2004 D e c i sion s O p inion s of the U nit e d S t at e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit
10-13-2004 

# Af r a n v . Go v of N J P r e c e de n t i al or N on-P r e c e de n t i al : N on-P r e c e de n t i al D ocke t N o . 04-3791

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Thi s de c i sion i s br ou gh t t o you for f r e e a nd ope n a c c e s s b y the O p inion s of the U nit e d S t at e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit at V i l l a no va U nive r sit y S choo l of L a

w Di g it al Re posit or y

. It h as be e n a c c e pt e d for inclusion in 2004 D e c i sion s b y a n author i z e d a dmini s tr at or of V i l l a no va U nive r sit y S choo l of L a

w Di g it al Re posit or y

. F or mor e infor m at ion, p le as e c on t a ct Be n j a min . C a rl s on@l a

w . v i l l a no va . e du . Re c omme nde d C it at ion

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w . v i l l a no va . e du/thir dc ir c uit_2004/232NOT PRE CEDENT IAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE TH IRD CIR CU IT

No. 04-3791

BRUCE I. AFRAN; CARL MAYER, on behalf of t

hemselves and a ll ot

her regi ster ed vo ter s in th e S tat e o f N ew Je rse y, Ap pellan ts

v. JAMES McGREE VEY, GOVERNOR OF THE ST ATE OF NEW JE RSEY; STATE OF NEW JERSEY

On A ppeal from the Un ited States District Co urt

for the Dis tri ct of New Jersey D.C. CivilAction No. 04-cv- 03912 (H ono rab le G arre tt E. B row n, Jr.) Argued October 7, 2004 Be for e: S CIR ICA , Chief Judge , M cK EE and FIS HE R, Circuit Judges (Fil ed: October

13, 2004)

Bru ce I. A fran , 

### Esquire (Argued) 10 Braeburn Drive Princet on, New Jersey08540 Ca rl J. M ayer, 

### Esquire (Argued) 58 Battl e Road Princet on, New Jersey08540 Attorney s for

Class Appell ants and Pro Se2

Ste fan ie A . Bra nd, 

### Esquire (Argued) Office of Attorney Generalof New Jersey De partm ent of Law and P ublic S afety 25 Market Stree t P.O. Box 112 Trenton, New Jersey 08625 Attorneyfor Appelle es

OPINI ON OF THE COURT

PER CURIAM
. This matt er requi res us t o determi ne the effec t under t he New Jersey Const

itution and s tatutes o f G over nor Ja mes M cG reeve y’s Aug ust 12 , 2004 anno unce men t that he will resi gn effecti ve November 15, 2004. Plaintiffs as k us to orde r the St ate of New Jersey to hold a s pecialgubernatorial election. Under the New Jersey Constituti on, such an election is r equired if there i s a “vacancy ” in offi ce. There i s no vacancyhere becaus e the Governor ha s not y et res igned and because he cont

inues t o serve and occ upy the office. Absent a vacancy , no speci al election is man dated . We will af firm th e judg men t of the Distric t Cou rt. I. Facts James McGreevey was ele cted as Governor of the State of New Jerseyon November 6, 2001, and was sworn i n January15, 2002. He was el ected t o a four-y ear term which expi res January 17, 2006.3

At an Au gust 1 2, 200 4 pre ss con feren ce, M cG reeve y publicly an nou nced his intentio n to res ign b efore the co mp letion o f his term . Citing “an a dult co nsen sual af fair with another man” w hich he believed would render the office “vulnerable to rumors, false allega tions, an d threa ts of d isclosu re,” M cG reeve y declare d “the right co urse o f actio n is to re sign .” Fo r the oste nsib le pu rpo se o f fa cilitat ing “a re spo nsib le tra nsitio n,” McG reeveystat ed that

the effect

ive dat e of his r esignation “willbe November 15, 2004.” McG reeveycontinue s to di scharge t he powers and functi ons of the New Jersey governorship. The Go vern or’s state d inten tion to re sign “ effe ctive” No vem ber 1 5, 200 4 is signi ficant . Had McGreevey “vacated” his offi ce prior to September

3, 2004, t

he New Je rs eyCon stit

ut io n wo ul d r eq ui re th at hi s s uc ce ss orbe el ec te d on Nov emb er2, 200 4. On the othe r hand, i f the offi ce is “va cated” after September 3, 2004, t

he Presi dent of the New Jersey Senate would serve as acti ng governor until t he next el ected governor takes of fic e in Ja nu ar y 20 06 . T he cu rre nt Pr es id en t o f th e N ew Je rse y Se na te i s R ich ar d C od ey,

w ho , lik e M cG re ev ey, i s a m em be r o f th e D em oc ra tic Pa rty. Plaintif fs B ruce A fran a nd C arl M ayer, purp orting to repres ent a c lass of all regis tered New Jers ey voters, brought t his action in fe deral c ourt on August 16, 2004, seeking a de claration t

hat Governor McGreevey “vacated” his offi ce under the New Jersey Constit ution; that t

his “vaca ncy” requires election of a new governor on November 2, 2004, to serve the remainder of the t erm; and that McGreevey’ s conti nued occupati on1 Afran v. McGreevey , __ F. Sup p. 2d __, 20 04 W L 207 2535 (D .N.J. Sept. 15, 200 4). 4 of the Governor’ s office i nfringes plaint iffs’ First , Fift

h, and Fourteenth Amendment right s in vi olati on of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Distri ct Court f or the Dis tri ct of New Jersey denied pl ainti ffs’ re quest for declar atoryand injunc tive relie f under 28 U.S.C. § 2201 and di smi ss ed t

hei r § 198 3 ac ti on f

orfai lu re to st at e a c la im. 1 Bec ause this cas e invo lves o nly que stion s of law , our rev iew is ple nar y. Poll ic e v. Nat’ l Tax Fund ing , L. P. , 225 F.3d 379, 388 -8 9 ( 3d Ci r. 200 0) . We wil l a ffi rm. II. FederalJurisdic tion We have juris dicti on under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 over the Dis tri ct Court’ s finalorder denyi ng Plaintiffs’ motion for de claratoryjudgment and di smissi ng the case . The District Court properly exerci sed it s federaljuri sdiction under 28 U.S. C. §§ 1331 and 1343. Fed eral j urisd ictio n is p rop er w her e pla intif fs a sser t a no n-f rivo lou s fe der al cla im. M artin v. U nited W ay of E rie C oun ty , 829 F.2d 445, 447 (3d Cir. 1987) (ci ting Bell v. Hood , 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946)). Only where t he clai m upon which federal j urisdi ction hin ges is “in sub stan tial o n [its ] fac e” is dism issal for wa nt o f jur isdic tion req uire d. Kulick v. Pocono Downs Racing Ass’n, Inc. , 816 F.2d 895, 898-99 (3d Cir . 1987) ( quoting Hagans v. Lavine , 415 U.S. 528, 542 n.10 (1974) ). Moreover, dismis sal for lack of juri sdiction is only appropri ate where “t he right clai med is ‘so i nsubstant ial, implausible, forecl osed by prior

decisi ons of thi s Court, or otherwise complet elydevoid of meri t as not2 Th e jur isdic tion al lan gua ge o f 28 U.S .C. § 134 3 tra cks the la ngu age of 2 8 U .S.C . §

1983, but each calls for a distinct analy sis: Under eithe r [§ 1331 or § 1343] , a court has jurisdi ction ove r the di spute so l ong as the plainti ff all eges that defendant’ s acti ons viol ate the requis ite f ederal law: under § 1331, anyfederal law; under § 1343, only laws that relate to ci vil rights . Once the plainti ff has met this threshol d pleadi ng requir ement, however, the tr uth of the facts a llege d in the c omplaint is a ques tion on t

he merit s, as is the legalquesti on wh ether th e fac ts allege d estab lish a vio lation. O therw ise, the d istrict cou rt could turn an at

tack on the merit s, agai nst which t he party has the pr ocedural protect ions of a full tri al inc luding t he right to a jur y, into an attac k on juri sdiction, whic h a court mayresol ve at anytime. Kulick , 816 F.2d 895, 897-98 (ci ting Duke Power Co. v. Caroli na Envtl. Study Group, Inc. , 438 U.S. 59, 70-71 (1978) a nd Bell , 327 U .S. at 68 2); see als o Fraternal Order of Pol ic e De

p’ t o f C or rs . L abo r Co mm. v. Wil li ams , 375 F.3d 1141, 11 43-44 (D .C. Cir. 2004) (di fferentiati ng standar d for dis missi ng § 1983 clai m for lack of j urisdi ction f rom that applied to m otion to dismiss § 1983 c laim for failure to state a c laim); Taxpayers Un ited for A ssessm ent C uts v. A ustin , 994 F.2d 291, 295-96 (6th Cir. 1991) (dismi ssing acti on under § 1983 for fai lure t o stat e a clai m despite hol ding that plaint iffs’ assert

ion of a “colorab le claim” un der § 19 83 w as sufficient to g ive rise to federal jurisdiction). 5 to invol ve a federalcontrover sy. ’” Id. at 899 (quoting Oneida Indian Nati on v. County of Oneida , 414 U .S. 661, 666 (1974)). In thi s case, plaint

iffs cl aim theywere deprive d of thei r constitutionall y pr otect ed right to vote. Although we conclude t hat plainti ffs have fai led to s tate a clai m upon which reli ef may be gr anted under § 1983, thi s does not de prive a f ederal court of juris dicti on. See Kulick , 816 F .2d at 8 98; M artin , 829 F.2d at 447. 2 Because plai ntiff s alleg e de priv ation of a fun dam enta l righ t pro tecte d by th e C ons titutio n, see Reynolds v. Si ms , 377 U .S. 533, 554 (1964), fed eral jurisdiction is proper.6 III. Abstention and Certif icati on De fend ants u rged the D istrict Co urt to ab stain fro m as serting fede ral jurisd iction in light of the al legedl y unse ttl ed stat us of New Jersey law, a posi tion pl ainti ffs– afte r opp osin g it in the D istrict Co urt– now adv anc e in th e alte rna tive t o th is co urt. See R. R. Comm ’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co. , 312 U .S. 496 (194 1). Th e D istrict Co urt dec lined to abstain . Altho ugh we rely upon diffe rent rea sonin g, w e agre e that a bsten tion is inappropriate in thi s case. The Pullman doctri ne authori zes federa l court abstention when a consti tuti onal challenge is int ertwined with an ambiguous issue of state law and a likelihood exists, theref ore, t hat cl arifi cati on of the st ate l aw issue wil l subst antia lly affect t he consti tuti onal inq uiry. Id. In order to ab stain under Pullman , the re must be t hree “spec ial circum stance s:” (1 ) Unc er ta in is sue s of

st at e l aw un derly in g t he f ede ra l c ons ti tu ti ona l c la ims brou ght in f edera l court; (2) State la w issues amenabl e to a st ate court interpret ation t hat would obviate the need for, or subst antia lly narrow, t

he scope of the adjudi cati on of the const itutional claims; (3) A federalcourt’ s errone ous constr uction of stat e law would be disr uptive of important stat e policies. Chez Sez III

Corp. v. Townshi

p of Union , 945 F.2d 628, 631 (3d Cir. 1991) (ci ting D’Io rio v. C oun ty of D el. , 592 F.2d 681, 686 (3d Cir. 197 8)) cert. denied , 503 U.S. 907 (1992). If the c ourt finds these three circum stances, “it must then make a discretionary7

determi nation a s to whether abstention is in fact

appropri ate under

the ci rcumstance s of the part icular case, based on the wei ght of the se cri teri a and other releva nt fact ors. ” Id. Absten tion under Pullman theref ore is discr etionary and is gener ally exerci sed spa ring ly. City o

f Ho uston v. Hill , 482 U.S. 451, 467 (1987) (c iti ng Colo. Rive r Water Conservati on Dist. v. United State s , 424 U .S. 800, 813 (1976)); see als o Baggett v. Bullitt , 377 U .S. 360 , 375 ( 196 4) (“T he ab stention doctrin e is no t an au toma tic rule applie d whenever a federalcourt i s faced with a doubtful issue of stat e law; i t rat

her invo lves a d iscretion ary exerc ise of a cour t’s equ ity pow ers.”); Planned Parenthood of Cent. N.J. v. Farmer , 220 F.3d 127, 149 (3d Cir. 199 9) (“ Pullman abstention shoul d be rarely invoked”). Mor eo ve r, amb ig ui ty

in st at e l aw wi llnot , s ta ndi ng alo ne , req ui re ab st en ti on. As the Supreme Court

stat ed: [ Pullman absten tion] co ntem plates th at def erenc e to state cour t adjud ication only be made where the i ssue of st ate l aw is uncert ain. If the s tate stat ute in que sti on, although ne ver interpreted by a s tate tri bunal, is not fairl y subj ect t o an inter pretat ion which willrender unnec essary or subst antia lly

modify t he federal cons titutional q uestion , it is the du ty of the f edera l court to exerc ise its pro perly invoked jurisdi ction. Thus, “rec ogniti on of the rol e of state courts as the fi nal expositors of state law imp lies no disregard f or the prima cy of the federa l judiciary in d ecid ing que stion s of fed eral l aw .” Harman v. Forssenius , 380 U.S. 528, 535 (1965) (quot ing England v. La. State Bd. Med. Exam ’rs , 375 U .S. 411, 415 -16 (196 4)) (citations omitted). Princi ples of comi ty and federal ism counselfor a st ate const itutional i nterpr etation by st ate courts. But the st ate l aw which control s our deci sion is no t un certa in.8

Furthermore, the discr etionary analy sis i n this case must be i nformed by c onsider ations of timi ng, as wellas the pol icydisfavoring forum-s hopping. Were we to abs tain, a final judici al det ermination would be subst antia lly delay ed. In a t

ime-sens iti ve environment such as that p resen ted by a ra pidly app roach ing ele ction, p rejudic e to bo th partie s wo uld inev itabl y resu lt fro m s uch dela y. See Farmer , 220 F.3d at 151 (noting that delayis a relevant factor in c onsidering w hether to abstain). Moreover, ci ting an “ immense confli ct of i nteres t” in an adjudic ation by the New Jersey courts , pla inti ffs elec ted to bring sui t in fe deral c ourt. But having obt ained an adverse ru ling on the m erits, plaintiffs now– in a reversal of p osition– argue to this court that t he New Jersey s tate courts are better s uited to resol ving thi s dispute. We disagr ee and h old tha t Pullman abstention is inappropriate in thi s case. 

### Pl ai nt iffs co nt en d i n t he al te rn at iv e t ha t w e s ho ul d c er ti fy to the New Jers ey Suprem e Cou rt 

### the question whether Governor McGreevey’ s action effects a vacancy under the New Jerse

y Cons tit ution. Under New Jersey Court Rule 2:12A, the New Jersey Supreme Court may answer such a ques tion i f “ther e is no cont roll ing appel late decisi on,

con stitutio nal p rov ision or sta tute i n th is Sta te.” P ress ler, Current N.J. Court Rules , R.2:12A (Gann 2004). The use of certific ation “ rest s in the sound disc reti on of the feder al court s.” Leh ma n B ros . v. Sc hein , 416 U .S. 386, 391 (1974) (R ehnqu ist, J., concu rring). Mo reover, this court “maynot properly ask a st ate court if i t would care in effect to rewri te a9

statu te,” o r a co nstitu tion al pr ovi sion

. Farmer , 220 F.3d at 152 n.12 (quoti ng Hil l, 482 U.S . at 471 ). Relying upo n the s ame cons ideratio ns w hich in form our d ecision not to abstain – timin g, fea sibility, public p olicy, and p laintiffs ’ cho ice of foru m– we declin e to employ c erti fication in t his cas e. IV. T he C onst itution al C laim Plaintif fs alleg e they ha ve be en de prived of the ir right to v ote un der the First, Fifth, and F ourteenth A mend ments in v iolation of 42 U .S.C. § 198 3. The D istrict Court di smi ss ed t

hi s c la im u nde r Fe d. R. Ci v. P. 12( b) (6 ) f orfai lu re to st at e a c la im. To state a claim for violation of § 1983, plaintiffs must all ege that defendants, while acting under col or of st ate l aw, deprive d them of ri ghts, privi leges, or immunities

sec ure d by th e C ons titutio n or law s of the U nited Sta tes. Parratt v. Tayl or , 451 U.S. 527, 535 (19 81) ov er ru le d on othe r g ro und s, Dan ie l v . W

il li ams , 474 U .S. 327 (198 6); see also Gru enke v. Seip , 225 F.3d 290, 298 (3d Cir. 2000). Thi s court ’s ini tialinquiry, theref ore, is whether

plaint iffs have “ alle ged the deprivati on of a right that e ither

federal law or the Constit ution pr otect s.” Gruenke , 225 F.3d at 298 (citing Baker v. McCollan , 443 U. S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979 )). The Constitution pr otect s the right of qua lifi ed citizens t o vote in bot h nationa l and loca l elec tion s. Rey nol ds v. Si ms , 377 U .S. 533 , 554 ( 196 4) (“It h as be en rep eated ly recog nized that all qu alified v oters h ave a cons titutionally pro tected right to v ote, an d to have thei r votes counted. ”) (ci ting Ex parte Yarbrough , 110 U.S. 651 ( 1884) and United3 Fo r this reas on, f ede ral co urts d o no t gen erall y med dle in loca l elec tion s. See Gam za

v. Aguirre , 619 F.2d 449, 454 (5th Cir . 1980) ( holding t hat Section 1983 does “not authori ze federalcourts to be st ate el ecti on monitors ”). I ndeed, el ecti on law disput es gen erall y lie w ithin the p rov ince of th e sta te co urts. See Powell v. Power , 436 F.2d 84, 86 (2d Cir. 1970) (noting that juri sdiction over l ocal el ecti on disput es, “wit h certa in narr ow and w ell defined ex ceptions,” rem ains “in the exc lusive cogn izance of the state courts”). 10 Statesv. Mosley , 238 U .S. 383 (191 5)); see als o Yick Wo v. Hopkins , 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) (not

ing that voting i s a “fundamentalpolitical right ”). Despi te constitutional protect ion of the franchi se, however, not every imperfection in s tateand localelections rises to th e lev el of a co nstitu tion al vio latio n. Duncan v. Poythress , 657 F.2d 691, 699 (5th Cir. 1981 ); see also Forenza v. Rodgers , 633 A.2d 1057, 1059 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1992) ( finding t

he proposi tion t

hat “not everyviolat

ion of st ate el ecti on law constitutes a den ial of constitutionally guaranteed rights” to be “w ell established”). 3 But there are exceptions t o the gener al rul e that federal courts do not superintend the administration of local electoralcontests. Where a discrete group of voters suffers a den ial of equ al pr otec tion , for exa mp le, the ir co nstitu tion al rig hts a re v iolat ed. See Reynolds , 377 U.S. at 559-61. Of relevance to this case, a cl aim under § 1983 w ill al so lie wh ere state or loca l election infrac tions w ork a denia l of su bstan tive du e pro cess rig hts in v iolat ion of th e Fo urte enth Am end me nt. See, e .g., Bon as v. T ow n of N . Sm ithfield , 265 F.3d 69, 74 ( 1st Cir . 2001) ( “[I]n t hose few cases i n which organic fail ures i n a state or local e lection proc ess thre aten to wo rk pa tent an d fu ndam ental u nfairn ess, a co lorable claim lies for a violatio n of subs tantive due p roces s”); Duncan , 657 F.2d at 700 (holdi ng11

that “th e due proc ess cla use o f the f ourtee nth am endm ent pro hibits ac tion by state officials wh ich seriously underm ine the fun dame ntal fairness of the electoral process” ); Griff in v. Burns , 570 F .2d 10 65, 10 77 (1 st Cir. 19 78) (“ If the e lection proc ess itself reaches the point of patent and fundamental unfairness, a violat ion of the due process clause may be indica ted an d relief und er § 1 983 theref ore in o rder.”); see als o Marks v. Stins on , 19 F.3d 873, 889 (3d Cir. 1994) (enj oining winni ng stat e senate candidat e from exercising of ficial authority where ab sentee ballots w ere obtained and cast illegally). We find in structive the de cision o f the C ourt o f A ppea ls for th e First C ircuit in Bon as v. T ow n of N orth S mith field , 265 F.3d 69 ( 1st Cir . 2001). In Bonas , four regist ered voters in the town of North Smithfie ld sought to compel an el ecti on in November 2001 for the No rth Sm ithfield to wn coun cil and scho ol com mittee. B ecau se a ref erend um to trans iti on the town from an odd- year election cy cle t o an even-y ear cy cle had been ad opted in 199 8, an d r eg ul ar ly sc he dul ed el ec ti ons ha d be en he ldin 199 9, th e t own decided not

to hold a muni cipal election in 2001. Invoking § 1983, plaint iffs– who desir ed to exer cise t

heir right t o vote for town council and sc hool committee in 2001– filed suit in federal dist

rict court claiming denial of their constituti onal rights. The court r ecognized t

he limi ted rea ch of federaljuri sdiction over cl aims ari sing from state or lo cal elec tion dis putes but h eld tha t wh ere the election proc ess is pa tently and fun dam enta lly unf air, su bsta ntiv e du e pr oce ss v iolat ion s ca n oc cur . Id. at 74

. “[T]otaland complete di senfranchi sement of the elect orate a s a whole,” he ld the Bonas12

court, is one suc h inst ance of patent and fundamental unfairne ss givi ng rise to a

con stitutio nal c laim

. Id. at 75. To de termine w hether such disenfranc hisemen t had in fact oc curred, the cou rt tu rn ed to st at e l aw: Do state and l ocal rul es mandate an el ecti on in North Smit hfiel d for the off

ices of town council and school committee i n the fal l of 2001? Assuming that such an election is requ ired...the T ow n’s ref usal to h old it w ould wo rk a tota l and c om plete disenfr anchisement

of the el ectorate, and there fore would constitute a viol ation of due pro cess (in addition to b eing a violation o f state law). Id. ; s ee also Tax

paye rs U nited fo r Ass essm ent C uts v. A ustin , 994 F .2d 29 1, 295 -96 (6 th Cir. 1991) (same). We employ a si milar analy tic f ramework. Assuming New Jersey law requir es an ele ction i n this case, refusal to hold it would rise to the l evel of a consti tuti onal viol ation. The determinative i nquiry , the refore, is whether New Jersey l aw requires an election under t

hese circumstances. As we discuss, we answer that que sti on in the negati ve. Therefore, there is no violat ion of pla inti ffs’ subs tanti ve due process right s, and theyhave fail ed to st ate a cl aim under § 1983. V. New Jersey Law As a thresh old m atter, the p arties vig orou sly dispute the m ethod of inte rpretatio n to be employ ed in thi s case. Defendants urge t his court to relyupon the plain meaning of the New JerseyConstit

ution, while plainti ffs suggest an expansive inter

pretat ion.13

Plaintiffs r elyheavil y upon a “l iberal ” rule of construction t

hey at tri bute to t

he New Jersey Supr eme Court’s opi nion in New Jersey Democratic Part y, Inc. v. Samson , 175 N.J. 178 ( 2002). I n Samson , Senat or Robert Torricel li wit hdrew his candi dacy for United States Senator

approximat elyfive weeks befor e the November 2002 genera l election. The New Jersey Democratic Party request ed Torric elli ’s name be taken off the ballot a nd re place d w ith the n ame of a n ew cand idate. T he ap plicab le Ne w Je rsey statute set forth the procedures for replac ement onlywhen the vacancyon the bal lot occ urred “no t later than the 5 1st d ay be for e the gen eral e lectio n.” N .J. Sta t. An n. 19 :13 -20

. Regarding vacanc ies arisi ng within fi ftydays of the el ecti on, however, the Samson court found the st atute sil ent regarding r eplacement . Reasoni ng that reconfigur ation of the ballots w as log istically feasib le, and emp hasizin g its belie f that th e app licable s tatute d id not speci fical ly preclude such a remedy , the New Jersey Supr eme Court permit ted plaintiff s to inse rt a new cand idate o n the b allot. Signifi cantl y, the Samson court cons trued a New Jers ey s tatute, rat her than a

New Jersey consti tuti onal provi sion. We decline t o applythe “l iberal ” inte rpret ation urged by plaint iffs t o the st ate Consti tuti on where there is no i ndication that the New Jersey Supreme Court would it self es pouse such an appr oach. Pl ainti ffs conceded at oral argu men t that the N ew Jersey Su prem e Co urt has neve r exp ressly end orsed a “libe ral” approach t o inter

pretat ion of the stat e Constit

ution.14

Of even greater

signi ficance, the New JerseyConstit ution–i n Articl e V, secti on 1, paragraphs 6 through 9–addr esses ea ch scenari o generat ed by a gube rnatorial va cancy and provides m eans for f illing it. Where the lang uage o f a constitutional pro vision is clear, the w ord s m ust b e giv en th eir p lain m ean ing

. Cambria v. Soari es , 776 A.2d 754, 758 (N.J. 2001) (quoting State v . Trump Hotels & Casino Resort s, I nc. , 734 A.2d 1160 (N .J. 1999)). We are mindful of New Jersey ’s poli cy pr eference i n favor of empowering voters , but w e belie ve the langu age o f the C onstitu tion inc orpo rates this princip le with in its text. Because the Constitution anti cipat es and provi des for suc cessi on and election proc edur es fo llow ing a v acan cy in the o ffice of the Go vern or, ou r textua l analysis is already i nfused by New Jersey’s preference for electi ng officials. Our analy sis must begin with t

he text its elf. The New Jersey Constitution ident ifie s severa l ways in which a gubernatori al “vacancy ” may arise, among them resi gnation. N.J. Const . Art. V, § 1, ¶¶ 6-8. Plaintiffs argue that by vi rtue of Governor M cGreevey’s August 12th announcem ent, there i s a vacancy in the of

fice of Governor . Because we find t his announcement

alone does not consti tute a

resi gnation, we disagree. The New Jersey Constitution est ablis hes a comprehensi ve framework by whic h unexpected t

ransfer s of power in the office of t he Governor willtake pl ace. When a governor r esigns, a vacancy aris es and the Constitution provi des for a pr ovisi onal fulfi llment

of the governor’s duties bythe Pres ident of the Senat e:4 In Ti tl e 1 9 of th e Ne w Je rs eyCod e, whi ch se ts fo rt h Ne w Je rs eyel ec ti on l aw, “generalelection” is defined as “the annualelection to be he ld on the f irst Tuesday a fter the fi rst Monday in November.” N. J . Stat . Ann. § 19:1- 1. 15 In the eve nt of a vacancy in the of fice of Governor

resul ting fr om the death, resi gnation or

removal of a Governor in offi ce, or t

he death of a Governor -elec t, or from any ot

her cause, the functions, powers, duties and emol uments of the office shalldevolve upon the Presi dent of the Senate, for the t ime being, and in the event of his deat

h, res ignati on or removal, then upon the Speaker of the General As sem bly . . . . N.J . Co nst. A rt. V , § 1, ¶ 6 (“ Par agr aph 6”)

. In ad dition to prov iding f or the im med iate assu mp tion of pow er by the S enate Preside nt, t

he Constit

ution al so provide s that a vacancy in the of

fice of t he Governor will– i n some circumst ances– trigger a s pecialgubernatorial e lection: In the e vent o f a va canc y in the of fice o f G over nor, a G over nor sh all be e lected to fill t he unexpired term at the general electi on next succeeding the vacancy, unless the vacancy

shalloccur withi n sixty day s immediat elyprecedi ng a generalelection, in which case he shallbe elected at the second succe eding gener al el ecti on; but no election to fill an u nexp ired term shall be held in any year in w hich a Go vern or is to be e lected for a f ull term . A G over nor e lected for an unex pired te rm sh all assume his of

fice i mmediatel y upon hi s elect ion. N.J. Co nst. Art. V, § 1, ¶ 9 (“Paragrap h 9”). 4 Reading thes e two provis ions t ogether, it i s apparent that t he New Jersey Constit ution contemplates the res ignati on of the governor and subseque nt tr ansfer of pow er as a three-step p rocess: first, the creation of a vacanc y by the governor’s resi gnation; second, t

he assumpti on of the powers and dut ies of t he Governor’s off

ice by the Senat e Presi dent; and thir d, an el ecti on to dete rmine the next governor . The ti ming of5 Should a vacancyoccur withi n the si xty days precedi ng a general election, anew

governor wil l be el ected at the “sec ond succeedi ng” generalelection. For example, i f a vacancy occurred i n October– withi n the si xty day window immediatelyprecedi ng a November general el ecti on– a new governor would be el ected thirt een months later, at the next gener al el ecti on. Second, where a vacancyoccurs between 61 and 364 days bef ore a general election, anew governor willbe elected at that next general election to fi ll t he rema inder o f the re signin g go vern or’s term . For e xam ple, w ere a v acan cy to arise in May, an el ecti on would be held the foll owing November and the victor would assume the gov erno r’s off ice un til the nex t regula rly sched uled g uber natoria l election – w hich c ould be up to three ye ars l ater. And finall y, should a vaca ncy arise during the y ear of a reg ular ly sche dul ed g ube rna toria l elec tion , a su cce sso r w oul d be cho sen at tha t elec tion

. If a vacancy

aris es in February of the fi nal y ear of a governor’s term, for e xample, a ne w govern or wo uld be elected for a full term the following Nov embe r. 16 the fi rst s tep– that is , when the Governor’ s office be comes vacant– determines bot h the date of the next gubernatori al el ecti on 5 and the duration of t he Senate Pre sident ’s te rm as acti ng governor. Unsurpris ingly , it is this dat e of “vacancy ” which li es at t he center of the current dispute. The parties offer competing views. According to pl ainti ffs, a va cancy arose i n the offi ce of Governor on August 12, 200 4, be cau se M cG reev ey’s p ubl ic an nou nce me nt co nstitu ted a n ef fec tive r esig natio n. Because thi s announcement came more t han sixty day s before t

he next gener al el ecti on, they argue Parag raph 9 req uires that an election to f ill the remainder of Mc Greev ey’s term be he ld on N ov em be r 2 , 20 04 , or – a s th ey s tat ed at o ra l ar gu m en t– on a ju di cia llydeterm ined d ate in th e futu re. De fend ants, co nver sely, conte nd th at no v acan cy exists because no re signation has occur red.6 The New Jersey Constitution provi des that a vacancy in the Governor ’s offi ce can aris e by vi rtue of de ath, removal, resi gnation, fail ure to qual ify , absence from the st ate, impeachment, or inabi lit y t o discharge the duties of offi ce by reason of mentalor phy sical disabi lit y. N.J. Const . Art. V, § 1, ¶¶ 6-7. 17 W e ag ree w ith d efe nda nts o n th is po int. U nde r the Ne w J erse y Co nstitu tion , a vacancy will arise upon r esignation. 6 Because Governor McGreevey has not res igned, th er e is no va ca nc y. On Au gust 1 2, 200 4, G over nor M cG reeve y made a dec laration that he wo uld resig n fr om off ice a nd t hat s uch resig natio n “w ill be eff ectiv e” N ove mb er 1 5, 20 04. Un der N ew Jersey law , he ha s not tak en the steps n ecess ary to transla te this announcement into an offic ial act. Chapter 14 of New Jersey Code Title 52 s ets forth “[m]ethods of resi gning from office” for both elected and appointed officers: Whenever a state officer holding an of

fice under

the appoi ntment of t

he joint meeting of t

he legi slat

ure shal l be desi rous of re signi ng, he shal l pres ent such resi gnation i n writi ng under his hand, duri ng the si tti ng of the l egisl ature a ddressed to th e join t me eting

. All other state officers desiro us of resign ing sh all send their resi gnations , in wri ting, to the gove rnor. All such r esignations shal l be fi led in t he off ice o f the sec retar y of sta te. No resignat ion made in any ot her way or pretended t

o be made, shall

be vali d. N.J. Stat. Ann . 52:14-10 (e mph asis added ). The text of section 14-1 0 req uires th at a go vern or file a written resign ation w ith the Secre taryof State to effect uate hi s resi gnation. After speci fyi ng the res ignati on procedures to be fol lowed by “astat e officer holding an of

fice under

the appoi ntment of7 Elsewhere i n the New JerseyCode, the governor is s pecifi call y i ncluded within the

stat utorydefini tion of a

“person hol ding an offi ce in this State. ” N.J. St at. Ann. 52:14- 7(a). 18 the joi nt meeti ng of the l egisl ature, ” the st atute uses al l-i nclusi ve language r equiri ng that “[a]l l other

stat e officer s” fil e written resi gnations with the of fice of t he Secret ary of State. N.J. St at. Ann. 52:14-10. 7 Even though the r equirement that resignations fi rst be sent “t o the governor ” may be r edundant when it is the governor r esigni ng, thi s does not defe at app lication o f sectio n 14 -10 to gub ernato rial resign ations. T he go vern or falls with in the c atch-a ll catego ry of “all o ther state offic ers” an d his re signa tion m ust, ther efo re, co mp ly with the te rms of th e sta tute. See id. ( “No resi gnation made i n any other w ay or pretended to be ma de, shall be valid.”). Th e s ub m iss io n o f a w ritt en let ter of re sig na tio n t o t he Se cr eta ry o f S tat e b y a departi ng governor, in accor dance with se ction 14- 10, is an establ ished pr acti ce in New Jersey . Each of the four New Jerseygovernors to have resi gned in the last 106 year s have

su bm i t t ed a w r i t t en r es i gn ati on t o the Se cr et ary of St ate. I n 1 89 8, Go ve r no r Jo hn W. Griggs su bmitted a w ritten letter of resignation to Sec retary of State Geo rge W urts. In 1913, G overno r Wo odrow Wilson s ubm itted a hand-w ritten resignation to the Se cretary of State so that

he could ass ume the presi dency of t he United States. In 1919, Governor Edge subm itted a written letter of resignation to Secretary of State T hom as M artin. More

recen tly, in 2001 Go vern or C hristine T odd Wh itman tende red a w ritten resig nation to Secretary of State DeForest Soaries.19

Plaintif fs urg e that M cG reeve y’s public anno unce men t is mo re “fin al” tha n w ould be a le tter to the Secr etary of S tate un der se ction 1 4-10 . The y posit that “ [e]ve n if [McG reevey ] theor etic ally retai ns the power t o stayon and change his decisi on... the reality is that he is not ch angin g his m ind an d he is goin g.” T he leg al reality, how ever, is

som ething diffe rent. U nder Ne w Je rsey law , a resign ation is n ot valid unles s it is in writi ng and fil ed in the office of t he Secret ary of State . “No resi gnation made i n any other wayor pret ended to be made, shallbe vali d.” N.J. Stat. Ann. 52:14-10. Plaintiffs have cit ed no stat

utoryprovisi on to the c ontrary, rely ing ins tead on the argument t hat McG reevey ’s publi c announcement i s “functi onally far more defi niti ve and finalthan would be a letter of resignation quietly and privatelydelive red to a gove rnment offi cial .” Bu t the N ew Jersey leg islature h as set f orth w hat co nstitutes a “def initive an d fina l” resignation. McG reevey’s announcement has not satisfi ed these statutory requir ements. By requ iring a w ritten filing with the S ecreta ry of State – a cle ar and conc rete

ma nife statio n of resig natio n– t he le gisla ture has assu red clari ty in the resig natio n pr oce ss. Because Governor McGreevey has not y et offi cial ly resi gned from the offi ce of the Governor, t

here is no vacancy under the New Jers ey Constitution. VI. Conclusion In sum, we hold t

hat the re is no vacancy in the of fice of New Jersey

Governor bec aus e Ja me s M cG reev ey, the cur ren t go ver nor , has not off icially re sign ed f rom off ice. Because it is the existence of a vacancy which triggers Paragraph 9’s election procedures,20

no specialelection is call ed for by New Jersey l aw. Absent a st ate l aw requirement that such an ele ction be held, plaint iffs have f

aile d to st ate a cl aim under § 1983 for violat ion of their Fourteenth Amendm ent rights t o substantive due process. For th e r eas ons st at ed, we wi llaff irm.