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*********************************************** 
LUCILLE NAPPO v. WILLIAM NAPPO

(AC 40613)

Lavine, Keller and Bishop, Js.

Syllabus

The defendant, whose marriage to the plaintiff previously had been dissolved, appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court

granting in part the plaintiff’s amended motion for contempt, modifying

his alimony obligation and issuing certain sanctions and remedial orders.

Pursuant to the dissolution judgment, which was rendered in 2004, the

defendant was ordered to pay the plaintiff as alimony one half of his

monthly benefit from his M Co. pension and so much of his social

security benefits as would equalize the parties’ incomes, taking into

account the social security benefits that the plaintiff receives. The alimony order also required the defendant to provide the plaintiff with

copies of tax returns and certain forms, and ordered that the parties

divide equally the proceeds of a $375,000 bond that the defendant had

posted in conjunction with his starting his own business after he retired

from M Co., and that the defendant seek the release of the bond from

the bonding company and share the proceeds with the plaintiff. As of

November, 2009, the defendant had not recovered the bond proceeds.

Following various modifications of the alimony order, the plaintiff filed

motions for contempt and for modification of alimony, which were later

amended, claiming, respectively, that the defendant had failed to comply

with a number of the court’s orders and that there had been a substantial

change of circumstances with respect to the parties’ financial situations.

Following a hearing on the plaintiff’s motions, the trial court found with

respect to the motion for contempt that, although the plaintiff had not

proven that the defendant had wilfully violated the alimony order, the

order, nevertheless, had been violated because the alimony payments

were improperly reduced by certain bank wire transfer charges. The

trial court also found that although the plaintiff had not proven that the

defendant had wilfully violated the order directing the defendant to pay

one half of the bond proceeds to the plaintiff, the order had not been

complied with. The court did find the defendant in contempt of an order

that required him to provide the plaintiff with notice related to the status

of the bond, and for his failure to provide the plaintiff with copies of

his tax returns and certain forms. The court issued certain remedial

orders and ordered sanctions for the defendant’s contempt and noncompliance with certain orders, and it granted the plaintiff’s motion for

modification of alimony. On the defendant’s appeal to this court, held:

1. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the plaintiff’s

amended motion for modification and increasing the defendant’s alimony payments to $1300 per month, that court having properly factored

into its calculation of the defendant’s weekly income certain amounts

advanced to him by his current wife and the expenditures she had paid

on his behalf: although the defendant claimed that the court erroneously

found an increase in his weekly net income by incorrectly assuming

that his current wife’s contributions to him constituted gifts rather than

loans that he was obligated to pay, no promissory note or other documentary evidence was presented to support the defendant’s contention that

the payments were loans, and there was no evidence that any terms of

repayment existed or that any repayment had ever been made or tendered during the entire course of the defendant’s current marriage of

approximately ten years, and the court correctly considered the current

wife’s financial contributions in calculating the defendant’s weekly

income because they were relevant to the defendant’s expenses, a material factor in determining his net income and, therefore, his ability to

pay the increased alimony; moreover, the defendant’s claim that the

modified alimony award of $1300, plus $1000 per month to be paid

toward an arrearage, was excessive was unavailing, as the award nearly

equalized the parties’ incomes as was originally intended in the dissolution judgment, and contrary to the defendant’s claim, the court’s failure

to take into account certain additional income that he claimed the
plaintiff allegedly derived from renting the parties’ former marital home

was not clearly erroneous in light of the evidence before the court,

which showed that the property had been foreclosed and was no longer

generating rental income.

2. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court improperly

sanctioned him for his contempt of certain court orders and issued

additional orders to remediate his failure to comply fully with certain

other orders:

a. This court declined to review the defendant’s claim that it was unfair

for the trial court to award the plaintiff attorney’s fees and travel

expenses as a sanction for his being found in contempt, which was

based on his claim that when the plaintiff failed to appear for a prior

hearing, the court denied his motion for sanctions for expenses related

to the cost of preparing for that hearing; the defendant brought his

motion for sanctions to address the plaintiff’s alleged failure to comply

with certain discovery requests and to file a financial affidavit, not

because of her failure to appear at the subject hearing, and his claim

that he also had incurred travel expenses and attorney’s fees in preparation for the hearing at which the plaintiff failed to appear was not

adequately raised before the trial court and, therefore, was not properly

preserved for appeal.

b. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the defendant

to commence paying interest on the plaintiff’s share of the bond proceeds

if the bond was not released on or before October 31, 2017: although

that court did not find the defendant in contempt for failing to comply

with its order to obtain the release of the bond and to share the proceeds

equally with the plaintiff, it expressed its concern that compliance was

lacking and entered the remedial order to secure compliance in the near

future, and it would defy common sense to conclude that merely because

the defendant’s violation of the order was not wilful, the court was

deprived of its authority to enforce its order; moreover, the court reasonably determined that the defendant, in the exercise of due diligence,

would be able to resolve the payment issue if given several additional

months to obtain the release of the bond, and the defendant admitted

in his appellate brief that the bonding company has been willing to

release the bond proceeds since December, 2017.

c. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the defendant

to reimburse the plaintiff $391.50 for the bank wire transfer charges, as

the remedial order was proper even though the defendant’s violation

of the alimony order was not wilful because it compensated the plaintiff

for a minor alimony deficiency.

Argued December 4, 2018—officially released March 19, 2019

Procedural History

Action for the dissolution of a marriage, and for other

relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford and tried to the court, Gruendel, J.;

judgment dissolving the marriage and granting certain

other relief; thereafter, the court, Albis, J., granted in

part the plaintiff’s amended motion for contempt,

granted the plaintiff’s amended motion for modification

of alimony and issued certain orders, and the defendant

appealed to this court. Affirmed.

William Nappo, self-represented, the appellant

(defendant).
Opinion

KELLER, J. The self-represented defendant, William

Nappo, appeals from the judgment of the trial court

granting postdissolution motions filed by the plaintiff,

Lucille Nappo, for modification of alimony and for contempt.1 The defendant claims that the court erred in (1)

granting the plaintiff’s motion for modification, thereby

increasing his monthly alimony payments,2 and (2)

imposing certain sanctions and fashioning additional

orders directed to the defendant upon finding him in

contempt and/or not in compliance with several court

orders. We affirm the judgment of the court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to this appeal. The parties’ marriage endured for

forty-seven years. After a contested trial, a judgment

of dissolution was entered on May 6, 2004. Since the

date of the judgment of dissolution, postjudgment proceedings have continued unabated.

At the time of the judgment, both of the parties were

sixty-five years old with limited incomes. The dissolution court, however, noted that during the course of

the marriage, the defendant had enjoyed significant

business success and a lavish lifestyle and had provided

generously for his four children without providing for

the plaintiff’s future. It concluded that it was ‘‘satisfied

that [the defendant] can again make a good or even

extraordinary income.3 Although he is sixty-five, his

health is good, his experience is broad, and his ability

to understand, create, and manage business opportunities is brilliant.’’ (Footnote added.) The alimony order

provided in pertinent part: ‘‘The [defendant] shall pay

the [plaintiff] as alimony [one] half of his monthly benefit from his Mobil [Corporation] pension immediately

and so much of his social security benefit as will equalize the parties’ income, taking into account the $149

per week that the [plaintiff] receives in social security.

As additional alimony, the [defendant] shall pay the

[plaintiff] $1 per year and the [plaintiff’s] medical insurance premium until the death of either of them or the

[plaintiff’s] remarriage, which shall be nonmodifiable

as to term. Each party shall notify the other of any

changes in income or employment within two weeks

of the same occurring. The [defendant] shall, by April

15th of each year, provide the [plaintiff] with all tax

returns, including 1099s and K-1s, for himself, any corporation in which he holds an interest of more than

[15] percent . . . and any partnership, sole proprietorship, or other entity in which he holds an interest or

from which he derives any financial benefit whatsoever.’’4

On January 18, 2006, the alimony order was modified

by agreement of the parties, and the defendant was

required to pay alimony at the rate of $170 per week,

payable in biweekly payments of $340. The alimony
order was modified again on February 20, 2007, which

effectively reinstated the original alimony order contained in the judgment of dissolution. As the language of

that judgment indicates, the calculation of the alimony

payment due from the defendant to the plaintiff requires

periodic recalculation as changes occur in the parties’

respective monthly social security benefits. Although a

later order was entered on January 13, 2012, it did not

change the operable alimony order but required the

parties to attend a status conference to discuss further

payments due under the 2004 dissolution judgment. The

status conference was held on February 9, 2012, and

the parties reached an agreement about the proper computation of alimony due under the 2004 dissolution judgment as reinstated in the February 20, 2007 order. Under

that agreement, the defendant began to pay monthly

alimony in the amount of $609.15.5

The judgment of dissolution also ordered that the

parties equally divide the proceeds of a bond in the

amount of $375,000 that the defendant had posted in

conjunction with starting his own business after he

retired from Mobil Corporation. The defendant was

ordered to seek ‘‘to be repaid for the bond and to divide

the proceeds’’ with the plaintiff.

On June 15, 2015, the plaintiff filed a motion for

contempt, which she amended on February 23, 2017

(amended motion for contempt), alleging that the defendant had failed: (1) to provide her with proof of tax

returns and 1099, K-1, and W-2 forms as ordered by the

court; (2) to pay her one half of the value of the bond,

or to comply with a court order of November 16, 2009,

relative to proof of his efforts to obtain release of the

bond; (3) to pay alimony on a timely basis; (4) to provide

verification of the amounts that the federal government

was deducting from his income; (5) to disclose information concerning his American Express credit card on

his financial affidavit as ordered by the court on December 9, 2015; and (6) to produce a copy of his passport,

also ordered by the court on December 9, 2015.

On June 15, 2015, the plaintiff also filed a motion

for modification of alimony, which she amended on

February 23, 2017 (amended motion for modification),

claiming a substantial change of circumstances based

on the financial situations of the parties. On January

27, 2016, the plaintiff filed another motion for contempt

(second motion for contempt), alleging that the defendant had failed to provide a true and accurate copy of

his credit report as ordered by the court on January

15, 2016.6 On February 3, 2016, the defendant filed a

motion for attorney’s fees for the defense of the plaintiff’s pending motions. On February 5, 2016, the plaintiff

filed a motion for attorney’s fees incurred in pursuing

her contempt motions and her motion for modification.7

On June 15, 2017, after three days of hearings, the
court rendered a decision on the February 23, 2017

amended motion for contempt and the January 27, 2016

second motion for contempt regarding the credit report,

as well as the February 23, 2017 amended motion for

modification of alimony. The court noted that during

the course of the hearing, the plaintiff had determined

that she was no longer pursuing certain claims she had

alleged in her amended motion for contempt, and it

issued the following findings and orders: ‘‘As to the

plaintiff’s claim that the defendant failed to make all

alimony payments in a timely manner under the terms

of the applicable order, the court finds that some payments were made late but that the defendant generally

made the payments within a relatively short time after

they were due. As to this ground, the court finds that

the plaintiff has not proven by clear and convincing

evidence that the defendant wilfully violated the court

order, and it does not find the defendant in contempt.

No remedial orders are entered with respect to this

claim.

‘‘With respect to the plaintiff’s claim that her alimony

payments were improperly reduced by bank wire

charges, the court finds that the defendant made

[twenty-five] monthly payments during the period

between November, 2013, and February, 2016, by wire

transfer. Each of those payments by the defendant via

wire transfer was reduced by a wire transfer fee charged

by the defendant’s sending bank and by a further fee

imposed by the plaintiff’s receiving bank. As a result

of these charges, the amount actually credited to the

plaintiff’s bank account for each of the months in question was less than the monthly alimony payment of

$609.15 due under the applicable order.

‘‘The payment of the alimony by wire transfer was

not a requirement of the judgment but, rather, was

agreed to by the parties informally. Nevertheless, the

order required the defendant to pay $609.15 to the plaintiff. Even though the parties may have agreed to the

wire transfer method, it was incumbent upon the defendant to pay his bank’s wire transfer fee rather than have

it deducted from the amount due to the plaintiff. The

court finds that during the relevant period a total of

$391.50 in wire transfer fees charged by the defendant’s

bank should have been paid by the defendant and not

passed on to the plaintiff. However, the court concludes

that the defendant is not responsible for the fees

charged by the plaintiff’s chosen banking institution to

receive the funds which she agreed to have paid to her

in that manner.

‘‘As to this ground, the court finds that the plaintiff

has not proven by clear and convincing evidence that

the defendant wilfully violated the court order. However, the court finds that there was a violation of the

order insofar as the defendant did not pay the full

amount of alimony due from him, and the court enters
the remedial orders below to make the plaintiff whole

and prevent the defendant’s [wire] transfer charges

from being passed on to her in the future.’’

As to the alleged failure of the defendant to transfer

to the plaintiff one half of the $375,000 bond pursuant

to the 2004 dissolution judgment, the court found that

‘‘[t]he bond funds had not yet been recovered by the

defendant or paid to the plaintiff on November 16, 2009,

when the court ordered the defendant to provide the

plaintiff with a written report every six months thereafter on the status of the bond and his efforts to comply

with the order to share the proceeds of it with her. . . .

‘‘As to the first of [the plaintiff’s] claims, the court

finds that the defendant has not yet obtained the bond

funds from the bonding company due to certain legal

impediments that have arisen. The cash collateral for

the bond in question is held by International Fidelity

Insurance Company (bonding company). The bonding

company was not required to release the funds which

were posted to secure the issuance of the bond until the

expiration of the statute of limitations on the liabilities

which the bond was intended to protect against, a

period which apparently expired on or about April 16,

2016. Since the passage of that date, the release of the

funds has been further delayed due to a technical error

in the statement, in a related bankruptcy proceeding, of

the legal name of the entity controlled by the defendant

which posted the collateral funds with the bonding company and to which the refund of the funds is payable.

As to this claim of contempt, the court finds that the

plaintiff has not proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has wilfully violated the order

to pay [one] half of the proceeds of the bond to her.

However, the order has not been complied with, and

the court enters remedial orders intended to secure

such compliance.

‘‘As to the second claim, the court finds that the

plaintiff has proven the following elements of contempt

by clear and convincing evidence. The defendant had

notice of the court’s order of November 16, 2009, requiring him to provide the plaintiff with a written report

every six months on the status of the bond and his

efforts to comply with the order to share the proceeds

of it with her. . . . His noncompliance was wilful. The

court therefore finds the defendant in contempt of the

order . . . . The award to the plaintiff of attorney’s

fees and travel expenses as hereinafter set forth is

attributable, in part, to this finding of contempt.’’

The court then found the defendant in contempt for

failing to provide the plaintiff with copies of his annual

income tax returns, 1099 forms and K-1 forms by April

15 of each calendar year, as well as for failing to provide

the plaintiff with a copy of his passport. The court noted

that its award to the plaintiff of attorney’s fees and

travel expenses is also attributable, in part, to these
additional findings of contempt. The court did not find

the defendant in contempt relative to the plaintiff’s

claims that he failed to disclose an American Express

credit card or that he failed to provide her with a

credit report.

As part of its ruling on the February 23, 2017 amended

motion for contempt, the court ordered the defendant

to pay to the plaintiff within thirty days the sum of

$391.50 in reimbursement of the defendant’s wire transfer charges that had reduced the amount of alimony

the plaintiff received. It also ordered the defendant to

provide the plaintiff’s attorney with a detailed monthly

written statement of his efforts to collect the cash collateral held by the bonding company until he has paid

one half of the bond proceeds as required by the 2004

dissolution judgment. The court also ordered that ‘‘[i]f

for any reason the defendant has not paid the plaintiff

in full for her [one] half of the bond proceeds . . . on

or before October 31, 2017, then the unpaid portion due

to the plaintiff shall accrue interest at the rate of [5

percent] . . . per annum commencing on November

1, 2017, and continuing until the unpaid portion plus

accrued interest has been paid in full, with any partial

payments after November 1, 2017, to be applied first

to interest and then to principal.’’ Finally, the court

ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff within thirty

days the sum of $2000 in attorney’s fees plus $1000

toward the plaintiff’s travel expenses to attend the

hearing.8

With respect to the amended motion for modification

of alimony, the court reviewed the financial affidavits

filed by each party at the time of the entry of the February 20, 2007 order and found by a preponderance of

the evidence that the defendant’s circumstances had

improved substantially since that date in two ways.

First, the defendant had remarried, and his current wife

provides the bulk of his financial support. Second, since

February 20, 2007, there had been a significant increase

in the defendant’s net worth. His assets had increased

in value by over $400,000, and his liabilities had

decreased by almost three million, from $5,371,775 to

$2,393.818. The court noted that it found the defendant

‘‘to be significantly lacking in credibility,’’ particularly

as to the nature of the financial support that his current

wife provides him. The defendant claimed that sums

contributed to his legal expenses and deposited into

his bank account were loans from his current wife, but

the court, noting the lack of any promissory note or

evidence of any repayment, found that they were gifts,

and that such gifts were continuing regularly. In addition, the court found that the defendant’s current wife

paid for the bulk of the couple’s expenses, including

the mortgage, taxes and other expenses for two condominium units, one in Connecticut and one in South

Carolina; country club memberships; and travel and

dining out, beyond that which the defendant could
afford on his reported income.

The court found that the defendant’s net weekly

income was therefore comprised of four elements: his

reported weekly income of $586 on his financial affidavit, the average weekly amount he has received from

his current wife for ongoing legal fees in the amount

of $263, the average weekly amount of gifts of cash

provided to him by his current wife for deposit into his

bank account in the amount of $90, and $254 in excess

weekly expenditures for which the only payment source

in evidence is the defendant’s current wife, as the defendant’s weekly expenses and liability payments exceed

his net weekly income. As a result of its consideration

of these four elements, the court found the defendant’s

net weekly income to be $1193.

The court found that the plaintiff’s net weekly income

as of the date of the hearing was $567, excluding alimony payments. This income calculation included

recurring financial support from her son. The court

further found that the plaintiff’s needs and expenses

reasonably required a greater amount of income than

the existing alimony order provided her.

Accordingly, the court granted the plaintiff’s

amended motion for modification and ordered the

defendant to pay the plaintiff $1300 per month in alimony retroactive to July 1, 2015, the first month following the date of service of her initial motion for

modification on the defendant.9 The retroactive order

generated an arrearage of $16,580, which the court

ordered payable in sixteen consecutive monthly installments of $1000, followed immediately by a final monthly

installment of $580, commencing on July 15, 2017.

The court also denied the parties’ respective motions

for attorney’s fees, finding no adequate basis for either

request. The court indicated that it previously had

awarded the plaintiff attorney’s fees after finding that

the defendant was in contempt of court orders. This

appeal followed.

Before addressing the defendant’s claims, we set

forth the standard of review that applies to our review

of the orders challenged on appeal. ‘‘An appellate court

will not disturb a trial court’s orders in domestic relations cases unless the court has abused its discretion

or it is found that it could not reasonably conclude as

it did, based on the facts presented. . . . In determining whether a trial court has abused its broad discretion

in domestic relations matters, we allow every reasonable presumption in favor of the correctness of its

action.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Schwarz

v. Schwarz, 124 Conn. App. 472, 476, 5 A.3d 548, cert.

denied, 299 Conn. 909, 10 A.3d 525 (2010). ‘‘As has often

been explained, the foundation for this standard is that

the trial court is in a clearly advantageous position to

assess the personal factors significant to a domestic
relations case. . . . Notwithstanding the great deference accorded the trial court in dissolution proceedings, a trial court’s ruling . . . may be reversed if, in

the exercise of its discretion, the trial court applies the

wrong standard of law.’’ (Citations omitted; internal

quotation marks omitted.) Gabriel v. Gabriel, 324 Conn.

324, 336, 152 A.2d 1230 (2017).

I

The defendant’s first claim is that the court abused

its discretion when it granted the plaintiff’s amended

motion for modification of alimony and increased his

payments to $1300 per month. The defendant claims

that there was insufficient evidence to support the

court’s finding that the money his current wife contributes to his expenses or advances to him were gifts,

rather than loans. He also claims that the modified

alimony payment, coupled with the order to pay $1000

per month on the arrearage created by the retroactivity

for a total of $2300 per month, constitutes 89 percent

of his weekly net income.

Modification of alimony after the date of a dissolution

judgment, unless and to the extent that the decree precludes modification, is governed by General Statutes

§ 46b-86. Schwarz v. Schwarz, supra, 124 Conn. App.

476. ‘‘When . . . the disputed issue is alimony, the

applicable provision of the statute is § 46b-86 (a), which

provides that a final order for alimony may be modified

by the trial court upon a showing of a substantial change

in the circumstances of either party. . . . The party

seeking modification bears the burden of showing the

existence of a substantial change in the circumstances.

. . . The change may be in the circumstances of either

party. . . . The date of the most recent prior proceeding in which an alimony order was entered is the appropriate date to use in determining whether a significant

change in circumstances warrants a modification of an

alimony award.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Rubenstein v. Rubenstein, 172 Conn. App. 370, 375,160

A.3d 419 (2017).

‘‘In general the same sorts of [criteria] are relevant

in deciding whether the decree may be modified as are

relevant in making the initial award of alimony. . . .

More specifically, these criteria, outlined in General

Statutes § 46b-82, require the court to consider the

needs and financial resources of each of the parties

. . . as well as such factors as the causes for the dissolution of the marriage and the age, health, station, occupation, employability and amount and sources of

income of the parties.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Schwarz v. Schwarz, supra, 124 Conn. App. 477.

When the initial alimony award was not sufficient to

fulfill the underlying purpose of the award, to ensure

the continued enjoyment of the standard of living that

the supported spouse enjoyed during the marriage, an

increase in the supporting spouse’s income, in and of
itself, may justify an increase in the award. See Dan v.

Dan, 315 Conn. 1, 15–16, 105 A.3d 118 (2014).

The defendant’s claims concerning the modification

of his alimony payments, to approximately double what

he had been paying, essentially concern whether the

court appropriately categorized the financial contributions his current wife had been providing to him. We

interpret his claim as an assertion that the court erroneously found an increase in his weekly net income from

$568, which was the amount he stated on his financial

affidavit, to $1193, by incorrectly assuming that his current wife’s contributions to him, totaling approximately

$137,000, constituted gifts rather than loans that he was

obligated to repay. We disagree.

‘‘Whether money should be characterized as income

or a loan is a question of fact for the trial court. . . .

This is often a matter that turns on the credibility of

the parties and whether any documentation of the loans

was provided. Compare Zahringer v. Zahringer, [124

Conn. App. 672, 678–79, 6 A.3d 141 (2010)] (court, after

determining that parties, including father’s accountant,

were credible and that documentation had been created, held that payments were loans), with Desai v.

Desai, 119 Conn. App. 224, 236–37, 987 A.2d 362 (2010)

(court, after determining that parties were not credible

and that documentation was lacking, held that payments were not loans).’’ (Citation omitted.) Keller v.

Keller, 167 Conn. App. 138, 152, 142 A.3d 1197, cert.

denied, 323 Conn. 922, 150 A.3d 1151 (2016).

In the present case, although the defendant asserts

that the contributions from his current wife were loans

that he would have to repay in the future and, thus,

should not be considered in the alimony calculation,

the court did not find his testimony on the subject to

be credible. No promissory note or other documentary

evidence was presented to support the defendant’s contention that the payments were loans, and there was

no evidence that any terms of repayment existed or

that any repayment had ever been made or tendered

during the entire course of the defendant’s current marriage—a period of approximately ten years.

In addition to finding that all the funds advanced to

the defendant by his current wife had been gifts and

not loans, the court also found that the evidence showed

that the defendant’s current wife pays the bulk of the

couple’s expenses. The court noted that the plaintiff

and his current wife led a lifestyle with a level of luxury

beyond that which the defendant could afford given the

income he reported on his financial affidavit. The court

noted that the defendant did not include on his financial

affidavit recurring deposits of funds from his current

wife into his personal bank account, which the court

also determined were gifts and not loans. The court

highlighted the fact that some of the funds that the

defendant’s current wife had given to him and spent
for his benefit came from income she received through

her position as owner and managing member in an

entity, Hampton Ventures, LLC, which owns and rents

office space within real property located at 1100 New

Britain Avenue in West Hartford. The defendant testified that in 2005, his dissolved company, R.E.T. Capital

Corporation, of which he was the sole owner, had lent

his current wife $225,000 in order to purchase this rental

property. He further testified that despite the fact that

a balloon provision in the promissory note required

payment in full by May, 2015, the loan had not been

repaid; rather, the date the note was payable had been

‘‘extended’’ to some unspecified time.

The court based its determination concerning the

financial contributions of the defendant’s current wife

on the testimony of both parties, the defendant’s financial situation, and his spending habits, which included

country club fees and the maintenance of two residences. We conclude that the court did not abuse its

discretion by factoring into its calculation of the defendant’s weekly income the amounts advanced to him by

his current wife and the expenditures she had paid on

his behalf. The court concluded that the financial needs

of the defendant were less than they were at the time

of the February 20, 2007 order by reason of the necessities and amenities provided to him by his current wife

above and beyond the funds she gives to him and uses

to pay his expenses. The court was correct in considering the income of the defendant’s current wife because

it was relevant to his current expenses, a material factor

in determining his current net income and, therefore, his

ability to pay the increased alimony. See McGuinness

v. McGuinness, 185 Conn. 7, 12–13, 440 A.2d 804 (1981).

We further conclude that the court’s modified

monthly alimony order of $1300 per month plus $1000

per month on an arrearage of $16,580 is not excessive,

as the defendant’s arguments suggest, in light of the

defendant’s net monthly income of $4772 ($1193

multiplied by 4.3) and the needs and expenses of the

plaintiff, whose current weekly net income, excluding

alimony but including additional support of $186.05 per

week, a recurring gift from her son, was determined to

be $567. This order nearly equalizes the parties’

incomes, as originally intended in the dissolution

judgment.

The defendant also argues that the court failed to

take into account additional income he alleges that the

plaintiff derives from renting the parties’ former marital

home in Avon. The only evidence with respect to her

renting those premises came through the testimony of

the plaintiff and her son, Jeffrey Nappo. Both indicated

that the property had been foreclosed and there was

no longer any rental income being generated. The defendant offered no contrary evidence and, viewed in light

of the evidence before the court, its failure to attribute
rental income to the plaintiff is not clearly erroneous.

II

The defendant’s second claim is that the court

improperly sanctioned him for his contempt of certain

court orders and entered additional orders to remediate

his failure to fully comply with others.10 The defendant

specifically takes issue with (1) the court’s award to the

plaintiff of attorney’s fees and travel expenses totaling

$3000, (2) the court’s remedial order that he pay 5 percent interest on any portion of the plaintiff’s one-half

share of the bond money that remained unpaid after

October 31, 2017, and (3) the court’s order that he

reimburse the plaintiff $391.50 for unpaid alimony as a

result of wire transfer fees deducted by the defendant’s

bank from his alimony payments. We decline to review

the first aspect of this claim related to the award of

travel expenses and attorney’s fees because it was not

raised before the trial court. With respect to the other

aspects of the claim, we conclude that the remedial

orders pertaining to the wire transfer fees and the 5

percent interest on the unpaid balance of the plaintiff’s

share of the bond money effective November 1, 2017,

reflected a proper exercise of the court’s inherent

authority to effectuate its judgment. See, e.g., Perry v.

Perry, 156 Conn. App. 587, 595, 113 A.3d 132, cert.

denied, 317 Conn. 906, 114 A.3d 1220 (2015); O’Halpin

v. O’Halpin, 144 Conn. App. 671, 677–78, 74 A.3d 465,

cert. denied, 310 Conn. 952, 81 A.3d 1180 (2013).

A

We first address the court’s award of travel expenses

and attorney’s fees to the plaintiff, which the court

indicated were sanctions it was imposing upon finding

the defendant in contempt for failure to provide the

plaintiff with periodic reports on the status of his efforts

to obtain release of the $375,000 bond; copies of his

annual tax returns, 1099 forms, and K-1 forms by April

15 of each calendar year; and a copy of his passport.

The following additional facts are relevant to this

claim. The plaintiff sought reimbursement for and presented evidence of her travel expenses from Florida to

Connecticut on October 16, 2015, and January 15, 2016,

totaling $1929.35.11 These trips were for previously

scheduled hearings on her amended motion for contempt and amended motion for modification.12 On October 16, 2015, the defendant appeared through counsel,

but the hearing did not go forward. On that date, the

court ordered a continuance to January 15, 2016, and

noted that the defendant ‘‘acknowledges his obligation

to appear on that date.’’ The court also reserved the

plaintiff’s ‘‘right to seek reimbursement of expenses

incurred for her trips to Connecticut for the hearing

held today and July 14, 2015 on which the [plaintiff’s

motion for modification and motion for contempt] were

scheduled to be heard.’’
On January 15, 2016, the defendant moved for a continuance, which the court granted on the condition that

he pay the plaintiff certain travel expenses as listed on

plaintiff’s exhibit 1. In its written order, the court stated:

‘‘By agreement of the parties, [the defendant] shall pay

within one week of today, the sum of $1500 to [the

plaintiff] of which $714.66 is to reimburse her for her

travel expenses to appear in court today. The balance

is subject to adjustment and will be applied toward the

cost of her return trip for the continued hearing.13 The

court continues to reserve [the plaintiff’s] right to seek

reimbursement for prior trips as previously ordered by

the court.’’ (Emphasis added; footnote added.) During

the hearing on February 18, 2016, the court inquired of

the plaintiff whether the defendant had paid her funds in

compliance with his January 15 order, and she indicated

that she had received $1500. The plaintiff further testified that she had traveled from Florida to Connecticut

a third time for the February 18, 2016 hearing. Upon

finding the defendant in contempt, the court ordered

that he pay the plaintiff an additional $1000 for travel

expenses.

The plaintiff, through counsel, also requested that

she be reimbursed for attorney’s fees of $5000 for each

contempt motion. The court, having found the defendant in contempt on some, but not all, of the allegations

contained in her amended motion for contempt,

awarded the plaintiff $2000 in attorney’s fees.

On appeal, the defendant does not dispute the court’s

calculation of the amounts awarded to the plaintiff for

travel expenses and attorney’s fees. His only claim is

that it was unfair to award attorney’s fees and travel

expenses to the plaintiff because, on December 1, 2014,

she failed to appear for a prior hearing, and that the

court denied his motion for sanctions for expenses

related to the cost of preparing for that hearing.

First, we observe that the motion for sanctions to

which the defendant refers, filed on January 27, 2014,

was brought to address the plaintiff’s failure to comply

with his discovery requests and to file a financial affidavit, not due to her failure to appear in court on December 1, 2014. Second, although, throughout his appellate

brief, the defendant has failed to cite to the record, we

have conducted a thorough search of the transcripts

and the written motions presented to the trial court

and have determined that this particular justification

for denying the plaintiff’s requests for travel expenses

and attorney’s fees—that he also had incurred travel

expenses and attorney’s fees in preparation for a

December 1, 2014 hearing at which the plaintiff failed

to appear—was not adequately raised before the trial

court and, thus, is unpreserved.

On February 3, 2016, the defendant filed a motion

for attorney’s fees on which he presented no evidence,
but his counsel did argue this motion at the close of the

hearing on March 10, 2017. In his motion, the defendant

raised two claims: (1) if the court did not find the plaintiff in contempt, the defendant should be awarded fees

pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-87; and (2) the defendant should be awarded attorney’s fees for defending

the plaintiff’s pending motions because this was the

third time the defendant had to prepare to defend similar motions filed by the plaintiff. During closing arguments, however, counsel for the defendant asked the

court to award the defendant fees if it did not find

the defendant in contempt14 or if it did not grant the

plaintiff’s amended motion for modification. The court,

having found the defendant in contempt and having

granted the plaintiff’s amended motion for modification, denied the defendant’s motion for attorney’s fees,

finding there was no basis for it.15 At no point did the

defendant seek reimbursement or claim any right of set

off for travel expenses or attorney’s fees incurred in

attending court to defend previous motions that had

been scheduled to be heard on December 1, 2014. Additionally, he did not present any evidence as to the

amount of such expenses he had incurred. Consequently, the defendant is unable to challenge the court’s

order on this unpreserved ground.

B

We next address the defendant’s claim that the court

abused its discretion in ordering him to commence paying interest on the plaintiff’s share of the bond proceeds

if the bond was not released on or before October

31, 2017.

‘‘[A] trial court possesses inherent authority to make

a party whole for harm caused by a violation of a court

order, even when the trial court does not find the

offending party in contempt.’’ O’Brien v. O’Brien, 326

Conn. 81, 96, 161 A.3d 1236 (2017). In addition, it has

long been settled that a trial court has the authority to

enforce its own orders. This authority arises from the

common law and is inherent in the court’s function as

a tribunal with the power to decide disputes. See Papa

v. New Haven Federation of Teachers, 186 Conn. 725,

737–78, 444 A.2d 196 (1982). A remedial award does not

require a finding of contempt. Rather, ‘‘[i]n a contempt

proceeding, even in the absence of a finding of contempt, a trial court has broad discretion to make whole

a party who has suffered as a result of another party’s

failure to comply with a court order.’’ (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Clement v.

Clement, 34 Conn. App. 641, 647, 643 A.2d 874 (1994);

see also Brody v. Brody, 153 Conn. App. 625, 636, 103

A.3d 981, cert. denied, 316 Conn. 910, 105 A.3d (2014).

We further recognize that ‘‘[a]lthough [a] court does

not have the authority to modify a property assignment,

[the] court, after distributing property, which includes

assigning the debts and liabilities of the parties, does
have the authority to issue postjudgment orders effectuating its judgment.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

O’Halpin v. O’Halpin, supra, 144 Conn. App. 677–78.

‘‘[A]n order effectuating an existing judgment allows

the court to protect the integrity of its original ruling

by ensuring the parties timely compliance therewith.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 677; see Perry

v. Perry, supra, 156 Conn. App. 595.

The following additional facts are relevant to this

claim. The court heard evidence that at least since the

defendant had received a letter dated July 11, 2016,

from the bonding company, he was on notice that he

needed to move to open the bankruptcy judgment to

correct the name of the entity that had posted the bond

in the bankruptcy order so that the order reflected ‘‘TriState Terminals Inc.’’ instead of ‘‘Tri-State Terminals

Corp.’’ Acknowledging that he was familiar with this

letter, the defendant testified on March 9, 2017, that he

had yet to hire a lawyer or take any other action to

correct the misnomer in the bankruptcy order.

As previously noted in this opinion, on the basis of

the evidence submitted to the court for its consideration

as to why the defendant had failed to obtain the release

of the bond, the court found that the defendant had not

yet obtained the release due to the fact that the bonding

company was not required to release the funds that had

been posted to secure the issuance of the bond until

the expiration of the statute of limitations on the liabilities that the bond was intended to protect against, a

period that apparently expired on or about April 16,

2016. After the passage of that date, the court found

that the release of the funds had been further delayed

due to a technical error in the statement, in a related

bankruptcy proceeding, of the legal name of the entity

controlled by the defendant that posted the collateral

funds with the bonding company and to which the

refund of the funds is payable. Although the court found

that the defendant was not in contempt, it expressed

its concern that compliance was lacking and entered

remedial orders intended to secure compliance in the

near future. In particular, the court ordered that ‘‘[i]f

for any reason the defendant has not paid the plaintiff

in full for her [one] half of the bond proceeds . . . on

or before October 31, 2017, then the unpaid portion due

to the plaintiff shall accrue interest at the rate of [5

percent] . . . per annum commencing on November

1, 2017, and continuing until the unpaid portion plus

accrued interest has been paid in full, with any partial

payments after November 1, 2017, to be applied first

to interest and then to principal.’’ The court then found

the defendant in contempt for wilfully failing to provide

the plaintiff with a written report every six months, as

ordered by the court on November 16, 2009, as to the

status of his efforts to obtain release of the bond.

Given the impediments of which the court was made
aware and the fact that over twelve years had elapsed

since the dissolution court had ordered the defendant

to obtain the release of the bond and share the proceeds

equally with the plaintiff, the court reasonably determined that the defendant, in the exercise of due diligence, would be able to resolve the payment issue if

given several additional months to obtain the release

of the bond. ‘‘It would defy common sense to conclude

that, merely because a party’s violation of a court order

was not wilful, the trial court is deprived of its authority

to enforce the order.’’ AvalonBay Communities, Inc.

v. Plan & Zoning Commission, 260 Conn. 232, 241–42,

796 A.2d 1164 (2002). In fact, the defendant now admits

in his appellate brief that the bonding company has

been willing to release the bond money since December,

2017. Accordingly, we conclude that court did not abuse

its discretion in ordering the defendant to commence

paying interest on the plaintiff’s share of the bond proceeds if the bond was not released on or before October

31, 2017.16

C

The final aspect of the defendant’s claim is that the

court improperly ordered that the defendant reimburse

the plaintiff $391.50, the sum deducted from his alimony

payments by his bank after he agreed to wire transfer

alimony payments directly to the plaintiff’s bank. The

court determined that this resulted in the defendant

failing to pay the plaintiff the full amount of alimony

owed.

We find no abuse of discretion on the part of the

court in issuing this particular remedial order. Although

the court did not find the defendant in contempt for

failure to pay alimony in a timely fashion, it noted that

the parties had informally agreed to have the defendant

wire the plaintiff’s alimony payments directly to her

bank account and that each party had incurred charges

from their respective banks as a result. The court

deemed it equitable, and we agree, that each party

should be responsible for his or her own bank’s charges,

and noted that as a result of the defendant having not

directly paid his wire transfer costs, the plaintiff’s alimony checks for the period of time that her payments

were wired to her bank were reduced by a total of

$391.50. This remedial order was proper in that it compensated the plaintiff for a minor alimony deficiency

even though the defendant’s violation was not wilful.

‘‘Irrespective of whether a violation is wilful, the party

violating a court order properly may be held responsible

for the consequences of the violation. To hold otherwise

would shift the cost of the violation to the innocent

party.’’ O’Brien v. O’Brien, supra, 326 Conn. 101.

‘‘Although ordinarily our trial courts lack jurisdiction

to act in a case after the passage of four months from

the date of judgment; see General Statutes § 52-212a;

there are exceptions. One exception arises when the
exercise of jurisdiction is necessary to effectuate prior

judgments or otherwise enforceable orders. . . . [Our

Supreme Court has rejected a] hypertechnical understanding of the trial court’s continuing jurisdiction to

effectuate prior judgments. . . . [T]he trial court’s continuing jurisdiction is not separate from, but, rather,

derives from, its equitable authority to vindicate judgments. . . . [S]uch equitable authority . . . [derives]

from its inherent powers . . . and is not limited to

cases wherein the noncompliant party is in contempt

. . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Brody v.

Brody, supra, 153 Conn. App. 635.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 The plaintiff did not participate in this appeal. This court entered an

order on June 28, 2018, that indicated that this appeal would be considered

solely on the basis of the defendant’s brief and appendices, and the record

in light of the plaintiff’s failure to comply with this court’s June 1, 2018

order requiring her to file a brief and appendix on or before June 15, 2018.

2

In his statement of issues in his principal brief, the defendant claims

that the court’s modification of the alimony award and its order of payments

on the resultant alimony arrearage was excessive in light of his income,

and that the court improperly treated his current wife’s contributions to his

financial support as gifts rather than loans. For ease of discussion, we will

address these claims together.

3 The court further indicated that the defendant’s ‘‘testimony that he has

no hidden assets is not credible, but the court has no direct evidence of

what assets he may have and therefore assigns no value to any assets except

those introduced into evidence.’’

4

It is apparent that this modifiable $1 per year alimony order and the

requirement of notice to the other party of any change in income or employment supports the dissolution court’s conclusion that the defendant might

one day achieve a higher level of income than the small income his Mobil

Corporation pension and social security benefits were providing him at the

time, which might justify an upward modification of alimony.

5 The court noted that despite apparent changes in the parties’ respective

social security incomes since 2007, there had been no subsequent recalculation of the appropriate amount due under the formula set forth in the 2004

dissolution judgment.

6 The orders of the court pertaining to the defendant’s American Express

credit card, passport, and credit report were a result of the plaintiff’s ongoing

attempts to obtain full disclosure of the defendant’s financial status in order

to pursue her contempt and modification motions.

7 The plaintiff also sought an award of attorney’s fees in both of her

contempt motions.

8 At the time of the hearing, both parties resided outside of Connecticut

and were required to travel to Connecticut to attend the hearing.

9 General Statutes § 46b-86, which governs modification of alimony, provides in relevant part: ‘‘No order for periodic payment of permanent alimony

or support may be subject to retroactive modification, except that the court

may order modification with respect to any period during which there is a

pending motion for modification of an alimony or support order from the

date of service of notice of such pending motion upon the opposing party

pursuant to section 52-50. . . .’’

10 The hearing on the plaintiff’s two contempt motions was commenced

on February 8, 2016. The defendant has failed to provide this court with a

transcript of the proceedings that transpired on that date in accordance

with Practice Book § 63-8. This defect in the appeal does not hamper our

review, however, because the trial court file contains a copy of a certified

transcript of the proceedings on February 8, 2016, which the defendant’s

counsel provided to the trial court at the commencement of a subsequent

trial hearing in this matter on March 9, 2017.

11 The hearing on the plaintiff’s amended motion for contempt and her

amended motion for modification previously had been continued from July

15 to October 16, 2015, with an order to the plaintiff that she serve the

defendant with a subpoena.
12 The plaintiff’s second motion for contempt was not filed until January

27, 2016.

13 The court subsequently continued the hearing to February 18, 2016.

14 The defendant claimed fees for defending the contempt motions pursuant to § 46b-87, which provides, in relevant part, that ‘‘if any . . . person

is found not to be in contempt of such order, the court may award a

reasonable attorney’s fee to such person. . . .’’ (Emphasis added.)

15 Apart from the defendant’s counsel apprising the court of his hourly

rate, the court was provided with no evidence of the amount of fees being

sought relative to this litigation.

16 The defendant also appears to claim that the order of interest is improper

because, in his words, ‘‘[the bonding company] has been willing to release

the [b]ond since December, 2017, if [the plaintiff] signs the required release

form from [the bonding company]. Since [the plaintiff] has not signed the

release to date, [the defendant] was forced to file a motion to compel

postjudgment . . . on March 23, 2018.’’ The defendant did not raise this

argument before the trial court, a failing that is readily apparent in light of

the fact that the defendant also explains in his appellate brief that the

bonding company was first willing to release the bond, following a release

by the plaintiff, in December, 2017—six months after the trial court rendered

the judgment from which he now appeals. Likewise, the defendant draws

our attention to a motion to compel, which was filed by him in the trial

court approximately nine months after the court rendered the judgment

from which he now appeals, in which he asks the court to order the plaintiff

to sign the release so that the funds may be distributed in accordance with

the court’s order in the dissolution judgment. Because the plaintiff did not

raise this claim concerning the release of the bond before the trial court in

connection with the judgment from which he appeals, we decline to address

it on appeal. See Ahmadi v. Ahmadi, 294 Conn. 384, 395, 985 A.2d 319

(2009) (‘‘[a] party cannot present a case to the trial court on one theory

and then seek appellate relief on a different one’’ [internal quotation

marks omitted]).