SUMMARY

February 21, 2019

2019COA22

No. 16CA0236, People in the Interest of D.C. — Juvenile Court 

— Delinquency; Crimes — Public Indecency

A division of the court of appeals considers whether sufficient 

evidence supported a juvenile’s adjudication for public indecency 

committed in a Division of Youth Corrections’ classroom. 

Interpreting the public indecency statute, § 18-7-301(1), C.R.S. 

2018, the division concludes that the residents, staff, and teachers

at the Division of Youth Corrections’ facility are “members of the 

public” for purposes of the statute and, thus, sufficient evidence 

established that the juvenile exposed his genitals in a place “where 

the conduct may reasonably be expected to be viewed by members 

of the public.” 

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions 

constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by 

the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be 

cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division. 

Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion 

should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2019COA22

Court of Appeals No. 16CA0236

Mesa County District Court No. 15JD243

Honorable Thomas M. Deister, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Petitioner-Appellee,

In the Interest of D.C., 

Juvenile-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division VII

Opinion by JUDGE DUNN

Márquez* and Casebolt*, JJ., concur

Announced February 21, 2019

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Kevin E. McReynolds, Assistant Attorney 

General, Denver, Colorado, for Petitioner-Appellee 

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Ryann S. Hardman, Deputy 

State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Juvenile-Appellant 

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. 

VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2018.
1

¶ 1 D.C. and E.L. were committed to the Division of Youth 

Corrections (DYC). During their DYC science class, D.C. exposed 

one of his testicles to E.L. E.L. reported the incident, and the 

prosecution filed a delinquency petition, alleging that D.C.

committed an act that, if committed by an adult, would constitute 

public indecency. After a bench trial, the juvenile court adjudicated 

D.C. delinquent.

¶ 2 D.C. appeals, contending that insufficient evidence supported 

the adjudication. We disagree and therefore affirm.

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶ 3 D.C. argues the prosecution failed to establish that the DYC 

classroom, where D.C. exposed his testicle, was a “public place” 

under the public indecency statute, § 18-7-301(1), C.R.S. 2018. We 

are persuaded the evidence was sufficient to support the 

adjudication. We, however, come to this conclusion not because 

the classroom was a public place (an issue we don’t reach) but 

because D.C. exposed himself where members of the public were 

reasonably likely to see it.
2

A. Standard of Review

¶ 4 We review challenges to the sufficiency of evidence de novo.

People in Interest of G.B., 2018 COA 77, ¶ 13. In doing so, we must 

determine whether the evidence, when viewed as a whole and in the 

light most favorable to the prosecution, is substantial and sufficient 

to support a conclusion by a rational fact finder that the juvenile 

committed the act beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. We give the 

prosecution the benefit of every reasonable inference that might 

fairly be drawn from the evidence. People v. Perez, 2016 CO 12, 

¶ 32.

¶ 5 We likewise interpret the public indecency statute de novo. 

See People v. Halbert, 2013 COA 95, ¶ 11. We give the statutory 

words their plain and ordinary meanings, and, if the statute is 

unambiguous, we apply it as written. Id.

B. Public Indecency

¶ 6 As relevant here, a person commits public indecency by 

knowingly exposing his genitals to the view of another under 

circumstances that are likely to cause affront or alarm “in a public 

place or [in a place] where the conduct may reasonably be expected 

to be viewed by members of the public.” § 18-7-301(1)(e). The 
3

statute therefore identifies two different ways to commit the crime of 

public indecency — exposing oneself “in a public place” or exposing 

oneself in a place where members of the public “may reasonably be 

expected” to view the exposure. See id.; see also Willhite v. 

Rodriguez-Cera, 2012 CO 29, ¶ 18 (“[T]he use of the disjunctive ‘or’ 

reflects a choice of equally acceptable alternatives.”); cf. Friend v. 

People, 2018 CO 90, ¶¶ 18-19 (Where a criminal statute sets forth 

different ways to commit a crime, separated by the disjunctive “or,” 

it “prescribes a single crime” that “can be committed in alternate 

ways.”).

¶ 7 Responding to D.C.’s motion for judgment of acquittal at trial, 

the prosecution argued that it had presented sufficient evidence 

establishing that the DYC classroom was a “public place” or that 

the exposure occurred in a place “where the conduct might 

reasonably ha[ve] been expected to be viewed by members of the 

public.”1 The juvenile court recognized that DYC residents, 

teachers, and staff are “members of the public,” but ultimately 

 ——————————————————————— 1 D.C. didn’t challenge the sufficiency of evidence as to any other 

element of the public indecency statute at trial, nor does he on 

appeal.
4

denied the motion because it concluded that the DYC classroom 

was a “public place.”

¶ 8 The parties disagree on whether the DYC classroom is a 

“public place” under the public indecency statute. But we need not 

wade into this disagreement because sufficient evidence showed 

that D.C. exposed his genitals in a place “where the conduct may 

reasonably be expected to be viewed by members of the public.”

§ 18-7-301(1); see People v. Steerman, 735 P.2d 876, 879 (Colo. 

1987) (reinstating a jury verdict vacated by the district court 

because sufficient evidence supported a statutory alternative for 

committing the charged crime); People v. Prendergast, 87 P.3d 175, 

186 (Colo. App. 2003) (rejecting the defendant’s sufficiency of the 

evidence challenge when the jury instruction phrased an element of 

the crime in the disjunctive and sufficient evidence supported the 

alternative manner to commit the crime); cf. People v. Dunaway, 88 

P.3d 619, 629 n.9 (Colo. 2004) (when elements of a crime are listed 

in the “disjunctive,” “proof of one” is sufficient); People v. Viduya, 

703 P.2d 1281, 1292 (Colo. 1985) (“[When t]he statute describes 

two ways in which this offense can be committed[,] . . . [i]t is then 
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proper to instruct the jury in the disjunctive, requiring conviction if 

any of the statutory alternatives is established by the evidence.”).

¶ 9 In that regard, E.L. testified that nine or ten other students 

and a teacher were in the DYC classroom when D.C. exposed 

himself. He also said that DYC staff were outside the classroom. 

Another student confirmed that the teacher and other students 

were present at the time of the incident. And a correctional officer 

testified that DYC staff go in and out of the classrooms and that 

they “use the classrooms for lots of different things.” The officer 

also explained that the juvenile residents (under staff supervision) 

may go in and out of the classrooms during school hours and that 

at times parents can “come in and visit” the school for such reasons

as parent-teacher conferences. Given this testimony, the juvenile 

court recognized that a “substantial . . . number of members of the 

community” are present in the school.

¶ 10 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution — as we must — a reasonable fact finder could 

conclude that D.C. knowingly exposed his genitals to E.L. in a place 

“where the conduct may reasonably be expected to be viewed by 
6

members of the public.” § 18-7-301(1). The evidence therefore 

sufficiently supports the adjudication. 

¶ 11 Attempting to avoid that result, D.C. leans heavily on In re 

May, 584 S.E.2d 271 (N.C. 2003), arguing that the DYC residents, 

teachers, and staff are not “members of the public” while in the 

classroom because, he contends, they are present there “only by 

virtue of having been assigned to live there or . . . their 

employment.” We see a few problems with this argument.

¶ 12 First, May, is distinguishable. It considered whether sufficient 

evidence supported the elements for the common law crime of 

“affray” (recognized in North Carolina), when a juvenile was involved 

in a physical fight on the grounds of a children’s group home. Id. at 

272-73. A necessary element of this crime is that the fight occurred 

“in a public place.” Id. at 274. Concluding the prosecution didn’t 

present evidence establishing this element, the court reversed the 

juvenile’s adjudication. In doing so, it recognized that only 

residents and staff of the children’s home (“associates of the 

combatants”) witnessed the fight and such witnesses with “strong 

ties to the facility” did not “transform the facility . . . into a public 

place.” Id. at 277. May did not hold that residents and staff of a 
7

juvenile facility can’t be members of the public. See id. at 276-77. 

Thus, May adds little to our analysis. 

¶ 13 Second, the public indecency statute does not require that the 

“members of the public” actually see the exposure, just that the 

exposure occur in a place where members of the public “may 

reasonably be expected” to see it. § 18-7-301(1). D.C.’s argument,

therefore, doesn’t account for the testimony that family members 

can (and do) visit the DYC school. These nonstaff members of the 

public “may reasonably be expected” to view conduct in the school, 

even if they might not have been physically present when D.C. 

exposed himself. This undisputed evidence alone supports the 

adjudication.

¶ 14 Third, we see no reason why DYC teachers, staff, and juvenile 

residents are not “members of the public.” After all, a “member” 

means “one of the individuals composing a society, community, 

association, or other group.” Webster’s Third New International 

Dictionary 1408 (2002). The legislature didn’t exclude teachers, 

staff, or juvenile DYC residents from being “members of the public” 

in the public indecency statute. And we are unaware of any 

authority stripping DYC teachers and staff of their public 
8

membership simply due to their place of employment. Cf. Doe v. 

Colo. Dep’t of Pub. Health & Env’t, 2018 COA 106, ¶ 38 (“‘[M]ember’ 

plainly means something different than ‘employee.’”) (cert. granted

Jan. 14, 2019). In the same way, juvenile DYC residents’ inability 

to freely leave the facility doesn’t mean they lose their status as 

“members of the public” entitled to protection from public 

indecency.

¶ 15 In fact, People v. Hoskay, 87 P.3d 194 (Colo. App. 2003),

reached a similar conclusion, albeit in a slightly different context. 

There, the defendant was convicted of public indecency for having 

sexual intercourse in the dormitory room of a detoxification facility. 

Id. at 198. The division rejected the defendant’s sufficiency 

argument, concluding that “[t]he evidence established that the 

dormitory room of the detoxification facility was open to [those]

admitted to the facility, as well as to the staff.” Id. at 199. It thus 

held that sufficient evidence supported the jury’s finding that the

room was “a place where sexual conduct may reasonably have been 

expected to be viewed by members of the public.” Id.

¶ 16 And our conclusion is consistent with courts in other 

jurisdictions, which have found that staff and residents of 
9

correctional facilities may be members of the public when 

considering similar crimes. See State v. Narcisse, 833 So. 2d 1186, 

1192 (La. Ct. App. 2002) (upholding the defendant’s conviction for 

obscenity in public view when he masturbated in front of jail 

infirmary staff); People v. Williams, 603 N.W.2d 300, 302 (Mich. Ct. 

App. 1999) (concluding that oral sex in a jail interview room was 

committed in a place where members of the public could have been 

exposed, including “jail personnel, attorneys, and visitors”), vacated 

in part, 613 N.W.2d 721 (Mich. 2000); cf. State v. Black, 545 S.W.2d 

617, 619 (Ark. 1977) (concluding that oral sex in the city jail’s 

“drunk tank” occurred in a public place where jail staff, other 

inmates, and people on public tours could view the act); People v. 

Giacinti, 358 N.E.2d 934, 937 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976) (affirming public 

indecency conviction committed in a prison cell that could have 

been viewed by prison staff, prisoners, and visiting ministers).

II. Conclusion

¶ 17 For these reasons, we conclude that sufficient evidence 

supports D.C.’s public indecency adjudication and therefore affirm

it.

JUDGE MÁRQUEZ and JUDGE CASEBOLT concur.