This opinion will be unpublished and 

may not be cited except as provided by 

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014). 

STATE OF MINNESOTA 

IN COURT OF APPEALS 

A15-2054 

In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Brad Ronald Stevens 

Filed June 20, 2016 

Affirmed 

Connolly, Judge 

Goodhue County District Court 

File No. 25-P9-04-001747 

Brad Ronald Stevens, Moose Lake, Minnesota (pro se appellant) 

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Angela Helseth Kiese, Assistant Attorney General, 

St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent) 

 Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Kirk, 

Judge. 

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N 

CONNOLLY, Judge 

 Appellant, committed as a sexually dangerous person, challenges the denial of his 

motions for relief, arguing that the district court abused its discretion in denying his Minn. 

R. Civ. P. 60.02 motion and in denying his motion for a preliminary injunction and a 

temporary restraining order. Because we see no abuse of discretion, we affirm. 
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FACTS 

In 1993, appellant Brad Stevens, now 49, was sentenced for two first-degree 

criminal-sexual-conduct offenses against two victims. In 2003, he pleaded guilty to 

attempted fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct against a third victim. In 2004, 

respondent Goodhue County filed a petition to commit him as a sexually dangerous person 

(SDP) and a sexual psychopathic personality (SPP). He was admitted to the Minnesota 

Sex Offender Program (MSOP) in St. Peter. In 2005, following a trial and a hearing, he 

was committed indeterminately as an SDP. 

Appellant has repeatedly challenged both his conviction and his commitment in this 

court. See, e.g., Stevens v. State, No. CX-96-1803 (Minn. App. Apr. 8, 1997) (affirming 

denial of appellant’s petition to vacate two sexual assault convictions on the ground that 

he suffered double jeopardy after imprisonment when his wages were applied in part to 

reimburse the state for the cost of his incarceration), review denied (Minn. June 11, 1997); 

Stevens v. State, No. A06-0622 (Minn. App. Jan. 23, 2007) (affirming the denial of his 

motion for postconviction relief), review denied (Minn. Apr. 17, 2007); Stevens v. State,

No. A09-0756 (Minn. App. Feb. 9, 2010) (affirming denial of his motion to correct his 

sentence); In re Commitment of Stevens, No. A10-1554 (Minn. App. Mar. 1, 2011) 

(affirming denial of appellant’s motion to vacate his commitment), review dismissed

(Minn. Aug. 18, 2011); Stevens v. State, No. A11-1759 (Minn. App. May 29, 2012) 

(affirming denial of his motion for a new trial or an evidentiary hearing). 

In June 2015, appellant filed a motion under Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 to vacate his 

commitment, based on Karsjens v. Jesson, (Karsjens II) 109 F. Supp. 3d 1139 ( (D. Minn. 
3 

2015), motion to certify appeal denied, Civ. No. 11-3659, 2015 WL 4478972 (D. Minn. 

July 22, 2015). Appellant also filed motions for a preliminary injunction and for a 

temporary restraining order. His motions were denied. He challenges the denials, arguing 

that they were an abuse of the district court’s discretion. 

D E C I S I O N 

1. Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 Motion 

The district court’s denial of a motion brought under Minn. R. Civ. P. 60 is reviewed 

for an abuse of discretion. Charson v. Temple Israel, 419 N.W.2d 488, 490 (Minn. 1988). 

The district court denied appellant’s motion on three grounds: (A) a committed individual 

may not move under Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 for a discharge; (B) there has been no change 

in the circumstances that resulted in appellant’s commitment; and (C) Karsjens II does not 

preclude his commitment. 

A. Propriety of Motion Under Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 

 In the decision challenged on appeal, the district court wrote: 

1. This Court has previously concluded in prior orders 

issued in this matter that Rule 60.02 does not apply to requests 

for discharge from commitment. The court reaffirms its 

previous findings of fact and conclusions of law on this issue. 

2. The commitment statute is the exclusive remedy for 

someone seeking discharge from their commitment. In re 

Lonergan, 811 N.W.2d 635, 642 (Minn. 2012). 

3. A motion may not be pursued under Rule 60 if the relief 

requested would frustrate either the rehabilitation of the patient 

or the protection of the public. Id. 

This conclusion was supported by the district court’s finding that appellant is “highly likely 

to reoffend and is a danger to the public as he has serious difficult[y] controlling his harmful 
4 

sexual behavior,” which indicated that the relief appellant requested, i.e., provisional 

discharge from MSOP, would frustrate his own rehabilitation and the protection of the 

public. 

 The district court did not err in concluding that a motion under Minn. R. Civ. P. 

60.02 for relief from judgment is not an appropriate means of challenging SDP 

commitment or seeking discharge. 

 B. Change in Circumstances 

 The district court found that: 

21. [Appellant] has not demonstrated that he has been 

rehabilitated. The Court reaffirms its previous Findings that he 

is highly likely to reoffend and is a danger to the public as he 

has serious difficult[y] controlling his harmful sexual behavior. 

. . . . 

23. [Appellant] has not provided sufficient evidence to this 

Court that the facts that necessitated the original commitment 

have changed. [Appellant] has not provided sufficient 

evidence to this Court that the facts . . . changed since the last 

Rule 60 order issued by the Court [two months earlier]. 

 Appellant argues that there has been a change in his circumstances, based on 

evidence provided by Dr. [R.], who testified that the tools used by the doctors who 

supported appellant’s commitment in 2005 were defective. The district court heard 

Dr. [R.’s] testimony when appellant offered it to show a change in the circumstances that 

necessitated his commitment at a hearing on one of his previous motions. 

 “As the trier of fact, the district court will be in the best position . . . to evaluate 

the credibility of witnesses--a critical function in these cases that rely so heavily on the 

opinions of experts.” In re Civil Commitment of Ince, 847 N.W.2d 13, 23-24 (Minn. 2014) 
5 

(addressing commitment as SDP). Moreover, courts must evaluate multiple factors, not 

just actuarial instruments, to determine whether a person is likely to reoffend. Id. at 24. 

 The district court discussed its reasons for rejecting Dr. R.’s testimony at length 

in its November 2014 decision, which it incorporated by reference into the decision that is 

the subject of this appeal. 

29. [Appellant] bases his claims upon the testimony of 

Dr. [R.] . . . that the actuarial data relied upon by both experts 

who supported [appellant’s] commitment as SDP was faulty 

and overestimated [appellant’s] “being highly likely” to 

reoffend in the future. 

30. Dr. [R.] questions the reliability and accuracy of the 

various actuarial tests that were administered to [appellant]. 

He alleges that [appellant’s] recidivism rate would actually be 

much lower if [Dr. R.’s] analysis of the tests and scores were 

accepted. 

31. Dr. [R.] concludes that [appellant] had no violations 

while he was in prison and that his only violation was his 

refusal to cooperate with sex offender treatment because his 

Fifth Amendment rights would not be protected. 

32. The doctor goes on to conclude, however, that 

[appellant] would have at least 18 months of supervised release 

and that “[appellant] agrees to the conditions which include sex 

offender treatment.” 

33. It appears rather circuitous to say [appellant] is a low 

risk to reoffend as long as he is in sex offender treatment and 

in the same paragraph conclude that his violation of his release 

conditions was his refusal to participate in sex offender 

treatment. 

. . . . 

37. Four doctors, two pre-petition screeners, and the two 

experts all opined that [appellant] met all statutory criteria for 

commitment as SDP. 

. . . . 

39. Of significant importance is the fact that both of the 

Court-appointed examiners found factors in addition to the 

base rate actuarial scores that supported the conclusion that 

[appellant] was “highly likely” to reoffend. 

. . . . 
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48. . . . [T]he Court finds that [appellant’s] challenge to the 

initial commitment based upon the report of Dr. [R.] . . . is 

without merit. The opinions and testimony of the original 

experts are more persuasive to the Court than the position taken 

by Dr. [R.]. 

 The district court did not err in concluding that appellant has not shown significant 

changes in the circumstances or conditions that resulted in his initial commitment. 

 C. The Effect of Karsjens

 Appellant’s overriding argument is that the district court’s 2005 orders committing 

him are void for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because portions of the Minnesota civil 

commitment statute were declared unconstitutional by the federal district court of 

Minnesota in Karsjens II. Both in challenging his initial commitment and in seeking 

release, appellant relies heavily on Karsjens II and on Karsjens v. Jesson (Karsjens I), 6 F. 

Supp. 3d 916 (D. Minn. 2014) (concluding that the appellants in that case, persons civilly 

committed to MSOP and challenging their commitments, had stated five claims but failed 

to state an equal-protection claim). His reliance is misplaced. 

 As a threshold matter, the eighth circuit’s review of Karsjens II is pending.1

 

Moreover, the Karsjens cases involved only one claim relating to initial commitment, 

 

1

 “The federal court issued its first ‘remedies’ order on October 29, 2015. Karsjens v. 

Jesson (Karsjens [III]), Civ. No. 11-3659, 2015 WL 6561712 (D. Minn. Oct. 29, 2015). 

The court indicated in its October 29 order that it anticipates issuing subsequent orders 

regarding MSOP’s policies and procedures. Id. at *17. The commissioner appealed to the 

Eighth Circuit and filed a motion in federal district court to stay enforcement of the 

October 29 order pending appeal. The district court denied the commissioner’s motion. 

Karsjens v. Jesson (Karsjens [IV]), Civ. No. 11-3659, 2015 WL 7432333, *7 (D. Minn. 

Nov. 23, 2015). The Eighth Circuit has since granted the commissioner’s request for a stay 

pending appeal. Karsjens v. Jesson (Karsjens [V]), No. 15-3485 (8th Cir. Dec. 15, 2015).” 

In re Civil Commitment of Hand, --- N.W.2d ---, ---, No. A15-1341, 2016 WL 1397100, 
7 

which was that the statute violated equal protection rights because of geographic variations 

in petition and commitment rates throughout the state. That claim was dismissed on the 

ground that the defendants had not made the decisions to commit the plaintiffs. Karsjens 

I, 6 F. Supp. at 935-36. Karsjens I is therefore not relevant to a challenge to initial 

commitment to the MSOP. 

 Karsjens II explicitly states that the case “[was not] about the immediate release 

of any single committed individual or committed individuals,” that the MSOP facilities 

“[would] not be immediately closed,” and that “there are some sex offenders who are truly 

dangerous and who should not be released.” Karsjens II, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1144. Thus, 

Karsjens II is also not relevant to a claim seeking immediate vacation of an SDP 

commitment. 

 In any event, the Karsjens matter is not dispositive authority for this court, which 

is bound by Minnesota Supreme Court opinions that have repeatedly rejected challenges 

to the constitutionality of the civil commitment of sex offenders. See, e.g., In re Linehan, 

594 N.W.2d 867, 875-76 (Minn. 1999); In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910 (Minn. 1994). On 

issues of interpretation of the federal constitution, this court is bound not by the federal 

district court but by the Unites States Supreme Court and the Minnesota Supreme Court. 

State v. Brist, 812 N.W.2d 51, 54 (Minn. 2012). 

 

*1 n.1 (Minn. App. Apr. 11, 2016) (holding that a motion for relief from an order for 

indeterminate commitment on the ground that the Minnesota Commitment and Treatment 

Act (MCTA) is unconstitutional is barred by the exclusive transfer-or-discharge remedies 

of the MCTA), pet. for review filed (Minn. May 10, 2016). 
8 

 The district court’s denial of appellant’s Rule 60.02 motion was not an abuse of 

discretion. 

2. Injunctive Relief 

 The standard of review for denial of injunctive relief is abuse of discretion. See, 

e.g., Pacific Equip. & Irr., Inc. v. Toro Co., 519 N.W.2d 911, 918 (Minn. App. 1994) (“Our 

standard of review is narrow, and we find no abuse of the district court’s discretion in 

denying [appellant’s] request for injunctive relief.”), review denied (Minn. Sept. 16, 1004). 

 Appellant moved for a preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining order 

that would “modify” his commitment and release him from judgment if he swore to abide 

by certain conditions, including appearing at all hearings and following state laws. “A 

primary factor in determining whether to grant a temporary injunction is the proponent’s 

probability of success in the underlying action.” Minneapolis Fed. of Teachers v. 

Minneapolis Pub. Schools, 512 N.W.2d 107, 110 (Minn. App. 1994). Failure to establish 

the likelihood of success on the merits is dispositive of a motion for injunctive relief. 

Sanborn Mfg. Co. v. Currie, 500 N.W.2d 161, 165 (Minn. App. 1993). Having 

“conclude[d] that [appellant] will not prevail on his rule 60.02 motion to vacate the 

commitment,” as discussed above, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying 

appellant’s motions for injunctive relief. 

 Affirmed.