[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 19-11131

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 3:17-cr-00444-WKW-WC-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

GUILLERMO GONZALEZ-ZEA, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Alabama

________________________

(April 30, 2021)

Before NEWSOM and BRANCH, Circuit Judges, and RAY,

* District Judge.

BRANCH, Circuit Judge:

*

 Honorable William M. Ray, II, United States District Judge for the Northern District of 

Georgia, sitting by designation.

USCA11 Case: 19-11131 Date Filed: 04/30/2021 Page: 1 of 22
2

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) agents in the process of 

staking out a residence in search of an ICE fugitive, whose social security number 

had been linked to a utility account at the address in question, stopped a car leaving 

the residence in the early morning hours of September 26, 2017. Guillermo 

Gonzalez-Zea was driving that car. ICE agents asked Gonzalez-Zea for his name 

and requested identification. Gonzalez-Zea produced an ID card issued in Mexico 

and admitted that he did not have any identification issued by the United States 

because he was here illegally. The officers explained that they were looking for an 

ICE fugitive, and Gonzalez-Zea stated that he lived alone, but he gave the officers 

permission to search his house. During the search of the residence, the officers 

discovered multiple firearms in plain view and arrested Gonzalez-Zea for 

possession of a firearm and live ammunition by an illegal alien in violation of 18 

U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(5) and 924(a)(2). Gonzalez-Zea moved to suppress the evidence,

and the district court denied his motion.

On appeal, Gonzalez-Zea argues that the district court should have granted 

his motion to suppress because: (1) the ICE officers did not have the requisite

individualized reasonable suspicion to stop him; (2) the ICE officers unlawfully 

prolonged the stop; and (3) Gonzalez-Zea’s consent to search his home was 

involuntary. After careful review and with the benefit of oral argument, we affirm.

USCA11 Case: 19-11131 Date Filed: 04/30/2021 Page: 2 of 22
3

I. Background

Between 5:00 and 6:00 a.m. on September 26, 2017, three ICE officers, 

Purdy, Skillern, and Hinkle, staked out a house in Heflin, Alabama (the “Heflin 

house”). The officers sought to apprehend Jose Rodolfo Alfaro-Aguilar, a 

Honduran national and an ICE fugitive with a warrant for his deportation.

2

 ICE 

agents believed Alfaro-Aguilar might be at the Heflin house because a few months 

earlier a social security number associated with Alfaro-Aguilar had been used to 

connect a utility service at the Heflin house—although there was no evidence that 

the utility was connected in Alfaro-Aguilar’s name. The ICE investigation also

revealed that the same social security number was associated with another 

individual by the name of Jose Sanchez who had 26 aliases and who was 

associated with 15 possible addresses, with the Heflin address being the most 

recent location.3

 

During the stakeout, all three ICE officers wore ICE badges and bulletproof 

vests with ICE printed on the front and the back and carried holstered firearms. 

2 Alfaro-Aguilar did not appear at his scheduled June 2016 immigration hearing, but his 

counsel indicated that Alfaro-Aguilar had departed the United States. Following that hearing, 

the immigration judge issued an order of removal for Alfaro-Aguilar. Approximately a year 

later, the ICE officers received the lead in this case that the social security number used by 

Alfaro-Aguilar was used to connect a utility service at the Heflin house. 

3

 Although Gonzalez-Zea argues that the social security number was associated with “26 

other individuals,” that contention is undermined by the record. The record confirms that the 

social security number was associated with two individuals—the fugitive Alfaro-Aguilar and 

Jose Sanchez. While Jose Sanchez had 26 documented aliases, he counts as only one individual. 

USCA11 Case: 19-11131 Date Filed: 04/30/2021 Page: 3 of 22
4

Sometime before dawn, Officer Purdy saw a man leave the house, get into a car, 

and leave the residence. Unable to tell whether the driver was the fugitive AlfaroAguilar, Officer Skillern activated his lights and siren and pulled the car over to 

ascertain whether the driver was the fugitive, while another officer continued to 

surveil the residence. 

The driver, Gonzalez-Zea, pulled over promptly. Officer Skillern asked 

Gonzalez-Zea for his name, which Skillern recognized “didn’t match the person 

[they] were looking for.” Officer Skillern asked Gonzalez-Zea for identification to 

confirm his identity, and Gonzalez-Zea gave him an identification card issued by 

Mexico. Officer Skillern asked Gonzalez-Zea if he had any other forms of 

identification, and Gonzalez-Zea said that he did not. When Officer Skillern asked 

“why he wasn’t able to have an Alabama driver’s license or any other United 

States issued ID,” Gonzalez-Zea stated that he was in the country illegally. This 

colloquy occurred about a minute into the encounter. 

At that point, Officer Skillern was “pretty positive” that Gonzalez-Zea was 

not the fugitive he was looking for, and he explained to Gonzalez-Zea that the 

officers were seeking a fugitive and asked whether anyone else lived in the house. 

Gonzalez-Zea stated that he lived there alone, but he granted the officers 

permission to go inside and “take a look” around. According to Officer Skillern,

Gonzalez-Zea “didn’t have any objection at all” when asked for his consent and 

USCA11 Case: 19-11131 Date Filed: 04/30/2021 Page: 4 of 22
5

their conversation was “friendly” and “cordial.” The record confirms that none of 

the officers drew their weapons during their encounter with Gonzalez-Zea, he was 

not patted down or searched, and he was not handcuffed. The officers did not read 

him his Miranda rights at this time, or tell him that he had a right to refuse to 

consent, or that he was free to go. 

Gonzalez-Zea drove his own car back to the house, and the officers followed 

in their cars. Gonzalez-Zea unlocked the door to the house and entered the house 

with the officers. As the officers walked around, they asked Gonzalez-Zea

questions about his living arrangements—whether anyone else lived there with 

him, how many rooms there were, and which room was his. Once the officers 

entered Gonzalez-Zea’s bedroom, they saw two guns in plain view: a shotgun in 

the corner and a rifle in an open closet. Officer Hinkle then read Gonzalez-Zea his 

Miranda rights. After being read his rights, Gonzalez-Zea indicated he was willing 

to answer the officers’ questions, and when asked if there were other weapons in 

the home, he showed officers where another firearm was located in a drawer. 

USCA11 Case: 19-11131 Date Filed: 04/30/2021 Page: 5 of 22
6

Gonzalez-Zea was charged with one count of possession of a firearm and 

live ammunition by an illegal alien under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(5)4 and 924(a)(2).5

 

He moved to suppress the evidence, alleging that it was recovered after “an 

unlawful traffic stop and unreasonable detention” and that his consent to search 

was not voluntary. After an evidentiary hearing, the magistrate judge issued a 

Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) recommending that the district court deny 

the motion to suppress. The district court adopted the R&R over Gonzalez-Zea’s 

objections. 

The district court found that the officers had reasonable suspicion to “believe 

the man they saw leaving the house [Gonzalez-Zea]. . . was the fugitive” they were 

seeking. Thus, “[t]hey were therefore permitted to stop and identify him.” The 

district court also found that the officers did not unreasonably extend the stop 

because they did not “detour from their search for [the fugitive],” and all their 

questions related to whether Gonzalez-Zea was the fugitive or whether the fugitive

lived in the house. Finally, the district court found that, based on the totality of the 

4 Section 922(g) provides in relevant part that: “It shall be unlawful[] for any person . . . 

who, being an alien . . . is illegally or unlawfully in the United States . . . to possess in or 

affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which 

has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)(A). 

5 Section 924(a)(2) provides that “[w]hoever knowingly violates [18 U.SC. § 922(g)] 

shall be fined as provided in this title, imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.”

USCA11 Case: 19-11131 Date Filed: 04/30/2021 Page: 6 of 22
7

circumstances, Gonzalez-Zea’s consent to search the house was voluntary. 

Gonzalez-Zea appealed.

II. Standard of Review

“Because rulings on motions to suppress involve mixed questions of fact and 

law, we review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its 

application of the law to the facts de novo.” United States v. Jordan, 635 F.3d 

1181, 1185 (11th Cir. 2011) (quotation omitted). We construe the facts in the light 

most favorable to the party that prevailed below, here, the government. United 

States v. Gordon, 231 F.3d 750, 754 (11th Cir. 2000). 

III. Discussion

A. Whether the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop Gonzalez-Zea

Gonzalez-Zea argues that the officers did not have the requisite 

individualized, reasonable suspicion necessary to conduct an investigatory stop. 

Specifically, he argues that he did not commit any traffic violation, and the 

officers’ decision to stop any vehicle that left the residence under surveillance to 

determine if the driver was the fugitive that they were searching for is not the sort 

of particularized, reasonable suspicion required by the Fourth Amendment. 

The Fourth Amendment prohibits “unreasonable searches and seizures.” 

U.S. Const. amend. IV. “Evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment 

must be suppressed.” Jordan, 635 F.3d at 1185. Whether a search or seizure is 

USCA11 Case: 19-11131 Date Filed: 04/30/2021 Page: 7 of 22
8

reasonable “depends upon all of the circumstances surrounding the search or 

seizure and the nature of the search or seizure itself.” United States v. Montoya de 

Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985). 

The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit a police officer, “in appropriate 

circumstances and in an appropriate manner [from] approach[ing] a person for 

purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior even though there is no 

probable cause to make an arrest”—these brief investigative detentions are 

commonly referred to as “Terry stop[s].” See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968). 

Terry and its progeny allow an officer to, “consistent with the Fourth Amendment, 

conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, articulable 

suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 

(2000). Such investigatory stops are also authorized based on a reasonable 

suspicion of past criminal activity, including where an officer has “a reasonable 

suspicion, grounded in specific and articulable facts, that a person [the officer] 

encounter[s] was involved in or is wanted in connection with [another crime].” 

United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229 (1985) (upholding a brief Terry stop of 

a person believed to be the individual on a police-issued wanted flyer “to check 

identification, . . . to pose questions to the person, or to detain the person briefly 

while attempting to obtain further information”); United States v. Kapperman, 764 

F.2d 786, 792 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding that a Terry stop of a vehicle was 

USCA11 Case: 19-11131 Date Filed: 04/30/2021 Page: 8 of 22
9

supported by reasonable suspicion where officers had an objective reason to 

believe that there may have been a fugitive inside the vehicle).

In Terry, the Supreme Court adopted “a dual inquiry for evaluating the 

reasonableness of an investigative stop.” United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 

682 (1985) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 20). Under Terry’s two-part inquiry, we first 

examine “whether the officer’s action was justified at its inception,” which turns 

on whether the officers had a reasonable suspicion that the defendant had engaged

in, was engaging in, or was about to engage in, a crime. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20. In 

the second part of the inquiry, we consider “whether [the stop] was reasonably 

related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first 

place.” Id.; see also Jordan 635 F.3d at 1186.

Reasonable suspicion “is not concerned with ‘hard certainties, but with 

probabilities.’” United States v. Lewis, 674 F.3d 1298, 1304 (11th Cir. 2012) 

(quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981)). To show that an 

officer has reasonable suspicion, the officer “must be able to articulate more than 

an ‘inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or “hunch” of criminal activity.’” 

Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 123 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27). “While reasonable 

suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing 

considerably less than preponderance of the evidence, the Fourth Amendment 

requires at least a minimal level of objective justification for making the stop.” Id. 

USCA11 Case: 19-11131 Date Filed: 04/30/2021 Page: 9 of 22
10

Reasonable suspicion may “be based on commonsense judgments and inferences 

about human behavior.” Id. at 125. “[W]e look to the totality of the circumstances 

to determine the existence of reasonable suspicion.” Jordan, 635 F.3d at 1186.

Here, construing the facts in the light most favorable to the government as 

the prevailing party, it is clear that the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop 

Gonzalez-Zea’s car and conduct an investigatory Terry stop under the totality of 

the circumstances. The officers knew that a social security number associated with 

the fugitive Alfaro-Aguilar had been used recently to connect a utility service at 

the Heflin house. Thus, they had a specific, articulable, objective basis for 

believing that the fugitive could be found at that location. Additionally, when the 

officers observed Gonzalez-Zea leaving the house, it was in the pre-dawn hours of 

September 26, 2017. Given the time of day, the officers possessed an objective,

reasonable suspicion that any man leaving the house was either the fugitive, or as a 

resident of the house, may have known the fugitive and his whereabouts. This 

information provided officers with sufficient particularized, reasonable suspicion

to conduct an investigatory stop of Gonzalez-Zea. See Hensley, 469 U.S. at 229; 

Kapperman, 764 F.2d at 792.

To the extent Gonzalez-Zea argues that the ICE officers had to observe a 

traffic violation or suspicious behavior specific to Gonzalez-Zea before stopping 

USCA11 Case: 19-11131 Date Filed: 04/30/2021 Page: 10 of 22
11

his vehicle,6 his argument is unpersuasive because “[t]he touchstone of the Fourth 

Amendment is reasonableness, not individualized suspicion.” Lewis, 674 F.3d at 

1306 (quoting Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 855 n.4 (2006)). In fact, “[t]he 

Supreme Court has rejected efforts to limit investigative stops to situations in 

which the officer has personally observed suspicious conduct.” United States v. 

Aldridge, 719 F.2d 368, 371 (11th Cir. 1983). Rather, because reasonable 

suspicion “is not concerned with ‘hard certainties, but with probabilities,’” Lewis, 

674 F.3d at 1304, the investigative lead linking the social security number used by 

the fugitive Alfaro-Aguilar to a recently opened utility account at the Heflin house 

and the officer’s observation of a male leaving the house in the pre-dawn hours 

were sufficient to justify the brief investigatory stop of the vehicle in order to 

confirm whether the driver was the fugitive the ICE officers were seeking. 

Gonzalez-Zea also cites a number of traffic-stop cases for the proposition 

that police cannot conduct a random traffic stop to check a driver’s license or 

question a driver about his citizenship status without any reasonable suspicion of 

6 Gonzalez-Zea acknowledges in his brief that this was a Terry stop, not a traffic stop. 

This contention is supported by the testimony of the ICE officers at the hearing on the motion to 

suppress that the vehicle stop was an investigatory stop to determine whether the male driver was 

the fugitive they were seeking—not a traffic stop. The ICE officers further testified that, even if 

they had witnessed a traffic violation, they lacked the authority to pull a vehicle over for a traffic 

violation or to issue traffic citations. Nevertheless, while this case is not a traffic-stop case, as 

we explained in Lewis, “cases involving traffic stops are nonetheless relevant in evaluating the 

reasonableness of investigatory detentions more generally.” 674 F.3d at 1306 n.5.

USCA11 Case: 19-11131 Date Filed: 04/30/2021 Page: 11 of 22
12

criminal activity. As explained above, the Terry stop here was supported by the 

officers’ reasonable suspicion, grounded in specific, articulable facts, that the 

fugitive they were looking for could be at the house in question, and that GonzalezZea—a male seen leaving the house in the early morning hours—could have been 

that fugitive or could have known the fugitive’s whereabouts. In short, this case is 

a far cry from the cases cited by Gonzalez-Zea wherein traffic stops based on a 

suspicion of mere potential general criminality were held to violate the Fourth 

Amendment. See, e.g., United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 874 (1975) 

(explaining that “the Fourth Amendment forbids stopping vehicles at random to 

inquire if they are carrying aliens who are illegally in the country” and “stopping 

or detaining persons for questioning about their citizenship on less than a 

reasonable suspicion that they may be aliens”); United States v. Yousif, 308 F.3d 

820, 827–28 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding that the police violated the defendant’s 

Fourth Amendment rights by stopping every car that went through a checkpoint to 

look for drugs without having an articulable, reasonable suspicion that the vehicle 

or its occupants are subject to seizure for a violation of the law); United States v. 

Jiminez-Medina, 173 F.3d 752, 755 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that an officer did not 

have reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle simply because it was driving slowly, 

was a certain vehicle type, was on a known alien-smuggling corridor at an odd 

hour, and the driver seemed preoccupied). 

USCA11 Case: 19-11131 Date Filed: 04/30/2021 Page: 12 of 22
13

Accordingly, for all the above reasons, we conclude that the officers had 

reasonable suspicion to justify the stop of Gonzalez-Zea’s vehicle.7

 

We now must turn to the second step of the Terry inquiry—whether the stop 

was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the 

interference in the first place—which leads us to Gonzalez-Zea’s second issue. 

B. Whether the officers unlawfully prolonged the stop

Gonzalez-Zea argues that, even if the initial stop was valid, the officers 

unlawfully prolonged it when they asked for Gonzalez-Zea’s identification and 

inquired as to whether he had any identification issued by the United States. 

According to him, the stop should have ended as soon as the officers observed that 

7 Gonzalez-Zea also argues that the officers’ reliance on the reports linking the social 

security number to the Heflin house was unreasonable because the number was associated with 

both Alfaro-Aguilar and Sanchez (who had 26 aliases). In other words, he argues that the 

officers had to rule out all other possible users of the social security number before they could 

have a legitimate, reasonable suspicion that the fugitive Alfaro-Aguilar was using the social 

security number and might be located at the Heflin house. Gonzalez-Zea’s argument conflates 

the concepts of what evidence is necessary to establish probable cause versus what is sufficient 

for reasonable suspicion—a much lower threshold. The Supreme Court has stated repeatedly 

that officers do not have to rule out every possibility of innocent conduct in order to possess 

reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop. See United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 

277 (2002) (“A determination that reasonable suspicion exists [for an investigative stop] . . . need 

not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct.”); Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125–26 (explaining that 

even where there are “innocent reasons” for certain conduct, where officers have specific, 

articulable, reason to believe that criminal activity was, is, or is about to be afoot, Terry

authorizes the officers to detain individuals to resolve that ambiguity). As discussed above, 

under the totality of the circumstances, the ICE officers had a reasonable suspicion to justify the 

stop in this case. See United States v. Simmons, 172 F.3d 775, 779 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that 

police officers possessed reasonable suspicion and did not act unreasonably in detaining the 

defendant to investigate whether he was the subject of a warrant for a person with a similar 

name, even though the warrant was from a county on the other side of the state and the date of 

birth did not match the defendant’s).

USCA11 Case: 19-11131 Date Filed: 04/30/2021 Page: 13 of 22
14

he did not match the physical description of Alfaro-Aguilar and at the latest when

Gonzalez-Zea told the officers his name, which did not match the fugitive’s. 

As explained previously, a Terry stop must also be “reasonably related in 

scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.” 

Terry, 392 U.S. at 20; see also Jordan 635 F.3d at 1186. Thus, an initially lawful 

investigatory stop may become unlawful if it is “prolonged beyond the time 

reasonably required to complete” the purpose of the stop. Rodriguez v. United 

States, 575 U.S. 348, 355–57 (2015); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983) 

(plurality opinion) (“An investigative detention must be temporary and last no 

longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.”). 

As discussed previously, the officers had a reasonable suspicion that 

Gonzalez-Zea could be the fugitive alien sought by ICE. Therefore, the officers 

stopped the vehicle leaving the Heflin house and immediately began asking a 

series of questions to dispel promptly and quickly with the task of confirming 

Gonzalez-Zea’s identity. Officer Skillern asked Gonzalez-Zea for his name and 

for identification to confirm the name he gave.

8

 These identification questions 

8 To the extent Gonzalez-Zea argues that the officers were not permitted to ask him for 

supporting identification and should have just accepted the name he supplied to the officers at 

face value, his argument is unpersuasive. As the Supreme Court has emphasized, “questions 

concerning a suspect’s identity are a routine and accepted part of many Terry stops.” Hiibel v. 

Sixth Judicial Dist. Ct. of Nev., 542 U.S. 177, 186 (2004); see also United States v. DiazLizaraza, 981 F.2d 1216, 1221 (11th Cir. 1993) (explaining that “[d]uring a Terry stop, officers 

may ask a suspect to identify himself or herself” and concluding that “the agents’ request for 

identification and basic personal information was reasonable”). For this reason, Gonzalez-Zea’s 

USCA11 Case: 19-11131 Date Filed: 04/30/2021 Page: 14 of 22
15

were related in scope to the circumstances that justified the stop in the first place—

confirming whether the driver of the vehicle was the fugitive. 

Further, when Gonzalez-Zea produced an identification card from another 

country, Officer Skillern asked him whether he had any United States 

identification, and when Gonzalez-Zea stated that he did not, Officer Skillern 

asked why he did not have any United States identification. Gonzalez-Zea argues 

that this additional identification inquiry “was a diversion from the purpose of the 

stop[] and an “impermissible foray into investigating unrelated criminal activity.” 

We disagree. Asking for an alternate form of identification simply was another 

identification-related inquiry that was part of the task of verifying Gonzalez-Zea’s 

identity, which was the purpose of the Terry stop. Although Gonzalez-Zea stated

that he was in the United States illegally in response to Officer Skillern’s 

questions, at no point during the stop did the officers investigate another crime or 

ask questions unrelated to verifying Gonzalez-Zea’s identity and locating the 

fugitive. The record establishes that Officer Skillern acted diligently and the 

overall Terry stop did not exceed the time needed to handle the matter for which 

related argument that the officers were not permitted to ask him for his name or identification 

because they should have been able to confirm from a “cursory visual inspection” that he was not 

the fugitive Alfaro-Aguilar similarly fails.

USCA11 Case: 19-11131 Date Filed: 04/30/2021 Page: 15 of 22
16

the stop was made—verifying whether Gonzalez-Zea who was seen leaving the 

Heflin house was the fugitive and attempting to locate the fugitive.9

 

Accordingly, for all these reasons, we conclude that the officers did not 

unlawfully extend the stop.10

C. Whether Gonzalez-Zea voluntarily consented to the officers’ search of 

the house

Gonzalez-Zea argues that the district court erred when it found that he 

voluntarily consented to the officers’ search of his house because the totality of the 

circumstances weigh against the voluntariness of his consent. Specifically, he 

asserts that his consent was the product of an illegal road-side seizure. Further, he 

argues that even if his seizure was valid, his consent was not voluntary because the 

officers were armed, the stop occurred during the pre-dawn hours in a rural area, 

9 To the extent that Gonzalez-Zea relies on our post-Rodriguez interpretation in United 

States v. Campbell, 912 F.3d 1340 (11th Cir. 2019), as to what renders a traffic stop 

unreasonably prolonged, we note that following briefing and oral argument in this case, a 

majority of this Court voted to grant rehearing en banc in Campbell, and as a result we vacated 

the underlying panel decision, 981 F.3d 1014 (2020). Accordingly, Campbell is no longer good 

law and will not be discussed further. 

10 In arguing that the Terry stop was unreasonably prolonged, Gonzalez-Zea also appears 

to challenge whether the overall manner and length of the investigatory detention was 

reasonable. See United States v. Acosta, 363 F.3d 1141, 1146 (11th Cir. 2004) (explaining that 

when evaluating the overall reasonableness of the scope of a Terry stop, we apply “four nonexclusive factors”: (1) “the law enforcement purposes served by the detention”; (2) “the 

diligence with which the police pursue the investigation”; (3) “the scope and intrusiveness of the 

detention”; and (4) “the duration of the detention.” (quoting United States v. Gil, 204 F.3d 1347, 

1351 (11th Cir. 2000)). To the extent that Gonzalez-Zea challenges the reasonableness of the 

manner and length of the detention, his argument fails as all four Acosta factors are satisfied in 

this case for the same reasons that the stop was not unreasonably prolonged. 

USCA11 Case: 19-11131 Date Filed: 04/30/2021 Page: 16 of 22
17

the officers did not return his identification card, they left their red-and-blue lights 

on, and he was never told he was free to leave or that he had the ability to refuse 

consent.11 We disagree.

As an initial matter, as discussed previously, we conclude that the ICE 

officers had reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop with GonzalezZea and that the officers did not prolong the stop. Accordingly, it follows 

necessarily that Gonzalez-Zea’s consent to the search of the Heflin house was not 

the product of an illegal seizure. Consequently, we consider his alternative 

argument that, even if his seizure was valid, his consent was the product of the 

allegedly coercive circumstances. 

A warrantless search “conducted pursuant to valid consent is constitutionally 

permissible.” Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973). In order to be 

valid, consent must be voluntarily given. Id. Consent is voluntary “if it is the 

product of an ‘essentially free and unconstrained choice.’” United States v. 

Benjamin, 958 F.3d 1124, 1134 (11th Cir. 2020). Voluntariness of consent “is a 

question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances.” 

Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227. The government bears the burden of proving that 

11 To the extent that Gonzalez-Zea also argues that the officers should have informed him 

of his Miranda rights and that their failure to do so mitigates the voluntariness of his consent, his 

argument fails. We have previously held that a consent to search is not a self-incriminating 

statement and that the failure to give a defendant a Miranda warning does not render the 

defendant’s consent to search invalid. United States v. Hidalgo, 7 F.3d 1566, 1568 (11th Cir. 

1993). 

USCA11 Case: 19-11131 Date Filed: 04/30/2021 Page: 17 of 22
18

“the consent was . . . freely and voluntarily given.” Id. at 222 (quoting Bumper v. 

North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968)). A district court’s determination that 

consent was voluntary is a finding of fact that will not be disturbed on appeal 

absent clear error. United States v. Spivey, 861 F.3d 1207, 1212 (11th Cir. 2017). 

“Normally, we will accord the district judge a great deal of deference regarding a 

finding of voluntariness, and we will disturb the ruling only if we are left with the 

definite and firm conviction that the trial judge erred.” Id.

When evaluating the totality of the circumstances underlying consent, we 

look at several factors, including “the presence of coercive police procedures, the 

extent of the defendant’s cooperation with the officer, the defendant’s awareness of 

his right to refuse consent, the defendant’s education and intelligence, and the 

defendant’s belief that no incriminating evidence will be found.” United States v. 

Purcell, 236 F.3d 1274, 1281 (11th Cir. 2001).

Almost all of these factors point in one direction—that Gonzalez-Zea 

voluntarily consented to the search. The ICE officers did not coerce Gonzalez-Zea 

into providing his consent. Rather, after Gonzalez-Zea stated that he lived alone, 

the ICE officers simply asked if they could search the Heflin house. Gonzalez-Zea 

agreed without any hesitation, drove his own vehicle back to the house, unlocked 

the house to let the officers in, and cooperated throughout the search. He was 

neither in custody nor restrained in any manner at the time he gave consent. 

USCA11 Case: 19-11131 Date Filed: 04/30/2021 Page: 18 of 22
19

Further, testimony at the suppression hearing confirmed that Gonzalez-Zea “didn’t 

have any objection at all,” when asked for his consent and his interaction with the 

ICE officers was “friendly” and “cordial.” Although the officers were armed 

during the interaction with Gonzalez-Zea, they never removed their weapons. 

Officers routinely carry weapons while on duty and, therefore, the mere presence 

of a weapon on an officer does not render an encounter with an officer unduly 

coercive and is insufficient to render a defendant’s consent involuntary. See 

United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 205 (2002) (explaining, in the context of 

determining whether an individual was seized or engaged in a consensual 

encounter with immigration officers, that “[t]he presence of holstered firearm is 

unlikely to contribute to the coerciveness of the encounter absent active 

brandishing of the weapon”). 

Likewise, the fact that the red-and-blue police lights were activated on 

Officer Skillern’s vehicle during his interaction with Gonzalez-Zea did not affect 

the voluntariness of Gonzalez-Zea’s consent. Leaving police lights on is simply 

not a display of force or coercive conduct on the part of an officer that could affect

an individual’s decision to freely and voluntarily consent to a search. See 

Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 233 (noting that involuntary consent is consent that is 

“coerced by threats or force, or granted only in submission to a claim of lawful 

authority”). 

USCA11 Case: 19-11131 Date Filed: 04/30/2021 Page: 19 of 22
20

Additionally, while the fact that the defendant’s identification was not 

returned at the time he consented to the search “is a factor we . . . consider in 

evaluating the totality of the circumstances,” “it is not a litmus test for voluntary 

consent.” Purcell, 236 F.3d at 1282. Here, there is no indication that the officers 

gave Gonzalez-Zea back his identification card at or before the time they asked for 

his consent to search the house. Nevertheless, in light of the friendliness of the 

encounter, Gonzalez-Zea’s lack of any objection to the search, and the absence of 

any coercive behavior by the officers, under the totality of the circumstances, the 

failure to return Gonzalez-Zea’s identification card is insufficient to render his 

consent involuntary.12 

While Gonzalez-Zea takes issue with the fact that the ICE officers failed to 

advise him expressly that he had a right to refuse consent, the Supreme Court “has 

rejected in specific terms the suggestion that police officers must always inform 

citizens of their right to refuse when seeking permission to conduct a warrantless 

12 Gonzalez-Zea cites two cases—United States v. Pruitt, 174 F.3d 1215, 1220 (11th Cir. 

1999), and the Tenth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Mendez, 118 F.3d 1426, 1430 (10th 

Cir. 1997)—in support of his contention that his consent was rendered involuntary by the 

officers’ failure to return his identification card. Pruitt, however, did not involve the issue of the 

voluntariness of the defendant’s consent because the defendant did not consent to a search. 174 

F.3d at 1218. And in Mendez, the Tenth Circuit addressed the issue of the officer’s retention of 

the driver’s identification in the context of determining whether a traffic-stop became a 

consensual encounter, not when determining whether the driver’s consent to search the vehicle 

was voluntary. 118 F.3d at 1430–31. Mendez certainly does not stand for the per se rule that an 

officer’s retention of an individual’s identification renders an individual’s consent involuntary. 

Id. at 1432. Moreover, even if Mendez stood for such a rule, we would not be bound by it. See 

Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (“Under the established federal 

legal system the decisions of one circuit are not binding on other circuits.”). 

USCA11 Case: 19-11131 Date Filed: 04/30/2021 Page: 20 of 22
21

consent search.” Drayton, 536 U.S. at 206; Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 234 

(“[N]either this Court’s prior cases, nor the traditional definition of ‘voluntariness’ 

requires proof of knowledge of a right to refuse as the sine qua non of an effective 

consent to search.”). Rather, the Supreme Court has emphasized repeatedly “that 

the totality of the circumstances must control, without giving extra weight to the 

absence of this type of warning.” Drayton, 536 U.S. at 206–07. Here, although 

the ICE officers did not inform Gonzalez-Zea of his right to refuse consent, there is 

no claim (or evidence of record) that the officers took any action that would have 

suggested to Gonzalez-Zea that he had no right to refuse the request to search the 

house. Given the lack of any coercive behavior on the part of the ICE officers, 

“[t]he mere fact that [the officers] did not inform [Gonzalez-Zea] of his right to 

refuse consent . . . is insufficient to render [his] consent involuntary.” United 

States v. Zapata, 180 F.3d 1237, 1242 (11th Cir. 1999). 

Relatedly, Gonzalez-Zea argues that his consent was involuntary because the 

officers did not inform him that he was free to go, but the Fourth Amendment does 

not require that a defendant be advised that he is “free to go before [his] consent to 

search may be deemed voluntary.” Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 40 (1996). 

Thus, the absence of this notification does not render Gonzalez-Zea’s consent 

involuntary, particularly in light of the totality of the circumstances discussed 

above. 

USCA11 Case: 19-11131 Date Filed: 04/30/2021 Page: 21 of 22
22

Accordingly, for the above reasons, we conclude that the district court did 

not clearly err in finding that, based on the totality of the circumstances, GonzalezZea voluntarily consented to the search of the Heflin house. 

IV. Conclusion

For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s denial of Gonzalez-Zea’s 

motion to suppress.

AFFIRMED.

USCA11 Case: 19-11131 Date Filed: 04/30/2021 Page: 22 of 22