perhaps, misguided.

Former Foreign Minister Heikki Haavisto correctly noted as far

back as 1993 that NATO has renounced taking in new members

anytime soon.67 Three years later, NATO has not yet found

expansion to be an urgent necessity, confirming Finland's refusal

until now to apply for that membership. Indeed, one gets the

impression the government would like the issue of Finland and
15

NATO to go away from the headlines. Lipponen even denounced talk

of NATO membership as idle chatter.68 But even so, it is clear

that Finland retains its option to join NATO if things change.

Meanwhile, officials are more concerned than they will admit

that Sweden went back to neutrality and that the EU has failed to

date in security. As Lipponen observed, "The EU is forced to bear

the responsibility, but despite this it cannot influence anything

through its current crisis intervention and decisionmaking

system."69 This situation leaves Finland with few options other

than self-defense and NATO's current prolonged and cautious

expansion based on thorough discussions with Moscow and "no

vetoes and no surprises." Otherwise, fears that NATO expansion

will provoke Russia and lessen Finland's ability to deal with

local crises will materialize, and Finland will once again be

alone face-to-face with an irate Russia.

Similar attitudes emerged during interviews with Finnish

officials. They noted the continuing division in NATO over its

expansion and also stressed that an effective defense capability

is more important than collective foreign defense guarantees.

This capability makes it difficult for Russia, under the best of

circumstances, to attack Finland; Russia today is far from having

the interest, need, resources, or will to do so. Therefore, if

NATO does expand, Finland would be best served by a process

having maximum transparency, i.e., "no surprises nor vetoes," and

thus no division of Europe into spheres of influence, e.g., those

in and those out of NATO and thus in Russia's sphere. Rapid NATO

expansion, particularly into the Baltic states, constitutes a

highly provocative act that could actually turn the Baltic into a

grey zone and tempt Russia back into it as many Russian planner

would seem to want.70 For the same reason of preventing

provocative acts or the capability for conducting them, Finland

opposed revising the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty

to allow Russia more forces in the Leningrad Military District.

Therefore, in Helsinki's view, the expanding contacts through the

PfP and using the WEU for peace operations and crisis management,

not new functions, best serve both the WEU and Finnish

interests.71

Foreign observers also agree that Finland has a paramount

interest in NATO remaining an efficient, credible, and effective

defense system. Ideally for Helsinki this means that if NATO is

to expand and Finland to join it, NATO should do so over time to

assuage Russian fears and prevent threats to Finland in response

to its entry into NATO. The attainment of this situation in

Europe would mean that NATO and Europe had moved decisively in

the direction of a true collective security system on a panEuropean scale based on structures of confidence with Russia and

other nonmembers. Or, in other words, Finland can safely join

NATO when Russia is fully integrated into a European security
16

system. As Hansrudolf Kramer noted, "If NATO develops into a

genuine system of collective security, Russia will have to

participate in it in some form or other. In that case, Finland

could participate in it as well."72 Since NATO expansion will

take a long time but Russia's reaction will be swift, and it is

unclear who will be admitted or whether all 16 NATO members will

favor Finland or anyone else in the foreseeable future, Finland's

security option and strategy, however flawed, remains that

outlined in 1992 in a speech in Finland by Norway's then Foreign

Minister Thorvald Stoltenberg. He stated then that,

Closer cooperation means that the region will be more

easily affected by developments in Russia, even if

political events should take an unexpected turn. The

best way for us to deal with such a situation is to

ensure that the Nordic countries are firmly linked with

broader-based European arrangements so that any

pressure on the area is also regarded as a pressure on

our partners in cooperation.73

Even though Sweden has more than reversed its course towards

security integration with Europe and Norway's voters rejected EU

membership, those facts do not invalidate Stoltenberg's insights.

Rather, Finland must redouble it efforts to stabilize Russia and

the Baltic through its membership in the EU and integration with

Europe because that is the only way it can avoid isolation next

to Russia and/or peripheralization in Europe.

Finland and Russia.

The growing size of Russia's forces in the Northwest and

Leningrad Military Districts (which has led Finland to oppose

Russian efforts to revise the CFE Treaty's local provisions)74

and the condition of the former Finnish province of Karelia on

the Russian border remain serious international issues smoldering

between Finland and Russia;75 nevertheless, the quandaries posed

by Russia's uncertain domestic evolution remain Finland's single

greatest concern. These potential dangers include a breakdown of

civil order inside Russia, major Russian threats to the Baltic

states, or the possibility that a Russian reaction to a rash NATO

expansion would place Helsinki in an isolated, but

confrontational, posture vis-a-vis Moscow. While nobody

imminently expects overt military threats against Finland as in

1939, or even the kinds of pressure exercised intermittently

after 1944, the Russo-Finnish border and the Russian North have

become more critical for Moscow, and troop strength there has

been built up since 1991.76

Many other negative alternatives, however, are possible.

Tomas Ries has identified three broad categories of such
17

nonmilitary alternatives, so-called "soft" crises, that would

require substantial mutual political will to resolve over the

long term lest they spawn bigger, more violent crises. The first

set of problems, caused by the poverty gap between Russia

(especially in its Northwest Provinces) and the EU with Finland,

threaten the collapse of Russia's social infrastructure, either

regionally or in general. Such a breakdown could trigger still

greater criminal trans-border pathologies, massive ecological

destruction, large-scale unregulated immigration, and a breakdown

of Russian public health, which, in tandem with Russia's

tremendous pollution problems, could trigger epidemics,

pandemics, and general public panics.77 While all the

Scandinavian states are cooperating with Russia in projects to

manage pollution, those projects are underfunded. The

disorganized situation in Russia, and the unstable political

order there have limited economic progress. A collapse of

Russia's infrastructure could also assume the form of a new

Chernobyl or major industrial accidents, e.g., when over 800

people sank on a ferry in the Gulf of Finland in 1994. The

incidence of both petty and organized crime also is rising. The

latter in particular poses difficult trans-border security

problems, especially in view of the penetration of Russia's

government by criminal elements. Any further erosion of Russia's

social infrastructure that could bring about epidemics and

unregulated large-scale immigration would certainly strain

Finland's infrastructure and police forces. As Ries observes,

The main point to note being that the scale and

intensity of all these problems would almost certainly

increase as a function of greater economic hardship in

Russia and/or further breakup of state structures. This

would be complicated by the fact that various forms of

crisis could begin interacting, generating new

problems. Finally the situation would deteriorate

further as the breakdown of organized life in Russia

made it more difficult for the Nordic authorities to

find counterparts with which to cooperate.78

A second category of threats that could challenge Finnish

security is the breakdown of Russia's political infrastructure,

either on its own, or in tandem with these kinds of crises. As

Chechnya shows, the potential for violence inside the Russian

Federation remains high and recent events underscore that nuclear

controls are not fully guaranteed.79 Many different scenarios,

like the October 1993 clash between Russian President Boris

Yeltsin and his Parliamentary opponents, or the exacerbation of

Chechnya or other ethno-political conflicts are all possible.

While Russia's Northwest appears relatively calm, St. Petersburg

obviously would be a glittering prize in the event of major

conflict, and instability there instantly alerts Finnish

policymakers.
18

However, the more likely threat is the further development

of a hardening Russian policy based either on the military and

defense industrial sectors or championing a fundamentally

militarized view of European and Russian security.80 That trend

could easily harden into a lasting division of Russia and Europe,

making Finland a "front-line state," exactly the opposite of

Finnish goals. Perhaps the most dangerous manifestation of such

trends would be the possibility of concerted Russian pressure,

not just military but also economic, against the Baltic States,

or worse yet a new attempt to annex them or curtail their

sovereignty.

For these reasons Finland wants Russia integrated into

Europe through as many channels as possible. Finland, as an

experienced middleman in Russian trade and gateway to Russia,

could benefit quite handsomely from expanded EU-Russian economic

relations. President Ahtisaari recently attacked NATO expansion,

and instead urged enlarging the EU, initiating a U.S.-Russian-EU

"permanent political dialogue," and integrating Russia into the

multilateral trading system from which it has been excluded, an

exclusion that also greatly irks Russia.81 Another instance where

Finland participates in a multilateral initiative to draw Russia

closer to Europe is the Barents Sea Initiative, the result of a

1992 Norwegian proposal. As Norway's late Defense Minister Johann

Jorgen Holst observed before his untimely death in 1993, the

Nordic states' main function, revealed in this initiative, is to

create regional bases for stability in the North which will then

influence broader European developments.82 And indeed, some

observers of this initiative openly aspire that the cooperation

generated here can provide the impetus for a "security community"

starting in Europe's high north and spreading outward from

there.83

Finally, when on January 25, 1996, the Council of Europe

voted to accept Russia as a member, President Ahtisaari and many

Finnish Parliamentarians strongly supported this decision on the

grounds that including Russia in organizations of multilateral

European cooperation would be of the utmost importance for

European stability. Not surprisingly, this stance annoyed

Estonia's delegation, a sign of the diverging attitudes of

Finland and its Baltic friends towards Russia.84

Finland and the Baltic States.

Finland views the tension between Russia and the Baltic

states as among the most critical of possible threats to its

security. It works steadily, particularly with Estonia where it

has special cultural ties, to stabilize the whole area. Finland

pursues three main lines of policy that aim to prevent the area
19

from becoming a source of tension in Europe. It uses economic,

political, and low-level military cooperation to strengthen the

new states' independence, promote their good relationship with

Russia, and facilitate their integration with Europe through the

EU.85 It has worked to soften discord over borders and economic

issues, preferring to see the problems of Russian minorities and

soldiers stationed there resolved in an all-European context by

international and OSCE mediation.86

Finland would like for Baltic issues to be

internationalized, i.e., discussed in the widest possible

multilateral setting, preferably including the OSCE and the EU.

This would ensure transparency, reassure all parties that they

are not alone and that they can get a fair hearing, and habituate

them to purely political processes of conflict resolution,

preventive diplomacy, fact-finding, and verification. The Baltic

states, unlike Finland from 1944-1991, would then not have to

face Moscow on their own, and grievances, real or imagined, would

be dealt with openly and fairly.87 Similarly, for the long term,

Finland strongly urges that the Baltic states join the EU and be

considered for membership on an equal basis with other Central

European applicants as confirmed by the EU's Essen summit in

1994.

Nonetheless, the high level of animosity towards Russia and

Russians, particularly in Latvia and Estonia, makes Finland's

role of advising reconciliation very difficult, and Finnish

officials hint at their and Europe's impatience with these Baltic

policies.88 This attitude naturally complicates Finland's

advocacy role for the Baltic states in the EU, the Council of

Europe, and other international agencies, where Baltic policies

have aroused criticism. Nor does the visible decline in

cooperation among the Baltic states aid Finland's efforts.89

Certainly this impedes Finnish and other Scandinavian efforts to

foster Baltic military cooperation and train officers there.

 Essentially Finland would like to see the Baltic states

profit from its example whereby Finlandization, a policy of

carefully regulated "liturgical" friendship with Russia, provided

a way to ensure the national defense by other means, e.g.,

avoiding deliberately provocative stances towards Russia.90 This

posture finds expression in the White Paper which openly calls

for Nordic countries to help the Baltic states normalize

relations with Russia to facilitate their integration with Europe

and stabilize the whole region.91 Finland would also like Estonia

and Latvia to arrange for the status of their largely stateless

Russian population on a legislative basis conforming to the

standards of the OSCE, Council of Europe, and international

law.92 Finland has abetted this project in the past and stands

ready to continue doing so.
20

Helsinki tries to focus the EU's political interest and

resources on supporting the Baltic states' integration with the

EU, and Europe in general, to develop the entire Baltic region,

including Russia. Finland considers such activity a key element

in its regional security policy and a justification of its

decision to join the EU.93 To the degree that the Baltic states

are truly in Europe, it then becomes harder for Russia to

pressure them. The Baltic states will then feel more secure about

their ability to defend their interests in a nonprovocative way

because their EU membership will provide a form of economicpolitical deterrence and reassurance to Moscow and the Baltic

capitals by helping to restrain everyone's moves.

Indeed, the most recent Finnish policy trend apparently now

accepts that the Nordic states alone cannot guarantee the Baltic

states' security. Therefore, if and when NATO expands, those

states must not be left outside of the European security

structure.94 While this is not an endorsement of either NATO

expansion or those states' inclusion in NATO, it does seem to

represent a step forward from preexisting policy guidelines that

invoked the need for the Baltic states to be integrated into

Europe to admit that such integration also serves Finland's

interests and to reject the apparent call by Russia's ambassador

to Finland, Yuri Deriabin, that the Baltic states follow Sweden

and Finland's neutrality.95

Finland and Europe: Some Concluding Observations.

Finnish interest in the EU stands revealed as part of an

evolving strategy to maximize its freedom of action and secure a

real guarantee of security--self-defense--while contributing to

and facilitating the long-term transformation of the broader

European security system that could ultimately provide it with

credible external guarantees. However, from today's vantage

point, Finland's hopes for the EU/WEU can only be realized if

these organizations clarify their real position on expansion

eastward and form a meaningful defense arm in the WEU devoted to

peacekeeping and crisis management. Finland could then

participate in PfP and/or OSCE activities in regions such as

Bosnia, and thereby strengthen its military-political integration

with the West. Since key EU members still show little practical

inclination to reform the EU and overcome the obstacles to its

economic-political expansion, and since the WEU remains unable to

take advantage of U.S. support for European integration to create

meaningful European military structures, Finland's insistence on

a "lone wolf" defense policy appears eminently realistic.96 But

it comes at a price, especially if NATO expands and Russia reacts

truculently.

Finland is not without a military option. It could consider
21

a military alliance if threats arose because Europe's current

security system is an interdependent one, i.e., nobody can act

threateningly without affecting the whole system. Finland then

would not be alone in making such a choice if new threats

appeared. But, since Europe is, in fact, not actively considering

implementing a common defense policy (as the language of

Maastricht, the reality of the situation, and the dispensation

given to Denmark not to join the CFSP all indicate), "progress in

defence matters will occur in the form of crisis management, not

in common defence."97 This is still Finnish policy. And Finland's

recommendations for the WEU appear more realistic for it than the

WEU's previous efforts at rivalling NATO.

Nonetheless, partisans of the WEU as a separate European

defense institution are not happy to acknowledge this reality

unless France's rejoining of NATO's military system terminates

the paralyzing debate over these institutions. This debate has

obvious relevance for Finland since it has staked so much on

demarcating the WEU from NATO. The WEU as NATO's rival cannot be

justified merely as a matter of European states' dignity,

especially since Finland or other small states near Russia need

real guarantees if they renounce self-defense.98 However,

partisans of the WEU becoming a true European pillar naturally

resent the attitude of the neutrals (or former neutrals), whom

they regard as "free riders" on the EU/WEU, that demand

commitments from Brussels and relevant capitals while they shirk

making the same commitment to the EU and WEU.99 NATO SecretaryGeneral Javier Solana, writing while still Spain's Foreign

Minister, complained that some neutral EU members could prevent

the WEU from implementing the EU's decisions with defense

implications. He also questioned the notion that EU membership

provided some sort of implicit security guarantee for states

which are unable to accede to membership in WEU or NATO.100

Such complaints, however, overlook Finland's dilemma,

especially in view of Sweden's retreat on regional and European

military-political integration. If Finland is to have real

security, it must simultaneously embrace self-defense and

economic-political integration, even if the seeming paradox

overshadows attempts at logical analysis.101 As a recent analysis

of European security issues observes,

The inherent diffusion of political power in European

institutions simply denies the smaller countries an

effective, unified role in the restructuring process.

This realization spawns efforts by smaller states to

strengthen smaller sub-regional organizations, but this

will not ensure security structure emerging to fill the

gap left by the dissolution of the WTO [Warsaw Treaty

Organization]. None of the forums in Central Europe has

been used to initiate local ideas on security
22

management.102

What then is left for Finland except self-defense and

membership in the EU? This is particularly the case in Northern

Europe given Norway's failure to join EU, Sweden's retreat from

its policies of 1992-1994, and the unresolved Baltic and Russian

situations. A robust, independent self-defense is Helsinki's only

credible card.

In the final analysis Helsinki long ago learned Wiktorin's

lesson ("if you do not take care of your security no one else may

care"103)at profound cost. In small states, NATO membership is not

a substitute for a rational security policy. If Europe and the

West cannot meet today's challenges, Finland will be isolated and

on the front line, obliged to meet them on its own. But if the EU

and NATO can resolve those challenges and move towards a genuine

pan-European system, Finland is admirably placed to move with

them. Finland's recent policies have overcome the solitude

imposed upon it from 1944-1991. Henceforth, Finland could likely

have more real chances for security cooperation than ever before.

While there are still some who cannot appreciate the magnitude of

Finland's concerns or its achievements, European security

policies that neglect Finnish thinking and experience injure not

only Finland, but also Europe.

ENDNOTES

1. Risto E.J. Penttila, Finland's Security in a Changing

Europe: A Historical Perspective, Finnish Defence Studies No. 7,

Helsinki: National War College, 1994, pp. 26-28; Jukka Salovaara,

"Finish Integration Policy--From an Economic to a Security

Motivation," Yearbook of Finnish Policy, 1993, Helsinki: Finnish

Institute of International Affairs, 1993, p. 1.

2. Headquarters, Department of the Army, DA PAM 550-167,

Eric Solsten and Sandra Meditz, eds., Finland A Country Study, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990, pp. 296-

297.

3. Rene Nyberg, "The Baltic Countries and the Northwest of

Russia: A European Challenge," European Security, Vol. III, No.

3, Autumn, 1994, p. 531; Osmo Apunen, "Finland and the Baltic

Question," Yearbook of Finnish Foreign Policy, 1992, Helsinki:

Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 1992, p. 47. Apunen

stated, "It must be admitted in all fairness that the Baltic

nations' right to self-government and sovereignty was one of the

key victims of Finland's own relationship with Soviet Union."

4. Penttila, pp. 22-23.

5. Salovaara, p. 18.
23

6. Penttila, p. 27.

 7. Jyrki Iivonen, "Different Development Alternatives in

Russia and Their Influence on Finnish-Russian Relations in the

1990s," Yearbook of Finnish Foreign Policy, 1992, p. 11. For an

official restatement of this view by Finland's President, see Dr.

Mauno Koivisto, "Finland and the Evolution of Europe," Speech to

the Plenary Session of the European Parliament, Strasbourg,

France, November 16, 1993, Yearbook of Finnish Foreign Policy,

1993, p. 69.

8. "Slow Haste," The Economist, May 20, 1995, pp. 50-51.

9. Timo Valtonen, "Economic Relations Between Finland and

Russia: Business, Social Work or Debt Collection?," Yearbook of

Finnish Foreign Policy, 1992, p. 23.

10. Ronald Tiersky, The Mitterand Legacy and the Future of

French Security Policy, McNair Paper No. 43, Washington, DC:

National Defense University, 1995, p. 18. On page 60, Tiersky

writes, "Integration in the EU equals national security because

EU states could not countenance military force used against any

member state, whether that state is a member of a corresponding

military alliance or not."; Apunen, p. 48; Pentilla, pp. 31-34;

Heikki Haavisto, "Finland's Foreign Policy in the 1990s: Choices

and Challenges in a Changing World," Yearbook of Finnish Foreign

Policy, 1993, p. 5; Salovaara, pp. 16-23; Tomas Ries, North Ho!

The New Nordic Security Environment and the European Union's

Northern Expansion, Sankt Augustin, Germany: Konrad Adenauer

Stiftung, 1994, pp. 4-8.

11. Alpo Rusi, "Security Expectation of EU Applicant

Countries: Austria, Finland, Norway, and Sweden," Paper Presented

to the 35th Annual Convention of the International Studies

Association, Washington, DC, March 28-April 1, 1994, pp. 2-3, 7-

8.

12. Ibid., pp. 13-17. Ambassador Nyberg also shares this

view. Nyberg, pp. 535, 540.

13. Rusi, pp. 5-9, 13-21.

14. Ibid., p. 16.

15. Ibid., p. 17.

16. Ibid., pp. 2-4, 13-21.

17. Helsinki, Helsingin Sanomat, in Finnish, August 15,

1993, Foreign Broadcast Information Service Western Europe,
24

(henceforth FBIS-WEU)-93-169, September 2, 1993, pp. 32-33;

Penttila, pp. 31-34; Salovaara, pp. 16-23.

18. Ibid.; Koivisto, pp. 68-70; Pentilla, pp. 26-28.

19. Pentilla, p. 28.

20. Esko Antola, "The Burden of History: Finland as a Status

Quo Country," The International Spectator, Vol. XXIX, No. 4,

October-December, 1994, pp. 73-74.

21. Helsinki, Helsingin Sanomat, in Finnish, November 12,

1994, FBIS-WEU-95-005, January 9, 1995, pp. 41-42.

 22. Ries (pp. 27-47) and Nyberg (pp. 535-537) categorize

the multiple types of such threats that might yet ensue; Tiersky

(p. 60) quotes the Norwegian historian Geir Lundestad as saying

that for states like Finland, "EU membership is a matter of

defending themselves against a possible new Russian threat."

23. Antola, pp.71-75.

24. Salovaara, p. 21; Helsinki, Suomen Kuvalehti, in

Finnish, October 6, 1995, FBIS-WEU-95-217, November 9, 1995, p.

18; Helsinki, Suomen Kuvalehti, in Finnish, April 28, 1995, FBISWEU-95-103, May 30, 1995, pp. 43-46; Hugh Carnegy, "Rainbow

Coalition Is Chasing a Pot of Gold," Financial Times Survey of

Finland, October 9, 1995; Helsinki, Hufvudstadsbladet, in

Swedish, March 15, 1994, FBIS-WEU-94-056, March 23, 1994, pp. 35-

36.

25. Copenhagen, Information, in Danish, October 6, 1994,

FBIS-WEU-94-199, October 14, 1994, pp. 55-56.

26. Paavo Lipponen, "Finnish Neutrality and EC Membership,"

in Sheila Harden, ed., Neutral States and the European Community, London: Brassey's, 1994, pp. 86-87.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid., p. 87; Antola called the old neutrality policy a

"metadoctrine" as a sign of the way in which it was embraced.

Antola, p. 77.

29. Stockholm, Dagens Nyheter, in Swedish, June 13, 1993,

FBIS-WEU-93-133, July 14, 1993, pp. 69-71; Helsinki, Helsinki

Suomen Yleisradio, in Finnish, December 8, 1992, FBIS-WEU-92-238,

December 10, 1992, p. 52; Helsinki, Pohjoismaiset Uutiset

Database, in Swedish, November 2, 1994, FBIS-WEU-94-215-A,

November 7, 1994, pp. 12-13; Helsinki, Hufvudstadsbladet, in

Swedish, May 25, 1995, FBIS-WEU-95-119, June 21, 1995, pp. 38-39.
25

30. FBIS-WEU-95-119, pp. 38-39.

31. Antola, p. 68; Copenhagen, Berlingske Weekendavsen, in

Danish, May 11-18, 1995, FBIS-WEU-95-111, June 9, 1995, pp. 45-

46; Nyberg, pp. 535, 540.

32. Penttila, pp. 31-32.

33. Ibid.

34. Jaakko Blomberg, "Finland's Evolving Security Policy,"

NATO Review, Vol. 41, No. 1, February, 1993, pp. 12-15.

35. Ibid., p. 14.

36. Ibid., p. 15.

37. Helsinki, Hufvudstadsbladet, in Swedish, June 5, 1995,

FBIS-WEU-95-110, June 8, 1995, p. 37.

38. Ibid., pp. 37-38. See also the articles in Helsinki,

Helsingin Sanomat, of May 19 and May 30, 1995, in Finnish, FBISWEU-95-115, June 15, 1995, pp. 28-30.

39. Interviews with Finnish officials by the author,

Helsinki, December, 1994. All subsequent interviews cited in

these notes were conducted by the author at that time unless

otherwise indicated.

40. Interviews with Finnish official by the author,

Helsinki, December, 1994.

41. General Gustav Hagglund, "Finnish Defense Policy Aims to

Protect Against External Pressures," NATO Review, Vol. 43, No. 4,

July, 1995, p. 40; Helsinki, Helsingin Sanomat, in Finnish,

November 10, 1994, FBIS-WEU-95-011, January 18, 1995, p. 31.

42. Helsinki, Hufvudstadsbladet, in Swedish, May 22, 1995,

FBIS-WEU-95-126, June 30, 1995, p. 34.

43. Oslo, Aftenposten Sondag, in Norwegian, November 12,

1995, FBIS-WEU-95-220, November 15, 1995, p. 25.

44. FBIS-WEU-95-217, November 9, 1995, p. 18; Helsinki,

Helsingin Sanomat, in Finnish, October 14, 1995, FBIS-WEU-95-217,

November 9, 1995, p. 19.

45. Stockholm, Sveriges Radio Network, in Swedish, September

22, 1995, FBIS-WEU-95-185, September 25, 1995, pp. 36-37. This

was also already clear to some in 1993. For example, see Pekka
26

Sivonen, in Helsinki, Helsingin Sanomat, in Finnish, July 6,

1993, FBIS-WEU-93-148, August 4, 1993, pp. 46-47.

46. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Security in a Changing

World: Guidelines for Finland's Security Policy: Report by the

Council of State to the Parliament 6 June, 1995 (henceforth White

Paper), Helsinki: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1995, pp. 13-16.

47. Ibid., pp. 45-46.

48. Ibid., p. 46.

49. Ibid., p. 54.

50. "The Jane's Interview," Jane's Defence Weekly, Vol. 22,

No. 15, October 15, 1994, p. 56.

51. White Paper, pp. 22-23.

52. Ibid., pp. 45-46, 58-60.

53. Ibid., pp. 58-60.

54. Helsinki, Helsingin Sanomat, in Finnish, November 23,

1995, FBIS-WEU-95-242, December 18, 1995, p. 21.

55. Ibid.

56. Helsinki, Helsingin Sanomat, May 24, 1995, FBIS-WEU-95-

131, July 10, 1995, pp. 37-38; FBIS-WEU-June 30, 1995, p. 34.

57. In this connection, France's recent rejoining of NATO's

integrated military command might deal a body blow to the whole

French inspired effort to make the WEU an alternative defense

agency for Europe. Paris' decision evidently conforms to

Finland's interests.

58. Martti Ahtisaari, "Finland, the European Union, and

International Change," Address by the President of Finland at the

Free University of Berlin, Berlin, Germany, November 23, 1994,

pp. 3-5.

59. Penttila, p. 55.

 60. Ries, pp. 7-8.

61. Ibid., p. 8; FBIS-WEU-95-110, pp. 37-38; FBIS-WEU-95-

115, pp. 28-30.

62. FBIS-WEU-95-119, pp. 38-39; FBIS-WEU-95-131, p. 37.
27

63. White Paper, pp. 45-46.

64. FBIS-WEU-95-111, pp. 46-47.

65. Ibid., p. 47.

66. Stockholm, Svenska Dagbladet, in Swedish, March 20,

1995, FBIS-WEU-95-055, March 22, 1995, p. 35.

67. Helsinki, Hufvudstadsbladet, in Swedish, October 8,

1993, FBIS-WEU-93-220, November 18, 1993, p. 57.

68. Helsinki, Hufvudstadsbladet, in Swedish, September 16,

1995, FBIS-WEU-95-192, October 4, 1995, p. 24.

69. Ibid. Lipponen's wariness about the WEU also emerges in

Helsinki, Hufvudstadsbladet, in Swedish, May 12, 1995, FBIS-WEU95-126, June 30, 1995, pp. 34-35.

70. Interviews with Finnish officials by the author,

Helsinki, December 1994.

71. Nyberg, p. 539; Helsinki, Suomen Yleisradio Network in

Finnish, September 22, 1995, FBIS-WEU-95-185, September 25, 1995,

p. 36; Helsinki, Suomen Yleisradio Network, in Finnish, June 17,

1995, FBIS-WEU-95-117, June 19, 1995, p. 45.

72. Hansrudolf Kramer, "Finland's Search for Security,"

Swiss Review of World Affairs, No. 11, November 1993, p. 10.

73. Thorvald Stoltenberg is quoted in Olav Schram Stokke and

Ola Tunander, "Conclusions," in Olav Schram Stokke and Ola

Tunander, eds., The Barents Region: Cooperation in Arctic Europe, London: International Peace Research Institute/Sage Publications,

1994, p. 235.

74. Ries, pp. 48-49; Nyberg, p. 539.

75. Ries, pp. 48-49. There are also recent charges that

Finland has downplayed the Karelia issue in order to show the EU

that it had no outstanding ethnic conflicts or issues that could

provoke one. Blomberg apparently has conceded this in Helsinki,

Hufvudstadsbladet, in Swedish, December 8, 1995, FBIS-WEU-95-239,

December 13, 1995, pp. 20-21.

76. Ries, pp. 47-48.

77. Ibid., pp. 24-51. Ries provides analysis of all the

possible threats or risks to Scandinavian security generally.

78. Ibid., p. 37.
28

79. Ibid., pp. 40-46.

80. Ibid., pp. 45-49.

81. London, The European, in English, October 19-25, 1995,

FBIS-WEU-95-204, October 23, 1995, p. 20.

82. Johann Jorgen Holst, "Institutions, Cooperation,

Prospects," in Olav Schramm Stokke and Ola Tunander, eds., The

Barents Region: Cooperation in Arctic Europe, London:

International Peace Research Institute/Sage Publications, 1994,

p. 23.

83. Anders Kjolberg, "The Barents Region as A European

Security Building Concept," in Olav Schram Stokke and Ola

Tunander, eds., The Barents Region: Cooperation in Arctic Europe,

London: International Peace Research Institute/Sage Publications,

1994, pp. 187-199.

84. Interviews with Finnish officials by the author,

Helsinki, December 1994.

85. Interviews with Finnish officials by the author,

Helsinki, December 1994.

86. Stephen J. Blank, Russia and the Baltic: Is There a

Threat to European Security?, Carlisle Barracks, PA.: Strategic

Studies Institute, 1993, p. 11.

87. Interviews with Finnish officials by the author,

Helsinki, December 1994.

88. Interviews with Finnish officials by the author,

Helsinki, December 1994.

89. Interviews with Finnish officials by the author,

Helsinki, December 1994.

90. Interviews with Finnish officials by the author,

Helsinki, December 1994.

91. White Paper, p. 23.

92. Ibid., p. 24.

93. Ibid., pp. 24, 61, 67.

94. Helsinki, Suomen Yleisradio Network, in Finnish, January

15, 1996, FBIS-WEU-96-012, January 18, 1996, p. 22.
29

95. Ibid.

96. White Paper, pp. 65-66.

97. Jaakko Blomberg, "EC Membership and Finnish Security

Policy," Speech to the National Defense Association of North

Karelia, January 11, 1993, Yearbook of Finnish Foreign Policy

1993, pp. 65-66.

98. This is argued by the Vice-Chairman of the Centre

d'Etude et de Prospective Strategique, Robert Buissiere, who

directly attacks the view that the WEU should confine itself to

peace operations and crisis management. Robert Buissiere, "A

Europe of Security and Defence," NATO Review, Vol. XLII, No. 5,

September 1995, pp. 31-35.

99. Ibid.

100. Javier Solana, "The European Security Agenda," NATO

Review, Vol. XLIII, No. 6, November 1995, p. 13.

101. Blomberg, "EC Membership and Finnish Security Policy,"

p. 65.

102. Rajendra K. Jain, "Enlargement of NATO: Partnership for

Peace and After," Strategic Analysis, Vol. XVIII, No. 3, June

1995, pp. 415-416.

103. "The Jane's Interview," p. 56.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

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