IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA No. 17

- 0016 Filed December 20, 2017

STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff

- Appellee,

vs. MONESHA LASHAY BROUGHTON , Defendant

- Appellant.

________________________________________________________________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Carol L. Coppola , District Associate Judge.

A defendant appeals the sentence s imposed following her convictions for operating while i ntoxicated and child endangerment. SENTENCE S VACATED AND REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING

.

Mark C. Smith , State Appellate Defender, and Melinda J. Nye , Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant. Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Sheryl A. Soich , Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Tabor and Bower, JJ.2

VOGEL, Presiding Judge. Monesha Broughton was charged with operating while intoxicated (OWI) , first offense, and child endangerment. See Iowa Code § § 321J.2, 726.6 (2016). Broughton waived her right to a jury trial and stipulated to a trial to the court on the minutes

. The court found Broughton guilty as charged

. Broughton asked for immediate sentencing and declined the opportunity to address the c ourt in mitigation of punishment

. See Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.23(3)(d). During the sentencing portion of the hearing, d efense counsel informed the court that Broughton was not asking for a deferred judgment

. The court then stated, “So, basically, we have a p lea agreement,” and defense counsel answered, “Yes.” The court then sentenced Broughton “based on the plea agreement” to two years in prison , with all but two days suspended , and placed her on probation for one year. The written sentencing order state d the court found the following factors the most significant in determining Broughton’s sentence s :

On appeal, Broughton asserts the district court abused its discretion in sentencing her by failing to place on the record sufficient reasons for selecting t he
sentence s imposed. See Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.23(3)(d) (“The court shall state on the record its reasons for selecting the particular sentence.”). She asserts the court only referenced a n undisclosed “plea agreement. ” She further states the check

marked reasons on the sentencing order are “post hoc justifications” t hat were not3

considered by the court when determining her sentence s

. In support of her assertion, s he notes the court’s statements at the sentencing hearing do not mention any of the factors listed in the order except for the “plea agreement.” In addition, she asserts the court did not learn the details of her situation, such as her employment status, family make

- up, and substance abuse evaluation results, before the court selected the sente nce s because she had waived the right to have a presentence investigation report prepared and no one informed the court regarding this information until after the sentence ha d been pronounced

. Broughton asks that we vacate her sentence s and remand the cas e for resentencing. Our review of the district court’s sentencing decision is for an abuse of discretion, so long as the sentence falls within the statutory limitations. State v. Thacker , 862 N.W.2d 402, 405 (Iowa 2015). “In exercising discretion, the district court must ‘weigh all pertinent matters in determining a proper sentence, including the nature of the offense, the attending circumstances, the defendant’s age, character, and propensities or chances for reform.’” Id. (citation omitted). The di strict court must provide the reasons for its sentencing decision on the record so that “ a reviewing court will be able to assess whether there has been an abuse of discretion .” Id

. at 407. “[A] ‘terse and succinct’ statement may be sufficient, ‘ so l ong as the brevity of the court’ s statement does not prevent review of the exercise of the trial court’ s sentencing discretion. ’ ” Id . at 408 (citation omitted). We note the court indicated at the sentencing hearing that it was imposing the sentence s in acc ordance with the “plea agreement , ” but there had been no4

guilty plea

. 1 The adjudication of guilt followed a trial on the minutes. Even if there had been a plea agreement, the record is devoid of any indication as to the details of the agreement. See id. at 410 (vacating a sentence and remanding for resentencing where the record failed to include the details of the plea agreement and, thus, it was unclear if the court was merely giving effect to the parties’ plea agreement or independently exercis ing its discretion). We also note the court’s sentencing order indicated it considered a number of factors in reaching the sentencing decision but included among those factors was the “ plea agreement. ”
W e agree the use of sentencing forms and check boxes is not improper. S ee State v. Thompson , 856 N.W.2d 915, 921 (Iowa 2014) ( “ I n this age of word processing, judges can use forms, such as the one available in this case, to check the boxes indicating the reasons why a judge is imposing a certain sentence.” ). Howe ver, because of the reference to a “plea agreement” in both the sentencing transcript and the sentencing order, this court is unable to determine whether the district court properly exercised its discretion in sentencing Broughton . Therefore, her
sentence s must be vacated , and the case is remanded for resentencing. SENTENCE S VACATED AND REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING

.

1 See State v. Cason , 532 N.W.2d 755, 757 (Iowa 1995) (noting w here the sentencing order is “merely giving effect to the parties’ agreement,” the district court does not abuse its discretion “in failing to state reasons for the sentence imposed” ).