NASA Technical Memorandum 102259

Personality Factors in Flight

Operations: Volume I. Leader

Characteristics and Crew

Performance in a Full-Mission

Air Transport Simulation

Thomas R. Chidester and Barbara G. Kanki

Ames Research Center, Moffett Field, California

H. Clayton Foushee

Federal Aviation Administration, Washington, D.C.

Cortlandt L. Dickinson

Menlo Park, California

Stephen V. Bowles

California Professional School for Psychology, Berkeley, California

April 1990

NationalAeronautics anti

Space Administration

Ames Research Center

Moffett Field, California 94035-1000

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................................

2

5

METHOD .......................................................................................................................................... 5

2.1 Study Desig_ Overview .................................................................

5

2.2 Subjectsand Recruitment................................................................

6

2.2.1 Prete,,;ting......................................................................

2.2.2 ProfileClassification.............................................................6

7

2.3 Confidentiality.........................................................................7

2.4 Expcrimentai_Equipment ................................................................7

2.5 Personnel.............................................................................

8

2.6 Experimental Procedure ................................................................

8

2.7 Simulation Scenarios .................................................................................................

9

2.7.1 Day One Scenarios ........................................................................................ 10

2.7.2 Day Two Scenarios ....................................................................................... 11

2.8 Measurement .............................................................................................................

2.8.1 Flight Experience and Personality Data ........................................................ 12

2.8.2 Subjective Workload ..................................................................................... 12

12

2.8.3 Crew Performance .........................................................................................

2.8.3.1 Observer Ratings ........................................................................... 12

13 2.8.3.2 Crew Errors ...................................................................................

14 2.8.3.3 Aircraft Handling ..........................................................................

14

RESULTS ........................................................................................................................................... 14

3.1 Pretest Data ............................................................................................................... 14

3.1.1 Flight Experience ..........................................................................................

3.1.2 Personality Data ............................................................................................ 14

16

3.2 Subjective Workload ................................................................................................. 17 . ........ .....

3.3 Observer R_fings ......................................................................................... 19

3.4 Error Analyses ...................................................................................................... 20

3.5 Aircraft Handling ......................................................................................................

20

DISCUSSION ................................................................................................................................... 22

4.1 Crew Familiarity .......................................................................................................

4.2 Implicatiom; for Designing Operationally-valid Research ........................................ 24

REFERENCES ..................................................................................................................................

25

111

PRECEDING PAGE BLANK NOT FILMED
APPENDICES

A

B

C

D

E

F

Definitions of Personality Scales ..............................................................................

Flight Experience Items ............................................................................................

Personality Battery ....................................................................................................

Task Load Index Items and Definitions ....................................................................

Items Comprising the Observer's Rating of Crew Performance ...............................

Observer Ratings of Phase Performance ...................................................................

28

29

30

39

40

41

iv
SUMMARY

Crew effectiveness is a joint product of the piloting skills, attitudes, and personality characteristics of team members. As obuious as this point might seem, both traditional approaches to optimizing

crew performance and more recent training development highlighting crew coordination have emphasized only the skill and attitudinal dimensions. This volume is the fu'st in a series of papers on this simulation. A subsequent volume will focus on patterns of communication within crews. This paper reports

the results of a full-mission simulation research study assessing the impact of individual personality on

crew performance. Using a selection algorithm described in previous research, captains were classified

as fitting one of three prof'des along a battery of personality assessment scales. The performances of 23

crews led by captains fitting each profile were contrasted over a one-and-one-half-day simulated trip.

Crews led by captains fitting a positive Instrumental-Expressive profile (high achievement motivation

and interpersonal skill) were consistently effective and made fewer errors. Crews led by captains fitting

a Negative Expressive profile (below average achievement motivation, negative expressive style, such as

complaining) were consistently less effective and made more errors. Crews led by captains fitting a

Negative Instrumental prof'de (high levels of competitiveness, verbal aggressiveness, and impatience and

irritability) were less effective on the first day but equal to the best on the second day. These results

underscore the importance of stable personality variables as predictors of team coordination and

performance.
INTRODUCTION

Theeffectivenessof anaircrewis ajoint productof thetechnicalskills, attitudes,andpersonality

characteristicsof its individual members(Sells,1955)andtheprocessby whichtheyplan,execute,and

solveproblems.As obviousasthismight seem,traditionalapproachesto theoptimizationof crewperformancein air transportoperationshaveemphasizedtheskills dimensionsalmostexclusively.As pilots

areselected,trained,andevaluated,theprimaryemphasisisonensuringthateachhasthetechnical

skills necessaryto performhisor herrole in thecockpit.Morerecently,manytrainingprogramshave

beenexpandedto includetheinfluenceof interpersonalcharacteristicsassociatedwith crewcoordination, in theform of CockpitResourceManagement(CRM) programs(seeOrladyandFoushee,1987).

While it is certainlyencouragingthateffortsarenow underwayto improveboth technical and interpersonal skills, the impact of other factors, particularly stable personality characteristics, may provide an

additional contribution to the crew performance process.

The search for personality predictors of performance in aviation operations has been plagued by

an historic failure to validate links between those dimensions and performance criteria (Melton, 1947,

1957; Ellis and Conrad, 1948; R. S. Melton, 1954). The reasons for these failures are complex, and

include the strategies of performance evaluation or assessment employed and problems with conceptualizations of the role of personality. For example, the vast majority of personality research in aviation settings has examined performance during initial pilot training and has employed criteria such as completing training or obtaining a pilot rating (Dolgin and Gibb, 1988). These types of criteria probably do not

capture the range of performance occurring in day-to-day flight. A focus on training-completion misses

the complex setting in which crews perform.

Judging the operational significance of personality solely on the basis of training-completion

research implicitly assumes that the relationship between personality and performance remains constant

from training through initial experience to routine performance. Helmreich, Sawin, and Carsrud (1986)

have presented evidence that performance during and shortly after training is much less sensitive to personality effects than performance after the effects of training have begun to subside. As a result, it is

necessary to assess the relationship at the level of routine performance, or in critical situations, to answer

questions of operational relevance. Unfortunately, criteria available from routine flight settings in the

form of regular performance checks typically consist of pass-fail evaluations, with failures being

extremely rare, and tend to focus on very standard tasks like control-manipulation smoothness or completion of specific maneuvers. Using flight checks as criteria would mask a broader range of performance variability and minimize the power of any predictor of performance (Hackman and Helmreich,

1987).

In any event, the research conducted to date has not fully explored the range of valid research

questions beating on the link between personality and performance. This range includes the following

issues: First, one can ask whether those attracted to aviation or space settings differ on average from the

general population. Second, among those sufficiently attracted to present themselves as candidates, does

personality predict successful completion of training? Third, do crewmembers who are more successful

or proficient in their duties over the course of a career differ in personality from those who are less successful? Fourth, does personality predict individual performance or do particular combinations of crew

personalities predict crew performance in critical flight situations? Fifth, how does personality interact
with training,taskdesign,cr othervariablesin thepredictionof performance?Thoughsomeresearch

hassuggestedpilot populationdifferencesin personalitycharacteristics(e.g.,Fry andReinhardt,1969),

only thetraining-completioaquestionhasbeenadequatelyexplored.Thepresentstudyfocuseson the

impactof personalityin critical flight situations.

Our strategyfor evaluatingthepotentialimpactof personalitycharacteristicsoncreweffectivenesswas(1) to definecritical elementsof performance,(2) to identify dimensionsof personalitytheoretically linkedto theseelements,(3) to identify aselectionalgorithmto classifyor differentiateindividual

subjectsalongthesedimen,;ions,and(4) to conductahigh-fidelity validationstudyto determinewhether

thesetheoreticalrelationshipstranslateintopracticalperformanceconsequences.As a startingpointfor

research,wechoseto focuson theimpactof crewleadersandthecharacteristicsthat contributeto leadership.Eventhoughourunderstandingof groupphenomenais notwhatit shouldbe,therearea number

of possibleelementsof asuccessfulcrewthathavebeensuggestedby previousresearch.First,high

levelsof individual technicalskill, proficiency,andthemotivationto work hardarethefoundationupon

whicheffectivecrewcoordinationis built. Second,pastresearch(e.g.,Kanki, Lozito, andFoushee,

1988)hasdemonstratedthefteffectivecrewsarecharacterizedby communicationspatternsthattendto

bebothpredictableandresponsivelylinked.In addition,we wouldsuggesthateffectiveleadershipis a

joint functionof: 1)maintainingeffectivetaskdelegationanddefinition,2) encouragingcross-checking

andfeedback,and3)creatinganatmospherewheresubordinatesfeelfreeto offer suggestionsand

counter-proposalsto leadel-prescribedcoursesof action(e.g.,Ginnett,1987).Ourtaskwasto seekpersonalitymeasuresthatcapturedtheseelements.

A greatdealof eml:hasishasbeenplaceduponthefirst element,individual technicalskills and

themotivationto achieve.]::orresearchpurposes,wechoseto focusondimensionsunderlyingthemotivationalcomponentof individual performance,one'soveralllevelof "instrumentality," whichwedefine

operationallyasaperson'slevelof goalorientationandindependence.We alsochoseto emphasize

"achievementstriving" asanadditionalmeasureof anindividual's dispositionalorientationtowardtask

performancesituations.A .';econd dimension, oriented toward communication and interpersonal

exchange, is commonly defined as "expressivity," or interpersonal warmth and sensitivity. Communication would be expected to be facilitated in groups led by or composed of individuals characterized by

high levels of expressivity and inhibited in groups composed of individuals characterized by both negative expressive (e.g., frequent complaining) and negative instrumental traits such as verbal aggressiveness, competitiveness, or impatience and irritability. In summary, we theorized that effective leaders are

more often characterized by relatively high levels of both positive instrumentality and positive expressivity (high levels of both concern for people and concern for performance), and that this type of leadership style would facilitate crew performance. Lower levels of positive expressivity and higher levels of

negative expressive and negative instrumental traits were expected to lead to less effective crew communication, coordination, and performance overall. Definitions of each of these dimensions and the

instruments measuring each are displayed in appendix A.

These dimensions were chosen for several reasons. First, a number of personality theorists and

researchers have focused cn dimensions reflecting instrumentality and expressivity as one central set of

personality characteristics. Influential theorists (e.g., Spence and Helmreich, 1978; Fiedler, 1967) have

all in one way or another identified these characteristics as core components of human personality with

strong behavioral relationships. Moreover, many popular management theories have espoused concern

for people balanced with concern for performance as the key to leader success. Blake and Mouton's
(1978)"managerialgrid" is perhapsthemostwidely appliedexampleof thesenotions,andit hasbeen

incorporatedinto manytrainingprograms,includinga numberin aviation.Second,thesedimensions

capturetheoreticallyrelevanttraitscorrespondingto coreelementsof performancein aviation.Third, a

greatdealof real-worldperformancedatahasbeencollectedfor theinstrumentsassessingthesedimensions(SpenceandHelmreich,1983;Helmreich,Spence,andPred,1988).

Sofar,wehavesuggestedpossiblerelationshipsbetweendimensionsof personalityandelements

of crewperformance.But if onewishesto applypersonalityresearchoperationally,eitherby selecting

individualswithdesirablecharacteristicsor tailoring trainingto individualpersonalityprofiles,onemust

havesomemeansfor classifyingindividuals.Typically in research,oneconcentratesononeor two

dimensionsof personality.A frequentapproachis todetermine,throughmultipleregressiontechniques,

theuniqueportionof behavioralvariancecontributedby aparticulartrait.But in appliedsettings,a

researchermayneedto considerthedistributionof combinationsof manydifferenttraitswithin individual subjects,or in otherwords,to look at theconstellationof traitsthatexistin peopleworkingin the

appliedsetting.This isoftenmadenecessaryby thesmallnumbersof subjectsavailablefor study.Providing aresearchdesigncombiningpossiblelevels(evensimplemediansplits)of eachtrait understudy

quickly becomesimpractical.

Chidester(1987)andGregorichet al.(1989)haveemployedthetechniqueof clusteranalysis

within severalsamplesof pilots to determinethedistributionsof differing combinationsof positiveand

negativepersonalattributesalongthepersonalitydimensionsdescribedabove.Clusteranalysisis astatisticaltechniquewhichcombinessubjectsinto groupsor clustersbaseduponeachsubject'ssimilarityto

othersubjectsalongany specifiedsetof dimensions(Anderberg,1973).Thosesubjectsthatfell into

eachclusteraresimilar to oneanotheralongthedimensionsanalyzedanddifferentfrom individualsin

otherclusters.Thesubgroupsthatwereidentifiedthroughthisprocessreflectmeaningfulconstellations

of traitsastheyaredistributedacrossindividuals.Threedistinctclustershavebeenfoundacrosssamples

of pilots,onewith highlevelsof positivetraitsandtwo otherswith differentconstellationsof negative

traits.Pilotsin thepositiveclusterarecharacterizedby highlevelsof instrumentality,expressivity,

achievementstriving,work, andmasteryandaredesignatedthepositiveinstrumental-expressiveor

"IE+" cluster.Oneof thenegativeclustersis definedby highlevelsof negativeexpressivityandlow

levelsof instrumentalityandachievementstriving.This clusteris characterizedby traitsassociatedwith

tendenciesto expressoneselfin anegativefashion(e.g.,complaining)andlower thanaveragegoalorientation.It hasbeenlabeledthenegativeexpressiveor "EC-" cluster.The secondnegativeclusteris

characterizedby higherthanaveragelevelsof verbalaggressiveness, negativeinstrumentality,andcompetitiveness.Thisclustercomprisesamore"authoritarian"orientationandmaywell beassociatedwith

elementsof aprofile popularlyknownas"the fight stuff." It hasbeenlabeledthenegativeinstrumental

or "I-" cluster.Chidester(1987)foundsomeevidencethattheseclustersmayberelatedto determinants

of crewperformance.Pilotsrespondeddifferentially to trainingin crewcoordinationasafunctionof

theseprofiles.IE+ pilots benefittedthemostfrom trainingasassessedbychangesin attitudesconcerning cockpitmanagement.

Havingspecifiedasetof elementscritical to crewperformance,a setof personalitycharacteristicslinkedto theseelements,andameansfor classifyingindividualsalongmultipledimensions,ourtask

wasto assesswhetherthesecharacteristicswereoperationallyrelevant.Thatis, dothesetheoreticalrelationshipstranslateinto real-worldperformancedifferences?Weput thesecharacteristicsto thetestin a

full-missionsimulationresearchexperiment.

4
METHOD

2.1 Study Design Overview

The current study wa,; designed to (1) evaluate whether the personality characteristics of aircraft

commanders significantly impact the crew performance process and (2) evaluate the experimental classification algorithm as a possible countermeasure for the prevention of crew coordination problems. A

two-day full-mission simulation study was designed, in which crews flew five flight segments under

varying conditions of workload and in which crews were chosen according to personality criteria. Three

different types of crews were composed. The crew types contrasted were based upon cluster membership

as described by Chidester (1987). Crew types represent selection for leadership; that is, only the captain's personality characteristics were considered when crews were chosen. The first crew type was

composed of a randomly assi gned first officer and flight engineer flying with a captain from the IE+

cluster. We hypothesized that these captains would be good leaders and their leadership would translate

into effective crew performaace. The second type was composed of a randomly assigned first officer and

flight engineer flying with a captain from the I- cluster. The third type was composed of a randomly

assigned first officer and flight engineer flying with a captain from the EC- cluster. We hypothesized

that these two negative leader crews would be less effective at crew coordination in the high workload

flight segments. These hypolheses were tested using data collected from four sources: self-reports,

expert observation, video-based coding of errors, and aircraft handling parameters.

2.2 Subjects and Recruitment

Twenty-three, three-person crews (69 pilots) completed a one and one-half day full-mission

simulation of airline operations in the Ames Man-Vehicle Systems Research Facility (MVSRF) Boeing 727 simulator. All crews were employed by the same major U.S. air carder, all crewmembers were

currently operating the B-727 exclusively in passenger operations, and all crewmembers were at the time

qualified in the B-727 crew position (captain, first officer, second officer, or flight engineer) they occupied in the simulation.

All crewmembers had completed an initial course in crew coordination or CRM and all had participated in at least one line-oriented flight training (LOFT) session during recurrent training. LOFT

(Lauber and Foushee, 1981) is a form of training in which a crew completes a full-mission simulation

very similar to that in this research project. Unlike traditional simulator training, the focus is not on the

completion of a specified set of maneuvers or procedures, but on training the crew to deal with problems

in the manner required in thz line environment; as a team working and exchanging information with

each other, with air traffic c,:mtrol, and with company dispatch and maintenance services.

Subjects were recruited through an announcement letter delivered to their company mailboxes at

their local domicile. This lel:ter described the study as a major simulation examining the factors influencing crew coordination in routine line operations and described the degree of participation requested.

Subjects were asked to notify a local union council member if they did not wish to be contacted by

NASA investigators by tele phone. Twelve of the 394 pilots and flight engineers in the domicile declined

to participate at this point. Telephone numbers for the remaining 382 pilots were released to the research
teamby thecompanythroughthelocal unionexecutivecommittee.Onememberof theresearchteam

thenattemptedto contactall of thesepilots by telephoneandmailedacopyof thepretestto thosepilots

contactedandwilling to participate.A totalof 161questionnairesweremailed; 121pilots returned

usablepretests.Of thatnumber,69subjects(18%of thosein thedomicile)weresubsequentlyscheduled

for thesimulation.While thismayappearto bea low percentageof participation,thedegreeof participationrequired(travelingto theresearchcenterontwo consecutivedaysoff duty),thegeographicdispersionof pilots assignedto thedomicile (manypilotscommutegreatdistancesto begineachduty

cycle),andthelimited amountof availablesimulatortimemadeahighercomplete-participationrate

unlikely. Wewereableto fill virtually all of thesimulatortimeslotsavailableto usdespitethreelastminutecancellationsoverthecourseof thestudy.Giventheseconstraints,therateofretumof pretest

questionnaires(31%of thedomicile)is amoreaccuratereflectionof willingnessof subjectsto

participate.

2.2.1 Pretesting- Priorto schedulingfor thesimulation,candidatesubjectpilots completeda

batteryof personalityinstrumentscomposedof theExpandedPersonalAttributesQuestionnaire(EPAQ;

Spence,Helmreich,andHolahan,1979),theWork andFamilyOrientationQuestionnaire(WOFO;

SpenceandHelmreich,1978),andtheAchievementStrivingandImpatience/Irritabilityscales(A/S, IA;

Pred,Spence,andHelmreich,1986)derivedfrom theJenkinsActivity Survey(JAS)measureof the

TypeA BehaviorPattern(Jenkins,Zyzanski,andRosenman,1971)alongwith anumberof itemsfocusing onflight experience.Scoringof theseinstrumentsbytheirpublishedinstructionsresultsin 10scalescores:instrumentality,expressivity,negativeinstrumentality,verbalaggressiveness, negativecommunion,work, mastery,competitiveness,achievementstriving,andimpatience/irritability(seeappendixA).

2.2.2 Profile Classification- Thepersonalitybatterywasscoredsothatclusterprofile couldbe

determinedfor eachsubject.A scoringroutinedevelopedby Chidester(1987)wasutilizedin lieu of

conductinga newclusteranalysisin this smallsample.This routinecomparesasubject'sscoreoneach

dimensionto norms(samplemedian)basedonasampleof over400airline pilots (Chidester,1990).

Eachsubjectis thenconsideredfor inclusionintoaclusterbaseduponhis/herrelativestanding(aboveor

belowthemedian)oneachdimensionascomparedto thepatternof medianscoresfoundfor thatcluster

in Chidester'ssample.Individualswereassignedto (1) theIE+ clusterif theyscoredabovethemedian

onthreeof thefollowing dimensions:instrumentality,expressivity,mastery,andwork, (2) theI-cluster

if theyscoredabovethemedianonnegativeinstrumentalityandverbalaggressivenessandbelowthe

medianonexpressivity,or (3) theEC- clusterif theyscoredabovethemedianon NegativeCommunion

andbelowthemedianon threeof thefollowing dimensions:instrumentality,achievementstriving,

mastery,work, andimpatience/irritability.If anindividualmetnoneof thesecriteria,he/shewaslisted

asunclassifiable.Unclassifiablecaptainswerenotpursuedfurtherfor recruitment,butunclassifiable

first andsecondofficerswererecruitedsincetheirassignmentto crewswasintendedto berandom.

Thecarefulreaderwill recognizea numberof alternativewaysof assigningnewindividualsto

previously-definedclusters.For example,thescoresof eachindividualmaybecomparedto clustercentroids (seeNorusis,1988)andincludedin theclusterto whichtheindividualis closest.Chidester's

(1987)scoringroutinewaschosento emphasizedistinctionbetweenclusters.Sincewewouldcontrasta

small sample,largepersonalitydifferencesbetweenclustersweredesirableandborderline-caseleaders

(theunclassifiable)werenotrecruited.Mostalternativeclassificationschemeswouldresultin lessdistinct clusters.
2.3 Confidentiality

Because of the sensitivity of pilot performance data in general and the focus upon operational

significance in this investigation, it was necessary to guarantee all participating pilots complete confidentiality. All data are identified by a five-digit code number. Thus, it is not possible for anyone, including the NASA investigators, to identify any participating pilot by name. The code number merely provides a link between each subject's pretest data and his or her participation in the simulator.

2.4 Experimental Equipment

A Boeing 727-200 simulator operated by the MVSRF at Ames Research Center was utilized.

This simulator has a six de_;ree-of-freedom motion platform and four-window visual system. It was

manufactured by Singer-Link Corporation, and is equipped with special effects and programmed with

the aircraft performance data required to meet Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Phase II certification. The MVSRF was constructed specifically for research purposes and is configured for detailed

data collection. Simulator computers record aircraft configuration and handling information, and multicamera videotape and multichannel audiotape recording systems are installed for capturing crew communication and action. A remotely-located Air Traffic Control (ATC) facility with flight-progress monitoring displays and voice-disguising equipment provides for highly realistic ATC support. The facility

also supports equipment to provide Automated Terminal Information System (ATIS) information to the

crew over VHF radio and background recordings of ATC communication provided by the FAA with aircraft operating in airspace controlled by Air Route Traffic Control Centers (ARTCC). Both of these

capabilities greatly enhanc_;d the realism of flights conducted in the simulator. We gratefully acknowledge the assistance of the FAA in obtaining recordings of Oakland and Los Angeles ARTCC

communications.

2.5 Personnel

Simulator operatiors were accomplished with a basic staff of six people. An expert observer

(described in section 2.8.3.1) rode in the simulator cab along with the subject crew. A simulator operator

and the experimenter occupied an Experimenter Operations Station (EOS) located remotely from the

simulator cab. The EOS rogm included a data-entry terminal through which all simulator functions were

initiated, modified, and terminated. (Aircraft setup and events were pre-programmed and the operator

needed only to initiate the program and make any changes necessitated by crew decisions, such as

adding fuel). Video and au:lio monitors and recording equipment were also located in the EOS, allowing

the experimenter and operztor to monitor crew communications and to detect simulator problems. The

experimenter started and stopped audio-video recording, communicated with the observer in event of

simulator problems, servec as ground-crewman and company dispatcher, and supervised the operation of

the simulator and support tacilities. The remote ATC facility housed an air traffic controller, a pseudopilot, and an ATC facility manager. The controller was a retired FAA-certified traffic controller who

provided all clearances and ATC services to the subject crew. The pseudopilot initiated calls to ATC

over the radio frequency ir use by the subject crew. These calls were scripted to simulate "traffic" as it

would normally occur in the operating environment. The pseudopilot also operated "target aircraft"

which were visible to the crew though the four-window visual system. A number of aircraft operating

7
alongapproachpathsandairwaysalongtherouteof flight weresimulatedin anattemptto increaserealism.An ATC facility managerworkedwith thecontrollerandpseudopilot,operatingtheATC facility

computersandmonitoringthecourseof thesimulation.TheATC manager also served as the interface to

facility maintenance and support personnel.

2.6 Experimental Procedure

Crews were met upon arrival at the simulator facility on the first day by the experimenter. In an

initial briefing, the importance of operational realism was emphasized and pilots were urged to treat the

simulation just as if it were an actual two-day trip. Crews were informed that they would have access to

all resources that they would normally have in flight, including complete ATC services, dispatch, access

to maintenance, ATIS, and so on. Crewmembers then received a detailed briefing on the differences

between the simulator's configuration and that of their company's aircraft. This briefing was conducted

by the expert observer. Following the briefing, crews were given a schedule of operations, weather information and flight plans for two familiarization flight segments, and an opportunity to hold an initial crew

briefing. Crews were then escorted to the simulator cab, where they completed a round trip between

San Francisco and Stockton, California. After completing the familiarization segments, crewmembers

had lunch, then returned to initiate the experimental flights.

2.7 Simulation Scenarios

Past full-mission simulation research (Ruffell-Smith, 1979; Lauber and Foushee, 1981; Foushee

et al. (1986) has shown that successful simulation scenarios have at least five essential elements. First,

they are designed to be completely representative of the actual operational environment, and all details

are faithfully represented. Second, they are complicated enough to require the coordinated action of all

crewmembers for successful completion, but not to the extent that they induce complete crew failure

such as a "crash." Third, problems presented to crews have ongoing consequences which must be dealt

with in flight, but cannot be fixed in flight. Fourth, the problems involved axe very ambiguous, and there

is usually no simple corrective "by the book" solution. And fifth, the original problem is usually compounded by other events such as weather-induced complications (e.g., landing on a rain-slick runway

with partial brake failure). It is also interesting to note that these characteristics have been seen in past

incidents and accidents.

In the process of scenario design, outlines of potential events were developed by the principal

investigators using accident case studies and incident reports. These were reviewed by investigators with

checking and training experience in the particular aircraft type being simulated and by simulator operational personnel from the MVSRF. Typical environmental conditions for the proposed area of flight

(November-February weather patterns for coastal and central California) were considered in great detail,

so that weather patterns and scenario events would seem realistic to the experimental flight crews. Aircraft documentation and airline dispatch procedures were assembled for each flight segment in cooperation with airline management and members of the local pilot labor union executive committee. Following this development process, selected scenario outlines were programmed into the simulator computer

and eight pretest runs were conducted using qualified flight crews to refine procedures, train facility personnel and the experiment staff, and test scenario events. These pretest crews were carefully debriefed to

8
assesstherealismof thesceaariosandproceduresusedby theexperimentstaff.This feedbackallowed

continualrefinementuntil tl',escenarioswerefinalized.

Crewsflew five experimentalflight segments(legs).Eachsegmentwasplannedandflown as

closelyaspossibleto realoperations.Crewswereprovidedwith all of theirnormalflight documentation, completedall normalflight andcockpitpreparations,andcommunicatedwith all groundsupport

personnelnormallyavailableto them.Flight routingscorrespondedto typical clearancesalongroutesin

centralandsouthernCaliforniaandwereadaptedfrom flight planscreatedfor anearlierNASA investigation.Airfields availableto thecrewincludedSanFrancisco(SFO),Stockton(SCK),Sacramento

(SMF),andLosAngeles(La,X). Segments1 through 3 were flown on the first day, segments 4 and 5

occurred on the second day. Routine levels of workload were designed into segments 1, 2, and 4, but

segments 3 and 5 were far more demanding than normal and involved continuing abnormal conditions

that could not be resolved completely in flight. Crews were led to believe, however, that they would fly

six legs. The last leg (SMF-SFO) was not intended to occur, except as a part of preflight planning,

because of scenario events. This deception was intended to counteract suspicions that might be associated with the last segment of the study, particularly since the last segment of day one involved an

abnormality.

2.7.1 Day One Scenarios- On the first day, all legs except the third were relatively routine.

However, one irregular item was included in the dispatch paperwork for the full-mission segments. The

deferred item list and accompanying minimum equipment list (MEL), indicated that the plane was to be

dispatched with the no. 3 generator inoperative. This was a legal procedure, but given the weather conditions (night, fog, and low cloud ceilings), prudent crews should have considered delaying departure

until either the weather improved or the generator was repaired. If the crew elected to request the repair,

the generator was "repaired," but the dispatcher warned the crew that they might expect it to malfunction

again requiring it to be reset. If the crew did not request repair, the generator was "repaired" later when

the crew reached the maintenance base at SFO. In either case, each time the no. 3 engine was started following the "repair," the generator field light illuminated, and at least one field reset was required to

bring the generator on line. This manipulation was intended to complicate the decision-making process

on a later high workload se;,_ment.

On segment 3, crews flew from Sacramento to Los Angeles. Following a normal takeoff and

climb, a combination of system failures were activated automatically. First, the vertical stabilizer trim

system began running uncommanded and jammed in a nose-down condition at a predetermined point.

Second, and shortly thereafter, when the aircraft crossed a specified navigational point, the no. 2 engine

low-oil-pressure warning light illuminated and the indicated pressure fell to the cautionary range. This

combination represented a relatively high-workload situation, but was compounded by neither weather,

traffic, nor ATC problems. No diversion from the flight plan was necessary, except for actions required

to stabilize the aircraft and land safely. Segment 3 is displayed graphically in figure 1.

The scenario prese_ ted the crew with two independent failures which could have impacted flight

safety. The jammed stabilizer trim system was a serious control problem, disabling the autopilot, and

requiring (due to the descent configuration) constant nose-up control inputs and considerable back pressure from the flying pilot. "]_is made the approach and landing much more difficult and was physically

fatiguing (given the need to hold constant, firm back pressure). The procedure for dealing with the

9
Takeoff:

Smog forecast for

LA. Basin

SFO

SJC

Descent and approach:

Stabilizer runs sway and

JamsIn position

Oil filter bypass light

Illuminates 5 min. later

Completion of checklists

Very high workload

SMF RNO

Climb:

Steep crossing

restriction

l Low celllnga and fog

I Cruise: /

=1 Uneventful 1

I / Landing:

I / High speed, reduced

J control landing

_J_ Physical and procedural

_ coordination required

Figure 1.- Scenario for segment 3.

jammed stabilizer trim, once it was identified, was to limit flap setting to 15° for landing, increase

approach speed by 15 knots, and to establish the landing configuration as early as possible so as to get a

feel for the control forces necessary for landing. This procedure is difficult but not unreasonable since it

is required for all type ratings in the B-727 aircraft. The low oil pressure light and corresponding cautionary gauge reading were also covered by a checklist procedure, but the outcome of the checklist left

the crew a choice. At the captain's discretion, the crew could either shut the engine down or reduce

thrust on the engine to idle. Shutting the engine down required the completion of more checklists

(greatly increasing workload and time requirements), may have required the dumping of fuel (again

increasing workload), and removed one generator from operation. Recall that the crew had already

encountered minor problems with the no. 3 generator, so the aircraft could have easily been down to one

should conditions have deteriorated further. The most prudent course would appear to be to keep the

engine operating as a reserve while continually monitoring its operating parameters. However, a pilot

could reasonably argue that the possibility of the engine failing catastrophically was sufficient to warrant

the workload consequences of shutting it down. Once this decision was made, the crew had to land the

aircraft in an abnormal configuration.

2.7.2 Day Two Scenarios-- On the second day, the weather continued to be characterized by

fog, overcast, and minimal visibilities in the central California valley. The In'st leg (SCK-LAX) went

without programmed incident except for fog in the Los Angeles area (ceiling 400 ft, visibility one mile).

By the time of the second leg (LAX-SMF), weather had deteriorated further in the central valley, resulting in poor visibility in the Sacramento area (ceiling 300 ft, visibility one-half mile; approaching the

legal minimums for ILS approaches). Weather in Los Angeles remained foggy but above legal minimums. Following a normal departure and climb out of the Los Angeles area and normal cruise, the crew

received clearance for the Wraps Four Arrival to Sacramento. As the crew entered the Sacramento terminal area, runway visual range (RVR) was reported by the approach controller as 2000 ft, just above

10
theCategory1approachmir imumsof 1800ft. Prudentcrewsshould,at thispoint, haveconsideredand

briefedfor a possibleCategcry2 approachandlanding.Theminimumsfor thisapproachwereRVR

1200with adecisionheightof 126ft. However,aftertheaircraftcrossedtheoutermarker,RVR was

reportedbythetoweraslessthanI000 ft, which wasbelowtheminimumfor theinitiation of an

approach.However,sincetheaircraftwasinsidethemarker,it waslegalto continueuntil thepublished

decisionheightandto landi:_thecaptainhadanadequateview of therunwayenvironment.If thecrew

attemptedthelanding,therunwaywasnotvisibleatthedecisionheight,requiringtheapproachto be

aborted.Duringthemissed_pproach,asthecrewretractedtheflaps,ahydraulicsystemA failure

occurred,causedby aleakthatdepletedall of thehydraulicfluid. At this point,it wasimmediately

apparenthata diversionto an alternate airport would be necessary. Weather conditions at various

nearby alternates were poor (all ceilings less than 800 ft and visibilities less than one mile). Reno

(RNO), San Francisco, Oakland, and San Jose (SJC) were the best alternates. Reno was unacceptable

because the prevailing wind direction made its shortest runway the active runway and the use of this

runway for B-727 operation:_ was prohibited by company policy. SFO had the best weather of the

remaining alternates, with clearing conditions, a 2000-ft ceiling, and 2 miles visibility with light rain.

SFO also provided a very loag runway at just under 12,000 ft. However, SJC was listed as the flight's

legal alternate, because SFO weather conditions were below alternate minimums at the time of dispatch.

Segment five is displayed graphically in figure 2.

This scenario confrot_ted the crew with a number of hazards and limitations. First, the hydraulic

failure disabled a number of aircraft systems. The landing gear had to be extended by hand crank, and

once extended could not be retracted. Flaps also had to be extended by alternate means, and this system

does not allow leading edge flaps to be retracted once extended. In addition, the trailing edge flaps were

not protected against asymmetric extension using the alternate system. Alternate extension required

more time than extension by normal means, and was limited to 15 ° in case of a missed approach (flap

retraction from the normal 20 ° setting by the alternate system following a missed approach would be too

slow to reduce drag sufficie atly to allow the aircraft to climb to obstacle clearance altitude). The

hydraulic failure also disabled nosewheel steering, ground spoilers, and outboard flight spoilers. All of

these limitations caused a combination of higher than normal approach speeds and reduced stopping

ability. Finally, the crew had to select an airport (SFO was suggested by the circumstances) and execute

an approach and landing under adverse circumstances. When the crew extended the flaps on approach to

SFO, they received an outboard trailing-edge flap asymmetry indication resulting from the lack of protection discussed above. This condition changed the handling characteristics of the aircraft and required

that crews discuss and estimate a landing speed, because none is given in the flight manuals for the

condition of split inboard/outboard flaps combined with a hydraulic system failure.

2.8 Measurement

A variety of workload and performance variables were measured. Measurement instruments and

procedures are described in this section.

11
Landing: Flap asymmetry problem /Jb_ RNO

High landing speed //_SMF_ Hlyo=raUlIC.Vailure _ Low ceilings and fog

No nose w_l stesr_/__axe _ Descont and

approach:

Fast, noisy

descent required

by ATC for

crossing traffic

Climb and cruise:

Light turbulence

Takeoff: Poorforecast

High takeoff weight

LAX

Figure 2.- Scenario for segment 5.

2.8.1 Flight Experience and Personality Data- Flight experience and personality data were

collected in the pretest described earlier. Crewmembers were asked to report their age, gender, total of

number of years they had been with their airline; total number of flight hours completed with their airline, in the military, in private aircraft, and any other setting; total flight hours in the B-727; and flight

hours in their present crew position (see appendix B). Personality characteristics were assessed using the

EPAQ, WOFO, and the A/S and I/I scales. These questions from these scales are listed in appendix C.

The scales are described in appendix A.

2.8.2 Subjective Workload-- Following each flight segment, all crewmembers completed the

NASA Task Load Index (TLX; Hart and Staveland, 1988). This rating form consists of 6 workloadrelated dimensions: mental demand, physical demand, temporal demand, performance, effort, and frustration. Subjects reported their responses along a seven-point Likert scales with high numbers indicating

greater amounts of the dimension in question. Hart and Staveland (1988) also advocate the completion

of a scale-weighting measure wherein subjects evaluate the importance of each dimension to their perception of workload in the performance setting. However, completion of the TLX by pretest crews used

in the scenario development process (24 subjects) indicated that a simple summed composite of the six

items correlated 0.92 with the weighted scale scores. As a result, the forced-choice procedure was eliminated and only the summed rating will be reported. Items forming the TLX are listed in appendix D.

2.8.3 Crew Performance-- Crew performance data were collected from three sources: expert

observation, video coding of crew errors, and computer recording of aircraft handling parameters.

2.8.3,1 Observer ratings: A recently-retired, highly experienced (39 yr in Part 121 operations,

30,750 total flight hours) airline captain served as an expert observer and was present in the simulator

cab with every flight crew. He was blind to the experimental condition, and evaluated crew performance

12
following everyflight segment,andindividualperformanceduringspecificphasesof thehigh-workload

segments.

The observer completed an overall rating form immediately after every segment. This form was

adapted directly from Helmreich and Wilhelm's (1987) Line/LOFT Checklist, which was, in turn,

derived from previous NASA simulation studies. The observer was instructed to complete the form

evaluating the crew as a unit. Ratings were made on five-point Likert scales and were intended to assess

the expert observer's overa_.l impression of performance on each dimension for each segment. These

ratings were summed and averaged to form a crew-level composite for each segment. Items forming this

scale are listed in appendix E, and will be referred to as observer ratings of crew performance.

The observer completed a second rating form for the high workload segments, three and five.

This form was adapted frora the Foushee et al. (1986) study and was organized by phase of flight and

abnormal events during segments three and five. Within each section of the form (e.g., preflight,

taxi/takeoff, climb, and cruise), the observer rated the performance of each individual crewmember.

Ratings were completed in real time as the flight progressed using a five-point Likert scale and were

summed and averaged to form a composite for each crewmember during each phase of flight. Items

forming this scale are listecl in appendix F, and will be referred to as observer ratings of individual phase

performance.

The ratings of crew and individual performance presented are limited to evaluations by a single

expert observer. The psych:_metfic ambiguities and potential biases resulting from use of a single

observer or rater are a problem for this study. However, as in previous NASA investigations, we have

elected to collect what mat be very important data in the only manner in which it could be collected,

rather than simply not collect it, and to bolster that data with information from other sources. For safety

reasons, only one observer can be in the MVSRF simulator cab at a time, so inter-rater reliability could

not be established for these ratings. We have chosen to err on the side of maximizing operational credibility over psychometric sc.phistication in these performance ratings, in a situation where maximizing

both was not possible. The observer is a highly experienced pilot in terms of both operational experience

and aircraft accident investigation, and as such, his evaluations would be considered highly relevant by

the aviation community. Much of the information required to make these ratings is available only in real

time and inside the simulator cab. The situational awareness of an experienced pilot sitting directly

behind the action of a flightcrew solving a problem simply cannot be matched or replaced by the evaluations using multichannel audio and multicamera video presentations. The use of multiple observers to

evaluate crews using these media would allow assessment of rater consistency, but at the expense of lost

information and reduced operational credibility. We have chosen to collect and analyze this operationally significant information, recognizing its psychometric limitations. At the same time, we have

attempted to compensate for these limitations by collecting data from other sources which reflect on the

same domain, crew effectiveness, but capture only smaller portions.

2.8.3.2 Crew errors: Error analyses were undertaken using two independent sources of data to

assure the reliability of performance assessment. First, during test runs, the expert observer kept a record

of all errors he observed. The second source of error data required a complete review of the videotape

records. Using these records, two condition-blind observers reviewed each flight for operational errors.

The first observer was a retired pilot, the second a NASA researcher. Both observers studied the B-727

training and flight operaticns manuals provided by the airline prior to initiating error identification.

13
Whenanerrorwasrecognizedby oneor bothobservers,thetapewasstoppedandthesegmentcontaining anallegederrorreviewed.Theerrorwascountedin theanalysisonly if bothobserversagreedthat

theerroroccurredandagreedonadescriptionof theerror.All errorsidentifiedby thevideotape

observerswerethenpresentedto theexpertobserver,whohadtheoptionof eliminatinganerroronthe

basisof hisnotestakenduringthesimulationsor hisoperationalexperience.This wasaconservative

errortabulationprocessandassuredthateveryerrordatapoint wasreviewedatleasttwice. Sincesome

performanceerrorsweremoreoperationallysignificantthanothers,errorswerecategorizedaccordingto

levelof severity.This processwasaccomplishedbytheexpertobserverandby bothof theobservers

involvedin thevideotapeerroranalysis.A three-levelclassificationwasutilized.Type 1errorswere

definedasminor,with a low probabilityof seriousflight safety consequences. Type 2 errors were

defined as moderately severe, with a stronger potential for flight safety consequences. Type 3 errors

were defined as major, operationally significant errors having a direct negative impact upon flight safety.

2.8.3.3 Aircraft handling: Data collected and stored by the simulator computer allowed the

assessment of aircraft handling. Deviations from prescribed paths during specific flight phases

(instrument approaches) were calculated for the high workload segments. Deviations from glide slope,

localizer, and target approach airspeed were collected by the simulator computer once per second from

the outer marker to the runway threshold on final approach during segments 3 and 5. The absolute value

of the deviations per second was summed for each dimension during each approach.

RESULTS

3.1 Pretest Data

Crewmembers who participated in the study are described by their years and hours of flight

experience and by their mean scores on personality scales in comparison to other samples of pilots.

3.1.1 Flight Experience-- Flight experience differed, predictably, by crew position. Captains

had been with their airline an average of 22.5 yr and had completed an average of 12,493 flight hours in

airline operations (not necessarily all with the same carrier), with 3,259 of those hours as Captain. Captains averaged 51 yr of age. First Officers had been with their airline an average of 13.8 yr and had

completed 4,011 airline flight hours, with 2,145 of those hours as First Officer. First Officers averaged

43 yr of age. Second Officers had been with their airline an average of 2 yr and had completed

2,680 airline hours, with 1,505 of those hours as Second Officer. It was not possible to determine with

certainty where the Second Officer's had completed airline hours other than as B-727 Second Officers,

because the background questionnaire did not request these details. However, because the B-727 was a

relatively junior (lower seniority) aircraft at the airline, these hours most likely consisted of Pilot-inCommand or Copilot hours completed with another airline, perhaps a commuter or regional airline. Second Officers averaged 33 yr of age.

3.1.2 Personality Data- Average scores on each of the personality characteristics assessed are

displayed in table 1. No differences among crew positions were found in the personality data. These

sample means can be compared with means among pilots sampled by Chidester (1990) and norms

reported by the authors of each instrument (male college students appear to be the closest comparison

14
groupreported).Comparisonsof thesemeanssuggeststhatthis samplefalls somewherebetweenthe

normsfor malecollegestudertsandnormsfor pilots reportedby Chidester(1990).

Table I. Sample means and norms for personality scales

I

Personality c h_tracteristics by

test administered

Sample Pilots a College males

Characteristics PAQ

Instrumentality

Expressivity

Negative instramentality

Verbal aggres:_iveness

Negative comnunion

40.47 43.87 38.92

22.55 24.24 22.08

11.89 10.30 13.69

5.26 4.14 5.55

5.74 5.84 6.36

Charzcteristics WOFO

Mastery 20.32 22.87 19.26

Work 20.48 22.00 19.80

. Competitiven_._ss 12.31 13.18 13.63

Char_cteristics JAS (derived scales)

Achievement striving 23.73 26.17 22.89

Impatience/ir_ itability 14.01 14.91 16.48

|

aBased on a sample of 469 pilots in domestic short-haul operations

(Chidester, 1990).

Table 2 displays the mean personality scale scores of captains classified into each cluster profile

for the purposes of this experiment. As would be expected given the use of an algorithm to assign pilots

on the basis of previously-de_Sned clusters, each cluster closely resembled its profile as defined by

Chidester (1987) and Gregorich et al. (1989). IE+ captains were distinguished by elevated scores on

instrumentality, expressivity, mastery, work, achievement striving, and unexpectedly, competitiveness.

In simple terms, IE+ captains can be described as being both instrumental and expressive relative to

other pilots. I- captains were distinguished by elevated scores on negative instrumentality, verbal

aggressiveness, impatience/irritability, and mastery. Perhaps most importantly, I- captains scored very

low on expressivity. I- capta: ns can be described as being instrumental, but not at all expressive. ECcaptains were distinguished by elevated scores on negative communion and expressivity and by very low

scores on instrumentality, mzstery, work, and achievement striving. EC- captains can be described as at

least moderately expressive, but not at all instrumental, relative to other pilots.

15
Table2. Personalityscalesmeansfor eachprofile amongcaptains

Personalitydimensionsby test

administered

IE+ I- ECCharacteristics PAQ

Instrumentality

Expressivity

Negativeinstrumentality

Verbalaggressiveness

Negativecommunion

43.09 40.30 36.11

24.18 19.20 23.72

10.18 14.10 11.50

4.40 6.40 5.28

4.00 6.00 6.50

Characteristics WOFO

Mastery 24.09 21.30 18.39

Work 22.18 19.60 18.89

Competitiveness 14.55 12.60 11.89

Characteristics JAS(derivedscales)

Achievementstriving 24.27 24.00 22.17

Impatience/irritability 13.09 15.40 14.39

3.2 Subjective Workload

Analysis of TLX workload ratings revealed flight segment as a significant main effect

(F (4,80) = 54.26, p < 0.01). Post hoc comparisons revealed that segments 3 and 5 were rated as significantly higher in workload than segments 1, 2, and 4. This served as a manipulation check, indicating that

the test segments required greater effort than the normal segments. Mean workload ratings for each segment are presented in table 3. While this analysis suggested no impact of captain personality on average

crew workload ratings, it has been argued that agreement or disagreement among crewmembers in workload assessment may be sensitive to differences in crew coordination (R. D. Blomberg, personal communication). However, disagreement contributes only to error variance in a repeated measures analysis.

An index of disagreement among crewmembers was calculated for each flight segment. Analysis of disagreement revealed a significant flight segment by captain personality interaction (F (8,80) = 2.27,

p < 0.05). Simple-effects tests suggested that crews led by IE+ captains disagreed more concerning

workload in both segments 3 and 5 than did crews led by I- or EC- captains. Follow up analyses using

analysis of covariance revealed that this was attributable to disagreement between IE+ captains and their

subordinate crewmembers. Specifically, IE+ captains rated segments 3 and 5 as less demanding than did

their subordinates, but their subordinates rated workload the same as subordinates or captains of I- or

EC- crews.

16
3.3 Observer Ratings

Analyses of the observer's ratings of crew performance during the full-mission segments

revealed a significant interaction between leader personality and flight segment (F (8,80) = 2.80,

p < 0.01). Means for each group of captains during each segment are presented in Table 4 and these

results are presented graphi,:ally in Figure 3. Examination of these means revealed that crews led by IE+

captains were rated as consistently effective, and these ratings were higher than the other crew types for

the segments overall (though not every comparison for every segment was statistically significant).

Crews led by EC- captains were rated as consistently less effective over all segments than those led by

IE+ captains (though not al_ comparisons were statistically significant). Crews led by I- captains

received ratings that varied considerably across segments. For segments one, two, and three, I- led

crews were similar to EC- crews; they were rated as less effective than IE+ crews. However, on segment

five, I- led crews were rateA as performing as well as IE+ led crews, and significantly more effectively

than EC- led crews.

Table 3. Average ratings of workload

Segment Task load index score

Segment 1 2.97

Segment 2 3.27

Segment 3 4.51 a

Segment 4 2.69

Segment 5 4.56 a

aMeans for segments 3 and 5 differ from

all others at the 0.05 level.

Table 4. Observer ratings of crew performance

Captain Personality profile

Segment IE+ I--a ECSegment 1 3.85 3.40 3.23

Segment 2 3.88 3.55 3.59

Segment 3 3.95 b 2.97 2.90

Segment 4 4.37 3.79 3.12

Segment 5 4.22 3.98 2.90 b

aThe following within-crew comparisons are significant among I- led crews: 5 vs. 1, 2, and 3; 3 vs. 4.

bIndicates significant between-crew differences

17
IE÷

4.5 F _ EcI

4.0

3.5

3.0

O

2.5

2.0

1 2 3 4 5

Flight Segment

Figure 3.- Observer ratings over five flight segments

Observer ratings of individual Phase Performance during the high workload segments were consistent with the crew-level ratings. That is, crews led by IE+ captains were rated as outperforming I- and

EC- led crews throughout segment three (F (2,20) = 3.69, p <. 0.05, post-hoe comparisons via Tukey's

Honestly Significant Difference (HSD)), and EC- crews were rated as performing more poorly than IE+

or I- led crews on segment five (F (2,20) = 4.27, p <. 0.05). There were mean differences in ratings

between phases, but no reliable differences among crew positions nor interactions between phase or

position and captain personality profile. Means for each phase are displayed for segment three in table 5

and for segment five in table 6.

Table 5. Observer ratings of phase performance--segment 3

Captain personality profile

Phase of flight IE+ I- ECPrestart 3.93 3.62 3.51

Taxi/takeoff 3.83 3.59 3.42

Climb 3.69 3.38 3.40

Cruise 3.69 3.24 3.04

Stabilizer 3.46 2.72 3.00

Oil pressure 3.63 2.99 2.51

Approach 4.15 3.55 3.27

Mean 3.76a 3.29

L i

aMean for IE+ differs from I- and EC- at the 0.05 level.

3.16

18
Table,5.Observerratingsof phaseperformance--segment5

Captainpersonalityprofile

Phaseof flight IE+ I- ECPrestart 4.42 3.79 3.40

Taxi/takeoff 4.30 3.64 3.41

Climb 4.39 3.94 3.41

Cruise 4.23 3.59 3.44

Missedappro_Lch 4.26 4.13 3.25

Hydraulicfail'are 4.14 3.91 3.24

CruisetoAltitude 3.96 3.89 3.12

Approach 3.63 3.99 3.06

Mean 4.16 3.86

I

aMean for EC- differs from IE+ and I- at the 0.05 level.

3.29 a

3.4 Error Analyses

A total of 998 error,; were identified by the video observers across the 23 crews. Of that number,

85 (8.5%) were eliminated by the expert observer as logical choices made by the crew in response to

available information. Of those errors that were eliminated, 60 (71%) were initially rated as type 1 errors

by the video observers; the remainder were initially rated as type 2 errors. None of the eliminated errors

was initially rated as a type 3.

A consensus severity classification was reached by the video and expert observers for the

remaining 913 errors. Tabh: 7 shows the relative frequency of each type of error. Examples of type 1

errors included: failure of the pilot not flying to make and announce a crosscheck dictated by company

policy, incorrect briefing of a missed approach procedure which was immediately corrected by the pilot

not flying, and failure to notice an "expect" provision on a standard arrival procedure. Examples of

type 2 errors included: delayed discovery of a system failure (hydraulic loss) following aural and visual

indications of the failure, flying at airspeeds above or below those required for the aircraft configuration,

and failure to use a proper ,:limb airspeed to make an ATC crossing restriction imposed due to intersecting traffic. Examples of type 3 errors included: airspeed deviations resulting in stick-shaker (stall) or

mach-overspeed warnings, identification and initiation of an incorrect checklist or failure to run a

required emergency checklist (jammed stabilizer) resulting in an improper landing configuration, and

failure to consider an alternate airport other than that filed (SJC) or to determine alternate weather following a weather-induced missed approach.

Table 7. Frequency of errors by severity classification

ii

Flight segment Type 1 Type 2 Type 3

I I

Segmer t 3 168 137 81

Segmer,t 5 242 161 124

19
Erroranalysesrevealedapatternof f'mdingssimilarto thatseenfor observerratings.A repeated

measuresanalysisincludingtype 1,2, and3 errorcountsfor eachday,with severitylevelenteredasa

designfactor,revealedthreemaineffects.First,EC- led crewstendedto makemoreerrorsthanIE+ or

I- ledcrews(F (2,20)= 4.03,p < 0.05;means= 23.2,17.7,and18.3perday,respectively).Second,asis

apparentin table7, crewstendedto makemoretype1(minor)thantype2 (moderate)errors,andmore

type2thantype3 (major)errors(F(2,40)= 22.60,p < 0.01;means=9, 6.6, and4.5perday,respectively). Third, crews tended to make more errors on day two than on day 1 (F (1,20)=20.64, p < 0.01;

means= 16.5 and 22.9, respectively). However, this difference between the two days appeared to be

entirely attributable to a difference in the length of segments three and five (F (1,20) = 151.75; p < 0.01;

means 66.5 and 100.1 minutes, respectively). An analysis of covariance, that controlled for this time difference eliminated the day effect, but left the captain personality (F = 4.05) and error severity (F = 22.6)

main effects intact. This indicates that the error rates were statistically equivalent on both days; given

equal flight times, equivalent numbers of errors would occur.

While error analyses were consistent with ratings by the expert observer in discriminating performance of EC- led crews from IE+ or I- led crews, they did not reveal a change in I- led crew performance over the course of the simulation. That is, the captain personality by flight segment interaction,

which was significant for expert observer ratings, was not significant for crew errors. One possible

explanation for this discrepancy is that in the process of systematically rating crew performance,

observers may (and probably should) take more than errors into account. This might be expected, since

the observer has access not only to errors, but also to the crew communications process which is significantly related to crew performance (Kanki, Lozito, and Foushee, 1989).

3.5 Aircraft Handling

Deviations from glide slope, localizer, and target approach airspeed were collected by the simulator computer once per second from the outer marker to the runway threshold on final approach during

segments 3 and 5. The absolute value of the deviation per second was summed for each dimension during each approach. These sums were submitted to a multivariate analysis of variance, which revealed a

main effect for flight segment (multivariate approximate F (4,17) = 7.55, p < 0.01). Univariate analyses

revealed that this difference was due to greater glide slope deviation on segment three than segment five

(F (1,20) = 22.25, p < 0.01). Follow-up analyses indicated that this effect was accompanied by greater

airspeed variability on segment three. These deviations could be expected to result from operation of an

aircraft with a jammed stabilizer, the problem presented to the crew on segment three. Aircraft handling

appeared to be unrelated to captain personality.

DISCUSSION

These results present a relatively consistent picture of the impact of leader personality on crew

performance, particularly in critical high-workload situations. As might be expected, consistently effective performance was found among crews led by IE+ captains and less effective performance among

crews led by EC- captains. Also, IE+ captains rated their workload during segments three and five as

lower than did their own crews or I- or EC- leaders and crews. This finding may be a clue to

20
understandingall theotherresults,butit requiresthetesting of hypotheses based upon process data.

Specifically, IE+ captains may evaluate the abnormal segments as less demanding due to specific

strategies they apply in task delegation, or they may simply adopt differing standards of evaluating

workload. Since we predicted that IE+ captains would better organize both people and tasks, a finding of

differing strategies would strongly validate this theoretical conceptualization. If IE+ captains do indeed

delegate tasks more effectively, one would expect their workload to be lower, but not necessarily that of

their subordinates. These jurdor officers may have a number of tasks to accomplish equivalent to those

led by less effective captains, yet the crew may have a greater capacity to deal with that workload. Discriminating between these two competing explanations will require further research into the process by

which these crews accompli:_hed their tasks.

Somewhat surprisinldy, I- led crews performed comparably with IE+ crews on the second day

and apparently improved ov,_r time. From previous research (Foushee et al., 1986), one might expect

that increasing crew familim'ity would result in better crew performance in the later flight segments,

regardless of crew type. Instead, familiarity apparently facilitated performance only among I- led crews.

These f'mdings are it_triguing because they support logical hypotheses about crew effectiveness

and are consistent with recent research examining individual pilot performance. Foushee and Helmreich

(1988) have hypothesized that relatively high levels of both instrumental and expressive traits might

facilitate crew performance. IE+ individuals have elevated levels of both of these traits, and as noted

earlier, Chidester (1987) found that IE+ pilots appeared to benefit most from CRM training. This group

showed the most positive and enduring attitude change up to six months after participating in the training program. Results from the present study suggest that personality factors, in general, may contribute

significantly to crew effectiveness, and provide further support for the notion that both instrumentality

and expressivity are import_ nt predictors of team performance in aerospace environments.

Somewhat surprising was the lack of relationship between captain personality and approach

deviations. In the Foushee et al. (1986) simulation study, approach deviations were sensitive to differences in crew familiarity, just as were ratings and errors. This would appear to argue for a reliable correspondence between approach smoothness and crew errors or observer ratings, and lead to an expectation

of similar patterns of person ality effects in the handling data. One could argue that at the least, familiarity influenced approach smoothness, since segment five approaches were smoother than segment three

approaches. But this explanation is confounded in the experiment with the jammed stabilizer manipulation, and the handling differences identified would appear _to be attributable to that manipulation. That

approaches flown in this study were not influenced by experimental variables may be due to a number of

factors, ranging from the aircraft type to the meaning of personality variables. This study utilized a

B-727 simulator, while Foushee et al. (1986) used a B-737 simulator. The variety of differences between

these two aircraft types might explain differences in findings concerning aircraft handling. Additionally,

personality characteristics should not be expected to influence all aspects of performance. Aircraft handling examines only the most individual physical and technical portions of the flying task, while the personality battery emphasizes differences in motivation towards organizing and performing tasks. Predictions of influence should be carefully defined to correspond to these motivational and organizational

portions of the task.

Perhaps this is the primary lesson to be drawn from decades of personality research in aviation

(cf. Dolgin and Gibb, 1988): that the variety of tasks comprising crew performance may be differentially

21
influencedby a numberof factors.Theseincludecharacteristicsof individuals(i.e.,skill, personality,

andexperience),theirorganizations(military or airline),theirmission(tactical,commuter,or long-haul),

training(technicalproficiencyandcrewcoordination)andtaskdesign(old vs.newtechnology).For

example,while theliteratureonpersonalityeffectsonpilot performanceis overwhelminglydominated

by failuresto demonstratereliablelinkages,mostof thisresearchexaminesonly whetherpersonality

predictscompletionof initial pilot training.Thevarietyof otherpossiblelinks betweenpersonalityand

performance-relevantfactorshavebeenleftrelativelyunexplored.Oneexceptionis thatpersonality

characteristicsappearto reliably differentiatethosewhoareattractedto aviationfrom thegeneralpopulation(Fry andReinhardt,1969;Novello andYoussef,1974a,1974b).Thepresentstudysuggeststhat

personalitymayplay acritical rolein day-to-dayand,especiallyhigh-workloadtaskperformance.Characteristicsof thecaptainandprobablythecrewimpacttheeffectivenesswith whichthecrewplansand

respondsto inflight problems.Perhapsaviationpsychologistsinterestedin personalitycannowbeginto

distinguishmorepreciselywhereandwhenthesecharacteristicsinfluenceperformanceoutcomes.

At leasttwo otherissuesareraisedby theresults:definingthelimits of crew familiarity effects,

and devising strategies for conducting operationally valid research. The remainder of this discussion

highlights those issues.

4.1 Crew Familiarity

The familiarity effect among I- led crews raises a number of important questions. Why was the

pattern of lower performance levels seen in the observer ratings not reflected in the errors committed by

I- led crews on the first day? The expert observer saw these crews as relatively ineffective, giving them

the lowest average ratings for segment three. However, these crews made no more errors than IE+ led

crews. One reason may be that process observers are, by definition, integrating more than errors into

their observations in any group task situation. In previous studies (Ruffell-Smith, 1979; Foushee and

Manos, 1981; Foushee et al., 1986; Kanki, Lozito, and Foushee, 1989), patterns of flight crew communications were significantly related to crew performance. As a result, we have incorporated communications dimensions into our observer rating scales. These scales require the observer to use his experience

and professional judgment to evaluate how crews make decisions, handle inter- and intracrew communications, prioritize problems, deal with distractions, and distribute workload. In short, these ratings seek

to evaluate the process by which crewmembers coordinate their activities. Since problems of crew

coordination do not always produce observable errors, we should not expect ratings reflecting process to

be perfectly correlated with performance outcomes. They are related, but they are not the same. Problems reflected in observer ratings are important in their own fight because they may raise the probability

that errors will be committed or not corrected quickly. We would argue that our observer ratings reflect

the fact that there were significant process problems within I- crews.

This argument is also consistent with the conceptual framework proposed by McGrath (1964,

1984). In this model, the link between input variables (such as personality profiles) and group outcomes

(such as errors of communication or action) is mediated by the process of group activities (such as patterns of communication). While it is possible to identify links between input and process or process and

outcome variables, these relationships may diverge somewhat from input-outcome relationships. The

observer ratings may be viewed as integrating both process and outcome information.

22
Theideathatfamiliarity mayhaveaffectedtheprocessof crewinteractionin I- crewsraises

anotherquestion.Whatbehaviorswerechangingoverthecourseof thesimulation?Thereareat least

threepossibilities.(1) Thecaptainsmayhavealteredtheirbehavior,(2) thejunior crewmembersmay

haveadaptedto thecaptain'sstyle,or (3) theperformancesituationsoneachdaymayhaveemphasized

differing elementsof leadershipor performance.Adaptationby subordinatesmaybethemostplausible

explanation.It is notunusualfor a crewto becomposedof individualswho havenevermet prior to the

beginningof a trip.Accordingly,anadjustmentperiodis likely duringthefirst few flight segments,and

it is probablethatsubordinatecrewmembersoftenattemptto tailortheirbehaviorsto thecaptain's

expectations.Sincethecaptain'srole ismorecentralto cockpitorganizationthanotherpositionsand

becauseit carriesfinal decisionauthority,we suspectthat acaptainis lesslikely to changehisbehavior

to adaptto thecrew(althoughthis mayoccurto alesserdegreeaswell).

Fousheeet al. (1986)demonstratedsignificantprocessdifferencesbetweencrewsthathad

recentlyflown togethervs.Ihosethathadnot.Themostlikely explanationis that,all subordinatecrew

membersareinitially tentativein theirbehaviorbecausetheyareawaitingsignalsfrom theleaderabout

howheor sheexpectsthecockpitcrewto operate.In general,IE+ leaderswouldbeexpectedto very

quicklycreateanatmospherein whichopencommunicationis encouraged.Theoretically,I- leaders

wouldnot beaslikely to do soandmightby naturetendto discouragequestioningby subordinates.

After theinitial adjustmentprocess,subordinatesin I- crewsmayhavebeenableto work moreeffectively becausetheyknewwtrotto expect.On theotherhand,EC- ledcrewsneverseemedto makeany

adjustmentsoverthecourseof thesimulation.ThatI- andEC- leadersdiffer substantiallyin taskmotivationor instrumentalitymaybesufficientto explainthedifferencesin theeffectsof familiarity, but

tangibleevidenceof bothchangeamongtheI- crewsanddifferencesbetweenEC-andI- crewswill

haveto await theprocessanalysesof datageneratedby this study.

Anotherimportantideais relatedto thegeneralityof thisfamiliarity effectandits application

overtime.ThecurrentstudyandtheFousheeet al.(1986)studycomparedcrewswho hadworked

togetherfor only two or threedays,andfamiliarity seemedto provideaperformancebenefitin a substantialnumberof thesecases.However,weknowlittle aboutteamperformanceoverlongerdurations,

andit is quitepossiblethatincreasingfamiliarity couldultimatelyresultin worseperformance.In this

report,wehavesuggestedthatanumberof characteristicsof I- leadersmight beviewedasaversive

undercertaincircumstances.I- leadersarecharacterizedby highlevelsof impatienceandirritability,

competitiveness,andverbalaggressivenesscombinedwith low levelsof expressivity.Sofar, wehave

shownthatleaderspossessiJ_gsuchcharacteristicsarecapableof operatingin crewsthatperformatrelatively high levelsafteraninitial adjustmentperiod,butit maynotbepossibleto maintaintheselevels

overlongperiodsof time.Overtime,wewouldpredictthatindividualspossessingtheseattributes

wouldhavedifficulty maintainingeffectivecrewperformance.If thisis thecase,wewouldbeparticularly concernedaboutcrewmembersfitting this profile andparticipatingin long-durationoperationssuch

asship,submarine,or spacestationoperations.Thetwo-daytime periodof this simulationstudywasnot

sufficientto exploretheselimits, andit is importantthatresearchonlongerdurationflights be

accomplished.

23
4.2 Implications for Designing Operationally-Valid Research

Foushee (1984) argued that flight simulation provides an ideal environment in which to conduct

research meeting both basic and applied criteria. Since aircraft simulators provide high levels of both

realism and experimental control, they make ideal laboratories for experimentation, and there are clearly

fewer problems in generalizing to real-world behavior. On the negative side, high-fidelity simulation

demands a large investment, and sound use of these expensive facilities demands that proposed theories

or models be conceptualized with real-world applications in mind. This suggests in turn that researchers

should collect evidence for the ecological validity of their theories prior to testing in a high-fidelity environment. The tradeoff identified here argues for a program of research moving from lower-fidelity to

increasingly high-fidelity environments.

We believe that high-fidelity studies represent an important direction for psychological research.

Helmreich (1983) has argued that researchers have overly restricted their work to the extent that it does

not apply to real-world phenomena. The failure of personality researchers to demonstrate strong links

with important behavioral dimensions may be in large part the result of the "sterile" laboratory tradition

so predominant in psychological research. The structuring of artificial tasks for laboratory experimentation, a process viewed as necessary for both control and assessment, may also tend to create artificial

conditions that account for far more behavioral variation than the experimental variables themselves.

We chose the personality battery utilized in this study in large part because of the substantial

body of real-world performance-relevant data collected by Spence, Helmreich, and their colleagues

(Spence and Helmreich, 1983; Helmreich, 1982, 1986; Chidester, 1987). For example, Spence and

Helmreich's (1983) measures of achievement motivation were shown to predict performance among

academic scientists and engineers. Moreover, Helmreich (1986) found instrumentality and expressivity

to be significantly correlated with check airman evaluations of individual pilot performance. This study

has provided further evidence for the validity of instrumentality and expressivity as meaningful and

important components of individual personality. As we consider the development of selection criteria for

future aerospace operations, these dimensions appear to be strong candidates for representation. In the

absence of such preliminary validation work, the application of personality models or measures to predicting pilot performance amounts to what Ellis and Conrad (1948) referred to as a criterion shift in the

absence of empirical justification. Given the cost of high-fidelity research, applying untested measures

or models becomes highly risky. This phenomenon may have been a factor in the problem-plagued

search for personality predictors of performance in past research. Thus, high fidelity research environments may put us in a better position to resume our search, but only if researchers accomplish preliminary validation work. Personality theory and research should move towards a closer association with

real-word performance.

24
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Chidester, T. R.: Selection tor optimal crew performance: Relative impact of selection and training. In

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Dolgin, D. L.; and Gibb, G. D.: A review of personality measurement in aircrew selection. NAMRL

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Ellis, A.; and Conrad, H. S.: The validity of personality inventories in military practice. Psychological

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Fiedler, F. E.: A theory of l,_adership effectiveness. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967.

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and D. C. Nagel (Fxls.), Human Factors in Aviation. San Diego: Academic, 189-227, 1988.

Foushee, H. C.; Lauber, J. K.; Baetge, M. M.; and Acomb, D. B.: Crew factors in flight operations III:

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NASA TM-88322, 1986.

Foushee, H. C.; and Manos, K. L.: Information transfer within the cockpit: Problems in intracockpit

communications. In C. E. Billings and E. S. Cheaney, eds., Information transfer in the aviation

system. NASA TP-1875, 1981.

Fry, G. E.; and Reinhardt, R. F.: Personality characteristics of jet pilots as measured by the Edwards Personal Preference Schedule. Aerospace Medicine, vol. 40, 484-486, 1969.

Ginnett, R.: The formation process of airline flight crews. In R. S. Jensen, ed., Proceedings of the Fourth

International Symp:_sium on Aviation Psychology, Columbus, OH, 399-405, 1987.

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Gregorich,S.;Helmreich,R. L.; Wilhelm,J.A.; andChidester,T. R.:Personalitybasedclustersaspredictorsof aviatorattitudesandperformance.In R.S.Jensen,ed.,Proceedingsof theFifth InternationalSymposiumonAviation Psychology,Columbus,OH, 1989.

Hackman,J.R.;andHelmreich,R. L.: Assessingthebehaviorandperformanceof teams in organizations: The case of air transport crews. In D. R. Peterson and D. B. Fishman, eds., Assessment for

decision. New Brunswick, NJ.: Rutgers University Press, I987.

Hart, S. G.; and Staveland, L. E.: Development of a multi-dimensional workload rating scale: Results of

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Workload. Elsevier, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 1988.

Helmreich, R. L.: Pilot selection and training. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American

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Helmreich, R. L.: Studying flight crew behavior: A social psychologist encounters the real world.

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DC, 1986.

Helmreich, R. L.; Sawin, L. L.; and Carsrud, A. L.: The honeymoon effect in job performance: Delayed

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pp. 1085-1088.

Helmreich, R. L.; Spence, J. T.; and Pred, R. S.: Making it without losing it: type A, achievement motivation, and scientific attainment revisited. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, vol. 14,

1988, pp. 495-504.

Helmreich, R. L.; and Wilhelm, J. A.: Evaluating cockpit resource management training. In R. S. Jensen,

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OH, 1987, pp. 440-446.

Jenkins, C. D.; Zyzanski, S. J.; and Rosenman, R. H.: Progress toward validation of a computer scored

test for the Type A coronary prone behavior pattern. Psychometric Medicine, vol. 33, 1971

pp. 193-202.

Kanki, B. G.; Lozito, S. C.; and Foushee, H. C.: Communication Indexes of Crew Coordination. Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine, vol. 60, 1989, pp. 56-60.

Lauber, J. K.; and Foushee, H. C.: Guidelines for line-oriented flight training. NASA CP-2184, 1981.

McGrath, J. E.: Social psychology: A brief introduction. Holt (New York), 1964.

McGrath, J. E.: Groups: Interaction and performance. Prentice-Hall (Englewood Cliffs, NJ), 1984.

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Melton,A. W., ed.:Apparatu:;Tests,Air ForcesAviation PsychologyProgramResearchReports,No.4.

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Melton,A. W.: (1957).Military psychologyin theUnitedStatesof America.AmericanPsychologist,

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Melton,R. S.:Studiesin theevaluationof thepersonalitycharacteristicsof successfulnavalaviators.

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Novello,J.R.; andYoussef,7.I.: Psycho-social studies in general aviation: II. Personality profile of

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Spence, J. T.; and Helmreich, R. L.: Masculinity and femininity: Their psychological dimensions, correlates, and antecedents. University of Texas Press (Austin), 1978.

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Achievement and achievement motives: Psychological and sociological approaches. W. H.

Freeman and Co. (New York), 1983.

Spence, J. T.; Helmreich, R. L.; and Holahan, C. K.: Negative and positive components of psychological

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27
APPENDIX A

DEFINITIONS OF PERSONALITY SCALES

Extended Personal Attributes Questionnaire (EPAQ; Spence, Helmreich, and Holahan, 1979)

Instrumentality- a cluster of positive attributes reflecting goal-orientation and independence (active,

self-confident, can stand up to pressure)

Expressivity- a cluster of positive attributes reflecting interpersonal warmth and sensitivity (gentle,

kind, aware of the feelings of others)

Negative Instrumentality- negative characteristics reflecting arrogance, hostility, and interpersonal

invulnerability (boastful, egotistical, dictatorial)

Negative Communion- self-subordinating, subservient, or unassertive characteristics (gullible,

spineless, subordinates self to others)

Verbal Aggressiveness- verbal passive-aggressive characteristics (complaining, nagging, fussy)

Negative Instrumentality- cluster of negative attributes reflecting emotional invulnerability,

cynicism, and hostility (arrogant, boastful, egotistical, dictatorial)

Work and Family Orientation Questionnaire (WOFO; Spence and Helmreich, 1978)

Mastery- a preference for challenging tasks and striving for excellence ("If I am not good at something, I would rather keep struggling to master it than move on to something I may be good

at")

Work- a desire to work hard and do a good job ("I find satisfaction in working as well as I can")

Competitiveness- a preference for tasks with clear winners and losers and a desire to outperform

others ("It annoys me when other people perform better than I do")

Achievement and Impatience Scales (Pred, Helmreich, and Spence, 1986)

Achievement Striving- a cluster of characteristics related to hard work, activity, and seriousness in

approaching work tasks ("How much does your job 'stir you into action? .... Compared to

others, how much effort do you put forth?")

Impatience/Irritability- ("How easily do you get irritated? .... When a person is talking and takes too

long to come to a point, how often do you feel like hurrying the person along?")

28
APPENDIX B

FLIGHT EXPERIENCE ITEMS

Crew Position (circle one) CAPT FO SO

How long have you been employed by your present airline? __.yrs. __

How many hours have you logged as a pilot in the following categories?

Military

General Aviation

Airline

Other

Age Sex

How many hours have you lo_;ged in your present crew position (Captain,

First Officer)?

mnths.

How many hours have you lo_r,ged in the B-727?

29
APPENDIX C

PERSONALITY BATTERY

Extended Personal Attributes Questionnaire (EPAQ)

The items below inquire about what kind of a person you think you are. Each item consists of a pair of

characteristics, with the letters A - E in between. For example:

Not at all artistic Very artistic

A ........ B ........ C ........ D ........ E

Each pair describes contradictory characteristics -- that is, you cannot be both at the same time, such as

very artistic and not at all artistic.

The letters form a scale between the two extremes. You are to choose a letter which describes where you

fall on the scale. For example, if you think you have no artistic ability, you would choose A. If you think

you are pretty good, you might choose D. If you are only medium, you might choose C, and so forth.

Be sure to answer every question, even if you're not sure.

Not at all aggressive Very aggressive

A ........ B ........ C ........ D ........ E

Very whiny Not at all whiny

A ........ B ........ C ........ D ........ E

Not at all independent Very independent

A ........ B ........ C ........ D ........ E

Not at all arrogant Very arrogant

A ........ B ........ C ........ D ........ E

Not at all emotional Very emotional

A ........ B ........ C ........ D ........ E

Very submissive Very dominant

A ........ B ........ C ........ D ........ E

Very boastful Not at all boastful

A ........ B ........ C ........ D ........ E

Not at all excitable Very excitable

in a major crisis in a major crisis

A ........ B ........ C ........ D ........ E

30
Very passive Very active

A........B........C........D........E

Not at all egotistical Very egotistical

A........B........C........D.......E

Not at all ableto devote Able to devote

self completelyto others selfcompletelyto others

A........B........C........D........E

Not atall spineless Very spineless

A........B........C........D........E

Veryrough Very gentle

A........B........C........D........E

Notat all complaining Very complaining

A........B........C........D........E

Not at all helpfultoothers Very helpfulto others

A........B........C........D........E

Not at all competitive Verycompetitive

A........B........C........D........E

Subordinatesoneselfto others Neversubordinateself to others

A........B........C........D........E

Very homeoriented Very worldly

A........B........C........D........E

Very greedy Not atall greedy

A........B........C........D........E

Not atall kind Very kind

A........B........C........D........E

IndifferentIoothers' approval Highly needful of others' approval

A ........ B ........ C ........ D ........ E

Very dictatorial Not at all dictatorial

A ........ B ........ C ........ D ........ E

ii:eelings not easily hurt Feelings easily hurt

A ........ B ........ C ........ D ........ E

31
Doesn'tnag Nagsalot

A........B........C........D........E

Not at all awareof Very aware of

feelings of others feelings of others

A ........ B ........ C ........ D ........ E

Can make decisions easily Has difficulty making decisions

A ........ B ........ C ........ D ........ E

Very fussy Not at all fussy

A ........ B ........ C ........ D ........ E

Give up very easily Never gives up easily

A ........ B ........ C ........ D ........ E

Very cynical Not at all cynical

A ........ B ........ C ........ D ........ E

Never cries Cries very easily

A ........ B ........ C ........ D ........ E

Not at all self-confident Very self-confident

A ........ B ........ C ........ D ........ E

Does not look out only Looks out only

for self for self

A ........ B ........ C ........ D ........ E

Feels very inferior Feels very superior

A ........ B ........ C ........ D ........ E

Not at all hostile Very hostile

A ........ B ........ C ........ D ........ E

Not at all understanding Very understanding

of others of others

A ........ B ........ C ........ D ........ E

Very cold in relations Very warm in relations

with others with others

A ........ B ....... C ........ D ........ E

Very servile Not at all servile

A ........ B ........ C ........ D ........ E

32
Very little needfor security Very strongneedfor security

A........B........C........D........E

Not atall gullible Very gullible

A........B........C........D........E

Goesto piecesunderpressure Standsupwell underpressure

A........B........C........D........E

Achievement and Impatience Scales

For each question below, pie ase select the alternative that best describes yourself or your opinion. Indicate the alternative you chocse by circling the appropriate letter on the scale, A, B, C, D, or E.

How much does your job "stir you into action"?

---A ............... B ............. C ............... D ............. E ....

Much less About average Much more often

than others than others

When a person is talking anti takes too long to come to the point, how often do you feel like hurrying the

person along?

---A .............. B ............. C ............... D ............. E ....

Very frequently Occasionally Almost never

Nowadays, do you consider yourself to be:

---A ............... B ............. C ............... D ............. E ....

Very hard- Slightly Very relaxed

driving hard-driving and easy-going

How would your best friend or others who know you well rate your general level of activity?

---A ............... B ............. C ............... D ............. E ....

Too slow, About Very active,

should be more active average should slow down

Typically, how easily do you get irritated?

---A ............... B ............. C ............... D ............. E ....

Extremely Somewhat Not at all

easily easily easily

33
How seriouslydo youtakeyourwork?

---A.............. B............. C ............... D ............. E ....

Much less About Much more

seriously average seriously

than most than most

How often do you set deadlines or quotas for yourself at work or other activities?

---A .............. B ............. C ............... D ............. E ....

Very often Sometimes Almost never

Do you tend to do most things in a hurry?

---A .............. B............. C ............... D ............. E ....

Not at all More true Definitely

true than not true

Compared with others in my occupation, the amount of effort I put forth is:

---A .............. B ............. C ............... D ............. E ....

Much more About average Much less

How is your "temper" these days?

---A .............. B ............. C ............... D ............. E ....

Very hard Sometimes get I seldom get

to control angry but easy angry

to control

Compared with others in my occupation, I approach life in general:

---A .............. B ............. C ............... D ............. E ....

Much more About Much less

seriously average seriously

When you have to wait in line such as at a restaurant, the movies, or the post office, how do you usually

feel?

---A .............. B ............. C ............... D ............. E ....

Accept it Feel very impatient

calmly and refuse to stay long

34
Work and Family Orientation Questionnaire

The following statements describe reactions to conditions of work and challenging situations.

For each item, indicate how much you agree or disagree with the statement, as it refers to yourself, by

choosing the appropriate letter on the scale, A, B, C, D, or E. When you have decided on your answer,

circle the letter that best describes your attitude. There are no right or wrong answers.

I would rather do something at which I feel confident and relaxed than something which is challenging

and difficult.

---A .............. B ............. C ............... D ............. E ....

Strongl3, Slightly Neither agree Slightly Strongly

agree agree nor disagree disagree disagree

It is important for me to do my work as well as I can even if it isn't popular with my co-workers.

---A .............. B ............. C ............... D ............. E ....

Strongly Slightly Neither agree Slightly Strongly

agree agree nor disagree disagree disagree

I enjoy working in situations involving competition with others.

---A ............... B ............. C ............... D ............. E ....

Strongl3, Slightly Neither agree Slightly Strongly

agree agree nor disagree disagree disagree

When a group I belong to phms an activity, I would rather direct it myself than just help out and have

someone else organize it.

---A ................ B ............. C ............... D ............. E ....

Strongl) Slightly Neither agree Slightly Strongly

agree agree nor disagree disagree disagree

I would rather learn easy fun games than difficult thought games.

---A .............. B ............. C ............... D ............. E ....

Strongly Slightly Neither agree Slightly Strongly

agree agree nor disagree disagree disagree

It is important to me to perform better than others on a task.

---A .............. B ............. C ............... D ............. E ....

Strongly Slightly Neither agree Slightly Strongly

agree agree nor disagree disagree disagree

35
I find satisfactionin working aswell asI can.

---A.............. B............. C............... D............. E....

Strongly Slightly Neitheragree Slightly Strongly

agree agree nordisagree disagree disagree

If I amnotgoodat somethingI wouldratherkeepstrugglingto masterit thanmoveonto somethingI

maybegoodat.

---A.............. B............. C............... D............. E....

Strongly Slightly Neitheragree Slightly Strongly

agree agree nordisagree disagree disagree

OnceI undertakeatask,I persist.

---A.............. B............. C............... D............. E....

Strongly Slightly Neitheragree Slightly

agree agree nordisagree disagree

I preferto work in situationsthatrequireahighlevel of skill.

---A.............. B............. C............... D............. E....

Strongly

disagree

Strongly Slightly Neitheragree Slightly Strongly

agree agree nordisagree disagree disagree

Thereis asatisfactionin ajob well done.

---A.............. B............. C............... D............. E....

Strongly Slightly Neitheragree Slightly Strongly

agree agree nordisagree disagree disagree

I feelthatwinning is importantin bothwork andgames.

---A.............. B............. C............... D............. E....

Strongly Slightly Neitheragree Slightly Strongly

agree agree nordisagree disagree disagree

I moreoftenattempttasksthatI amnot sureI cando thantasksthatI believeI cando.

---A.............. B............. C............... D............. E....

Strongly Slightly Neitheragree Slightly Strongly

agree agree nordisagree disagree disagree

36
I find satisfactionin exceedingmy previousperformanceevenif I don't outperformothers.

---A.............. B............. C............... D............. E....

Strongly Slightly Neitheragree Slightly Strongly

agree agree nordisagree disagree disagree

I like to work hard.

---A.............. B............. C............... D............. E....

Strongly Slightly Neitheragree Slightly Strongly

agree agree nordisagree disagree disagree

Partof my enjoymentin doiagthingsis improvingmy pastperformance.

---A.............. B............. C............... D............. E....

Strongb._ Slightly Neitheragree Slightly

agree agree nordisagree disagree

It annoysmewhenotherpeopleperformbetterthanI do.

Strongly

disagree

---A............... B............. C............... D............. E....

Strongly Slightly Neitheragree Slightly Strongly

agree agree nordisagree disagree disagree

I like to bebusyall thetime

---A............... B............. C............... D............. E....

Strongly Slightly Neitheragree Slightly Strongly

agree agree nordisagree disagree disagree

I try harderwhenI'm in competitionwith otherpeople.

---A.............. B............. C............... D............. E....

Strongly Slightly Neitheragree Slightly Strongly

agree agree nordisagree disagree disagree

It is importantto methatmyjob offersopportunityfor promotionandadvancement.

---A............... B............. C............... D............. E....

Strongly Slightly Neitheragree Slightly Strongly

agree agree nordisagree disagree disagree

37
It is importantto my future satisfactionthatmyjob payswell.

---A.............. B............. C............... D............. E....

Strongly Slightly Neitheragree Slightly Strongly

agree agree nordisagree disagree disagree

It is importantto methatmy job bringsmeprestigeandrecognitionfrom others.

---A.............. B............. C............... D............. E....

Strongly Slightly Neitheragree Slightly Strongly

agree agree nordisagree disagree disagree

38
APPENDIX D

TASK LOAD INDEX ITEMS AND DEFINITIONS

Mental Demand Low/High How much mental and perceptual activity was required

(e.g., thinking, deciding, calculating, remembering, looking, searching, etc)? Was the task easy or demanding,

simple or complex, exacting or forgiving?

Physical Demand Low/High How much physical activity was required (e.g., pushing,

pulling turning, controlling, activating, etc.)?

Temporal Demand Low/High How much time pressure did you feel due to the rate or

pace at which the tasks or task elements occurred? Was

the pace slow and leisurely or rapid and frantic?

Performance Perfect/Failure How successful do you think you were in accomplishing

the goals of the task set by the experimenter (or yourself)?

How satisfied were you with your performance in

accomplishing these goals?

Effort Low/High How hard did you have to work (mentally and physically)

to accomplish your level of performance?

Frustration Level Low/High How insecure, discouraged, irritated, stressed and

annoyed versus secure, gratified, content, relaxed and

complacent did you feel during the task?

All items were rated on a seven-point scale.

39
APPENDIX E

ITEMS COMPRISING THE OBSERVER'S RATING OF CREW PERFORMANCE

Items scored "not at all" to "very much" on a five-point scale:

Communications were thorough, addressing coordination, planning, and problems anticipated.

Open communications were established among crewmembers.

Timing of communications was proper.

Active participation in decision making process was encouraged and practiced.

Alternatives were weighed before decisions were made final.

Crewmembers showed concern with accomplishment of tasks at hand.

Crewmembers showed concern for the quality of interpersonal relationships in the cockpit.

Work overloads were reported and work prioritized or redistributed.

Crewmembers planned ahead for high workload situations.

Appropriate resources were used in planning.

Items scored on a five-point bipolar scale:

Overall vigilance Inattentive

Interpersonal climate Hostile

Preparation and planning Late

Distractions avoided or prioritized Poor -

Workload distributed and communicated Poor

Overall Crew Effectiveness Poor -

Alert

Friendly

Well in Advance

Excellent

Excellent

Excellent

40
APPENDIX F

OBSERVER RATINGS OF PHASE PERFORMANCE

Items (scored on a 5-point scale ranging from below average to above average):

Procedures, Checkli:;ts, and Callouts

ATC and Company Communications

Planning and Situation Awareness

Crew Coordination _Lnd Communication

Overall Performance and Execution

Phases of flight in which ratings were completed:

_egment 3

Prestart

Taxi/Fakeoff

Climb

Cruise

Runaway/Jammed Stabilizer

Oil Filter Bypass

Approach/Landing

Segment 5

Prestart

Taxi/Takeoff

Climb

Cruise

Approach and Missed Approach

System A Hydraulic Failure

Cruise to Alternate

Approach/Landing

41
RI/ A NaNon_ Aeronmu_c$ and

SpaCe Administzs_on

I. Report No.

NASA TM- 102259

Report Documentation Page

2. Government Accession No. 3. Recipient's Catalog No.

4. Title and Subtitle

Personality Factors in Flight Operations: Volume I. Leader

Characteristics and Crew Performance in a Full-Mission Air

Transport Simulation

7. Author(s)

Thomas R. Chidester, Barbara G. Kanki, H. Clayton Foushee (Federal

Aviation Administration, Washington, DC), Cortlandt L. Dickinson

(Menlo Park, CA), and Stephen V. Bowles (California Professional

School for Psychology, Berkeley, CA)

9. Performing Organization Name and Address

Ames Research Center

Moffett Field, CA 94035-1000

5. Report Date

April 1990

6. Performing Organization Code

8. Performing Organization Report No,

A-90018

12. Sponsoring Agency Name and Address

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Washington, DC 20546-0001

10. Work Unit No.

199-06-12

11. Contract or Grant No.

13. Type of Report and Period Covered

Technical Memorandum

14. Sponsoring Agency Code

15. Supplementary Notes

Point of Contact: Thomas R. Chidester, Ames Research Center, MS 262-5

Moffett Field, CA 94035-1000

(415) 604-5785 or FTS 464-5785

16. Abstract

Crew effectiveness is a joint product of the piloting skills, attitudes, and personality characteristics of team

members. As obvious as this point might seem, both traditional approaches to optimizing crew performance and

more recent training development highlighting crew coordination have emphasized only the skill and attitudinal

dimensions. This volume is the first in a series of papers on this simulation. A subsequent volume will focus on

pattems of communication within crews. This paper reports the results of a full-mission simulation research study

assessing the impact of individual personality on crew performance. Using a selection algorithm described in

previous research, captains were classified as fitting one of three profiles along a battery of personality assessment

scales. The performances of 23 crews led by captains fitting each profile were contrasted over a one-and-one-halfday simulated trip. Crews led by captains fitting a positive Instrumental-Expressive profile (high achievement

motivation and interpersonal skill) were consistently effective and made fewer errors. Crews led by captains fitting

a Negative Expressive profile (below average achievement motivation, negative expressive style, such as complaining) were consistently less effective and made more errors. Crews led by captains fitting a Negative Instrumental

profile (high levels of competitiveness, verbal aggressiveness, and impatience and irritability) were less effective

on the first day but equal to the best on the second day. These results underscore the importance of stable personality

variables as predictors of team coordination and performance.

17. Key Words (Suggested by Author(s))

Crew coordination

Personality factors

Pilot performance

lB. Distribution Statement

Unclassified- Unlimited

Subject Category - 03

19. Security Classif. (of this report)

Unclassified

20. Security Classif. (of this page)

Unclassified

21. No. of Pages

42

22. Price

A03

NASA FORM 1626 OCT_

For sale by the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161