IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 14-1773

Filed October 12, 2016

STATE OF IOWA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

DONALD DEAN GRIDLEY,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Wapello County, Myron L. Gookin, 

Judge.

Donald Gridley appeals his conviction for vehicular homicide, alleging

various errors in his jury trial. AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND 

REMANDED.

Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Bradley M. Bender, 

Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven, Assistant 

Attorney General, for appellee.

Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Vaitheswaran and Tabor, JJ.
2

VAITHESWARAN, Judge.

A truck slid down an embankment and crashed, killing Donald Gridley’s 

father. The State charged Gridley with vehicular homicide, defined as 

“unintentionally caus[ing] the death of another by operating a motor vehicle while 

intoxicated.” See Iowa Code § 707.6A(1) (2013). A jury found him guilty. 

On appeal Gridley (1) challenges the sufficiency of the evidence 

supporting the jury’s finding of guilt, (2) contends the district court should have 

excluded certain opinion testimony proffered by a law enforcement officer, (3) 

argues the district court erred in instructing the jury on his refusal to provide a 

urine sample, and (4) contends the district court applied an incorrect standard in 

ruling on his motion for new trial.

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

The jury was instructed the State would have to prove (1) “the defendant 

operated a motor vehicle,” (2) while under the influence, and (3) as a result of 

these acts he “unintentionally caused the death of” his father. Gridley challenges 

the evidence supporting the first element—whether he was the person who 

operated the motor vehicle. He claims his father operated the vehicle. The jury 

could have found the following facts. 

Gridley and his father attended a funeral. At the reception, Gridley 

estimated he consumed at least seven or eight alcoholic drinks. Early the 

following morning, a deputy sheriff responded to a 911 call from a farmhouse. 

Gridley was outside. Gridley told the deputy he was involved in a vehicle 

accident and thought “his dad was possibly dead.” The deputy noted that Gridley 

had “bloodshot, watery eyes, . . . slurred speech, [and] [smelled] of alcohol.” He 
3

surmised Gridley had been drinking. A urine test taken several hours later 

revealed “a urine alcohol concentration of 0.198 grams per 67 mils of urine,” a 

level that, according to the tester, could impair an individual. The test also was 

positive for marijuana metabolites, oxycodone, and benzodiazepines.

The deputy drove Gridley to the scene of the accident. He found Gridley’s 

father pinned on the floorboard of the passenger side of the vehicle, facing the 

passenger side door. The deputy did not see “any evidence that [Gridley’s

father] was moved from the driver’s seat to the passenger seat.” Other 

witnesses who arrived at the scene confirmed the impracticability of Gridley’s 

assertion that he had repositioned his father.

Two volunteer firemen at the scene heard Gridley ask, “Did I kill my 

father? Is he going to die? Did I kill my father?” A paramedic testified Gridley 

“initially admitted that he was the driver of the vehicle.” While the paramedic 

conceded Gridley “seemed confused,” he stated the confusion was “just over 

[his] questions later.” 

A deputy sheriff testified he “saw a red mark on [Gridley’s] chest” that 

“resembled a steering wheel mark.” A state trooper agreed with the prosecutor 

that “damage to a steering wheel” could “cause injuries to the driver of [a] 

vehicle” and this evidence could be used to identify the driver. An agent with the 

department of criminal investigation opined that two blood samples collected 

from the steering wheel and driver’s side of the dashboard “matched the known 

profile of Donald Gridley.” Gridley’s father “was eliminated as the source of the 

DNA found on those two samples.” 
4

A reasonable juror could have found from this evidence that Gridley,

rather than his father, drove the vehicle. Although several witnesses testified the 

vehicle belonged to Gridley’s father and he never allowed others to drive it, jurors 

could have discredited most of these witnesses based on their close relationship 

with the Gridleys. 

We acknowledge that one defense witness did not fall into this category

because she first met the Gridleys at the reception. She struck up a 

conversation with Gridley’s father and learned he “was extremely adamant to a 

very significant degree that only he drove his truck.” She came close to 

accepting a ride from him and went so far as to approach the passenger side of 

the Gridley vehicle. She testified Gridley’s father “had the driver’s door opened, 

and he was on the driver’s side right by the door,” while Gridley “was on the 

passenger side” with her. Ultimately, she accepted a ride with someone else and 

left before the Gridleys got into their vehicle. While this testimony appears to 

cast doubt on whether Gridley drove the vehicle, a reasonable juror could have 

ascribed limited weight to the woman’s statements in light of her early departure. 

Substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding of guilt. See State v. 

Tinius, 527 N.W.2d 414, 416 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994) (finding substantial evidence 

to support a conviction for vehicular homicide notwithstanding evidence that a 

person who died in the car accident “had driven the car on prior occasions, and 

was known to generally prefer driving a vehicle over riding as a passenger, 

especially after drinking at bars”). 
5

II. Expert Testimony

Gridley challenges the State trooper’s testimony that he was “aware . . .

steering wheel marks can be left on the driver of a vehicle” and “those types of 

marks, [are] evidence you can use to help determine who the driver is.” The 

trooper also agreed with the prosecutor that “when there’s damage to a steering 

wheel . . . it [could] also cause injuries to the driver of the vehicle,” and “a 

semicircle in the abdomen region [would] be consistent with striking a steering 

wheel.” Finally, the trooper discussed the injuries sustained by Gridley’s father

and opined that these injuries placed him on the passenger side of the vehicle.

Gridley asserts (1) the trooper’s testimony was based “largely on witness 

statements or information obtained through police investigation” rather than his

personal observations, (2) the testimony “improperly vouched for” the deputy 

sheriff’s testimony about the mark on Gridley’s chest, and (3) the trooper was not 

qualified as a forensic pathologist who could testify to the source of injuries 

sustained by Gridley’s father.

Gridley did not object to the trooper’s opinion testimony about the mark on 

his chest and its relationship to the steering wheel. Accordingly, he did not 

preserve error and we will review his first two contentions under an ineffectiveassistance-of-counsel rubric. See State v. Maxwell, 743 N.W.2d 185, 195 (Iowa 

2008). “Ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims based on failure to preserve 

error are not to be reviewed on the basis of whether the claimed error would 

have required reversal if it had been preserved at trial. Rather, a defendant must 

demonstrate a breach of an essential duty and prejudice.” Id. at 196. We find 

the record adequate to address the issue. 
6

We begin with Gridley’s challenge to the trooper’s testimony based on his 

lack of personal knowledge. Our courts have consistently allowed law 

enforcement officers to opine on matters gleaned through the observations of 

other officers, whether or not the matters are within the personal knowledge of 

the testifying officer. See State v. Owens, 418 N.W.2d 340, 342 (Iowa 1988) (“[I]t 

is well established that when police officers are acting in concert, the knowledge 

of one is presumed shared by all.”); State v. Schubert, 346 N.W.2d 30, 32 (Iowa 

1984) (“[W]here law enforcement authorities are cooperating in an investigation, 

. . . the knowledge of one is presumed shared by all.”); see also State v. Palmer, 

554 N.W.2d 859, 868 (Iowa 1996) (“Our conclusion in no way undermines the 

validity of our prior cases applying the rule of shared knowledge in other 

situations.”). Pursuant to this shared knowledge doctrine, the trooper permissibly 

relied on the deputy sheriff’s testimony about the injury in opining about its 

possible source. On our de novo review, we conclude Gridley cannot establish 

counsel’s breach of an essential duty in failing to object to the trooper’s testimony 

for lack of personal knowledge.

We turn to Gridley’s assertion that the state trooper “improperly vouched 

for [another officer’s] testimony that [he] sustained a red mark to his abdominal 

area during the accident.” Opinions prohibiting personal vouching have arisen 

primarily, if not exclusively, in child victim cases, where the expert’s testimony 

either bolsters the credibility of the victim or undermines the credibility of the 

defendant. See State v. Tyler, 867 N.W.2d 136, 165-66 (Iowa 2015). Those 

opinions are inapposite. The trooper did not comment on or impugn the 

defendant’s credibility; he simply used shared law enforcement information to 
7

opine on a possible source of Gridley’s injury. Defense counsel did not breach 

an essential duty in failing to challenge the testimony on this basis. 

We are left with Gridley’s challenge to the trooper’s qualifications to opine 

that the facial injuries sustained by Gridley’s father were consistent with having 

been seated on the passenger side of the vehicle. Counsel preserved error on 

this issue by objecting to the trooper’s qualifications at trial. Accordingly, we 

review the issue directly under an abuse of discretion standard. See Hyler v. 

Garner, 548 N.W.2d 864, 868 (Iowa 1996) (“Whether a witness is sufficiently 

qualified to testify as an expert is within the court’s discretion,” and “we reverse 

only for a manifest abuse of discretion to the prejudice of the complaining 

party.”).

There is no question the trooper lacked training as a forensic pathologist. 

However, he possessed extensive experience as an accident investigator, having 

examined “70 to 80 technical collision[s]” in twelve years. His opinion was based 

on an examination of the vehicle and his observation of damage to the rear view 

mirror that was consistent with the mark on the face of Gridley’s father. This 

opinion fell well within the scope of the trooper’s experience and training. See

Iowa R. Evid. 5.702 (authorizing “witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, 

skill, experience, training, or education” to testify on matters that “will assist the 

trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue”); State v. 

Johnson, No. 02-1818, 2003 WL 22698004, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 17, 2003) 

(concluding officer’s “previous experience and training provided him with 

sufficient specialized knowledge to testify that the injuries observed on 

[defendant] were consistent with those suffered by drivers of automobiles in slow 
8

speed crashes”). Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in 

overruling the objection to the trooper’s qualifications.

III. Jury Instruction on Test Refusal

One of the deputy sheriffs testified he “requested a urine sample” from 

Gridley, and Gridley refused to provide one. Gridley did not object to the

testimony but did object to a jury instruction on how to construe the refusal. The 

instruction stated: “The defendant was asked to give a urine sample so it could 

be analyzed to determine the percent of alcohol in his blood. The defendant 

refused. A person is not required to give a sample of any bodily substance; 

however, you may consider a refusal in reaching your verdict.” Gridley asserted 

the instruction was improper because the State failed to establish the 

foundational “steps necessary for invoking implied consent.” The district court 

overruled the objection. 

On appeal, Gridley argues “there [was] a lack of evidence that the law 

enforcement officer[] properly invoked implied consent.”1The State concedes 

error was preserved. Assuming without deciding this is the case, we will proceed 

to the merits. See Top of Iowa Coop v. Sime Farms, Inc., 608 N.W.2d 454, 470 

(Iowa 2000) (“[T]his court will consider on appeal whether error was preserved 

despite the opposing party’s omission in not raising this issue at trial or on 

appeal.”); State v. Johnson, 223 N.W.2d 226, 229 (Iowa 1974) (“No objection 

 

1

Iowa Code § 321J.6(1) states:

A person who operates a motor vehicle in this state under 

circumstances which give reasonable grounds to believe that the person 

has been operating a motor vehicle in violation of section 321J.2 or 

321J.2A is deemed to have given consent to the withdrawal of specimens 

of the person’s blood, breath, or urine and to a chemical test or tests of 

the specimens for the purpose of determining the alcohol concentration or 

presence of a controlled substance or other drugs . . . .
9

was made to the evidence showing the circumstances under which the mortgage 

was made. Objection was first made when the instruction was given to the jury. 

It was too late.”). 

Although the deputy did not discuss an implied consent form or the 

implied consent procedures, he unequivocally testified that Gridley refused the 

urine test. His refusal triggered application of the following statute: “If a person 

refuses to submit to a chemical test, proof of refusal is admissible in any civil or 

criminal action or proceeding arising out of acts alleged to have been committed 

while the person was operating a motor vehicle in violation of section 321J.2 or 

321J.2A.” Iowa Code § 321J.16. In light of the deputy’s testimony, we conclude 

the district court did not err in giving the jury instruction.

IV. Motion for New Trial

Gridley moved for a new trial and for arrest of judgment. His new trial 

motion cited the pertinent rule but not the pertinent standard for application of the 

rule. See Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.24(2)(b)(6) (allowing court to grant a new trial 

“[w]hen the verdict is contrary to law or evidence”); State v. Ellis, 578 N.W.2d 

655, 658-59 (Iowa 1998) (noting distinction between sufficiency-of-the-evidence 

standard and weight-of-the-evidence standard and holding “‘contrary to . . . the 

evidence’ in rule [2.24](2)(b)(6) means ‘contrary to the weight of the evidence’”).

The district court used the sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard to deny Gridley’s 

motion. 

Gridley contends the “district court appl[ied] an incorrect standard in 

overruling [his] motion [for new trial.]” The State responds that Gridley’s new trial 
10

motion made “no reference to any witness or testimony that was somehow not 

credible, nor the word ‘weight.’” 

In Maxwell, the court found that the defendant “clearly raised the issue of 

whether the verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence by citing rule 

2.24(2)(b)(6) in his motion.” 743 N.W.2d at 193. Gridley’s motion similarly cited 

the rule. Although Gridley subsequently referred to the sufficiency-of-theevidence rather than the weight-of-the evidence standard, Ellis required 

application of the weight-of-the-evidence standard. 578 N.W.2d at 658-59.

Because this standard was not applied, we affirm the convictions, but reverse 

the ruling on Gridley’s motion for new trial and “remand the case to the district 

court to rule on the motion for new trial under the correct weight-of-the-evidence 

standard.” See State v. Nitcher, 720 N.W.2d 547, 560 (Iowa 2006).

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.