In the

Court of Appeals

Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth ___________________________

No. 02-23-00304-CR

___________________________

On Appeal from County Criminal Court No. 7

Tarrant County, Texas

Trial Court No. 1724153

Before Sudderth, C.J.; Kerr and Wallach, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Wallach

TONY STATURE, Appellant

V. 

THE STATE OF TEXAS
2

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Tony Stature appeals his conviction for driving while intoxicated

(DWI), second offense. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 49.04, 49.09(a). In six issues, 

Stature argues that the trial court erred by: (1) failing to grant his motion to suppress

(first issue), (2) admitting blood evidence because the chain of custody was 

insufficient (second issue) and because the blood evidence was obtained through an 

invalid search warrant in violation of his rights under the United States and Texas 

Constitutions (fourth and fifth issues), (3) denying his motion for mistrial after the 

State presented evidence of a gun (third issue), and (4) denying his motion for 

directed verdict (sixth issue). We affirm.

I. Background

On March 25, 2022, Euless police officer Jacob Shoemate was working patrol 

when he observed a black truck’s weaving within its lane. Officer Shoemate followed 

the vehicle, and he saw the driver, whom he identified as Stature, commit two traffic 

offenses—failure to signal a lane change and failure to stop at a designated stop.

Officer Shoemate stopped Stature’s vehicle for the traffic violations, and when he 

approached, he saw two beer cans inside Stature’s vehicle. According to Officer 

Shoemate, Stature’s eyes were red and watery, and he had an odor of alcohol on his 

person. Officer Shoemate asked Stature to get out of his vehicle so that he could 

administer field sobriety tests.
3

Officer Shoemate observed that on the walk-and-turn test Stature exhibited six 

out of the eight clues of intoxication. Officer Shoemate believed that Stature had lost 

the use of his mental faculties based upon that test, but he did not find a loss of 

physical faculties at that time. Stature next performed the one-leg stand test, and 

Officer Shoemate determined from that test that Stature had lost the use of his mental 

and physical faculties. A video of Stature’s walk-and-turn test and one-leg stand test 

was played for the jury. Based upon the totality of the tests and his personal 

observations, Officer Shoemate arrested Stature for DWI.

Officer Shoemate transported Stature to the Euless Police Department and 

read him his statutory warnings. Stature did not consent to give a blood sample, so 

Officer Shoemate had to request a search warrant for the blood draw. After getting 

the search warrant, Officer Shoemate took Stature to the hospital for a blood draw.

Michael Bankhead drew Stature’s blood at the Texas Health HEB Emergency 

Department and sealed the vial with a tamper-proof seal. Officer Shoemate took the 

blood sample to the police property room, and it was later sent to a third-party 

toxicology lab for testing. Jacklyn Merson, a senior analyst and laboratory supervisor 

at Armstrong Forensics Laboratory, tested Stature’s blood sample and testified that he 

had a blood alcohol concentration of 0.211—above the legal limit in Texas. See id. 

§ 49.01(2)(b).

Before trial, Stature moved to suppress “all evidence subsequent to the red and

blues coming on,” arguing “that there wasn’t the requisite reasonable suspicion of 
4 

probable cause to justify the detention.” The trial court denied the motion, and the 

case proceeded to trial. 

At the close of the State’s case, Stature reurged his motion to suppress. He

made three suppression requests based upon evidence (1) that Officer Shoemate’s 

testimony was not credible, (2) that there was no probable cause to arrest for DWI 

because the officer did not administer the field sobriety tests correctly, and (3) that 

there was no probable cause to obtain the search warrant for the blood draw. The trial 

court denied the requested motions to suppress. The trial court also denied Stature’s

request for a directed verdict on the element of intoxication.

The jury convicted Stature of DWI and assessed his punishment at 30 days’ 

confinement in the county jail and a $2,000 fine. The trial court suspended imposition 

of the confinement portion of the sentence and placed Stature on community 

supervision for 18 months. This appeal followed.

II. Motion to Suppress

In his first issue, Stature argues that the trial court erred by failing to grant his 

pre-trial motion to suppress. Stature does not challenge the trial court’s rulings on his 

motions to suppress made at the close of evidence at trial.

A. Standard of Review

We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence under a 

bifurcated standard of review. Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2007); Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). We give almost 
5 

total deference to a trial court’s rulings on questions of historical facts and 

application-of-law-to-fact questions that turn on an evaluation of credibility and 

demeanor, but we review de novo application-of-law-to-fact questions that do not 

turn on credibility and demeanor. Amador, 221 S.W.3d at 673; Estrada v. State, 

154 S.W.3d 604, 607 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); Johnson v. State, 68 S.W.3d 644, 652–

53 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).

B. Applicable Law

An officer may make a warrantless traffic stop if he has reasonable suspicion to 

do so. Jaganathan v. State, 479 S.W.3d 244, 247 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). Reasonable 

suspicion exists when, based on the totality of the circumstances, the officer shows 

specific, articulable facts at the suppression hearing that, when combined with rational 

inferences from those facts, would lead him to reasonably conclude that a person is 

engaging in criminal activity. State v. Torrez, 490 S.W.3d 279, 283 (Tex. App.—Fort 

Worth 2016, pet. ref’d). This is an objective standard that disregards any subjective 

intent of the detaining officer and looks solely to whether an objective basis for the 

stop exists. Id.

Whether a traffic stop was based on reasonable suspicion does not depend 

upon showing that an actual offense was committed; it is enough to show that the 

officer reasonably believed an offense was in progress. Id. Thus, at the suppression 

hearing, the State need not establish that a crime occurred prior to the stop but must 

elicit testimony showing sufficient facts to prove that reasonable suspicion existed 
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that the person stopped was engaging in criminal activity. Id. at 283–84. Reasonable 

suspicion requires only a “minimal level of objective justification” for the stop. Hamal

v. State, 390 S.W.3d 302, 306 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); see also Daniel v. State, 683 S.W.3d 

777, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024) (holding that an officer’s reasonable 

misinterpretation of state criminal law will not undermine the reasonable suspicion 

required to conduct a traffic stop). 

C. Discussion

At the suppression hearing, Officer Shoemate testified that he stopped Stature 

for two traffic violations: (1) failure to signal a lane change, and (2) failure to stop at a

designated point. On cross-examination, Officer Shoemate was unable to identify the 

specific statute for either of the traffic violations.

Section 545.104 of the Transportation Code requires an operator to use a signal 

to indicate an intention to turn, change lanes, or start from a parked position. Tex. 

Transp. Code Ann. § 545.104(a). Officer Shoemate specifically testified that he 

observed Stature change lanes without using a signal and that such failure to signal 

was a traffic violation.

Section 544.007 of the Transportation Code states that an operator of a vehicle 

facing a steady red signal shall stop at a clearly marked stop line. Id. § 544.007(d). In 

the absence of a stop line, the operator shall stop before entering the cross walk on 

the near side of the intersection. Id. Officer Shoemate testified that the traffic signal 

was red the entire time Stature was approaching and that Stature stopped his vehicle 
7

seven to eight feet into the crosswalk. Officer Shoemate stated that Stature’s failure to 

stop at the designated stop was a traffic offense. The trial court observed the dashcamera video that showed where Stature stopped his vehicle at the traffic signal.

Stature argued at the hearing that the State did not provide evidence of 

reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop because Officer Shoemate’s testimony was 

not credible and was the only evidence that supported the failure to signal a lane 

change violation and because the evidence showed that he did not completely pass the 

line of the crosswalk. The trial court determined that there was reasonable suspicion 

to initiate the traffic stop based upon Officer Shoemate’s testimony and the dashcamera video.

Although he could not identify the appropriate statutory references, Officer 

Shoemate testified unequivocally that he had observed Stature commit two traffic 

violations. His testimony provided sufficient facts to prove that he reasonably 

believed an offense was in progress. See Torrez, 490 S.W.3d at 284.

On appeal, Stature argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to 

suppress because the articulated facts did not match the reason for the stop. He 

contends that Officer Shoemate testified the traffic stop was for failure to stop at a 

designated place—a violation of Section 544.010,

1 which deals with stop signs and 

1

Section 544.010 provides that an operator of a vehicle approaching a stop sign 

or a yield sign shall stop at a clearly marked line. Tex. Transp. Code 

Ann. § 544.010(a)–(c). In the absence of a clearly marked stop line, the operator shall 
8

yield signs,—and there was no evidence he failed to stop at a stop sign or yield sign.

We disagree. Officer Shoemate specifically testified that the traffic signal light was red 

and that Stature stopped seven to eight feet into the crosswalk—a violation of Section 

544.007(d). Even though he could not identify the specific statute, his testimony was

sufficient to establish that he reasonably believed Stature had committed a traffic 

violation. See id.

Stature next argues that there was no evidence Officer Shoemate considered 

exceptions to the law requiring a signal to indicate a lane change citing, State v. Cortez, 

543 S.W.3d 198, 206–08 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). In Cortez, the trial court granted the 

defendant’s motion to suppress concluding that there was no evidence of a traffic 

violation. Id. at 202. The court of criminal appeals noted that even if the defendant 

had committed the traffic violation—driving on an improved shoulder—he was 

statutorily permitted to do so based upon circumstances listed in the statute allowing a 

driver to drive on an improved shoulder. Id. at 207. Stature contends that for the

offense of failure to signal a lane change, Officer Shoemate should have considered 

the circumstances in which that action was permissible. Unlike the statute considered 

in Cortez, Section 545.104 does not provide for circumstances in which failing to 

signal a lane change is permissible. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 545.104. Thus, there 

were no statutory exceptions Officer Shoemate was required to consider.

stop before entering the cross walk on the near side of the intersection. 

Id. § 544.010(c).
9

Stature finally argues that Officer Shoemate was not reliable because there were 

inconsistencies between his report and his testimony at the hearing. He specifically 

notes that Officer Shoemate indicated in his report that Stature was leaving a business 

that sold alcohol, but at the suppression hearing he stated he did not observe Stature 

leave such a business. Officer Shoemate stated that this was a clerical error in his 

report. He further points out that Officer Shoemate’s report indicates there was a 

911 dispatch tape included, but at the suppression hearing he stated to his knowledge 

there was no 911 call. Officer Shoemate stated that he had misunderstood, and he was 

under the impression that the 911 dispatch tape was referring to the “recording of the 

traffic stop.”

At a suppression hearing, the trial court is the sole trier of facts and judge of 

the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. Wiede v. 

State, 214 S.W.3d 17, 24–25 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). The trial court observed the 

demeanor and appearance of Officer Shoemate and was able to resolve any 

inconsistencies. See id. at 24.

Officer Shoemate testified that he observed Stature commit two traffic 

violations, and the trial court found there was reasonable suspicion to initiate the 

traffic stop. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, 

we hold that the trial court did not err by denying Stature’s motion to suppress at the 

pre-trial hearing. We overrule his first issue.
10

III. Blood Evidence

In his second issue, Stature argues that the trial court erred by admitting the 

blood evidence because the chain of custody was insufficient. In his fourth and fifth 

issues, he argues that the trial court erred by failing to exclude the blood evidence 

because the search warrant to obtain the blood sample was invalid under the United 

States and Texas Constitutions.

A. Standard of Review

We review a trial judge’s admissibility decision for an abuse of discretion. 

Johnson v. State, 490 S.W.3d 895, 908 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). The trial court abuses its 

discretion when its decision falls outside the zone of reasonable disagreement. Id. But 

if the evidentiary ruling is correct under any applicable theory of law—even if the trial 

court gave a wrong or insufficient reason for the ruling—we will not disturb it. Id.

B. Chain of Custody

The State offered State’s Exhibit 8 (the box for the blood kit sample) and 

State’s Exhibits 8A and 8B (the blood tubes). The trial court admitted State’s Exhibit 

8 for record purposes only and admitted State’s Exhibits 8A and 8B for all purposes 

over Stature’s predicate and Fourth Amendment objections.

Stature argues on appeal that the chain of custody was insufficient to support

the admission of the blood evidence. He further contends that the evidence was not

properly authenticated under Rule 901(a) of the Texas Rules of Evidence. See Tex. R. 

Evid. 901(a) (“To satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identifying an item of 
11

evidence, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that 

the item is what the proponent claims it is.”). We have reviewed chain-of-custody

complaints as complaints that evidence was not authenticated under Rule 901 even

when the appellant’s objection did not mention authentication or the rule. See Preston v.

State, No. 02-22-00024-CR, 2023 WL 4630625, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 20,

2023, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Proof of the beginning and

the end of the chain of custody will support admission of the evidence barring any

showing of tampering or alteration. Id. at *4. 

Officer Shoemate took Stature to the hospital for the blood draw, and he

prepared the seals for the blood vials containing Stature’s identifying information as

well as the date and the time of the blood draw. Bankhead drew Stature’s blood and

placed a tamper-proof seal over the top of the vials. The vials were placed in

protective sleeves and put into protective containers. The protective containers were

put into the blood kit box and sealed. Officer Shoemate took the blood kit box to the

Euless Police Department property room and placed it in a refrigerated locker.

According to Officer Shoemate, after he leaves the sample in the property room, it is

sent off to a toxicology lab for testing.

Merson identified the blood kit box. She testified that when she received the

blood sample kit, there was no indication of tampering and that the vials containing

the blood were sealed. Merson reviewed the information on the blood kit box against
12

the lab’s chain of custody to confirm identifying information. After confirming she

had the correct information, Merson conducted the tests on Stature’s blood sample.

The beginning of the chain of custody was established by Officer Shoemate’s

testimony that he was present during Stature’s blood draw, the blood vials were sealed

and labeled with Stature’s identifying information, and the evidence was placed in the

police property room. See id. Merson’s testimony identifying Stature’s blood sample kit

as the one she received and tested establishes the end of the chain of custody. See

Durrett v. State, 36 S.W.3d 205, 210 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.).

Stature contends, however, that the State did not establish the end of the chain

of custody because Officer Shoemate did not personally bring the evidence to trial.

Officer Shoemate testified that a detective brought the blood sample kit to court for

him because he forgot it. Even if we agreed with Stature’s argument that the chain of

custody did not end with Merson’s testing the blood sample, the State is not required

to prove a chain of custody if a witness could authenticate the exhibit by other means.

Preston, 2023 WL 4630625, at *5. Officer Shoemate identified his signature and badge

number on the blood samples. Testimony that an item is what it is claimed to be and

about its distinctive characteristics satisfies the requirements of authenticating or

identifying an item of evidence. Id.; Tex. R. Evid. 901(b)(1), (2), (4).

“Absent evidence of tampering, issues regarding the chain of custody bear on 

the weight, rather than on the admissibility, of evidence.” Davis v. State, 313 S.W.3d 

317, 348 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Stature contends that there was evidence of 
13

tampering because the dates on the blood evidence do not match. Merson testified 

that she tested the blood sample on April 1, 2022, but her lab analysis report is dated 

April 6, 2022. Stature argues that it is possible the lab confused two separate blood 

samples. A mere showing of the opportunity for tampering, absent affirmative 

evidence of such, is not sufficient to require exclusion of the evidence. Patel v. State, 

No. 2-08-032-CR, 2009 WL 1425219, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 21, 2009, 

no pet.) (mem. op, not designated for publication). Merson specifically testified that 

there was no evidence that anyone had tampered with the blood samples. There is no 

evidence in the record of tampering.

We hold that the State established a proper chain of custody and that there was 

no evidence of tampering. Officer Shoemate authenticated the evidence by identifying 

the blood vials and his signature and badge number on the seals. See Tex. R. Evid.

901(b)(1), (2), (4). Thus, the trial court did not err by admitting the blood evidence 

over Stature’s chain-of-custody objections. We overrule the second issue.

C. Invalid Search Warrant

In his fourth issue, Stature argues that the trial court erred by failing to exclude 

the blood evidence because it was obtained through an invalid search warrant in 

violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. In his fifth issue, he argues that admitting 

the blood evidence obtained through an invalid search warrant violated his rights 

under Article 1, Section 9 of the Texas Constitution and Article 38.23 of the Texas 

Code of Criminal Procedure.
14

On appeal, Stature specifically complains that there was no probable-cause 

affidavit attached to the warrant and that there was no probable cause presented to 

the magistrate who signed the warrant. The State counters that Stature has not 

preserved this complaint for review.

When the State offered the blood evidence, Stature’s counsel objected, “Well, 

foundation and predicate I don’t believe have been properly laid. That will be our first 

objection, in addition to . . . So our objection as of right now is, foundation and 

predicate have not been properly laid and 4th Amendment, 38.23, blood - - unlawful 

blood search without a warrant.” The trial court sustained the foundation and 

predicate objections and overruled the Article 38.23 objection. 

Officer Shoemate then testified that he was able to identify the blood vials 

because his signature and badge number were on them as well as Bankhead’s signature 

and the date and time of the blood draw. The State again offered State’s Exhibit 8 and 

State’s Exhibits 8A and 8B. Stature’s counsel “renewed [his] objections.” The trial 

court admitted State’s Exhibit 8 for record purposes only and admitted State’s 

Exhibits 8A and 8B for all purposes over Stature’s predicate and Fourth Amendment 

objections.

The State argues that the heart of Stature’s complaint was the lack of predicate 

and chain of custody for the evidence, and although he referenced the Fourth 

Amendment, he did not argue at any point that the search warrant lacked an affidavit 

or that the warrant was not supported by probable cause.
15

To preserve a complaint for appellate review, a party must make a timely 

request, objection, or motion with sufficient specificity to apprise the trial court of the 

complaint. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a); Saldano v. State, 70 S.W.3d 873, 886–87 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2002); Vafaiyan v. State, 279 S.W.3d 374, 383 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, pet. 

ref’d.). The complaint made on appeal must comport with the complaint made in the 

trial court or the error is forfeited. Heidelberg v. State, 144 S.W.3d 535, 537 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2004); Vafaiyan, 279 S.W.3d at 383. 

Stature’s argument at trial was that the State had failed to lay the proper 

foundation and predicate for the blood evidence. Stature’s counsel referenced the 

Fourth Amendment and Article 38.23, but only stated “unlawful blood search without 

a warrant.” State’s Exhibit 5 (the search warrant) was admitted for record purposes 

without objection. Stature did not object or make the trial court aware that there was 

no probable cause affidavit attached to the warrant. At no time did Stature object that 

there was no probable cause for the warrant. At the close of evidence, Stature orally 

moved to suppress “on the probable cause contained within the search warrant, 

specifically the times.” However, he does not challenge the denial of that motion to 

suppress on appeal. 

Because Stature failed to preserve his argument that the search warrant was 

invalid because there was no probable-cause affidavit attached to it and no probable 

cause presented to the magistrate, he has waived his complaint for review. Tex. R. 
16

App. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A); see Vafaiyan, 279 S.W.3d at 383. We overrule Stature’s fourth 

and fifth issues.

IV. Gun Evidence

In his third issue, Stature argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion 

for mistrial when the State offered evidence of a gun.

A. Standard of Review

We review the denial of a motion for mistrial for an abuse of discretion, and we 

must uphold the ruling if it was within the zone of reasonable disagreement. Coble v.

State, 330 S.W.3d 253, 292 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). A mistrial is appropriate only in 

extreme circumstances for a narrow class of prejudicial and incurable errors. See

Hawkins v. State, 135 S.W.3d 72, 77 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). We balance three factors 

in reviewing whether a mistrial was warranted: (1) the misconduct’s severity (the 

magnitude of the testimony’s prejudicial effect); (2) the measures adopted to cure the 

misconduct (the efficacy of any cautionary instruction by the judge); and (3) the 

certainty of conviction absent the misconduct (the strength of the evidence 

supporting the conviction). Archie v. State, 221 S.W.3d 695, 700 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2007).

Ordinarily, a prompt instruction to disregard will cure error associated with an 

improper question and answer. Ovalle v. State, 13 S.W.3d 774, 783 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2000) (holding that a prompt instruction to disregard, coupled with the case’s 

circumstances, may render an error harmless). This is because a jury is presumed to 
17

follow an instruction to disregard unless something in the record suggests that it could 

not follow the instruction. Coble, 330 S.W.3d at 292–93.

B. Discussion

On redirect examination, the State asked Officer Shoemate questions about the 

inventory of Stature’s car. When the State asked Officer Shoemate what items he put 

in inventory, he responded “Item 1 was a Ruger LCP .380.” The trial court sustained 

Stature’s relevance objection and instructed the jury to disregard Officer Shoemate’s 

answer. The trial court denied Stature’s request for a mistrial. 

The testimony concerning the gun was very brief and consisted only of the 

name of the gun found in Stature’s vehicle. Stature contends that the testimony 

implies that he also committed the crime of unlawfully carrying a weapon, but there 

was no other testimony concerning the gun, its association with Stature, or any other 

possible offenses. The trial court promptly instructed the jury to disregard the 

statement, and the jury is presumed to follow the trial court’s instruction. Id. Officer 

Shoemate testified that he believed Stature had lost his mental and physical faculties, 

and the jury observed Stature’s performance on the field sobriety tests. Merson’s 

testimony that Stature’s blood alcohol concentration was 0.211 provided strong 

evidence for conviction.

The gun evidence was not so prejudicial that it was an extreme circumstance 

warranting a mistrial. See Hawkins, 135 S.W.3d at 77. We overrule Stature’s third issue.
18

V. Directed Verdict

In his sixth issue, Stature argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion 

for directed verdict.

A. Standard of Review

A motion for directed verdict is essentially an evidentiary-sufficiency challenge. 

See Madden v. State, 799 S.W.2d 683, 686 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). In our evidentiarysufficiency review, we view all evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to 

determine whether any rational factfinder could have found the crime’s essential 

elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct.

2781, 2789 (1979); Queeman v. State, 520 S.W.3d 616, 622 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). The 

factfinder alone judges the evidence’s weight and credibility. See Tex. Code Crim.

Proc. Ann. art. 38.04; Martin v. State, 635 S.W.3d 672, 679 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). We 

may not re-evaluate the evidence’s weight and credibility and substitute our judgment 

for the factfinder’s. Queeman, 520 S.W.3d at 622. Instead, we determine whether the 

necessary inferences are reasonable based on the cumulative force of the evidence 

when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. Braughton v. State, 569 S.W.3d 

592, 608 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018); see Villa v. State, 514 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2017) (“The court conducting a sufficiency review must not engage in a ‘divide 

and conquer’ strategy but must consider the cumulative force of all the evidence.”).

We must presume that the factfinder resolved any conflicting inferences in favor of 

the verdict, and we must defer to that resolution. Braughton, 569 S.W.3d at 608.
19

B. Applicable Law

A person commits the offense of DWI if the person is intoxicated while 

operating a vehicle in a public place. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 49.04(a). Intoxicated is 

defined as “not having the normal use of mental or physical faculties by reason of the 

introduction of alcohol” or “having an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more.” 

Id. §49.01(2)(a), (b).

C. Discussion

Stature first argues that the evidence is insufficient because the blood evidence 

should not have been admitted without probable cause for the warrant. Even if the 

trial court had erred by admitting the blood evidence, we must consider all evidence, 

even improperly admitted evidence, when conducting a legal sufficiency analysis. 

Gardner v. State, 306 S.W.3d 274, 285 n.6 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). 

Stature also argues that Officer Shoemate’s testimony was contradictory and 

inaccurate and that the field sobriety tests were administered incorrectly. The jury, as 

factfinder, was free to judge the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the 

witness’s testimony and resolve any conflicting inferences therefrom. Ybarra v. State, 

No. 02-23-00115-CR, 2024 WL 1100785, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 14, 

2024, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication); see Braughton, 569 S.W.3d 

at 608. 

Officer Shoemate observed Stature commit two traffic offenses. He testified 

that he determined Stature had lost the use of his mental and physical faculties after 
20

observing him perform the field sobriety tests. The jury was able to view Stature 

perform the field sobriety tests from Officer Shoemate’s dash-camera video. In 

addition, Merson testified that Stature had a blood alcohol concentration of 0.211, 

which is greater than the 0.08 required for intoxication. See Tex. Penal Code. Ann. 

§ 49.01(2)(b). We hold that the evidence is sufficient to support Stature’s DWI 

conviction and that the trial court did not err by overruling his motion for directed 

verdict. We overrule his sixth issue.

VI. Conclusion 

Having overruled all of Stature’s issues on appeal, we affirm the trial court’s 

judgment.

/s/ Mike Wallach

Mike Wallach

Justice

Do Not Publish

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: July 18, 2024