PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-1464

FREIGHT DRIVERS AND HELPERS LOCAL UNION NO. 557 PENSION 

FUND,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

PENSKE LOGISTICS LLC; PENSKE TRUCK LEASING CO., L.P.,

Defendants – Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

Maryland, at Baltimore. Ellen L. Hollander, District Judge. 

(1:12-cv-02376-ELH)

Argued: January 27, 2015 Decided: April 21, 2015

Before NIEMEYER, THACKER, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

Reversed and remanded by published opinion. Judge Niemeyer 

wrote the opinion, in which Judge Thacker and Judge Harris

joined.

ARGUED: Corey Smith Bott, ABATO, RUBENSTEIN & ABATO, PA, 

Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. David R. Levin, DRINKER 

BIDDLE & REATH LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellees. ON BRIEF:

Paul D. Starr, ABATO, RUBENSTEIN & ABATO, PA, Baltimore, 

Maryland, for Appellant. Brian A. Coleman, Washington, D.C., 

Mark E. Furlane, DRINKER BIDDLE & REATH LLP, Chicago, Illinois, 

for Appellees.
2

NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge:

This appeal raises the question of how a party to an 

arbitration proceeding under the Multiemployer Pension Plan 

Amendments Act of 1980 (“MPPAA”), Pub. L. No. 96-364, 94 Stat. 

1208 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 

29 U.S.C.), can obtain review of the arbitration order, as 

provided in 29 U.S.C. § 1401(b)(2). Specifically, we must 

determine whether § 1401(b)(2) and § 1451 require the 

dissatisfied party to commence a civil action in a district 

court by filing a complaint, or whether § 1401(b)(3) requires 

the dissatisfied party to file an application for review of the 

arbitration order by filing a motion, as provided in the Federal 

Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16. The distinction 

between the two procedures is critical to the outcome of this 

appeal. 

Freight Drivers and Helpers Local Union No. 557 Pension 

Fund (the “Pension Fund”), a multiemployer pension plan, 

commenced this action under § 1401(b)(2) by filing a complaint. 

The Pension Fund seeks to vacate or modify an arbitration order,

entered pursuant to § 1401(a)(1), which rejected the Pension 

Fund’s assessment of withdrawal liability with respect to two 

participating employers. When the district court granted the 

participating employers’ motion to dismiss with leave to file an 

amended complaint, the Pension Fund filed an amended complaint, 
3

which, it argued, related back to the filing date of the 

original complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c). 

Thereafter, however, the district court granted the employers’

second motion to dismiss, ruling that the Pension Fund could 

challenge the arbitration award only by filing a motion to 

vacate or modify, as provided under the FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 6 

(providing that “[a]ny application to the court hereunder shall 

be made and heard in the manner provided by law for the making 

and hearing of motions”). The court thereupon treated the 

Pension Fund’s amended complaint as a motion and dismissed it, 

concluding that it was untimely under § 1401(b)(2) because, 

unlike an amended complaint, a motion cannot “relate back” under 

Rule 15. In addition, because the court treated the amended 

complaint as a motion, it found the motion deficient under 

District of Maryland Local Rule 105, which requires a motion to 

be supported by a memorandum setting forth the reasoning and 

authorities for the motion.

On appeal, we conclude that commencing an action by filing 

a complaint is the appropriate procedure for seeking review of

an arbitration award entered pursuant to § 1401(a) and that the 

amended complaint in this case related back to the filing date 

of the original complaint, thus rendering it timely. 
4

Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s order of dismissal 

and remand for further proceedings as a civil action.∗

I

During the period from 2001 to 2004, Penske Truck Leasing 

Co., L.P., engaged in several transactions by which it 

ultimately transferred ownership of its subsidiary, Leaseway 

Motorcar Transport Company, to a third party, in which Penske 

Truck Leasing apparently retained a minority ownership interest. 

As a result of the restructuring, Penske Truck Leasing took the 

position that it and Leaseway were no longer under “common 

control,” as that term is used in the Employee Retirement Income 

Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1301(b)(1). 

Thereafter, Leaseway ceased making contributions to the Pension 

Fund, and the Fund responded by assessing withdrawal liability 

against Penske Truck Leasing and the Penske Logistics Group LLC, 

an affiliated company, (collectively the “Penske companies”). 

When neither Penske Truck Leasing nor Penske Logistics satisfied 

the Pension Fund’s requests for withdrawal liability, the 

 ∗ With respect to pending cases, in which the party seeking 

review of an MPPAA arbitration order under § 1401(b) filed a 

motion, as provided by the FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 6, we encourage 

district courts to be flexible in allowing the party to bring 

its process in compliance with our decision today, subject to 

considerations of prejudice and equity. 
5

parties submitted the dispute to arbitration, as mandated by 

§ 1401(a)(1).

The parties to the arbitration proceeding were “Penske

Logistics LLC [and] Penske Truck Leasing Co., L.P.,” on the one 

side and “Freight Drivers & Helpers Local Union No. 557 Pension 

Fund” on the other, and the arbitrator never suggested that the 

parties to the proceeding were not the appropriate parties. The 

arbitrator dismissed the Pension Fund’s claim for the imposition 

of withdrawal liability in an order dated July 13, 2012, 

concluding that the Penske companies were not liable for 

withdrawal payments because the Pension Fund was exempt as “a 

trucking industry fund as that term is described in [29 U.S.C. 

§ 1383(d)].” 

The Pension Fund, as the dissatisfied party to the 

arbitration proceeding, commenced this action on August 9, 2012, 

to vacate or modify the arbitrator’s order, alleging that the 

arbitrator erred as a matter of law in applying the trucking 

industry exemption. The Pension Fund captioned its complaint 

“Freight Drivers and Helpers Local Union No. 557 Pension Fund, 

by its Trustee, William Alexander,” versus “Penske Logistics LLC 

[and] Penske Truck Leasing Co., L.P.” 

The Penske companies filed a motion to dismiss the 

complaint, arguing that because the Pension Fund sued “by its 

Trustee, William Alexander,” instead of by its Joint Board of 
6

Trustees (consisting of four trustees), the Pension Fund did not 

have standing to sue under § 1401(b)(2). The district court 

granted the motion and gave the Pension Fund 21 days within 

which to file an amended complaint to correct the deficiency. 

It is significant that in reaching its decision, the 

district court analyzed the MPPAA’s procedures for judicial 

review of an arbitration award as requiring the commencement of 

a civil action. Explaining the procedures, the court stated 

that “[j]udicial review of the arbitrator’s decision is 

available to ‘any party thereto,’” as indicated by the title to 

§ 1401(b)(2), by filing a “‘civil action subsequent to 

arbitration award.’” (Quoting § 1401(b)(2)). The court 

summarized, “As indicated, an action under 29 U.S.C. 

§ 1401(b)(2) must be brought ‘in accordance with’ 29 U.S.C. 

§ 1451, titled ‘Civil actions.’” Further on in its analysis, 

the court applied the rules applicable to complaints, indicating 

that a court may “consider documents attached to the complaint, 

as well as those attached to the motion to dismiss, so long as 

they are integral to the complaint and authentic.” (Quoting 

Philips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem’l Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 

2009)). In determining who the proper party plaintiff would be 

in any such action, the court explained the relationship between 

§ 1401(b)(2) and § 1451. It stated, “[Section 1451] pertains to 

the manner in which the § 1401(b)(2) action is initiated, i.e., 
7

the how. In other words, § 1401(b)(2) incorporates the 

procedural requirements set forth in § 1451, such as the 

provisions governing venue and service of process. See id.

§ 1451(d), (g).” Reiterating the policy for such a civil 

action, as described in Board of Trustees, Sheet Metal Workers’ 

National Pension Fund v. BES Services, Inc., 469 F.3d 369, 373-

74 (4th Cir. 2006), the district court related how Congress 

intended to adopt a stream-lined process that required 

“arbitration, with judicial review.” (Emphasis added). The 

Court stated in conclusion, “For the foregoing reasons, I will 

grant defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, without prejudice, and with 

leave to amend. Specifically, plaintiff may amend the Complaint

provided that the Board of Trustees file[] suit on behalf of the 

Fund.” (Emphasis added). The court gave the Pension Fund 

21 days within which to file its amended complaint.

As authorized by the district court, the Pension Fund filed 

its amended complaint within 21 days, naming as plaintiff 

“Freight Drivers and Helpers Local Union No. 557 Pension Fund, 

by its Plan Sponsor, The Joint Board of Trustees.”

The Penske companies again filed a motion to dismiss the 

amended complaint, this time arguing that a party challenging an 

MPPAA arbitration order must do so by filing a motion in 

accordance with the FAA, rather than by filing a complaint. 

They argued further that if the district court were to treat the 
8

amended complaint as a motion, the motion would be untimely 

because it was not filed within 30 days of the arbitration award

and would be deficient for failing to comply with Local 

Rule 105, which requires an accompanying memorandum of 

“reasoning and authorities.” 

The district court again granted the Penske companies’ 

motion to dismiss by order dated February 7, 2014, and thus it 

ended the litigation. In doing so, the district court concluded 

first that the Penske companies were correct that a party 

challenging an MPPAA arbitration award must do so by filing a 

motion, as required by the FAA, because, as they claimed, such a 

procedure was required by § 1401(b)(3). The court stated:

[Section 1401(b)(3)] plainly provides that arbitration 

proceedings under ERISA should be conducted in 

accordance with the procedures set forth in the FAA, 

and the FAA plainly provides that a party seeking to 

vacate an arbitration award must proceed by motion. 

* * *

As a result, plaintiff’s “Amended Complaint” is an 

improper filing.

The court declined, however, to elevate form over substance and 

therefore treated the Pension Fund’s amended complaint as a 

motion to vacate. But in doing so, it noted that a motion, 

unlike a complaint, could not relate back under Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 15(c), therefore rendering the motion untimely. 

Moreover, in treating the amended complaint as a motion, the 

court also concluded that the motion should have been 
9

“accompanied by a memorandum setting forth the reasoning and 

authorities in support of it,” as required by Local Rule 105. 

After the district court denied its motion for 

reconsideration, the Pension Fund filed this appeal, challenging 

the district court’s gateway procedural ruling that a party 

seeking review of an MPPAA arbitration order must do so by 

filing a motion, as provided in the FAA. 

II

The Pension Fund contends that the district court erred in 

rejecting its filing of a complaint as the proper method by 

which to obtain review of an MPPAA arbitration order. It argues 

that 29 U.S.C. §§ 1401(b)(2) and 1451 “evince that the mechanism 

through which to bring an action [to vacate or modify an 

arbitration award] is by filing a complaint.”

The Penske companies contend, to the contrary, that “the 

sole method to challenge an arbitration award . . . is by filing 

a motion, so the ‘Amended Complaint’ is not a proper method for 

the [Pension Fund] to challenge the arbitration award.” They 

rely on § 1401(b)(3), which provides that “[a]ny arbitration 

proceedings under this section shall, to the extent consistent 

with this subchapter, be conducted in the same manner, subject 

to the same limitations, carried out with the same powers . . . 
10

and enforced in United States courts as an arbitration 

proceeding carried out under [the FAA].” 

The difference in the parties’ positions thus presents the 

narrow procedural question of whether a party who seeks to 

vacate or modify an arbitration award under the MPPAA (1) must 

commence an action by filing a complaint or (2) must file an 

application by motion under the FAA. We conclude that the MPPAA

requires the former. 

The MPPAA provides that after mandatory arbitration 

proceedings have been conducted pursuant to § 1401(a), a party 

to the arbitration proceeding “may bring an action . . . in an 

appropriate United States district court . . . to enforce, 

vacate, or modify the arbitrator’s award.” § 1401(b)(2)

(emphasis added). It also provides that the action must be 

brought “in accordance with section 1451 of this title,” id., 

which, in turn, requires that “the complaint in any action under 

. . . section 1401 of this title shall be served upon the 

[Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation] by certified mail,” id.

§ 1451(g) (emphasis added). The plain meaning of these 

provisions can only lead to the conclusion that a party seeking 

review of an MPPAA arbitration award must do so by commencing a 

civil action in a district court by filing a complaint to vacate 

or modify the award. While the titles of § 1401(b) and § 1451,

explicitly referring to such review as a “civil action,” are not 
11

part of the substantive text, the text in no uncertain terms 

refers to a civil action, using the terms “an action” in a 

“district court” with respect to which the “complaint” must be 

served on the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation. Indeed, 

this is the language of most federal statutes providing for 

civil actions in a district court.

This reading is confirmed by the statute’s identical 

provision for a civil action to collect withdrawal liability 

payments where no arbitration is involved. Section 1401(b)(1) 

provides that “[i]f no arbitration proceeding has been 

initiated . . . , the amounts demanded [for withdrawal 

liability] shall be due and owing” and the Plan’s sponsor “may 

bring an action . . . for collection.” (Emphasis added). The 

parties agree that this provision authorizes collection by means 

of a civil action commenced by the filing of a complaint in 

court. They can hardly deny that the exact same language used 

in § 1401(b)(2) likewise authorizes review of an arbitration 

award by means of a civil action commenced by the filing of a 

complaint in court. See United States v. Cleveland Indians 

Baseball Co., 532 U.S. 200, 213 (2001) (noting the general 

presumption that “identical words used in different parts of the 

same act are intended to have the same meaning” (quoting Atl.

Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433

(1932)).
12

Finally, it is no accident that the MPPAA uses the terms of 

art “an action,” “civil action,” “in a district court,” and 

“complaint,” which are precisely those used by the Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure governing civil actions in district courts. 

Rule 2 provides that “[t]here is one form of action -- the civil 

action,” and Rule 3 provides that “[a] civil action is commenced 

by filing a complaint with the [district] court.” Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 2, 3 (emphasis added). 

Moreover, the House Committee Report explaining the MPPAA 

leaves little doubt that judicial review authorized by 

§ 1401(b)(2) refers to review by a civil action commenced by the 

filing of a complaint. In describing enforcement of arbitration 

awards under the MPPAA by a “civil action,” the Report states:

In general, the district courts of the United States 

have exclusive jurisdiction for civil actions under 

the bill without regard to the amount in controversy. 

In the case of an action brought by a plan fiduciary 

to collect withdrawal liability, State courts of 

competent authority are also to have jurisdiction.

* * * 

In addition, a copy of the complaint in any action 

brought under the bill is to be served on the PBGC by 

certified mail. The PBGC may intervene in any action 

brought under the bill.

In the case of an action under the bill, the court is 

permitted to award to the prevailing party all or a 

portion of costs and expenses in connection with the 

action, including reasonable attorneys fees.

The period of limitations for the commencement of an 

action under the bill is to expire six years after the 

date on which the cause of action arose.
13

H.R. Rep. No. 96-869, pt. 2, at 42 (1980), reprinted in 1980 

U.S.C.C.A.N. 2993, 3032.

The Penske companies rely exclusively on § 1401(b)(3) in 

support of their position. That provision incorporates 

generally the FAA procedures for “[a]ny arbitration proceedings” 

under the MPPAA, which, they argue, includes the FAA’s

procedures for review of arbitration awards. See 9 U.S.C. § 6. 

First, we note that if there were any tension between 

subsection (b)(3) (providing for use of FAA procedures for 

arbitration proceedings) and subsection (b)(2) (providing for 

civil actions to review arbitration awards), subsection (b)(3)

requires that subsection (b)(2) govern, as subsection (b)(3) 

expressly limits applicability of the FAA “to the extent 

consistent with this subchapter.” § 1401(b)(3). But when the 

overall structure of the statute is considered and the statute 

is properly construed, there appears to be no such tension. 

Subsection (a)(1) requires that disputes over withdrawal 

liability be submitted to arbitration; subsection (b)(3) 

requires that the “arbitration proceedings” be conducted in 

accordance with the procedures set forth in the FAA; and 

subsection (b)(2) and § 1451(g) require that review of 

arbitration awards be pursued by bringing a civil action in 

district court by filing a complaint and serving a copy on the 

Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation. Thus, the mechanisms for 
14

conducting arbitration proceedings are provided by the FAA and 

the mechanisms for review of those proceedings are provided by 

the MPPAA and the rules governing civil actions in district 

courts, beginning with the commencement of a civil action by the 

filing of a complaint.

The conclusion that the MPPAA distinguishes procedures for 

arbitration proceedings from procedures for judicial review is 

further indicated by the scope of regulations promulgated by the 

Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation regarding “Arbitration of 

Disputes in Multiemployer Plans,” 29 C.F.R. pt. 4221. The 

stated purpose of those regulations is to “establish procedures

for arbitration, pursuant to [§ 1401], of withdrawal liability 

disputes.” Id. § 4221.1. And in providing the procedures for 

arbitration proceedings under the MPPAA, the regulations limit 

their scope “to arbitration proceedings initiated pursuant to 

[§ 1401]” and then “only to the extent that they are consistent 

with this part and adopted by the arbitrator in a particular 

proceeding.” Id. The regulations provide procedures for every 

stage of such an arbitration proceeding from its “initiation” to 

the “award,” id. §§ 4221.3-4221.8, but they provide no 

procedure for review of an award except the arbitrator’s 

“reconsideration of [an] award,” id. § 4221.9. The absence of 

regulations pertaining to judicial review speaks volumes about

the scope of § 1401(b)(3)’s reference to the FAA. 
15

It is therefore not surprising that in MPPAA arbitration 

cases, we have noted that the MPPAA “clear[ly]

authoriz[es] . . . judicial review . . . [of] the arbitrator’s 

legal rulings,” Republic Indus., Inc. v. Teamsters Joint Council 

No. 83 of Va. Pension Fund, 718 F.2d 628, 641 (4th Cir. 1983)

(emphasis added), and that the judicial review authorized by 

§ 1401(b)(2) is much more expansive than the narrow review 

authorized by the FAA, see id. (noting that the FAA “prohibits 

judicial review of legal or factual disputes voluntarily 

submitted to an arbitrator”). While the MPPAA does restrict to 

some degree judicial review of an arbitrator’s factual findings, 

see § 1401(c) (creating a presumption of correctness of the 

arbitrator’s findings of fact), it provides de novo judicial 

review of the arbitrator’s legal conclusions, see Trustees of

the Cent. Pension Fund of the Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs

and Participating Emp’rs v. Wolf Crane Serv., Inc., 374 F.3d 

1035, 1038 (11th Cir. 2004) (noting that “the appropriate 

standard of review is clear error for findings of fact [made by 

the arbitrator] and de novo for conclusions of law” and 

collecting cases of the different courts of appeals so holding, 

including our decision in Republic Industries). Indeed, we 

explained the overall structure of the MPPAA in BES Services, 

where we described precisely the dichotomy of procedures -- FAA 
16

procedures for arbitration proceedings and judicial review by 

court proceedings in a district court:

Congress did not intend to create a new, broad 

category of litigation that would force benefit plans 

to spend their assets on court costs and attorneys

fees. Rather, it chose to require arbitration, with 

judicial review, to create a more efficient disputeresolution process.

* * * 

Thus, when there is a dispute concerning the 

determination of withdrawal liability, the dispute, 

whether over law, facts, or both, is committed in the 

first instance to arbitration. And that arbitration 

proceeding is conducted as any arbitration would be 

conducted under the Federal Arbitration Act.

But unlike the Federal Arbitration Act, the MPPAA 

treats an award issuing from such a § 1401 arbitration 

like an agency determination -- the arbitrator decides 

the issues in the first instance but then the decision 

is subject to judicial review.

* * * 

Thus, if a party commences an action in federal court

without having first exhausted the mandatory 

arbitration process, it will be subject to a failureto-exhaust defense.

469 F.3d at 374-75 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).

In sum, a party seeking to vacate or modify an arbitrator’s 

award under § 1401(b)(2) must commence an action in a district 

court by filing a complaint and pursuing that action thereafter 

in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
17

III

The distinction between a civil action commenced by the 

filing of a complaint to vacate an arbitration award and an 

application to vacate an award by means of a motion is critical

in this case.

The arbitrator’s award was entered on July 13, 2012, and 

the Pension Fund commenced this action to challenge the award 

within 30 days, as required by § 1401(b)(2), by filing a 

complaint in the district court on August 9, 2012. When the 

district court granted the Penske companies’ motion to dismiss 

for lack of standing, it granted the Pension Fund leave to file 

an amended complaint within 21 days, and the Pension Fund 

complied with that order, filing an amended complaint on 

August 7, 2013. Because that date was far beyond the 30 days 

specified by § 1401(b)(2), however, the amended complaint would 

be timely only if it related back to the filing date of the 

original complaint, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 15(c).

The district court did not address whether the Pension 

Fund’s amended complaint, properly viewed as such, related back; 

rather, it concluded that the amended complaint should be

treated as a motion and that a motion “cannot ‘relate back’ 

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15.” Thus, in treating 

the Pension Fund’s amended complaint as a motion, the district 
18

court created the conditions for the court’s order of dismissal. 

First, it dismissed the motion as untimely; and second, it found 

the motion deficient because it was not accompanied by a 

memorandum setting forth the “reasoning and authorities” for the 

motion, as required by Local Rule 105.

Inasmuch as we find that the Pension Fund’s filing of a 

complaint was indeed the appropriate procedure by which to 

challenge the arbitration award under § 1401(b)(2), we are left 

to determine only whether the Pension Fund’s amended complaint 

related back to the filing date of the original complaint. 

Because the factual circumstances relevant to resolving this 

question are not disputed and the relation-back question is 

purely legal, we decide it here. See Hill v. Peoplesoft USA, 

Inc., 412 F.3d 540, 544 n.* (4th Cir. 2005) (“Although the 

district court did not address these arguments, a remand to 

address these arguments is unnecessary because the arguments 

raise purely legal questions based on facts not in dispute”).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 provides in pertinent 

part:

An amendment to a pleading relates back to the date of 

the original pleading when . . . the amendment asserts 

a claim or defense that arose out of the conduct, 

transaction, or occurrence set out -- or attempted to 

be set out -- in the original pleading.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(B). Even with the addition of new 

parties, the Rule allows the relation back of amendments so long 
19

as the parties have notice of the particular conduct,

transaction, or occurrence at issue. See 6A Charles Alan Wright 

et al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 1498 (3d ed. 2010 & 

Supp. 2014).

In this case, the original complaint was brought in the 

name of the Pension Fund, by one of its trustees, challenging 

the July 13 arbitrator’s award, to which the Pension Fund and 

the Penske companies had been the only parties. As with the 

original complaint, the amended complaint was again brought in 

the name of the Pension Fund, but this time by its Board of 

Trustees, comprised of four members. And it again challenged

the same July 13 arbitration award. In short, the Pension Fund 

as the named party remained the same; the conduct challenged 

remained the same; and the cause of action remained the same. 

The only change effectuated by the amended complaint was to note 

that the Pension Fund was suing through all four trustees 

instead of only one.

Because the substantive allegations in the amended 

complaint were identical to those contained in the initial 

complaint, the requirements of relation back under Rule 15(c)

clearly apply. See Wilkins v. Montgomery, 751 F.3d 214, 225 

(4th Cir. 2014) (“The proposed amended complaint in this case 

clearly meets the . . . requirement of . . . Rule 15(c)(1)(B)

. . . because it [does not] alter the underlying causes of 
20

action”). Moreover, the Penske companies have identified no 

prejudice nor have they identified any information or fact that 

they did not know as of the filing date of the original 

complaint. Indeed, the Penske companies’ counsel conceded at 

oral argument that there was “absolutely no doubt” that the 

initial complaint placed the Penske companies on notice of the 

claims leveled against them by the Pension Fund. 

The Penske companies argue that the second filing was not 

really an “amended” complaint at all, but rather the initial 

complaint of the only party to have statutory standing to bring 

the suit, the Joint Board of Trustees. They reason therefore 

that the second filing commenced an entirely new action that 

could not “relate back” to anything. This argument is hypertechnical, carrying no equitable or pragmatic weight. Moreover, 

it is inconsistent with the circumstances acted on by the 

district court and with the conduct of the parties. The court 

stated that “[the] plaintiff” -- identified in the caption of 

the court’s order as the Pension Fund -- “may amend the 

Complaint provided that the Board of Trustees file[] suit on 

behalf of the Fund.” And, in amending its complaint, the 

Pension Fund did exactly what the district court instructed it 

to do, changing nothing except the reference to the Pension 

Fund’s trustees. 
21

Further, as the Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 15(c) 

observe, the Rule does not expressly treat the relation back of 

an amended complaint that changes plaintiffs. Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 15 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment; see also In 

re Cmty. Bank of N. Va., 622 F.3d 275, 297 (3d Cir. 2010) 

(explaining that Rule 15(c) does not expressly contemplate 

“amendments changing plaintiffs” because “th[at] problem is 

generally easier [than that of amendments changing defendants]”

(second alteration in original) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 

advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment)). Thus, the 

amendment at issue does not technically implicate the “chief 

consideration of policy” of Rule 15(c). See id. (quoting Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 15 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment); cf.

Hinson v. Norwest Fin. S.C., Inc., 239 F.3d 611, 618 (4th Cir. 

2001) (“[A] court determining whether to grant a motion to amend 

to join additional plaintiffs must consider . . . the general 

principles of amendment provided by Rule 15(a) . . .” (emphasis 

added)). As explained by Professors Wright and Miller:

As long as defendant is fully apprised of a claim 

arising from specified conduct and has prepared to 

defend the action, defendant’s ability to protect 

itself will not be prejudicially affected if a new 

plaintiff is added, and defendant should not be 

permitted to invoke a limitations defense. This seems 

particularly sound inasmuch as the courts will require 

the scope of the amended pleading to stay within the 

ambit of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set 

forth in the original pleading.
22

6A Wright et al., supra, § 1501 (emphasis added) (footnote 

omitted). The important fact remains that the amended complaint

concerns the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth 

in the original pleading. 

We conclude, therefore, that the Pension Fund’s amended 

complaint relates back to the filing date of the original 

complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c).

* * *

For the reasons given, we reverse and remand for further 

proceedings as a civil action. 

REVERSED AND REMANDED