F OR P UBLICATION



### UNIT E D ST AT E S CO URT O F APPE AL S FO R T H E NINT H CIRCUIT

U N I T E D S T E E L W O R

K E R S L O C A L 12- 369; D A V I D R O B E R

T S , Plaintiffs
,

and

S T E P H A N I E B

. G R

E E N , Plaintiff-Appellant
,

v

.

U N I T E D S T E E L W O R

K E R S I N T E R N A T I O N A L ; U N I T E D S T E E L P A P E R A N D F O R E S T R Y R U B B E R M A N U F A C T U R

I N G E N E R

G Y A L L I E D I N D U S T R I A L A N D S E R V I C E W O R

K E R S I N T E R N A T I O N A L U N I O N ; AF L -CI OCL C; H A

N F O R D A T O M I C M E T A L T R A D E S C O U

N C I L ; AF L -CI O; D A

V E M O L N A A , husband and the marital community thereof; V I N C E S T R

O O P S , husband and the marital community thereof; J A

N E D O E S T R

O O P S , wife and the marital community thereof; K I R K D O M I N A , husband and the marital community

thereof; J A

N E D O E D O M I

N A , wife and the marital community thereof; V I C T O R C R U Z , husband and the marital community N o. 10-35450

D.C. No. 2:07-cv-05053- RHW

OPI NI ONUSW L O C A L 12-369 V

. USW I N T ’ L 2

thereof; J A

N E D O E C R

U Z , wife and the marital community

thereof; J I M W O O D W

A R D , husband and the marital community

thereof; J A

N E D O E W O O D W

A R D , wife and the marital community

thereof; C H E R

R I E M I L L E R , wife and the marital community thereof; J O H N D O E M I L L E R , husband and the marital community thereof; M A R G I E M E Y E R S , wife and the marital community thereof; J O H N D O E M E Y E R S , husband and the marital community thereof; J I M O R O S C O , husband and marital community thereof; J A

N E D O E O R

O S C O , wife and the marital community

thereof; K A R E N A L E X A N D E R , wife and the marital community

thereof; J O H

N D O E A L E X

A N D E R , husband and the marital community

thereof; R

A N D Y K N O W L E S , husband and the marital community thereof; J A N E D O E K N O W L E S , wife and the marital community thereof; J A N E D O E M O L N A A , wife and the marital community thereof,

Defendants-Appellees

.

A ppeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of W a shing ton Robert H. W haley
, Senior District J udg e, PresidingUSW L O C A L 12-369 V

. USW I N T ’ L 3

Arg ued and Submitted April 8, 2013—Seattle, W ashing ton

F iled September 6, 2013

B efore: Dorothy

W . Nelson, A. W allace Tashima, and Consuelo M. Callahan, Circuit J udg es.

Opinion by

J u dg e Tashima

SUMMARY *

Labor Law

The panel affirmed the district court’s judg ment af t e r bench trial in a former local u nion president’s action alleg ing

r a ce and g ender discrimination and retaliation f or ha v i n g eng ag ed in prot ected speech under the L abor-Manag ement Reporting and Disclosure Act.

The plaintiff, a nuclear chemical operator at the H anford Nuclear Reservation, was the elected presi d e n t of her local union. She sued the local union, the international union, the Hanford Atomic Metal Trades C ouncil, and HAMTC’s president.

Affirming the dismissal of claims under L MRDA § 609, the pan e l h eld that this provision does not protect union officers from discipline suffered in their official capacities.

* T h is su m m ary co n stitu

tes n o part o f th e o p in io n o f th e co u rt. It h as b een p rep ared b y

co u rt staf

f f o r th e co n v en i en ce o f

th e read er.USW L O C A L 12-369 V

. USW I N T ’ L 4

The panel also affirmed the district court’s judg ment a fter trial on claims broug ht u nder L MRDA §§ 101 and 102, L abor Manag ement Relati o ns Act § 301, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Title VI I
, and the W ashing ton L aw Ag a inst Discrimination

. The panel held that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the defendants did n o t eng ag e in unlawful retaliation o r discrimination because, rather than reflecting discriminatory

or retaliatory animus, the actions tak en ag ainst the p laintiff

were attributable to the competing interests of rival factions within the local, or t h e need to alleviate the tension created thereby

.

COUNSEL

Natalie R. Ram (arg

ued) and Deanne E

. May

nard, Morrison & F oerster L L P, W ashing ton, D.C., for Plaintiff-Appellant. * *

Danielle E. L eonard (arg

u ed), Peter D. Nussbaum, Matthew J

. Murray
, Altshuler B erz o n L L P, San F rancisco, California; J ay Smith and J oshua F

. Y o u n g , G ilbert & Sackman, L os Ang eles, California, for D efendants-Appellees United Steel, Paper a nd F orestry , Rubber, Manufacturing
, Energ y , Allied I ndus t rial and Service Workers I n ternational U nion, A F L

CI O
, CL C.

Daniel Hutz e nbiler (arg ued) a nd R i chard H. Robblee, Robblee D etwiler & B lack PL L P, Seattle, W ashing ton, for Defendants-Appellees Hanford Atomic Metal T rades Council, David and J ill Molnaa.

** T h e co u rt ap p reciates an d t h an k s co u n sel f

o r h er p ro b o n o rep resen tatio n

o f P lain t if f

- A p p ellan t o n th is ap p eal.USW L O C A L 12-369 V

. USW I N T ’ L 5

OP INION

TASHI MA, Circuit J udg e:

Plaintiff Ste phanie Green, formerly President o f the United Steel Workers L ocal 12-369 (the “L ocal”), bring s the instant action ag ainst the United Steel, Paper a n d Fo restry , Rubber, Manufacturing
, Energ y , A llied I ndu s t r i a l a n d Service W o rkers I nternational U n i o n , A FL -CI O, CL C (the “I nternational”), the Hanford Atomic Metal Trades Council ( “ H AMTC”), and David Molnaa ( c o l l e c t i v e l y , “ D e f e n d a n t s ” )

. Green pursues claims for discrimination on the basis of race and g ender and retaliation for having eng ag ed i n p rotected speech under the L abor-Manag ement R eporting a nd Disclosure Act (“L M R D A ” )
, 29 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. The district court d ismissed Green’s claims under L MRDA § 609, but permitted the remainder of her c laims to proceed to trial. F ollowing a ten-day bench trial, the district court entered judg ment in favor of Defendants, findin g t h a t they had not unlawfully

discriminated or retaliated ag ainst Green.

On appeal, we hold that L MRDA § 609 does not protect union officers from discipline suffered in t h eir official capacities, and therefore the district court properly dismissed Green’s claims u nder thi s p r o v ision. W e further affirm the district court’s judg ment entered after trial.

I. BACK G R OUND

A. F actual Background

A s underscored by the leng th of the trial below, t h e factual h istory of this c ase is ex tensive to s a y t h e l e ast. W eUSW L O C A L 12-369 V

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focus on the a cto r s , events, and controversies most relevant to Green’s claims.

1. P arties

Green is a nuclear chemical operator (“NCO”) at the Han f o r d Nuclear Reservation in Richland, W ashing ton. I n Novemb er 2 0 0 5, Green was elected President of the L ocal, making her the first female and first African-American President in the L ocal’s history

. Green was reelected in May 2009, and she continued to s e r v e as President at the time o f trial.

The L ocal is an amalg amated local that is headquartered in Richland and mainta ins b ranches in the states o f W a shing ton, Hawaii, and O reg on. As o f 2 0 0 7
, over half o f the L ocal’s 1400 members were, like G reen, employ ed at the Hanford Reservation.

A unique representation arrang ement ex ists for members employ e d at Hanford. The L ocal and f ourteen other unions with members at Hanford c omprise H AMTC. HAMTC, a nd
not the constituent unions
, a c t s as the c ollective barg aining
ag ent for Hanford union employ ees. Defendant Molnaa has served as President of HAMTC since 2005.

The I nternational is the parent org aniz ation of the L ocal. I t assumed this status in April 2 005 after merg ing w ith the L ocal’s previous parent, the Paper A llied-I nd ustrial Chemical and Energ y W orkers I nternational Union (“PACE”). During the period relevant to this sui t, V incent Stroops was a staff representative for the I n ternational, serving in this capacity a s

a l i ai s on between the I nternational and the L ocal. J im W o odward was a Subdistri c t Director for the I nternational,USW L O C A L 12-369 V

. USW I N T ’ L 7

covering the district to w hich the L ocal belong s. Woodward reported to Terry B onds, who served as District Director for the I nternational. L eo Gerard is President of the I nternational.

2. Decertif

ication Ef

fort in 2002

Green wa s embroiled in d isputes within the L ocal w ell before b eing e lected Preside n t

. I n 2002, Green a nd other NCOs formed a g roup that attempted to decertify the L ocal a s their r ep r e s e ntative. A ccording to the district court, the NCOs contended tha t t h e L ocal was not adequately serving their interests relative to the other barg aining units within the L ocal.

Stroops, then acting as a staf f r epresentative for PACE, filed formal charg es ag ainst Green a n d t h e other N COs for violating the PACE Constitution. The charg es ag ainst Green

were d ismissed because she was not provided proper notice, but other members of t h e group were found g uilty a nd suspended from the L ocal for various periods of time.

3. Stew ard Election in 2005

I n J anuary 2005, G reen won a n e l e c tion to serve a s “steward” for a subset of NCOs at the H anford Reservation. F ollowing the election, a dispute arose a s to the scope of this position. The notice for the election had l i s t e d the relevant position a s c o vering the “K-B asin,” which includes three separate buil d i n g s – “K-East,” “K-W est,” and “CVD.” Gre e n ’ s predecessor as steward, Kirk Domina, had been
recog niz ed as steward f

or the e ntire K-B asin. However, a fter Green w on the election, Karen Alex a n d er, one of the L ocal’s staff representatives and a member of its Ex ecutive B oard,USW L O C A L 12-369 V

. USW I N T ’ L 8

informed Green that her position covered o n l y the K-W e st building and that there w as no steward position for the entire K-B asin. Randy

Knowles, then-President of the L ocal, later reiterated this position.

I n May 2005, the L ocal ag r eed to recog niz e G reen as the point of contact for the entire K-B asin. Nevertheless, in J uly 2005, Green filed internal charg es with the L ocal’s Ex ecutive B oard, alleg ing that the events surrounding the steward election reflected discrimination attributable to her r ace a nd
g e nder. Green filed a similar complaint with the E q ual Employ ment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) in October 2005. On Ma y 24, 2007, the E E OC issued a determination that there was cause to believe that Green’s alleg a tions were meritorious.

4. Election as P resident a nd U nion Go v ernance Disputes

Green was elected Pres i d en t o f the L ocal in N ovember 2005. W hen the e le c t i o n results w ere received, Karen Alex a nder apparently commented: “W e’ll just let the fucking nig g e rs run it then. See if they can do any better than I did.” W h en the L ocal’s leadership o r dered that the election b e rerun, Green appealed th e decision to the I nternational. I n April 2006, the I nternational overturned the d ecision a nd ordered that Green be seated as President.

On May 4, 2006, G reen presided over her f irst Ex ecutive B oard meeting as President. T en s i ons rose when Green announced that, contrary to pri o r p r actice, certain decisions by the Ex ecutive B oard wou ld b e subject to ratification b y union members at the L ocal’s monthly membership meeting s. B ecause these membership meeting s w ere held in Richland,USW L O C A L 12-369 V

. USW I N T ’ L 9

N C O s a t t h e H a n f

o r d R e s e r v a t i o n c o m p r i s e d a d i s p roportionate percentag e of those able to attend, whi l e members from outly ing branches such as the Spokane b ranch

were inevitably underre p r e s e n ted. I ndeed, in response to G r e e n ’s announcement, an Ex ecutive B oard member from t h e Spokane branch warned Green that the new policy would lead
to the L ocal losing its Spokane units. Green’s response to this warning was simply
, “OK.”

As w as likely the intended effect, after the new pol icy

was implemented, decisions o f the Ex ecutive Bo a r d were reg ularly overturned at the monthly membership meeting s in Richland.

5. Decertif

ication of Spokane Units

The warning Green r eceived at the Ex ecutive B oard meeting proved to be correct: two units of the Spokane branch

– pharmacists and technicians

– ultimately decided to decertify from the L ocal. G reen contends, however, that she was unduly

marg inaliz ed in this process.

I n J uly 2 006, the I nternational a rrang ed a meeting with the Spokane pharmacists to discuss the unit’s d esire to decertify

. Green travel e d t o Spokane to participate in the discussions, but upon her arrival, an official with the I nternational info r m e d h er that she w ould not be a llowed to attend the meeting

. The pharmacists eventually decertified from both the L ocal and the I nternational. I n J une 2007, the technicians at the Spokane branch decertified from the L ocal, but were per m i tted to form a new local within the I nternational. Ag ain, Green was not included in t he discussions concerning

the unit’s decertification efforts.USW L O C A L 12-369 V

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6. Signature Authority

After G reen’s election, a controversy devel o p ed over whether Green had “sig n a ture authority ” with respect to

c o m munications with HAMTC. L ocals can only communicate with employ e rs at Hanford throug h HAMTC, and H AMTC will only forward certain documents if the documents have been sig ned by an official for the local who ha s sig nature authority

. I n itially
, Molnaa, the President o f HAMTC, refus ed to recog niz e Green’s sig nature a uthority

. Molnaa would instead r eturn documents that had been sig n ed by Green to Karen Alex ander (to recall, one of the L ocal’s staff representat ives) and have Alex a n der add her sig nature. Molnaa te s t ified that he w ould o nly recog niz e Green’s sig nature authority if she were a sta f f r e presentative or if a staff representative told him that she had s u c h a uthority

. Green d e clined, on principle, to ask Alex ander t o convey to Molnaa that Green should be afforded the a u thority

. Green
notes that Molnaa recog n iz ed the sig nature authority of prior presidents, but Defendants counter that those presidents also had been staff representatives.

The dispute w as resolved in J anuary 2007 when Stroops, acting on b ehalf of th e I nternational, requested that Molnaa

r e c o g niz e Green’s sig nature authority

. Molnaa thereafter
recog niz ed Green’s authority

.USW L O C A L 12-369 V

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7. Maki Com m ission

a. Initial Maki Hearing and Report

I n December 2006, a g roup of L oc a l o f f icers a nd employ e es, led by Ex ecutive B oard member Marg ie My ers, wrote to I nternational President Gerard and lev i e d a host o f alleg ations ag ainst Green. The g roup alleg ed that Green h ad failed to uphold h er d

uties as President, misappropriated funds, act e d i n violation o f the relevant constitutions a nd by laws, falsified records, harassed officers, and failed to represent the union.

I n response to the allegations, Gerard appointed I nternational representative Thomas Maki to investig ate the charg es. Maki conducted a thr ee

- d ay hearing in F ebruary 2007. O n May 24, 2 007, Maki issued a report clearing Green of any wrong doing

. Maki further conc l u d e d that Green a nd her ally Dave Roberts had done nothing to warrant either their removal from office o r placing the L ocal under an administratorship.

b. G reen’s 2007 EEOC Com plaint

On Fe b r uary 14, 2007, shortly before Maki’s three-day hearing
, Gr een f

iled a second complaint with the E EOC alleg ing that she was ex periencing d iscrimination on the basis of her race and g ender. The I nternational hired the law f irm of Gilbert & Sackman to p repa r e a response to the charg es. On April 23, 2007, the firm submitted a response on behalf o f both the I nternational and the L ocal.USW L O C A L 12-369 V

. USW I N T ’ L 12

G i l b ert & Sackman submitted invoices to the L ocal f o r the w ork done in preparing this response, but a t its April 2007
g eneral membership meeting
, the L ocal voted not to authoriz e funds for the fees. Green contends that she left the room prior to the debate over whether to authoriz e the pay ments.

c. Second Maki Report

On Aug ust 10, 2 007, Maki issued a n amended version o f his report. The body of the report, which addressed the specific alleg ations levied by My ers in December 2006, was identic a l t o t he previous version issued in May

. Maki, however, amended the conclusion of the report to recommend that the L ocal be placed under an administratorship.

Maki c ited the following reasons for this new recommendation: (i) the L ocal had failed to process internal
g rievances filed by

certain members; (ii) Green had violated the L ocal’s b y laws by r emoving members of committees without the Ex ecutive B oard’s a pproval; ( i i i ) the L ocal h ad terminated full-time e mploy ees, subjecting the L ocal t o potential leg a l and financial liabilities; (iv) Green had f iled an EEOC complaint ag ainst the L ocal, and while Maki “ [ h ad] no problem w ith that,” he had “learned that t h e L o c a l Union ha[ d] d ecide d
, a t t he President’s u rg ing
, not to retain leg al counsel to defend the L o cal ag ainst these charg es,” which “would seem to be a conflict of interest”; and (v) there were “serious alleg ations of lack [ of] representation” reg arding some of the L ocal’s units.

I n his deposition testimony
, Maki could n ot recall
pre c i s e ly when h e had learned of these new alleg a tions, but he stated that they h a d b e e n r e lay ed to him by Subdistrict Director W oodward or another I nternational employ ee. MakiUSW L O C A L 12-369 V

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conceded that, before issuing the amended report, he h ad not offered Green an opportunity to respond to the new charg es.

8. Im position of

Adm inistratorship

B a sed on the amended Maki r eport , B onds, the I nternational’s District Director, sent an e-mail to President Gerard re commending that the L ocal be placed under an emerg ency a dministratorship. The reasons p rovided b y B onds tracked in lang uag e a n d substance those u sed by Maki in his amended report. On Aug ust 20, 2007, Gerard imposed

an emer gency administratorship o n the L ocal. Green a nd R o b er t s were suspended as officers as a result of the administratorship.

Green and Roberts filed suit to enjoin the I nternational’s actions, a

nd the district court gr a n t e d the request for injunctive r elief. The district c ourt noted that, u n d er the I nternational’s constitution, a full hearing was required prior
to imposing an adminis t ratorship, ex cept in cases o f
emerg ency

. The court concluded that t h e r e h ad not b een an adequate hearing conducted in this instance and t h a t the circumstances did not constitute an emerg ency

. A c cording ly
, the court o rdered that the administratorship be dissolved a nd that Green and Roberts b e restored to their elected p ositions.

9. K ins Com m ission

The problems within the L ocal persisted after G reen was reinstated. On October 15, 2 007, Ex ecutive B o a rd member Marg ie My ers e-mailed Gerard and B onds, among others, a nd informed them that Green had fired the L ocal’s secr e t a r y

. My ers added, “ W hen are y ou g uy s g oing to realiz e that every day y ou wait to come and put us in administratorship she g e tsUSW L O C A L 12-369 V

. USW I N T ’ L 14

strong er. I f y o u g et in here now, y o u mig ht possibly save this l o c a l a nd y ourselves $50K that she is try ing to g et to h e r attorney to f

ig ht y ou!” I n res p o n s e to this e-mail, Gerard
wrote to B onds, “I think we n eed to move qui[ c] k er

. . . have we done an audit . . . what are we doing .”

On October 17, 2007, Green c o n d ucted a “special meeting ” of the L ocal, alle ge d l y without providing proper notice to members. At this meeting
, Green appo i n t e d an officer to a n e l ec t e d p osition and made d e cisions on the

ex p enditure of u n ion f

unds. B onds subsequently wrote to Green to inform her that the meeting h ad been unauthoriz ed and that any

actions taken at the meeting were invalid.

On October 19, 2007, B onds wrote to Gerard requesting that another commission be c o n vened to investig ate Green’s conduct. B onds cited the above-d e scribed unauthoriz ed meeting
, the backlog of g r ievances, news that HAMTC h ad beg un e x ploring whether to ex p el the L ocal, and the repeated

r e p orts of conflict w ithin the L ocal. Pursuant to this letter, Gerard appointed another commission, this o n e c h a ired b y David Kins.

The Kins Commission held its hearing over three day s in November 2007. I n its repo rt, the Kins Commission

r e commended that the L ocal b e placed under a n adminis t r a torship. The report relied principally on the L ocal’s failure to process g rievances a n d the subverting of the L ocal’s democratic processes. With respect to t h e l atter issue, the report cited the d isenfranchisement o f outly ing branches, t he discharg e of employ ees without the involvement of the Ex ecutive B oard, and the special meeting that Green conducted in violation of the L ocal’s by laws.USW L O C A L 12-369 V

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F ollowing the issuance of the Kins Commission’s report,

an appeal panel for the I nternat i o nal rejected the recommendation to impose an administratorship. The panel noted that, since the Kins Commission hearing
, Gre e n h a d

m ade sig nificant prog ress in processing g rievances a n d h a d

ex p ressed a willing n ess to both improve internal relations a nd facilitate the L ocal’s democratic functioning

.

B. P rocedural History

The above facts g ave rise to two separate suits that were

cons o l i d a t ed for purposes of trial. The first suit was the previously described action filed by Green, Roberts, and the L ocal a g ainst the I nternational i n Aug ust 2007 seeking to enjoin the administratorship. I n J a nu ary 2008, the plaintiffs amended their complaint to tra n s f orm the suit into a discrimination action.

The second suit was fil e d b y G reen in November 2007 against the I nternational, HAMTC, Molnaa, Stroops, W o odward, and vario u s individuals a ssociated with the L ocal. 1 This suit is the subject o f the instant a ppeal

. Green filed an amended comp l a i n t on April 4, 2008, asserting

causes of action under L MRDA § § 1 01, 102, and 609, the L abor Manag ement Relations Act (“L MRA”) § 301, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Title VI I
, a nd W ashing ton state antidiscrim i n ation law. On J u ly 25, 2008, the district court dismissed Green’s claims under L MRDA § 6 09, but permitted the remainder of her claims to proceed to trial.

1 T h is actio n w as in itially n u m b ered No

. 0 7 cv

- 5 0 6 6
, b u t it assu m ed th e

case n u m b er o f th e f

irst actio n w

h en th e tw o actio n s w ere co n s o lid ated in March 2 0 0 9

.USW L O C A L 12-369 V

. USW I N T ’ L 16

The district court consolidated the two actions on March 11, 2009. I n November 2009, the district court presided over

a ten-day bench trial. 2 A t the close of Plaintiffs’ c ase, Defendants moved for judg ment pursuant to F ederal Rule o f Civil Procedure 52(c). The district court g ranted Defendants’ motion, finding that they h ad not eng ag ed i n unlawful discrimination or retaliation. F inal judg ment was entered on April 12, 2010, and Green timely a p p e al ed. W e have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

I n reviewing the dist rict court’s judg ment entered under Rule 52(c), w e review its finding s of fact for clear error a nd its conclusions of law de novo

. Lee v. W

. Coast Life Ins. Co.
, 688 F .3d 1004, 1009 (9th Cir. 2012). I f the distri c t co u r t applied the correct leg al r

ule, we may set aside its finding s o f fact a s clearly erroneous only if they a re “illog ical, implausible, or w ithout support in inf e r e n c e s that may be d r a wn from the facts in the record.” United States v

. Hinkson
, 585 F .3d 1247, 1263 (9th Cir. 2009) ( en banc). I n apply ing this standard in the contex t o f a b ench trial, we “must constantly have in mind t h a t [our] function is not to decide factual issues d

e novo .” Anderson v. City of Bessemer C ity
, 470 U.S. 564, 573 ( 1985) ( internal quotation marks

o m i t ted). “I f the district court’s a ccount of the evidence is
p l a u s ible in lig ht of the record v iewed in its entirety
, [w e ]
may not reverse it e ven thoug h convinced that had [ we] been sitting as the trier of fact, [ we] would have we ig hed the evidence differently .” Id. at 573–74.

2 T h e p l ain tif

f s d is m i s s e d all o f t

h e in d iv id u al d ef

en d an ts ex cep t f

or Mo ln aa p rio r to trial.USW L O C A L 12-369 V

. USW I N T ’ L 17

W ith respect to the district court’s d ismissal of Green’s claims under L MRDA § 6 09, we review the g rant of a motion
to dism i s s d

e n o v o

. Autotel v. Nev. Bell Tel. Co.
, 6 97 F .3d 846, 850 (9th Cir. 2012).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Section 609 of

LMRDA

T h e district court dismissed G reen’s claims u nder § 6 0 9 on the g round that the provision does not ex tend p rotections
to union officers in their o fficial capacities. T h is question is essentially one of first impression across the federal Courts o f Appeals.

The L MRDA, enacted in 1959, “ w as the product o f
cong ressional concern with widespread abuses of power b y union leadership.” Finnegan v. Leu
, 456 U

. S

. 4 31, 435 (1982). T itle I of the L MRDA, denominated t h e “B ill o f Rig hts o f Members of L abor Org a niz ations,” enshrines protections for union members parallel to certain rig hts
g uaranteed under the F ederal Cons t i tution. Id. To this end, §§ 101(a)(1) and (2) of Ti t l e I g uarantee equal voting rig htsUSW L O C A L 12-369 V

. USW I N T ’ L 18

and the rig hts to free speech and assembly

. 3 Id. at 436 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(1)–(2)).

Tw o separate provisions allow for enforcement of the

r i ghts enumerated in § 101. Section 102 creates a pr i v a t e rig ht of action for th e i n fring ement of any Title I rig hts, providing , in pertinent part:

Any p erson whose rig hts secured by the provisions of thi s subchapter have been infring ed by any violation of this subchapter
may bring a ci vil action in a district court o f the United States for such relief (in c luding injunctions) as may

be appropriate.

29 U.S.C. § 412. Section 6 0 9
, which is not in Title I
, similarly provides:

I t shall be unlawful for a

n y labor o rg aniz ation,

or any offic e r , ag ent, shop steward, or other

r e p r esentative o f a labor org aniz ation, or an y employ ee thereof t o fine, suspend, e xpel, or

3 Of p articu l ar relev an ce, § 1 0 1 (a)(2 ) p ro v id es, in p ertin en t p art:

Ev ery m em

b er o f an y lab or o rg an izatio n sh all h av e th e rig h t to m eet an d assem

b l e f reely w ith oth er m em

b ers;

an d to ex p ress an y v iew s, arg u m en ts, or o p in io n s ; an d
to ex p ress at m eetin g s of t h e lab o r o rg an izatio n h is

v iew s , u p o n can did ates in an electio n o f th e lab or

o rg an i zatio n o r u

p o n an y b u sin ess p ro p erly b ef o re th e

m eetin g , su

b j ect to t h e o rg an i zatio n ’ s estab lish ed an d

reaso n ab le ru les p ertain in g to th e co n d u ct o f m eetin g s.

2 9 U.S.C. § 4 1 1 (a)(2 ).USW L O C A L 12-369 V

. USW I N T ’ L 19

otherwise d

iscipline any of its members for exercising any right to which he is entitled under the provisions of t h i s chapter. The provisions of section 412 of this title shall be applicable in the enforcement of this section.

29 U.S.C. § 529 (emphasis added).

The primary difference between § 6 0 9 and § 102 is that § 609 protects ag ainst retaliation for the ex ercise of any rig ht secured under the L MRDA, wh ereas § 102 only protects rig hts secured under Title I

. 4 See Finnegan
, 456 U.S. a t 439 n.10.

I n Finnegan
, the Supreme Court limited the reach of both § 609 and § 102 with respect to app o i n t e d union officers. The plaintiffs in Finnegan were former business a ge n ts of a local who h a d openly supported the in c u m b e n t candidate in the local’s presidential election. See id. at 433. The ag ents ha d b e e n appointed by this incumbent, and when the challeng er won the election, h e discharg ed the ag e nts from their positions. See id. at 434– 4 4

. The Court held that the
ag ents could not maintain a cause of action under either § 609

or § 102. W ith respect to § 609, t h e C o u r t held that term “discipline” as used in the provision “ r efers only to r etaliatory actions that affect a union memb e r ’s rig hts or status as a

m ember of the union.” Id. at 437. I n other w o r d s , § 6 0 9

4 A s th e S u

p rem e C o u rt ex plain ed in Fin n eg a n , th e su b stan tial o v erlap b etw een § 6 0 9 an d § 1 0 2 i s lik ely attrib u tab l e t o h asty leg islativ e d raf tin g

. S ee Fin n eg a n , 4 5 6 U.S. at 4 3 9 n .1 0

. Sectio n 6 0 9 w as o rig i n ally d raf ted

as a cri m i n a l p ro v isio n

. S ee id

. It w as later am en d ed to allo w f o r civ i l

en f o rcem en t b y th e S ecretary o f L ab o r, an d it w as o n ly a d ay bef o re f in al
p assag e th at it w as tran sf o rm ed in to a p riv ate rem ed y

. S ee id

.USW L O C A L 12-369 V

. USW I N T ’ L 20

encompasses only “ punitive ac t i o n s taken ag ainst union members as members.” Id. at 437–38.

W ith r espect to § 102, the Court n oted the possibility that “a litig ant may maintain an action under § 102 – to redress an ‘infring e ment’ of ‘rig hts secured’ under Title I – without necessarily stating a violation of § 609.” Id. at 439. The Court held, however, that “ whatever limits T i t l e I places on

a union’s authority to utiliz e dismissal from union office

. . . , it does n ot restrict t h e f

r eedom of an elected union leader to choose a staff whose v iews are compatible with his o wn.” Id. at 441 (internal citation omitted).

I n Sheet M

e t a l W o rkers’ International Ass’n v. Lynn
, 488 U.S. 347 (1989), the Court declined to ex tend Finnegan ’s § 102 analy sis to elected union officers. The plaintiff in Lynn

was an elected business represent ative who was removed from his position after o pposing a measure advocated by the local’s leadership. See id. at 349–50. He broug ht suit under § 102, alleg ing that his r emoval violat e d t he free speech protections of § 1 01(a)(2). See id. a t 350. T h e Co u rt di s t i ng uished Finnegan
, reasoning that, in lig ht of the L MR DA ’ s d e mocratic g overnance g oals, the r etaliatory removal of an elected o ff i c er presents sig nificantly g reater

concerns than d oes the removal of an a ppointed official. See id. at 353–5 5

. The Court e x pressly noted, however, that its holding w a s limited to § 102, as it was not p resented with a claim under § 609. See id. a t 353 n.5.

Af t e r Finnegan and Lynn
, it is established that an appointed u n ion officer may not b ring suit under either § 102

or § 609 for retaliation suffered in his official capacity
, but an elected officer can bring s u it under § 102 when faced with such retaliation. The question presented here, which no CourtUSW L O C A L 12-369 V

. USW I N T ’ L 21

of Appeals has addressed since Finnegan and Lynn
, is whether an elected officer can also maintain an action under § 609.

Althoug h Fi n n egan and Lynn a r e admittedly in some tension, they c an be reconciled for purposes of the present inq u i r y

. Finnegan ’s d iscussion o f § 6 09 w as in absolute
terms that did n o t a d m it of a distinction between appointed and elected officers. The Court emphasiz ed multi p l e t i mes that the term “ discipline” as u sed in § 6 09 only encompasses actions t h at affect an individual’s status as a m e mber of a union, not as an employ ee. See Finnegan
, 45 6 U

. S

. at 437–38. I n c ontrast, the Court’ s d i s cussion of § 102 was predicated almost entirely on the appointed nature of the officers in question, w ith the Court even acknowledg ing that other c ircumstances could e x ist in which union officers could maintain suit under § 102, if not § 609. See id. at 4 40–42. I n Lynn
, the Court can be v iewed as del i n e ating such circumstances. I ndeed, the Lynn Court employ ed lang uag e

s u g g e sting that it is Title I rig hts – which are the e x c l u s i v e focus of § 102, but not § 609 – that present unique concerns when dealing with elected versus a ppointe d officers. See Lynn
, 4 88 U.S. at 355 (“[ T] he poten t ial c hilling effect on Title I free speech rig hts is more p ro n o u nced when elected officials are discharg ed. Not only is the fired official likely
to be chilled in the ex ercise of h is o wn free speech rig hts, but so are the members who voted for him.”).

Even if doubts ling ered as to the prop e r s y nthesis o f Finnegan and Lynn
, the question at hand can be resolved under b asic principles of statutory interpretation. Cong ress employ e d lang uag e nearly identical to that in § 609 in § 101(a)(5) of Title I
, w hich affords due process protections
ag ainst disciplinary action. That section provides, “NoUSW L O C A L 12-369 V

. USW I N T ’ L 22

member of any labor org aniz ation may be fined, suspended, expelled, or otherwise disciplined

. . . u nless such member has been (A) served with written specific charg es; (B ) g iven

a reasonable time to prepare his defe n s e ; (C) afforded a full and fair h earing .” 29 U

. S

. C. § 411(a)(5) (emphasis added). The Court has held that the phrase “otherwise discipline[ d] ” carries the same meaning across § 101(a)(5) and § 609. See Breininger v. Sheet Metal W orkers Int’l Ass’n Local Union No. 6
, 493 U.S. 67, 90 n.13 (1989); F innegan
, 456 U.S. at 438 & n.9.

The Conference Report accompany ing the f i nal passag e of the L MRDA clarified that the “prohibition [ in § 101(a)(5)]

on suspension without observing c e rtain safe gu ards applies only to suspension of membership in the uni o n ; i t does not refer to suspension of a member’s status as an officer of the union .” H.R. Rep. No. 8 6-1147, at 3 1 ( 1 9 5 9 ) (Conf. Rep.) (emphasis added). Thus, it is evident that Cong ress d id not i n t end for § 101(a)(5) to protect ag ainst disciplinary actions th a t imping e on the incidents of u nion employ ment, reg ardless of appointed versus elect e d status. And because the operative lang uag e of § 609 is to be accorded the same meaning
, Breininger
, 493 U.S. at 9 0 n.13, i t fo l l ows that § 609 likewise does not apply to a ctions di re c ted ag ainst union officers in their official capacities. 5

5 T h e Su p rem e Co u rt en d orsed th is an aly sis in Fin n eg an

. S ee 4 5 6 U .S.
at 4 3 8 & n .9

. It is in p art f o r t hi s r e a so n t h at w e are n o t b o u n d b y ou r p rev io u s d ecisio n s in Gra n d Lo dg e o f In t ern a tio n a l Ass’n o

f Ma ch in ists

v. Kin g , 3 3 5 F.2 d 3 40 (9 t

h Cir. 1 9 6 4 ), an d Co oke v. Ora n g e Belt District Co u ncil o f P a i n t e r s N o

. 4 8
, 5 29 F.2 d 8 1 5 (9 th Cir. 1 9 7 6 ). In Gra n d Lo d g e , w e ex t en d ed th e pro tectio n s o f § 6 0 9 to ap p o in ted u n io n o f f icers. S ee 3 3 5 F.2 d at 3 4 4

– 4 6

. W e n o ted th e p arallel lan g u ag e, an d clear leg i slativ e h isto r y , o f § 1 01 (a)(5 ), b u t w e co n clu d ed th at d if f eren tial
treatm en t w as w arran ted f o r th is p ro v isio n an d § 6 0 9

. S ee id

. at 3 4 1

– 4 6

.USW L O C A L 12-369 V

. USW I N T ’ L 23

B e cause the alleg ed retaliatory actions directed toward Green imping ed only upon her statu s as a union officer, she
may not seek redres s for these actions under § 609. According ly
, we affirm the district court’s dismis s a l o f Green’s § 609 claims.

B. Judgm ent on Rem aining Claim s Entered at Trial

The district court entered judg ment a g ainst Green on her remaining claims following the ten-day b ench trial conducted in November 2009. T h e s e claims were broug ht under L MRDA §§ 101 and 1 0 2, L MRA § 301, 4 2 U

. S

. C. § 1981, Title VI I
, and the W ashing ton L aw Ag ainst Discrimination (“W L AD”). G reen challeng es the district court’s ruling s on each of these claims.

1. Legal P rinciples

To state a claim for a violation of L MRDA § 101 (a)(2),

a union member must demonstrate that: “(1) he or she

In C o oke
, w e assu

m ed th at Gra n d Lo d

g e ’ s § 6 0 9 h o ld in g ap p l ied in th e

co n tex t of an elected o f

f i cer (w ith o u t d iscu s sio n o f a p o ssib le d i stin ctio n b etw een elected an d ap p o in ted o f f i cers). S ee 5 2 9 F.2 d at 8 1 8

.

In Fin n eg an , th e Co u rt ex p ressly rej ected Gra n d Lo d ge ’ s d if f eren tial
treatm en t o f § 1 0 1 (a)(5 ) an d § 6 0 9
, an d in stead en d o rsed th e i n f eren ce th at

w e d raw t o d ay f

ro m § 1 0 1(a)(5 ). S

ee 45 6 U.S. at 4 3 8 & n .9

. T h u s, n o t

o n ly did Fin n eg a n o v erru le Gra n d L o d g e ’ s h o ld in g w ith resp ect t o ap p o in ted o f

f i cers sp ecif

i cally
, b u t it also d i rectly “ u n d ercu t th e th eo ry or

reaso n i n g ” o n w

h ich Co o ke

– th ro u g h Gra n d L o d g e

– r e sted

. Miller v. Ga mmie
, 3 3 5 F.3 d 8 8 9
, 9 0 0 (9 th Cir. 2 0 0 3 ) (en ban c). A cco rd i n g ly
, to th e

ex ten t Gra n d Lo d

g e an d C o o ke stan d f

o r th e p ro p o sit i o n t h a t § 6 0 9
p ro tects elected u n io n o f

f icers in th eir of

f icial cap acities, t

h ey h av e b een ab ro g ated b y Fin n eg a n an d are no t co n tro llin g

. S ee id

. at 8 9 9

– 9 0 0

. In d eed , th e p arties d o n o t arg u e to th e co n trary

.USW L O C A L 12-369 V

. USW I N T ’ L 24

ex e r cised the rig ht to oppose union p o licies; (2) he o r she was subjected to retaliatory action; and (3) the retaliatory action

was a direct res ult o f his or her decision to ex press disag reement .” Casumpang v

. Int’l Longshoremen’s & W arehouseman’s Union, Lo c a l 1 42
, 269 F .3d 1042, 1058 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).

L MRA § 301 provides f e deral courts jurisdiction to enforce contracts “‘between an employ er and a l a bor
org aniz ation or between

. . . labor o r g aniz ations.’” SE IU v

. Nat’l Union of

Healthcare W

orkers
, 5 98 F .3d 1061, 1069 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 185(a)) (alteration omitted). Green’s claims under this provision proceeded at trial under the theory that the constitutions of the I n t ernational a nd HAMTC prohibit disc r imination on the basis of race a nd
g ender, or a lternatively
, that o fficials of the I nternational a nd HAMTC interpreted their constitutions in bad faith. B ad faith in this contex t can be found “on evidence that union officials

a c ted contrary to the [ union’s] b est interest, out o f self-interest, or in an unconscionable o r outrag eous way

. ” Teamsters Joint Council No. 42 v. Int ’l Bhd. of Teamsters, AFL-CIO , 82 F .3d 303, 306 (9th Cir. 1996).

Under § 703(c)(1) of Title VI I of the Civil Rig hts Act of 1 9 6 4
, it is “an unlawful employ ment practice for a labor
org aniz ation

. . . to discriminate ag ainst [ ] any individual because of h is race, color, relig ion, sex , or nat i o n a l orig in.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c)(1). The well-established burdenshifting framework o f M

cDonnell Dougl a s Corp. v

. Green
, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), a

pplies to a Title VI I action aga inst a labor union. Beck v. U

n i t e d F ood & Commercial W

orkers Union, Local 99
, 506 F .3d 8 7 4
, 8 8 2 (9th Cir. 2007). Under this framework, if the p laintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination and th e d e f e ndant produces evidence of aUSW L O C A L 12-369 V

. USW I N T ’ L 25

leg itimate, non-discriminatory reason f o r its actions, “the plaintiff retains [ the] ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that he has been the victim of intentio n al d i s crimination.” I

d. at 883 (internal q

uotation marks a n d alterations omitted). The same leg al principles that apply to

a Title VI I claim apply t o a claim of race discrimination under 42 U .S.C. § 1981. See Manatt v. B a nk o f A m., NA
, 339 F .3d 792, 797 (9th Cir. 2003).

F inally
, under t h e W L A D, “[ t] he plaintiff’s ultimate burden at trial

. . . is to present evidence suff i c i en t f o r a reasonable trier of fact to con clude that the defendant’s alleg ed discriminator y m o t ive w as more likely than not a substantial factor in its adverse e mploy ment action.” Fulton

v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health S ervs. , 2 79 P.3d 5 0 0
, 507 (W a sh. Ct. App. 2012) (citing Hill v. BCTI Income Fund-I
, 2 3 P.3d 440, 449 (W ash. 2001)).

2. District Court’s F indings of F act

As indicated above, Green’s claims at tr i al a ll rested on the notion that Defendants retal i a ted ag ainst her for h aving
eng ag ed in protected speech or d i s c riminated ag ainst her on account of her race or g ender. 6 B ased on its finding s of fact

w ith respect to the discrete incidents and c ontroversies (described below), the district c ourt reached a broader finding

6 T h e o n e arg u ab le ex cep tio n is Green ’ s claim u n d er L MRA § 30 1 th at th e In t ern atio n al an d HA MT C in terp reted th eir co n stitu tio n s in b ad f

aith

. It ap pears, h o w ev er, th at an y n o tio n o f b ad f aith w o u ld b e b a s ed o n th e th eo ry th at th e I n t e r n atio n al an d HA MT C w ere actu ally m o tiv ated b y retaliato ry o r d iscrim in ato ry an im u s. R e g a r dless, th e d istrict co u rt’ s f actu al d eterm in atio n th at th e In tern atio n al an d HA MT C h ad leg itim ate,

n o n

- d iscrim in ato ry r e aso n s f or th eir actio n s also d ef

eats th e su g g estio n th at th ey acted in b ad f

aith

.USW L O C A L 12-369 V

. USW I N T ’ L 26

that Defendants had not eng ag ed in unlawful retaliation o r discrimin at i o n. To prevail on appeal, Green must demonstrate that this ultimate f actual determin ation was clearly erroneous. S

ee Anderson
, 470 U.S. at 566; Beck
, 506 F .3d at 882.

This would be a t a l l o r d er in any contex t, b ut it is a particularly difficult task here. The ex p erienced district judg e presided over a t en-day bench trial in a case with an

ex traordin a rily complex and leng thy history

. The thrust o f the distric t court’s analy sis was that, rather than reflecting discriminatory or retaliatory a nimus, the actions taken ag ainst G reen were attributable to the competing interests of rival factions within the L ocal, or the need to alleviate the tension created thereby

. Aft e r reviewing the r ecord and the district court’s analy s i s of the specific incidents underly ing Green’s claims, we are unable to conclude that this determination was “illog ical
, i mplausible, or w ithout support in inferences that

m a y b e d

rawn from the facts in the record.” Hinkson
, 585 F .3d at 1263. W e emphasiz e that this would b e a difficu l t question if presented d e n ovo , but under the deferential standard of review that go v e rns, “the district court’s account o f the evidence is plausible in lig ht of the record viewed in its entirety .” S ee A n d e rson , 470 U.S. at 573–74.

B e low w e c o nsider the district court’s finding s on those alleg ations most important to its ultimate finding o f fact.

a. Stew ard Election in 2005

The district court f

ound that there were leg itimate reasons for the attempted restriction of Green’s position as steward. However, we need not con sider the district court’s preciseUSW L O C A L 12-369 V

. USW I N T ’ L 27

f i n d i n g s on this issue. All of the a ctors involved in th e steward dispute were a ff i l i a ted with the L ocal, and Green presents no facts establishing that the I nternational “instig ated, supported, ratified or encourag ed the L ocal’s activities or that the L o cal acted pursuant to its ag reem e n t with the I nternational.” Moore v. Local Union 569 of I BEW
, 989 F .2d 1534, 1543 (9th Cir. 1993). The I n ternational was not e ven affiliated w ith the L ocal for the majority o f the period at issue; the steward c ontroversy beg an in J anuary 2005 and w as resolved in May 2005, while the I nternational only merg ed with PACE in April 2005. B ecause G r e e n is unable to connect the I nternational (or HAMT C ) t o the steward alleg a tions, the alleg ations cannot support a finding of liability

. 7 S

ee id.

b. Decertif

ication of Spokane Units

The district court found no impropriety in t he I nternational’s actions relating to the decertification of two units of the Spokane branch. Rather, the d i s t rict court concluded that Green had been ex cluded from t h e meeting s concerning the d e certification efforts “because it was perceived that her Presiden c y wa s p art of the reason for the desire to d isassociate with the L ocal and perh a ps the I nternational.”

There is a mple evidence to s u pport the district court’s finding s on this issue. As noted by the dis t r ict court, Green

was made aware at her first Ex ecutive B oard meeting that her proposed chang es to union g overnance

– particularly her p lan

7 T h e sam e h o ld s tru e w ith resp ect to th e racially ch arg ed c o m m e n t

m ad e b y Karen A lex an der – a m em ber o f th e L ocal’ s Ex ecu t iv e B o ard

– f o llo w in g Green ’ s electio n as P resid en t.USW L O C A L 12-369 V

. USW I N T ’ L 28

t o s u b j e c t a ctions by the Ex ecutive B oard to a vote at th e monthly memb e rs hip meeting s in Richland – could lead to the Spokane u nits leaving the L ocal. Green’s response w a s only
, “ OK.” Green therefore cannot dispute that the members of the Spokane branch h ad a g e nuine desire to decertify from the L ocal that was bas e d
, at least in part, on her a ctions. Given such, it was reasonable for the d i s t r i ct court to conclude that the I nternational was a cting to alleviate d iscord within the L ocal and prevent the units from lea v i n g the I nternational altog ether.

c. Signature Authority

This is the central a lleg ation that involves HAMTC a nd Molnaa. The district court conclu d e d that Molnaa did not have improper motives in de c l i n i ng to recog niz e Green’s sig nature authority

. I n reaching this conclusion, the district
court made two separate, but r elated fin d i n gs : (1) Molnaa had a reasonable p olicy of only recog n i z i ng the sig nature authority of staff representatives; an d ( 2 ) Molnaa did not want to deviate from this p olicy because to do so wo u ld embroil him in the ong o ing dispute over the balance of power between Green and the Ex e cutive B oard.

There is sufficient evidence to support these finding s. I t is undisputed that the p r ior presidents whose sig nature authority had been r ecog niz ed were staff repre s e n tatives, while the only other p r e s ident who was not a staff representative did n ot have sig nature authority

. Moreover, Molnaa recog

niz ed Green’s sig nature authority immediately
upon being requested to do so by the I n ternational. I n this
reg ard, Molnaa testified:USW L O C A L 12-369 V

. USW I N T ’ L 29

I had no idea of the authority of the president of that local. However, my ex p erien c e has shown me that, y o u k

now, y o u’ve g ot a local level, a nd y ou wo rk y our way up to district, internationals, that the international is the parent org aniz ation. Th e i r by laws are based off their constitution, and they have [ a] c ertain
amount of au t h ority
, and I r ecog niz e that. And Mr. Stroops was an I n t e rnational representative, a

nd if that r eso lved the problem, I

would accept that from him.

This testimony supports the inference that Molnaa h ad initially declined to de v i ate from his standard practice because he did not want to b e c o m e involved in the intraL ocal dispute over Green’s a u t hority

. B y following the request of the I nternational, Molnaa could continue to be seen as not taking sides in the feud.

d. Mak i Com m ission and Im position of Adm inistratorship

L ike the district court, we consider the chang e to the Maki

r e p o rt in Aug ust 2007 and the resulting imposition o f a n administratorship to be the most troubling of the events in question. I n M a ki’s initial report, issued on May 24, 2007, Maki found that the charg es ag ainst Green were baseless. Y et less than t h r ee months later, Maki amended the report to recommend that an administratorship b e i m p osed and that Green be removed from office.

This reversal is o f c oncern fo r s e veral reasons. A s a matter of process, Maki conceded that he had not pro vided Green an o pportunity to r espond to the new alleg ations a ndUSW L O C A L 12-369 V

. USW I N T ’ L 30

had just assumed they were true. Sub s t a n t i v e ly
, one of the primary alleg ations relied upon by Maki – that the L ocal was not defending itself ag ainst Green’s 2007 EEOC charg e – was larg e ly not accurate. As B onds c onceded in his testim o ny , the L ocal had in fact been defended ag ainst the EEOC charg e because the G ilbert & Sackman firm had sub m itted a response on behalf o f b o t h the I nternational and the L ocal. The L ocal’s deci s i o n was only not to authoriz e funds to pay for this representation.

After indicating that it had “carefully considered the Maki testimony ex p laining his chang es and the tes t imony o f B onds,” the d istrict court found that the w ritten reasons in the second Maki report (and B onds’ le t t er) were sufficient to justify the administratorship, and that the o t h e r problems made known to the I nternational but n o t referenced in the written ex planations bolstered the decision. The district court found that the administratorship had b e e n imposed because the turmoil within the L ocal h a d simply r e a ched a breaking
p oint, such that a ction needed to be taken in the inte r e s t s o f the L ocal’s members.

Despite t h e irreg ularities in the events leading to the administratorship, the district court’s finding is a reasonable inference to be drawn from the record. Putting aside whether the L ocal d e f

e n d ed itself ag ainst the EEOC complaint, Maki’s second report and B o nds’ letter also ex plained that Green had terminated two full

- time employ ees, another employ e e had resig ned, and members o f the L ocal’s committees were being removed without the approval of the Ex ecutive B oard. This was u ncontroverted evidence that the union was in a state of disarray

.USW L O C A L 12-369 V

. USW I N T ’ L 31

M o r e i mportantly
, B onds provided credible t e s t i m o n y t h a t supported the district court’s ex planation. B onds testified:

[ T] here [ was] such

. . . t urmoil g oing on in that local with a g reat portion of the ex ecutive board being opposed to them and co n s tantly stirrin g up problems that it was causing the L ocal not to be able to operate.

And like I said, the only mechanism I have for chang ing thing s is the admi nistratorship. I
cannot com e in there and take Marg ie My ers and remove her from a trustee, no more than I can g o and take Stephanie Green and remove her as president of th e L o cal. W hat I can do is appoint an administrator that can g o look at the facts and try to chang e t h i n gs and try to bring b o t h sides tog ether, possibly reappoint the same officers. Y ou know, I

– this was not any thi ng more than me try ing to fig ure out a way to fix how this local was operating

. And i t w as not all [ Green] a n d Dave Rober t s ’s fault. I t was every

body ’s fault.

B onds later added that o ne of the reasons he h ad recommended the a dministratorship was that he continued to receive petitions from outly ing branches seeking to decertify from the L ocal, just as the Spokane units had.

Given the history of events, it was permis s i b le for the distr i c t court to credit this testimony

. The record is r eplete

w i th constant infig hting between the competing facti o n s within the L ocal, with this tension only e scalating over time. The district court reasonably concluded that it w as theUSW L O C A L 12-369 V

. USW I N T ’ L 32

complications created by this tension, p a rticularly the threat of additional units decertify ing
, that led that the I nternational
to determine that a chang e in leadership was necessary

. The district court’s assessment i s s t r eng thened by the f act the I nternational had actually supported Green in various way s since her election as President. F or instance, the I nternational had overturned the decision to rerun the election ( ordering that Green be seated) a n d had requested that HAMTC
recog niz e Green’s sig nature a u t h o r ity

. Thus, there is no evidence that, p rior to the administratorship, the I nternational
eng ag ed in a pattern of discrimination or retaliation directed at Green.

According ly
, the district court did not commit clear error in assessing the reasons fo r the imposition of the administratorship, which is the pri m a r y basis for Green’s claims ag a inst the I nternational.

e. K ins Com m ission

The final e vent that m u s t be considered is the appointment o f the Kins Commission in October 2007. Green emphasiz e s the e -mail sent b y Marg ie My e rs to Gerard and B o nds prior to the decision to a ppoint the commission, in which My ers wrote, “I f y ou g et in here now, y ou mig ht possibly save this local and y o urselves $50K that she is try ing
to g et to her a ttorney to fig ht y ou!” Gerard wrote to B onds in
response, “I think w e need to m o v e q u i [ c ] ker

. . . h ave we done an audit . . . what are we doing .”

The d istrict court dete r m i n e d that the Kins Commission

w a s not instituted f

or improper reasons. Ag ain, th er e i s sufficient evidence to support this f i n ding

. Green contends that the inference to b e drawn from the My ers e-mail is thatUSW L O C A L 12-369 V

. USW I N T ’ L 33

the I nternational wa s m o t i v ed by a d esire to suppress her speech, b ut a competing inference i s that the e-mail merely reinforced the dy sfunctional na t u re of the L ocal, which h ad previously led to the administratorship being impo s e d i n Aug ust 2007. I ndeed, the p roblems within the L ocal h ad persisted since the administratorship was dissolved b y the district c ourt on procedural g rounds. As described in B onds’ letter t o G e r ard recommending appointment of the Kins Commission, Green had conducted a s p ecial meeting with insuffic i ent notice, members from outly ing branches continued to complain about t h eir ex clusion from the d e mocratic processes of the L o cal, and HAMTC had begu n to discuss the possibility of ex pelling the L o c al. I f the turmoil w ithin the L ocal was the cause of the Aug ust 2007 administratorship, g iven th e s u bsequent events, the same motivation almost surely d r ove the decision to c onvene another commission. The district court’s finding s of fact on this issue are not clearly

erroneous.

3. Sum m ary

Given the district court’s analy sis o f Green’s a lleg ations, both as discrete incidents an d as part of a broader course o f conduct, we hold that i t did not c learly err in finding that Defendants d id not discr i m i nate o r retaliate ag ainst Green. According ly
, we affirm the district court’s judg ment entered at trial.

IV. CONCLUSION

F or the reasons stated above, the judg ment of the district court is AF F IRMED.