United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Testimony before the Subcommittee on Federal 

Financial Management, Government Information, 

and International Security, Committee on 

Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 

U.S. Senate 

HURRICANE KATRINA

Planning for and 

Management of Federal 

Disaster Recovery 

Contracts 

Statement of William T. Woods, Director 

Acquisition and Sourcing Management 

For Release on Delivery

Expected at 11:30 a.m. CDT 

Monday, April 10, 2006

 

GAO-06-622T 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

April 10, 2006

HURRICANE KATRINA

Planning for and Management of Federal 

Highlights of GAO-06-622T, a testimony Disaster Recovery Contracts 

before the Subcommittee on Federal 

Financial Management, Government 

Information, and International Security, 

Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate. 

The devastation experienced 

throughout the Gulf Coast region in 

the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and

Rita has called into question the 

government’s ability to effectively

respond to such disasters. The 

government needs to understand 

what went right and what went

wrong, and to apply these lessons

to strengthen its disaster response 

and recovery operations. 

The federal government relies on 

partnerships across the public and 

private sectors to achieve critical

results in preparing for and 

responding to natural disasters,

with an increasing reliance on 

contractors to carry out specific

aspects of its missions. At the same

time, the acquisition functions at 

several agencies are on GAO’s highrisk list, indicating a vulnerability 

to fraud, waste, and abuse. 

This testimony discusses how three 

agencies—the General Services 

Administration, the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency

(FEMA), and the U.S. Army Corps 

of Engineers (the Corps)—

conducted oversight of key 

contracts used in response to the 

hurricanes. Efforts are ongoing by 

these agencies to address issues 

GAO and others have identified. 

What GAO Recommends

While GAO is not making any new 

recommendations in this 

testimony, GAO highlights previous 

recommendations and also 

identifies other issues agencies 

should consider when conducting 

emergency procurements. 

Agency acquisition and contractor personnel have been recognized for their 

hard work in providing the goods and services required to be responsive. 

The response efforts nonetheless suffered from three primary deficiencies: 

First, there was inadequate planning and preparation in anticipating 

requirements for needed goods and services. Some key agencies did not 

always have adequate plans for contracting in a major contingency situation. 

For example, while contracts for some items were in place prior to the 

storm, the Federal Emergency Management Agency did not adequately 

anticipate needs for such services as providing temporary housing and 

public buildings. There were also competing tensions between the selection 

of national contractors and the Stafford Act requirement that there be a 

preference for contractors from the affected area. Better planning could 

have alleviated those tensions. 

Second, there was a lack of clearly communicated responsibilities across 

agencies and jurisdictions to ensure effective outcomes. In a disaster

situation, sometimes local or state officials determine the requirements and 

communicate them to FEMA, which then may write and award the contract 

or communicate the requirements to another agency that writes and awards 

the contract; and then FEMA or another agency will oversee contract 

performance. To ensure effective execution of the contract, this approach 

puts a premium on clear alignment of responsibilities and good 

communications, but our fieldwork identified examples where unclear 

responsibilities and poor communications resulted in poor acquisition 

outcomes. For example, the process for ordering and delivering ice heavily 

depends on effective communications between FEMA and the Corps. 

However, according to Corps officials, FEMA did not fully understand the 

contracting approach used by the Corps and ordered at least double the 

amount of ice required, resulting in an oversupply of ice and a lack of 

distribution sites to handle the volume ordered. 

And third, there were insufficient numbers and inadequate deployment of 

personnel to provide for effective contractor oversight. The purpose of 

monitoring is to ensure that contracted goods and services are delivered in 

accordance with the agreed upon schedule, cost, quality, and quantity 

provisions stated in the contract. Without sufficient numbers of trained 

people properly deployed, however, monitoring will not be effective,

agencies may not be able to quickly identify and correct poor contractor 

performance, and agencies will be at risk of overpaying contractors. Our 

work indicated that while monitoring was occurring on the contracts we 

reviewed, the number of staff available was not always sufficient and staff 

were not effectively deployed. For example: FEMA’s contracts for installing 

temporary housing in four states had only 17 of the 27 technical monitors 

that had been determined necessary to oversee contractor performance. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-622T.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact William T. 

Woods at (202) 512-4841 or

woodsw@gao.gov. 
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

Thank you for inviting me here today to discuss the management and 

oversight of federal disaster recovery contracts related to Hurricanes 

Katrina and Rita. The size and strength of Hurricane Katrina resulted in 

one of the largest natural disasters in our nation’s history, and in its 

aftermath major questions have been raised about our nation’s readiness 

and ability to respond to catastrophic disasters. Hurricane Rita increased 

demands on an already stressed response and recovery effort by all levels 

of government. 

GAO has a large body of ongoing work on a range of issues relating to all

phases of the preparation, response, recovery, and rebuilding efforts 

related to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. GAO’s work has been coordinated 

with the rest of the accountability community at the federal, state, and 

local levels to ensure that all significant issues associated with relief and 

recovery, including contracting, are addressed while avoiding unnecessary 

duplication of efforts. 

Comptroller General Walker recently testified on GAO’s preliminary 

observations on the challenges encountered in the response to Hurricane 

Katrina, and he identified four themes that are similar to lessons learned 

from past catastrophic disasters.1

 These include the central importance of 

(1) clearly defining and communicating leadership roles, responsibilities, 

and lines of authority for response in advance of a catastrophic disaster; 

(2) clarifying the procedures for activating the National Response Plan and 

applying them to emerging catastrophic disasters; (3) conducting strong 

advance planning and robust training and exercise programs; and 

(4) strengthening response and recovery capabilities for a catastrophic 

disaster. 

These themes directly relate to what I will discuss today, namely how 

three agencies planned for and conducted oversight of several key 

contracts in support of Katrina and Rita response and recovery efforts: the 

General Services Administration (GSA), the Federal Emergency 

Management Agency (FEMA), and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (the 

Corps). In doing our review we selected 13 mission-critical contracts each 

with a dollar value in excess of $5 million that were awarded to 

12 contractors performing work for the three agencies. We analyzed in 

 1

Hurricane Katrina: GAO's Preliminary Observations Regarding Preparedness,

Response, and Recovery. GAO-06-442T, Washington D.C.: March 8, 2006. 

Page 1 Hurricane Katrina Contracts GAO-06-622T 
detail how monitoring policies and processes were put into practice. We

conducted our work from October 2005 through February 2006 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Given the environment in which they were operating, agency acquisition 

and contractor personnel have been recognized for their hard work in 

providing the goods and services required to be responsive. The response 

efforts nonetheless suffered from three primary deficiencies: 

• inadequate planning and preparation in anticipating requirements for 

needed goods and services, 

• lack of clearly communicated responsibilities across agencies and 

jurisdictions to ensure effective acquisition outcomes, and 

• insufficient numbers and inadequate deployment of personnel to 

provide for effective contractor oversight. 

A number of efforts are under way by these agencies to address the issues 

we and others have identified. 

The private sector is an important partner with the government in 

responding to and recovering from natural disasters such as Hurricanes 

Katrina and Rita. As we recently noted,

2

 such partnerships increasingly 

underlie critical government operations. With hundreds of billions of tax 

dollars spent each year on goods and services, it is essential that all federal

agency acquisitions be handled in an efficient, effective, and accountable

manner. 

Summary 

Contractors Role in 

Responding to 

Emergencies is 

Increasing 

Over $87 billion of federal funding has been appropriated in response to 

the recent hurricanes. In responding to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the 

government depended heavily on contractors to deliver ice, water, and 

food supplies; patch rooftops; and provide housing to displaced residents 

and temporary facilities to local government agencies. Overall, the 

circumstances caused by the hurricanes created a difficult environment in 

which agencies had to balance the need to deliver goods and services 

quickly with the need for appropriate controls. Although achieving that 

balance is sometimes hard to accomplish, that fact must not be allowed to

serve as an excuse for poor contracting practices. 

 2

GAO, 21st Century Challenges: Reexamining the Base of the Federal Government, 

GAO-05-325SP (Washington, D.C.: February 2005). 

Page 2 Hurricane Katrina Contracts GAO-06-622T 
There Was Inadequate 

Planning and 

Preparation in 

Anticipating 

Requirements for 

Needed Goods and 

Services 

The need for strong planning is one of the themes identified by the 

Comptroller General in regard to the government’s overall response to the 

hurricanes. Planning also must explicitly address the need for and 

management of the contractor community. In this regard, we found that 

some key agencies did not always have adequate plans for contracting in a 

major contingency situation. We also noted the competing tensions 

between the selection of national contractors and the requirement under 

the Stafford Act for a preference for contractors from the affected area.

Better planning could have alleviated those tensions. 

For example: 

• While contracts for some items were in place prior to the storm, the 

Federal Emergency Management Agency did not adequately anticipate

needs for such services as providing temporary housing and public 

buildings. 

• The practice of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is to establish 

Planning and Response Teams for various missions assigned to it by 

FEMA prior to an event, with specific responsibilities assigned to team 

members. However, the Corps indicated it did not know prior to the 

hurricane that it would be tasked by FEMA with some of the mission 

assignments it received. In one case, faced with a compressed time 

frame for acquiring portable classrooms and with no prior knowledge 

about the classroom mission they were assigned, Corps contracting 

officials placed an order, under an existing agreement, with a 

subsidiary of an Alaska Native Corporation under the Small Business 

Administration’s section 8(a) Business Development Program. The 

Corps accepted the contractor’s proposed price of $39.5 million even

though the Corps had information that the cost for the classrooms was 

significantly less than that. Based on our analysis of a quote obtained 

by the contractor from a local Mississippi business, the price the 

contractor actually paid for the classrooms, and prices for similar units 

from General Services Administration (GSA) schedule contracts, our 

preliminary conclusion is that the Corps could have, but failed to, 

negotiate a lower price. 

• Similarly, better management of requirements development could have

avoided costs to house workers and victims. Based on information 

provided by local officials, FEMA spent $3 million for 4,000 base camp 

beds that were never used. 

Page 3 Hurricane Katrina Contracts GAO-06-622T 
• Preparation was also lacking in implementation of the Stafford Act 

preference for contractors residing or doing business in the affected 

area.3 The Corps staff expressed uncertainty regarding how to apply 

preferences or determine if a company was in an affected area.

4

 Several 

GSA and FEMA officials indicated they were aware of the Stafford Act, 

but stated it is difficult to immediately factor in local businesses in 

such a catastrophic event. GSA officials stated they plan to review the 

Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) to see if additional Stafford Act 

guidance is necessary.5

In discussing our findings and observations with FEMA officials, they 

indicated that in order to better respond to future disasters, they were 

taking steps to improve in areas such as staffing and premobilization 

capabilities. However, they also stated that such pre-planning and 

preparedness has a cost. The Corps commented that contracting staff need

to have defined requirements in order to get the right type of contracts put 

in place, and the contracting staff did not always get defined requirements 

in a timely manner. Additionally, a Corps official commented that until 

funding for a particular mission is secured, preparation for it cannot go

forward and this also delayed contracting efforts. Finally, both GSA and 

the Corps noted that they tried to reach out to local and small businesses 

through forums and other means to make them aware of opportunities to 

contract with the federal government.

 3

42 U.S.C. § 5150. 

4

GAO recently issued a decision on a protest of the terms of a solicitation issued by the

Corps for demolition and debris removal in the State of Mississippi. The protester asserted, 

in part, that the Corps decision to limit the competition for this work to Mississippi firms

improperly exceeded the authority granted under a provision of the Stafford Act to provide 

a preference to firms residing, or primarily doing business, in the area affected by a major 

disaster. GAO’s decision did not view the Corps decision to implement the Stafford Act 

preference with a set-aside as an abuse of the agency’s discretion, and the Corps did not act 

improperly by limiting this competition to Mississippi firms. AshBritt, Inc. B-297889, March 

20, 2006. 

5

See FAR, Subpart 26.2-Disaster or Emergency Assistance Activities. 

Page 4 Hurricane Katrina Contracts GAO-06-622T 
We also found that processes for executing contracts were hindered by 

poor communication. As envisioned under the National Response Plan 

(NRP), federal agencies responding to a disaster carry out their acquisition 

functions through a network of federal, state, and local agencies. In some 

instances, the local or state officials determine the requirements and 

communicate them to FEMA; FEMA may write and award the contract or

communicate the requirements to another agency that writes and awards 

the contract; and then FEMA or another agency oversees contract 

performance. This approach puts a premium on aligning roles and 

responsibilities clearly and maintaining good communications to ensure 

effective execution of the contract. 

There Was a Lack of 

Clearly Communicated 

Responsibilities 

Across Agencies and 

Jurisdictions 

Our fieldwork identified examples where unclear responsibilities and poor 

communications resulted in poor acquisition outcomes. For example: 

• FEMA officials stated that a contractor spent approximately 

$10 million to renovate 160 rooms and furnish another 80 rooms in 

military barracks in Alabama that a FEMA survey team identified for 

use as temporary housing. To renovate the facility, FEMA headquarters 

awarded a contract without consulting local FEMA officials in 

Alabama. According to FEMA officials in Alabama, however, the 

facility was not needed and they tried to stop the renovation. These 

same FEMA officials stated that few evacuees agreed to live at the 

facility, and when officials decided to close the facility, it had only six 

occupants. 

• The process for ordering and delivering ice heavily depends on

effective communications between FEMA and the Corps. However, 

according to Corps officials, FEMA did not fully understand the 

contracting approach used by the Corps and ordered at least double 

the amount of ice required, resulting in an oversupply of ice and a lack 

of distribution sites available to handle the volume ordered. 

Additionally, the local Corps personnel were not always aware of 

where ice might be delivered and did not have the authority to redirect 

ice as shipments arrived, resulting in inefficient distribution and receipt 

at the state level. 

• FEMA tasked GSA to write three contracts in Louisiana for base 

camps, hotel rooms, and ambulances, with a total value of over 

$120 million. GSA contracting officers awarded the contracts, but could 

not tell us which FEMA officials would be responsible for overseeing 

contractor performance. The FEMA official identified as the main point 

of contact by GSA did not have any knowledge of these contracts or 

who was responsible for oversight. Only after contacting multiple 

Page 5 Hurricane Katrina Contracts GAO-06-622T 
FEMA officials over a 3-week period were we able to determine the 

agency officials responsible for contract oversight. 

In commenting on our findings, GSA officials stated that their role is to 

provide resource support in the response phase of a disaster, meaning 

they are responsible for executing contracts under the NRP, and FEMA is 

responsible for monitoring the contracts. FEMA officials commented that 

there needs to be more clarity regarding procurement roles and indicated

one of their goals is to work with GSA to clarify procurement 

responsibilities for the future. GSA officials indicated that the current 

memorandum of understanding between GSA and FEMA is being updated 

to reflect the standards of the new NRP as well. 

The purpose of agencies’ monitoring processes is to ensure that 

contracted goods and services are delivered in accordance with the 

agreed-upon schedule, cost, quality, and quantity provisions stated in the 

contract. Without sufficient numbers of trained people properly deployed, 

however, effective monitoring is hampered and agencies may not be able

to identify and correct poor contractor performance in a timely manner. 

Furthermore, agencies can be at risk of paying contractors more than the 

value of the services performed. 

Our work indicated that while monitoring was occurring on the contracts

we reviewed, the number of monitoring staff available was not always 

sufficient, and staff were not always effectively deployed. For example:

There Were 

Insufficient Numbers 

and Inadequate 

Deployment of 

Personnel to Provide 

for Effective 

Contractor Oversight 

• FEMA’s contracts for installing temporary housing in four states had 

only 17 of the 27 technical monitors that had been determined 

necessary to oversee contractor performance.6

• Corps officials responsible for overseeing the “blue roof” program’s 

field operations told us it was slowed down due to the lack of sufficient 

monitors.7

 6

Data provided by FEMA official was dated November 18, 2005. 

7

 he Corps manages the Operation Blue Roof mission for FEMA. Operation Blue Roof 

provides assistance to storm victims in disaster areas through the installation of rolled

plastic sheeting on damaged roofs, helping to protect property and allowing residents to 

remain in their homes. 

Page 6 Hurricane Katrina Contracts GAO-06-622T 
Deployment practices did not always provide for appropriate notification 

of responsibilities or overlap of rotating contracting officers and oversight

personnel, thus making knowledge transfer and continuity of contract 

management operations difficult. For example: 

• For four of the contracts we reviewed, officials were either unaware or 

not notified by FEMA of their oversight responsibilities. 

• The lack of overlap between oversight personnel for a large temporary 

housing contract left the most recent contract administrator with no 

knowledge or documentation of who had authorized the contractor to 

perform certain activities or why the activities were being performed. 

While discussing our findings and observations with FEMA officials, they 

emphasized that they lacked adequate staffing, but said they have made 

efforts to fill staffing gaps. Additionally, FEMA officials stated they 

recognize the need for continuity in contract oversight and indicated they

are implementing a process to ensure workload and knowledge sharing 

among rotating personnel. However, they also believe that fewer transition 

difficulties exist now as a result of hiring more people and having more 

oversight officials staying in the affected areas. GSA officials indicated 

there may also be other alternatives for ensuring adequate contract 

oversight, such as designating GSA employees to conduct oversight on 

some contracts. Corps officials stated their policy is to rotate certain 

personnel every 29 days to keep personnel costs to a minimum because of

regulations under the Fair Labor Standards Act.8

In reviewing contracts awarded for Iraq—another contingency situation—

GAO found that without effective acquisition planning, management 

processes, and sufficient numbers of capable people, poor acquisition 

outcomes resulted. GAO made recommendations regarding the need for 

ensuring that requirements for placing orders are within the scope of 

contracts; timely definition of contract terms and conditions, and 

sufficient numbers of trained staff who have clear responsibilities and 

guidance for overseeing contractor performance. Having these capabilities 

requires preparation, such as having prearranged contracts in place in 

advance of the disaster or other contingency. 

Previous Lessons Can 

Guide Agency 

Contracting Actions 

in Emergencies

 8

5 CFR § 551.208. 

Page 7 Hurricane Katrina Contracts GAO-06-622T 
Among the issues that we have identified in previous reports that warrant 

consideration by agencies when contracting in an emergency are: 

• the strategies and flexibilities they will use to plan their procurements 

to avoid the risks associated with undefined contracts; 

• the knowledge they need to have to identify, select, and manage 

contractors to achieve successful outcomes; and 

• the need to have competitively awarded contracts in place prior to the 

event against which orders can be placed as needed. 

In executing these contracts, agencies should consider such issues as how 

to effectively 

• communicate and coordinate with other agencies and with contractors; 

• define contract terms and conditions to avoid excessive costs and 

ensure desired performance; and 

• monitor contractors. 

Finally, agencies should consider crosscutting issues that affect their 

overall ability to manage contractors, such as the 

• capability of their information systems to provide visibility into

financial and contracting operations; 

• skills and training of the acquisition workforce; 

• alignment of responsibilities among the key officials in managing the 

award and oversight of contracts; and 

• the policies, procedures, and guidance for managing contracts.

In closing, in any acquisition, agencies must have in place sound 

acquisition plans, processes to make and communicate good business 

decisions, and a capable acquisition workforce to monitor contractor 

performance so that the government receives good value for the money 

spent. These components are critical to successfully managing contracts in 

any environment—even in a contingency situation such as that presented 

by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 

- - - - - 

Mr. Chairman this concludes my statement. I would be happy to respond

to any questions you or other members of the Subcommittee may have at 

this time. 

Page 8 Hurricane Katrina Contracts GAO-06-622T 
For further information regarding this testimony, please contact 

William T. Woods at (202) 512-4841 or woodsw@gao.gov. Individuals 

making key contributions to this testimony included Penny Augustine, 

James Kim, John Needham, and Shannon Simpson. 

Page 9 Hurricane Katrina Contracts GAO-06-622T 
Page 10 Hurricane Katrina Contracts GAO-06-622T 

Appendix I: Recent GAO Products on 

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita 

Hurricane Katrina: Comprehensive Policies and Procedures Are 

Needed to Ensure Appropriate Use of and Accountability for 

International Assistance. GAO-06-460, Washington, D.C.: April 6, 

2006 

Hurricane Katrina: Policies and Procedures Are Needed to Ensure 

Appropriate Use of and Accountability for International 

Assistance. GAO-06-600T, Washington, D.C.: April 6, 2006 

 

Hurricane Katrina: Status of the Health Care System in New 

Orleans and Difficult Decisions Related to Efforts to Rebuild It 

Approximately 6 Months After Hurricane Katrina. GAO-06-576R, 

Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2006 

Agency Management of Contractors Responding to Hurricanes 

Katrina and Rita. GAO-06-461R, Washington, D.C.: March 16, 2006 

Hurricane Katrina: GAO's Preliminary Observations Regarding 

Preparedness, Response, and Recovery. GAO-06-442T, Washington D.C.: 

March 8, 2006

Emergency Preparedness and Response: Some Issues and Challenges 

Associated with Major Emergency Incidents. GAO-06-467T. Washington:

D.C.: February 23, 2006. 

Disaster Preparedness: Preliminary Observations on the Evacuation of 

Hospitals and Nursing Homes Due to Hurricanes. GAO-06-443R. 

Washington: D.C.: February 16, 2006.

Investigation: Military Meals, Ready-To-Eat Sold on eBay. GAO-06-410R. 

Washington: D.C.: February 13, 2006.

Expedited Assistance for Victims of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: 

FEMA’s Control Weaknesses Exposed the Government to Significant 

Fraud and Abuse. GAO-06-403T. Washington: D.C.: February 13, 2006. 

Statement by Comptroller General David M. Walker on GAO’s 

Preliminary Observations Regarding Preparedness and Response to 

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. GAO-06-365R. Washington, D.C.: February

1, 2006. 
Federal Emergency Management Agency: Challenges for the National 

Flood Insurance Program. GAO-06-335T. Washington, D.C.: January 25,

2006. 

Hurricane Protection: Statutory and Regulatory Framework for Levee 

Maintenance and Emergency Response for the Lake Pontchartrain 

Project. GAO-06-322T. Washington, D.C.: December 15, 2005. 

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Provision of Charitable Assistance. GAO06-297T. Washington, D.C.: December 13, 2005. 

Army Corps of Engineers: History of the Lake Pontchartrain and 

Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project. GAO-06-244T. Washington, D.C.: 

November 9, 2005. 

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Preliminary Observations on Contracting 

for Response and Recovery Efforts. GAO-06-246T. Washington, D.C.: 

November 8, 2005. 

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Contracting for Response and Recovery 

Efforts. GAO-06-235T. Washington, D.C.: November 2, 2005.

Federal Emergency Management Agency: Oversight and Management of 

the National Flood Insurance Program. GAO-06-183T. Washington, D.C.: 

October 20, 2005. 

Federal Emergency Management Agency: Challenges Facing the National 

Flood Insurance Program. GAO-06-174T. Washington, D.C.: October 18, 

2005. 

Federal Emergency Management Agency: Improvements Needed to 

Enhance Oversight and Management of the National Flood Insurance 

Program. GAO-06-119. Washington, D.C.: October 18, 2005. 

Army Corps of Engineers: Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity Hurricane 

Projection Project. GAO-05-1050T. Washington, D.C.: September 28, 2005. 

Hurricane Katrina: Providing Oversight of the Nation’s Preparedness, 

Response, and Recovery Activities. GAO-05-1053T. Washington, D.C.: 

September 28, 2005.

Page 11 Hurricane Katrina Contracts GAO-06-622T (120550) 
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