This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A15-0623

State of Minnesota, 

Respondent, 

vs. 

James Pierre Dortch, 

Appellant.

Filed April 4, 2016

Affirmed

Jesson, Judge

Ramsey County District Court

File No. 62-CR-14-6452

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Kaarin Long, Assistant County Attorney, 

St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Tara Reese Duginske, Special 

Assistant Public Defender, Briggs and Morgan, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for 

appellant)

Considered and decided by Kirk, Presiding Judge; Jesson, Judge; and Peterson, 

Judge. 

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

JESSON, Judge

Appellant challenges his conviction of possession of a firearm by an ineligible 

person, arguing that his right to a speedy trial was violated and that there was insufficient 
2

evidence to support his conviction. Because appellant’s defense was not prejudiced by 

the trial delays and the evidence supports the conviction, we affirm. 

FACTS

In August 2014, Saint Paul police responded to a report of a group of males, 

including one wearing a black t-shirt with red lettering, with a gun. When the officers 

conducted a felony stop of the men and ordered them to get on the ground, the man 

wearing the black t-shirt began to run away while holding the waistband of his pants. 

The other men in the group complied with the officers’ commands. Officers pursued the 

running man, but lost sight of him for about 10 seconds when he ran behind some trees. 

The man was apprehended shortly thereafter and identified as appellant James Pierre 

Dortch. Officers searched the area where Dortch had briefly hidden, and discovered a .45 

caliber handgun with an obliterated serial number. The handgun “was not dirty, was not 

dusty, and did not appear as if it had been abandoned there for an extended period of 

time.” Based on the handgun’s condition, the officers believed it had very recently been 

discarded. Dortch was arrested and charged with possession of a firearm by an ineligible 

person and possession of a firearm with an altered serial number. 

Two days after his arrest, Dortch made a phone call from jail in which he stated 

that “they a-- ain’t found nothing on me but, sh-t, they, they found that mother--cker and 

it’s my DNA on there. . . . They didn’t find it on me. They found it though. You feel 

me? And I was the only one that ran over there so they charged me with it.” Subsequent 

testing did not match Dortch’s DNA to a sample taken from the handgun. 
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On September 24, 2014, Dortch demanded a speedy trial and a jury trial was set 

for November 17, 2014. On November 17, at the state’s request to allow more time for 

DNA analysis, the district court rescheduled the jury trial for November 24, 2014. On 

November 24, Dortch requested a continuance to allow him more time to review the 

DNA results, and the district court rescheduled the jury trial for December 1, 2014. On 

December 1, Dortch waived his right to a jury trial and a bench trial began. The bench

trial continued on December 5 and 26, 2014. On January 7, 2015, the district court made 

findings of guilt on the record, and on January 14, 2015, the district court issued a written

order consistent with the on-the-record findings. This appeal follows. 

D E C I S I O N

I.

Both the United States and Minnesota constitutions guarantee a criminal defendant 

the right to a speedy trial. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Minn. Const. art. I, § 6. “A speedytrial challenge presents a constitutional question subject to de novo review.” State v. 

Griffin, 760 N.W.2d 336, 339 (Minn. App. 2009). We balance four factors to determine 

whether a defendant’s right to a speedy trial was violated: “(1) the length of the delay; 

(2) the reason for the delay; (3) whether the defendant asserted his or her right to a 

speedy trial; and (4) whether the delay prejudiced the defendant.” State v. Windish, 590 

N.W.2d 311, 315 (Minn. 1999) (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530-31, 92 S. Ct. 

2182, 2191-92)). All the factors must be considered along with other relevant 

circumstances. Id. A single factor does not create “a necessary or sufficient condition to 

the finding of a deprivation of the right to a speedy trial.” Id. (quotation omitted). 
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Length of Delay

“The length of the delay is a ‘triggering mechanism’ which determines whether 

further review is necessary.” Id. at 315 (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S. Ct. at 

2192). Upon a defendant’s demand after the entry of a not-guilty plea, “the trial must 

start within 60 days . . . unless the court finds good cause for a later trial date.” Minn. R. 

Crim. P. 11.09(b). Because Dortch’s trial began more than 60 days after his speedy-trial 

demand, we must consider the other factors. 

Reason for delay

The state and the court bear the burden to ensure a speedy trial. Windish, 590 

N.W.2d at 316. Different weights are assigned to different reasons for delay. State v. 

Sistrunk, 429 N.W.2d 280, 282 (Minn. App. 1988), review denied (Minn. Nov. 23, 1988). 

Valid reasons, such as missing witnesses, justify an appropriate delay. Barker, 407 U.S. 

at 531, 92 S. Ct. at 2192. Reasons such as negligence or overcrowded courts weigh less 

heavily against the government. Id. The state’s deliberate attempt to delay trial weighs 

strongly against the state. Id. Conversely, “[w]hen the overall delay in bringing a case to 

trial is the result of the defendant’s actions, there is no speedy trial violation.” State v. 

DeRosier, 695 N.W.2d 97, 109 (Minn. 2005). When a defendant causes the delay, this 

“often is deemed a temporary waiver of his speedy trial demand, which can only be 

revived when the defendant reasserts his speedy trial right.” State v. Johnson, 498 

N.W.2d 10, 16 (Minn. 1993). 
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On Dortch’s original trial date, November 17, 2014, the state requested, and was 

granted, a one week continuance.1 Dortch’s trial was rescheduled for Monday,

November 24, 2014, the 60th day following his speedy demand. On November 24, 

Dortch requested a continuance because he had only received the DNA results the prior 

Friday. The state noted that they had also only received the DNA results the prior Friday, 

and that they promptly shared the results with the defense. The district court granted a 

one week continuance, and trial commenced on December 1, 2014. 

Dortch asserts that his requested delay should be attributed to the state because the 

state did not provide the DNA evidence earlier. But there is no indication that the state 

was responsible for the amount of time it took for the DNA results to be released, or that 

the state deliberately delayed trial because of the DNA evidence. Moreover, the time 

needed for DNA testing can constitute good cause for a continuance. State v. Stroud, 459 

N.W.2d 332, 335 (Minn. App. 1990). Thus, Dortch’s requested delay did not violate his

right to a speedy trial. 

After the first morning of trial, the court continued the trial for four days because 

the state’s other witnesses were unavailable. The record is unclear as to why, after the 

second day of trial, the matter was continued for thirteen days, and ultimately did not 

resume until December 26, 2014. Dortch contends that the state was responsible for the 

delays after trial commenced, but cites no authority supporting his assertion that delays 

after trial commences violate the right to a speedy trial. Further, at least one of the delays 

 

1 The state’s first requested continuance kept Dortch’s trial within the 60-day period; this 

delay is thus irrelevant to Dortch’s speedy-trial demand.
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after trial began was due to witness unavailability, a permissible reason for delay. 

Windish, 590 N.W.2d at 317. Dortch’s trial was completed within a month of its 

commencement, and the limited in-trial delays do not require reversal. 

Assertion of right to speedy trial

Dortch asserted his speedy-trial demand in writing and on the record and did not 

withdraw this request. This factor clearly weighs in favor of Dortch. 

Prejudice as a result of the delay 

The purposes of the right to a speedy trial are: “(1) preventing oppressive pretrial 

incarceration; (2) minimizing the anxiety and concern of the accused; and (3) preventing 

the possibility that the defense will be impaired.” Id. at 318. The third factor presents the 

most serious interest. Id. There is no indication that the trial delay prejudiced Dortch. 

To the contrary, Dortch’s defense was strengthened by the delay that he asked for in 

order to review DNA evidence that favored him.

Dortch remained in custody during the delays and claims that the number of court 

appearances and continuances caused him great anxiety and concern. But Dortch had 

three outstanding warrants in two other counties. “If a defendant is already in custody for 

another offense, . . . the first two interests are not implicated.” State v. Taylor, 869 

N.W.2d 1, 20 (Minn. 2015). Although the record is unclear as to whether Dortch would 

have been held in another county had he been released, when considering the length of

his likely incarceration in connection with the other charges, we cannot find prejudice in 

Dortch’s pretrial incarceration. There is also no indication that Dortch suffered undue 

prejudicial stress and anxiety. See State v. Friberg, 435 N.W.2d 509, 515 (Minn. 1989) 
7

(“The only prejudice attested to at the hearing was the stress, anxiety and inconvenience 

experienced by anyone who is involved in a trial.”). 

After balancing these factors, we conclude that Dortch did not suffer prejudice that 

requires reversal. 

II.

Dortch asserts that there is insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction of

possession of a firearm by an ineligible person. Our review of a sufficiency-of-theevidence claim is limited to a painstaking analysis of the record to determine whether the 

evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the conviction, is sufficient to 

sustain the verdict. State v. Webb, 440 N.W.2d 426, 430 (Minn. 1989). We will not 

disturb the verdict if the factfinder, acting with due regard for the presumption of 

innocence and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably 

conclude that the defendant was guilty of the charged offense. Bernhardt v. State, 684 

N.W.2d 465, 476-77 (Minn. 2004). 

Circumstantial and direct evidence are given the same weight.2 State v. Bauer, 

598 N.W.2d 352, 370 (Minn. 1999). But where at least one element of a charge is based 

on circumstantial evidence, we apply a two-step process to the analysis. State v. Porte, 

832 N.W.2d 303, 309-310 (Minn. App. 2013). “The first step is to identify the 

circumstances proved.” State v. Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d 594, 598 (Minn. 2013). In doing 

 

2

“Direct evidence is evidence that is based on personal knowledge or observation and 

that, if true, proves a fact without inference or presumption. Bernhardt, 684 N.W.2d at 

477 n.11 (quotation omitted). Circumstantial evidence is “evidence based on inference 

and not on personal knowledge or observation.” Id. (quotation omitted). 
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so, we defer to the factfinder’s acceptance of the state’s evidence and rejection of 

conflicting evidence. Id. at 598-99. “The second step is to determine whether the 

circumstances proved are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any rational 

hypothesis except that of guilt.” Id. at 599 (quotations omitted). An alternative rational 

hypothesis must be supported by more than “mere conjecture” and must “point to 

evidence in the record that is consistent with a rational theory other than guilt.” State v. 

Tscheu, 758 N.W.2d 849, 858 (Minn. 2008). We independently examine inferences that 

may be drawn from the circumstances proved by the evidence as a whole, refraining from 

examining each piece of evidence in isolation. State v. Andersen, 784 N.W.2d 320, 329-

30, 332 (Minn. 2010). Because this case involves both direct and circumstantial 

evidence, we apply the two-step process. 

The state proved by direct evidence that: Dortch was the only one who ran from 

the group of males stopped by the police after a 911 caller reported someone in the group 

had a gun; he was seen clutching the front of his pants while running; officers lost sight 

of him momentarily and subsequently found a handgun in the area where they lost sight 

of him; the handgun recovered was not dusty or dusty and appeared to have been very 

recently discarded; and Dortch stated in a phone call from jail that “They a-- ain’t find 

nothing on me but, sh-t, they, they found that mother--cker and it’s my DNA on there.” 

The only inference we must make is that Dortch dropped the handgun in the area where 

officers lost sight of him. 

Dortch argues that he ran, not because he possessed a firearm, but because he had 

outstanding warrants; that he could have been clutching his pants because they were 
9

loose; that the firearm could have been placed in the weeds at any time since it was a 

remote area near a liquor store; and that the jail call was merely a statement about what 

would happen if his DNA was found on the gun. Given the entirety of the record—

including the direct evidence of a report of a group of men with a gun, that Dortch was 

the only one who ran through the area where the gun was found, that the officers found 

the handgun in the area where they briefly lost sight of Dortch, and the specific

statements Dortch made during a phone call placed after his arrest—these alternative 

explanations are mere conjecture that do not reasonably support a rational hypothesis 

other than that of guilt. The evidence forms a complete chain that supports the 

conviction.

Affirmed.