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*********************************************** 
SYLVESTER TRAYLOR v. STATE

OF CONNECTICUT ET AL.

(SC 19977)

Robinson, C. J., and Palmer, Kahn, Ecker and Stevens, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff sought, inter alia, a judgment declaring unconstitutional the

statute (§ 52-190a [a]) that requires a complaint sounding in medical

malpractice to be accompanied by a good faith certificate and a letter

authored by a similar health care provider opining that there appeared

to be evidence of medical negligence. In 2006, following the suicide of

his wife, the plaintiff had brought a medical malpractice action against

his wife’s treating psychiatrist, A, and his employer, C Co., but failed

to append to the complaint the good faith certificate and opinion letter

required by § 52-190a (a). Although the plaintiff subsequently obtained

an opinion letter and amended his complaint, the trial court dismissed

the counts of the amended complaint sounding in medical negligence

on the ground that the original complaint failed to comply with § 52-

190a (a). The trial court subsequently rendered judgment for A and C

Co. on the remaining counts. Thereafter, in 2011, the plaintiff commenced two additional actions against A and C Co., their telephone

answering service, T Co., and its owners, and other governmental officials, employees and entities, among others, in which he challenged the

dismissal of his medical malpractice action. Those actions, both of which

included the claim that § 52-190a is unconstitutional, ultimately were

resolved against the plaintiff. In 2016, the plaintiff, representing himself,

commenced the present action against A, C Co., T Co. and its owners,

the state, the Appellate Court, and five Superior Court judges. Thereafter,

the trial court granted A and C Co.’s motion for summary judgment on

the ground that the claims directed against them were barred by the

doctrine of res judicata, as the plaintiff previously had or could have

raised and litigated those claims in one of the 2011 actions. The trial

court granted the motion to dismiss filed by T Co. and its owners,

concluding that the plaintiff’s claims against them were barred by the

prior pending action doctrine, the plaintiff previously having raised those

claims in one of the 2011 actions. The trial court also granted the motion

to dismiss filed by the state, the Appellate Court and the Superior Court

judges, concluding, inter alia, that the plaintiff’s claims for declaratory

relief were barred by sovereign immunity and collateral estoppel, and

that the claims against the judges were barred by absolute judicial

immunity. Accordingly, the trial court rendered judgment for the defendants, and the plaintiff appealed, claiming that § 52-190a is unconstitutional because it imposes a financial burden and other obstacles on

plaintiffs seeking to bring medical malpractice claims and, therefore,

violated his rights to due process, equal protection, and access to the

courts. Held that this court could not review the plaintiff’s claim that

§ 52-190a is unconstitutional, as the plaintiff failed to address in his

brief to this court any of the issues that provided the basis for the trial

court’s resolution of the plaintiff’s action in favor of the defendants: the

plaintiff’s failure to challenge in his appellate brief the trial court’s

independent, alternative conclusions that the claims against the defendants were barred by, inter alia, res judicata, collateral estoppel, and

the prior pending action doctrine operated as an abandonment of any

challenge to the trial court’s conclusions and thus effectively rendered

the appeal moot because, even if this court were to agree that § 52-190a

is unconstitutional, the trial court’s conclusions would stand; moreover,

the policy of this state’s courts to be solicitous of self-represented litigants could not excuse the plaintiff’s complete failure to challenge in

his brief to this court the trial court’s threshold conclusions.

Argued December 13, 2018—officially released August 27, 2019

Procedural History

Action seeking a judgment declaring, inter alia, that a
certain medical malpractice statute is unconstitutional,

and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in

the judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, where the

case was transferred to the judicial district of Danbury

and then to the judicial district of Hartford, Complex

Litigation Docket; thereafter, the court, Moll, J., granted

the motions to dismiss filed by the named defendant

et al. and the motion for summary judgment filed by

defendant Bassam Awwa et al., and rendered judgment

thereon for the defendants, from which the plaintiff

appealed. Affirmed.

Sylvester Traylor, self-represented, the appellant

(plaintiff).

Jane R. Rosenberg, former solicitor general, with

whom, on the brief, was George Jepsen, former attorney

general, for the appellees (named defendant et al.).

William L. Stevens, for the appellees (defendant

Advanced Telemessaging, LLC, et al.)

Donald E. Leone, Jr., with whom, on the brief, was

Anthony D. Sutton, for the appellees (defendant Bassam Awwa et al.)
Opinion

STEVENS, J. This appeal arises from the most recent

in a series of civil actions that the plaintiff, Sylvester

Traylor, has brought in state and federal court relating

to the suicide of his wife, Roberta Mae Traylor

(Roberta). The plaintiff, who is self-represented,

brought the present case against the defendants, who

are (1) the state of Connecticut, numerous current and

former Superior Court judges,1 and the Appellate Court

(state defendants); (2) Roberta’s treating psychiatrist,

Bassam Awwa, and his employer, Connecticut Behavioral Health Associates, P.C. (Awwa defendants); and

(3) Robert Knowles and Neil Knowles, and their business, Advanced Telemessaging (Knowles defendants).

The plaintiff now appeals2

from the judgment of the

trial court, Moll, J.,

3

rendered in accordance with its

granting of the defendants’ motions to dismiss and for

summary judgment. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that

General Statutes § 52-190a,4 which requires a plaintiff to

append a good faith certificate and supporting opinion

letter to the complaint in cases of medical negligence,

is unconstitutional. Although the plaintiff fully briefed

his attack on the constitutionality of § 52-190a, we cannot reach the merits of that claim because of his failure

to challenge the trial court’s threshold conclusions that

his claims against all of the defendants are barred by,

inter alia, the doctrines of res judicata and collateral

estoppel. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the

trial court.

The record reveals the following facts relevant to the

plaintiff’s claim on appeal,5 as pleaded in his complaint,6

and the complex procedural history of this case. Beginning in 2002, Awwa and his employer, Connecticut

Behavioral Health Associates, P.C., provided psychiatric treatment to Roberta. In 2002, the plaintiff attended

a treatment session with Roberta, at which time Awwa

became aware of her suicidal thoughts. In early 2004,

Awwa prescribed medication for Roberta to treat her

major depressive disorder, despite the existence of

manufacturers’ warnings that (1) the medications

should not be prescribed to anyone with suicidal

thoughts, (2) ‘‘the possibility of a suicide attempt is

inherent in depression and may persist until [a] significant remission occurs,’’ and (3) ‘‘[c]lose supervision of

high risk patients should accompany initial drug therapy.’’ Awwa changed Roberta’s medication on several

occasions during the period of time leading up to March

1, 2004. The plaintiff contacted the Awwa defendants

on nine different occasions to inform them that Roberta

was having adverse reactions to the medications that

Awwa had prescribed. Roberta also sent Awwa a letter

dated December 23, 2003, to that effect. Awwa did not

return the plaintiff’s telephone calls or otherwise indicate that he appreciated the danger of the situation. On

March 1, 2004, Roberta tragically committed suicide.
On June 2, 2006, the plaintiff, acting as a self-represented party, filed a medical malpractice action in New

London Superior Court against the Awwa defendants in

his own name and as administrator of Roberta’s estate,

claiming wrongful death, medical malpractice, loss of

chance, and loss of consortium. See Traylor v. Awwa,

Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket

No. CV-06-5001159-S (2006 action). At the time the plaintiff filed the complaint, he had not attached the certificate of good faith and written opinion of a similar health

care provider, which are required by § 52-190a. On July

27, 2006, the Awwa defendants moved to dismiss the

2006 action for lack of personal jurisdiction; the trial

court, Hon. D. Michael Hurley, judge trial referee,

denied that motion on December 14, 2006. Subsequently, on October 19, 2006, the plaintiff filed a certificate of good faith and supporting written opinion letter

authored by Howard Zonana, a professor of psychiatry

at Yale University School of Medicine, opining that there

was a good faith basis for the action.

On December 26, 2006, the plaintiff, now represented

by counsel, filed a request to amend the complaint pursuant to Practice Book § 10-60. On December 29, 2006,

the Awwa defendants objected to the request, and Judge

Hurley sustained their objection on January 16, 2007.

On January 8, 2007, the Awwa defendants moved to

dismiss the 2006 action, claiming that the complaint as

originally filed lacked the certificate of merit and written opinion of a similar health care provider required by

§ 52-190a. Subsequently, on June 1, 2007, Judge Hurley

denied that motion to dismiss and thereafter issued

numerous discovery orders.

The Awwa defendants did not comply with Judge

Hurley’s discovery orders. Eventually, counsel for the

Awwa defendants stated in court that his clients had

destroyed all relevant medical and telephone records

that were within their exclusive possession and control,

despite their knowledge of their obligation to preserve

those records given a pending or impending civil action

dating back to Roberta’s death in March, 2004. Similarly,

the Knowles defendants, acting at the direction of the

Awwa defendants, destroyed relevant records in their

possession. The plaintiff and his expert witnesses never

had an opportunity to examine those records. Subsequently, the case was reassigned to Judge Thomas F.

Parker, judge trial referee, who the plaintiff later named

as a defendant in the present case. See footnote 5 of

this opinion.

On July 12, 2010, the plaintiff, represented by counsel,

filed an amended complaint that became the operative

complaint in the 2006 action, adding claims of spoliation

and violations of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110a et seq.,

arising from the destruction of the records.7 On July

16, 2010, the Awwa defendants moved to dismiss the
amended complaint on the ground that the plaintiff’s

original June 1, 2006 complaint initiating the action

failed to comply with § 52-190a because the required

certificate of good faith and opinion letter had not been

attached. Judge Parker granted the Awwa defendants’

motion, concluding that, although Judge Hurley had

denied an earlier motion to dismiss filed by these defendants, that denial preceded the Appellate Court’s decisions in Rios v. CCMC Corp., 106 Conn. App. 810, 943

A.2d 544 (2008), and Votre v. County Obstetrics & Gynecology Group, P.C., 113 Conn. App. 569, 966 A.2d 813,

cert. denied, 292 Conn. 911, 973 A.2d 661 (2009).8 See

Traylor v. Awwa, Superior Court, judicial district of

New London, Docket No. CV-06-5001159-S, 2010 WL

3584285, *3–4 (August 11, 2010). Relying on Rios and

Votre, Judge Parker concluded that the plaintiff’s failure

to obtain and file the written opinion letter required by

§ 52-190a (a) at the initiation of the 2006 action was

not remedied by the eventual filing of Zonana’s letter,

and that Judge Hurley’s ruling to the contrary was inconsistent with this appellate precedent. Id., *5.

Judge Parker next determined that Judge Hurley’s

earlier decision was not entitled to preclusive effect

under the doctrines of law of the case or collateral

estoppel. Id., *5–6. Judge Parker then concluded that

other specifications in the complaint against Connecticut Behavioral Health Associates, P.C., were barred by

the statute of limitations in General Statutes § 52-555

(a). Id., *9–10. Accordingly, on August 11, 2010, Judge

Parker rendered judgment dismissing counts one

through six of the complaint in the 2006 action. Id., *10.

On August 27, 2010, the plaintiff appealed from the

judgment of dismissal to the Appellate Court under

docket number AC 32641; the Appellate Court subsequently granted the Awwa defendants’ motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction on January 5,

2011.9

In a subsequent memorandum of decision, Judge Parker rendered judgment dismissing the two remaining

counts in the 2006 action, namely, spoliation and

CUTPA violations, concluding that the earlier dismissal

of the underlying medical malpractice claims for failure

to file a good faith certificate and opinion letter meant

that the defendants had rebutted the presumption that

the plaintiff could have prevailed on those claims in

the absence of the acts of spoliation. See Traylor v.

Awwa, Superior Court, judicial district of New London,

Docket No. CV-06-5001159-S, 2011 WL 1025029, *9–10

(February 15, 2011). Accordingly, Judge Parker rendered judgment for the defendants in the 2006 action.

Id., *10.

On February 23, 2011, the plaintiff, as a self-represented party, appealed from that judgment to this court

under docket number SC 18754; that appeal later was

transferred to the Appellate Court pursuant to Practice
Book § 65-4. The Appellate Court docketed the plaintiff’s appeal under docket number AC 33038, along with

another appeal, docket number AC 33039, which had

been filed by the plaintiff’s then attorney in this case

on behalf of the estate. The appeal in docket number

AC 33039 subsequently was withdrawn as derivative.

After the plaintiff’s counsel was granted leave to withdraw from the case on June 30, 2011, the Awwa defendants subsequently moved to dismiss the appeal for

lack of a justiciable controversy between the parties,

on the ground that the plaintiff’s claims were derivative

of those of the estate, with the estate’s appeal having

previously been dismissed.10 The Appellate Court

granted that motion to dismiss on December 16, 2011.

On December 29, 2011, the plaintiff filed a petition for

certification to appeal from that judgment of dismissal,

which this court denied on January 25, 2012. Traylor

v. Awwa, 303 Conn. 931, 36 A.3d 242 (2012).

In 2011, the plaintiff filed a new action in New London

Superior Court against the Awwa and Knowles defendants, their attorneys and insurers, then Attorney General Richard Blumenthal, court officials, and several

New London prosecutors. Traylor v. Awwa, Superior

Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV11-5014139-S (first 2011 action). The first 2011 action,

which was later removed to federal court, included in

its fifteen count complaint a claim that § 52-190a violated the state and federal constitutions. See Traylor

v. Awwa, Docket No. 3:11CV00132 (AWT), 2014 WL

555358, *1 (D. Conn. February 10, 2014). In a series of

rulings, the plaintiff’s claims in the first 2011 action,

including his claim challenging the constitutionality of

§ 52-190a, were resolved against him.11

While the first 2011 action was pending, the plaintiff

instituted a second action in 2011, this time in the Hartford judicial district under docket number CV-11-

5035895-S (second 2011 action). The complaint in the

second 2011 action also included the claim that § 52-

190a is unconstitutional, and all of the claims raised in

this complaint were resolved against the plaintiff.12 See

generally Traylor v. Gerratana, 148 Conn. App. 605, 88

A.3d 552, cert. denied, 312 Conn. 901, 91 A.3d 908, and

cert. denied, 312 Conn. 902, 112 A.3d 778, cert. denied,

U.S. , 135 S. Ct. 444, 190 L. Ed. 2d 336 (2014).

The plaintiff filed the present action in April, 2016,

in the Stamford-Norwalk judicial district, seeking

declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as damages in

excess of $15 million. The plaintiff’s lengthy complaint

pleaded claims for relief under six separate counts,

namely (1) violations of his constitutional rights to due

process and equal protection of the laws by the state

defendants in connection with their handling of his

previous actions, (2) fraudulent concealment by the

Awwa and Knowles defendants, (3) spoliation by the

Awwa and Knowles defendants, (4) violation of CUTPA
by Advanced Telemessaging and Connecticut Behavioral Health Associates, P.C., (5) intentional infliction

of emotional distress by the Awwa and Knowles defendants and Judge Parker, and (6) loss of consortium

as to the Awwa and Knowles defendants. The case

subsequently was transferred to the Danbury judicial

district, and later to the Complex Litigation Docket in

the judicial district of Hartford.

After the case was transferred to the Hartford Complex Litigation Docket, the Awwa defendants moved

for summary judgment, and the Knowles defendants

and the state defendants each moved to dismiss the

amended complaint. The plaintiff did not oppose these

motions or appear at the February 6, 2017 hearing on

them.13

With respect to the Awwa defendants’ motion for

summary judgment, the trial court agreed with their

argument that they are entitled to judgment as a matter

of law under the doctrine of res judicata. After comparing the complaints, the trial court concluded that res

judicata barred the plaintiff’s claims of fraudulent concealment, CUTPA violations, and intentional infliction

of emotional distress because they previously had been

raised and litigated to conclusion in the first 2011 action.

The trial court concluded similarly with respect to the

plaintiff’s claim of loss of consortium because he had

an adequate opportunity to raise that claim in the first

2011 action. The trial court further determined that

the plaintiff could have challenged the lower courts’

conclusions on these issues by way of appealing the

first 2011 action. Accordingly, the trial court granted

the Awwa defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

The trial court addressed the state defendants’

motion to dismiss as follows. The trial court first

observed that the plaintiff’s complaint sought no monetary damages against either the state, the Appellate

Court, or any individual state defendant in his or her

official capacity. The court further concluded that any

claim against any state defendant in his or her individual

capacity was, in effect, against the state and, therefore,

barred by sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Spring v. Constantino, 168 Conn. 563, 568–69, 362 A.2d 871 (2012).

As to the plaintiff’s claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against the state defendants, the trial court

concluded that these claims were barred by sovereign

immunity because the plaintiff failed to allege sufficient

facts showing that he had suffered a substantial violation of his constitutional rights or that the defendants

had acted in excess of their statutory authority.14 Specifically, the trial court observed that these claims were

identical to those raised by the plaintiff in the second

2011 action, and the trial court relied on the Appellate

Court’s holding in that case that the plaintiff had not

sufficiently pleaded ‘‘a substantial claim that the state

or one of its officers [had] violated [his] constitutional
rights.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) The trial

court reasoned that, in this context, the plaintiff’s claim

for declaratory relief was ‘‘barred on the independent

grounds of sovereign immunity and collateral estoppel.’’

The trial court also concluded that ‘‘the plaintiff [lacked]

standing to challenge the constitutionality of § 52-190a

because he, in fact, obtained the opinion letter required

by the statute.’’ The trial court next determined that

the plaintiff’s claims against the individual judges were

barred by absolute judicial immunity, and that his

claims were nonjusticiable to the extent that they

sought an order to overturn or reverse the decisions of

the Appellate Court or the Superior Court. Accordingly,

the trial court granted the state defendants’ motion

to dismiss.

Finally, the trial court granted the Knowles defendants’ motion to dismiss. The trial court agreed with

their argument that the plaintiff’s spoliation and CUTPA

claims against them were barred by the prior pending

action doctrine because they also were raised in the

first 2011 action. The trial court determined that dismissal was warranted given that the actions are ‘‘virtually alike’’ and that the first 2011 action could have

provided the plaintiff with the same remedy, given that

‘‘the claims in the two actions so obviously overlap that

the plaintiff moved to consolidate the matters.’’

The trial court rendered judgment for all of the defendants in accordance with its decisions on their motions

for summary judgment and dismissal. This appeal

followed.15

On appeal, the plaintiff has filed a brief claiming that

§ 52-190a is unconstitutional because the ‘‘certificate

of merit requirement burdens access to the courts by

imposing an expensive and unnecessary prerequisite to

having one’s day in court.’’ Arguing that access to the

courts is a fundamental right under both the state and

federal constitutions, the plaintiff contends that the certificate requirement ‘‘creates an improper and often

impossible obstacle to access to the courts,’’ citing

internal pressure from within the medical community

not to support plaintiffs in general, as well as the

expense of obtaining the relevant medical records and

hiring an appropriate expert to review them. In particular, the plaintiff relies heavily on a line of decisions

from the Oklahoma Supreme Court invalidating various

iterations of that state’s certificate of merit statute. See,

e.g., John v. Saint Francis Hospital, Inc., 405 P.3d 681,

691 (Okla. 2017); Wall v. Marouk, 302 P.3d 775, 778

(Okla. 2013); Zeier v. Zimmer, Inc., 152 P.3d 861, 874

(Okla. 2006). The plaintiff further argues that § 52-190a

violates his right to equal protection under the state

and federal constitutions.

In response, the defendants contend that review of

the merits of the plaintiff’s constitutional claims is precluded by his failure to brief challenges to the trial
court’s threshold conclusions that his claims in the present case are barred by the doctrines of res judicata,

collateral estoppel, and sovereign and judicial immunity, as well as the prior pending action doctrine. The

state defendants further argue that, other than his challenge to the constitutionality of § 52-190a, the defendant

has abandoned his other constitutional claims against

the state defendants challenging various actions taken

by the courts, and particularly Judge Parker, during the

handling of his cases, both on and off the bench. We

agree with the defendants and conclude that the plaintiff’s failure to brief a challenge to the trial court’s conclusions in its memoranda of decision abandons any

such challenge to those conclusions, in essence mooting his constitutional attack on § 52-190a.

‘‘We repeatedly have stated that [w]e are not required

to review issues that have been improperly presented

to this court through an inadequate brief. . . . Analysis, rather than mere abstract assertion, is required in

order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure to brief

the issue properly. . . . Where a claim is asserted in

the statement of issues but thereafter receives only

cursory attention in the brief without substantive discussion or citation of authorities, it is deemed to be

abandoned.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Gilmore, 289 Conn. 88,

124, 956 A.2d 1145 (2008); see id., 124–25 (claim abandoned when party ‘‘devotes little more than a page of

her original and reply briefs combined to the discussion

of her claim, limiting her argument to the bare assertion

that she should not be held legally liable for offer of

judgment interest because she was not specifically

named in the offer and no unified offer was made to

all four defendants,’’ and cites one case ‘‘entirely unrelated to the issue on appeal’’).

In the present case, the plaintiff’s complete failure

to challenge what the trial court actually decided in its

memoranda of decision operates as an abandonment

of his claims. ‘‘An unmentioned claim is, by definition,

inadequately briefed, and one that is generally . . .

considered abandoned.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) State v. Saucier, 283 Conn. 207, 223, 926 A.2d

633 (2007). Indeed, when an appellant entirely fails to

challenge the trial court’s conclusions with respect to

the merits of the case, thus leaving them intact despite

the briefing of other issues, the appeal is, in essence,

rendered moot. See, e.g., Hartford v. CBV Parking

Hartford, LLC, 330 Conn. 200, 210, 192 A.3d 406 (2018)

(‘‘[u]ndoubtedly, if there exists an unchallenged, independent ground to support a decision, an appeal from

that decision would be moot, as this court could not

afford practical relief even if the appellant were to prevail on the issue raised on appeal’’); Middlebury v. Connecticut Siting Council, 326 Conn. 40, 53, 161 A.3d

537 (2017) (declining to review claim that trial court

improperly determined that claims were abandoned by
inadequate briefing because ‘‘the plaintiffs have failed

to challenge the trial court’s alternative conclusions

rejecting the claims on the merits’’); Doe v. Hartford

Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 317 Conn. 357, 379

n.23, 119 A.3d 462 (2015) (‘‘where alternative grounds

found by the reviewing court and unchallenged on

appeal would support the trial court’s judgment, independent of some challenged ground, the challenged

ground that forms the basis of the appeal is moot

because the court on appeal could grant no practical

relief to the complainant’’ [internal quotation marks

omitted]).

We acknowledge that the plaintiff is a self-represented party and that it ‘‘is the established policy of the

Connecticut courts to be solicitous of [self-represented]

litigants and when it does not interfere with the rights

of other parties to construe the rules of practice liberally

in favor of the [self-represented] party. . . . The courts

adhere to this rule to ensure that [self-represented]

litigants receive a full and fair opportunity to be heard,

regardless of their lack of legal education and experience . . . .

‘‘This rule of construction has limits, however.

Although we allow [self-represented] litigants some latitude, the right of self-representation provides no attendant license not to comply with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law. . . . A . . . court does not

have the discretion to look beyond the pleadings and

trial evidence to decide claims not raised.’’ (Citations

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Oliphant

v. Commissioner of Correction, 274 Conn. 563, 569–70,

877 A.2d 761 (2005); see also Costello v. Goldstein &

Peck, P.C., 321 Conn. 244, 257–58, 137 A.3d 748 (2016)

(‘‘[t]his court has always been solicitous of the rights

of [self-represented] litigants and, like the trial court,

will endeavor to see that such a litigant shall have the

opportunity to have his case fully and fairly heard so

far as such latitude is consistent with the just rights of

any adverse party’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]).

The solicitous treatment we afford a self-represented

party does not allow us to address a claim on his behalf

when he has failed to brief that claim. See, e.g., Deutsche

Bank National Trust Co. v. Pollard, 182 Conn. App.

483, 487, 189 A.3d 1232 (2018) (‘‘Other than a broad

and conclusory claim that the court too narrowly construed the transaction test, the defendant has provided

this court with no argument specific to any count of

his counterclaim; nor has he set forth any reasoning in

support of the notion that his pleadings fall within the

parameters of the transaction test. Although we recognize and adhere to the well-founded policy to accord

leeway to self-represented parties in the appeal process,

our deference is not unlimited; nor is a litigant on appeal

relieved of the obligation to sufficiently articulate a

claim so that it is recognizable to a reviewing court.’’
[Footnote omitted.]); Tonghini v. Tonghini, 152 Conn.

App. 231, 239–40, 98 A.3d 93 (2014) (‘‘declin[ing] to

enter into the statutory thicket of the family support

magistrate laws without any meaningful assistance

from the parties’’ and observing that ‘‘the fact that the

defendant is self-represented cannot excuse or cure

. . . obvious inadequacies in the record’’); In re Nicholas B., 135 Conn. App. 381, 384, 41 A.3d 1054 (2012)

(declining to review self-represented respondent’s

claim that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance because his ‘‘argument is devoid of any legal

analysis, let alone citation to any authority,’’ and

determining solicitude to self-represented parties was

unwarranted because ‘‘[t]he major deficiencies in the

presentation of this claim, which undeniably interfere

with the petitioners’ right to respond adequately to the

claim, fall well outside of that degree of latitude

afforded self-represented parties’’); but cf. State v.

Brown, 310 Conn. 693, 698 n.4, 80 A.3d 878 (2013) (noting policy of solicitous treatment of self-represented

parties and treating defendant’s motion to correct illegal

sentence filed pursuant to nonexistent ‘‘ ‘Practice Book

Rule § 93-22’ ’’ as properly filed ‘‘pursuant to Practice

Book § 43-22’’).

In the present case, the plaintiff has not addressed

any of the issues, including res judicata, collateral estoppel, standing,16 and the prior pending action doctrine,

which provided the dispositive bases for the trial court’s

memoranda of decision.17 The plaintiff’s status as a selfrepresented party does not permit us to overlook that

complete omission. Because this omission operates as

an abandonment of any challenge to what the trial court

actually decided in this case,18 we cannot address the

single substantive issue that the plaintiff has raised,

namely, his challenge to the constitutionality of § 52-

190a.19 Accordingly, we are required to affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

1 The plaintiff named the following current and former Superior Court

judges as defendants: James W. Abrams, Emmet L. Cosgrove, Kari A. Dooley,

Thomas F. Parker, and Terence A. Zemetis.

2 The plaintiff appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate

Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to General

Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-1.

3 Given the multiplicity of Superior Court judges involved in this case in

both adjudicative and party capacities, for the sake of simplicity, all references herein to the trial court are to Judge Moll unless otherwise noted.

4 General Statutes § 52-190a provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) No civil action

or apportionment complaint shall be filed to recover damages resulting from

personal injury or wrongful death occurring on or after October 1, 1987,

whether in tort or in contract, in which it is alleged that such injury or death

resulted from the negligence of a health care provider, unless the attorney

or party filing the action or apportionment complaint has made a reasonable

inquiry as permitted by the circumstances to determine that there are

grounds for a good faith belief that there has been negligence in the care or

treatment of the claimant. The complaint, initial pleading or apportionment

complaint shall contain a certificate of the attorney or party filing the action

or apportionment complaint that such reasonable inquiry gave rise to a good
faith belief that grounds exist for an action against each named defendant

or for an apportionment complaint against each named apportionment defendant. To show the existence of such good faith, the claimant or the claimant’s

attorney, and any apportionment complainant or the apportionment complainant’s attorney, shall obtain a written and signed opinion of a similar

health care provider, as defined in section 52-184c, which similar health

care provider shall be selected pursuant to the provisions of said section,

that there appears to be evidence of medical negligence and includes a

detailed basis for the formation of such opinion. Such written opinion shall

not be subject to discovery by any party except for questioning the validity

of the certificate. The claimant or the claimant’s attorney, and any apportionment complainant or apportionment complainant’s attorney, shall retain the

original written opinion and shall attach a copy of such written opinion,

with the name and signature of the similar health care provider expunged,

to such certificate. . . .

* * *

‘‘(c) The failure to obtain and file the written opinion required by subsection (a) of this section shall be grounds for the dismissal of the action.’’

5 We note that the vast majority of the allegations in the plaintiff’s 105

page complaint consists of facts supporting his various due process claims

arising from the handling of his first medical malpractice action, with particular attention to the actions of Judge Thomas F. Parker, judge trial referee,

both on and off the bench, along with the fact that Judge Parker ultimately

was not renominated to his position as a judge trial referee. Because the

plaintiff’s sole claim on appeal concerns the constitutionality of § 52-190a,

which the trial court did not reach, we need not discuss those other allegations in any detail.

6

‘‘The standard of review for a court’s decision on a motion to dismiss

[under Practice Book § 10-30] is well settled. A motion to dismiss tests,

inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction.

. . . [O]ur review of the court’s ultimate legal conclusion and resulting

[determination] of the motion to dismiss will be de novo. . . . When a . . .

court decides a jurisdictional question raised by a pretrial motion to dismiss,

it must consider the allegations of the complaint in their most favorable

light. . . . In this regard, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in

the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations,

construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader. . . . The motion

to dismiss . . . admits all facts which are well pleaded, invokes the existing

record and must be decided upon that alone. . . . In undertaking this

review, we are mindful of the well established notion that, in determining

whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction, every presumption favoring

jurisdiction should be indulged.’’ (Footnote omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted.) Cuozzo v. Orange, 315 Conn. 606, 614, 109 A.3d 903 (2015);

see also Miller’s Pond Co., LLC v. New London, 273 Conn. 786, 789 n.5, 873

A.2d 965 (2005) (noting that motion for summary judgment, which was

treated as ‘‘equivalent of a common-law motion for judgment on the pleadings,’’ requires court to ‘‘accept as undisputed the facts pleaded in the complaint’’).

7 We note that, in 2009, the plaintiff also brought a separate mandamus

action in the New London judicial district under docket number CV-09-

4009523-S, challenging an earlier decision of the trial court, Abrams J.,

to open a judgment of default that had been rendered against the Awwa

defendants in the 2006 action on the ground that they had violated discovery

orders previously rendered by Judge Hurley. See Traylor v. State, 128 Conn.

App. 182, 183, 15 A.3d 1173, cert. denied, 301 Conn. 927, 22 A.3d 1276 (2011).

Judge Abrams granted the Awwa defendants’ motion to open because he

had rendered the default judgment without reviewing their properly filed

objection and subsequently determined that they had not violated any discovery orders. Id., 184. Judge Parker subsequently granted the motion to dismiss

the mandamus action ‘‘because the plaintiff did not claim that any of the

discovery orders could not be subject to an appeal once the malpractice

action had concluded.’’ Id., 184–85. The Appellate Court affirmed that judgment denying the writ of mandamus ‘‘because the plaintiff has failed to

demonstrate that there is no other specific adequate remedy available to

review the court’s actions. Moreover, because the actions of the court that

are complained of here may be made an issue in the plaintiff’s appeal from

the final judgment of the medical malpractice action, mandamus is not

warranted.’’ Id., 186.

8

In Bennett v. New Milford Hospital, Inc., 300 Conn. 1, 30–31 n.17, 12

A.3d 865 (2011), this court discussed, but took no position regarding, the
continued viability of the holding in Votre v. County Obstetrics & Gynecology

Group, P.C., supra, 113 Conn. App. 585–86, that the opinion letter requirement of § 52-190a (a) cannot be satisfied through an opinion of a similar

health care provider filed with an amended pleading that was not filed at

the commencement of the action.

9

In their motion to dismiss, the Awwa defendants claimed that the Appellate Court lacked jurisdiction because there was (1) no appealable final

judgment and (2) no justiciable controversy between the parties to the

appeal. The Appellate Court granted the Awwa defendants’ motion in an

order without an opinion.

10 The Appellate Court granted the attorney’s motion to withdraw, which

was filed in accordance with the plaintiff’s wishes as stated during the

preargument conference, and sua sponte ordered that his appeal as administrator of the estate would be dismissed unless he obtained new counsel

within thirty days. The plaintiff did not obtain new counsel. The Appellate

Court subsequently dismissed that portion of the appeal on August 2, 2011.

On August 4, 2011, the plaintiff filed a petition for certification from that

portion of the order, which this court dismissed for lack of a final appellate

judgment; see General Statutes § 51-197f; on September 28, 2011. See Traylor

v. Awwa, 302 Conn. 937, 28 A.3d 989 (2011).

11 More specifically, the claims against the state defendants in the first

2011 action were dismissed by the District Court on the ground that the

plaintiff’s complaint failed to state a claim under each count or each count

was barred by sovereign immunity. Traylor v. Awwa, supra, 2014 WL 555358,

*12. The plaintiff appealed from this judgment to the United States Court

of Appeals for the Second Circuit but withdrew that appeal on April 15, 2014.

The District Court also dismissed the plaintiff’s claims in the first 2011

action against the Awwa defendants. The plaintiff also appealed from this

judgment to the Second Circuit, but withdrew that appeal on April 15, 2014.

The District Court denied the motion to dismiss with respect to CUTPA and

spoliation allegations against the Awwa defendants’ insurer and attorney;

see Traylor v. Awwa, 899 F. Supp. 2d 216, 224–27 (D. Conn. 2012); but

subsequently granted a motion for summary judgment filed by these defendants. See Traylor v. Awwa, 88 F. Supp. 3d 102, 109–10 (D. Conn. 2015). The

plaintiff appealed from the granting of that motion for summary judgment

to the Second Circuit; the Second Circuit dismissed that appeal on November

19, 2015.

The District Court remanded the remaining claims against the Knowles

defendants in the first 2011 action to New London Superior Court, where

they were transferred to the Complex Litigation Docket in the judicial district

of Waterbury. The first 2011 action was then transferred again to the Stamford-Norwalk judicial district, where Judge Genuario granted the Knowles

defendants’ motion for summary judgment on October 26, 2016. On June

21, 2017, this court dismissed the plaintiff’s writ of error challenging the

granting of summary judgment in the first 2011 action, and the Appellate

Court subsequently denied the plaintiff’s motion for permission to file a late

appeal from that granting of summary judgment.

12 Specifically, the second 2011 action was instituted against numerous

judges, legislators, and court employees, and the Awwa defendants’ insurer,

challenging rulings in the plaintiff’s other cases as violations of the state

and federal constitutions, along with the constitutionality of § 52-190a. See

generally Traylor v. Gerratana, 148 Conn. App. 605, 88 A.3d 552, cert. denied,

312 Conn. 901, 91 A.3d 908, and cert. denied, 312 Conn. 902, 112 A.3d 778,

cert. denied, U.S. , 135 S. Ct. 444, 190 L. Ed. 2d 336 (2014). The

Appellate Court upheld the dismissal of the second 2011 action on the

ground that it was barred by the doctrines of qualified and absolute judicial

and legislative immunity. Id., 612–15; see id., 615 (concluding that claims

against insurer were abandoned because of inadequate briefing). Particularly

pertinent to the present case, the Appellate Court held that the plaintiff’s

claims in the second 2011 action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief

against the legislative defendants on the ground that § 52-190a is unconstitutional were barred by sovereign immunity because ‘‘[n]one of the claims

raised by the plaintiff allege[s] a substantial claim that clearly demonstrate[s]

an incursion upon [his] constitutionally protected interests.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 611.

While litigation continued in the first and second 2011 actions, the plaintiff

continued to apply for fee waivers in the New London judicial district to

allow him to reopen the original 2006 action and to file new actions. The

trial court, Cosgrove, J., denied two of these applications pursuant to General

Statutes § 52-259b (c) after a hearing, on the ground that the plaintiff ‘‘has
repeatedly filed actions with respect to the same or similar matters; that

these filings demonstrate an extended pattern of frivolous filings that have

been without merit; that this filing is consistent with the [plaintiff’s] previous

pattern of frivolous filings; and that the granting of the fee waiver would

constitute a flagrant misuse of [J]udicial [B]ranch resources.’’ Traylor v.

Awwa, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV-06-

5001159-S, 2016 WL 823033, *4 (February 5, 2016). Ultimately, however,

Judge Povadator, sitting in the Stamford-Norwalk judicial district where

this case originally was filed, granted the fee waiver on March 14, 2016,

which allowed the plaintiff to pursue the present action.

13 We note that the plaintiff’s conduct in responding to the motions and

appearing in court was at issue before the trial court. After giving the plaintiff

an additional month of time to file responsive briefs, in addition to a previous

ninety day extension before its assignment to the case, the trial court then

granted the plaintiff an extension of an additional sixty days, ultimately

setting January 23, 2017, as a due date for briefs and February 6, 2017, as

the hearing date. On February 1, 2017, the plaintiff moved for continuance

of a ‘‘ ‘February 23’ status conference’’ on the ground that he needed more

time to prepare and represented therein that he had contacted the defendants’ attorneys regarding his request but they had not responded to him.

The plaintiff also indicated in a separate filing that he required a continuance

because he had vision problems resulting from medication.

Because there was no status conference scheduled for February 23, 2017,

the trial court presumed that the plaintiff sought a continuance of the only

scheduled event, namely, the February 6 hearing. On February 2, 2017, the

trial court issued an order denying a continuance of the February 6 hearing,

but directed the plaintiff to appear at that hearing to argue in support of

his request for more time to respond, and to submit for in camera review

medical documentation supporting his arguments that he ‘‘was physically

unable’’ to participate. On February 3, 2017, the plaintiff obtained his medical

records from a Veterans Affairs (VA) office and then had them sent from

the New London courthouse to a court officer in Hartford via e-mail. The

plaintiff then filed a ‘‘notice of compliance’’ stating that he would not attend

the February 6 hearing, ‘‘claiming for the first time that he was unable to

drive as a result of prescribed medication.’’

At the February 6 hearing before the trial court, the court officer confirmed

on the record that, on the afternoon of February 3, the plaintiff had ‘‘called

him and said that he had driven to a VA office that day to obtain his medical

records and that he had driven to the New London courthouse that day to

have those records e-mailed to [Judge Moll’s] chambers.’’ (Emphasis in

original.) Given that the plaintiff had driven a car that day and his medical

records did not support any claims of vision problems, the trial court found

that the plaintiff was ‘‘flagrantly disregarding the court’s deadlines and the

court’s February 3, 2017 order denying his request to continue the February

6, 2017 hearing. Accordingly, the [trial] court proceeded with the February

6, 2017 hearing, which [the plaintiff] failed to attend.’’ The plaintiff has not

challenged that finding or the denial of additional extensions in this appeal.

See footnote 18 of this opinion.

14 As explained in Columbia Air Services, Inc. v. Dept. of Transportation,

293 Conn. 342, 349, 977 A.2d 636 (2009), this court has recognized three

exceptions to sovereign immunity: ‘‘(1) when the legislature, either expressly

or by force of a necessary implication, statutorily waives the state’s sovereign

immunity . . . (2) when an action seeks declaratory or injunctive relief on

the basis of a substantial claim that the state or one of its officers has

violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights . . . and (3) when an action

seeks declaratory or injunctive relief on the basis of a substantial allegation

of wrongful conduct to promote an illegal purpose in excess of the officer’s

statutory authority.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

15 On January 7, 2019, the plaintiff filed a motion asking us to take judicial

notice of certain misrepresentations that he claimed counsel for the state

and the Awwa defendants had made during oral argument in this appeal on

December 13, 2018. By order dated February 27, 2019, we denied this motion.

16 Although the plaintiff does not address the issue of standing, we note—

sua sponte, because it implicates our subject matter jurisdiction; see, e.g.,

Fairfield Merrittview Ltd. Partnership v. Norwalk, 320 Conn. 535, 548, 133

A.3d 140 (2016)—that the trial court concluded that the plaintiff lacked

standing because he had failed to allege a substantial claim that the opinion

letter requirement of § 52-190a was an incursion on his constitutionally

protected interests. In so concluding, the trial court relied upon the Appellate

Court’s decision in Traylor v. Gerratana, supra, 148 Conn. App. 605, in
which the Appellate Court simply concluded that the plaintiff’s amended

complaint in that action had made ‘‘only conclusory allegations that § 52-

190a violated his constitutional rights to equal access to court, separation

of powers, equal protection, due process, and a trial by jury. None of the

claims raised by the plaintiff alleges a substantial claim that clearly demonstrate[s] an incursion upon [his] constitutionally protected interests.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 611. We disagree with the trial court’s

reliance on this reasoning as applied to the present case. Having reviewed

the operative complaint in this case, we conclude that the allegations in the

plaintiff’s complaint, taken as true—and particularly the allegation that § 52-

190a creates an ‘‘economic barrier’’ to access to the courts, given that ‘‘[t]he

average burden of cost for the prelitigation certificate of merit is $10,000

to $20,000,’’ with a disproportionate effect on African American litigants

like the plaintiff—are sufficiently specific allegations of economic injury to

demonstrate an incursion upon constitutionally protected interests. See,

e.g., Allco Finance Ltd. v. Klee, 861 F.3d 82, 95 (2d Cir. 2017) (allegation that

state’s request for proposal charged unlawful fees was injury ‘‘sufficiently

‘concrete’ and ‘particularized’ to qualify as injur[y]-in-fact’’), cert. denied,

U.S. , 138 S. Ct. 926, 200 L. Ed. 2d 203 (2018); E.M. v. Dept. of Education,

758 F.3d 442, 459 (2d Cir. 2014) (parent had standing to bring claim under

Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., when

she became ‘‘subject to a contractual obligation to pay [private school]

tuition . . . and . . . incurred that obligation as a direct result of the

[d]epartment’s alleged failure to provide her child a [free and adequate

public education]’’). Given the significant expense allegedly incurred by the

plaintiff, and the fact that his failure to obtain the letter at the outset of the

2006 action led to its dismissal, we also disagree with the trial court’s

conclusion that ‘‘the plaintiff lacks standing to challenge the constitutionality

of § 52-190a because he, in fact, obtained the opinion letter required by the

statute.’’ Nevertheless, the plaintiff’s failure to challenge the state defendants’ other grounds for dismissal renders this standing conclusion harmless

error not requiring reversal.

We further note that, because the plaintiff’s standing to challenge the

constitutionality of § 52-190a emanates from his interests in the claims relating to the 2006 action, his opportunity to assert this constitutional challenge

was in the lengthy proceedings before the trial court in the 2006 action and

during the subsequent appeals. ‘‘[I]t is well settled that [f]inal judgments

are . . . presumptively valid . . . and collateral attacks on their validity

are disfavored. . . . The reason for the rule against collateral attack is well

stated in these words: The law aims to invest judicial transactions with the

utmost permanency consistent with justice. . . . Public policy requires that

a term be put to litigation and that judgments, as solemn records upon

which valuable rights rest, should not lightly be disturbed or overthrown.

. . . [T]he law has established appropriate proceedings to which a judgment

party may always resort when he deems himself wronged by the court’s

decision. . . . If he omits or neglects to test the soundness of the judgment

by these or other direct methods available for that purpose, he is in no

position to urge its defective or erroneous character when it is pleaded or

produced in evidence against him in subsequent proceedings.’’ (Citation

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Sousa v. Sousa, 322 Conn. 757,

771, 143 A.3d 578 (2016).

Put differently, under the circumstances presented in this case, any claims

by the plaintiff that § 52-190a should not be applied to him because of its

unconstitutionality were matters required to be asserted in the action in

which the decision to apply the statute to him was made, and any challenges

to the decision applying the statute to him were matters subject to direct

appeal. ‘‘[I]t is now well settled that, [u]nless a litigant can show an absence

of subject matter jurisdiction that makes the prior judgment of a tribunal

entirely invalid, he or she must resort to direct proceedings to correct

perceived wrongs . . . . A collateral attack on a judgment is a procedurally

impermissible substitute for an appeal.’’ (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 771–72; see also, e.g., In re Shamika F., 256

Conn. 383, 406–407, 773 A.2d 347 (2001).

17 We acknowledge that the plaintiff touched on issues of standing, collateral estoppel, and res judicata briefly during the principal and rebuttal

portions of his oral argument before this court. Raising a claim at oral

argument is not, however, a substitute for adequately briefing that claim.

See, e.g., Studer v. Studer, 320 Conn. 483, 493 n.11, 131 A.3d 240 (2016)

(‘‘[i]t is well settled that claims on appeal must be adequately briefed, and

cannot be raised for the first time at oral argument before the reviewing
court’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]).

18 We note that the plaintiff’s appeal form specifies both ‘‘[f]inal judgment’’

and ‘‘the decision regarding [the plaintiff’s] motion for an extension of time

due to illness’’; see footnote 13 of this opinion; as the challenged actions

of the trial court. The plaintiff has not, however, addressed the denial of

his requested extensions of time in his brief. Accordingly, we deem any

challenges to that discretionary decision similarly abandoned.

19 We note that the Appellate Court has previously rejected a similar

constitutional challenge to the good faith certificate requirement of § 52-

190a under the open courts provision of the state constitution; see Conn.

Const. art. I, § 10; and the due process clauses of the federal and state

constitutions. See Lohnes v. Hospital of Saint Raphael, 132 Conn. App. 68,

81–84, 31 A.3d 810 (2011), cert. denied, 303 Conn. 921, 34 A.3d 397 (2012).