GAO-07-503R Operation Iraqi Freedom 

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

March 28, 2007 

Congressional Committees 

Subject: Operation Iraqi Freedom: Preliminary Observations on Iraqi Security 

Forces’ Logistics and Command and Control Capabilities

From May 2003 through June 2004, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), led by 

the United States and the United Kingdom, was the United Nations-recognized 

authority responsible for the temporary governance of Iraq and for overseeing, 

directing, and coordinating the reconstruction effort. In May 2003, the CPA dissolved 

the military organizations of the former regime and began the process of creating or 

reestablishing new Iraqi security forces, including the police and a new Iraqi military. 

Over time, multinational force commanders assumed responsibility for recruiting and 

training some Iraqi defense and police forces in their areas of responsibility.1 In May 

2004, President Bush issued a National Security Presidential Directive stating that 

after the transition of power to the Iraqi government is achieved, the Department of 

Defense (DOD) would continue to be responsible for U.S. activities relating to 

security and military operations. The Presidential Directive also stated that the U.S. 

Central Command would direct all U.S. government efforts to organize, equip, and 

train Iraqi security forces. 

In the summer of 2004, Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) developed and began 

implementing a comprehensive campaign plan, which elaborated on and refined the 

original strategy for transferring security responsibilities to Iraqi forces. In November 

2005, the National Security Council issued the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, 

which states that the Coalition will adjust its “posture and approaches as conditions 

evolve and Iraqi capabilities grow,” and that Coalition troop levels in Iraq will 

decrease over time as the Iraqis take on more responsibilities for themselves. The 

national strategy implies a conditions-based linkage between the development of the 

Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and the size and shape of the U.S. presence in Iraq. 

In April 2006, MNF-I revised the campaign plan and, in conjunction with the U.S. 

Embassy in Baghdad, issued a Joint Campaign Plan that states as a goal the transfer 

of security responsibilities from MNF-I to the ISF and the Iraqi government. Finally, 

in August 2006, DOD issued its fifth report to Congress, Measuring Stability and 

 

1

 The CPA was responsible for police training at the Baghdad and Jordan academies with support from 

the State Department and the Justice Department. The CPA’s Coalition Military Assistance Training 

Team was responsible for training a new Iraqi Army. 
Page 2 GAO-07-503R Operation Iraqi Freedom 

Security in Iraq, stating that even though 5 Iraqi Army divisions, 25 brigades, 85 

battalions, and 2 National Police battalions had assumed lead responsibility for 

security in their areas of operation, most of these units still require support from 

Coalition forces. This is because logistics, sustainment, and command and control 

capabilities of the ISF are not yet fully developed. The ISF comprises the forces of the 

Ministry of Defense (MOD)—that is, the Iraqi Army, Navy, Air Force, and several 

Strategic Infrastructure Battalions—and the forces of the Ministry of Interior (MOI)—

which includes the police, border enforcement, and other Iraqi civilian security 

services. 

Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I), which operates under 

MNF-I, leads the Coalition effort to train, equip, and organize the Iraqi Security 

Forces. Once ISF units are trained and equipped, operational responsibility for their 

employment is turned over to Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I), a command that is 

subordinate to MNF-I and is responsible for command and control of operations in 

Iraq.2

According to DOD’s August 2006 report to Congress, the seating of the new 

government of Iraq, which was not fully complete until the appointment in June 2006 

of the Ministers of Defense, Interior, and State for National Security Affairs, sets the 

conditions for continuing progress toward Iraqi security self-reliance. Senior 

Coalition officials in Iraq echoed this sentiment, stating that prior to the seating of the 

Minister of Defense and Minister of Interior in particular, only limited progress could 

be made toward forging a self-reliant ISF. 

In light of the broad congressional interest in Iraq, we have undertaken this 

engagement under the authority of the Comptroller General to conduct evaluations at 

his own initiative3

 to provide information on the status and challenges of developing 

ISF support capabilities. Specifically, our objectives were to determine (1) the 

current state of the logistical, command and control, and intelligence capabilities of 

the Iraqi Ministry of Defense; and (2) the current state of the logistical, command and 

control, and intelligence capabilities of the Ministry of Interior. Additionally, during 

the course of our work Coalition officials provided us with information on the status 

of coordination and communication between and within the ministries. 

On March 7, 2007, we issued a classified report to you containing our preliminary 

observations.4

 This report is the unclassified version of that classified report. Certain 

specific information and data about the current state of ISF’s logistical, command and 

control and intelligence capabilities was classified as secret. On March 9, 2007, we 

testified before the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight 

and Investigations, on the development of the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of 

Interior’s logistical capabilities for the Iraqi army and police.5

 We expect to provide a 

follow-up report later that will examine in more detail the progress in the 

 

2

 MNC-I is headquartered by the U.S. Army III Corps forward deployed to Camp Victory, Baghdad. 

3

 31 U.S.C. § 717(b)(1)(2000). 

4

 GAO, Operation Iraqi Freedom: Preliminary Observations on Iraqi Security Forces’ Support 

Capabilities, GAO-07-120C (Washington, D.C.: March 7, 2007). 5

 GAO, Operation Iraqi Freedom: Preliminary Observations on Iraqi Security Forces’ Logistical 

Capabilities, GAO-07-582T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 9, 2007). 
Page 3 GAO-07-503R Operation Iraqi Freedom 

development of these capabilities, the level of U.S. support being provided to the ISF, 

and the linkage between the development of the ISF’s support capabilities and the 

drawdown of U.S. forces in Iraq. This report is one of a series of products that GAO 

has produced since June 2004 addressing the security situation in Iraq and Iraqi 

security forces. A list of related GAO products appears at the end of this report. 

To determine the current state of the logistical, command and control, and 

intelligence capabilities of the Iraqi Ministries of Defense and Interior, we reviewed 

relevant documents, orders, policies, and data that we obtained from the Department 

of Defense, the Department of State, and contracting officials. We also met with and 

interviewed DOD officials and contractor representatives in the United States and 

made two trips to Iraq, in January and August 2006. In Iraq, we met with officials from 

the Department of State, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Multi-National 

Force-Iraq, Multi-National Corps-Iraq, and Multi-National Security Transition 

Command-Iraq. During our August 2006 trip, we also met with Iraqi Army officials 

and made a site visit to an Iraqi Army training compound and Iraq’s National Depot. 

During our visits, we talked with knowledgeable officials and determined that the 

data they provided us was sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. We 

conducted our review from January 2006 through August 2006 in accordance with 

generally accepted government auditing standards. Notwithstanding our repeated 

requests for DOD to expedite and complete its reviews, this report was under 

security review within the Department of Defense and MNF-I from October 2006 until 

February 2007. In our March 9th testimony, we updated information on the ISF’s 

logistical capabilities and, where appropriate, we have identified that information in 

footnotes throughout this report. 

Results in Brief 

Progress has been made in developing the logistics and command and control 

capabilities of the Iraqi Ministry of Defense. For example, there is a logistical concept 

in place for the MOD, and MNSTC-I is fielding many of the units required by the 

concept. Furthermore, the Coalition and MOD have established a training base at 

Taji, where Iraqi logistical and communications specialists are being trained. 

However, significant challenges remain in order for the MOD to achieve selfsufficiency. For example, although the ministry has a logistical concept, 

implementing that concept is hampered by a lag in the development of national and 

regional logistics centers, impediments to training of Iraqi logisticians and mechanics, 

and maintenance shortfalls. Similarly, the establishment of a command and control 

capability in the MOD faces training challenges as well as a shortage of military 

leadership; the lack of a communications doctrine; and the lack of clearly defined 

policies and procedures at the ministerial level have further undermined efforts to 

develop this capability. 

Progress has also been made toward developing the logistics and command and 

control capabilities of the Iraqi Ministry of Interior. For example, a logistics concept 

for the MOI is being worked on, the ministry has fielded communications technology, 

and a National Command Center is in operation. However, the MOI also faces 

challenges, such as supplying its forces and maintaining its vehicles. Furthermore, 

the logistics concept may not fully include the forces that are based in the provinces. 
Page 4 GAO-07-503R Operation Iraqi Freedom 

With regard to command and control, maintenance and procedural challenges limit 

the capabilities of the MOI’s communications technology. 

Background 

On June 28, 2004, the CPA transferred power to an interim sovereign Iraqi 

government. The CPA was officially dissolved, and Iraq’s transitional period had 

begun. Under Iraq’s transitional law,6 the transitional period included the completion 

of a draft constitution in October 2005 and two subsequent elections—a referendum 

on the Iraqi constitution and an election for a permanent government.7 The Iraqi 

people approved the constitution on October 15, 2005, and voted for representatives 

to the Iraq Council of Representatives (COR) on December 15, 2005. The Independent 

Electoral Commission of Iraq certified the election results on February 10, 2006. On 

April 22, 2006, the COR elected senior members of the new government, including a 

president, two vice presidents, a speaker of the COR, and two deputy speakers. This 

Presidency Council subsequently nominated a prime minister-designate and two 

deputy prime minister-designates, signaling the start of a constitutionally-mandated 

30-day period in which the Prime Minister-designate was required to form his cabinet. 

On May 20, 2006, the Prime Minister-designate named his cabinet, which the COR 

approved the same day, with the Prime Minister and deputy prime ministers also 

serving temporarily as the Ministers of Defense, Interior, and State for National 

Security Affairs. On June 8, 2006, the Prime Minister submitted his nominees and the 

COR approved by a majority vote the Minister of Defense, Minister of Interior, and 

Minister of State for National Security Affairs. 

Under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1546, MNF-I has the authority to 

take all necessary measures to contribute to security and stability in Iraq during this 

process, working in partnership with the Iraqi government to reach agreement on 

security and policy issues. 

Ministry of Defense is Developing Support Capabilities, but Faces Training, 

Procedural, Maintenance, and Staffing Issues 

Iraq’s Ministry of Defense has established a logistical concept and its development is 

ongoing; however, implementation of the concept is hampered by the failure to 

develop national and regional logistics centers, training problems, and maintenance 

challenges. Similarly, as of August 2006, the standing up of a command and control 

capability in the MOD is hampered by a shortage of leadership and a lack of policies 

and procedures at the ministerial level, the lack of a communications doctrine, and 

training challenges. 

Implementation of Logistical Concept is Challenged

In early 2005, the MOD and MNF-I approved a multilayered logistics concept for the 

Iraqi military. Inherent to the concept is the generation of a variety of units from the 

 

6

 Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period, March 2004. 7

 See GAO, Iraq’s Transitional Law, GAO-04-746R (Washington, D.C.: May 25, 2004) for more 

information on key events during Iraq’s transitional period. 
Page 5 GAO-07-503R Operation Iraqi Freedom 

ministerial to the unit level. The provision of logistics support at the lowest levels is 

expected to be the purview of Headquarters and Services Companies (HSC), which 

provide limited health, maintenance, supply, and transportation support to Iraqi Army 

battalions, brigades, and divisions, and Motorized Transport Regiments (MTR), which 

provide additional transportation, maintenance, and vehicle recovery support to each 

of the Iraqi Army’s infantry divisions. Mid-level logistics support is expected to come 

from a National Depot, five Regional Support Units (RSU), and numerous Garrison 

Support Units (GSU). The National Depot, located at Taji, provides facilities for the 

receipt, storage, accounting, and issue of the Iraqi Armed Forces’ national 

stockholding of most classes of supply as well as the maintenance capability to 

overhaul vehicles and other equipment. The RSUs are to provide regionally focused 

supply, maintenance, and contract support for the Iraqi military while GSUs are to 

provide base support for each Iraqi military installation. A Support Command is to 

provide command and control of the National Depot and RSUs while the Iraqi Joint 

Headquarters logistics staff section (M-4) is to provide logistics input to plans and 

orders. Finally, atop the logistics structure is the Office of the Director General of 

Acquisitions, Logistics, and Infrastructure (DG AL&I), which is expected to direct the 

ministry’s overall logistical capability and the acquisition of capital equipment, to 

develop ministerial policies and procedures, and to manage the budget. The 

envisioned end state is a comprehensive logistics system that will provide 

maintenance, supply, transportation, and garrison support to all elements of the Iraqi 

military.8

However, several challenges remain in the standing up of this logistics system. First, 

the establishment of the National Depot, RSUs, and GSUs has lagged behind the 

creation of HSCs and MTRs. Second, the training of Iraqi logisticians has been 

affected by a lack of fuel, electricity, personnel, and materiel support to the training 

academy. Finally, the maintenance of the Iraqi military’s vehicles is complicated 

because of the heterogeneity of the MOD’s vehicular fleet and the lack of trained 

mechanics. 

The Establishment of National and Regional Logistics Centers Has Lagged 

Behind 

Although the MOD’s logistics concept does not delineate any priority to the 

establishment of one type of logistics unit over another, according to an August 13, 

2006, MNSTC-I briefing, the priority has been on generating lower echelon logistics 

formations, specifically HSCs and MTRs. As of August 2006, most of the authorized 

HSCs and MTRs had been formed. Meanwhile, the creation of national and regional 

logistics centers has lagged behind; a circumstance that Coalition officials contend 

makes the attainment of MOD self-sufficiency problematic. For example, the 

establishment of the National Depot has been plagued by manpower shortages, 

security issues, inadequate fuel stocks, and poor maintenance. In August 2006, 

Coalition officials assigned to the National Depot told us that since April 2006, the 

amount of fuel delivered to the National Depot has been below that required to 

support routine warehouse, maintenance, and transportation requirements. The 

maintenance of forklifts, vehicles, and generators necessary to support day-to-day 

 

8

 The areas of health and garrison support are not addressed in this report. 
Page 6 GAO-07-503R Operation Iraqi Freedom 

operations has suffered as well because of a lack of spare parts, a situation 

exacerbated by the variety of makes and models of the equipment with which the 

National Depot operates. In the words of one senior Coalition logistician, what 

presently exists at Taji is “a depot in name only.”9

 

The establishment of the RSUs and GSUs faces similar challenges. As of August 2006, 

all five RSUs were still in the process of being formed and had significant shortfalls in 

personnel, leadership, training, and facilities. Furthermore, as of August 2006 the 

exact number of GSUs to be formed had not been determined, and only five were in 

the process of being formed.10

Coalition logisticians have emphasized that development of all echelons of the 

logistic concept is crucial in order for MOD to become capable of independently 

sustaining its forces. 

Challenges Exist in the Training of Iraqi Logisticians 

Another challenge that the Coalition and MOD face in developing a logistics system 

for the Iraqi military is a shortage of experienced officers and noncommissioned 

officers available to staff logistics units. Providing trained officers and 

noncommissioned officers to fill support and combat service support positions 

throughout the Iraqi Army is the mission of the Iraqi Armed Service and Supply 

Institute (Institute). However, during our visit to the Institute, several problems that 

negatively affected its ability to fulfill its mission were evident. 

According to a senior Iraqi Army official from the Institute, one problem hampering 

the training of logisticians for the Iraqi military is illiteracy. At least 25 percent of the 

students who report for each course are turned away because they are illiterate in 

Arabic and therefore incapable of reading the required manuals.11 This includes 

students from Kurdish provinces who, though literate in Kurdish, cannot read, write, 

or speak Arabic. 

For those who are eventually accepted into one of the Institute’s courses, training has 

been hampered by quality-of-life problems, an insufficient number of trained cadre 

members, and equipment shortages. The quality-of-life problems stem from 

insufficient fuel for the generators which provide the power to run air conditioners, 

 

9

 In its supplemental Fiscal Year 2007 Security Forces Fund request, DOD has asked for a total of 

$339.2 million to build and develop maintenance, warehouse, and base support facilities at the 

National Depot. According to DOD, if these funds are not procured, the National Depot’s construction 

will be affected and the shortfall will necessitate the continued presence and support of Coalition 

forces further into the future. 

10 According to updated information we obtained in December 2006, the MOD was still developing the 

RSUs and they would not be transitioned to full Iraqi control until June 2007. Moreover, the same 

update revealed that full transition of the GSUs to Iraqi control would not occur until late 2007. In its 

supplemental Fiscal Year 2007 Security Forces Fund request, DOD has asked for $73 million to build 

and outfit 58 dining facilities for GSUs and RSUs. Without this funding, DOD states that those facilities 

might go months or years without use while waiting for equipment to be delivered through Iraqi 

acquisitions systems. According to DOD, if that were to occur the Coalition would not be able to 

diminish its support. 

11 As a result of the literacy problem within the country, MNSTC-I has developed a literacy course. 
Page 7 GAO-07-503R Operation Iraqi Freedom 

water pumps, and other life-support equipment. In August 2006, ambient 

temperatures during the day ran as high as 120 degrees Fahrenheit. 

As of August 2006, the Institute was staffed with just over half of its authorized Iraqi 

officer instructors. Although the reasons for this shortage are unclear, it has resulted 

in the training of fewer logistics specialists for the Iraqi Army because without the 

needed cadre the Institute has had to operate at less than full capacity. 

Maintenance Is Challenged by a Heterogeneous Vehicle Fleet and Undermined 

by a Lack of Trained Mechanics and Funds 

Vehicle maintenance is another challenge that the MOD faces, a challenge 

exacerbated by the heterogeneous mixture of the ministry’s vehicular fleet, a 

circumstance that has several causes: MOD vehicle purchases, gifts of vehicles from 

donor countries, and vehicles left over from Saddam’s army. According to an 

August 1, 2006, vehicle inventory, the Iraqi Army has 6 different types of fuel trucks, 

at least 4 of which come from different manufacturers: Nissan, Ford, KrAZ 

(Ukrainian), and MAZ (Belarusian); 21 different types of light utility vehicles, 

including vehicles manufactured by Chevrolet, Gazelle (Russian), Honker (Czech), 

Kia, Mercedes, Mitsubishi, Nissan, and UAZ (Russian); and 15 different types of 

medium cargo vehicles, including U.S. military 2.5- and 5-ton cargo trucks, as well as 

vehicles manufactured by AMC, Ashok Leyland (Indian), GAZ (Russian), Hyundai, 

Kamaz (Russian), Nissan, and Mercedes.12 According to Coalition officials, obtaining 

repair parts for such a heterogeneous vehicle fleet, especially parts for vehicles of 

non-U.S. manufacture that are in relatively short supply in the MOD’s vehicle 

inventory, is so expensive that it results in the cannibalization of parts from similar 

vehicles awaiting repair. The result is that some vehicles never get repaired.13

As an interim solution to meet the maintenance requirements of this heterogeneous 

fleet, MNSTC-I committed to a national maintenance contract. According to the 

statement of work, MNSTC-I’s intent, by way of a “focus sustainment” effort, was to 

contract for the services of a maintenance contractor to support the sustainment of 

the vehicles and equipment issued to the Iraqi Armed Forces and to assist the Iraqi 

Armed Forces in becoming self-sufficient. To facilitate the transfer of organizational 

and intermediate maintenance tasks, the maintenance contractor was to be organized 

to conduct on-the-job training for Iraqi personnel. However, Coalition officials stated 

that this training regimen has not produced sufficient numbers of trained Iraqi 

mechanics. As of August 11, 2006, only 26 of the 191 Iraqis that had been enrolled in 

the on-the-job training program had completed this training. 

The national maintenance contract’s statement of work also requires the contractor 

to determine and maintain an adequate authorized stockage level (ASL) for all 

equipment repaired, with the intent of the ASL being to reduce the “wait time” for 

 

12 Coalition officials stated that the information they provided us about the MOD’s vehicle inventory 

was fairly complete as of that point in time, but acknowledged that there may be some vehicles in the 

MOD’s inventory over which they do not have visibility. 

13 According to DOD’s Fiscal Year 2008 Security Forces Fund request, a portion of the $1,043 million it 

has requested for equipment and transportation will be used to purchase common system vehicles for 

the MOD, with an eye toward reducing the fleet to just one or two systems. 
Page 8 GAO-07-503R Operation Iraqi Freedom 

parts. According to Coalition officials, although an ASL has been completed, updated, 

and partially funded by the Coalition, the MOD has not yet budgeted for maintaining 

the ASL once the contract expires in March 2007. Coalition officials fear that a failure 

by the Iraqis to budget for and maintain the ASL will result in repair part shortfalls 

that will have a concomitant negative impact on equipment readiness levels.14

Coalition officials have remarked that the national maintenance contract is too 

expensive for the MOD to continue past its March 2007 end date. Coalition officials 

have presented an alternative to the national maintenance contract based on foreign 

military sales and direct vendor contracts to the MOD. As of August 2006, the MOD 

had taken no action with regard to this alternative.15

Command and Control Capability Is Hampered by Lack of Ministerial Policies and 

Procedures, a Shortage of Leadership, Lack of a Communications Doctrine, and 

Training Challenges

Although the MOD’s command and control structure is still under development, 

Coalition and Iraqi Army officials identified several challenges that need to be 

addressed before full capability is achieved. These include the development of 

ministerial policies and procedures, the growth of Iraq’s military leadership, the 

development of an effective communications infrastructure, and the training of 

communications specialists. 

Leadership, Procedures, and Policies Need to be Developed 

According to senior Coalition officials, one of their greatest challenges is getting their 

Iraqi counterparts on the ministerial and Joint Headquarters Staff to agree on their 

respective roles and responsibilities. This confusion stems in large part from an 

absence of accepted procedures and policies. Echoing this claim is an August 1, 2006, 

Coalition assessment of the MOD’s executive support measures of effectiveness. This 

assessment rates all of the following core competencies as “ineffective”: the 

ministry’s development and implementation of a decision-making process; a process 

for the overall professionalization of the ministry; a directive that establishes terms of 

reference for ministry officials, civilian and military; a process for oversight and 

periodic review of decisions; and development and establishment of policy and 

procedures for command and control under provisions of the Constitution. Coalition 

officials, working in concert with their Iraqi counterparts, are addressing each of 

these shortcomings. In August 2006, these officials stated that they believe that the 

June 2006 naming of a Minister of Defense will contribute much to the development 

and implementation of appropriate procedures and policies. They stress, however, 

that without effective procedures and policies, command and control of the Iraqi 

military will suffer from confusion, lack of coordination, ineffectiveness, and 

inefficiency. 

 

14 In its supplemental Fiscal Year 2007 Security Forces Fund request, DOD has asked for $499.6 million 

to procure recommended levels of supplies initially required to meet Iraqi wholesale and retail 

authorized stockage levels for most major classes of supplies. If it does not receive this funding, DOD 

states that the Iraqis will require continued support from Coalition forces. 15 According to a DOD official, MNSTC-I has reprogrammed some of its funds to extend the national 

maintenance contract beyond its March 2007 expiration date. 
Page 9 GAO-07-503R Operation Iraqi Freedom 

According to a July 2006 MNSTC-I report, although leadership development programs 

for the Iraqi military are under way and a senior officer selection committee has been 

established to identify Iraq’s future leaders, these measures will take time to have an 

effect. However, the report stresses that it has become increasingly evident that the 

larger and more complex the Iraqi Army has become, the harder it is to find senior 

leaders at the rank of lieutenant colonel and above able to provide confident, 

competent commanders and senior staff. 

Communications Doctrine Needs to Be Developed 

According to Coalition and Iraqi Army officials, as of August 2006, the MOD had not 

yet agreed on an Iraqi Army communications doctrine. According to these same 

officials, a communications doctrine is essential to the establishment of an effective 

communications system which, in turn, is an essential part of a command and control 

system. 

Training Challenges Remain 

As of August 2006, several challenges exist in training Iraqi signal officers, 

noncommissioned officers, and soldiers. The 28-day training program, which is 

conducted at the Iraqi Signal School at Taji, is the same for all students regardless of 

rank and includes basic computer skills, preventive maintenance checks and 

services, basic radio communications procedures, and hands-on training with 

antennae and the various radios employed by the Iraqi Army. The officials stated that 

what is needed are several more courses specifically designed to train Iraqi Army 

officers and noncommissioned officers in more advanced procedures. Five such 

courses are envisioned for the future (a signal officer basic and advanced course, a 

noncommissioned officer basic and advanced course, and a signal military 

occupational specialty course), but a lack of qualified instructors has undermined 

efforts to establish these courses. And finally, according to a senior Iraqi Army signal 

officer, there is a tendency throughout the Iraqi Army to improperly employ the 

Signal School’s enlisted graduates. Despite having been trained in communications, 

once the students return to their units they are employed as infantrymen, while 

officers, who may not have graduated from the Signal School, run the radios. 

Ministry of Interior Is Developing Support Capabilities, but Has Not 

Resolved Logistical and Communications Challenges 

Although the Ministry of Interior and its Coalition advisers are developing a logistics 

concept and the ministry has demonstrated accountability for some commodities, the 

ministry faces challenges in the supply of its forces and maintenance of its vehicles 

and the logistics concept may not fully address MOI forces based in the provinces. In 

the area of command and control, the MOI has fielded communications technologies, 

but maintenance and procedural challenges limit the capabilities of these systems. 
Page 10 GAO-07-503R Operation Iraqi Freedom 

MOI and Coalition Are Developing a Logistics Concept and MOI Has Accountability 

for Some Commodities, but MOI Faces Supply and Maintenance Challenges

The Coalition and Ministry of Interior are currently developing a logistics concept for 

the ministry’s forces, but the concept may not be ready for ministry approval until 

December 2006.16 The ministry is experiencing logistics challenges in several areas, 

including the repair of police vehicles and the maintenance of its radios. Also, it is 

unclear whether the draft logistics concept for the MOI will fully address forces 

located outside the capital. 

Logistics Concept May Not Be Ready for MOI Consideration until 

December 2006 

According to a Coalition document, the Coalition’s goal is to develop a Ministry of 

Interior logistics system in which the central government procures and distributes 

commodities; supports both the MOI’s federal forces (National Police and Border 

Forces) and those forces that are based in each of Iraq’s 18 provinces (Iraqi Police 

Service, Facility Protection Service, and Fire/Civil Defense); and provides 

accountability of items such as vehicles, weapons, and durable equipment. In August 

2006, this was the end state envisioned by the Coalition for the ministry’s logistics 

system, and although the MOI has not yet approved the draft logistics concept being 

developed by the Coalition, Coalition officials stated that one of the ministry’s 

organizations has implemented accountability of some commodities. 

The draft logistics concept calls for a system of five to seven warehouses that would 

perform maintenance on communications equipment and weapons and would include 

three distribution centers to dispense supplies. In addition, the concept is to include 

contracts that would provide maintenance of vehicles and communications 

equipment. Although we did not examine the proposed contracts, Coalition officials 

stated that the proposed contracts will include $130 million in Coalition funding for 

12 months of vehicle maintenance and $4.5 million in MOI funding for 12 months of 

radio maintenance and training of Iraqi mechanics. A Coalition official also stated 

that these contracts are intended as temporary solutions to provide maintenance until 

the MOI is able to develop its own capabilities in these areas.17 An August 2006 

Coalition document states that in February 2007, the MOI would assume operation of 

six warehouses that supply ministerial forces and were being run by a Coalitionfunded contractor.18

 

 

16 As of December 2006, the Ministry of Interior had not approved the draft logistics concept proposed 

by the Coalition. The reason for this is unclear. 

17 It seems that MOI’s dependence on Coalition support of its logistical facilities will continue into 

fiscal year 2008. DOD states that the MOI requires approximately $175 million from the supplemental 

Fiscal Year 2007 Security Forces Fund for the construction and sustainment of warehouse and 

maintenance depots. 

18 According to an update we received from DOD in December 2006, only one of the six warehouses 

will transition to Iraqi control by February 2007. The remaining five are to continue under Coalition 

control until July 2007. 
Page 11 GAO-07-503R Operation Iraqi Freedom 

MOI Has Exercised Accountability over Some Commodities, but Still Faces 

Maintenance Challenges 

The end state envisioned by the Coalition for the MOI’s logistics system calls for the 

logistics system to provide accountability over items including vehicles, weapons, 

and durable equipment. While the ministry has not approved the draft logistics 

concept, a Coalition official stated that one of the ministry’s organizations, the 

National Police, has demonstrated accountability for certain commodities, for 

example, vehicles, weapons, and uniforms. 

However, the ministry is experiencing significant supply and maintenance challenges 

in several other areas. According to a July 2006 Coalition assessment, the MOI’s 

logistics capabilities are ineffective because the force being developed by the 

Coalition for the MOI is overwhelming the ministry’s existing logistics capabilities 

and a lack of centralized contracting and budget authorities limit MOI oversight. 

Because of this ineffectiveness, the Coalition was procuring and distributing 

equipment, vehicles, and weapons for the MOI, and a Coalition-funded contractor 

was running warehouses that supply ministerial forces and providing transportation 

of supplies from these warehouses to MOI facilities.19 

Coalition officials also stated that the MOI faces maintenance challenges. In August 

2006, approximately 1,600 police vehicles were inoperable in Baghdad alone. In 

addition, MOI personnel are unable to maintain a certain type of American truck 

delivered by Coalition forces because these personnel are unable to work with the 

vehicles’ computerized systems. As of August 2006, the ministry had 1,179 trucks of 

this type on hand.20 Coalition officials also stated that there is little or no sustainment 

of certain types of police radio equipment. 

It is unclear how the logistics concept in development will address some of the 

challenges the MOI faces. For instance, the MOI does not currently have a program to 

perform vehicle maintenance, and although we did not examine it, Coalition officials 

explained that the vehicle maintenance contract under consideration will operate 

only in Baghdad. As of August 2006, the draft logistics concept did not include a 

means to transport MOI vehicles from other parts of the country to Baghdad.21 

 Logistics Concept May Not Fully Address Provincial Forces’ Needs 

Another related challenge is that the Coalition and ministry are unclear on how the 

concept will incorporate MOI forces in Iraq’s 18 provinces. One goal for the logistics 

system is to support ministerial forces in the provinces. However, in August 2006, a 

Coalition official explained that the future logistical relationship between the MOI’s 

headquarters and its forces located in the provinces remained unclear. For instance, 

 

19 These challenges have continued and the MOI remains dependent on the Coalition to operate its 

warehouse system. 

20 According to a December 2006 DOD update, Iraqi mechanics remain unfamiliar with the 

computerized systems which are found in most of the MOI’s vehicles. Moreover, a significant 

component of the MOI’s forces, the National Police, is unable to maintain its vehicles. 21 DOD is requesting $145 million to build 130 maintenance facilities for the MOI. DOD states that 

without this infrastructure the ministry will not be able to maintain its vehicle fleet. 
Page 12 GAO-07-503R Operation Iraqi Freedom 

while Iraqi Police Service units located in the provinces are part of the ministry’s 

forces, funding for these units is controlled by each provincial governor. In August 

2006, a Coalition official stated that the then-current draft logistics concept 

incorporated some of the ministry’s provincial forces. However, the extent to which 

the forces are included is unclear. Also, because the relationship between the 

ministry and its provincial forces is still being defined by Iraqi officials, the MOI’s 

eventual draft logistics concept may not fully address provincial forces. 

Although the Coalition is currently focused on certain MOI forces that operate on a 

federal level (National Police, Border Forces, and the ministry’s national 

headquarters in Baghdad), as the relationship between the ministry and its provincial 

forces becomes clearer and the concept evolves, Coalition officials explained that the 

logistical relationship between the ministry’s headquarters and its provincial forces 

may be clarified in the concept. According to an August 2006 Coalition document, the 

focus of the ministry’s future logistics efforts were to shift to provincial forces. 

However, the timeline for this shift is unclear. 

MOI Has Fielded Command and Control Communications Technologies, but 

Maintenance and Procedural Challenges Limit Capability 

While we did not examine the contracts ourselves, a Coalition official stated that 

Coalition-funded contractors have built two command and control networks for the 

Ministry of Interior: the Advanced First Responder Network, which is intended to 

provide communication between police forces, the ministerial headquarters, and Iraqi 

military forces in 15 Iraqi cities; and the Iraqi Command and Control Network, which 

is designed to link the MOI’s national and provincial headquarters. The MOI’s forces 

are also being equipped with short- and long-range radios that allow these forces to 

communicate among themselves and with Iraqi military units. 

As of August 2006, the MOI’s progress in developing a national command and control 

network had been mixed. Installation of the Advanced First Responder Network was 

complete; work on the Iraqi Command and Control Network was ongoing, with 52 

percent of funded sites installed; and most of the of short- and long-range radios have 

been deployed (about 91 percent and 81 percent of authorized requirements, 

respectively). 

Although these technologies have been fielded, the MOI faces substantial challenges 

in the area of national command and control. For example, the capability of the 

Advanced First Responder Network is limited by infrastructure insufficiencies, the 

fragility of Iraq’s electrical grid, and by the MOI’s inability to replace critical 

components. 

Infrastructure, Maintenance, and Procedural Challenges Limit the Capabilities 

of Certain Communications Technologies 

According to a Coalition document, the $218.5 million Advanced First Responder 

Network was installed through a Coalition-funded contract and is intended to provide 

a communications system for first responders by integrating MOI police with local, 

provincial, and national public safety headquarters and Iraqi military units through 
Page 13 GAO-07-503R Operation Iraqi Freedom 

radio, secure voice, data, and global positioning system services. In its current form, 

the network was designed to provide communication for MOI forces operating in 

15 Iraqi cities. Although, according to a Coalition document, 65 percent of the 

country’s population lives in these cities, the network does not provide national 

coverage. Several of Iraq’s 18 provinces—including Dahuk, Erbil, Sulaymaniyah in the 

northeast, al-Anbar in the west, and Maysan in the east—do not have a city covered 

by the network. 

According to a Coalition document, other infrastructure insufficiencies also limit the 

network’s capability. For instance, certain switches operate in a way that is not 

compatible with communications systems in Iraq and a system of microwave relay 

towers used to transmit signals is poorly designed. 

Another challenge is maintaining consistent power for the network. According to a 

Coalition official who worked with the MOI’s Directorate of Communications, the 

fragility of Iraq’s electrical grid means that the network must be powered with 

generators. The relatively small number of backup generators presents an additional 

challenge because the loss of a generator can result in a substantial loss in network 

capability. 

Challenges faced by the MOI in replacing parts compound the loss of capability 

caused by infrastructure insufficiencies and inconsistent power. For three reasons, 

the ministry has difficulty replacing parts. First, while we did not examine the 

contract, a Coalition official stated that the original contract to build the network 

does not require the contractor to provide spare parts. For instance, according to a 

Coalition document, replacement of faulty switches falls outside the scope of the 

operations and maintenance contract. Second, according to another Coalition 

document, although the ministry’s Directorate of Communications has agreed to 

assume responsibility for operations and maintenance in January 2007, it is unclear 

whether the Minister of Interior has agreed to that decision. Third, the ministry’s 

Directorate of Finance has refused a request for additional funding for the network 

made by the Directorate of Communications. In August 2006, a Coalition official 

stated that without additional funding to address these challenges, the network 

would likely fail within 3 months.22

 

In addition, as of August 2006, the MOI had not yet begun to develop the standard 

operating procedures23 that govern how it will run its communications networks. 

However, according to Coalition officials, Iraqi staff in the National Command 

Center24 are implementing standard operating procedures provided by the Coalition 

 

22 DOD has requested $27 million in U.S. funding for MOI communications maintenance and has stated 

that without this money, MOI’s radio networks will be severely jeopardized, its first responder network 

will degrade and become inoperable, and the MOI will be unable to assume responsibility for its 

national command and control network. 

23 Standard operating procedures are a set of instructions covering those features of operations which 

lend themselves to a definite or standardized procedure without loss of effectiveness. 24 According to a document provided by Coalition officials, the National Command Center maintains 

nationwide strategic and operational situational awareness and exercises command and control in 

order to implement plans and policy and track the execution of all operations for the Ministry of 

Interior. 
Page 14 GAO-07-503R Operation Iraqi Freedom 

and are making progress in their implementation. For instance, the outgoing shift 

now briefs the incoming shift, the center’s work space is arranged for more effective 

communication, and the Center staff now has adequate technology. 

In a July 2006 assessment, the Coalition judged the MOI’s communication capabilities 

as partly effective. A Coalition official who works with the ministry to develop its 

command and control capabilities explained that while the MOI has several 

communications technologies in place or in the process of being installed, as of 

August 2006, these had not been coordinated to form a functioning national command 

and control network. 

Concluding Observations 

The Coalition has been working to transfer full security responsibilities for the 

country to the Iraqi military and police. With regard to the development of logistics 

capabilities, Coalition officials stated that the MOD has progressed further than the 

MOI. In regard to the development of command and control capabilities, we were 

unable to determine if one ministry had made significantly more progress than the 

other. This is because Coalition and Iraqi government efforts in this area are 

numerous and in various stages of development, making them difficult to compare. 

We plan to address this comparison in subsequent work on ISF support capabilities. 

Further, according to senior Coalition officials, the seating of the Ministers of 

Defense and Interior in June 2006 sets the conditions for even greater progress 

toward attaining ISF self-reliance. However, significant challenges must be overcome 

before the ISF achieves full capability. These include training Iraqi logisticians and 

communications specialists, maintaining Iraqi vehicles and equipment, and 

developing policies and procedures within the ministries. Without qualified 

logisticians and communications specialists, reliable vehicles and equipment, and 

accepted policies and procedures, the Iraqi forces cannot achieve the self-sufficiency 

upon which the drawdown of Coalition forces depends. Coalition officials recognize 

these challenges and state they work daily to rectify them. 

Agency Comments 

DOD provided official oral comments on a draft of this correspondence and stated 

that it had no comments on our findings and observations. DOD also provided 

technical comments that were incorporated into the correspondence where 

appropriate. 

- - - - - 

We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional committees and the 

Secretary of Defense. This report will also be available at no charge on the GAO Web 

site at http://www.gao.gov. 
Page 15 GAO-07-503R Operation Iraqi Freedom 

Please contact me at (202) 512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov if you or your staff have any 

questions concerning this report. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional 

Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key 

ontributors to this report included Marilyn Wasleski, Assistant Director; Katherine 

Lenane, Guy LoFaro, Christopher Turner, Cheryl Weissman, and Gerald Winterlin. 

William M. Solis, Director 

Defense Capabilities and Management 
Page 16 GAO-07-503R Operation Iraqi Freedom 

List of Congresssional Committees

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye 

Chairman 

The Honorable Ted Stevens 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Appropriations 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Carl Levin 

Chairman 

The Honorable John McCain 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr. 

Chairman 

The Honorable Richard G. Lugar 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Foreign Relations 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Joseph Lieberman 

Chairman 

The Honorable Susan M. Collins 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

United States Senate 

The Honorable John P. Murtha 

Chairman 

The Honorable C.W. Bill Young 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Committee on Appropriations 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Ike Skelton 

Chairman 

The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 
Page 17 GAO-07-503R Operation Iraqi Freedom 

The Honorable Tom Lantos 

Chairman 

The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Foreign Relations 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Henry A. Waxman 

Chairman 

The Honorable Tom Davis 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable John F. Tierney 

Chairman 

The Honorable Christopher Shays 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs 

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

House of Representatives
Page 18 GAO-07-503R Operation Iraqi Freedom 

Related GAO Products

Stabilizing Iraq: Preliminary Observations on Budget and Management Challenges 

of Iraq’s Security Ministries. GAO-07-637T. Washington D.C.: March 22, 2007. 

Stabilizing Iraq: Factors Impeding the Development of Capable Iraqi Security 

Forces. GAO-07-612T. Washington, D.C.: March 13, 2007. 

Operation Iraqi Freedom: Preliminary Observations on Iraqi Security Forces’ 

Logistical Capabilities. GAO-07-582T. Washington, D.C.: March 9, 2007. 

Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: GAO Audit Approach and Findings. 

GAO-07-385T. Washington, D.C.: January 18, 2007. 

Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Key Issues for Congressional 

Oversight. GAO-07-308SP. Washington, D.C.: January 9, 2007.

Rebuilding Iraq: Status of DOD’s Reconstruction Program. GAO-07-30R. 

Washington, D.C.: December 15, 2006. 

Rebuilding Iraq: Status of Competition for Iraq Reconstruction Contracts. GAO-07-

40. Washington, D.C.: October 6, 2006. 

Rebuilding Iraq: Continued Progress Requires Overcoming Contract Management 

Challenges. GAO-06-1130T. Washington, D.C.: September 28, 2006. 

Stabilizing Iraq: An Assessment of the Security Situation, GAO-06-1094T. 

Washington, D.C.: September 11, 2006. 

Rebuilding Iraq: More Comprehensive National Strategy Needed to Help Achieve 

U.S. Goals. GAO-06-788. Washington, D.C.: July 11, 2006. 

Rebuilding Iraq: More Comprehensive National Strategy Needed to Help Achieve 

U.S. Goals and Overcome Challenges. GAO-06-953T. Washington, D.C.: July 11, 

2006. 

Rebuilding Iraq: Actions Still Needed to Improve the Use of Private Security 

Providers, GAO-06-865T. Washington, D.C.: June 13, 2006. 

Rebuilding Iraq: Governance, Security, Reconstruction, and Financing Challenges. 

GAO-06-697T. Washington, D.C.: April 25, 2006. 

Rebuilding Iraq: Enhancing Security, Measuring Program Results, and 

Maintaining Infrastructure Are Necessary to Make Significant and Sustainable 

Progress. GAO-06-179T. Washington, D.C.: October 18, 2005. 

Rebuilding Iraq: Actions Needed To Improve Use of Private Security Providers. 

GAO-05-737. Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2005. 
Page 19 GAO-07-503R Operation Iraqi Freedom 

Rebuilding Iraq: Preliminary Observations on Challenges in Transferring Security 

Responsibilities to Iraqi Military and Police. GAO-05-431T. Washington, D.C.: 

March 14, 2005.

Rebuilding Iraq: Resource, Security, Governance, Essential Services, and Oversight 

Issues. GAO-04-902R. Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2004. 

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