2014 - 2015 CIVIL AFFAIRS ISSUE PAPERS:

THE FUTURE OF CIVIL AFFAIRS

Edited by

Christopher Holshek

John C. Church, Jr.

Carlisle Barracks, PA and

UNITED STATES 

ARMY WAR COLLEGE

PRESS
PKSOI PAPER

2014 - 2015 Civil Affairs Issue Papers:

“The Future of Civil Affairs”

Presented by the

Civil Affairs Association

In coordination with the

U.S. Army Peacekeeping & Stability 

Operations Institute

U.S. Military Academy Center for the Study of 

Civil-Military Operations

and the

Foreign Area Officer Association

Edited by

Christopher Holshek and John C. Church, Jr. 

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and 

do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. 

Government. Authors of Peacekeeping and Stability Operations 

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academic freedom empowers them to offer new and sometimes 

controversial perspectives in the interest of furthering debate on 

key issues. This report is cleared for public release; distribution 

is unlimited.
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ISBN: 978-0-9861865-0-9

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Table of Contents

Foreword....................................................................v

Civil Affairs Association 

President Joseph P. Kirlin III

Executive Summary ...............................................vii

Panel Summaries on Shaping the Future of 

Civil Affairs.................................................................1

– Past as Prologue....................................................1

John C. Church, Jr.

– Lessons from the Decade of War........................9

Kurt E. Müller

– The Way Forward...............................................23

Karen Guttieri

Issue Papers

1. “Quality is Free – Improving Outcomes 

in an Era of Austerity through 

Integrated Civil Military Training and 

Operations”...............................................................33

Staff Sgt. Bjorn E. Hansen and 

Sgt. 1st Class Ryan S. Long

2. “Redefining Civil Affairs”................................. 55

Colonel Dennis J. Cahill (ret.)

3. “Remote Civil Information Management: 

A Concept For How U.S. Army Reserve Civil 

Affairs Subject Matter Experts Can Bring 

Relevant Civilian Skill Set Support to 

Combatant Commanders”......................................73

Major Marco A. Bongioanni
4. “Military Governance: The Essential 

Mission of Civil Affairs,”........................................91

Colonel David Stott Gordon (ret.)

5. “Transforming CA Into a Phase Zero 

Force,”......................................................................105

Major Shafi Saiduddin

For more information, go to: 

http://www.civilaffairsassoc.org/

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FOREWORD

The Civil Affairs Association is a veteran’s organization whose principal mission is, as it has been for 

over 65 years, to help ensure the maintenance and enhancement of the Civil Affairs capabilities required by 

our Armed Forces in war and peace. We encourage 

professional dialog and the exchange of ideas on all 

aspects of Civil Affairs between our members, the military branches, and interested civilian organizations. 

Our goal is to encourage research and publications 

that advance Civil Affairs thought and scholarship 

and activities which create esprit d corps and comaraderie in the Civil Affairs community through the U.S. 

Army Civil Affairs Regiment/Corps, its members, 

and its activities. We support a strong U.S. Civil Affairs military force to promote and help build international stability and peace.

The future of this critical national strategic capability is once again being reviewed, due to shifts in U.S. 

national security, defense, and foreign policies and 

another historic military drawdown due to budgetary 

pressures.

In this pivotal moment, the Civil Affairs Association, in partnership with the U.S. Army Peacekeeping 

and Stability Operations Institute, the Center for the 

Study of Civil-military operations at the U.S. Military 

Academy, and the Foreign Area Officers Association, 

is reaching out to the community of practice including 

the most operationally experienced Civil Affairs force 

in decades, to contribute to that discussion. The result 

is the first of a series of Civil Affairs issue papers beginning to look at “The Future of Civil Affairs.”

The purpose of these issue papers is to provide a 

platform for the broader Civil Affairs community to 
communicate to important leaders in the Executive 

and Legislative branches, as well as key military commands and institutions, and to define the way ahead 

for Civil Affairs based on tested experience.

This first set of issue papers has been launched at 

the annual Civil Affairs Roundtable in March 2015 at 

the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, NY. It is our 

intent, for the foreseeable future, to enter into a cycle of issue papers presented and selected every fall 

at the annual Symposium and to launch and discuss 

the resulting issue papers every spring at the annual 

Roundtable. We will nominate the topic of the next issue papers in the spring and request papers thereafter.

The Association extends its profound thanks to the 

Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, the 

Center for the Study of Civil-Military Operations, and 

the Foreign Area Officers Association for their partnership and support in this endeavor.

Joseph P. Kirlin III

Colonel, U.S. Army, (ret), Civil Affairs

President

The Civil Affairs Association

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY – 

“THE FUTURE OF CIVIL AFFAIRS”

Christopher Holshek

For centuries, Civil Affairs (CA) has long been 

called upon to facilitate stable and secure transitions 

from military to civilian control and from conflict 

to peace. Recently, CA is helping to bring together 

whole-of-nation elements to engage partners and mitigate conflict. In short, CA is a major national strategic 

capability that helps end and prevent wars. This capability along with Military Information Support (formerly Psychological Operations) and Foreign Area 

Officers, comprises the only part of the Joint Force 

specifically suited for Peace & Stability Operations as 

well as Engagement. 

However, the future of Civil Affairs is under careful review, given shifts in U.S. foreign, national security, and defense policies and another military drawdown under budgetary constraints. The U.S. Navy 

has eliminated its Maritime Civil Affairs command. 

U. S. Army Civil Affairs is engaged in intense discussions regarding both Active and Reserve components, 

while the Marine Corps has doubled its Civil Affairs 

Groups, but – as with all of Civil Affairs – struggles 

under increased demand.

With another pivotal moment in the history of 

Civil Affairs, the Civil Affairs Association, in partnership with the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability 

Operations Institute, the Foreign Area Officer Association, and the Center for the Study of Civil-military 

operations at the U.S. Military Academy, is reaching 

out to the community of practitioners including the 

most operationally experienced CA force in decades, 
to contribute to that discussion. The result is this first 

of a series of Civil Affairs issue papers beginning to 

look at “The Future of Civil Affairs.”

Their purpose is to provide a platform for the 

broader Civil Affairs community to communicate to 

important opinion leaders in the Executive and Legislative branches, as well as key military commands 

and institutions, what it thinks the way ahead should 

be for CA, utilizing experienced operators rather than 

the just the usual think-tank approach. This not only 

draws on the rich legacy of CA, but its remarkable talent. The first-prize winner, in fact, was written by two 

non-commissioned officers.

This first set of issue papers is based on the papers 

presented at the Civil Affairs Symposium at the Freedoms Foundation in Valley Forge, PA, in November 

2014, held in conjunction with three panel discussions. 

These were published and launched at the annual 

Civil Affairs Roundtable in March 2015 at the U.S. 

Military Academy, West Point, NY. The intent, for the 

foreseeable future, is to enter into a cycle of issue papers presented and selected every fall at the annual 

Symposium and the publication and the discussion of 

the resulting issue papers every spring at the annual 

roundtable. At that time those present will nominate 

the topic of the next issue papers and request papers 

thereafter.

The Civil Affairs Issue Papers, under the larger 

rubric of “The Future of Civil Affairs,” look at a host 

of issues, among them: mission, doctrine, and operations; executive and legal authorities; Joint/Service 

proponent; force design, structure, and management; 

force mix and integration of Active and Reserve 

Components; recruitment, career management, and 

education and training; and, inter-organizational 

partnering.

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Following the November Symposium, the issue 

papers committee, headed by Brig. Gen. Bruce Bingham USA (ret), selected the five papers to comprise 

the 2014-15 issue papers on “The Future of Civil Affairs” for publication. Selected from nearly 20 submissions, they include, in order of Committee ranking:

1. “Quality is Free – Improving Outcomes in an Era 

of Austerity through Integrated Civil Military Training and Operations” – Staff Sgt. Bjorn E. Hansen and 

Sgt. 1st Class Ryan S. Long.

2. “Redefining Civil Affairs” – Colonel Dennis J. 

Cahill (ret).

3. “Remote Civil Information Management: A Concept For How U.S. Army Reserve Civil Affairs Subject 

Matter Experts Can Bring Relevant Civilian Skill Set 

Support to Combatant Commanders” – Major Marco 

A. Bongioanni.

4. “Military Governance: The Essential Mission of 

Civil Affairs,” – Colonel David Stott Gordon (ret).

5. “Transforming CA Into a Phase Zero Force,” - 

Major Shafi Saiduddin.

In addition to the five papers, the 2014-15 Civil Affairs issue papers publication includes a summary of the 

three panels at the 2014 Symposium that discussed: 

observations and lessons from Civil Affairs in the 

peacekeeping operations of the 1990s; Civil Affairs 

during the “Decade of War” and the third panel that 

discussed the way ahead for Civil Affairs as seen by 

major Civil Affairs commands and institutions.

They can all be summarized by the following three 

insights.
First, Civil Affairs is a national strategic capability 

that must be preserved.

As mentioned, Civil Affairs (CA), along with other 

related force capabilities, is the part of the Joint Force 

able to facilitate Civil-military operations (CMO) and 

dedicated primarily to Peace & Stability Operations – 

“a core U.S. military mission that the Department of 

Defense shall be prepared to conduct with proficiency,” according to DoD Directive 3000.05 – as well as 

Engagement under the new Army Functional Concept. 

Outside the small elements of the State Department 

and the U.S. Agency for International Development, 

(USAID) “CA is the major capability the nation has to 

transition to peace and bring together whole-of-nation 

elements to help mitigate conflict, to end and prevent 

wars. It is the most expedient and cost-effective means 

to execute U.S. political-military strategy and secure 

peace and stability on the ground. The low-tech solution to the low-tech problem, it engages and collaborates with partners from all walks of life to prevent or 

mitigate large-scale deployments of general purpose 

forces for low or high intensity combat operations. 

This unique strategic economy-of-force capability 

helps preserve combat forces for their core missions. 

In that regard, Civil Affairs is an essential instrument 

of America’s “strategic landpower.”

As the third panel pointed out, despite the end of 

the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and a general drawdown of forces, “strategic and operational demand 

remains high for military personnel who understand 

the civil dimension in humanitarian assistance and 

disaster relief and Peace & Stability operations under 

the U.S. Army Functional Concept for Engagement, 

particularly when the environments are dangerous 

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but also in growing ‘Phase 0’ (Shape and Influence) 

operations involving theater security cooperation, 

“building partnership capacity,” and conflict prevention.”

To which Shafi Saiduddin added in his paper: “In 

a resource-constrained national security environment, 

preventing future conflicts will be more important 

than our ability to dominate a maneuver battlefield. 

More importantly, there is a strong reluctance by 

policy makers, and the American public, to become 

involved in large scale counterinsurgency operations, 

limiting our strategic options.” Thus, the economy-offorce impacts of CA become even more important.

Because Civil Affairs, for more than a “Decade of 

War,” has been focused almost entirely on tactical level missions, its operational and strategic capabilities 

have gone fallow and require restoration. This became 

readily apparent as the demand for CA skyrocketed 

with the invasion of Iraq. The ad hoc management 

of CA through the 1990s was exposed, particularly 

as David Gordon put in his paper, despite the long 

legacy of CA in military government, “the capabilities required to carry out military government were 

shunned and neglected by DoD and the Army at large 

until the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq made it terribly clear that history was repeating itself.”

To preserve Civil Affairs as a strategic capability, as Dennis Cahill posed in his paper, CA must be 

thought anew – redefined. The creation of the Institute for Military Support to Governance, by the U.S. 

Army's Special Operations Center of Excellence, many 

agreed, is a step in the right direction in restoring 

much-needed functional specialists in order for CA 

to conduct its five core tasks represented in the five 

logical lines of operations of: Civil Information Man-
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agement, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, Nation 

Assistance, Population Resource Control and Support 

to Civil Administration. But it is only one step.

Second, Civil Affairs like all major strategic capabilities, requires appropriate authorization, organization, and resourcing. 

As the third panel advised, CA should be seen “in 

the context of wider policy trends of the recent era: 

expanded engagement in civil dimension operations 

and increased American reliance on civilian agencies 

and contractors in stability operations. American military actions abroad from 1989 onward broadened to 

include humanitarian intervention, not only to stabilize relationships between states, but also to protect 

people within them. Global human security norms 

emerged that expanded definitions of security and its 

relationship to development. New national, international, non-governmental and even for-profit agencies 

came forward to address the challenges of security 

and development.”

Yet, Civil Affairs writ large has struggled to keep 

up with even what the first panel identified as its major 

observations from the 1990s – the increasing complexity and ambiguity of the CMO environment; the growing need to identify and specify required civil-military 

capabilities early in the strategic and operational planning processes; the importance of managing complex, 

civil-military, interagency, and multinational political 

frameworks; and the importance of connecting with 

indigenous expertise, interlocutors, and power brokers in an inclusive way among all parties to the conflict – including illicit networks. Instead, it has not 

because CA has been constantly shaped by responses 
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to operational versus strategic requirements – and 

thus managed operationally versus strategically. As 

Long and Hansen noted in their paper, management 

of CA has reflected consistent violation of the truths 

and imperatives of Special Operations. These include: 

humans are more important than hardware; quality is 

better than quantity; Special Operations Forces cannot 

be mass produced; and, competent Special Operations 

Forces cannot be created after emergencies occur.

Given the growing and not diminishing need of 

the Joint Force to deal with complex peace and security environments and Phase 0 operations involving 

security cooperation, conflict prevention, and peacebuilding in coordination with an even greater array of 

civilian partners, Civil Affairs must evolve and adapt 

to these emerging imperatives which will require the 

CA force to work more collaboratively, multilaterally, with and through country teams, as Saiduddin 

explained. Among his recommendations is adding 

Operational Preparation of the Environment (OPE) to 

the list of CA core tasks.

From the perspective of being a national strategic 

capability, a rebalancing and overhaul of all of Civil 

Affairs along “DOTMLPF-P” (doctrine, organization, 

training, material, leadership, education, and policy) 

lines is in the offing. Army Reserve CA in particular 

has been far from ideally structured under DOTMLPFP and is not integrated strategically and operationally 

with active component CA and interagency partners.

But any reconfiguration of Civil Affairs forces – 

universal or otherwise – must capitalize on the tremendous operational experience CA has earned in 

more than a Decade of War as well as its enduring 

strategic and operational roles and value added capability. Moreover, it must be done within a strategic 
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context as well as with an understanding of operational lessons. “Once we satisfactorily understand the 

problem set,” Gordon wrote, “we can then develop 

the DOTMLPF needed.”

The good news, the third panel observed, is that 

it is “no longer the situation that most senior leaders 

do not understand the value of Civil Affairs.” Thus, 

there is a unique historic opportunity to maintain this 

national strategic capability at relatively low cost not 

only for contingencies, but for steady-state engagement activities, including Special Operations “persistent engagement” missions, that can help the Army 

fulfill its strategic role of “Prevent” and “Shape” as 

well as “Win” and thus prevent or mitigate large-scale 

deployments of general purpose forces for low or high 

intensity combat operations. If, properly managed, 

organized, maintained, educated, trained, authorized, 

and resourced both combat capability and military 

operational capabilities can be enhanced. Hence the 

need for emphasis on personnel and training as stated 

by the Commander of the U.S. Army Civil Affairs & 

Psychological Operations Command (Airborne), or 

USACAPOC(A).

Third, other than issues relating to the martial principle of unity of command, the most urgent areas of 

focus for Civil Affairs are Active/Reserve and Special Operations/General Purpose Forces integration.

The prevailing mood of the Symposium, especially 

among the third panel, “might be characterized as a 

moment of acceptance of institutional conditions and, 

at the same time, investment in small scale, practical 

steps to strengthen the community.” 
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As the second panel surmised, although it is unlikely that DoD will reconsider the CA “divorce” from 

SOF, its repercussions have had a negative impact on 

Army CA, notably reduced funding and support for 

RC CA units and less interaction between AC and 

RC CA. Long and Hansen added that “calls to restore 

Army CA under a unifying command are politically 

charged and unlikely.” Beyond the well-known decisions leading to a disjointed Army force, the Symposium also viewed the Navy’s decision to eliminate 

the entire Maritime Civil Affairs and Security Force 

Assistance Teams as a strategic error, reflecting a lack 

of understanding of the global reach and the benefits 

to theater engagement that this small force generated. 

While DoD may or may not broach the overarching 

subjects of executive authority, proponent office, and 

so on, the consensus was that, for the meantime, the 

community should look more at issues of force balance and integration along especially Active-Reserve 

and Special Operations - General Purpose Force lines. 

With regard to balance and integration, the papers 

are rich with ideas. Ringing loud and clear from all 

three periods the panels represented was how “deliberative methodical Civil Affairs planning at all levels 

and phases of military operations was a key to success.” A more mindful approach to Civil Information 

Management, Marco Bongioanni explained in his paper, would go far to improve CA’s ability to integrate 

across numerous lines of coordination.

And while growing demand for Civil Affairs capabilities calls for more readily available Active Component CA forces for theater security cooperation and 

contingency missions, including the presence of CA 

planners at major and maneuver commands, the challenges of the strategic and operational environments 
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also clearly elicit the “whole-of-society” equities 

found in the Reserves. These attributes are even more 

applicable to emerging security cooperation and security assistance operations increasingly performed by 

general purpose Forces in Regionally Aligned Force 

and “building partner capacity” missions as well as in 

Special Operations “persistent engagement” missions.

Reserve CA, in particular, embodies the longstanding national treasure of the citizen-soldier. Reserve 

Civil Affairs, which comprises 85% of Army Civil Affairs and an even higher percentage among Marines, 

bring specific civilian skill sets – and a civilian mindset – difficult and financially challenging to duplicate 

in the active component. These forces also bring the 

ability to access as well as influence whole-of-society 

actors and activities that are center-of-mass of Phase 0 

(Shape and Influence) as well as transition from conflict to peace (Phase 4 and 5) – otherwise known in 

broader (civilian) terms as conflict prevention, conflict 

transformation, and peacebuilding, respectively.

While capabilities have grown among other services, the majority of Civil Affairs capability still comes 

from the Army with land power remaining most suited 

to integrate all elements of national power, especially 

before and after the outbreak of violent conflict. All of 

the Nation’s strategic and operational CA capability, 

however, is in the Army, while about 90% of that is in 

USACAPOC (A).

Restructuring USAR Civil Affairs forces in a big 

way is imminent and unavoidable, many suggested. 

Among many things, as Saiduddin mentioned, doctrinal Reserve CA – Active command concepts of integration and support-to-supported relations based on 

Cold War era assumptions about civil-military operations (i.e., high intensity warfare concerns about minimizing civilian interference with operations) must be 
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seriously revised in accordance with the realities and 

developments outlined above.

There is no doubt that “there is much that is worrisome about the state of Civil Affairs today,” the third 

panel concluded. However, “the future of Civil Affairs 

includes some hopeful prospects thanks to practical 

steps recently taken.” All three panels agreed that in 

looking to history and in looking forward that both the 

USMC and Army recognize the need to invest in training and education, including the development of civil 

sector experts. “The CA leadership is taking actions 

to more effectively integrate with civilian partners in 

both the public and private sectors, and to provide the 

civil information that partners and commanders need 

in the field,” it reported. 

“But they cannot come even close to fulfilling the 

potential of Civil Affairs alone – the future of Civil 

Affairs needs much greater attention at four-star and 

executive agency levels.”
Colonel (ret.) Christopher Holshek has over 30 years of 

civil-military experience at the strategic, operational, and 

tactical levels in joint, interagency, and multinational settings across the full range of operations, including as Senior U.S. Military Observer and Chief of Civil-Military 

Coordination in the UN Mission in Liberia and command 

of the first CA battalion to deploy to Iraq in support of

Army, Marine and British forces. He helped develop Joint, 

Army, NATO, and UN civil-military policy and doctrine. 

An executive member of the UN Association and the U.S. 

Global Leadership Coalition’s “Veterans for Smart Power,” 

he also writes extensively on peace & security, strategy, 

and civil-military issues, including for Foreign Policy and 

The Huffington Post. His book, Travels with Harley – A

Journey through America in search of Personal and National Identity, is being published by Inkshares.com.
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Panel Discussion: Shaping the Future of Civil 

Affairs – Past as Prologue

John C. Church, Jr.

Moderator: Colonel John C. Church, Jr., U.S. Marine Corps Reserve, Director Civil Military Integration 

Team, Headquarters U. S. Marine Corps, Assistant 

Professor, Immaculata University

• Haiti – Brigadier General Bruce B. Bingham, 

U.S. Army Civil Affairs (ret.), Director, Civil 

Affairs Association

• Bosnia/Herzegovina – Major General Thomas 

J. Matthews, U.S. Army Civil Affairs (ret.)

• Kosovo – Colonel Michael Hess, U.S. Army 

Civil Affairs (ret.), Director, Civil Affairs Association

The first panel of the Civil Affairs Symposium was 

designed to review Civil Affairs efforts in Haiti, Bosnia/Herzegovina and Kosovo from those whose efforts were instrumental to those missions. 

The first question put to Brigadier General Bingham who, in 1994, became the Civil Affairs Advisor 

to the Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command 

for the Haitian intervention and subsequently led the 

Ministerial Advisory Team in Haiti, had to do with 

Civil Affairs planning and its impact upon the success of Civil Affairs challenges across the spectrum of 

operations. Specifically, the question resulted from an 

analysis of the 1995 article entitled “Interagency and 

Political-Military Dimensions of Peace Operations: 

Haiti – A Case Study,” written by Dr. Margaret Daly 

Hayes and RADM Gary F. Wheatley, USN (ret.).
2

U.S. forces were introduced into the country of 

Haiti in support of United Nations Security Council 

Resolution 940 on Sept. 19, 1994, as part of Operation 

Uphold Democracy. The purpose of this interdiction 

was to restore the democratically elected government 

of President [Jean Bertrand] Aristide and provide for 

a mechanism to assist in sustaining a secure and stable 

environment to allow for democracy to sustain itself 

in this long deprived nation and reduce the flow of 

Haitians leaving in unsafe boats in an attempt to reach 

the United States.

Brigadier General Bingham quickly agreed that 

deliberative methodical Civil Affairs planning at all 

levels and phases of military operations was a key to 

success. He further cited that he and his fellow Civil 

Affairs soldiers enjoyed an extensive timeline for preparation. He indicated that the planning to execution 

phase was significant and enabled a solid effort, but 

there were events that planning could not anticipate. 

He cited the “scared off landing” of the Harlan County (LST-1196) which was sent to Port au Prince to pave 

the way for an agreed-upon UN intervention. However, she was ordered back to sea a day later in the face 

of protests. Brigadier General Bingham recalled that 

the first ever Inter-Agency Rehearsal of Concept drill 

at Ft. McNair as well as extensive Army Special Operations Command and 18th Abn Corps planning for a 

peaceful entry also facilitated and strengthened Civil 

Affairs planning. 

Brigadier General Bingham further noted that his 

direct access to first, CINC, Atlantic Command, ADM 

Paul D. Miller, USN, and then Marine General John J. 

Sheehan allowed Brigadier General Bingham an opportunity to clearly shape the manner of the Civil Affairs contribution to the planning cycle from the very 
3

highest perspective. Brigadier General Bingham noted 

the success of the Marine Colonel Ray Kelly who was 

in between his two tours of duty as the Chief of Police 

for New York City, and the fact that the Ambassador 

William Lacy Swing and then the CINC wanted “more 

Ray Kellys,” was perhaps emblematic, one could offer, 

of the need for proven warriors who also possessed 

street smarts and people skills. 

Also critical to the success of the effort, according 

to Brigadier General Bingham, was the complete and 

thorough vetting process conducted with the Pentagon, all operational chain of command representatives 

as well as the Department of State with regard to Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and Private Voluntary Organizations (PVOs). This vetting of NGOs 

and PVOs was the a first smart step. Then, added 

Brigadier General Bingham, the Ministerial Advisory 

Teams would consider where and how to best assist 

the NGOs and PVOs so that their efforts would not 

clash with other missions. 

Brigadier General Bingham offered that this Haiti 

mission featured a classic and successful application 

of the functional specialty Civil Affairs capabilities. 

He and his Civil Affairs professionals garnered tangible results and positively influenced a wide swath 

across all of the Haitian government offices by quickly 

establishing a good rapport and appreciation from 

Haitian cabinet leaders.

The second query was put to Major General Matthews, former President of the Civil Affairs Association, who participated in numerous domestic and expeditionary civil military operations from the Mariel 

Boat Lift to Operation Joint Endeavor in the Balkans 

and the California wildfires. He has served in and 

commanded U.S. Army Civil Affairs units at the Bri-
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gade and Command level and currently serves as a 

Distinguished Senior Fellow at the Joint Special Operations University and as a Subject Matter Expert for 

the Joint Civil Military Campaign Planning Course at 

the Joint Special Operations University, U.S. Special 

Operations Command. 

Reviewing “Peace and Stability Lesson from Bosnia,” by Max G. Manwaring, which appeared in the 

1998 Winter publication of Parameters, Colonel Church 

asked Major General Matthews, when harkening back 

to his service in Bosnia, if he recalled those specific 

examples of those individuals for whom he may have 

served who the “right” or mature “mind set” when 

understanding challenges specific to the execution of 

Civil Affairs operations and or civil military operations. Major General Matthews commented that he 

knew of Mr. Manwaring’ effort and many other numerous after action, lessons learned reports that were 

written and several of which quoted the general. 

Major General Matthews commanded at the Brigade and Command level during his time in BosniaHerzegovina. History notes that NATO conducted 

its first major crisis response operation in Bosnia and 

Herzegovina. The NATO-led Implementation Force 

(IFOR) was deployed in December 1995 to implement 

the military aspects of the Dayton Peace Agreement 

and was replaced a year later by the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR). SFOR helped to maintain a 

secure environment and facilitate the country’s reconstruction in the wake of the 1992-1995 war. 

When recalling his time in Bosnia-Herzegovina 

Major General Matthews was quick to concede that 

“the senior guys got it” but that the real challenge that 

remained was educating the colonels and below. He 

further offered that there was a particular challenge 
5

associated with overcoming the then restrictive NATO 

CIMIC doctrine. Major General Matthews added that 

World Bank and others were focused on major reconstruction projects. He and those in his charge were focused on disaster recovery and labor intensive projects 

to address the potential vast unemployment problem 

that would be made dangerously worse by demobilizing soldiers. In an article describing that mission 

Major General Matthews sagely noted the subtlety between reconstruction efforts versus disaster recovery. 

When he led the NATO-led peace force’s program 

focusing on emergency relief, Major General Matthews recalled that every one of the acts undergone 

in terms of disaster recovery became building blocks 

for reconstruction. Matthews further offered, in retrospect, that real reconstruction in any conflict takes 

both funding and coordination among donors for a 

lasting rebuilding of institutions.

Major General Mathews was clear in that the most 

effective Civil Affairs professionals are able to allow 

both the military commanders and their civilian counterparts to see how wise deliberative actions serve 

both parties well. He recalled a time when he was able 

to convince higher staff and IFOR commanders that 

fixing a water pipe was worth the cost because do so 

not only assisted the local populace it also meant the 

French soldiers were no longer placed at risk every 

day when they escorted trucks carrying bottles of water. Major General Mathews conceded that his “selling” the same effort to two different audiences was 

not easy, but when done so proved valuable time and 

time again to both the combatant commander and the 

local citizenry. 

Finally, Colonel Michael Hess, who in addition to 

his U. S. Army Civil Affairs career was the Assistant 
6

Administrator for the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict 

and Humanitarian Assistance of the U.S. Agency for 

International Development (USAID), drew upon over 

three decades of Active and Reserve service to include 

duty in support of humanitarian operations in Turkey, 

Iraq, Bosnia and Kosovo. His discussion was mainly 

on the initial NATO and United Nations intervention 

in Kosovo in 1999-2000. 

Among his observations from that experience were: 

the complexity and ambiguity of both the operation 

and the NATO-UN-U.S. civil-military architecture; 

the need to identify and specify required civil-military capabilities early in the strategic and operational 

planning processes; the importance of establishing 

an Executive Steering Group to manage the complex, 

civil-military, interagency, and multinational political 

framework; and the importance of seeking out indigenous expertise, interlocutors, and power brokers in 

an inclusive way among all parties to the conflict – including illicit networks. 

In addition, Colonel Hess noted success points in: 

the ability to draw from recent lessons in other major peacekeeping operation in the region (in BosniaHerzegovina); the payoff from having Civil Affairs including early in the strategic and operational planning 

processes; and a well-crafted, actionable UN Security 

Council Resolution 1244 for the international intervention. He also noted, however, issues with disparate 

and disjointed civil-military approaches among the 

NATO/UN sending states – which led to the development of more robust NATO and UN CIMIC doctrines 

that, unfortunately, remain unfamiliar to U.S. Civil 

Affairs operators.

Colonel Church cited Eric Ridge’s, “Civil Affairs 

in Kosovo,” published for the Center for Strategic and 
7

International Studies in January of 2009, and specifically asked Colonel Hess if he would ever consider relaxing a force protection measure and accepting a risk 

– if in the long term it would strengthen relationships 

with the local populace and build trust. Colonel Hess 

firmly responded in the negative and clearly reminded 

the facilitator and the audience that: the mission will 

always be a military mission with civil-military end 

state. Still, he remembered how “great” civilian and 

military and inter-agency cooperation enabled his CA 

teams in the first rotation to make a greater impact, 

thus setting up future rotations for compiling success.

Clearly, one of the major themes from this panel 

discussion was the need for and the benefit to be had 

by early and successful proactive and engaged Civil 

Affairs planning. Furthermore, the most successful Civil Affairs professional will have the ability to 

build beneficial relationships with commanders and 

staff entities across the spectrum of the military structure while simultaneously creating and or nurturing 

positive relationships with those relevant interagency 

partners as well as those key NGOs, PVO who are best 

positioned to contribute to mission success. Finally, 

the sage Civil Affairs professional is able to anticipate 

and then articulate - to designated audiences - how 

actions undertaken by the military will also benefit the 

local populace and, at other times, how certain actions 

undertaken by the local populace may also serve to assist a combatant commander as well. This partnering, 

planning and communicating must take place at every 

level of mission, tactical through strategic.
8

John C. Church, Jr., is an Assistant Professor of English 

and Communication at Immaculata University. A colonel in the Marine Reserves, he served with the 2nd Marine 

Expeditionary Brigade in Helmand Province, Afghanistan 

and commanded a combined, joint Civil Affairs unit of Marines, soldiers, sailors, and Iraqi civilians in Ar Ramadi,

Iraq. As a Civil Affairs officer he also served in Kosovo, Iraq,

Liberia and Afghanistan. John now commands 3D Civil 

Affairs Group in Great Lakes, Illinois. John earned a M.A. 

in National Security and Strategic Studies from the U.S. 

Naval War College and an M.A. in Communication Journalism and Public Affairs from American University in 

Washington, D.C. He is a doctoral student in Mass Media 

and Communication at Temple University.
9

Panel Discussion II: Shaping the Future of 

Civil Affairs – Lessons from the Decade of War

Kurt E. Müller

Moderator: Dr. Kurt E. Müller, Colonel, U.S. Army 

Civil Affairs (ret.), Senior Research Fellow, Center for 

Complex Operations, National Defense University

• Major General Steven J. Hashem, U.S. Army 

Civil Affairs (ret.)

• Colonel Leonard J. DeFrancisci, U.S. Marine 

Corps Civil Affairs, Force Headquarters Group, 

Marine Forces Reserve

• Colonel Jim Ruf, U.S. Army Civil Affairs (ret.) 

and Senior Program Officer for Civil-Military 

Affairs, U.S. Institute of Peace

• Dr. Rosemary Speers, Principal Research Scientist, Center for Naval Analyses

Some military functions demonstrate a history 

of integration into operations and strategy using the 

analogy of a sine curve. When a military campaign 

cannot achieve its purpose without addressing one 

of these functions, these domains receive considerable attention; but, when the need dissipates, the crest 

gives way to an accelerating decline of attention and 

resources. These observations are instructive for Civil 

Affairs because operational environments account 

for CA demand signals. Thus, prior to Operations 

Desert Shield and Desert Storm, military organizations 

relegated much CA planning to exercising for future 

wars. But since expeditionary operations depend 

on friendly forces for planning capabilities, contract 

oversight, and civil-military interaction, Desert Shield/

Storm reemphasized the need for CA. 
10

After its considerable use in the campaigns of 1991, 

Civil Affairs became a valued function for theater staff. 

Peacekeeping operations used CA extensively, and 

frequent call-ups led to consideration of expanding 

Active Component (AC) capabilities, as Reserve Component (RC) CA capacity increasingly required reconstitution. By the time the first rotation of Operation

Iraqi Freedom was over, more than half of the qualified 

and available Reserve Component CA personnel had 

been exhausted. When Operations Enduring Freedom

and Iraqi Freedom became protracted campaigns, DoD 

reaped the result of the earlier, massive call-up of RC 

CA units – leading DoD to fill resulting gaps first with 

RC members of other services, who had neither the 

institutional support nor the professional ethos of the 

extant CA force structure, and then expanding the AC 

CA structure. A 2011 RAND study later found CA the 

most utilized career field in the Army Reserve. Experimental staffing models such as billet transfers from 

underused specialties to CA could offer a staffing solution to reduce the ratio of deployment-to-“dwell” 

time to the DoD goal of one year on active duty in 

five years of Reserve service. Even then, CA remained 

the busiest career field in the USAR, with deployment 

rates far exceeding all other specialties.1

Thus, the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review called 

for significantly increasing CA, resulting in first the 

95th CA Brigade (grown from the 96th CA Battalion 

serving Special Operations) and later adding the 

85thCA Brigade as a General Purpose unit. RC CA increased by about one third, Marine Corps CA capacity 

more than doubled, and the Navy revived attention 

to CA. While the operational environment demanded 

CA for the counterterrorist campaigns of the newcen-
11

tury, Defense planners ignored the characteristics of 

RC staffing and modeled deployments on AC patterns. Whether “leaning forward” or “running to the 

sound of the guns,” short-war mentalities run the risk 

of squandering limited resources.

Lessons Learned or (at least) Observed

In 2012, the Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis (JCOA) division of the Joint Staff published Enduring Lessons from the Past Decade of Operations, expected 

to be volume 1 of a series, Decade of War.

2

 The publication compiled themes derived from 46 studies, highlighting four key changes in the strategic environment 

and identifying eleven strategic themes. Of the key 

changes, two are of particular interest to CA: (1) the 

shift from U.S. hegemony to multipolar concentrations of power and (2) an emphasis on the information 

domain. All eleven strategic themes are relevant to 

CA, but seven are particularly so:

• Understanding the Environment

• Battle for the Narrative

• Transitions

• Special Operations Forces (SOF)–General Purpose Forces (GPF) Integration

• Interagency Coordination

• Coalition Operations, and

• Host-Nation Partnering

Of the seven, Colonel (ret.) James Ruf highlighted 

the four italicized . Regarding the operational environment, Ruf stressed not only understanding the nation 

that is the target of an intervention, but also aware-
12

ness of interorganizational actors. Nonmilitary actors contribute to economic, governance, and societal 

domains to make transitions to host-nation authority 

possible. Because their contributions to conditions 

that facilitate transition to civil authority are essential, 

Ruf called for periodic training with such partners to 

build, maintain, and strengthen working relationships 

with military actors. 

Many of these organizations are not staffed sufficiently to allow them to participate in military exercises. When they do, they must achieve value for 

their participation. Building opportunities for mutually beneficial training requires commands to move 

from acknowledging the value of civil-sector actors to 

designing scenarios that facilitate interaction that also 

helps these civilian entities accomplish their missions. 

Ruf’s organization, United States Institution of Peace 

(USIP), has proven itself as a solid venue for civil-military collaboration that facilitates civilian priorities as 

well as military ones. A large military footprint easily skews consideration of the factors that influence 

decision-makers’ determination of when to transition 

to civilian authority.

Ruf noted the value of meaningful, integrated 

training and education and observes that much of the 

terminology that the defense, diplomatic, development, and civil-society communities use in discussing 

interventions, counterinsurgency, conflict prevention and termination, stabilization, and related complex operations may be shared but is not necessarily 

mutually understood. The term “stabilization” as an 

example elicits different reactions from each of these 

communities. 

Whereas military doctrine calls for a transition 

from military control to a non-military entity, the lat-
13

ter are typically undefined, therefore unfamiliar. The 

successor may be a combination of U.S. agencies, a 

multilateral control commission, a UN mission, or a 

host-nation authority. If there is a need for transition 

expertise, such expertise must reside in the various 

communities of interest.

In host-nation partnering, the Civil Affairs community needs to build a civil-military capability in a host 

nation and identify the role for CA in this effort. CA 

can contribute to inter-organizational understanding 

of complex operations and should remain engaged in 

developing concepts for effective transitions. Much as 

some leaders in the intelligence community have recognized shortcomings in analyzing the human terrain 

of an operational environment, the CA community 

needs to emphasize familiarity with the economic, social, and political issues and actors that contribute to 

successful civil-military operations.3 As a repository 

of expertise in inter-agency and multilateral civil-military operations, the CA community needs to ensure 

the integration of that expertise in politico-military 

environments.

MG (ret) Steven Hashem observed key opportunities for Civil Affairs operations to influence the outcome of an intervention by straddling civil-military 

and multilateral boundaries. MG Hashem’s observations added to the themes Ruf cited by highlighting 

coalition operations and SOF-GPF cooperation. The 

participation of coalition partners in operations from 

Desert Shield to Enduring Freedom, in peacekeeping, 

stabilization, and belligerent interventions, adds international legitimacy to narratives that justify these 

interventions. Incorporating coalition partners thus 

offers both practical (tactical and operational) and 
14

strategic (diplomatic) benefits. If long-term outcomes 

are an underappreciated metric of success, surely international legitimacy that validates an intervener’s 

claims of improving the geopolitical environment is a 

key factor in any dispassionate evaluation of results.

MG Hashem provided examples of strategic impact, i.e., achieving the political end of a military operation. Reflecting on operational-level briefings during 

Operations Joint Forge/Joint Guard, MG Hashem noted 

that of four daily briefers to the NATO Stabilization 

Force (SFOR) commander—each of three Multinational Divisions and the Combined-Joint, Civil-Military Task Force—the CJCMTF “was the one organization talking about anything of substance.” From the 

perspective of military maneuver and engagement, 

SFOR’s operational environment was static, therefore 

“nothing significant to report” (NSTR) is a positive 

achievement in peacekeeping. 

But the geopolitical outcome that enables a transition to civil authority rests in the domain that capitalizes on a positive security environment to achieve 

a suitable advancement in economic and governance 

conditions. Once an intervening force has established 

a secure environment, civil society needs to resume its 

economic and social activity. Military planners usually expect a transition authority to shepherd this development, but security and civil-society activity are 

so intertwined that the military occupier—whether 

benign or belligerent—cannot escape a shared responsibility for conditions that facilitate the transition to 

sovereignty.

MG Hashem raised concerns for DoD-wide infusion of Civil Affairs in military planning and execution 

and notes actions underway at U.S. Special Operations Command that address both SOF-GPF integra-
15

tion and joint CA. USSOCOM is addressing 23 tasks 

identified in Joint Requirements Oversight Council 

Memorandum 162-11. Of the unfinished tasks, significant ones include incorporating CA into the training 

objectives of combatant commanders and theater special operations commands (TSOCs) and into professional military education and reviewing career paths 

and requirements for joint CA billets at combatant 

commands and TSOCs.

USSOCOM is the Office of Primary Responsibility 

for 10 of the Civil Affairs 23 tasks and services. Combatant commands, Joint Staff, and others are primary 

actors for the remainder. Although it is unlikely that 

DoD will reconsider the “divorce” of CA from SOF, 

its repercussions have negatively impacted Army CA, 

most notably in reduced funding and support for RC 

CA units and less interaction between AC and RC 

CA. One could also see an impact on the AC 85th CA 

Brigade. A recent Total Army Analysis recommended 

cutting 50% of the AC CA force, which would fall on 

the 85th, supporting GPF, rather than on the 95th, supporting (and classified as) SOF. The Congressional 

budgetary climate favors reducing GPF overall in favor of promoting the small footprint that exemplifies 

SOF. But distance between AC SOF CA and RC GPF 

CA undermines shared concepts, lexicon, and interoperability.

MG Hashem observed Civil Affairs successes at 

tactical, operational, and strategic levels, much depends on situations, timing, and personalities (both 

supporting and supported). In particular, CA leadership present early in a campaign needs to shape the 

impact of CA operations. Once subsequent personnel 

rotations begin, it becomes more difficult to influence 

changes in command priorities. 
16

Here an observation from previous CA symposia 

is appropriate. Early in Operation Joint Endeavor, CA 

leadership was stymied in attempting to address the 

civilian environment because planning staffs drew 

from operations in Somalia a concern to avoid mission 

creep. Since the CA deployment included planners at 

multiple echelons, with the support of senior allied 

leaders at NATO, CA at Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe, was able to influence SACEUR’s 

campaign plan to direct IFOR to support provisions of 

the civilian annexes to the General Framework Agreement for Peace, not simply to the task of keeping the 

former belligerents separated and developing confidence-building measures.

Analogous to the need to move beyond deconflicting agencies’ independent operations to synergistic 

interdependent programming, the ability to fund 

projects to meet a timely need is a clear and persistent theme. Parsimonious use of program funds is a 

consistent theme that interagency partners face. During its short lifespan, in common-core training, the 

interagency Civilian Response Corps included in its 

scenarios a dilemma common to chiefs of mission: 

multiple agencies with independent funding for activities, some of which the ambassador may see as undermining current priorities. This dilemma may seem 

exceptional to military commanders used to unity of 

command, but ambassadors confront such situations 

routinely, as does the National Security Council when 

it submits integrated civil-military funding proposals 

to Congress, only to receive a response underfunding 

civilian activities. This challenge requires legislative 

review and action as much as any appeal to interagency collaboration.
17

Marine Corps Lessons

In promoting the role of Marine Corps CA in support of Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTF), 

Colonel Leonard J. DeFrancisci highlighted the DoD 

strategic themes of understanding the environment, 

interagency coordination, and host-nation partnering. 

Seeing offensive, defensive, and stability operations 

as components requiring differential weighting that 

reflects characteristics of the mission at hand, Marine 

Corps CA has been most successful recently when the 

CA elements were closely integrated in the MAGTF 

structure rather than operating independently. 

Of all the Services, the Marine Corps most clearly 

recognizes CA as critical to stability operations. In accord with counterinsurgency, the Marines have historically stressed classic “small wars” approaches of 

restoring services and facilitating economic stability. 

These tasks require collaboration with interagency and 

host-nation partners, and such collaboration demands 

both an understanding of differing execution horizons 

and abiding by the principle of unity of command, a 

recurring theme that requires continuous exploration. 

Interagency planners recognize that Congress funds 

agencies for specific purposes, and specific agencies 

emphasize an end-state that can differ from the one 

the military tends to seek. Harmonizing these disparate activities requires mutual understanding and 

shared experience. 

Shared experience and close collaboration leads to 

some shared insights as well. Marine Civil Affairs has 

been particularly aware of the need to identify causes 

of instability, mapping the human terrain, and conducting a civilian-oriented preparation of the battlefield. CA builds awareness of the civil domain much 
in the same way as reconnaissance forces provide information on the enemy. In pursuing information on 

the human factors in a conflict environment, “operational culture,” i.e., efforts to facilitate an understanding of the cultural environment in which Marines are 

deployed, are the first step in improving civil preparation and civil-information management. 

Civil Affairs support to MAGTF operations offers 

multi-service application as well. Funding CA operations appears to be an often troubling concern shared 

across services. These areas would benefit from joint 

procedures to facilitate battle handover and interoperability, to facilitate transition of control from Marine 

quick response units to those tasked with longer term 

operations.

Maritime Civil Affairs

The reactivation of maritime Civil Affairs was actually a renaissance, not an innovation. Few CA practitioners are aware that California had a naval officer 

as military governor before it was a state and that the 

Navy had an extensive military-government operation in the Trust Territory of the Pacific. The Maritime 

Civil Affairs Group (MCAG) was activated in 2006, at 

the time that deployable CA capacity was in critically 

short supply. The sine-curve pattern fits maritime 

CA in that it was reorganized in 2009, merged with 

security training, and then disestablished in mid-May 

2014. Fortunately, the Center for Naval Analyses is 

undertaking an effort to archive the materials the then 

MCAG (later the Maritime Civil Affairs and Security 

Training Command or MCAST) produced, gather lessons learned, describe best practices in Maritime CA, 

and develop courses of action to maintain and reconstitute this capability.

18
19

The Navy justified disbanding MCAST by indicating the presence of mission capabilities in “other Department of Defense agencies,”4

 and, indeed, a number 

of the tasks MCAG and MCAST undertook have been 

conducted by Army elements. But the maritime environment is likely to be served more effectively by CA 

forces attuned to the characteristics of that environment, notably in addressing functional specialties in 

maritime CA. The WW II example of the Navy captain 

serving as port marine superintendent thus echoes in 

the era of Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa.

The maritime flavor of CA is notable in the source 

of requests for MCAG/MCAST. Geographic Combatant Commands (GCC) and Global Fleet Stations called 

for MCAT deployments in every GCC. As is true of 

CA in the other services, MCAG/MCAST, which often comprised both AC and RC personnel, undertook 

whole-of-government approaches to their missions. 

The learning trajectory of MCAG/MCAST is highly instructive. Experience in the Horn of Africa highlights maritime dimensions that are replicable in stability and counterinsurgency operations elsewhere. In 

2008, for example, MCAST began a program in Kenya 

called Community Watch on the Water. By 2011 the 

program transitioned to Kenyan control. A significant 

outcome of this effort is evident in improved relations 

between government agencies and the fishing industry. In 2008, Kenyan public perception was of government authorities as oppressive. By 2010, the two 

sides in this conflict were relying on each other. The 

experience in Kenya is applicable to the U.S. Pacific 

Command as well, particularly in Indonesia and the 

Philippines, where counter-piracy and illicit fishing 

are regional issues.
20

Conclusion

Some government capabilities are used episodically rather than continuously. Prior to the Decade 

of War, Civil Affairs often found itself in such a situation. We can take solace that over the past quarter 

century, the United States has used its CA assets to 

minimize circumstances that promote conflict and to 

hasten the recovery from conflict. But we cannot avoid 

concluding that protracted expeditionary operations 

call for CA capacity far beyond that needed for peacetime engagement. Recent deployments demonstrate 

that specific service environments call for expertise attuned to the elements they support: fitting in a service 

culture facilitates trust building, just as civilian experience eases the civil-military, whole-of-government, 

whole-of-society interaction that characterizes CA 

operations. 

When RC CA personnel were scheduled for release 

from active duty but demands for the function continued, DoD opted to (1) school Air Force and Navy 

personnel in CA operations and (2) expand Army, 

Navy, and Marine capacity in both active and reserve 

components. In current circumstances, there is a predictable call to reduce the size of the military. Marine 

Corps lessons offer continuing support for expanded 

CA structure, and Army RC reductions across the 

force are likely to be smaller than for AC. With fewer 

troops deployed, supporting CA operations will also 

decline, but the need for planning CA or CA related 

capabilities remains. If CA planning capacity is inadequate, we can predict that combatant commands 

will ignore the broader civil society in which military 

interventions occur, and we will find future leaders 

again assailing the inability to understand the operational environment. 
21

Moreover, Civil Affairs is not ground-force specific. Maritime aspects surfaced recently that had not 

been appreciated since Admiral William Radford (later 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) relinquished his 

position as High Commissioner of the Trust Territory 

of the Pacific Islands in 1951. Recent experience indicates the desirability of joint CA billets on combatant 

command staffs and those of sub-unified commands. 

But effectively filling such positions should demand 

both joint and CA experience. The primary question 

in a period of reducing organizations will be how we 

maintain institutional knowledge as well as organizational capabilities.

Dr. Kurt E. Müller is a Senior Research Fellow with 

the Center for Complex Operations at the National Defense 

University. His CA assignments include command of the 

416th CA Bn, J3/CA for JTF 160, USAREUR CIMIC team 

chief, Special Functions Chief of the 304th CA Bde, and Civil 

Affairs Advisor to SACEUR and C9 at SHAPE. After retirement, he became a CA subject-matter expert for the U.S. 

Special Operations Command, then at the State Department Civilian Response Corps.
22

Notes

1. Michael L. Hansen, Celeste Ward Gventer, John D. Winkler, and Kristy N. Kamarck, Reshaping the Army’s Active and 

Reserve Components (Santa Monica: RAND, 2011), esp. 39–42, 69, 

73.

2. Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis Division, Decade 

of War, Volume 1: Enduring Lessons from the Past Decade of Operations (Suffolk, VA: JCOA, 2012).

3. See, for example, Michael T. Flynn, James Sisco, and David 

C. Ellis, “‘Left of Bang’: The Value of Sociocultural Analysis in 

Today’s Environment,” Prism 3.4 (2013): 12–21.

4. Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, OPNAVNOTE 

5400, subj: Disestablishment of Maritime Civil Affairs and Security Training Command and Detachment, Virginia Beach, VA, 13 

Dec 2013.
23

Panel Discussion III: Shaping the Future of 

Civil Affairs – The Way Forward

Karen Guttieri

Moderator: Dr. Karen Guttieri, Security and Development Policy Lead with the Peace Innovation Lab 

at Stanford University and author of Masters of Peace

• Major General Daniel Ammerman, Commander, U.S. Army Civil Affairs & Psychological Operations Command (Airborne)

• Brigadier General Ferd Irizarry II, U.S. Army 

Reserve Command, G-3/5/7

• Brigadier General Hugh Van Roosen, Director, 

Institute for Military Support to Governance 

(IMSG), U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special 

Warfare Center and School

• Lieutenant Colonel Louis “Rocky” Simon, Director, U.S. Marine Corps Civil-military operations School

The state of Civil Affairs (CA) at the close of 2014 

might be characterized as a moment of acceptance of 

institutional conditions and, at the same time, investment in small scale, practical steps to strengthen the 

community. The third and final panel of the Civil Affairs Symposium in Valley Forge focused on “Shaping 

the Future of Civil Affairs.” The panelists discussed 

the state of the community affected by a mixed recent 

past that results from a convergence of institutional 

and policy trends, as well as ways forward for the CA 

community. To sharpen this effort, they focused on 

four priorities: training and education; functional specialty revitalization; public-private partnerships; and, 

civil information management. These are practical ar-
24

eas of concentration for a community that appears to 

accept its institutional limits while striving to address 

the larger demand in the operational environment.

Institutional Trends in Civil Affairs

The recent past sends mixed signals about the future of Civil Affairs. The U.S. Marine Corps continued 

expansion of its CA capability – at 900 personnel it is 

twice the size it was in 2004. Although the Marines 

added Active Component elements to their CA force 

structure in that time, CA is unlikely to become a primary military occupational specialty for the USMC. 

The Navy, on the other hand, in 2014 entirely disestablished the force structure it had launched in 2006, 

without clear indication how the capability would be 

provided by others to meet demand for it. And the 

Army, home to the largest number of CA forces, remained divided along the lines set forth by the 2006 

“divorce” that separated Active and Reserve Components between U.S. Army Special Operations Command and U.S. Army Reserve Command. That division 

was further complicated by the Army’s establishment 

of the Active Component 85th CA Brigade reporting to 

Forces Command, all the while sustaining proponent 

office with the U.S. Special Operations Command. 

The Army established Civil Affairs as a branch in 2007 

without providing other features of a general officer 

branch within the Army, or a branch schoolhouse. As 

outgoing U.S. Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Commanding General Jeffrey Jacobs noted in his 

2014 farewell address, three different force provider 

headquarters control Army CA units based in the continental United States, and a Special Operations proponent determines doctrine, training and equipment 

for a force that is mostly conventional. 
25

Policy Trends in Civil Affairs

The state of Civil Affairs in 2014 should also be 

considered in the context of wider policy trends of the 

recent era: expanded engagement in civil dimension 

operations and increased American reliance on civilian agencies and contractors in stability operations. 

American military actions abroad from 1989 onward 

broadened to include humanitarian intervention, not 

only to stabilize relationships between states, but also 

to protect people within them. Global human security 

norms emerged that expanded definitions of security 

and its relationship to development. New national, 

international, non-governmental and even for-profit 

agencies came forward to address the challenges of 

security and development. 

In 2005, Department of Defense Directive 3000.05 

defined stability operations – missions in which Civil 

Affairs are key contributors – as “civilian and military 

activities.” DoD 3000.05, later affirmed in a 2009 DoD 

Instruction, defined stability operations “a core U.S. 

military mission” that the military should be prepared 

to conduct “throughout all phases of conflict” and 

across the range of military operations, including in 

combat and non-combat environments.” This message 

addressed a debate on the American way of that had 

simmered at least since Vietnam, but did not point to 

a clear way forward for the CA community.

In theory, the U.S. Army’s Civil Affairs force structure has resided primarily in the Reserves to develop 

and sustain specialized civilian skills that could be 

drawn upon as needed. However, intense demand for 

CA forces after 2003 showed problems with the system of functional specialty concentrations among CA 

personnel. The intense demand for CA generalists be-
26

tween 2005 and 2009 took precedence over functional 

specialists. To meet demand, the Department of Defense turned to the individual ready reserve, internal 

cross-leveling, and Navy and Air Force “shake and 

bake” CA personnel. CA partners in the field, expecting specialists, were often disappointed. As noted at 

the Symposium, the inability to deliver on the promise 

of functional specialists became a “black eye” for CA. 

In order to meet demand in Afghanistan and Iraq, 

the U.S. revisited a civil-military model it had used 

in Vietnam, by reconceiving the Joint Civil-military 

operations Task Force (JCMOTF) as Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). PRTs included civilians from 

the State Department and other agencies as well as 

military civil-military personnel. However, by 2003 

these were already in such seriously short supply that 

PRTs were often commanded by a Navy commander 

or Air Force lieutenant colonel. In 2005-6 the Army established a Human Terrain System comprised mostly 

of contracted civilians to develop sociocultural knowledge for combat commanders in Afghanistan and 

Iraq, including Human Terrain Teams deploying with 

tactical units. 

In the midst of a military surge in Afghanistan in 

2010, the United States conducted a “civilian surge” 

that tripled the number of diplomats and civilian 

workers including experts in law, governance and 

agriculture, to more than 1,100. Surprisingly missing from this surge effort was an organization by the 

State Department for just these types of missions. The 

Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) Civilian Response Corps, was established in 2008 to provide civilian experts, similar to 

programs in Europe and Canada. The program initially aimed to provide up to 4,000 civilian experts, and 
27

would include active, standby and reserve members. 

The Department of State was unable to fill the roster of 

the Response Corps or wrest control of civilian surge 

efforts from the office of the Special Representative 

for Afghanistan and Pakistan, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and other civilian 

agencies. After struggling for several years, S/CRS 

was transformed into the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO) following the 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review and 

plans for a cadre of expeditionary civilians were set 

aside. 

The Future of Civil Affairs

These factors together begged the question about 

the viability of the military’s Civil Affairs brand and, 

more generally, what should be the future of CA. 

U.S. CA and Special Operations Commanding General Major General Daniel Ammerman assured those 

convened that the CA brand is not suffering because 

demand for it remains so high. Indeed, the 1 June 

2014 edition of Army Times termed CA “the hottest 

job in the Army today,” noting that even as the Active 

Component sheds thousands of soldiers, CA would 

add 400 annually in the coming several years. The expansion of CA may indeed signal the strength of the 

brand, or it may signal that increased salience of the 

civil dimension in United States missions abroad creates sufficient demand to overcome any challenges to 

the brand.

The panel at large concluded that the immediate 

future is unlikely to bring a reconciliation of the Army’s 2006 “divorce,” much less development of a joint 

force structure. That said, the panelists did highlight 
28

some recent and promising developments regarding 

the role of Civil Affairs in American strategy.

For instance, the U.S. Marine Corps already has a 

company grade and basic school, and will add a staff 

course in January 2015 in Washington, DC. Maj. Gen. 

Ammerman identified readiness, training and leader 

developments among the top items on his list of priorities for USACAPOC. Clearly a focus on preparation is vital to address what Brig. Gen. Irizarry called 

a need to develop “credible CA expertise.” For most 

of its existence, the professional military education for 

Civil Affairs has been “a pick-up game,” hampering 

its professionalization as a force.

Brig. Gen. Van Roosen noted a goal of the Institute for Military Support to Governance (IMSG), established in 2014, is to provide predictable, accredited 

skills. He added that 54 functional specialty cells reside at the Army’s Civil Affairs battalions, brigades 

and commands, but that few personnel met the criteria 

for the doctrinal skill identifiers. Irizarry, in his comments, argued that CA personnel need to be “expert 

generalists” conversant with operational design. The 

expertise needed is one that enables a system-wide 

view of a field such as agriculture or engineering, or 

threat finance. That observation echoes a 2014 Naval 

Postgraduate School report for the IMSG in 2014. Van 

Roosen remarked that the IMSG has now completed 

its analysis of expertise, identified 22 categories, and 

will soon issue its own report. These personnel would 

perform as advisory teams, in military government, 

support to civil authority and theater security cooperation beginning in October 2015 when the conversion 

of a portion of the 38A Civil Affairs to the new 38G 

(Governance) takes place. By directly commissioning 

some officers, the IMSG seeks to more readily access 

expertise from the civilian sector. 
29

Recognizing the increased relevance of civilian as 

well as military expertise, Ammerman identified the 

Army Reserve’s Public-Private Partnership Initiative 

(P3I) and “informal networks” among his top priorities. P3I provides a means for private sector resources 

and Reserve manpower to combine. As Ammerman 

mentioned, U.S. Army Reserve training exercises are 

already engaging the private sector. Irizarry noted the 

establishment of Army Reserve Engagement Cells at 

the Combatant Commands, to leverage the Reserve 

Component more deliberately and continuously with 

Active Component commands. 

Lt. Col. Simon, the current director of the USMC 

Civil-military operations School, focused primarily on 

Civil Information Management (CIM), or more precisely, on MARCIM – the U.S. Marine Corps semantic 

wiki for assessment and analysis. MARCIM enables 

mobile data collection, and a site for data sharing and 

collaboration. The system enables decision support 

with visualization (maps, graphs and timelines) and 

link analysis. That two of the three papers selected as 

finalists in the CA Association essay competition are 

on the topic of CIM underscores its importance. But 

those papers focus on CIM, in part, because it has yet 

to settle upon a working system that truly delivers. 

Irizarry also emphasized civil reconnaissance and CA 

as “scouts of the civil domain.” He argued for development of a standardized concept, lexicon, and handson training. Writ large, it would be more appropriate 

to think about “threat” rather than “enemy” because 

often the concern for CA is a non-human foe such 

as pestilence or illiteracy. The environment must be 

framed “beyond time and space.” (Some added that 

what Irizarry may really mean here is the difference 

between “threats” and “drivers of conflict,” a term 
30

used more readily by peacebuilders and development 

experts using a “human security” approach.)

Threading these themes together, Brig. Gen. Irizarry discussed the need to shift thinking from Civil Affairs Operations (CAO) to Civil Military Operations 

(CMO) with CA as the lead proponent. He spoke of the 

need to place new emphasis on the Civil Military Operations Center concept. Focusing on force structure, 

he emphasized the need for CA to rethink the troop to 

task and consider the function, size, scale and scope of 

the mission, rather than a standard consideration that 

a brigade combat team is assigned a CA company. In 

some cases, such as the West African Response Force, 

this model may not fit, and a more tailored package of 

CA is needed.

Maj. Gen. Ammerman noted that even as the 

demand for Civil Affairs is strong, the budgets are 

shrinking – training funds for Reserve CA for the current fiscal year are half of the previous year. Meanwhile, civilian surge efforts are also retrenching. The 

Department of State has disbanded its Civilian Response Corps. Many of the ad hoc structures such as 

PRTs and the HTS did not make their way into the 

more permanent force structure or doctrine. 

Lt. Col. Simon said the new generation of Civil Affairs could leverage technology to their advantage if 

given the right tools at the right time for the right mission. He claimed without hesitation that those graduating from the MOS-producing school have what they 

need to make a difference. The challenge remains how 

to best enlighten those at the operational and strategic 

level leading the captains and corporals, not those engaged at the tactical level.
31

Conclusion

There is much that is worrisome about the state of 

Civil Affairs today. The Navy disestablished nearly all 

of its CA capability and the prospect for a Joint Force 

structure is slimmer than ever. The Army’s Civil Affairs leadership appears to have accepted its institutional divisions. Policy makers in recent years often 

turned not to CA but to ad hoc and non-CA solutions to 

civil dimension challenges. Professional military education for CA has often been a “pick-up game.” The 

functional specialist program has been “a black eye.” 

Civil Information Management, in turn, struggles to 

achieve its potential.

On the other hand, strategic and operational 

demand remains high for military personnel who 

understand the civil dimension in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief and Peace & Stability 

operations under the U.S. Army Functional Concept for 

Engagement, particularly when the environments are 

dangerous but also in growing “Phase 0” (Shape and 

Influence) operations involving theater security cooperation, “building partnership capacity,” and conflict 

prevention.

It is no longer the situation, the panel concluded, 

that most senior leaders do not understand the value 

of Civil Affairs. The future of CA includes some hopeful prospects thanks to practical steps recently taken. 

The USMC and the Army recognize the need to invest in training and education, including the development of civil sector experts. The CA leadership is taking actions to more effectively integrate with civilian 

partners in both the public and private sectors, and to 

provide the civil information that partners and commanders need in the field. But they cannot come even 
32

close to fulfilling the potential of CA alone – the future 

of CA needs much greater attention at four-star and 

executive agency levels.

Dr. Karen Guttieri is the Security and Development 

Policy Lead with the Peace Innovation Lab at Stanford 

University. She’s published in the domains of international 

security, military strategy and doctrine, international law, 

cognitive psychology, and organizational learning, directed 

multidisciplinary and interagency research teams on Governance Innovation for Security and Development and Insurgency, and developed graduate courses and programs on 

Security and Development and the Rule of Law for the Civil 

Affairs community. Karen is completing Masters of Peace, 

a book on the American military’s approach to Civil Affairs. 

Dr. Guttieri was selected in 2014 as an Honorary Member 

of the Civil Affairs Regiment.
33

Quality is Free: 

Improving Outcomes in an Era of Austerity Through 

Integrated Civil Military Training and Operations

Sergeant First Class Ryan S. Long and 

Staff Sergeant Bjorn E. Hansen

 A continued lack of familiarity between Active and 

Reserve Civil Affairs (CA), and between CA and other 

governmental agencies (DoS/USAID, etc.), all during 

an era of reductions in military spending, continues to 

result in unnecessary friction during joint and interagency operations. By integrating Reserve and Active 

Component CA and military/non-military training 

and routine operations the Army and DoD can expect higher force generation rates, lower end-strength 

requirements, and better operational outcomes. This 

paper will present a case for integrating Active and 

Reserve CA force structure and operations, improving 

training and readiness standards, and integrating CA 

training with relevant non-DoD agencies in order to 

better utilize the unique capabilities of each component, while reducing costs. 

Since the War on Terror began in 2001, U.S. Army 

Civil Affairs has been relied on to support the nation’s 

political and military efforts in nearly every theater 

of operations. With the vast majority of CA forces 

belonging to the Army Reserve, these resource and 

personnel-intensive operations quickly drained the 

availability of trained CA forces Army-wide. As Army 

CA struggled to generate forces over more than a decade of warfare, it faced challenges brought about by 

rapid growth and provisional missions and taskings, 

such as fractures between Active Component (AC) 

and Reserve Component (RC) forces, and missions in 

support of non-DoD elements. 
34

These missions rapidly impacted readiness and 

the overall effectiveness of CA as a branch. Units 

rarely deployed together, and non-CA Soldiers were 

regularly tasked with typical CA tasks such as: project management; collecting civil reconnaissance; and, 

conducting foreign humanitarian assistance. Senior 

leadership positions were filled with re-classed individuals sent through two-week Civil Affairs courses 

immediately prior to leading units in combat, and rosters were intermittently filled out with Inactive Ready 

Reserve augmentees. The AC was forced to fill CA positions with Field Artillery officers, while intelligence 

sections were tasked with covering down on the unfamiliar task of Civil Information Management. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) were frequently led 

by the Navy and Air Force officers, and parallel organizations such as Human Terrain Teams were created 

in an effort to offset CA’s workload.

Civil Affairs can view its ability to meet OPTEMPO demands with some pride, but it is essential to understand that these temporary structures were created 

both in support of Civil Affairs Operations (CAO) and 

Civil Military Operations (CMO) and to cover real 

and perceived deficiencies. No matter the purpose, it 

remains the Army’s continual mission to adjust and 

grow based on lessons learned. The drawdown of 

forces in Iraq and Afghanistan allows a respite from 

the experiences of the past decade of war, but CA and 

the Army must learn from these experiences in order 

to address these deficiencies in an era of declining resources. History has shown us that CA forces will continue to be called on in times of instability and conflict, 

despite claims that these missions are solely civilian 

endeavors.1 As such, this response to lessons learned 

must be completed before subsequent (and inevitable) 
35

contingency operations again expose systemic weaknesses in the current arrangement.

Operational Disconnects 

The organizational split between Active and Reserve CA in 2006 was largely driven by then-Secretary 

of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s opinion that the failures of OEF/OIF required a shift in CA force structure to better support the conventional Army’s needs 

in Iraq and Afghanistan, and to not distract the focus 

of the Special Operations community from its Direct 

Action focus. Despite a clear preference to remove CA 

from the Special Operations community due to the 

strain of managing the readiness challenges of reservists, USSOCOM argued that CA was a capability that 

belonged within Special Operations Forces (SOF). 

As a compromise, nearly all Reserve CA was shifted out of USASOC in late 2006. As explained by Brigadier General Hugh Van Roosen in his 2009 Army War 

College paper, this had a significant effect on the integration, readiness, and doctrinal clarity of Reserve CA 

as it “consistently violated three of its four SOF truths 

and imperatives. These include: humans are more important than hardware; quality is better than quantity; 

Special Operations Forces cannot be mass produced; 

and, competent Special Operations Forces cannot be 

created after emergencies occur.”2 After eight years of 

continuous deployments under this arrangement, the 

result has been a parallel CA community, with Active 

and Reserve units training and deploying separately 

and little shared knowledge between them before, 

during, or after respective deployments. 

The removal of USACAPOC from USASOC and 

the explicit relegation of Active CA to SOF missions 
36

immediately revealed the obvious capability and capacity gap of a lack of Civil Affairs support to rapid 

conventional contingency operations. The Army’s solution, the creation of the 85th Civil Affairs Brigade, 

further compounded the lack of unity within Civil Affairs. Currently, the 85th BDE aligns its battalions to 

each Geographic Combatant Command (GCC), while 

USACAPOC does the same with its reservist elements. 

With the inclusion of USASOC’s 95th BDE and their 

similar alignment, the Army has created a confusing 

overlap of responsibilities between three elements of 

the same branch that almost never interact with one 

another. CA now has three distinct sub-branches, with 

only the nominal consistency of a shared proponency 

and its doctrine to unite them. 

In a typical mission, CA forces could now enter a 

conflict rapidly in support of SOF, transition after a 

90-day period to an Active Component team, and then 

finally pass the mission to reservists and their specialized civilian skills. However, this confusing overlap 

rarely succeeds, as these involved elements lack common standards, familiarity, SOPs, data-sharing mechanisms, or even a means of identifying or communicating with one another prior to their brief turnover. 

Calls to restore Army CA under a unifying command are politically charged and unlikely, despite the 

fact that this organizational handicap is clearly recognized by all echelons of CA forces. While not necessarily a result of the so-called “divorce,” elements have 

attempted isolated measures to unify CA’s vital Civil 

Information Management (CIM) systems through 

programs such as CIM-DPS and USACAPOC’s shortlived AxisPro system, acknowledging that after 13 

years of continuous deployments CA still does not 

have an effective and centralized program to manage 
37

and share its most important operational information. 

The raw data, analysis, and products from these many 

years of conflict are scattered across a range of databases and systems such as Tactical Ground Reporting System (TIGR), Combined Information Database 

Network Exchange (CIDNE), Geographic Information 

Systems (GIS), the Asymmetrical Software Kit (ASK) 

and Mapping the Human Terrain (MAP-HT), not to 

mention Excel spreadsheets and PowerPoint slides. In 

addition to these systems, the AC 95th BDE has developed the Civil Affairs Operating System (CAOS) for 

its own operations, and other stopgap theater-specific 

options are still being created and employed. The result has been an inability to aggregate and analyze 

Civil Affairs Operations and Civil Information across 

provinces, years, or initiatives. In a sly historical reference, Afghanistan is commonly referred to as the 

“graveyard of databases.” 

The authors strongly believe that effective CIM 

is the basis by which CA, along all operational lines, 

brings relevance and value to the combatant commander and non-military agencies. CA is uniquely qualified 

to integrate and analyze disparate data sources from a 

complex civil environment, and to maintain this information for future operations. Any attempt to bridge 

these CA communities will fail without an acknowledgement of the need for the aforementioned Active 

and Reserve CA, non-CA military, and non-military 

actors in a theater to share and analyze data in a common and sustained format. These organizations must 

make progress towards a single common operational 

picture in support of commanders and other affected 

leaders. Simply put, and as a first step towards some 

form of unification, CA must address this single glaring operational issue.
38

A re-unification, under any proposed structure, 

would not only support continuity within the branch, 

but also place CA in a position to more effectively 

support its aligned GCCs in joint and interagency missions. This reorganization would benefit training and 

force generation, as well as CIM data sharing, through 

more streamlined chain of command and focus areas. 

As outgoing USACAPOC Commander Major General 

Jeffrey Jacobs noted in his retirement speech in June 

2014, “unless and until we can fix that disconnect, we, 

USACAPOC, cannot provide the best possible Civil 

Affairs support to the United States Army and the 

Army will not truly interest itself in CA and Civil Affairs will not achieve full equality as a branch of the 

Army.”3 While completely true, it is also telling that 

this message from the Army’s senior CA officer only 

applied to his outgoing command within the Reserve, 

and not Army Civil Affairs as a whole.

Reacting to Austerity 

The current drawdown of all components of the 

armed forces (Active, Reserve, and Guard) dismisses 

fears of a shrinking capability by assuming that the 

operational nature of the Guard and Reserve forces 

will continue into the future. This is at odds with the 

prior, strategic use of those forces, which historically 

expected to rely upon them for massive mobilizations 

of national interest. The continuing era of low-intensity conflict throughout the world has the potential to 

quickly degrade and distract the Active forces from 

their traditional missions without regular assistance 

from the Guard and Reserve forces. This is particularly true for CA forces. While Reserve CA provides 

ongoing support of the continuing joint mission in the 
39

Horn of Africa, as well as small mobilizations in support of DoS and DoD missions within assigned GCCs, 

there is a distinct possibility of the AC CA units (both 

conventional and SOF) assuming these missions for 

the foreseeable future. This has the potential of eroding the operational experience earned at great cost, 

with lessons relearned only when these RC units are 

mobilized for a future contingency.

The post-9/11 era has demonstrated the ability 

of the Guard and Reserve to generate forces for deployment, but only with significant mobilization, lead 

time and resources.4 After the first rotation, the typical 

unit often relied on cross-leveling Soldiers from other 

units, and even from other services, in order to man 

subsequent battle rosters. This was particularly true of 

CA units, where experienced NCOs and officers were 

in short supply, particularly those able to deploy. With 

the total cost of deploying a soldier for a year ranging 

from one to two million dollars, the answer to these 

concerns is not to fight to preserve every slot in CA 

units, but rather to increase the percent of qualified 

CA Soldiers ready and available to deploy. 

A streamlined yet more professional force would 

trade numbers for expanded training and enhanced 

efforts to identify, recruit, and retain higher quality 

Soldiers. A ready and available Reserve CA soldier 

would have the following characteristics: 

• Physically fit- passing the APFT according to 

SOF standards 

• Experienced- either a prior deployment or having a secondary Military Occupational Specialty (MOS)

• MOS-qualified- graduated from appropriate 

qualification or Noncommissioned Officer Education System (NCOES) courses
40

• High aptitude- possessing GT scores from at 

least the highest quintile

• Relevant civilian skills- completed training or 

current occupation in line with one of the functional areas or core tasks of Civil Affairs

While senior leadership within the CA community 

would wholeheartedly agree with these expectations, 

the composition of Reserve CA units belies a commitment to these standards. These requirements would 

almost certainly result in a reduced population of CA 

forces, and would limit the ability of Soldiers lacking 

applicable skill sets to enter the CA community. This 

would not be a negative, as CA may be forced to cut 

end strength in the coming years, and these filters are 

reasonable methods of ensuring some basic standard 

within Army Civil Affairs, whether SOF-aligned, 

AC, or RC. The authors propose a better integration 

between Active and Reserve CA to meet Army Force 

Generation (ARFORGEN) requirements with an expected reduction in end strength. 

Force Validation and Training

In an effort to more effectively support changing 

missions and force structure, CA must also quickly 

adapt its training and readiness capabilities. Current 

ARFORGEN methods look at the readiness levels of 

standard-sized echelons, ignoring the fact that CA 

elements typically operate in teams of four to six soldiers. A CA battalion commander may slowly push 

his unit along the four-year RC ARFORGEN cycle, but 

the operational needs of the Army tend to be far more 

complex and immediate, as our recent contingency 

operations have shown. 
41

In both the AC and RC, single elements, to include 

CA Teams (CAT), CA Planning Teams (CAPT), Civil 

Liaison Teams (CLT), as well as individuals, are often 

deployed from units that aren’t yet in the ARFORGEN “available” status. These missions are either 

requested by commanders, are assigned based on the 

inability of planned units to deploy, or are assigned 

based on needs within the unit’s aligned GCC. Additionally, and as noted earlier, in larger contingency 

operations like Iraq and Afghanistan, small groups 

were often transferred between elements so as to support another unit’s company-level or higher mobilization. In order to meet the needs of these missions, 

commanders have regularly been forced to send adhoc teams of volunteers, or to pull from individuals 

who happened to meet readiness standards at that 

time. The ARFORGEN policy has not been effective at 

providing adequate CA forces or predictable deployments for soldiers. 

Rather than continuing to rely on these (arguably 

ineffective and certainly administratively cumbersome) patchwork organizations, a team-based validation process will work to motivate organic elements to 

increase their readiness at the lowest level, especially 

when combined with incentives for increased standing 

on order-of-merit lists for advanced schooling, as well 

as for the opportunity to undertake operational training and deployments. Additionally, commanders will 

be able to quickly identify and allocate ready teams 

when needs arise. At the lowest level, the tactical-level 

CAT, these teams are led by experienced captains and 

sergeants first class who should already be aware of 

ARFORGEN requirements, so transition issues should 

be minimal.
42

Teams would internally track their ARFORGEN 

requirements for key members, allowing considerations for new Soldiers, those awaiting MOS reclassification, pending losses, and those with temporary 

medical issues, and push for their completion at the 

lowest level.5 Unit-level Mission Essential Task List 

(METL) training can then be more specifically targeted and verified by battalion or higher leadership, so 

as to bring these teams up to ARFORGEN standards 

quickly and effectively, resulting in organic elements 

that have trained together, with members that are fully aware of, and invested in, their team’s capabilities.

While team-based validation would help to ensure 

that missions are assigned to teams that are judged to 

be fully capable by ARFORGEN standards, the lessons from recent operations clearly show that simply 

providing the proper number of “ready” bodies to a 

theater is not always sufficient to ensure success. In an 

effort to address a lack in specialized skill sets, the CA 

Proponent has further developed its Additional Skill 

Identifier (ASI) system. This has partly addressed the 

branch’s inability to expand and organize the civilian 

skill sets of its Soldiers along CA functional specialties, 

such as Public Health, Governance and Rule of Law. 

Additionally, a long term plan to provide a separate 

career path for Civil Affairs officers, known as the 38G 

path, is also in development with the goal of further 

enhancing CA’s ability to support its specialized mission requirements.6

These efforts would be a good start if the 38G program were even fully supported for implementation, 

but it has languished for several years now. Even if 

implemented as envisioned in late 2015, it partly ignores the aforementioned issue that CA missions often require a specific skill set for a specific mission. 
43

CA Officer ASIs are notoriously understaffed, and 

limiting these opportunities to officers further restricts 

the overall effectiveness of teams ranging from Functional Specialty Cells to the lowest level CAT. These 

programs, left alone, will only continue this myopia 

by recognizing the concern only at the officer level, 

making the assumption that a unit is defined by the 

skills and qualifications of its officers and not by its 

members as a whole—another tenet that highly effective SOF elements would find disagreeable.

This issue can be mitigated by combining our recommendations to consistently and regularly enhance 

the skill sets of CA soldiers (quality is better than 

quantity), and by cataloguing and reorganizing team 

structures based on existing civilian skill sets. In addition to allowing for enlisted ASIs beyond the currently 

required Battle Staff, the CA Proponent could easily 

identify or contract for training courses and certifications to further develop and recognize the capabilities of CA elements as a whole. These courses would 

align with CA functional areas, and be open to AC/

RC officers and enlisted members to mitigate the gap 

between skills offered and mission needs.

These rank-immaterial ASIs would truly embrace 

the intent of Reserve Component CA to not just bring 

in individuals with civilian skill sets, but to also develop its own Soldiers, just as every other branch of 

the military does from the grade of E-1 onward. Additionally, these courses would allow Active Component CA troops the opportunity to expand their capabilities, further diminishing the gap between them and 

their RC counterparts. It is fully understood that new 

courses cost money and manpower, so measures must 

be undertaken to utilize distance-learning options, as 

well as tie these courses in with existing organic skills, 
44

such as law, engineering, information analysis, and 

languages. Since our recommendations above will result in a more clearly identifiable force with specific 

skill sets, opportunities would avail such as having 

Reserve Component CA Soldiers who work as judges 

or attorneys being tasked with conducting standardized training on Rule of Law. Units would also coordinate with local colleges for applicable lectures 

and to encourage Soldiers to utilize unused education benefits to support training needs. Furthermore, 

as expanded upon below, commands would engage 

with interagency and interorganizational partners to 

conduct the type of partnership-building and training 

efforts that were desperately needed in the lead-up to 

the recent conflicts.

Interorganizational Partnering

CAO, by doctrine, directive, and common sense, 

are best accomplished through cooperative and coordinated efforts between a range of military and nonmilitary actors. Unfortunately for many CA Teams, 

the first time most of them learn about the capabilities 

of non-military resources in theater is when they meet 

upon arrival for their mission or deployment. To the 

Department of State or USAID professional, (now defunct) Civilian Response Corps member, or S2 analyst, 

the four-man CAT represents the capabilities of the 

entire branch, whether Active or Reserve. The CAT 

must have more than a cursory awareness of these 

different agencies, their capabilities, and their restrictions, as the supported commander, his staff, and maneuver unit commanders each are relying on the CAT 

to leverage these non-military assets to complete their 

mission.7
These expectations are not just operationally relevant, but are a core element of Civil Affairs’ DoD 

mandate. As clearly stated in DoDD 2000.13:

“Civil Affairs operations may be conducted to support 

national policies and interests as part of an interagency, bilateral, or multinational military or political-military operation, in accordance with law and consistent 

with applicable DoD policy and issuances.”

This expands on the experiences gained from the 

World War II-era FM 27-5 on Military Governance and 

Civil Affairs, which presciently noted the fact that military governance isn’t specifically a task for times of 

war. CA will always be expected to stand ready to 

accomplish missions in support of other U.S. Government entities in line with its core tasks and functional areas. The National Defense Strategy further 

reinforces this expectation, emphasizing the need 

for providing “a Stabilizing Presence” and building 

upon capabilities developed since 2001.8 Civil Affairs’ 

utilization from these recent conflicts are directly at 

odds with CA’s supposed stated mission, as CA was 

often expected to replicate non-DoD assets in theater 

to give the supported commander his own capabilities instead of simply partnering to take advantage of 

the skills and missions of USAID and DoS initiatives. 

These directives clearly outline the expectations for 

Civil Affairs, and can be leveraged to support the justification for additional interagency training links.

The CA proponency has begun work on developing this link with the Institute for Military Support to 

Governance.9 This effort proves that elements within 

CA leadership already understand that the true subject matter experts for CA’s functional areas lie in the 

civilian world. It should, therefore, be very simple to 

45
46

justify interagency training opportunities between 

DoD and these groups. Utilizing existing civilian training courses, encouraging links with local academic resources, and building upon existing relationships created during these ongoing conflicts would support the 

Army’s need to enhance training while responding to 

austerity measures. 

Part of successful interagency partnering is acknowledging that the Army cannot be all things to all 

people. Too often combatant commanders have conducted CMO in parallel with the work of a PRT or DoS 

actor because it was not comprised of personnel from 

his unit. CA teams must be able to effectively advise a 

commander on the capabilities of civilians from within a PRT or other similar organization. This cannot be 

accomplished without regular training opportunities 

with State Department, USAID, U.S. Institute of Peace 

(USIP), or other organizations expected to advise 

ambassadors and high-level military leaders on the 

conduct and resolution of a conflict. Once effectively 

trained, these units can conduct Joint Readiness Training Center and National Training Center rotations 

with the confidence and skills required to convince 

Active Component leaders of Civil Affairs’ relevance. 

Only by supplying well-rounded CATs and other CA 

elements can the supported commander be effectively 

advised on how to work with and capitalize on nonorganic assets in their AO. 
47

Implementation Strategies

The recommended solutions to the issues pointed 

out in this paper can be organized along the DoD categories of doctrine, organization, training/leadership/

education, materiel, and personnel, and are restated 

below:

Doctrine - While CA doctrine has improved in the 

last ten years, it would need to be adapted to fit the 

proposed changes. Modifications would delineate the 

roles of those with specialized skills and additional 

skill identifiers within the force, and would highlight 

the importance of interoperability between all CA elements.

Organization – Lasting links must be established 

between AC/RC CA as well as with relevant government agencies to ensure a true whole-of-government 

approach that is formalized prior to being called for 

in a contingency operation. This “Civil WARTRACE” 

will drastically improve links between these elements 

here in the United States, and also provide a framework for a robust “reachback” system for deployed 

personnel, whether DoD or otherwise. A system 

would also be developed to better support CA units 

with on-call support from DoD personnel and teams 

with expertise in areas such as contracting, engineering, geographic information systems, and intelligence. 

These personnel would be drawn from a pool of individuals who are not only skilled in their own fields, 

but more importantly have been trained in how their 

respective roles apply to both Civil Military Operations and Civil Affairs Operations. 

Training/Leadership/Education – The 38G program must be instituted, and similar programs rapidly initiated to acknowledge, develop, and retain the 
48

specialized expertise of enlisted Soldiers. Joint training must be conducted between Active and Reserve 

CA, between CA and other DoD elements, as well as 

between CA and interagency and intergovernmental 

elements. Civil Affairs soldiers will utilize existing 

U.S. Government organizational training opportunities, to include an expansion of joint and interagency 

Realistic Military Training (RMT) and Innovative 

Readiness Training (IRT), and units will expand their 

connections to local universities and private/public 

sector organizations and agencies in order to support an expanded CA skill set without requiring the 

costly development of additional resident CA training 

courses within DoD. Many of these recommendations 

stem from a systemic failure to adhere to NCO and officer career development plans, which already call for 

this type of personal and professional development.

Materiel - Unified Civil Information Management 

is the basis for effective continuity between Army 

CA’s three major elements (not to mention joint CA 

capabilities). A single standardized CIM system is 

absolutely vital—contracted and managed by the CA 

proponency and linked with other services and agencies. A joint working group would retain the best 

aspects of the numerous systems utilized, and ensure 

interoperability at all levels throughout program development.

Personnel – Finally and arguably most importantly, without quality soldiers, CA cannot complete 

appropriate training and participate in the types of 

joint and interagency operations envisioned in this paper. Recruitment and retention must be incentivized, 

to include identifying and drawing from functional 

experts already within the DoD. Civil Affairs must 

market itself beyond the appeal of attending Basic 
49

Airborne School, and de-mystify the military by presenting itself as a professional and academic branch, 

fully accessible and rewarding to those with specialized skill sets. Standards must be raised, allowing for 

a natural reduction in end-strength to offset the costs 

of expanded training and expertise. ARFORGEN validation must be tracked at the team level in order to 

provide a more organic rewards-based readiness system with incentives to adhere to both Army and Civil 

Affairs developmental requirements. This highly proficient cadre of CA personnel could then be further 

augmented by previously identified DoD specialists 

(engineers, data managers) to support additional skill 

training and rapid expansion in the case of future 

contingencies.

Conclusion

Civil Affairs finds itself with time to reflect on 

the lessons learned in the post 9/11 era of conflict. 

For more than a decade Reserve and Active CA have 

deployed at a pace that has burned out the force and 

resulted in a demand for other personnel, units, and 

agencies to become involved in CAO and CMO. The 

outgoing commander of USACAPOC acknowledged 

our need to deliver a better product to the supported 

commanders, or risk becoming marginalized. Budgets 

and end-strength are decreasing and will continue to 

do so into the near future, but the need to be ready 

to deploy at short notice to help address a stunningly 

diverse array of issues is not decreasing. Active Component CA can benefit from the unit skills and capabilities Reserve Component CA have available, but 

they will likely only do so if the RC can improve the 

consistency, preparedness, and specialized skill sets 
50

necessary to effectively augment and partner with 

them and non-DoD agencies. 

This continued reliance on RC CA will require an 

acknowledgement that there are three distinct CA 

communities, and that the linkages between them are 

poor. Where these three communities are housed is 

almost immaterial- what matters is that they need to 

operate together as a family. Low-intensity deployments, combined AC/RC training opportunities, and 

unified information sharing will work to normalize 

this relationship. Further training opportunities and 

information sharing with non-DoD agencies through 

an effective CIM program will begin to formalize the 

relationship between DoD and non-DoD agencies. 

The result will be increased coordination, improved 

information sharing, and an awareness of the capabilities of each agency. The number of critical After Action Reports (AARs) and special investigator reports 

in Iraq and Afghanistan about the failure to address 

these issues are legion. The issues are known; the only 

choice now is whether to act. 

SFC Ryan S. Long has served in Civil Affairs for 13 

years and has deployed four times, serving on Civil Affairs 

Teams, Provincial Reconstruction Teams and Civil Affairs 

Planning Teams in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Horn of Africa. He is a graduate of the Defense Language Institute’s 

Arabic Basic course, and is completing degrees in Arabic 

and geography/GIS. He currently serves as the CIM NCOIC for HHC, 415th CA BN, Kalamazoo, MI.
51

SSG Bjorn E. Hansen has served as a Civil Affairs 

sergeant and team sergeant on two separate deployments 

to Iraq. Prior to joining the Army Reserve in 2006, he deployed as a squad leader with the 1st Provisional Security 

Company to Camp Lemonier, Djibouti, with the US Marine 

Corps Reserve. He has master’s degrees in urban and regional planning and business administration and 13 years 

civilian experience as a transportation planner in Charlotte, 

NC. He currently serves as 1SG for D Co, 422nd CA BN, 

Greensboro, NC. 

Notes

1. Kathleen H. Hicks. “The Future of U.S. Civil Affairs Forces,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2009: 13.

2. Hugh Van Roosen. “Implications of the 2006 Reassignment 

of U.S. Army Civil Affairs,” U.S. Army War College, 2009: 14.

3. Sharilyn Wells. “New USACAPOC CG Emphasizes Training, Leader Development.” U.S. Army Reserve Portal. 25 June, 

2014: 1.

4. Hicks, “The Future of U.S. Civil Affairs Forces,” 19.

5. Gerard Dolan. Operations Update Information Paper. 415th

Civil Affairs Battalion. August, 2014: 10-12.

6. 38G Concept Briefing: Slide 9.

7. Hicks, “The Future of U.S. Civil Affairs Forces,” 16.

8. “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense.” Department of Defense National Defense Strategy,

 2012.

9. IMSG Concept Briefing: Slide 10.
52

Bibliography

Williams, Gregory. “Bridging the Gap between Reserve and 

Active.” U.S. Army Reserve Portal. 26 September, 2014. Accessed 15 October, 2014. http://www.usar.army.mil/resources/

Pages/Bridging-the-gap-between-Reserve-and-Active.aspx

Wells, Sharilyn. “New USACAPOC CG Emphasizes Training, Leader Development.” U.S. Army Reserve Portal. 25 June, 

2014. Accessed 15 October, 2014. http://www.usar.army.mil/

resources/Pages/New-commanding-general-of-USACAPOC.aspx

Van Roosen, Hugh, “Implications of the 2006 Reassignment 

of U.S. Army Civil Affairs,” U.S. Army War College, 2009

DoD Directive 2000.13, March 11 2014, U.S. Undersecretary 

of Defense for Policy

“Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense,” DoD National Defense Strategy, 2012

“Military Governance Specialists and the Institute for Military Support to Governance Concept Brief,” John F. Kennedy 

Special Warfare Center and School, 2013 (PowerPoint briefing)

Dolan, Gerard, Operations Update Information Paper, 415th 

Civil Affairs Battalion, August, 2014

Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-25, U.S. Army Noncommissioned Officer Professional Development Guide, 2011

Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3, Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management, 2014 

Hicks, Kathleen H., “The Future of U.S. Civil Affairs Forces,” 

Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2009
53

Redefining Civil Affairs

Dennis J. Cahill

Civil Affairs (CA) forces have participated in every 

major United States military operation since World 

War II. During World War II and the Korean War, 

CA forces followed closely behind combat units, addressing issues of immediate concern to the people 

and governments of newly liberated friendly territories or standing up temporary military governments 

in newly occupied territories. In Vietnam, CA was an 

integral part of the Civil Operations and Revolutionary (later Rural) Development Support (CORDS) program that was an integrated civil and military effort 

to combat insurgency. These roles were repeated in 

one form or other from Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada in 1983 through Operation Enduring Freedom in 

Afghanistan, the Philippines, the Horn of Africa, the 

Caribbean, and Central America. Yet, over time, exercising the full range of CA capabilities in military operations diminished and many military commanders 

came to view CA primarily as a link to humanitarian 

assistance (HA) supplies and managers of the commander’s emergency response program (CERP) rather 

than a uniformed source of skills associated with the 

functions and well-being of civilian communities in 

the commanders’ areas of responsibility. This path 

has led to two alarming consequences: the atrophy of 

core task skills within the CA force that were designed 

to mitigate the absence of U.S. government agency 

representation in civil-military operations,1 and the 

development or transfer of traditional CA capabilities 

to other, sometimes ad hoc, organizations, such as human terrain teams and reconstruction teams.
54

One reason commanders misunderstand the value 

of CA forces is the poorly worded definition currently 

associated with the term Civil Affairs, which illogically 

refers to forces and units rather than affairs, or activities, of a civil nature that are important to military 

operations. Correcting this deficiency begins with rewriting the current definition. Another reason stems 

from the fact that, until now, CA doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leader development, personnel, facilities, and policy (DOTMLPF-P) have not been 

sufficiently integrated into the broader Army DOTMLPF-P considerations or, more importantly, critical 

routine and pre-deployment training events and the 

early days of contingency operations. Correcting this 

deficiency requires a review of how Civil Affairs are 

integrated into Army doctrine and training as well as 

a review of Army and Defense Department policies 

guiding access to U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) forces in 

training and deployments.

This paper highlights some problems with the current definition of Civil Affairs and makes the case for 

CA to be defined as matters of civilian community interest that affect or are affected by the execution of military 

missions. It crosswalks current CA capabilities with 

future Army capabilities identified in current Army 

doctrine-shaping concepts to redefine the value of CA 

forces beyond HA and CERP. It then identifies policy 

recommendations to strengthen the relationship between supported commanders and their supporting 

CA forces. 
55

Revisiting the Definition

The term, Civil Affairs, has little usage outside of a 

military context and a non-military definition of Civil 

Affairs is virtually nonexistent in Standard English 

dictionaries. One exception – Merriam-Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary – defines Civil Affairs as “affairs 

and operations of the civil population of a territory that are 

supervised and directed by a friendly occupying power.”2

This definition harkens back to the military government and transitional military authority operations 

of the United States and Allied militaries following 

World Wars I and II and in Korea in the 1950s. It is 

close to what we’re looking for, but it needs to be updated to meet our purposes.

The military definition that was contained in Joint 

and Army doctrinal publications prior to the year 

2000 was very complex. This particular year offered 

that that Civil Affairs were “The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations

between military forces and civil authorities, both governmental and nongovernmental, and the civilian populace in 

a friendly, neutral, or hostile area of operations in order to 

facilitate military operations and consolidate operational objectives. Civil Affairs may include performance by military 

forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of local government. These activities may occur prior 

to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They

may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military 

operations.” This version was radically different from 

the Merriam-Webster’s version in that its focus was on 

“activities of a (military) commander” as opposed to 

“affairs and operations of (a) civil population,” which 

one might logically infer from the term. It also did not 

conform to published Department of Defense (DoD) 
56

standards, which called for definitions of military terminology to be clear, concise, and complete.3

Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, Department of Defense 

Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, currently 

defines Civil Affairs as “designated Active and Reserve component forces and units organized, trained, and 

equipped specifically to conduct Civil Affairs operations

(formerly, activities) and to support civil-military operations. Also called CA.”4

 Although this definition has 

been the accepted one for at least the last 15 years, it 

is awkwardly constructed, contains an obvious circular error, and fails to adequately provide a meaning of Civil Affairs that is useful to a commander. In 

its simplified form, the definition does no more than 

say that Civil Affairs are “designated...forces and unit 

... (that) conduct Civil Affairs operations...” Since Civil 

Affairs operations are defined as “actions planned, executed, and assessed by Civil Affairs forces ...,”5

 the definition effectively states that “Civil Affairs are designated

forces that conduct actions planned, executed, and assessed 

by Civil Affairs forces.”

Considering an Alternative

According to English grammar, an open form compound word like Civil Affairs combines the modifying adjective, civil, meaning, “of or relating to the regular business of the people in a city, town, state, etc.: not 

connected to the military or to a religion,”6 with its plural 

noun, affairs, meaning, “work or activities done for a purpose (such as) commercial, professional, public, or personal 

business”7 to create a new plural noun.8 Thus, we might 

describe Civil Affairs as commercial, professional, public, 

or personal work or activities that are of, or related to, the 

regular business of the people in a city, town, state, etc. Be-
57

sides being wordy and multifaceted, this language 

has little utility for the military definition-builder who 

must identify a “general military or associated significance”9

 for the term. We must find, therefore, simple 

wording that reflects recognition that “the physical, 

cultural, social, political, and psychological aspects of 

human populations”10 can influence military operations on the land domain.

To define Civil Affairs, then, in a way that a commander would find militarily significant, we might 

consider this alternative: matters of civilian community interest that affect or are affected by the execution 

of military missions. In this context, the civilian community consists of indigenous populace and institutions (IPI) in the operational environment11 as well as 

all non-military partners, including U.S. and foreign 

government agencies, non-government organizations 

(NGOs), international relief organizations (IROs), and 

multi-national corporations (MNCs). Matters of interest to this community include non-military issues 

common to all peoples and cultures that can be organized under the broad, stability endstate conditions of 

social well-being, rule of law, safe and secure environment, sustainable economy, and stable governance.12

Strength or instability in any of these areas influence 

a commander’s ability to execute missions in any operational environment across the range of military 

operations.

This definition would have made sense to General 

Dwight D. Eisenhower who, on 30 November 1942 – 

just three weeks into Operation Torch in North Africa 

– wrote to General George C. Marshall: “The sooner I 

can get rid of all these questions that are outside the 

military scope, the happier I will be! Sometimes I think 

I live ten years each week, of which at least nine are 
58

absorbed in political and economic matters.”13 In 

other words, as Allied forces advanced against Axis 

forces through Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia, issues 

of social well-being, rule of law, safe and secure environment, sustainable economy, and stable governance 

within and among the communities through which 

they fought – and which now constituted “rear areas” 

– began to affect the execution of military missions associated with combat and logistics. He could no longer ignore these issues and had to dedicate precious 

military resources to execute stability operations in 

his ever-expanding area of responsibility – a contingency for which he had not prepared. 

This definition also describes a major focus of combat operations during the transition from the Afghanistan Campaign’s Consolidation II phase to Consolidation III phase in late 2009. The senior intelligence 

officer of the International Security Assistance Force 

(ISAF) directed subordinate intelligence staffs to expand their information-gathering efforts to “acquire 

and provide knowledge about the population, the 

economy, the government, and other aspects of the 

dynamic environment we are trying to shape, secure, 

and successfully leave behind.”14 In a supporting effort, the Director of ISAF Joint Command’s Information 

Dominance Center developed Host Nation Information Requirements (HNIR) to “enable the commander 

to make informed decisions – allow him to more effectively conduct the full spectrum of military and 

civilian activities that will achieve popular support 

for government”15 in a population-based counterinsurgency mission. In this instance, commanders were 

interested in identifying matters of civilian community 

interest throughout Afghanistan that (would) affect or 

(be) affected by the execution of military missions designed 

to support the local populace, national security forces, 
59

and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in a unified effort against enemy forces and 

other threats to the security of Afghans. 

The Continuing Need for Civil Affairs Forces

In the mid-1980s, the CA force was at risk of being eliminated from the Army’s force structure. The 

Commander of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine 

Command (TRADOC) and others “believed that Civil 

Affairs forces were anachronisms and needed to be 

expunged from the Army... (the TRADOC commander) spoke for many when he attacked the concept of 

government support by U.S. military personnel as an 

outmoded and politically unacceptable idea. He felt 

that more mundane civil-military roles required of CA 

units could readily be performed by other forces, or 

agencies in lieu of Army Reserve units composed of 

rank-heavy citizen-soldiers.”16 The Chief of Staff of the 

Army was convinced to retain the force by transferring it to the newly-formed U.S. Special Operations 

Command but, in 1990, in the early days of planning 

for a Kuwait Task Force to oversee the post-conflict 

restoration activities that would follow Operation 

Desert Storm, anti-Civil Affairs sentiment resurfaced 

when “HQDA... felt that the State Department and 

other civilian agencies should have been considered 

for the role that the CA Reserve soldiers would have 

to assume; after all the restoration of government dealt 

with traditional civilian, not military, matters.”17

The problem with this line of thinking is that civilian matters in an operational environment are military 

matters in the sense that they must be taken into account and dealt with quickly by military commanders 

to be fully successful. The recently-published Army 

Operating Concept (AOC) recognizes this when it 
60

says, ”Recent and ongoing conflicts reinforce the need 

to balance the technological focus of Army modernization with a recognition of the limits of technology and 

an emphasis on the human, cultural, and political continuities of armed conflict.”18 (Italics added.) It goes 

on to say, “The Army... prepares for security operations abroad including initial establishment of military 

government pending transfer of this responsibility to other 

authorities.”19 It later states, “The complexity of future 

armed conflict, therefore, will require Army forces 

capable of conducting missions in the homeland or 

in foreign lands including defense support of civil authorities, international disaster relief and humanitarian 

assistance, security cooperation activities, crisis response, 

or large-scale operations.”20 The Army core competency 

of wide area security “includes the essential stability 

tasks including: establish civil security; security force assistance; establish civil control; restore essential services; 

support governance; and support economic and infrastructure development.”21

Each of the italicized terms in the preceding paragraph is tailor-made for CA forces. The Army’s CA 

branch consists of Soldiers dedicated to studying the 

functions of civil society and how those functions are 

affected by man-made or naturally occurring crises. 

The two fields within the CA branch are distinct and 

mutually supporting. Soldiers in the generalist field 

(currently identified by career management field 

(CMF) 38A and military occupational specialty (MOS) 

38B) plan for, integrate, and deconflict Civil Affairs 

(as defined in this paper) with military operations at 

every level. Soldiers in the functional specialty field 

(soon to be identified by CMF 38G) apply skills in 

civil sectors that fall under six functional specialty 

areas—rule of law, economic stability, governance, 

public health and welfare, infrastructure, and pub-
61

lic education and information. The individuals and 

teams resident in corps/division G-9 sections, brigade 

S-9 sections, and CA units, are trained, organized, and 

equipped to engage with the civilian communities 

described earlier – often in the local language; conduct civil reconnaissance to answer civil information 

requirements identified by commanders to enhance 

situational understanding; plan, coordinate, integrate, 

and deconflict civil and military interests in all phases 

of operations across the range of military operations; 

and, when required, perform activities and functions 

normally the responsibility of local government. The 

supported commander, therefore, needs neither to 

look far for these inherent military capabilities nor 

create competing or redundant capabilities in his or 

her organization.

The following table (Table 1) provides a crosswalk 

of future Army required capabilities, identified in the 

AOC and Army Functional Concepts (AFC), with current capabilities of the Civil Affairs force.

Future Army Required Capabilities Current Civil Affairs Capabilities

[] Develop and sustain a high degree of situational 

understanding while operating in complex 

environments against determined, adaptive enemy 

organizations. (AOC)

[] Assess a nation-state’s ability for governance, 

economic development, essential services, rule of law, 

and other critical government functions to identify 

strengths and deficiencies. (AFC for Engagement)

[] Understand regional considerations (cognitive, 

moral, physical, and socio-economic) of the operational 

environment in order to have scalable options. (AFC for 

Engagement)

[] Develop pre-mission, country or sub-national 

CA area studies to establish baseline information 

relating to the geography, historical setting, and the 

social, political, military, economic, health, legal, 

education, governance, infrastructure, and national 

security systems and institutions of a specified area 

using a combination of open- and restricted-source 

materials. (FM 3-57)

[] Conduct civil reconnaissance and CA initial, 

deliberate, and survey assessments to obtain a rapid 

overview of existing conditions, to update the CA 

area study, and/or to provide in-depth analysis on 

specific issues or locations, according to priority 

information requirements, to enhance situational 

understanding and facilitate decision-making by 

integrating into the overall supported commander’s 

operations plan and enhancing the deployment of 

the common operating picture. (FM 3-57)
62

[] Maintain an agile institutional Army that ensures 

combat effectiveness, supports other services, fulfills 

DOD and other government agencies’ requirements, 

ensures quality of life for Soldiers and families, and 

possesses the capability to surge (mobilize) or expand 

(strategic reserve) the active Army. (AOC)

[]Develop agile, adaptive, and innovative leaders who 

thrive in conditions of uncertainty and chaos, and are 

capable of visualizing, describing, directing, leading, 

and assessing operations in complex environments and 

against adaptive enemies. (AOC)

[] The Civil Affairs Branch Proponent and the 

Army Force Modernization Proponent at the U.S. 

Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and 

School, along with the U.S. Army Special Operations 

Command G-8 and G-9, perform DOTMLPF-P 

functions for the active and reserve component 

CA forces that support both special operations 

forces and conventional forces, including execution 

of mobilization courses to meet Army surge and 

expansion requirements. 

[] Establish and maintain security across wide areas 

(wide area security) to protect forces, populations, 

infrastructure, and activities necessary to shape 

security environments, consolidate gains, and set 

conditions for achieving policy goals. (AOC)

[] Protect civilians from the effects of combat 

operations to reduce collateral damage effects, 

influence the local population, deny the enemy 

popular support, and preserve freedom of action. 

interorganizational (AFC for Maneuver Support and 

Protection)

[] Conduct populace and resources control (PRC) - 

a core CA task that includes:

- Populace control (e.g., dislocated civilian (DC) 

operations and noncombatant evacuation operations 

(NEO)) to provide security for the populace, mobilize 

human resources, deny enemy access to the 

population, and detect and reduce the effectiveness 

of enemy agents; and

- Resources control (e.g., property rights 

procedures, rationing and distribution programs, 

customs procedures, and protecting and securing 

strategically important institutions) to regulate the 

movement or consumption of material resources, 

mobilize materiel resources, and deny materiel to 

the enemy. (FM 3-57)

[] Conduct foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) 

- a core CA task - to relieve or reduce the results of 

natural or man-made disasters or other endemic 

conditions that present a serious threat to life 

or that can result in great damage to or loss of 

property. (FM 3-57)

[] Conduct nation assistance (NA) - a core CA task 

that includes security assistance (SA) and foreign 

internal defense (FID) - to support a host nation by 

promoting sustainable development and growth of 

responsive institutions in order to promote longterm regional stability. (FM 3-57)

[] Conduct support to civil administration (SCA) - a 

core CA task that takes place in friendly or occupied 

territories - to help to stabilize or to continue the 

operations of the governing body or civil structure 

of a foreign country, whether by assisting an 

established government or by establishing military 

authority over an occupied population.

(FM 3-57)
63

Table 1.

[] Integrate joint and multinational partner capabilities 

and campaigns to ensure unity of effort and accomplish 

missions across the range of military operations. (AOC)

[] Support efforts led by other U.S. government 

agencies to enhance a partner’s capability for 

governance, economic development, essential services, 

rule of law, and other critical government functions. 

(AFC for Engagement)

[] Establish a civil-military operations center 

(CMOC) at tactical, operational, and strategic levels 

to plan and facilitate coordination of activities of the 

Armed Forces of the United States with indigenous 

populations and institutions, the private sector, 

intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental 

organizations, multinational forces, and other 

governmental agencies in support of the joint force 

commander. (JP 3-08, JP 3-57, FM 3-57) 

[] Incorporate the human aspects of conflict and war 

into operations planning and execution in order to 

enable scalable options. (AFC for Engagement)

[] The G-9/S-9 is the principal and coordinating staff 

officer for synchronizing Civil Affairs operations 

(CAO) and integrating civil-military operations 

(CMO). The G-9/S-9 conducts the initial assessment 

during mission analysis that determines CA forceaugmentation requirements. The CA planning 

teams augment supported G-9 staffs at division and 

higher levels to assist in this process. The G-9/S-9 

staff provides direction and staff oversight of the 

supporting CA unit during mission execution. The 

G-9 and his staff ensure each course of action 

effectively integrates civil considerations (the “C” of 

METT-TC). (FM 3-57)

[] Establish, maintain, and shape relations with foreign 

defense establishments, leaders, populations, and 

nongovernmental and intergovernmental organizations 

to gain and maintain access, facilitate maneuver, and 

succeed in unified land operations. (AFC for Mission 

Command)

[] CA forces enable interagency coordination 

through various means and organizational 

structures at the strategic, operational, and tactical 

levels including—

- Civil-military operations Centers.

- Civil Liaison Teams.

- Direct support of Provincial Reconstruction Teams 

and Civilian Response Corps elements.

- Civil-Military Support Elements. (FM 3-57)

[] Conduct information collection to support the 

commander’s issuing of mission commands and 

specifically to answer the commander’s priority 

intelligence requirements and commander’s critical 

information requirements across the range of military 

operations. (AFC for Intelligence)

[] Conduct civil information management (CIM) 

- a core CA task - by which civil information 

(driven by the commander’s critical information 

requirements (CCIR) and integrated with the 

intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) 

plan) is collected, entered into a central database, 

and internally fused with the supported element, 

higher HQ, and other USG and DOD agencies, IGOs, 

and NGOs. The CIM process ensures the timely 

availability of information for analysis and the widest 

possible dissemination of the raw and analyzed civil 

information to military and nonmilitary partners 

throughout the AO. (FM 3-57)
64

Addressing Policy Constraints

On September 11, 2001, 96% of the CA force was 

in the USAR; the remainder comprised of one Active 

Component (AC) CA battalion. In post-9/11 operations, the USAR portion of the CA force was activated 

on a rotational basis under the partial mobilization 

authority of 10 U.S. Code 12302, which allowed for involuntary activation of Reserve Component (RC) forces for up to 24 consecutive months. Early Army policy 

dictated that AC and RC units would have standard 

theater deployment tour lengths of 12 months (known 

as “Boots on the Ground” time, or BOG). To achieve 

this, RC units generally mobilized for 16-18 months 

to allow for post-mobilization train-up periods and 

post-deployment leave time. DoD policy, however, 

dissolved the Army’s ability to build, deploy, and redeploy multi-component units on synchronized timelines, first by interpreting 24 consecutive months to 

mean 24 cumulative months, then by limiting total mobilization time for RC units to 12 months – reducing 

BOG to about 9 months and imposing a policy goal 

of five-year “dwell” periods between deployments for 

RC units and individuals.22

Meanwhile, AC units continued to deploy to a 

theater for 12 (and sometimes 15) months BOG with 

a dwell goal of two years. While the dwell goals were 

never fully realized during Operations Enduring Freedom (OEF) or Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the differing BOG 

times effectively guaranteed that AC maneuver commands and their supporting USAR CA units would be 

on different training and deployment schedules, making the development of pre-deployment relationships 

difficult, if not impossible. 
65

In 2005, the Office of the Secretary of Defense 

(OSD) directed the expansion of AC CA capability by 

creating an AC CA brigade, consisting of one HHC 

and five CA battalions, focused primarily on Special 

Operations missions. Three years later, OSD directed 

the creation of a second AC CA brigade, also with one 

HHC and five CA battalions, but placed in the General Purpose Force to meet perceived shortfalls in the 

USAR CA force.23 At full strength, and given enough 

lead time, this brigade could train and deploy with up 

to one corps headquarters, five division headquarters, 

and 25 brigade combat teams for an overseas contingency operation. If the operation required USAR CA 

unit rotations and OEF/OIF BOG policies are reinstated, subsequent rotations will again be out of synchronization. To strengthen the relationships between 

supported commanders and supporting CA forces, reduce unsynchronized deployments, and increase mission success, the Army must advocate mobilization 

and deployment policies that maximize USAR CA 

unit mobilization times and align AC/RC BOG times. 

In Summary

CA capabilities must be preserved by the Army, 

exercised by supported commanders, and strengthened by continued integration into Army DOTMLPFP initiatives and changes to DoD deployment policy. 

Redefining the term “Civil Affairs” as presented in 

this paper serves at least two purposes: it returns the 

term to its grammatical and historical roots; and, it 

clarifies the concept of Civil Affairs for commanders 

and their staffs. More importantly, it helps define the 

purpose of CA forces and activities in a way that a 

supported commander can appreciate. Commanders 
66

need not look far nor create new capabilities to focus 

on those matters of civilian community interest inherent 

to every military mission and that affect or are affected 

by the execution of those missions. The capabilities required by commanders to integrate or deconflict Civil 

Affairs with military missions reside in their CA soldiers and staff and in CA units.

Dennis J. Cahill is a retired Civil Affairs officer who currently works as the Deputy Director of Civil Affairs Force 

Modernization at the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special 

Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS) and Special 

Operations Center of Excellence (SOCoE). The views expressed in this paper are his alone and do not necessarily 

reflect the position or policy of the USAJFKSWCS/SOCoE

or the U.S. Army. 
67

Notes

1. The Civil Affairs core tasks, outlined in FM 3-57, Civil Affairs Operations, with Change 2, 18 April 2014, are populace and 

resources control (PRC), foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA), 

civil information management (CIM), nation assistance (NA), and 

support to civil administration (SCA).

2. http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/civil%20affairs, 18 

September 2014.

3. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 

5705.01, Standardization of Military and Associated Terminology, 

10 November 2010, requires a definition to be clear, concise, and 

complete. To be clear, the definition must address the meaning 

of the term only. It “should not contain doctrinal or procedural 

information; i.e., it should focus on describing ‘what’ a term is 

and not ‘how’ or ‘why’ it is used.” To be concise, definitions must 

“be as brief as possible including only information that makes 

the term unique.” The definition should be limited to one sentence whenever possible. Finally, to be complete, the definition 

must “include all information required to distinguish the term 

from those that are related or similar.” Additionally, a definition 

should not contain circular errors – meaning the term being defined should not be contained in the definition as a characteristic 

of the term – or contain hidden definitions of other terms.

4. JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 8 November 2010 (As Amended Through 15 August 

2014).

5. The full definition of Civil Affairs operations is: “Actions 

planned, executed, and assessed by Civil Affairs forces that enhance awareness of and manage the interaction with the civil 

component of the operational environment; identify and mitigate 

underlying causes of instability within civil society; or involve the 

application of functional specialty skills normally the responsibility of civil government. Also called CAO.” (JP 3-57)

6. http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/civil.
68

7 . http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/

affairs?show=0&t=1411324782.

8. http://www.grammarly.com/handbook/mechanics/compoundwords/3/open-compound-words/ and http://grammar.ccc.commnet.edu/

grammar/compounds.htm.

9. Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 5025.12, Standardization of Military and Associated Terminology, 14 August 

2009.

10. Definition of land domain, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, 

The U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World, 31 

October 2014.

11. JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 11 August 2011, defines operational environment as “a composite of the conditions, circumstances, 

and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the

decisions of the commander.”

12. FM 3-7, Stability, 2 June 2014.

13. United States Army in World War II Special Studies, Civil 

Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors, Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1964, p. 45. http://www.

history.army.mil/books/wwii/civaff/.

14. Major General Michael T. Flynn, Captain Matt Pottinger, 

and Paul D. Batchelor, Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan, http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/

publications/AfghanIntel_Flynn_Jan2010_code507_voices.pdf.

15. George Franz, David Pendall and Jeffrey Steffen, “Host 

Nation Information Requirements: Achieving Unity of Understanding in Counterinsurgency,” Small Wars Journal, 15 January 

2010. “Host Nation Information Requirements [are] information 

the commander needs about friendly nation institutions or organizations in order to partner effectively, develop plans, make 

decisions, and integrate with civilian activities” and include questions such as, “Who are the key influencers and community leaders that will determine the right projects for economic development? (Development); What partnership activities should we take 
69

to ensure sustainable freedom of movement for the population? 

(Security)...Where and when can we enhance the growth of government capacity to serve the population? (Governance)” http://

smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/host-nation-information-requirements.

16. Dennis Barlow, The Kuwait Task Force: Postconflict Planning

and Interagency Coordination, September 2012 http://cco.dodlive.mil/

files/2012/09/cco_case_study_no._4-kuwait_task_force-student.pdf.

17. John R. Brinkerhoff, “Waging the War and Winning the 

Peace,” a report prepared for the Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, by the Andrulis Research Corporation, October 9, 1991, 

p. 51.

18. TRADOC Publication 525-3-1, The U.S. Army Operating 

Concept: Win in a Complex World, 2020-2040, 7 October 2014, 

p. 6.

19. Ibid, p. 8.

20. Ibid, p. 14.

21. Ibid, p. 21.

22. Defense Science Board Task Force on Deployment of 

Members of the National Guard and Reserve in the Global War 

on Terrorism, 4 September 2007. 

23. In 2005, the Army began to transform to a modular, brigade-centric force. The transformation of USAR CA units from the 

A-series Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) 

to the G-series MTOE was scheduled to begin in 2008 and end in 

2011. In the fall of 2005, however, the Joint Staff validated and 

approved a Central Command request to deploy CA units in the 

modular configuration to support corps, divisions, and brigade 

combat teams. This decision required roughly two CA battalions 

of the A-series configuration to deploy one CA battalion of the Gseries configuration. The grade and MOS shortfalls that remained 

after this consolidation required reassignment and retraining of 

hundreds of USAR Soldiers each year to meet deployment readiness goals. 

71

Remote Civil Information Management: 

A Concept for How U.S. Army Reserve Civil Affairs 

Subject Matter Experts Can Bring Relevant Civilian 

Skill Set Support To Combatant Commanders

Major Marco A. Bongioanni

The ability to effectively identify subject matter 

experts (SMEs) at the right place and time is not a 

new struggle for U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) Civil Affairs (CA). Lean Six Sigma, a series of techniques and 

tools for process improvement initially developed in 

the manufacturing sector and today also taught to senior Department of Defense (DoD) leaders, notes the 

importance of SMEs as somebody who, “Exhibits the 

highest level of expertise in performing a specialized 

job, task, or skill of broad definition.” 1 Lean Six Sigma 

also specifically identifies non-utilized talent as one of 

the eight significant wastes that hinders performance 

improvement and an essential focus for any manager 

looking to improve processes.

The current lack of remote tools that can allow us 

to harness underutilized SMEs is a significant waste 

for not only USAR CA, but also DoD and other U.S. 

Government agencies. This deficiency also hinders 

our ability to support allied or coalition partner security forces around the world in the global war against 

violent extremist organizations (VEOs). Because we 

cannot effectively help remotely, we often have to 

commit financial and human resources in “boots on 

the ground” deployments. These commitments are 

made despite having significant depth in SMEs all 

over the continental United States (CONUS). However, particularly in the civil sector, there is currently 

no effective mechanism in place to link requests for 

information (RFIs) with stateside SMEs. This concept 
72

article posits that the creation of an online “Remote 

Civil Information Management (CIM) Portal,” as the 

potential missing link for how not only USAR CA can 

better support the various Combatant Commander 

Areas of Responsibility (COCOM AORs) but also how 

it could leverage SMEs from a variety of other interagency, intergovernmental, and non-governmental 

organizations (NGOs).

Framing the Problem

TRADOC Pam 525-8-5, U.S. Army Functional Concept for Engagement, clearly notes the current Army 

Concept Framework (ACF) does not adequately guide 

forces on how to advise and assist foreign security 

forces, governments, and peoples. TRADOC Pam 

525-8-5 further notes the importance of partnership 

activities and special warfare activities in any engagement strategy.2

 CA forces play an important role in 

this framework, but they are by far the sole players. 

There are a variety of other DoD, interagency, intergovernmental, and NGO players on the battlefield 

that ultimately help in how we can best advise and assist foreign security forces, governments, and peoples.

It is important to briefly understand the clear 

distinction between Civil Affairs Operations (CAO) 

and Civil Military Operations (CMO) in order to best 

grasp the warfighting capability gap that a remote 

CIM portal could fill in line with the Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership & Education, 

Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPL) model. According to JP 3-57, Civil Military Operations, CAO is “Actions planned, executed, and assessed by Civil Affairs 

forces that enhance the awareness of and manage the 

interaction with the civil component of the operational environment.” 3

 Meanwhile CMO is, “activities of 
73

a commander performed by the designated Civil Affairs or other military forces that establish, maintain, 

influence, or exploit relations between military forces, 

indigenous populations, and institutions.” 4

Perhaps it is the often confusion between what 

CAO and CMO is that causes disregard or dismissal 

of important host nation civil sector shortfalls that are 

usually first identified at the tactical level through basic CIM RFIs. CIM has therefore remained a relatively 

narrow U.S. Forces centric task, mainly in the CAO 

realm, and is lacking in doctrinal guidance. Is it therefore our doctrine that needs adjusting to take into account the varied stakeholders in both CAO and CMO 

support for the COCOMs?

Additionally, in TRADOC Pam 525-3-1, The U.S. 

Army Operating Concept, winning in a complex world 

means leveraging concepts and technologies to maintain capability overmatch while speeding deployment 

and reducing logistical demand.5 Despite the plethora 

of existing technologies and equipment to conduct 

CIM and manage civil sector RFIs, there has been little 

to no attempt to share it with foreign security forces, 

governments, and peoples. While by nature the vast 

majority of CIM data is not classified, such as livestock 

breeding habits, agricultural outputs, public transportation problems, or rule of law questions. This info 

should therefore be resident on an unclassified reporting network and used directly by our allies to help 

in their efforts against VEOs. Does this apparent lack 

of digital materiel effect how we train and fight with 

CIM data? A further examination of the current use of 

SMEs, CIM systems, and a review of an existing current digital model will help further show DOTMLPL 

warfighting capability gap shortfalls in two distinct 

areas: doctrine and material.
74

Background – DoD’s Current Approach 

to CA SMEs

According to FM 3-57, Civil Affairs Operations, 

USAR Functional Specialty Teams (FxSPs) should 

have subject matter experts at the BN and BDE level in 

public health and welfare, rule of law, infrastructure, 

and governance. Additionally at the CACOM and 

above level the FxSP should also have specialists in 

economic stability and public education and information.6

 This current FxSP specialty array does not align 

well within the Army, Joint, and DOS stability framework and has also historically proven notoriously 

difficult to man with qualified soldiers. Additionally, 

within USAR CA formations, there are many civilian 

skill set SMEs that are not slotted in FxSP positions. 

Visibility of these soldier civilian skill sets is almost 

non-existent outside the local command levels. USAR 

CA soldiers struggled to prove how they could be a 

value added asset to a commander not only in Iraq 

and Afghanistan but also in previous CAO and CMO 

in the Balkans and Haiti. Due to a variety of factors 

such as manning shortfalls, mismatch of skill set with 

seniority of position, and inefficient task organization 

structures, many SMEs were often assigned to positions where their skills sets were not relevant or underutilized. Land owning maneuver commanders often marginalized these Soldiers when they could not 

effectively action on CIM data and utilize their supposed functional skill set expertise. Failure in many of 

these examples ultimately soiled the image for USAR 

CA and how civilian SME skill sets translate to CAO 

and CMO capability.

To address the apparent USAR CA FxSP shortfalls 

there is currently new doctrine and task organization 

changes being developed around the concept of creat-
75

ing area of concentration 38G (Military Government) 

specialists. ATP 3-57.70, Civil-military operations Center, identifies that, “By fiscal year 2016 all FxSP functional specialists positions identified in the USAR will 

be recoded to 38G. The new area of concentration has 

the ability, through the use of criteria for degree-ofproficiency coding, to distinguish between competence levels corresponding to strategic, operational, 

and tactical employment. Proficiency levels are determined by experience, education, and certifications and 

will identify four levels of proficiency: basic, senior, 

expert, and master.”7 Despite these coming changes, 

the inherent low density of even these new 38G FxSP 

subject matter experts in any formation makes it even 

more critical to link theater based operations with 

stateside USAR CA SMEs, even while in a part time 

Troop Unit Program (TPU) status.

Background – DoS’s Current Approach to SMEs

DoD is not the only government agency challenged with finding operational relevancy for SMEs 

in its ranks. In 2005, the Department of State (DoS) 

published its Post-Conflict Reconstruction Essential 

Tasks. In an attempt to bring its SMEs to where they 

could have a relevant application in Iraq and Afghanistan and address these post-conflict reconstruction 

essential tasks, DoS created the Civilian Response 

Corps (CRC). Similar to the USAR CA FxSPs, the CRC 

would be experts in their respective reconstruction 

fields and be able to provide actionable guidance and 

recommendations on CMO goals to senior DoS and 

DoD officials on the ground. Despite being well intentioned, the CRC also was also not resourced as it was 

envisioned due to a revision by DoS in the roles of the 

Conflict Stabilization Operations Bureau.
76

Presidential Policy Directive 23 (PPD 23) further 

outlined a new inclusive and deliberate approach to 

sector security assistance (SSA), an area of close focus 

also for DoD and USAR CA. While PPD 23 reaffirmed 

DoS lead in policy, supervision, and general management of SSA, it also highlighted the importance of 

interagency collaboration in order to synchronize regional.8

 However, the mere existence of parallel DoD 

and DoS efforts on how to best focus their SMEs to 

support SSA and political military policy shows the 

somewhat disjointed effort and the need for a single 

automated system to ultimately link all U.S. Government SME capability.

Shortfall of Current CIM Systems

ATP 3-57.50, Civil Affairs Civil Information Management, further highlights the importance of the entire 

scope of CIM planning, collection, collation, processing, analysis, production of products, and dissemination as vital to successfully supporting the commanders CMO objectives.9

 However, as previously noted, 

even the doctrine falls short on recommending ways 

that CIM planning information can be shared with allies and coalition partners to support strategic objectives. A digital CIM portal may be the logical answer 

for sharing the workload with coalition and allied 

partners of what has traditionally been a unique U.S. 

Forces skill. 

Despite CA soldiers deployed to COCOM theaters trained in CIM software systems such as Tactical 

Ground Reporting (TIGR), AxisPro, Map Human Terrain (MAP HT), or Combined Information Data Network Exchange (CIDNE), there is currently no ability 

for even them to query potential stateside USAR CA 
77

SMEs or coalition and allied partners for answering 

their potential RFI. Often relevant CIM information is 

gathered and collated by a Joint Task Force CIM cell or 

military intelligence collection structure and stored on 

secret or secure networks. Access to these networks is 

something neither a CONUS Soldier nor a coalition or 

allied partner nation staff officer can accomplish, even 

on an official network computer. CIM data need to be 

accessible by commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) computing devices otherwise it is useless to any agency, 

NGO, or allied/coalition country who do not possess 

computers with specific government security patches.

How a Remote CIM Portal Could Help 

in the Global War on Terrorism

The concept of the Remote CIM Portal aligns well 

with the current information gathering techniques of 

many of the security forces from our coalition and allied partners who are countering VEOs. These security forces have a small core group of staff officers, who 

are often cross trained from their traditional combat 

arms roles, fulfilling the additional duty of Civil-Military Cooperation (NATO-CIMIC) or Coordination 

(UN-CIMIC) Officers. Meanwhile, infantry soldiers 

at the unit level have likely also received additional 

pre-deployment training in basic CMO skills such as 

conducting key leader engagements (KLEs), mapping 

of the civil terrain, and collecting of civil component 

spot reports. This raw CIM data gathered by coalition 

and allied partners frequently do not make it into a 

database where a trained staff officer can collate, analyze, and potentially give recommendations for action. Creating an online digital database portal at the 

unclassified level to collate, analyze, and action CIM 
78

data is one of the few clear ways U.S. forces could collaborate with these partners on the ground with limited expenditure. 

A Possible Fictional Scenario Involving 

Remote CIM

Regionally aligned CA forces focused at defending 

national interests by conducting CMO and security 

cooperation operations is a current reality seen across 

the globe. The following example uses a fictional scenario but realistic challenges from the current U.S. 

Africa Command area of responsibility and highlights 

the significant increase in capability CA forces could 

have with a remote CIM tool to link SMEs with requirements in theater.

A Peacekeeping Troop Contributing Country (TCC) 

staff officer at battle group headquarters deployed in support of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) 

has just received several daily civil information situation 

reports. He notices in the reports there are several request

for information (RFI) from a recent civil reconnaissance 

conducted by two coalition infantry companies. Included 

is a request for a SME on zoonotic diseases to help with a

strange virus effecting goat herds in Beledweyne, a call for 

advice from a water plant manager on what types of pumps 

should be used at a new public works agricultural water 

distribution system in Kismaayo, and a question from an

education administrator in Mogadishu on methods to improve administration of 15 different elementary schools in 

his district. He passes these reports to his CIM cell who 

posts these RFI to a digital portal on a COTS automation 

platform via an unclassified commercial internet connection. The next morning at Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti, a CA 

officer assigned to Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Af-
79

rica (CJTF-HOA) signs into the same portal and sees these 

RFIs, prioritizes them, and categorizes them based off FxSP 

specialty areas. 

Ten days later back in the CONUS during a regularly 

scheduled battle assembly (BA) weekend at 353rd Civil Affairs Command (CACOM), a unit assigned to the United 

States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations 

Command (USACAPOC), several part time TPU USAR 

Soldiers assigned to the units FxSP see these same RFI in 

the digital portal. One of these soldiers is a veterinarian 

in his civilian profession while another works for the U.S. 

Department of Education. Since they don’t have a SME in 

their FxSP infrastructure section with the necessary skills 

to answer the public works water distribution RFI, they 

run a quick portal query and identify a soldier in a subordinate BDE who has a graduate degree in water system 

management and forward him the RFI. These SME all reply 

to these RFI with recommendations on how to solve these 

varied civil sector challenges. 

Several days pass and the CA staff officer back at CJTFHOA screens the SME reply’s and forwards the recommendations back to AMISOM battle group HQs in Mogadishu. 

Shortly thereafter a local veterinary officer orders the right

medication to treat the goats, the water plant manager orders the right pumps to improve agricultural water distribution, and the school administrator learns of a United States 

Agency for International Development (USAID) funded 

education administration training program. The end state 

is SME are able to support the COCOM and rapidly bring 

relevant recommendations to coalition partners that directly 

impacts their ability to build civil component capacity and 

defeat violent extremist organizations. Most importantly, 

this occurred in a time of fiscal constraint without having

to set additional boots on the ground or spend a dollar in 

operational contingency funds. 
80

APAN: A Possible Successful Existing Model 

An example of a current successful system that 

bridged many of the aforementioned CIM gaps is the 

existing All Partners Access Network (APAN) Unclassified Information Sharing Service (UISS). Created by 

a DoD initiative in 2010 as a platform to mainly share 

disaster response information with NGOs, APAN has 

grown into truly one of the only functioning UISS 

collaborative knowledge solutions between DoD elements, other government agencies, and NGOs. APAN 

operates much like a social network site where administrators grant access to account requests. Once an 

agency is verified, it can link and collaborate with other agencies in its community space. Message boards, 

announcements, chat rooms, and map graphics are all 

accessible in a Microsoft Share Point format. There is 

even a mobile application and an “APAN Lite” version displayed with limited graphics for users in lowbandwidth areas. 

This is a critical capability as many digital infrastructures in the developing world still use dial up 

servers and other low bandwidth networks. APAN is 

currently being successfully used by many other collaborative agencies inside and outside the traditional 

scope for DoD to include the Ebola Response Network 

(ERN), Afghan Information Sharing (RONNA), Rim 

of the Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC) and the Air Force Office of Scientific Research (AFOSR). Despite APANs 

apparent success, there is currently no link between 

its collaboration tools and the USAR CA SME community. An APAN like tool for use in CIM collection would be a potential goldmine and it could help 

bridge the gap between COCOM CIM RFI and SMEs 

with a limited resource expense. 
81

Remote CIM Portal Implementation 

Recommendations

Implementing a Remote CIM Portal would require 

a threefold effort:

1. Development of Portal. Using experience from 

existing CIM database platforms such as TIGR, 

AxisPro, MAP HT, and UISS portals such as 

APAN, develop a web-based “Remote CIM 

Portal” that can be accessed from any unclassified COTS automation platform. This design 

must be accessible via low bandwidth “dirty” 

commercial Internet but still have the appropriate security measures to protect information 

up to the unclassified level. This portal also 

needs to be formatted and presented with basic 

input fields, map graphics, and structure to allow ease of use by operators who may speak 

English as a second language and have limited computer automation skills. Social medial 

sites such as Facebook, LinkedIn, and Twitter 

should be used as a design guides for the portal 

as their use and manipulation is familiar globally. It is essential that any non-intuitive functions or tools be limited so any user, even with 

limited training, can master the basic operation 

techniques. This Remote CIM Portal should 

also ideally have links to the existing APAN 

structure so that user accounts can be established and monitored within the existing UISS 

guidelines. 

2. Training and Registration. Develop a training 

software package for this portal. This package should include modules translated into a 
82

variety of languages to allow ease of instruction and a training site that replicates the actual 

portal but does not have a live feed. The registration process should have drop downs where 

SMEs can note their particular civilian skill sets, 

licenses, or accreditations into a functional specialty area database. This format would be the 

heart of the database and query tools should be 

built into it so you can quickly identify SMEs 

with particular skills for a particular problem. 

3. Create a project office. Assign this office to USACAPOC or SOCOM with full-time military 

and civilian staff. They will manage the portal 

database on a daily basis, track response times 

on incoming/outgoing CIM RFIs, communicate with the applicable command for responses, and offer software /technical help desk 

support. This office should also be manned 

with individuals who would ensure the continual doctrinal CAO aspect of analyzing CIM 

that requires specialized CA skills to develop 

actionable products such as linkage diagrams. 

Therefore, conceptually this office would have 

a branch that handles the day to day administrative aspects of operating the system and another branch that performs as a CIM think-tank 

by doing strategic level analysis on data in the 

system.

Daily Operation and Use of System Once Created

Once fielded, trained/registered, and operational, 

the remote CIM portal database would be ever expanding and could not only tie in USAR CA SMEs 

but also active duty CA counterparts, interagency 
83

experts, intergovernmental organizations, and NGOs 

via the existing APAN structure. While RFIs could be 

inputted into this database on a daily basis, one of the 

large benefits of this system is that real time same day 

responses are not required. Since most CIM RFI deal 

with longer term civil sector challenges such as agricultural, farming, and education questions, responses 

are not necessarily as time sensitive.

A lag time of even a few weeks in receiving a response is acceptable. This process makes it particularly usefully for USAR CA units and their TPU Soldiers 

who only drill once a month. Responses could occur 

days or even weeks later and still be relevant in application. The distribution of BA dates across the calendar in different USACAPOC units would also mean 

that different FxSP subject matter experts from different commands would be able to provide feedback on 

these RFI throughout the month. The newly created 

project office could help monitor particular RFI that 

need a more immediate turn around. 

The creation of a remote CIM portal would not 

only provide a strong link between theater based operations and stateside SMEs, it would also provide a 

monthly real world training opportunity for USAR 

CA staffs and organizations. A remote CIM portal, 

linked to an existing successful UISS such as APAN, 

is truly limitless in its collaboration possibilities. Different hierarchies could be created in the database for 

support of COCOM AORs, aligning them with USAR 

CACOMs already focused at particular regions.
84

Strategic Implications

Remote technology concepts, such as the remote 

CIM portal, support recent strategic guidance. TRADOC Pam 525-8-5, U.S. Army Functional Concept for Engagement, noted the importance of enhancing foreign 

security environments in a responsible, cost-effective 

manner that follows U.S. and partner interests.10 A 

remote CIM platform helps achieve CMO and CAO 

goals without the significant associated costs with 

having to put boots on the ground.

The concept of creating a remote CIM portal could 

be the missing link to not only link SMEs across DoD, 

but also interagency, intergovernmental, and NGO 

alike. By using APAN, SMEs have already been providing and proving the importance of strategic level 

help to many NGOs during disaster response and 

humanitarian scenarios. Extending a capability like 

APAN to help answer a variety of CIM RFIs would 

truly provide a unique reach back value added benefit to any COCOM. Again since this portal can be 

accessed from any COTS automation platform via an 

unclassified network, it has an ability to influence the 

tactical, operational, and strategic levels of warfare. 

Recommendations for a Way Ahead & Conclusion

Since this is a concept paper for a system that could 

potentially fill a DOTMLPF warfighting capability 

gap, the biggest recommendation for a way ahead is 

to establish a timeline for implementation of the three 

previously mentioned recommendations. A trial run 

of the system once developed could be conducted 

first with all USAR CA Soldiers. After initial training, 

these soldiers would establish user accounts in order 

to test the system for effectiveness and ease of collab-
85

orative use. Since the majority of these soldiers have 

skill sets from their civilian careers, it would give the 

system a wide enough SME pool to allow a variety of 

its functions tested. The system could then be on a live 

server connection with the COCOMs (given a handful of their staff officers also trained on how to use 

it). Later account access could be extended to SMEs 

from other DoD, interagency, intergovernmental, and 

NGOs. Finally, partners could also receive access. At 

each of these implementation windows there should 

be a variety of measures of effectiveness and performance that the system is tested on for its operational 

capability.

As we have seen in the analysis of this concept 

paper, there currently exists a DOTMLPF warfighting 

capability gap shortfall in two distinct areas: doctrine 

and material. This shortage is due to the lack of a 

system that can link CONUS SME capability with the 

end users supporting a COCOM AOR. The successful implementation of a remote CIM portal would also 

have the additional effect of further developing CIM 

doctrine and allowing the varied stake holders to become more involved in CAO and CMO goals. In line 

with the Lean Six Sigma process improvement concepts, a remote CIM portal would allow maximization 

of limited resources and ensure SMEs do continue to 

be non-utilized talent. 

With a relatively modest initial expenditure for 

portal design development, training plus initial registration, and creation of a project office manager, 

USAR CA, interagency, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental agency SMEs could truly directly impact the various COCOM missions to defeat violent 

extremist organizations and build civil component 

capacity without ever having to set additional boots 

on ground. 
86

MAJ Marco A. Bongioanni has served as a Civil Affairs 

and Logistics Officer in a variety of assignments to include

deployments in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom, Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa, and overseas tours 

to the Republic of Korea and the Multinational Force and 

Observers, Sinai, Egypt. He currently serves as the Executive Officer for 411th Civil Affairs Battalion, Danbury, CT.

He is a licensed mental health counselor in his civilian career, working for the Department of Veteran’s Affairs. The 

views expressed in this paper are his alone and do not necessarily reflect the position or policy of the U.S. Army.
87

Notes

1. George, Michael L. Lean Six Sigma: Combining Six Sigma 

Quality with Lean Production Speed McGraw-Hill; 1 edition 

(April 25, 2002).

2. TRADOC Pam 525-8-5, U.S. Army Functional Concept for 

Engagement,24 FEB 2014.

3. JP 3-57, Civil Military Operations, 11 SEP 2013.

4. Ibid

5. TRADOC Pam 525-3-1, The U.S. Army Operating Concept

6. FM 3-57, Civil Affairs Operations, OCT 2011.

7. ATP 3-57.70, Civil-military operations Center, MAY 2014.

8. Presidential Policy Directive 23, April 05 2013.

9. ATP 3-57.50, Civil Affairs Civil Information Management, SEP 

2013.

10. TRADOC Pam 525-8-5, U.S. Army Functional Concept for 

Engagement, 24 FEB 2014

89

Military Governance:

The Essential Mission of Civil Affairs

Colonel (ret.) David Stott Gordon

“Military government, the administration by military 

officers of civil government in occupied enemy territory, is a virtually inevitable concomitant of modern 

warfare. The US Army conducted military government in Mexico in 1847 and 1848; in the Confederate 

states during and after the Civil War; in the Philippines, Porto (Puerto) Rico, and Cuba after the Spanish American War; and in the German Rhineland after 

World War I. In each instance, neither the Army nor 

the government accepted it as a legitimate military 

function. Consequently, its imposition invariably 

came as a somewhat disquieting experience for both, 

and the means devised for accomplishing it ranged 

from inadequate to near disastrous.”

--Earl F. Ziemke,

The US Army in the Occupation 

of Germany 1944-1946 1

As Dr. Ziemke points out, the U.S. military, in particular the Army, has invariably been given the task 

of administering occupied or liberated territory after 

major combat operations, and (with the exception of 

World War II) invariably has been ill- or unprepared 

to carry out that task. In World War II, thanks largely 

to the experience in the Occupation of the Rhineland 

by US Army forces after the Armistice in World War 

I,2 the Army made substantial preparations in terms of 

doctrine, training, and force structure to prepare for 

the occupation of the Axis nations and the civil administration of territories liberated from Axis occupation.3

 While today’s Army Civil Affairs (CA) forces are 
90

the descendants of the CA and Military Government 

forces created prior to and during World War II, the 

capabilities required to carry out military government 

were shunned and neglected by DoD and the Army at 

large until the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq made 

it terribly clear that history was repeating itself: the 

U.S. was quite unprepared for the responsibilities of 

administering Iraq and supporting the government of 

Afghanistan, and the ad hoc means we devised once 

again “ranged from inadequate to near disastrous.” 

As a consequence of now more than a dozen years 

of conflict in Afghanistan and Iraq, we have painfully 

learned numerous lessons about how to stabilize a 

country; however, we should have studied and understood these lessons well before the first U.S. boots 

hit the ground. It is possible that these lessons can be 

institutionalized in doctrine, training and force structure so that future leaders and commanders will not 

be unprepared as their predecessors have been. In furtherance of this goal, DoD has established the policy 

that it must maintain a capability to conduct a broad 

range of Civil Affairs operations, including actions 

that “establish and conduct military government until 

civilian authority or government can be restored.”4

A very positive development is that the U.S. Army 

John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School 

has established the Institute for Military Support to 

Governance (IMSG), which is in the process of studying and developing the doctrine, training, and force 

structure for providing military support to civil governments in future conflicts. In particular, the IMSG 

has focused on developing Civil Affairs specialists in 

military government (AOC 38G). This paper discusses 

what I believe to be the principal mission for which 

38Gs must prepare. 
91

Occupation is the Occupation: “We’ll Never Have 

To Do That Again” Or Will We?

While 38Gs may be deployed to support U.S. operations in a number of circumstances (security assistance, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, etc.) 

the scenario that is most important to the military is 

the environment that will exist in the immediate aftermath of major ground combat operations. In such 

an environment, it will be essential for the U.S. Government to be prepared to restore order to the civilian 

population in the vacuum that results from combat.5

While the idea of the U.S. being an occupying 

power may be politically, culturally, and socially untenable in our current environment, it can become an 

unavoidable necessity, given the geopolitical realities 

that we now face and may encounter in the not-toodistant future. A chronic problem of the U.S. military 

has been that we have failed to adequately prepare for 

such a necessity, and have massively failed because 

of that lack of preparedness; the initial occupation of 

Iraq in 2003 is a glaring example. Consider the following all-too-possible scenario:

President Putin invades the Baltic States, which are 

members of NATO. NATO decides to honor its commitments to protect the Baltic States from invasion, 

and mounts a counterattack. After fierce fighting carried out largely by the US Army and Marines, NATO 

ground and air forces force the Russian military out 

of the Baltics and secure a buffer zone within Russian 

territory. NATO also occupies the Kaliningrad Oblast 

of Russia, which has no land connection to the rest of 

Russia. Because of the disruption caused by the Russian invasion and occupation and the NATO counterattack, the governments of Estonia, Lithuania, and 

Latvia are unable to administer their own territories or 
92

provide essential government services to their populations, and will require months of reconstruction before 

they are able to perform those tasks. The Kaliningrad 

and the buffer zone within Russian territory are captured enemy territory, making the US and its NATO 

allies responsible for their governance under international law regarding occupation. Winter is coming, 

and there will be a massive humanitarian catastrophe 

if basic governmental services are not restored quickly.

There are of course many other readily foreseeable 

scenarios, as well as those that seem far-fetched now 

(much like the occupation of Iraqi territory in 1991 

and 2003 would have seemed impossible in 1988).

Planning Assumptions

In practically any scenario, the following planning 

assumptions probably will be applicable:

• Critical government infrastructure will be 

damaged or destroyed by combat operations, 

looting, etc.

• Important public records may have been destroyed, damaged, or removed.

• Local national public employees will have either fled or will refuse to cooperate with American forces.

• In particular, police and other law-enforcement 

personnel will not be available to provide security and law enforcement services.

• U.S. forces personnel will not be fluent in the 

local language, necessitating numerous technically trained translators.
93

• The operational capacity of U.S. civilian agencies and international civilian actors to participate in administration of occupied/liberated 

territory will be very limited or non-existent 

initially and probably for a considerable time 

thereafter.6

• The environment will be insecure.

Legal and Practical Considerations

There are legal and practical considerations which 

mandate that the U.S. forces be prepared for occupation, restoration, and administration. The fundamental 

legal consideration is that the Occupying Power has a 

legal duty under The Hague Regulations and the Geneva Civilians Convention to administer the occupied 

territory, to include providing security, governance, 

law enforcement, judicial proceedings and enforcement, and other essential government services. 7 

The practical reason is that not being prepared for 

occupation administration creates a high risk that the 

occupied territory will lapse into anarchy and spawn 

widespread criminal activity, terrorism, and insurgency, as was clearly the result of the US lack of preparation for the occupation of Iraq.8

The Occupying Power must be prepared to carry 

out these responsibilities mandated by international 

law immediately upon taking control of the territory 

or any part thereof. Administration of occupied territory, in the aftermath of major combat operations, is a 

complex task requiring extensive preparation and resources; it cannot be an afterthought. Put simply, we 

cannot make our plans for military governance based 

on what resources we are able to spare for the project. Instead, we must realistically determine what is 
94

necessary to restore and administer essential government services during and immediately after combat 

operations until such functions can be transferred to 

U.S. and international civilian personnel and/or local 

nationals.

Mission Essential: The Capability to Administer 

Governmental Systems

Thus, the capability to administer governmental 

systems is the mission essential element. It is relatively easy to advise; one person can visit different 

organizations every month or so, and claim those organizations have been successfully advised. However, 

the legal requirement is to administer, not advise. It is a 

completely separate issue to be able to administer the 

day-to-day functions of government in the absence 

of operating governmental institutions or when such 

institutions are severely crippled by conflict. And to 

administer, it is necessary for enough qualified personnel to be present on the ground to ensure that the 

mechanisms of government work. It is critical for 

long-term mission success to recognize and use “the 

Golden Hour:”

In post-conflict transition terminology, the golden 

hour refers to the first year after the end of hostilities. Unless the population senses steadily improving conditions in that first year, popular support for 

change and whoever is in charge declines, and the 

chances for economic, political, and social transformation begin to evaporate, enabling recidivism and even 

insurgencies.9

Historically, the burden of post-conflict administration has fallen on the military, particularly the 
95

Army. Moore10 has described the history of American 

post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction, which 

has been done almost exclusively by military personnel exercising governance functions. Patterson11 has 

addressed some of the issues involved and lessons 

learned in military governance. Her paper uses the 

military government schools created during World 

War II as a potential model for training and education 

programs for contemporary military nation builders. 

She provides a useful summary of the historical data 

from the principal sources about American military 

government in World War I and World War II. 

One fact that needs to be recognized is that the 

military’s primary interest in an occupation or liberation scenario is not primarily to support development, but to have the capability and capacity to restore and administer existing governmental systems. 

As we have seen in the past, the military will be the 

agency of United States that will be tasked to restore 

essential governmental services because no other U.S. 

entity will be capable of doing so. Development efforts will come after basic services are restored. This 

is not to offer that many activities the military might 

be tasked to perform might be similar to development 

activities, and may--and should--support and facilitate subsequent development activities, but providing administration to restore governance is the basic 

requirement.12

Phases of Transitional Military Governance

I propose six phases to transitional military governance in an occupation/liberation scenario:
96

1. Secure: Take control and safeguard all important 

installations, records, administrative facilities, etc.

2. Restore: Reactivate critical systems, such as law 

enforcement, power, water and sanitation, food distribution, judicial functions.

3. Administer: Perform all the governmental functions necessary to provide critical services.

4. Reconstitute: Locate, vet, and negotiate with 

Host Nation (HN) government personnel to bring 

them back into the workforce, and, if necessary, bring 

in new hires to staff critical functions.

5. Train, Mentor, and Advise: Train local personnel 

so that they are better able to perform their jobs. Mentor them in order for them to become more confident 

and competent in their tasks. As more responsibility is 

transferred to local officials, advise them in performing their tasks.

6. Disengage: As local authorities become more capable of effectively executing the tasks of governance, 

US personnel progressively transfer all responsibility 

to the local authorities, disengage, and redeploy.

The Need for Generic Mission Analysis: 

What Does It Take to Run a Country?

Perhaps the most logical way to determine the 

proper qualifications for 38Gs would be to analyze the 

sorts of missions they would be called on to perform, 

and then determine the qualifications needed to do 

the tasks associated with the missions. 

The basic governance mission is to be able to restore and administer all essential governmental services at the local, district, provincial and national lev-
97

els of an occupied territory. The logical first step (and 

this is a potentially large academic research project) 

is to understand what is necessary to provide the required governance in such a scenario. What are the 

tasks to be performed, and the sorts of skills required 

to do the tasks? How many people, and what and how 

much equipment, might be necessary? This Military 

Governance Requirements Research Project should be 

the precursor to the further development of doctrine, 

organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) relating 

to 38Gs.

Every country is different, but all countries have 

similar characteristics. For instance, governments tend 

to be organized in hierarchical structures. Most nations have a tiered governance structure (usually district, provincial, and national) with minor variations 

(e.g., city, town or village, consolidated metropolitan 

level). There may also be tribal and other traditional 

governance structures, which may have an overlay of 

more formal structures with which they sometimes 

cooperate and sometimes compete. 

It ought to be possible to analyze the governmental 

structures in several countries which might be conflict 

risks because of their locations, political and/or economic conditions. What sort of governance services 

do they currently provide? What are their systems for 

administration? How are they funded? How are their 

officials selected? What are the processes by which 

they interact with their populaces? What are the problems, such as corruption, discrimination, favoritism, 

lack of resources, or lack of authority, with which they 

must cope? 
98

The goal of such research is not to prepare our 

personnel to administer those particular countries, 

but to attempt to make valid abstractions and generalizations which will allow 38Gs to understand a new 

country and develop feasible plans and programs to 

operate within it successfully. We cannot create 38Gs 

who are expert on every country; rather, we should be 

looking to formulate principles of analysis which we 

can teach to our 38G experts so that they can rapidly 

and accurately evaluate a new mission environment.

Note that the standard of governance in an occupation or liberation scenario is restoration of basic 

governmental services, such as delivery of food and 

water, basic health services, transportation and other 

infrastructure services, and public order services such 

as police and judicial functions. In most areas where 

we may have to operate, the services rendered by the 

local government are relatively rudimentary even in 

the best of times, so that is the standard for which we 

are seeking to achieve in an occupation or liberation.

Conclusions and Recommendation

In Afghanistan and Iraq, we spent years in painfully developing techniques, tactics, and procedures to 

assist and strengthen the governments of those countries. Many of the problems that we faced as conditions 

deteriorated would simply not be issues in the early 

phases of an occupation or civil administration, and 

possibly might never become issues if the proper steps 

are taken at the beginning. The temptation we will 

face is to structure our future doctrine and forces on 

the basis of the lessons that we most recently learned, 

rather than determining what lessons we should have 

learned before we began. It is important that we struc-
99

ture our doctrine and train and equip our personnel 

to be prepared to deal with the issues that exist during 

and immediately after major conflict, rather than limiting our scope to what they might need to know and 

be able to do after years of engagement in a mature 

theater.

CA and U.S. Government preparation to provide 

military support to governance suffered from neglect 

for many years. The U.S. Government and the military in particular had to pay a very high price for this 

neglect in Afghanistan and Iraq. Our nation needs to 

make the investment of both fiscal and intellectual 

capital needed to understand and prepare for the inevitable next time the U.S. military is required to govern foreign territory disrupted by war or disaster.

My recommendation is that the IMSG should take 

the lead to champion and coordinate the Military 

Governance Requirements Research Project described 

in this paper so that we adequately understand the 

nature and requirements of occupation and liberation 

administration. Once we satisfactorily understand 

the problem set, we can then develop the DOTMLPF 

needed.

Colonel (Ret) David Stott Gordon is a retired Army 

judge advocate officer with over 20 years’ experience in Civil Affairs organizations. He is a graduate of the Judge Advocate Basic and Graduate courses, the Civil Affairs Officer

Advanced Course, the Army Command and General Staff 

College, and the Army War College. His overseas service 

in Civil Affairs includes Saudi Arabia in Operation Desert 

Storm and Afghanistan in Operation Enduring Freedom. 

He is a rule of law and stability operations consultant for 

the Department of Defense.
100

Notes

1. Erwin F. Ziemke, The US Army in the Occupation of Germany 

1944-1946 (Army Historical Series), (Washington, DC: US Army 

Center of Military History, 2003 reprint), page 3.

2. Erwin L. Hunt et al., American Military Government of Occupied Germany 1918-1920 (Washington, DC: Government Printing 

Office, 1943) (the “Hunt Report”).

3. Harry L. Coles and Albert K. Weinberg, Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors (United States Army in World War II, Special Studies), (Washington, DC: Office of The Chief of Military 

History, Department of the Army, 1964).

4. DOD Directive 2000.13, Subject: Civil Affairs (March 11, 

2014), Para. 3(5). It should be noted that this requirement to be 

able to execute military government is not included in TRADOC 

Pam 525-8-5, US Army Functional Concept for Engagement (24 Feb 

2014), and needs to be added to that pamphlet.

5. FM 3-57, Civil Affairs Operations (2011, with changes 1 and 

2, 2014), para. 2-59.

6. The scope of this paper has been very deliberately limited 

to what the US military can do in an occupation or liberation scenario, rather than propose an inter-agency solution. While other 

agencies of the US government will also participate in any occupation or liberation action, the capability and capacity of other agencies to participate in the early stages of an occupation or liberation 

will be quite limited; the other agencies, by their structures, mandates, staffing, and funding, are and will be very limited in their 

ability to plan and execute any operations to administer occupied 

or liberated territory. The optimum solution would be some sort 

of inter-agency process or organizational structure that was designed to function in an occupation or liberation administration; 

however, there is no such process or structure that exists today, 

nor does there appear that a viable system will be developed in 

the foreseeable future. 
101

7. Hague Regulations (1907), Arts. 42-56; Geneva Civilians 

Convention (1949), Arts. 47-78.

8. See e.g., Ted Spain and Terry Turchie, Breaking Iraq: The

Ten Mistakes That Broke Iraq (Palisades, NY: History Publishing 

Company, 2013); Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military 

Adventure in Iraq (New York: Penguin Press, 2006); David L. Phillips, Losing Iraq: Inside the Postwar Reconstruction Fiasco (Westview 

Press, 2005); Larry Diamond, Squandered Victory (New York: Henry Holt, 2005).

9. James Stephenson, Losing the Golden Hour: An Insider’s View 

of Iraq’s Reconstruction (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2007), 

page 36.

10. Richard Scott Moore, “Non-Traditional Missions, Civil 

Tasks, Military Forces, and Complex Operations,” in Jon Gundersen and Melanne Civic, Unity of Mission, Air University Press 

(2014).

11. Rebecca Patterson,Revisiting a School of Military Government: 

How Reanimating a WWII-Era Institution Could Professionalize Military Nation Building. Kauffman Foundation Research Series: Expeditionary Economics (June 2011) http:ry //www.entrepreneurship.

org/~/media/Entrepreneurship/Files/Resource%20Ceonter/EE%20

Revisiting%20reportfinal_withphotos.pdf.

12. 38Gs will not be limited to providing administration in 

occupation/liberation situations. They may also engage in developmental advise and support activities as part of other types of 

missions not involving combat operations or occupation. But if 

the US has the qualified personnel and other resources needed 

for occupation, these assets can be used for other missions such 

as security assistance, humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping 

when required.
102

Transforming CA Into a Phase Zero Force

Major Shafi Saiduddin 

 

Success in the future operating environment will 

depend on the ability of Civil Affairs professionals to 

generate strategic effects in a Phase 0 (Shape and Influence) complex operations environment. Currently 

Army Civil Affairs, in terms of doctrine, training and 

force structure, is imbalanced towards a Phase 4 (Stability) post-conflict reconstruction mission.

The recent addition of Special Operations as an 

Army core competency is a recognition that current 

doctrine has not been completely successful in prosecuting population centric conflicts.1

 Culturally and 

structurally, our military is still primarily configured 

to fight World War II style conventional conflicts. As 

historian Max Boot illustrates in his book Invisible 

Armies, conventional conflicts are an aberration in the 

history of warfare. Historically, what we call irregular warfare has actually been the most regular form 

of warfare.2 In the future, we are far more likely to engage in small wars than in maneuver warfare against 

an industrialized nation state. The role of the nation 

state itself is predicted to decline. 

With the decentralization of information through 

the Internet and cell phones, the role of the civilian 

population in conflict is increasing and future conflicts will involve many types of non-state actors. Governance, or the lack thereof, will play a crucial role in 

how conflicts begin and are resolved. Influence will 

play a greater role in military operations than force. 

We are more likely to encounter conflicts in megacities which are not conducive to traditional concepts of 

military operations.3 As we have seen recently in Iraq 
103

and Afghanistan, there are limitations on our ability 

to create stability by training host nation forces. Traditional military training exercises with partner nation 

forces may not be enough to disrupt a complex political awakening or influence a population.4

Our greatest challenge for the foreseeable future 

will remain countering violent extremist ideology. 

Without fully understanding regional and cultural 

dynamics and developing our ability to wage what 

can best be described as “political warfare,” we are 

likely to struggle with irregular conflicts while our 

adversaries wage unconventional warfare campaigns 

against us. In a resource-constrained national security 

environment, preventing future conflicts will be more 

important than our ability to dominate a maneuver 

battlefield. More importantly, there is a strong reluctance by policy makers, and the American public, to 

become involved in large scale counterinsurgency operations, limiting our strategic options. 

In response to these challenges, the Army changed 

its operating concept from “AirLand Battle” to “Win 

in a Complex World.” An important part of this new 

operating concept is regional engagement.5

Engagement typically takes place in what we describe as “Phase 0,” the doctrinal term used to describe 

the steady state environment before a conflict begins. 

Phase 0 is also the time were potential conflicts can 

be identified and often mitigated before armed conflict ensues. Consistent with this concept, Civil Affairs 

(CA) personnel have the potential to take the lead in 

the Phase 0 environment, but the force as currently 

structured lacks the ability to take on this challenge. 

At present, approximately 84% of the total Army CA 

force is oriented towards supporting conventional 

forces engaged in high intensity warfare and post 
104

conflict reconstruction activity. CA could also facilitate decisive strategic effects in Phase 0; however, this 

will require significant changes in terms of doctrine, 

training and force structure.

Both Army doctrine and National Security Strategy support expanding CA’s role in Phase 0. The U.S. 

Army Functional Concept for Engagement stresses the 

need for the Army to assess, shape, deter, and influence the behavior of a people, foreign security forces, 

and governments. It further describes the future role 

of the Army in a “Prevent, Shape and Win” construct, 

reinforcing the importance of conflict prevention.6

Building partner nation capacity, as illustrated by 

Presidential Policy Directive 23, Security Sector Assistance, is key to the National Security Strategy. One 

of the stated purposes of Security Sector Assistance 

is reducing the possibility that the United States or 

partner nations may be required to intervene abroad 

in response to instability. CA forces, by nature of their 

language and regional expertise are ideally suited 

as a Phase 0 force. CA forces are capable of conducting population centric operations, advising and assisting in governance and development, segmenting 

and fully understanding population dynamics in a 

region, and working in conjunction with units from 

peer Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) regiments such as Special Forces (SF) and Psychological 

Operations (PSYOP) to influence a population while 

conducting Unconventional Warfare (UW) or Foreign 

Internal Defense (FID). CA can become the focal point 

for military integration into the Interagency domain, 

allowing whole of government efforts to succeed. 

Most significantly, CA can have wide reach into a 

population, interacting with civilian authorities, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), public health 
105

officials, and a wide range of private sector actors, 

as well as host nation government and military. This 

extended reach gives CA unique potential to develop 

networks and shape the environment well beyond the 

confines of a traditional combined military exercise. 

By building networks CA can set the stage for a coordinated UW campaign or a counter-UW campaign. 

CA can also prevent future conflicts by identifying 

causes of instability and directing resources towards 

mitigating unstable conditions. 

Changes are ultimately needed in CA force structure. A significant difficulty in planning the future CA 

force is that the service lacks a comprehensive theory 

for CA. This is not unexpected, as the development 

of a theory for Special Operations is a relatively new 

endeavor.7 As CA is a core Special Operations capability, it follows that a theory for CA will mean it nests 

within a larger theory of Special Operations. The need 

for a comprehensive theory of Special Operations is 

illustrated by the disconnect between definitions of 

Special Operations and actual capabilities. Joint Publication 3-05 currently defines Special Operations as: 

“operations requiring unique modes of employment, 

tactical techniques, equipment and training often conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments and characterized by one or more of the 

following: time sensitive, clandestine, low visibility, 

conducted with and/or through indigenous forces, 

requiring regional expertise, and/or a high degree of 

risk.” 

This definition is based on tactical capabilities, and 

leans more to kinetic, rather than shaping, operations. 

It has resulted in an inadequate conceptualization of 

how SOF can be utilized to achieve strategic effects. 

The use of Special Operations has grown dramati-
106

cally in recent years, but their use has not yet been 

translated into a new way of war.8 The definition of 

Unconventional Warfare is likewise extremely narrow and tactically focused. Our current definition 

of UW is: activities conducted to enable a resistance 

movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and 

guerrilla force in a denied area. A “traditional” UW 

campaign that meets all the parameters of this definition is a rare occurrence. Far more common are long 

term UW campaigns waged by both nation state and 

non-state adversaries against the U.S. and partner nations in a Phase 0 environment9

. 

A more accurate definition of Special Operations 

has been suggested by Col. Cory M. Peterson, winner of the Joint Special Operations University 2014 

essay contest: “Special Operations are tactical activities which result in political and strategic-level effects. 

Special Operations are conducted by highly trained 

and educated operators due to the significant, primarily political, risk of mission failure or exposure.” 10

Moving toward a theory Special Operations requires 

developing a corresponding theory of CA that will 

likely follow a parallel line of thought focused on tactical activities that lead to strategic outcomes. This is 

precisely the intent of CA’s role in conflict prevention. 

Rather than merely shaping an environment for future operations, CA has the potential to significantly 

impact the strategic environment.

The lack of a comprehensive theory for CA has 

also led to misunderstandings within the military 

and even within the CA community as to what CA is 

and what it does. Divisions within the force, such as 

SOF CA versus conventional CA, and tactical general-
107

ist versus functional specialist, contribute to this and 

create confusion for joint force commanders, chiefs of 

mission and civilian policy makers alike, as to the exact capabilities they have at their disposal. A superficial understanding of the true capabilities of CA leads 

to a perception that CA is only a maneuver enabler 

or a post-conflict force used to rebuild a nation and 

transition it to civil authority. This perspective can result in a very myopic “project focused” use of CA, as 

metrics, such as numbers of projects and dollars spent, 

can be easily quantified and tracked. However, as the 

final report from the Special Inspector General for Iraq 

Reconstruction illustrates, money spent and numbers 

of projects do not necessarily translate into effects.11

This confusion has been compounded by a bias towards lethal, or “kinetic”, operations, such as direct 

action, within the SOF community. As a decade plus 

of combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have 

illustrated, neither direct action, nor training indigenous combat forces to a U.S. standard, have been successful in achieving stability. Our ability to influence 

populations and counter violent extremist ideology 

remains limited. SOF leaders have recognized this and 

Army Special Operations Forces doctrine has been 

reorganized into two mutually supporting concepts, 

Special Warfare and Surgical Strike. Special Warfare 

is defined as the execution of activities that involve a 

combination of lethal and nonlethal actions taken by 

a specially trained and educated force that has a deep 

understanding of cultures and foreign language, proficiency in small-unit tactics, and the ability to build 

and fight alongside indigenous combat formations in 

a permissive, uncertain, or hostile environment. Surgical Strike is defined as “the execution of activities 

in a precise manner that employ special operations 
108

forces in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover 

or damage designated targets, or influence threats.”12

These doctrine changes create a more clearly defined 

role for CA within Special Operations, but are sufficiently broad enough that they do not constrain CA to 

a particular role or phase of an operation.

A prerequisite for influencing a population is 

achieving a deep understanding of culture, social 

or tribal dynamics, local forms of governance and 

politics. Furthermore, this understanding must be actionable, moving beyond the typical area study and 

involving lasting relationships with government and 

military officials as well as influential non state actors. There is a limit to how much this effort can be 

achieved through episodic engagement such as traditional military exercises. CA teams, working out of an 

embassy on a rotational basis, are in a perfect position 

to develop both this deep understanding and lasting 

relationships, and to translate these into coordinated 

action by working with a Theater Special Operations 

Command (TSOC) to develop plans supporting national strategy.

Key to changing the role of CA in supporting 

Phase 0 operations is adding Operational Preparation 

of the Environment (OPE) to the list of CA core tasks. 

OPE is defined in Joint Publication 1-02 as the conduct 

of activities in likely or potential areas of operations 

to prepare and shape the operational environment.13

Current CA core tasks include: Populace and Resources Control (PRC); Foreign Humanitarian Assistance 

(FHA); Civil Information Management (CIM); Nation 

Assistance (NA); and Support to Civil Administration 

(SCA). While many of the activities CA conducts during Phase 0 fall within these existing core tasks, no sin-
109

gle task clearly conveys to a non-CA commander what 

CA’s actual role is in Phase 0. The purpose of CA persistent engagement is to secure a strategic advantage for 

the United States, to prevent future conflict, and shape 

the environment for anticipated operations. OPE describes the intent of CA engagement activities to joint 

force commanders far more accurately than either Nation Assistance (NA) or Support to Civil Administration (SCA). Assigning OPE as a core task of CA is also 

consistent with the recent changes in ARSOF doctrine 

delineating the responsibilities of Special Warfare and 

Surgical Strike. OPE is one subset of the umbrella term 

Preparation of the Environment (PE). The other subset 

of PE is Advanced Force Operations (AFO), which are 

operations conducted to refine the location of specific, 

identified targets and further develop the operational 

environment for near-term missions. AFO supports 

targeting for kinetic Surgical Strike operations while 

OPE includes the development of networks and collection of information by CA that could support the 

Special Warfare missions of Unconventional Warfare 

and Foreign Internal Defense.

The Phase 0 mission will also require additions to 

the current active duty CA training pipeline of selection, language, regional studies and core CA skills. 

Persistent engagement involves small teams operating in uncertain environments outside a traditional 

military support structure. Author David Kilcullen 

describes the capability as “early entry or high threat 

humanitarian and governance teams.”14 CA teams 

have the ability to go places where Department of 

State civilians cannot without a large protective detail. Tactical proficiency for a CA team must be on par 

with a Special Forces Operational Detachment-Alpha 

(ODA), though the focus will be different. While an 
110

ODA is primarily focused on training and fighting 

alongside a guerrilla or partner nation force, a CA 

team must focus on individual and team survivability in a low signature environment. Threats faced may 

include insurgents, terrorists, foreign intelligence services and common criminals. As part of the only U.S. 

military present in some regions, the ability to blend 

seamlessly with other SOF teams and form a Crisis Response Element (CRE) or Quick Reaction Force (QRF) 

when needed, adds value in the eyes of commanders and chiefs of mission. Advanced marksmanship, 

high threat driving and surveillance detection are all 

examples of the skills required. Active duty SOF CA 

conducts this type of training, however the Phase 0 

environment includes regionally aligned conventional forces as well. Advanced tactical training should be 

incorporated into the qualification pipeline for all CA 

soldiers.

The 2006 separation of the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC) from the U.S. Army Special Operations 

Command (USASOC) and the designation of Army 

Reserve CA as “conventional” has often been blamed 

for the force structure imbalance. However, the problem existed prior to 2006. At that time there were only 

four CA battalions in the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) 

with a dedicated SOF mission, these were designated 

Foreign Internal Defense/Unconventional Warfare 

(FID/UW) battalions. The majority of USAR CA battalions were designated as General Purpose and configured to support conventional maneuver units. The 

only active duty unit, the 96th CA battalion, was designated as General Support and intended as an earlyentry SOF CA capability working with both SOF and 

conventional forces.15 Before 2006, there was already a 
111

training and capability gap between the SOF CA FID/

UW battalions and the General Purpose battalions. 

Now that the SOF CA mission exists entirely on the 

active duty side and active duty CA has a selection 

and assessment course and a comprehensive qualification course, that gap has widened considerably. 

While the active component SOF CA element has 

expanded from one to five battalions with the creation 

of the 95th CA brigade, the net SOF CA force structure 

has not increased from the pre-2006 levels (96th plus 

four FID/UW battalions). At the same time, the SOF 

mission has expanded to include the Civil-Military 

Engagement program. SOF CA Civil Military Support 

Elements (CMSEs) now work on a rotational basis out 

of Embassies and conducting persistent engagement 

in support of the Global SOF Network. The 95th also 

continues the FID/UW missions supporting Theater 

Special Operations Commands and maintaining a UW 

focused CA capability. The active component 85th CA 

brigade and all of USACAPOC are designated as ‘conventional’ and unable to support the CMSE mission or 

TSOC requirements, including the FID/UW mission. 

It goes without saying that the engagement mission 

will need to be targeted judiciously, but it will also 

require an increased number of units available for 

tasking.

Rebalancing the force toward Phase 0 operations, 

necessarily involves accepting risk in other mission areas. The Phase 4, post-conflict reconstruction, mission 

for CA is still important, however, a new paradigm is 

needed to mitigate risk and allow CA to conduct this 

mission more effectively thereby reducing the numbers of CA forces required. In order for CA to achieve 

strategic effects in conjunction with partnered forces, 

the CA force must consist of experienced, highly 
112

skilled, language trained, regional experts. This level 

of training cannot take place overnight and will result 

in a continual shortage of qualified CA personnel. 

Furthermore, the troop to task alignment needs to be 

more flexible than the current construct that aligns a 

CA battalion with a brigade combat team. This alignment often results in either too little or too many CA 

soldiers tasked against a problem set.16 To be fair, this 

concept of integration was developed for high intensity warfare when maneuver forces are not focused on 

Civil Military Operations (CMO) and minimizing civilian interference with operations is considered more 

of a priority than influencing a population. Additionally, institutional knowledge of CMO has historically been limited within maneuver forces. Much has 

changed in the training and experience of maneuver 

officers over the past decade of conducting Counterinsurgency (COIN) in Iraq and Afghanistan. Operating 

in the human domain is now part of maneuver institutional training. Today’s maneuver officers are so well 

versed in COIN that senior leaders in the maneuver 

community have concerns that the schoolhouse has 

not been focusing enough on high intensity warfare. 

The time is right to build on this knowledge and 

further institutionalize CMO within the conventional 

force. The new Army Operating Concept stresses the 

concept of Regionally Aligned Brigades. This necessitates a closer relationship with regionally aligned 

Special Warfare forces, and the issue of Special Operations Forces - Conventional Forces - Joint, Interagency, 

Intergovernmental and Multinational (SOF-CF-JIIM) 

integration is a priority topic for senior leadership. 

A framework for integration has been outlined in 

the Strategic Landpower white paper and developed 

further through joint exercises such as Silent Quest.17
113

True interdependence will involve hybrid planning 

and command structures at the strategic and operational levels. 

One possible solution at the tactical level is to bring 

back the CMO planner course and skill identifier. This 

former opportunity was a two to three week course 

taught at the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS) covering the 

basics of CA, CMO and operational planning. It could 

easily be a requirement for maneuver officers at the 

captain and major ranks. The current Reserve Component Civil Affairs Qualification Course (CAQC) with 

its combination of distance learning and a four-week 

resident phase can easily be modified to fill this requirement and taught through mobile training teams. 

A robust S9, Civil-military operations staff section at 

the maneuver battalion and brigade levels is also required for commander to effectively conduct CMO, 

however, ongoing personnel shortages in the CA 

regiment limit the ability to effectively staff, let alone 

expand, S9 sections. The CMO planner skill identifier 

would allow maneuver units to fully staff these sections ‘in-house’ and would effectively institutionalize 

CMO at the tactical level. Other units that could benefit from the CMO planner designator and expanded S9 

sections include theater engineer and medical units, 

as these units are most often used in large scale humanitarian operations. Recognizing that CA tactical 

units are a limited commodity, they can best be managed at the operational level through the combination 

of hybrid strategic/operational planning structures, 

an expanded S9 section at the maneuver tactical level, 

and when necessary, CA qualified SOF Liaison Elements (SOFLEs) attached to maneuver units.
114

In a time of active duty “downsizing,” a comprehensive restructuring of Reserve Component CA will 

be necessary. At present, the majority of the force 

structure imbalance exists in the Army Reserve. With 

active duty CA remaining at zero growth at best, or 

even shrinking, the reserve component will need to 

train for Phase 0 operations. Army Reserve CA forces 

will likely be restructured following the implementation of the 38G Military Government Specialist career 

field. Creation of this career field, consisting of civil 

sector experts, was intended to correct the imbalance 

between CA generalists and functional specialists. 

Historically, tactical generalists and functional specialists were placed under the same career field and 

this has limited the capabilities of both. The development of the 38G career field creates an opportunity to 

restructure and “right-size” the Reserve Component 

and this restructuring also provides a venue to transition some CA tactical units to match active duty SOF 

CA capabilities and reconfigure others to better support conventional forces.

One area of concern is the Reserve Component’s 

ability to recruit and train soldiers to succeed in the 

active component pipeline, a key requirement for developing a Phase 0 capability. However, there is already an established process within National Guard 

Special Forces that can be adapted to the needs of CA. 

Reserve component Special Forces has already gone 

through a similar evolution. From the 1960s through 

the 1980s, reserve component SF qualification was 

achieved through a variety of methods, from on the 

job training to a correspondence course program, 

while active duty SF went through the full resident 

course. This dual training standard within the force 

led to a gap in rapport and trust between active and 
115

reserve component SF. During that time, reserve SF 

had a very limited role in real world operations, and 

integration with their active component counterparts 

was poor.18

In 1990 the Reserve Component training pipeline 

was eliminated and all SF soldiers were required to attend Special Forces Assessment and Selection (SFAS) 

and the active component Special Forces Qualification 

Course (SFQC). In order to increase the success rates 

of soldiers going through the pipeline, reserve component SF units created training detachments to assess volunteers and prepare them for the schools. The 

actual processes used to evaluate and recruit are decentralized and units can develop training programs 

that work for them. Typically, the programs involve 

some sort of a “tryout” to assess volunteers, and then 

a training program conducted during monthly drills 

to prepare these volunteers for the rigors of SFAS. 

Success rates for some units have been up to 90%.19

Another method used by National Guard SF was 

recruiting SF qualified soldiers leaving active duty. 

The combination of these methods has allowed National Guard SF to maintain strength and readiness 

through a decade of continuous deployments. It must, 

however, be noted that reserve component SF is considerably smaller today than it was 30 years ago. The 

two USAR SF Groups were deactivated in the early 

1990s and there are only two SF Groups in the National Guard. The difference is that the two National 

Guard Groups are full partners with their active duty 

counterparts and are involved nearly seamlessly in 

any operation requiring Army Special Forces. 

The new Army Operating Concept correctly identifies the future operating environment as complex. 

Traditional military solutions are unlikely to produce 
116

acceptable results. By identifying unstable conditions 

and leveraging whole of government efforts to deal 

with them before they become a problem, we have the 

potential to avoid large scale deployments that can be 

costly in lives and resources. In a resource constrained 

national security environment, the need for regional 

experts who can thrive in complex environments and 

work seamlessly with international civilian and military partners has never been greater. 

Army CA, with changes in doctrine, training, and 

force structure, can fill this role, based on the following recommendations:

1. Add Operational Preparation of the Environment to the list of core CA tasks. This is consistent with current doctrine and employment of 

CA and will clearly define CA’s Phase 0 capabilities to supported entities.

2. Develop a new paradigm to enable CF to conduct CMO more effectively. This change will 

mitigate risk to the Phase 4 mission and allow 

changing the balance of the CA force. Support 

to conventional units is best provided through 

better SOF-CF-JIIM interdependence and the 

development of hybrid command and planning structures at the strategic and operational 

levels as well as expanded S9 sections at the 

tactical level. This will also support the regional 

alignment of conventional forces.

3. Re-purpose the Reserve Component CAQC into 

a non-branch qualifying CMO Planner course 

for CF soldiers and expand S9 sections at the 

maneuver battalion and brigade levels in order 

to institutionalize CMO within maneuver forces. Employing CA qualified liaison elements 

with CF will solidify this interdependence.
117

4. Incorporate Phase 0 specific advanced tactical 

skills into the CA training pipeline to increase 

the survivability and operational effectiveness 

of CA teams working in a Phase 0 environment.

5. Restructure USAR CA forces significantly and 

reconfigure a portion of them to match active 

duty SOF CA training and capabilities. Utilize established National Guard Special Forces 

methods of recruiting and training to enable 

Reserve Component soldiers to complete the 

active duty training pipeline. 

MAJ Shafi Saiduddin served inCivil Affairsfor 14 years.

He deployed as a CA Team Leader with the Combined, Joint 

Special Operations Task Force - Afghanistan (CJSOTF-A) 

and as a Current Operations Officer (J33)/ Future Operations Planner (J5) with the Special Operations Command 

and Control Element - Horn of Africa (SOCCE-HOA). He 

also served as an assistant instructor for 3rd BN 1st Special Warfare Training Group. MAJ Saiduddin is currently 

the Group Civil Military Operations Officer (S9) at 19th

Special Forces Group (Airborne). The views expressed in 

this paper are his alone and do not necessarily reflect the

position or policy of the 1st Special Forces Command (Airborne), Army National Guard or the U.S. Army.
118

Notes

1. Sydney Freedberg, “After ‘10 years of abject failure’, SOCOM, Army, Marine leaders focus on ‘Strategic Landpower’.” 

Breaking Defense News, August 27, 2013.

2. Max Boot, Invisible Armies, (New York, Liveright Publishing 2013).

3. David Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of 

the Urban Guerrilla, (London, C. Hurst & Company Publishers, 

2013) 66, 126.

4. Lieutenant Colonel Richard B. Davenport, “The Future of 

Interdependence: Conventional Forces Will Look More Like SOF; 

SOF Will Look More Like the CIA.” Special Warfare, April-June 

2014. 23.

5. U.S. Army, The U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a 

Complex World, Department of the Army TRADOC Pamphlet 

525-3-1, U.S. Government Printing Office 2014.

6. U.S. Army, The U.S. Army Functional Concept for Engagement, Department of the Army TRADOC Pamphlet 525-8-5, U.S. 

Government Printing Office 2014. 18.

7. Harry R. Yarger, “21st Century SOF: Toward an American 

Theory of Special Operations.” JSOU Report 13-1 (April 2013).

8. Linda Robinson, Paul D. Miller, John Gordon IV, Jeffrey 

Decker, Michael Schwille, Raphael S. Cohen, Improving Strategic 

Competence; Lessons from 13 Years of War, (RAND Corporation, 

2014). 71.

9. Colonel (ret) David Maxwell, “Do We Really Understand 

Unconventional Warfare,” Small Wars Journal, October 23, 2014.1.

10. Colonel Cory M. Peterson, “The Use of Special Operations 

Forces in Support of American Strategic Security Strategies.” 

JSOU NDIA Essay Contest, 2014.
119

11. Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Learning from Iraq,” March 2013.

12. U.S. Army, Special Operations, Department of the Army 

ADP 3-05, U.S. Government Printing Office, 2012. 4.

13. Department of Defense, Special Operations, JP 3-05, U.S. 

Government Printing Office, 2014. II-4. 

14. David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small 

Wars in the Midst of a Big One, (Oxford University Press, 2009) 

299.

15. Major Robert G. Brady, “The Civil Affairs FID/UW Battalion and Its Implications for SOF in LIC Operations.” Special 

Warfare, Winter 1991. 12.

16. Brigadier General Ferdinand Irizarry, Civil Affairs Symposium Panel Discussion, November 14, 2014.

17. Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence Henry, “Institutionalizing 

Interdependence.” Special Warfare, April-June 2014. 18. 

18. Lieutenant Colonel (P) James D. Moore, “The Future of the 

Reserve Component (RC) Special Forces (SF) Individual Training 

Program.” U.S. Army War College. March 31, 1989. 

19. Sergeant Sara Yoke, “2/19 Special Forces Selection and 

Assessment Program boasts high success rate.” Defense Video 

and Imagery Distribution System, March 14, 2013.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General William E. Rapp

Commandant

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