SHAPING CHINA’S SECURITY ENVIRONMENT:

THE ROLE OF THE PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY

Edited by

Andrew Scobell

Larry M. Wortzel

October 2006

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ISBN 1-58487-251-9
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CONTENTS

Foreword

Ambassador James R. Lilley .

1. Introduction

 Andrew Scobell and Larry M. Wortzel. 

Part I: What’s Shaping the PLA?. .

2. Changing the Landscape of Civil-Military Relations in China: 

The PLA Responds to Recruiting and Retention Challenges

Frank Miller .

3. China’s Military Buildup: Beyond Taiwan?

 Ellis Joffe. .

Part II: War and Defense Modernization. .

4. Assessing America at War: Implications for China’s 

Military Modernization and National Security

 Susan M. Puska. .

5. War Control: Chinese Concepts of Escalation Management

 Lonnie D. Henley. .

6. China as a Major Asian Power: The Implications 

of Its Military Modernization 

(A View from the United States) 

Paul H. B. Godwin . 

Part III: Northeast Asia. . 

7. How the PLA Sees North Korea

John J. Tkacik, Jr.  . 
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8. The PLA, Japan’s Defense Posture, and the Outlook 

for China-Japan Relations

 Robert G. Sutter. . 

Part IV: South and Southeast Asia. . 

9. The Chinese Military Eyes South Asia

 Srikanth Kondapalli. . 

10. China and Southeast Asia: Building Influence, 

Addressing Fears

 Larry M. Wortzel. . 

About the Contributors . .
FOREWORD

This is the eighth volume on the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 

to be published by the Strategic Studies Institute. It is the product 

of a conference held at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, from 

September 23-25, 2005, to examine the PLA and the global security 

environment in which it operates. This gathering was the 18th in a 

series of annual conferences on China’s PLA. I have been privileged 

to be involved with and/or attend most of these gatherings over the 

years. At the 2005 conference, I was honored to deliver the keynote 

address in which I offered some of my insights and observations 

about China derived from a lifetime of living in or working on the 

Middle Kingdom. More than 50 experts on China participating in 

this conference provided critical comments and guidance on the 

initial drafts of the chapters included in this volume. 

These contributions contained herein address the role of the 

Chinese military in shaping its country’s security environment. Of 

course, the PLA itself is shaped and molded by both domestic and 

foreign influences. In the first decade of the 21st century, the PLA is 

not a central actor in China’s foreign policy the way it was just a few 

decades ago. 

Nevertheless, the significance of the PLA must be understood. 

The military remains a player that seeks to play a role and influence 

China’s policy towards the such countries and regions as United 

States, Japan, the Koreas, Southeast Asia, South Asia, and, of course, 

Taiwan. It is important not to overlook that, in times of crisis or 

conflict, the role and influence of the PLA rise significantly. Indeed, 

this was one of the findings of last year’s volume (Chinese National 

Security Decisionmaking Under Stress) in this series of annual edited 

volumes published by the U.S. Army War College.

The 2005 conference was one of the best because of the vigorous 

and spirited exchanges, the revelation of interesting facts such as 

the PLA using target models of U.S. planes in its exercises, and the 

participation of top China scholars, such as Andy Nathan and Tom 

Christensen, who added depth and fresh insights into the process.
I commend to you this latest contribution to enhance our 

knowledge about the PLA and Chinese national security thinking. I 

know a careful examination of this volume will provide readers with 

important insights and a greater understanding of Chinese military 

and strategy.

Ambassador James R. Lilley

Senior Fellow

American Enterprise Institute

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Andrew Scobell

Larry M. Wortzel

For 2 decades after the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was 

established, there was no question that the People’s Liberation 

Army (PLA) had a central role in shaping China’s security and 

foreign policy. Indeed, the PLA also was a major actor in domestic 

policy. The new leaders that took over China in 1949 all came from 

the military or Communist Party cadre who fought the Nationalists 

from 1927 through the Anti-Japanese War, and then fought the final 

battles of the civil war. At the local, provincial, and national level, the 

Party, the Army, and the government were almost synonymous. The 

PLA’s influence in national policy declined in subsequent decades, 

however. Today, one must carefully count the number of senior 

leaders with military connections in the Communist Party Politburo 

to debate the extent of PLA influence in China. 

In 1950, when the Chinese forces poured across the border into the 

Korean War, there was no doubt that the PLA was a principal actor 

in shaping the security environment in China. The same is true of the 

PLA’s actions in the Sino-Indian War and in the Cultural Revolution, 

when the military restored order. In Africa, PLA Railway Engineer 

Corps troops advanced China’s interests with projects like the TanZam Railway. During the American involvement in Vietnam, some 

50,000 PLA troops deployed to North Vietnam and Laos in support of 

China’s political and security interests. In 1979 and again in 1989, the 

generation of PLA veterans in the central Chinese government turned 

to the military. The numbers of military personnel in the National 

People’s Congress and the leading bodies of the Communist Party 

today, however, are far lower than they were in the first few decades 

of the PRC’s existence. This volume is an attempt to characterize the 

way that the PLA shapes, and is used by the government to shape, 

China’s security environment. The military clearly is not as central 

an actor as it was in the past. The editors and the authors attempted 

in this volume to characterize the extent to which the PLA shapes the 


domestic, regional, or global security environment to meet China’s 

interests.

We asked each of the contributing authors to examine a series of 

questions as he or she addressed the topic:

• How does the PLA function as an actor in China’s security 

and foreign policies?

• Is the PLA the principal actor in policy formulation, or does it 

provide support for foreign policy and security initiatives?

• At what point in the policy process does the PLA interact with 

the various central Party and government “leading groups” 

that decide foreign and security policies?

• Is the PLA shaping the security environment through such 

mechanisms as defense exchanges, arms sales, visits by senior 

officers, student officer exchanges, or military exercises?

• Is there a clear security or foreign policy agenda in specific 

geographic regions attributable to the PLA? 

The short answer to these questions is that the PLA remains an 

important actor and factor in shaping the international and domestic 

security environment for the central leadership. Clearly, the military 

is not the central player that it once was. Rather, the PLA is one of a 

number of foreign policy and security actors, and it responds to the 

Politburo Standing Committee and Central Military Commission, 

whose members are no longer almost exclusively military veterans. 

This book is not all inclusive of the world, or all of the international 

activities by the PLA. The authors cover the domestic landscape in 

China and the state of civil-military relations. The book also explores 

how the PLA assesses U.S. military actions, the strength of the U.S. 

military, and the situation in and around the Taiwan Strait. For Asia, 

the book assesses the PLA’s posture with respect to South Asia, 

Southeast Asia, Japan, and Korea. Clearly, the PLA also is active and 

a factor in China’s security related interests in Latin America, the 

Middle East, Central Asia, and Africa. This volume does not cover 

these regions. However, we believe that the way that the authors 

have characterized the PLA’s interests and activities is a good guide 

to the way that it is used, and behaves, as a security actor in other 

parts of the world. 


In chapter 2, Frank Miller examines civil-military relations in 

China. The relationship between the populace and the military is 

in flux and evolving in response to Beijing’s own domestic reforms 

and the changing international environment. The influx of western 

investment and business, broadened educational opportunities, 

generally higher standards of living, and greater freedom to travel 

all have created alternatives to military service, which once was an 

attractive way to gain some social mobility in Communist China. 

These new opportunities have created serious competition to the 

PLA in its traditional support and recruiting base. China’s OneChild Policy, higher educational standards for the military, and 

efforts to stem corruption also have had a significant effect on the 

recruiting base from which the PLA can select. That said, rising 

nationalism has helped PLA recruiting and increased the interest of 

youth in anything military. The PLA has respect and support from 

the majority of Chinese citizens. 

The General Political Department’s (GPD) challenge is to fill 

the PLA’s rolls with qualified and motivated youth who are loyal 

to the Party and the military. Miller makes the point that the PLA 

is examining personnel and recruiting systems in other modern 

militaries, in particular the United States, Russia, and India. The rise 

of nationalism in China also is a factor in civil-military relations. 

It has created increased interest in military service among China’s 

youth. The PLA also has offered incentives to attract young people to 

military life, including tuition assistance, and a guaranteed technical 

assignment. 

Miller concludes that the PLA is not as close to the people as 

it once was, and its claims of a close relationship to the people are 

exaggerated. That the PLA is searching for new ways to recruit 

and retain is an indication that the PLA is no longer seen as a good 

opportunity, and the rise of nationalism, by itself, is not enough to aid 

recruitment. The changing environment of civil-military relations is 

an aspect of China’s overall social modernization and its emergence 

as a regional and global power. Recruitment issues provide a window 

into the PLA’s relations with the people, the government, and the 

party. The bigger long-term question is whether the PLA retains its 

unique position in Chinese society as the unquestioning defender 

of the Communist Party, or becomes a professional military more 

motivated by affairs of the state. 


In chapter 3, Ellis Joffe reminds the reader that there is widespread 

agreement that the Chinese armed forces have made remarkable, even 

surprising, progress in modernizing. Although the PLA is no match 

for the U.S. military, the fast growth of Chinese military capacity 

and the PLA’s ability to use the weapons systems it has fielded have 

become serious considerations in U.S. Government assessments of 

China.

Joffe believes that the long-term objectives of China’s military 

modernization reach far beyond settling the issue of Taiwan. In 

his view, Beijing’s long-term plans are to provide the military 

underpinning for China’s goals of rising to great power status. China’s 

leaders have opted for slow and incremental military advances rather 

than for major but unrealistic attempts to modernize rapidly. 

The near-term goal for the PLA is to be capable of conquering 

Taiwan and coping with U.S. intervention. Over the past decade, 

a concerted effort to acquire this capability was the strategic 

focus of China’s military buildup. Specifically, China wants to 

be able to overrun Taiwan rapidly, preferably before the United 

States intervenes; to deter the United States by raising the costs of 

intervention; to deny U.S. forces access to the theatre of operations, 

primarily by improving China’s naval capabilities; and, if all else 

fails, to defeat the United States in combat around Taiwan. 

In the future, without Taiwan as the driving force, the scope 

and pace of the buildup might be reduced. The buildup also will be 

influenced by the continued availability of Russian weapons. The 

state of China’s economy also will affect the future military buildup. 

Joffe thinks that if rural and urban unrest increase, the leadership 

might try to reduce increases in military appropriations in order to 

divert funds to other sectors. Nonetheless, according to Joffe, the 

dominant factor shaping civil-military relations will be the common 

objective of building up China’s military power for the sake of 

objectives arising out of an assertive nationalism.

Susan Puska, like Frank Miller, is a former military attaché in 

China. In chapter 4, Puska tell us that, while overall bilateral U.S.-

China ties moved in a more positive direction after September 11, 

2001 (9/11), both the Chinese and American militaries remained 

mutually wary and cautious. The U.S. Secretary of Defense did not 


choose to make his first official visit to China until October 2005. 

When he was in Singapore in June of that year, he asked the pointed 

question about the ultimate goals of China’s military buildup.

During the October 2001 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 

(APEC) meeting, President Jiang Zemin expressed strong opposition 

to terrorism. He said China supported military operations in 

Afghanistan, but it was not open-ended support, and he cautioned 

that Afghanistan’s sovereignty and independence must be ensured. 

The APEC meeting was an opportunity for China and the United 

States to begin counterterrorism intelligence cooperation. In addition, 

China generally acquiesced to the U.S. military intervention in 

Afghanistan, as well as U.S. cooperation with Pakistan and Central 

Asia. Puska says that, whereas they were cautiously supportive of 

operations in Afghanistan against the Taliban, China’s collective 

leadership was skeptical of U.S. intentions to resort to military action 

in Iraq to remove Saddam Hussein.

Strategic level examinations of the motives and objectives of U.S. 

military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq are discussed freely 

in official civilian press reports in China. These can be found in 

the People’s Daily and People’s Liberation Daily, as well as academic 

journals. The talking points are highly formulaic and reinforce 

one another through repetition. There also are operational and 

tactical assessments of the coalition effort in Iraq in technical and 

academic journals, both civilian and military. The articles tend to 

be straightforward discussions of U.S. capabilities, but they imply 

that the PLA also must have these capabilities as part of its own 

modernization efforts. With respect to operational doctrine and 

procedures, the PLA emphasizes operational and tactical logistics, 

high-technology weapons and equipment, information technology, 

and psychological operations. China’s military contacts have 

widened in recent years, but China’s central military relationship 

will likely remain with Russia for the foreseeable future. This military 

cooperation, which began largely as a marriage of convenience after 

the end of the Cold War, continues to mature in ways beyond arms 

sales of second-string Russian products and tentative cooperation. 

Finally, Puska tells us that China’s perception of the threat to its 

sovereignty posed by Taiwan independence and U.S. intervention 

provides urgency to China’s military modernization. She thinks 


that, if China is to gain great power status, it must further develop 

its military in all components of power—land, sea, and air. China 

cannot afford and likely does not want to achieve parity with the U.S. 

military because the cost to China’s overall national development 

would be destabilizing. However, China recognizes it must possess 

a credible military deterrent to protect China’s national interests in 

the post-9/11, post-Iraq War era.

In Chapter 5, Lonnie Henley, former Defense Intelligence Officer 

for East Asia, examines how the PLA fits into the Chinese security 

establishment in managing conflicts and conflict escalation. Defining 

the issue, Henley reminds us “war control is the deliberate actions 

of war leaders to limit or restrain the outbreak, development, scale, 

intensity, and aftermath of war.” The measures that may be taken 

include arms control, crisis control, and control of the scale of 

conflict. 

According to Henley, Chinese military writings focus on how to 

prevent unwanted escalation of a crisis or conflict and how to ensure 

that military operations are controlled and modulated to serve 

broader political objectives. A central insight from Henley’s review 

of books and papers from the PLA Academy of Military Science 

and the National Defense University is that PLA military academics 

have begun formal consideration of the issue only in the past 5 years. 

He believes that the concepts will continue to evolve over the next 

decade. 

Preventing the unintended escalation of a political crisis into a 

military conflict, or a small-scale conflict into a major war, is part of 

a broader Chinese concept known as “containment of war” or “war 

control.” China’s military literature treats this as an activity involving 

all elements of national power designed to shape the international 

environment. The PLA’s goals are to reduce the risk of war, manage 

crises, and prevent unintended escalation. Ultimately, the PLA 

seeks to adopt measures that will put China in a favorable position 

if war occurs and ensure military operations serve larger political 

objectives. PLA literature emphasizes that a principal contribution 

the military can make to control a fast-developing crisis is to be a 

highly visible and capable force obviously ready to take action. 

There is a growing body of work in the field available in 

China, but it often is not examined in the English-speaking world. 


Henley believes that a vigorous effort should examine Chineselanguage sources and incorporate them into our understanding of 

PLA modernization efforts. Henley calls for greater exploration of 

Chinese concepts of nuclear escalation and war control in general. 

The discussion of crisis management, containment, escalation, 

and war control in Chinese military writing is a blend of classical 

Chinese strategic thought, practical considerations common to all 

modern militaries, sophisticated assessment of the political and 

military challenges the PLA would face in a crisis, and optimism 

about China’s ability to mold the situation and control the course of 

events. There is a distinctively Chinese perspective that may have 

a significant influence on Beijing’s behavior in a crisis, to include a 

potential conflict in the Taiwan Strait. 

Paul Godwin, a veteran analyst of the PLA who taught for years 

at the National Defense University, looks at U.S. assessments of the 

implications of China’s military modernization in Chapter 6. In the 

United States, the improving capabilities of the Chinese PLA are 

perceived as a potential threat to U.S. strategic interests in the West 

Pacific. China’s intent to develop a self-sustaining military industrial 

complex also is a target of American concern.

China has broadened its foreign policy approach to pursue 

positive relations with the world. It has reached beyond its earlier 

concentration on Asian neighbors. Beijing seeks to work closely with 

the European Union and to extend its diplomatic influence into Latin 

America, the Middle East, and Africa. Godwin argues that much of 

China’s diplomacy is to ensure access to the energy supplies, but it 

also is designed to reinforce Beijing’s status as an influential player 

on the world scene. Although the strategy has made China richer 

and more influential, Godwin does not think that Beijing’s defense 

policy reflects the confidence one might expect. Instead, Godwin sees 

a fundamental apprehension of U.S. power and military presence 

both globally and in the Asia-Pacific region. 

Neither China nor the United States accept the legitimacy of 

each other’s defense policies and strategies, according to Godwin. 

Instead, they are locked in “strategic distrust.” Godwin thinks 

that Washington and Beijing must concentrate at senior levels on 

programs and contacts to ease mutual apprehension. Ultimately, 

however, Godwin argues that both sides must agree on mutually 


acceptable roles in Asia. Beijing and Washington cannot escape from 

some level of political and economic competition, but they must seek 

reciprocal acceptance of their military security policies.

John Tkacik, of The Heritage Foundation, assesses how the PLA 

views North Korea in chapter 7. Tkacik tells us that in 1950, at the 

start of the Korean War, senior Chinese military commanders did 

not think that North Korea was worth a war. At the time, the whole 

Politburo had military experience in one form or another, since 

China had just emerged from the war against Japan and its own civil 

war. Military commanders knew relatively little about North Korea 

then, and the ultimate decision to go in was forced by Mao Zedong, 

who believed that “when one’s neighbors are on fire, we (China) 

cannot sit around crying about it.” The decisionmaking process was 

something of a mystery then, according to Tkacik. 

Tkacik tells us that things today are not much different. The 

Chinese Navy seems to be providing basing for North Korean 

special operations vessels. China facilitated the North Korean 

nuclear program by ensuring that transports from Pakistan could 

transit Chinese airspace carrying equipment to North Korea. In 

return for the nuclear help, North Korea sent back a Nodong ballistic 

missile to Pakistan after a refueling stop at a Chinese air base. Thus, 

the “support thy neighbor” analogy still seems to apply today. The 

PLA is quite concerned that the Korean Peninsula historically has 

been a corridor for aggression against China. Certainly, Japan took 

advantage of this route over a number of centuries. Thus, the Chinese 

military does not want to see North Korea collapse, but still defends 

the border to ensure that millions of North Koreans do not stream 

into Manchuria.

Robert Sutter, a former National Intelligence Officer for East Asia, 

looks at Japan’s defense posture vis-à-vis China in Chapter 8. Sutter 

opines that a series of political and historical issues have molded 

the political climate in China in such a way that China and Japan 

face the most serious deterioration in Sino-Japanese relations since 

they established diplomatic relations over 30 years ago. Looking at 

the PLA, Sutter thinks that its priorities reflected in recent Chinese 

National Defense White Papers reflect a general worsening of security 

relations with Japan across a number of key national security issues 

in recent years. 


To a certain extent, Japan’s policies toward Taiwan affect PLA 

priorities about Tokyo. Moreover, China’s emphasis on territorial 

integrity, as well as the goal of securing strategic resources such as 

oil and gas, makes Japanese forces a focus of PLA planning. In the 

year or so leading up to the October 2005 conference where Sutter’s 

analysis was presented, PLA naval forces deployed in ways that 

exacerbated tensions with Japan, worsening relations. 

Despite concerns over Taiwan, sovereignty, and contested 

maritime claims, Sutter sees “powerful reasons why Chinese leaders, 

as well as Japanese leaders, will seek to avoid further deterioration 

and restore more businesslike relations.” One of the chief reasons 

for Beijing to moderate its own behavior is China’s drive to project 

around the region an image that it is a leader in Asia, a benign good 

neighbor, and one that will show flexibility in accommodating the 

interests of regional partners. 

Sutter points to tension among U.S. specialists on Asia over the 

outlook for China-Japan relations. Some U.S. specialists argue that 

the Sino-Japanese friction is against U.S. interests, and the United 

States should take concrete measures to reduce tensions. People 

advocating this approach suggest that the United States should 

discourage Japanese prime ministerial visits to the controversial 

Yasukuni war memorial. The same people believe that the United 

States should push the Japanese government officials to be more 

forthright in accepting responsibility for Japanese aggression in the 

Pacific War. The other side of the debate in the United States, Sutter 

says, are those specialists who see Sino-Japanese relations as unlikely 

to deteriorate substantially. They believe that it is in American 

interests to avoid actions that would offset Sino-Japanese tensions.

Sutter believes that the national security priorities of the PLA 

suggest that PLA leaders will focus less on economic and diplomatic 

consequences of escalating disputes in Sino-Japanese relations and 

more on security and historical aspects of relations. Thus, PLA 

concerns will serve as a drag on efforts by Chinese leaders to manage 

relations with Japan. 

South Asia has not been the principal focus of China’s attention 

over the last 5 decades. This is not to say that it has been overlooked: 

China fought a war with India in 1962, assisted Bangladesh and 

Pakistan in its sovereignty efforts, and has been a major military 
1

and foreign assistance supplier to both of the latter countries. The 

PLA was a major actor in all of these matters. However, the PLA’s 

attention in the recent period generally has been on the eastern 

seaboard of the country, specifically towards Taiwan, Japan, Korea, 

and the South China Sea. The Soviet Union and its successor states, 

including Russia, also drew strong attention from China. 

In chapter 9, Srikanth Kondapalli interprets the PLA’s perspectives 

on South Asia. In a review of Chinese scholarship on the region, 

Kondapalli notes that China focuses on the major problems between 

the two countries such as the Tibet issue, the 1962 war, and relative 

configurations of power in Asia, including China-Pakistan relations. 

PLA scholars recognize that the domain of policy perspectives on 

South Asia is principally that of the foreign ministry. The PLA does 

not challenge this primacy. The same is true of areas including arms 

control.

The PLA’s views on South Asia at times have differed from those 

of the civilian leadership. The primary differences have involved 

India, while there has been a coincidence of views of both the PLA 

and the civilian leadership regarding other South Asian countries. 

Kondapalli notes that although confidence-building measures 

(CBMs) have increased between India and China, some in the PLA 

have argued for “encircling” India. PLA scholars have suggested 

it would be a good idea to help other South Asian countries as a 

hedge against India and to curb its “regional hegemony” or chances 

of becoming a “great power.”

The PLA’s strategy of confronting India has become more nuanced 

in recent years. Still, in Indian military circles, China’s actions 

were seen as an attempt by the PLA at “strategic encirclement” 

or “marginalization” of India. China’s late 1985 PLA naval visits 

to Chittagong, Colombo, and Karachi (skipping Indian ports) are 

read this way, as are the continuing arms transfers to Pakistan and 

Bangladesh. 

Overall, in Kondapalli’s assessment, the PLA sees South Asia 

as a region dominated by India. The Chinese reaction is to develop 

closer relations with Pakistan and Bangladesh. While there is still 

PLA military cooperation with Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, and 

Myanmar, the PLA has been expanding its contacts with the Indian 

military forces in terms of preventive CBMs and exchanges. While 
there has never been a military alliance between China and Pakistan 

or with Bangladesh, these states are being courted extensively for 

their value in countering India, besides being sources of raw materials 

and markets for Chinese low technology arms. 

In chapter 10, Larry Wortzel assesses China’s successful diplomacy 

and increasing influence in Southeast Asia. Wortzel thinks that 

the PRC has undertaken a diplomatic strategy of moderation and 

reassurance in Southeast Asia over the past decade, with the objectives 

of easing fears of China as a military threat to the region, building 

influence, working with multilateral organizations, and lessening 

U.S. influence in the region. The PLA has influenced and supported 

this strategy, but has not been the major actor in articulating the 

strategy.

Beijing uses its “comprehensive national power” to advance 

political, economic, military, and other security goals in Southeast 

Asia. The Foreign Ministry and the Chinese Communist Party, 

including its liaison and propaganda organs, have been major 

architects of the strategy and agents of its articulation. China’s 

military organs have played a supporting role in articulating the 

strategy, but a role that has been clearly subordinate to the Foreign 

Ministry. However, unlike the situation in the 1960s and 1970s, there 

is no strong ideological component in today’s strategy. Even though 

the Chinese Communist Party maintains friendly party-to-party 

relations with the Communist parties in the region, especially those 

of Vietnam and Laos, the Foreign Ministry plays the main role in 

articulating the strategy. 

Still, Wortzel argues that, while the PLA is not the major 

instrument through which China addresses its goals in the region, 

it has an important role in advancing China’s interests. The PLA 

provides the backdrop of military power that makes the nations 

in the region consider China’s security interests as a factor in their 

policies. Southeast Asian nations, meanwhile, hedge their security 

interests. The nations in Southeast Asia maintain good relations with 

China, but want the United States and Australia present and active 

in the region. However, Southeast Asian nations would not “buy 

into” an American-led containment policy against China. China’s 

public diplomacy is successful, but its military power is enough of a 

latent threat that Southeast Asian nations still hedge their security. 
Wortzel argues that there has been a strong security component 

to all relationships in the region. The growing military power of 

China, and its increased ability to send its Navy around the region, 

have been factors in ensuring good relations. Thus, the PLA may not 

be leading in all relations, but it can certainly see itself as a major 

factor behind China’s improved standing in Southeast Asia. 

In summary, the authors have painted a picture that shows a 

part for the PLA in China’s foreign and security policies, but not 

the leading part. Whether in domestic policy or foreign policy, the 

PLA is a major actor, but it is clearly subordinate to the dictates 

of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the domestic policy organs, 

respectively. China’s foreign policies today are nuanced, with the 

PLA playing a prescribed role. That said, in domestic policy, it is 

still the military that is the ultimate guarantor of party control and 

stability. 
PART I:

WHAT’S SHAPING THE PLA?

CHAPTER 2

CHANGING THE LANDSCAPE OF CIVIL-MILITARY 

RELATIONS IN CHINA: THE PLA RESPONDS TO 

RECRUITING AND RETENTION CHALLENGES

Frank Miller

A lawsuit was filed in Guangzhou earlier this year claiming damages by 

the Ministry of National Defense’ Tri-Service Honor Guard for the image 

of several of its soldiers being used without permission by a Chinese 

toymaker. The Shenzhen-based company was directed to remove all 

advertising featuring the servicemen, issue a public apology and pay 

RMB 100,000 Yuan (US$12,3300) in compensation.1

 The PLA is the army of the CPC and of the country and of the people2

There is no doubt that the Civil-Military Relationship within the 

People’s Republic of China (PRC) is evolving in response to many 

factors resulting both from Beijing’s reforms and the changing 

international environment. The influx of western investment and 

business, broadened educational opportunities, generally higher 

standards of living, and greater freedom to travel all have created 

serious competition to the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) 

traditional support and recruiting base. To compound the situation, 

China’s One-Child Policy, higher educational standards, and efforts 

to stem corruption also have had a significant effect on the recruiting 

base from which the PLA can select. To its favor, the PLA can count 

on the benefits of rising nationalism, increased interest by the youth 

in anything military, and a growing level of respect and support by 

the majority of Chinese citizens. 

None of these benefits, however, translate directly into recruiting 

numbers, and actions are being taken to identify and solve the problem. 

The General Political Department’s (GPD) Cadre Department is 

studying hard how to fill the PLA’s rolls with qualified, motivated, 

and loyal (to both the Party and the job) youth. Their task in many 

ways is very similar to that of U.S. recruiters under strong economic 

conditions. Concurrent with the GPD’s efforts is that of the General 
Staff Department (GSD), which is trying to professionalize the PLA’s 

professional military education (PME) system to reflect the needs of 

an informationalized military in a high-tech world. 

The PLA is treading on new ground here, and they know it. To 

help them understand the problem they face, both the GPD and GSD 

are seeking truth from fact by researching the personnel systems of 

modern militaries, in particular the United States, Russia, and India 

(all of which have greater than a million personnel under arms) and 

the United Kingdom. While they have reached out to these countries 

for direct assistance in answering specific issues, the two responsible 

organizations have not integrated their strategies, and often are 

competing with each other for time with the foreign interlocutor.3

Major conferences are being convened and study tours arranged to 

each of the above countries to gain ground truth (and, according to 

one PLA officer, to open the travelers’ eyes to the need to change), 

while relationships with each other and with the foreign militaries 

are being subordinated to the search for a “Holy Grail” in personnel 

policies.

The desire to change their personnel policies is very real and can 

be attributed to their awareness that much of their modernization 

goals depend on getting it right. What is still at issue, though, is 

whether they have instituted a basic change in their principles 

regarding their role in society. Is the PLA changing its core values 

or just its façade? Are these attempts to make a military career more 

attractive to its dwindling recruitment base enough to overcome 

traditional Chinese norms, which are growing in importance as the 

strength of Cold War ideologies subside? And can they retool their 

educational system to match the industrial retooling that is equipping 

more and more of their combat units? Perhaps more accurately, 

can the PLA create a benefits package that attracts the tech-savvy 

talent already being trained in China’s civilian institutions? And if 

they do build it, will anyone come? Will the PLA ever again be able 

to attract good iron to make its nails? Or must it create a system 

that builds on what it can get, stressing an independent system of 

education and advancement that is realistic in assessing its place in 

society? This question is the dilemma and source of divergence in 

the approaches taken by the GSD and GPD. It also is reflective of 

a changing relationship between the PLA and the people it claims 
to represent. On a larger scale, this change also represents a shift in 

personal loyalties of the average citizen in China. In the end, this 

change has the potential to be profound, leading observers to watch 

closely for the direction taken by the PLA. As the concept of a People’s 

Army fades into the reality of the modern world, will the “P,” which 

stands for “People,” come to really mean “Party” or “Professional”? 

The path taken could be a harbinger of the larger political transition, 

and while it certainly needs to be watched, is arguably also worth 

attempting to influence.

CLAUSEWITZ, WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS

This chapter attempts to introduce two areas in which the search 

for a new personnel policy has highlighted a change in relationships 

to which the PLA must find a way to adjust. At the strategic level, 

the PLA is facing a significant change in its relations with both the 

Chinese people and with the government/party. This section seeks 

to identify and dissect the relations of the PLA as an institution with 

its main constituents—the PRC government, the Communist Party of 

China (CPC), and the Chinese people themselves. In Clausewitzean 

terms, the PLA sits comfortably in one corner of a double-summit 

“trinity,” with a singular loyalty to the people and dual loyalties to 

the government and the party. As shown in Figure 1, the duality of 

governance in China allows for two seemingly congruous organs—

the Party and the Government—shown separately in the Chinese 

version of Clausewitz’s trinity model. The placement in the model is 

purposeful, to show that the Government is closer to and therefore 

more influential on the daily lives of the people, while it is the Party 

that has the greater influence on the PLA. Conversely, the influence 

of the government on the PLA and of the Party on the people is more 

indirect and usually through the actions of the other governing organ. 

The reality of this model is somewhat hidden by the convenience 

of having the national leadership hold concurrent positions in both 

organs, leading the casual observer to see a model that peaks at the 

Politburo, or more accurately its Standing Committee (PBSC) (See 

Figure 2.) In the model depicted below, the national leadership 

operates in extremis to both organs of power, with the ability to choose 

the route of influence based on the current situation and goals.
Gov’t CPC

People PLA

Public Relations

Figure 1. Clausewitz in China.

Gov’t CPC

People PLA

PBSC

CMC

Figure 2. The Reality.

To the people, the PLA’s current relationship is as an employer, a 

protector, and—at least among the youth—a growing source of pride. 

The growing professionalism of the PLA speaks to its relationship 

as an arm of the Chinese government, while the career aspirations 
of PLA officers are more closely linked to the PLA’s relationship to 

the Communist Party. A recent article in the Chinese Academy of 

Military Science’s monthly journal highlights the historical duality 

of PLA relationships with the government and with the people. 

The author, writing from the PLA’s perspective, seems to imply 

the PLA’s relationship with each has room to improve, and that the 

PLA’s sacrifices over the years obligates the others to work harder 

to better support the PLA. By its absence of consideration, however, 

the author has demonstrated the relative closeness of the PLA to the 

Party.4

At a lower level, the incongruence in the PLA’s parallel approach 

to personnel policy modernization has placed the General Staff and 

General Political Departments in competition with each other—with 

each major stakeholder stressing the area in which it is familiar. The 

GPD is trying to understand the mind of the Chinese youth in an 

attempt to develop benefit packages that will not only attract new 

blood, but that then keeps them in the military for the full term. The 

GSD is struggling to reform a backbone PME infrastructure that 

allows them on the one hand to prepare officers for each stage in 

their career, while on the other being itself the enticement needed to 

keep the officer on the rolls until retirement. In this search, the GSD 

actually is trying to sell its PME as part of a benefits package—and in 

so doing has become a competitor of GPD. This position on the part 

of the GSD seems to imply a pessimistic view of the Party and GPD’s 

ability to attract quality recruits.

The GPD is responsible for ensuring Party loyalty through 

political education, promotions, assignments and overseeing the 

PLA’s civil-military relations.5 The latter is key to understanding the 

PLA’s ability to give itself a makeover. The PLA sees itself as having 

three distinct roles in Chinese society. It is a key part of the PRC’s 

national security apparatus, both at the tactical and operational 

level—following Mao’s declaration that it be first and foremost a 

combat team6— and at the strategic level as an integral part of the 

Chinese policymaking apparatus. It is therefore an institution of the 

Chinese government that demands a great deal of respect from both 

foreign and domestic entities wishing to deal with Beijing. To Chinese 

society, the PLA also is used as an employer and as an educator, 
2

the latter role being especially important to the Communist Party, 

which continuously calls on the PLA to be the “model” in whatever 

political campaign is currently being undertaken.

ROLES

The Institution.

The PLA considers itself one of the founding members of the 

PRC, and as such, takes a great interest in its role in preserving 

the viability of the nation. At the same time, it seeks to preserve its 

traditionally deep connection with the people, and to maintain its 

stake in the central leadership of the nation and of the party. In many 

ways, these two relations are different and can be at odds with one 

another. The PLA is still considered a Party Army. Constitutionally, 

however, the PLA is linked to the National People’s Congress (NPC) 

and State Council through the Central Military Commission (CMC), 

though this linkage is limited. The CMC is in Jiang Jingsong’s 

seminal English-language work on the National People’s Congress 

a “distinct state institution,” though he later admits that only 

through its dual role in the CPC can the CMC exert direct power on 

the military. Additionally, Jiang points out that the CMC is unique 

as a state institution by not having any responsibility to the NPC. 

Only the Chairman of the CMC is constitutionally responsible to the 

NPC, though how he is accountable to the NPC is a question left 

unanswered by Jiang.7 Despite not being accountable to the NPC, the 

PLA receives special consideration by the NPC for its own allotment 

of NPC Deputies8 and authority (through the CMC) to introduce bills 

or reports to the NPC Standing Committee directly.9 The result of 

this arrangement is a military that is significantly closer to the Party 

than the Government. The PLA has learned to use this double peak 

to its advantage, playing one off the other as the situation requires. 

Such advantage has created a semi-autonomous sub-group within 

the greater Chinese society that, while not able to fully govern itself, 

is able to ensure its equities are taken into account with all matters of 

state.
The Employer.

The PLA, even after this year’s 200,000-man reduction, is still the 

largest army in the world, employing 2.3 million active duty and 

reserve troops and over 10 million militia.10 The People’s Armed 

Police, also a sector of China’s armed forces, brings in another one 

million plus, for a total of about 14 million under arms. Much of this 

number consists of 2-year conscripts, with each new year offering 

another 13 million males who reach conscription age. In a country of 

1.3 billion, with a birth ratio of 1.12 males to every female—created by 

the 25-year-old one-child policy—one would expect these numbers 

to be easy to maintain. It seems, however, that this is not the case, as 

the PLA recently announced a decision to hire civilians to fill many 

of the roles traditionally held by officers.11

Conscription is not really a problem for the PLA. First, it is 

legislated by law.12 Second, the potential pool of conscripts is not 

going to dwindle anytime soon. The PLA is, for many young kids in 

the countryside, a chance to escape the drudgeries of near-subsistence 

farming. Rural families are normally supportive of filling a quota if 

they have a son, less so if they have a daughter. Urban families are 

more constrained by the one-child policy and are starting to lose the 

allure for letting their only child join the army. 

In the case of one PLA women’s sport team, the recruitment 

typically occurs at the age of 12-13, at which time the girls are sent to 

special schools to train and study, so that when they are old enough 

to join the PLA legally (18 years old), they have already mastered 

their sport. This allows the girls to complete their service obligation 

of 6 years (to pay for school) by the age of 24-25, leaving them still 

culturally eligible for marriage.13 Girls selected for the various PLA 

Song and Dance Troupes are sent to special schools as early as age 

5,14 which can be witnessed on any televised variety stage show 

sponsored by or for the PLA.

The story is different for officer accessions. As an employer, the 

PLA is finding itself in stiff competition with the much higher paying 

high-tech industrial base, which is rapidly expanding in China. The 

need to modernize into a high-tech force capable of fighting on the 

21st century battlefield means the PLA is seeking to hire officers from 
the very same pool of candidates from which Lenovo, Haier, AVIC, 

and a whole host of foreign companies are recruiting. At present, the 

PLA is able to meet their goals because of the vast economic disparity 

across China. The fact that the PLA operates its own college-level 

institutions allows them to recruit promising high school students 

from the villages of economically backward areas. The recruitment 

of these students is assisted by the presence of military departments 

at all levels of government. This is a recruiting support system that 

no other institution, with the obvious exception of the Communist 

Party itself, can claim. 

This advantage is doomed to be lost as the economic growth 

expands domestically to include the harder to reach inner provinces. 

What today is an army led by coastal citizens and populated by 

Han Chinese from “upriver,” will soon find itself led by those 

upriver-sourced officers and populated by an ever-decreasing pool 

of economic recruits (those who join for economic reasons) and an 

increasing percentage of non-Hans. This will require the PLA to 

change its relationship significantly with the people, to give it a 

greater attraction among the growing middle class and among the 

ethnic minorities. This is a task the PLA recognizes as essential, and 

it is working hard to figure out how to accomplish this transition. 

A recent briefing by the Xinjiang Military District Command noted 

that the PLA now has five ethnic Uighur and one Kazakh general 

officers. This comment was intended to show that the PLA values 

the contributions of China’s ethnic minorities, but was followed by 

the realization that these numbers lagged far behind the civilian 

government numbers and will have to grow.15

The Educator.

I have already mentioned a key advantage of the PLA over other 

major employers in China—its own system of colleges and academies. 

This system is antiquated, however, and is no longer considered 

capable of preparing the number of junior officers, technicians, and 

conscripts needed to field an army under the high-tech conditions 

of the 21st century. In 2004, the ability to teach warfighting skills 

was enhanced by rotating former field commanders into teaching 

positions at the PLA’s National Defense University.16 In contrast, a 
recent CMC decision has approved a plan to hire contract civilians to 

handle nonwarfighting jobs in support of the military. While details 

of just which jobs fall under this category are unavailable,17 it shows 

a recognition by the military leadership that it can no longer afford to 

recruit, educate, train, and retain qualified uniformed personnel for 

all of its required activities. It must, therefore, outsource certain jobs 

to civilian companies who can better recruit from the increasingly 

mobile population. This decision provides some insight into the 

limitations of the support provided to the PLA by the nation’s civilian 

leadership. This concern is strong enough to have made it into the 

toast presented to the PLA and foreign military attachés at the 

annual PLA Birthday celebration.18 In the same venue, the Minister 

of Defense also stressed the PLA’s leadership role as a model for 

ideological education.

PATH TO PARTY MEMBERSHIP 

An unspoken role of the PLA is as a quick path to Party 

Membership. Current membership figures for the Communist Party 

are around 65 million, with the PLA-based membership always over 

one million. Approximately 95 percent of all Army officers are Party 

Members, while only 20 percent of enlisted have joined—or been 

allowed to join—the Party.19 These numbers are more reflective of 

a limitation the Party places on its members than of desires by its 

members. The author has met dozens of PLA officers over the years 

who will admit their Party Membership was more a job benefit than 

a personal goal. It is a necessary criterion for advancement beyond 

the rank of major, and for key assignments and prestige. But it does 

not garner any more pay; better housing, or other direct perks for 

the member, making several junior officers question its immediate 

benefit to them.20

In early 2004, a new revision of the rules for Party recruitment 

was implemented which, according to the PLA Daily, drew on the 

experiences of recent recruiting drives. The article assures the reader 

that the original principles for membership have been retained, but 

the fact that they see a requirement to update the rules in order to 

“maintain progressiveness . . . of the CPC” demonstrates recognition 

of a changing recruiting base.21 So how does the PLA recruit its future 
generation of officers? While details of the recruiting “plan” are not 

available to the author, much can be derived by asking the young 

officer candidates why they joined.

WHY JOIN THE PLA?

In discussions with National Defense Students (Guo Fang Sheng), 

roughly equivalent to the U.S. ROTC program, the majority stated 

that someone in their family had been or was in the military, and that 

they had been a major influence in convincing the students to join 

the program. Of 10 students interviewed at Nanjing University, two 

had parents currently in the military, while another four had either 

grandparents or uncles that had been PLA. One of the remaining 

four claims to have always dreamed of being a soldier. All 10 agreed 

the money paid toward tuition helped their decision to join. These 

percentages generally are reflective of other conversations the author 

has had with military cadets around the country, indicating a major 

source of officer recruiting is by portraying the army as a family 

business. Other reasons offered in discussions with school cadre and 

students are discussed below.

Quota.

Each military region is responsible for recruiting within its area of 

responsibility (AOR). They are given quotas from GSD, but the actual 

recruiting is decentralized from the Military Regions to the Districts, 

who work with the relative Provincial Military Headquarters.

Incentives/enticement. 

National Defense Students are provided tuition assistance. In 

return, they incur a service obligation following graduation.

Sense of Duty (Nationalism).

Nationalism in China is reaching fervor. This extends well 

beyond those who actually join the military. Chatrooms and 

blogs are filled with pro-China and anti-everyone else rhetoric.22
Combined with a rising interest in anything military, nationalism is 

creating a generation more aware of China’s role in the world and 

the importance of building a strong military to support this new role. 

When I asked a group of students who had accepted the National 

Defense scholarship how the recruiters had convinced them to 

decide so early to join the military, nationalism and patriotism was 

the number one response. One student went so far as to list the logic 

used to sign him, saying:

1. The recruiters persuaded us to work for the motherland.

2. They convinced us that the military provides a platform in 

which we could pursue our career goals (he was studying to be a 

computer engineer).

3. They assured us the PLA could provide a relatively good and 

stable quality of life.

In a follow-up with the school recruiter (a PLA Captain), he 

admitted that problems still exist with this technique—that it is not 

effective enough for the academically highest students. The students 

the author met with all had scores in the high 500s to low 600s on 

the national college entrance exams, good enough to gain entrance 

into Nanjing University, which is typically ranked around fifth in 

the nation.23

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS CHANGING OVER TIME?

Traditionally, the Chinese peasant feared the army. Seeing an 

approaching army on the horizon was never good news. Typically, 

the sons were conscripted on the spot, while the crops were destroyed 

in the fields or stolen from the cribs. This relationship, such as it was, 

existed into the Nationalist Army period and was a critical component 

for the success of Mao’s Red Army in earning the respect of the 

peasants among which it hid during the fight against the Japanese 

and later against Chiang Kai-shek’s ruling Kuomintang (KMT). The 

PLA’s propaganda apparatus was very effective in promulgating the 

difference of the PLA by emphasizing the closeness to the people.24

This theme has somewhat changed since the end of the honeymoon 

on June 4, 1989. The PLA has become more professional over its 78 
years of history. Today, posters calling for the people’s support to the 

nation’s defense do not exalt the PLA as much as the more abstract 

responsibility to love and defend the country.25 Even Minister of 

Defense General Cao Gangchuan openly admits the need to place a 

renewed emphasis on building reserve forces and strengthening the 

National Defense Mobilization Committees.26

By the time of Deng Xiaoping’s Openness and Reform Period, the 

PLA had inculcated itself into society by consolidating gains made 

in the Cultural Revolution. Utilities that were “nationalized” were 

incorporated into local units, and Garrison Commanders became 

virtual warlords of their areas. This practice apparently was allowed 

to continue so long as it did not get out of hand. By the late 1980s, 

Deng’s Four Modernizations placed economic development squarely 

ahead of defense issues, forcing an even greater commitment of a 

unit’s time in nondefense-related activities. Units were forced to 

make up for themselves a budget share that could not maintain a 

decent quality of life, much less provide for ample training. In the 

mid 1990s, however, the need to modernize both the economy and 

the military signaled an end to the decentralization of quality-oflife budgeting. All division-level units and below were ordered to 

divest themselves of their businesses and get back into the training 

areas. This decision, in turn, required a steep increase in the central 

budget dedicated for defense issues, but since too much would have 

been destabilizing, much of the front-end research and development 

(R&D) and procurement lines were moved out of the MND and 

consolidated into the newly reorganized Committee on Science 

Technology and Industry for the National Defense (COSTIND). This 

divergence helps account for the consistent reduction of defense 

spending as a percentage of the overall state expenditures from 17.37 

percent in 1979 to 7.6 percent in 2004.27

Post-Tiananmen. 

The PLA’s relationship with the people probably was never 

lower than in the years following the actions of late May and early 

June 1989, though the author doubts there was a corresponding drop 

in recruiting numbers. The PLA suffered not only from the general 

populace due to its obvious association with the hardliners in the 
Politburo Standing Committee who had directed it to take action 

against the people, but also from within its own ranks. To date, this 

internal debate apparently is not entirely over, as witnessed by the 

astounding call of Dr. Jiang Yanyong in 2004 for the CPC to admit its 

errors that night 15 years earlier. Ironically, Dr. Jiang also played a 

major part in part of the PLA’s major come-back roles—taking charge 

in stopping the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) outbreak 

from reaching epidemic proportions. This action by the PLA, when 

other government agencies were denying a problem existed, helped 

convince skeptics that the major flood relief efforts of 1998 were not 

an anomaly; that the PLA was once again the People’s Army.

Currently, the PLA enjoys a widespread and growing recognition 

for its service to the nation. The corruptive practices of the 1980s 

have been dealt with, and the distrust from June 1989 into the early 

1990s have faded with time. For the PLA’s part, it took stock of 

its floundering relationships and actively campaigned to restore 

its reputation. By the turn of the century, the PLA was well on its 

way, taking advantage, at the same time, of a new passion for youth 

video games.28 The more popular games in the exploding number 

of on-line gaming centers required knowledge of military tactics 

and weapons, fuelling a surge in the interest of China’s “Generation 

Y” for anything military related. Websites and chat rooms were 

created that specialized in everything from Military Doctrine and 

Strategy to the specific characteristics of the various types of military 

ammunition.29 Fashions discovered camouflage and cargo pockets, 

and no wardrobe is complete without some sort of unit patchbearing muslin or rip-stop nylon. The military motif of a popular 

new nightclub in Beijing is advertised as one of its drawing points.30

That being said, playing army and joining the army are two 

entirely different things, which the PLA is finding out to its chagrin. 

The kids who can afford to play these games, join the clubs, spend 

hours on the internet, and wear the latest fashions also can afford 

to avoid the lure of a free education in exchange for a 10-year 

commitment. They are the new urbanites from relatively wealthy 

double-income families who can send them to good high schools. 

They score relatively high on the entrance exams and therefore 

can get into the more prestigious universities. They are not, in the 

words of Howard Krawitz, “politically dependable members [of] 
Chinese society most willing to accept the party’s authority and most 

susceptible to manipulation through propaganda.”31 Those who do 

not get accepted to the top schools often are sent overseas to attend 

university, for to accept a lower-end degree in China is to limit the 

wage-earning potential of the family’s only chance for a successful 

future—the only child.

THE ONE-CHILD POLICY

The one-child policy has had a tremendous effect on PLA 

recruiting and retention, especially among the growing population 

of females. A retired colonel who coached one of the PLA’s national 

sports teams explained that, with only one child, parents are 

reluctant to allow them to join the army. In the past, this was not 

the case, though the army typically would get the second or third 

child from families with a business background. For those already 

in the military, the effect of the one-child policy on their benefits has 

been positive. They are now allowed one trip home per year, vice 

the previous allowance of once every other year. According to a PLA 

squad leader, this change is attributable directly to complaints from 

parents under the one-child policy who were missing the traditional 

family observances with their only son or daughter deployed with 

the PLA.32

The problem is common to societies whose economies are 

coming of age and whose members see a rosy future. How do you 

get intelligent, computer-savvy youth who will be needed to operate 

or command the operators of an army’s future high-tech equipment 

to give up the chance for a high-paying job and benefits to join the 

army? How do you get a college graduate— who traditionally could 

earn enough to hire a gardener if desired—to willingly waddle in the 

mud and rain, freeze at night, and bake during the day, just so he can 

lead a platoon of peasant conscripts in digging out irrigation ditches 

in momo cun [nowheresville] China? Worse yet, how do you get the 

increasingly computer savvy peasant conscripts to dig that ditch? 

This is essentially the question directed to the commandant of the 

U.S. Army Infantry Center during a senior level visit of PLA officers 

in 2004. The visitors were astounded that the students were college 

graduates, were volunteers [for the Infantry], and were conducting 
field training like privates. The head of the delegation invited the 

Commandant to visit China and explain to Chinese academy leaders 

how he motivates American lieutenants to “get down in the dirt and 

practice the drills.”33

Efforts to find and fix this problem have been ongoing for several 

years. A study of the world’s other large militaries focuses primarily 

on those with over a million in uniform; the United States, Russia, 

and India. This effort has demonstrated perhaps the clearest split 

in the PLA since Tiananmen. From the author’s participation in 

many of the meetings to hear how the United States can help in 

professionalizing the PLA, several areas clearly are not agreed to 

by all within the PLA. While the author cannot always point to a 

specific reason, the body language, refusal to even sit in on sessions 

by certain staffs, and times when previous meetings were maligned 

by a member of another staff section, all point to an ongoing internal 

conflict on how best to modernize the personnel management system 

of the PLA—from recruitment through retirement and everything in 

between. To the author, it is clear that the GSD is not willing to trust 

that the GPD’s recruiting strategy will succeed.

NATIONALISM

Of interest is a simultaneous rise in nationalism within China. 

This rise corresponds with the same phenomenon throughout all 

of Northeast Asia, but combined with the increased interest in the 

military, one cannot help but speculate that at least some in the 

government and military condone the trend. Incentives also have 

risen to convince some to commit early to a military life, including 

tuition assistance, and a guaranteed technical assignment. In other 

words, the PLA will teach you a skill and pay you while you both 

learn and apprentice. And finally, when your commitment is over, 

the PLA’s commitment is not, as it is tasked to “demobilize” all of its 

officers into appropriate jobs. In many cases, this means finding an 

appropriate-level management position in a state-owned enterprise, 

but more recently, private and international corporations are being 

successfully contacted.34 A significant amount of the 2005 Defense 

Budget’s announced growth of 12 percent over the previous year 

apparently is dedicated to the costs of demobilization.35
3

CONCLUSION

The actions taken in response to the changing recruitment pool 

indicates a split for the PLA at two distinct levels. First, the PLA is 

not as close to the people as it once was and still claims to be. That the 

PLA is searching for new ways to recruit and retain is an indication 

not only that the PLA is no longer seen as a good opportunity (relative 

to others), but that even the rise of nationalism is not enough to aid 

recruitment without internal adjustments by the PLA. Second is 

within the PLA itself, particularly between the GSD and GPD, over 

how to make the needed adjustments. The GSD is working to fix its 

training base to not only better prepare its officers for a changing 

environment, but also as a recruiting incentive to attract the better 

candidate to enter their training pipeline. The GPD is working to 

adjust promotions, pay systems, and assignments issues.

Both reflect a desire to recruit and retain through retirement 

the best officers. Both agree that what defines “best” in an officer is 

changing with the Revolution in Military Affairs and other ongoing 

changes within the PLA, and both are faced with the same pressures 

that competition for resources creates.

The difference in how to overcome these pressures, however, is 

the potential source of inter-staff competition. If the GSD creates a 

system of Education and Training that is based on getting what it gets 

(in qualitative terms) and then polishing a diamond from the rough, 

it may find itself in competition with the GPD’s ideas of increasing 

the quality of recruits at accession. This combination could also 

run counter to the GSD’s own goals by not providing a challenging 

enough academic environment for the increasingly smart youth 

being recruited out of the high schools and universities. On the other 

hand, if they build a system of PME institutions based on the GPD’s 

plan to entice higher quality recruits, they risk a mismatch in needed 

prerequisite knowledge should the GPD plan fail. If the two staffs 

get the combination right, however, each staff’s adjustments will 

have a synergistic improvement over the current system. This is an 

area to watch.

Another area to watch is the demographics of PLA recruitment. 

In much the same way that the University of Michigan’s Lee and 

Campbell Group36 is researching family relationships in Liaoning, 
the issue of a shifting recruit pool needs to be studied in depth. 

Where are regional quotas being filled by actual volunteers, vice 

selections from an unwilling population? And from where are the 

officer candidates recruited? Are there demographic similarities that 

support analysis of a shifting recruitment pool? Can this pool be 

linked to economic conditions or academic opportunities? Is there 

a pattern geographically or in terms of economic opportunities that 

can be detected? And perhaps much can be deduced by asking the 

young members of China’s growing high-tech industries why they 

did not consider a career in the military. The PLA also will need to 

answer all of these questions in the coming years to determine if 

their reforms are having the desired impact. 

The changing environment of the PLA’s civil-military relations 

is an important aspect of China’s overall social modernization and 

emergence as a regional and global power. Recruitment issues 

provide a good window into the PLA’s relations with the people, 

the government, and even the party. Further study is necessary to 

determine if the anecdotes presented in this chapter become trend 

lines. The outcome of this transition will determine whether the PLA 

retains its unique position in Chinese society as the unquestioning 

defender of the Communist Party, or as a professional military 

more motivated by affairs of the state. The future is fraught with 

contradictions. Ironically, the latter case is a possibility should the 

GPD succeed in its goal of attracting highly educated urban recruits, 

especially if they have the opportunity for overseas study before their 

PLA-sponsored political indoctrination. On the other hand, a more 

professional military—one that is closer to the government than to 

the party—also moves closer to the people, a long-time goal of the 

post-Tiananmen PLA.

Areas for further study include the use of nationalism as a 

recruiting tool, especially among the minorities, and whether the 

technologically growing PLA also is acquiring the requisite moral, 

ethical and legal bases for managing their personnel. As the PLA’s 

weaponry becomes more lethal, the failure to instill a sense of 

professionalism in their future leadership will create a danger to 

itself and to the region. It is for this reason that foreign scholars and 

governments alike should pay particular attention to this sector of 

the PLA’s transformation.
ENDNOTES – CHAPTER 2

1. The PLA unit initially was not identified. See Liu Li, “PLA has Toymaker 

in its Sights,” China Daily, May 25, 2005, p. B1. For the verdict and further details 

on the case, see Liu Li, “PLA Guard Defends its Honour in Court,” China Daily, 

November 30, 2005, p. A3. No mention was made of who was to receive the 

compensation. 

2. Mao Zedong, as quoted by Major General Yao Youzhi, Academy of Military 

Sciences, in “People’s Liberation Army and Contemporary China,” a presentation 

given to the Beijing Military Attaché Corps, Beijing, China, May 18, 2005.

3. The author witnessed this dynamic while escorting a senior Army officer 

through China in June 2005. Meetings with the General Staff and Political 

Departments would occur sequentially, even though the topic covered was 

identical. In each case, the senior representative from one would attempt to play 

up the focus of his department at the expense of the other.

4. See Xu Genchu, “Establishing Army-Government and Army-People Relations 

in a Harmonious Society,” China Military Science, Vol. 81, No. 4, Beijing: Academy 

of Military Sciences (AMS), 4th quarter 2005, pp. 103-107. Xu is a Lieutenant 

General and Deputy Commandant of AMS.

5. James C. Mulvenon and Andrew N.D. Yang, eds., The People’s Liberation 

Army as Organization: Reference Volume v1.0, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, CF-182-

NSRD, 2002.

6. Yao. 

7. Jiang Jingsong, The National People’s Congress of China, Beijing, PRC: Foreign 

Languages Press, 2003, pp. 137-140. 

8. Ibid., p. 89.

9. Ibid., p. 165.

10. The statistics in this section are compiled from China’s 2004 Defense White 

Paper, the Annual Report to Congress on the Military Power of the People’s Republic 

of China, and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) World Fact Book online at www.

cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ch.html. The Militia figures are for “primary” 

militia only, defined as under 35 years of age. The International Institute for 

Strategic Studies Military Balance separates the reserves from the active duty, 

adding another 800,000 reservists to the total. The active duty figure includes an 

unknown number of PLA uniformed civilians (Wenzhi Ganbu). I am indebted to 

Dennis Blasko for the above information on reserve and civilian numbers.

11. The high point of the PLA manpower roles was 1951, when they had 

6.27 Million on active duty. The decision to undergo the latest cuts was made in 

September 2003. See “PLA on Course to Cut 200,000 Personnel,” China Daily, July 

15, 2005, p. 1.

12. The Military Service Act was promulgated during the 2d Session of the 6th 

NPC, May 1984. See Jiang, p. 176.
13. From author’s conversation with the former coach of the Chinese Women’s 

Sport Parachute Team, Beijing, July 14, 2005.

14. Interview with unnamed PLA dancers, Urumqi, August 31, 2005.

15. Briefing to Beijing–based Foreign Army Attachés, Urumqi, September 

1, 2005. As June Teufel-Dreyer correctly pointed out during discussions of this 

chapter’s draft, there is virtually no difference between Han, Manchu, Korean, and 

Zhuang ethnicities in Chinese society. Any discussion of ethnic makeup of the PLA 

can be skewed if too much credit is given to these latter groups as minorities.

16. Although the policy was decided upon in 2003, the officers did not begin 

teaching until the term beginning after the Spring Festival in 2004. See “Senior 

Commanders to Teach in University,” PLA Daily, September 2, 2003.

17. One known example is the canteen service for the Ministry of National 

Defense Foreign Affairs Office. Judging from the comments that the canteen is now 

more expensive and less flexible in its hours, the PLA will probably go through the 

same growing pains of dealing with contractors as the U.S. military.

18. General Cao Gangchuan, “We must do still a better job in ensuring mutual 

support between the PLA and the government . . . so as to consolidate the solidarity 

between the military on the one hand and the government and the people on the 

other.” Toast at the Reception Marking the 78th Anniversary of the Founding of 

the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, Beijing, July 31, 2005.

19. Yao, offered during the question and answer section of his presentation.

20. This is a consistent theme the author has heard since the early 1990s.

21. Tang Wu and Sai Zongbao, “New Rules on Recruiting CPC Members in 

the Military Promulgated,” PLA Daily Online, February 27, 2004. See http://english.

chinamil.com.cn/english/pladaily/2004/02/27/20040227001021_TodayHeadlines.html In 

one reported case during the same timeframe, party membership played a role 

in four demobilized NCOs finding work as policemen in Shanghai. See Ming Jie 

and Fang Hongxiang, “Demobilized Soldiers Engaged as Civil Servants,” PLA 

Daily Online, February 12, 2004. Both articles accessed on August 27, 2005. See 

http://english.chinamil.com.cn/english/pladaily/2004/02/12/20040212001032_China

MilitaryNews.html

22. For a detailed discussion of the origins and dangers of this rise in nationalism, 

see Peter Hays Gries, “China’s New Nationalism: Pride, Politics and Diplomacy,” 

Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2004.

23. Interview with Nanjing University National Defense Student Unit, Nanjing, 

June 8, 2005.

24. Thousands of posters, sayings, writings, movies, and plays were authored 

with this theme. See, for example, Hu Ko, “Steeled in Battle,” Peking, PRC: Foreign 

Languages Press, 1955. See also Xu, p. 105.

25. These posters are posted around major cities in China by the local National 

Defense Support Unit and the People’s Civil Defense Corps.
26. Cao, Bayi Toast, July 31, 2005.

27. Major General Ge Tiede, Deputy Commander, Lanzhou Military Region, 

Briefing to the Beijing-based Army Attachés, Dunhuang, PRC, August 30, 2005. 

The CIA Factbook Online estimates the 2004 military expenditure as a percentage 

of gross domestic product (GDP) to be 4.3 percent.

28. The video games also are seen by the PLA as a means to simulate combat 

in the training of its junior officers and NCOs. The author has been approached 

on numerous occasions while in uniform by young PLA officers who want to 

know the differences between U.S. Army Rangers and Special Forces, so that they 

would know better how to play to their strengths in their unit gaming sessions. 

At the institutional level, every Army academy the author has visited has built a 

simulations center to help train their cadets.

29. For more on websites in China dedicated to studying the PLA, see James C. 

Mulvenon and Andrew N. D. Yang, eds., A Poverty of Riches: New Challenges and 

Opportunities in PLA Research, Santa Monica, CA: RAND: CF-189-NSRD, 2003.

30. Haidian District’s The Nameless Highland “. . . caters to a younger crowd 

and with its military décor, blends in well with the nascent live music in Beijing.” 

See “City Weekend,” November 24-December 7, 2005, p. E16. Also available Online 

at www.cityweekend.com.cn.

31. Howard M. Krawitz, “Modernizing China’s Military: A High-stakes 

Gamble?” Strategic Forum Paper No. 204, National Defense University Institute 

for National Strategic Studies, December 2003, p. 3. Elsewhere, he describes the 

PLA’s traditional population base as “members of a politically acceptable class with 

historically low levels of education, readily susceptible to political indoctrination.” 

See Krawitz, p. 4.

32. Interview with a Third Class NCO, Urumqi, September 1, 2005. This NCO 

had a wife and daughter in Qingdao, but used his annual leave to visit his parents. 

His own family joined him at that time, but was also able to visit him in Xinjiang 

during school breaks. 

33. Author’s notes while escorting a senior PLA officer, Ft. Benning, GA, 

September 2005.

34. Author’s discussions with a senior PLA officer in Bejing, April 16, 2005.

35. Ibid. This rise in the demobilization share of the budget does not, however, 

include retirement pay, which is not included in the Defense Budget.

36. The University of Michigan’s Lee-Campbell Resarch Group is a collection of 

Ph.D. candidates, researchers, consultants, and technical staff under the leadership 

of faculty members James Lee and Cameron Campbell. They conduct long-term 

research on family relationships, demographics, and population behavior in Asia 

and Europe. For more information on this group and their on-going projects, see 

their website at http://michigan.ccast.ac.cn/leegroup/index.htm.
CHAPTER 3

CHINA’S MILITARY BUILDUP:

BEYOND TAIWAN?

Ellis Joffe

Although specialists on the Chinese military are divided as to the 

ramifications of China’s military modernization, there is widespread 

agreement that in the past few years the Chinese armed forces 

have made remarkable and unexpected progress. Even though the 

conventional wisdom only a few years ago was that the Chinese 

army was no match for the U.S. military and that the gap would 

widen, the surprising growth of Chinese military power clearly has 

become a serious consideration in U.S. Government assessments of 

China’s behaviour in its vicinity and beyond. 

This growth was considered substantial enough by 2005 to have 

elicited expressions of concern, if not alarm, by top U.S. Government 

and intelligence officials over China’s military buildup. Its extent and 

implications were detailed in the report on China’s Military Power 

submitted to Congress by the Department of Defense (DoD) in July 

2005,1 which asserts that, although China does not face a direct threat 

from another country, it continues to increase its military buildup. 

What, then, have been the objectives of China’s military buildup? 

How have they shaped its course and content? What does the buildup 

indicate about the possible use of China’s military power, and where 

is it headed?

The Objectives of China’s Military Buildup.

Although China’s military buildup began at the start of the 

1980s, there is no doubt that the catalyst for its acceleration and for 

the acquisition of advanced capabilities from the late 1990s has been 

the emergence of the Taiwan issue in a form that is unacceptable to 

the Chinese—unacceptable because Taiwan leaders reject the “one 

China” principle and are intent on moving toward separation from 
China. However, a broader look at the process shows that, despite 

the supreme significance of this issue, the process began in earnest 

before its emergence, and presumably will not end even if tensions 

over Taiwan will be reduced substantially, if not resolved. 

The long-term objectives of China’s military modernization are 

more far-reaching than the Taiwan issue: they are to provide the 

military underpinning for China’s coveted rise to great power status, 

beginning with the attainment of regional preeminence backed by 

military power. However, China’s leaders realized from the outset 

that the enormous gap between their capabilities and whatever 

capabilities were commensurate with their long-range objectives 

was unbridgeable for a long time due to the appalling backwardness 

of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the low level of China’s 

economic and technological development. China’s leaders therefore 

opted for slow and incremental military advances rather than for 

major but unrealistic attempts to modernize rapidly. 

In the meantime, their long-term objectives remained dormant and 

did not influence the course of military modernization for more than 

a decade. During this decade, modernization proceeded unevenly: 

following a successful spurt in the early 1980s, it slowed down until 

the end of the period. However, this spurt was limited largely to the 

nontechnological aspects of the army’s combat capabilities and was 

marked mainly by the upgrading of old weapons rather than the 

acquisition of new ones. 

The turning point occurred in the early 1990s with the appearance 

of several factors conducive to military modernization. The fortuitous 

combination of these factors convinced Chinese leaders that their 

long-term objectives did not have to remain dormant any longer, and 

enabled them to begin the long process of building up military forces 

that are essential for a rising power. From then on, these objectives 

have provided the broad strategic impetus to the step up of China’s 

military buildup. 

The first factor was the Gulf War. The vast array of modern 

weapons that demolished the Iraqi army demonstrated dramatically 

to the Chinese military that, despite a decade of modernization, their 

armed forces were still generations behind those of the United States.2

Not that this was news to them, but knowing something theoretically 
was one thing, seeing it on their screens, quite another. And what 

they saw convinced the Chinese that they had to initiate sweeping 

changes that would begin to pull the PLA out of its backwardness 

and prepare it for a different kind of war: “limited war under high 

technology conditions.” These changes encompassed operational 

doctrines and training, but the most pressing need was for new 

weapons.

Meeting this need was beyond the capacity of China’s military 

industries that were mired in technological backwardness and 

bureaucratic incompetence. Although the Chinese also began to 

initiate reforms in these industries, it was clear that this would be 

a long process, the success of which was not guaranteed. In the 

meantime, the Chinese surely would have been unable to move ahead 

if not for the second factor that worked in their favor: the collapse of 

the Soviet Union and the availability from 1992 of advanced weapons 

from Russia. In turning to Russia, the Chinese broke two of their own 

rules against large imports of new weapons: the desire not to become 

dependent on foreign suppliers and the difficulty of absorbing such 

weapons. The readiness of the Chinese to do this, and the timing of 

the arms deals, which began several years before the Taiwan crisis, 

was a clear indication of China’s desire to push ahead with military 

modernization independent of specific contingencies. 

The third factor was economic. Modern weapons are expensive. 

China is estimated to have spent about $20 billion on imports from 

Russia alone, with some $12 billion worth of weapons and equipment 

delivered by 2004. High cost was the chief reason for the small 

quantities of weapons that the Chinese had bought until then, and 

it was the strongest rationale of the Deng Xiaoping leadership for 

rejecting military demands for more money. Its argument was that 

economic development had to precede military advances. By the 

early 1990s, this argument began to weaken. After a brief recession 

due to leadership differences that followed the suppression of the 

Tiananmen demonstrations, the Chinese economy began to move 

ahead rapidly. Deng’s 1992 “southern tour,” during which he 

castigated conservative leaders who opposed China’s transition to 

a market economy, broke the logjam and released the enormous 

energies that have powered China’s subsequent economic surge. The 

new party leader, Jiang Zemin, could no longer hold off the financial 
demands of the generals by telling them that they had to wait for the 

expansion of the economy.

Jiang could not hold them off for political reasons as well. Lacking 

the political authority and military stature of his predecessors, Jiang 

could not rely on the automatic support of the military, as they could. 

Although his rise had been sanctioned by Deng, Jiang had to win over 

the generals by being receptive to their needs. Foremost among these 

was money. In addition, Jiang genuinely seemed to be committed to 

modernizing the armed forces not only for internal political reasons, 

but also because he was fully aware both of their backwardness and 

of their importance for advancing China’s external aims.

Despite the push that this combination of factors gave to military 

modernization in the interest of far-off objectives, progress still was 

relatively slow until the second half of the 1990s precisely because 

the objectives were far off. What the endeavor lacked was a strategic 

focus that would give it a clearly defined target and a sense of 

urgency. This much-needed focus was provided by the emergence 

of the Taiwan issue. 

Taiwan and China’s Military Buildup.

The Taiwan issue first emerged in a new and, from China’s 

standpoint, provocative form as a result of Taiwan President Lee 

Teng-hui’s trip to the United States in 1995, which sparked a crisis 

that intensified for nearly a year and reached a climax during the 

spring of 1996 in the run-up to elections in Taiwan. In the end, the 

crisis brought two U.S. carrier groups into the vicinity of Taiwan, and 

forced a humiliating Chinese retreat from missile firing exercises. 

Tensions remained high in the following years and were further 

exacerbated by Lee Teng-hui’s 1999 enunciation of the “two state” 

theory. As his successor, Chen Shui-bian, continued to push for the 

de facto separation of Taiwan from China, the Taiwan issue remained 

deadlocked.

After the 1995-96 crisis, the Chinese began to prepare for military 

action in order to prevent separation. There is no doubt that from the 

outset of their preparations the Chinese considered such action to be 

only a means of last resort, not only because of the uncertainty of the 

outcome, but also because of the enormous political and economic 
damage that it would wreak on a rising China. At the same time, there 

also is hardly any doubt that in the event of a formal declaration of 

independence by Taiwan, concern for national honor, international 

credibility, and internal politics would leave the Chinese little choice 

except to make good on their threat of war. Nonetheless, their 

preparations were designed first of all to deter war, not to wage it.

Not that militarily the Chinese had much choice. The gap between 

their capability and an effective warfighting one was evidently still 

too wide for the Chinese to contemplate seriously an invasion of the 

island, even without the possibility of American intervention. Their 

initial steps, therefore, were directed at increasing and improving 

their missiles opposite Taiwan on the apparent assumption that the 

threat of a missile strike would deter the Taiwanese from pushing 

for separation too far.3

Whether at this time the Chinese already were certain of an 

American counterattack if they struck Taiwan with missiles is not 

clear, but given the dispatch of carrier groups in 1996 and the U.S. 

policy of “strategic ambiguity” toward the Taiwan issue, they must 

have taken such a possibility into account. In any case, missiles alone 

could only be an interim solution for the Chinese. First, because 

there was always the possibility that a missile attack, while crippling 

Taiwan, might not bring about its capitulation, leaving Taiwan 

defiant and China without the option of following up its attack with 

an invasion. Such a failure would cause China an enormous loss 

of national face. It would damage severely China’s relations with 

the United States, even if the United States refrained from military 

action. And it would harm China’s economy, international posture, 

and regional relations. The Chinese surely could settle for nothing 

less than Taiwan’s surrender. 

Similar calculations presumably came into effect in case China tried 

to subjugate Taiwan by imposing a naval blockade. A blockade—the 

forms of which could range from marking shipping lanes for missile 

strikes, through physical stopping of ships, to submarine attacks—

could presumably undermine Taiwan’s economy, or even destroy 

it if imposed over a long period. However, this, too, was an unsure 

option due to uncertainty about its results, as well as doubts about 

China’s ability to enforce it, the possibility of U.S. intervention, and 

international pressure. 
4

This left only one certain option—a successful invasion and 

occupation of Taiwan. However, in the second half of the 1990s, 

China was woefully unprepared to undertake such an invasion. 

Its weapons were still far from adequate, new ones were still in the 

process of absorption, and indigenous acquisition programs begun 

several years previously—especially of naval vessels—was still in 

early stages. Chinese troops, moreover, apparently were still not 

ready for complex operations.

At the same time, by the end of the decade the possibility of 

U.S. intervention became, for the Chinese, a certainty. The “U.S.-

led” North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) bombardment of 

Yugoslavia during the Kosovo crisis was viewed by the Chinese as 

reflecting U.S. readiness to bully other nations in order to impose its 

will. Foremost among America’s adversaries, as the Chinese saw it, 

was China, whose rise to great power status the United States was 

determined to block. 

The conclusion was clear to the Chinese: their armed forces had to 

be capable of conquering Taiwan and coping with U.S. intervention. 

A concerted effort to acquire this capability therefore became the 

strategic focus of China’s accelerated military buildup. Its specific 

aims have been to enable China’s armed forces to overrun Taiwan 

rapidly, preferably before the United States intervenes; to deter the 

United States by raising the costs of intervention; to deny U.S. forces 

access to the theatre of operations, primarily by improving China’s 

naval capabilities; and, if all else fails, to defeat the United States in 

combat around Taiwan. 

China’s weapons acquisition and troop preparations have 

both been oriented toward these aims. Foremost among the new 

or improved weapons have been ballistic and cruise missiles; 

submarines and surface vessels armed with advanced attack and 

defense systems; sea lift capabilities; advanced aircraft, new air 

refueling capabilities, and early warning and control aircraft; and new 

air defense systems. For the ground forces, the emphasis has been on 

improved armor and artillery, helicopters, amphibious capabilities, 

and joint service operations. Command, control, communications, 

and computer systems also were improved, as well as logistics and 

the use of information technology.4
Although it is clear that, as a result of these efforts, the Chinese 

have increased greatly the quality and quantity of weapons and 

equipment, it is not at all clear what progress they have made in 

the professionalism and proficiency that are required to make 

effective use of their new acquisitions. The extent of such progress 

is uncertain. Even though the Chinese have increased slightly the 

transparency of their armed forces, this has not contributed much 

to facilitating an assessment of their combat capability. Nonetheless, 

there can be little doubt that the proven quality of Chinese soldiers 

and basic-level leaders, combined with new weapons and extensive 

preparations, have increased greatly the reach and effectiveness of 

the PLA. 

How does this increase relate to the objectives of their buildup? 

The Pentagon report is vague on this question. It states that “the 

cross-Strait balance of power is shifting toward Beijing” and notes 

that China’s “attempt to hold at risk U.S. naval forces . . . approaching 

the Taiwan Strait” potentially poses “a credible threat to modern 

militaries operating in the region.” At the same time, it notes major 

defects in interservice coordination, joint operations, and operational 

experience, and states that “China’s ability to project conventional 

military beyond its periphery remains limited.” Nevertheless, the 

bottom line seems to be that an acceleration of China’s military 

modernization threatens stability in the Taiwan Straits and the safety 

of U.S. personnel.

Top U.S. naval experts take exception to this view of China’s 

threat on the seas. According to one, all of China’s outstanding 

strategic problems are maritime, so it is not surprising that it is 

building up its naval forces. China is not building a huge navy for 

sea control but is aiming at sea denial with submarines, land-based 

aircraft, and ballistic missiles. To achieve this, the Chinese need a 

highly sophisticated targeting network that would not be vulnerable 

to disruption. This is a very ambitious objective, and China still has 

a long way to go. The U.S. Navy will have time to take appropriate 

action to make sure that U.S. forces are not denied access to the 

region.5

Do the Chinese think they are on the way to achieving this objective 

with respect to Taiwan? Obviously this is not a subject that they tend 

to discuss openly, and their occasional public statements are marked 
by bravado and confidence. However, during an internal debate on 

China’s security several years ago, some Chinese analysts candidly 

acknowledged U.S. military superiority over China in a Taiwan 

conflict.6 Although China has made much progress since then, so has 

the United States, and it is doubtful whether Chinese strategists now 

consider the Chinese armed forces capable of stopping or defeating 

the United States in a Taiwan conflict.

One clue to their thinking in 2005 inadvertently may have 

been given by a Chinese general known for his outspoken views. 

Responding to a reporter’s question about China’s ability to defend 

itself against U.S. intervention (especially with aircraft carriers) in 

a Taiwan conflict, he replied that China is the weak side, and the 

balance of power between the United States and China is such 

that China has no capability to wage a conventional war against 

the United States. In the event of war, therefore, China will have 

to respond with nuclear weapons.7 Although his preposterous 

conclusion was presumably a silly attempt at weakening American 

resolve over Taiwan, his admission of China’s inferiority probably 

reflects a realistic appraisal that is widespread among the Chinese 

military. 

In conclusion, China may be able to invade and occupy Taiwan, 

and it may be able to inflict damage on U.S. forces approaching the 

battle zone. But it clearly does not have the ability to deny access to 

these forces. Since this is one of China’s main objectives in the event 

of war, it will continue to build up its forces to that end as long as 

the Taiwan issue remains unresolved. But is this the only objective 

driving China’s military buildup?

Beyond Taiwan?

This is a difficult question because China’s accelerated buildup 

has “dual-use” possibilities. Even if the strategic focus and fuel for 

the buildup has been provided by the Taiwan issue, the new weapons 

and improved combat skills acquired for that purpose already have 

given China a capability that it can use for limited purposes beyond 

Taiwan. For example, the penetration of an advanced Chinese 

submarine into Japanese waters in November 2004 may have been 

a response to rising tensions with Japan, especially due to Japan’s 
strengthening of strategic ties with the United States. And in another 

show of force, five Chinese naval vessels, including a missile destroyer 

and two missile frigates, were spotted by the Japanese in September 

2005 in the vicinity of a disputed undersea exploration site. 

Since China’s purpose is to disable U.S. forces as far from Taiwan 

as possible, it will continue to develop naval and air capabilities 

that increase its regional reach. As these capabilities develop, China 

might be inclined to use them against other countries in the region 

as backup for its diplomatic or economic interests.8 As long as the 

Taiwan issue continues to generate tensions, the military buildup 

increasingly will provide China with “dual-use” capabilities. But 

what if both sides settle on a stable status quo and tensions are vastly 

reduced? 

It is a safe bet that the military buildup will continue. Just as in 

the early 1990s China’s leaders took initial steps toward developing 

the armed forces appropriate for a rising power unrelated to Taiwan, 

so they view the continuation of this development as an essential 

component of China’s ascent. China’s stunning surge in the world 

economy and the concurrent rise in its international stature can 

only have strengthened this view. The necessity of acquiring this 

component is underlined by the concern of China’s leaders over the 

impact of U.S. power on the global situation, and on China’s security 

as a result of its military presence and its alliances, most notably 

with Japan, in the region.9 It also is underlined by their concern for 

protecting China’s sea lines of communication, especially in view of 

its thirst for oil. If the Chinese continue on their current trajectory, it 

is possible that they will present a substantial military challenge to 

U.S. preeminance in the Western Pacific in a couple of decades. 

However, without Taiwan as the driving force, the scope and 

pace of the future buildup might be reduced. The buildup also will 

be influenced by some of the same factors that started it in the first 

place. First, although the continued availability of Russian weapons 

is not ensured, given the unease of some Russian generals with the 

building up of China’s armed forces, China’s improving military 

industry presumably will be able to fill many of China’s needs. 

More important will be the future state of China’s economy. 

If it continues to develop at similar levels, it will be difficult for 

the political leaders to make big cuts in the military budget on 
economic grounds. Even so, if rural and urban unrest increases due 

to widespread disaffection, a leadership worried about instability 

might try to reduce increases in military appropriations in order to 

divert funds to these sectors. However, if the economic fault lines 

identified by many observers cause a serious economic slowdown, if 

not worse, the military undoubtedly will be under pressure to reduce 

expenses.

How competing economic and military demands balance out will 

depend largely on civil-military relations. Almost a year after Hu 

Jintao replaced Jiang Zemin as head of the military establishment, his 

relations with the generals seem to be correct but cool. The military’s 

expressions of support for Hu are sparse and lukewarm; his public 

presence on the military scene is low key, if not elusive; and Hu’s 

statements of support for military modernization are perfunctory. 

This coolness presumably reflects the increasing separation 

between a development-oriented civil leadership and an increasingly 

insular professional military. If Hu succeeds in consolidating his 

control over the generals—primarily by using his vast institutional 

powers of appointment and dismissal—he should have no difficulty 

in keeping down the military budget in the event of an economic 

slowdown. If not, his attempt to do this presumably will cause friction. 

Nonetheless, the dominant factor shaping civil-military relations 

will be the common objective of building up China’s military power 

for the sake of objectives arising out of an assertive nationalism.

ENDNOTES – CHAPTER 3

1. “The Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2005,” Annual Report 

to Congress, Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, July 2005. 

2. David Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military: Progress, Problems, and 

Prospects, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2002, pp. 69-74.

3. On China’s options, see Shambaugh, pp. 311-327.

4. Paul H. B. Godwin, “China as a Major Asian Power: The Implications of Its 

Military Modernization,” unpublished paper, 2005. 

5. Inside the Navy, July 25, 2005.

6. David M. Finkelstein, “Chinese Perceptions of the Cost of a Conflict,” in 

Andrew Scobell, ed., The Costs of Conflict: The Impact on China of a Future War, 

Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2001, pp. 9-27.
7. The New York Times, July 15, 2005.

8. Godwin.

9. Ibid.

PART II

WAR AND DEFENSE MODERNIZATION

CHAPTER 4

ASSESSING AMERICA AT WAR:

IMPLICATIONS FOR CHINA’S MILITARY MODERNIZATION

AND NATIONAL SECURITY1

Susan M. Puska

INTRODUCTION

The September 11, 2001 (9/11), terrorist attacks on America 

provided a strategic opening for China and the United States to 

rebuild bilateral relations most recently damaged by the April 2001 

EP-3 Incident.2 President Jiang Zemin, watching the unfolding 

events on CNN, wasted little time in contacting President Bush to 

express his condolences personally.3 The following month, President 

Bush attended the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum 

hosted by the Chinese in Shanghai. Meeting President Jiang for the 

first time, President Bush cautiously began to reenergize the bilateral 

relationship. With top-down authority on both sides, relations shifted 

to a more positive and constructive approach that have continued to 

grow over the last 5 years. 

While overall bilateral ties moved in a more positive direction after 

9/11, both the Chinese and American militaries remained mutually 

wary and cautious. The U.S. Secretary of Defense, for example, did 

not choose to make his first official visit to China until October 2005, 

5 years after assuming office, and 4 years after President Bush told 

Jiang Zemin in October 2001 that military-to-military ties were an 

important part of bilateral relations and should be resumed.4 While 

bilateral military activity has increased gradually since 9/11, with 

promises for more contacts in 2006, they remain uncertain and 

vulnerable to recurring cancellations and postponements.

During the October 2001 APEC meeting, President Jiang Zemin 

expressed strong opposition to terrorism. He said China supported 

military operations in Afghanistan, but it was not open-ended 

support, and he cautioned that Afghanistan’s sovereignty and 
5

independence must be ensured. The APEC meeting, nonetheless, led 

the way for U.S.-China counterterrorism intelligence cooperation5

and China’s general acquiescence to the U.S. military intervention in 

Afghanistan, as well as U.S. cooperation with Pakistan and Central 

Asia. 

Whereas they were more cautiously supportive of operations in 

Afghanistan against the Taliban as a direct response to 9/11, China’s 

collective leadership was far less supportive of U.S. intentions to 

resort to military action in Iraq to remove Saddam Hussein, although 

they were not capable of stopping military action. In general, Chinese 

leaders put a priority on maintaining stable relations with post9/11 America, while asserting China’s fundamental foreign policy 

principles (expressed in the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence), 

which provide a counterpoint to U.S. priorities and international 

action since 9/11. At the same time, China’s leaders used the 

mechanisms of influence available to them, such as the Shanghai 

Cooperation Organization (SCO), to protect and promote China’s 

national interests along China’s periphery from India and Pakistan 

to Central Asia and Russia, often in reaction to U.S. initiatives to 

support Afghanistan operations and the wider war on terrorism. 

In the summer of 2002, China’s official press began to question 

U.S. motives toward Iraq, particularly after President Bush’s West 

Point commencement address in which he implied that the United 

States would use preemptive and unilateral force. Chinese military 

interlocutors in Beijing at the time expressed surprise and frustration 

with the “Bush Doctrine.” Some in the official press attributed this 

“shift” in U.S. policy to America’s global dominance, which stimulated 

“hegemony.”6 The polemic analysis in civilian and military press in 

response to the Bush Doctrine sidestepped any recognition that any 

country, including China during its 1979 unilateral and preemptive 

intervention in Vietnam, reserves the unstated right to resort to 

preemptive military action against national threats. These criticisms 

of the United States were largely masked behind the “personal 

opinions” of the writers, which avoided damaging bilateral relations 

with more direct official criticisms. 

Yuan Jing-dong, a Chinese national security academic writing 

for a Western audience succinctly characterized China’s complicated 

policy toward U.S. military intervention in Iraq based on three often 
contradictory considerations: (1) China’s principle of sovereignty and 

nonintervention, (2) U.S.-China relations in the post-9/11 era, and 

(3) “[China’s] growing concern over the implications for [China’s] 

security [within the context] of an expanding campaign against 

terrorism.”7 Chinese civilian leaders and the military worried what 

implications U.S. preemptive action could have on China’s national 

security.8 In particular, the Bush Doctrine raised old and new worries 

about whether or not the United States might be more inclined to 

intervene on Taiwan’s behalf. After the 2002 State of the Union 

address, they also faced the prospect that the United States might 

attack North Korea militarily, which the President had identified as 

a member of an “axis of evil.” Lacking sufficient power to persuade 

the superpower, and also prudently assessing that confrontation 

would only undermine China’s long-term national interests, 

especially economic development, the Chinese leadership sought 

nonconfrontational and new indirect ways to promote Chinese 

interests. Consequently, China’s post-9/11 national security strategy 

has given more weight to diplomatic cooperation with the United 

States. At the same time, China has sought to enhance its image as a 

positive force for peace and economic development within the AsiaPacific and the rest of the world. 

As a result of a more cooperative approach to the United States, 

the general arch of U.S. China bilateral relations since 2001 has 

been relatively positive and cooperative, dominated by diplomatic 

cooperation under the purview of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 

(MFA). The People’s Liberation Army (PLA), for the time being, is 

taking a back seat on national security policy. Since 2003, China’s 

leadership has taken greater initiative, such as its work to ease 

tensions on the Korean Peninsula, which has enhanced bilateral ties 

and raised China’s stature in the Asia-Pacific region and globally.9

While the possibility of an American intervention in East Asia was 

raised by the Bush Doctrine, which required delicate handling, China 

nonetheless also has benefited from the strategic breathing room of 

a distracted and aggressive United States. Particularly since 2003, 

the United States remains intensely focused on achieving complete 

“victory” in Iraq stabilization and reconstruction. Extensive work 

also remains unfinished in Afghanistan, while the vital mission 

to protect the U.S. homeland against terrorist attacks has been 
unfulfilled in key areas. Beyond security issues directly arising from 

America’s global war on terrorism, domestic challenges, such as the 

need for extensive domestic recovery and reconstruction in the wake 

of the Katrina disaster, weigh heavily on the attention of leaders at 

all levels of government and national resources. Combined with 

the U.S. intent to reduce its military footprint in Asia, the U.S. focus 

on Iraq provides China with an opportunity to strengthen its own 

influence among Asia neighbors. 

But beneath the relatively positive political atmospherics and 

targeted bilateral cooperation, the foundation of U.S.-China ties 

remains unstable and vulnerable to disruption during the next 

bilateral crisis. As China’s confidence and military capabilities 

mature, and issues that are essential to China’s national security, such 

as Taiwan reunification, remain unresolved, the U.S. preoccupation 

allows China to reshape its regional presence. Core issues of potential 

conflict in the bilateral relationship merely have been papered over. 

Resolution of explosive issues, such as Taiwan, remain perpetually 

deferred to an undetermined future, when it may be too late to 

negotiate peaceful solutions. Mutual threat perceptions, distrust, 

and even underlying hostility, particularly between the militaries 

and other influential national security actors in each country, are 

potential tinder to the overall relationship. 

Despite cosmetic improvements since the EP-3 incident, the 

bilateral military relationship continues to be treated as an expendable 

facet of bilateral relations, or a stick with which to beat the other 

side to demonstrate distrust and suspicion. Within national security 

and military circles on both sides of the Pacific, it is now common 

to entertain the likelihood of conflict between China and the United 

States as an inevitable outcome.10 Some even cavalierly welcome 

the prospects of a conflict between the United States and China, 

too easily disregarding the potential costs of such a confrontation 

or what end-state such a war could achieve. Consequently, the next 

bilateral crisis easily could wipe away this recent positive trend, but 

this time the consequences to regional stability could be quite high, 

and the ability for both sides to recover may prove elusive. 

Within this complex and contradictory civil-military context, an 

examination of China’s ongoing national security assessment and 

adjustments to a post-9/11 America may provide a more realistic, if 
sober, view of mid to long-term U.S.-China relations than the current 

rosy picture provides. At a time of post-9/11 global military activism, 

U.S. operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as its antiterror 

operations in other countries, have been of particular interest and 

concern to Chinese leaders, academics, diplomats, and military 

observers, causing China to adjust its national security posture in 

Central Asia, for example, as well as its bilateral relationship with 

Russia. Below the strategic level, the Chinese military plays a role 

in assessing operational capabilities that the Chinese military may 

have to fight or employ itself in the future as its military develops 

modern informational military capabilities. Having been at peace 

internationally since the 1979 intervention in Vietnam, the PLA lacks 

any modern military wartime experience. Consequently, observations 

of America at war in Afghanistan and Iraq provide proxy experience 

for study, evaluation, and adaptation to the PLA modernization.

This chapter examines overall analytical trends in both civilian 

and military writings on the U.S. war in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Civilian writings tend to focus on the strategic level and overall 

foreign policy issues that address why the United States intervened 

and what it hopes to achieve internationally and in terms of U.S. 

national security. Military writings concentrate on how the military 

has carried out its operations and the tactics employed. 

This is not intended to be an exhaustive study of all Chinese 

writings, but rather draws on a representative sample. Many of the 

Chinese writings (civilian and military) heavily exploit Western 

(especially American) writings on the war. The use of indirection, 

particularly when criticizing the United States, has been strong in 

Chinese open source writings, so the author has attempted to filter 

out original Chinese viewpoints, rather than regurgitate Western 

writings. 

The chapter addresses the following strategic questions: 

• Why, according to Chinese assessments, did the United States 

militarily intervene in Iraq and Afghanistan? What are its longterms goals as they affect China? What are the implications of 

U.S. military intervention on China’s national security?

• How has China’s threat assessment of the United States been 

effected by the Iraq and Afghanistan military operations? 
• What strategic opportunities do the U.S. interventions in Iraq 

and Afghanistan provide China and how are the Chinese 

exploiting these? 

• Has China’s assessment of America’s comprehensive strength 

and influence, as well as its military, changed since 9/11? 

At the operational and tactical level, the chapter will identify 

some of the PLA’s main areas of interest and discuss how the PLA 

is using these American operations to promote its own interests and 

enhance their own military modernization. 

THE ROLE OF THE PLA IN NATIONAL SECURITY 

DECISIONMAKING 

The PLA has enjoyed a monopoly over military matters in China 

during much of the reform era since 1979. Loose civilian oversight 

depended upon key personalities at the highest levels, such as Deng 

Xiaoping, who possessed Long March military credentials, or Jiang 

Zemin, who tried to follow the Deng model despite his lack of military 

experience. Jiang worked assiduously to buttress his position as 

Deng’s heir by developing special links to military leaders through 

promotions and intense courting. 

Over time the PLA’s role and influence on central politics declined 

in relative terms. In national security affairs where Chinese policies 

toward the United States remain centrally and tightly controlled, 

the PLA plays a subordinate role, but it still can influence policy 

by advocating certain positions. It can also shape policy through its 

management of military information. 

Military influence on national policy is not unique to China. The 

U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) influences national policy and 

public threat perceptions of China when it emphasizes particular 

aspects of Chinese military modernization in the Annual Report 

to Congress, or when Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld 

pointedly questions Chinese intentions for acquiring certain military 

capabilities and declaring that China has no threats that justify these, 

for examples. Although the PLA has come to play a more “normal” 

role as one of many interest groups in Chinese politics, it still is unique 
in the amount of control and compartmentalization it exercises over 

military information. Further, the PLA’s special relationship to 

the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) through its officer corps, all 

ostensibly embedded Party members, assures the PLA will have 

special influence over foreign policy, although not necessarily 

decisive. In bilateral military relations, as an example of PLA power 

and influence, the PLA is often a check on greater openness and 

transparency in the name of protecting “state secrets,” which may 

inhibit the scope of bilateral relations. In the case of the EP-3, the 

PLA could not resolve the international crisis with the United States, 

which was the responsibility of the MFA to resolve, but they could 

inhibit resolution through withholding of information and general 

foot dragging, which complicated MFA negotiations. The PLA also 

withheld health information during the severe acute respiratory 

syndrome (SARS) crisis, for example, which could have helped the 

central authorities respond quicker to the crisis. 

ASSESSING AMERICA’S MILITARY OPERATIONS

The Chinese view of the U.S. military’s performance in Afghanistan 

and Iraq can be found openly in the official press, as well as military 

and civilian works published throughout China. Relatively wellinformed academics and journalists, who interviewed named and 

unnamed military experts, have written extensively on various 

aspects of the operations. Writers also have depended on Western 

sources, quoting Americans at length. While many reports are long 

quotes of Western media and government statements, others pick 

and choose criticisms, which allow the Chinese official press to 

criticize the United States, using Western reporting. 

In general, strategic level discussions of the motives and objectives 

of U.S. military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq are discussed 

freely in official civilian press reports such as People’s Daily and 

People’s Liberation Daily and academic journals. The talking points 

are highly disciplined and reinforce one another through repetition. 

Operational and tactical assessments can be found in technical and 

academic journals, both civilian and military. At the operational 

and tactical level, Chinese writings on Iraq and Afghanistan are 
more technical. These technically oriented assessments address 

capabilities. The articles tend to be straightforward discussions of 

U.S. capacity, sometimes without comment of the implications for 

PLA modernization. At other times, however, the articles imply that 

the PLA also must have these capabilities as part of its modernization 

effort, if it hopes to provide a viable deterrent capability or will 

have to fight the U.S. military in the near future. Countermeasures 

generally are not discussed directly in open sources publications; 

however, mistakes and miscalculations that the U.S. military makes 

often are discussed in some detail. The needs of the PLA in terms of 

doctrine and procedures, as well as capabilities, are also discussed 

in general terms, with emphasis on operational and tactical logistics, 

high-technology weapons and equipment, information technology, 

and psychological operations. 

With some exceptions, Chinese civilian and military observers 

of the 21-day military campaign to topple Saddam Hussein viewed 

U.S. military operations with admiration for the speed of offensive 

operations and the employment of high–technology weapons and 

equipment. The U.S. arsenal of military precision-guided weapons, 

high-tech communications, and modern throughput logistics system 

performance were praised in broad, sometimes unrealistic, terms. 

Many compared these capabilities to the Gulf War, and noted how 

far the U.S. military capability had developed as a fully informational 

force. The brevity of the military campaign reinforced the view of 

some Chinese analysts that the PLA must acquire modern weapons 

and equipment faster to develop into an effective force. Although 

peer military capability with the United States is judged to be far 

beyond China’s reach for the near to mid-term, some analysts 

argued that China must possess high-technology weaponry and 

equipment in the information age to deter a preemptive attack on 

China’s territory. Some writers charged that the dramatic mismatch 

between the Iraqi military and U.S. forces demeaned the value of 

the U.S. defeat of Iraqi forces, but many Chinese observers remained 

focused on the methods and results of American high-technology 

and its information age military. 

Professor Qiao Xinsheng of the Zhongshan University of Finance, 

Economy, Political Science, and Law writes an example of an 

academic, nontechnical piece focused on a polemic criticism of the 
U.S. war in Iraq,11 including an examination of several “paradoxes” 

of the war. He wrote, for example, that the Iraq War was a “real 

war,” in which two powerful armies met in battle, but it also was an 

“unreal war,” in which one side (Iraqi military) melted away into the 

general population, rather than defend its positions or take effective 

measures to delay the advancing U.S. Army, such as destroying 

bridges.12

Qiao said Iraq was a “just war,” because a hated dictator was 

disposed. But it also was an “evil war” because it lacked clear 

international legal authority and caused untold suffering for the 

Iraqi people. The American goal to liberate the Iraqi people, who had 

suffered for years under a ruthless dictator and 12 years of sanctions, 

was undermined, Qiao wrote, by the number of civilian casualties 

and damage to property that the U.S. military operation caused.13

Qiao observed that although the war seemed to be prepared 

carefully, with advance assembly of forces and materiel over a period 

of months, it also was launched hastily without the support of Turkey 

and lacking an effective plan for reconstruction.14 Writing prior to 

the insurgency in the summer 2003, Qia wrote that the American 

“victory” in battle did not justify the use of force. He thought that 

the Iraq War provided an “impressive display” of American military 

capability, but in the end, he wrote, “the most modern military in the 

world could only defeat an underdeveloped Iraqi military, which 

easily allowed the Americans to decapitate the Iraqi regime.”15

Further, Qiao saw the Iraq War primarily as “America’s war.” 

Unlike the 1991 Gulf War, which had a powerful coalition force that 

shared a large portion of the costs of that war, the Iraq War had a small 

coalition of the willing and depended largely on a preponderance of 

American forces, equipment, weapons, and financing.16

Several commentaries concentrated on the miscalculations of the 

Iraq War, in particular. For example, a commentary by Lin Bo of the 

National Defense University Strategic Studies Research Institute on 

March 27, 2003, analyzed military miscalculations during the first 

week of the conflict. He wrote that the “myth of the U.S. military’s 

“zero casualties” (more a reflections of Chinese beliefs that the United 

States would shrink away from escalating American casualties). He 

argued that the strategy of “no contact” (stand off) war, created in 
the 1990s, had been “demolished.”17 Lin assessed that the Iraq War 

could not be fought, let alone won, merely through air and precision 

guided attacks. He echoed what many retired American soldiers 

would also conclude—only land power can seize and hold terrain 

and ferret out a hidden enemy and command structure. 

Lin also noted several “lessons” from the war, such as the 

“taboo” of making last minute changes during battle preparations 

because of the “failure” to get Turkey to support a northern route 

of advance, which left the 4th Infantry Division on board ships in 

the Mediterranean. According to Lin, this caused a shortfall in U.S. 

ground forces, which led to problems during the battle. Lin’s focus 

on the plan and a failure to follow the script is more of a political 

comment on U.S.-Turkey relations than a military assessment, 

despite any debate of whether or not the United States has ever 

provided sufficient troops to accomplish the mission in Iraq. Lin’s 

attention on the plan also reflects a difference between Chinese and 

American military planners. Chinese planning tends to be rigidly 

developed from the top to the bottom. Chinese military planners 

stress the importance of “the plan” and executing it to the letter. 

American military planners and commanders, on the other hand, 

value advance planning, but also flexibility to adjust to the conditions 

on the ground, according to the situation and relying on the initiative 

of officers and soldiers alike. 

Among the other lessons Lin identified, he anticipated problems 

to come when he predicted: “Once the war gets into the stage of urban 

warfare and guerrilla fighting, it will be difficult for the United States 

to bring its advantages to bear, and its casualties [will mount].”18

He assessed that the use of outdated U.S. equipment in some units 

would cause higher casualties, a situation that would hurt some 

units that lacked sufficient body armor and hardened vehicles. He 

also said problems in the military information system would lead to 

friendly fire and misdirected attacks. 

In terms of the overall shortcomings of U.S. forces, Lin wrote 

that the war against Iraq exposed numerous problems in the U.S. 

military information systems. He noted that U.S. guided missiles 

hit a British [jet] fighter because the enemy identification systems 

analysis was “not stable.” He also wrote that numerous incidents of 

“impeded signals” also occurred, which disrupted operations. In the 
battle of Umm Qasr, for example, Lin noted that the United States 

and Iraqis fought for 5 hours while ground support aircraft took a 

very long time arriving—a delay he attributed to communications 

system problems. 

Lin found that the U.S. military global positioning system (GPS) 

experienced interference and, consequently, precision bombing 

effectiveness was not as good as “publicized.” Additionally, he said, 

U.S. fighters violated Iranian airspace and launched a number of 

missiles into Iranian territory, which resulted in Iranian casualties.19

Although Lin’s comments also were reflected in Western analysis 

before and after the war, they nonetheless present a view of Chinese 

modernization priorities and concerns, such as communications, 

precision bombing, close air support, use of GPS, etc. Such comments 

also could serve to caution a domestic audience in the PLA leadership 

that may be inclined to overemphasize acquisition of high-technology 

as the magic weapon for PLA modernization. Lin’s assessment does 

not reflect any appreciation of the softer elements of military power, 

such as training, nor the battlefield complications that can degrade 

the effectiveness of weapons and equipment for any informational 

era army, including a modernized PLA.

Another report in People’s Liberation Daily directly questioned 

whether U.S. forces intended to remain in Iraq “because, in the 

global strategy of the United States, having troops stationed in Iraq 

is of major strategic significance.” The commentary of this author, 

Yu Zi, was consistent with other civilian commentaries that claimed 

the United States seeks control over Middle East oil, while others see 

the U.S. role to be a more expansive objective to unilaterally shape 

the world in America’s favor. Yu noted that, although the United 

States said it would withdraw when “the conditions are right,” the 

United States likely would only “withdraw its forces from Iraq in a 

limited, controlled, and gradual manner.” He added that the United 

States would concurrently, “ask the UN [United Nations] to send 

international peacekeeping forces (which actually may quite possibly 

still be mainly U.S. forces) to Iraq in order to ensure the military 

presence and dominant position of the United States there.”20

In an otherwise admiring report on the Internet version of People’s 

Daily by Li Xuejiang,21 the author wrote: “While the United States 

spent nearly a year to prepare for it, when it came the time to start 
6

it, it was launched in a hurry,” which echoed other criticisms. Li 

added, “the advance [to Baghdad] was met with repeated resistance, 

eventually the quick end came with the surprisingly easy capture of 

the capital . . . the victory was won after all in only 3 weeks. A war 

myth was thus created,” which he suspected had less to do with the 

ability of the American forces and more to do with the voluntary 

collapse of Iraqi forces.

“In all fairness,” he continued, “the U.S. military is really good 

and laudable for many of its innovations in strategy and tactics.” 

First, he said, the “decapitation operation” was effective. The U.S. 

military persistently and continuously used its absolute domination 

of the air and superiority in precision guidance technology to “trackbomb” Saddam and his senior officials. As a result, he said, the Iraqi 

army lost its commander-in-chief and became disorganized like a 

group of “headless flies.”22

Second, the “theory of shock and awe” was applied successfully, 

Li wrote. “With its air superiority,” it was like “entering an 

unpeopled land,” as the United States carried out an unprecedented 

large-scale bombing of the Iraqi capital. The strategy overwhelmed 

Iraqi commanders, disintegrating and demoralizing the army, and 

the Iraqis soon realized that it was impossible to fight the superior 

U.S. military, he wrote. Consequently, the Iraqi military reached 

the “pessimistic conclusion” that to put up a desperate resistance 

would be “like hitting an egg against a rock,” and they fled or 

surrendered.23

Third, Li judged, the most noteworthy point was the “bold 

strategy” of a “direct thrust into the heart.” The thrust could be 

separated into a major and minor round. During the first round, the 

British army nibbled away at such cities like Umm Qasr and Basra, 

while the U.S. main force advanced unchecked toward Baghdad. 

This was a risky move, Li thought, since an insufficient number of 

American troops were stretched thinly in exposed positions along 

over 500 kilometers of supply lines.24 For a time, this overextension 

was a “fatal flank,” which compelled the Pentagon, Li wrote, to 

adjust its strategy and dispatch another 120,000 troops.25

The second round opened on April 5 and 7, when armored 

detachments were ordered into the center of Baghdad. “Fortunately,” 

Li said, “the Iraqi command in the city had already been paralyzed.” 
Consequently, the Iraqi troops had no leaders. The Republican 

Guards collapsed into “stragglers and disbanded soldiers,” with no 

possibility to organize any “meaningful resistance,” he wrote.26

In Li’s assessment, the Iraqi forces should have and could have 

done much more to counter the U.S. invasion, such as bomb out 

bridges, dig deep defensive ditches, construct high forts, and deploy 

large number of troops to protect the capital. Li assessed that the 

Iraqi army’s defensive strategy was a complete “blunder,” but the 

“foolishness and impropriety [of military commanders] obviously 

contributed” to Iraq’s defeat. “The easy capture of Baghdad [by U.S. 

forces] was due half to good planning and half to luck. In the annals 

of war, it can be regarded only as an “exception and not a model,” he 

wrote.27

Finally, Li wrote, the most significant characteristic of the war 

was the unprecedented disparity in the balance of strength of the U.S. 

and Iraqi forces, a comment echoed by other commentaries. The U.S. 

superpower, he said, defeated a “tired and weak country” that had 

not yet recovered from the Gulf War. The Iraq War, consequently, was 

a confrontation between a modern army equipped with 21st century 

high technology against a “motley force” that lacked discipline and 

was poorly equipped with the outdated arms and equipment from 

the 1970s and 1980s. As a result, the circumstances of the Iraq War 

“were really like . . . a falcon catching a rabbit, there is no chance of a 

miss,” Li said.28

Wu Liming and Liao Lei, writers for the Hong Kong Xinhua 

service, marveled at the ability of the United States to send aircraft 

into the region without the need of forward operational bases. They 

also expressed admiration for air operations, including “the U.S. 

forces’ B-2 bomber [which] took off from the continental United 

States, stopped and reorganized at a U.S. military base in the Indian 

Ocean after completing its mission, and then returned to the United 

States.”29 The ability of the United States to project air and naval 

power from the continental United States to Afghanistan and Iraq 

impressed Chinese observers, but, so far, has not tipped the balance 

to support investment in a comparable Chinese capability. It has 

stimulated the China military, however, to find lower cost ways to 

counter aircraft carrier power, while also looking to what will replace 

the carrier battle group in the future.
Psychological Warfare Assessment.

Several Chinese writers extensively examined the role and 

effectiveness of U.S. psychological operations and informational 

warfare during the Iraq War.30 They assessed that the United States 

had a considerable advantage over Iraqi forces because the United 

States has psychological assets within its force structure, including 

special psychological warfare units.31 The use of over 400 news 

media from different countries that were embedded in U.S. forces, 

but strictly controlled, was praised as an effective means for U.S. 

troops to maintain the initiative in propaganda.32

The U.S. military also was praised for being able to carry 

out “electronic interference” over the Iraqi media, as well as use 

the exploitation of more traditional propaganda means, such as 

distributing flyers by air. “Secret agents” and “special troops” also 

were praised for their ability to “instigate rebellion” within Iraqi 

forces effectively, as they did during the Gulf War, which resulted 

in over 80,000 troops surrendering at that time, according to one 

Chinese report.33

U.S. forces were lauded by the Chinese for their stress on 

disinformation (rumor and information fed to news media) to 

carry out “soft killing” to shake popular support for the regime 

and military morale.34 The American forces, practiced resourceful 

“deception to create confusion . . . giving the impression that there is 

indeed someone inside the Iraqi Government passing information” 

to U.S. forces, according to one report.35

Despite their achievements in psychological warfare in Iraq, 

however, the American forces were found to be less effective than 

they could have been. Sowing rumors and false information, as well 

as dropping pamphlets, for example, were not as effective in the 

Iraq War as in the earlier Gulf War because some were discredited 

quickly. Further, the U.S. military did not suppress Iraqi radio and 

television completely. As a result, pictures of civilians being bombed, 

U.S. prisoners of war, and downed U.S. aircraft were broadcast 

nationwide, boosting the morale of the Iraqi forces.36

Nonetheless, according to Chinese assessments, the U.S. 

operation in Iraq showed that “modern psychological warfare” plays 

an increasingly important role in information warfare. “The present 
war in Iraq could mark a turning point in the development of this 

warfare as it moved from the backstage to the front stage to play a 

more important role in battle,” according to one article.37 Through its 

reliance on its “military superiority” and the application of extensive 

“modern high technological means,” the United States carried out 

“the most extensive and most complex psychological warfare against 

Iraq since the Vietnam War.”38

The Chinese military, which has its own long history in the 

effective application of propaganda, seemed to learn or reinforce 

much from the American experience in the Iraq War during the 21-

day campaign. Chinese analysts assessed that propaganda is even 

more important in the information age. Control over the media and 

other electronic means must be ensured early and thoroughly, as the 

U.S. military did, to ensure success. The campaign reinforced that 

the propaganda message also must be controlled, while consistency 

and repetition must be ensured. Bluff, intimidation, and deception 

remain effective means to force your adversary and the population 

to give up or give in to your wishes, but advanced technology is 

essential to maintaining command and control over the message. 

If the psychological warfare lessons of the Iraq War discussed 

above prove influential on China’s military modernization, we can 

expect the PLA to put greater emphasis on psychological operations 

as a wartime specialization, rather than simply a means to maintain 

good order and discipline, and ensure subordination of the military 

to the Party, which appears to be the primary mission of PLA 

propaganda departments at present. The commissar system likely 

would be changed by greater emphasis on wartime propaganda in 

the information age. If we see greater professionalism within the 

wartime propaganda function, we also should expect to see some 

reorganization of propaganda entities into special psychological 

warfare units, similar to U.S. PSYOPS units. 

Psychological warfare and the lessons of the U.S. experience in the 

Iraq War likely would be most relevant to Chinese ongoing training 

and military modernization to execute a Taiwan contingency operation. During such an event, however unlikely, the Chinese military 

could be expected to attempt to avoid giving the appearance that they 

are attacking “Chinese people” in Taiwan. Hence, Operation IRAQI 

FREEDOM as a war of liberation may provide some useful lessons 
to the PLA for a possible Taiwan contingency. As a cautionary tale, 

however, Iraq also is useful in demonstrating the limits of propaganda 

and good works. The Iraqi insurgency demonstrates how a relatively 

small number of nonbelievers can wreak havoc, disrupting even the 

most modern and powerful army in the world as it tries to stabilize an 

area after a military victory. Although the PLA likely would dismiss 

the lesson of the liberation of Iraq as it applies to Taiwan because the 

latter is filled with welcoming compatriots, it should not be lost on 

the Chinese that even if a small number of people on Taiwan were 

to resist the PLA after a successful liberation (with or without the 

use of force), it could be very costly and disruptive to post conflict 

stabilization, reconstruction, and political consolidation. 

Insurgency Assessment.

The role and effectiveness of the post-conflict insurgency in Iraq 

has received less attention that one would expect from Chinese 

civilian and military writers, given China’s history in guerrilla 

warfare and the enshrinement of people’s war within its national 

strategy. Several writers prematurely anticipated the United States 

becoming ensnared in an insurgency. Wu Liming and Liao Lei, for 

example, wrote: “The entire nation in arms is another ‘assassin’s 

mace’ (sha shou jian) of Iraq’s.” The authors cited reports that Iraq 

had sent out “tens of thousands of assault rifles to more than 2,000 

clans” in advance of the war to prepare for guerrilla war and 

ambushes. They wrote that Iraq’s large tribes resolutely would resist 

the U.S. force’s invasion.”39 Although these and other writers were 

wrong about guerrilla tactics being used against the U.S. forces as 

they advanced through Iraq, they eventually were proven right after 

the end of major combat. Nonetheless, authors have not dwelled on 

the effectiveness of guerrilla warfare to disrupt and terrorize, and 

potentially influence political decisions on the ground. This oversight 

perhaps reflects a view among PLA analysts that information war 

and military modernization is more important for the PLA’s future 

than its historic reliance on guerrilla warfare. China’s military may 

still straddle the old and new, but the PLA clearly wants to move in 

a direction that takes it into a modern future, rather than its historic 

past.
Logistics Assessment.

U.S. military logistics operations during the Iraq War were of 

particular interest to civilian and military observers. Assessments of 

U.S. military logistics in the Iraq War focused on modern logistics 

trends, such as large-scale operations, integration, accuracy, and 

specialization. They reflect a trend toward greater professionalism 

within integrated joint logistics planning and advance preparation, 

and a greater recognition of the importance logistics plays in modern 

warfare. 

Since 2003, numerous articles40 have been published in Chinese 

technical journals that analyze U.S. logistical support during the 

war. Several articles proposed that China expend greater energy 

researching modern military logistics operations that can be applied 

to the PLA’s modernization. Although some analysts criticized the 

American military’s long logistics lines, which were vulnerable to 

disruption in Iraq, they also recognized the lesson for China. Even 

in peacetime, China’s military operations are spread widely over 

a complicated topography slightly larger than the United States. 

Already stretched by domestic operations, in a contingency, the 

PLA also would face the challenges of protecting stretched lines of 

communications, which would be exacerbated if and when China’s 

military force is projected outside continental China.

High-technology Assessment.

Among the topics of greatest interest regarding American hightechnology application during the Iraq War and Afghanistan, Chinese 

observers have shown special interest in America’s Integrated Joint 

Battlefield Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance System 

(in Afghanistan),41 use of the GPS,42 and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 

(UAVs),43 among others.

China’s military modernization can be expected to continue, even 

accelerate, opportunities to exploit off-the-shelf purchases and other 

military acquisitions of advanced military weapons and equipment.
Afghanistan Assessment.

With the exception of the article mentioned on battlefield 

intelligence, much of the writing on Afghanistan military operations 

has concentrated on the political-military consequences of a longterm U.S. military presence in Central Asia, how this intrusion 

promotes U.S. long-term national interests in control over Eurasia’s 

heartland, and how this challenges, not only China, but also Russia.

One author’s criticism of the lingering presence of U.S. military 

in Afghanistan is typical: “After the end of the Afghanistan War, 

the United States said it would be even harder to predict whether 

or not it could capture the leaders of the al-Qa’ida organization. 

Consequently, it has kept on sending military personnel to Central 

Asia, which has made the anti-terrorism war more complicated. 

Think about it this way: (According to the U.S. media) the United 

States clearly understands how . . . the leaders of the al-Qa’ida 

organization enter and exit the country. Therefore, people have 

reason to doubt whether or not the United States will lose the reason 

for the continued establishment of its military bases in Central Asia, 

as well as for the maintenance of its military forward deployment 

there.”44

Although the military, in particular, was very suspicious of the 

long-term intentions of the U.S. presence in Central Asia to support 

Afghanistan operations after 9/11, they were not in a position to 

resist U.S. intervention and, in fact, were not inclined to protect the 

Taliban, in any case. Still, they resisted participation in the U.S.-

led coalition. Some military representatives at the time said the 

PLA was considering sending PLA engineers, whom they had also 

provided to Cambodia, but they expressed concern over their ability 

to provide their own force protection and logistics support. China’s 

primary response to the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan and its 

ongoing presence in Central Asia has been at the diplomatic level, 

where they have over time been able to reenergize the Shanghai 

Cooperation Organization (SCO) and promote Chinese perspectives 

within the collective body. Economic development and the quest for 

greater energy security also have guided China’s post-9/11 priorities 

in Central Asia, which over time has proven more effective than a 
confrontation with the United States over its military presence in 

Central Asia. 

On the military and security side, military diplomacy and 

multilateral exercises have supported diplomatic moves. Additionally, the attack on Islamic extremism on China’s testy western border 

has helped the PLA and internal security forces step up operations to 

suppress Islamic extremism in Xinjiang Province, all in the name of 

fighting the global war on terrorism,45 Han migration, infrastructure 

improvements, and economic development also were accelerated 

after 9/11 as a means to stabilize the area. 

While the United States remains engaged in Afghanistan but 

primarily concentrating on operations in Iraq, China may find 

increasing opportunities to fill a void and promote its own interests 

in Afghanistan, but diplomatic and economic development, rather 

than military involvement, remain at the top of their strategy. 

Some Lessons for Chinese Military Modernization.

The Iraq War, and to a lesser extent the Afghanistan War, have 

reinforced the necessity of advanced technology, professionalism, 

and specialization to develop a modern military, which is the 

ultimate guarantor of national security. Chinese observations of 

America at war, combined with a perceived propensity for post9/11 America to use preemptive force unilaterally throughout 

the world, added urgency to China’s military modernization, but 

the primary response has been at the diplomatic level, which the 

Chinese have reinforced by continuing to further economic relations 

in Central Asia, for example. In China’s foreign policy since 9/11, 

the role of the military has been to support foreign policy through 

its military diplomacy and bilateral engagement, while striving to 

achieve concrete results in military modernization to provide a more 

credible military deterrent and to be prepared to fight, if diplomacy 

fails. 

At an operational and tactical level, we can expect the Chinese 

military to adapt relevant methods and equipment from the Iraq 

War that the PLA deems applicable to its border and sovereignty 

challenges, particularly Taiwan, and that fit within the overall defense 
budget. For example, as recognized by many Chinese observers of the 

Iraq War, an essential component of Chinese military modernization 

is advanced communications, and the ability to command space 

(satellites). In military logistics, emulation and integration of best 

practices in asset visibility, accountability, precision resupply, surge 

capacity—all of which are based on advanced communications—

also is essential to the modernization of the PLA.

We can expect, consequently, that the Chinese military will 

continue to emphasize the importance of communications, as well as 

advanced weaponry. China must buy more modern military assets 

to enhance its capability, where feasible, while continuing to tilt 

priority toward economic strength as the base of China’s growing 

power. 

Although it has not been discussed widely in the open literature, 

the Chinese should be both reassured and cautioned that Mao’s 

People’s War is still relevant to modern warfare. The Chinese 

military can rest assured that China retains a significant insurgency 

advantage if deterrence fails and China is invaded by a ground force, 

even of a superior military, such as the United States. 

But they also may be sobered by how effectively an asymmetrical 

force can harass, tie down, and otherwise hamstring a superior force 

when they plan for possible operations against Taiwan, if China 

decided to resort to force to resolve this sovereignty issue. The Iraq 

insurgency has retaught the old lesson that a superior military force 

that is willing to endure casualties, may not be defeated militarily 

by an inferior force, but its strategic objectives may, nonetheless, be 

thwarted. At best, they may be achieved only after a much higher 

cost in troops, equipment, and treasure. Ultimately, the costs of 

prolonged low intensity war may undermine the strategic objectives 

of any ”liberation,” and in the case of a Taiwan liberation, there 

could be an even more effective native resistance than the United 

States has faced in Iraq. 

While China, so far, faces small-scale and sporadic “insurgency” 

problems in Muslim areas in Xinjiang and elsewhere, this problem 

presently remains operationally manageable. China’s assessment that 

it can better address these domestic insurgent (terrorist) problems 

through economic development, integration, Han migration, local 
control (through the good auspices of the police, PLA, and Party), 

as well as through cooperation with Muslim countries, may prove 

correct. China’s ongoing collaboration with the U.S. global war on 

terror (GWOT) gives China’s strategy to suppress Islamic extremism 

more legitimacy and urgency. Intelligence cooperation with the 

United States may even enhance the effectiveness of these efforts 

and may help China prevent this problem from growing over time. 

Lessons for China’s National Security Calculus.

This model of occupying a country first and then forming a constitutional 

government . . . has become the United States’ fixed way of thinking in 

the second half of the 20th century. From Haiti and Panama in Central 

America to Europe’s Yugoslavia and Asia’s Afghanistan, the United 

States was constantly reliving its fond dream [of] World War II.46

The purpose of the United States in sending troops to Iraq is to realize U.S.-

style democracy in Iraq. We believe that in the future, a U.S. democratic 

framework will emerge in Iraq. However, can the United States bring 

about the spirit of democracy? Absolutely not. Democracy realized with 

missiles is no democracy. It is the mockery of democracy.47

In truth, the image of the United States was ruined entirely by the United 

States alone. As long as the United States does not change its biases against 

certain ethnic groups, certain countries and certain religions, there are 

more troubles to come for the power politics of the United States.48

Solutions of major international issues need collective wisdom, enhanced 

international cooperation and the rule of the UN and the Security 

Council.49

China’s international policy decisions since 2001, and especially 

since the war in Iraq in 2003, reflect an estimation that: 

• A decline of U.S. power is not imminent, but its post-Cold 

War preeminence has eroded, and its domestic economy 

may be weakened by foreign debt-dependency and war 

expenditures. The United States is a wounded superpower, 

which makes it more dangerous and unpredictable, but one 

that is still critical to the stability of the world economy and 

China’s economic development. 
7

• Engagement, rather than confrontation, with the United States 

suits China’s national interests for the foreseeable future. 

China must hedge its bets, however, by cooperating without 

getting too close, avoiding confrontation without sacrificing 

Chinese national interests. 

• The present unpopularity of the United States throughout the 

world, especially in the oil rich Muslim areas, makes it prudent 

for China to balance its international policy with emphasis on 

cooperation that is dominated by diplomacy and economic 

development, while setting itself apart from the United States 

in basic principles. 

• The relative decline of American prestige, particularly in 

the developing world, provides China with an opening to 

promote its own national interests throughout much of Asia 

and the world. Building on its long-term relationship with 

the developing world, China is well-positioned to enhance 

its position with the developing world through its emphasis 

on diplomacy, cooperation, multilateral fora, and economic 

development. 

• Regardless of the risks of confrontation with the United 

States, China cannot allow the United States to intimidate it. It 

must rely on diplomacy as the first line of defense against the 

United States, but its national security depends upon its own 

military strength and its ability to use force, if necessary, even 

against the United States, in matters of national sovereignty, 

particularly Taiwan reunification. 

• Anti-China forces within and outside the U.S. administration 

require China to remain on guard against U.S. movements 

that could damage China’s national interests. China may be 

able to build a wider and deeper U.S. domestic coalition over 

time, but this always will be vulnerable to negative domestic 

trends. Anti-Chinese sentiment may even grow more hostile 

over time. 

• The U.S. deemphasis, even dismissal, of multi-lateral 

mechanisms provides an opportunity for China to play a 

more active role internationally. Benefit may be accrued 
if China promotes regional and international initiatives 

and is seen to provide responsible leadership, all of which 

China has avoided in the past. China must continue to build 

wider coalitions to counter U.S. power and dominance. U.S. 

containment or constrainment of China can best be addressed 

through multilateral relations—a Chinese version of the 

coalition of the willing to counter American power.

• Resources: U.S. intervention into Central Asia and the Middle 

East has the long-term objective of ensuring U.S. (and its 

allies) access to oil. Given China’s increasing dependence on 

foreign oil, China must proactively ensure access to multiple 

and dependable sources of oil and other key resources (water) 

in order to promote its own national security and foundation 

for future economic development.

• The U.S. mission to promote democracy is a cover for U.S. 

hegemony. It is an indirect threat to China, as the United 

States seeks regime change in China to eliminate the Chinese 

Communist Party’s monopoly on power.

• Regardless of American intentions in the global war against 

terrorism, it provides an opportunity for China to address 

its domestic terrorism threat, while cooperating with the 

United States and the rest of the world. Within the context 

of antiterrorism, cooperation with Central Asia and Russia 

through the mechanism of the SCO can be strengthened. This 

strategy provides greater security to China’s vulnerable west, 

enhances needed access to resources and trade, and helps 

check the limits of U.S. influence in Central Asia. 

CONCLUSIONS

Chinese leaders pragmatically engage the United States and the 

world to promote stability that provides a supportive environment 

for China’s revival.50 This national strategy reassures most regional 

and global powers that the outcome will be a “peaceful rise”51 for 

China. Meanwhile, the Chinese military plays a supporting role to 

diplomatic and economic efforts, but continues on its long road to 

building a modern military that will be commensurate with China’s 
great power status and provide more leverage with regional and 

global powers, such as Japan and the United States. Buying time for 

national development by avoiding confrontation with the United 

States tugs China’s national policy toward cooperation with the 

United States for the near term. But the bilateral relationship still 

lacks solid stability and durability. Chinese leaders cannot hope 

for the best in this mercurial relationship with the United States. 

They must provide a credible military capability that can ensure 

China’s national security. Looking into the future, a credible military 

capability also will be essential to China’s global role, as it becomes 

increasingly dependent on imported resources, especially oil. 

The lessons of America’s wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, which 

displayed the latest and greatest of modern military might, lay 

bare China’s historic vulnerability to powers with overwhelmingly 

superior military strength. Even though Chinese leaders have little 

choice today but to pursue cooperation and dialogue because the 

United States represents China’s biggest potential threat, China 

also recognizes that the United States is its best hope for continued 

economic development and a chance to maintain peace and stability 

on China’s doorstep through America’s close ties to Japan and 

Taiwan, and America’s legacy role on the Korea Peninsula. For 

both sides, there is still time to mature the relationship into a more 

lasting and stable arrangement to promote peace and stability, but 

the window is closing as China’s comprehensive strength continues 

to grow.

China’s need to sustain its national security strategy based on 

independence and greater multilateralism has been accentuated 

by the Afghanistan and Iraq Wars, and America’s stark policy of 

preemptive and unilateral use of force. Following an initial setback, 

when the Chinese watched helplessly as Central Asia powers and 

Russia scurried to accommodate the United States with bilateral 

agreements that seemed to undercut the relevancy of the SCO, 

Russia and the Central Asia powers have since become even more 

receptive to promoting collective efforts with China under the SCO. 

The reinvigoration of the SCO sees China playing a key role, if not 

the leader, then certainly the coach, to keep the momentum going to 

deepen and mature the regional organization, an accomplishment 

that may radiate out, affecting China’s role in the UN and ASEAN/
ARF, where China has become more proactive since 9/11. As China 

demonstrates its willingness to take a more visible role in hosting 

events and supporting initiatives, its “Five Principles of Peaceful 

Coexistence” mantra becomes more attractive, regionally and 

globally. 

China’s longstanding cooperation with the developing world, 

which arose out of mutual economic conditions and political 

necessity, has over time become a useful counterweight to the 

United States. China can develop these ties further as it increases 

its economic strength, leveraging its goods, services, and expertise 

for assured access to natural resources, and in return for access to 

China’s long dreamed of market. This base of developing world 

support already has helped China fend off U.S.-sponsored human 

rights resolutions,52 but these relations also may assist China in 

diversifying its oil supply.53

In a broader sense, the U.S. lack of interest, even hostility, toward 

collective bodies, such as the UN and international agreements, 

provides China an opportunity on the international stage to increase 

its multilateral cooperation and promote its influence through 

its ability to work with countries, large and small, on economic 

development and other concerns of interest throughout the world.54

For China’s military modernization, the Iraq War, in particular, 

provides impetus and benchmarks for the next stage of its 

modernization. China can be expected to continue to combine 

domestic research and adaptation of advanced military methods 

and technologies. Its military contacts, which have deepened and 

widened in recent years, will continue to augment international 

relations, while providing the PLA exposure to diverse and 

specialized military capability throughout the world, where it can 

sample the variety of approaches to modernization among large 

and small powers with limited defense budgets. China’s military 

will continue to adapt what is most relevant. But China’s central 

military relationship likely will remain Russia for the foreseeable 

future. This military cooperation, which began largely as a marriage 

of convenience after the end of the Cold War, continues to mature 

in ways beyond arms sales of second-string Russian products and 

tentative cooperation. If the Peace Mission 2005 Exercise in August 
is any indication, China-Russia military ties in the wake of the Iraq 

War will continue to address a growing and mutual suspicion of the 

use and objectives of U.S. military power in the post-9/11 era.

Through a combination of imaginative and diversified foreign 

military cooperation, Chinese military modernization has in recent 

years moved beyond the “one step forward, two steps back” pace. This 

effort is now spiced up by a dogged persistence and eagerness that is 

especially reflected in a new generation of better educated military 

officers and buoyed by China’s growing national wealth, confidence, 

and national expectations of revived greatness. Further, China’s 

threat perception of Taiwan independence and U.S. intervention 

provide spark and urgency to China’s military modernization. After 

feeling like watching paint dry for many years of observing China’s 

military modernization, observers now express alarm and shock, as 

well as suspicion over China’s motives for seeking a modern military 

capability. But the ease with which the U.S. military superpower 

defeated the Iraqi military and decapitated the regime in only 21 

days should leave no doubt of the lesson for China. If China is to 

regain its great power status fully, it must further develop its military 

in all components of power—land, sea, and air. China cannot afford 

and likely does not want to achieve parity with the U.S. military 

because the cost to China’s overall national development would 

be destabilizing. But China recognizes it must possess a credible 

military deterrent to protect China’s national interests in the post9/11, post-Iraq War era.

ENDNOTES – CHAPTER 4

1. This chapter draws on material used during a panel discussion which the 

author participated in at the Wilson Center on January 13, 2005. 

2. For an assessment of the EP-3 incident, see Shirley Kan, et al., “China-U.S. 

Aircraft Collision Incident of April 2001: Assessments and Policy Implications,” 

Congressional Research Service, Updated October 10, 2001; and John Keefe, 

“Anatomy of the EP-3 Incident, April 2001,” The CNA Corporation, January 2002. 

For an account of the experiences of the EP-3 crew, see Lieutenant Shane Osborn 

with Malcolm McConnell, Born to Fly: the Untold Story of the Downed American 

Reconnaissance Plane, New York: Random House, 1991. U.S.-China relations under 

the new administration actually began on a rocky basis before April 2001. See 

“Summary of Statements and Events,” 2001-05, attachment to this chapter. Also 
see Michael Mann, Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush’s War Cabinet, New York: 

Viking Books, 2004, pp. 281-286, for a discussion of the new administration’s 

approach to relations with China and the handling of the EP3 incident. Mann, 

p. 281, writes that Condolezza Rice told a visitor that the Bush administration 

expected “some conflicts” with China and planned to get these out of the way 

early during 2001, so that they would not effect the 2002 16th Party Congress. 

3. Within embassy circles in Beijing at the time, it was common knowledge that 

Jiang Zemin observed that he had called President Bush on his own initiative and 

without prior approval once he watched the events live on CNN. 

4. In discussion with President Jiang in October 2001, President Bush said he 

thought military-to-military contacts were useful and should be resumed. DoD 

demurred for several months, while it reviewed all possible options for militaryto-military contacts, and did not move toward a resumption of contacts with the 

Chinese military until well into 2002. The term military “engagement,” which had 

been used since the late 1990s to characterize military contacts between the United 

States and China, was purged from the DOD vocabulary as sounding too weak 

or soft on China. Ironically, the Chinese had objected to the term “engagement” 

when the U.S. side first used it during the late 1990s, because the work in Chinese 

implies a military action and carried the implication of U.S. bullying and power 

politics. Nonetheless, the Chinese military came to accept “engagement” as 

appropriate and used it well into the Bush administration, while DoD used more 

general terms, such as “military contacts.” 

5. The anti-terrorism intelligence sharing between China and the U.S. intelligence 

frequently has been characterized as a one-way street—the United States gives and 

China takes. From China’s perspective, however, this commitment, which followed 

the precedence of Cold War era intelligence cooperation, was, nonetheless, a 

significant step, particularly after the EP-3 incident. Although the PLA Second 

Department was involved on the Chinese side, this effort did not directly involve 

the U.S. military, which likely suited both sides. 

6. Weng Ming, “Bushism is Emerging,” July 10, 2002, Xinhuanet.com.

7. Jing-dong Yuan, “Making Sense of China’s Iraq policy, Pacific Forum #40, 

October 3, 2002, available online at www.csis.org.

8. Ibid.

9. On September 5, 2003, former Secretary of State Colin Powell went so far 

as to say they were the “best” they had been since 1972, when President Richard 

Nixon visited China, reestablishing bilateral relations between the two countries. 

Christian Science Monitor Press Briefing Luncheon, St. Regis Hotel, Washington, 

DC, December 21, 2004, available online at hongkong.usconsolate.gov/uscn/

state/2004/1220101.htm.

10. For a recent sampling of discussions of war with China, see Robert D. 

Kaplan, “How We Would Fight China,” Atlantic Monthly, June 2005. 

11. Professor Qiao Xinsheng, “Six Paradoxes of the Iraq War,” Renmin Ribao 

Wang, April 4, 2003. Since scholars, technical experts, and layman alike can now 
write for money in China, it has become increasingly difficult to determine how 

influential any writings are. The official press and publishing houses are still 

important in a political system where one party has a monopoly over power, 

however, the prevalence of articles throughout China also suggests that there was 

not only wide interest in the Iraq War, there also is a growing interest in military 

matters, in general, as well as a growing body of competent military observers 

throughout the country in both military and civilian positions. This growing interest 

and expertise may be the outcome of two additional factors beyond making extra 

money. First, the PLA has taken steps to inform the public about military matters. 

Of particular interest, are military books written for children. In 2000, for example, 

the PLA published a series of books on Chinese and Western military matters 

entitled, “Soldiers of the Future.” Since that time, popular books and magazines 

that appeal to children and adults have mushroomed. Second, as a growing power 

with a history of military weakness and neglect, there may be a growing popular 

recognition that China cannot be a great power without a modern military as well. 

Third, the introduction of military training and affairs to new university students 

since 1989 is likely raising both the awareness and knowledge of military matters 

among China’s intellectuals (thanks to Taylor Fravel for reminding me of this 

latter point). 

12. John Keegan, in The Iraq War, New York: Knopf, 2004, marveled at how the 

Iraqi army failed to fight to protect its own homeland and key military objectives. 

He argues that the failure of the Iraqi military, and the general indifference of the 

Iraqi public, dispelled accepted military theory in the West that a military and 

its population will resist external invasion, and disputed the post-World War II 

paradigm of grateful populations greeting military liberators. He argues that this 

theory only applies to Western countries themselves and not to former colonies 

in the developing world, such as Iraq, where ethic unity and sense of nation are 

relatively weak.

13. Qiao. 

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid.

17. Lin Bo, “Why the U.S. Military has Made Repeated Miscalculations,” Renmin 

Ribao, March 27, 2003, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service-China (Hereafter 

FBIS-CHI)-2003-0324. 

18. Ibid. 

19. Ibid.

20. Yu Zi, “When Will U.S. Withdraw Troops from Iraq?” Jiefang Junbao, April 

19, 2005, FBIS-CHI. 

21. Li Xuejiang, “Viewing from the Sidelines—A Very Dramatic War,” Renmin 

Ribao Wang www, April 15, 2003, FBIS-CHI-2003-0415. 

22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.

24. Li also could have made the point that the lightly trained and protected 

logistics units lacked sufficient means to fend off attack when separated from 

combat forces as these barreled on to Baghdad. 

25. Li.

26. Ibid. 

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid.

29. Wu Liming and Liao Lei, “U.S. Military Strike Against Iraq Is a SuspenseFree Quick and Decisive War,” Beijing Xinhua Hong Kong Service, January 31, 2003, 

News Edge Document No. 200303031477.1_68a3003a42d06f14.

30. See, for example, Tian Zhaoyun and Che Hui, “Talks on Iraq: Focus on [the] 

Second Battlefield—How the United States Wages Psychological War Against 

Iraq,” Xinhua Domestic Service, March 24, 2003, FBIS-CHI-2003-0324.

31. During post-Cold War restructuring, many U.S. psychological operations 

assets were stripped out of the active force, but the Chinese do not appear to assess 

this as a shortcoming, either during the initial campaign or after the insurgency 

developed. 

32. Tian and Che.

33. Ibid. 

34. Ibid. 

35. Ibid.

36. Cui Xuewu, “Psychological Warfare of U.S. Military Suffers Setback,” 

Renmin Ribao, March 28, 2003, FBIS-CHI-2003-0328.

37. Tian and Che.

38. Ibid. 

39. Wu and Liao.

40. For examples, see Han Mingguang, Guo Zhiming, and Zheng Jinzhang 

(Department of Logistics Information Engineering, Logistics Engineering 

University, Chongqing, China) “Observ[ing] Modern Military Logistics through 

[the] Iraq War,” Logistics Technology, No. 1, 2005, pp. 83-86; Han Jin, “The Military 

Logistics Behind the War on Iraq,” China Water Transport, No. 6, 2003, pp. 26-27; 

Wang Meng and He Liang (Military Economic Academy), “The Trends of Military 

Logistics in the Iraq War,” Logistics Management, No. 1, 2004, pp. 63-64; Liu 

Weiguang, “Seeing Military Logistics Construction and Reform from the Iraq War,” 

Logistics Management, No. 4, 2004, pp. 9-12; Bian Fengjie and Zheng Huaizhou, 

“Inspiration for Military Accurate Equipment Support Based on Modern Logistics 

Technology From [the] Iraq War,” Journal of the Academy of Equipment Command 

and Technology, Vol. 15, No. 3, 2004, pp. 37-40; Yang Hongwei, Li Yong, and Li 
Qingquan, “Primary Argument of Equipment Support of Iraq War,” Logistics 

Management, Vol. 27, No. 104, April 2004, pp. 87-90; Chen Yao, Yang Xilong, Wan 

Jin and Jiang Honggang, “Intelligent Simulation of Military Logistics in Limited 

War,” Logistics Technology, No. 1, 2005, pp. 83-86. 

41. Wang Lianggang and Liang Dewen (Southwest Institute of Electronic 

Technology, Chengdu), “Foreign Army’s Integrated Joint Battlefield Intelligence, 

Surveillance and Reconnaissance System: an Overview,” Telecommunications 

Technology, No. 2, 2004, pp. 1-6. 

42. Cheng Libin and Li Shanshan (PLA Engineering Institute, Hefei, China), 

“Analysis of GPS jamming and counter-jamming technique in Iraq War,” Electronic 

Optics and Control, Vol. 11, No. 1, February 2004, pp.18-21. 

43. Zhou Jianjun, et. al. (PLA Navy Information Engineering Techonology 

Research Institute), “Application of UAVs in the Iraq War and Its Enlightenment,” 

Aeronautical Science and Technology, No. 1, 2004, pp. 30-33. 

44. Zhang Zhengduo and Zhang Donghang, “The Motive Behind [Intelligence] 

‘Failure’” Jiefang Junbao, June 20, 2005, News Edge document No. 200506201477.1_

5a08009fdcdzj341. A Xinhua article raised a similar question about U.S. 

reconstruction in Iraq, charging that it is “a cover for U.S. hegemony: They 

[neoconservatives in the Bush administration] stressed: To reform the work, it is 

not enough to cause “power changes.” Consequently, “State rebuilding” must be 

pursued, sparing neither human resources nor financial resources. The fact that 

Bush talked voluminously about “disseminating liberty” in his [2005] inaugural 

speech indicates he has accepted [this] core idea.” “When Will U.S. Troops 

Withdraw From Iraq?” Xinua News Analysis.

45. Local Uighurs whom the author talked with after 9/11, looked more to 

Saudi Arabia (Wahabism) and Pakistan for religious inspiration, and possibly 

some support, such as training and possibly economic support. The Taliban and 

al-Qa’ida did not appear to be a major source of influence within Xinjiang before 

9/11.

46. Qiao Xin Sheng, “Six Paradoxes of the Iraq War,” Renmin Ribao, April 14, 

2003, FBIS-CHI-2003-0404.

47. Ibid.

48. Hai Lin, “Story Can Be Retracted Buts Facts Are More Difficult to ‘Retract’,” 

Renmin Ribao, May 21, 2005, available on Dialog.com. 

49. “China: Iraq Resolution Is a Milestone,” 09/06/04, www.china-embassy.org.

50. The author agrees with David Finkelstein’s characterization of China’s 

recent efforts to achieve comprehensive development and full integration into 

the international order as a “revival,” from an historical perspective. See “China: 

Is it a threat, or an opportunity?” Transcript of a discussion posted on People’s 

Daily online on August 23, 2005. In contrast to “China threat” or even the “rise 

of China” characterizations, which focus on potential disturbances to U.S. status 

and the post-World War II international system (which itself may be less relevant 
to the United States since 9/11), “revival” more appropriately acknowledges 

that China is attempting to return the country to world greatness and power, a 

goal the Chinese have pursued since the collapse of the Qing Dynasty. “Revival” 

accords legitimacy to the Chinese endeavor, rather than simply comparing it to the 

destabilizing rise of Germany in the 1930s, as is frequently the case. 

51. For discussion of the “peaceful rise” debate, see Evan S. Medeiros, “China 

Debates Its ‘Peaceful Rise’ Strategy,” YaleGlobal online, June 22, 2004, yaleglobal.yale.

edu/display.article?:id=411b. 

52. The Tibetan Center for Human Rights and Democracy recently expressed 

outrage that another year will pass without a country sponsoring a resolution on 

China’s human rights record at the UN Commission on Human Rights. The U.S. 

State Department announced on March 22, 2004, that the United States would 

sponsor a China human rights resolution, but backed off when it became apparent 

that a majority of countries would not support it. 

53. Nico Colombant, “China’s new African Oil Ties Create Concerns,” Energy 

Bulletin, September 30, 2004, reported that Chinese trade to Africa overall had 

increased nearly 50 percent since 2003. According to the report, China sought to 

establish relations with newly emerging oil producing countries, such as Gabon, 

from the Gulf of New Guinea to Central Africa. 

54. During President Bush’s October 2003 visit to Asia, many foreign 

representatives expressed concern that America’s focus on war and terror was out 

of sync with Asian countries’ concern for economic development.

CHAPTER 5

WAR CONTROL:

CHINESE CONCEPTS OF ESCALATION MANAGEMENT

Lonnie D. Henley

War control is the deliberate actions of war leaders to limit or restrain 

the outbreak, development, scale, intensity, and aftermath of war. The 

objective of war control is to forestall the outbreak of war, or when war 

cannot be avoided, to control its vertical and horizontal escalation, to 

strive to minimize the consequences of war, or to strive to achieve the 

greatest victory for the smallest cost. War control includes arms control, 

crisis control, control of armed conflict, etc., and is a major component of 

contemporary strategic research and strategic guidance.1

Containing war is not only a task in peacetime; the issue exists in wartime 

as well. In wartime, it generally takes the form of containing enlargement 

of the scope of the war, restraining escalation of the war’s intensity, and 

so forth. Sometimes it even finds expression in the war aim of “using war 

to restrain war,” particularly by countries with a defensive strategy.2

This chapter examines Chinese military writings on how to 

prevent unwanted escalation of a crisis or conflict, and how to ensure 

that military operations are constrained and modulated so as to best 

serve broader political objectives. It relies primarily on the writings 

of scholars at the Academy of Military Science (AMS), National 

Defense University (NDU), Shijiazhuang Army Academy, and 

other leading military academic institutions. A central insight is that 

People’s Liberation Army (PLA) military academics have only begun 

formal, methodical consideration of the issue since 1999, and that the 

concepts explored here will continue to evolve over the next decade. 

Notwithstanding the field’s early stage of development, however, it 

draws on deeper springs of Chinese military and strategic thought 

to constitute a coherent strategic viewpoint significantly different 

from Western concepts of escalation control. It is likely that “war 

control” concepts will have a major influence on Chinese behavior 

in any future crisis, particularly a conflict with the United States over 

the Taiwan issue. 
GENERAL CONCEPT

Although preventing unwanted escalation is implicit in Chinese 

concepts of how to fight and win local wars under high-technology 

conditions, the term “escalation control” seldom appears in Chinese 

writings. Instead, preventing unintended escalation of a political 

crisis into a military conflict, or a small-scale conflict into a major war, 

is part of a broader Chinese concept known as “containment of war” 

(èzhì zhànzhēng) or “war control” (zhànzhēng kòngzhì). War control 

is a wide-ranging activity, uniting all elements of comprehensive 

national power to shape the international environment and reduce 

the risk of war; to manage crises and prevent unintended escalation; 

to put China in a favorable position if war does occur; to control the 

conflict once it is underway and ensure military operations serve 

larger political objectives; and above all to ensure China retains the 

political and military initiative and is not forced into a defensive or 

reactive position without control over the pace, scale, intensity, or 

conclusion of the war.

War control is not a prominent topic in Chinese military writings, 

but has attracted some serious examination in the past 5 years or so. 

It was not discussed in the 1987 edition of the landmark Academy of 

Military Science (AMS) volume Zhànlüè Xué (The Science of Strategy), 

or in the 1999 National Defense University book of the same name; 

by 2001, however, it merited a chapter in the second edition of the 

AMS volume.3 Dan Xiufa, a researcher on Mao’s military thought at 

AMS, noted in 2003 that “there has not been much deep research into 

Mao Zedong’s thought on preventing and containing war,” a sure 

sign it has not been central to Chinese military theories heretofore.4

His is one of two recent articles that mine Mao’s writings for insights 

on the issue, both reaching the unsurprising conclusion that Mao 

was a master of war control, despite his lack of any explicit reference 

to the concept.5 The most in-depth treatment of the subject is a 2001 

National Defense University (NDU) doctoral dissertation by Colonel 

Xiao Tianliang, an assistant professor in the Strategy Teaching and 

Research Institute at NDU.6 This present study draws heavily on 

Xiao’s dissertation, together with the 2001 Zhanlüe Xue and shorter 

articles by researchers from AMS, NDU, and other military academic 

institutions. 
War control stresses the comprehensive employment of political, 

economic, diplomatic, and all other instruments of national power, 

but military means of course figure largely in the strategic equation.7

War control includes many factors.

Measures to Shape the International Security Environment, 

Peacefully Resolve Disputes, and Reduce the Threat of War. 

These range from mediation and negotiation of economic and 

territorial disputes, through “military diplomacy” and confidencebuilding measures, to arms-control and arms-reduction treaties and 

formal international security mechanisms.8

Measures to Manage Crises and Prevent 

or Postpone the Outbreak of War. 

Crises should be contained both geographically and in terms of 

their subject matter and intensity. Allowing a crisis over one issue 

to expand and include other political, economic, or territorial issues 

is a sure way of losing control. Such horizontal escalation increases 

the risk of vertical escalation toward higher-intensity political or 

military confrontation. It also increases the risk of the crisis becoming 

internationalized, attracting unwelcome intervention by other 

concerned parties or, even worse, by great powers and international 

organizations. This could limit China’s freedom of action and 

ability to control the crisis to its advantage. In some cases, however, 

deliberately enlarging the crisis may be a useful tactic to gain control 

and seize the initiative for China.9

Effective crisis management depends a great deal on whether 

the crisis has been foreseen and analyzed in advance, as well as the 

effectiveness of crisis management leadership structures. Anticipating 

crises, thinking through the causes and possible responses before 

they occur, and having appropriate resources at the ready are the 

key to gaining control and maintaining the initiative.10 Leadership 

decisionmaking processes are at a premium in a fast-developing 

situation with too little information.11

Good crisis management does not preclude the use of military 

force. In fact, ostentatious force deployments may be a key part 
of the political and psychological pressure China uses to gain the 

initiative and win the contest of wills at the heart of any crisis. 

Xiao Tianliang notes that of four main approaches to a crisis, the 

war-mongering model (hàozhàn xíng) is too likely to provoke the 

other side to extreme action—besides being “unsuited to China’s 

national character”—while a soft approach (runruò xíng) may overly 

embolden the opponent and lead him to do something rash. The 

recommended approaches are either military intimidation (wēishè 

xíng) or bargaining (jiāoyì xíng). Bargaining is often successful, but if 

one decides on intimidation, the intent is to use overweening military 

power to “cow the opponent into submission (shèfú duìfāng).”12 (The 

meaning of weishe here is clearly “intimidation,” not “deterrence.”) 

In the extreme, as other authors note, the military approach may 

include “fighting a small war to prevent a large war.”13

Measures Taken During War to Control the Scale, Pace, Scope, or 

Intensity of the Conflict. 

This includes efforts to prevent escalation, minimize destruction, 

and shape the course of the war to serve larger political and foreign 

policy objectives. The main principle underlying Chinese thought on 

war control is that military operations must be firmly subordinated 

to the larger national interest and broader political, diplomatic, and 

economic objectives. This may sometimes require halting military 

operations short of their intended objectives, or modulating the pace 

and intensity of operations to create the proper climate for pursuing 

political ends. 

This does not always mean lowering the intensity; “sometimes 

political goals require decisive victory, sometimes creation of an 

advantageous situation, sometimes just a symbolic attack.”14 In 

particular, when issues of territorial sovereignty or national dignity 

are at stake, economic interests already are compromised, and firm 

military action is required. But in general, the prevailing international 

environment of peace and development, as well as China’s long-term 

economic interests, are deemed to require preventing rather than 

inciting escalation, using closely coordinated political, economic, 

diplomatic, and military means, because “an excessive military 

attack can put us on the defensive politically.”15
THEORETICAL BASIS

Chinese military thinkers generally underpin their practical 

suggestions with an appeal to universal military theory, and those 

discussing war control are no exception. The central theoretical 

issues in war control are the evolution of warfare and human 

society on the one hand, and the changing international strategic 

situation on the other. Throughout most of human history, warfare 

necessarily was unlimited, because the political objectives were so 

out of proportion to the military means at hand as to provide no 

stopping point short of absolute victory or absolute defeat. From the 

stone age through the end of the Cold War, most conflicts involved 

existential threats to a country’s political system or even the survival 

of its population. The material means of warfare, in the meanwhile, 

did not include sufficiently subtle or agile control mechanisms, or 

sufficiently detailed timely knowledge of the battlefield situation, to 

permit careful modulation of the pace and intensity of the conflict. 

The current political and technological situation is seen to be 

fundamentally different as far as war control is concerned. The 

advent of “war under high-technology conditions,” largely through 

the application of information technology to the mechanized 

warfare forces of the late industrial age, creates the novel possibility 

of grasping and directing large-scale far-flung military operations 

in real time.16 At the same time, the advent of nuclear and other 

weapons of enormous destructive power make unlimited war far 

too dangerous to contemplate.17

The global strategic situation has also changed, such that no 

major power faces a fundamental threat to its existence or its most 

vital national interests. Crises are inevitable, maybe even more likely 

than in the past, and may well escalate into open war. But much 

less is at stake in such a conflict than in past eras. In China’s view, 

the prevailing international trend is toward peace and development, 

driven by the strategic trifecta of multi-polarity, globalization, and 

“informationization.” Furthermore, conflict is more “transparent” 

than in the past and much more subject to scrutiny by the international 

community and the general public, again due to the ubiquitous spread 

of information technology. Finally, of course, nuclear weapons make 

uncontrolled escalation far too dangerous. As a result, they feel, the 
era of unlimited warfare is over. The material ability to contain war 

exists, as does the political imperative to do so, a major reversal of 

the situation that prevailed throughout much of human history.18

MILITARY MEASURES TO CONTAIN WAR

What we call “shaping the situation” refers to making full use of the 

strategic commander’s subjective initiative, on the basis of our own 

military power, through the rational concentration and employment of 

forces, to create a powerful posture and strong offensive capability that 

is irresistibly fierce and overpowers the enemy.19

As noted above, containing war requires comprehensive 

application of political, economic, diplomatic, and military 

capabilities. The military part of this effort encompasses a wide 

range of actions to shape the overall situation (zàoshì).

Military Intimidation and Deterrence.

One of the first contributions the military can make to controlling 

a fast-developing crisis is the existence of a highly visible and capable 

military force obviously ready to take action. “Preparedness for war 

and containment of war are a dialectical unity.”20 Overt shows of force 

and vigorous deployments toward a crisis zone put pressure on the 

opponent, helping China gain the initiative and control development 

of the crisis. Depending on the situation, this may include moving 

strategic nuclear forces or elite conventional units. In other cases, 

it may be necessary to limit visible deployments so the opponent 

does not over-react and escalate more than China wants. Even then, 

however, clandestine deployments usually are necessary in case the 

crisis does escalate, because in modern high-technology local war, 

the first battle is often decisive.21 One way or another, the proper 

posture (and posturing) of China’s forces is seen as a central aspect 

of early crisis management.

In an age of local wars, Chinese strategists believe, the primary 

deterrent factor is no longer nuclear weapons, important though they 

remain. The ability to deter encroachment on China’s territory or 

vital interests lies mainly in the nation’s overall economic, political, 

diplomatic, and military strength, its comprehensive national 
power (zōnghé guólì). In addition to nuclear missile forces, the major 

military components of China’s strategic deterrent include its large 

and increasingly capable conventional forces. PLA strategists also 

see the nation’s perceived willingness to fight over issues of vital 

interest—Taiwan, for example—as an important deterrent factor that 

reduces the likelihood they will need to do so. Finally, the ability to 

mobilize and organize huge quantities of manpower, technology, 

and resources from society at large, under the rubric of People’s War 

Under Modern Conditions, “is still the magic weapon for deterring 

and preventing a large-scale invasion by the enemy.”22

Control of Overall War Objectives.

Unless fundamental national interests are at stake, military 

objectives in the conflict should be constrained to stay in consonance 

with political objectives. The history of warfare reveals many 

instances where military war aims outstripped the guiding political 

objectives, resulting in uncontrolled escalation and complete loss of 

the political initiative.23

Control of Military Targets.

A limited war requires careful balance in the selection of military 

targets. On the one hand, one must attack vital targets that have a 

decisive effect on the enemy’s military capability and will to fight. 

On the other, the targets must be such that the opponent can endure 

the loss without being driven to an implacable quest for vengeance 

and that the international community can tolerate without being 

moved to large-scale political or military intervention. Failure to 

strike the right balance can cause unwanted escalation, or put China 

on the political defensive and cause it to lose control of the overall 

situation.24

Control of Military Operational Parameters.

Having decided on overall war aims and the general nature 

of the target set, there is still a decision of what “form of warfare” 

(zhànzhēng xíngshì) the military operation should embody. Chinese 
theory groups these into the two broad categories of offensive and 

defensive warfare, each expressed in various “forms of operations” 

(zuòzhàn xíngshì)—mobile, positional, or guerrilla warfare; protracted 

war versus wars of quick decision; wars of annihilation versus 

wars of attrition or modern effects-based operations; whether the 

conflict should be high- or low-intensity, symmetric or asymmetric. 

A critical step in Chinese military planning is the “commander’s 

determination” of the situation (zhhuīyuán de juédìng), which includes 

a decision on the overall military requirements and objectives, 

designation of the primary and secondary operational directions 

(zuòzhàn fāngxiàng), and selection of the size and type of forces to 

employ. A correct decision on these operational parameters at the 

outset has a significant effect on the ability to maintain control of the 

conflict.25

Control of Warfighting Techniques (Zhànzhēng Shuduàn). 

The increased killing power of modern weapons, and the 

increased “transparency” of the battlefield due to modern news and 

information media, require strict control on the selection of weapons 

and tactics. Inflicting excessive damage on the enemy, especially on 

the civilian population or vital infrastructure, will stir up intense 

resentment and bring into play political factors that make it much 

more difficult to control the situation. This is not to say extreme 

measures are not sometimes necessary, of course; merely that they 

are inherently difficult to control, and should be carefully considered. 

The military commander must not succumb to the temptation to use 

whatever means is available to achieve the military objective. As 

always, the warfighting techniques should serve the overall political 

objectives of the war.26

Control of the Pace, Rhythm, and Intensity of the Conflict. 

AMS specialists studying U.S.-British operations in Iraq in 

2003 concluded that they represented the epitome of “highlycontained warfare.” Allied forces tightly controlled the degree to 

which military operations interacted with political, economic, and 

psychological aspects of the situation, in addition to the more visible 
and unprecedented control over military targets and the overall 

pace and rhythm of the conflict.27 Careful modulation of the pace 

and intensity of the fight can create favorable conditions for the 

political and diplomatic struggle. The side that holds the initiative 

can press the offensive and bring the conflict to a resolution while 

its advantage still holds; the side that lacks the initiative can slow 

and drag out the conflict while it seeks an opportunity to reverse the 

situation.28

Control the End of the War.

Purely military considerations must not be allowed to determine 

when and how the conflict comes to an end. Throughout most of 

human history, wars were for national or societal survival, and 

political war aims could not be achieved without the complete 

achievement of military objectives. In an era of limited war, on the 

other hand, it is quite possible that political objectives may come 

within reach before the military operation has played out to its 

intended end. In such a case, continued conflict could harm rather 

than serve the national interest, and the wise leader will either 

terminate or prolong the conflict if it is politically advantageous to 

do so. PLA analysts assess that China has done this well in every 

conflict since 1949, and that it represents a particular strength of the 

Chinese strategic perspective.29

Properly ending the conflict is not only a matter of timing, but 

also of close coordination between military operations and political 

maneuvering in the final stages of the conflict. It may be necessary 

to pause the fighting to create space for negotiations, or intensify 

the fighting in order to force the opponent to the negotiating table; 

to spring unexpected “assassin’s mace” weapons and throw the 

opponent off balance at a critical point; or to accelerate seizure of key 

objectives before the situation stabilizes. This is a particularly critical 

juncture in the struggle to “influence the situation” (zàoshi) and seize 

the initiative. It requires military superiority on the battlefield, which 

may entail rapid commitment of additional elite forces in the final 

stages of the war. But it also requires flexibility and precise control 

of military operations. If the war has gone badly for China, it may 

require great political agility to gain the best from a bad situation.30
9

Control the Post-Conflict Situation.

The military’s role in war control does not end when the shooting 

stops. Continued military pressure may be needed to make the enemy 

abide by terms of the settlement, potentially including a resumption 

of military conflict to make the enemy return to the agreement.31

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE INITIATIVE

Mao Zedong incisively pointed out: “War is a competition 

of subjective capabilities between two military commanders 

competing for superiority and for the initiative, based on the 

material foundations of military and financial strength.”32

Throughout Chinese discussion of war control, the emphasis is 

on seizing the political and military initiative (zhēngq zhdòng) and 

avoiding situations that would put China in a reactive, passive, 

defensive posture (bèidòng). Holding the initiative creates leeway and 

freedom of action, letting China set the agenda. A reactive position 

limits China’s options, making it impossible to maintain control of 

the situation.

Seizing and holding the initiative requires rapid reaction to an 

incipient crisis, including immediate deployment of sizeable forces as 

early as possible. It requires clear, quick, and correct decisionmaking. 

It requires strong standing forces, as well as thorough contingency 

planning and rapid mobilization of societal resources. It requires a 

resolute and principled political stance, firmly asserted at the outset 

and throughout the confrontation. It requires a rapid transition to 

war when events reach that level, and employment of formidable 

military power at every stage, particularly when settlement talks 

seem near. And it requires avoiding internationalization of the 

problem or outside political and military intervention, especially by 

hegemonic powers.33

It is difficult to overstate how prominent the concept of the 

initiative is in Chinese writings. To an outside observer, there seems 

a clear risk that such strong emphasis on gaining the initiative may 

lead China to over-react to a developing crisis, creating a cycle of 
reaction and escalation. There certainly is some discussion about the 

need to avoid provoking the enemy beyond the point of tolerance, as 

discussed above, driving him to a quest for vengeance that renders 

the conflict beyond control. But Chinese war control theorists 

give little thought to the possibility that what China considers a 

resolute response that maintains the initiative, the opponent might 

misconstrue as alarming preparations for aggressive military action. 

Chinese military authors seem to be unable to get outside their 

own subjective view of China’s innocent intentions, unable to view 

China as others might view it. The Chinese are certainly not alone 

in this weakness; our own society is not particularly good at seeing 

ourselves as others see us. But it is possible this strong belief in seizing 

the initiative as the key to crisis management and war control could 

itself contribute to unwanted escalation.

RELEVANCE TO A TAIWAN STRAIT CRISIS

From America’s perspective, and certainly from Taiwan’s, the 

central question is how these concepts would affect a crisis involving 

China, Taiwan, and possibly the United States. Available Chinese 

writings do not provide direct answers to that question, but a bit of 

informed speculation is possible. 

Before we can proceed, however, a few assumptions are necessary. 

First, we cannot be sure these publicly available writings accurately 

reflect the real state of Chinese thought on this subject. It is possible, 

indeed probable, that there are classified documents containing 

more explicit discussion of how to manage an emerging crisis and 

prevent undesired escalation. PLA contingency plans and war plans 

must address these issues, at least implicitly, and it is likely there 

is more systematic discussion in other classified venues. It seems 

reasonable to assume, however, that the public writings reflect the 

general tenor of any more detailed classified discussion, both in the 

general concepts involved and the level of interest in the subject.

Second, we cannot be certain that the theoretical and doctrinal 

discussion we observe among mid-level PLA academics reflects the 

thought processes and perspectives of the national-level political and 

military leadership. In fact, some differences are inevitable, given 

the different background, outlook, and professional experience of 
the two groups, in China or any other country. But given the nature 

of the Chinese political system, it is likely that the public writings 

of PLA academics do not diverge sharply from the general outlook 

of the top leadership, though with large caveats about the role of 

individual personalities within the leadership collective. 

With those assumptions as a foundation, we can draw a few 

tentative conclusions about the relevance of Chinese war control 

concepts to a Taiwan conflict or crisis. First, these concepts have 

only recently become a factor in Chinese planning for a Taiwan 

contingency. From the available evidence, it appears serious 

theoretical consideration of war control among PLA academics began 

around 1999. Yu Shifu and Yin Xinjian’s “Initial Exploration of Mao 

Zedong’s Thoughts on Containing War” was among the first articles 

on the subject, published in early 2000. Other Western authors assert 

this is roughly the same time Jiang Zemin and the Central Military 

Commission (CMC) ordered the PLA to begin serious efforts to 

prepare for a Taiwan conflict, with a target readiness date variously 

cited as 2005, 2007, or 2010. (Some go further and portray this as an 

intention to attack on a certain date, but most interpret it as a target 

to achieve a specified military capability, separate from any political 

decision to go to war.)

It seems reasonable to view the interest in escalation control as 

part of the broader consideration of what a conflict with Taiwan 

really would require. If we are right that the PLA is currently working 

on its first serious, fully-developed operations plans for a Taiwan 

contingency, we can expect all aspects of those plans to improve as 

they are refined and updated in coming years. Like other aspects of 

serious operational thought and planning in China, Chinese concepts 

of war control are still evolving and will show increasing levels of 

sophistication and practicality over the coming 5 to 10 years.

As an aside, the PLA has shown a keen awareness of the need for 

more competent staff officers as an essential prerequisite for better 

planning. There have been several professional military education 

texts published in recent years on “military operations research” 

(jūnshì yùnchóuxué)—embodying an explicitly American approach 

to detailed military planning—as well as many studies on how to 

develop and train competent staff officers and guides to staff officer 

duties and functions in peacetime and wartime.34
A second conclusion we might draw is that large troop movements, 

mobilization of strategic nuclear forces, and other apparently 

threatening actions are likely in any serious crisis, whether or not 

Beijing intends to attack. The importance of maintaining the initiative, 

the value of troop movements for creating political leverage, and 

simple military prudence may all impel PRC leaders to order large 

deployments early in a crisis, whatever their ultimate objectives. 

Significantly, such movements are among the few visible indicators 

American and Taiwan intelligence can use for warning of attack, but 

the war control literature suggests they may provide little insight 

into China’s real intentions.

Third, it is no great revelation to say the Chinese will take a 

rigid stance on issues of principle at the start of a crisis, but the war 

control and crisis management literature reinforces this expectation. 

Vigorous assertion of China’s (invariably) correct and principled 

stance is seen not just as a political/moral imperative, but also as an 

effective tactic for gaining and maintaining control of the situation. 

It is less clear whether this means ultimate compromise on matters 

of principle is impossible, or merely unlikely.

Fourth, it is likely any attack on Taiwan will be designed carefully 

to achieve political rather than purely military objectives. Again, 

this is not an earth-shaking revelation, but war control literature 

provides another source of insight into Chinese thinking on the 

issue. In particular, war control theorists emphasize the careful 

selection of targets to undermine the enemy’s will to fight, without 

arousing such resentment and hatred that it produces the opposite 

effect. That said, there is little indication in other Chinese writings 

of any concern over strong resistance from the Taiwan military or 

populace, and the war control writings do not mention Taiwan by 

name in this context, so perhaps we should be cautious in stretching 

to that conclusion. But even so, it is clear that war control thought 

advises careful attention to the negative as well as positive political 

effects of striking any particular target. 

Fifth, in the immortal words of Yogi Berra, “it ain’t over till it’s 

over.” Even in what seem to be the final stages of the conflict and 

negotiations for its termination, Beijing will struggle vigorously to 

hold or regain the initiative, particularly if the war has gone badly 
for China. Rather than putting the best face on defeat, war control 

theorists would advocate bold and unexpected actions to create a 

more favorable environment for the final political struggle. And as 

noted above, a political settlement may not end the fighting if China 

feels that “post-conflict” military strikes are necessary to keep the 

enemy within the terms of the settlement as China sees them. 

THE EFFICACY OF “WAR CONTROL” 

IN PREVENTING ESCALATION

Escalation control certainly does not occupy a central place in PLA 

strategic theory as it did in U.S. thought during the Cold War. War 

control is a new and still secondary part of Chinese strategic military 

thought, and escalation control is only one aspect of war control. But 

as discussed above, social and technological developments in recent 

decades are seen as making it easier to manage crises and prevent 

unintended escalation of a conflict. Chinese writers almost seem to 

think this makes the world safe for war once more, or perhaps safe 

for the first time. There is a danger that this belief in controllable war, 

together with the extreme emphasis on maintaining the initiative, 

could combine to increase rather than decrease the likelihood of 

escalation. 

FUTURE CONTINUED DEVELOPMENT 

OF WAR CONTROL DOCTRINE

It seems to this observer that since the early 1990s, the PLA 

has developed a fairly standard pattern for developing new 

operational concepts, best illustrated in the development of joint 

operations doctrine in the Eighth through Tenth Five-Year Plans 

(FYP).35 The Eighth FYP (1990-95) was a period of discussion and 

experimentation, defining operational requirements and conducting 

small-scale, decentralized experimentation on various warfighting 

techniques at a number of units around China. The Ninth FYP (1996-

2000) was a period of consolidation and codification, combining 

the new techniques into a comprehensive concept of operations 

and developing a body of written doctrinal regulations, teaching 

materials, and training standards published since January 1999. The 
Tenth FYP was the period of implementation, focused on education 

in military academies and schools and training in military units to 

inculcate the new approach to warfare. 

The flood of new doctrinal publications, teaching materials, 

and training standards since 1999 is likely to represent only the 

first generation of modern Chinese operational doctrine.36 We can 

expect the PLA to continue refining and developing its doctrine to 

incorporate lessons learned from field training and foreign (primarily 

U.S.) developments, as well as new thinking on topics such as war 

control. The development, codification, and implementation of 

operational doctrine is a seminal event in PLA history, a new level 

of maturity and competence in the complex business of developing 

modern military capabilities.

Considering the concept of war control against this backdrop, its 

state of development seems to parallel that of joint operations in the 

early 1990s. Serious discussion began around 1999-2000, and it now 

appears as a major topic in works such as the 2001 Science of Military 

Strategy. It is being debated among the same genre of military 

academics who were central to the development and codification 

of joint operations doctrine in the 1990s. But it is not yet the topic 

of major authoritative monographs bearing the official imprimatur 

of the AMS or General Staff Department, as many other strategic 

and operational issues have been. In short, we can expect further 

development of war control concepts in the PLA over the coming 

decade. 

DOCTRINAL REFORM IN THE CONTEXT 

OF PLA MODERNIZATION

This codification of operational and managerial processes is only 

one reflection of a fundamental transformation of the Chinese officer 

corps. At the end of the Cultural Revolution, in 1975, Deng Xiaoping 

berated the PLA for being bloated, undisciplined, disorganized, 

lazy, and combat ineffective.37 When Deng gained full power in 1979, 

and with the PLA’s dismal performance in Vietnam to vindicate 

his criticisms, the PLA launched on a reform program that is now 

in its 25th year.38 In the early stages of reform, the most serious 

obstacle to progress was the extremely low educational level and 
military competence of the PLA officer corps. For nearly 2 decades 

prior, since the end of the PLA’s first reform period in the 1950s, the 

armed forces had focused on political education, intense factional 

strife, and public order amidst the chaos of the Cultural Revolution, 

even taking control of local and provincial government after party 

and government structures were destroyed in the political struggle. 

The generation of officers who led the PLA in 1979 largely were 

uneducated peasants recruited in the Civil War and anti-Japanese 

war era (1930s and 1940s), and had spent the previous 2 decades 

doing everything except develop competence in modern combat 

operations.

Twenty-five years later, a major improvement in the quality of 

the officer corps represents the most profound change in the PLA’s 

military capabilities. For the first time in Chinese history, the PLA has 

reasonably well-educated officers chosen and promoted primarily 

on the basis of military competence. Even more important, the entire 

cadre of officers up to senior colonel (brigadier general equivalent), 

the core of military planning staffs at every level, have spent their 

whole career in a PLA dedicated to reform and modernization, 

where realistic training and complex combined arms operations are 

the norm. The previous period of professionalization, in the 1950s, 

lasted only 8 to 10 years by the most generous estimate. In contrast, 

the current reform period has lasted 25 years so far, and looks set 

to remain on course for decades to come. The PLA is achieving a 

critical mass of competent officers able to tackle the challenges of 

modern warfare in a way their predecessors never could. The same 

phenomenon is visible in every other aspect of Chinese government 

and society, from fiscal management to infrastructure development 

to international relations.

Chinese forces were starting from an extremely low base when 

today’s colonels were lieutenants, and the program has suffered fits 

and starts along the way. Only 10 percent of PLA line officers, and 30 

percent of all cadres (line officers, technical officers, and PLA civilian 

personnel) now hold a full university degree, for instance, compared 

to nearly 100 percent in the U.S. forces.39 The PLA still has a long way 

to go before it is a fully competent, modern armed force. There is no 

question, however, that in every field, the PLA will achieve greater 

progress in the coming decade than it did in the last. 
CREDIBILITY OF DOCUMENTARY SOURCES

As discussed above, it seems likely the kind of sources consulted for 

this chapter—writings by faculty members and doctoral candidates 

at the AMS, NDU, Shijiazhuang Army Command Academy, etc.—

accurately reflect the thinking of those charged with developing and 

implementing PLA doctrine. These sources are not authoritative, 

meaning they are not regulatory documents issued under authority 

of the Central Military Commission or General Departments. Such 

documents, with titles such as Outlines (gāngyào) and Regulations 

(tiáolìng, tiáolì), are the official promulgation of PLA operational 

doctrine and managerial procedures. Academic writings of the kind 

cited here occupy a lower but important place in the hierarchy of 

PLA doctrinal materials. 

The official regulations provide only very general guidance. 

Responsibility for fleshing out these guidelines falls to military 

academic institutions, especially NDU, AMS, and the Command 

Academies, which produce materials to translate that guidance into 

detailed operational concepts and promulgate them throughout 

the officer corps. For example, the 2000 Science of Campaigns and 

2002 Guide to the Study of Campaign Theory seem to implement the 

classified 1999 PLA Outline on Joint Campaigns.

40 There has been a 

flood of teaching materials published in the past few years, as the 

PLA implements and popularizes the new generation of doctrine 

developed and codified in the 1990s.41

The articles cited in this chapter rest on the third rung of the 

ladder of authoritativeness. They are neither official orders and 

regulations, nor the direct implementing materials used to train 

officers in the new concepts those orders dictate. Rather, they are 

the professional conversation ongoing among those who write such 

materials, intended for one another as well as for the more general 

military audience. They do not represent official doctrine, but they 

probably embody the general state of understanding of an issue 

among those who write doctrine. This is particularly true, in my 

view, of military science doctoral dissertations from NDU and AMS, 

like Xiao Tianliang’s work cited here. The dissertations published in 

NDU’s Military Science Doctoral Dissertation Archive series all seem 

to spend the first three-quarters of the work demonstrating mastery 
of the current state of the field, then add the student’s thoughts and 

suggestions in the few chapters. The strong similarity between Xiao’s 

dissertation and the shorter discussion of war control in the 2001 

Zhanlue Xue reinforces this interpretation. In my view, this makes 

such dissertations particularly valuable for gauging the PLA’s 

current thinking on a given issue.

Limitations Imposed by the Sources. 

On a topic like war control, however, the PLA’s is not the only 

perspective that matters, and perhaps not even the most important. 

It is indeed important for the PLA to be conscious that military 

operations must support broader political objectives. But it is the 

political leaders who determine those objectives, and determine 

what military posture best furthers them. Whether political leaders 

think in terms similar to those outlined here for the PLA remains an 

open question.

It is possible that a similar body of writings exists, perhaps 

from the Central Party School, to instruct rising political leaders 

on escalation control and crisis management in the same way these 

writings educate rising military leaders. If such writings do exist, 

however, we do not seem to have any window into their content or 

concepts. And of course, anything used to train today’s rising midlevel cadres may have only limited relevance to how senior leaders 

would behave in a crisis. We can speculate that rising political leaders 

are being trained in concepts similar to what military officers are 

hearing, and that the training given mid-level political and military 

leaders reflects the perspectives of senior leaders who order such 

training. But without direct evidence on the issue, we can only draw 

tentative conclusions.

CONCLUSION

The field of PLA studies has changed enormously in the past 10 

years with the sudden flood of valuable Chinese-language materials 

readily available in PRC bookstores, mail-order catalogs, and online. 

We have long castigated the Chinese for insufficient “transparency” 
on military issues, and there remain important areas where Beijing 

continues to conceal information other countries believe a major 

power should make public in the interests of mutual understanding 

and stability. The transparency charge is beginning to wear thin, 

however, in light of the enormous and growing volume of public 

information on PLA issues that has not been examined in the 

English-speaking world. We should make a vigorous effort to better 

use these Chinese-language sources and incorporate them into our 

understanding of PLA modernization efforts. 

In the field of war control and escalation control, we need to find 

more information about Chinese concepts of nuclear escalation, and 

to compare it to both U.S. nuclear escalation thought and Chinese 

war control thought. The writings discussed here make occasional 

reference to nuclear issues, such as the deployment of strategic 

nuclear forces for purposes of political signaling, but do not directly 

address nuclear escalation. 

We also need to look for reflections of war control thinking in 

the statements and writings of the national political and military 

leadership. We may conclude tentatively that PLA writings on war 

control probably parallel the top leadership’s views, but we need 

more direct evidence before we can be confident in that conclusion.

The discussion of crisis management, containment, escalation, 

and war control in Chinese military writings seems to represent a 

blend of modern and traditional Chinese strategic thought, practical 

considerations common to all modern militaries, sophisticated 

assessment of the political and military challenges the PLA would 

face in a crisis, and optimism about China’s ability to mold the 

situation and control the course of events. Taken together, war 

control constitutes a distinctively Chinese perspective that may have 

a significant influence on Beijing’s behavior in a crisis, to include a 

potential conflict in the Taiwan Strait. As in other aspects of Chinese 

military development, we can expect to see increasing sophistication 

and realism as PLA theorists continue to explore and develop this 

relatively new field of strategic thought. 
10

ENDNOTES – CHAPTER 5

1. Peng Guangqian and You Youzhi, chief editors, Zhanlüe Xue (The Science of 

Military Strategy), Beijing: Military Science Press, 2001, p. 213. Cited hereafter as 

Zhanlüe Xue 2001. All translations by the author unless otherwise noted.

2. Yao Youzhi and Zhao Dexi, “‘Zhanlue’ de fanhua, shouheng yu fazhan” 

(“The Generalization, Conservation, and Development of Strategy”), Zhongguo 

Junshi Kexue (China’s Military Science) September 30, 2001, pp. 120-127, Foreign 

Broadcast Information Service (FBIS)-CPP20011126000199.

3. Gao Rui, chief editor, Zhanlüe Xue (The Science of Strategy), Beijing: Military 

Science Press, 1987; Wang Wenrong, chief editor, Zhanlüe Xue (The Science of 

Strategy), Beijing: National Defense University Press, 1999; Zhanlüe Xue 2001, 

Chapter 8. 

4. Dan Xiufa, “Shenhua Mao Zedong junshi sixiang yanjiu de xin shiye” 

(“A New Perspective on Deepening Study of Mao Zedong’s Military Thought), 

at www.pladaily.com.cn/item/mzd/jn/048.htm. There is no date on the article, but 

it commemorates the 110th anniversary of Mao’s birth, putting it in 2003. The 

author’s affiliation is not mentioned in this article, but he is identified elsewhere 

as a researcher in the Mao Zedong Military Thought Research Institute of the 

Chinese Academy of Military Science; see, for example, biz.sinobook.com.cn/press/

newsdetail.cfm?iCntno=674. All Internet materials last accessed in September 2004. 

All translations are by this author unless otherwise noted. 

5. Yu Shifu and Yin Xinjian, “Mao Zedong ezhi zhanzheng sixiang chu tao” 

(“An Initial Exploration of Mao Zedong’s Thought on Containing War”), Junshi 

Lishi (Military History), Beijing, 2000, No. 1, at www.cass.net.cn/zhuanti/y_kmyc/

zhuanjia/a00130.htm. Yu Shifu is a professor at the Shijiazhuang Army Command 

Academy; see “Jun xiao qunying shao cui; jiaotan jiang xing shenghui” (“Stars of 

the Military Academic World”), Jiefangjun Bao, September 8, 2000, at www.pladaily.

com.cn/pladaily/20000908/big5/20000908001013_Army.html. 

6. Xiao Tianliang, Zhanzheng Kongzhi Wenti Yanjiu (On War Control), Beijing: 

National Defense University Press, 2002. 

7. Yuan Zhengling, “An Active Defense Strategy to Protect National Interests—

Understanding the ‘National Defense of China 2002’,” Zhongguo Guofang 

Bao, Beijing, December 24, 2002, p. 4, FBIS-CPP20021224000044. Excerpt here 

retranslated by the author. 

8. Zhanlüe Xue 2001, Chapter 8; Ma Ping, “Shuli kexue de zhanlüe guan” 

(“Foster a Scientific Strategic Outlook”), Jiefangjun Bao, Beijing, May 1, 2001, p. 

3, translated in FBIS-CPP20010501000034, original text at www.pladaily.com.cn/gb/

pladaily/2001/05/01/20010501001038_gdyl.html; Xiao Tianliang, Ch. 4, pp. 96-133.

9. Xiao Tianliang, pp. 140-143.

10. Han Jiahe and Xiong Chunbao, “Qiantan junshi weiji kongzhi” (“A Brief 

Discussion of Military Crisis Control”), Guofang Bao, Beijing, October 22, 2001, p. 
1

3, at www.pladaily.com.cn/gb/defence/2001/10/22/20011022017053_zhxw.html. Senior 

Colonel Han Jiahe is identified elsewhere as a professor at the Nanjing Army 

Command Academy; see FBIS-CPP20040218000058. One notes this was published 

not long after the April 2001 EP-3 crisis.

11. Xiao Tianliang, p. 147.

12. Ibid., 148-149.

13. Yu Shifu; Dan Xiufa.

14. Xiao Tianliang, pp. 167, 170.

15. Yuan Zhengling.

16. Yu Jiang, “Zhanzheng kongzhi: zouchu suobujide weigu” (“War Control: 

Getting Out of an Exhausting Difficult Situation”), Guofang Bao, Beijing, March 

25, 2004, at www.pladaily.com.cn/gb/defence/2004/03/25/20040325017054.html. The 

author is identified in the article as a researcher at the PLA Academy of Military 

Science.

17. “20 shiji zhanzheng liugei women de sikao yu qishi” (“Reflections and 

insights on 20th Century Warfare”), Jiefangjun Bao, Beijing, December 25, 2000, 

FBIS-CPP20001225000027. This article summarizes a round-table discussion 

among several PLA strategists; the thought cited was expressed by Professor Xu 

Yuan of the NDU Strategy Research Office.

18. Han Jiahe and Xiong Chunbao; Xiao, p. 164. 

19. Xiao Tianliang, p. 171.

20. Feng Changsong, “Tigao daying zhanzheng he ezhi zhanzheng de nengli” 

(“Raise Abilities to Win and Contain Wars”), Jiefangjun Bao, Beijing, August 27, 

2003, FBIS-CPP20030827000124.

21. Xiao Tianliang, p. 176.

22. Feng Changsong.

23. Yu Jiang.

24. Xiao Tianliang, p. 166.

25. Ibid., p. 184.

26. Yu Jiang; Xiao, pp. 180-185.

27. “Zhongguo junshi zhuanye tichu xiandai zhanzheng mouqiu ‘gao 

zhengzhi’” (“Chinese military specialists address the quest for ‘high control’ in 

modern warfare”), Guangming Ribao, April 28, 2004, at news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2004-

04/28/content_1444426.htm.

28. Xiao Tianliang, p. 191; Yu Jiang.

29. Xiao Tianliang, p. 192; Dan Xiufa; Yu Shifu and Yin Xinjian.

30. Xiao Tianliang, pp. 193-198.

31. Ibid., p. 199.
1

32. Yu and Yin, “An Initial Exploration of Mao Zedong’s Thought on Containing 

War.” 

33. Xiao Tianliang, pp. 138, 145, 175; Xu Wen, “Xiandai jubu zhanzheng dui 

woguo wuqi zhuangbei dongyuan zhunbei de qishi” (“Insights from modern 

local war for China’s weapons and equipment mobilization preparation”), 

Zhongguo Hangtian (Aerospace China), No. 3, Beijing, 2004, at www.space.cetin.net.

cn/docs/ht0403/ht0403htzc03.htm; Wang Congbiao, “Shishi keji qiang jun zhanlue: 

tigao wojun xiandaihua fangwei zuozhan nengli—Xuexi Jiang Zemin ‘Lun 

Kexue Jishu’” (“Implement the Strategy of Strengthening the Military Through 

Science and Technology to Improve the Defensive Combat Capabilities of China’s 

Military—Studying Jiang Zemin’s ‘On Science and Technology’”), Jiefangjun Bao, 

February 13, 2001, FBIS-CPP20010213000086.

34. For example, Li Zhangcheng and Jiang Jingzhuo, Junshi yunchou xin fangfa 

yanjiu yu yingyong (Research and Application of New Methods in Military Operations 

Researc), Beijing: Military Science Press, 2002; Dai Feng, ed., Junshi yunchouxue 

daolun (Introduction to Military Operations Research), part of the “Military School 

Students Mandatory Military Reading List Collection,” Beijing: Jushi Yiwen Press, 

2002; He Li, ed., Canmouzhang lun canmou xiuyang (Chiefs of Staff On Cultivating 

Staff Officers), Beijing: Military Science Press, 2003; and Liu Leibo, ed., Xinxihua 

zhanzheng yu gaosuzhi canmou rencai (Informationized Warfare and Highly Qualified 

Staff Personnel), Beijing: NDU Press, 2004, among many others.

35. For a longer discussion of this pattern, see Lonnie Henley, “PLA Logistics 

and Doctrine Reform, 1999-2009,” in Susan M. Puska, ed., People’s Liberation Army 

After Next, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2000, 

pp. 55-77.

36. The current wave of publications is technically the second generation of 

Chinese written doctrine, but all involved concede that the doctrinal writings 

published in the 1950s were a cursory effort of little operational value. 

37. Deng Xiaoping, “Zai Junwei Zuotanhui shang de Jianghua” (Speech to 

the Discussion Meeting of the Central Military Commission), in Deng Xiaoping 

Wenxuan, 1975-82 (Collected Works of Deng Xiaoping, 1975-82), Beijing: Renmin 

Chubanshe, Hong Kong: San Lian Publishers, 1983, pp. 363-67. 

38. For a detailed examination of the 1979 China-Vietnam conflict and the PLA’s 

very low level of operational competence, see Edward C. O’Dowd, “The Last 

Maoist War: Chinese Cadres and Conscripts in the Third Indochina War (1978-

91)”, dissertation in candidacy for Doctor of Philosophy, Department of History, 

Princeton University, October 2004. 

39. Zhang Yu, Lun Zhongguo Tese de Junshi Rencai Chengzhang zhi Lu (On the Road 

for the Development of the Military Personnel with Chinese Characteristics), Military 

Science Doctoral Dissertation Collection, Beijing: National Defense University 

Press, 2001, p. 147.

40. Zhanyi Xue (The Science of Campaigns), Beijing: NDU Press, 2000; Zhanyi Lilun 

Xuexi Zhinan (Guide to the Study of Campaign Theory), Beijing: NDU Press, 2002; 
1

Zhongguo Renmin Jiefangjun Lianhe Zhanyi Gangyao (PLA Outline on Joint Campaigns), 

Beijing: Central Military Commission, 1999. The text of the Outline has not been 

published, but its existence is discussed in Guide to the Study of Campaign Theory

and many other places. Its issuance was announced in “Zhongyang Junwei zhuxi 

Jiang Xemin qianshu mingling wojun xinyidai zuozhan tiaoling banfa” (“CMC 

Chairman Jiang Zemin Signs Order Implementing Our Army’s New Generation 

of Operational Regulations”), Renmin Ribao, January 25, 1999, at www.people.com.

cn/item/ldhd/Jiangzm/1999/mingling/ml0003.html.

41. For discussion of the development of the new generation of doctrine, 

see Lonnie Henley, loc. cit., and David Finkelstein, “Thinking about the PLA 

Revolution in Doctrinal Affairs,” draft paper, November 2002, cited by permission 

of the author.

1

CHAPTER 6

CHINA AS A MAJOR ASIAN POWER:

THE IMPLICATIONS OF ITS MILITARY MODERNIZATION

(A VIEW FROM THE UNITED STATES)

Paul H. B. Godwin

INTRODUCTION

There is a seeming contradiction between China’s increasing 

influence in global and regional politics and the apprehension seen 

in Beijing’s perception of its security environment. Without a doubt, 

China today is more influential in world politics and the Asia-Pacific 

region than at any time in the modern era. Yet, Beijing’s official 

national defense policy suggests China is extremely uncertain 

about its national security environment. So apprehensive is Beijing 

that it believes military power is becoming increasingly important 

in preserving China’s security. This public anxiety comes after 15 

years of double-digit percentage defense budget increases and what 

appears to be an acceleration of China’s military modernization 

programs.

Over the 25 years since their initiation, China’s current defense 

modernization programs have reached the point where they 

suggest that Beijing’s objective is to build Asia’s dominant defense 

establishment. In the United States, the improving capabilities of 

the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA—as the services and 

branches are collectively named) increasingly are perceived as a 

potential threat to U.S. strategic interests in the West Pacific. The 

purpose of this chapter is to assess China’s military modernization 

programs by addressing seven issue areas. First, how does Beijing’s 

enunciated defense policy fit into the overall objectives of China’s 

security policy? Second, how does Beijing define the threats to 

China’s security? Third, to what extent do China’s acquisitions and 

indigenous development programs reflect Beijing’s defense policy 

and the military strategy it suggests? Fourth, China’s military 
1

capabilities will be assessed in light of Beijing’s threat assessment and 

the strategy it has evidently developed in response to this perceived 

threat. Fifth, the issue of the PLA’s conventional force projection 

capabilities will be addressed. Sixth, a brief assessment will be made 

of the progress in China’s intent to develop a self-sustaining military 

industrial complex. Finally, an assessment will be made of possible 

events that could change the direction of China’s defense policies.

In addressing these issues, the chapter’s primary focus will be on 

the trends seen in China’s military modernization programs rather 

than present capabilities. Given the broad scope of China’s programs 

that range from modernizing the strategic nuclear deterrent to 

developing capabilities in information warfare, trends are a stronger 

indicator of possible intent than current capabilities. The chapter’s 

conclusion will assess the policy implication these trends suggest for 

the region and the United States.

CHINA’S PERSPECTIVE ON ITS NATIONAL DEFENSE POLICY 

Beijing’s defense policy is formulated in an era where China is 

more secure from imminent external military threat than at any time 

in the past 150 years. Moreover, although Beijing does not view China 

as a “great power” because it lacks the technological sophistication 

of the world’s most advanced economies, Beijing has become a major 

player in the international system seeking great power status. Beijing 

is conducting an active diplomacy implementing a foreign policy 

strategy with multiple objectives collectively designed to transform 

China into a major world power.1 This diplomacy is intended in 

large part to uphold an international environment conducive to 

sustaining and expanding the global trade and commerce necessary 

to build the economy and technological sophistication China needs 

to be a great power. This trade does more than enrich China and 

contribute to its domestic economic development. It also provides 

access to many of the technologies and manufacturing skills required 

to achieve Beijing’s most critical long-term defense modernization 

objective: a self-sustaining defense research and development (R&D) 

infrastructure and military industrial complex (MIC). 

This same foreign policy strategy now pursues positive relations 

with the world beyond its initial concentration on China’s Asian 
1

neighbors. Beijing seeks to work closely with the European Union 

(EU) and to extend its diplomatic influence into Latin America, the 

Middle East, and Africa. While much of this diplomacy is intended 

to ensure China’s access to the energy supplies demanded by a 

rapidly expanding economy, it also is designed to reinforce Beijing’s 

status as an influential player on the world scene. Within Asia, this 

diplomacy has established Beijing as a primary player in regional 

security forums while simultaneously easing, but not eliminating, 

apprehension over China’s increasing military capabilities. In brief, 

the strategy executed by Beijing has made China richer and more 

influential in the world than at any time since the mid-18th century. 

Nonetheless, Beijing’s defense policy does not reflect the confidence 

one might anticipate from China’s diplomatic achievements. What 

it does reflect is a fundamental apprehension of U.S. power and 

military presence both globally and in the Asia-Pacific region. 

National Defense Policy.

The authoritative statements of Beijing’s perception of its security 

environment and the defense policy and strategy it requires are found 

in China’s defense white papers.2 Whereas the most recent white 

paper, published in December 2004, sees the international system as 

stable, “factors of uncertainty, instability, and insecurity” are viewed 

as increasing. In an only thinly veiled reference to the United States, the 

white paper states that “tendencies of hegemonism and unilateralism 

have gained new ground, as struggles for strategic points, strategic 

resources, and strategic dominance crop up from time to time.” This 

statement and the white paper’s reference to the U.S. invasion of Iraq 

as exerting a “far reaching influence on the international and regional 

security situations”3 demonstrates Beijing’s apprehension over the 

power and influence of the United States. These judgments also 

explain the white paper’s conclusion that “(t)he military factor plays 

a greater role in international configuration and national security.”4

The United States is unquestionably at the center of Beijing’s military 

security concerns. The reason for this is found in the white paper’s 

logic explaining why Beijing sees military power assuming greater 

importance in protecting China’s national security. 
1

First, the metric employed in describing the developments in 

military capabilities changing the conduct of war is clearly drawn 

from the technological advances and doctrinal changes found in the 

U.S. armed forces. The white paper focuses on the consequences 

for military operations of the transition from mechanization to 

“informationalization”—referred to as the “World Wide Revolution 

in Military Affairs (RMA).” In Beijing’s view, as the world’s major 

militaries undergo this transformation and battlefield technologies 

change the conduct of war to “[a]symmetrical, noncontiguous and 

nonlinear operations,” the global military imbalance is widening. 

Because American armed forces are the leaders in this transformation 

and have applied advanced technologies to military operations in 

war, the imbalance of most concern to Beijing is between China 

and the United States. Second, as Chapter III of the white paper 

details,5 the PLA’s modernization is now dedicated to “building an 

informationalized force and winning an informationalized war. . . .” 

The only military adversaries the PLA potentially will confront with 

the capabilities it fears most are the U.S. armed forces. Currently, 

should that confrontation occur, it could be over Taiwan. Preventing 

Taiwan’s independence is declared the PLA’s “sacred responsibility.”6

In preparing China’s armed forces for this contingency, the white 

paper is explicit in its attachment of foremost priority to modernizing 

the PLA’s naval, air, and strategic missile forces. This priority is 

necessary “in order to strengthen the capabilities for winning both 

command of the sea and command of the air, and conducting strategic 

counterstrikes.”7 A military confrontation with the United States over 

Taiwan is the only probable scenario requiring this combination of 

military capabilities. 

This apprehension over U.S. capabilities is stated clearly in the 

white paper’s assessment of the Asia-Pacific security environment. 

Although viewed as essentially stable, responsibility for any 

potential instability is placed on U.S. policies and strategy. Whereas 

the Six-Party Talks seeking to end North Korea’s nuclear programs 

are described as weak and terrorism and transnational crimes are 

recognized as major problems, the United States and Japan are seen 

as the principal sources of potential regional instability. The white 

paper states:
1

The United States is realigning and reinforcing its military presence in this 

region by buttressing military alliances and accelerating missile defense 

systems. Japan is stepping up its constitutional overhaul, adjusting its 

military and security policies and developing the missile defense system 

for early deployment. It also has markedly increased military activities 

abroad.8

As expected, the United States is criticized for increasing the quantity 

and quality of its arms sales to Taiwan. The Taiwan issue, however, 

was to become even more salient following the February 2005 

meeting of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC). 

The SCC’s joint statement issued on February 19 included a 

carefully worded reference to Taiwan as being among their agreed 

“common strategic objectives.” Specifically, the United States and 

Japan agreed they would “[e]ncourage the peaceful resolution of 

issues concerning the Taiwan Strait through dialogue.”9 China’s 

Foreign Minister, Li Zhaoxing, was inflexible in his response during 

a press conference. He declared that “[a]ny move to include Taiwan 

directly or indirectly in the scope of U.S.-Japan security cooperation 

constitutes an encroachment on China’s sovereignty and an 

interference in China’s internal affairs.”10

This focus on the U.S. military presence in the region, the alliance 

with Japan, and the centrality of Taiwan in Beijing’s perception 

of its Asian security environment contrasts sharply with Beijing’s 

assessment of the role played by the Association of Southeast Asian 

Nations (ASEAN) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). The white 

paper declares:

China has established a strategic partnership with the ASEAN dedicated 

to peace and prosperity in the region, and engaged in comprehensive 

cooperation that has seen rapid expansion. Cooperation in East Asia, 

with the ASEAN and China, Japan, and the ROK [Republic of Korea] 

as the main players, keeps expanding, leading to greater economic 

development and political and security trust in the region. The ARF as 

the most important official channel for multilateral security dialogue 

in the Asia-Pacific region, plays a positive role in promoting security 

cooperation in the region.11

Even with the tensions so evident in Sino-Japanese relations, the 

contrast between China’s apprehension over U.S. capabilities and 
1

strategy and the contributions ASEAN and ARF make to regional 

security could not be more starkly stated. 

Nor are Beijing’s concerns necessarily misplaced. Certainly, the 

degree of cooperation achieved between China and the United States 

in the years following the tragic terrorist attack of September 11, 2001 

(9/11), on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon has increased 

significantly. Nonetheless, despite this enhanced cooperation, U.S. 

mistrust of China’s long-term strategic intentions toward the Asian 

region has been stated in official documents laying out American 

national security and defense strategies. One year after the 9/11 

tragedy, The National Security Strategy of the United States warned 

that “In pursuing advanced military capabilities that can threaten 

its neighbors in the Asia-Pacific region, China is pursuing an 

outdated path that, in the end, will hamper its pursuit of national 

greatness.”12 On September 30, 2001, the U.S. Department of Defense 

(DoD) Quadrennial Defense Review’s (QDR) reference to a possible 

“military competitor with a formidable resource base emerging in 

Asia”13 could only be read as referring to China. Secretary of Defense 

Donald Rumsfeld’s statement at the recent Asian security conference 

held in Singapore would confirm to Beijing that U.S. concerns over 

China remain high among the Defense Department’s priorities. In 

his prepared remarks, Secretary Rumsfeld asserted that because 

no country threatened China, Beijing’s investments in its military 

modernization programs were questionable.14

Beijing’s concentration on defeating or offsetting U.S. military 

capabilities can be seen in the trends found in China’s acquisitions 

from foreign sources, especially Russia, and indigenous programs 

and R&D projects. Nonetheless, although the primary driver for 

China’s current military modernization programs is preparing the 

PLA for a possible military conflict with the United States over 

Taiwan, the weapons, equipment, operational doctrine, and training 

being developed are fungible. The capabilities being developed can 

be applied to military contingencies other than a Taiwan scenario, 

and these are not minor capabilities. Simply listing them, some of 

which have their origins in the 1950s, attests to the level of military 

capabilities sought by Beijing.15
• R&D in space systems to provide wide area intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities.

• R&D in anti-satellite systems.

• Cruise missile acquisitions and programs dedicated to 

improving the range, speed, and accuracy of land, air, and 

ship-launched weapons.

• Ballistic missile programs improving the range, survivability 

(mobile systems), reliability, accuracy, and response times 

of tactical, regional, and intercontinental-range weapons to 

augment or replace current systems.

• Construction of new classes of nuclear-powered attack and 

ballistic missile submarines (SSN/SSBN) to augment or 

replace those now in service.

• Acquisition and development of advanced diesel-electric 

submarines armed with sub-surface launched cruise missiles 

and guided torpedoes to augment or replace older vessels 

now in service.

• Development and acquisition of more capable surface 

combatants armed with advanced antiship cruise missiles, 

antisubmarine warfare, and air defense systems.

• Air power programs developing and acquiring technologically 

advanced multiple-role combat aircraft, together with airborne 

early warning and control system aircraft (AWACS) and aerial 

refueling to increase their effectiveness and combat radius, 

and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) designed to attack an 

adversary’s air defense radars.

• Air defense programs developing and acquiring surfaceto-air missiles (SAM) and aircraft capable of providing an 

integrated air defense of China’s territory.

• Ground force programs modernizing armor and artillery 

weapons, deploying increasing numbers of helicopter 

aviation units, improving airlift for airborne units, deploying 

increasing numbers of special operations forces units, and 

increasing amphibious warfare capabilities.
• R&D in offensive and defensive information warfare 

operations. 

• R&D and deployment of improved command, control, 

communications, and computer systems (C4).

• Increasing the tempo and complexity of exercises to make 

the PLA capable in the joint service operations essential for 

contemporary warfare, including amphibious operations.

Although undoubtedly now primarily intended for a possible 

military conflict with the United States over Taiwan, as they mature 

these trends will provide military capabilities China can apply to its 

maritime claims and defense of its land borders. Beijing’s defense 

requirements should not be underestimated. China’s land border 

stretches some 13,728 miles, extending from Russia and North 

Korea in the north and northeast to Southeast Asia and South and 

Central Asia, touching on no less than 14 countries. China’s coastline 

extends some 9,000 miles from Russia in the north to Vietnam in 

the south. China’s current threat environment, however, is low, and 

Beijing’s regional diplomacy is dedicated to sustaining a cooperative 

relationship with all neighboring states, including resolving border 

disputes. Moreover, even now, no single Asian power can match 

China’s military power on continental Asia. With the possible 

exception of Japan, it is likely that within a decade or so no Asian 

country will be capable of challenging China’s naval and air power in 

maritime East Asia. Only India conceivably will be able to countervail 

a Chinese naval presence in the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean, 

should Beijing choose to patrol that distance from its home waters.

The question arising from this unfolding range of military 

capabilities is what future security environments are China’s defense 

modernization programs designed to prepare for? It is difficult to 

assume they are intended primarily to enhance China’s prestige by 

presenting Asia and the world with technologically advanced highly 

trained armed forces. It is reasonable to conclude that China’s defense 

programs, especially the intent to develop an indigenous capability 

to design and manufacture any defense items Beijing believes it 

requires, are calculated to make China Asia’s dominant military 

power. If this should be the objective, then what are Beijing’s strategic 
intentions when this goal is achieved over the coming two decades? 

Currently, the United States is the Asia-Pacific region’s predominant 

power with every intention of remaining so. 

The Sino-American Paradox.

Despite the undeniable focus of Beijing’s defense modernization on 

potential military confrontation with the United States, Washington 

and Beijing recognize that their national interests are served best by 

avoiding direct confrontation. Both are expanding cooperation in all 

realms serving their mutual interests. That is, China and the United 

States are pursuing parallel polices of pragmatic mutual engagement. 

More recently, when the two leaders met on the sidelines of the 

November 2004 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting 

in Chile, President Hu Jintao asked President George W. Bush to 

engage in what he referred to as a “strategic dialogue.” President 

Bush agreed, but because the term “strategic dialogue” is reserved 

for close allies, Washington chose to term the meetings a “global 

dialogue.” Nonetheless, the United States and China agreed to hold 

regular high-level talks on political and security issues.16 The first of 

these was held in Beijing on August 1, 2005, by Vice Foreign Minister 

Dai Bingguo and Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick.17 These 

meetings can be seen as paralleling the Sino-American Defense 

Consultative Talks (DCT) between the two defense establishments. 

This mutual engagement is a positive consequence both of reciprocal 

concerns over the potential costs of open confrontation, as well as 

the reality that Beijing and Washington have much to gain through 

cooperation. Nonetheless, the strong opposition the United States 

and Japan presented to the EU’s potential lifting of its postTiananmen arms embargo on China is indicative of the tensions 

that mark this engagement. The central argument presented by the 

United States and Japan was that lifting the embargo threatened the 

regional balance of military power by potentially assisting China in 

its already accelerating military modernization programs.18 Similar 

arguments were raised by the United States with Israel in the dispute 

over Israeli arms and technology sales to China.19

This reciprocal pattern of apprehension and cooperation reflects 

the utility China and the United States see in a pragmatic relationship. 
Perhaps contradicting China’s defense white paper, China’s Ministry 

of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) has expressed the view that it welcomes 

a continuing strong U.S. regional presence because it contributes 

to regional security and stability.20 A sustained American political, 

economic, and military presence provides those Asian states 

apprehensive over Beijing’s growing influence the ability to hedge 

against any potential attempt by China to dominate the region. In 

this sense, the United States assists in providing the regional stability 

that allows Beijing to pursue its primary external strategic objective 

of sustaining an international environment conducive to enhancing 

China’s economic development and modernization. 

There is a paradox underlying this policy of mutual engagement. 

Even as this pragmatic cooperation forms the core of their relationship, 

China and the United States are simultaneously preparing for war 

with each other over Taiwan. Both will have contingency plans on 

the shelf containing operational designs to defeat the other.21

ASSESSING CHINA’S MILITARY CAPABILITIES

Whereas Beijing’s aspirations for its military modernizations 

programs seemingly are evident, PLA capabilities are far less so. As 

a matter of policy and despite improvements over the years, Beijing’s 

lack of transparency in its military capabilities and programs makes 

a confident assessment impossible. For example, for some years now 

the PLA has focused on developing the capability to conduct joint 

warfare, but what can be known from reports on military exercises or 

the occasional visits of observers is too limited for reliable judgment. 

Nor can any estimate be confident that it properly assesses PLA 

logistic capabilities for joint operations. The effectiveness of PLA Navy 

(PLAN) anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and anti-air warfare (AAW) 

cannot be determined for the same reasons. The quality of training, 

maintenance, and all the other factors that contribute to effective 

ASW and AAW simply cannot be determined from the information 

available. Similar problems affect assessments of essentially all other 

realms of warfighting. Any evaluation therefore is left with trying to 

make informed guesses from the platforms, weapons, and supporting 

systems in the PLA’s inventory joined with what is known about 
PLA operational doctrine and the exercises conducted to train for 

this doctrine. This is not firm ground for assessing capabilities.

The second dilemma an assessment has to confront is the difficulty 

of determining the PLA’s capabilities against a specific adversary 

or adversaries in a particular scenario. An example of this difficulty 

is found in the debate between Michael O’Hanlon of the Brookings 

Institution and Lyle Goldstein and William Murray of the U.S. Naval 

War College. The central issue they debated was the potential cost 

in U.S. Navy (USN) ships required to defeat a PLAN submarine 

blockade of Taiwan.22 One could assume, given the overall ASW 

superiority and numbers of USN SSN, destroyers, aircraft carriers, 

and land-based P-3 aircraft that any Chinese attempt to enforce a 

submarine blockade of Taiwan would be defeated quickly. However, 

continuing improvements in China’s submarine force joined with 

the complexities of ASW operations in the Taiwan area and the postCold War withering of U.S. ASW assets led Goldstein and Murray 

(an experienced retired USN submarine officer) to argue to the 

contrary.23 In doing so, they criticized an earlier essay by Michael 

O’Hanlon, who had argued that in the most severe case while 

assisting the Taiwan navy, the USN could possibly lose two ships. 

24 Goldstein and Murray conclude that in the best case, U.S. losses 

would be three ships, and in the worst case 14 ships could be lost in 

a single tactical exchange.25

In part, these problems are the result of basing analyses on open 

sources. It is possible that the U.S. intelligence community (IC), 

drawing on its multiple sources, can assess the PLA’s capabilities 

with more confidence. Nonetheless, even the IC has to grapple 

with the secrecy enveloping China’s modernization programs. The 

recent DoD report on China’s military power states that because 

of this secrecy, the report’s “findings and conclusions are based 

on incomplete data.”26 Furthermore, as China’s armed forces 

modernize across the board and the MIC becomes more capable in 

the R&D and production of sophisticated platforms, weapons suites, 

and supporting systems, estimating the PLA’s future capabilities 

is becoming even more difficult. Equally uncertain is the PLA’s 

capability to command, control, coordinate, and provide timely 

intelligence to its modernized forces. The PLA could be moving faster 
or slower toward its aspirations than an external observer, especially 

one using only open sources, will know with any confidence.

U.S. AND CHINA: MILITARY STRATEGIES

In terms of military strategy, the U.S. position in Asia serves as 

the maritime balancer to China.27 In essence, the military strategies of 

China and the United States consist of a continental power countered 

by a maritime power. American forces deploy throughout the AsiaPacific region from U.S. and foreign-hosted bases and facilities. 

These bases and facilities extend from the West Coast of the United 

States to Hawaii and Guam, and from the Republic of Korea and 

Japan in the north through Southeast Asia down to Australia and 

Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. Possibly, U.S. access to bases in 

Central Asia (Uzbekistan, which is ending, and Kyrgyzstan) could 

be included in this listing. Their purpose, however, is to support 

coalition operations in Afghanistan rather than serve as facilities for 

possible operations against China. 

Given this continental-maritime structure, Beijing’s basic military 

strategy for defense against the United States is to maintain strategic 

deterrence through a credible second-strike capability and to defend 

China’s territory and littoral seas. Because of its location some 100 

miles from the mainland, Taiwan is encompassed by this strategy. 

The trends in China’s defense modernization programs listed earlier 

are designed in large part to make this strategy increasingly robust. 

Strategic deterrence will be bolstered by the new class (094) of 

SSBNs armed with 12 JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missiles 

(SLBM). These ships will grant China a survivable sea-based strategic 

force. It safely can be assumed they will be quieter and more reliable 

than the troublesome single-ship Xia-class that represents China’s 

first generation SSBN. The new SSBN force will complement the 

solid-fueled, mobile land-based DF-31 and DF-31A intercontinental 

ballistic missiles (ICBMs) now under development for deployment 

in the near future. These new weapons will be quicker in responding, 

more accurate, and survivable than the 20 slow responding, liquidfueled silo-based DF-5A ICBMs that form the core of China’s current 

deterrent. Equally important, even if only two 094 SSBN are deployed 
in the coming decade, they would add 24 ICBM to the 20 land-based 

weapons now in place. When the DF-31/31A are deployed, the 

number of ICBMs capable of striking the United States will increase 

even more. There are many unknowns about China’s nuclear force 

planning. Among them is how Beijing conceptualizes its future 

strategic force structure as it confronts the U.S. national missile 

defense (NMD) program and is capable of deploying increasing 

numbers of weapons at sea and on land. Possibly, rather than relying 

on a just a few weapons—a minimal deterrent—as it has in the past, 

Beijing will conclude that, with NMD on the horizon, a significantly 

larger force is necessary.

Strengthening littoral defense is sought by improving the PLA’s 

naval and air power capabilities to conduct operations several 

hundred miles from China’s coast. When employed in a joint service 

campaign, these capabilities will provide the basis for a “local sea 

denial” or “anti-access” defense potentially extending 200 miles or 

possibly much more from China’s territorial waters. The military 

objective is to present a threat to U.S. aircraft carrier strike groups that 

will slow their advance into the Taiwan area of operations (TAO). 

Once in the TAO, the objective is to make U.S. Navy operations 

extremely hazardous and costly.

Although China is exploring the use of ballistic missiles to 

strike ships, the greatest imminent threat to U.S. naval forces is the 

deployment of modern Russian and indigenously developed quiet, 

diesel-electric submarines (SS) and a new class (093) of SSNs. The 

093 SSN, Russian Kilo, the latest Song, and the Yuan SS are armed with 

submerged-launch long-range anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM) and 

wake-homing and/or wire-guided torpedoes. This deployment is 

complemented by the acquisition and development of more modern 

and lethal surface combatants, including the Sovremenny-class 

guided-missile destroyers (DDG) from Russia and the indigenous 

development of DDGs and guided missile frigates (FFG). The ASCMs 

arming these ships are increasing in range, speed, and lethality.

Air power improvements focus on the acquisition from Russia and 

indigenous development of fourth-generation multiple-role combat 

aircraft. The new air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM) arming these 

aircraft have greater range, supersonic speed, and the ability to take 
evasive maneuvers to defeat the target ships’ defenses. The combat 

potential of these aircraft will be enhanced by the deployment of 

AWACS and aerial refueling aircraft. When these two capabilities 

mature, they will grant PLAN aviation and PLA Air Force (PLAAF) 

aircraft greater range and effectiveness.

In response to U.S. “deep strike” operations, point defense of 

essential military, industrial, and political installations is being 

replaced by an integrated air defense system (IAD) that includes 

SAMs, air defense artillery, and offensive counter air operations. 

The “high-tech” contribution of advanced SAMs and air defense 

aircraft to IAD is joined by a 21st century version of “people’s 

war.” “People’s Air Defense” units formed out of China’s urban 

militia now are assigned the task of repairing bombing and missile 

damage, restoration of electricity and water supplies, reestablishing 

communications, and responding to all other consequences of enemy 

air and missile attacks.28

Although our ability to determine what progress has been made 

is minimal, the PLA’s interest in offensive and defensive information 

operations must not be overlooked. The PLA views these operations 

as “Integrated Network Electronic Warfare” and as a capability 

essential to seizing battlespace initiative through “electromagnetic 

dominance in the early stages of a conflict.”29

Looking further ahead, China’s space programs are to provide 

two capabilities critical to a littoral defense strategy. Wide-area ISR 

capabilities will serve to locate and track U.S. aircraft carrier strike 

groups and permit over-the-horizon (OTH) targeting for China’s air 

and ship-borne cruise missiles. Should China’s anti-satellite program 

be successful, it would be used to damage the ISR and command and 

control satellites so important to U.S. military operations. Finally, as 

mentioned earlier, the 2005 DOD annual report states that China is 

exploring the possibility of using ballistic missiles to attack USN task 

forces.30 Clearly, using ballistic missiles to target American aircraft 

carriers will require both maneuvering warheads and space-based 

ISR to locate, track, and target the strike force. 

The actual number of modern platforms currently in the PLA’s 

inventory is relatively small, therefore the current capacity to 

implement this antiaccess strategy is quite limited. The majority of 

China’s air, naval, and strategic missile forces consists of older types 
incorporating updated 1960s technologies. For example, of some 2,600 

combat aircraft in the PLAAF and PLAN aviation units, only about 

300 are third and fourth generation types armed with sophisticated 

munitions.31 Nor have the capabilities of AWACS aircraft and aerial 

refueling yet been developed sufficiently by training to be considered 

operational. The PLAN suffers from a similar imbalance in both its 

surface combatants and submarines. Most are older, although often 

updated, ships. More important is the direction the acquisition and 

development trends demonstrate. 

It seems evident that in the foreseeable future, and even with 

the anticipated improvements in U.S. platforms, weapons, and 

supporting systems, China’s littoral defense is going to become even 

more difficult to penetrate. Indeed, it would be prudent to anticipate 

that future Chinese SS will incorporate air independent propulsion 

(AIP). Extending the number of days PLAN diesel-electric submarines 

can stay submerged operating on their batteries would make them 

even more difficult to locate and kill than they are today. The same 

level of improvement also should be anticipated for China’s new 

SSN over the noisy first generation Han-class. Similarly, the wellknown deficiencies in the air defense capabilities of the PLA surface 

combatants evidently are being overcome by the introduction of 

two indigenously developed Aegis-type DDGs referred to as Project 

052C.32 None of this progress suggests that China’s armed forces are 

intended to match overall U.S. capabilities. What PLA modernization 

programs do demonstrate is that China systematically is overcoming 

the deficiencies found in the existing legacy platforms and weapons 

systems as it brings its armed forces into the 21st century. Although 

China’s naval and air forces clearly are not as numerous or wellequipped and trained as their U.S. counterparts, they are reaching 

for capabilities that will make a military confrontation with them 

more hazardous and costly. 

As Thomas Christensen so concisely stated the problem several 

years ago, China can cause problems for U.S. security policy without 

matching American military capabilities.33 The distribution of the 

U.S. Pacific Fleet’s large inventory of sophisticated and extremely 

competent combatants serves as an example of the problem.34 The 

submarine force contains 26 SSN, 7 SSBN, and 3 nuclear-powered 

guided missile submarines (SSGN-converted Ohio-class SSBN capable 
1

of being armed with 154 Tomahawk land-attack cruise missiles). Seabased air power consists of five aircraft carrier air wings. A sixth 

aircraft carrier, the Ronald Reagan (CVN 76), does not have an assigned 

air wing. Each air wing contains 60-85 aircraft. A typical air wing’s 

missions include strike, airborne early warning, electronic attack, 

ASW, and logistic support. The Pacific Fleet’s surface combatants 

consist of 11 guided missile cruisers (CG), 22 DDG, 2 destroyers 

(DD), and 13 frigates (FFG). This inventory is divided among the 

Third and Seventh Fleets, Task Force 12, and Task Force 14. Only the 

Seventh Fleet, headquartered in Yokosuka, Japan, is forward-based 

in the West Pacific. The Seventh Fleet’s combat power centers on the 

Kitty Hawk (CV 63) Strike Group composed of the aircraft carrier’s 

air wing,35 2 CG, 3 DDG, 2 FFG, and 2 SSN.36

Thus, although the U.S. Pacific Fleet’s aggregate capabilities 

are far superior to anything China can put to sea, few ships are 

forward-based in the West Pacific. Any major confrontation with 

China would require the redeployment of ships to the West Pacific, 

requiring considerable transit time.37 U.S. naval vessels steaming at 

14 knots would take 18 days to reach the East China Sea from the 

U.S. West Coast. From Pearl Harbor, the steaming time is 14 days; 

and from Yokosuka, 5 days. Ships in the Persian Gulf would steam 

for 15 days to reach the East China Sea. More rapid advance, say 

20 knots, would result in ships arriving in the operating area with 

engineering problems and most likely with weapon systems and 

sensors needing maintenance. This speed of advance also would 

restrict crew training and readiness for combat operations, especially 

for the air wing embarked on aircraft carriers. Furthermore, the 

increased speed would require either additional refueling stops or 

additional replenishment ships for underway refueling. Therefore, 

a moderate advance of 14 knots would result in greater combat 

effectiveness in the area of operations despite the longer transit times. 

Nuclear-powered submarines have shorter transit times, because 

their speed is not affected by the sea state; therefore their machinery 

and weapons suites are not susceptible to the vibrations and other 

consequences of high-speed surface transit. 

Recent U.S. responses to China’s improving military capabilities 

are difficult to separate from what could also be preparation for a 

potential North Korea crisis. Nonetheless, changes being made to U.S. 
air and naval forces in preparation for a Taiwan or North Korea crisis 

can be applied to either contingency.38 The Pacific Fleet has moved 

three SSN to Guam, placing them closer to China. Consideration is 

being given to moving an aircraft carrier and its air wing from the 

Atlantic Fleet to be based in Pearl Harbor. In May 2005, the 13th 

Air Force moved from Guam to Hawaii. According to General Paul 

V. Hester, commander of U.S. Pacific Air Forces (PACAF), the new 

13th Air Force headquarters will provide an air operations and 

warfighting center to cover the entire Pacific region. General Hester 

plans to establish a strike force at Andersen Air Force Base (AFB) 

on Guam composed of 6 strategic bombers and 48 fighters rotated 

from U.S. bases. These combat aircraft will be joined by 12 aerial 

refueling aircraft to provide a long-range force projection capability. 

In November 2004, Major General David Deptula, PACAF’s Director 

of Air and Space Operations, anticipated the strategic bombers being 

employed for maritime control. Available technologies now provide 

strategic bombers with all-weather, day/night precision anti-ship 

capability.39 In addition, three Global Hawk unmanned reconnaissance 

aircraft will be based on Guam. With 28 hours endurance and a 

range of more than 11,780 miles at altitudes up to 65,000 feet, a Global 

Hawk will be capable of missions covering 62,000 square miles a day, 

from Bangkok to Beijing. Adding to these developments, Lieutenant 

General Henry Obering, USAF, Director of the Missile Defense 

Agency, has stated that China would be treated as a potential missile 

threat in the development program for national missile defense. This 

decision was made, he said, because it was “prudent” to do so.40

As these contingency preparations were being made, the paradox 

of Sino-American relations continued. In April 2005, the DCT were 

held as scheduled in Washington. General Xiong Guangkai of the 

PLA General Staff Department met with his counterpart, Under 

Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith, and other senior 

officials, including National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley. 

China’s news agency Xinhua reported that General Xiong discussed 

China’s December 2004 defense white paper, and that both sides had 

agreed they should strengthen their military dialogue and exchanges 

“in order to enhance mutual understanding and trust.”41 Other 

patterns of normal military ties between the two countries also were 
sustained. U.S. and Chinese centers of professional military education 

(PME) continued their exchange of visits, and on July 16, General Liu 

Zhenwu, commander of the Guangzhou Military Region, departed 

China for a visit to U.S. PACOM at the invitation of its commander, 

Admiral William J. Fallon, USN. In a press interview before General 

Liu’s arrival, Admiral Fallon stressed that he sought to strengthen 

military ties between his command and the PLA. Admiral Fallon is 

reported as saying “I don’t see a threat, I don’t want to be perceived 

as the military commander here to be offering or proposing a threat 

to China.”42

Moreover, in October Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld made his 

first visit to China, and in July 2006 General Guo Boxiong, Vice 

Chairman of the Central Military Commission, visited the United 

States. Symbolically, these two official visits restored military 

relations to the point they were prior to the 2001 collision between a 

PLA Navy fighter and a U.S. Navy reconnaissance aircraft.

CHINA’S FORCE PROJECTION CAPABILITIES

Although in principal the emerging capabilities of the PLA are 

applicable to scenarios other than Taiwan, the current DoD report 

judges that “China’s ability to project conventional military power 

beyond its periphery remains limited.”43 The question arising 

from this statement is how limited are these capabilities? With the 

PLAN conducting exercises in the South China Sea and its nuclear 

submarines patrolling further east, on one occasion circling Guam,44

this question requires more detailed assessment. 

Assessments of PLA conventional force projection capabilities 

have to address how far from China’s borders and against what 

adversary? Beijing is working diligently to resolve its remaining land 

border disputes, and no state in Asia is contemplating an invasion 

of China. Consequently, beyond possible border incidents that 

China must prepare for, a ground war is so unlikely that it does not 

warrant discussion. Should a border incident flare up, PLA ground 

forces are capable of responding effectively. These forces have been 

undergoing modernization, including PLAAF initial training in 

close air support. Furthermore, and despite the uncertain results of 

Beijing’s 1979 incursion into Vietnam, ground warfare is the PLA’s 

forte.
In China’s maritime realm, tensions in Northeast Asia involve 

primarily territorial disputes with Japan. With Japan an ally of the 

United States, a major military confrontation over these disputes is 

improbable. Moreover, Japan’s Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces 

(MSDF/ASDF) are themselves extremely capable. Indeed, the only 

potential but still unlikely use of China’s force projection capabilities 

other than in a Taiwan crisis is over the continuing territorial disputes 

in the South China Sea.

In a South China Sea scenario, as in all other uses of military force, 

one has to ask the purpose of the force projection. Is it to establish 

a “presence” or to conduct sustained combat operations? If it is the 

former, perhaps as an act of coercive diplomacy, the PLAN can carry 

out the mission with ease. A surface action group (SAG) flotilla 

composed of four or five DDGs and FFGs accompanied by one or 

two submarines and an underway replenishment ship would make 

China’s intent clear. If, however, a PLAN SAG has to prepare for 

possible sustained combat operations, then two deficiencies come 

into play. 

Despite the PLAN’s introduction of Aegis-type DDGs, the fact 

remains that almost all PLAN surface combatants only have limited 

AAW capabilities. This means that if the PLAN is conducting 

sustained combat operations in the South China Sea, its surface 

combatants are exposed to land-based air attack from several regional 

air forces. Some protection for the SAG could be provided by China’s 

land-based aircraft using aerial refueling, but this technique has 

not been operationalized thus far. Moreover, the defending aircraft 

would require frequent refueling to ensure sustained loiter time 

over the area of operations. This is far beyond the PLA’s capabilities. 

An aircraft carrier with fixed-wing aircraft would be needed for 

sustained air operations in an area as distant as the South China Sea. 

Such a ship remains only a distant dream for the PLAN. 

A second deficiency is the limited wide-area surveillance 

capability available to the PLAN.45 In the 1990s, China equipped Y-8 

turbo-prop transports with British Skymaster surveillance and early 

warning radars capable of identifying surface and air targets and 

vectoring ships and aircraft. With a flight endurance of 10.5 hours 

and a cruising speed of 340 mph, the Y-8 could partially compensate 
for this deficiency. A potential third PLAN deficiency is ASW. 

The PLAN is acquiring improved ASW helicopters for its surface 

combatants and the new submarines will have an improved ASW 

capability, but how competently these capabilities can be employed 

simply is not known. Nonetheless, a PLAN flotilla would not be 

defenseless. Assuming one or two submarines are part of the SAG, 

surface ships attacking with ASCM confront a daunting task. In 

addition to facing the SAG’s submarines, the PLAN’s newest DDGs, 

especially the Sovremenny, are armed with lethal, supersonic longrange ASCM. 

This discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of a PLAN 

SAG operating in the South China Sea, however, begs a basic 

question. Should Beijing employ military coercion to enforce China’s 

sovereignty claims, would any state in Southeast Asia choose to 

challenge the kind of SAG the PLAN can dispatch today? Would any 

regional navy and air force choose to challenge a SAG escorting an 

amphibious group planning to seize one of the many of the disputed 

Spratly islets? Looking ahead a decade, does any Southeast Asian 

nation’s military modernization programs contemplate developing 

the capabilities to challenge China’s future naval and air power? Even 

without an aircraft carrier, China’s drive for a major regional navy 

is marked clearly by current acquisitions and indigenous programs. 

Thus far, the only regional navies that will sustain the capabilities 

to meet or exceed the PLAN are those of Japan and India. Indeed, 

today the capabilities of Japan’s air and naval forces exceed those of 

the PLAN and the PLAAF. 

CHINA’S MILITARY INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX46

As it has been since the first defense modernization programs 

began in the mid-1950s, Beijing’s long-term strategic objective is to 

build a self-sustaining defense R&D and military industrial complex. 

Extensive industrial reforms undertaken in the late 1990s have 

made a substantial improvement in China’s defense production. 

R&D procedures and production methods have all improved, with 

consequent progress in the quality of the output. Nonetheless, even 

in the sector that has demonstrated the most progress other than the 

missile industry, shipbuilding, reliance on imported components 
and technologies continues. Whereas significant headway has been 

made in the production of platforms, China’s most advanced ship 

types contain critical imported components and technologies. The 

PLAN’s newest diesel-electric submarine, the Yuan-class, likely 

draws upon some Russian submarine technology. The most recent 

Song-class submarines rely on German diesel engines and copies of 

the French DUUX-5 digital sonar system and other copies or imports 

of European, Russian, or Israeli components.47 The PLAN’s newest 

destroyers use Ukrainian gas turbine engines and Russian antiaircraft 

missile systems and search radars.48

The aviation industry has demonstrated the least progress. 

Despite China’s development of the Kunlun turbo-jet engine and 

the anticipated WS-10 advanced turbo-fan power plant, the engine 

for China’s first indigenous fourth generation combat aircraft, the 

F-10 designed with Israel’s assistance, is supplied by Russia—the 

A1-31FN built by Salyut. That China continues to rely on importing 

Russian aircraft for the PLAAF and PLAN aviation demonstrates 

the aviation industries’ continuing deficiencies. Naval aviation, for 

example, is being enhanced by the purchase of Russia’s Su-30Mk2 

armed with the supersonic Kh-31 ASCM.49

Even China’s missile industry, which has had pride of place among 

the defense industries since the mid-1950s, has its own weaknesses. 

The industry’s successes can be seen in the development and 

production of solid-fueled ballistic missiles and new classes of cruise 

missiles. China’s cruise missiles are increasing in range and accuracy 

and a land-attack cruise missile (LACM) is under development as is 

a long-range surface-to-air missile perhaps comparable to the U.S. 

Patriot or Russian S-300. These successes must be tempered with 

the recognition that the United States has had solid-fueled ICBMs 

since the 1960s. Moreover, whereas LACMs, beyond-visual-range 

air-to-air missiles, and anti-radiation missiles have long been in 

the inventories of Western and Russian militaries, they are new to 

China. This observation is not made to denigrate all the industry has 

accomplished in the last few years, but to provide a perspective that 

does not exaggerate these achievements.

While not a defense industry, the information technology (IT) 

sector has established a close working relationship with the PLA. 
IT corporations provide command, control, communications and 

intelligence (C4I) equipment to the armed forces, thereby providing 

an important modernizing component. This has allowed the PLA 

to incorporate major improvements in its communications abilities 

and operational security. Presumably, these same technologies have 

assisted the PLA in developing capabilities in offensive and defensive 

information operations often now referred to as “computer network 

operations” (CNO).50

Although Chinese rightly feel pride in the success of their 

manned space program, China’s space industries and R&D have 

had a military purpose since their origins in the mid-1950s. China’s 

military space and counterspace programs51 are focused primarily 

on countering U.S. capabilities. Beijing’s primary interests are spacebased command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR), targeting for a variety of 

weapons, including cruise and ballistic missiles and anti-satellite 

(ASAT) systems. China’s progress in these realms is difficult to 

estimate. Nevertheless, as in other areas of advanced technologies, in 

addition to its indigenous programs Beijing works in cooperation in 

other countries, including Brazil and the EU and in a joint university 

program between Qinghua University and the United Kingdom’s 

(UK) University of Surrey. Four state-owned space industries are 

supervising China’s R&D as part of Beijing’s participation in the 

EU’s Galileo satellite navigation system.52 Additionally, China is 

developing its own Beidou satellite navigation system 53 and has access 

to Russia’s Global Navigation System (GLONASS). How close China 

is to disrupting U.S. space systems while employing its own systems 

for C4ISR and targeting cannot be determined from unclassified 

sources, and perhaps not by the intelligence community. What is 

important, nonetheless, is the concentrated and expensive priority 

Beijing has placed on developing these capabilities.

The effort Beijing has directed at improving China’s defense 

industries and R&D over the past 25 years, and particularly in the past 

5 years, demonstrates China’s commitment to a self-sustaining MIC. 

Beyond extensive reorganization and reform, Beijing has increased 

its R&D investments and raised expenditures on the importation of 

foreign manufacturing technologies. These policies have generated 

an expanding cohort of technicians, engineers, and scientists. With 
all its deficiencies, especially in view of the heavy baggage the MIC 

carried over from the 1960s and 1970s, the improvements made 

are remarkable. Whether these improvements signify a take-off 

stage for the MIC is not knowable. It is clear that the groundwork 

has been prepared for the time when further progress in military 

technologies will depend on China’s indigenous R&D and production 

capabilities. 

RESOURCES, POTENTIAL POLITICAL CHANGE, 

AND CHINA’S FUTURE COURSE

What could cause China to change its current course? Will 

economic expansion stagnate, limiting the resources Beijing can 

allocate to military modernization? Will China’s political system 

undergo such change that Beijing will alter its strategic objectives? 

There are no firm answers to these and similar questions, but 

exploring them could shine some light on Beijing’s determination to 

pursue China’s current defense policies.

Resources.

Can Beijing sustain the level of defense expenditures it has 

accepted since 1989? With an average annual increase of 14.5 percent, 

the official defense budget has doubled in real terms about every 5 

years. Even with these increases, the official defense budget over this 

period consumed a modest 1.6 percent of gross domestic product 

(GDP). When the recent RAND study54 adjusted the official budget 

to reflect probable total military expenditures, the defense burden in 

2003 was 2.3 to 2.8 percent of GDP. This is not an unusual defense 

burden. It is reasonable to assume that China’s future economy will 

slow from its current high rate of expansion and grow at an average 

annual rate of 5 percent. This rate of growth will triple the size of 

China’s economy by 2025. Maintaining defense expenditures at some 

2 percent of GDP as China’s economy expands at 5 percent a year 

will provide the defense establishment with sufficient funding to 

sustain its modernization programs. Nevertheless, it is questionable 

whether the rates of increase seen in recent years can be sustained if 

the economy grows at 5 percent per annum. To maintain such a high 
rate of annual increase, estimated by the RAND study to average 9.8 

percent a year in real terms, would require Beijing to accept defense 

expenditures ranging from 6.2 to 7.6 percent of GDP by 2025. This 

level of spending is excessive; China’s military expenditures would 

exceed those of any NATO or Asian country. 55

Moreover, the central government confronts demands for more 

societal spending. China’s economic expansion will be accompanied 

by an older, more urbanized population that, although wealthier, 

also will be making more demands on government expenditures. 

Currently neglected areas such as pensions, health care, education, 

public infrastructure, and the environment will compete with 

military spending. These demands joined the bad debts created 

by nonperforming loans granted by government banks to stateowned enterprises, placing an increasing burden on government 

expenditures. Even with these competing demands, sustaining 

military expenditures that require only around 2 percent of GDP is 

acceptable. 

Nonetheless, defense spending at 2 percent of GDP could 

be viewed as inadequate, should Beijing perceive its security 

environment deteriorating to the point it believes a major war is 

probable. Under this condition, Beijing could consider it necessary 

to increase its defense expenditures to the range of 3 to 5 percent. 

Such a decision would create a serious friction with the increasing 

societal demands on central government expenditures. 

Although the probability of economic collapse is slim, defense 

expenditures would be threatened by economic stagnation. If 

stagnation did set in, societal demands for spending on pensions, 

health care, and other societal needs would increase with the growth 

in unemployment and other consequences of prolonged economic 

decline. Unless China confronted a severe and immediate external 

military threat to its security, fear of internal unrest could well result 

in priority placed on domestic spending to ease societal tensions with 

the cost paid by decreased expenditures on military modernization. 

It also is possible that, even without economic stagnation, China’s 

political leadership could conclude that mounting national debt 

and increasing societal demands required diminishing military 

expenditures.
Political Change.

The swelling demands on future government spending are 

accompanied by tensions afflicting China’s polity stemming from 

uneven economic expansion, unemployment, corruption, and the 

malfeasance of many government and party officials. It would be 

imprudent to assume, however, that the Chinese Communist Party 

(CCP) is about to lose control and China disintegrate. Certainly, 

popular protests are increasing in number rapidly, growing larger 

and better organized. This pattern of protests is strong especially in 

China’s northeast “rustbelt” and in rural areas. In urban areas, the 

organization of protests is being aided by the wide use of cell phones, 

e-mail, and the Internet. China’s police, however, are becoming 

more sophisticated in their responses. The police now admit that the 

protesters often have legitimate complaints against such problems 

as avaricious managers and corrupt local officials. Moreover, police 

techniques for controlling these protests have begun to change from 

blunt suppression to containing and placating the protestors.56

China’s political elite is worried about the implications of 

increasing unrest for the CCP’s continued monopoly of political 

power, but the response across China’s polity has been mixed.57 At 

the top of the political system, the CCP has indeed sought to increase 

its control over the political process and over the mass media and 

internet. At lower levels, however, experiments first seen in village 

elections have been repeated in urban areas. Moreover, experiments 

in “e-government” are underway in some provinces and municipal 

governments, including electronic bulletin boards that seek feedback 

and public opinion on government policies. There are even the early 

signs of an emerging civil society, especially in the rich, Internet, 

and cell phone-linked urban areas. In short, changes underway in 

China suggest continued CCP rule in a still controlled but more open 

political climate. Collapse of CCP rule and the disintegration of China 

seem far less probable than an incremental easing of authoritarian 

controls beginning at the level of local governance.

More importantly, from the PLA’s point of view, maintaining 

an authoritarian but slowly liberalizing political system that eases 

societal tensions minimizes the possibility that it will be used to bring 
1

mass protests under control as it was in the Tiananmen debacle. 

Unless public protests get completely out of control, they are the 

responsibility of the civilian Ministry of Public Security police and 

the People’s Armed Police (PAP). The PLA can be used for domestic 

security purposes only when requested by local authorities and 

approved by the central government.58

POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND SPECULATIONS 

For the United States, the major unresolved question hovering over 

China’s military modernization programs is whether Beijing’s intent 

is ultimately to challenge U.S. military supremacy in maritime Asia. 

From an American perspective, the trends potentially are ominous. 

China’s programs embracing strategic nuclear force enhancements, 

space exploitation for the conduct of military operations, information 

warfare, naval and air power modernization, and homeland defense 

against air and missile attack are all designed in large part to counter 

U.S. capabilities. From a Chinese perspective, beyond a possible 

confrontation over Taiwan, these programs are a necessary hedge 

against an uncertain future security environment that has at its center 

a potential U.S. shift to a more confrontational policy as China’s power 

and influence increases. Beijing’s defense white papers consistently 

signal such apprehension. Consequently, in Beijing’s eyes there is 

no contradiction between China’s expanding regional and global 

political influence and the aspirations of its military modernization 

programs. China’s most dangerous potential adversary wields the 

world’s most powerful military.

For the coming decade, China’s national interests drive Beijing 

toward maintaining its policy of fostering a pragmatic mutual 

engagement with the United States. Similarly, although Chinese 

military capabilities developed in response to U.S. military power 

are applicable to scenarios other than a Sino-American confrontation, 

Beijing will continue to rely on expanding trade, commerce, foreign 

direct investment, and technology transfers to build China’s economy. 

This will constrain China’s use of force. Aggressive military action 

in Asia would undermine the international environment Beijing 

correctly believes China needs to achieve its long-term strategic 
objectives. For this reason, even as China prepares for a possible war 

with the United States over Taiwan, Beijing does not seek such a 

war. It is more probable that Beijing believes the PLA’s overt war 

preparations serve as a deterrent to Taiwan and stimulate the United 

States to keep pressure on Taipei to avoid unnecessarily provocative 

actions and statements.

Beyond this decade, the strategic landscape is uncertain. Because 

each is suspicious of the other’s strategic intent, neither China nor the 

United States accept the legitimacy of each other’s defense policies 

and strategies. At the root of the problem is what former Deputy 

Assistant Secretary of State Randall Schriver recently has defined as 

“strategic distrust.” Schriver suggests the gravest political danger 

underlying Sino-American relations is a “steady drift toward great 

power global rivalry, if not outright adversarial relations.”59 Such 

mutual suspicion does not serve the interests of the United States, 

China, or Asia. East Asia long has looked to the United States as the 

region’s security guarantor, with U.S. allies and friends contributing 

the bases and access to facilities that make America’s military strategy 

possible. Despite the stability the U.S. military presence brings to the 

region, thereby serving China’s near-term interests, the role of East 

Asia’s security guarantor is an aspect of U.S. policy and strategy that 

feeds Beijing’s suspicions of Washington’s strategic intent.

Nonetheless, the opportunity to ease this reciprocal mistrust 

exists. Although senior defense and military officials from China 

and the United States can play an important role in this task, the 

objective cannot be accomplished at this level of authority. Because 

it is a matter of strategic intent, easing mutual apprehension can 

be achieved only by the most senior political leadership in both 

capitals. This requires Beijing and Washington to face the reality 

of their reciprocal suspicion. The best avenue for approaching 

this sensitive area today is the “strategic dialogue” suggested by 

President Hu Jintao and initiated this summer in Beijing by Vice 

Foreign Minister Dai Bingguo and Deputy Secretary of State Robert 

Zoellick. Ultimately, however, mutually acceptable visions of the 

roles the United States and China will fulfill in Asia have to be agreed 

upon by the two countries’ political leaders. Beijing and Washington 

undoubtedly would anticipate political and economic competition. 
The difficult task will be to find reciprocal acceptance of their military 

security policies. No such agreement is now in sight, but the perilous 

consequences of a sustained military rivalry should spur initial steps 

toward easing their mutual apprehension.

ENDNOTES – CHAPTER 6

1. For detailed assessments of Beijing’s foreign policy over the past decade, see 

Evan Medeiros and M. Taylor Fravel, “China’s New Diplomacy,” Foreign Affairs, 

Vol. 82, No. 6, November-December 2003, pp. 22-35; David Hale and Lyric Hughes 

Hale, “China Takes Off,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 6, November-December 2003, 

pp. 26-53; and David Shambaugh, “China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional 

Order,” International Security, Vol. 29, No. 3, Winter 2004/05, pp. 64-99.

2. China has published defense white papers since in 1995. The 1995 white 

paper was entitled China: Arms Control and Disarmament but was functionally a 

defense white paper. Beginning in 1998, defense white papers have been published 

in alternate years. The following discussion is drawn from China’s National Defense 

in 2004, Beijing: State Council Information Office, December 27, 2004, pp. 2-4.

3. Ibid., p. 2.

4. Ibid.

5. Chapter III is entitled “Revolution in Military Affairs with Chinese 

Characteristics,” pp. 5-12.

6. Ibid., p. 4.

7. Ibid., p. 6.

8. Ibid., p. 3.

9. “Joint Statement of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee” issued 

by the U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC, February 19, 2005. 

10. Hu Xiao, “Japan and U.S. Told: Hands Off Taiwan,” China Daily, March 7, 

2005.

11. China’s National Defense in 2004, p. 3.

12. The National Security of the United States of America, Washington, DC: The 

White House, September 17, 2002, p. 27.

13. Quadrennial Defense Review Report, Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 

September 30, 2001, p. 4.

14. Remarks Delivered by Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, Shangri-La 

Hotel, Singapore, Saturday, June 4, 2005, U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the 

Assistant Secretary of Defense, Public Affairs.

15. This listing is drawn primarily from Annual Report to Congress: The Military 

Power of the People’s Republic of China 2005: A Report to Congress Pursuant to the 

National Defense Authorization Act Fiscal Year 2000, Washington, DC, Office of 
the Secretary of Defense, July 2005 (hereafter DOD Report 05), Chapter 5, “Force 

Modernization Goals and Trends” pp. 26-36.

16. Glenn Kessler, “Senior Level Meetings to Focus on Politics, Security, and 

Possibly Economics,” The Washington Post, April 8, 2005.

17. Yuan Peng, “China-U.S. Strategic Dialogue, a Trust Building One,” People’s 

Daily, August 2, 2005.

18. Steven R. Weisman, “European Union Said to Keep Embargo on Arms to 

China,” The New York Times, March 22, 2005.

19. Sharon Weinberger, “New Technology Transfers to China on Hold, 

Pentagon Official Confirms,” Defense Daily, June 16, 2005.

20. See Shambaugh, “China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order,” p. 

91, where Professor Shambaugh cites both then-Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan 

in 2001 and more recently Ministry of Foreign Affairs Director General for Asian 

Affairs Cui Tiankai as taking this position.

21. See Michael A. McDevitt, “The China Factor in Future U.S. Defense 

Planning,” in Jonathan D. Pollack, Strategic Surprise: U.S.-China Relations in the 

Early Twenty-first Century, Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2003, pp.149-

157, for a valuable discussion of U.S. DoD planning and the paradox raised on p. 

154.

22. Michael O’Hanlon, Lyle Goldstein, and William Murray, “Damn the 

Torpedoes: Debating Possible U.S. Navy Losses in a Taiwan Scenario,” International 

Security, Vol. 29, No. 2, Fall 2004, pp. 202-206.

23. Lyle Goldstein and William Murray, “Undersea Dragons: China’s Maturing 

Submarine Force,” International Security, Vol. 28, No. 4, Spring 2004, pp. 161-196.

24. Michael O’Hanlon, “Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan,” International 

Security, Vol. 25, No 2, Fall 2000, pp. 51-86, esp. pp. 75-79.

25. Michael O’Hanlon, et. al., “Damn the Torpedoes,” p. 205.

26. DOD Report 05, “Executive Summary.”

27. The logic of this strategy is best described by Robert S. Ross, “The Geography 

of Peace: East Asia in the 21st Century,” International Security, Vol. 23 No. 4, Spring 

1999, pp. 81-118.

28. Dennis J. Blasko, “People’s War in the 21st Century: The Militia and the 

Reserves,” presented at the conference Swimming in a New Sea: Civil-Military Issues 

in Today’s China, convened by the CNA Corporation, Alexandria, Virginia, March 

21-23, 2004.

29. DOD Report 05, p. 25.

30. Ibid. p. 4.

31. “Country Briefing: China,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, April 13, 2005, reports the 

number of PLAAF combat aircraft as 3000. The DOD 05 report in Figure 11, p. 44, 

credits the PLAAF and PLAN aviation with some 2600 combat aircraft.
32. James C. Bussert, “China Debuts Aegis Destroyers,” Signal, July 2005.

33. Thomas J. Christensen, “Causing Problems Without Catching Up: China’s 

Rise and Challenges for U.S. Security Policy,” International Security, Vol. 25, No. 4, 

Spring 2001, pp. 5-40.

34. Pacific Fleet submarine force can be found at www.csp.navy.mil. Surface 

combatants can be found at www.surfpac.navy.mil. Amphibious warfare ships are 

not included in this listing.

35. USS Kittyhawk’s Air Wing composition can be found at www.kittyhawk.navy.

mil.

36. Seventh Fleet ships can be found at www.c7f.navy.mil. Amphibious warfare 

ships, the command ship, mine countermeasures ships, and salvage ship and 

submarine tender are not included in this listing.

37. This discussion is taken from Bernard D. Cole, “The Modernization of the 

PLAN and Taiwan’s Security,” in Martin Edmonds and Michael M. Tsai, eds., 

Taiwan’s Maritime Security, London and New York: Routledge Curzon, 2003, pp. 

72-73.

38. This discussion is taken from Richard Halloran, “Checking the Threat That 

Could Be China,” Japan Times, June 12, 2005.

39. “The Air Force’s Emergent Strategy for the Pacific,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, 

November 17, 2004.

40. Ann Scott Tyson, “U.S. Missile Defense Being Expanded, General Says,” 

Washington Post, July 22, 2005.”

41. “China, U.S. to Enhance Military Exchanges,” Xinhuanet, April 29, 2005. 

42. Audrey McAvoy, “Fallon Hopes to Boost Defense Ties with China,” 

Associated Press, July 7, 2005.

43. DOD Report 05, “Executive Summary.”

44. “Chinese Sub Near Guam Before Breaking into Japan Waters, Possibly in 

Training to Constrain U.S. Military Moves,” Asahi, December 7, 2004. 

45. Lyle Goldstein and William Murray, “China Emerges As A Maritime 

Power,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, October 2004. 

46. The following discussion draws primarily from Keith Crane, Roger Cliff, 

Evan Medeiros, James Mulvenon, and William Overholt, Modernizing China’s 

Military: Opportunities and Constraints, Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation, 

2005, pp. 135-190 (Chapter 5, “China’s Defense Industry”); and Evan S. Medeiros, 

“Analyzing China’s Defense Industries and the Implications for Chinese Military 

Modernization,” RAND Corporation, Testimony presented to the U.S.-China 

Economic and Security Review Commission on February 6, 2004. 

47. Goldstein and Murray, “China Emerges As A Maritime Power.” 

48. Richard D. Fisher, Jr., “China accelerates Navy Building,” Jamestown 

Foundation, China Brief, Vol. 3, Issue 15, July 29, 2003.
49. Goldstein and Murray, “China Emerges as a Maritime Power.”

50. DOD Report 05, p. 25.

51. This discussion draws upon Ibid. pp. 35-36.

52. David Lague, “EU Satellite Project Could Improve Accuracy,” International 

Herald Tribune, April 19, 2005.

53. Geoffrey Forden, “Strategic Uses for China’s Bei Dou Satellite System,” 

Jane’s Intelligence Review, October 2003.

54. The following discussion is taken from Crane, et. al., Chapter 7, “Future 

Expenditures on the Military,” Modernizing China’s Military, pp. 205-237.

55. Ibid., pp. 224-227.

56. Murray Scot Tanner, “Protests Now Flourish in China,” International Herald 

Tribune, June 2, 2004.

57. The following discussion is taken from Dr. Richard Baum, “China’s State 

Control Mechanisms and Methods,” Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic 

and Security Review Commission, April 14, 2005.

58. I am grateful to Dennis Blasko for bringing this point to my attention. See 

Article 22, Law of the People’s Republic of China on National Defense, adopted at the 

Fifth Session of the Eighth National People’s Congress (NPC) on March 14, 1997, 

Beijing, Xinhua Domestic Service, March 18, 1997.

59. Randall G. Schriver, “Addressing the Rise of China and Rise of Strategic 

Distrust in U.S.-China Relations,” CSIS Freeman Report, September 2005, pp. 1-2. 

Schriver served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific 

Affairs from 2003 to 2005.

PART III

NORTHEAST ASIA

CHAPTER 7

HOW THE PLA SEES NORTH KOREA

John J. Tkacik, Jr.

Introduction: Was North Korea Worth Fighting For?

A half-century ago, Chinese military commanders did not 

necessarily believe North Korea was worth a war. Consider Chinese 

People’s Liberation Army (PLA) General Peng Dehuai’s first direct 

encounter with the Korean problem at an expanded Politburo 

meeting in the afternoon of Tuesday, October 4, 1950.1 He had left 

his Field Army headquarters in the western Chinese city of Xi’an that 

morning—suddenly, and under urgent orders to present himself at 

the Politburo conclave. The Party Center in Beijing had even sent a 

“silvery” Illyushin passenger plane out to the ancient capital of Xi’an 

to retrieve the General who was, at least that day, the top Communist 

official charged with the pacification and reconstruction of the 

nascent People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) Northwest Bureau. 

When General Peng arrived at the old imperial Zhongnanhai 

compound abutting central Beijing’s Forbidden City, he was 

completely unaware that he would be asked to command China’s 

secret invasion of Korea set to commence in less than 2 weeks. 

It was 4:00 pm, and the meeting was already in progress as the 

General entered the conference room within the ancient Yi Nian 

Hall. Chairman Mao himself greeted the General and beckoned him 

to enter. “Old Peng-ah,” the Chairman called out in apparent relief 

that he might now have an ally, “you’re just in time . . . sorry we had 

to call you so suddenly, but the American Imperialists don’t let us 

rest.”

The General commented that he had not been in Xi’an but a short 

time; his family was just settling-in—or “lighting the fire” as they 

say in Chinese—when he received his orders to Beijing.

“I don’t care if your family’s lighting a fire,” Mao retorted in mock 

impatience, “our Korean neighbors have just ‘lit a fire’, and when our 

neighbors are on fire, we can’t sit around crying about it, can we?” 
1

And, (now that he was on the subject) Mao continued that “Korea” 

was exactly what this Politburo meeting was about—sending troops 

to Korea, to be precise. 

“In a while,” the Chairman addressed the General in a courteous 

third-person syntax, “Old Peng should also be prepared to make a 

statement.”

Peng was caught by surprise. What statement did anyone need 

of him? Out in northwest China’s deserts, he had not really thought 

much about Korea—nothing at all, really. He knew that the Chairman 

had deployed 300,000 troops from General Lin Biao’s Fourth Field 

Army, now in Southern China, back to its old Manchurian haunts 

in August when the North Korean army’s invasion stalled under 

American bombing and strafing runs at the Naktong River. But that 

was someone else’s problem.

He quietly took a chair and ruminated to himself that he had 

enough problems coping with the post-liberation economic crises in 

the Northwest Bureau. Moreover, it did not seem that they really 

needed him here at this meeting—virtually all the attendees were 

top PLA generals. One more general was not going to be much use.

He was jarred from his reverie by a tug at his sleeve. Next to him 

on his right was Gao Gang, senior Politburo member and Chairman 

of the Northeast People’s Government that ran Manchuria as a 

virtual independent country since 1946 and had not yet been brought 

administratively under the Center’s jurisdiction. 

“Get ready, Old Peng,” Gao muttered. The General gave Gao a 

puzzled look but got nothing but a knowing smile in return. Sotto 

voce, the General asked Gao when he had arrived in Beijing. “A few 

days earlier,” was the reply. “So, has the Center decided to send 

troops to Korea?” Gao nodded, then slurped at his tea mug, “on 

October second” and added “we’ve already sent a report to Stalin.” 

“Then why are we still debating it?” “There are still differing 

opinions . . .” He paused, “let’s put it this way, this is a big deal, if 

it’s screwed up, we’ll be in a real mess, so let’s be prudent about this. 

. . .” Gao’s whisper trailed off.

“You say there’re differing views? Whose?” In a low voice, 

Gao asserted that “an absolute majority is very concerned . . . Mao 

Zedong is no exception.” “And you?” “I’m in the ‘against-faction’,” 
Gao admitted. “Who decided to send in the troops?” “Mao Zedong,” 

said Gao flatly, not bothering to use the title “Chairman” or even the 

honorific “comrade.”

At which point there came a high-pitched Hunanese voice from 

the head of the conference table. “I say, Gao Gang,” Chairman Mao 

interjected (also dispensing with the “comrade” formalities), “you 

can’t hold your own side meetings here . . . we all want to hear your 

views, you, with your ‘lofty’ mountain ‘outpost’ [a play on Gao 

Gang’s name]. The higher you are, the farther you can see!” At the 

sound of the Chairman’s voice, the room suddenly fell silent. Mao’s 

intervention focused all attention on Gao.

Gao, who obviously was not the Chairman’s favorite in the 

Politburo, screwed up his courage. “I still feel the same way, we 

should be cautious. Our land has been through over 20 years of war, 

we’ve only just been united, a sense of peace has yet to be restored. 

If we fight again, I’m afraid our economy won’t be able to bear the 

strain. We’ve only just gained power, we should be thrifty. Fighting 

a war isn’t all fists, it’s money . . .”

Looking around the room, Gao continued, “Then there are Lin 

Biao’s views, I think we ought to take them very seriously. Our army 

has backward weapons, most of them are junk [sanba dagai] from the 

Japanese. Each American corps has 1,500 artillery pieces, one of ours 

only has 200, even fewer tanks . . .” 

General Lin Biao had evidently made these same arguments 

when Mao asked him to command the Korean campaign many days 

earlier. Of all the Chinese generals, Lin had the most operational 

military experience on the Korean border as chief of the PLA’s 

Fourth Field Army during the Manchurian campaigns. And the 

brave General Lin was adamant against sending Chinese troops into 

Korea. 

(“Who could have imagined that Lin Biao believed this?” was 

the way the Communist Party’s Party History Research Office put 

it, by way of explaining Lin’s suspicious absence from the October 

4 meeting.) Lin warned, “rushing headlong into Korea against the 

Americans can only mean we will all be consumed in flames [yinhuo 

shao shen].”2

Puzzled by Lin’s reaction, General Nie Rongzhen recalled “Lin 

Biao said he was ill, blinding headaches, hot flashes, insomnia; and 
on that pretext, he obstinately refused to go” to Korea. “This was 

very strange, for we used to work together, and I had never seen him 

so frightened of anything.”3

Korea wasn’t important either to General Lin Biao or Chairman 

Gao Gang. Even if the Americans were to occupy the entire peninsula, 

in their view, the threat to China was minimal. And most historians 

agree that the general consensus among the Chinese Politburo in 

September and October 1950 was against Chinese participation 

in the war. The logistical strains alone would overwhelm China’s 

fragile economy which was just emerging from the Chinese Civil 

War, the military risk of confronting a United States armed with 

atomic weapons was grave, and much of Southwestern China had 

still not been pacified despite the defeat of Chiang Kai-shek’s main 

force armies.4

Yet, when it dawned on him that he was going to lead the battle 

in Korea, General Peng Dehuai gave an ironic rebuttal to those 

in the October 4, 1950, Politburo meeting who said China’s entry 

into the Korean War would severely damage China’s economy. He 

asked them, “what are the ramifications of not entering the war?” He 

warned that “in the past, Japan has used Korea as a springboard for 

aggression into China.”5 As passionate as Peng’s words seemed to be, 

it is unlikely that this argument actually swayed anyone—Peng also 

cheerily pointed out, ”. . . if we are devastated, it would just mean 

that our victory in the War of Liberation would be several years late 

[dalanle, dengyu Jiefang Zhanzheng wan shengli ji nian].”6 This deadpan 

observation, no doubt, was intended as cold water on Chairman 

Mao’s enthusiasm. Instead, Chairman Mao played it as support. The 

Chairman, himself, favored entering the war, and as long as he had 

at least one other sane individual backing him up—tongue in cheek 

or otherwise—the rest of the Politburo apparently was willing to 

follow suit.

But with 50 years of hindsight, it is now clear that Mao was in 

a distinct minority if he truly considered Korea to be of dramatic 

strategic importance to China. Apparently in an effort to prod the 

Politburo into supporting him, the Chairman told an expanded 

Politburo meeting on October 2, 1950, that he had, that very day, 

sent a telegram to the Soviet leader, Marshal Stalin, confirming that 

China would move 12 divisions of Chinese troops into North Korea, 

beginning October 15. 
In all probability, Chairman Mao, recent archival revelations now 

indicate, was testing the waters. In fact, Mao had sent an entirely 

different telegram to Marshal Stalin on October 2, indicating that 

perhaps North Korea was not all that important to China’s security. 

Mao explained that China would not immediately send troops to 

Korea after all.

However, having thought this over thoroughly, we now consider that 

such actions may entail extremely serious consequences. In the first place, 

it is very difficult to resolve the Korean question with a few divisions 

(our troops are extremely poorly equipped, there is no confidence in the 

success of military operations against American troops), the enemy can 

force us to retreat.

In the second place, this will provoke an open conflict between the USA 

and China, and as a consequence of which the Soviet Union also can be 

dragged into war, and the question thus would become extremely large.

Many comrades in the CC/CPC [Central Committee of the Communist 

Party of China] judge that it is necessary to show caution here.7

There are several explanations for Mao’s duplicity. Perhaps Mao 

wanted to give himself room to back down if his Politburo rebelled. 

Perhaps he wanted to pressure Stalin for vastly more military aid 

than Stalin theretofore had been willing to provide. 

In any case, Mao’s real telegram to Stalin (as opposed to the one 

in the Chinese archives which apparently was never sent8) reflects a 

realization that North Korea was not as strategically important as the 

“lips and teeth” metaphor might suggest. The idea that the United 

States had any intention whatsoever of invading Chinese territory 

simply was not credible in the Chinese Politburo. In retrospect, 

one is led to believe that Mao made the ultimate decision to enter 

the Korean War primarily to demonstrate that China, under his 

leadership, was ready to lead the Socialist Revolution in the East.

This is not to say that the Chinese leadership lacked a sense of 

responsibility or loyalty to their North Korean socialist comrades. 

North Korean archives seized when the U.S. Army occupied 

Pyongyang in October 1950 show that the Communists’ People’s 

Liberation Army (PLA) had several divisions of ethnic-Koreans 

fighting in Manchuria during the first part of the 1945-49 Chinese Civil 
War.9

 Korean War scholar Bruce Cumings cites estimates that assert 

15-20 percent of PLA troops in Manchuria in 1947—”fully seventy 

thousand”—were ethnic Koreans, and a Joint PLA-North KoreanSoviet Military Council controlled the movements of all troops and 

materiel across the Sino-Korean border in support of the Communist 

side during the Civil War in Manchuria.10 The PLA began detaching 

ethnic Korean infantry divisions back to North Korea as early as 

1948, and by the beginning of the Korean War, 80 percent of Korean 

People’s Army (KPA) officers had served in China. By the autumn 

of 1950, at least 100,000 ethnic Korean troops were veterans of the 

Chinese Civil War, some of whom had fought “all the way down to 

the ‘last battle’ for Hainan Island in May 1950.”11

The PRC-DPRK Alliance.

This was a relationship “sealed in blood” in the Chinese Civil 

War and the Korean War that followed immediately after. But North 

Korea’s leader Kim Il Sung (himself a creation of Stalin) remained 

deeply suspicious of China’s potential influence within his own 

military.12 No doubt the Beijing purges of pro-Soviets in the Chinese 

Communist Party (CCP) leadership in 1954 following Stalin’s death 

sharpened Kim’s worries. And no doubt, the CCP leadership was 

sensitive to Kim’s suspicions. In the early 1960s, the pressures of 

the Sino-Soviet ideological dispute impelled China to conclude a 

rather broad treaty of alliance with North Korea, an alliance unlike 

any others in its utter lack of hedging. Article II of the Treaty signed 

in 1961 requires China, in the event of an armed attack against 

North Korea, to “immediately render military and other assistance 

by all means at its disposal.”13 China also is required “to adopt all

measures to prevent aggression” against the North. There are no 

provisions for head-scratching or shilly-shallying should the casus 

belli for “aggression” against the North be unclear. Indeed, China’s 

commitment to defend the North Koreans is articulated far more 

directly and categorically than the Soviet-North Korean alliance, 

signed just 5 days before.14

To China’s credit, it made sure that Article IV of the Treaty also 

obliged North Korea to “continue to consult . . . on all important 

international questions of common interests.” In return, North Korea 
persuaded China to “render . . . every possible economic and technical 

aid in the cause of socialist construction” including “scientific and 

technical cooperation.” Moreover, Article VII deprives China of any 

possible legal way to unilaterally revise or terminate the alliance 

should relations with North Korea become strained. In fact, one 

Chinese scholar recommended a renegotiation of the alliance to gain 

leverage with both Pyongyang and Washington, a suggestion that 

was ignored—though not removed from the Chinese internet site 

that published it.15 Thus far, the PLA appears completely committed 

to the precise terms and spirit of the treaty.

Despite this relationship “sealed in blood,” Chinese military 

strategists are no doubt asking themselves, “Is North Korea Still 

Worth Fighting For?”

The PLA’s Strategic Concerns in Korea.

China has had a peculiarly possessive relationship with North 

Korea for millennia. In 2003, Chinese archeologists and linguists 

resurrected an ancient controversy by claiming that most of the 

Korean peninsula, running down as far as the 38th Parallel, had been 

governed for 700 years by a Chinese king and essentially had been a 

Chinese Kingdom—and before that, it was part of China.16

Koreans in general view the kingdom in question, known in 

Korean history as “Koguryo” (and in Chinese as “Gaogouli”), as one 

of their most glorious dynasties. Nonetheless, the claim made its way 

onto the website of the Chinese Foreign Ministry and throughout 

2004, horrified South Korean scholars and diplomats demanded a 

retraction, an explanation, and promises that Chinese academics 

would never allude to it again. In August, Jia Qinglin, the fourth 

ranking member of the CCP Politburo, visited Seoul and supposedly 

reached an unpublicized “oral agreement” on the controversy. But 

just days later, the CCP propaganda department blocked Chinese 

domestic access to the Chinese pages of Seoul’s Chosun Ilbo, pages 

which reported the Jia Qinglin compromise, and completely shut 

down an ethnic-Korean website in China that also reported the Jia 

visit.17

But North Korea was oddly circumspect—”Some Great Powerminded historians in other countries are scheming to erase Koguryo
history and our nation-state’s traditions and position” was about as 

direct as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) media 

got. Pyongyang’s reticence puzzled South Korean observers who 

commented that “North Korea draws its legitimacy from Koguryo, 

so it would be difficult for it to continue to remain silent . . .”18 Since 

then, Pyongyang has remained silent—except to say that Koguryo

was indeed a “Korean” nation, a “model kingdom,” and worthy of 

Korean emulation.19

Pyongyang’s equanimity toward Chinese assertions of historical 

sovereignty over a good part of North Korean territory was odd—

like Sherlock Holmes’s “dog that didn’t bark.” But like so much of the 

Chinese-North Korean relationship, a relationship that is husbanded 

by deeply secretive bureaucrats and ideologues on both sides of the 

Yalu River, the reasons for Pyongyang’s complaisance are hidden 

from view. Few Chinese scholars—if any—are willing or able to 

comment on it or any other aspect of Beijing-Pyongyang ties with 

any authority. And even fewer from the Chinese PLA. 

Yet both Chinese and North Korean military commanders certainly 

have very sophisticated strategies to manage their relationship. And 

these strategies often are reflected indirectly in open sources, and in 

unguarded comments to foreign diplomats and scholars. 

Historians of Sino-North Korean relations understand that links 

between China’s PLA and the KPA predate both the founding of the 

People’s Republic and the Democratic People’s Republic—and their 

friendship is “sealed in blood,” as both Chinese and DPRK military 

leaders insist every time they meet. That friendship undoubtedly 

underwent a metamorphosis during the Sino-Soviet ideological 

schism from the late 1950s through the collapse of the Soviet Union 

in 1991, as the North Korean leadership skillfully played off Beijing 

and Moscow (mostly in Moscow’s favor). And when the Union of 

Soviet Socialist Republic’s (USSR) demise left North Korea without a 

generous great-power patron, China was quick to step in to prevent 

a similar collapse of its little Korean socialist brother. It is apparent 

that Chinese strategists no longer see North Korea as strategic real 

estate essential to an outside aggressor—like the hegemonic United 

States—which may want to invade Manchuria. Rather, North Korea’s 

survival has now become essential to China, which does not want 
to see a unified Korea emerge on its borders as a large, advanced 

industrial state with a modern military and nuclear weapons. 

Pyongyang is one of Beijing’s last remaining revolutionary allies 

(although it is no longer even “communist” in name), yet it has 

become a major liability. It is an economic disaster held together 

only by outside aid. It is a ruthlessly “feudal” dictatorship that 

most Chinese have a hard time stomaching. It is a reckless nuclear 

brinkman. And it is a major source of social instability and violent 

lawlessness in China’s Yalu-Tumen border areas.

How the PLA (as opposed to the rest of the Chinese foreign 

policy establishment) intends to postpone Korean unification while 

mitigating the liabilities of the Pyongyang regime is a question that 

appears to be at the heart of its 21st century strategy for Northeast 

Asia. Understanding the PLA’s dilemma requires an historic 

perspective, a strategic examination, and a look at the available 

evidence of military-to-military contacts over the past few years.

For over 2,100 years, Chinese strategists considered the Korean 

Peninsula either a part of China or a vassal state. Since the end of the 

19th century, however, the Chinese have seen Korea as a potential 

corridor of invasion; first by Tsarist Russia, then Japan, and now by 

the United States. As one Chinese strategic writer, Senior Colonel 

Shen Weilie of China’s National Defense University, writes:

The Northeast Asia region has been the locus of several instances of 

Imperial Russian and Militarist Japanese aggression; and now it has 

again become an area where the strategic interests of the United States, 

Russia, Japan, and China clash. Although the United States is far removed 

on the shores of the Eastern Pacific, nonetheless, as a superpower, it 

has established a so-called U.S. defensive front line on the island chain 

abutting our nation in the Western Pacific and Northeast Asia from Japan 

to Korea. Moreover, it has set up many military bases and deployed 

troops, signed treaties of military alliance with Japan and Korea, whose 

strategic target is China, and has thereby become a main adversary that 

threatens the security of China’s northeast.20

Colonel Shen’s thesis is that U.S. aggression in the Korean War 

directly threatened the security of Northeast China, and that after 

the war, Japan experienced a metamorphosis, turning from a “major 

economic state” into a “major political-military state” which aims to 
become the “central player” (fahui ‘zhongxin zuoyong’) in the Western 

Pacific, and particularly in Northeast Asia. Colonel Shen believed 

that Japan refuses to acknowledge its historical criminal behavior 

in its aggression against China and, in this failure, Japan is witness 

to the resurgence of militarism. As such, Japan also is a potential 

adversary that threatens the security of China’s northeast. On the 

other hand, China and Russia have reached a strategic understanding 

and are now partners in Asia. And, with the final demarcation of the 

Sino-Russian border in the Far East, “Russia will not again become 

a threat to China’s security.” The situation on the Korean Peninsula, 

says Shen, always has been unstable, and “is a potential flashpoint in 

Asia.” As soon as military conflict erupts, it will pose a grave threat 

to China’s security.21

In short, says Colonel Shen, 

in any future anti-aggression war to defend the national security of 

China’s northeast, the U.S. and Japanese military alliance and the U.S.-

ROK [Republic of Korea] alliance under U.S. hegemonism and Japanese 

militarism, the seaborne aggression may come from the Yellow Sea area 

of the Liaodong Peninsula, while the land invasion still may come from 

the area of the Korean Peninsula, and the air attacks will come mainly 

from bases in Japan and South Korea.22

Following the terrorist attacks against the United States on 

September 11, 2001, one would think Chinese strategists would either 

be relieved that America’s attention would be distracted from China 

(which is indeed a sentiment I heard during a closed conference 

October 6-8, 2001, in Shanghai between The Heritage Foundation 

and the Shanghai Institute for Strategic Studies), or at the very 

least would worry that the United States would suddenly achieve 

a strategic presence in Central Asia. It is surprising that the Chinese 

also argued that “under the pretext of the opportunity offered by 

anti-terrorism, the United States expanded and strengthened their 

military presence in Northeast Asia.” This situation was complicated 

when the United States intercepted intelligence that North Korea 

had a “nuclear program” and was “exporting guided missiles.” 

According to the China Institute of Contemporary International 

Relations [CICIR], North Korea was still the “biggest problem in the 

Asia-Pacific region left over from the Cold War” and the two sides 
(United States and DPRK) were plagued by mistrust. Both sides were 

“playing the nuclear card.” The United States used it to “impede the 

over-rapid progress of DPRK relations with Japan and the ROK,” 

while the DPRK used the nuclear card to “drag” the United States 

into a dialogue “in an effort to improve relations with the United 

States.”23

Obviously, this view of the overland vulnerability of China’s 

Northeast provinces (Manchuria) to an attack from Korea has been 

influenced by the PLA’s experience in the Korean War. Still, it is 

very difficult to believe that the Chinese military has any fear that 

the United States (or anyone else) will ever again plan to invade 

Manchuria via North Korea. Nonetheless, that is the published story, 

and the PLA is sticking to it for the time being.

It is clear that the opposite is the case, that the PLA sees North 

Korea as a strategic problem—not as a corridor for invasion of 

China’s northeast—but in its own right. 

China’s Interests in Korea.

The late Nobel laureate Francois Mauriac would have understood 

China’s current Korean dilemma. In 1952, the French writer explained 

that he “loved Germany so much,” he was “glad there are two of 

them.” 

China likewise loves Korea very much. The collapse of the 

Pyongyang regime would result quickly in a unified peninsula of 70 

million Koreans with a world-class heavy industrial base, advanced 

technology, wealth, a massive modern military machine (with 

who-knows-how-many nuclear devices) and—last, not least—an 

irredentist claim on nearly 18,000 square miles of China’s Changbai 

Mountain (Korean: “Paektu-san”) region, which is regarded as the 

birthplace of the Korean race.24

In private discussions with U.S. academics, senior PLA strategists 

have commented that “Korea is a victim of East-West confrontation 

. . . reunification should not jeopardize another country’s security.”25

No doubt, the other country is China. The last thing China wants, 

therefore, is another powerful, assertive and sullen neighbor on its 

borders. 
1

In March 1994, a group of U.S. intelligence community Asia 

specialists gathered near Washington with colleagues in academia 

and think tanks for a round-table discussion of North Korea. Their 

unclassified views no doubt were informed by a broad spectrum of 

information sources, as well as their own professional intuition.26

The consensus of the conferees was that China’s primary 

strategic objective on the Korean Peninsula was to impede (if not 

delay indefinitely) North-South unification. In the aftermath of the 

disintegration of the USSR, North Korea’s preeminent patron had 

ceased the provision of significant amounts of aid. North Korea was 

in the midst of an industrial and agricultural catastrophe and in total 

economic collapse; unless China—or someone—intervened, the 

crisis would eventually precipitate unification under Seoul’s ROK 

government. Faced with this, China was not overly concerned about 

North Korea’s withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty 

(NPT) and its repudiation of safeguards under the International 

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in January of that year. While China 

might prefer a non-nuclear North Korea, the conferees believed, 

“it is willing to live with ambiguity.” But Korean unification was 

something China would work hard to avoid.

China’s objectives, therefore, were to prevent economic and social 

chaos in North Korea by infusions of massive amounts of food and 

energy aid—preferably not paid for by the Chinese government. At 

the time, China was accepting North Korean currency in payment 

for all exports to the DPRK. One Chinese expert explained in July 

1993 that 

we have not reduced economic aid. We are still supplying the same level 

of oil exports, only now we no longer accept barter, but insist on trade 

in dollars. In fact, however, we have not demanded any hard currency. 

The change is only a written policy, but has not been implemented. In the 

past, we had barter trade and North Korea had nothing to provide us, 

so it built up debt—now it has no hard currency, so it is still building up 

debt. They owe China a lot . . . We don’t force them to pay.27

The massive amounts of food and fuel aid that North Korea needed 

to avoid a meltdown would have to come from the developed 

world—and with the approval of the United States.
The PLA Role in the 1993-1994 Nuclear Crisis.

Accordingly, China saw the 1993-94 nuclear crisis as an 

opportunity to bring about some form of Washington-Pyongyang 

rapprochement and to “begin the process of integrating North Korea 

into the world community.”28 This objective was very much in 

Beijing’s mind when it normalized relations with Seoul in 1992. 

China nevertheless was concerned that the United States would 

use the nuclear crisis to play a dominant role in Northeast Asia under 

cover of multilateralism. Instead, Beijing wanted to assure itself of the 

primary role in determining the fate of the Peninsula. In extremis, the 

conferees judged, Beijing could abandon its stance of nonintervention 

on the Peninsula, using direct and assertive diplomatic pressure on 

Pyongyang or “even intervene militarily” if it perceived the North 

Korean situation to be dangerous to its national security. 

But a nuclear-armed North Korea was not viewed in 1993 as a 

major problem by Chinese scholars closely associated with the PLA. 

One was asked, “Could China live with a North Korea having the 

bomb?” The response was “Yes, I can live with it. I wouldn’t like 

North Korea having nuclear weapons, but it is inevitable for more 

and more countries to have nuclear weapons.”29 In July 1993, thenCCP Politburo Standing Committeeman Hu Jintao visited Pyongyang 

with an entourage of PLA generals to celebrate jointly the 40th 

anniversary of the “victory of the Korean Liberation War [sic].” In 

his speech at the festivities, Comrade Hu “welcomed the positive 

progress achieved in the Korean-U.S. dialogue and hoped that the 

involved parties would solve existing problems through continued 

dialogue and consultation based on equality.”30 Since North Korea, 

just 10 days before, had managed to get U.S. negotiators in Geneva 

to “support the introduction of LWRs [light water reactors] and . . 

. explore with the DPRK ways in which LWRs could be obtained,” 

Hu’s sentiments were understandable.31 Evidently, the CCP and the 

PRC government were of the opinion that North Korea’s nuclear 

policies made “positive contributions to maintaining peace and 

stability in Asia and throughout the world.”32 Significantly, this last 

phrase, which once presaged optimism for a peaceful settlement of 

the North Korean nuclear issue, was to return again a decade later. 
In 1994, as North Korea’s economy went into a free fall and whole 

provinces sank into starvation, Beijing was terrified that North Korea 

would implode. Chinese leaders feared hundreds of thousands 

of refugees would stream into Manchuria, and that eventually 

China would have an assertive unified Korean nation poised on its 

northeast border like the unified Germany that appeared in Europe 

after the collapse of communism there. A “soft landing” for North 

Korea became China’s strategic imperative. 

Imperative to China, maybe, but not to whomever was in charge 

in Pyongyang. By March 1994, it was clear to all that the DPRK was 

dragging its collective feet on the nuclear issue. At one point, a DPRK 

negotiator at Panmunjom, apropos of nothing, declared “Seoul is not 

far from here. If a war breaks out, it will be a sea of fire.” The war 

crisis that followed is well-chronicled in Don Oberdorfer’s 1997 book, 

The Two Koreas. Suffice it to say, by mid-June, all sides in the Korean 

crisis had itchy fingers on their triggers. When the Chief of the KPA 

General Staff, General Choe Kwang, arrived in Beijing on June 7 for 

long-planned meetings, there were reports that Chinese President 

Jiang Zemin was to warn North Korea to accept negotiations on the 

nuclear crisis. According to reliable reports, however, “it has been 

learned this is not true.”33

Apparently, what was true was that General Choe was consulting 

in depth with the PLA on preparations for a war. A North Korean 

military delegation was in China in February 1994; KPA Major 

General Kim Hak-san, director of the Foreign Affairs Bureau of the 

North Korean Army, met PLA Chief of General Staff General Zhang 

Wannian in March. And educated speculation was that General Choe 

Kwang’s trip was in preparation “for ‘an emergency on the Korean 

peninsula’ since he is the one who controls the general command of 

‘military operations’ under the Supreme Commander and Chairman 

of the National Defense Committee, Kim [Jong]-il.”34

For their part, the PLA leaders were saying all the right things. 

General Zhang Wannian warmly welcomed his KPA counterpart 

and gushed that “the Armies of the two countries of China and the 

DPRK have a long tradition of friendly relations” and emphasized 

“the friendship concluded between the people and Armies of the 

two countries through blood ties is invincible.” The next day, 
Chinese Defense Minister Chi Haotian repeated to General Choe 

that the “Armies of the two countries fought shoulder to shoulder 

. . . opposing the Japanese imperialist aggressors, and that during 

the fatherland liberation war, they shed blood and fought together 

in one dugout against the U.S. imperialist aggressors.” And, as if he 

hadn’t mentioned “blood” enough, Minister Chi again “emphasized 

that the friendship between the two countries was truly bonded by 

blood.”35

In Chinese President Jiang Zemin’s meeting with General Choe, 

Jiang apparently did not even broach the nuclear issue. He did, 

however, repeat that Beijing-Pyongyang ties were “interdependent, 

like teeth and lips.” Jiang insisted to Choe that “we are satisfied with 

the current development of relations between the two parties and 

countries. Strengthening and developing Sino-Korean friendship is 

a firm policy of our party and government, and it also is the wish 

of our entire party and the people throughout the country. We will 

make an effort for this on our part.”36 These were hardly the words 

of one ally trying to walk a reckless partner back from the brink. 

One foreign interlocutor, hopeful that China’s message to the 

North Korean militarist was at least tough in private, confidentially 

queried a Chinese strategist about Chairman Jiang’s words, asking 

“maybe [Jiang] said very different things in private [to Choe] than he 

said in public.” The Chinese counterpart explained the facts of life to 

the American. “I don’t know what was said privately, but what Jiang 

said publicly means something. I think that if Jiang had said different 

words in private, then he would not have said such positive things 

in public.”37

Given that the possibility of economic sanctions against the DPRK 

was, at that precise time, under serious review in both the United 

Nations (UN) Security Council and the International Atomic Energy 

Agency (IAEA), and that Pyongyang had preemptively declared 

that sanctions would be regarded as “a declaration of war,” it would 

have been unthinkable for either the PLA or the KPA not to prepare 

for the unthinkable.

How far the “unthinkable” might go was anyone’s guess. But a 

respected South Korean journalist wrote from Hong Kong on June 

11 what he considered to be a reliable report that “China promised to 
send a ground army of approximately 85,000 troops to North Korea 

if a war breaks out.” KPA General Choe had, according to the report, 

reviewed the entire panoply of military assistance and operations 

with his PLA brethren in Beijing, including credit assistance for 

Chinese food and fuel if UN economic sanctions were imposed. 

Another source told the journalist in some detail that under the 

PRC-DPRK alliance treaty, three divisions of the 39th Mechanized 

Group Army (about 50,000 to 75,000 men) from the Shenyang 

Military Region (MR) and 10,000 Rapid Deployment Troops from 

the Jinan MR would be ready for deployment to Korea in the event 

of hostilities.38

The sources, some of which were described as “Western 

diplomats,” said the PLA movements would only be ordered if 

North Korea was invaded by the United States, but that if North 

Korea invaded South Korea, “China will not directly provide military 

support to North Korea, except for spare parts or ammunition for the 

Chinese-made weapons North Korea currently possesses.”39

Another reputable Hong Kong journalist, Jen Hui-wen, political 

commentator at Hong Kong’s respected Hsin Pao newspaper, filled 

in the outlines of this message in a later article. China, he said, 

believed an effective strategy to deal with the pressures on the DPRK 

required that: 1) the DPRK should never initiate any shooting; 2) the 

DPRK’s reaction to international sanctions should be commensurate 

with the sanctions, but should not be an overreaction; 3) in order 

to avoid friction, the KPA should be removed a distance from the 

demilitarized zone; and, finally, 4) that “a political solution is the best 

strategy, stalling is the second best strategy, conflict is a bad strategy, 

and taking the initiative to launch an attack is the worst strategy. It 

should not emphasize the word ‘fighting,’ it should emphasize the 

word ‘talking’.”40

These, apparently, were not trial balloons from a Chinese source to 

the South Korean, but rather a signal that had already been received 

by “Western diplomatic sources” in Hong Kong, that the PLA and 

the KPA were well along in the combat planning aspect of the nuclear 

crisis. The PLA was involved in the diplomacy of the nuclear crisis as 

well. Hsin Pao reported that Jiang Zemin, as Chairman of the Central 

Military Commission (CMC), addressed a PLA forum on June 9, 1994, 

where he posited a “denuclearized Korean peninsula” and “peace 
and stability on the Korean peninsula” as China’s two strategic goals 

in the nuclear crisis. Jiang reported that a CCP delegation led by 

Politburo propaganda chief Ding Guangen, accompanied by Wen 

Jiabao (then an alternate Politburo member), General Wang Ruilin 

(Deng Xiaoping’s military confidant), and veteran Manchurian MR 

commander Li Desheng had been sent to the DPRK to sensitize 

Pyongyang to China’s concerns.

The fine print of this politico-military delegation’s presentation is 

instructive. The Ding delegation told its North Korean counterparts 

that 1) China would “do what it could” to support economic reforms 

in the DPRK; 2) if the DPRK developed nuclear weapons, China 

would be opposed; and, 3) if the DPRK was attacked, China would 

fulfill its obligations under the PRC-DPRK alliance treaty. 41

The PLA’s Role in the 2002-Present Nuclear Crisis.

There is considerable circumstantial evidence indicating that 

the PLA leadership has coordinated with its KPA counterparts to 

the same extent that it did prior to the July 1994 negotiations that 

ultimately led to the Agreed Framework. On April 19, 2003, just 6 

days before the first session of U.S.-PRC-DPRK “Three Party Talks” 

on North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, Pyongyang suddenly 

announced that the KPA’s top commander, General Jo Myong 

Rok, would visit Beijing from April 21-23. The terse one-line press 

release was not posted in English until the following day.42 While the 

purpose of General Jo’s visit was never announced, Seoul’s Yonhap

news agency quoted Chinese sources as saying “his trip was seen as 

aimed at fine-tuning its talks stance with China.”43 A DPRK press 

report issued after Jo’s departure reported that “Jo Myong Rok and 

General Pak Jae Gyong and Colonel General Pak Sung Won of the 

KPA” had met with Chinese CMC Vice Chairman Guo Boxiong and 

CMC members General Xu Caihou and General Xiong Guangkai. “Jo 

also met and had a friendly talk with” PRC Defense Minister (and 

state councilor and CMC vice chairman) General Cao Gangchuan.44

The following day (April 22), General Jo’s party also conferred with 

Chinese President (and CMC Chairman) Jiang Zemin in a meeting 

again attended by Generals Guo, Xu, and Xiong, as well as vice 

foreign minister Wang Yi.45
The level of General Jo’s meetings, and the comprehensive array 

of Chinese military leaders with whom he met, was firm evidence 

that the General’s visit was intended to coordinate a bilateral 

position on the talks with the American negotiators who arrived in 

Beijing the same day that General Jo’s party departed. But the “Three 

Party Talks” abruptly ended 2 days later after only a few hours of 

meetings, when the North Korean representative reportedly “pulled 

aside Assistant Secretary of State James A. Kelly and in effect told 

him: ‘We’ve got nukes. We can’t dismantle them. It’s up to you 

whether we do a physical demonstration or transfer them.’”46

Chinese negotiators evidently painted this shocking behavior 

on the part of the North Koreans as unexpected. Chinese Foreign 

Minister Li Zhaoxing, said The New York Times, “did not seek to 

disguise the fact that the talks had broken down,” and the Times

headline speculated that “North Korea May Be Angering Its Only 

Ally.”47 But this was hardly the case. While Chinese diplomats may 

have been hinting at some distress at the DPRK’s shenanigans, 

at no time did the foreign ministry ever utter a cross word about 

Pyongyang’s stance.

Four months later, in August 2003, on the eve of the first round 

of “Six Party Talks” in Beijing—this time including representatives 

from South Korea, Japan and Russia, supposedly to act as witnesses 

to North Korea’s antics and thereby to moderate them—the same 

routine played out. On August 17, China announced that General 

Xu Caihou, would make a quick visit to Pyongyang—no date 

mentioned. 

The following day, the delegation arrived—and met with the 

same cast of characters who had visited Beijing in April. The Chinese 

delegation left Pyongyang on August 23 “after winding up its 5-day 

visit.”48

On August 27, the first session of “Six Party Talks” began in 

Beijing. In that session, the North Koreans continued to vituperate 

their threats and insults, saving the most pointed jibes for the hapless 

Russian deputy foreign minister to whom the North Korean delegate 

referred by name as a “liar” and a “lap dog” of the Americans.49

Moreover, the North Koreans refused to budge from their insistence 

on the right to develop and maintain a nuclear arsenal. Even Russia’s 

normally sympathetic Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Losyukov 
was said to have shaken his head in dismay and mutter, “there go 

55 years of history.”50 The Russian remained noncommittal in public 

and would only “suggest” in private “that the North Koreans had 

not been listening to Mr. Kelly’s presentation.”51 The session ended 

acrimoniously but was nonetheless painted as “a good beginning” 

by the State Department.52

China, however, remained firmly in North Korea’s corner. The 

weekend after the talks, Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Wang Yi 

declared that “the main problem we are facing” was not North 

Korean histrionics, but “the American policy towards [the] DPRK.” 

This, after the vice minister was described by all present at the sixparty talks (in an unmistakable incidence of mass hallucination) as 

“visibly angered” by the North Korean delegates’ outbursts.53

Again, the PLA and its North Korean counterparts had engaged 

in lengthy talks immediately prior to multiparty nuclear talks in 

Beijing—talks that were marred by North Korean bombast and 

insults. Meanwhile, as Chinese diplomats evinced frustration with 

the North Koreans during the closed negotiation session, in public 

they blamed the United States for the impasse.

There were no press reports of similar PLA-KPA coordination in 

anticipation of subsequent rounds of “Six Party Talks” in February or 

June 2004, or in July, September, or November 2005, but it is likely that 

they occurred. At the end of October 2005, Chinese CMC Chairman 

Hu Jintao visited North Korea and met DPRK Leader Kim Jong Il. Ten 

days later, the “first session of the fifth round of the Six Party Talks” 

began in Beijing and, again, ended with no progress.54 It is apparent 

that Chinese leaders, especially its military commanders, were in 

close contact with their North Korean counterparts immediately 

prior to each round of nuclear negotiations, and it is therefore highly 

unlikely that the Chinese were surprised by anything that the North 

Koreans did at those sessions.

Fortifying the Sino-Korean Border.

Close coordination of diplomatic negotiating positions, however, 

was probably the least concern of the PLA’s Korea strategists. When 

the North Korean nuclear crisis erupted again in October 2002, China 

was left as the only world power with any sway over North Korea. 
Over 88 percent of all North Korean oil comes from China (the rest 

comes in aid from the West) as does more than 90 percent of North 

Korea’s non-aid food imports.55

In the 8 years since 1994, North Korea’s economic condition had 

not improved, and pressures along the Sino-Korean border had 

steadily increased. By August 2003, economic and social tensions in 

Manchuria from the flood of North Korean migrants (and lawless 

KPA soldiers) had grown so bad that the imminent deployment of 

150,000 regular PLA soldiers had become common knowledge in 

Hong Kong. Hong Kong press reports said the PLA was replacing 

People’s Armed Police (PAP) border troops in an effort to bring under 

control a Korean crime wave on the border. The deployments were 

confirmed indirectly by the Chinese foreign ministry, which said the 

new troop dispositions were meant to streamline administration of 

the border and was “a normal adjustment carried out after many 

years of preparation by the relevant parties.”56

Mysteriously, for 2 weeks in July 2004, the PLA conducted rivercrossing maneuvers complete with floating bridges on the Yalu River 

near the major Korean border city of Sinuiju. Reportedly, the drills 

involved placing 10 floating bridges out to the middle of the Yalu, 

but not beyond. One observer told a Japanese newspaper that “we 

witnessed a few hundred of soldiers, but considering the fact that 

there were about 100 tents that can accommodate up to 10 soldiers 

each pitched near the river; I guess there were a total of 1,000 soldiers 

participating in the training.”57

While the PLA was conducting precautionary maneuvers along the 

Yalu River border, the CCP was still trying to assuage North Korea’s 

political sensitivities. In July 2004, when a Chinese scholar published 

a rather intemperate policy blast at North Korea—charging “Dear 

Leader” Kim with starving his people, and commenting favorably 

on President Bush’s antipathy toward the DPRK regime, the CCP 

propaganda department not only expunged the offending work 

from the Internet, but also recalled all print issues of the offending 

publication, Strategy & Management, and shut down the publication 

altogether.58

One Hong Kong magazine reported that one of the first things 

Communist Party General Secretary Hu Jintao did upon ascending 

to the Chairmanship of the CMC was to issue a document declaring 
that “although North Korea has suffered temporary economic 

difficulties, in politics it has been consistently correct.”59

The CCP Politburo Standing Committee’s propaganda czar, Li 

Changchun, then visited Pyongyang on September 24, and repeated 

the encomium of a decade earlier:

[Li Changchun] said all nations and all peoples, benefit from this nation’s 

[the DPRK’s] practical choices and determination of its own road to 

development, and this is advantageous to the formation of all manner 

of characteristic theories and policy lines of social development, and 

advantageous to the realization of the people’s wealth and happiness, 

to the embodiment of the multi-polar world, and also is fundamentally 

beneficial to the protection of regional stability and world peace. He 

expressed that China will continue to support North Korea’s party and 

people in their insistence on the socialist road to development, and support 

the North Korean comrades in their exploration for development models 

that are suitable to this nation’s [DPRK’s] actual situation, and support 

the Korean side’s calls for Juche and peaceful unification, and support 

the positive force that North Korea has put forth in improving the international 

environment. (Emphasis added)60

Sympathetic as the CCP party-hacks may have been to North 

Korea’s “development model,” the PLA was keeping its powder 

dry. In October 2004, the PLA deployed an additional 10,000 regular 

soldiers to reinforce another 20,000 troops in China’s Tumen River 

border area in a move that reportedly startled Western intelligence 

agencies. A Japanese newspaper said the move was intended to 

prevent North Korean soldiers from crossing the border. The troops 

apparently needed extra assistance from police dogs because the 

following week, there was a report that every police dog unit in North 

Korea had been deployed away from the Demilitarized Zone and 

transferred up to the Sino-Korean border to stem the flow of Korean 

migrants—and the PLA committed to providing the necessary 

supplies of dog food.61 The Chinese foreign ministry confirmed the 

troop movements but insisted the troops were sent to the border to 

help with a “communication engineering project.”62

For a change, the foreign ministry spokesman was stating the 

simple truth. According to a Shenyang MR logistics department 

officer, “the communications infrastructure along the ChineseKorean border is very advanced.” The system includes electronic 
1

monitoring technology to assist border patrols. Said the Shenyang 

MR officer, “every single road that is monitored by a surveillance 

camera can be viewed by the CMC back in Beijing.”63 Another 

Chinese periodical confirmed the deployments in 2005, noting that 

then-Chinese CMC Chairman Jiang Zemin personally approved 

funds for the construction and renovation of over 100 military base 

camps along the Korean border.64

The PLA then discovered that elaborate electronic surveillance 

systems are no substitute for manpower. Five armed North Korean 

bandits crossed the Yalu river at Guangping in Yanbian Korean 

Autonomous Prefecture on October 16, 2005, an area within the 

responsibility of the Jilin Provincial Military District, and killed a 19-

year-old PLA soldier in a nighttime gunbattle. The doomed soldier, 

four other troopers, and a PLA officer had gotten the Chinese 

equivalent of a “911” call and had hustled out to a remote vacation 

villa in the border town of Guangping to rescue several tourists and 

hotel workers who were being held hostage by the bandits. The 

bandits escaped into nearby woods and presumably slipped back 

across the border into North Korea.65

The inescapable impression is that the PLA views the PRC-DPRK 

border region as porous and lawless. It is not unexpected, then, that 

the PLA gives every appearance of planning to do something about 

it. 

Peace Mission 2005: The Korea Scenario. 

On the surface, any joint China-Russia military exercise that 

begins in Vladivostok with a “strategic planning” exercise, and then 

continues on with separate joint amphibious landing and airborne 

demonstrations on China’s Shandong peninsula has to raise suspicions 

that the two nations are practicing for a North Korea contingency. 

China actually billed Peace Mission 2005 (PM2005), which was held 

between August 18-25, 2005, as a simulated mission “to aid a third 

state where law and order has broken down because of terrorist 

violence” according to The Washington Post.

66 The Associated Press 

described “a fictional scenario” where Russia and China “have been 

given a UN mandate to stabilize a country plunged into violence by 

ethnic strife.”67
Indeed, terrorism is a major consideration for China, Russia 

and their “Shanghai Cooperation Organization” (SCO) allies, all 

of whom were invited to send military intelligence officials to the 

drills—as were SCO observer nations India, Pakistan, and Iran. The 

Peace Mission 2005 operation plan centered on a coordinated Russian 

seaborne and airborne landing near a coastal town, “in advance of 

an inland offensive coordinated with the Chinese military.” 

Preliminary reporting from Western media set the China-Russia 

PM2005 military drill in the context of “mutual unease at U.S. power 

and a fear of Islamic extremism in Central Asia,” and Russia’s 

particular concerns about “the United States’ expanding military 

presence in oil-rich Central Asia.” The Chinese Ministry of National 

Defense statement of August 1, 2005, declared that the exercises were 

meant to “strengthen the capability of the two armed forces in jointly 

striking international terrorism, extremism and separatism.” But it 

was clear from the beginning that Moscow did not want anything to 

do with China’s designs on “separatist Taiwan” and insisted against 

Chinese pressure that the plans take place in Central Asia—or some 

place far away from Taiwan. 

According to one Japanese magazine, PM2005 was entirely 

China’s idea68—and was entirely paid for by Beijing.69 Beijing was 

paying for the show, so a compromise was reached—Vladivostok 

and Shandong. While China no doubt hoped that the exercise would 

send a signal to the United States that China was determined to take 

Taiwan whatever the cost, there was little in Peace Mission 2005 that 

had “Taiwan” written on it. The naval staging was unopposed, the 

beach landings met minimal opposition—“62 minutes of pitched 

battle in the pouring rain” according to Xinhua. The Russian paratroop 

drops were to link up with an “inland offensive”—apparently by 

Chinese troops coming in force from another direction. 

And there was certainly nothing in it relevant at all to “Central 

Asia.” Indeed, the Russians were reported to have asked to hold 

the maneuvers in China’s western deserts, bordering on potential 

Central Asian havens for real terrorists and extremists. PM2005’s 

centerpiece, however, was PRC-Russian naval coordination of 

a beach landing and a near-shore airdrop. There are, after all, no 

beaches and no shorelines in Central Asia. 
On the contrary, the more one looks at PM2005, the more it looks 

like it was a very serious effort to plan for the collapse of North 

Korea. On August 19, the PRC-controlled Wen Wei Po newspaper in 

Hong Kong speculated that the Shandong site indicated that China 

and Russia were preparing for problems with North Korea—as well 

as Taiwan.70 From its Korean War experiences, the Chinese PLA is 

all too aware of the problems of penetrating the mountainous border 

areas between China and the DPRK in an effort to occupy the political 

centers in and around Pyongyang. It makes far more sense to stage 

beach landings on North Korea’s western shores somewhere on the 

50 miles of flat shorelines north of Nampo port and move smartly 

inland 20 miles to Pyongyang.

China’s military planners easily can imagine North Korea’s 

economy in full collapse, and Chinese border troops can estimate that 

the existing stream of North Korean refugees would turn into a fullfledged human-tsunami. But in a state of collapse, the Chinese army 

cannot assume that the DPRK leadership or the army will simply 

disappear. Nor can the PLA assume that the South Koreans will 

not want a piece of the action—and this concern may have inspired 

the PLA Navy to establish a “military hot line” with South Korea in 

April 2005.71

They understand all too well that the sole function of the DPRK’s 

military leadership is “the preservation of the memory of the leader” 

(i.e., Kim Il Sung) at the absolute core of the “Kimilsung Constitution.”72

This duty will be carried on “generation after generation.” As such, 

the DPRK’s guiding ideology of “Army First” (Songun)—which 

replaced “Self Reliance” (Juche) as the supreme light of North Korean 

wisdom—places the “Army above the workers and peasants”; and 

the Army is the “supreme organ of state power” (not the Korean 

Workers’ Party, much less the DPRK government). Any Chinese 

military planners who contemplate offensive operations inside the 

DPRK will have to deal with the KPA one way or another. It will 

likely be a tad tricky to persuade North Korea’s leader Kim Jong Il 

and his army “whose sole mission is to defend the headquarters of 

the revolution headed by Kim Jong Il at the cost of their lives,”73 to 

quietly lay down their arms.

PM2005 is a plausible indicator that the Chinese military is 

planning for a possible invasion and occupation of North Korea—
perhaps even under the auspices of the UN and at least in nominal 

partnership with the Russian Federation. And China would, of 

course, impose a pro-China civil government in Pyongyang that 

will be committed wholeheartedly to the eventual “unification” 

of the Korean Peninsula at some point in the coming millennium, 

or shortly thereafter. After all, North Korea (or Gaogouli) has been 

Chinese territory more often than not in the past two millennia, so 

what real difference would another century or two make?

The operational aspects of PM2005 seem also designed to keep 

the United States at an arms-length when such an occupation takes 

place.74 Chinese and Russian naval operations included, said The 

Washington Post, “strategic long-range bombers capable of carrying 

nuclear weapons, which will fire cruise missiles at targets on the 

surface of the sea.” There was also a test firing from the Russian 

destroyer Burny of a Russian-made Moskit supersonic anti-ship 

cruise missile that is designed to keep U.S. carriers and other surface 

combatants away, but there was only one reported anti-submarine 

drill and no shipboard air defense drills.

Mystery Boats, Mystery Planes.

Although the very peculiar relationship between the Chinese and 

North Korean militaries rarely comes out into view, a few anecdotes 

will give a flavor of how close they are. For example, during the 

evening of December 22, 2001, three suspicious maritime vessels—

which looked for all the world like Chinese fishing boats—were 

challenged by a Japanese Coast Guard cutter in the East China Sea 

some 390 km west of the island of Amami-Oshima in Kagoshima 

Prefecture. As the Japanese cutter approached the flotilla, it came 

under automatic weapons and anti-tank missile fire from one of 

the ships. When one of the “fishing boats” launched a missile in its 

direction, the Japanese cutter responded with a withering volley 

which apparently disabled the ship. But rather than let the Japanese 

authorities board the boat, its crew scuttled the vessel and it quickly 

sank—with all hands. The other two ships fled the scene under very 

high speed.

The Japanese Coast Guard had challenged the boats because 

their peculiar behavior led the Japanese to suspect they were North 
Korean spycraft. Their suspicions were confirmed when underwater 

cameras revealed that the craft’s fishing bridge, which had separated 

from the hull and lay in the seabed several meters away, was a 

dummy structure. Video of the remains of the sunken ship’s crew in 

90 meters of water also indicated that at least some of the crew had 

committed suicide, and the rest had been shot with small arms. 

Despite considerable diplomatic pressure from China (which 

insisted that the sunken ship was in Chinese waters), Japanese 

salvage ships eventually brought the spyvessel to the surface, and 

put it on display at the Museum of Maritime Science in Tokyo. The 

mystery boat may have looked like a fishing vessel, but it had 4,000 

horsepower engines and a top speed of 30 knots. It also had wide 

doors in the stern, which could permit smaller vessels to launch 

secretly, no doubt in order to conduct clandestine operations. And 

the vessel carried a hefty arsenal of weaponry including rocket 

launchers, an 82mm bazooka, an antiaircraft machine gun, and two 

surface-to-air missiles.

But the most curious aspect of the incident was a report in Tokyo’s 

respected Asahi Shimbun newspaper that quoted several government 

officials as saying that Tokyo has obtained U.S. satellite photos 

showing a vessel looking identical to the alleged spy ship calling 

at a Chinese military port some 100 km south of Shanghai and 130 

km northwest of the spot where it sank on December 22. Japanese 

officials cited by Asahi believed the ship at the Chinese naval berth 

was either the one that was sunk or a very similar one that left North 

Korea around the same time. Japanese Defense Agency Director 

General Gen Nakatani told a separate news conference, “I cannot 

comment on details of information we receive from the U.S. military. 

I cannot say whether such information has been provided to us.”75 In 

contemplating this incident, American and Japanese policymakers 

must have been left scratching their respective heads, “Why on 

earth is the Chinese navy providing basing for North Korean special 

operations vessels?”

Consider another example. In July 2002, U.S. intelligencecollectors had happened upon a Pakistani military C-130 transport 

plane that had flown through Chinese airspace carrying a cargo 

from Pakistan’s top-secret nuclear weapons base, the Khan Research 
Laboratory. The C-130’s cargo was probably $75 million worth of 

equipment relating to a uranium enrichment centrifuge. It landed at 

a Chinese military base to refuel, and proceeded on to North Korea. 

The aircraft returned to Pakistan carrying a North Korean Nodong

ballistic missile, again, via a refueling stop at a Chinese military 

base.76 The flights were only the latest in a series of secret Pakistani 

C-130 missions to North Korea that dated back at least to 1998.77

While the North Korean military seems to have a special 

relationship with its counterparts in Chinese military intelligence, 

there is certainly much skepticism about the value of keeping 

company with the North Koreans among China’s nonintelligence 

military analysts. 

Just what exactly the PLA thinks about North Korea is a mystery to 

outside observers. This is partially due to the secretive nature of PLA 

strategic thought, partially to the less-than-monolithic composition 

of PLA strategists, but mostly due to conflicting evidence in the 

meager historic record. Senior Colonel Shen Weilie’s theories about 

the Korean Peninsula as a corridor for aggression against China 

notwithstanding, the way the PLA acts on the Korean border reflects 

a PLA consensus that North Korea is a strategic conundrum all its 

own—and, when the time comes, the PLA will be fully prepared to 

deal with it by force.

ENDNOTES – CHAPTER 7

1. The dialogue that follows is based on Ye Yumeng, Hei Xue, Chubing Chaoxian 

Jishi [Black Snow, A True Account of Entry Into the Korean War], Beijing: Zuozhe 

Chubanshe [Authors’ Publishers], 1988, pp. 46-47. Whether Mr. Ye based this 

on a transcript of the meeting that somehow picked up the side conversation, 

or reviewed Gao Gang’s confession file (following his purge and death in 1954) 

or embellished existing files with fictional dialogue is unclear. I suspect that the 

meeting was recorded via several microphones around the conference table in 

order to catch incriminating comments.

2. Zhang Xi, “Peng Dehuai Shou Ming Shuai Shi, Kang Mei Yuan Chaode 

Qianwian Houhou” [“Peng Dehuai Appointed to Lead the Troops, Background 

for the Korean War”], in Zhonggong Dangshi Ziliao [CCP Party History Materials] 

Issue 31, Beijing: Zhonggong Dangshi Ziliao Chubanshe, 1989, p. 126.

3. Nie Rongzhen, Inside the Red Star, the Memoirs of Marshal Nie Rongzhen, Beijing: 

New World Press, 1988, p. 636. This is a fairly accurate English translation of Nie 

Rongzhen Huiyi Lu, published in 1986.
4. See, for example, Shen Zonghong, ed., Zhongguo Renmin Zhiyuanjun Kang 

Mei Yuan Chao Zhanshi [The Chinese People’s Volunteer Army’s Military History of 

the War against the United States and in aid of North Korea], Beijing: Junshi Kexue 

Chubanshe [Military Science Publishers], 2nd ed., December 1990; pp. 3-9. Hong 

Xuezhi, Kang Mei Yuan Chao Zhanzheng Huiyi [A Memoir of the Korean War], Beijing: 

Jiefangjun Wenyi Chubanshe [People’s Liberation Army Literary Publishers], 

November 1990, p. 10. 

5. Zhang Xi, pp. 133-134.

6. Peng Dehuai, Peng Dehuai Zishu [Peng Dehuai’s Confession], Beijing: Renmin 

Chubanshe, December 1981, p. 258. Also see Nie Rongzhen, p. 636. 

7. Cold War International History Project [CIHP] Bulletin, Issues 6-7, Winter 

1995/1996, pp. 114-115 (with photocopy of the original telegram in Russian).

8. See Shen Zhihua, “The Discrepancy between the Russian and Chinese 

versions of Mao’s 2 October 1950 message to Stalin on Chinese entry into the 

Korean War: A Chinese Scholar’s reply” in CIHP Bulletin Issues 8-9, 1996/1997, 

pp. 237-242.

9. The entire State Department volume entitled North Korea: A Case Study in the 

Techniques of Takeover, Publication 7118, Far Eastern Series 103, released in January 

1961 by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, 

Washington, DC, was based on these archives and on debriefs of captured Korean 

People’s Army officers.

10. Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, Vol. II, The Roaring of the 

Cataract 1947-1950, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990, pp. 351-376. 

See also Chen Jian, China’s Road to the Korean War, The Making of the Sino-American 

Confrontation, New York: Columbia University Press, 1994, pp. 109-111.

11. Ibid.

12. Cumings, p. 365.

13. A text of the Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance between 

the People’s Republic of China and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is found in 

Sukhee Han, “Alliance Fatigue amid Asymmetrical Interdependence: Sino-North 

Korean relations in Flux,” The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. XVI, No. 1, 

Spring 2004, pp. 177-179.

14. Ibid.

15. As recently as September 2003, some Chinese scholars had published 

recommendations that China unilaterally declare Article VII void and renegotiate 

the terms of the alliance. See Shen Jiru, “Weihu Dongbeiya Anquande Dangwushiji—

Zhizhi Chaohe Wentishangde Weixianboyi” [“An Urgent Mission to Maintain 

Security in Northeast Asia—Control Risk from North Korean Brinkmanship”], in 

Shijie Jinji yu Zhengzhi [World Economy and Politics], No. 9, 2003, pp.53-58, at www.

iwep.org.cn/wep/World%20Volume/2003/2003,9/shenjiru.pdf. 
16. See Tan Qixiang, ed., Zhongguo Lishi Ditu Ji [Cartographic Compendium of 

Chinese History], Beijing: Cartographic Publishing House, 1985-89, Vols 2-10. Tan 

Qixiang’s work is considered the authoritative Chinese historical work on China’s 

boundaries with its Asian neighbors. See Vol. 2, pp. 27-28; Western Han Dynasty 

(from 221 BCE to about 8 CE). Youzhou is shown as China Proper stretching from 

near present-day Beijing in the west across the Liaodong Peninsula to cover over 

half the Korean Peninsula in the east. Vol 2, pp. 61-62, shows Eastern Han China 

(to 220 CE) as comprising Yuelang Jun which covered the Western half of the North 

Korea, the Eastern half occupied by a suzerain state, Gaogouli. Vol. 3, pp. 13-14, 

shows the Chinese Kingdom of Wei (one of the Three Kingdoms) retaking the 

northern half of the Korean peninsula. Vol 3, pp. 41-42, shows the Western Jin

dynastic borders encompassing the same territory. Vol. 4, pp. 3-4, depicts Gaogouli

as a Chinese kingdom during the Eastern Jin and the 16 Kingdoms period, coequal with the Former Qin, eastern Jin, and several other smaller principalities. By 

the Northern Dynasty period (ending 464 CE), Gaogouli is delineated as a kingdom 

separate from China. Vol. 5, pp. 32-33; at the beginning of the Tang Dynasty (606 

CE), Gaogouli is once again incorporated into metropolitan China’s “Marches North 

of the River,” Hebeidao. Vol. 5, pp. 36-37, show the post-An Lushan rebellion (741 

CE) Tang Dynasty Korean Peninsula south of present-day Pyongyang as a nonChinese realm of Xinluo, while Korea from Pyongyang north is divided between 

Metropolitan China’s Qidan, and a suzerain Chinese kingdom of Bohai. This 

demarcation persists in the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms period (the Tenth 

Century CE), Vol. 5, pp. 78-79. The non-Chinese kingdom of Gaoli then pushes 

north to the mouth of the Yalu River by Liao-Northern Song Dynasties, with 

the rest of Korea north and east of the Yalu’s mouth subsumed into the Nyuzhi

principality (Vol. 6, pp. 8-9). This swath of Korea becomes part of the “East Capital 

Route (Dongjinglu) in China’s Jin Dynasty (according to a Chinese map of 1134 

CE). After that period, Korea was occupied by the Mongolian armies of Chinggiz 

Khan, and reoccupied by Chinese at the end of the Mongols’ Yuan Dynasty. For 

a description of the controversy see James Brooke, “China Fears Once and Future 

Kingdom,” The New York Times, August 25, 2004, at www.nytimes.com/2004/08/25/

international/asia/25korea.html.

17. (No author cited), “Bi Tan Gaogouli, Liang Hanguo Wangzhan Guanbi” 

[Prevent Discussion of Koguryo, Two Korean Websites Shut Down], China Times, 

Taipei, August 30, 2004. For Jia’s visit to Seoul see Agence France Presse report, “China 

Drops Claims to Ancient Korean Kingdom” carried in the Taipei Times, August 25, 

2004, p. 5, at www.taipeitimes.com/News/world/archives/2004/08/25/2003200148. 

18. (No author cited), “Why Is North Korea Silent on Koguryo?” The Chosun Ilbo, 

Seoul, August 8, 2004, at english.chosun.com/w21data/html/news/200408/200408080018.

html.

19. (No author cited), “Pyongyang Says Koguryo Kingdom is Model for 

Unified Korea,” Yonhap News Agency, Seoul, September 23, 2004, at english.yna.

co.kr/Engnews/20040923/300200000020040923113422E9.html. This article appeared 

during the visit of CCP Politburo member Li Changchun to Pyongyang.
20. Shen Weilie and Lu Junyuan, eds., Zhongguo Guojia Anquan Dili [China’s 

National Security Geography], Beijing: Shishi Chubanshe [Contemporary Affairs 

Publishers], September 2001, page 386. (Hereafter ZGAD). Although labeled 

“INTERNAL PUBLICATION” [Neibu Faxing], the author purchased his copy at 

the main Shanghai Xinhua Bookstore in October 2001.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid, p. 402.

23. Lu Zhongwei, ed., Guoji Zhanlue yu Anquan Xingshi Pinggu 2002/2003 

[International Strategic and Security Review 2002/2003], Zhongguo Xiandai Guoji 

Guanxi Yanjiusuo [CICIR], pp. 160-162.

24. Tsinghua University international studies professor Chu Shulong says out 

loud that the Chinese government is not in a hurry to see a unified Korea, “it 

brings up the question of our Korean minority and how they will react if Korea is 

one again.” See Jehangir S. Pocha, “Separated by River and Reform—One Country 

Busy Catching Fish, Another Enjoys the View,” Calcutta, The Telegraph, November 

29, 2005, at www.telegraphindia.com/1051129/asp/frontpage/story_5536195.asp. My 

personal notes say Chu Shulong, unlike many other Chinese foreign affairs 

exports, served in the military and continues to have very close ties with a wide 

range of military personnel. He joined the PLA Air Force when he was still in his 

teens and came up through the ranks to become a teacher at an air force academic 

institute. The PLA air force sent him to graduate school in China, but he did not 

return to the military after getting a degree. Rather, he went to the China Institute 

for Contemporary International Affairs (CICIR). 

25. Memorandum dated June 25, 1993, in author’s personal files.

26. Personal notes of a meeting on “Korean Outcomes and Major Power 

Interests: Implications for the United States” held under the auspices of the Office 

of the Secretary of Defense OSD/RSA/EAPR and the Defense Nuclear Agency on 

March 17, 1994.

27. Memorandum dated July 2, 1993, in the author’s personal files.

28. Personal notes of March 17, 1994.

29. Memorandum dated June 13, 1993, in author’s personal files.

30. “Hu Jintao’s Activities in DPRK Reported; Addresses Pyongyang Banquet,” 

Xinhua Domestic Service in Chinese 1408 GMT, July 28, 1993, in Foreign Broadcast 

Information Service-China (henceforth FBIS-CHI)-93-144.

31. Donald Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, Reading, MA: 

Addison-Wesley, 1997, p. 291. 

32. See “Greeting the 45th Founding Anniversary of the Democratic People’s 

Republic of Korea” an editorial in Renmin Ribao [People’s Daily], September 9, 1993, 

p. 1; at FBIS-CHI-93-175.

33. Sin Yong-su, Envoy Denies PRC Warned DPRK on Negotiations, Kyonghyang 

Sinmun, Seoul, June 9, 1994, p. 1; at FBIS-EAS-94-111.
34. Yu Yong-ku, “Significance of Choe Kwang Visit to PRC Viewed,” transcribed 

from Chungang Ilbo, Seoul, June 7, 1997, at FBIS-EAS-94-109.

35. “DPRK Military Delegates’ PRC Visit Reported,” Pyongyang Korean 

Central Broadcasting Network, June 8, 1994, at FBIS-EAS-94-111.

36. Zhang Rongdian, “Jiang Zemin Meets DPRK Military Delegation,” 

transcribed from Xinhua, Beijing, June 7, 1994, at FBIS-CHI-94-110. “Xinhua Cited 

on PRC, DPRK High-Level Meeting,” transcribed from Yonhap, Seoul, June 8, 

1994, at FBIS-CHI-94-110.

37. Memorandum dated June 21, 1994, in author’s personal files.

38. Kim Song-yong, “Daily Reports PRC To Send 85,000 Troops If War Breaks 

Out,” Transcribed from Choson Ilbo, Seoul, June 12, 1994, p. 1, at FBIS-CHI-94-113.

39. Ibid.

40. Jen Hui-wen “Beijing Political Situation: Inside Story About China Briefing 

DPRK on How To Act,” transcribed from Hsin Pao, Hong Kong, June 24, 1994, p. 

25, at FBIS-CHI-94-122.

41. Ibid.

42. (No author cited), “First vice-chairman of DPRK NDC to visit China,” 

KCNA, April 19, 2003, at www.kcna.co.jp/item/2003/200304/news04/21.htm#13.

43. (No author cited), “North Korea Says It’s Ready For Talks,” The Taipei Times, 

April 20, 2003, p. 1 (citing Reuters News Agency), at www.taipeitimes.com/News/

front/archives/2003/04/20/202750. 

44. “Jo Myong Rok’s sojourn in Beijing,” KCNA, April 23, 2003, at www.kcna.

co.jp/item/2003/200304/news04/23.htm#10.

45. “Chinese President meets Jo Myong Rok,” KCNA, April 24, 2003, at www.

kcna.co.jp/item/2003/200304/news04/24.htm#8.

46. Glenn Kessler, “N. Korea Claims to Have Nuclear Weapons, US Officials 

Say,” The Washington Post, April 25, 2003, p. A-01.

47. Joseph Kahn, “North Korea May Be Angering Its Only Ally,” The New York 

Times, April 26, 2003, p. A-01, at www.nytimes.com/2003/04/26/international/asia/

26KORE.html.

48. “High-level Military Delegation of China to Visit DPRK,” KCNA at www.

kcna.co.jp/item/2003/200308/news08/18.htm#14; “High-level Military Delegation 

of China Arrives,” KCNA, at www.kcna.co.jp/item/2003/200308/news08/19.htm#9; 

“Jo Myong Rok Meets Chinese Military Delegation,” KCNA, at www.kcna.co.jp/

item/2003/200308/news08/19.htm#10; “Chinese Military Delegation Winds Up Its 

Visit to DPRK,” KCNA at www.kcna.co.jp/item/2003/200308/news08/23.htm#13.

49. Private conversation with U.S. government officials. See the Author’s 

Heritage Foundation Backgrounder #1717, “Time for Washington to Take a 

Realistic Look at China Policy” at www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/

bg1717.cfm#pgfId-1071493.
1

50. Ibid.

51. David E. Sanger, “U.S. Said to Shift Approach in Talks with North Korea,” 

The New York Times, September 5, 2003; p. A-03.

52. See “State Department Background Briefing Attributable To A Senior State 

Department Official Re: Six-Party Talks On North Korea” at the State Department 

Briefing Room, Washington, DC, September 4, 2003, transcript provided by Federal 

News Service, Inc. 

53. Joseph Kahn, “Chinese Aide Says U.S. Is Obstacle in Korean Talks,” The 

New York Times, September 2, 2003, at www.nytimes.com/2003/09/02/international/

asia/02KORE.html.

54. The July-August “fourth round” of talks was continued for a “second 

session” ending September 19, 2005. The “Statement of Principles” that emerged 

on September 19 was, at best, a restatement of the “Agreed Framework” of 1994, 

and could hardly be called “progress.” See John Tkacik, “Agreed Framework, 

Part Deux,” Hong Kong, Far Eastern Economic Review, September 2005 (published 

September 23, 2005), pp. 21-24, at www.feer.com/articles1/2005/0509/p021.html.

55. Statistics on North Korean trade are spotty at best, nonexistent at worst. 

Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs James Kelly told a U.S. 

Senate hearing on September 11, 2003, that “China is the supplier of last resort 

to North Korea of fuel, and I would say food as well. Numbers of perhaps some 

$500 million a year turn up with some regularity. It’s not clear how much of that 

is paid for by the North Koreans.” See “U.S. Senator Richard G. Lugar (R-IN) 

Holds Hearing on Relations with China,” September 11, 2003, Verbatim Transcript 

by Federal Document Clearing House. The Food and Agriculture Organization 

estimates that North Korea agricultural imports in 2003 were about U.S.$284 million 

(see FAO webpage at www.fao.org/es/ess/toptrade/trade.asp?lang=EN&country=116). 

See also Nicholas Eberstadt, “Statistical Blackouts in North Korea: Trade Figures 

Uncovered,” Beyond Transition, World Bank, Washington, DC, March-April 1998, 

at www.worldbank.org/transitionnewsletter/marapr98/pgs21-23.htm. 

56. Philip P. Pan, “China Deploys Troops on N. Korea Border,” The Washington 

Post, September 16, 2003; p. A13. See also Christopher Bodeen, “China Assigns 

Army to Guard Korean Border,” The Associated Press, September 15, 2003.

57. Won-Jae Park, “People’s Liberation Army Trains River Crossing at Aprok 

River,” Seoul Donga Ilbo in English, August 8, 2004, at english.donga.com/srv/service.

php3?bicode=060000&biid=2004080953828.

58. The article apparently appeared in July, but was not noticed until midAugust. See Wang Zhongwen, “Yi Xin Shijiao Shenshi Chaoxian Wenti yu 

Dongbeiya Xingshi” [“Examining the DPRK Issue and Northeast Asian Situation 

from a New Viewpoint”], Beijing Zhanlue Yu Guanli [Strategy and Management], 

No. 4, July/August, pp. 92-94, transcribed by FBIS at CPP20040825000196. For a 

full description of the incident, see John J Tkacik, Jr., “China’s ‘S&M’ journal Goes 

Too Far on Korea,” The Asia Times, Bangkok, September 2, 2004, at www.atimes.

com/atimes/China/FI02Ad06.html.
59. Yu Senxue, “Hu Jintao Jiuzhi Jianghua Shaqi Tengteng” [“Hu Jintao’s 

Inauguration Speech Filled With Sound and Fury”], Hong Kong Kaifang, No. 216, 

December 2004, p. 13.

60. Luo Hui, “Jin Richeng hui Li Changchun: Chaozhong Renmin Chuantong 

Youyi Bu Ke Po” [“Kim Jong Il Sees Li Changchun: The Traditional Friendship 

Between the Peoples of the DPRK and China Is Unbreakable”], Xinhua, September 

12, 2004, at www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/1024/2778612.html. 

61. (No author) “Zhong-Chao Bianjing Zhujunquan, Fang Jumin Tiaotou” 

[“PRC-North Korea Border Police Dogs Intended to Stem Flow of Migrants], 

Taipei China Times, October 18, 2004. (Cites Seoul Chosun Ilbo.)

62. Kang Chan-ho, Ser Myo-ja, “Chinese Reinforce Border Near North,” Seoul 

Joongang Daily, October 13, 2004, at joongangdaily.joins.com/200410/13/20041013222

0434579900090209021.html. 

63. (No author), “Han, Mian Liang Bianjing Gai you Junfang Zhushou, Jieti 

Wujing chengdan Fangwu, Bianjing Tuxiang ke zhijie da Beijing” [“Borders with 

Korea, Myanmar Will Now Be Guarded By Military, Replacing Armed Police and 

Assuming Defense Duties, Border Images Can Be Viewed Directly From Beijing”], 

New York, World Journal, November 22, 2005. Report cites “the latest issue of 

Liaowang Eastern Weekly, a subsidiary of Xinhua.”

64. Ibid.

65. “Zhong-Han Bianjing Bao Qiangzhan, Ren Xunxhi” [“Gunfight at the 

China-North Korea Border, Chinese PLA Soldier Killed In Action”], New York 

World Journal, December 13, 2005, p. A-08. Cites Changsha Wanbao.

66. Peter Finn, “Chinese, Russian Militaries to Hold First Joint Drills; Alliance 

May Extend to Arms Sales,” The Washington Post, August 15, 2005; p. A10, at www.

washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/08/14/AR2005081400927.html.

67. Burt Herman, “Chinese-Russian Military Exercises Begin,” The Associated 

Press, August 19, 2005.

68. (No author cited), “Assault Landing Requested by China; Display of its 

Capability in Dealing With Taiwan?” Transcribed by FBIS, Tokyo Kyodo Clue II

(Internet Version) August 18, 2005, at FBIS JPP20050818000018.

69. (No author cited) “E Bao: Ejun Yanxi, Zhongguo Maidan” [“Russian Paper: 

China Foots Bill for Russian Military Exercise”], Taipei China Times Internet 

Edition, August 19, 2005.

70. cited in FBIS Analysis: PRC Media On Sino-Russian Military Exercise 

FEA20050831007588—FBIS Feature—1304 GMT August 31, 2005.

71. (No author), “Huwei Huang Hai, Zhong Han She Junshi Rexian, ‘Chaoxian 

Ribao’ beilou, Nanhan yu Dalu jiu haijun hezuo da gongshi, you zhu Hainan 

Zhengqiu, fangfan tufaxing chongtu” [Protect the Yellow Sea, PRC-ROK Establish 

Military Hot Line; Chosun Ilbo Reveals South Korea and Mainland Reach Consensus 

on Naval Cooperation, To Aid in Sea Emergencies and Rescue, Guard Against 

Sudden Confrontations”], New York World Journal, April 17, 2005, p. A-08.
72. North Korea is not governed by a “Korean Constitution” but a “Kimilsung 

Constitution.” See “Kim Il Sung Constitution,” Korean Central News Agency 

(KCNA), Pyongyang, December 26, 2005, at www.kcna.co.jp/item/2005/200512/

news12/27.htm#8. This document officially is praised as follows: “The world history 

of constitution has not known such constitution as one of the DPRK which is run 

through with the revolutionary outlook on the leader to perpetuate the memory 

of the leader.”

73. “National Meeting Marks 14th Anniversary of Kim Jong Il’s Assumption 

of Office as KPA Supreme Commander,” KCNA in English, December 23, 2005, 

Pyongyang, at www.kcna.co.jp/item/2005/200512/news12/24.htm#11.

74. In addition to pacifying an occupied North Korea, China, at least, may 

also want to know where North Korea’s government archives are. Who knows 

what secrets may fall into the wrong hands if North Korea is suddenly absorbed 

by South Korea after an economic collapse? See “DPRK, China Cooperate in 

Documentary Field,” Korean Central News Agency, August 13, 2005, at www.kcna.

co.jp/item/2005/200508/news08/15.htm#1. 

75. David Ibison, “Pyongyang’s spy ship reveals a dark secret,” Financial Times, 

May 28, 2003, p. 3. See also (No author), “U.S. Photos Show Mystery Ship LookAlike,” Japan Times, March 2, 2002, sourcing Asahi Shimbun, p. 1; “Japan Ends Ship 

Probe,” Japan Times, March 2, 2002 (sourcing Kyodo News Agency).

76. David E. Sanger, “In North Korea and Pakistan, Deep Roots of Nuclear 

Barter,” The New York Times, November 24, 2002, p. A-01. Danny Gittings, “Battling 

the Bribers,” Asian Wall Street Journal, October 29, 2002, p. 18. William C. Triplett 

II, “Road to Pyongyang through Beijing?” The Washington Times, February 21, 

2003, p. A18. On September 11, 2003, Senator Feingold asked Assistant Secretary 

of State James Kelly “about North Korean planes flying through Chinese airspace 

or even making refueling stops in China when these planes may well be involved 

in proliferation activities. . . . have we raised this issue with the Chinese?” Kelly 

responded “Yes, sir, we have raised that issue with the Chinese. It would probably 

be best to brief you more completely on that particular topic in a closed hearing, 

sir.” See U.S. Senate Committee On Foreign Relations “Hearing On U.S.-China 

Relations, September 11, 2003.”

77. Paul Watson and Mubashir Zaidi, “Death of N. Korean Woman Offers Clues 

to Pakistani Nuclear Deals,” The Los Angeles Times, March 1, 2004.
CHAPTER 8

THE PLA, JAPAN’S DEFENSE POSTURE,

AND THE OUTLOOK FOR CHINA-JAPAN RELATIONS1

Robert G. Sutter

INTRODUCTION

The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is broadly 

influenced by the many nationalistic and other political issues that 

have served to bring about the most serious deterioration in SinoJapanese relations since the establishment of diplomatic relations 

over 30 years ago. More concretely, PLA priorities evident notably 

in recent Chinese National Defense White Papers reflect a number 

of key national security issues with Japan that on the whole are 

worsening in recent years. 

The outlook for China-Japan relations is uncertain and subject 

to debate among U.S. and other specialists. Regarding the PLA, it 

remains unclear exactly what role in Chinese leadership deliberations 

over policy toward Japan is played by PLA priorities regarding 

Taiwan and securing territorial integrity and strategic resources such 

as oil and gas. On the whole, the PLA priorities clearly emphasize the 

negative and support those who argue that Sino-Japanese relations 

are bound to deteriorate further. Moreover, this year, more than in 

the recent past, PLA naval forces have been deployed in ways that 

exacerbate tensions with Japan, worsening relations. 

On the other hand, however, this paper demonstrates that there 

also are powerful reasons why Chinese leaders, as well as Japanese 

leaders, will seek to avoid further deterioration and restore more 

businesslike relations. Among them is China’s drive to project an 

image of leadership in Asia as a benign good neighbor, showing 

flexibility and accommodation to regional partners. 

Deepening disputes, rivalry, and conflicts with Japan contradict 

important Chinese goals at home and abroad. While PLA leaders no 

doubt share such broad policy goals to some degree, PLA emphasis 

on national security issues and their obvious negative implications 
for Sino-Japanese relations means that the PLA will serve as a drag 

on broader Chinese efforts to establish a position as a trusted partner 

in Asia with a benign agenda in the broad interest of regional peace 

and stability.

The debate among U.S. specialists over the outlook for ChinaJapan relations tends to drive differences among them over the 

implications of the tense relations for U.S. interests. On the one 

hand are U.S. specialists who argue that the Sino-Japanese friction 

is against U.S. interests and the United States should take concrete 

measures to reduce tensions. Such measures include U.S. efforts to 

get the Japanese prime minister to stop visiting the controversial 

Yasukuni war memorial and for Japanese government officials to be 

more rigorously forthright in accepting responsibility for Japanese 

aggression in the Pacific War; and U.S. efforts for Chinese officials 

to curb nationalistic excesses, avoid the widespread perception that 

Beijing manipulates history and other issues to weaken Japan, and 

manage territorial and other disputes without popular violence and 

in accordance with accepted international norms. On the other hand 

are U.S. specialists who see Sino-Japanese relations as unlikely to 

deteriorate substantially, as incentives on both sides offset sources of 

recent tensions. They see U.S. actions in this context as unwise and 

unwarranted.

DETERIORATING SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS

The future stability of East Asia will depend heavily on the 

relationship between the main regional powers, China and Japan. 

Relations between the two swung markedly in the post-Cold War 

period. At first, both powers adjusted their bilateral relations amicably 

following the demise of the Soviet Union and its strategic influence 

in East Asia. The rise of China’s power and influence in Asian affairs 

in the 1990s, combined with Chinese military assertiveness over 

Taiwan and the South China Sea in the mid 1990s, coincided with 

a protracted period of lackluster Japanese economic performance 

and weak political leadership. This called into question the past 

disparity of the economic relationship between the two powers, 

added to ongoing differences over territorial, strategic, historical, 
and economic issues, and strengthened the wariness and occasional 

antipathy between the two countries.2

More recently, Chinese relations with Japan have worsened. 

Chinese government, and specifically PLA concerns with Japan’s 

defense posture, including its notably strengthened alliance 

relationship with the United States, have added to this trend in 

worsening relations. The result has seen Chinese and U.S. relations 

with Japan move in markedly different directions. This has 

undermined Chinese influence in Japan, while enhancing that of 

the United States. It also has seriously complicated China’s broader 

strategy in Asia, which is based on a good neighbor policy seeking 

to enhance China’s influence by dealing with Asian countries in an 

accommodating way, putting aside differences and seeking greater 

areas of common ground. China’s uncompromising approach to and 

deteriorating relationship with Japan, its most important neighbor, 

belies Chinese broader declarations of goodwill, accommodation and 

“win/win” solutions. It prompts Japan, a country with half of Asia’s 

wealth and its most modern military force, to prepare for protracted 

difficulties and rivalry with China in Asia, while adding to broader 

regional wariness over Chinese intentions.3

The Bush administration has worked assiduously to strengthen 

the alliance with Japan and has found a willing partner in the Japanese 

administration of Prime Minister Koizumi. Both sides have played 

down persisting trade and other disputes as the bilateral relationship 

has reached new heights of strategic and political cooperation. While 

Japan also pursues alternative paths to support its national security 

and other interests, its reliance on the alliance with the United States 

has deepened to an unprecedented degree. In response, Japan is 

prepared to take new and more expansive military actions in support 

of allied interests in Asian and world affairs.4

By contrast, China has seen political and security relations with 

Japan deteriorate markedly despite burgeoning economic trade and 

large Japanese investment in China. Disputes range widely and 

involve competing and highly nationalistic views of Japan’s military 

expansion in Asia prior to 1945; territorial and resource conflicts in 

the East China Sea; rising Japanese concerns over China’s military 

buildup focused on Taiwan and Chinese concerns about Japan’s 

closer cooperation with the United States regarding Taiwan; Chinese 
concerns over Japan’s closer military cooperation with the United 

States over ballistic missile defense and in regard to international 

deployments of Japanese forces; Sino-Japanese competition for 

Russian and other energy resources; and Chinese opposition to 

Japan’s strenuous efforts seeking a permanent seat in the United 

Nations (UN) Security Council.5 Several of these issues are of specific 

concern to the PLA, as was highlighted notably in the Chinese 

Defense White Paper of December 2004, discussed below. 

Popular Chinese anger at Japan saw Chinese demonstrators attack 

Japanese diplomatic and business installations in China in 2005. The 

Chinese government allowed the violence to take place for several 

days before cracking down, suggesting to some in Japan that the 

Chinese authorities were using the popular outbursts to intimidate 

Japan. The crisis alarmed many other governments in Asia, fearful 

that China might follow such forceful policies toward them in the 

event they differed with China over sensitive issues.6

Underlying the crisis was a continuing change in regional 

power relationships. China’s rising power and influence in Asian 

affairs since the 1990s combined with Chinese military buildup and 

assertiveness focused on Taiwan and coincided with Japan entering 

a second decade of poor economic performance. As China loomed 

larger as Asia’s leader in economic growth, Japan responded with 

deepening concern over its place in Asian and world affairs. This 

added to ongoing differences over territorial, strategic, historical, 

and economic issues, and strengthened the suspicion between the 

two countries. Meanwhile, stronger nationalism in both countries put 

them at odds over a variety of sensitive issues related to history and 

territorial claims.7 Notable in this regard was Chinese concern over 

a U.S.-Japan declaration on February 19, 2005, where the Japanese 

government joined the United States in expressing a joint position 

on Taiwan.8

DEBATE OVER SALIENT TRENDS AND KEY DETERMINANTS 

IN SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS

There is an active debate among specialists about the determinants 

and direction of Sino-Japanese relations. Some experts have predicted 

an increasingly intense competition, including likely confrontation 
and possible conflict in future China-Japan relations.9

 They highlight 

changes in attitudes of Japanese and Chinese decisionmakers, opinion 

leaders, and popular opinion about the status and outlook of their 

mutual relations. They tend to see initiatives reflecting strong SinoJapanese friction and rivalry.10 Signs of Sino-Japanese competition 

and rivalry in Asia include:11

• Separate and seemingly competing proposals by China and 

Japan in 2001-02 to establish free trade arrangements with the 

ten Southeast Asian nations in ASEAN.

• Strong Japanese competition with China to gain improved 

access to Russian oil in the Far East.

• Greater Japanese support for Taiwan and for stronger U.S. 

backing of Taiwan during the Bush administration.12

• The first significant cutbacks in Japanese aid to China since 

the normalization of relations in the 1970s.

• Increased Japanese willingness to deploy military forces in 

Asia in support of U.S. and UN initiatives.

• Stepped up Japanese efforts to improve security, aid, and other 

relations with India and other nations on China’s southern 

and western flanks, including strong Japanese aid efforts for 

Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asian countries.13

• In the face of China’s steadily increasing economic ties 

and political influence in South Korea, on-again, off-again 

Japanese efforts to improve ties with Seoul, attempting to 

ease differences over historical, trade and other issues.14

Underlying changes in Japan said to foreshadow greater JapaneseChinese rivalry involve:

• With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the 

Cold War, strategic thinkers in the Japanese government 

and elsewhere in Japan have focused more on China’s rising 

power as the major long-term regional security concern for 

Japan.

• China’s continued remarkable economic growth, along with 

its rising political and military standing, has prompted more 

Japanese to view China as a rival for regional influence.
• Previous Japanese sensitivity and responsiveness to Chinese 

demands for special consideration on account of Japan’s 

negative war record in China over 50 years ago have lessened 

with the passage of time, the change in Japanese leadership 

generations, and Beijing’s loss of moral standing in Japan on 

account of its crackdown after the Tiananmen incident, its 

nuclear testing, and its intimidating military actions against 

Taiwan and in the South China Sea.15

• Undergirding Japan’s more critical approach to China is a 

strong sense of national pride and determination among 

Japanese leaders and public opinion to preserve Japanese 

interests in the face of perceived efforts by PRC officials to 

use charges from the past and recent economic, political, 

and strategic issues to prompt Tokyo to give way to Chinese 

interests. 

Meanwhile, changes in China said to be leading to greater friction 

with Japan include:

• Chinese strategists’ long-standing concerns about Japan’s 

impressive military capabilities have increased as a result 

of U.S.-Japanese agreements from 1996 onwards, which, 

to Chinese observers, appear to broaden Japan’s strategic 

role in East Asia and to provide U.S. strategic support for 

Japanese politicians wishing to strike a military posture in 

the region less deferential to China than in the past.16 U.S. 

support for Prime Minister Koizumi’s strong military actions 

and deployments to the Indian Ocean in support of the U.S. 

war against terrorism in Afghanistan during 2001-02 and 

the Japanese leader’s strong stance in support of the U.S.-led 

attack on Iraq in 2003 and deployment of Japanese forces to 

Iraq in 2004 represented new developments in this perceived 

trend.

• Chinese government specialists have acknowledged changes 

in Japanese attitudes toward China and judged that Beijing 

appeared likely to meet even more opposition and gain less 

support from Japan as it sought to expand China’s influence 

in Asian and world affairs. The Japanese decisions to cut aid 

to China seem consistent with this trend.
• Chinese nationalism has been a focal point of governmentsponsored media and other publicity in recent years 

especially following the Tiananmen Incident and the collapse 

of communism in Europe and the Soviet Union at the end of 

the Cold War. Appealing to the sense of China as having been 

victimized by foreign aggressors in the past, the publicity 

focused heavily on Japan, by far the most important foreign 

aggressor in modern Chinese history. The governmentsponsored publicity has elicited widespread positive response 

in China and soured the overall atmosphere of China’s 

relations with Japan.17

A contrasting perspective gives greater weight to the common 

interests and forces that continue to bind Sino-Japanese relations 

and to limit the chances of serious confrontation or conflict. 

Mutual interests center on strong, growing economic and strategic 

interdependence between Japan and China, and the influence of 

the United States and other third parties, including other national 

powers in Asia—all of whom favor and could be expected to work to 

preserve Sino-Japanese stability. Specific elements of the argument 

against the development of serious Sino-Japanese rivalry involve:

• Both the Japanese and Chinese governments remain 

domestically focused, and continue to give top priority to the 

economic development of their countries, which they believe 

require a prolonged, peaceful, and cooperative relationship 

with their Asian neighbors, notably one another.

• China depends heavily on Japan for economic relations, for 

technology and investment, and as a market for Chinese 

goods; Japan increasingly depends on China as a market, 

source of imports, and offshore manufacturing base.

• Personnel exchanges between Japan and China have grown 

markedly. Tens of thousands of Japanese students visit or 

study in China each year. Government sponsored exchange 

programs abound, and even if they do not always promote 

positive feelings, they probably do promote more realistic 

mutual perceptions. 
1

• Few, if any, governments active in Asian affairs would benefit 

from or seek to promote greater Sino-Japanese friction. This 

includes the Bush administration, which is careful to balance 

its strong pro-Japanese slant with reaffirmation of continued 

interest in closer mutually beneficial relations with China 

designed in part to sustain regional peace and stability. Such 

cooperation is especially important to the United States, and 

to China and Japan, in regard to efforts to deal diplomatically 

with the North Korean nuclear issue and related provocations 

coming from Pyongyang in 2002-05.

• Because the United States remains such a dominant military and 

economic power in the region, the U.S.-Japan alliance results 

in a marked asymmetry in Japanese and Chinese perceptions 

of competition and rivalry. While Japanese elite and popular 

opinion are more focused on China as a future concern, 

Chinese elite and popular opinion are more preoccupied with 

the United States as a possible concern; Japan’s role is seen as 

secondary, the junior partner in one of the U.S. alliances and 

security arrangements that affect Chinese interests. Given the 

Chinese focus on dealing with the primary concern posed by 

the United States, one result that works against Sino-Japanese 

rivalry is that Chinese officials at times have sought to avoid 

disputes with Japan and rather have tried to woo Japan away 

from close alignment with the United States and toward 

positions more favorable to China.18

THE RECENT TURN FOR THE WORSE

The Asian Economic crisis of 1997-98 added to the already strong 

preoccupations of leaders in Tokyo and Beijing with their respective 

domestic problems, especially economic problems. At least for the 

time being, neither government sought to exacerbate tensions over 

the array of issues that continued to divide them. Thus, they went 

ahead with senior leaders’ meetings in Tokyo and Beijing, capped 

by President Jiang Zemin’s November 1998 visit to Japan. That visit 

saw Japanese officials stand firm in the face of Chinese pressure on 

issues related to Taiwan and the history of China-Japan relations. 
Chinese leaders adjusted their approach, as leaders in both capitals 

endeavored to emphasize the positive and give less public attention 

to important and often deeply-rooted differences. Lower level 

commentary in China and Japan made clear such differences over 

history, the U.S.-Japan alliance, Taiwan, theater missile defense, and 

competing visions of regional leadership had not been forgotten.19

While he emphasized Sino-Japanese economic and other 

compatible interests, Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi tested 

Chinese tolerance on the sensitive history issue with his repeated 

visits to the Yasukuni Shrine—a Japanese war memorial that included 

commemoration of the Japanese leaders during the Pacific War who 

were later convicted as war criminals. After his third visit despite 

Chinese admonitions, Chinese officials made it known in 2003 that 

the Japanese Prime Minister would not be welcome in Beijing; but 

they were flexible in arranging a meeting between the Japanese Prime 

Minister and China’s recently installed President at the sidelines of 

an international summit in Europe in mid 2003. (There were several 

subsequent meetings between Koizumi and top Chinese government 

leaders, but none in Beijing.)

At that time, the burgeoning crisis over North Korea’s nuclear 

weapons program and the danger that tensions on the Korean 

peninsula might escalate and result in military confrontation and 

war saw Chinese leaders take unprecedented measures to work 

cooperatively and pragmatically with the United States and others in 

order to deal with the crisis through diplomatic means. For their part, 

Japanese officials were anxious to work closely with South Korea, 

China, and Russia, while Japan relied strongly on close collaboration 

with the Bush administration in seeking a political solution to the 

crisis. At bottom, dealing with the North Korean nuclear challenge 

posed an added preoccupation for Chinese and Japanese leaders 

that, at least over the short term, reduced the likelihood that they 

would adopt more assertive and potentially disruptive policies. 

They presumably were loath to appear to worsen an already delicate 

situation in ways that could affect their interests adversely in stability, 

development and security.20

The sharp turn for the worse in China-Japan relations seen during 

the violent anti-Japanese demonstrations in China during April 

2005 was marked by concurrent deterioration of relations regarding 
political and security issues on several fronts, even as economic 

relations prospered. Prime Minister Koizumi remained unapologetic 

about visiting the Yasukuni shrine.21 Another textbook seen to whitewash Japanese aggression prior to 1945 was approved for publication 

by Japanese government officials. First China, then Japan, engaged 

in exploitation of gas in disputed waters in the East China Sea. 

Russia vacillated between strong incentives from Japan and China in 

determining whether to favor one or the other in building a pipeline 

to East Asia for Siberian oil. Repeated intrusions into Japanese 

claimed waters by Chinese “research” and other ships presaged 

the intrusion of a Chinese nuclear powered submarine that was 

found and tracked by Japanese forces in Japanese territorial waters 

near Okinawa. Growing Japanese concern about the implications 

for Japanese interests posed by the rapid Chinese military buildup 

focused on Taiwan elicited more explicit Japanese government 

expressions of concern and a variety of countermeasures, many 

involving strengthening Japan’s alliance relationship with the United 

States. In this context, Japan engaged in bilateral consultations with 

the United States over the Taiwan situation; worked in a trilateral 

forum with Australia and the United States that dealt with Taiwan 

and other Asian issues; was explicit in noting Japanese government 

concerns over the Taiwan situation; and backed the United States in 

seeking curbs on European and Israeli arms sales to China.22 A large 

Chinese-Russian military exercise involving naval and air forces in 

the East China Sea in August 2005 was followed by Japan’s detection 

in September of a flotilla of Chinese warships sailing near a Chinese 

gas rig exploiting resources in the East China Sea that are claimed by 

Japan.23

Japanese leaders used the marked increase in Japan’s international 

profile seen at the time of Japan’s impressive aid and relief efforts 

after the Tsunami disaster in South Asia in December 2004 to launch 

a series of high-level international visits and associated economic and 

other gestures in an effort to garner support for a permanent seat for 

Japan on the UN Security Council. Despite strenuous government 

efforts, China remained in the second echelon among tsunami relief 

donors. The Chinese government opposed Japan’s UN bid. As noted 

earlier, public opinion in China was fed by a long-standing Chinese 
government media and education campaign to build nationalism by 

emphasizing the evils done to China by past imperial powers, notably 

Japan. In these circumstances, whether by design or happenstance, 

tens of thousands of Chinese responded to an Internet campaign 

against Japan’s UN bid by taking to the streets, with many attacking 

Japanese businesses and diplomatic properties in April 2005. For 

several days, the Chinese police attempted to regulate but did not 

attempt to stop the violent anti-Japanese acts, bringing bilateral 

relations to the lowest point since the normalization of relations in 

1972.24

Subsequently, government officials on both sides endeavored 

to restore order and maintain mutually advantageous business 

ties. However, neither side gave ground on the various political 

and security disputes that gave rise to the recent deterioration of 

relations.25 Fresh from his success in leading his party to a decisive 

victory in the Diet election of September 2005, Prime Minister 

Koizumi again visited the Yasukuni Shrine in October, prompting 

shrill Chinese protests and cancellation of foreign minister talks to 

improve relations.26

PLA PRIORITIES AND JAPANESE POLICY 

AND PRACTICE—ADDING TO THE NEGATIVES 

IN CHINA-JAPAN RELATIONS

Forces of nationalism, anger over Japanese leaders visiting 

the Yasukuni Shrine, and outrage over Japanese textbooks white 

washing aggression in China prior to 1945 almost certainly have 

an important impact on the feelings of Chinese military leaders 

and policy inclinations of the PLA. However, the impact of these 

powerful but often poorly defined sentiments or movements is hard 

to measure. 

This chapter endeavors to focus on the more clear-cut enumeration 

of PLA concerns and priorities seen in the Chinese National Defense 

White Paper issued in December 2004.27 That document in some 

respects marked an advance in criticizing Japan over a previous 

White Paper in 2002.28

Both the 2002 and 2004 documents gave top priority to the 

Taiwan issue. Clearly, any perceived effort by Japan supporting 
Taiwan separation from China would be viewed as a major concern. 

Also highlighted in both documents is the PLA determination to 

protect Chinese territory and territorial claims and to secure strategic 

resources such as oil and gas. As Chinese-Japanese territorial conflicts 

grow in scope and intensity, they intrude ever more directly on these 

PLA priorities. 

Discussing the Asian-Pacific regional situation, the 2002 document 

was vague in noting the sources of such adverse developments as 

strengthening military alliances and enlarging operations of armed 

forces. Not so the 2004 White Paper. It first explicitly criticized the 

United States for “realigning and reinforcing its military presence 

in this region by buttressing military alliances and accelerating 

deployment of missile defense systems.” It then explicitly criticized 

Japan for “stepping up its constitutional overhaul, adjusting its 

military and security policies, and developing the missile defense 

system for future deployment.” The White Paper added further 

criticism of Japan, that the Japanese government “also has increased 

markedly military activities abroad.” 

The evidence of Japanese policy and practice in these key areas of 

PLA concern and Chinese responses criticizing such Japanese policy 

and practice (noted below) show that on balance the PLA priorities 

add to friction in Japan-China relations. They offset continued efforts 

by military leaders on both sides who continue to engage in some 

business-like contacts seeking to maintain communications and 

avoid conflict. They also offset efforts by military and other Chinese 

officials to cooperate with Japan on such key issues as the Six Party 

Talks regarding North Korea’s nuclear weapons program and the 

global war on terrorism.29

Based on the authoritative White Paper, it also appears that PLA 

priorities give less attention than other Chinese official commentary 

regarding China’s priority, emphasized repeatedly by top level 

Chinese leaders, to be seen as accommodating and flexible in dealings 

with neighbors, seeking wherever possible “win-win” solutions to 

problems involving China and neighboring states.30 Some Chinese 

officials continue to stress China’s determination not to be seen as 

adverse to the United States or its security and other interests in 

Asia, including its relations with key allies, emphasizing China’s 
determination to develop and rise in influence in a manner that does 

not disturb Asia’s prevailing powers, which are led by the United 

States and include notably Japan. These themes are central to China’s 

recent foreign policy in Asia, resting on mutually advantageous trade 

ties, adroit and flexible bilateral and multilateral diplomacy, and 

“soft power” highlighting the attraction of China to its neighbors.31

Unfortunately for Chinese priorities concerning what some 

Chinese officials have called China’s “peaceful rise” in Asia,32 PLA 

priorities vis-à-vis Japan add to factors that lead to Chinese policies 

and actions that widen the gap between China and Japan, solidify 

China’s broadly acknowledged unattractive image in Japan, and 

complicate China’s efforts to reassure Asian neighbors. It remains 

hard to discern exactly what role in Chinese leadership deliberations 

over policy toward Japan is played by PLA priorities regarding 

Taiwan and securing territorial integrity and strategic resources 

such as oil and gas. On the whole, however, the PLA priorities 

clearly emphasize the negative and support those who argue that 

Sino-Japanese relations are bound to deteriorate further. Moreover, 

this year, more than in the recent past, PLA naval forces have been 

deployed in ways that exacerbate tensions with Japan, worsening 

relations. 

 A review of the successes and failures in China’s recent policies 

with its neighbors in Asia33 shows that China’s greatest failure is in 

relations with Japan. Given that Japan has half the wealth of Asia 

and other major attributes and influence, the inability of China to 

establish a stable and constructive relationship with Japan is a major 

source of weakness in any Chinese strategy to seek a more prominent 

role as an accommodating and attractive leader in Asian affairs.

Taiwan. 

Evidence of Japan’s growing involvement with Taiwan in ways that 

are adverse to Chinese interests includes repeated reports of Japanese 

consultations with the United States, and other U.S. allies, regarding 

deterring China’s use of force against Taiwan, and preparation for 

actions in the event of such a use of force.34 The Japanese foreign 

minister now publicly says that Taiwan is covered under terms of 

the U.S.-Japan security treaty, which the Japanese government is 
endeavoring to strengthen.35 Recent reports in mainstream media 

say that Japan is redeploying forces to protect southern Japan 

from Chinese attack, that Japanese officials acknowledge that U.S. 

marines in Okinawa will play a rapid response role under some 

Taiwan conflict contingencies, and that retired Japanese military 

officers are assisting Taiwan in preparing for mine warfare.36 Official 

Japanese statements increasingly are explicit about their concerns 

over the Chinese military buildup targeted against Taiwan, and 

have joined with the United States in urging a peaceful resolution 

of the issue. The Japanese prime minister criticized China’s March 

2005 so-called antisecession law directed at Taiwan.37 Japan’s strong 

recent commitment to missile defense cooperation with the United 

States has direct implications for Taiwan, which are discussed below. 

Japanese politicians travel often to Taiwan and controversial Taiwan 

leaders like Lee Teng-hui are permitted to visit Japan.38

Territorial Issues.

The disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands controlled by Japan are 

at the center of the many active territorial issues between China and 

Japan. The two governments dispute ownership and the resources 

(e.g., gas, oil, fish) that are related to the economic zone that comes with 

the territorial claim.39 The issue is related to the U.S.-Japan security 

treaty, which the 2002 and 2004 White Papers seem to criticize. Bush 

administration officials have claimed that the United States is bound 

under the treaty to help Japan in the event Japanese forces come 

under attack protecting the disputed islands.40 Meanwhile, disputes 

over how and where to divide competing territorial claims in the East 

China Sea have become more prominent recently than at any time 

since the normalization of relations between the two governments in 

1972.41

Missile Defense. 

A review of Japanese missile defense efforts and Chinese 

comments about them show that China views the recently beefed 

up Japanese efforts as decreasing China’s ability to hold Japan at 

risk, increasing the strength of the U.S.-Japan alliance to compete 
with China in the region and complicating China’s ability to use 

force against Japan, U.S. forces in Japan, and Taiwan in the event 

of the conflict over Taiwan.42 The missile defense efforts planned 

by Japan in conjunction with the United States clearly diminish the 

effectiveness of one of the few classes of weapons in which China is 

superior to Japan: ballistic missiles.43 China has hundreds of ballistic 

missiles that can hit Japanese territory. Beijing presumably has the 

ability to saturate any Japanese missile defense system, but Chinese 

ballistic missiles have a number of missions, and Beijing presumably 

would prefer not to be forced to focus them on Japan. Meanwhile, if 

the Japanese missile defense system, developed in conjunction with 

the United States, seems successful, it might encourage others to join 

with the United States and Japan in pursuing a closer missile defense 

cooperation. Reasons why a successful U.S.-Japan missile defense 

would affect PLA interests regarding Taiwan include: 

(1) Japan would have some more assurance that it could offer 

assistance to aid American forces and deal with possible Chinese 

response. This would especially be the case if the U.S. and Japan 

combined missile defense efforts to protect Japan. 

(2) Also, if Japanese ships substitute for U.S. ships guarding 

against missile attack from North Korea, U.S. ships would be free to 

help with missile defense for Taiwan. 

Expanded Scope of Japanese Military Activities. 

The recent trend of the Japanese government to break with past 

precedent and undertake a variety of military actions in support of 

U.S., UN, or other objectives continues to develop in ways that are 

of concern to China.44 Japanese military forces are the most modern 

in Asia. The Japanese government has now reached a point where 

Japanese officials discuss preemptive actions against North Korea 

and push for revision of article nine in the Japanese constitution and 

other constraints on “normal” use of Japanese military forces. Feeding 

back to Chinese concern over the strengthened U.S.-Japan alliance, 

the Japanese efforts to undertake more security responsibilities and 

revise the constitution in ways that allow even greater scope for 

Japanese military activities abroad are welcomed and encouraged 

by senior U.S. officials.
“Shaping” China’s Role in Asia. 

The Bush administration has been explicit that U.S. policy in Asia 

remains unsure whether a rising China will be a friend or foe, a force 

for stability and development, or a source for disruption. They point 

to what they see as positive elements in China’s growing influence 

and negative aspects. They prudently prepare for both. In this regard, 

they work closely with Japan, seeing the U.S.-Japanese alliance as 

the key foundation for U.S.-led efforts to “guide” China onto the 

right paths and to deter China from taking the paths opposed by 

the United States.45 The latter involves U.S.-Japan discussions on 

dealing with Chinese military expansion, threats to Taiwan, and 

related questions. These U.S.-led efforts are a direct challenge to 

the goals of Chinese independence and opposition to infringement 

on Chinese rights set forth in the Chinese National Defense White 

Paper. Nonetheless, the Japanese government joins with the United 

States in this effort. Notable in the past year were Japanese efforts to 

persuade European and Israeli governments to follow U.S. advice and 

refrain from military sales that would increase Chinese capabilities 

in Asia.46 Meanwhile, Japanese official statements and documents 

support U.S. public concerns about the purpose and scope of China’s 

rapid military buildup.47

Short-Term Outlook and U.S. Policy Implications.48

The wide range of recent Sino-Japanese differences, reinforced 

by PLA priorities highlighting worsening security related issues 

between the two countries, makes it hard to be optimistic about future 

Sino-Japanese relations. Nonetheless, forces working against further 

deterioration of relations and encouraging more businesslike SinoJapanese relations remain strong and appear powerful enough in 

this author’s view to keep tensions within bounds and avoid strident 

rivalry or military conflict. As noted above, both the Chinese and 

Japanese leaderships are likely to remain focused for some time to 

come primarily on domestic issues involving economic development 

amid favorable surroundings. In these circumstances, they can ill 

afford the dangers and negative fallout that would come from an 

escalating conflict with an important neighbor. 
Both countries will continue to rely on advancing China-Japan 

economic relations as key measures in their domestic agendas focused 

on tasks of development and nation-building. Meanwhile, the United 

States and other powers in Asia will continue to seek moderation 

in Sino-Japanese tension. Whenever China or Japan take steps that 

escalate tensions, they will risk jeopardizing their influence among 

their regional colleagues and undermining this goal held important 

by leaders in both China and Japan.

The national security priorities of the PLA suggest that PLA 

leaders will remain less attentive to the economic and diplomatic 

consequences of escalating disputes in Sino-Japanese relations. 

In effect, PLA concerns will serve as a drag on efforts by Chinese 

leaders to manage relations with Japan in a businesslike and 

nonconfrontational way. They will add to the serious impediments 

burdening China’s ongoing effort to create a favorable and moderate 

image in Asia and to build an Asian order of regional cooperation 

that will help buffer China from suspected efforts by the United 

States to contain Chinese rising influence. 

So long as Sino-Japanese tension persists amid conflicting 

assessment among U.S. specialists as to the causes and seriousness of 

the tensions, there will continue to be debate on what role the United 

States should take in regards to China-Japan differences. On the one 

hand are U.S. specialists who argue that the Sino-Japanese friction 

is against U.S. interests and the United States should take concrete 

measures to reduce tensions. Such measures include U.S. efforts to 

get the Japanese prime minister to stop visiting the controversial 

Yasukuni war memorial; to persuade Japanese government officials 

to be more rigorously forthright in accepting responsibility for 

Japanese aggression in the Pacific War; and to press Chinese officials 

to curb nationalistic excesses to avoid the widespread perception 

that Beijing manipulates history and other issues to weaken Japan, 

and manage territorial and other disputes without popular violence 

and in accordance with accepted international norms. On the other, 

are U.S. specialists, including this author, who see Sino-Japanese 

relations as unlikely to deteriorate substantially, as incentives on both 

sides offset sources of recent tensions. They see U.S. intervention in 

Sino-Japanese disputes in this context as unwise and unwarranted.
1

ENDNOTES – CHAPTER 8

1. This is a revision of a paper presented at the 2005 PLA Conference 

sponsored by the Heritage Foundation and the Army War College, September 

23-25, 2005. Thanks are due to panel commentator Thomas Christensen and to the 

many participants at the conference who offered constructive comments on the 

conference paper.

2. See among others, Greg Austin and Stuart Harris, Japan and Greater China, 

Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 2001; Caroline Rose, Sino-Japanese Relations: Facing 

the Past, Looking to the Future, New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2005; Christopher 

Howe, China and Japan: History, Trends, Prospects, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 

1996; Ming Zhang and Ronald A. Montaperto, A Triad of a different Kind: The United 

States, China, and Japan, London: Macmillan Press, 1999; Asia’s Global Powers: ChinaJapan, Canberra: East Asian Analytical Unit, Government of Australia, 1996.

3. See “New Thinking on Japan,” in Peter Hays Gries, “China Eyes the 

hegemon,” Orbis, available online May 23, 2005. 

4. Mike Mochizuki, “Japan: Between Alliance and Autonomy,” in Ashley Tellis 

and Michael Wills, eds., Strategic Asia 2004-2005, Seattle WA: National Bureau 

of Asian Research, 2004, pp.103-138; Ralph Cossa and Brad Glosserman, “U.S.-

Japan Defense Cooperation: Has Japan become the Great Britain of Asia?” Pacific 

Forum CSIS, Issues and Insights, Vol. 5, No. 3, March 2005. See quarterly reviews 

of U.S.-Japan relations by Brad Glosserman in Comparative Connections, www.csis.

org/pacfor.

5. Mike Mochizuki, “Terms of Engagement: The U.S.-Japan Alliance and the 

Rise of China,” in Ellis Krauss and T. J. Pempel, eds., Beyond Bilateralism: U.S.-Japan 

Relations in the New Asia-Pacific, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004, p. 87-

114; Thomas Christensen, “Have Old Problems Trumped New Thinking? China’s 

Relations with Taiwan, Japan, and North Korea,” China Leadership Monitor, No. 

14, June 2005; “China and Japan: In the pipeline,” Economist, April 29, 2004, at 

taiwansecurity.org, May 3, 2004. See quarterly reviews of China-Japan relations by 

James Przystup in Comparative Connections, www.csis.org/pacfor.

6. Robert Marquand, “Anti-Japan Protests Jar an Uneasy Asia: Demonstrations 

Spread from Beijing to Several Southern Cities Sunday,” Christian Science Monitor, 

April 11, 2005. “Lee Kuan Yew: China Must Teach Youngsters Not to Let its Might 

Threaten Neighbors,” The Star (Malaysia), May 17, 2005 (Internet version); Eric 

Teo Chu Cheow, “Feuding Risks for East Asia,” The Japan Times, April 22, 2005, at 

taiwansecurity.org, April 25, 2005.

7. See, among others, Mike Mochizuki, “Terms of Engagement,” p. 87-114; and 

Robert Sutter, China’s Rise in Asia: Promises and Perils, Lanham MD: Rowman and 

Littlefield, 2005, p. 125-150.

8. This statement and other U.S.-Japan steps to strengthen the alliance, and 

their possible implications for China and Taiwan are reviewed in Dan Blumenthal, 

The Revival of the U.S.-Japanese Alliance, Washington, DC: American Enterprise 
Institute, Asian Outlook, February-March 2005; “China and Japan: So Hard to be 

Friends,” Economist, March 23, 2005, at Taiwansecurity.org, March 28, 2005. The 

Taiwan Foreign Minister welcomed the U.S.-Japan declaration of February 19, 

2005. “Taiwan’s MOFA Welcomes U.S.-Japan Security Statement,” Central News 

Agency, February 20, 2005 (Internet version). The Taiwan government seeks closer 

cooperation with Japan as well as the United States in their common concern about 

China’s military buildup. Interviews, Taiwan, June 2005.

9. Michael Green, “Managing Chinese Power: The View from Japan,” in 

Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert Ross, eds., Engaging China, London: Routledge, 

1999; Michael Green and Benjamin Self, “Japan’s Changing China policy: From 

Commercial Liberalism to Reluctant Realism,” Survival, Vol. 38, No. 2, Summer 

1996; Benjamin Self, “China and Japan: A Façade of Friendship,” Washington 

Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 1, Winter 2002-03, pp. 77-88. 

10. Yoichi Funabashi, “New Geopolitics Rages over Various Parts of Asia,” 

Asahi Shimbun, January 15, 2002. 

11. See, among others, Hisane Masaki, “Fresh Irritants May Still Derail SinoJapan Ties,” The Japan Times (Internet versions), March 29, 2002.

12. “Tokyo-Taipei Links ‘Good’ Despite Damning Reports,” Asia Times (internet 

version), March 29, 2002; Dan Blumenthal, The Revival of the U.S.-Japanese Alliance, 

Washington DC: American Enterprise Institute, Asian Outlook, February-March 

2005. 

13. See, for instance, S. Frederick Starr, “A strong Japanese initiative in Central 

Asia,” Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Analyst, October 20, 2004.

14. “China and Japan: So Hard to be Friends,” Economist, March 23, 2005, at 

Taiwansecurity.org, March 28, 2005. For a review and chronology of developments 

in China-Japan relations and Japan-Korea relations over the past 5 years, see 

the quarterly assessments of these respective topics in Comparative Connections, 

Honolulu: CSIS, Pacific Forum, www.csis.org/pacfor.

15. See as a particularly articulate example of this line of thinking, Yoshihisa 

Komori, “Rethinking Japan-China Relations: Beyond the History Issue,” A Paper 

presented at the Sigur Center for Asian Affairs, George Washington University, 

Washington DC, December 5, 2001.

16. For example, see Tian Peiliang, “Nationalism: China and Japan,” Foreign 

Affairs Journal, Beijing, Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs, No 63, March 

2002, pp. 63-83.

17. Benjamin Self and Michael Green are among the specialists associated 

with the view of seeing hardening, especially in Japanese policy and behavior 

toward China. See also David Fouse, “Japan’s China Debate,” Asia’s China Debate, 

Honolulu: Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies, December 2003; Yong Deng, 

“Chinese Relations with Japan,” Pacific Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 3, Autumn 1997, p. 

379; Michael Armacost and Kenneth Pyle, “Japan and the Engagement of China” 

(Seattle), NBR Analysis, Vol. 12, No. 5, 2001; Joseph Y. S. Cheng, “Sino-Japanese 
Relations in the 21st Century,” Journal of Contemporary Asia, Vol. 33, No. 2, 2003, p. 

268; Wu Xinbo, “The Security Dimension of Sino-Japanese Relations,” Asian Survey, 

Vol. 40, No. 2, March-April 2000, p. 301; Denny Roy, Stirring Samurai, Disapproving 

Dragon, Honolulu: Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies, September 2003; 

“Noted Scholar Discusses ‘New Thinking’ in Sino-Japanese Relations” (Beijing), 

Renmin Wang, January 1, 2004 (Internet version); Liu Xiaobiao, “Where are SinoJapanese Relations Heading?” (Beijing) Renmin Wang, August 13, 2003 (Internet 

version); Shi Yinhong, “On Crisis Formation, Control in Sino-Japanese Relations,” 

(Hong Kong) Wen Hui Po, June 1, 2005 (Internet version). For an assessment based 

on extensive interviews with Chinese and Japanese officials, see Robert Sutter, 

China’s Rise in Asia: Promises and Perils, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 

2005, pp. 125-150.

18. David Pilling, “China and Japan Look to Restore Relations,” Financial 

Times (Internet version), April 3, 2002; Kwan Weng Kim, “China-Japan Ties Lack 

Spontaneity,” Straits Times (Internet version); April 5, 2002; Robert Sutter, “ChinaJapan: Trouble ahead?” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 4, pp. 37-49; Mike 

Mochizuki, “Terms of Engagement,” pp. 96-100; Ma Licheng, “New Thoughts for 

China-Japan Relations” (Beijing), Zhanlue yu guanli, December 1, 2002, pp. 41-47.

19. James Przystup, “Progressing But Still Facing History,” Comparative 

Connections, October 1999, www.csis.org/pacfor.

20. James Przystup, “Political Breakthrough and the SARs Outbreak,” 

Comparative Connections, July 2003; James Przystup, “Cross Currents,” Comparative 

Connections, April 2003; James Przystup, “Congratulations, Concern, Competition, 

and Cooperation,” Comparative Connections, January 2003.

21. “Japan’s PM Koizumi Continues High-Profile Diplomacy Challenged by 

China,” Agence France Presse, May 8, 2005, at taiwansecurity.org.

22. Thomas Christensen, “Have Old Problems Trumped New Thinking? 

China’s Relations with Taiwan, Japan, and North Korea,” China Leadership Monitor, 

No. 14, June 2005; James Przystup, “China-Japan: No End to History,” Comparative 

Connections, July 2005. 

23. James Przystup, “Japan-China: Summer Calm,” Comparative Connections, 

October 2005.

24. “Japan’s PM Koizumi Continues High-Profile Diplomacy Challenged by 

China,” Agence France Presse, May 8, 2005, at taiwansecurity.org.

25. “Hu’s Points Show Way for Sino-Japan Ties,” China Daily, June 21, 2005, at 

taiwansecurity.org.

26. Norimitsu Onishi, “Koizumi Provokes Anger Around Asia,” New York 

Times, October 17, 2005 (Internet version).

27. China’s National Defense in 2004 published by the PRC State Council’s 

Information Office and released on December 27, 2004 is available at www.fas.org/

nuke/guide/china/doctrine/natdef2004.html.
28. China’s National Defense in 2002 published by the PRC State Council’s 

Information Office and released on December 9, 2002 is available at english1.people.

com.cn/features/ndpaper2002/nd.html.

29. Chinese and Japanese Foreign Ministry officials meet at the vice ministerial 

level to deal with various issues in relations. Some military contacts also continue, 

though at a level lower than Chinese military contacts with other neighbors.

30. David Shambaugh, “China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order,” 

International Security, Vol. 29, No. 3, Winter 2004-05, pp. 64-99.

31. The concept of soft power, as distinct from hard power involving military, 

economic, or political pressure and persuasion, refers to nations getting what they 

want in international affairs through attraction rather than coercion, especially the 

attractiveness of a country’s culture and ideas. Joseph Nye, Soft Power: The Means to 

Success in World Politics, New York: Public Affairs, 2004; Yoichi Funabashi, “China’s 

‘Peaceful Ascendancy,’” Yaleglobal, December 19, 2003, at www.taiwansecurity.org; 

Willy Wo-Lap Lam, “China aiming for ‘peaceful rise,’” CNN.com, February 3, 

2004; Speech by Premier Wen Jiabao in New York City, December 9, 2003, www.

fmprc.gov.cn (accessed December 20, 2003); Fu Mengzi, “China’s Development and 

Security Concept,” Beijing Review, June 9, 2005, p. 18-19; “No Anti-U.S. Plan in Asia: 

China,” Reuters, June 18, 2005 (report of speech at Brookings Institution of Zheng 

Bijian, at Taiwansecurity.org); David Sands, “Military Strategy ‘Defensive,’ Envoy 

Insists,” Washington Times, June 29, 2005 (at taiwansecurity.org, July 9, 2005).

32. Zheng Bijian, “China’s ‘Peaceful Rise’ to Great-Power Status,” Foreign 

Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 5, September/October 2005, pp. 18-24.

33. Sutter, China’s Rise in Asia.

34. “U.S. Proposes Talks with Japan Over Taiwan Strait Contingencies,” Kyodo, 

December 14, 2004 (Internet version); Dan Blumenthal, The Revival of the U.S.-

Japanese Alliance, Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, Asian Outlook, 

February-March 2005, pp. 3-5.

35. “China Shocked by Japanese Foreign Minister’s Comment on Taiwan, Says 

Spokesman,” Xinhua, May 4, 2005; “Taiwan Covered in Japan-U.S. Security Pact: 

Machimura,” Asahi Shimbun, April 30, 2005, p. 3.

36. “Retired Japanese Officers Advised Taiwan Navy on Mine Warfare,” AFP, 

April 26, 2005 (Internet version); “Troop Relocation Difficult; U.S. Says Okinawa 

Marines Serve to Deter China-Taiwan Crisis,” Yomiuri Shimbun, June 30, 2005.

37. “Japanese PM: [Anti-Secession Law] Will Bring Negative Influence on 

Cross-Strait Ties,” United Daily News, March 15, 2005 (Internet version). 

38. Reviewed in James Przystup’s quarterly assessments of Sino-Japanese 

relations in Comparative Connections. See also Dan Blumenthal, The Revival of the 

U.S.-Japanese Alliance Washington DC: American Enterprise Institute, Asian 

Outlook, February-March 2005, pp. 3-5.

39. “China Lodges Solemn Representations to Japan’s Approval of Oil, Gas 

Drilling,” People’s Daily online, July 15, 2005.
40. Yoichi Funabashi, “Maintain the Armitage Doctrine Quietly,” Asahi Shimbun, 

February 10, 2004.

41. “Japan and China Dispute a Pacific Islet,” New York Times, July 11, 2005.

42. “Why Does U.S. Preach ‘China Military Threat’?” People’s Daily, June 20, 

2005, at taiwansecurity.org; “Sino-Japanese Relations Under the ‘New U.S.-Japan 

Security Alliance’,” People’s Daily online, March 1, 2005; Blumenthal, Revival, p. 4.

43. Ann Scott Tyson, “U.S. Missile Defense Being Expanded, General Says,” 

Washington Post, July 22, 2005, p. A10. “Japan Faces $545 Million Tab for Interceptor,” 

Yomiuri Shimbun, June 20, 2005.

44. “China Criticizes Japan’s New Defense Guidelines,” Associated Press, 

December 12, 2004, at taiwansecurity.org.

45. “Secretary Condoleezza Rice En Route to Tokyo, Japan,” On-the-record 

Briefing, March 17, 2005, at www.state.gov/secretary/; “Interview with Former U.S. 

Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage,” Toyko Chuo Koron, May 2005, pp. 

194-203.

46. “Japanese Request that Israel Suspend Arms Sales to East Asia, www.haaretz.

com, January 17, 2005; “Japanese Prime Minister Urges EU to Keep Arms Embargo 

on China,” Agence France Presse, May 2, 2005. 

47. “China Urged to be More Open on Defense,” Associated Press, June 4, 

2005, at taiwansecurity.org, June 12, 2005; “White Paper Focuses on Chinese Navy,” 

Yomiuri Shimbun, July 4, 2005; “Japan’s White Paper Adds Chill to China Ties,” 

China Daily, July 5, 2005.

48. This section benefited from the lively discussion among specialists at the 

September conference where this paper was presented, as well as subsequent 

conferences dealing with China and Japan, notably “U.S.-China Relations: Key 

Issues and Prospects,” sponsored by the DACOR Bacon House Foundation and 

the China Policy Program at the Elliott School, George Washington University, 

October 28, 2005. 
PART IV

SOUTH AND SOUTHEAST ASIA

CHAPTER 9

THE CHINESE MILITARY EYES SOUTH ASIA

Srikanth Kondapalli1

Introduction.

The South Asian region—bordering on Central Asia in the north, 

adjoining the Middle East in the west, and controlling the Indian Ocean 

to the south—is in a very important strategic position, while India is 

deservedly South Asia’s top power—whether in terms of territorial 

area, human resources, scientific and technological capabilities, military 

strength, or economic strength.2

South Asia has not been the principal focus of China’s attention 

over the last 5 decades. This is not to say that it has been overlooked: 

China fought a war with India in 1962, assisted Bangladesh and 

Pakistan in their sovereignty efforts, and has been a major military 

and foreign assistance supplier to both of the latter countries. The 

People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was a major actor in all of these 

matters. However, the PLA’s attention in the recent period generally 

has been on the eastern seaboard of the country, specifically towards 

Taiwan, Japan, Korea, and the South China Sea. The Soviet Union 

and its successor states, including Russia, also have drawn strong 

attention from China. 

In interpreting the PLA’s perspectives on South Asia, Chinese 

scholarship has reflected on the major problems between the 

two countries, such as the Tibet issue, the 1962 war, and relative 

configurations of power in Asia. Scholars in China also have explored 

the three major problems in India-China relations: the border dispute, 

the Tibetan issue, and China-Pakistan relations.3 Yang Pingxue 

believes that the root of many of the India-China border problems, 

including Pakistan and Bangladesh, are a consequence of India’s 

inheriting British colonial security policies.4
Reviewing the Literature on India-China Relations.

Many Indian Army officers assess China’s basic approach as one 

with an objective of the “marginalization” of India. For instance, 

Sahgal argued that the PLA is “creating a ring of anti-India influences 

aimed at the strategic marginalization of India” and “leveraging the 

strategic configuration of power to its advantage, in South Asia.”5

Pravin Sawhney has argued that Chinese military deployments 

and preparations pose a threat to India.6 Other scholars outside the 

region view the PLA’s perspectives on India as a part of its strategic 

encirclement.7 For Mohan Mallik, continuing Chinese strategic 

weapons proliferation to Pakistan is intended against India.8 For 

Valerie Niquet, 

Even though tactically Beijing acknowledges the demographic 

importance and the cultural prestige of India, it is not ready to share its 

supremacy, strategic and economic, with its Asian neighbour. Like the 

Sino-Japanese relations, the Sino-Indian equation hinges on the scope of 

China’s ambitions, the nature of the Beijing regime, and the overall issue 

of leadership in Asia.9

John W. Garver, a prominent American scholar on Sino-Indian 

relations, has argued that China systematically has downplayed 

perceptions of a threat from India in its media coverage in the recent 

period.10 Mark W. Frazier viewed Chinese and Indian military and 

security establishments at a crucial juncture in the post-1998 period. 

In contrast to the civilian leaderships’ broad agenda of joining 

globalization and reform process, according to Frazier, the military 

constituents are protectionist “statist” in their agenda.11

Andrew Scobell has argued that the subject must be understood 

in terms of Chinese strategic culture, influenced, as it were, by the 

Confucian tradition and the thinking of the military scholar, Sun Zi. 

The resulting strategic culture combines traditions of pacifism and 

realpolitik in its notions of security. A negative image was portrayed 

by the Chinese military leaders about India, given the overall 

threat perceptions of the Chinese leadership about its neighbouring 

countries. Tracing Tibet as a crucial issue in this milieu, Scobell argued 

that China and India are likely to witness “simmering tensions” in 

their relations.12
Michael Pillsbury looks at China’s assessment of its own 

“comprehensive national power” and the strategic outlook vis-àvis India and Japan. While India’s comprehensive national power is 

not yet a match to China’s, Pillsbury identifies and analyses several 

Chinese military and civilian perceptions of a rising India that could 

challenge China in military and economic terms. The greatest concern 

in the Chinese publications reviewed by Pillsbury was in the sphere 

of maritime power.13

From China’s perspective, India’s actions on Tibet are seen as 

critical issues affecting China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, 

while India’s 1998 nuclear tests were only a threat to its national 

security.14 China is sensitive to its sovereign claims in Tibet and hence 

waged war against India in 1962.15 For Xia Liping, 1962 was “not a 

purely military action, but a complicated political, diplomatic, and 

military war.” The main objective of the Chinese government was 

“not to recover the territory, but to wipe out more Indian effective 

strength so as to give more serious lessons to Indian Army.” The 

purpose here was “to shatter the attack by Indian troops, hit their 

arrogance, and give serious lesson to Indian Government.”16 The 

hostilities between China and India also drove China to change 

its nuclear nonproliferation policies and help Pakistan develop 

a nuclear capability. According to John Garver, helping Pakistan 

against Indian domination is a way to enhance Chinese security. 

While China’s response to Indian nuclear tests in 1974 was low key, 

its response to the 1998 tests was “strident.”17

Chinese military action in the 1962 events were termed by Larry 

M. Wortzel as reflective of the PLA’s “good strategy and strong 

initiative in campaign art,” and he attributed its success to “a 

combination of audacious action on the battlefield, good leadership, 

taking advantage of the terrain, good logistics, and strong ideological 

preparation.”18 Several of these themes of the recent period shall be 

analysed below.

Determinants.

The major determinants in the PLA’s considerations on 

South Asia are the structural and dynamic aspects of the security 

environment in the region and how this regional environment fits 
20

into the international security situation. PLA scholars and analysts 

recognize that the domain of policy perspectives on South Asian 

countries is principally that of the foreign ministry. The Ministry 

of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Asian Affairs Department is tasked to 

manage China’s relations with South Asia. On strategic matters, the 

MFA Arms Control and Disarmament Department has the principal 

role in formulating policy. Its actions became more focused after the 

1998 Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests. China’s foreign policy goals 

were to “cap, roll back, and eliminate nuclear weapons” in South 

Asia (United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution #1172). 

Notwithstanding the MFA’s lead on policy, the Chinese military 

also has a major say in deciding about China’s equations with this 

region. The PLA’s participation in the foreign affairs of the country is 

done through a structured process in the Chinese Communist Party’s 

(CCP) Foreign Affairs Small Leadership Group. This is headed by Hu 

Jintao, who is also the chairman of the Central Military Commission 

(CMC). In addition to Hu, the PLA is represented in this body by 

the Minister of National Defense, also a CMC member.19 The CMC 

receives feedback from various defense personnel stationed abroad 

and from strategic think tanks, associated with the Academy of 

Military Science (AMS), National Defense University (NDU), and 

other PLA bodies; PLA newspaper articles; and security analysts’ 

views. This input goes to all of the CMC leaders. The PLA General 

Staff Department Overseas Foreign Intelligence Gathering and 

Assessment and Foreign Affairs Section also provides input to 

the military leadership through its branch devoted to South Asian 

affairs.20

Another major factor in security relations between China and the 

countries in South Asia is the PLA presence in contiguous provinces 

in China. Chinese troops are present in Tibet Military District, frontier 

guards and other policing units, Chengdu Military Region (MR), 

and Lanzhou MR certainly are considered in the decisionmaking 

process on issues related to India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Nepal. 

However, it is difficult to know the extent to which the views of PLA 

leaders in contiguous areas are solicited formally. 

There are divergent views between the foreign ministry and the 

PLA on several issues relating to South Asia, especially on border 

dispute resolution, nuclear issues, and Indo-Pakistan balancing 
2

strategy. Charged with national defense, the PLA often has been 

less willing to compromise on Chinese territorial claims with the 

neighbouring countries. It has been overtly sensitive on issues related 

to sovereignty aspects. 

A major difference between PLA and the civilian leadership 

perspectives on the region is that, while China’s civilian leaders are 

critical of U.S. hegemony, they have been relatively silent on how 

India should fit into a multipolar world. In contrast, in the past 4 

decades, the PLA has been critical of “Indian hegemony” in South 

Asia. Even while willing to enhance confidence-building measures 

(CBMs), PLA assessments constituents still express concern about 

Indian hegemony in South Asia. 

While the PLA may focus on security threats in the region, 

China’s civilian leadership works toward economic development and 

trade, seeking a relatively peaceful environment. Hence the civilian 

leadership is more willing than PLA leaders to explore cooperation 

with India in the World Trade Organization and develop more 

nuanced strategic relations with Russia and India. These divergent 

views blended together in the agenda of the 16th Communist Party 

Congress with its focus on creating a peaceful environment for the 

next 2 decades even as the country explores the need to resolve the 

Taiwan issue.

Beijing’s “Western Development Strategy” also affects how 

China handles security and economic relations with South Asia. The 

success of the “Western Development” campaign is crucial to China’s 

balanced geographical development as well as domestic security. It 

affects the level of Beijing’s control over west and southwest China.21

The 10th five-year plan (2001-05) envisages about 70 major projects 

for Xinjiang involving an expenditure of several billion. A stable 

environment across its western and southwestern borders would 

not only lead to security in Xinjiang and other regions, but also 

focus on economic development. In the post-September 11, 2001, 

counterterror environment and given the festering of the Xinjiang 

Uighur “separatist” movement, China is poised to take more than 

a cursory interest in this region.22 This factor is significant because 

a crucial actor in implementing the western development campaign 

is the PLA, or paramilitary units, or those PLA units now integrated 

into the civilian sectors like the engineering corps or construction 

corps. 
2

PLA Deployments and Relative Capabilities.

The PLA pays close attention to the relative force levels in South 

Asia. The naval visits Beijing conducted to Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, 

and Pakistan in late 1985 and early 1986 are examples of how China 

manages security relations in the region. Indian military operations 

in controlling Siachen Glacier in the early 1980s were viewed with 

concern by the Chinese military for their possible impact on military 

operations in Tibet and Xinjiang. The Indian joint military exercise, 

Operation CHECKERBOARD, conducted in the late 1980s, appears 

to have raised Chinese concerns. The PLA paid particular attention 

to the kill ratio in the exercise, which showed a strong Indian military 

response.23 By the 1990s, the PLA had strengthened its presence in 

the region, and the recent 2004 White Paper of the PLA discusses 

the enhancement in the revolution in military affairs potential of 

surrounding countries, probably including India. These have again 

led to a reevaluation on the part of the PLA to support other South 

Asian countries militarily.

Overall, China has about 400,000 troops from four corps (group 

armies) and eight to ten independent divisions and brigades in the 

Chengdu and Lanzhou MRs.24 India has deployed four army corps 

in areas contiguous to China or as their operational focus, a total 

of about 235,000 troops. These include the 14th Corps at Tezpur in 

Assam, the 3rd Corps at Rangapahar (Dimapur) in Nagaland, and 

the 33rd Corps at Siliguri in West Bengal. There are also 10 mountain 

infantry divisions and engineering and medical units.25

The Chinese Air Force has about 300 J-7 II, J-6, and Q-5 aircraft 

in the South Asia region.26 In addition, the Su-27s, Su-30s, and J-8IIs 

may be pressed for air support duties. The Indian Air force (IAF) 

has a total of about 1,400 aircraft in its active inventory deployed in 

five air commands, three of which have a direct operational focus on 

China. India probably has the qualitative advantage in the air. 

The entry of Su-30 fighters in the Indian inventory was seen as 

threatening the security of China’s south-western region. One Chinese 

writer identified three main problems with the Su-30MKI: the need 

to achieve air domination [duoquan zhikongquan]; an increase in the 

threat of air warfare in the southwest; and the difficulty in supporting 
2

ground troops.27 About 15 airfields in and around Tibet are in the 

western sector: Kashgar, Yarkhand, and Khotan; the central sector: 

Hoping, Gonga Dzong, Donshoon, and Nagchuka; and the eastern 

sector: Gormo, Jeykundo, Chengdu, Kantzu, Bangda, Kunming, 

Paoshan, and Mangshi.28 These airfields can accommodate up to a 

maximum of 15 fighter squadrons and 12 bomber squadrons. 

China’s strategic weapons capabilities surpass those of India.29

According to Vijai K. Nair, citing U.S. Air Force National Intelligence 

Center’s declassified documents and Russian reports, China has been 

upgrading its nuclear and ballistic missiles to target India. Not only 

are the numbers of CSS-2 missiles at the 53rd Army at Jianshui, with 

a range of 3,100 km, not changed, but the crew training program at 

Kunming training area is being enhanced, in addition to the probable 

replacement of CSS-2 by CSS-5 Mod#1. Large-scale training activities 

were reported from Datong field garrison, Haiyan training facility in 

the 56th Army (with missile bases at Da Qaidam, Delingha, and Xiao 

Qaidam). The interconnecting communications among the missile 

bases from Jianshui-Kunming-Yunan-Chengdu-Lhasa-HaiyanDatong are being upgraded for faster mobility.30 Additionally, the 

U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) estimates that China has been 

producing about 60 missiles a year for operations against Taiwan for 

which it reportedly has deployed about 400 short and medium range 

missiles. If the Taiwan issue is resolved, it is likely that at least some 

of these could be shifted to the Indian front.

F China, with its railway line construction activity, road-building 

and airfield expansion, also has been improving its logistical 

capabilities. Nonetheless, in 1988, for instance, it was estimated that 

the Indian armed forces had an edge over China in Tibet in terms of 

logistics. India also has better road and rail communications to the 

border areas.31

In terms of military capabilities, several outcomes are possible. 

Depending on the “resolution of the Taiwan issue,” Chinese military 

deployments could be altered in the southwest portions of China. 

While the PLA may not be adept in simultaneously waging twotheater warfare—say on Taiwan and India—it has shown flexibility 

and agility in coping with challenges at multitheater levels. For 

instance, in 1962, soon after operations on the Taiwan front, the PLA 

shifted troops to the India front. However, it would be difficult for 
2

the PLA to deploy more than half of its field divisions on the Indian 

front in the current scenario, even though it has improved military 

logistics in the India-China border areas. 

Donald Goel estimated that in terms of tanks; air force; command, 

control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance (C4ISR); and troop transportation, India leads, while 

China has an edge in the areas of ground-to-ground missiles and 

heavy caliber artillery. The Indian lead in ground force air defense 

systems is traced to 50 SA-11s, while China has 8 SA-10 launch 

systems. The Chinese disadvantage in this field may be overcome 

with their acquisition of HQ-7, FM-90, FT-2000, and LY-60 in the short 

to medium term. Goel estimated that the IAF can employ 80 percent 

of its fighter bombers (about 280 planes, with a maximum of 500) 

capable of dropping 1,500 tons of bombs in the first air attack. This is 

estimated to be double the Chinese air force capability. The air war 

may include about 300 Indian fighters pitched against about 200 that 

China can deploy. Indian frontline airfield availability may prove to 

be advantageous in terms of weapon/troop load capability.32

Andrei Pinkov’s assessment of the Chinese military view of 

future campaigns against India is as follows:

• The enemy (a synonym for India) that has hi-tech weapons 

and equipment will conduct a large-scale invasion of some 

Chinese territory;

• An operational force with certain hi-tech weapons and 

equipment will be organized and put into operation for the 

purpose of counterattacks; 

• The campaign actions will include the defense, commitment 

of reserves, and initiation of the counterattack. Most of the 

time for this action is spent outside of the boundary line; 

• Hi-tech weapons and equipment will be brought into full play, 

especially tactical missile troops (ground-to-ground missiles); 

and, 

• The firepower should be combined organically. As to the form 

of combat, all the firepower should be combined, including 

short-range fires, light cannon fire, air attack, tactical missiles 

(ground-to-ground missiles), and surprise attack by non-lineof-sight long-range artillery.33
2

Chinese security concerns in the naval and nuclear fields are 

related to the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace of the 1970s after the 

U.S. bases in Diego Garcia came into being, and the 1974 South 

Asian Nuclear Free Zone proposals.34 Indian naval modernization 

and ballistic missile deployments evoked concern among the PLA, 

specifically as these have potential implications for China’s energy 

security in the Indian Ocean. These will be elaborated on below.

India.

Despite the general opinion that the PLA has not focused much 

on India, an elaborate list below indicates its major appraisals and 

reappraisals. These are concerned with the PLA’s views on Indian 

defense policies, defense budgetary allocations, troop deployments, 

intentions, the emerging cooperation between the United States 

and India and the like. The three main basic goals of Indian defense 

policy, according to World Military Yearbook of 2001, are:

dominate South Asia [chengba nanya], 

• control the Indian Ocean [kongzhi yindu yang], 

• strive to be a world class military power [zheng dang shijie yiliu 

junshi qiangguo].

The Yearbook further noted that, in order to pursue “great power 

diplomacy,” India has: 

• actively competed with regional militaries, and actively 

developed its strength to influence security aspects of the 

world and the Asia-Pacific region. 

• carried out “minimum credible nuclear deterrence” to contend 

with China and deter Pakistan, intended to extend India’s 

second-strike capability in the Indian Ocean so as to check 

U.S. influence.

• insisted that its defense buildup is linked to economic growth 

but has enhanced its defense budget, dual-use technologies, 

information technology (IT), nuclear energy, and aerospace 

capabilities. 

• took the policy of hi-tech weaponry as the core principle in 

building technology intensive armed forces.
2

• ensured overwhelming military superiority along its borders 

with Pakistan for the security of Kashmir.

• enlarged its influence in the Indian Ocean, made preparations 

to enter the South China Sea, and made efforts to conduct 

exercises with the Japanese, Vietnamese, and South Korean 

navies.

Further, the Yearbook mentioned Indian: 

• defense strategy as “regional deterrence” [diqu weishe]; 

• strategic objectives as dominating South Asia, containing 

[ezhi] China, controlling the Indian Ocean, and becoming a 

great military power;

• strategic policy of waging limited hi-tech war under nuclear 

deterrence conditions and preparing for changes from one 

theater to multiple theaters;

• strategic objectives: consider Pakistan and China as two 

adversaries [duishou]; possess overwhelming superiority 

over Pakistan and force it to vacate occupied territory; regard 

China as a potential threat; do not give up on China’s “vested 

interest”; seek an opportunity to expand; control South 

Asia through diplomatic, military, economic, and nuclear 

deterrence; control the areas from the Arabian Sea to the South 

China Sea; and develop military cooperation arrangements 

with Southeast Asian countries.

• Current Indian military operational concepts are: the basic 

purpose of war is to eliminate the enemy’s war fighting 

ability, attack must be combined with defense, limited war is 

to be waged under hi-tech conditions, with dozens of nuclear 

strikes. The basic themes of these ideas are: emphatic offensive 

battles; first strikes; crossing the boundary; extending damage 

into enemy territory; fully implementing three-dimensional 

war through attack in depth and defense; placing the emphasis 

on flexible battles, combined operations, and the role of the 

air force; focus on coordinated air-land battle; emphasis on 

the concentration of absolute military strength in one major 

direction; seeking quick resolution; paying attention to the 
2

role of electronic war, deception, electronic countermeasures, 

and concealment of operational intentions; and the efficient 

conduct of operational command.35

The above long citation is a dominant theme of the PLA and 

is reflected and reproduced in several forms. These have not only 

influenced the subsequent PLA discourse but also the views of 

Chinese scholars studying the region. Despite the launching of a 

“constructive cooperative partnership” (xing he zuo huo ban guanxi) 

during Jiang Zemin’s visit to New Delhi in 1996 and the gradual 

normalization of relations between the two countries, the PLA 

continues to sport such views. For instance, according to the PLA 

paper:

Since the 80s, India started pursuing a policy of “regional deterrence” and 

a military strategy aimed at seeking a strong military . . . consolidating 

[its] gains, containing China and deterring Pakistan, controlling weak 

and small neighbors, and intercepting big power penetration outside 

the region, thereby clearing hurdles in its path towards becoming a 

world power. Indian armed forces development took a path of attaining 

regional military superiority, importing and incorporating advanced 

weapons technology, spending on indigenous production, and speeding 

up weapons modernization.36

The Indian Defense Ministry’s annual report mentioning that 

there is a huge imbalance in Chinese and Indian nuclear power and 

that several Indian cities are within Chinese nuclear range was termed 

the “spread of sheer fallacy.” China’s strategic weapons transfers 

to Pakistan were dismissed as “fabricating rumors out of thin air.” 

The citing of a “China threat” by Indians to further their defense 

modernization, specifically their strategic weapons program, was 

termed as holding a “shield.” A commentator, writing in the PLA 

Daily, wondered: 

How could one win the trust of others if he seeks to benefit himself at 

others’ expense? The Chinese people wish those people in India who are 

eager to advertise the “theory of China threat” could really proceed from 

the interests of the Chinese and Indian people to say more things favorable 

to their interests and do more things beneficial to the two countries so as 

to promote a sound and steady development of the relations between 

China and India.37
2

Yan Liwei argued that India playing a greater role from the 

Persian Gulf to the Strait of Malacca “is bound to further push India 

and Pakistan to the brink of war.” Commenting that Indian political 

leaders are whipping up a war frenzy against Pakistan after the 

Kaluchak attack by terrorists in Jammu and Kashmir, Yan argued 

that: 

. . . Pakistan reiterated to the international community through various 

ways that it has always upheld the stance of cracking down on terrorism, 

and the activities of the Muslim militia in Kashmir are “freedom and 

democracy” activities and should be distinguished from terrorist 

organizations. In order to prevent India from profiting, after weighing 

up the pros and cons the Pakistani Government did not shrink from 

deciding to cooperate with the United States in the face of strong domestic 

pressure, thus easing the pressure from the United States. 38

India’s entry into the Central Asian arena was viewed with 

caution by a military journal. Four main factors were mentioned as 

to why India has embarked on linking with the Central Asian region: 

contain [ezhi] Pakistan; protect energy security; combat terrorism; 

and pin down China’s development [qianzhi Zhongguo fazhan].39

Nuclear Tests and China’s Response.

The Indian nuclear tests of 1998 evoked a sharp response from 

China. This is natural, given the strategic importance of this event 

to the Asian balance of power, with China as the sole declared 

nuclear power in Asia. Indeed, the shrill Chinese tone against India 

peaked, with reports that then CMC Chairman Jiang Zemin hardly 

slept during the night India tested its nuclear weapons.40 Several 

comments in this regard are set forth below.

According to Cheng Ruisheng, speaking to the Liberation Army 

Daily, which started a special column on experts’ opinions on Indian 

nuclear tests,

. . . the main reason for this is that the Indian authorities, foreseeing 

that India’s nuclear tests would evoke strong condemnation in the 

international community, had to find an excuse that could confuse world 

opinion to reduce the pressure from the international community. The 

“China threat theory,” which still enjoys some support in the international 
2

community, came in handy as a “shield.” Viewed at a deeper level, this 

incident shows that a handful of people in India still harbor hostile 

sentiment toward China, despite the fact that the constant improvement 

of Sino-Indian relations over the years is moving gradually to eliminate 

the shadow of the 1962 Sino-Indian border conflict.41

A May 20, 1998, an article in the PLA Daily criticized the Indian 

nuclear tests, commenting that:

Since independence, India has pursued a military expansionist line. After 

50 years of development, it now has a strong military that is the world’s 

fourth largest. While other countries have capitalized on the opportunity 

arising from the end of the Cold War to develop their economies, India has 

intensified its efforts to build up its military and make war preparations. 

Since the beginning of the nineties, its military spending has grown 

continuously and has remained fairly high. . . . India has always viewed 

China and Pakistan as its biggest threat, thinking that it could rival China 

and Pakistan and consolidate its hegemonic status in South Asia only if it 

developed nuclear weapons.42

Another article in the PLA Daily published on the same day 

stated: 

The Indian authorities have engaged in double-dealing, calling loudly 

for nuclear disarmament while quietly implementing a nuclear weapons 

plan. They also have intentionally orchestrated a clumsy show of 

recrimination, with key Indian Government officials openly dishing 

up “the China threat theory” with the aim of finding an excuse for its 

nuclear weapons development and diverting attention. . . . History has 

proved and will continue to prove that any country that vainly hopes to 

dominate the world or a region will end up lifting a rock only to drop it 

on its own toes.43

The PLA Daily articles criticized the Indian nuclear tests for 

going against the “current international trend” and destabilising 

regional and world peace. While it was silent on the Chinese and 

French nuclear tests of 1996, the article criticized the Indian leaders’ 

quest since independence to become a global power and charged 

that all successive leaderships have taken active steps in developing 

nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities.44 Yet another writer viewed 

the 1998 nuclear tests as India seeking hegemony over South 

Asia.45 According to a Chinese radio bulletin, acquisition of nuclear 
2

weapons in 1998 was a part of India’s desire “to establish its regional 

supremacy status in sub-continental South Asia.”46 Cao Yongshang 

and Xu Yong, after mentioning that India is developing a nuclear 

deterrent policy, conducted successive long-range ballistic missile 

tests in April 1999 and January 2001, enhanced its conventional 

military capabilities, and established a joint command facility in 

the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, opined that “Through an active 

and flexible diplomatic policy, India has won relatively widespread 

strategic room and interests, and is stepping closer to the goal of 

being a military and political superpower in the 21st century.47

Recent Chinese assessments note a growth in the Indian 

national defensive power in the last few decades. Hu Angang and 

Liu Taoxing, for instance, argued that Indian military power has 

increased, especially between 1980 and 2000.48 While reflecting on 

the growing interactions between India and major powers, especially 

with the United States and Russia, and acquisitions from Israel, Liu 

Siyuan argued that, while India acquired more than 70 percent of its 

inventory from Russia in the fields of ground, air, and naval fields, 

it also is, in the recent period, acquiring several weapons/weapon 

systems from Israel, with the U.S. blessing to become a great military 

power.49

Other Strategic Issues.

It is not only on the nuclear issue that the PLA’s views on India 

have hardened. There are other issues as well that exhibited an 

inveterate animosity between the two countries. According to Zhang 

Wenmu, “. . . the concept of the ‘big power’ of India should imply the 

historical concept that brings Pakistan, Bangladesh, Chinese Tibet, 

and all countries along the coast of the Indian Ocean into the Indiacontrolled ‘federation’.” Zhang equated Nehru’s political agenda 

with that of the Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP) views about “greater 

India.” Identifying two regions as the security focus of India, the 

northern (Pakistan-Tibet-Bangladesh regions) and southern (Indian 

Ocean) regions, Zhang argued that India has a program to make Tibet 

an independent region in order to eliminate the threat emanating 

from China, which is viewed purely as a geographic threat. He 
further stated that the “deeper meaning of that statement [by George 

Fernandes in 1998] is that China is the “biggest” obstacle to India’s 

pursuit of hegemony in South Asia and that China’s capability 

to resist Indian hegemonism in South Asia is greater than that of 

Pakistan.”50

According to Jian Hua, India is not satisfied with being a South 

Asian power but has been:

. . . ambitiously preparing to dash out of the Indian Ocean and march 

toward the whole world. In addition to its nuclear deterrent, India has 

formulated a military strategy of “guarding against China in the north, 

attaching Pakistan in the West, occupying the Indian Ocean in the south, 

and expanding the scope of its influence in the East.” In this extremely 

ambitious strategy, the “eastward expansion” is a very important link. Its 

nucleus is to expand the scope of its influence and activities to the South 

China Sea and part of the Pacific Region.51

Wang Tao, reflecting on the Indian defense allocations to several 

top of the line weapon systems from Russia, France, Israel and 

the United States, stated “India’s continuous engagement in arms 

expansion under the present high-tension situation of the southern 

Asian regions is a very risky move, because the ‘erroneous message 

that such a move has helped to relay’ will definitely give rise to an 

increasingly fierce arms race in these regions.”52

Wang Ming argued that in order to control the Indian Ocean and 

compete to become a big power in the world, India has embarked on 

a military modernization program. Wang pointed to Indian plans 

to become a “futuristic military” by increasing the technical arms of 

the services; transforming the Army into a “strategic strike service”; 

raising its three-dimensional operational ability; acquiring 400 T90 tanks from Russia; acquiring 24 attack submarines, 200 extra 

warships, and 3 aircraft carriers, long-range air lift capabilities, air 

refuelling, and airborne warning and control systems (AWACS); 

increasing its air fighting detachments from 39 to 55; procuring 190 

Su-30 aircraft from Russia and 126 F-16 or F-18 aircraft from the United 

States; enhancing its strategic bomber, strategic reconnaissance, 

and strategic transport aircraft; and ensuring its ability to conduct 

reliable and effective strategic nuclear strikes.53 Wang and Yan 

identified four commando units as the special operation forces in 
the Indian military. Numbering a total of 20,000, these forces are 

variously tasked for para-dropping, assault operations, amphibious 

operations, and counterterrorism.54

Nie Yun has mentioned that the Indian Army plans to increase 

its special operation forces from the current level of 5,000 to about 

20,000 to gear up for the higher responsibilities that would be 

bestowed on India after it becomes a permanent member of the UN 

Security Council. Nie stated that the Indian Army has been training 

several such forces at a secret base and has plans to acquire digital 

battlefield equipment, global positioning systems (GPS), night vision 

equipment, etc.55 Li Lin has argued that the Indian ground forces 

have embarked on a hi-tech modernization program for its tanks; 

armored personnel carriers; self-propelled artillery; and Prithvi, 

Agni, and Surya series of missiles and have allocated several billion 

dollars for the period 2001-15 in order to “seek hegemony” [changba] 

in South Asia.56

On the Indian Navy, PLA writers mention its impact on the Indian 

Ocean. While former PLA General Logistics Department (GLD) 

director Zhao Nanqi observed in the early 1990s that the Indian 

Ocean is not India’s ocean, others have pointed out its impact on 

the energy security of China in the event of a war between the two 

countries. The key here is the power projection capability of the Indian 

Navy. An Binggong reported that India launched an indigenous 

aircraft carrier program in May 2005 at Cochin Shipyard, making it 

the fifth country in the world having this technological ability. The 

ship, to enter service in 2012, is 252 meters wide, has about a 37,500 

ton displacement, can carry 30 aircraft, and is to cost about $1 billion.57

According to Jiang Nan, in the last 50 years of naval ship-building 

and operational activity, India has achieved several landmarks.58

Li Jie focused on Indian efforts in acquiring nuclear submarines.59

Another writer underlined the growth of the Indian Navy, especially 

its modern destroyer program, and termed it as a “specter” [youling] 

for the Indian Ocean.60 While the IAF reportedly has pressed into 

service Israeli-made Heron and Searcher -2 unmanned aerial vehicles 

(UAV) on the Pakistan and China borders for surveillance and 

reconnaissance purposes, the Indian Navy reportedly is preparing 

to form a UAV base in the eastern Andaman and Nicobar Islands 
to counter Chinese installations on the Myanmar-held Great Coco 

Islands.61 Citing Indian naval plans to acquire warships, submarines, 

aircraft, and UAVs, a PLA writer argued that this reflects the Indian 

desire to control the Indian Ocean region. He said: 

For a long period of time, India has regarded the Indian Ocean as an 

“ocean of destiny” and an “ocean of the future” and strived to turn it into 

an “ocean of India.” With the guidance of the strategic idea of “looking 

east, going out from the west, and going south,” India has had an ever 

increasing desire to become a maritime military power. Since the 1990s, 

India has stepped up implementing the “Indian Ocean control strategy” 

and the “blue water project” to enhance its Navy’s maritime attack 

capability.62

Su Ping, in a general introduction on the Indian military in PLA 

Daily, after explaining in detail the services, force structures, weapon 

systems, deployments, training, etc, observed that the IAF is one 

of the highly modern and professional services.63 Cui Jianchuang 

and Bi Shuqin argued that IAF is increasing its precision strike 

capabilities by acquiring and conducting test flights of low altitude 

missiles and strengthening its air defense network.64 A writer noted 

the IAF acquisition of nine new type Jaguar fighters with precision 

navigational aids, laser-range finders, and operational systems on 

July 15, 2005. While India has acquired nearly 130 Jaguar aircraft 

from the British firm BAE since 1979 and has assembled 100 more, 

this type of aircraft has become one of the mainstays of the IAF in 

its long-range precision strike missions. Song Dazhao has argued 

that these fighters, in addition to the other military aircraft, high 

modernization levels, and operational expertise, have provided the 

Indian military the ability to project force. Along with long-range 

precision strikes, Song identified strategic deterrence preparation as 

the other major objective of the IAF modernization.65 As peace and 

tranquillity prevails on the line of actual control areas with China, the 

IAF reportedly is increasingly conducting “mercy missions” of air 

drops and logistic support in the remote border areas of Arunachal 

Pradesh in the recent past. No hostile air intrusions by China were 

reported.66 Another report, however, indicated that the IAF has not 

lowered its guard in the eastern sector and indeed has maintained 

nearly 10,000 sorties of flying time for its pilots at Tejpur, a forward 
airbase near China.67 Reflecting on the IAF plans to send a team to 

Alaska for exercises (which used to be reserved for Asian countries 

like Japan, South Korea, Singapore, or Thailand); a Chinese writer 

indicated that the United States and India are evolving a common 

“understanding” regarding China. The Indian effort, according to 

this report, is to fit into the U.S. “strategic orbit” and carry forward 

U.S. policy and its global strategic needs.68

Another PLA concern is the growing Indian missile capability. 

This is of serious concern to the PLA as any enhanced reach of the 

missile capability of India could neutralize the nuclear deterrent 

capacity of China. Chun Xiao identified the recent series of Indian 

missile tests in the category of Akash [sky] as a part of the Indian plan 

to achieve the capabilities of that of the Patriot II series of missiles.69

An unidentified writer underlined the large missile capability of 

India in the Asian region in terms of quantity and quality. This 

writer has traced the origins of the Indian missile program to 

Britain, France, and the former Soviet Union/Russia. Prithvi, Agni, 

and Surya series missiles and their parameters are identified, and he 

argues that it is not the technological barriers but political signals 

from the Indian establishment that are crucial in launching the latter 

intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) programs.70 These will be 

augmented by the acquisition of a second strike nuclear capability. 

India also plans to buy two nuclear submarines from Russia.71 Fang 

Hua predicted that India is on the threshold of launching several 

long-range ballistic missiles with solid propellant fuel in a short 

period of time. Fang mentioned that India has accelerated the 

missile program with an array of new series of missiles, including 

the enhanced versions of Agni II IRBM (2,000-2,500 km range), Agni 

III IRBM (3,500 km range from May 2001), Surya ICBM (5,000 km 

range), and Surya III ICBM (12,000-20,000 km range) to “be out by 

2003.”72 Indian attempts to build an anti-missile defense system are 

traced to the 1990s. Developments in this regard include acquisitions 

from Russia of S-300 PMU batteries, acquisition of the Barak system 

from Israel, support in 2001 of President George W. Bush’s missile 

defense proposals, etc.73 Dong Guozhong argued that Indian missile 

tests of the Agni in January 2002 [of a range of about 700 km) “made 

the people of the world become nervous” and warned of an arms 

race in the region.74
On a related issue of strategic significance, Dai Wenming 

mentioned that India is on the verge of acquiring strategic intelligence 

through satellite imageries in the South Asian region and beyond to 

serve its security interests in the changed conditions after both India 

and Pakistan acquired missile capabilities. Specifically tracing such 

programs to 2001, Dai stated that India has a plan to launch a series 

of satellites that can observe the region more accurately, with picture 

resolutions reduced from 2.5 meters to 1 meter to 500 millimetres. 

With the help of Israel in January 2004, India is now in a position to 

acquire “absolute advantage” over Pakistan in information collection. 

These systems can be used for the proposed missile defense systems’ 

early warning.75 Yi Fan has summarized the recent Indian space 

program and argued that India has ambitions to become one of 

the great countries in the world in the 21st century, and estimated 

that by 2020, India would be a space power in the fields of military 

surveillance, telecommunications, and meteorological aspects 

and will acquire the ability to launch mini-satellites for military 

purposes.76 A PLA writer, after tracing the Indian space program 

from the 1980s (implying that these have dual use applications), 

argued that “. . . the development trend of India’s missile technology 

has been vigorous, and that India is constantly accelerating the steps 

to realize its intention to dominate South Asian affairs and to enter 

into competition with the world’s great powers.” More intriguing 

is the comment that the defensive and offensive space and missile 

programs “might upset the existing strategic balance in the South 

Asia region. What the influence this series of changes will have on 

the Kashmir region in South Asia, people will just have to wait and 

see.[!]”77

To overcome the challenges posed by the Indian military 

capabilities, the PLA adopted a policy of supplying arms to other 

South Asian countries, expanding military-to-military ties, in the 

belief that it can thereby exert pressure on India and check its rise 

(see the two appendices). Besides, in 1999 China reportedly set up a 

special task force to engage in information warfare activities against 

not only Taiwan, Japan, the United Staates, and South Korea, but also 

India. Reportedly the program included the following four methods, 

as reported by Prasad. These remind one of the methods proposed 

by senior PLA colonels in their work on Unrestricted Warfare.
1. China would not attack military or political targets in these 

countries but would target their financial, banking, electrical supply, 

water, sewage, and telecommunications networks. 

2. Chinese companies would establish business links with private 

companies in these countries. After carrying on legitimate business 

for some time, they would insert malicious computer codes and 

viruses over commercial e-mail services. 

3. The viruses and malicious codes would be sent through 

computers in universities in third countries so that they could not be 

traced back to China, but would be thought to be the handiwork of 

adolescent pranksters. 

4. The attacks would be launched when the political leadership of 

the target countries was preoccupied with election campaigns.78

The U.S. Factor.

Several Chinese military experts have reflected on the possible 

impact of growing U.S.-India relations on Chinese security. Most 

of them have expressed concern that such relations are detrimental 

to Chinese security interests. Moreover, a realignment of the global 

strategic equation—that shifted in 1971 into U.S.-China-Pakistan 

axis and Soviet Union-India treaty and then to the gradual postCold War U.S.-India rapprochement—may not augur well for 

China, as the latter increasingly came under the U.S. scanner. On 

the other hand, the earlier shrillness against the United States in the 

Chinese security outlook of the 1950s and 1960s is giving way to a 

more accommodative “peaceful coexistence” approach in the recent 

period. In this context, with then U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell’s 

announcement in March 2004 designating Pakistan as a major nonNorth Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) ally, the region is poised 

to emerge once again in the Chinese security calculus as it did after a 

similar agreement was arrived at by the United States and Pakistan 

50 years ago. Though the contexts are different, China has shown 

remarkable flexibility in the recent period to the presence of U.S. 

forces in Pakistan, if not in other parts of Asia. On the other hand, 

the physical presence of U.S. troops in Pakistan, with its implications 

for any possible “control” of Chinese supplied strategic weapons, 
may be causing the PLA to think of opening up another front in 

Bangladesh against India.

Despite U.S. opposition to Indian nuclear tests in May 1998, 

Chinese security analysts viewed President Bill Clinton’s visit to 

India in March 2000 and President Bush’s policies as anti-China in 

orientation and pro-India in content. Liberal democratic political 

systems, similar perspectives on ballistic missile defense systems, 

closer defense relations as exhibited in reinstatement of defense policy 

group consultations, joint military exercises, a common perspective 

on free navigation on the high seas, lenient sanctions regimes, and 

alleged similarities in strategic agendas of countering China and 

separating Tibet were all cited as contributing to the improvement 

in recent U.S.-India relations.79 These are, according to Liu Ying, 

in accordance with the Indian interests in becoming a great power 

and U.S. interests in sustaining and expanding global and regional 

strategies.80 Another reporter criticized the alleged Indian drive for 

achieving “one-sided nuclear superiority” and linked Indian nuclear 

and ballistic missile build up—which he estimated at about 30-70 

nuclear weapons with the prospect of developing 100 weapons by 

2005 and 200 missiles—to the U.S. strategy of engaging with South 

Asia.81 Nie Hongyu has drawn attention to the Indian military 

commanders’ conference in October that is intended to take steps 

to deploy nuclear weapons.82 The People’s Daily, 3 days before the 

September 11, 2001 (9/11), events, drew linkages to the U.S. ballistic 

missile defense plans and the Indian nuclear program thus:

Currently, India is one of the few countries in support of the NMD 

[National Missile Defense] program of the United States, so the 

Americans naturally do not want to offend India, therefore they actually 

give tacit consent to India’s practice of expanding its nuclear arsenal and 

developing a “reliable and minimal nuclear deterrent force”. . . . India’s 

current acceleration of its pace of using nuclear power to equip its armed 

forces is inseparable from the profound background of U.S. change of its 

South Asian strategy.83

The January 2002 visit of Indian Defense Minister Fernandes to 

the United States was seen as ending the Cold War between the two 

countries but also as furthering military cooperation.84 According to 

Ding Zengyi, the U.S. objectives in enhancing relations with India 

are to: 
• raise U.S. troops’ combat capabilities by conducting training 

in the Indian Ocean (thereby ensuring U.S. energy security in 

the Indian Ocean) and by joint exercises with Indian troops;

• check the spread of terrorism;

• ensure peace between the two nuclear states of India and 

Pakistan so that the nuclear factor does not affect its strategic 

plan in South Asia; and,

• contain India-Russia relations and wean away India into the 

U.S. camp.

In the case of India, the main reasons for improving relations 

with the United States are, according to Ding:

• The United States provides India with a “shortcut” to fulfil its 

dream of becoming a great power.

• India can acquire the latest military technologies from the 

United States and replace its aging inventory.

• India can receive prestige, security, and the possibility of 

playing an increasingly important role on the international 

stage.85

According to Zhang Guoping, U.S. interests in conducting joint 

military exercises and enhancing cooperation with India are due to 

its objective of linking up Central, West, and South Asia, while the 

Indian objective is to become a military and political power and force 

Pakistan into “submission.”86 Reports about a potential formation, 

dubbed the “Asian NATO,” with U.S.-Israel-India forming the 

western wing in Asia, while U.S.-Japan-India make up the eastern 

wing, were viewed by the PLA Daily as reflecting the Cold War 

mentality of working towards strategic containment of a rising 

China. Nevertheless, Wang Yusheng argued that since India-China 

relations improved after the June 2003 joint statement between the 

two premiers and enhancement in confidence-building measures 

(CBMs) between the two militaries as reflected in the November 

2003 joint naval operations and mutual military exchanges, these 

measures would usher in greater cooperation between the two 

countries.87 Another writer viewed U.S. plans for restructuring West 
Asian political contours as a part of its larger scheme for global 

supremacy, reduction of Russian and Chinese influence and control 

over energy resources, and measures to form an “iron triangle” over 

West Asia, Central Asia, and South Asia to include the United States, 

Israel, Turkey, and India.88 According to an observer, the ChinaPakistan joint naval operation off Shanghai was viewed as “resolutely 

breaking out of the circle of containment” strategy of India and the 

United States, who held a major naval exercise in October 2003 and 

formed a “military alliance.”89 The U.S. President’s decision to send 

Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and others to India was seen by 

a PLA writer as an attempt to mediate between the two countries.90

Another commentator viewed such mediation efforts as part of a 

U.S. plan to not just curb potential South Asian conflict, but as a 

part of the U.S. grand strategy of facilitating oil and gas exports of 

Central Asian Republics to the Indian Ocean and beyond through 

Afghanistan and Pakistan.91

Some analysts in China have cautioned India against improving 

relations with the United States. Mentioning that Indian military 

exercises in May 2002 and joint exercises with the United States and 

France have revealed an Indian desire to dominate South Asia and 

expand its influence, Shi Chun-yu warned India that this would be 

detrimental to Indian interests. He suggested that, 

India should not forget that once the U.S. military strength grows in 

South Asia and the Indian Ocean region, India unavoidably would be 

the first to be suppressed. By that time when the wolf is brought into the 

house, it will be too late for India to repent!92

Kashmir.

While China has exhibited a flexible policy towards the Kashmir 

issue in the recent period compared to its “self-determination” policy 

of the 1960s and 1970s, the PLA appears to be still taking time to 

readjust to this policy. The Chinese PLA or other officials stationed 

in India appeared not to have visited Kashmir, Sikkim, or other areas 

near to the border or contentious areas. The PLA shows concern 

about the Indian control of Siachen Glacier for its potential impact 

on not only the Pakistani airfield at Skardu but also for operations 
2

in Tibet and Xinjiang. However, given the spurt in activity by 

Uighurs in Xinjiang, the PLA appears to be concerned more about its 

counterterrorism drive. Nevertheless, it needs to be pointed out that 

soon after the U.S. strikes on al-Qa’ida and the Taliban in Afghanistan, 

the PLA has not only blocked the China-Afghan border areas, but also 

has enhanced its troop presence and its chief of general staff visited 

these areas. On a related subject, maps published in China generally 

depict Kashmir as a separate territory. Certain think-tanks in China 

like the China Institute of International Strategic Studies (CIISS) have 

published maps which depict Kashmir as an independent territory. 

This used to be the case with Sikkim as well until about 2003. After 

the Indian prime minister’s visit to China in June 2003, China has 

sent signals that it recognizes Sikkim as a part of India, a position 

that it had not accepted since Sikkim’s integration with India in 1976. 

More concrete developments are visible, with some Chinese maps 

depicting Sikkim as a part of India. In a major departure from the past 

practice, in October 2003 the Chinese defence attaché to India joined 

his counterparts in the Indian Army organized trip to Sikkim.93

Transgressions.

An issue between China and India, specifically in the context 

of the unresolved border dispute is the growing number of 

transgressions of the line of actual control by both sides. While 

many such transgressions are unintentional in nature, given the 

high-altitudes and inhospitable weather conditions, intentional 

transgressions to enforce sovereignty claims also have increased in 

the last 7 to 8 years. This issue may be seen as one more difference 

in perspective between the civilian leadership’s desire to evolve 

normalization and the PLA or the frontier guards’ resolve to enforce 

sovereignty claims in the region.94 It was estimated that nearly 1,000 

transgressions a year were reported in the last 4 years, even though 

the May-July 1998 transgressions (coinciding with Indian nuclear 

tests) were considered to be more political in nature.95 Then Indian 

Army Chief General Padmanabhan reportedly wrote a note to the 

government, drawing attention to the aggressive patrolling done by 

Chinese troops during the Kargil events, often five to ten kilometres 

deep inside the Indian territories.96
According to Arunachal Pradesh chief minister Mukul Mithi, 

Chinese troops, often in the guise of herdsmen, not only have 

transgressed the border areas, but have built infrastructure facilities 

in the region.97 The following year, Chinese Deputy Director-General 

of the Asian Department of the Foreign Ministry Sun Guoxiang 

denied that Chinese troops violated the India-China boundary 

areas.98 Chinese troops’ intrusion in Ladakh was detected by local 

authorities at Sheshoon and Chemoon in 2003.99

A related issue is whether India can permit Chinese companies 

bidding for projects in border or security sensitive areas. India has 

concerns over Chinese bidding for projects in areas closer to the 

border region or in fields related to defense and strategic areas. 

Proposals by Hutchinson Port Holdings and Huawei Technologies 

and proposals to set up hydro-electric projects in Himachal Pradesh 

reportedly were denied by the Indian side.100 In March 2001 the 

United States criticized the Huawei Company for allegedly laying 

down fiber optic lines in Baghdad. In December, the U.S. Federal 

Bureau of Investigation (FBI) reportedly alerted Indian agencies on 

possible supplies of telecommunication networks for the Taliban in 

Afghanistan. Huawei Technologies invested about $120 million, and 

513 people work at its Bangalore branch.101 The Indian Navy also 

reportedly cancelled a Chinese tender for dredging of the Mazagon 

Dockyard.

Counterencirclement By India.

If the PLA’s policy is to exert pressure on India by supporting 

Pakistan, Bangladesh, and other countries, such “encirclement” also 

may be replicated by the Indians. While India had little strength or 

intention to enter into such escalation during the Cold War period, 

the rise of India and the reformulation of its security interests from 

the Persian Gulf to the Strait of Malaccas in 2001 could extend its 

reach. Indian naval exercises in 2001 and 2004 in and around the 

South China Sea were seen by the PLA as a part of this Indian 

design. In October and November 2000, the Indian Navy, following 

deliberations at its naval commanders conference, intends to conduct 

unilateral and bilateral exercises with its Vietnamese and South 

Korean counterparts. This decision is in line with Defense Minister 
Fernandes’ statement on April 14, 2000, that India’s interests extend 

from the north of the Arabian Sea to the South China Sea. This is 

considered by an analyst as a direct challenge to China.102 A Chinese 

analyst viewed this as “a daring attempt out of deepgoing and longterm strategic considerations.”103 Emerging contacts between India 

and Taiwan are another area of concern to the PLA.

A major concern for the PLA is the emerging relations between 

India and Taiwan. While both do not have diplomatic relations, any 

contacts between the two were viewed with suspicion by the PLA. 

The then Indian military chief’s statement during the 1962 war that 

India and Taiwan should exert pressure on the People’s Republic 

of China (PRC) could have opened two unmanageable war theaters 

for the PLA. This may result in the same situation that the PLA has 

adopted over the last 4 decades—that of putting pressure on India 

during the Indo-Pakistan conflict, as in the 1965, 1971, or in the 1999 

Kargil events. In the recent period, India and Taiwan reportedly are 

developing military cooperation—to start with military intelligence 

sharing—according to a Chinese website report. Liu Weijun 

reported that IAF officials visited Taiwan and met Taiwanese air 

force chief Chen Chao-min. Tracing such contacts to Lee Teng-hui’s 

administration, this report argued that “Taiwan wants to use India 

to diffuse military pressure from the mainland China, and India tries 

to play the Taiwan card to weaken China’s tie with its long time 

enemy Pakistan.”104

PLA on CBMs and Normalization.

Overall policies of building a “well-off society” in the next 2 

decades by the 16th Party Congress meant emphasis on furthering 

CBMs and normalizing relations with the neighboring countries. The 

PLA and Indian armed forces have initiated several CBMs in the last 

3 decades, with the 1996 agreement formalizing such measures.105

The following points flowing across the lines of actual control (LAC) 

were observed by both militaries: 

• Reducing/limiting combat tanks, infantry combat vehicles, 

guns with 75 mm or bigger caliber, mortars with 120mm or 

bigger caliber, surface-to-surface missiles, and surface-to-air 

missiles. 
• Exchanging data on such military forces and armaments and 

ceilings.

• Avoiding large scale military exercises involving more than 

one division (15,000 troops).

• Prior notification of an exercise by more than a brigade (5,000 

troops).

• Prevent air intrusions, with restrictions on flying combat 

aircraft within 10 km of the LAC.

• No fire/blasts, etc., within two km of the LAC.

• Self-restraint on the LAC and deescalation.

• Meetings between border personnel at designated places.

• Expanding telecommunication links between the border 

meeting points.

• Contacts between border authorities.

• Assistance to personnel and information on forced or 

inadvertent LAC crossings.

• Information on natural disasters, etc.

Certain concrete results in the CBMs are in the regular meetings 

between border personnel. In 1978 the first flag meeting between 

border personnel took place at Chushul in the western sector. Border 

security personnel met in the eastern and western sectors for a second 

time in July 1991.106 Soon after the CBM agreements were signed, the 

number of such meetings has increased to nearly four to five. During 

these meetings, both sides raised issues related to the transgressions 

of the LAC. In addition, both sides also have instituted courtesy calls 

on each other on the Indian Independence Day on every August 

15th and the Chinese National Day on October 1st. These have been 

furthered in the recent period, with plans for joint exercises between 

the two. 

Two Chinese naval ships visits to Bombay on May 27, 2001, for 

a 3-day visit were termed as having political rather than military 

significance.107 India and China conducted joint naval search and 

rescue operations in November 2003 at Shanghai a month after 
the Chinese navy conducted similar operations with the Pakistani 

navy.108 Indian naval ships INS Ranjit, guided-missile corvette INS 

Kulish and INS Jyothi with about 900 personnel participated in drills 

with the Chinese navy off Shanghai in November 2003.109 While 

viewing this joint operation more in terms of its political significance 

rather than having any major military significance, a writer vividly 

described the different scenarios involved in the operation:

The first step is an exchange exercise; the second step, formation of ships; 

and the third step, a maritime search-and-rescue exercise. In the course 

of the search-and-rescue exercise, a crew member from the Indian side 

would board a Chinese ship and, in a scenario where some incidents 

have happened on the Chinese ship, a helicopter would be dispatched 

to “rescue” this crew member from the Chinese ship and bring him back 

to the Indian ship. Besides, the ships on both sides would conduct a joint 

exercise to put out a fire.110

According to Meng Xiangqing of the NDU, with the joint 

operations with Pakistan and Indian navies, China is sending signals 

that it is following a “balancing strategy” between these two South 

Asian countries, and that it is not playing favorites between the two 

in the region.111

On November 6, 2004, the Indian side invited for the first time 

a Chinese border guards’ team to participate in a volleyball sports 

event at Chushul in the border areas.112 The Indian military also 

has plans to invite Chinese military delegations to participate in 

counterterrorism maneuvers. In 2004, two such events took place 

between the two sides.113

Increasing CBMs between the PLA and Indian armed forces are not 

without their problems, though. The Indian Army chief’s suggestion 

that India and China should conduct a joint military exercise to 

counter terrorism was viewed by the Pakistani side with concern. A 

Pakistani foreign ministry spokesman warned against “crossing red 

lines”—meaning these exercises should not be conducted in disputed 

areas.114 On November 18, 2003, Indian Army Chief General N. C. Vij 

stated that, even as India-China relations are improving in the recent 

period, India should not be complacent about the growing Chinese 

military capabilities and rail and road infrastructure developments 

in Tibet and that India needs to match these capabilities.115
Nevertheless, with the Indian prime minister’s visit, according to 

a PLA commentator, bilateral relations:

. . . have entered a new stage of development, which has laid a solid 

foundation for good-neighborly relations and mutually beneficial 

cooperation . . . China’s responsible behavior in handling international 

problems of various kinds and the role played by China in safeguarding 

world and regional peace over the past several years have been obvious 

to all countries. More and more Indian people are all the more willing to 

regard China as a friendly neighboring country and a trade partner, and 

the market for the “China Threat Theory” has been getting smaller and 

smaller in India.”116

Another commentator in the PLA Daily hailed the improvement 

in bilateral relations because this belied the “Asian NATO” concept 

and the talk about improving relations between the United States, 

Israel, India, Australia, and Japan. With improvement in India-China 

relations after the Indian prime minister’s visit and the joint naval 

operations in November, according to Wang Yusheng, certain views 

of the strategic experts of the United States and Japan were rejected.117

Meng Xiangqing of the NDU viewed the Indian prime minister’s visit 

to China in June 2003 as a second major effort towards normalization 

of relations between the two countries after such efforts were made 

in the 1950s.118 These have set the pace for enhancing military 

exchanges between the two militaries. Chinese Defense Minister 

Cao Gangchuan visited India in 2004, followed by Chinese Chief of 

General Staff Liang Guanglie in 2005. Cao Gangchuan, before setting 

out from Beijing, mentioned that “China is willing to actively create 

a harmonious, stable, and peaceful regional political and security 

environment with all Asian countries, including Pakistan, India, and 

Thailand.”119

While bilateral relations improved further, important differences 

still persist between the two countries on continuing Chinese 

assistance to Pakistan, its role in the Southern Asian region, and 

divergence between the Indian desire to discuss and participate 

in global issues of concern and the Chinese position of confining 

discussions to “regional” security issues only. From the Chinese 

point of view, despite eliciting a favorable response from the 

Indian government for its position on Tibet, as reflected in the Joint 
Declaration of June 2003, it is still concerned about the economic and 

military rise of India. 

Rise of China and India.

The economic growth of India and enhancement of its military 

capabilities pose a challenge as well as an opportunity for China. 

The PLA responses to the rise of India, in light of the rise of China, 

are mixed in nature, with a dominant view arguing that this could 

pose a challenge to China. The overall perspective of the PLA during 

the rise of China may be gleaned from the following: For Jiang 

Lingfei, Professor at National Defense University, China’s rise poses 

historical opportunities as well as challenges. Jiang viewed the 9/11 

events as shaping China’s rise but adds that it would be conditioned 

by socialist development and the enhanced role of the country in 

international relations. Luo Yuan, chairman of the Strategy Research 

Institute of the Academy of Military Science, argued that China’s 

rise would result in national cohesion and would make it the most 

powerful country in the Asia-Pacific region. He proposed three 

stages in such a rise:

1. The construction [yingzao] stage, in which China should 

promote a peaceful environment on its periphery and safeguard 

national sovereignty and territorial integrity.

2. The molding [suzao] stage, in which China would pursue 

policies to shape events and regain lost territories.

3. The plan and control [jinglue] stage, in which by political [or 

military ?] means, the international community accepts China’s 

efforts in building a new political economic international order that 

ensures strategic balance and stability.

Luo stated that China currently is at the first stage mentioned 

above. He contended that emphasis on peace does not mean that 

China should neglect the defense sector. Indeed, it should strengthen 

its defense forces. In his support, Luo cites an old proverb “youguo 

wufang, guojiang buguo” [a country without defense would not be 

a country]. On the other hand, even if China rises without any 

military backing, it will not be able to retain its influence long and 
will certainly decline. The experience of the Qing Dynasty clearly 

validates this assertion, according to Luo. Therefore, for a rising 

China, the military should have to provide “escort” functions. 

Indeed, the only existing powerful countries in the world are those 

with strong military strength. Luo advocates higher attention should 

be paid to the defense sector during the course of China’s rise. This 

is conducive for China to achieve a higher strategic ability not only 

to wage a dozen local wars successfully but, more importantly, to 

restrain a war from breaking out. The second ability that China 

can possess, by emphasizing military modernization, is strategic 

autonomy that ensures independence from an adversary’s control 

of strategic resources. The third quality that Luo bestows on China, 

on the path to rapid rise with defense preparation, is its strong 

international coordinative [xietiao] ability. Luo warns China that if it 

neglects/forgets war preparation, it would face disaster in its path to 

a peaceful rise [heping jueqi, wangzhan biwei]. 120

According to Professor Gu Haibing of the People’s University, 

China needs to adopt a great power strategy for the coming years 

as the international influence of China is set to grow phenomenally. 

Gu notes that China’s rise faces stiff competition [qiangli jingzheng] 

from India and from the economically resourceful Japan. In order 

to overcome problems in China’s rise, Gu argued that China 

should choose this as the “fulcrum” of all its strategies and enhance 

the military capabilities of the country to ensure the country’s 

“independence.” Emphasis is placed by Gu on the powerful nation 

[qiangguo] (with priority given to building military capabilities of the 

country), rather than on the other elements of enriching the people 

(fumin) and environment (huanqing meijing).121

Hu Xin, of the PLA International Relations Academy’s 

International Research Institute, argued that the peaceful rise of 

China is all set to become the strategic guiding principle of the 

country in the 21st century. Hu identified the main challenges facing 

the country as relations with the United Staates, issues related to 

Taiwan, and the security of the country in its border regions. He 

introduced the concept of “multiple rises” as a part of China’s 

interaction with the international system. While agreeing that the 

United States is able to maintain its dominant international position 

for several decades, he noted the simultaneous rise of several nations 
(like China, the European Union (EU), Russia, Japan, and India), with 

their consequent influence on adjusting the international power. 

However, it is possible that these rising powers may compete or even 

come to blows in the international power struggle. It is here that 

Hu suggests that China should have the ability to control events, 

restrain negative domestic or international hostile factors, enhance 

qualitative and quantitative aspects of its strategic resources, 

etc. As a rising power, China should, according to Hu, shoulder 

responsibility in the international arena and actively participate 

in resolving international problems. This calls for a change in its 

foreign policy. Interestingly, Hu suggests that, as in a long-distance 

race, China should acquire sustenance from its fellow competitors.122

The above statement implies that the PLA needs to work along with 

India, at least in the short to medium term, to enhance its IT potential 

and expand military exchanges for probable benefits in more closely 

understanding Indian military intentions and capabilities and like. 

The above discussion of China’s rise and “multiple rise” of other 

countries, and the consequent influence on the strategic environment 

and policy options, poses fresh challenges to the inherited wisdom 

of the PLA. These factors are bound to influence the PLA’s views on 

South Asia, although it is not clear at the moment how exactly the 

PLA will respond.

Pakistan.

China’s relations with Pakistan have been beneficial to the former, 

given the latter’s geographical proximity to the Islamic world in 

Southwestern and West Asia,123 as a counter to the growing economic 

and military power of India,124 as a source of western military 

technology, in light of Pakistan’s support to China in securing its 

UN Security Council membership between 1961 and 1971,125 and 

other factors. However, the Pakistani establishment reportedly 

collaborated with American agencies in covert operations in Tibet 

in the 1950s.126 Nevertheless, from the 1962 war between India and 

China, both China and Pakistan have evolved an “all weather” 

[quantianhou] relationship, which remained relatively undisturbed 

despite the end of the Cold War and the spread of terrorism. 
In general, Chinese security perceptions on Pakistan are related to 

efforts to build bridges with China’s neighbors in the overall policy 

of “good-neighborliness” [mulin zhengce], overcome the U.S. trade 

embargoes, and nullify the influence of encirclement of China by the 

Western powers through the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization/

Central Treaty Organization (SEATO/CENTO) security treaties that 

came up in the 1950s; secure Tibet and Xinjiang from outside influence 

and intervention; create conditions in the international arena for the 

reunification process of the PRC with Taiwan and other regions; 

provide assistance to the third world countries so as to maintain 

independence of these countries and keep at bay the “hegemonic” 

influences in the region, and the like. Building close relations with its 

neighbors will also contribute to forming allies and friends for China 

that may, in the short term, create cushions for the security of the 

country as well as contribute to the global rise of China in the long 

term. In the nonmilitary fields, given the restive Xinjiang Uighur 

movement, efforts by China in persuading the concerned [such as 

the then Taliban-led Afghanistan and Pakistan] would be conducive 

to its national security. Another dimension is that, since the four 

modernization programs were launched, energy requirements of 

China have increased, underlining the requirement for oil and gas 

supply routes security. Joint efforts with Pakistan in the Gwadhar 

naval port construction comes in handy, as it overlooks the Strait of 

Harmuz that accounts for about 47 percent of the Persian Gulf oil 

exports. Environmental considerations, drug and human trafficking, 

and illegal financial flows are other areas China also is concerned 

about.

Several scholars have viewed the enduring Sino-Pakistan 

relations from different prisms. Samina Yasmin, for instance, in her 

doctoral dissertation on the subject, contends that such relations 

should be viewed from a “dominant-bilateral equation,” which is 

“characterised by differing strategic outlooks and responses . . .”127

One aspect of the neo-realist perspective is the view that forming 

security alliances provides cushions against drastic and negative 

changes of the international relations. John W. Garver has argued 

that the fundamental rationale for such bilateral relations has not 

changed despite the changes in the international scenario, but that 

the “entente cordiale remained unchanged.” According to him, 
2

“China’s overriding strategic interest in South Asia is to maintain a 

balance of power favorable to itself. Most fundamentally, this entails 

the perpetuation of Pakistan’s existence as a strong center of power 

in South Asia, independent of Indian domination . . .”128 However, 

while several elements of neo-realist perspective are visible in the 

Sino-Pakistan security relations, one crucial variable, i.e., an explicit 

security/defense alliance, is missing in such relations. 

Sino-Pakistan relations withstood the vagaries of international 

relations in the Cold and post-Cold War eras alike. According to 

General Yu Yongbo, a member of the CMC, speaking in May 1997, 

“no matter what changes may take place in international situation and 

in each other’s countries, the two peoples always support each other, 

sympathize with each other, and help each other.”129 Cai Bingkui, 

Vice Chairman of the PLA’s think-tank (CIISS) and a member of the 

newly formed (in March 2003) Sino-Pakistani Friendship Forum, 

argued that such relations withstood the test of time because of the 

“mutual trust” evolved between the two countries based on “common 

understanding and common interests” and on a “broad consensus in 

understanding the international and regional issues.” The Friendship 

Forum, composed of the two countries “celebrities” and specialists, 

met for the first time in September 2003. Its goal is “to promote and 

enhance the friendly ties between the two nations.”130 Meeting the 

Pakistan Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on January 16, 2002, at 

Beijing, Jiang Zemin, who worked in Pakistan in the 1970s,131 stated 

that China would “coordinate positions” with Pakistan in order to 

“safeguard peace and stability in the region.”132

Contrary to the general belief that the Sino-Pakistani military 

relations may have affected post-9/11 events, and in light of China’s 

problems in Xinjiang, the Chinese foreign ministry declared in its 

2003 assessment that such relations are “continuing and maintained” 

[ZhongBa zai junshi lingyu jixu baochi youhao zhulai].133 However, given 

the Chinese problems related to the growth of Uighur separatism 

and the reported support the militants received from al-Qa’ida/

Taliban or from some in Pakistan, Chinese leaders like Li Peng and 

others have emphasized measures to curb cross-border terrorism. 

As a part of this strategy, some interpreted Chinese responses to the 

Kargil crisis in 1999 as maintaining neutrality between India and 

Pakistan.134
The discussion above on the PLA’s views on India mentioned 

Indian plans to emerge as a great power and impose its hegemony 

on the region. As a policy option to curtail such influence, the PLA 

followed a policy of supporting Pakistan to counter India. PLA 

statements in this regard are implicit in nature. A brief historical 

account may be useful in explaining this position. The Indo-Pakistan 

wars of 1965 and 1971, as several Chinese authors contend, led to 

a “common strategy” between the two countries, especially in the 

late 1970s, that was further strengthened after the Union of Soviet 

Socialist Republic’s (USSR) Afghan occupation.135 In the 1965 IndoPakistan war, soon after India attacked Lahore on September 6, 

Premier Zhou Enlai reportedly advised Pakistan to wage a people’s 

war of withdrawing from the territories and luring the adversary 

deep inside the country to be drowned later. As India had superior 

strength numerically, Pakistani forward postures would be 

detrimental to the latter.136On the occasion, Zhou said:

. . . the Indian reactionaries could not have engaged in such a serious 

military adventure without the consent and support of the United 

States. Everybody knows that for several months now, U.S. imperialism 

has used every means in an attempt to compel Pakistan to give up its 

independent policy. The Indian reactionaries’ armed attack on Pakistan 

was an inevitable result of this policy of the United States.137

During President Liu Shaoqi’s visit to Pakistan in March 1966, 

a commentator, Anjam, wrote in Beijing Review, acknowledging 

Chinese support. He said: “At the time of the Indian attack [in 1965], 

China boldly stood by Pakistan . . . This will be remembered by all 

posterity in our country.” Another article, an editorial of Ta’Meer, 

in the same issue of the Beijing Review stated: “No intrigue, threat, 

or pressure can stand in the way of the ever-increasing mutual 

friendship and cooperation” between the two countries.138 Liu Shaoqi 

himself outlined the Chinese security concerns during this visit. He 

stated, at the State Banquet on April 1, 1966:

Last year, when Pakistan was subjected to India’s armed attacks, its 

Government, people, and army put up a heroic resistance and dealt a 

heavy blow at the aggressors. The Chinese Government and people firmly

supported Pakistan in its righteous fight against aggression . . . [SinoPakistan] relations are in the fundamental interests of our two peoples. 
. . . The Pakistan people can rest assured that, when Pakistan resolutely 

fights against foreign aggression in defense of its national independence, 

sovereignty, and territorial integrity, the 650 million Chinese people will 

stand unswervingly on their side and give them resolute support and 

assistance . . . We have always held that the Kashmir dispute should be 

settled in accordance with the wishes of the Kashmir people.139

In the joint communiqué issued during the 1966 visit, the 

“[Pakistan] President expressed the deep gratitude . . . for the support 

they received from the Government and people of China in resisting 

aggression . . .”140 The period of the 1970s was described by the 

Chinese as a common struggle with Pakistan against “expansionism 

[kuozhang zhuyi] and hegemonism [baquan zhuyi]” in Southern 

Asia.141 In the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war, the Chinese reportedly 

advised Pakistan to make a political settlement with the leaders of 

East Pakistan, but in vain. In the event of war, there was no concrete 

Chinese support to Pakistan’s operations, even as some pressure 

was exerted by China on the India-China border areas. The IndoSoviet Treaty and possible Soviet military buildup on the Chinese 

northeastern and western borders were too unnerving to the Chinese 

to get involved militarily in the war.142 Nevertheless, Chinese civilian 

and military aid to Pakistan increased by leaps and bounds from this 

period onward.143 For instance, Pakistan reportedly received nearly 

one-third of its arms from abroad from the PRC in the 1966-80 period 

that is worth about U.S. $1.5 billion. Subsequently, Pakistan signed 

several agreements for further import of weapons from China.

According to a Pakistani commentator, China has established 

military cooperation arrangements with Pakistan from the 1970s. 

The year 1989 witnessed a military cooperation agreement between 

China and Pakistan. The agreement envisaged “purchase of 

military goods, mutual research, and cooperation, along with the 

manufacturing of arms, the transfer of technology, and the sale of 

these arms to third countries with mutual understanding.” This 

was followed by another supplementary agreement in 1993 that 

made China “the most important military seller” of weapons or 

systems to Pakistan. China also promised and fulfilled the pledge 

related to supply and cooperation in the manufacturing of fighter 

aircraft, tanks, and missiles. Thus China provided M-11 missiles to 

Pakistan.144 On March 12, 2002, Deputy Chief of General Staff Xiong 
Guangkai reportedly signed an agreement with Pakistan for further 

cooperation between the two militaries.145

Mutual high level military visits between China and Pakistan 

have increased over a period of time as Appendix I indicates. Indeed, 

such visits far outnumber India-China military visits. This is another 

indication of the importance attached by the PLA towards Pakistan. 

A few days before the 9/11 events, a high level military team from 

China reportedly visited Pakistan to enhance military cooperation. 

At the same time, it was reported that a joint high level commission 

would meet in Beijing to review and enhance military relations 

between the two countries.146 However, after the 9/11 events and 

entry of the United States in the region, specifically with the Afghan 

war, China has mobilized its troops to block any al-Qa’ida/Taliban 

infiltration into Xinjiang through the 96-kilometer-long border with 

Afghanistan.

Pakistan continues to receive advanced weapons systems from 

China (see Appendix II). The Pakistan Navy has opened negotiations 

with China for the transfer of F-22P frigates in early 2003.147 Pakistan 

reports indicated that the Super 7 aircraft is being developed 

indigenously, with the assistance of the China Aero Technology 

Import and Export Corporation and the Chengdu Aircraft Industry 

Corporation. The first flight test was reported in May 2003, and two 

more were conducted subsequently, and the aircraft was declared 

fit for development. About 300 are to be manufactured with Italianmade Kreno S-7 fire control radar system, 3,800 kg weight of weapon 

carriage, and 3,000 km range.148 Pakistan also has plans to buy 50 F7MG aircraft from China to replace its aging F-6 aircraft.149

Due to the nature of warfare conditions between India and Pakistan, 

China emphasized supplying armored equipment to Pakistan. It has 

supplied equipment in this regard.150 The Al-Khalid Main Battle Tank 

is being manufactured in Taxila with Chinese technical cooperation. 

Under Project 711 that began in the 1980s, these tanks are considered 

to be modern. Pakistan is said to be graduating from mere assembly 

of such tanks to manufacturing them in the country with Chinese 

collaboration.151 Post 9/11, China has not only beefed up its security 

in Xinjiang by redeploying to the region several ground-attack 

fighters but also reportedly has enhanced its military cooperation 

with Pakistan. According to a Hong Kong report, China supplied 
Pakistan with a new type of missile system, the LY-60N ground-toair missiles, for air defense purposes even before these were supplied 

to the PLA units. In addition, China reportedly supplied tanks and 

communication equipment.152

Several reports indicated Chinese cooperation with Pakistan in a 

strategic weapons program. These include not only supply of about 

5,000 ring magnets, but also designs of nuclear weapons, missiles, and 

missile technologies. With Pakistani inveterate animosity towards 

India, these weapons of mass destruction (WMD) transfers of the 

PLA appear to be well thought out. Whereas the Indian ballistic 

missile program generally is termed by the PLA writers as part of the 

Indian designs to become a great power, similar plans by Pakistan 

were termed as only having a defensive impact. A PLA writer stated 

that the Pakistani missile tests of Ghauri (1,500 km range) IRBM, 

Hatf-2 (180 km range), and another missile of 290 km indicated that 

Pakistani: 

. . . intention is as plain as daylight—showing its real strength to prevent 

war. After all, given the situation that its conventional military strength 

is inferior to that of India, Pakistan can only rely on the deterrent role 

of its nuclear strength to control the offensive that may be launched by 

India.153

Counterterrorism and Joint Exercises.

China conducted naval operations with a foreign naval force for 

the first time in its contemporary history with Pakistan in October 

2003 at Shanghai.154 After agreeing to conduct exercises in July 2003, 

the Chinese navy (with No. 521 vessel) had maritime operations with 

the Pakistan naval ships (Babur and Nasr) in October 2003, involving 

nearly 1,600 personnel and several surface vessels, submarines, and 

anti-submarine helicopters in search and rescue operations and 

damage control following attacks involving nuclear, biological, or 

chemical weapons.155

The 2004 PLA White Paper issued in December 2004 emphasized 

measures to strengthen nontraditional security issues such as 

countering terrorism, drug trafficking, and piracy, and enhancing 

maritime search and rescue operations. The paper specifically 

mentioned cooperation with Pakistan and India in this regard.156
Pakistan’s counterterrorism campaign has been much appreciated 

by China.157 The Chinese army conducted military exercises with the 

Pakistani army in the Taxkorgan Tajik autonomous county of Xinjiang 

from August 3-6, 2004. Code-named Youyi (Friendship)-2004, these 

are high-altitude operations performed by about 200 troops of both 

countries at about 4,000 meters on the Pamir Mountains bordering 

China, Pakistan occupied areas, Afghanistan, and Tajikistan. 

According to Major General Cheng Bing, the “exercise is aimed to 

further strengthen cooperation between the two countries and armies 

in nontraditional security fields and maintain security and stability in 

the region, and to improve the capacity of jointly combating terrorism, 

separatism, and extremism.” This live-fire operation achieved “great 

success” and involved encirclement, assault, and mop-up practices. 

These exercises came in the wake of a series of events that 

highlighted security concerns for China in the Xinjiang region, 

which declared itself independent in the early 20th century before 

the People’s Republic was formed in 1949. While differences with 

the Soviet Union on the agreement to keep foreigners from a third 

country from entering into Xinjiang were kept under the carpet, 

these surfaced soon after the Sino-Soviet split in 1960, when nearly 

60,000 Uighurs migrated to the Soviet Central Asian Republics. 

The pan-Turkic movements spread during the Soviet occupation of 

Afghanistan with the active support of the United States, Pakistan, 

and China from 1979-89. Chinese transfers of arms to the mujahideen

against the Soviets during this period appear to have boomeranged 

in the recent period as al-Qa’ida trained separatists started entering 

into Xinjiang in the last few years. Most are suspected of having been 

trained in Pakistani camps. Chinese Deputy Chief of Staff General 

Xiong Guangkai estimated in his book published in late 2003 that 

nearly a thousand such armed separatists have entered Xinjiang.158

To counter these flows, in the 1990s China closed its Karakoram 

highway connecting with the Pakistan-occupied northern areas 

to stop the flow of “separatists” from Afghanistan into Xinjiang. 

Later, after the United States launched its strikes on Taliban-held 

Afghanistan following the 9/11 incidents, China closed its borders 

with Afghanistan and Pakistan due to fears that fleeing al-Qa’ida/

Taliban activists would sneak into Xinjiang. Nevertheless, the Uighur 

movement spread fast, with several incidents of attacks against state 
organizations like the military, police, and judiciary, and against 

infrastructural projects and administration. 

In addition to the Pakistan link in the Uighur movement, a 

spate of incidents in which Chinese were killed in Pakistan and 

other places have led the Chinese to seek the active cooperation of 

the Pakistan government. A car bomb attack on May 3, 2003, at the 

Gwadar Port construction site killed three Chinese engineers and 

injured eleven, including nine Chinese and two Pakistanis. These 

engineers were employed by China Harbor Engineering Company, 

which was overseeing the port project. While Pakistan authorities 

saw a Baluchi hand in this incident, the Chinese authorities suspected 

Uighur “separatists” were responsible. A Pakistan air force plane 

carried the deceased to China, and the Pakistani government has 

paid U.S.$145,000 compensation to the Chinese victims. The matter 

of safety of Chinese was discussed in the first week of August 2004 

when Pakistan Senate Chairman Soomro met Chinese Premier 

Wen Jiabao in Beijing. Wen also demanded the security of over 

3,000 Chinese working in Pakistan on several military and civilian 

projects. Other incidents also underlined the plight of Chinese 

working in these areas. On April 11, 2004, for instance, seven Chinese 

construction workers were taken hostage briefly in the Iraqi town of 

Falluja, although they were freed in 36 hours. On June 10, 11 Chinese 

road workers were gunned down and five wounded at Kunduz, 

Afghanistan. In the last week of July, an explosion in a Chinese 

national-run restaurant in Islamabad injured several people. The 

Chinese suspect the involvement of Uighurs in these incidents and 

blame them for the general deterioration of the situation in Pakistan 

and Afghanistan.

These incidents have alerted the Chinese leadership to take 

concrete measures to counter “separatism” in Xinjiang, and seek the 

support of Pakistan in this regard. In a late 2001 visit to Xian, the 

capital of the Chinese western province of Shaanxi, Pakistan President 

Pervez Musharraf issued a statement at a famous mosque in the city 

that the Chinese Muslims should be patriotic and work for the good 

of China. In early November 2003, Hu Jintao, in his first meeting 

with President Musharraf since taking office as the President of 

China, said that both countries must tackle the Chinese version of the 

“Axis of Evil”—the “three evil forces,” viz., extremism, separatism, 
and terrorism. He also urged Pakistan to step up its fight against 

transnational crime and drug trafficking. President Musharraf said 

that Pakistan stood resolutely against terrorism and did not allow 

anti-China forces, including Uighurs seeking independence for 

Xinjiang, to use Pakistan as a base. To facilitate this, both countries 

signed an extradition treaty in the same month 

On December 15, 2003, the Chinese Ministry of Public Security 

publicized a list of terrorist organizations and 11 terrorists to include 

the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), the East Turkistan 

Liberation Organization, the World Uighur Youth Congress, and 

the East Turkistan Information Center. The ministry requested other 

countries to ban these four organizations and their activities, their 

support base, and financial aspects and to deny protection to these 

organizations. When the head of ETIM, Hasan Mahsum, was killed 

by the Pakistani army on October 2, 2003, in a joint antiterrorism 

raid along the border of Pakistan and Afghanistan, China thanked 

Pakistan for this operation as Hasan was accused of plotting several 

incidents in Urumqi and Hotan in Xinjiang. 

A joint working group was established in 2001 to discuss and 

suggest measures to counter narcotics trafficking, illegal border 

trade, and money-laundering, besides other trans-border crimes. 

The frequency of these meetings was increased after 1 year in view 

of the worsening situation on the border of these two countries. In 

July 2004 Pakistani Interior Minster Syed Faisal Saleh Hayat met 

Chinese Minister for Public Security Zhou Yongkang at Beijing to 

“neutralize” the threat posed by al-Qa’ida. 

However, despite China seeking the Pakistan government’s 

support in countering these nontraditional security challenges, 

there appears to have been no respite, given the popular support 

and discontent in Xinjiang and the short-sighted policies of these 

governments. 

Bangladesh.

The three key principles governing China’s relations with 

Bangladesh are, according the Chinese Foreign Ministry yearbook, 

“treat each other with equality [and] mutual benefit, mutual trust 

[and] mutual help, concerted cooperation” [pingdeng xiangdai, 
xianghu xinren, huzhu hubu, xietiao hezuo].159 The PLA’s views appear 

to be not entirely at variance from the above civilian leadership’s 

guidelines. Indeed, by supporting Bangladesh in military and 

economic infrastructure projects, China would not only enhance its 

influence in the region, but also exert pressure on India. The PLA 

has been active in building linkages with this country in terms of 

arms transfers, as Appendix II indicates, and through periodic 

interactions with the Bangladesh military for enhancing “mutual 

trust” and cooperation, as Appendix I indicates. Indeed, the number 

of China-Bangladesh mutual military visits almost surpasses that 

of the China-India military visits to each other. This indicates the 

relative importance given by the PLA and the civilian leadership to 

Bangladesh. 

At the strategic level, Chinese cooperation with Bangladesh 

could enhance the latter’s position in the region. In certain cases, 

such as in any joint cooperation in the control of vulnerable Siliguri 

corridor, the PLA may place enormous military pressure on Indian 

troop movements to the Indian northeast, specifically if it has 

any arrangement with Bangladesh forces. The late 2002 defense 

cooperation agreement between the two sides has been cited as an 

instance of elevation of bilateral relations between the two armed 

forces. While the document has not been published, this is intended 

to further “institutionalize” the military links between the two and 

enhance systematic training, arms exports promotion, etc.

The military interaction between the two armed forces highlights 

the security dynamic in Sino-Bangladesh relations. In general, 

statements issued during these meetings indicate common concern 

and understanding on the need to “maintain independence” of 

Bangladesh, strive for “stability” in South Asia and the like. Given 

the PLA’s assessment that India is hegemonic and intends to be a 

big power, as noted above, the context of these statements between 

the Chinese and Bangladesh militaries make it amply clear that such 

interactions are not purely bilateral in nature.

Making Dhaka as his first overseas visit after taking over as 

the Air Force Commander, Cao Shuangming assured his hosts in 

1993 that China would continue to extend defense cooperation with 

Bangladesh, especially in Air Force related issues.160 Lieutenant 

General Tang Tianbiao, deputy director of the General Political 
Department (GPD) told the Bangladeshi foreign minister on 

November 2, 1998 that, 

China and Bangladesh, as well as the Chinese and Bangladesh armed 

forces, have been maintaining a traditional friendship and friendly 

and cooperative ties. Further developing bilateral Bangladesh-Chinese 

friendly and cooperative ties will be beneficial to the basic interests of the 

people of the two countries and to peace and stability in South Asia and 

even in the whole of Asia. He commended Bangladesh for its unwavering 

efforts in developing its own economy, in enhancing regional cooperation, 

and safeguarding peace in south Asia.161

Then Chief of General Staff Fu Quanyou, meeting Bangladesh 

Army Chief Muhammad Mustafizur Rahman at Beijing on May 

7, 1999, said that bilateral “ties between the armies of the two 

countries are becoming tighter, thanks to the great attention given 

by government and military leaders.”162

While the visiting Rear Admiral Abu Taher, chief-of-staff of the 

Bangladesh navy, thanked China “for its selfless aid to Bangladesh,” 

CMC vice chairman Zhang Wannian told the former in March 2000 

that, 

Military relations between China and Bangladesh are the important 

component part of bilateral relations and have fully demonstrated 

good-neighborly relations between the two countries. The development 

of military relations between China and Bangladesh not only accords 

with the basic interests of the two countries but are also conducive to 

promoting peace and stability in the region.163

In December 2002, Bangladesh PM Khaleda Zia signed four pacts 

with China, including one on defense cooperation that reportedly 

called for “institutionalizing” current defense ties between the 

two.164 This agreement is expected to plug loopholes in the existing 

defense ties and cooperation and further elevate such interactions in 

the future. The April 2005 nuclear agreement during Premier Wen 

Jiabao’s visit to Dhaka was set to be in the civilian field, though the 

strategic significance of such a move is quite evident.

One of the concrete manifestations of cooperation between the 

two militaries, apart from the training activities and 2002 defense 

cooperation agreement, is in the growing arms transfers of China 
2

to Bangladesh, as Appendix II indicates. These include supplies of 

frigates, fast attack craft, ship-to-ship missiles and launchers, fighter 

aircraft, etc. A few examples include the Bangladesh-considered 

purchase of eight F-7MB fighter aircraft from China on “very easy 

financial terms,” i.e., no payment for at least 2 years and a “spread 

out” payment schedule to be worked out through negotiations 

with the Chinese government.165 The Bangladesh Air Force already 

had some of these aircraft in addition to the Chinese supplied AIII ground-attack aircraft. The letter “B” in the F-7MB stood for the 

Chinese export version of the aircraft for Bangladesh. The policy 

approval for procuring these aircraft came in 1997.166

Nepal.

Major objectives of China in building relations with Nepal are 

protecting its interests in Tibet, curtailing the influence of India, 

expanding its influence in the region through infrastructure building 

projects, curtailing the spread of Maoists, etc. Several of these are 

appealing to the PLA. Relatively, the PLA’s interactions with Nepal 

have not been as intensive as they are with other countries in the 

region (see Appendix I), although it has supplied small arms and 

other weapons and equipment to Nepal in the late 1980s and agreed 

in 2005 to train the Nepalese army to counter Maoists. 

Chinese civilian and military leadership alike have shown interest 

in ties with Nepal. During the visits of President Jiang Zemin in 1996 

and subsequently during other occasions, such as Li Peng’s visits, it 

was reiterated that relations with Nepal are important, even in the 

security fields. Meeting the Nepalese Army Chief in December 1999, 

vice president and vice-chairman of CMC Hu Jintao said that China 

wanted to fulfil its strategic goal of building good neighborliness by 

enhancing relations with Nepal.167 On a hastily arranged visit to Nepal 

as a part of his visit to southeast Asian countries, defense minister 

Chi Haotian began the first visit to Nepal in February 2001. This visit 

comes a few days after the Maoists injured a Chinese national at 

Sindhuphulchok in the first of such attacks on Chinese.168

China has emphasized extending cooperation with Nepal in 

infrastructure development programs connecting Tibet and Nepal. 

In the infrastructure projects, reports indicated plans to extend the 
Golmud-Lhasa railway line to Kathmandu. If implemented, these 

could enhance further the logistics facilities of the PLA in the region. 

Apart from the economic benefits that such projects entail, especially 

for Tibet, the strategic and logistics importance of overcoming 

Himalayan barriers may not be out of place.169

China and Nepal had agreed in 1994 to start transport service 

along the 873 km highway linking Kathmandu and Lhasa. It took 

nearly a decade for this proposal to materialize. The Nepalese 

government-run transport organization, Sajha Yatayat, announced 

that in September 2004 such trips will be made.170 However, this was 

delayed further until May 1, 2005, when in March 2005, both sides 

signed an agreement to start a two-way bus ride.171

A careful reading of the statements issued during the mutual visits 

from China and Nepal, especially by military personnel, indicates 

the need for both parties to arrive at an “understanding” on issues 

related to India. During the visit of Political Commissar of the General 

Armaments Department Li Jinai in June 1999, King Birendra said that 

emerging “new issues” like Kosovo and Kashmir should be resolved 

through consultation and dialogue. Li, on his part, emphasized the 

need for stability in South Asia.172 While seeking “further support” 

from Nepal on issues like Tibet, Taiwan, and human rights, General 

Fu Quanyou, during his visit to Nepal in April 2000, emphasized 

closer relations between the two neighbors. King Birendra stated 

that “Although China is much larger than Nepal, China showed 

understanding and support to Nepal’s struggle for independence 

and sovereignty and has extended much assistance to Nepal’s 

economic development.”173 On September 4, 2001, the Commander 

of the Chengdu MR, Liu Baochen, told the Nepalese PM that the 

PLA will work with the Nepalese Army in “in maintaining peace 

and stability of the bordering areas.” He stated:

The goodwill visit of my delegation is in response to the consensus 

reached by the leaders of our two countries in 1996 to build a goodneighborly partnership that will be handed down from generation to 

generation. In particular, our visit is aimed at further strengthening 

the good relations between the armies of the two countries, especially 

promoting the relations between the Royal Nepal Army and China’s 

Chengdu Military Region and Lanzhou Military Region.174
In reply to Royal Nepalese Army Chief Pyar Jung Thapa’s remarks 

that the PLA has helped the Nepalese Army modernization program, 

Lieutenant General Zou Gengren, Commander of the Lanzhou MR, 

on a visit to Kathmandu in September 2002 said:

The goodwill visit of my delegation is aimed at further strengthening 

the good relations between the armies of the two countries, especially 

promoting the relations between the Royal Nepal Army and China’s 

Lanzhou Military Region. . . . [W]e will cooperate more closely with the 

Nepali army in maintaining peace and stability of the bordering areas.175

However, despite a relative enhancement in the interactions 

between the two militaries of Nepal and China, there exist underlying 

tensions between the two. For instance, the border interactions 

between Nepal and China are not without problems. Specifically, the 

Chinese border guards’ role in the border trade and smuggling were 

highlighted by the Nepalese side. For instance, in March 3, 1997, at 

Friendship Bridge, the only border post for vehicles between the two 

countries, the Nepalese truck drivers and traders protested for 2 1/2 

days against Chinese Armed Police brutality on Tashi Gyaltsen. In 

August 1994, two Tibetans were stabbed by the Chinese police at 

Zhangmu (Dram). In August 1996, Tibetans protested against the 

Chinese police for beating to death a Tibetan at Dram Public Security 

Office.176 Another report indicated that Chinese police personnel 

maltreat common people and officials from the Nepalese side several 

ways at and across the border check post in Humla district.177

Sri Lanka.

While the civilian leadership of the PRC has been making efforts 

to build relations with Sri Lanka for the last 5 decades, the PLA’s role 

has been relatively less pronounced. Even though the Sri Lankan 

government recognized the PRC in 1950, full diplomatic relations 

started only from 1957. More important from the Chinese national 

security point of view, the Rubber and Rice Pact signed between the 

two countries in 1952 was to come in handy in the difficult years of 

U.S. trade embargoes against the PRC.178 Also, the Sri Lankan position 

on Taiwan, and more importantly, given its predominantly Buddhist 
orientation, Tibet and human rights are crucial for consolidating the 

PRC’s national interests.179

Other issues in which China has shown security concerns related to 

its support of Sri Lanka’s policy of “independence, peace, neutrality, 

and nonalignment” and its backing for the Sri Lankan proposal for 

declaring the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace in the backdrop of 

the UN Resolution of 1971.180 However, Sri Lankan support for the 

Indian nuclear tests in 1998 was unpalatable to China.

Nevertheless, one main area that directly affects security relations 

between the two countries is arms transfers. China has exported arms 

to Sri Lanka in the recent period to counter the Tamil rebels. During 

the tsunami events, the PLA logistics department exhibited interest 

in Sri Lanka. 181 The China North Industries Corporation (NORINCO) 

carried out most of the military transactions with Sri Lanka, although 

they are not without controversies related to corruption, etc.182

Conclusions.

The PLA has an active interest in South Asia and regional 

security that forms a crucial element in China’s policies toward the 

region. Although China’s overall role in South Asia has been limited 

except in times of crisis, recent policy initiatives from Beijing have 

been proactive. The PLA has been one of the crucial players as it has 

pushed for a role to deal with India and build linkages with other 

South Asian states. Among the issues addressed by the PLA on South 

Asia are countering “splittism” in Tibet and “separatism” in Xinjiang; 

promoting the recently launched Western Development Campaign in 

Tibet, Xinjiang, Yunnan and Sichuan; having a maximalist position of 

no compromise on border dispute resolution with India and Bhutan; 

having nuclearization of the region; the growing international clout 

of India with its economic and military rise; growing concern over 

the U.S. role in the region; and evolving strategies to enhance energy 

security in the Indian Ocean. 

The PLA’s views on South Asia as an institutional actor at times 

have differed from those of the civilian leadership. While such views 

on India differed between the PLA and civilian leadership during 

normal or nonconflict times, there has been a surprising coincidence 
of views of both the PLA and civilian leadership on other South Asian 

countries. Of late, with CBMs increasing in content and scale in the 

military and nonmilitary fields between India and China, there also 

has been a division within the PLA constituents. While some in the 

PLA have argued for “encircling” India or helping other South Asian 

countries against India in order to curb its “regional hegemony” and 

drive to become a “great power,” others saw in India the benefits of 

normalization in relations in the overall context of unipolarity and 

resolve to reunify with Taiwan. Given the “multiple rises” of China, 

Japan, and India in the recent period and renewed U.S. interest in 

the region, PLA responses are expected to be less confrontational but 

firm on India.

While the PLA’s strategy of confronting India has become more 

nuanced in the recent period, earlier policy called for exerting 

pressure on India. In Indian military circles, China’s actions were 

seen as an attempt by the PLA at the “strategic encirclement” or 

“marginalization” of India. This can be seen in the late 1985 PLA naval 

visits to Chittagong, Colombo, and Karachi, skipping Indian ports; 

continuing arms transfers to most of the South Asian countries, with 

Pakistan receiving the strategic weapons; and Bangladesh elevated 

in the Chinese security calculus with extensive military exchanges 

with these countries. The PLA military exchanges with the region 

indicate emphasis placed on Pakistan and Bangladesh, while ties 

with Indian armed forces remain sparse and defensive and conflict 

prevention in nature. Along with security considerations of both the 

countries, PLA’s close relations with Pakistan and Bangladesh have 

not been conducive to the full normalization of relations between 

China and India.

Overall, the PLA has painted a negative picture of India as 

dominating South Asia through increased defense preparation. In 

this context, policy fallout to counter such domination by India has 

been the PLA efforts to prop up other countries like Pakistan and 

Bangladesh. To a large extent, the PLA has been successful in pushing 

through this policy of the PRC in the last 4 decades. However, with 

the civilian leadership’s emphasis on building a “well-off society” by 

2020 and the resolve to focus on solving the Taiwan issue, it appears 

the PLA has adopted a nuanced approach to its South Asia policy, 
even as it maintained its traditional relations with the concerned 

countries. While there has been no let down on military cooperation 

with Pakistan, Bangladesh, or Nepal and Myanmar, the PLA has 

been expanding its contacts with the Indian military forces in terms 

of preventive CBMs and exchanges. The PLA leadership continues 

to follow a policy of balancing India by supporting Pakistan, 

Bangladesh, or Nepal; supplying nuclear and missile systems or 

components; and supplying small arms to insurgents in northeast 

India through a third party as “commercial” transactions. The PLA 

displayed identical views with the civilian leadership on Pakistan, 

Bangladesh, and Nepal and supported them to balance India. While 

there has never been a military alliance between China and Pakistan 

or with Bangladesh, these states are being courted extensively for their 

value in countering India, besides being sources for raw materials 

and markets for low technology arms of China. However, the PLA’s 

arms market and military cooperation with Pakistan, Bangladesh, 

and Myanmar are witnessing a rise in sophisticated arms transfers 

in the last few years. 

APPENDIX I

CHINA’S MILITARY DIPLOMACY WITH SOUTH ASIA

a. China-India Defense Personnel/Security Meetings.

Period Place Remarks

1956 Different Indian Defense Services delegation of nine

 members from the places in three services led

by Lieutenant General J. N. Chowdhury.

 China

1958 Shanghai INS Mysore headed by Admiral Srinivasan’s

 port call.

April 1987 Beijing Defense Minister KC Pant’s stop over visit en

 route to India from Pyongyang.

March 15-22, 1991 New Delhi Defense MFA bureau delegation visited.

May 15-31, 1991 Beijing Former Indian Army chief visited Beijing 

Strategic Studies Institute.

June 23-30, 1991 Beijing Indian Army Intelligence Bureau chief’s visit.

November 14-22, New Delhi NDU vice-president visited.

1991

March 26-April 6, Beijing IDSA Director visited Beijing International 

1992 Strategic Studies Institute.

July 24-30, 1992 Beijing Defense Minister Sharad Pawar’s visit.

August 30- Beijing National Defense College (NDC) delegation 

 visited.

September 5, 1992

April 30-May 9, New Delhi GLD deputy chief of staff visited.

1993

November 15-19, Bombay Visit by Chinese naval training ship Zheng He.

1993
December 18-23, New Delhi Deputy Chief of General Staff Lieutenant 

1993 General Xu Huizi’s visit.

March 6-16, 1994 New Delhi Chinese Air Force deputy chief of staff

delegation visit.

June 26-July 2, 1994 Beijing NDC delegation visited.

July 22-30, 1994 Beijing Chief of Army Staff General B.C. Joshi’s visit.

September 7-12, New Delhi Minister for National Defense General Chi 

1994 Haotian’s visit.

November 9-15, Beijing IAF intelligence bureau chief’s visit.

1994

March 15-22, 1995 Beijing Indian Army delegation’s visit.

September 8-11, Shanghai Indian naval vessels port call at Shanghai.

1995

December 20-27, New Delhi PLA Air Force delegation headed by deputy 

1995 commander Liu Shunyao’s visit.

March 10-19, 1996 New Delhi Chief of Naval Staff Admiral V. S. Shekhawat’s

 visit.

June 23-29, 1996 Beijing NDC Army department chairman visited.

July 3-10, 1996 New Delhi Jinan MR commander visited.

October 3-11, 1996 New Delhi PLA delegation visited.

May 26-31, 1997 Beijing Five-member delegation headed by Vice

Chief of Army Staff 

General Vice-President Malik visited.

June 6-12, 1997 New Delhi Chengdu MR Commander Lieutenant 

General Liao Xilong visited.

April 12-17, 1998 New Delhi Chinese NDU delegation led by Lieutenant 

General Dong Lisheng’s visit to NDC.

April 26-May 1, New Delhi Chief of General Staff Fu Quanyou’s visit. 

1998 The first ever visit by a Chinese chief of 

general staff. 
November 21, 1999 Nathu La Pass A telephone link was established in the 

Sikkim sector between Yatung garrison 

in Tibet and the 17th Mountain Division of 

the Indian Army to keep each other informed

of activities along the border and “defuse 

border tensions.”

March 6-7, 2000 Beijing As a result of E. A. M. Jaswant Singh’s visit to 

Beijing in June 1999, the first ever security 

dialogue between the two countries held by

MEA Joint Secretary (Disarmament) Rakesh 

Sood and Director-General of the Asian 

Department of the MFA, Zhang Jiuhuan. PRC 

told India to abide by the Chinese-backed 

UN Resolution 1172, calling for India to 

roll back its nuclear program. The meeting 

cames 2 weeks before U.S. President Clinton’s 

visit to India.

April 1, 2000 Nathu La Pass Commemorative border meeting of the 

Nathu La Brigade of India and Yatung 

garrison of the Chinese army authorities on

the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the

 establishment of diplomatic relations between 

 the two countries.

May 22-26, 2000 Beijing NDC delegation visit.

August 18-23, 2000 New Delhi Chinese Academy of Military Science 

delegation’s visit headed by General Tian 

Shuyan.

September 16-19, Shanghai Indian naval port calls at Shanghai with INS

2000 Delhi and a frigate.

April 1-7, 2001 Beijing Lieutenant General Kalkat, GOC-in-C,

 Eastern Command.

May 20-26, 2001 Beijing Air Chief Tipnis visited.

May 22-26, 2001 New Delhi NDU delegation headed by Zhang Xingye 

 visited.

May 27-30, 2001 Mumbai Two Chinese naval ships from the North Sea 

Fleet made a port call.
2

September 7-12, Mumbai Deputy commander of the Chengdu MR, 

2001 General Liu Baochen, with seven-member

delegation, including those from the Lanzhou

MR.

December 16-22, Mumbai Deputy Chief of Staff Lieutenant General 

2001 Zhang Li.

November 23- Chengdu and Indian Central Command delegation’s visit.

December 1, 2002 other places

April 2003 Beijing Defense Minister George Fernandes visit 

with a 16-member delegation.

July 2003 New Delhi Chinese Air Force delegation’s visit.

 and other

 places

November 10-14, Shanghai India-China naval drills near Shanghai with

2003 INS Ranjit, INS Kulish, and INS Jyoti.

November 2003 Tibet Indian military delegation’s first visit to Tibet.

March 26, 2004 New Delhi MND Cao Gangchuan’s visit to New Delhi as 

a part of his Pakistan, India, and Thailand 

 visit.

December 2004 Beijing Indian Army Chief General N. C. Vij’s visit.

January 24, 2005 New Delhi First “strategic dialogue” between the two 

countries with F. S. Shyam Saran and Wu 

Dawei delegations in talks on globalization 

and multipolarity, energy security, reform of 

the UN, border disputes, etc.

April 12, 2005 Beijing Yashwant Prasad, vice chief of the Indian 

naval staff, and his party met CGS Liang 

Guanglie.

May 2005 New Delhi CGS Liang Guanglie’s visit with 11-member 

delegation.
b. China-Pakistan Defense Personnel/Security Meetings.

Period Place Remarks

March 1988 Islamabad Chinese Air Force Chief Wang Hai visited.

March 1988 Beijing Pakistan naval chief of staff visited.

October 1988 Islamabad PLA deputy chief of staff visited.

December 1988 Beijing Pakistan Army chief of staff visited.

February 27- Islamabad Chief of Staff Chi Haotian visited.

March 3, 1989

March 20-26, 1989 Islamabad Xinjiang MR Commander visited.

September 9, 1989 Beijing Pakistan defense secretary’s delegation 

 visited.

October 8-13, 1989 Beijing Pakistan Army deputy chief of staff visited.

December 11-19, Islamabad Guangzhou MR Commander’s visit.

1989

December 24-26, Beijing Pakistan defense minister’s visit.

1989

February 19-27, 1990 Islamabad Minster for National Defense visited.

May 13-23, 1990 Beijing Pakistan naval chief of staff visited.

November 18-26, Beijing Pakistan Army delegation visited.

1990

December 30, 1990- Beijing Pakistan Army chief of staff visited.

January 2, 1991

March 17-24, 1991 Islamabad PLA deputy chief of staff visited.

June 2-9, 1991 Beijing Pakistan Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

 visited.

October 24-30, 1991 Beijing Pakistan Army chief of staff visited.
February 7-14, 1992 Islamabad Chinese naval commander’s visit.

May 10-18, 1992 Beijing Pakistan Air Force chief of staff.

May 17-25, 1992 Beijing Pakistan Army head of Chief of Staff Bureau.

August 16-25, 1992 Beijing Pakistan’s Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff

 visited.

September 27- Beijing Pakistan defense minister’s visit.

October 2, 1992

November 15-23, Beijing Pakistan Army’s air defense commander’s 

1992. visit.

March 11-15, 1993 Beijing Pakistan’s newly appointed Army chief

 visited.

May 6-14, 1993 Beijing Pakistan’s naval chief visited.

May 20-27, 1993 Islamabad Chinese Air Force commander’s visit.

December 1-7, 1993 Islamabad Chief of General Staff Zhang Wannian’s

 visit.

December 2-6, 1993 Beijing Pakistan defense minister’s visit.

February 27- Beijing Pakistan Army chief’s visit.

March 6, 1994

March 18-24, 1994 Islamabad Chinese Ordnance Factories delegation

 visited.

July 17-25, 1994 Beijing Pakistan’s tri-services public relations bureau

delegation visited.

July 17-21, 1994 Islamabad Defense Minister Chi Haotian’s visit.

September 18-25, Beijing Pakistan Air Force chief’s visit.

1994

October 6-14, 1994 Islamabad Chinese Navy’s East Sea Fleet’s naval aviation

 commander and others visited. This is the 

first time a naval aviation delegation visited 

Pakistan.
November 17-22, Islamabad NDU delegation headed by its vice-presi1994 dent.

November 20-24, Beijing Pakistan Army chief’s visit.

1994

November 20-27, Islamabad Lanzhou MR deputy commander’s delega1994 tion.

January 6-12, 1995 Islamabad General Logistics Department Director Fu

Quanyou’s visit.

April 23, 1995 Beijing Pakistan National Defense College delega-

 tion.

April 27, 1995 Beijing Pakistan Air Force chief’s visit.

May 28-June 4, 1995 Beijing Pakistan naval chief’s visit.

September 29- Islamabad NDU delegation.

October 8, 1995

October 22, 1995 Beijing Chairman of Joint Chief’s of Staff’s visit.

November 16-20, Islamabad PLA’s China North Industries delegation’s

1995 visit.

December 7-13, 1995 Islamabad PLA naval deputy commander’s visit.

December 8-17, 1995 Islamabad Lanzhou MR deputy commander’s visit.

June 22-27, 1996 Beijing Pakistan chief of army staff visited.

June 28-July 2, 1996 Islamabad PLA Navy Commander Zhang Lianzhong’s

 visit.

August 15-21, 1996 Islamabad PLA deputy chief of staff visited.

November 23-29, Islamabad PLA Air Force chief visited.

1996

November 29, 1996 Beijing Pakistan Army delegation’s visit.

December 29, 1996- Islamabad Chinese Air Force Commanders Academy’s

January 4, 1997 high-level unit’s visit.
February 23-28, 1997 Beijing Pakistan Defense College commandant’s 

 visit.

May 5-9, 1997 Islamabad Director of General Political Department Yu 

Yongbo visited.

August 21-27, 1997 Islamabad General Political Department’s Cadre 

Department deputy director visited.

October 31- Islamabad PLA Naval Commander Shi Yunsheng 

November 7, 1997 visited.

November 10-15, Islamabad PLA Logistics Department’s health 

1997 department’s deputy director visited. 

December 7-12, 1997 Islamabad Chinese Air Force Command Academy’s 

high level unit’s visit.

December 22-28, Islamabad Academy of Military Science vice president’s 

1997 visit.

March 1-8, 1998 Beijing Pakistan naval chief’s visit.

April 26-29, 1998 Beijing Pakistan’s National Defense College delega-

 tion visited.

May 10-16, 1998 Beijing A delegation of 20 members of Pakistan 

Military Medicine visited the PLA Medical 

Institute, No. 304 Military Institute, and the

Naval Hospital Institute.

August 23-28, 1998 Beijing Pakistan’s Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff

 visited.

October 23-29, 1998 Islamabad Deputy director of the GDP visited.

February 19-23, 1999 Islamabad Chinese Defense Minister Chi Haotian’s visit.

May 24-31, 1999 Beijing Pakistan Chief of Joint Staff Musharraf’s 

 visit.

June 7-13, 1999 Islamabad Chinese General Armaments Department 

Political Commissar Li Jinai’s visit.

August 16-22, 1999 Beijing Pakistan’s Air Force chief visited.
February 26- Islamabad Chinese Air force Commander Liu Shunyao’s

March 2, 2000 delegation.

May 6-11, 2000 Beijing Pakistan Defense College delegation’s visit.

May 22-28, 2000 Beijing Pakistan’s naval chief of staff’s visit.

June 14-18, 2000 Islamabad Chinese Armed Policy Department’s deputy 

political commissar’s visit.

August 7-14, 2000 Islamabad Deputy chairman of the Commission of 

Science and technology for National Defense 

 visited.

November 14-16, Islamabad Chinese naval delegation headed by its

 2000 political commissar participated in the

Pakistani-organized “2000 Year International 

Defense Exhibition.”

November 16-21, Islamabad Nanjing MR political commissar’s visit.

2000

February 16-23, 2001 Beijing Pakistan Air Force chief’s visit.

April 19-21, 2001 Islamabad Chief of General Staff Fu Quanyou’s visit.

April 23, 29, 2001 Beijing Pakistan Military Academy chief visited.

May 2-June14, 2001 Pakistan Chinese naval visit.

July 23-30, 2001 Beijing Pakistan’s Army chief of staff’s visit.

January 14-21, 2002 Beijing Pakistan’s chief of Joint Staff’s visit.

July 2003 Beijing General Mohammad Youaf, first deputy chief 

of general staff visited to attend the Second 

Round of China-Pakistan Defense and 

Security Consultation.

August 25, 2003 Zhurihe in A Pakistani delegate participated along with

Inner 14 other foreign military officers in observing

Mongolia a PLA armored brigade exercise.

 

September 2003 Islamabad Chief of the General Staff Liang Guanglie 

 visited.
September 2003 Islamabad First round of disarmament consultations 

 between the two sides.

October 21 2003 Beijing Pakistani Air Force Chief Marshal Kaleem

 Saadat visited.

October 2003 Shanghai Port call of Pakistan naval fleet. Conducted 

joint search and rescue exercises with the 

Chinese navy, the first of its kind between 

the Chinese and foreign navies.

November 5, 2003 Beijing General Musharraf met Defense Minister 

Cao Gangchuan.

March 23, 2004 Islamabad Defence Minister Cao Gangchuan visited.

April 27, 2004 Beijing Pakistani NDC delegation led by Rear

Admiral Syed Afzal met Lieutenant General

Fan Changlong, assistant chief of the general 

staff of the PLA.

c. China-Bangladesh Defense Personnel/Security Meetings.

Period Place Remarks

April 2-11, 1988 Beijing Bangladesh Army chief of staff visited.

March 7-13, 1989 Dhaka Chief of Staff Chi Haitian’s visit.

March 1989 Dhaka National Defense University President Zhang

 Zhen visited.

September 1989 Beijing Bangladesh Air Force chief of staff visited.

September 1989 Beijing Bangladesh naval delegation visited.

December 1989 Dhaka Naval Commander Zhang Lianzhong’s visit.

February 8-13, 1990 Dhaka Chinese Air Force Commander Wang Hai

 visited.

February 27- Dhaka Defense Minister’s visit.

March 4, 1990
April 25-May 1, 1991 Beijing Bangladesh Army chief of staff visited.

June 11-14, 1991 Dhaka PLA General Staff Department’s second

 department chief visited.

October 3-11 Beijing Bangladesh naval chief of staff visited.

November 22-25, Dhaka Deputy chief of staff visited.

1991

May 1992 Dhaka PLA Armored Corps commander’s visit.

May 1992 Beijing Bangladesh’s Armaments Unit’s National

Command Staff Institute’s head visited.

September 1992 Beijing Bangladesh’s Army Commander of Unit 9

and head of the Capital District visited.

November 1992 Beijing Bangladesh Air Force chief of staff visited.

May 17-20, 1993 Dhaka Chinese Air Force Commander Cao 

Shuangming’s visit. This was his first overseas 

 visit.

June 6-13, 1993 Beijing Bangladesh army chief visited.

October 24-29, 1993 Beijing Chinese naval vessel Zheng He from Dalian 

 visited.

November 28- Dhaka Chief of Staff Zhang Wannian visited.

December 1, 1993

January 12-16, 1995 Dhaka General Logistics Department Director Fu 

Quanyou’s visit.

February 13-16, 1995 Dhaka PLA Navy deputy commander’s visit.

June 5-12, 1995 Beijing Bangladesh Army chief’s visit.

October 29- Beijing Bangladesh Army’s delegation.

November 6, 1995

August 21-25, 1996 Dhaka PLA deputy chief of staff visited.

October 8-18, 1996 Beijing Bangladesh Navy chief of staff visited.
October 26- Beijing Bangladesh Chief of Air Staff Vice Marshal 

November 3, 1996 Jamal Uddin Ahmed visited.

 

November 7-12, Beijing Bangladesh Army chief visited.

1996

August 17-21, 1997 Beijing Bangladesh Defense Secretary’s visit.

August 30- Dhaka Eight-member delegation headed by Major

September 4, 1997 General Zhou Shaojun visited to attend the 

commissioning ceremony of a Landing Craft 

Tank at Postogola.

November 1-4, 1997 Dhaka Lanzhou MR Commander visited.

November 4-8, 1997 Hong Kong Bangladesh naval vessel Madhumati made 

 port call.

October 28- Dhaka Deputy Director of GDP Lieutenant General

November 2, 1998 Tang Tianbiao visited.

May 4-12, 1999 Beijing Bangladesh Army Chief Muhammad

Mustafizur Rahman’s visit.

June 13-16, 1999 Dhaka General Armaments Department Political

Commissar Li Jinai’s visit.

September 10-15, Dhaka Ministry of National Defense Foreign Affairs

1999 Office chairman’s visit.

October 31- Beijing An officer of the Armaments Bureau of the

November 8, 1999 Prime Minster’s Office visited.

March 28-April 5, Beijing Rear Admiral Abu Taher, Chief-of-Staff of 

2000 the Bangladesh Navy visited.

August 15-18, 2000 Dhaka Academy of Military Science Vice President

General Tian Shuyan led a delegation of 

military research and training personnel.

November 12-16, Dhaka Nanjing MR’s political commissar led a 

2000 delegation.

July 8-14, 2001 Beijing Bangladesh’s Chief of Army Staff Ahsan N.

Amin’s visit.
December 22-25, Dhaka Chinese Deputy Chief of Staff Gen Zhang 

2001 Li’s visit.

April 2002 Dhaka National Defense University delegation’s 

 visit.

June 2-8, 2002 Beijing Bangladesh’s Army chief visited.

August 19-26, 2002 Beijing Bangladesh’s Air Force chief’s visit.

December 23-29, Beijing Prime Minster Khaleda Zia’s visit. Defense 

2002 Cooperation agreement signed.

December 2003 Dhaka Deputy Chief of General Staff General Wu 

Quanxu visited.

September 22, 2004 Beijing Hasan Mashhud Chowdhury, Chief of Army

Staff of Bangladesh Army met Cao 

Gangchuan. Cao said China attached “great 

importance” to ties with Bangladesh and 

continued to support the latter’s efforts to 

“play a greater role in regional and world 

affairs.”

April 12, 2005 Beijing Mahbubur Rahman, advisor to the prime 

minister on national defense and security and 

chairman of the standing committee on the 

Ministry of Sefense of the Bangladesh 

Parliament met Chief of the General Staff 

Liang Guanglie.

May 21-24, 2005 Dhaka CGS Liang Guanglie’s visit with an 11-

member delegation.

d. China-Nepal Defense Personnel/Security Meetings

Period Place Remarks

November 29- Beijing Nepal’s defense secretary’s visit. This is the 

December 5, 1993 first such visit in 30 years. 

 

November 19, 1996 Beijing Visit of Army Chief Lieutenant General 

Dharmapalbar Singh Thapa.

May 13-19, 1997 Beijing Nepal defense secretary’s visit.
2

June 12-17, 1997 Kathmandu Chengdu MR commander visited with a 

seven-member delegation.

November 24- Beijing Nepal military delegation’s visit.

December 2, 1998

June 16-20, 1999 Kathmandu General Armaments Department Political

Commissar Li Jinai visited.

September 15-20, Kathmandu Ministry of National Defense Foreign Affairs

Office chairman visited.

December 7-13, 1999 Beijing Nepal Army Chief Prajwal Shumshere Jung

Bahadur Rana’s visit.

April 6-11, 2000 Kathmandu Chief of General Staff, Fu Quanyou and 

 others visited.

October 17-24, 2000 Beijing Deputy chief of Army Staff’s visit.

February 21-24, 2001 Kathmandu Chinese defense minister Chi Haotian’s visit. 

This is the first visit of a Chinese defense 

minister to Nepal.

August 22-30, 2001 Beijing Nepalese military delegation visited.

September 4-10, Kathmandu Lieutenant General Liu Baochen, Commander

2001 of Chengdu MR, visited with a seven-member 

delegation.

October 30- Beijing Defense Secretary of Nepal’s visit.

November 7, 2001

March 26, 2002 Beijing Army Chief Lieutenant-General Pyar Jung

Thapa and delegation visited.

September 15-21, Kathmandu Lanzhou MR Commander Lieutenant 

2002 General Zou Gengren’s seven memberdelegation visit.

April 2003 Beijing Defense Secretary MP Aryal visited.

October 15, 2003 Beijing Lieutenant General Victory Renan, Chief of 

General Staff of the Royal Nepalese Army 

 visited.
e. China-Sri Lanka Defense Personnel/Security Meetings.

Period Place Remarks

February 28- Colombo Ordnance Factories deputy manager visited.

March 4, 1993

March 21-April 2, Beijing Sri Lankan naval chief’s visit.

1994

June 10-17, 2002 Beijing Sri Lankan defense minister’s visit.

e. China-Maldives Defense Personnel/Security Meetings.

Period Place Remarks

April 14-18, 2001 Male Chief of General Staff Fu Quanyou’s visit.

November 10-15, Beijing Maldives national security bodyguard chief’s 

2001 visit.

Notes: This list is not exhaustive but reported in the sources below.

Sources: Zhongguo Waijiao (various Yearbooks from 1996-2005); Zhongguo Waijiao 

Gailan (Various Yearbook from 1989-1995); Various Indian Parliament debates 

and newspaper reports; PLA Daily website at www.chinamil.com.cn\site1\wjdwjlsl\

wjdwjlsl.htm and www.chinamil.com.cn\site1\wjdwjlsl\2002\2002.htm.

Appendix II

CHINA’S ARMS TRANSFERS TO SOUTH ASIAN COUNTRIES

a. Pakistan

Type Designation No. Year Delivery Remarks

Fighter F-6 100 1971 - -

Fighter/ A-5 Fantan A 98 (1991) - With Pakistan Air Force 

ground Squadrons 

attack Nos. 7, 16, and 26.

Fighter F-7M Airguard 40 (1991) 1993 Included 20 trainer version.

Fighter F-7MG (55) (2001) 2001-03 Included nine F-7PG.

Fighter F7MG 11 (2002) 2003 -

Fighter F-7P Skybolt 40 1992 - -

Fighter FC-1 - 1991 2005 Joint venture between 

China and Pakistan. Israeli 

avionics reportedly 

 incorporated.

Fighter Super 7 - 1999 - To Pakistan. Deal struck 

during PM Nawaz Sharif’s 

visit to China in June 1999

Fighter F-7 75 1983 1986-90 -

Fighter JF-17 150 (1999) 2006 Six reportedly delivered.

Air-to-air PL-12 - (2004) - For JF-17 contract to be 

missiles signed.

Fighter/ Q-5 Fantan-A 100 1984 1986 For final assembly in 

ground Pakistan.

attack

Fighter FT-7P 15 - - With PAF squadrons No. 2 

trainer at Masroor, Nos. 18 and 20 

at Rafique, and No. 25 at

Mianwali.

Trainer K-8 - 1999 - PRC offered for export to 

aircraft Egypt the Karakoram K-8 jets . 

Previously 75 of these also 

were offered to Pakistan

from 1991.
Trainer K-8 (6) (2001) 2003 Six delivered.

Transport Y-12 - - - -

ASW Z-9C (4) (2004) - Contract to be signed.

Helicopter

Portable Hong Ying-5 300 1988 - Arming M-113 APCs.

SAM

Portable Anza 450 1988 - -

SAM

Portable HN-5A - 1988 - License-production under

SAM way in Pakistan.

Portable QW-1 Vanguard (750) (1993) 1994-2003 Pakistan design Anza-2

SAM (License production).

MBT-2000 Al-Khalid (P90) - 1999 - Original agreement date

back to 1988. Chinese

NORINCO and Pakistan 

Heavy Industries Taxila are

 partners.

MBT T-59 975 (1975) 1978-90 -

MBT T-69 II 450 1989 1991-93 Deal worth $1.2 billion.

MBT T-85 II 12 1990 1993 -

Anti-tank Red 200 1989 1990-2003 10,600 to be delivered. 

missile Arrow 8 Pakistan design Bhaktar

 Shikan (Licence Produced).

Towed Gun Type 56 190 - - -

85mm

Submarine Romeo 2 1988 - For final assembly in

Pakistan.

Frigate Jiangwei 4 (2004) - Deal about $500-700 million.

Contract to be signed.

Fast Attack Hainan class 3 1977 - -

Craft (FAC)

Patrol

Hydrofoil Huzhuan 3 1971 - -

FAC patrol Huangfen - 1971 - -

FAC gun Shanghai 12 - - -
FAC Hegu 4 1981 - -

FAC Huangfen 4 1984 - -

FAC patrol Hainan 4 1976-80 - -

FAC Huzhuan 4 - - -

torpedo

ShShM C-801/802 4 1996 1997 For the four Jalata class FAC. 

system Eight probably delivered in

2004.

ShShM C-802 32 1996 1997 For the four Jalatas.

system

Fire Control Type 347G 2 (2003) 2004 One delivered in 2004. For 

Radar Jalata class

b. Bangladesh

Frigate Jianghu I class 2 (1988) 1989 The first, Xiangtan, was 

delivered in November 1989. 

 Status of the second is

 uncertain.

Frigate Jianghu class 4 - 1989 -

FAC Huangfen class 2 1992 - -

FAC-gun Shanghai class 8 - 1980-82 -

FAC Huangfen class 4 - 1988 -

FAC Hegu class - - 1983 -

FAC Hegu class - - 1992 -

FAC Patrol Hainan Class 2 - 1982 -

FAC Patrol Hainan Class 1 - 1985 -

FAC Patrol Hainan class 2 1991 - -

FAC Patrol Hainan class 6 1991 - Four delivered in 1993; 

six by 1995-96.

Patrol boat Haizhui class - - 1996 -

Mine- T-43 class 4 (1993) 1995-96 Bangladeshi designation 

sweeper Sagar class.

(Ocean)
Amphibious LCU/LCP- 8 - - -

warfare Yuchin

Tugs Hujiu class - - 1984 & 1995 -

ShShM L Hai Ying 2L 2 1988 1989 For two Jianghus

ShShM L Hai Ying 2L 2 1992 - For two Huangfens

ShShM Hai Ying 2 (24) 1988 1989 Arming two Jianghus

ShShM Hai Ying 2 (8) 1992 - -

ShShM Fei Lung - 1988 1989-90 Arming two Jianghus

Fighter/ A-5 Fantan 20 1989 1990 -

ground 

attack

Fighter F-6 40 1992 1992 -

Fighter F-7M Airguard 44 1992 1992-94 -

c. Sri Lanka

FAC Patrol Shanghai class 5 - 1972 -

FAC Patrol Shanghai class 3 1991 1994 Sri Lankan designation Rana

 Class

FAC Patrol Shanghai class 3 (1996) 1998 -

Patrol craft Haizhui class 9 1994 1995-98 Three supplied in August 

1995, three in May 1996, and

another three in August 1998.

FAC Patrol Haiqing class 2 (1995) 1997 -

Landing Yuhai class 1 (1996) 1997 -

Ship 

Artillery 122 mm and - 1991 1991 Two systems of 122 mm 

systems 130mm artillery acquired in mid1991.

Air CEIEC-408C (3) 2004 - Designation uncertain.

Surveillance 

radar

Sources: Yearbooks of SIPRI; Military Balance (various); Foreign Broadcast Information Service-CHINA (various).
ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 9

1. The author thanks Andrew Scobell, Larry Wortzel, Paul Godwin, Brantly 

Womack, Bernard Cole, Michael Swaine, June Teufel Dreyer, Harlan Jencks, 

Kenneth W. Allen, Gregory K. S. Man, Andrew Nathan, and Shirley Kan for their 

critique and suggestions in improving this revised manuscript submitted at The 

Heritage Foundation and the U.S. Army War College organized conference on 

September 24-25, 2005. Nevertheless, none of the above is responsible for the views 

or errors expressed in this article.

2. Ding Zengyi, “Indian-US Military Cooperation Raises Concern,” Liberation 

Army Daily, February 24, 2002, in Foreign Broadcasting Information Service-China 

Report-2002-0226 (hereafter FBIS-CHI), March 1, 2002.

3. Sun Jinzhong, “Toushi ZhongYin guanxi jiuge” [“A Look at the Sino-Indian 

Disputes in Perspective”] Nanya Yanjiu Qikan [South Asia Quarterly] (Chengdu), 

Issue 1, Serial No. 108, 2002, pp. 49-53. See Mao Zhenfa (Chief Editor), Bianfanglun 

[Border Defence Theory], Beijing: Military Academy Publication, 1996, pp. 132-134. 

Ma’s arguments here are well-known, although the volume is valuable in terms of 

the Chinese perspective on various aspects of border defense in general.

4. See Yang Pingxue, “A Trial Analysis of Factors Limiting Development of 

Sino-Indian Relations,” Nanya Yanjiu Qikan, No. 1, Serial No. 108, March 2002, 

pp. 38-41. Besides these, Yang also mentioned the irreconcilable disputes between 

India and Pakistan as also leading to tensions in the India-China relations. 

5. Arun Sahgal, “China’s Search for Power and Its Impact on India,” The Korean 

Journal of Defence Analysis, Vol. XV, No. 1, Spring 2003, pp. 155-182, especially pp. 

155, 171.

6. Pravin Sawhney, The Defence Makeover: 10 Myths that Shape India’s Image, New 

Delhi: Sage Publications, 2002, chapter 1, pp. 19-64.

7. This is based on interactions with Indian military officials.

8. Mohan Malik, “Nuclear Proliferation in Asia: The China Factor,” Australian 

Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 53, No. 1, 1999, pp. 31-41.

9. Valerie Niquet, “China and the Indian Subcontinent” China News Analysis, 

Taipei, No. 1555, March 1, 1996, p. 5.

10. John W Garver, “Asymmetrical Indian and Chinese Threat Perceptions,” 

Sumit Ganguly, ed., India as an Emerging Power, London: Frank Cass, 2003, pp. 

109-134.

 11. See Mark W. Frazier, “China-India Relations Since Pokhran II: Assessing 

Sources of Conflict and Cooperation,” National Bureau of Asian Research Journal 

Access Asia Review, Vol. 3, No. 2, 1999, at www.nbr.org. Frazier cited Chinese premier 

Zhu Rongji’s TV interview in July 1998 as voicing the security establishment’s 

usual depiction of India as striving for “regional hegemony.”
12. See Andrew Scobell, “‘Cult of Defense’ and ‘Great Power Dreams’: The 

Influence of Strategic Culture on China’s Relationship with India,” Michael R. 

Chambers ed., South Asia in 2020: Future Strategic Balances and Alliances, Carlisle 

Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2002, pp. 329-59, see especially p. 348.

13. See Michael Pillsbury, “China’s Strategic Outlook: A Case Study of Japan 

and India,” in his China Debates the Future Security Environment, Washington, DC: 

National Defense University, 2000.

14. Lei Guang, “From National Identity to National Security: China’s Changing 

Responses Toward India in 1962 and 1998,” The Pacific Review, Vol. 17, No. 3, 2004. 

On the 1998 nuclear tests, see also John W. Garver, “The Restoration of Sino-Indian 

Comity Following India’s Nuclear Tests,” The China Quarterly, No. 168, December 

2001, pp. 865-889. Some suggested that, while the Indian nuclear tests do not pose 

any fresh challenge to the PRC, the Indian prime minister mentioned in his letter 

to the U.S. president that China as a threat was seen in negative terms. See Zhuang 

Shengfu, “China Has Never Constituted a Threat to India,” International Strategic 

Studies, Beijing, No. 1, January 1999, pp. 49-54.

15. Cheng Feng and Larry M. Wortzel, “PLA Operational Principles and Limited 

War: The Sino-Indian War of 1962,” Mark Ryan, et. al. eds., Chinese Warfighting: The 

PLA Experience since 1949, Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe, 2005, pp. 173-197. On the 1962 

war, see also S. V. Thapliyal, “Battle of Eastern Ladakh: 1962 Sino-Indian conflict,” 

USI Journal, New Delhi, April-June 2005, pp. 282-98; and Roderick MacFarquhar, 

“War in the Himalayas, Crisis in the Caribbean,” in his The Origins of the Cultural 

Revolution: The Coming of the Cataclysm, Vol. 3, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 

1997, pp. 297-323.

16. Xia Liping, “A Perfect Application of PLA Operation Principles to a Limited 

War: Sino-Indian War of 1962,” Shanghai, unpublished manuscript.

17. John W. Garver, “Nuclear Weapons and the China-India Relationship,” 

Paper presented at conference on “South Asia’s Nuclear Dilemma,” Weatherhead 

Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, February 18-19, 1999, at 

meadev.nic.in/govt/johngarver-1.htm. 

18. Larry M. Wortzel, “Concentrating Forces and Audacious Action: PLA 

Lessons from the Sino-Indian War,” in Laurie Burkitt, et. al., eds., The Lessons of 

History: The Chinese People’s Liberation Army at 75, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies 

Institute, 2003, pp. 327-352.

19. See David L. Shambaugh, “China’s National Security Research Bureaucracy,” 

The China Quarterly, No. 110, June 1987, pp. 276-304; Ellis Joffe, “How Much Does 

the PLA Make Foreign Policy?” David S. G. Goodman and Gerald Segal, eds., 

China Rising: Nationalism and Interdependence, London: Routledge, 1997, pp. 53-70, 

especially pp.58-59.

20. Michael D. Swaine, “The PLA in China’s National Security Policy: 

Leaderships, Structures, and Processes,” The China Quarterly, No. 146, June 1996.
21. See Yang Jirui and Sun Jin, eds., Zhongguo Xibu da kai fa yu Nanya: Xianzhuang 

yu qianjing [China’s Western Development and South Asia: Current Situation and 

Prospects], Chengdu: Sichuan Publication Group, 2004. 

22. For an account of the policy shifts of China towards this region and the 

factors behind them, see Han Hua, “China and South Asia,” K.Santhanam and 

Srikanth Kondapalli, eds., Asian Security and China 2000-2010, New Delhi: Shipra 

Publications & IDSA, 2004, pp. 290-300. See also Cheng Ruisheng, “Sino-Indian 

Relations After India’s Nuclear Tests” May 20-22, 1999, at lxmi.mi.infn.it/~landnet/

NSA/cheng.pdf.

23. The adverse kill ratio for China was mentioned Georges Tan Eng Bok, “How 

Does the PLA Cope with ‘Regional Conflict’ and ‘Local War’?” Richard H. Yang, 

Chief ed., China’s Military: The PLA 1990/1991, SCPS Yearbooks, Boulder: Westview 

Press, 1991, chapter 11, pp. 150-151. 

24. Dennis J. Blasko, The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and Transformation for the 

21st Century, New York: Routledge, 2006, pp. 80-87. 

25. This is based on International Institute of Strategic Studies, Military Balance 

2004-2005, London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 2004, p. 151, and 

www.bharat-rakshak.com. 

26. This is based on Donald Goel, “A Comparison of the Military Forces in the 

China-Indian Border Area,” Kanwa Special Report, No. 1, October 1, 1998, at www.

kanwa.com/english/981001d.html, accessed on March 14, 2001.

27. Yuan Gangkun, “Yindu Kongjun : Zai Zhongyin bianjiang diqu bushu Su-30 

zhantouji” [“Indian Air Force: Deployment of Su-30 Fighter Aircraft in the IndiaChina Border Areas”], Xiandai Bingqi, Issue 306, June 2004, pp. 2-3.

28. R. V. Kumar, Chinese Air Force Threat, New Delhi: Manas Publications, 2003, 

p. 152. See chapter nine for the operational conditions of the Chinese Air Force in 

Tibet, pp. 145-64.

29. See Ashley J. Tellis, India’s Emerging Nuclear Posture: Between Recessed 

Deterrent and Ready Arsenal, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 58-75.

30. Vijai K. Nair, “The Chinese Threat: An Indian Perspective,” China Brief, Vol. 

1, Issue 9, November 8, 2001, at china.jamestown.org.html.

31. See Ravi Rikhye, “Thedo-Tibetan Border Today: Some Military Implications,” 

China Report, Vol. 24, No. 3, July-September 1988, pp. 289-98.

32. Donald Goel, “The Differences between China and India in the Military 

Capabilities,” Kanwa Special Report, No. 2, October 1, 1998, at www.kanwa.com/

english/981001e.html, accessed on March 14, 2001.

33. This is based on Andrei Pinkov, “China Adjusts Its Military Strategy 

Against India,” Kanwa Special Commentary, October 26, 1998, at www.kanwa.com/

english/981026e.html, accessed on March 14, 2001.

34. Sardar Aseff Ahmad Ali, “A New Nuclear Doctrine,” The Nation, Islamabad, 

June 25, 1998, FBIS-TAC-98-176, June 26, 1998.
2

35. See the entry on “Yindu” [“India”], Shijie Junshi Nianjian 2001 [World Military 

Yearbook 2001], at mil.qianlong.com/5051/2002-5-26/145@240422.htm, accessed on 

August 8, 2005.

36. See Li Yanan, “India Dreaming to be a Military Super Power,” Liberation 

Army Daily, June 12, 1999.

37. Wang Jiaqing, “International Watch: A ‘Shield’ That Doesn’t Hold Water 

and Can’t Stand Refuting,” Liberation Army Daily, June 14, 2001, FBIS-CHI-2001-

0614, June 18, 2001.

38. Yan Liwei, “Will India and Pakistan Go to War on a Large Scale?” Liberation 

Army Daily, May 27, 2002, FBIS-CHI-2002-0528, May 29, 2002.

39. See signed Editorial, “Yindu chazu Zhongya” [“India Participates in Central 

Asia”] Bingqi Zhishi, Issue 197, No. 3, 2004, p. 6.

40. This is based on my interviews in China in May-July 1998.

41. Cheng, cited at “Jiefangjun Bao Interview With Former Envoy to India 

Cited,” Zhongguo Xinwen She, May 27, 1998, FBIS-CHI-98-147, May 29, 1998.

42. “What Is the Intention in Wantonly Engaging in Military Ventures,” 

excerpted at “Jiefangjun Bao Cited on India Nuclear Tests,” Zhongguo Xinwen She, 

May 20, 1998, FBIS-CHI-98-140 May 23, 1998.

43. “The Ambition of Seeking Hegemony Is Completely Exposed,” excerpted 

at “Jiefangjun Bao Cited on India Nuclear Tests,” Zhongguo Xinwen She, May 20, 

1998, FBIS-CHI-98-140, May 23, 1998.

44. Liberation Army Daily, “Why India Is Making Haste to Cross Over the 

Nuclear Threshold,” Xinhua, May 14, 1998, FBIS-CHI-98-134, May 19, 1998.

45. Ding Zengyi, “India’s Attempt To Seek Hegemony Has Been Long-Standing 

- Interview With Liu Wenguo, Member of China South Asia Society,” Liberation 

Army Daily, May 26, 1998, FBIS-CHI-98-154, June 4, 1998.

46. “Commentary on Nuclear Tests,” Central People’s Radio May 19, 1998, 

FBIS-TAC-98-141, May 23, 1998.

47. Cao Yongsheng and Xu Yong, “India Seeks 21st Century Major Power 

Status,” Liberation Army Daily, February 11, 2002, FBIS-CHI-2002-0211, February 

14, 2002.

48. This study compares the national defensive power between the United 

States, Japan, China, and India from the 1960s. See Hu Angang and Liu Taoxing, 

“Zhong Mei Ri Yin guofang shili bijiao,” Zhanlue yu Guanli, Issue 61, June 2003, pp. 

40-45, especially see p. 42.

49. See Liu Siyuan, “Yindu junzhong de ‘dawei zhixing’,” Shijie Junshi, Issue 131, 

November 2003, pp. 36-37. Similar views were expressed by Du Zhaoping, “E 

Yin haijun yanbing yinduyang,” Xiandai Jianchuan, Issue 212, July 2003, pp. 37-38; 

and Qu Baolin, “Yindu: Xunsu fazhan de junshi daguo,” Junshi Shilin, Issue 157, June 

2003, pp. 23-25.
50. Zhang Wenmu, “Issue of South Asia in Major Power Politics,” Ta Kung Pao, 

September 23, 1998, FBIS-CHI-98-293, October 20, 1998. He viewed developments 

this regard as a part of a “mega chessboard” of U.S. strategy of expanding NATO 

as far as South Asia and separating Tibet and the western regions of China. This is 

a far cry from the Cold War period when the then two super powers did not show 

much interest in South Asia, as India’s limited national strength did not allow it to 

“stand on its own.” See also Zhang Wenmu, “The South Asian Post-Nuclear Tests 

Situation and Trends,” Ta Kung Pao, March 3, 1999, FBIS-CHI-1999-0310, March 

11, 1999.

51. Jian Hua, “The United States, Japan Want To Rope in India Which Cherishes 

the Dream of Becoming a Major Country,” Ta Kung Pao, June 6, 2001, FBIS-CHI2001-0604, July 6, 2001.

52. Wang Tao, “India’s Military Expenditure, Effects on Region,” Liberation 

Army Daily, March 18, 2002, FBIS-CHI-2002-0318, March 25, 2002.

53. Wang Ming, “Yindu sanjun: 2015 ‘weilai jundui’ dingxing” [“Indian Three 

Services: Finalising the Design for 2015 ‘Futuristic Military’”], PLA Daily, at www.

chinamil.com.cn\site1\jsslpdjs\2005-04\28\content_194033.htm. 

54. Wang Xudong and Yan Weijiang, “Explore the Secrets of India’s Special 

Forces,” Liberation Army Daily, October 31, 2001, FBIS-CHI-2001-1031, November 

5, 2001.

55. Nie Yun, “Yindu lujun chongqin dazao tezhong budui wei ‘ruchang’,” Guofangbao, 

May 24, 2005, at www.chinamil.com.cn\site1\jsslpdjs\2005-05\26\content_213938.

htm. 

56. See Li Lin, “Yindu lujun wuqi zhuangbei mian mianguan,” Junshi Shilin, 

Issue 154, March 2003, pp. 11-13. Another set of writers focused on the special 

operation forces that India is building up. See Han Qingli, et.al., “Nanya hu: Yindu 

tezhongbudui,” Bingqi Zhishi, Issue 184, February 2003, pp. 40-41.

57. An Binggong, “Yindu kaishi jianzao xin hangmu” [“India Starts Building a 

New Aircraft Carrier”], PLA Daily, May 25, 2005, at www.chinamil.com.cn\site1\

jsslpdjs\2005-05\26\content_213942.htm. See also Ge Lide and Wang Jingguo, 

“Yindu hangmu, ni neng gaosu women shenme,” Shijie Junshi, Issue 138, June 2004, 

pp. 25-30.

58. Jiang Nan, “Yindu quhujian 50 nian” [“India at 50 Years”], parts 1 and 2, Xiandai 

Jianchuan, Nos, 223 and 224, June-July 2004, pp. 8-13 and 10-14, respectively.

59. This is the subject of Li Jie, “Yindu jiasu fazhan heqianting de zhanlue sikao” 

[“India’s Speedy Development of Strategic Thought on Nuclear Powewred 

Submarines”], Xiandai Jianchuan, No. 4, Issue 209, April 2003, pp. 15-16, on Indian 

efforts to acquire such capability from Russia. 

60. See Liang Guihua, “Yinduyang shang de ‘youling’” [“An Actor on the Indian 

Ocean”], Xiandai Bingqi, Issue 295, July 2003, pp. 12-15.

61. Gautam Datt, “Navy To Set Up Base for UAV’s in Andaman,” The Asian 

Age, November 10, 2003. 
62. Zhu Zaiming, “India Speeds up Development of Oceangoing Fleets,” 

Liberation Army Daily, June 5, 2002, FBIS-CHI-2002-0605 June 10, 2002.

63. Su Ping, “Yindu junshi liliang jieshao” [“Introduction to Indian Military 

Power”] PLA Daily at www.chinamil.com.cn\site1\ztpd\2004-09\07\content_4803.

htm. 

64. Cui Jianchuang and Bi Shuqin, “Yinkongjun tigao jingque daji nengli” [“Indian 

Air Force Enhances Precision Abilities”] PLA Daily, May 25, 2005, at www.chinamil.

com.cn\site1\jsslpdjs\2005-05\26\content_213943.htm. 

65. Song Dazhao, “Yindu kongjun zhuangbei shuangzuo xing ‘meizhouhu’ kongjiqi” 

[“Indian Air Force Equips Double-Seater ‘Jaguar’ Deep Strike Aircraft”] at mil.

qianlong.com/4919/2005/08/04/228@2751343.htm, accessed on August 5, 2005.

66. Sujan Datta, “Peace Games with China,” The Telegraph, Calcutta, May 31, 

2003.

67. Pratap Chakravarty, “India Relies on Aging MiGs to Guard Frontier Posts 

Near China,” AFP, May 31, 2003, FBIS-NES-2003-0531, June 2, 2003.

68. “MeiYin junshi guanxi fazhan xunsu ezhi Zhongguo zhengwei ‘gongshi’”, June 

12, 2003, at news.sohu.com/58/17/news210041758.shtml, accessed on March 28, 2003.

69. Chun Xiao, “Yindu ‘akasi’ dikong daodan jiang zai jinnian dizhuang pei budui” 

[“The Development of U.S.-India Military Relations . . .”], PLA Daily, May 10, 

2005, at www.chinamil.com.cn\site1\jsslpdjs\2005-05\13\content_202998.htm. For 

a comparison between the Akash series of missiles with that of the Chinese, see 

Chen Guoying, “Yindu daodan ‘yanghuo’ duo ‘guohuo’ yutu chongwei” [“India’s 

Missiles . . .”], PLA Daily, at www.chinamil.com.cn\site1\jsslpdjs\2005-04\28\

content_194064.htm. Chen adds that India preferred to acquire its missile systems 

through indigenous methods rather than from the United States.

70. See “Yindu jundui zhuangbei de dandaodaodan” [Indian Military Equips with 

Ballistic Missiles], www.qianlong.com, August 12, 2002, at database.cpst.net.cn/popul/

guard/zbdg/artic/20812091326.html, accessed on August 5, 2005.

71. See “Yindu xiang Eluosi goumai 2 sou he qianting” [“India to Purchase 2 

Nuclear Submarines From Russia”], Xiandai Jianchuan, Issue 229, December 2004, 

p. 2.

72. Fang Hua, “India’s ‘Agni’ Increasingly Intense, ICBM to Be Launched 

Soon,” Liberation Army Daily, June 11, 2001, FBIS-CHI-2001-0611, June 14, 2001.

73. Qian Feng, “India’s Attempt To Build Antimissile Defense System,” People’s 

Daily, August 7, 2004, FBIS-CHI-2004-0807, October 14, 2004.

74. Dong Guozheng, “A Dangerous Signal,” Liberation Army Daily, January 31, 

2002, FBIS-CHI-2002-0131, February 1, 2002.

75. Dai Wenming, “Yindu jiasu fazhan zhencha weixing yongyu huoqu zhanlue 

qingbao” [“India Accelerates Development of Reconnaissance Satellites to Obtain 

Strategic Intelligence”], PLA Daily, May 17, 2005, at www.chinamil.com.cn\site1\
jsslpdjs\2005-05\26\content_213827.htm. India launched a high resolution satellite 

April 2005 and planned to launch one more later the year. See also www.chinamil.

com.cn\site1\jsslpdjs\2005-05\13\content_202992.htm. 

76. Yi Fan, “Yindu hangtian fazhan zongshu,” Hangkong Zhishi, Issue 387, July 

2003, pp. 41, 22. 

77. “India’s Missile System Gradually Takes Shape.” Liberation Army Daily, 

February 6, 2002. FBIS-CHI-2002-0206. February 11, 2002.

78. This is based on Ravi Visvesaraya Prasad, “Hack the Hackers,” at 37.s5.

com/, accessed on March 20, 2004. Prasad mentioned here the Chinese task force as 

headed by Xie Guang with members such as Chief of General Staff Fu Quanyou; 

Yuan Banggen, Head of General Staff Directorate; Major General Wang Pufeng; 

Senior Colonel Wang Baocun; Shen Weiguang; Wang Xiaodong; Qi Jianguo; Liang 

Zhenxing; Yang Minqing; Dai Qingmin; Leng Bingling; Wang Yulin; and Zhao 

Wenxiang. While Qi and Dai have formulated the program, Leng Bingling, Wang 

Yulin, and Zhao Wenxiang reportedly are in charge of mobilizing students and 

businessmen to support their military’s cyber attacks against civilian targets in 

these countries. He also mentioned several information warfare exercises with 

India as a potential target.

79. Shih Chun-yu, “Why Are the United States and India Getting Close?” Ta 

Kung Pao, August 14, 2001, FBIS-CHI-2001-0814, August 15, 2001; and Zhang 

Wenmu, “Issue of South Asia in Major Power Politics,” Ta Kung Pao, September 

23, 1998, FBIS-CHI-98-293, October 20, 1998. See also Wang Ruolai, “What Are 

the Intentions of the United States and India in Cozying Up with One Another?” 

People’s Daily, August 29, 2001, FBIS-CHI-2001-0830, August 29, 2001; Shih Chunyu, “Both the United States and India Have Own Intention in Making Friends,” 

Ta Kung Pao, September 5, 2001, FBIS-NES-2001-0905, September 5, 2001. Gong 

Yaowen has argued that Powell’s visit to South Asia in the aftermath of the 9/11 

events was to mediate between India and Pakistan so that a united fight against 

terrorism is made. See “Colin Powell Will Go to South Asia as a Mediator,” Ta 

Kung Pao, October 14, 2001, FBIS-NES-2001-1015, October 18, 2001. 

80. Liu Ying, “Reasons Behind Warming of India-U.S. Military Relations,” 

Liberation Army Daily, August 22, 2001, FBIS-CHI-2001-0822, August 24, 2001. See 

also Shih Chun-yu, “Why Are the United States and India Getting Close?” Ta Kung 

Pao, August 14, 2001, FBIS-CHI-2001-0814, August 15, 2001.

81. See “India Needs to Eliminate ‘Anxiety About China’,” People’s Daily, 

September 6, 2001, FBIS-CHI-2001-0906, September 7, 2001.

82. Nie Hongyi, “India Prepares To Establish Nuclear Armored Troops,” 

Liberation Army Daily, September 3, 2001, FBIS-CHI-2001-0904, September 7, 2001. 

Nie mentioned that India is about to acquire 3,700 km range Agni III missiles by 

2002 and a Surya ICBM with a range of about 5,000 km by 2003, Tu-22M3 strategic 

bombers, six SSBNs, and other long-range weapon systems the near future.

83. See “US Consent to India’s Nuclear Weapons Program to Gain Support 

for NMD-China,” as cited by PNS, September 8, 2001, at paknews.com/top.

php?id=1&date1=2001-09-08. 
84. Shih Chun-yu, “India and USA Accelerate Military Cooperation,” Ta Kung 

Pao, January 25, 2002, FBIS-CHI-2002-0125, January 28, 2002.

85. Ding Zengyi, “Indian-US Military Cooperation Raises Concern,” Liberation 

Army Daily, February 24, 2002, FBIS-CHI-2002-0226, March 1, 2002.

86. Zhang Guoping, “United States and India Hold First Joint Military Exercise 

in 39 Years; Each Has Its Aims in Developing Military Ties,” Liberation Army 

Daily, May 20, 2002, FBIS-CHI-2002-0521, May 22, 2002. Zhang mentioned about 

the “Balance Iroqois” exercises held in Agra and Alaska. On this subject, the 

civilian assessments are similar to the PLA assessment. See Zhao Yuhua, “India’s 

Domineering Military Exercises,” People’s Daily, May 14, 2002, FBIS-CHI-2002-

0514, May 15, 2002.

87. Wang Yusheng, “Cold War ‘Experts’ Disappointed Again,” Liberation Army 

Daily, November 24, 2003, FBIS-CHI-2003-1124, November 28, 2003. 

88. Shih Chun-yu, “United States Draws India, Israel, and Turkey to Its Side 

To Form Alliance,” Ta Kung Pao, February 14, 2003, FBIS-CHI-2003-0214, February 

19, 2003.

89. Chu Yun-kai, “China, Pakistan Joint Military Exercise Aims at Breaking 

Potential Circle of Containment,” Hong Kong Economic Journal, October 30, 2003, 

FBIS-CHI-2003-1030, November 12, 2003.

90. Yan Feng, “Why Is United States So Ill At Ease?” Liberation Army Daily, June 

3, 2002, FBIS-NES-2002-0603, June 6, 2002.

91. Kung Yao-wen, “The Situation in South Asia Viewed in Terms of Central 

Asia’s Energy Resources,” Ta Kung Pao, June 2, 2002, FBIS-NES-2002-0603, June 6, 

2002.

92. Shih Chun-yu, “India’s Military Exercises Aim at Dominating South Asia,” 

Ta Kung Pa, May 16, 2002, FBIS-WEU-2002-0516, June 3, 2002.

93. “Chinese on Sikkim Tour,” The Telegraph, October 16, 2003. 

94. For instance, even as Indian Prime Minister A. B. Vajpayee was attempting 

normalization of relations with the PRC in June 2003, Chinese frontier guards 

ill-treated the Indian patrols in the Arunachal Pradesh areas during the same 

period.

95. This is based on in interviews with several officials at Delhi and other 

places.

96. See Rahul Datta, “Indian Army Gives Priority to Mapping India-China 

Border,” The Pioneer, September 6, 2001, p. 5; and “High Level Chinese Military 

Team to Visit India,” The Asian Age, September 6, 2001, p. 3.

97. See Luke Harding, “The Forgotten Flashpoint between Nuclear Powers,” 

The Guardian, October 16, 2000.

98. See “China Refutes Reports About Border Incursions,” PTI report cited in 

Times of India, December 30, 2001. 
99. “After Pak, It Is Intrusion From China: Thupstan,” UNI Report, Jammu Daily 

Excelsior, September 27, 2003, FBIS-NES-2003-0927, September 29, 2003.

100. Jairam Ramesh, “Growing ambivalence,” The Telegraph, May 29, 2003; and 

“Is India China’s Imaginative Rival?” People’s Daily, February 24, 2004, at service.

china.org.cn/link/wcm/Show_Text?info_id=88256&p_qry=India, accessed on February 

25, 2004.

101. The Huawei company reportedly denied these allegations. See Anita 

Narayan, “Huawei’s Indian Branch Cleared of Taliban Link,” December 14, 

2001, at www.chinaonline.com/issues/foreign_relations/NewsArchive/cs-protected/2001/

December/C01121403.asp. 

102. “India Challenges China in South China Sea,” Strafor.com weekly analysis, 

April 26, 2000, at www.atimes.com/ind-pak/BD27Df01.html. 

103. Jian Hua, “The United States, Japan Want To Rope in India Which 

Cherishes the Dream of Becoming a Major Country,” Ta Kung Pao, June 6, 2001, 

FBIS-CHI-2001-0604, July 6, 2001. Jian also implies Indian deployment of UAVs on 

the India-China border areas, wiretapping of telephone lines in Tibet bordering 

India, close collaboration with the United States and Japan, etc., as other features 

of this counter-encirclement strategy and to target China.

104. See Liu Weijun, “Taiwan, India Developing Secret Military Ties,” AFP, 

citing United Daily News, January 3, 2002, at museums.cnd.org/Global/02/01/03/020103-

0.html.

105. This is based on Srikanth Kondapalli, “China: Mixed Signals to Confidencebuilding Measures,” India and Neighbours, New Delhi: CNF Publications, 2005, 

pp. 35-52. See also Rosemary Foot, “Chinese-Indian Relations and the Process of 

Building Confidence: Implications for the Asia-Pacific,” Pacific Review, Vol. 9, No. 

1, 1996, pp. 62-65.

106. Indian Ministry of External Affairs, Annual Report 1991-92, p. 17.

107. “Sino-Indian Joint Exercise; Strong Hint of Feeling Out Strategies,” World 

Journal, May 28, 2001, as cited at www.ndu.edu/inss/China_Center/Chinaframe.htm. 

108. According to Zhang Jingyu, “Indian Defense Minister Announces that 

India-China Naval Exercise Will Begin Soon,” People’s Daily, October 31, 2003, at 

FBIS-CHI-2003-1101, November 5, 2003. These operations were to be reciprocated 

by both sides, although only Indian ships visited Shanghai in November. See 

Meng Yan, “Chinese and Indian Navies Take to the Water Together,” China Daily, 

November 14, 2003.

109. Wen Haiyan and Wu Hanyue, “Chinese and Indian Navies Conduct a 

Joint Search and Rescue Exercise at Sea for the First Time,” Liberation Army Daily, 

November 15, 2003, FBIS-CHI-2003-1115, November 17, 2003.

110. Ts’ai Chih-ch’eng, “Chinese and Indian Navies Conduct Joint Search-andRescue Exercise in East China Sea,” Ta Kung Pao, November 15, 2003, FBIS-CHI2003-1115, November 17, 2003.
111. Liao Yameng, “Expert Analyzes the ‘Balancing’ Strategies of China, India, 

and Pakistan,” Wen Wei Po, November 7, 2003, FBIS-CHI-2003-1107, November 13, 

2003. Meng mentioned that South Asia is crucial as it forms China’s “backyard” 

and that the region constitutes a potential “dynamite depot” of the world.

112. “ZhongYin bianfang jun shouban tiyu jiaoliu shuangfang bing deng chang xianyi” 

[“China-India from Her Defense . . .”], at news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2004-11/07/

content_2188597.htm, accessed on March 11, 2005.

113. Zhang Tian and Ya Long, “Yindu Junfang-Yi yaoqing Zhongguo jundui 

rujing canjia fangong yanxi” [“Indian Military: Invitation to the Chinese Military 

to Participate in Counterterrorism Maneuvers”], news.xinhuanet.com/world/2005-

01/04/content_2413838.htm, accessed on March 11, 2005.

114. See Qudssia Akhlaque, “Red lines Won’t Be Crossed, Hopes Pakistan: 

Indo-China Joint Military Exercises,” The Dawn, December 30, 2004, at www.dawn.

com/2004/text/top8.htm, accessed on March 9, 2005.

115. “China’s Development Cause of Concern: Vij,” PTI Report, Jammu Daily 

Excelsior, November 19, 2003, FBIS-CHI-2003-1119, November 20, 2003.

116. Ding Zengyi, “China and India Jointly Write the New Chapter of Good 

Neighborliness and Friendship,” Liberation Army Daily, June 30, 2003, FBIS-CHI2003-0630, July 7, 2003. 

117. Wang Yusheng, “Cold War ‘Experts’ Disappointed Again,” Liberation 

Army Daily, November 24, 2003, FBIS-CHI-2003-1124, November 28, 2003.

118. Liao Ya-meng, “The Second Sino-Indian Normalization,” Wen Wei Po, June 

20, 2003, FBIS-CHI-2003-0620, June 23, 2003.

119. “China Values Military Ties With Neighboring Countries,” Xinhua, March 

2,2004, at www.chinaembassy.org.au/eng/wgc/t80309.htm, accessed on June 8, 2005.

120. See Tao Deyan and Zhang Binyang, “Zhuanjia zonglun Zhongguo heping jueqi 

jinglue” [“Experts Discuss China’s Peaceful Rise Concept”], Zhongguo Zhengzhi 

Xue, May 18, 2004 (originally published in Guoji Xianqu Daobao, at www.cpd.org.cn, 

accessed on July 23, 2005).

121. “Zhongguo ying xuanze daguo zhanlue: Fang Zhongguo Renmin daxue jiashou 

Gu Haibing” [“China Needs to Adopt a Great Power Strategy: Interview with 

Chinese People’s University Professor Gu Haibing”] Zhongguo Zhengzhi Xue, June 

29, 2004, at www.cp.org.cn accessed on July 23, 2005 [article originally published 

China Economic Times]. 

122. Hu Xin, “Guoji liliang ‘duozhong jueqi’ shiye xia de Zhongguo jueqi zhilu” [“The 

Pathway of Chinese Rise in View Of ‘Multiple Rises’ in International Power”], 

Zhongguo Zhengzhi Xue, May 18, 2004 (originally published in Guoji Xianqu Daobao

[International Herald Guide]).

123. Samina Yasmeen, “Sino-Pakistan Relations and the Middle East,” China 

Report, Vol. 34, Nos. 3 and 4, 1998, pp. 327-343. For the geo-political link with 

Pakistan, see Lin Liangguang, et. al., 2001, p. 114.
124. See John W. Garver, Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth 

Century, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2001; Mohan Malik, “The China 

Factor in the India-Pakistan Conflict,” Occasional Paper Series, Asia-Pacific Center 

for Security Studies, Honolulu, Hawaii, November 2002; Shao Zhiyong, “India’s 

Big Power Dream,” Beijing Review, April 12, 2001, p. 10.

125. See An Qiguang, “Zhonghua renmin gongheguo yu Bajisitan guanxi” [“PRC 

and Pakistan Relations”], Tang Jiaxuan ed., Zhongguo Waijiao Ci Indian [Dictionary 

of China’s Diplomacy], Beijing: World Knowledge Publications, 2000, pp. 552-553, 

p. 552.

126. See “Dhaka Airstrip Used by CIA for Covert Operation,” Independent 

(Dhaka), April 23, 1999.

127. See Samina Yasmeen, “China and Pakistan in a Changing World,” K. 

Santhanam and Srikanth Kondapalli, eds., Asian Security and China 2000-2010, 

New Delhi: Shipra Publications & IDSA, 2004, pp. 309-19.

128. John Garver, “Sino-Indian Rapprochement and the Sino-Pakistan Entente,” 

Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 111, No. 2, 1996, pp. 323-347, cited on pp. 324 and 

345.

129. Yu cited “Pakistan President Meets Chinese Military Delegation,” Xinhua,

May 06, 1997, FBIS-CHI-97-126, May 7, 1997.

130. See “The Solid Foundation For Sino-Pakistani Friendship: High Level of 

Mutual Trust,” International Strategic Studies, Beijing, No. 1, Serial 71, January 2004, 

pp. 25-27 [emphases added]. 

131. For this revelation by Jiang himself, see “President Jiang Zemin Met with 

Pakistan Chief Executive Officer Pervez Musharaf,” September 10, 2000, at www.

fmprc.gov.cn/eng/5116.html [downloaded on August 10, 2002].

132. “Jiang Backs Pakistan Role Afghan Peace Aims,” China Daily, January 17, 

2002, p. 1.

133. This is based on Chinese Foreign Ministry Policy Research Division’s 

Zhongguo Waijiao 2003 nianban [China’s Foreign Affairs 2003 edition], Beijing: World 

Knowledge Publication, 2003, p. 240.

134. See “China Tilts Toward India on Kargil Conflict” at www.strafor.com, 

June 16, 1999. See also He Chong, “The Historical Roots of the ‘Kashmir Conflict’ 

Between India and Pakistan,” Zhongguo Tongxun She, June 14, 1999, FBIS-CHI1999-0615, June 16, 1999.

135. See Lin Liangguang, et. al., 2001. Wang Taiping, writing for the Ministry 

of Foreign Affairs history during the 1970s, termed the Sino-Pakistan objective as 

“common struggle” [gongtong touzheng]. See Wang Taiping, ed., Zhonghua renmin 

gongheguo wiajiaoshi 1970-1978 [PRC’s Diplomatic History 1970-1978], Beijing: World 

Knowledge Publications, 1999, p. 110. 

136. For details about the Chinese advice, see General Mohammad Musa, 

My Version: India Pakistan War 1965, Wajidalis, Lahore, Pakistan, 1983, as quoted 
Ahmad Faruqui, “China’s Defence Policy and Its Implications for Pakistan,” www.

defencejournal.com/2001/feb/china-defence.htm. Marshal Chen Yi reportedly advised 

Pakistan, during his visit to Karachi on September 4, to occupy Aknoor Fort first 

and deny India the advantages the war. Altaf Gauhar’s account of this period as 

well recounts Zhou Enlai’s and Chen Yi’s advice to visiting President Ayub Khan 

September 1965 on the need to wage a protracted warfare, raising people’s militia, 

etc. See Gauhar as cited “Chinese Wisdom for Pakistan’s Benefit,” The Dawn, 

reprinted The Asian Age, July 26, 1999. 

137. “Chinese Government Leaders Condemn Indian Expansionism And 

Aggression Against Pakistan,” Beijing Review, No. 38, September 17, 1965, pp. 10-

11 (Zhou cited on p. 10).

138. “Chairman Liu Shao-chi [Shaoqi] Visits Pakistan,” Beijing Review, No. 

14, April 1, 1966, p. 3. During this occasion, President Ayub acknowledged the 

Chinese support “in that hour of trial.” Ibid., p. 4.

139. “Chairman Liu Shao-chi’s Speech,” Beijing Review, No. 14, April 1, 1966, p. 

5 [emphases added].

140. “China-Pakistan Joint Communiqué,” March 31, 1966, Beijing Review, No. 

15, April 8, 1966, p. 6.

141. See Wang Taiping, 1999, op.cit., p. 110.

142. See Faruqui, op. cit. During the secret conclave between U.S. Secretary of 

State Henry Kissinger and Chinese Permanent representative to the UN Huang 

Hua on December 10, 1971, at New York, the latter, after listening to the imminent 

fall of West Pakistan in the 1971 War, asserted, “China would never stop fighting 

as long as it had a rifle in its armory; it would surely increase its assistance to 

Pakistan.” However, no direct and active Chinese support to Pakistan was 

forthcoming. As explained by Zhou Enlai to Kissinger in Beijing during Nixon’s 

visit, “Of course, we don’t interfere in other’s internal affairs, but Yahya really did 

not lead his troops in East Pakistan. Even though we assisted with armaments, 

we didn’t send a single military personnel, who the Soviet Union calls military 

adviser. We only sent people to train in the use of the planes and guns we sent 

and afterwards brought those people back.” Zhou cited in “Chinese Wisdom for 

Pakistan’s Benefit,” The Dawn, reprinted The Asian Age, July 26, 1999.

143. See Tang Jiaxuan, ed., Op.cit., 2000, p. 552. 

144. Zafar Iqbal Rao, “China and the Muslim World—A Glance at Military 

Relations,” Rawalpindi Nawa-i-Waqt, August 16, 2001, FBIS-CHI-2001-0817, 

August 20, 2001. He also adds that China has set up a nuclear reactor in Algeria, 

supplied chemical weapons to Libya, sold medium range ballistic missiles to Saudi 

Arabia, transferred nuclear technology to Iraq, Libya, and Syria, and signed a 10-

year agreement with Iran on supply of nuclear weapons in 1990. See also “China 

Helping Pakistan Build Missiles: Report” at www.dawn.com/2000/07/03/top5.htm; 

and “China Increased Missile Sales to Pakistan: US,” at www.dawn.com/2000/08/10/

top8.htm that cited reports from the United States. 
145. See “China, Pakistan Sign Secret Pacts: Military Agreements Raise Concerns 

Over Nuke Technology” at www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_

ID=26907 accessed on March 20, 2004. This report cites U.S. intelligence sources 

as mentioning transfers recently of not only F-8 fighters, but also ballistic missile 

materials for Pakistan’s Shaheen-1 and Shaheen-2 types of missiles.

146. Muhammad Saleh Zafir, “Pakistan, China Agree to Enhance Defense 

Cooperation,” Rawalpindi Jang, September 7, 2001, FBIS-CHI-2001-0913, September 

14, 2001.

147. “PN Allowed to Negotiate Purchase of Chinese Frigates,” The News, 

February 21, 2003, FBIS-CHI-2003-0221, February 24, 2003.

148. Azim Zaidi, “Pakistan Has Produced Modern Jet Fighter Aircraft Super 

Seven with China’s Cooperation,” Khubrain, May 30, 2003, FBIS-CHI-2003-0530, 

June 2, 2003. 

149. “China Offers to Sell F-7MG Aircraft to Pakistan,” Editorial at Rawalpindi’s 

Nawa-i-Waqt, June 4, 2000, FBIS-CHI-2000-0607, June 8, 2000.

150. See Ihtashamul Haque, “POF Will Manufacture T-80 Tank Shells: China 

To Transfer Technology,” at www.dawn.com/2001/06/02/top3.htm. 

151. Brigadier Retd A. R. Siddiqi, “HIT: Rebuild to Manufacture,” The Nation, 

August 1, 2001, FBIS-CHI-2001-0801, August 2, 2001. 

152. Hsiao Peng, “China Sells Sophisticated Weapons To Help Pakistan Deal 

With War,” Sing Tao Jih Pao, October 26, 2001, FBIS-NES-2001-1026, October 29, 

2001. Hsiao adds that these LY-60N medium-to-low range all weather missile 

systems were developed and produced by the Shanghai Space Technology 

Research Institute. It can track and follow 40 targets and its interception capability 

stretches between 30 and 1200 meters. 

153. Zheng Hong, “The Thick Nuclear Haze is Flowing in the Sky of South 

Asia,” Liberation Army Daily, June 3, 2002, FBIS-CHI-2002-0603, June 6, 2002.

154. Zha Chunming, “Zhongba haijun shouci haishang soujiu yanxi” [“SinoPakistan First Naval Search and Rescue Operation at Sea], Bingqi Zhishi, Issue 194, 

December 2003, pp. 28-29.

155. Qian Xiaohu and Ding Zengyi, “Building a Sea to Sky ‘Life Channel’—

Witnessing the Sino-Pakistani Joint Maritime Search and Rescue Exercise,” 

Liberation Army Daily, October 23, 2003, FBIS-CHI-2003-1023, October 27, 2003; 

and Zha Chunming, “Zhongba haijun shouci haishang soujiu yanxi” [“Sino-Pakistan 

first Naval Search and Rescue Operation at Sea”] Bingqi Zhishi, Beijing, Issue 194, 

December 2003, pp. 28-29. China reportedly did not send its fleet to the Indian Fleet 

Review 2001, citing the absence of the Pakistan Navy in the event. Nevertheless, 

subsequently Chinese ships visited Mumbai. This has been a far cry from the 1986 

Chinese naval visits to Chittagong, Colombo, and Karachi, skipping Indian ports.

156. “China Cooperates with Others to Combat Non-Traditional Security 

Threats,” PLA Daily, December 27, 2004.
2

157. Wang Zhanliang, “Bajisitan yu fangong zhanzheng” [“Pakistan and 

Counterterrorism”] Xiandai Bingqi, Issue 311, November 2004, pp. 2-4.

158. See Xiong Guangkai, “The Global Counterterrorism Campaign: Current 

Situation and Future Prospects” in his International Strategy and Revolution Military 

Affairs, Beijing: Qinghua University Publications, 2003, p. 146. Xiong stated that 

East Turkistan proponents launched 260 terrorist attacks in China since 1990, 

killed 170 and wounded 440. Ibid., p. 145.

159. This is based on Chinese Foreign Ministry Policy Research Division’s 

Zhongguo Waijiao 2003 nianban [China’s Foreign Affairs 2003 edition], Beijing: World 

Knowledge Publication, 2003, p. 92.

160. “China Assures Help to Modernise Defence Forces,” Daily Star (Dhaka), 

May 19, 1993.

161. See Hao Fusheng, “China: Bangladesh’s Foreign Minister Meets PLA 

Delegation,” Xinhua Domestic Service, November 5, 1998, FBIS-CHI-98-309, 

November 6, 1998.

162. Fu cited at “Fu Quanyou Meets With Bangladeshi Military Leader,” Xinhua, 

May 7, 1999, FBIS-CHI-1999-0507, May 10, 1999.

163. “Zhang Wannian Meets Bangladesh Guest, Spoke on Taiwan Issue,” 

Xinhua Domestic Service, March 29, 2000, FBIS-CHI-2000-0329, March 30, 2000. 

Zhang thanked Bangladesh for its position on Taiwan, Tibet, and the human rights 

issue.

164. “Khaleda China-Bound for Defence Agreement,” PTI report, December 

22, 2002, cited at www.telegraphin India.com/1021223/asp/foreign/story_1508248.asp, 

accessed on April 6, 2005. 

165. See “Bangladesh to Acquire Eight Chinese Fighter Planes,” Daily Star, 

April 8, 2000.

166. See “Dhaka Considering Chinese Offer of F-7MB Jets,” Daily Star, December 

28, 2000. The delay procurement of these aircraft was traced to internal differences 

in Bangladesh politics between the Awami League and the Bangladesh Nationalist 

Party. See “Beijing Unaware of Dhaka’s Plan To Buy War Planes,” Daily Star, June 

21, 2000; and “Govt Deviating from Self-Reliant Defence Policy: BNP,” Independent

(Dhaka), September 1, 2000.

167. “Vice President Hu Jintao Meets Nepalese Military Leader,” Xinhua, 

December 9, 1999, FBIS-CHI-1999-1209, December 10, 1999. The Nepalese Army 

Chief said that his army would not allow any activity in Nepal that “splits” China. 

Chi Haotian, during his meeting with the Nepalese army chief, said that “Support 

for a so-called “independence of Tibet” by some foreign forces which harbor evil 

intentions is unacceptable, and it will, beyond any doubt, be resolutely opposed 

by the entire Chinese people, including the people of Tibet.” See “Defense Minister 

Chi Haotian Meets Nepalese Army Chief,” Xinhua, December 9, 1999, FBIS-CHI1999-1209, December 10, 1999.
168. This is based on Keshab Poudel, “Chi’s Visit: Security Concerns?” Nepal 

News, Vol. 20, No. 33, March 2-8, 2001, at www.nepalnews.com/contents/englishweekly/

spotlight/2001/mar/mar02/national1.htm. 

169. See Nischal Nath Pandey, “Nepal’s Foreign Policy vis-a-vis India and 

China: The Security Imperatives,” Paper presented on April 9, 2003, at Banaras 

Hindu University, at www.ifa.org.np/article/article10.php, accessed on April 6, 2005.

170. “Nepal Announces Bus Services to Tibet,” Indo-Asian News Service, August 

2, 2004, at www.123bharath.com/in India-news/index.php?action=fullnews&id=5273, 

accessed on August 2, 2004. 

171. See “Direct Passenger Bus to Open between China and Nepal in May,” 

People’s Daily, March 29, 2005, at english.peopledaily.com.cn/200503/28/eng20050328_

178434.html, accessed on April 1, 2005.

172. Chen Anning, “Nepalese King Meets PRC Military Delegation” Xinhua 

Hong Kong Service, June 18, 1999, FBIS-CHI-1999-0618, June 21, 1999.

173. “Nepali King Meets With China’s Fu Quanyou,” Xinhua, April 10, 2000, 

FBIS-CHI-2000-0410, April 11, 2000.

174. Liu cited at “Nepal PM Says Committed To Enhancing Friendship With 

China.” Xinhua, September 4, 2001, at FBIS-CHI-2001-0904, September 6, 2001. A 

day earlier, the Royal Nepalese Army Chief reiterated Nepal’s position that “any 

activities detrimental to China’s security interests will not be allowed within its 

territory”—a euphemism to Tibetan activities. See “Nepali Army Chief Reaffirms 

Support for One-China Policy,” Xinhua, September 3, 2001, at FBIS-CHI-2001-0903, 

September 4, 2001.

175. “Nepali Army Chief Reaffirms Support For One-China Policy,” Xinhua, 

September 16, 2002, FBIS-CHI-2002-0916, September 17, 2002.

176. “Tibet-Nepal Trade Drops After Chinese Police Assaults,” June 26, 1997, at 

www.tibetinfo.net/news-updates/nu260697.htm accessed on June 6, 2004. This reportly 

indicated that bribery and violence is a common feature with the Chinese armed 

police, but these demonstrations were termed “unprecedented.”

177. See “Chinese Border Police Misbehave with Nepalis,” Kathmandu 

Post Report, October 22, 2000, at www.nepalnews.com.np/contents/englishdaily/

ktmpost/2000/oct/oct23.htm. This report indicated that the Chinese police often use 

harsh words, drag, beat, or even employ Nepalese in their personal work. 

178. See V. Suryanarayan, “Sri Lanka’s China Policy-Legacy of the Past and 

Prospects,” Paper presented at the Department of Chinese and Japanese Studies, 

University of Delhi, September 17-18, 1993.

179. See, for details, “China Seeks Sri Lanka Support at Human Rights Meet,” 

Sunday Times (Colombo), February 26, 1995; and “Business with Taiwan Despite 

One-China Policy,” Island (Colombo), March 3, 1995. For the displeasure of the 

Tibetan community at the refusal of the Sri Lankan government to allow entry to 

the Dalai Lama, see “Refusal to Okay Dalai Lama Visit to Lanka Decried,” Sunday 

Leader (Colombo), August 15, 1999.
180. See the “Joint Communiqué between the People’s Republic of China and 

the Republic of Sri Lanka, 1972,” at www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/4989.html.

181. “PLA General Logistics Department Starts Up Emergency Military 

Aid Mechanism,” PLA Daily, January 6, 2005, at english.chinamil.com.cn/site2/

columns/2005-01/07/content_106699.htm. 

182. See “Sri Lanka’s Main Military Equipment Deal Under Cloud,” Sunday 

Times, August 20, 1995; “Armed Forces Acquiring Equipment To Meet Tiger 

Threat,” Island, September 13, 1995; and “Rs 2.5 Billion Sino-Lankan Arms Deal,” 

Sunday Times, September 17, 1995.
CHAPTER 10

CHINA AND SOUTHEAST ASIA:

BUILDING INFLUENCE, ADDRESSING FEARS

Larry M. Wortzel

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has undertaken a diplomatic 

strategy of moderation and reassurance in Southeast Asia over the 

past decade. The objectives of this strategy have been to ease fears of 

China as a military threat to the region; to build Chinese influence 

in the region and within its major multilateral organization, the 

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN); and to lessen U.S. 

influence in response to earlier American containment strategies 

in Southeast Asia. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has been a 

factor influencing and supporting this strategy, but has not been the 

major actor in articulating the strategy.

Beijing’s diplomatic strategy in Southeast Asia has political, 

economic, and military or security components. In this sense, China 

is exercising all of the instruments of national power in executing the 

strategy; these are political, diplomatic, economic, military, social, 

and cultural.1 The Foreign Ministry and the Chinese Communist 

Party (CCP), including its liaison and propaganda organs, have been 

major architects of the strategy and agents of its articulation. China’s 

military organs have played a supporting role in articulating the 

strategy, but a role that clearly has been subordinate to the Foreign 

Ministry. However, unlike the situation in the 1960s and 1970s, 

there is no strong ideological component in today’s strategy. Even 

though the CCP maintains friendly party-to-party relations with the 

Communist parties in the region, especially those of Vietnam and 

Laos, the Foreign Ministry plays the main role in articulating the 

strategy. 

Although the PLA is not the major instrument through which 

China addresses its goals in the region, it, nonetheless, has an 

important role in advancing the strategy. The PLA provides the 

backdrop of military power and that makes the nations in the region 
consider China’s security interests as a factor in their policies. One 

of the most active actors in advancing China’s strategy in Southeast 

Asia has been the Central Communist Party School. For the most part, 

the Central Party School has acted through its surrogate, the China 

Reform Forum. The major goal of China’s activities in the region is to 

reassure Southeast Asian nations that China’s long-term intentions 

are benign. This played to the very nature of ASEAN. ASEAN is a 

body for the discussion of political, economic, and security matters 

through mutual consultation, as is its ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). 

By actively engaging the ARF and ASEAN, China’s has played to 

ASEAN’s goals through careful diplomacy.

The Historical Record.

Security always has been a major component of the policies of the 

PRC in Southeast Asia. In the 1950s and 1960s, China’s support for 

Communist insurgencies in the region and its actions in providing 

weapons to indigenous Communist parties created deep concern 

about China’s long-term intentions among Southeast Asian nations. 

The active support and presence of PLA forces in Vietnam and Laos 

during the U.S. war in Southeast Asia exacerbated fears of China 

in the region. China’s seizure of the Paracel Islands, its expansive 

territorial claims in the South China Sea, and its aggressive rate 

of military growth increased concerns within Southeast Asia over 

China’s long-term intentions. A naval clash with Vietnam in the 

Spratly Islands only increased fears of China, as did its 1979 attack 

into Vietnam. Indeed, it was these concerns about the PLA that led 

to the creation of the ASEAN ARF.2 The Chinese seizure of Mischief 

Reef claimed by the Philippines after the withdrawal of U.S. forces 

from Clark Air Force Base and Subic Bay was another factor that 

created the perception of a threat from China. 

China’s policies toward overseas Chinese also complicated 

diplomacy and security perceptions in the region. There are 

significant Chinese populations throughout Southeast Asia, and for 

a long time, Beijing treated all of the Diaspora as “overseas Chinese” 

(Huaqiao), ignoring their citizenship and claiming that their ethnicity 

made them citizens of China. In a couple of instances claims that 
Beijing has an obligation to protect ethnic Chinese citizens in other 

countries (in Vietnam in 1975 and Indonesia in 1995) exacerbated 

concerns over China’s military intentions. Over the past 5 decades, 

there have been explicit attempts by Beijing to put such fears among 

Southeast Asian governments to rest, the first of which took the form 

of a charm offensive in Indonesia. 

China’s First Charm Offensive in Southeast Asia.

Zhou Enlai, China’s Foreign Minister, represented China at the 

Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung, Indonesia, April 18-24, 1955. 

At that time, Zhou advanced China’s policy of peaceful coexistence 

in an attempt to address concerns among Asian nations that China 

was a threat to the internal security of those nations. Beijing also 

was working to counter U.S. containment strategy by seeking to 

establish a nonaggression pact with the Philippines, ease concerns 

in Thailand, and address concerns about a Communist fifth column 

in Indonesia.3 Indeed, at the time, there were concerns throughout 

Southeast Asia about the Chinese population in those nations, 

and Beijing’s attempts to support the spread of communism in the 

region. This affected China’s relations with Thailand, Malaysia, the 

Philippines, and Indonesia. 

The “peace offensive” did not last long, however. By 1963, China 

sought to place itself at the center of a worldwide movement to 

spread socialist revolution, strengthening anti-Chinese policies in 

Southeast Asia and the American network of alliances designed to 

contain Communism in the region. The beginnings of the ideological 

split between Beijing and Moscow fed the CCP’s efforts in the 

region. However, the CCP was not successful in all cases. The United 

States provided significant covert and overt help to the Philippine 

government in its effort to suppress the indigenous, but Beijingsupported, Communist rebellion in the Philippines. The same is 

true in Laos. In Malaya, the British government was instrumental in 

suppressing the mainly ethnic-Chinese Communist insurgency. In 

this period, China’s ideological and military aid to Southeast Asian 

insurgencies increased. Beijing supported Indonesian President 

Sukarno’s confrontation with Malaysia. A tipping point came in 
Indonesia, when in 1965 a coup broke out with radical military officers 

attempting to overthrow the anti-Communist senior leadership of 

the Indonesian Army. Beijing had supported the Communist Party 

of Indonesia (PKI) with encouragement, money, and some 100,000 

small arms.4 When the PKI and Communist sympathizers in the 

Army tried to take over the government, there was a bloodbath as 

the Indonesian armed forces went after not only the insurgents, but 

also ethnic Chinese in general. Even today, in Beijing one can meet 

surviving members of the Indonesian, Philippine, and Malayan 

Communist Party (or their children) who fled to China to escape 

death in anti-Communist counterinsurgency operations in their 

home countries. In addition, of course, the American involvement 

in Vietnam strengthened, while the PLA poured money, equipment, 

and some 50,000 troops in engineer, armor, and air defense units into 

North Vietnam and Laos. 

Why it Matters for the United States.

The United States has important interests in Southeast Asia. 

These interests include freedom of navigation through the region and 

ensuring protection of the sea and air lines of communication; keeping 

the area open to free trade and investment; promoting the rule of law 

and values such as democratic institutions of government, human 

rights, and religious freedom; and supporting America’s treaty allies 

and friends in the region.5 In pursuing these national interests, “the 

United States has followed a strategy to promote a stable, peaceful, 

and prosperous Asia-Pacific Region.”6 From the standpoint of 

diplomatic engagement and military security engagement this means 

promoting regional stability and nurturing friendships and alliances 

designed to keep another power or group of powers from dominating 

the region. In addition to military contacts and relations, the United 

States exercises diplomatic and political strategies designed to avoid 

being excluded from influence in the region by another power or 

group of powers.7 Nonetheless, there is room for China as a strong 

power in the American strategy for the region. In a speech in China 

in 2004, then U.S. Trade Representative (and now Deputy Secretary 

of State) Robert Zoellick told an audience “. . . the United States and 
others need to work with China to integrate its rising power into 

regional and global security, economic, and political arrangements. 

For its part, China warrants respect, but needs to be careful not to 

trigger fears.”8

There should be no mistake that in recent years this mention 

of preventing the domination of the region by other powers is 

principally a concern about China. China’s influence in Southeast 

Asia is strong, its economic influence is growing, and its history in 

security relations over the 56 years the PRC has been in existence 

primarily has been one of excluding American and Russian (earlier 

Soviet) influence. India more recently has expressed its own concerns 

about the security of Southeast Asia, but has not acted to pursue those 

interests in a way that affects U.S. interests negatively. Australia and 

Japan both have important interests in the region. The interests of 

these strong U.S. allies, however, are complementary to those of the 

United States. 

The same is not true of China. China’s previous actions in the 

region: its support for indigenous revolutionary groups, its expansive 

maritime claims in the South China Sea, its muscular claims to be 

the protector of citizens of other countries who are ethnic Chinese, 

its pursuit of oil and natural gas resources, and its military buildup create security concerns in the region.9

 Naturally, given its own 

interests, the United States has responded to those concerns by 

strengthening its own diplomacy in the region, tying Southeast Asian 

states into the general war on terrorism, stationing more military 

forces in the region (primarily in Guam), and reinvigorating security 

assistance. 

China has responded as well. In the world of ideas, scholars 

speaking for the Communist Party and the government in Beijing 

have articulated a strategy by which China would rise as a major 

power and do so peacefully. At the same time, the PLA has worked 

with the Foreign Ministry to create confidence-building measures 

through the ASEAN ARF. In 2002, the PRC signed the Declaration 

on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, with ASEAN 

outlining a code of conduct for nations with competing territorial 

claims in that area. This resulted in enough good will that in August 

2005, a Chinese state-owned oil company, China Oilfield services, 

won a contract from the Philippine National Oil Company and 
PetroVietnam (both state owned) to do seismic exploration for 

oil and gas in the Spratly Islands.10 The PLA also has worked on 

security assistance programs in the region. These will be covered in 

more detail later in this chapter, but these actions include providing 

military equipment to Burma and developing an anti-ship cruise 

missile with the Indonesian Armed Forces.

A New Security Concept.

Beijing sought to reassure the rest of the world of its peaceful 

intentions in 2002 with the “new security concept.” Aimed primarily 

at calming fears in the Asia-Pacific region after the seizure of Mischief 

Reef in 1995, the firing of missiles over Taiwan, and the arrival of 

a U.S. fleet off the Taiwan Strait in 1996, China’s leaders called for 

a “new security concept” based on “mutual trust, mutual benefit, 

equality, and coordination.”11 The “Concept” emphasized confidence 

building and a multi-lateral security dialogue as a means to resolve 

international problems. Of course, Beijing still reserved the right to 

use force against Taiwan, which it views as an internal problem. In 

this paper, Beijing lauded the resolution of border disputes with 

Russia and noted the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperative 

Organization (SCO). Addressing Southeast Asia specifically, Beijing 

emphasized its active participation in the ASEAN Regional Forum, 

seeking “cooperation and dialogue over confrontation.” In the 

economic sphere, Beijing emphasized its participation in the “10+3 

cooperation in East Asia.” While this was a move toward calming 

fears of China in Southeast Asia, other scholars in China associated 

closely with the Central Communist Party School moved further 

with a more comprehensive theory to address concerns over China’s 

rise as a great power. 

There was a division of labor among ministries and agencies in 

China. The PLA handled the military-to-military portion of a general 

package of diplomatic and economic initiatives. While PLA officers 

reassured regional neighbors about China’s benign intentions at 

various regional fora, the PLA Navy ventured further into the region 

and built its own strength. This conveyed the point that while China’s 

intentions might be benign, the nation was prepared to protect its 

interests with force.
China’s Peaceful Rise.

The earlier themes designed to reassure China’s neighbors evolved 

into a full- blown effort to reassure the world that China has peaceful 

intentions.12 In April 1998, four of China’s national security scholars 

published a book discussing the concept of a peaceful rise for China 

as an international power.13 The focus of the book, as outlined by its 

main author in the introduction, is to examine how the rise of China 

as a world power (or superpower) can take place in such a way as to 

avoid war and another cold war.14 The authors began their work on 

the theory in 1994 and, through the China Philosophy Society, began 

further research on the topic. With respect to Southeast Asia, Yan 

Xuetong explained that the strategists who developed the theory of 

China’s peaceful rise designed it to respond to the “China Threat 

Theory” advanced at the time by Lee Kuan-yew of Singapore and 

Prime Minister Mahathir of Malaysia.15

The Central Communist Party School has been the major actor 

in promulgating this theory internationally. In a speech to the 

Center for Strategic and International Studies of the United States on 

November 13, 2003, Zheng Bijian, as he retired from his work at the 

Central Communist Party School in China, explained the concept of 

China’s peaceful rise. American scholars, who argued that the rise of 

great powers usually creates instability in the international system, 

particularly when those powers are nondemocratic states, challenged 

him. The Americans specifically mentioned the cases of Germany and 

Japan in the lead-up to World Wars I and II. In response, in a 2004 

issue of the China Reform Forum journal, Zheng responded with 

a new formulation: “our [China’s] path is different from both the 

paths of Germany in World War I and Germany and Japan in World 

War II, when they tried to overhaul the world political landscape by 

way of aggressive wars. Our path is also to be different from that of 

the former U.S.S.R. [Union of Soviet Socialist Republics] during the 

reign of Brezhnev, which relied on a military bloc and arms race in 

order to compete with the United States for world supremacy.”16

As the Chairman of the China Reform Forum, a position he 

assumed after his retirement from the Central Party School, he 

advanced the “Peaceful Rise” theory at the Bo’ao Forum on Hainan 
2

Island in 2003.17 Indeed, he may be its most active international 

proponent for China, including publishing a version of his popular 

“China’s Peaceful Rise” speech in the U.S. Council on Foreign 

Relations magazine, Foreign Affairs.

18 The “Peaceful Rise” thesis is 

an interesting one. The thesis suggests that China’s rise as a great 

power is inevitable, and that the different interests of a rising power 

and an existing superpower in the same region will create friction. 

Implicit in the “Peaceful Rise” theory, however, is the suggestion 

that it is up to the United States, as the lone superpower in the world, 

to accommodate China’s rise.19

It was not only CCP intellectuals that put forth the formula. On 

December 10, 2003, not long after Zheng Bijian’s speech, Premier 

Wen Jiabao told an audience at Harvard University in Boston that, 

as a developing country, China would seek to rise peacefully as it 

resolves its natural resource and energy problems.20 Sixteen days later, 

celebrating the 110th anniversary of Mao Zedong’s birth, Hu Jintao 

told the audience that China would “develop along its own socialist 

course . . . and would follow a peaceful road to development.”21

Hu repeated the formulation on February 23, 2004, to a politburo 

study meeting of senior CCP leaders, telling them that the peaceful 

development path would also follow a policy of self-reliance.22 In 

addition, to complete the set of new senior leaders that repeated the 

formulation, on March 14, 2004, Wen Jiabao echoed the formula, 

telling a session of the National People’s Congress in Beijing that, 

although China’s peaceful rise would take a long time, it would not 

depart from the general interests of the world.23

The CCP did not accept the “Peaceful Rise” formulation without 

some internal debate. In a meeting of senior PLA Air Force officers 

in May 2004, Jiang Zemin suggested that perhaps the formulation 

should be set aside, since the thesis potentially limited China’s military 

development and modernization. This objection by Jiang was both a 

manifestation of friction between Jiang and Hu Jintao in the transfer 

of power from Jiang to Hu and a demonstration of genuine concern 

within the PLA that it could continue to modernize and strengthen.24

In the end, after some period of debate, the CCP arrived at the position 

that “there is no contradiction between military modernization or 

military strength and China’s peaceful rise.”25 China’s policymakers 
in the PLA and the CCP see military development as complementing 

China’s peaceful rise, and accommodating this rise requires an 

adjustment in attitude by the United States and Southeast Asia. 26

There are unspoken elements in the “Peaceful Rise” formulation. 

Some of China’s security thinkers suggest that it is a sign of hostility 

if the United States or other powers try to prevent China’s rise. 

Some in Beijing interpret the debate between the United States and 

the European Union (EU) over Brussels lifting arms sales sanctions 

against China as a sign of hostility on the part of Washington.27

There is also some resentment among security specialists in China 

over the continued imposition of high technology export controls by 

the United States. 

An analogy that illustrates Beijing’s attitude on the “Peaceful 

Rise” debate is to imagine yourself walking down the middle of a 

wide street when someone else turns the corner and walks in your 

direction on an intersecting path. That person does not deviate 

his or her course, but expects another to shift its own course to 

accommodate the new arrival’s route. Failure to accommodate the 

new arrival could be interpreted as hostile and to directly challenge 

the new arrival is clearly hostile. Moreover, since the path of the new 

arrival is not shifting, any failure to adjust your route could result in 

a clash. Thus, the “Peaceful Rise” thesis may not be quite as benign as 

Beijing’s security thinkers suggest. That said, in Southeast Asia, the 

thesis has been successful and has won Beijing increased influence 

and diplomatic influence. 

A more recent formulation of the “Peaceful Rise” formula 

takes into consideration China’s “comprehensive national power” 

(zonghe guoli). In an article in Guoji Zhengzhi Kexue (The Science of 

International Politics), Yan Xuetong argues that there is a defined 

position (standing) of actual strength for China in the international 

community.28 He argues that, in terms of overall national strength, 

China is now the number two nation in the world, second to the 

United States. Moreover, according to Yan, China can maintain this 

position and even grow in comprehensive national power peacefully 

without coming into conflict with the United States. The theme of 

comprehensive national power is an integral part of grand strategy 

in China today. Strategic thinkers are consumed by computations of 
what China’s rightful place in the world should be based on, using 

mathematical equations representing elements of power (economic, 

social-cultural, scientific/technical, military, and political), with 

the objective of creating a “scientific” justification for China’s rise, 

while the Foreign Ministry argues that the rise will not upset the 

international order.29

The PLA has been part of the action. The first security policy 

conference of the ASEAN Regional Forum was held in Beijing on 

November 4-6, 2004, with the goal of “expanding the channel for 

dialogue on security issues between high ranking officials in the 

Asia-Pacific region.30 This latest effort represents a stage of a longerterm policy in the PLA, and by China, to interact with and engage 

the member states of ASEAN.

China’s Multilateral Activities in Southeast Asia.

Over the decades since the establishment of the PRC, there has 

been an evolution of policy toward participation in multilateral 

institutions. If China was not able to lead a multilateral body, 

such as the nonaligned movement, Beijing generally treated such 

institutions as potential threats to China’s sovereignty that could 

limit the foreign policy options open to China’s diplomacy.31 China’s 

diplomats also knew that ASEAN originally developed the ARF, in 

part, to respond to fears of China’s military activities and expansion 

into Southeast Asia, especially in the Spratly Islands. Gradually, 

however, Beijing participated in multilateral institutions in Southeast 

Asia, albeit grudgingly. In addition, in the past 4 to 5 years, as U.S. 

policy shifted to focus on fighting the war on terror and countering 

the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), China 

is perceived in Southeast Asia as a positive and effective player in 

multilateral institutions in the region.32

China is now active in security-related multilateral matters in the 

ASEAN Regional Forum.33 In Track II, nongovernmental (or quasigovernmental) organizations, China participates in the Council for 

Security and Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), the Northeast 

Asia Security Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD), and the Asia-Pacific 

Roundtable.34 In the economic realm, China is an active participant in 
the Bo’ao Forum for Asia and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 

(APEC) forum, and has negotiated an ASEAN-China Free Trade 

Agreement.35 Meanwhile, in Northeast Asia, China has gone from 

being a mere “concierge” for the six-party talks with North Korea to 

being an active facilitator and negotiator. 

These activities by China are consistent with the broader foreign 

policy orientation in Beijing of trying to achieve a multipolar world 

order.36 They are effective means of countering fears that China means 

to dominate the region and have helped Beijing achieve its broader 

international goals.37 These policies toward Southeast and Northeast 

Asia have not been carried out in isolation. Beijing also has worked 

hard to create the Shanghai Cooperative Organization, a multilateral 

institution aimed at cementing security policy and relations in 

Central Asia and with Russia. Indeed, China’s Defense White Paper

says that “China supports regional security dialogue and cooperation 

at different levels, through various channels, in different forms and 

in a step-by-step manner pursuant to the principles of participation 

on equal footing and reaching consensus through consultation in 

the spirit of seeking common ground while reserving differences,” 

a comfortable formulation for ASEAN states.38 Writing in the Far 

Eastern Economic Review, Murray Heibert assessed China’s actions as 

“subtle,” but aimed at “diluting American influence” and reducing 

American strategic dominance in the region.39 Meanwhile, ASEAN 

increasingly is willing to cooperate with China, especially as the 

United States has been preoccupied with other security problems.40

China’s activities with ASEAN have been effective in bringing 

about acceptance of Beijing as a center of power and balancer in 

the Asia-Pacific region.41 China is seen in the region as a positive 

actor, especially after the Asian financial crisis. The Philippines has 

accepted security cooperation with China, softening its attitudes 

since the occupation of Mischief Reef in 1995. Indonesia, whose 

armed forces have been held at arms length by the United States for 

human rights violations in East Timor and Aceh, is cooperating with 

China on the development of a naval cruise missile. For years, the 

United States refused to work with Indonesian industry on any form 

of missile development on nonproliferation grounds. Nonetheless, 

while China has gone from a skeptical attitude toward ASEAN, 
there is still concern in the region over China’s long-term intentions, 

particularly in view of its military buildup and the development of a 

blue-water navy.42

In the last year, China hosted an ARF security policy conference, 

workshops on alternative development, and on increasing cooperation 

in the field of nontraditional security issues (such as disaster relief). 

According to Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing, “in the next 

year China will co-host with Brunei an Inter-sessional Meeting on 

counterterrorism and international crime, and with the United States 

and Singapore will host a seminar on nonproliferation of WMD.”43

Li also expressed Beijing’s willingness to co-host an intersessional 

meeting with Indonesia. 

China’s active diplomacy and confidence-building measures 

in the security realm have gone a long way to improve Beijing’s 

image in the region. This has been a coordinated effort across the 

government and the CCP. The PLA has been an active player in these 

activities, even if it is not the primary agent for engaging Southeast 

Asia. The combination of strategy conferences PLA officers attend 

and diplomacy emphasize the point that the rise of China is in the 

interests of Southeast Asian nations. China’s diplomacy also stresses 

that China’s goal is not to “push the United States out of the region,” 

but given the way that the United States exercised its military power 

in Iraq, some military hedge to American hegemony is a valuable 

tool in Asia.

Specific Actions in Southeast Asia.44

During the 2-year period between January 2001 and January 

2003, there were 21 bilateral military-diplomatic visits between 

leaders of the PLA and Southeast Asian military leaders.45 The year 

2001 opened with a visit by the Philippine Defense Minister to China 

in January, while in February the Chinese Defense Minister took a 

PLA delegation to Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. The numbers of 

visits into China from Southeast Asia was about two to three times 

the number of visits by Chinese officials overseas. This is consistent 

with the author’s experience in dealing with China as a military 

attaché, from the staff of the office of the Secretary of Defense, and 

on the Department of the Army staff. Simply put, the PLA has a 
finite annual budget for overseas visits as well as to receive foreign 

visitors. The PLA distributes its budget for international activities 

around the world, with an emphasis on specific geographical regions 

or countries, depending on broader policy considerations.46 If there 

are a significant number of visits by a specific country to China, the 

PLA accepts the visiting delegation if that country foots the bill for 

the visit.47

With respect to arms sales policies, the PLA is also an important 

actor and can shape regional policy. Arms sales decisions, foreign 

military cooperation, and foreign military assistance come under 

the purview of the General Armaments Department of the PLA. 

Officers from this department participate in policy decisions across 

the government and can shape foreign policy.48

Vietnam.

China’s relations with Vietnam are “normal” and regular, but 

not particularly friendly. Vietnam’s security planners see all of 

Southeast Asia at some risk in the face of China’s size and strength. 

Nonetheless, physical proximity alone requires close contact. 

The senior leaders of China visited Vietnam in April 2001, 

September 2001, February 2002, and October 2004. These visits, 

however, were either Communist Party-to-Party visits or governmentto-government visits. They were not specific military delegations. 

In most cases, however, the Chinese delegation included a military 

official responsible for improving military-to-military contacts.49

In November 2001, the guided missile frigate Yulin made a 

port call to Ho Chi Minh City as part of a friendship visit. This was 

billed as a way to “increase military understanding between the two 

countries.”50 A PLA delegation also visited Vietnam in September 

2003, led by the inspector general for discipline of the PLA General 

Political Department (GPD). During the visit, Major General Ye 

Wanbi visited the tunnels of Cu Chi, most likely an opportunity 

to emphasize the bilateral China-Vietnam military effort against 

the United States during the Vietnam War.51 Later the same year, 

Chinese Vice President Zeng Qinghong visited Vietnam in October 

and paid a call on the Chief of the General Staff of the People’s Army 

of Vietnam (PAVN), Phung Quang Thanh.52
The Deputy Chief of the General Staff Department (GSD) of the 

PLA, Lieutenant General Qian Shugen, visited Vietnam in March 

2004, as part of a good will, training, and military education visit. 

Qian met with Defense Minister General Pham Van Tra.53 Later the 

same year, there were economic delegation visits and even a visit by 

Premier Wen Jiabao. But there were only passing references to the 

Spratly Islands during the Wen visit.54 The PLA GDP followed this up 

with a visit by GPD vice director Lieutenant General Tang Tianbao 

in December 2004, another Party-to Party visit that emphasized 

cooperation against the United States.55

In 2005, a major delegation of Vietnam military officials visited 

China in April, meeting with General Xiong Guangkai, CMC Vice 

Chairman Xu Caihou, and PLA Chief of the General Staff Department 

General Liang Guanglie.56 There were the obligatory expressions of 

a “desire for friendly cooperation between the two armed forces,” 

but no substantive agreements came from the visit. Later the same 

year, in July 2005, the PAVN Chief of the General Staff met with 

his Chinese counterpart in a confidence-building visit.57 In addition 

to these military delegations, there were a number of trade, border 

demarcation, and Foreign Ministry related visits. There are still no 

close relations between the two nations, although efforts are being 

made to ensure balanced, friendly relations. In the military sphere, 

using the GSD as the main agent to make or sponsor visits between 

the two militaries demonstrates a tepid relationship. Considering 

that during the U.S. war in Vietnam there were 50,000 Chinese troops 

operating in that country, the level of cooperation today between the 

PAVN and the PLA is relatively low. The contacts reflect the reality 

of a smaller nation overshadowed by a more powerful military and a 

stronger economy. In addition, there probably is still some restraint 

on both sides, given the Chinese attack into Vietnam in 1979 and the 

ensuing years of combat.

Laos.

During the American war in Vietnam, the PLA was building 

roads through Laos and had air defense forces stationed there. One 

road system almost reached the border with Thailand. Today, those 

roads are functional but devoted to civil trade. Vietnam is Laos’ 
dominant security partner, and China does not dispute this limited 

sphere of influence for Vietnam. The Laotian military is relatively 

small and is equipped with a mix of older United States and Sovietbloc weapons. China could supply parts or ammunition for many 

of these weapons, but there is no major military trade or activity 

between the two countries. 

 The Chinese Defense Minister visited Laos in February 2001 

as part of a swing through Southeast Asia that included Vietnam, 

Cambodia, and Nepal. His Laotian counterpart made a return visit 

in December of the same year, spending about 2 weeks in China. In 

2003, PLA Chief of the GSD General Liang Guanglie met with the 

Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the People’s Army of Laos.58

They discussed unspecified “military exchanges,” but Laos remains 

a relatively low priority for China today. In May 2005, in connection 

with attending a security policy meeting of the ASEAN Regional 

Forum in Vientiane, Deputy Chief of the PLA GSD General Xiong 

Guangkai met with Prime Minister Buongnang Volachit and Deputy 

Defense Minister Major General Douangchai Pichit.59 Relations 

between Laos and China are cordial, with Laos supporting China on 

its Taiwan policy.60

Cambodia.

China maintains a correct but distant relationship military 

relationship with Vietnam and good but not deep relations with Laos. 

The long-standing relationship between King (Prince) Sihanouk and 

Beijing has been the focus of China’s aid and friendship for years. 

Relations with Cambodia, on the other hand, are strong, backed by 

foreign aid and military assistance, and aimed at building a strategic 

relationship in Southeast Asia and in the Indian Ocean.61 There are 

parallels in the way that China treats Cambodia and the way that 

Beijing approaches relations with Thailand and Burma. 

China supported Pol Pot during his reign in Cambodia with the 

Khmer Rouge. Beijing also actively worked to undermine Vietnam’s 

influence there, supporting an insurgency after Vietnam’s invasion of 

Cambodia. There are military aid packages in the millions of dollars 

each year for Cambodia, including the reconstruction of Kampong 
Chhnang Air Base. The 2003 aid package from China to Cambodia 

was some $30 million.62 The Wall Street Journal quotes Cambodian 

Army Major General Bun Song as saying, “The U.S. helped us open 

the door to democracy, but then they flew away. So we have no choice 

right now but to rely on China.”63 Former Cambodian Ambassador to 

the United States Roland Eng, who spent years in Beijing with Prince 

Sihanouk, tells of thousands of Chinese merchants and families 

moving to Cambodia to set up businesses.64 Nor is China’s interest 

solely in the ports along the Indian Ocean. Beijing is cultivating 

relations with Cambodia (and Thailand) because of their strategic 

location on the Mekong River as part of Beijing’s relationship with 

the Greater Mekong Subregion.65

Myanmar.

During the 1990s, Myanmar (Burma) received as much as $3 

billion in weapons from China.66 Analyzing the bilateral relationship, 

the Financial Times characterized Myanmar as China’s “client state.” 

Beijing is putting shelters for ships in the Mergui archipelago in the 

Andaman Sea while supplying tanks, patrol boats, fighters, and air 

force training to Myanmar.67 Still, Myanmar seems to seek some 

balance in its relations, also purchasing jet aircraft from India and 

Moscow. When Jiang Zemin visited Rangoon (Yangyon) in late 2001, 

China and Myanmar signed six agreements on the economy and 

border security.68 In 2003, China’s Vice Premier Li Lanqing offered 

Myanmar debt relief and $200 million in new loans, which propped 

up the military and its rule.69

If one doubted the relationship between China and Myanmar, 

the old Burma Road, a muddy track during and after World War II, 

is now a paved, multimodal highway, supplementing rail and river 

transport systems.70 Thus, while using China for a security anchor, 

Myanmar has managed to turn isolation by the United States into a 

strong position in ASEAN and Southeast Asia.71 Still, while there are 

strong security considerations in China’s relations with Myanmar, 

the PLA is not a direct actor in a range of political, economic, and 

security relations. This allows China to be in a position to export from 

its southwest region, allows access to the sea from the southwest part 

of China, and provides a set of places from which China can monitor 

India. 
Indonesia.

No security relationship in Southeast Asia has seen greater 

improvement in the past 5 years than that between China and 

Indonesia. Yet U.S.-Indonesian security relations should be close. 

Between 1950 and 1993, 8,065 Indonesian officers trained at U.S. 

military institutions. The United States also provided about $200 

million in military assistance to Indonesia and $400 million in loans 

and credits for military purchases.72 The President of Indonesia, 

Susilo Bambang Yudyohono, is a 1991 graduate of the U.S. Army 

Command and General Staff College in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. 

However, the U.S. Congress cut off security assistance to Indonesia 

in 1992 after extrajudicial killings and atrocities by the Indonesian 

armed forces in Dili, East Timor. 

It is fair to say that China has taken advantage of the end of 

U.S. military assistance to improve its own relations with Jakarta. 

Still, Indonesian military leaders always have tried to avoid direct 

alignment with any powers. Even when American military assistance 

was flourishing, there was still a Soviet military mission in Indonesia. 

One can go to the naval base in Surabaya and see Soviet PT-76 

amphibious tanks entering the water off the ramps of U.S. landing 

ships. Before 1965, China provided arms and assistance to Indonesia. 

Although China established diplomatic relations with Indonesia 

on April 13, 1950, those relations were suspended on October 30, 

1967, in the wake of the November 30, 1965, coup attempt and the 

subsequent anti-Chinese riots and suppression in Indonesia.73

Beijing used loans at concessional rates and a series of bilateral 

visits to repair relations with Jakarta over the period 1990 to 2002.74

Of course, given the close association of Li Peng with the Tiananmen 

Massacre, China was not critical of the role of the Indonesian 

armed forces in suppressing civil liberties. When PRC Defense 

Minister Chi Haotian visited Indonesia in September 2002, he met 

with then Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security (now 

President) Yudyohono to discuss cooperation in counterterrorism. 

Chi praised Indonesia’s domestic and international counter-terrorist 

programs.75

Beijing also has taken advantage of the end of U.S. military 

assistance cooperation to improve relations with Indonesia. There 
30

have been traditional concerns in the United States over missile 

development and proliferation around the world. When the United 

States sold high-speed computers to Indonesia’s aircraft manufacturer, IPTN, in the 1980s, Washington placed restrictions on the 

software applications that could run on the computer and refused 

to allow the computer to network with military research institutes 

working on air-to-air missiles.76 China has no such proliferation 

concerns. Indonesian Minister Juwono Sudarsono noted in November 

2004 that Indonesia needed alternative sources of military equipment 

and expertise because of the U.S. embargo, and that China was one 

nation that could supply such equipment.77

China and Indonesia reportedly have signed agreements to 

develop missiles together and a strategic partnership agreement.78

Together, China and Indonesia will develop a ballistic missile with 

a range of 150 kilometers in accordance with an agreement initialed 

by Defense Minister Jurwono Sudarsono in August 2005, and they 

will work together on naval cruise missiles with ranges of 9-19 miles. 

These defense ties are important inroads for China in Southeast Asia, 

and are one way that Chinese diplomacy has flanked the United 

States, with its neuralgia for cooperation with the Indonesian armed 

forces.

Beijing secured its new relationship with Jakarta through low 

interest loans ($300 million), relief assistance (about $2 million), and 

a strategic partnership agreement.79 One defense-related web site 

in India claims that China will build a submarine base in Indonesia 

as a means to help secure the Malacca Strait; however, no reliable 

independent source has confirmed this information.80 Thus far, on 

the Chinese side, the defense cooperation between the two nations 

has involved North China Industries (NORINCO), which was 

established originally by the equipment department of the PLA 

GSD.81 Indonesian Defense Minister Sudarsono noted, “Within 2 

years, military relations will make up 40 percent of our bilateral 

relations” with China.82

Philippines.

Philippine-China security relations were at their recent nadir 

after the 1995 seizure of Mischief Reef by China. Originally, Chinese 
3

fishermen detained Philippine fishing boats. By early February 

1995, however, the PLA Navy was involved, and China reiterated 

its claims to the Spratly Islands and the South China Sea.83 By 1996, 

the two countries had exchanged military attachés at their respective 

embassies. China built two concrete structures there that appeared 

to have military use. In October 1998, two PLA navy frigates blocked 

passage to the reef by a Philippine naval ship carrying journalists.84

Chinese diplomacy and Beijing’s actions in the ARF, however, have 

done much to improve the situation with the Philippines and in the 

South China Sea in general.

Beijing and Manila agreed on a bilateral framework for 

cooperation on May 16, 2000.85 In addition to agreeing to scientific, 

technical, legal, and economic cooperation, the two governments 

committed to “peace and stability in the South China Sea.” Thus, 

having handed Manila a fait accompli by its actions on Mischief Reef, 

Beijing got Manila to agree that neither side would “take actions 

that might complicate or escalate the situation.” This is effective 

diplomacy backed up by the naval presence of the PLA. China made 

its commitments to the government in Manila firmer in 2002 when 

Beijing signed the 2002 ASEAN-China Declaration on the Conduct 

of Parties in the South China Sea.86 There also have been a series 

of military contacts aimed at confidence-building. In October 2000, 

Philippine Chief of the General Staff Angelo Reyes paid a visit to 

China. He visited again as Secretary of Defense in April 2002. PLA 

General and Minister of Defense Chi Haotian paid a return visit to the 

Philippines in September 2002, and in 2004 two Philippine defense 

officials, Armed Forces Chief of Staff Narcisco Abaya and Secretary 

of Defense Avelino Cruz, visited China.87 Manila and Beijing also 

opened formal defense and security consultations between the PLA 

and the Philippine armed forces, the first of which was when PLA 

General Xiong Guangkai visited Manila between May 22 and 25, 

2005. Beijing will train five Filipino soldiers in China in the future, 

and Xiong donated 80 million pesos of equipment to the Philippine 

armed forces.88 In the future, the two countries will hold annual 

defense talks.89
3

Malaysia.

Malaysia has shown some interest in diversifying its sources of 

military equipment. In the past, Malaysia has bought short-range 

air defense systems from the United States, Pakistan, and Russia, 

but Malaysian armed forces are exploring purchases from China. 

China Precision Machinery Import and Export Corporation, a 

state-owned major producer of missiles, signed a memorandum 

of understanding with two Malaysian companies on the purchase 

of short-range missiles and co-production in Malaysia of the FN6 short-range, shoulder-launched anti-aircraft missile. This has an 

engagement capability of about 6 kilometers. Malaysia also has 

explored the purchase of the KS-1A medium-range surface-toair missile from China.90 In addition, in the general area of science 

and technology cooperation, China is willing to share satellite and 

space technology with Malaysia. Such technology has both civil 

and military application.91 These overtures aside, there has been no 

substantive action between the two countries, and no arms deal is 

expected before 2006, if at all.

Singapore.

Of all the nations in Southeast Asia, Singapore has made the 

strongest commitments to the United States. Notwithstanding the 

security agreements between the United States and Thailand and the 

renewed U.S.-Republic of Philippines security agreement, Singapore 

has taken substantive action to provide facilities for U.S. forces. The 

naval base at Sembawang houses a U.S. Navy logistics and support 

group, a pier was built there to permit a U.S. aircraft carrier to berth, 

and Changyi Airfield can accommodate two squadrons of U.S. fighter 

aircraft. Still, the PLA is making some inroads in Singapore.

As part of a “show the flag” trip around the world, a PLA Navy 

task force stopped in Singapore in 2002. The guided missile destroyer, 

Qingdao, and a fleet support/ depot ship, Taicang, made a 3-day call in 

Singapore where China’s North Sea Fleet commander, Ding Yiping, 

embarked.92 Singapore Navy ships already had visited China twice 

on good-will voyages in the past. However, there have really been 
3

no direct military initiatives between Singapore and China. Instead, 

there have been a series of diplomatic confidence-building measures, 

most of which involved the ARF.

Thailand.

When the People’s Army of Vietnam was poised on the ThaiCambodian border in 1980, its guns and artillery had greater range 

than the howitzers the United States had provided to Thailand. 

The Royal Thai Army remedied that problem with the purchase of 

Chinese 130 millimeter guns. In addition, China perhaps sealed a 

new security relationship with Thailand when as many as five main 

force PAVN divisions withdrew from the Cambodian-Thai border 

to reinforce the Vietnam-China border in the aftermath of Beijing’s 

February 16-March 16, 1979, attack into Vietnam. 

Beijing has been a good security partner for Thailand. The Royal 

Thai Army inventory includes 50 Type-69 Tanks. Today these are 

in storage or used for training, but in the 1980s, they were in the 

active inventory. Thai officers complained about the durability of 

the tracks, but the tanks were serviceable and of use in the event 

of an attack by Vietnam. Thailand also has 450 Type-85 armored 

personnel carriers from China, 15 130 millimeter Type-59 towed 

guns, Type-85 multiple rocket launchers, and 24 57 millimeter antiaircraft guns. The Thai Navy has two PRC Jianghu-III class frigates, 

designated the Chao Phraya class in Thailand and two Jianghu-IV 

frigates, designated the Kraburi class.93 In a 2004 interview, Chinese 

Minister of Defense General Cao Gangchuan described Sino-Thai 

military relations as “comprehensive, deep, and high-level.” 94 Cao 

repeated these remarks on the 30th anniversary of the establishment 

of Sino-Thai diplomatic ties on July 4, 2005.95

Brunei.

The PLA’s exchanges with Brunei and military relations in general 

have developed more slowly than in other places in Southeast Asia. 

The first Memorandum of Understanding on Military Exchanges 

was signed on September 12, 2003, committing both countries to 

bilateral exchanges, attendance at military courses, visits, sports, 
3

and cultural exchanges.96 Later the same year, two PLA Navy ships 

made a port call at Muara en-route to a friendship cruise that also 

stopped in Singapore and Guam.97 In 2004, Shenyang Military 

Region Commander Qian Guoliang, Guangzhou MR deputy political 

commissar Ma Guowen, and staff from both military regions visited 

the Brunei Ministry of Defense and the commander of the Royal 

Brunei armed forces.98 The attention to Brunei rounds out generally 

good relations between the PLA and other armed forces in Southeast 

Asia.

Conclusions.

In their 1999 study, Kenneth Allen and Eric McVadon said that 

the PLA has had a role in “shaping and implementing” China’s 

foreign policies by pursuing the following goals:

• To shape the international security environment in support of 

key Chinese national security objectives;

• To improve political and military relations with foreign 

countries;

• To enhance China’s military and defense industry 

modernization;

• To provide military assistance to countries in the developing 

world; and,

• To acquire knowledge in modern military doctrine, operations, 

training, military medicine, administration, and a host of 

noncombat related areas.99

The PLA has not been the principal actor in China’s relations 

with Southeast Asian nations. Southeast Asian nations, meanwhile, 

hedge their security interests by maintaining good relations with 

China, but would not want to exclude the United States or Australia 

from the region. Nor would Southeast Asian nations “buy into” an 

American-led containment policy against China. The peaceful rise 

of China and its economic strength is consistent with the interests of 

Southeast Asian states and Australia. The hedge is needed, however, 

because the PLA is the backup for the legal claims of China in the 
3

South China Sea. Thus, China’s public diplomacy is successful, but 

its military power is enough of a latent threat that Southeast Asian 

nations still hedge their security. 

Therefore, it is fair to say that there has been a strong security 

component to all relationships in the region. Beijing has been skillful 

in exercising a range of relations using the “comprehensive national 

power” of China, ensuring contacts in the political, diplomatic, 

cultural, trade, and economic spheres around the region. However, 

the growing military power of China and its increased ability to 

send its Navy around the region have been a factor in ensuring 

good relations. The PLA’s activity has consisted mainly of high-level 

visits and military diplomacy, except, of course, for Thailand. The 

backdrop of regional security has been a major factor in promoting 

the way that China has behaved in the region. Thus, the PLA may 

not be leading in all relations, but it can certainly see itself as a major 

factor behind China’s improved standing in Southeast Asia. 

ENDNOTES – CHAPTER 10

1. Yan Xuetong, “Heping Jueqi de Yan Guan Jiao” (Research Perspectives on 

Peaceful Rise), Zhanlue Guancha (China Strategic Review) Vol. 6, 2005, pp. 70-77, 

Published by the China Reform Forum. 

2. Larry M. Wortzel, The ASEAN Regional Forum: Asian Security Without an 

American Umbrella, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1995.

3. John W. Garver, Foreign Relations of the People’s Republic of China, Englewood 

Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1993, pp. 49, 122. China’s Five Principles of Peaceful 

Coexistence are 1) mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty; 2) 

mutual nonaggression; 3) mutual noninterference in internal affairs; 4) equality 

and mutual benefit; and 5) peaceful coexistence. These principles were enumerated 

in a Sino-Indian agreement on April 29, 1954, and repeated in Bandung by Zhou 

Enlai on April 19, 1955. The principles are mentioned in full in the 1972 Sino-U.S. 

Communiqué and in Hu Yaobang’s September 1, 1982, report to the 12th National 

People’s Congress. 

4. Garver, p. 150.

5. Bruce Vaughn, China-Southeast Asia Relations: Trends, Issues, and Implications 

for the United States, CRS Report for the Congress, CRS RL32688, February 8, 

2005, p. 4. See also Michael McDevitt, “U.S. Strategy in the Asia-Pacific Region: 

Southeast Asia,” in W. Lee, R. Hathaway, and W. Wise, eds., U.S. Strategy in the 

Asia-Pacific Region, Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center for International 

Scholars, 2003, p. 44.
3

6. This quote is from the U.S. National Security Strategy. See the statement 

of Richard Ellings, President, National Bureau of Asian Research, Committee on 

International Relations, House of Representatives, Hearing on “The United States 

and Asia: Continuity, Instability and Tradition,” March 17, 2004.

7. Wortzel, The ASEAN Regional Forum: Asian Security without an American 

Umbrella.

8. The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative/Home/Document Library/

USTR Zoellick Speeches/2004/02/25/04/China Trade. China and America: Power 

and Responsibility, 02/24/2004.

9. See the table on diverging and converging U.S. and Chinese interests in 

Southeast Asia in David Shambaugh, “China Engages Asia: Reshaping the 

Regional Order,” International Security, Winter 2004/2005, p. 64.

10. Taipei Times, August 28, 2005, p. 1.

11. China’s Position Paper on the New Security Concept,” August 6, 2002, www.

chinaembassy.org.tr/eng/xwdt/t61685.htm.

12. Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 

China’s Peaceful Development Road, Beijing, December 22, 2005, issued as a White 

Paper on Peaceful Development, www.chinadaily.com.cn/english.doc/2005-12/22/

content_505678.htm. 

13. Yan Xuetong, Wang Zaibang, Li Zhongcheng, and Hou Ruoshi, Zhongguo 

Jueqi: Guoji Huanjing Pinggu (The International Environment for China’s Peaceful Rise), 

Tianjin: Tianjin Renmin Chubanshe, 1998. 

14. Ibid. p. 2.

15. Ibid. pp. 234-235.

16. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, 

DC, maintains a regular program of exchanges with the Central Communist Party 

School of China and its China Reform Forum. A compilation of Zheng Bijian’s 

speeches on “China’s Peaceful Rise” can be found on the CSIS web site, www.csis.

org. See also Zheng Bijian, “Zhongguo Heping Jueqi Fazhan Daolu You Liyu ZhongMei Guanxi” (“China’s Peaceful Rise is Conducive to the Sino-U.S. Relationship”), 

Luntan Tongxun (China Reform Forum Newsletter, 9/2004), September 28, 2004, pp. 

3-6. 

17. Xinhua, October 29, 2003, in www2.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2003-10/29/

content_276497.htm; www.adb.org/Documents/Events/2003/Boao_Fourm_Asia/default.

asp. Zheng Bijian, “Zhongguo Heping Jueqi Fazhan Daolu You Liyu Zhong-Mei 

Guanxi,” pp. 3-6. 

18. Zheng Bejian, “China’s Peaceful Rise,” Foreign Affairs, Summer/Fall 2005.

19. Discussion with Zheng Bijian, Beijing, August 23, 2005.

20. See news.xinhuanet.com/zhengfu/2004-03/26/content_1386611.htm, in Chinese.

21. Ibid. Hu Jintao, Speech in celebration of the 110th anniversary of Mao 

Zedong’s birth, December 26, 2003.
3

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid.

24. Discussion between the author and PLA officers in May 2004 and August 

2005. 

25. Discussion with Zheng Bijian, August 23, 2005. 

26. Larry Wortzel, “China’s Peaceful Rise,” The Asian Wall Street Journal, 

September 5, 2005, p. A9.

27. Meetings with the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, the China Reform 

Forum, and at Qinghua University, Beijing, August 22-23, 2005. 

28. Yan Xuetong, “Zhongguo Jueqi de Shili Diwei” (“China’s Overall Strength 

and Its Peaceful Rise”), Guoji Zhengzhi Kexue, (Science of International Politics), Vol. 

2, 2005, pp. 1-25, see especially p. 23.

29. See Huang Shifeng, ed., Zonghe Guoli Lilun, (The Theory of Comprehensive 

National Power). Beijing: Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Press, 1993, pp. 1, 

10-14, and 104-105. See also Liu Zhongmin, “Pondering Non-traditional Security 

Threat in the Maritime Space After the Indian Ocean Tsunami,” Zhongguo Zhanglue 

Guacha, Vol. 1, January 26, 2005, pp. 55-65.

30. Xinhua News Agency, Beijing, 1418 GMT, December 20, 2004, in BBC 

Monitoring International Reports. 

31. Kuik Cheng-Chee, “Multilateralism in China’s ASEAN Policy: Its Evolution, 

Characteristics, and Aspiration,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 27, No. 1, April 

2005, p. 102. 

32. Discussions with journalists in Hong Kong, August 28, 2005.

33. In addition to the 10 ASEAN states (Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, 

Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore Thailand and Vietnam), the ARF 

is comprised by Australia, Canada, China, the European Union, India, Japan, 

Mongolia, New Zealand, North Korea, Papua New Guinea, Pakistan, Russia, 

South Korea, East Timor, and the United States. See vietnamnews.vnagency.com.vn/

showarticle.php?num=02POL290705.

34. See Yan Yang and Chu Dao, “The Security Problems in the Asia-Pacific 

Region and the Security Problems of Parties Concerned,” Xiandai Guoji Guanxi

(Contemporary International Relations), Vol. 7, 1994, pp. 2-7; Eric Teo, “Solidifying 

China’s Regional Partnerships,” China Daily, May 15, 2005; and Wang Yizhou, 

Quanqiu Zhengzhi he Zhongguo Waijiao (Global Politics and China’s Foreign Policy), 

Beijing: Zhijie Zhishe Chubanshe, 2003. 

35. John Wang and Sarah Chan, “China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement: 

Shaping Future Economic Relations,” Asian Survey, Vol. 43, No. 3, May/June 2003, 

pp. 507-526. 

36. Ibid. p. 297. 
3

37. “Deals and Diplomacy: China’s Influence in Southeast Asia is Growing as 

its Trade and Investments Boom,” Time International, Asia Edition, May 30, 2005, 

p. 14. 

38. China’s National Defense in 2000, Xinhua, October 16, 2000.

39. Murray Heibert, “How China is Building an Empire,” Far Eastern Economic 

Review, November 20, 2003, p. 30. 

40. David Shambaugh, “Beijing Charms its Neighbors,” The International Herald 

Tribune, May 14, 2005, p. 6; Michael R. J. Vatikiotis, “Catching the Dragon’s Tail: 

China and Southeast Asia in the 21st Century,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 

25, No. 1, April 2003, p. 65.

41. Alice D. Ba, “China and ASEAN: Reinvigorating Relations for a 21sr Century 

Asia,” Asian Survey, Vol. 43, No. 4, July/August 2003, pp. 622-674. 

42. Ba, “China and ASEAN,” p. 646; “China looks to flex ASEAN muscle,” TV 

New Zealand, July 25, 2005, tvnz.co.nz/view/page/411366/599871.

43. “China to forge security cooperation in Asia-Pacific region: FM,” People’s 

Daily Online, english.people.com.cn/200507/29/eng20050729_199142.html. 

44. For a comprehensive look at China’s military diplomacy in the region in 

from the time of the establishment of the PRC until 1999, see the monograph 

by Kenneth W. Allen and Eric A. McVadon, China’s Foreign Military Relations, 

Washington, DC: The Stimson Center, October 1999. 

45. See www.chinamil.com.cn/sitel/wdwjdlsl/wdwjdlsl.htm.

46. Discussions with PLA foreign affairs office staff, 1999, 2002. 

47. In the case of incoming U.S. visitors, this is often the case because the U.S. 

Government funds such visits as part of its own internal engagement planning, 

and the PLA tends to use the money from such visits to fund its own international 

operations. Thus, the PLA will often accept more visits than it makes. 

48. The author owes this point to discussion from the floor at the 2005 PLA 

conference, Carlisle, PA, September 23-25, 2005. See also David Shambaugh, 

Modernizing China’s Military: Progress Problems and Prospects, Berkeley, University 

Of California Press, 2002, pp. 143-146.

49. See vn.chineseembassy.org/chn/zygx/t177232.htm.

50. “First PLA Navy Visit to Vietnam,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, November 28, 

2001, p. 16.

51. BBC Monitoring Service, September 30, 2003, from Vietnam News Agency, 

September 29, 2003. 

52. BBC Monitoring Service, October 28, 2003. 

53. BBC Monitoring Service, March 6, 2004. 

54. SCMP.com, October 6, 2004. 

55. BBC Monitoring Service, December 7, 2004. 
3

56. BBC Monitoring Service, April 11, 3005. 

57. People’s Daily Online, July 0, 2005. 

58. World News Connection (hereafter WNC) NTIS, U.S. Department of 

Commerce, August 27, 2003.

59. BBC Monitoring Service, May 28, 2005.

60. People’s Daily Online, July 27, 2005; Vietnam News Agency, July 28, 2005. 

61. Karby Leggett, “Beyond the Wall: China Looks Abroad, Challenging the US 

for Influence in Asia,” Wall Street Journal, June 7, 2001, p. A.1.

62. Sothea, “China Seen as ‘Real Cause’ of Current Political ‘Turmoil’ in 

Cambodia,” Foreign Broadcast Information Service, FBIS-SEP20040518000092, May 

13, 2004.

63. Legget, “Beyond the Wall, ” June 7, 2001.

64. Interview, September 2004, Washington, DC.

65. “Cambodian PM to attend GMS Summit in China,” www.chinaview.com.cn, 

2005-07-03, 10:20:09.

66. Amy Kazin and James Kynge, “A Tussle for Asia,” Financial Times, June 27, 

2001, p. 20.

67. “Burma’s Reliance on China, BBC, December 11, 2001, 23:38 GMT; Peter 

Kammerer, “China India Hold Key to Burma,” South China Morning Post, June 20, 

2003, p. 8.

68. See interactive.wsj.com/archives/retrieve.cg?id-BT-CO20011212-001537.djm.

69. Amy Kazin, “China Throws Burma a Financial Lifeline,” Financial Times, 

January 17, 2003; Washington Post, September 28, 2003, p. B7.

70. Asia Times, September 23, 2003. 

71. Helen James, “Myanmar’s International Relations Strategy,” Contemporary 

Southeast Asia, No. 3, Vol. 26, December 1, 2004, p. 530. 

72. Dana R. Dillon, Democratic Indonesia as a Security Partner, Heritage 

Backgrounder 1800, Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, September 24, 

2004.

73. See www.chinaembassy-indonesia.or.id/eng/4360.html.

74. Tan Hongwei, “Roundup on NPC Chairman Li Peng’s Fruitful Found-Day 

Visit to Indonesia,” Zhongguo Xinwenshe, 0250GMT, September 12, 2002, FBISCPP20020912000017. 

75. Jakarta TVRI 1 Television, 2300 GMT, September 18, 2002, FBISSEP200209919000025.

76. Author’s experience with security review visits to Indonesia in 1987.

77. “Indonesia Explores Arms Purchases from China,” BBC Monitoring Service, 

November 6, 2004; “Indonesia to Pursue Military Cooperation with Russia and 

China,” BBC Monitoring Service, November 25, 2004. 
3

78. Yeguang Xinwen, latenews.com, June 13, 2005, 08:36:20; and BBC Worldwide 

Monitoring, August 5, 2005. 

79. “China and Indonesia Seal Strategic Pact, International Herald Tribune, April 

26, 2005. 

80. India-defence.com, srirangan.net/india-defence/node/241/print.

81. Murie Dickie and Shawn Donnan, “Jakarta in Missile Deal with Beijing,” 

Financial Times, August 1, 2005, p. 7. 

82. Ibid.

83. Terry McCarthy, “Reef Wars,” Time, March 8, 1999. 

84. See www.subcontinent.com/sapra/world/w_1999-21.html.

85. See ph.china-embassy.org/eng/zfgx/zzgx/t183269.htm.

86. See ph.china-embassy.org/eng/zfgx/zzgx/t183270.htm.

87. Gilbert Felongo, “Manila and Beijing Agreee to Set up Mechanism for 

Annual Defence Talks,” Financial Times, November 19, 2004.

88. “Beijing Expands Influence, Woos RP,” Manila Times, “Newsbites,” May 24, 

2005.

89. Volt Contreras, “Chinese Envoy Allays Fear of Stronger RP-Sino Ties,” 

Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 27, 2005.

90. “Malaysia to Buy PRC Surface to Air Missiles,” Kuala Lumbpur Bernama, July 

20, 2004, in FBIS-SEP20040720000095. 

91. The Star Online, September 16, 2003, allmalysiainfo.com.

92. People’s Daily Online, english.peopledaily.com.cn, May 24, 2002. 

93. Institute for International Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 2004-2005

London: Oxford University Press, 2005, pp. 190-192.

94. BBC Monitoring service, March 22, 2004, from Xinhua News Agency, 1257 

GMT March 21, 2004, pp. 2—4. 

95. BBC Monitoring service, July 4, 2005, from Xinhua News Agency, 0628 

GMT, July 4, 2004. 

96. BBC Monitoring Service, September 13, 2003, from Borneo Bulletin, Bandar 

Seri Begawan, September 13, 2003.

97. BBC Monitoring Service, October 30, 2003.

98. BBC Monitoring Service, November 28, 2004

99. Allen and McVadon, China’s Foreign Military Relations, p. iv.
ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS

PAUL H. B. GODWIN is a Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research 

Institute, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. He retired as professor of international 

affairs, the National War College, Washington, DC, in the summer of 1998. 

In the fall of 1987, he was a visiting professor at the Chinese National 

Defense University. His teaching and research specialties focus on Chinese 

defense and security policies. Dr. Godwin’s most recent publications 

are “Change and Continuity in Chinese Military Doctrine: 1949-1999,” 

in Mark A. Ryan, David M. Finkelstein, and Michael A. McDevitt, eds., 

Chinese Warfighting: the PLA Experience Since 1949 (Armonk, New York: 

M.E. Sharpe, 2003); “China’s Defense Establishment: The Hard Lessons of 

Incomplete Modernization,” in Laurie Burkitt, Andrew Scobell, and Larry 

Wortzel,eds., The Lessons of History: The Chinese People’s Liberation Army at 

75 (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2003); 

Preserving the PLA’s Soul: Civil Military Relations and the New Generation of 

Chinese Leadership, CAPS Papers No. 33 (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China: 

Chinese Council of Advanced Policy Studies, October 2003); and “China as 

Regional Hegemon?” in Jim Rolfe, ed., The Asia-Pacific Region in Transition 

(Honolulu, Hawaii: Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2004). Dr. 

Godwin graduated from Dartmouth College with a degree in International 

Relations, and received his Ph.D. in Political Science from the University 

of Minnesota.

LONNIE D. HENLEY is Defense Intelligence Officer for East Asia and 

Pacific, in the Defense Intelligence Agency. He is a retired Army China 

Foreign Area Officer, and has worked in a variety of China and Korearelated positions. He is the author of China’s Capacity for Achieving a 

Revolution in Military Affairs , U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies 

Institute (1996); “The RMA After Next,” Parameters, Winter 1999-2000; 

and other publications dealing with Chinese military capabilities, Asian 

security issues, and the future of warfare. He was educated at West Point, 

Oxford, Columbia, and the Defense Intelligence College.

ELLIS JOFFE is Professor of Chinese Studies at the Hebrew University of 

Jerusalem and a Senior Fellow at the Truman Research Institute at that 

university. Among Dr. Joffe’s works are Party and Army: Professionalism 

and Political Control in the Chinese Officer Corps, 1949-64 (1965), The Chinese 

Army After Mao (1987), and many articles in journals and books. He was 

educated in Jerusalem, Hong Kong, and at Harvard University.
SRIKANTH KONDAPALLI is a Research Fellow at the Institute for 

Defence Studies & Analysis, New Delhi. He has completed two research 

projects at IDSA - “China’s Armed Forces” and “China’s National Defence 

Strategy”; was Post-Doctoral Visiting Fellow at People’s University, Beijing, 

in 1997-98; qualified in the Chinese language test of Beijing Language & 

Culture University, 1996-97; was an Honorary Fellow at the Institute of 

Chinese Studies, Delhi; and is a Member of the Indian Council for Asia 

Pacific Studies. Dr. Kondapalli’s current project is Security Initiatives in 

Enhancing National Power: China in Asia. His latest publications include 

China’s Naval Power (New Delhi: Knowledge World & IDSA, 2001), A Great 

Leap Forward Modernisation: China’s Armed Forces in 2003 (Taipei: Centre for 

China Studies, 2005), and “China’s Political Commissars and Commanders: 

Trends & Dynamics,” (Singapore: Institute for Defence and Strategic 

Studies, University of Nanyang, Working Paper, 2005). Dr. Kondapalli 

received his Ph.D. in Chinese Studies at the Centre for East Asian Studies, 

School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

JAMES R. LILLEY is Senior Fellow in Asian studies at the American 

Enterprise Institute. Mr. Lilley was the U.S. Ambassador to the People’s 

Republic of China from 1989 to 1991 and to the Republic of Korea from 

1986 to 1989. He served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International 

Security Affairs from 1991 to 1993. Mr. Lilley wrote the forewords for the 

AEI publications Chinese Military Modernization, Over the Line, and China’s 

Military Faces the Future. He is also the coeditor of Beyond MFN: Trade Beyond 

MFN: Trade with China and American Interests and Crisis in the Taiwan Strait. 

He is the author most recently of: China Hands: Nine Decades of Adventure, 

Espionage, and Diplomacy in Asia, with Jeffrey Lilley (New York: Public 

Affairs, 2004).

FRANK MILLER is currently the Army Attaché to the U.S. Embassy in 

Beijing. As a Special Forces Officer assigned to First Special Forces Group 

and as a China Foreign Area Officer, he has served throughout East Asia, 

including tours in Okinawa, Hong Kong, and Hawaii as the J5 Country 

Manager for China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Mongolia. His previous tour 

was as the Defense and Army Attaché to the Socialist Republic of Vietnam 

in Hanoi. Colonel Miller is a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, Naval 

Postgraduate School, and the U.S. Army War College.

SUSAN M. PUSKA retired from the U.S. Army on February 1, 2005. As 

a military logistician, she served in various command and staff positions 

in Germany; Korea; Fort Hood, Texas; and Aberdeen Proving Ground, 

Maryland. Her last position prior to retirement was Political-Military 
Advisor, Bureau of Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State. Prior to 

this she served as the Army Attaché, U.S. Embassy, Beijing, during 2001-

03. During 1999-2000, Colonel Puska was the Director of Asian Studies, 

Department of National Security and Strategy, U.S. Army War College. 

Between 1996 and 1999, she served as the China Political-Military Desk 

Officer, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of the Army, International 

Affairs. During 1992 to 1994, she was an Assistant Army Attaché at the U.S. 

Embassy, Beijing. Her publications include “SARS 2002-2003: A Case Study 

in Crisis Management,” in Chinese Crisis Management (Carlisle, PA: Strategic 

Studies Institute, 2005); “The People’s Liberation Army General Logistics 

Department: Toward Joint Logistics Support,” in PLA As Organization 

(Santa Monica, California: RAND, 2002); editor of People’s Liberation Army 

After Next (Carlisle, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, 2000); and 

New Century, Old Thinking: The Dangers of the Perceptual Gap in U.S.-China 

Relations, (Carlisle, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, 1999). She 

studied Mandarin Chinese at the Defense Language Institute, Monterey, 

California, and The John Hopkins-Nanjing University Center for Chinese 

and American Studies, Nanjing, PRC. Colonel Puska has a BA from 

Michigan State University, an M.A. from the University of Michigan, and 

is a 1997 graduate of the U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania.

ANDREW SCOBELL is an Associate Research Professor at the Strategic 

Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, and Adjunct Professor of Political 

Science at Dickinson College. Prior to his current position, he taught at the 

University of Louisville, Kentucky, and Rutgers University, New Jersey. 

Dr. Scobell’s research focuses on political and military affairs in the AsiaPacific Region. He is the author of China’s Use of Military Force: Beyond the 

Great Wall and the Long March (Cambridge University Press, 2003). Dr. 

Scobell earned a Ph.D in political science from Columbia University.

ROBERT G. SUTTER became a Visiting Professor in the School of Foreign 

Service at Georgetown University in August 2001. Dr. Sutter specialized 

in Asian and Pacific Affairs and U.S. foreign policy in a U.S. Government 

career of 30 years. He held a variety of analytical and supervisory positions 

with the Library of Congress for over 20 years, and he also worked with 

the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of State, and the Senate 

Foreign Relations Committee. After leaving the Library of Congress, where 

he was for many years the Senior Specialist in International Politics for the 

Congressional Research Service, Dr. Sutter served for 2 years as the National 

Intelligence Officer for East Asia and the Pacific at the U.S. Government’s 

National Intelligence Council. He has held adjunct faculty positions with 

Georgetown, George Washington, and Johns Hopkins Universities and 
the University of Virginia. He has published 12 books, numerous articles 

and several hundred government reports dealing with contemporary East 

Asian and Pacific countries and their relations with the United States. Dr. 

Sutter received a Ph.D. in History and East Asian Languages from Harvard 

University. 

JOHN J. TKACIK, JR. is Senior Research Fellow in Asian Studies at The 

Heritage Foundation with a research focus on U.S. policies toward China 

(including Hong Kong and Macao), Taiwan, and Mongolia. Mr. Tkacik 

is a retired diplomat who served overseas with the U.S. Foreign Service 

in Taiwan, Iceland, China and the former British Crown Colony of Hong 

Kong, as well as in the Department of State in Washington, DC, where he 

was Chief of China Analysis in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research 

(INR). After Mr. Tkacik’s retirement, he worked in Hong Kong as vice 

president for external relations for R.J. Reynolds Tobacco International. He 

joined The Heritage Foundation in 2001. Mr. Tkacik is the Editor and main 

contributor to “Rethinking One China,” a book published by The Heritage 

Foundation in 2004. He has a master’s degree from Harvard University 

and a bachelor’s degree from Georgetown University.

LARRY M. WORTZEL is a commissioner on the U.S.-China Economic 

and Security Review Commission, a Congressionally appointed body. He 

is also a fellow with The Heritage Foundation, where he previously was 

Vice President for Foreign Policy and Director of the Asian Studies Center. 

Dr. Wortzel was a career Army officer, retiring as a colonel after 32 years 

of military service in 1999. He spent 7 years as an infantryman. He has 

long experience as a counterintelligence officer and foreign intelligence 

collector for the Defense Department. In 1971-72, while assigned in 

Southeast Asia, he collected communications intelligence on Chinese forces 

in Laos and Vietnam. He was an intelligence analyst on China at the U.S. 

Pacific Command from 1978-82. Dr. Wortzel served as a military attaché 

in China from May 1988 to June 1990 and June 1995 to December 1997. He 

also served as a strategist on the Department of the Army staff. His last 

military position was Director of the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army 

War College. Dr. Wortzel is the author of two books on military history 

and political issues in China and has edited and contributed chapters to 

five other books on the Chinese armed forces. He has been quoted widely 

on these subjects in newspapers and on wire services. He studied at the 

Chinese Language and Research Centre of the National University of 

Singapore in 1982-83. A graduate of the Armed Forces Staff College and 

the U.S. Army War College, Dr. Wortzel earned his B.A. from Columbus 

College, Georgia, and his M.A. and Ph.D. from the University of Hawaii.