# IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL S OF TEXAS

P D-0960-10

THE S TATE O F TEXAS

v. RANDA LL CHUPIK , Appellee

On S tate ’s P etition for Discre tionary Revie w from the Third Court of Ap peals,

Travis County
Womack, J ., delivere d the opinion of the Court, in which Ke ller, P.J ., and J ohnson, Kea sler, Cochra n, and Alca la, J J ., joined. J ohnson, J ., filed a c oncurr ing opinion. Herve y , J ., concur red w ithout opini on. Price, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Mey ers, J., joi ned.
We gr anted r eview to de termine whe ther, in a State’ s appea l from a pr etrial orde r g ranting a motion to suppress evidenc e, the r ecor d must reflec t the evidenc e that wa s suppressed. We hold that there is not such a r equire ment. The a ppellee, Ra

ndall Chupik, was char g ed by information with driving while intox icated. T he trial c ourt g rante d his pretrial motion to suppress evidenc e. The State appea led the trial cour

t’s order under A rticle 44.01(a )(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure , and the ThirdC h u p i k

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## Court of Appea ls affirme d the orde r. We shall rever se. 1


## I . The Proce eding s Be low I n the ea rly morning hours of De cembe r 11, 2008, an of fice r of the A ustin P olice Depa rtment stopped the appe llee’s ve hicle af ter see ing it we aving on a public stree t. After a sking the appe llee some que stions, the officer g ave him thre e fie ld-sobriety tests, the first of which w as a Hor izont al Gaze Ny stag mus (“HGN ”) te st. After the three tests, the office r ar rested the appellee

. At the hea

ring on his moti on to suppress, the appe llee ar g ued that the stop and the initial questions violated his feder al constitutional rights. The trial court r uled that the stop and the initial questions were pe rmissible, but made written finding s of fa ct and c onclusions of law that the appe llee wa s “under

arr est at the c onclusion of the administration of the H GN test,” a nd was there afte r “subjec ted to custodial interrog ation without having ha d his Miranda warnings rec ited to him.” The trial c ourt there fore suppressed “ the answe rs to all questions asked of [the

2 

## appellee ] after the a dminist ration of the [HGN te st] ... exclusive of his response to the que stion as to whethe r he w ould give a bre ath or blood sample.” The trial c ourt also conc luded that “the evidenc e suppre ssed in this case is not of substantial importance rela tive to the quantity

and quality of other e vidence the State has a vailable to pre sent to prove this cha rg e.” The State a

ppeale d the trial cour

t’s order under A rticle 44.01(a )(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and included w ithin it s notice of a ppeal a cer tification by

the Tra vis County Attorney that the appe al was not take n for pur poses of de lay

and the suppre ssed evidenc e wa s of

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.

I t a l i c s i n o r i g i n a l

. 2C h u p i k

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## substantial importance in the c ase. The Court of Appea ls held that the trial cour t’s conclusion
reg arding “substantial importance ” did not aff ect the State’ s rig ht of appe al. Howeve r, the Court 3 

## of Appe als found that the r ecor d did not support the trial court’s f inding that the of

fice r continued to question the appe llee af ter the H GN test. The Court ther efor e held that the State’ s appea l presente d nothing f or re view bec ause “ there is nothing in the re cord to show that the court’s r uling will re sult in t he exclusion of any evidenc e at tria l.” 4


## I I . Discussion Under Article 44.01( a)( 5) of the Code of Criminal Procedur e, the State is entitled to
appea l an orde r of a

court in a c riminal case if the orde r “g rants a motion to suppress evide nce, a confe ssion, or an admission, if jeopar dy has not attac hed in the ca se and if the prosec uting attorney cer tifies to the trial court that the a ppeal is not taken f

or the purpose of dela

y and that the evidenc e, conf

ession, or admission is of substantial importance in the c ase.” Nothing in the pla in lang uag e of A rticle 44.01(a )(5) require s the State to detail the items of evide nce tha t were suppressed by

the cour t. L eg islative history

and per suasive fe dera l authority weig h ag ainst rea ding into the statute

a re quirement of a

n evidentiar

y showing . We have noted tha t Article 44.01 wa s intended to be construed liber ally

in favor of

State’s appe als and wa s enac ted with the intent to provide Texas
prosec utors with the same broa d power s aff orded the fede ral g overnme nt under Title 18, Section

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. 3

T h e C o u r t o f A p p e a l s a l s o h e l d t h a t i f i t a s s u m e d t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t d i s c o v e r e d p o s t

- H G N q u e s t i o n i n g 4
a f t e r v i e w i n g a v i d e o o u t s i d e t h e r e c o r d , t h e C o u r t o f A p p e a l s w o u l d t h e n h a v e “ n o b a s i s f o r r e v i e w i n g t h e t r i a l c o u r t ’ s c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t h i s q u e s t i o n i n g c o n s t i t u t e d c u s t o d i a l i n t e r r o g a t i o n , ” a n d a g a i n n o t h i n g w o u l d b e p r e s e n t e d f o r r e v i e w . I

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. B e c a u s e w e h o l d t h a t t h e r e c o r d n e e d n o t r e f l e c t t h e e v i d e n c e s u p p r e s s e d , w e h a v e n o n e e d t o a s s u m e t h e v i e w i n g o f s u c h a v i d e o . F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e r e c o r d d o e s n o t s h o w t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t v i e w e d s u c h a v i d e o o r t h a t i t s r u l i n g w a s s o m e h o w a f f e c t e d b y i t

.C h u p i k

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## 3731, of the United States Code. The pe rtinent provision of Section 3731 states: 5 

## An appe al by

the United States shall lie to a cour t of appe als from a

decision or order of a district c ourt suppressing or excluding e vidence or re quiring the re turn of seized prope rty

in a cr iminal procee ding, not made afte r the de fenda nt has bee n put in jeopardy

and bef ore the verdic t or finding on an indictment or infor mation, if the United States attorne y cer tifies to the district court that the a ppeal is not taken f or purpose of dela

y and that the e vidence is a substantial proof of a fac t materia l in the proce eding

. Fe dera l courts of a

ppeals now a g ree that, once the g overnme nt cer tifies that the evidenc e is a substantial proof of a materia l fac t, a re viewing court may not review“the substantiality or the mater iality ” of the e vidence : “The statute is c lear – the United States Attorney ’s ce rtification 6 

## that the appe al is not taken for purposes of de lay

and that the e vidence excluded by the district court’s or der is a substantial pr oof of a fac t material in the proc eeding is the final word on materia lity

for the pur

poses of de termining whether we ha ve jurisdiction to hear the appe al.” 7 

## Simi larly , we he ld in Johnson v. State that a def endant may

not challeng e the 8


## prosec utor’s ce rtification. We explained that the statute did not require any showing of the underly ing ba sis for the ce rtification: The plain lang uag e of the literal text of Art. 44.01(a) (5) pr ovides for the State to appea l a suppression orde r if jeopa rdy has not attac hed and the prosec uting attorney makes the a

bove-note d requisite ce rtification to the trial c ourt. I t clear ly

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. 3 d 4 9 9 , 5 0 6 ( 9 t h C i r . 2 0 0 8 ) ( o v e r r u l i n g p r i o r c a s e s r e q u i r i n g “ t h a t t h e g o v e r n m e n t ’ s b a r e c e r t i f i c a t i o n b e b a c k e d u p b y a p r e l i m i n a r y s h o w i n g t h a t t h e e x c l u d e d e v i d e n c e t r u l y i s m a t e r i a l ” ) ; U n i t e d S t a t e s v
. C o m i s k e y , 4 6 0 F

. 2 d 1 2 9 3 , 1 2 9 7

- 9 8 ( 7 t h C i r . 1 9 7 2 ) ( h o l d i n g c e r t i f i c a t i o n n e e d n o t a l l e g e “ s p e c i f i c e v i d e n t i a r y f

a c t s w h i c h c o n s t i t u t e s u b s t a n t i a l p r o o f o f t h e c h a r g e a l l e g e d a g a i n s t d e f e n d a n t

. ” ) ; U n i t e d S t a t e s v
. J o h n s o n , 2 2 8 F

. 3 d 9 2 0 , 9 2 4 ( 8 t h C i r . 2 0 0 0 ) ( s t a t i n g “ m e r e c e r t i f i c a t i o n i s r e q u i r e d t o d e m o n s t r a t e m a t e r i a l i t y ” )

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## sets forth the r equire ments for proc eeding with such an a ppeal. I n the instant cause , there is no claim that the State has not met those re quirements. Appe llee simply seeks to cha lleng e the ve rity of the State’s c ertification. Art. 44.01 does not include a pr ovision for making such a c halleng e. The plain lang uag e of A rt. 44.01(a) (5) simply

require s the ce rtification ra ther than a ny showing of the underly ing ba sis for such. 9 

## Despite its quotation of Johnson ’s holding, the Court of Appea ls require d a showing of the suppresse d evidenc e. To support its require ment, the cour t looked to Gonzales v. State , 1 0 

## which wa s cited for

the proposition that “when a defe ndant see ks to challeng e an or der

overr uling a motion to s uppress e vidence , the appe llate cour t must be able to identify

‘the fr uits’ that the trial cour

t held would not be suppresse d.” 1 1 

## But the Court of A

ppeals c ited only

one step of the two-step inquiry formulated by Gonzales . The two-ste p inquiry stems from a long

line of ca ses dea ling ve ry specific ally

with a defe ndant’s rig ht to appeal a fter ple ading g uilty or nolo contendere . Until the L eg islature amende d Article 44.02 of the Code of Criminal Proce dure in 1977, the g ener al rule w as that defe ndants who pled g uilty or nolo contendere could not appea l pretrial r ulings. The 1977

1 2 

## amendments a llowed such a ppeals, e ncoura g ing g uilty pleas whe re the only

contested issues

wer e matter s that could be ra ised befor e trial. 1 3

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v o l u n t a r i l y a n d u n d e r s t a n d i n g l y m a d e , a l l n o n j u r i s d i c t i o n a l d e f

e c t s i n c l u d i n g c l a i m e d d e p r i v a t i o n o f f e d e r a l d u e p r o c e s s a r e w a i v e d

. ” )

.

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. S t a t e , 5 7 1 S

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.C h u p i k

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## The proble m leading to the two-step inquiry in Gonzales was that Ar

ticle 1.15 of the Code of Criminal Procedur e re quired the State to introduce some evidenc e into the re cord to support a def

endant’ s g uilty

plea in a f

elony case . Shortly

afte r the a mendment to Article 44.02, we he ld in Ferguson that when a defe ndant judicially

confe ssed as pa

rt of his g uilty

plea in a felony case and the e vidence contested in the pr etrial he aring was not introduce d by the State to meet its burden unde r Article 1.15, nothing wa s prese nted for r eview. We then overr uled 1 4 

## Ferguson in Morgan v. State , holding that the de fenda nt’s judicial confe ssion was a fr uit of the 1 5 

## contested se arc h or seizure, a nd such a c onfession should not bar a n appellate court fr om

rea ching the merits despite the f act that the c ontested evide nce w as not introduced. 1 6 

## Parallel to Ferguson and Morgan , a line of c ases including Isam v. State , McG lynn v. 1 7 

## State , and Kraft v. State develope d in the misdemeanor c ontext

. These c ases c ulminated in 1 8 1 9 2 0 

## the holding in Kraft that an appe llate cour t may revie w a pr etrial ruling

on the admissibilit y

of evidenc e whe re the appellate court knows the c ontent of the e vidence and the e vidence “is of

5 7 1 S

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. F e r g u s o n b a s e d i t s h o l d i n g o n a g e n e r a l r u l e a p p l i e d i n S t i g g e r s v
. S t a t e , 5 0 6 1 4 S

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. 2 d 6 0 9 ( T e x . C r . A p p . 1 9 7 4 ) , t h a t “ [ w ] h e r e n o e v i d e n c e o b t a i n e d a s a r e s u l t o f a s e a r c h i s i n t r o d u c e d i n e v i d e n c e , n o e r r o r w i t h r e s p e c t t o s u c h s e a r c h i s p r e s e n t e d f o r r e v i e w . ” I

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T h e m i s d e m e a n o r c a s e s d e v e l o p e d s e p a r a t e l y f r o m t h e f

e l o n y c a s e s b e c a u s e e v i d e n c e w a s n o t r e q u i r e d t o 2 0 b e i n t r o d u c e d t o s u p p o r t a m i s d e m e a n o r p l e a u n d e r A r t i c l e 1

. 1 5

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- 7



## such a na ture that it may

be said it has ‘somehow

been use d.’” Then in McKenna v . State we

2 1 

## applied Kraft ’s holding to f elony case s as well, citing Kraft ’s emphasis that “if the evidenc e appellant maintains should have been suppr essed is instrumental in obtaining a convic tion then the appe llate cour

t should review the me rits of the motion on appea l.” 2 2 

## Gonzales dealt with the spec ific question of whe ther the c ontested evide nce ha d to be
actua lly admitted into evidence at a pr etrial he aring in order f or an a ppellate c ourt to addre ss the merits of the a

ppeal. Ba sed on Kraft

and McKenna , Gonzales held that the evide nce ne ed not be 2 3


## actua lly admitted, and for

mulated a two- step inquiry for a ppellate c ourts to use when de ciding whether to addre ss the merits of a c laim reg arding the trial cour t’s denial of a

pretria l motion t o suppress evide nce pr ior to a g uilty plea: First, the a

ppellate c ourt must identify “the f ruits” that the trial c ourt held would not be suppresse d. Second, the a ppellate c ourt must determine that these fruits have “ somehow bee n used” by the State. I f it is not clear f rom the testimony

and exhibi ts what “the f

ruits” ar e, then the a

ppellate c ourt nee d not addre ss the merits of the c laim. L ikewise, if the f ruits have not “some how bee n used” by the State, then the appe llate cour

t need not addr ess the mer its of the claim. 2 4


## Her e, the Court of A

ppeals c oncluded that Gonzales “is an a pplication of the broa der principle that c ourts do not decide a bstract que stions of law or issue advisory opinions.” But

2 5 

## when we trac e the line of case s leadingto Gonzales , we se e the f undamental c oncer

n was not to require that the excluded evidenc e be ide ntified, but rather to ensure tha

t a conviction sec ured

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## afte r a g uilty

plea wa s not overturne d when the e vidence was of little importance in obtaining the conviction. The identification of the fruits that wer e rule d admissible has neve r bee n a sepa rate 2 6 

## and indepe ndent re quirement for appellate jurisdiction, but rather a nece ssary

proce dural step to enable the substantive ana ly sis that was perf ormed in the sec ond step. I n other wor ds, an appellate court c ould not analy ze whether

the evidenc e wa s material unless it was c lear from the

rec ord wha t evidence it should analy ze. To now insist t hat appe llate cour ts perfor m the first step of the Gonzales test independe ntly in the Article 44.01( a)( 5) conte x t is particularly troubling wher e our c ases a

nd persua sive fede ral a

uthority ag ree that the substantive sec ond step of the Gonzales test, analy sis of materiality , is inappropriate under the statute. I I I . Holding We theref ore hold that the r ecor d need not r efle ct the suppre ssed evidenc e in orde r for an appellate court to consider a State’s inter locutory

appea l under Ar

ticle 44.01(a )(5) . I t is sufficient that the prosec uting a ttorney cer tifies that the suppresse d evidenc e is of substantial importance in the ca se. We reve rse the judg ment of the Third Court of A ppeals a nd rema nd to that court for consideration of the merits of the State’ s appea l.

Deliver ed June 15, 2011. Publis h.

S e e M c G l

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. 2 d , a t 2 1 ( “ [ U ] n l e s s a n d u n t i l w e a r e c o n f i d e n t a b o u t w h a t f

r u i t s o f a s e a r c h h a v e 2 6
s o m e h o w b e e n u s e d , t h e C o u r t n e e d n o t d e c i d e w h e t h e r t h e s e a r c h w a s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y p e r m i s s i b l e . ” ) ; K r a f t , 7 6 2 S

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. . . w o u l d i n a n y m e a s u r e i n c u l p a t e t h e a c c u s e d , t h a t e v i d e n c e h a s b e e n ‘ u s e d ’ a g a i n s t h i m i n s e c u r i n g h i s m i s d e m e a n o r c o n v i c t i o n , a n d h e n c e , t h e a p p e l l a t e c o u r t s h o u l d e n t e r t a i n t h e m e r i t s o f h i s a p p e a l

. ” ) ; M c K e n n a , 7 8 0 S

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. 2 d , a t 7 9 9 ( “ T h e e m p h a s i s i n K r a f t i s t h a t i f t h e e v i d e n c e a p p e l l a n t m a i n t a i n s s h o u l d h a v e b e e n s u p p r e s s e d i s i n s t r u m e n t a l i n o b t a i n i n g a c o n v i c t i o n t h e n t h e a p p e l l a t e c o u r t s h o u l d r e v i e w t h e m e r i t s o f t h e m o t i o n o n a p p e a l

. ” )

.