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# United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit

No. 15-2162

S T E V E N Y AH NKE, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

K AN E C OUNT

Y , I L L I N O I S

, et al., Defen dants-Appellees.
Appe al f ro m the Uni ted S tates Distri ct Co urt fo r the Nor thern Distri ct o f Il l i noi s, Eastern Di v i sio n. No. 1: 12 -cv-05 15 1 — Amy J. St. Eve , Judg e.

A RGU E D J ANUAR

Y 20, 2016

— D E C I D E D M A Y 24, 2016

Before W OOD, Chief

Judge, and M ANI ON an d RO VN E R , Ci r cui t Judges.

R OVN E R , Circui t Judge. After the Sher i ff of Kane C o un t y ter minated Deputy Sher i ff St ev en Y ahnke’s employment, Y ahnke sued the County and the Sher i ff, alleging t hat he w as ter minated becau se of hi s poli tic al affil i ation and that the ter minati on occurred wi thout due process. The di strict court gr anted sum mary judgment in fav or of the defendants on both2 No. 15-2162
counts, and Y

ahnke appeals. W

e affi rm the judgment on the due process clai m but w e v acate the judgment on the poli tic al affi li ation c ount and remand for t rial.
I. The Kane County Sher i ff’s offi ce hi red Y ahnke in 1986, and he w o r k e d as a Deputy Sher i ff for more than tw enty y ears,
ev entually holding the rank of Ser geant. The posi tion of Sher i ff i s an elected post in Kane Cou nt y , and in 2006, then-Sheriff Kenneth Ramsey opted to ret i re rat her than run for re-election. Deputy Sher i ff P atr i ck Perez deci ded to run for the po st , and Y ahnk e also contemplated enter ing the race. At the tim e, Y ahnke told sev eral people about hi s intention to run and spoke to a numbe r of people about becoming hi s campai gn manager and rais ing fund s. Ev entually , Y ahnke deci ded not to

run for the offi ce, and Perez, a Democrat, defeated Republi can Kev in Wi llia ms, another Deputy Sher i ff whom Y ahnke had supp or ted.
Perez too k ov er the post in December 2006. Earlier that y ear , Sher i ff Ramsey had approved Y ahnke’s request to e n ga ge in second a r y e mplo yment as the part-t i me poli ce chi ef of the Vi llage of Maple P ark

. In June 2007, after Sher i ff Pe r e z t o ok offi ce, Y ahnke w as injured whi le w or kin g as a Deputy Sher i ff and began receiving di sabi li ty benefi ts. In July 2007, Perez and Undersheriff St ephen Zim an advis ed Y ahnke that hi s secondary employment as Maple P a r k poli ce chi ef w as sus pended unti l he could ret urn to w or k in the Sher i ff’s offi ce. But Zim an allow ed Y

ahnke t o co ntinue wi th some inv olv ement in the Maple P ark posi tion, such as opening the mai l. In August 2007, Y ahnke hosted a party at hi s home atte nded by almost all ofNo. 15-2162 3
the Maple P a r k p o l i ce offi cers. At that ev ent, Y ahnke openly di scu ssed a p l a n t o r un for the Sher i ff’s posi tion in 2010, the next election cycle.
Becaus e Y

ahnke remain ed on tempor ary tot al di sabi li ty , in
e arly Nov ember 2007, Zim an or dered Y ahnke to cease a l l secondary employment, inclu ding the li mi ted inv olv ement in Maple P arkthat Z i man previous ly allow ed. In the meantim e, Perez sought a legal opini on from the County’ s S tate ’s A tto r ney reg ardin g whether Y ahnke’s dual employment presented

a co nflic t of intere st. The St ate’s Att or ney consu lted wi th the Illinoi s Att or ney General and conclu ded that secondary employment as chi ef of the Mapl e P ark poli ce presented a potent i al confli ct of intere st wi th Y ahnke’s jo b a s a Deputy Sher i ff. Later that same month, Sh e r i ff Perez permanently

1

rev oke d Y

ahnke’s authorizati on to act as poli ce chi ef of Maple P ark

. S he r iff Perez also opened an inv esti gation wi th the Offi ce of Professi onal St andards (“OPS”) into whether Y ahnke

co nt inued to w or k as poli ce chi ef of Maple P ark during the period that hi s secondary employment w as sus pended. The OPS inv esti gato r collected bus iness and publi c recor ds that could be c onstrued as evidenc e that Y ahnke had continued to perfor m some of hi s duti es as poli ce ch i ef of Maple P arkafter Nov ember 2007. On O ct o ber 7, 2008, Sher i ff Perez notifi ed Y ahnke in tw o lette rs that he w as fi ling charges wi th the Mer i t Commi ssi on seeking hi s remov al for caus e. In the fi rst lette r ,

Mapl e Park i s l ocated pri maril y i n Kan e Co unty, b ut straddl es the b or der 1 ofnei ghb or i ng DeKa l b Co unty.4 No. 15-2162

Perez accu sed Y

ahnke of violating Mer i t Commi ssi on Rules by fai ling to di s p lay absolute honesty during an OPS inv esti gativ e interv i ew that too k place on Sept ember 2, 2008, and by fai ling to fo l l o w the or ders of the Sher i ff and Undersheriff to cease secondary employment. In the second lette r , Perez char ged Y ahnke wi th fai ling to di splay absolute honesty reg ardin g an OPS inv esti gation into Y ahnke’s us e o f comp tim e and ov er
tim e pro cedures. Th e Mer i t Co mmi ssi on set a h earing date to

rev i ew t he char ges. For reasons w e wi ll di scu ss below , that hearin g nev er too k place. The Sher i ff t e r minated Y ahnke’s employment on O ctober 28, 2008.
Y ahnke sued Kane County and Sher i ff Perez, asserting that his t ermin ation w as in ret ali ation for exer ci sing hi s First Amendment rights, a nd t ha t he w as ter minated wi thout due process, in violati on of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Y ahnke a ss e r t ed he 2 had been ter minated becau se of his poli tic al affi li ation and becau se the Sher i ff beli ev ed that Y ahnke w ould oppose hi m in
an e lecti on. In the course of di scov ery in a state co urt laws ui t betw een the same parties, Undersheriff Zim an w as questi oned about the Sher i ff’s reaction to learning t ha t Y ahnke had engaged in outsi de employment. Zimantestifi ed: The w o r d s I recall, when i t came to di sci plining Ser geant Y

ahnke, I w ent t o the Sher i ff and I sai d, Y ou know

, he w as teaching, he w as—we sent

Yahnke also b ro ught a state l aw cl aim fo r retali atory di scha rge under the 2 I l l i no i s Wor kers’ Co mpensa tio n Act. Afte r granting judgment i n fav or of the def endants on the fed eral cl aims, the di stric t cour t decl i ned to exerci se suppl emental juri sdi cti on over the state l aw cl aim and di smissed i t witho ut prej udi ce.No. 15-2162 5

Inter nal Affai rs out and they found him teaching, he’s gui lty of that, do y ou w ant to giv e hi m a lette r , tim e off or whatev er

, I w ent to the Sher i ff and asked hi m that. I don’t mean to be vulgar here, but he sai d, I ’ m no t giving hi m any tim e off, I ’m fi ring him

. He thinks he’s going to run for Sher i ff again st me some day

. R. 170- 3 at 67-68. In oppositi on to the defendants’ motion for 3

sum mary judgment, Y ahnke ci ted th is testim ony as di rect evidenc e of the Sher i ff’s motiv e for hi s ter minati on, but the court di d not address thi s evidenc e. Instead, the dis tr i ct court

assu med that Y

ahnke establi shed a prima facie ca se of First Amendment ret ali ation, and turned to the Sher i ff’s stated

reasons for fi ring Y

ahnke. The court found that Perez had nonret ali ator y reasons t o ter minate Y ahnke, namely

, that he had continued hi s secondary employment afte r being or dered to stop, and t hat he w as not absolutely honest in departmental inv esti gations of hi s conduc t. The court then shi fted the b urden back to Y ahnke to demonstrate that the Sher i ff’s stated reasons
w ere not w or thy of credence. The court conclu ded, again wi thout addres sin g the deposi tion t esti mony of Undersheriff Zim an, t ha t Y

ahnke had fai led to produce evidenc e that the Sher i ff’s stated reasons w ere a pret ext and that the tr ue reason
w as Y ahnke’s poli tic al affi li ation or ambi tions

. The court also

Al though Ziman coul d not recal l the preci se date of this conversatio n, b y 3 consi deri ng the context and c o ns t rui ng the reco rd i n Yahnke’s fav or , i t i s apparent tha t i t too k pl ace duri ng the t i me p eri od tha t the Sheri ff was i nv esti gating Yahnke fo r engag i ng i n seco nd ar y empl oyment. It was therefo re wi thin the re l evant time frame.6 No. 15-2162
conclu ded that Y

ahnke w as prov i ded all t he process t hat w as due in the course of hi s t e r minati on, and t hat Y ahnke w ai v ed certain p r o ce dures that w ere av ai lable to hi m. The court there fore gr anted sum mary judgment in fav or of the defendants. Y ahnke appeals.
II. On ap peal, Y

ahnke asserts that the cour t erred in gr anting judgm e nt t o the defendants on the First Amendment clai m when he presented di rect evidenc e that the Sher i ff ter minated hi m becau se of hi s poli tic al acti vity

. Y ahnke also notes that, in shi fting the burden to Y ahnke to demonstrate that the Sher i ff’s stated reasons w e re a pret ext, the court err oneously required Y ahnke to meet all three part s o f a d i sjuncti v e standard that thi s court appli ed in Carter v
. Chicago State Univ

. , 778 F .3d 651, 659 (7th Ci r
. 2015). Y

ahnke also arg ues on appeal that the court
err ed in gr anting judgment on hi s due process clai m when the court di sregar ded di sputed i ssu es of ma t e rial fact. Fin ally , Y ahnke asserts t hat the di stric t court should h av e gr anted hi s motion to strike the defendants’ Local Rule 5 6

. 1 statement of facts for v ariousviolati ons of that r ule.
W e rev i ew the di stric t court's gr ant of sum mary judgment de novo , examining the recor d in the li g ht mo st fav or able to Y ahnke and construing all reasonable infer ences from the

ev ide nce in hi s fav or

. Anderson v
. Liberty Lobby , Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986); Naficy v
. Illinois Dep't of Human Servs. , 697 F .3d 504, 509 (7th Ci r
. 2012); Norman–Nun nery v
. Madiso n Ar ea T ech. Coll. , 625 F .3d 422, 428 (7th Ci r
. 2010). Summary judgment i s appropr i ate when there are no genuine di sputes of mat e rial fact and the mov ant i s entitled to judgment as a matter of law

.No. 15-2162 7
Fed.R.Civ

.P

. 56(a); Naficy, 697 F .3d at 509. Anderson , 477 U.S. at 255; McGreal v. Ostrov, 368 F .3d 657, 663 (7th Ci r . 2004).
A. “The First Amendment gener ally prohibi ts gove rnment offi ci als from di smi ssing or demoting an employ ee becau se of the employ ee's e ngagement in consti tutionally prot ected poli tic al acti vity

.” Heffer nan v
. City of Paterso n, New Jersey, 136 S. Ct. 1412, 1416 (2016) (ci tin g Elrod v
. Burns , 427 U

. S. 347 (1976); and Branti v
. Fin kel , 445 U.S. 507 (1980))

. T o make out a prima facie clai m for a violati on of First Amendment rights, publi c employ ees must pr e sent evidenc e that (1) their speech

w as consti tutionally prot ected; (2) they suffered a depriv ation li kely to deter free sp e e ch; and (3) their speech w as at least a
mo tiv atin g factor in the employ er’s acti ons. Kidwell v
. Eisenhauer, 679 F .3d 957, 964 (7th C ir

. 2012); Greene v
. Doruff , 660 F .3d 975, 977-78 (7th Ci r
. 2011); Spiegl a v
. Hull , 371 F .3d 928, 935 (7th Ci r
. 2004). The defendants concede that Y ahnke’s poli tic a l affi li ation and desi re to run for poli tic al offi ce i s prot ected by the First Amendment. See Branti, 445 U.S. at 516- 17 (to prev ai l in a First Amendment re t a l ia t ion clai m, i t i s suffi ci ent for the plainti ffs to p r o ve t hat they w ere di smi ssed solely for the reason that they w ere not a ff ilia ted wi th or sponsored by a part i cular poli tic al party ). There i s no di spute that Y ahnke’s ter minati on is t he sort of depriv ation li kely to deter the exer cise o f First Amendment rights. See Rutan v
. Republi can Pa rty of Illinois , 497 U.S. 62, 73-74 (1990) (di smi ssal, deni al of tr ansfer

, fai lure to recall after lay off, and r e fu sal to promo te are si gni fi cant penalti es that i mpermi ssi bly encroach

on First A me ndment freedoms unles s such practic es are8 No. 15-2162

narro wly tailored to further vital government intere sts). The only factor a t issue here i s whether the Sher i ff ter minated Y ahnke becaus e of hi s poli tic al affi li ation. The di stric t court analyzed caus ation under the burdensh ift ing framew or k set out by the Supreme Court in Mt. Healthy City School D i s t. Bd. of Educ. v
. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977). The Court held that, in p r o v ing a First Amendment clai m, the ini tial burden i s on the plainti ff to demonstrate that hi s c on d u c t was consti tutionally prot ected and that hi s cond u c t

w as a sub stanti al or motiv atin g factor in the defendant’s acti on again st hi m. The burden then shi fts t o the defendant t o show that i t w ould hav e take n the same acti on ev en in the absenc e of the prot ected conduc t. Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287. W e later

sum mari zed the rule: [T] he burden of proo f relat ing to caus ation i s di

vided betw een the parties in Fi rst Amendment to rt

cases

. T o make a prima facie showing of caus ation the plainti ff mus t sh ow only that the defendant's conduct w as a suffi ci ent condi tion of the plaintiff ' s injury

. The defendant can r ebut, but o nly by showing that hi s conduc t w as not a necess ary condi tion of the harm—the harm w ould hav e occurred anyw ay
. Greene, 660 F .3d at 980. On summary judgment, o f course, the plainti ff’s burden i s si mply to demonstrate that the r e i s a genuine i ssu e of mater i al fact on the questi on of causati on. The di stric t court assu med (wi thou t cit ing any particu lar pi ece of evidenc e ) t ha t Y ahnke met the ini tial burden of demonstrating t hat hi s poli tic al affi li ation w as a motiv atin g factor in the Sher i ff’s deci si on to ter minate hi m. The court thenNo. 15-2162 9
turned to the Sher i ff’s stated permi ssi ble, non-poli tic al reasons for ter minat ing Y

ahnke, namely that he violated reg ulati ons that required hi m to be honest in all department dealings and that he had fai led to comply wi t h the or der that he cease secondar y employment. The court then shi fted the bur d e n back to Y ahnke to demonstrate that the Sher i ff’s stated reasons
w ere pret extual, and that the real r e a so n w as ret ali ator y ani mus

. Thayer v
. Chiczewski, 705 F .3d 237, 252 (7th Ci r
. 2012). Showin g p r e tex t, the court held, required evidenc e that the S he riff’s reasons w ere “unw or thy of credence.” Reeves v
. Sanderson Plumbin g Products, Inc. , 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000). T o establi sh that the Sher i ff’s reasons w ere not w or th y o f credence, the court turned to our opini on in Carter v
. Chicago State U n i v ersity, 778 F .3d 651 (7th Ci r
. 2015). There we held that a plainti ff could prove that a defendant’s proffere d justifi cati on is unw or thy of credence by “prov i ding evidenc e tending t o prove that the emp l o yer's proffere d reasons are factually baseles s, w ere not the actual motiv ation for the di sch arg e in questi on, or w ere insu ffi cient to motiv ate” the employment acti on. Carter

, 778 F .3d at 659. Unfort unately , the di stric t court inadv ert ently swi tched out the “or ” in that standard for an “and” and c reat ed a conjuncti v e test r ather than a di sjuncti v e
one. Although Y

ahnke twi ce poin ted out thi s err or in hi s bri ef

on appeal, the defendants inexpli cably continued to ci te the mi squoted language intheir response bri ef.
In any case, all Y

ahnke need do at thi s stage of the proceeding s is d emonstrat e a genuine i ssu e of material fact on the Sher i ff’s intent in fi ring hi m. In the context of the Carter cas e , Y ahnke mus t demonstrate a genuine i ssu e on any one of three fa ct or s w e set out in that case to survive sum mary judgment.10 No. 15-2162

Y ahnke easi ly demon st r a t e s a genuine i ssu e on the second Carter factor by ci tin g the deposi tion of Undersheriff Zim an. Zim an repo rt ed to the Sher i ff that an inv esti gato r had di scovered that Y

ahnke w as t eaching during the period o f t i me that he w as prohibi ted from engaging in secondary employme nt

. The Undersheriff a sk e d whether the Sher i ff w anted to “give hi m a lette r

, tim e off or whatev er

,” ostensibly refer ring to a wri tte n repr i mand or a sus pensi on, both of whi ch were opti ons under the prog ressi v e di sci pline system of the Collectiv e Bargaining Agr eement. See R. 150-4 at 22. As we noted abov e, the Sher i ff replied, “I’m not giving hi m any tim e off, I’m fi ring hi m. He thinks he’s going to run for Sher i ff again st me some day .” A finder of fact credi tin g Zim an’s v ersi on of the c onv er
sati on could easi ly find that the Sher i ff fi red Y ahnke becau se of hi s poli tic al ambi tions and hi s poli tic al oppos i tion to the Sher iff, a motiv e for the ter minati on that i s i mpermi ssi ble under the First A mendmen t. Construing t hat conv ersation in fav or of Y

ahnke, i t i s clear that, e ven i f Y ahnke had violated department rules, lesser forms of di sci pline w ere av ai lable and

w ere suggested as appropr i ate by the Undersheriff. The finder of fact could conclu de that Sher i ff Perez rej ected these lesser

sanc tions in fav or of ter minati on because Y ahnke expr essed a desi re to run again st the Sher i ff, and that the proffere d reasons
w ere not the actual motiv at io n for the di sch arg e. On the

caus ation is sue, that i s mor e th a n e no ugh to defeat sum mary judgment, and a tr i al mus t be he ld to deter mine the Sher i ff’s tr ue motiv ation. W

e v acate the judgment on the First Amendment clai m and remand for tr i al.No. 15-2162 11

B.
W e affi rm, how ev er

, th e di stric t court’s judgment on Y ahnke’s due process claim

. In the second count of hi s complaint, Y ahnke alleged t ha t he had a prot ected proper ty intere st in his continued employ ment wi th Kane C o un t y and that he w as no t afforded due process when the Sher i ff ter mi

nated hi s employment. “The fund amental requirement of due process i s the oppor tuni ty to be heard ‘ a t a me aningful tim e and in a meaningful manner .’” Mathews v
. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) ( quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965))

. In analyzing a procedural due process clai m, w e mus t fi rst deter mine whether the plainti ff w a s d e p r iv ed of a prot e ct ed intere st and then deter mine what process i s due. B ry n Maw r Care, Inc. v
. Sebeliu s , 749 F .3d 592, 598 (7th Ci r
. 2014); Pugel v
. Boa rd of T

rustees of Un iv

. of Ill. , 378 F .3d 659, 662 (7th Ci r
. 2004). The pa rt i es do not di spute that Y ahnke had a prot ected proper ty intere st in hi s continued employment wi th the County; a Collectiv e Barg aining Agr eement an d the Kane County Sher i ff’s Mer i t Commi ssi on Rules and Regulations made Y ahnke a tenured deputy sub ject t o the M erit Commi ssi on. W e ther efore fo cuson the pr ocess that w as due. Under the Mer it C ommi ssi on Rules, a hearin g mus t
commenc e wi thin thi rt y days after the S he riff fi les a wri tte n complaint wi th the Mer i t Commiss i on seeking remov al of an employ ee unles s t he e mplo y ee w ai v es t he thi rt y day requirement or elects arbi tr ation instead of a hearin g. As w e no t e d abov e, on October 7, 2008, the Sher i ff not i fi e d Y ahnke that he

w as fi ling charges wi th the Mer i t Co mm iss i on seeking Y ahnke’s ter minati on. On October 15, 2008, the Mer i t Commi s-12 No. 15-2162

si on sent a lette r to Y

ahnke informing hi m that i t had receiv ed the Sher i ff’s charges and r e quest for ter minati on. That same lette r notifi ed Y

ahnke that t he M erit Commi ssi on had sch eduled the requi si te hear ing for O ctober 27, 2008. Also on October 15, 2008, a lawy er from Y a hnk e’s uni on fi led a “St e p Three" gr i ev ance on Y ahnke’s behalf (hereafter “St ep Three Gri ev ance”). The ter ms of the Collecti v e Bargaining Agr eement prov i de for a four -step gr iev ance process. In St ep One, the employ ee may rais e a gr i ev ance in wri tin g w i th the employ ee’s i mmediat e superv i sor

. In the case of County employ ees such as Y

ahnke, that gr i ev ance i s refer red to the Sher i ff. If unresolv ed at S t ep One, the gr i ev ance proceeds to St ep T w o, whi ch encompas ses rev i ew by the County Human Resources Di recto r
. If necess ary , at St ep Th r e e , the gr i ev ance
mus t be p r esented by the uni on to the Sher i ff or hi s desi gnee
or the County B oar d Chai rman. If sti ll unresolv ed, at St ep Four , the uni on must notify the Sher i ff in wri tin g of the intent to go to arbi tr ation. But Mer i t Commi ssi on employ ees such as Y ahnke may

, as an alter nati v e to rev i ew by the Mer i t Commi ssi on, ski p di rectly to S tep Three: The di sci pline of Mer i t Commi ssi on employ ees shall hav e as an alter nati v e to rev i ew by the Mer i t Commi ssi on be subject to rev i ew by the prov i si o ns of St ep Three of the Gri ev ance Pro cedure

. Wi thin the tim e prov i ded for in St ep Four of t he Gr iev ance Procedure for appealing the deci si ons of the Sher i ff, the Uni on ma y fi le a request for arbi tr ation under the pro vis i ons of Ste p Four of the Griev ance P ro cedure. If no such request i s made, then the employ eeNo. 15-2162 13
shall be deemed to hav e elected to proceed under the ter ms of the rules of the Mer i t Co mmi ssi on. R. 150, Ex. 4 at23-24.
In Y ahnke ’s St ep Three Gri ev ance, the uni on noted that Y ahnke had been the subject of an ext e nsi v e inv esti gation reg ardin g his secondary employment, and that Y ahnke had gr i ev ed the centr a l iss ues of hi s right to maintain secondary

e mployment. The St ep Three Gri ev ance also noted t ha t Y ahnke’s prior gr i ev ance had proceeded to t he p o int of arbi tr ation but that the Sher i ff had changed legal c ounsel and forced a continuanc e of the arbi tr ation. The Sher i ff then placed Y ahnke on admin i strat i v e leav e before notifying hi m on October 9, 2008 that the Sher i ff w as sending the matter to the Mer i t Commi ssio n wi th a request for ter minati on. At that poin t, the Sher i ff’s offi ce stopped payin g Y ahnke. Y

ahnke asserted that these acti ons violated the Collective Bargaining Agr eement becau se: (1) the order to c ease secondary employment w as i llegal and arbi tr ary , and the Sher i ff’s continuanc e of the arbi tr ation w or ked to Y ahnke’s detr ime nt ; (2) the Sher i ff placed Y ahnke in i llegal unpai d status prior to a t e r min a tion hearin g wi th the Mer i t Board; (3) Y ahnke w as not prov i ded an
a p p ro p ri ate complaint as required by the Collec tive B a rg a inin g Agr eement; (4) the di sci pline w as g iven wi thout just caus e, based on an i llegal or der , and w as not p r o g r e ssi v e or corr ectiv e; and (5) the di sci pline w as a poli tic ally motiv ated act of ret ali ation. In the box on the gr i ev ance form for “relief sought,” Y ahnke ’s uni on re presentativ e wrot e, “St ay any di sci pline unti l the outcome of the gr i ev ance arbi tr ation addressing the central i ssu e of the O .P

.S. inv esti gation.” R. 150, Ex. 7.14 No. 15-2162

A w eek later

, the uni on lawy er repr esenting Y ahnke sent a lette r t o the chai rman of the Me rit Commi ssi on stating:
I ha ve been made aw are of a lette r that y ou have sent to

... Y

ahnke, concerning a Mer i t C ommi ssi on hearin g thi s coming Monday Oct ober 27, 2008. Pursu ant to

... the Collectiv e Bargaining Agr eement

... Y ahnke has exer ci sed hi s alter nati v e to rev i ew by the Mer i t Co mmi ssi on by prov i si on of step 3 of the Gri ev ance Procedure. The step 3 gr i ev ance w as fi led

... on October 15, 2008.

... In the ev ent the Chai rman deni es the gr i ev ance, Ser geant Y ahnk e wi shes to proceed to step 4 of the gr i ev ance process under the Collectiv e Bargaining agr eement wi th hi s intent to go t o in dependent arbi tr ation. R. 150, Ex. 15. On October 28, the Sher i ff again se nt Y ahnke a seri es of lette rs setting fort h hi s purpor ted violati ons, a nd statin g in relev ant part : The violati ons of these gener al or ders w arr ant y our di smi ssal as a Deputy Peace Offi cer Ser geant. Based

on my authority under the ter ms of 55 ILCS 5/3- 8014, and since you hav e w ai v ed y our right to a Mer i t Commi ssi on hearin g and filed notice of y our intent to go to independent arbi tr ation, I am t erminating y our emp l o yment wi th the Kane County Sher i ff’s D epart ment, effecti v e i mmedi ately

. R. 150, Ex. 8

. A t a M e rit Commi ssi on meetin g that same day , Undersheriff Zim an “advis ed the Commi ssi on that Sg t. St ev enNo. 15-2162 15

Y ahnke has been fi red and requested arbi tr ation. The Commi ssi on wi ll not be hearing the case.” R. 150, Ex. 9. And indeed the Commi ssi on nev er heard the case. Nor di d i t go to arbi tr ation, ev en though the uni on sought to compel arbi tr ation o n Y

ahnke’s behalf in state court. As the Illinoi s Appellate Court explained, when Y ahnke atte mpted to set up the arbi tr ation hear ing, Sher i ff P e r ez responded that the St ep Three Gri ev ance had been resolv ed and he di d not agr ee to arbi tr ate i t. Policemen ’s Benevolent Labor Comm. v
. Co u n ty of Kane, 2012 IL App (2 d ) 1 2 0009-U, 2012 WL 6969132 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012). Perez too k the posi tion t hat Y ahnke’s October 15 gr i ev ance had been resolv ed when Y ahnke “w as sent hi s chec k for th e t ime off w or k he clai med prior to hi s ter minati on.” Y ahnke conceded in t he st ate court proceeding that the ter minati on di d not occur unti l October 28, a nd t ha t hi s October 15 St ep Three Griev ance w as not fi led wi th reg ard to the October 28 ter minati on lette r
. Th e Sher i ff arg ued that Y ahnke had not fi led a gr i ev ance speci fi cally challen gin g hi s ter minati on. The Appellate Court affi rmed t he t r i al court’s conclu si on that, once the Octob e r 1 5 gr i ev ance w as resolv ed, nothin g w as left to arbi tr ate, and the October 15 gr i ev ance w as insu ffi ci ent to challen ge t he ter minati on. Wi th that factual backgro und in place, t he d istric t court analyzed Y

ahnke’s due p r o cess clai m. The court noted that Y ahnke had enter ed into an Agr eed Or der to w ai v e hi s right to proceed before t he M e rit Commi ssi on and instead elected to proceed to arbi tr ation under the Collectiv e Bargaining Agr eement. R. 163, E x. 5. But havin g w ai v ed the Mer i t Co mmi ssi on hearin g, Y

ahnke di d not follow up and fi le a gr i ev ance relat ed to hi s October 28 ter minati on. The court noted that Y ahnke had16 No. 15-2162 adequate procedures av ai labl e an d s i m p ly d i d n ot fol l ow them. The court there fore gr anted judgment in fav or of the defendants on the due process cl ai m. On appeal, Y

a hn k e arg ues that, under the Mer i t Commi ssi on Rules, he mus t be afforded a hearin g befor e the Mer i t Commi ssi o n unless he w ai v es the thi rty day requirement or elects arbi tr ation instead of a hearin g. Y ahnke contends that the Sher i ff conceded that Y ahnke had reques t e d a rbi tr ation and that Y

ahnke had “fi led notic e of [hi s] intent to go to independent arbi tr atio n.” Y ahnke contends that the Sher i ff could not have wi thdrawn the Mer i t Commi ssi on charges unles s the Sher i ff also accepted t hat Y ahnke had already proper ly fi led hi s request for a r bitrat i on of hi s ter minati on. Mor eov er

, the Collectiv e Bargaining Agr eement prov i des that i f an employ ee does not fi le a gr i ev ance, he or she i s deemed to elect to proceed under the rules of the Mer i t Commi ssi on. Y ahnke fa ults the di stric t court for conclu ding that he w as required to fi le an addi tional gr i ev ance speci fi cally di rected at hi s ter minati on; by Y ahnke’s reasoning , the October 15 gr i ev ance w as suffici ent to preserve hi s right to arbi tr ate hi s ter minati on and the Sher i ff had already co nc e d e d that i t w as suffi ci e nt. The Sher i ff’s later refusal to arbi tr ate the ter minati on
w as a rev ersal of hi s earlier conces si on that Y ahn k e had follow ed the proper proced ur e s. According to Y ahnke, thi s creates a di sputed i ssu e of material fact, namely , why the Sher i ff told the Mer i t Commi ssi on that Y ahnke had requested arbi tr ation and that the Sher i ff there fore w ould wi thdraw the Mer i t Commi ssi on charges so that the parties could proceed to arbi tr ation. According to Y ahnke, the answer i s that the Sher i ffNo. 15-2162 17

too k these acti ons so t ha t Y ahnke w ould hav e no means of obtaining a hearing on hi s termin ation. Although there may be a factual di spute reg ardin g why the Sher i ff told the Mer i t Co mm iss i on that Y ahnke w as w ai ving hi s hearin g in fav or of arbitration, that d i spute i s not material to Y ahnke’s due process clai m. It i s the acti ons that Y ahnke too k and, more i mport antly , d id no t take , that led to hi s procedural bind. A process exis ted for Y ahnke to challen ge hi s ter minati on : he could hav e had a hearin g before the Mer i t Commi ssi on or he could hav e fi l e d a gr i ev ance again st hi s ter minati on and proceeded to a rbi tr ation. But he w ai v ed the Mer i t Commi ssi on hearin g when hi s uni on lawy er sent a lette r to the Mer i t Commi ssi on, and then he fai led to fi le a gr i ev ance that w as adequate to challenge hi s t ermin ation. He may hav e thought that the October 15 gr i ev ance w as adequate, but by hi s
own conces si on, and by the findings of the Illinoi s courts, that gr i ev ance w as not speci fi cally addressed to t he ter minati on, whi ch occurred tw o w eeks after the St ep Three Gri ev ance w as fi led. Y ahnke essenti ally arg ues the Sher i ff’s statements that Y ahnke had filed hi s intenti on to g o to arbi tr ation ar e conclu

si v e on the i ssu e. But the Sher i ff’s characterizati on of ev ents to the M e r it Commi ssi on could nei ther preserve nor w ai v e Y ahnke’s arbi tr ation rights. Only Y ahnke coul d preserve hi s rights, and the Illinoi s courts found that he faile d t o do so when he neglected to fi le a g r ie v ance speci fi cally challengin g hi s ter minati on. There i s no evidenc e that the Sher i ff prev ented hi m from obtaining a hear ing. Due process w as av ai lable; Y ahnke si mply fai led to perfect hi s request for arbi tr ation. The di stric t court there fore di d not err in gr anting judgment to the defendants on the due process c lai m.18 No. 15-2162

III. The di stric t court also deni ed Y ahnke’s motion to strike the d e fe nd ants’ Local Rule 56.1 St atement of Facts. But the propr i ety of that decis i on i s now moot in relat i on to Y ahnke’s First Amendment clai m becau se w e are remanding for tr i al. As for Y ahnke’s due process clai m, w e hav e relied only on undi sputed facts and on Y ahnke’s ver sio n of the facts in affi rming the di stric t c ourt ’s gr ant of judgment in fav or of the defendants. W

e wi ll there fore not address the i ssu e further

. In

sum, w e v acate the judgment in part and remand for a tr i al on Y ahnke’s clai m under the First Amendment. W e affi rm the judgment as to the due process clai m. Each party wi ll bear i ts own costs on appeal.
AFF IRM ED IN P ART ; V ACA TED AND REMANDED IN P ART

.