US FOREIGN POLICE ADVISING:

THE CASE OF VIETNAM

Jennifer C. Gibbs, Penn State Harrisburg

Editor
PKSOI Paper

US Foreign Police 

Advising: 

The Case of Vietnam

U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability 

Operations Institute

March 2020

Edited by

Jennifer C. Gibbs

Penn State Harrisburg
ii

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ISBN-13: 978-1-7325659-3-7
iii

US Foreign Police Advising:

The Case of Vietnam

Table of Contents

Preface���������������������������������������������������������������������������������v

Section I. Background: US Involvement in Vietnam������1

Chapter 1. The Vietnam National Police���������������������3

Cheyenne Bennese and 

Christopher Haraszkiewicz

Chapter 2. US Foreign Police Advising through 

USAID in the Vietnam War�������������������������������������������9

Michael Paul Posteraro, Jr. and Drew Tush

Section II. Police Advising in Vietnam: A Case Study of 

Police Advising Experiences of COLONEL Nguyen�����19

Chapter 3. Police Leadership during Wartime ��������22

Jarrett Gilbert

Chapter 4. Police Training During Wartime ������������30

Justin Krovic

Chapter 5. Police Deviance�����������������������������������������37

Joseph Ortiz

Chapter 6. Police Violence������������������������������������������45

Alexa Keys

Chapter 7. Combating Terrorism through Community Policing in Vietnam�����������������������������������������������57

Abayomi Ayoola
iv

Section III Applying Lessons Learned to US Foreign 

Advising Today�����������������������������������������������������������������62

Chapter 8. Lessons Learned and Best Practices ������63

Eunsil Yoo

Chapter 9. Looking toward the fFture: Does One 

Size Fit All? �������������������������������������������������������������������78

Karen Finkenbinder, Ph.D.

References�������������������������������������������������������������������������89
v

Preface

The genesis of this project stemmed from a unique opportunity 

to connect with the highly respected Colonel (COL) Charles 

Nguyen Tan Cuon, a retired police administrator from 

Vietnam. COL Nguyen was born in 1925 in Saigon, the son 

of the former Vietnam Minister of Security. With public 

service and safety in mind, he quickly rose through the ranks 

of the police force, holding several highly esteemed positions 

throughout his career and commanding over 5,000 police.

COL Nguyen’s policing experiences are unique. 

First, COL Nguyen was a police leader during peace and 

war times. He commanded a police force during the Vietnam 

War, where police were the first line of defense against 

insurgents, fighting and collecting intelligence for the 

military in addition to their regular duties of keeping order 

and responding to crimes. Second, COL Nguyen engaged 

with multiple foreign entities who were either fighting 

the Viet Cong, offering police assistance, or both. While 

managing his police units, he also negotiated with Australian 

forces in his district and worked with police advisors from 

the US, among other nations providing service to South 

Vietnam, officially known as the Republic of Vietnam (RoV) 

at that time. COL Nguyen developed a close relationship 

with some of his advisors, including Mr. Frank Clark from 

the US Agency for International Development (USAID). 

When Saigon fell, COL Nguyen fled with his family to the 

US, settling in Rockville, Maryland.

With his breadth of experiences leading various 

aspects of a police force during peace and war times, COL 

Nguyen has much to contribute to our understanding of 

policing, especially foreign police advising. His wealth of 

knowledge is particularly applicable to US foreign police 

advising today, given the US contribution to rebuilding police 

forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as service to policing 

agencies in various other countries. Thus, the US Army War 
vi

College organized a series of interviews with COL Nguyen 

and his USAID advisor, Mr. Frank Clark. Their experiences 

are interwoven with academic literature in the chapters to 

follow.

Figure 1: Clark and COL Nguyen at the US Army War 

College in 2016.

This project greatly benefited from the assistance 

of many contributors. We are grateful to COL Nguyen for 

sharing his wisdom and experiences, from which we learned 

so much. Our gratitude extends to Mr. Frank Clark for his 

service. Similarly, we appreciate Major Phu Tan Nguyen, 

M.D. and USAF Lt. Col. (Ret.) Larry Bouchat for conducting 

the interviews. The generous assistance of the US Army 

War College cannot be understated; we thank the institution 

for including us in this important project. Specifically, this 

project is the brainchild of Dr. Karen Finkenbinder and 

brought to fruition by the efforts of J. Scott Braderman of 

the Peacekeeping & Stability Operations Institute at the US 

Army War College. We also would like to acknowledge 

student assistants who helped with various tasks, including 

Michael P. Posteraro, Jr., Daniela Barberi, Eunsil Yoo and 

Christopher Haraszkiewicz.
1

Section I

Background: US Involvement in Vietnam

Foreign assistance in policing is not a new phenomenon, but 

often we fail to consider the past, while planning for the future. 

Since 1989, the role of the US in several stability operations 

has increased, such as: Panama (1989), Somalia (1992), Haiti 

(1994, 2004), Bosnia (1995), Kosovo (1999), Afghanistan 

(2001), and Iraq (2003). Additionally, US military and 

civilian organizations have been used to rebuild military and 

police forces and to provide logistics to international forces 

(El Salvador, 1991; East Timor, 1999). With the intention of 

avoiding past mistakes in future stability activities, we have 

endeavored to capture the lessons from Vietnam policing 

development. The operational environment in Vietnam was 

similar to Afghanistan and Iraq, in that police development 

was initiated during the conflict, in a dangerous environment 

that was difficult for civilian development actors to work in, 

thus requiring a large military police advising contingent. 

Police advising in what was then RoV also incorporated 

USAID and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) advisors, 

as well as those from other countries, but that is beyond 

the scope of this anthology of lessons learned. The lessons 

derived from the US intervention in Vietnam have important 

implications for foreign advising today and in the future.

The United States government (USG) established 

diplomatic relations with Vietnam in 1950, following its 

limited independence within the French Union; France 

continued to oversee Vietnam’s defense and foreign policy. In 

1954, Vietnamese nationalists fighting for full independence 

defeated France, and the now-divided Vietnam entered 

into two decades of civil war. The USG did not recognize 

North Vietnam’s government. The US maintained an 

embassy in RoV, and entered the war on the South’s side 

against the North. In 1975, just prior to RoV’s surrender to 
2

North Vietnamese forces, the USG closed its Embassy and 

evacuated all Embassy personnel.

After the fall of RoV, the country was reunified 

under communist rule. In 1978, Vietnam invaded 

Cambodia following border clashes. US policy held that 

normalization of its relations with Vietnam were based on 

withdrawal of the Vietnamese military from Cambodia. 

As part of a comprehensive political settlement, the US 

and Vietnam agreed to continue cooperation on prisoner 

of war/missing in action (POW/MIA) issues and on other 

humanitarian concerns. In 1995, the US announced the 

formal normalization of diplomatic relations with Vietnam. 

In 2015, the US and Vietnam marked the 20th anniversary of 

diplomatic relations.

The USG supports a strong, independent, and 

prosperous Vietnam that respects human rights and the rule 

of law. US relations with Vietnam have become increasingly 

cooperative and broad-based in the years since political 

normalization. Vietnam is a partner in nonproliferation 

regimes, including the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear 

Terrorism. Vietnam takes advantage of expertise, equipment, 

and training available under the Export Control and Related 

Border Security program. With the support of the US 

Department of Energy’s Megaports Initiative, Vietnam is 

installing radiation detection equipment to help detect and 

identify weapons of mass destruction and their components 

at the commercial port of Cai Mep-Vung Tau. The US and 

Vietnam also signed an agreement on counternarcotics and 

hold regular dialogue on human rights.

In the 1980s, Vietnam introduced market reforms, 

opened up the country for foreign investment, and improved 

the business climate. Vietnam has become one of the fastestgrowing economies in the world. Vietnam’s rapid economic 

transformation and global integration has lifted millions 

out of poverty and has propelled the country to the ranks 

of lower-middle-income status. US assistance in Vietnam 
1

focuses on consolidating gains to ensure sustainable 

economic development, while promoting good governance 

and the rule of law. Assistance projects aim to deepen 

regulatory reforms, improve the capacity and independence 

of Vietnam’s judicial and legislative bodies, and promote 

more effective public participation in the law and regulationmaking processes

Chapter 1 describes the National Police in Vietnam 

at the time of the Vietnam War. Cheyenne Bennese and 

Christopher Haraszkiewicz illuminate the motivations of the 

United States involvement and how their support affected 

the development of the National Police. In Chapter 2, Emily 

Shirk and Michael Posteraro, Jr. provide the history of the 

Vietnam Police and their responsibilities during the Vietnam 

War and introduce the key source for this monograph: COL 

Nguyen. To conclude this section, Drew Tush and Michael 

Posteraro, Jr. in Chapter 3 describe the United States Agency 

of International Development (USAID) and its role in the 

Vietnam War. Tush and Posteraro also introduce Mr. Frank 

Clark, COL Nguyen’s USAID advisor, with whom COL 

Nguyen had a close relationship. In Chapter 4, Justin Krovic 

describes how American policing ideology affects foreign 

countries such as Vietnam, who receive American military 

intervention during wartime. Joseph Ortiz addresses police 

deviance and corruption, their effects on a department as 

a whole, as well as their relationship with communism in 

Chapter 5. Ortiz explains how Social Learning Theory offers 

strategies to eliminate deviant opportunities within a police 

department. In Chapter 6, Alexa Lorance examines famous 

cases of police brutality in the US from the 1960s to 2015 

and compares those incidents of police brutality in Vietnam, 

and the resultant public outcry. Section II concludes with 

Abayomi Ayoola’s findings in Chapter 7, which defines 

terrorism and analyzes how different policing methodologies 

neutralize terrorist efforts and generate greater communitypolice relationships. Chapter 8 by Eunsil Yoo introduces US 
2

policing policies in Vietnam, as well as current US foreign 

police assistance activities, then concludes with lessons 

learned based upon experiences from Vietnam Wars and 

insight from COL Nguyen. Finally, Dr. Karen Finkenbinder 

outlines the way forward for future advisors.
3

Chapter 1

The Vietnam National Police

by Cheyenne Bennese and Christopher Haraszkiewicz

Prior to the onset of the Vietnam War, policing in Vietnam 

was unstable, lacking control and unity. In May of 1961, 

President Kennedy sent 400 Green Berets to South Vietnam 

as “special advisors” to train the South Vietnamese soldiers. 

The number of advisors during President Kennedy’s term 

eventually exceeded 16,000. Significant changes did not 

develop in the Vietnamese Police until 1962, when South 

Vietnamese President Ngo Diem issued a decree to form the 

National Police (Friedman, 2012; Nguyen, 2006; “South 

Vietnam-National Police,” n.d.; Thompson et al., 1971). 

These changes were greatly influenced by support from the 

US Government (USG). In 1964, Congress gave President 

Lyndon B. Johnson substantial authorities for waging the 

conflict in Vietnam; however, Congress never relinquished 

Constitutional checks and balances, such as funding and 

raising of troops. In March 1965, President Johnson deployed 

the first US combat troops to assist police and military forces 

in South Vietnam, and to protect the American air base in 

Da Nang. The American people initially supported the 

deployment of the 3,500 Marines to South Vietnam, who 

joined the nearly 23,000 American military advisors already 

in Vietnam.

At first, the National Police were disliked by many 

of the deployed Americans. Occasionally, carousing soldiers 

on pass ran afoul of the National Police, who were enforcing 

law and order (Friedman, 2012). The National Police were 

underpaid; therefore, requesting bribes from disorderly 

American troops was all too enticing. This did not sit well 

with the USG as the corruption presented a bad image among 

the Vietnamese citizens (Friedman, 2012). 
4

The USG decided to take action, motivating the 

National Police to undergo major reforms. From 1967 to 

1972, the US spent $155 million in support to the National 

Police (Friedman, 2012). Further, the US Agency for 

International Development (USAID) played an integral role 

in helping the police maintain law and order (Friedman, 

2012; Walton, 1968). Many US police officers also provided 

technical support and advice to the National Police (Walton, 

1968). The USG supported a Public Safety Program to 

properly train and equip the police officers, thus improving 

relations between the Vietnamese citizens and the police 

(Friedman, 2012). The Vietnamese government instituted an 

information campaign to enhance the image of the National 

Police, depicting the police as serving the people. Police 

conducted inspections and searches of cars and homes, 

resulting in the confiscation of innumerable weapons and 

ammunition that could have been utilized by the Viet Cong 

(Friedman, 2012).

During the Vietnam War, US grand strategy was the 

global containment of communism. To deter communist aggression, the United States depended on nuclear weapons, 

conventional forces, and allies. This strategic approach 

sought to prevent a world war or fight limited wars only. 

The domino theory argued that communist aggression would 

never stop at one country but would continue until it dominated regions and then the world. For Vietnam, the domino 

theory stated that after South Vietnam fell, North Vietnam 

would invade Cambodia, then Thailand, then Malaysia, 

thereby dominating the South China Sea.

Additionally, the USG developed two different types 

of ideology to defeat the North and the communist threat. 

The first strategy was a containment policy (Gaddis, 2005). 

Containment was the idea that one cannot just outright destroy the opponent; one can contain the opponent to its current holdings. By buffering and supporting the areas that 

could come under the influence of communism, the US 
5

would contain the communist threat. The US implemented 

a communism containment policy in the North (Gaddis, 

2005). USG did not see communism as a sustainable form of 

government, either socially or economically; thus, containment was considered a viable option to counter communism. 

The second communism defeat strategy was the 

domino theory (Gaddis, 2005). This theory supported the 

idea that in any unstable parts of the world – Asia, Africa, 

South America, and the Middle East – if a country adopted 

communism with the support of Russia, then the surrounding 

countries would also become communist governments. Just 

like dominos, if one communist country is knocked down, 

the surrounding countries will eventually fall. President 

Eisenhower adopted this theory to ensure that any parts of 

the world under Russian influence would become a USG area 

of intervention to counter the communist influence (Gaddis, 

2005). While the United States and the Russians would not 

fight each other directly due to the potential for atomic war, 

they confronted each other through other countries in proxy 

wars. Both the containment strategy and the domino theory 

played prevalent roles during the Cold War, becoming the 

primary factors for the increased support from the US to 

South Vietnam.

Originally, the National Police consisted of about 

17,000 officers, but its presence did not extend to rural areas 

(Thompson et al., 1971). With the help of the USG, the 

police force grew to nearly 120,000 men (Friedman, 2012). 

Starting in 1968, police forces gradually expanded their 

influence to the villages (“South Vietnam-National Police,” 

n.d.; Thompson et al., 1971). The Vietnamese police showed 

great appreciation for the support they received from the US 

While the US provided assistance and advice, it encouraged 

the police to exercise initiative and reduced assistance in 

kind (Walton, 1968).

The National Police ultimately secured Saigon City, 

44 provinces, and 2,000 villages in Vietnam (Walton, 1968). 
6

Included in the National Police was the combat branch 

of the police: the Police Field Force (Walton, 1968). This 

branch was more heavily armed than the regular police, 

with machine guns, mortars and grenades. The force was 

organized into 50 companies of 184 men each, trained to 

combat the Viet Cong and guerrilla attacks (Walton, 1968).

Not only were the National Police required to 

perform normal police functions, they also had the added 

responsibility of security control (“South VietnameseNational Police,” n.d.). Like any other police force, their 

primary duty was to protect their citizens and deter crime 

(Thompson et al., 1971). They also had the special role of 

detecting terrorism and placed great emphasis on countering 

communist subversion (Thompson et al., 1971). An additional 

force, the Special Force, was integral in monitoring small 

scale attacks by guerrilla units. They focused on overall 

communist threats, sabotage and espionage attempts to gain 

information (Thompson et al., 1971). 

The dual roles of the National Police created great 

hardship during the War. The National Police were often 

the first responders to Viet Cong attacks (“South VietnamNational Police,” n.d.). They endured the brunt of guerrilla 

attacks and responded to many of the suicide attacks, putting 

their lives at great risk even though they were not the 

military (Friedman, 2012; Walton, 1968). As the first line 

of defense, the National Police were naturally a target of the 

Viet Cong (Walton, 1968). They endured frequent bombings 

at the National Police headquarters in Saigon and at various 

checkpoints (Friedman, 2012). Annually, about 1,000 police 

officers were killed by communist forces (Friedman, 2012).

North Vietnam initiated the conflict in 1960, but 

after seven years of fighting they had not achieved much 

progress. Backed by the Russians, they devised a plan to 

have an all-out offensive attack during the holiday of Tet. 

China advised against the Tet Offensive, but North Vietnam 

rebuffed the advice. Tet is a New Year holiday celebrated 
7

in Southeast Asian cultures. Tet normally coincided with a 

ceasefire so that soldiers and civilians could celebrate the 

holiday (Schmitz, 2005). The plan of the North Vietnamese 

was to attack and capture as much territory as possible, 

including Saigon. The Viet Cong initiated the attack in over 

100 different cities on January 31, 1968, which came as a 

surprise to the Republic of Vietnam and US military. While 

the Tet Offensive was a surprise attack, it failed, and within a 

few weeks, the Republic of Vietnam and US military pushed 

the Viet Cong back over the borders, almost completely 

destroying them (Willbanks, 2007). Almost 820 Vietnamese 

police officers were killed and 1,620 were wounded during 

the Tet Offensive (Friedman, 2012).

Acting as a military presence also created great 

confusion in the National Police. By having the additional 

paramilitary task of acting as a military entity, there were 

difficulties with command and control. Often, the distinction 

between being a police officer and a soldier was not clear cut 

(Thompson et al., 1971). Additionally, it was often difficult 

to determine who was in charge and whose orders were most 

pertinent (Thompson et al., 1971). This created a strain on 

officers as there was growing tension between the superiors 

(Thompson et al., 1971). 

By 1973, the majority of the American troops had 

withdrawn from Vietnam. North Vietnam attacked again 

in 1975 and occupied Saigon until May of the same year. 

The focal point of the war was not to overthrow the North 

Vietnam government because doing so would encourage 

Russia and China to join the war. The war’s objective was 

to ensure the RoV government could fight on its own, which 

was highlighted by the USG support for the National Police.

Toward the end of the war, there were growing 

anxieties about the follow-on effects of the war. Many feared 

a cease-fire would only increase the burden on the police, 

as military forces were forbidden from engaging in any 

offensive operations (Thompson et al., 1971). Further, many 
8

police officers were concerned that political unrest might 

ensue following the war, due to a lack of order within society 

(Thompson et al., 1971).

The aftermath of the war catalyzed the importance of 

the National Police (“South Vietnam-National Police,” n.d.). 

Vietnam experienced many expected post-war problems, 

such as instability, putting great emphasis on the National 

Police to maintain law and order (“South Vietnam-National 

Police,” n.d.). 
9

Chapter 2

US Foreign Police Advising through USAID 

in the Vietnam War

by Michael Paul Posteraro, Jr. and Drew Tush

The United States Agency for International Development 

(USAID), which administers civilian aid to foreign countries 

in need, was heavily involved in the Vietnam War, providing 

a great deal of foreign police advising to Vietnamese police, 

including COL Nguyen. This chapter opens with a partial 

history of the United States becoming a major player in 

the Vietnam War, a brief background on the dual role of 

the Vietnamese police, and an introduction into USAID’s 

support for RoV.

Background

The disaccord in Vietnam originated during World War 

II, when Ho Chi Minh became president and instituted 

communism in the Democratic State of Vietnam, or North 

Vietnam (Moyer, 2007). Beginning in 1945, communists 

took control of major cities, which met with opposition from 

French colonists – a conflict that persisted until the French 

withdrawal in 1954 (Moyer, 2007). By that time, Vietnam 

had already endured several years of turbulent conflict, 

which contributed to Vietnam’s political chaos, economic 

collapse, and underdevelopment (Hall, 2009). The Geneva 

Accords divided Vietnam along the 17th parallel, with the 

Democratic Republic of Vietnam in the north, retaining 

its communist government under Ho Chi Minh, and the 

non-communist Republic of Vietnam in the south, led by 

President Ngo Dinh Diem, who was heavily influenced by 

American advisors (Hall, 2009; Moyer, 2007; Rotter, 1999). 

However, conflict ensued, as Ho Chi Minh initiated a plan to 

invade and dominate RoV (Moyer, 2007).
10

Between 1950 and 1965, the USG gradually inserted 

itself into Vietnam’s dissension, implementing a strategy 

of containment to stem the spread of communism, as the 

US simultaneously grappled with Russia in the Cold War 

(Rotter, 1999). It is worth mentioning that Ho Chi Minh’s 

ideals solidified within Russia’s communist regimes. In 

1922, Ho Chi Minh attended the Fourth World Congress of 

the Communist International in Russia, where he organized 

and collaborated with Russian and Asian revolutionaries 

(Fischer, 1954). Despite the US recent end to the conflict 

with Korea, they feared Vietnam would align with China’s 

communist regime, ultimately dispersing communism 

further around the globe and eradicating democracy (Moyer, 

2007; Rotter, 1999).

US President Dwight D. Eisenhower supported the 

RoV government to stop the spread of communism from the 

North. To that end, President Eisenhower deployed military 

advisors and CIA agents to train military personnel and 

police forces in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism 

techniques. In 1961, President John F. Kennedy sent more 

than 400 soldiers trained by Special Operation Forces (i.e., 

Green Beret) to teach the RoV force counterinsurgency 

techniques to thwart the Communist guerrillas (Rotter, 1999). 

In August 1964, President Lyndon B. Johnson requested a 

Congressional resolution allowing him to “take all necessary 

measures to repel an armed attack against the forces of the 

United States and to prevent further aggression” (Summers, 

1995, p. 23). This resolution initiated US bombing north 

of the 17th parallel in 1965, while also allowing for the 

deployment of over 3,500 Marines to RoV, officially starting 

the war between the United States and North Vietnam 

(Moyer, 2007; Rotter, 1999). US involvement officially 

ended in 1973 when the US negotiated a peace treaty with 

North Vietnam, although fighting between the north and the 

south continued until Saigon fell under the control of North 

Vietnam in 1975.
11

Every battle during the Vietnam War was fought 

in the South, not in the secluded jungle terrain, which had 

significant implications for civilians and especially their 

police. Many police officers lost their lives during the conflict 

with the Viet Cong. Although fighting conventional crime 

was still the primary policing role, they also were tasked to 

assume a counterinsurgency and counterterrorism role as 

well. COL Nguyen, a high-ranking police administrator in 

RoV, recalled:

...the Police played a crucial role in securing and 

protecting citizens against crime, violence and 

manifestation, and performing 90% of civilian 

administration including identification, licensing, 

exit/entry control, economic security, public health 

and safety.... Most of our time was spent on 

clandestine activities to identify, track, investigate 

and prevent the communist surges. We often had to 

find a balance between making immediate arrests 

as elements were exposed and being patient with 

surveillance to [gain a greater understanding of the 

network structure]. (Nguyen, 2012)

Fighting War and Crime: A Brief Background 

on the National Police

To effectively aid military and paramilitary forces attempting 

to battle the Viet Cong insurgency, the National Police had 

to acquire intelligence, maintain public order, and many 

times personally combat the Viet Cong. Unfortunately, the 

National Police faced many problems associated with their 

rapid expansion in 1964. The force experienced inauspicious 

effects on management and administration, which tied directly 

to inadequately defined and often overlapping jurisdiction. 

The police were centrally administered and operationally 

decentralized. Commanding a decentralized police force 

with a centralized directorate is rather arduous when the 
12

directors are not immersed in the action. An example of this 

was when they realized that more police officers, funding, and 

mobilization were required after the Tet Offensive of 1968 

left 818 officers dead and 1,620 wounded. Because of the 

National Police’s immeasurable amount of responsibilities 

and duties, special units were created (e.g., Marine Police, 

Police Special Branch and the National Police Field Force) 

with a specialized duty for combatting the Viet Cong (Pike, 

2011).

To adapt to these changes, the police underwent 

swift expansion. In 1965, the Marine Police were created to 

combat the Viet Cong in waterborne areas, which included 

3,000 navigable miles of inland waterways, primarily in the 

Mekong Delta area (Pike, 2011). The Marine Police were 

comprised of two operating units: the River Group and the 

Sea group. The River Group was responsible for patrolling 

the delta area of Vietnam, and the Sea Group was responsible 

for patrolling the coastal waters beyond the harbors (Swann, 

1969). 

Another specialized unit called the Special Branch 

was curated to analyze intelligence and supervise the capture 

of individuals suspected of political treason against the state. 

The Special Branch was also the only branch particularly 

trained and entrusted with the task of identifying and 

eradicating the Viet Cong infrastructure (“Part III: Elements 

Charged With Specific Revolutionary Development Roles”, 

1966).

The National Police Field Force (NPFF) was 

established in January 1966 with a subdivision in each 

province called the Provincial Field Force (PFF) (Pike, 

2011). The PFF’s main purpose was to annihilate the Viet 

Cong network in all Vietnam villages, hamlets, and districts. 

The PFF maintained a consistent presence within rural 

areas to ensure the Viet Cong’s resurgence in these areas 

(“Data On GVN Field Force/Police”, 1968-71). The PFF 

was comprised of lightly armed tactical elements. Every 
13

member was fully trained as a patrolman combined with 

further training in counterinsurgency and military operations 

(Handbooks For Military Support Of Pacification, 1968). 

The PFF’s light armament translated into high mobility. 

They also were in charge of riot and crowd control during 

spontaneous crisis situations. The fifth PFF Battalion was 

responsible for protecting the Saigon Municipal Police, and 

dealing with internal security and defense. This unit was in 

charge of operations against local Viet Cong in response to 

the Special Branch’s targeted intelligence products. The PFF 

addressed all riot and civil disruptions, managed operations 

supporting the pacification program, and oversaw resource 

control. At first, this unit was heavily tied with the US 

and the Vietnam Army, but by 1970, they predominantly 

operated independently. During operations with the military, 

they gave insight on local terrain and culture, thus providing 

for more targeted searches and the appropriate application 

of the use of force (Pike, 2011). The PFF was equipped and 

trained to suppress village guerrilla groups in order to aid 

the local uniformed police. Platoons were stationed in rural 

areas to maintain a persistent presence, and each platoon was 

accountable for one village (USAID, 1966). 

This rapid structural expansion of police forces 

produced unintended negative effects, largely through 

expeditious and subpar training, as well as poor and 

deficient police enforcement. These adverse effects were 

clear after beliefs surfaced about the Viet Cong acquiring 

supplies through illegal trafficking from Saigon. Due to the 

aforementioned deficiencies, Viet Cong infiltrations were 

prevalent; therefore, police training had to be specialized for 

each new branch (USAID, 1966). 

Training

The length of all police training was the same, but 

differed according to the unique operational mandates of 

the specialized branches. For example, there were certain 

requirements that police must meet before joining the 
14

National Police Field Force. Early on, an average National 

Police cadet was a young adult male with only a sixthgrade education. Many of the recruits had no experience 

with law or law enforcement, and many had never driven 

an automobile. Still, the recruits were literate, which was 

a valuable asset. At first, the training course was only six 

weeks long, but in January 1966, the course was extended 

to 12 weeks (USAID, 1966). COL Nguyen, a high-ranking 

police manager, who also lectured at the Police Academy, 

described police training during his tenure:

Police Officers were required to have a high school 

degree, Police Academy training, [a] three-month law 

course, and focused studies in counter-manifestation 

[of all Viet Cong networks], trafficking, or counterterrorism. Patrol Officers typically had a military 

background since they were recruited from the 

Ranger School for the NPFF. Police Chiefs were 

required to have in-depth knowledge of civil and 

administration [law]. Service Chiefs and Adjutants/

Deputies further focused on criminal investigation, 

intelligence and operation[al] planning. To me, 

important character traits were honesty; loyalty to 

order, structure; devotion to country; and a passion 

for Police work (Nguyen, 2012).

The National Police Field Force (NPFF) deserves 

special attention in this discussion, as this branch was 

responsible for riot and crowd control during spontaneous 

crisis situations and for internal security and defense. The 

NPFF also was in charge of operations against local Viet 

Cong insurgents (Pike, 2011). NPFF recruits received police 

and paramilitary training in the police academy. Paramilitary 

training followed the military model, teaching recruits selfdiscipline, time management, confidence in performance, 

conformity to departmental policies, and following orders 
15

– despite how unsatisfactory they may be. Paramilitary 

training also included drill and ceremony, chain of command, 

teamwork and resiliency to stress (Gundy, 2007). The Special 

Branch specialized in intelligence acquisition, and was the 

sole provider of intelligence products. The Commander of 

the NPFF Training Center was responsible for discipline, 

housing, feeding, and other supervisory duties. Several 

special courses afforded the recruits were leadership training, 

instructor training, radio operations, field maintenance, 

first aid, motor and armament, and driving. Once a cadet 

completed his training, he was assigned to a certain area for 

two years. After finishing the initial two years, the officer 

was then eligible for advanced training, which included 

interrogation and counter-intelligence classes predominantly 

offered due to the war (Kerwin, 1968). Any additional 

training was offered by foreign advisors.

Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development 

Support Program

Given the role of the Vietnamese police in combating 

insurgents, the US (through the CIA) and the RoV government 

established the Civil Operations and Revolutionary 

Development Support program (CORDS) in 1967, which 

combined rural programs with military operations (Schoux, 

n.d.). CORDS integrated civilians and civilian agencies into 

military hierarchical structures for better coordination in 

combatting the insurgency – namely, to attempt to eliminate 

the Viet Cong insurgents and their encompassing network 

(Clinton, 2007). CORDS was responsible for allocating 

American advisors to support operations of terrestrial 

task forces (Moyar, 1997). The first public safety advisors 

attempted to train the national police in counterinsurgency. 
16

United States Agency for International Development

USAID was created during John F. Kennedy’s Presidency 

after the US became involved in the Vietnam War. This 

program was designed to give assistance and help to 

Vietnam in the 1960s during the war. USAID’s mission 

was to promote peace and prosperity by impacting foreign 

economic and social developments (USAID, 2015). As the 

fighting between RoV and the Communist North Vietnam 

continued, President Johnson employed USAID as day to 

day operations and assistance to RoV through programs 

such as CORDS.

At USAID’s inception, only 17 foreign police 

officials had been trained to take part in police advising in 

Vietnam, in contrast to the 114 foreign police advisors at 

the end of the Vietnam War. This was important for both 

the Vietnamese and the US military personnel, alike, as they 

knew they would be fighting beside allies with the same 

level of training and quality of people (McHugh, 1994).

In understanding relations of the advisors around 

Vietnam, Special Police and the Provincial Reconnaissance 

Unit (PRU, an elite paramilitary counter-terrorism team) 

gained more reliable data through intelligence-collected 

counterpart procedures (Moyar, 1997). Most of these 

advisors spoke Vietnamese or had excellent interpreters 

(Moyar, 1997). In comparison to CIA advisors, Special 

Police and PRU had better communications and reliable 

intelligence (Moyar, 1997). 

Following the heavy deployment of US troops to 

Vietnam, some RoV Army forces focused on wrestling 

control of the villages and their people away from the Viet 

Cong, which was a task known as pacification. Pacification 

advisors, who tended to be district level US military and 

civilian advisors, often had challenges capturing communists 

with intelligence (Moyar, 1997). CIA advisors conducted 
17

interrogations of non-military personnel in Province 

Interrogation Centers (Moyar, 1997). The CIA advisors were 

centralized around Special Police questioning, and employed 

RoV interpreters (Moyar, 1997). Some CIA personnel, who 

oversaw Province Interrogation Centers, were excellent in 

gathering information from prisoners (Moyar, 1997). 

However, by 1963, failure was inevitable. When 

the new CIA chief arrived in Saigon, he noticed that the 

heads of the local police chief and his family were impaled 

on stakes. Disgusted by what he saw, he organized small 

counter-terror teams. These teams were charged with 

attacking the Viet Cong directly. At the same time, based on 

Viet Cong cruelty and their employment of unconventional 

fighting techniques, the CIA decided to train the police in 

sophisticated interrogation techniques, e.g., torture (McCoy, 

2011). Controversy and criticism emerged, as many of the 

Third World nations were already violating conventional 

human rights. Combining the human rights violations with 

the newly acquired interrogation tactics was a recipe for 

disaster (McCoy, 2011). These methods inevitably failed to 

defeat the Viet Cong.

In 1969, the National Police shifted from central 

policing in Saigon to the countryside and the villages. They 

established police stations in many villages and towns to 

help combat crime and terrorism (McCoy, 2011). These 

rural police officers were trained by their advisors to gather 

intelligence through interrogating suspects using torture, 

such as threats, physical suffering, and psychological 

torment (McCoy, 2011). In contrast to these advanced 

interrogation techniques, advisors also taught positive 

leadership skills and ethical virtues. Before the war, the 

police were highly unorganized, poorly led and plagued by 

corruption. The Americans tried to combat these problems, 

even though they employed such techniques to pursue their 

own agenda of eradicating communism. The effectiveness 

of these programs is questionable, as President Diem had 

little support from the advisors in RoV. Many of the advisors 
18

felt that he was too egotistical and stubborn, depending too 

much on the Americans for help. Many of the advisors also 

felt President Diem would fall out of power within days of 

an American departure. 

Continuing USAID Efforts in Vietnam

Despite the fact that the Kennedy administration enacted the 

USAID bill back in the early 1960s, the programs did not 

start to show a positive surplus until around 1989. Over the 

course of 15-20 years since the early 1990s, there has been a 

rise in aid for children from Vietnam (Libraries, 2010). A lot 

of the almost 330 million US dollars in aid given to Vietnam 

currently goes towards causes such as AIDS eradication, 

influenza treatment and prevention, improving the economy 

and promoting higher levels of education. US aid to 

Vietnam continues to increase dramatically. Assistance in 

health has increased by 69%, the economy has grown 14%, 

humanitarian assistance was raised by 13%, and education 

and government has grown an additional 4% (Libraries, 

2010).

One major USAID program is Agent Orange Clean 

Up in Vietnam. Agent Orange was an aerial herbicide 

employed by the RoV and the US forces to defoliate rural 

and forested areas, thus depriving the Viet Cong guerrillas 

of food and concealment. Agent Orange not only destroyed 

forests, but also affected exposed soldiers and citizens. 

According to the United States Department of Veteran 

Affairs (2015), Agent Orange is an unwanted byproduct of 

herbicides. Due to these powerful and harmful chemicals that 

were used as a war tactic, USAID partnered with Vietnam to 

clean up the after-effects. The USG Ambassador stated that 

the plans are to dig up the ground that was contaminated, 

enabling it to breakdown to safe levels for the Vietnamese 

people (USAID, 2012). 
19

Section II.

Police Advising in Vietnam:

A Case Study of the Police Advising 

Experiences of COL Nguyen

At the time of the Vietnam War, the RoV’s main police 

force was referred to as the National Police, and they were 

paramount in the fight between the Viet Cong and the 

Republic of Vietnam. Their dual responsibility was difficult, 

because they were combatting crime while simultaneously 

fighting a war. Therefore, in order to maximize support 

for the US and RoV, the US sent advisors over to provide 

guidance, education, and support for the police as they 

strove to tackle both jobs. Due to how imperative they were 

in Vietnam’s counterinsurgency efforts, the National Police 

are described in greater detail in this section. 

The description of the National Police and the issues 

that surround police are illuminated by Colonel Charles 

Nguyen Tan Cuon (“COL Nguyen”), a former high-ranking 

police administrator with the National Police. For this 

reason, COL Nguyen will be introduced before discussing 

the National Police. During his time as a police administrator 

in RoV, COL Nguyen had several advisors from the USG, 

including Frank Clark, a policing advisor through USAID. 

As such, the material in the chapters to follow draw heavily 

from COL Nguyen’s experiences.

Introducing COL Nguyen

COL Nguyen was a police administrator with the National 

Police. In an array of offices, COL Nguyen advocated open 

communication with advisors, especially with foreign allies 

operating within his jurisdiction. For example, a General 

of Korea collaborated with COL Nguyen on the Korean 

brigade. As Commander, COL Nguyen led his police force 
20

against both crime and the Viet Cong (Nguyen, 2012). COL 

Nguyen’s experiences are crucial to better understand US 

foreign police advising, as COL Nguyen had advisors from 

the USG and other countries. This section of the monograph 

connects COL Nguyen’s wisdom with research literature on 

foreign police advising.

As background, COL Nguyen was born in Saigon, 

Vietnam on November 2, 1925. His parents, Joachim Nguyen 

Tan Cuong and Marie Lacouture, were French citizens. He 

described his family’s background of service:

Our family has a rich history of civil service. 

My Vietnamese (paternal) grandfather was Governor 

of Cho Lon, the largest province in Vietnam with 

a predominant Chinese community. My French 

(maternal) grandfather was the Chief Prosecutor 

(Procureur Generale) and later, Chief Judge of 

Indochina, which was comprised of Vietnam, Laos 

and Cambodia under French rule. My father was 

appointed Minister of Security for seven consecutive 

administrations, [while holding] the dual post of 

Minister of Youth and Sports.

I grew up in the southern central highland 

city of Da Lat, where our extended family made 

a comfortable living in government, railroad 

administration, horse breeding, agriculture and 

commerce. I was educated within the French 

Catholic Lasalle Taberd school system, in which the 

curriculum emphasized philosophy, history, theology, 

natural sciences and mathematics.

When I was 20 years old, I attended a French 

college preparing to study law and become a judge 

as my family had hoped, but World War II (WWII) 

changed my plans. When the Japanese Army invaded 

Indochina during WWII, I was mobilized within 

the French Army and later captured as a prisoner 
21

of war. After the Japanese were defeated and WWII 

ended, I worked as Security Inspector for the Surete 

Federale Francaise, the equivalent of the FBI, which 

controlled intelligence and criminal investigation 

across Indochina. When the French left Vietnam, the 

Vietnamese government requested my transfer to the 

Vietnamese Police. (Nguyen, 2012)

In the Vietnamese Police force, COL Nguyen held 

several leadership positions. He quickly rose to the Chief of 

Police of Vinh Binh Province in 1952, moving to the Chief 

of Police of the Binh Duong Province two years later. From 

1959-1961, he was the Chief of the Operations Service at the 

National Police Headquarters, and then became a Lecturer at 

the National Police Training Center from 1961-1963. COL 

Nguyen resumed his management duties as the Police Chief 

of Tuyen Duc Province and Dalat City from 1963-1964 

before returning to the National Police Headquarters as the 

Chief of the Coordinating Service from 1964-1965. As his 

career progressed, he was given more responsibility:

Successively, I became Police Chief of provinces, 

including Commander of the Police Special Branch 

in Region 3, controlling 10 provinces and Vung 

Tau City (1968-1971). Later as Chief of Special 

Operations Service, I was also nominated as General 

Secretary of the combined anti-terrorism center at 

Saigon comprised of US, Korean and Australian 

military forces. (Nguyen, 2012)

He continued his career in leadership positions with the 

Vietnamese National Police, while lecturing part-time at the 

Academy. When Saigon fell, he fled to the United States and 

settled in Rockville, Maryland.
22

Chapter 3

Police Leadership during Wartime

by Jarrett Gilbert

Naturally, when someone hears about war, the first thoughts 

that come to mind are military combat, casualties and 

politics. However, within regions where war is taking place, 

everyday life changes and many suffer from these changes. 

During these times of war, not only are military forces 

conducting combat operations, but the police are decisively 

engaged in maintaining law and order. During the Vietnam 

War, the police had their own war to deal with to keep their 

communities safe. The war affected many things in Vietnam, 

but some of the biggest changes were to policing functions, 

adopting different styles of policing with help from other 

police agencies around the world. Chiefs of police had to 

change the way they managed their police department during 

the war. Some of biggest changes were to communications, 

hiring and training practices, and the evaluation system. 

There were different styles of management and leadership 

among the police. One police chief, who was very successful 

in leading his police departments, was COL Nguyen. 

One of the many police departments COL Nguyen 

was in charge of during the Vietnam War was Region 3, 

which was of most importance because of its proximity to 

Saigon (Nguyen, 2015). Saigon was the capital of RoV and 

was the target of many communist attacks. Region 3 spanned 

10 provinces and Vung Tau City. 

The Vietnam National Police had about 130,000 

officers and was considered a paramilitary service (Nguyen, 

2012). The police were organized to support an elected 

administration, though the police were not elected. In the 

Khanh Hoa Province, COL Nguyen commanded about 5,000 

officers. Under Nguyen’s command, he had three deputies 

who specialized in criminal investigation, intelligence, and 

operations planning. COL Nguyen appointed a Chief of 
23

Police for each district, and created a police post in every 

village with a six to twelve police officers. 

In Vietnam, policing was focused on prevention. 

The three main areas of policing activities were internal 

security to counter anti-government and anti-establishment 

movements, intelligence gathering specifically to target 

communists, and criminal investigation to counter criminal 

activities (Nguyen, 2012). The Vietnamese police followed 

two models: the French Police model to exploit information 

to gain the element of surprise, and the CIA model based 

on surveillance, which returned the best results (Nguyen, 

2012). During a time of political instability in Vietnam, the 

police played a crucial role. The police in Vietnam under 

COL Nguyen were responsible for securing and protecting 

citizens against violence and crime, as well as collecting 

intelligence for military use (Nguyen, 2012). Beyond being 

the first responders to criminal and military emergencies, 

the police performed many different tasks associated with 

civilian administration, to include citizen identification, exitentry passports, and economic security (Nguyen, 2012).

The National Police had two different kinds of 

police: uniformed police for traffic and special police, who 

did not wear uniforms (Nguyen, 2015). Today, about 15% 

of Vietnam police officers are women (Nguyen, 2006), 

although female police officers comprised a small proportion 

of the police force during the Vietnam War. COL Nguyen 

had women officers under his command, but they were not 

in uniform (Nguyen, 2015). The female police officers, 

known as “Swans,” would go to crime scenes to collect 

information for COL Nguyen. The use of undercover Swans 

to gain intelligence was a main goal for the police; collecting 

intelligence on insurgents was extremely difficult for the 

Swans’ male counterparts during the war because they were 

suspected of being spies (Nguyen, 2015). In COL Nguyen’s 

technical compound in Saigon, he had about 500 female 

technicians, who were trained in the US for fingerprinting 

(Nguyen, 2015). 
24

COL Nguyen’s leadership strategies would have to 

change sometimes during times of conflict. COL Nguyen 

and his command would change their strategy according to 

the terrorist’s tactics in a specific region (Nguyen, 2015). 

In Saigon City, they would have to use politics and more 

diplomacy as a police force. In general, COL Nguyen did not 

favor any specific leader or political group, as they changed 

all the time, but he worked for his country, as it will always 

stay the same (Nguyen, 2015). In this manner, COL Nguyen 

displayed the value of neutral competence in his police 

management style. Neutral competence refers to the idea 

that government service should be politically neutral, and 

the government should focus on the abilities and skills of 

workers to do the job at hand instead of favoring political 

allegiances (Stohr & Collins, 2014). COL Nguyen may 

have remained politically neutral throughout his career, but 

the officers under him were influenced by political parties. 

Regardless of political allegiances, the officers are sworn 

to obey the orders of the police department’s leadership 

(Nguyen, 2015). 

Citizens of Vietnam, in general, trusted and respected 

the police. This respect can be credited to the involvement 

the police played in the citizens’ daily lives and businesses. 

Community conflict can occur when a community feels 

that police are treating them unfairly (Domonoske, 2006). 

Communities felt neglected during the Vietnam War, where 

in small problems would normally have been handled 

swiftly, issues were ignored or responses were delayed as 

the primary focus was on countering communist infiltration 

during the war. COL Nguyen and his police force used their 

connections within the community to settle conflicts. COL 

Nguyen, as the police chief, effectively employed persuasion 

techniques to mitigate community conflict in order to prevent 

rises in crime (Domonoske, 2006). 

COL Nguyen’s police force reflected an open 

organization, which is an organization that is affected by 
25

its environment. Open organizations are usually physically 

located in communities and tasked with serving the public 

(Stohr & Collins, 2014). The relationship between the police 

and community is essential for community policing, which 

was an informal goal of COL Nguyen and his police force. It 

was COL Nguyen’s belief that the police and the community 

should be able to communicate freely in order to help 

each other, and propagated this belief to his subordinates. 

In community policing, trust is grown quicker and more 

often, as any community issues would be brought to the 

police directly. The community policing helps with the CIA 

model of policing, which focuses on gathering information 

on any imminent threats to the area. COL Nguyen viewed 

policing as prevention, so he used his relationships with the 

community to receive information (Nguyen, 2012). 

In COL Nguyen’s area of responsibility, there were 

communist infiltrations, but the police did not know who the 

communists in their area were until they made themselves 

known (Nguyen, 2012). COL Nguyen’s military experience 

and previous knowledge of communists swayed his way of 

thinking in this situation. COL Nguyen adopted a heuristic 

way of thinking in regards to fighting against communists; 

heuristics refers to individuals judging the occurrence of 

an event happening based on the subject’s availability in 

an individual’s memory (Garner, 2008, pg.13). When COL 

Nguyen was tasked with dealing with communists, he 

remembers everything he went through during the war in 

the fight against communists. Most of COL Nguyen’s police 

force spent their time trying to identify, track, investigate, 

and prevent the communist surges (Nguyen, 2012). The CIA 

model made operations challenging for COL Nguyen, as 

often the need for surveillance to identify entire networks 

outweighed the desire to make immediate arrests. This 

balancing act was essential to achieving the long-term goal 

of eliminating the communist presence (Nguyen, 2012). 

Communists were involved in occupation, terrorism, and 
26

manifestation (Nguyen, 2012). According to COL Nguyen, 

the communists aimed to kill as many citizens as possible 

to create fear and chaos while avoiding capture (Nguyen, 

2012). Today, similar events are happening throughout the 

world as violent extremists try to kill as many people as 

possible to inspire fear and chaos. Currently, police officers 

worldwide are taking the same approach as COL Nguyen 

and his officers did as they try to find a balance in making 

immediate arrests and being patient with surveillance. Police 

must use discretion when making arrests and when acting in 

rapid response or emergency situations (Domonoske, 2006). 

COL Nguyen and his police officers were required to use 

discretion when arresting communists and when deciding to 

use physical or lethal force. 

The environment of Vietnam affected the way COL 

Nguyen managed his police force on a daily basis. The 

Vietnam War was a very complex operational environment 

requiring a high level of coordination (Sklansky, 2011). 

COL Nguyen had to devise new, more discreet approaches 

to daily policing in such an environment (Sklansky, 2011). 

Vietnam’s complex environment called for COL Nguyen to 

be a true leader to influence groups and systems to address 

complex needs (Sklansky, 2011). Many leaders fail to fix 

these issues because they treat the problems with standard 

management solutions, but COL Nguyen believed that every 

officer should step up and be a leader in his police force 

because members of the community look at each officer as 

leaders of the community. Instead of training individuals to 

become better leaders, police organizations should improve 

leadership as an organization. This way of improving 

leadership shies away from only training those individuals 

in the top tier of the police force, and instead focuses on 

training every officer to be a true leader. 

COL Nguyen’s leadership style of influencing 

an individual or group to comply using one’s charisma, 

persuasion, power or other behaviors, was paramount to the 
27

success of the police force under his leadership (Schafer, 

2010). COL Nguyen’s ultimate goal was to protect the 

citizens inside his province and to keep communists out of 

his area of command. Most policing agencies have little or 

no protocols to develop current or future leaders (Schafer, 

2010). Resource limitations in time, money, and access to 

quality education can be an explanation for the shortage of 

effective leaders inside the Vietnam police force (Schafer, 

2010), which likely was the result of the war in Vietnam. 

COL Nguyen and his police were allocated police advisors 

to assist in educating them on best practices in policing. 

Studies show that the top five characteristics that contribute 

to police leader efficacy are honesty and integrity, caring for 

the needs of employees, strong communication skills, strong 

work ethic, and approachability (Schafer, 2010). The top five 

characteristics that contribute to police leader inefficacy are 

ineffective communication, neglecting the needs of police 

officers, questionable ethics and integrity, poor work ethic, 

and inability to delegate (Schafer, 2010). Some indicators to 

assess a leader’s efficacy are the achievement of goals and 

key tasks, development of subordinates, and the management 

of a positive organizational morale (Schafer, 2010). COL 

Nguyen displayed these indicators by removing communist 

insurgents, bringing in advisors to aid his police officers, and 

ensuring police moral remained high. 

COL Nguyen wanted advisors to come into his 

police force and teach them new methods. Frank Clark was 

a USAID advisor who helped COL Nguyen with logistics. 

Mr. Clark provided transport, equipment, and weapons for 

COL Nguyen and his police force, and Mr. Clark assisted in 

providing additional security. COL Nguyen’s CIA advisor 

provided intelligence and funding for all operations against 

any communist activities. Mr. Freanick provided significant 

help in gathering intelligence to assist in the targeting of 

communists within the provinces. COL Nguyen also had a 

US Special Forces captain to train the Police Field Force. He 
28

employed open communications with all his advisors and 

gave them full access to the police force. The police force 

resources were stretched thin, which left his officers with 

little time for classroom instruction. Instead, the officers 

received on-the-job training from advisors.

The roles of COL Nguyen’s military and civilian 

advisors were different. Both required an understanding 

of the long-term goals of the police. They gained an 

understanding with regular engagement across many of COL 

Nguyen’s organizations. The US Special Forces Captain 

specialized in training that did not require significant change. 

COL Nguyen’s advisors had no authority to use force on 

the civilians of Vietnam because the US had no policing 

authority in Vietnam. Based on the nature of operations, 

COL Nguyen and the Americans would discuss the level 

of support needed to ensure they followed the Vietnamese 

Police authority (Nguyen, 2012).

COL Nguyen believed his advisors made a difference 

in his police force. The US advisors delivered perspectives 

that prepared COL Nguyen and his police force to act more 

proactively and strategically in handling security risks. His 

advisors provided training that improved the police force’s 

everyday interactions with civilians. As one of the unique 

aspects of the police force mission was to assist the public 

in fighting fires, the US Special Forces Captain provided 

training on firefighting. However, COL Nguyen felt that the 

communication between his US military and civilian advisors 

was lacking, so he often felt the need to synchronize the 

advisors so that they could learn from one another (Nguyen, 

2012).

COL Nguyen reported that he became a better police 

officer during his time in Vietnam. Policing taught him to have 

honesty and integrity. Police officers should be composed, 

observant, unassuming, and vigilant. COL Nguyen had 

officers all around him, who had high potential and a 

strong character. In a police force, trust and empowerment 
29

throughout the police structure creates a stronger and more 

united police force. COL Nguyen learned to be respectful 

and fair when assessing officers and take every opportunity 

to help develop his officers. His community policing style 

led him to build trust and relationships with civilians, so they 

would seek help from the police before breaking any laws. 

As an officer, COL Nguyen sought to change perspectives 

and behavior. The relationships that COL Nguyen built 

with other officers during the war lasted a lifetime (Nguyen, 

2012).
30

Chapter 4

Police Training During Wartime

by Justin Krovic

Policing is an extremely dynamic occupation. Police 

officers are fundamentally charged with maintaining order, 

enforcing governmental laws, and combating threats to 

the general public. These responsibilities are tremendously 

challenging given the instability of the environment in 

which police are expected to operate. Establishment of an 

effective police force in such a setting can be accomplished, 

in part, through demanding training programs. Police 

academies provide a learning atmosphere in which police 

recruits are introduced to the policing profession, trained in 

various disciplines relating to the field, and instilled with 

the confidence essential to succeed in their careers (Caro, 

2011). Academy training must also reflect the current social 

situation and relevant concerns of society that the police are 

expected to alleviate (Caro, 2011). During times of national 

crisis or conflict when the police are thrust into more of 

a militaristic function, academy training can experience 

a drastic shift in curriculum. This is especially true when 

the police are formed, trained, and influenced by foreign 

involvement during wartime. In particular, Vietnam has 

had a long-standing influential foreign presence within its 

borders due to tyrannical conquest, exploitation of resources, 

and constant conflict. Throughout the Vietnam conflict in the 

1960s-1970s, the Vietnamese National Police experienced 

a separation from their long-standing French influence 

and incorporated newfound tactics provided by American 

advisors in the wake of a highly volatile predicament. The 

American involvement in the formulation and training of 

a foreign police force, as experienced during the Vietnam 

conflict, echoes today in the wake of Middle Eastern conflict 

and American occupancy in the Middle East. 
31

Background on the Influence of Western Policing

Maintaining order has been the enduring function of the 

police since their inception. Early forms of policing units were 

typically communal peace officers, who patrolled specific 

geographical regions with virtually no form of structured 

training and relied heavily on other community members to 

assist them in their daily duties (Cordner & Shain, 2011). 

In addition, the expectations and responsibilities of police 

officers were extremely ambiguous and could vary largely 

between even the most closely located areas. Furthermore, 

because of this arbitrariness, the police were politically 

dependent and were often used to extend the influence of 

the governing political party, then discarded when that party 

forfeited their power. Professionalism in policing began in 

Western culture with the pioneering principles brought about 

by Sir Robert Peel through the Metropolitan Police Act of 

1829 in London, England (Dinnen & Braitwaithe, 2009).

Peelian principles called for the formation of a structured 

administrative body in policing to organize, train, incorporate, 

and evaluate appointed personnel in the profession (Ibid, 

2009). Organized highly along military lines, this newfound 

institution incorporated graded authority, stringent 

appearance standards, and a formal training regimen (Ibid, 

2009). The underlying factor in the establishment of such 

an organized police force was to effectively combat crime 

in metropolitan areas in the early to mid-1800s (Ibid, 2009). 

This traditional theory of policing, although effective in the 

organization of policing administration and establishing 

expectations for the police, did little to account for the 

unpredictability and complex environment in which police 

operate (Conti, 2006). This western style of policing was 

nonetheless adopted overwhelmingly and incorporated in a 

majority of developed nations. In addition, underdeveloped 

nations that were under western control, such as Vietnam, 

eventually incorporated this form of police organization 

(Dinnen & Braitwaithe, 2009).
32

Foreign Police Training in Vietnam

Fascination, and fluctuating crime, led to world-wide research 

and modification of policing practices and organization 

following the implementation of Peelian policing principles 

(Dinnen & Braitwaithe, 2009). Formal training for police 

officers began to incorporate a larger variance of roles and 

duties, while also introducing officers to real-world scenario 

training, much like a militaristic approach to training 

(Bradford & Pynes, 1999). This proved instrumental in 

training officers for potential emergency management and 

operations in hostile conditions. Throughout the early to 

mid-1900s, there was an increased need for reactive police 

training given the tumultuous state of Europe (Barr & 

Sereseres, 2001). In addition, the mounting instability in 

Southeast Asia, primarily Vietnam and Korea in the 1950s, 

led to an increase of western influence in the region. With 

military operations in Korea subsiding by 1953, Vietnam 

became the next worldwide hotspot for military presence 

for the next 20 years (Burris, 2008). However, the Vietnam 

conflict would not only become the notoriously negative 

plight of the American military effort, it would also 

demonstrate American ambitious mentorship into police 

training that would echo a few decades later during Middle 

Eastern conflicts (Huong & Fry, 2005).

Periods of war have dramatic effects on all aspects 

of a civilization. Vietnam has been a war-torn country for 

nearly its entire existence. Disputing political regimes, 

colonialism, and foreign influence are all part of Vietnams’ 

historical portfolio. With the withdrawal of the French 

presence in the late 1940s and the eradication of Japanese 

occupancy shortly after, a communist movement began to 

sweep Vietnam through the efforts of the self-proclaimed 

ruler of Vietnam, Ho Chi Min, who had concentrated control 

in the northern region of Vietnam (Burris, 2008). President 

Harry Truman, following the conclusion of World War II, 
33

emphasized thwarting such totalitarian rule in the Middle 

East and Asia (Burris, 2008). Therefore, American military 

and aid began to escalate in the southern region of Vietnam, 

and ultimately resulted in total military occupation and 

operations. This foreign military involvement, as well as the 

menacing reality of conflict, led to radical modifications to 

RoV police training. 

US Involvement in Training Police during Conflict

There are three distinct roles that police assume during a 

conflict situation: crisis response, support/augmentation 

of military forces, and maintaining public order (Lau, Li, 

Mak, & Chung, 2004). During the Vietnam conflict, the 

Vietnamese National Police Force was primarily concerned 

with counter-intelligence, interrogation, and providing 

training for smaller communal departments in RoV to 

assist locally stationed military units (Nguyen, 2015). The 

police were also responsible for maintaining municipal 

public order and providing security for citizens amidst the 

ensuing turmoil of military occupation (Lau et al., 2004). 

COL Nguyen described the emphasis of professionalism and 

attention to detail that he instilled in police recruits during 

his tenure: “First you should be polite, and be a good man 

and good uniform, and when you come you should be polite 

and you should salute first. I ask would you like to give me 

your ID? I don’t ask, do you have an ID? ...Always polite” 

(Nguyen, 2015).

Although there are conspiracy debates over whether 

the American government participated in the clandestine 

training, support, and financing of various radical groups, 

political regimes, and military units throughout history, there 

is undoubted transparency in the American involvement in 

coordinated police training and development during the 

Vietnam conflict (Barr & Sereseres, 2001). This included 

the organization of the Vietnamese National Police Force 
34

and USAID appropriations to fund the development of 

more sophisticated police training (Barr & Sereseres, 

2001). In addition, USAID advisors were assigned to act 

as conduits between Vietnamese police administrators and 

American military personnel, government personnel, and 

the intelligence community to improve communications 

between these different entities and enhance training efforts 

(Garatti & Rudnitski, 2007). US military strategy, tactics, and 

policy were incorporated into police training at the academy 

level and into continual training for seasoned officers (Conti 

& Nolan III, 2005). The enhanced communication and US 

principled training greatly improved cohesion between 

military forces and the police, which was indispensable 

during times of national conflict (Modell & Haggerty, 1991). 

Although the military presence of US forces in Vietnam was 

quite lengthy, the subsequent eradication of those forces 

following military “victory” leaves a now identifiable norm 

regarding US involvement in foreign countries, particularly 

for military and diplomatic purposes (Garatti & Rudnitski, 

2007). 

There also is substantial discussion, and even 

protest, regarding the effectiveness of American influence in 

foreign countries and the subsequent changes to a particular 

region following American occupancy (Barr & Sereseres, 

2001). During the 1960s and 1970s, there was constant 

strife concerning American foreign interests in operations in 

Vietnam between a largely anti-war division of the population 

and a heavy-handed American governing body (Huong & 

Fry, 2005). Despite conflicting views on foreign presence and 

the assumed American totalitarian approach, the overarching 

question remained the same: “Does American involvement 

work?” Answering this seemingly rational question is rather 

daunting. Intentions are, unfortunately, much more practical 

than implementation. The extent to which American 

resources are asserted to combat militaristic, and in recent 

years terroristic, threats are astronomical (Burris, 2008). 
35

However, the reverberating effects of combat are not met 

with such prowess and constant scrutiny as formulating a 

police force in a tumultuous region of the world such as 

Vietnam (Huong & Fry, 2005). This same debate is currently 

held regarding the recent US involvement in police training 

and diplomatic implementation in the Middle East following 

nearly two decades of American criticized involvement in 

the region (Modell & Haggerty, 1991). 

Applying Vietnam Lessons to Today’s Foreign 

Police Advising

There are two primary correlations regarding the US 

influence seen in police training in recent years in the Middle 

East, and US influence in police training experienced during 

the Vietnam conflict. The first correlation is the fact that both 

instances of US influence in police training occurred during, 

and subsequently following, military operations (Burris, 

2008). The two overreaching events that tend to initiate 

US response and intervention in foreign countries are war 

and national tragedy, such as terrorist attacks or devastating 

natural disasters. Typically, police training influenced by US 

involvement during wartime supports military operations 

and in turn is provided by military operatives or government 

officials (Conti & Nolan III). In recent years, privatized 

contractors are supplementing military led training, while 

still implementing a fundamental emphasis on military tactics 

and strategy (Werth, 2011). This more modern approach to 

police training, as well as strict paramilitary training for 

police officers, has had controversial implications. Lowest 

bidding for training contracts leads to underdeveloped 

training programs for officers, which can ultimately lead 

to enhanced police casualties and corruption of the force 

(Werth, 2011). In addition, outfitting and training officers in 

a militaristic fashion can lead to an increased divide between 

the citizens and police (Werth, 2011). 
36

The second primary correlation between US led 

police training during the Vietnam conflict and the training 

provided in contemporary times, particularly in Iraq, is 

that after intense efforts to develop and establish the police 

force, a vacuum was created following an abrupt evacuation 

of US forces while providing only a small contingent to 

further guide police forces (Garatti & Rudnitski, 2007). 

Although there was continuous attention given to police 

training during military involved operations, the subsequent 

removal of troops and support personnel from the region 

following “victory,” ultimately hindered the full capacity 

development of the police forces. Interestingly, even though 

the favorable popularity for initial engagement in these two 

particular conflicts was tremendously different, the distain 

for involvement in these conflicts reached similar heights 

nearing the end of US occupation (Huong & Fry, 2005). 

Although there seemed to be an immense concern for the 

livelihood of citizens in both of these war-torn countries, the 

growing majority of the US citizenry despised governmental 

interest in foreign affairs, and advocated for the removal of 

military troops in the regions (Modell & Haggerty, 1991). 

Given the turbulent environment in which police 

officers are expected to operate, they must receive quality 

training that prepares them for the trials and tribulations 

they may encounter on a day-to-day basis during the 

performance of their duties. Police academies achieve this 

need and provide police officers with initial scenario, tactics, 

strategy, and confidence training needed to be successful at 

their jobs. However, during periods of conflict, this training 

can be influenced heavily by support to military occupation 

and the social needs of the area. Although military tactics 

and strategy may be effective skills to teach during wartime, 

after the occupying threat is dissolved, these skills can have 

detrimental effects on the social environment of a nation. 
37

Chapter 5

Police Deviance

by Joseph Ortiz

Employing police officers and expecting them to perform 

their duties requires a set of behavioral expectations and 

a high level of responsibility to accomplish their goals in 

a way that is acceptable to the public. Deviance begins to 

undermine this public trust. Police officers who engage 

in deviant activities may have values and goals that are 

inconsistent with their department. Furthermore, these 

officers may use their position for personal gain or to avoid 

a particular outcome. Police officers also may be slowly 

molded in such a way that they become deviant over time. 

Therefore, deviant activities must be found and eliminated, 

while promoting leaders with integrity. 

This chapter continues with a discussion of the 

definition and concept of police deviance. Individual 

officer deviance is differentiated from systemic corruption, 

followed by the link between corruption and communism. 

Theories of deviance are applied to these situations, along 

with preventive suggestions. The chapter concludes that 

police deviance should be immediately addressed to reduce 

its effects on the police community and the public they serve.

Police Deviance

The concept of police deviance contains a wide array 

of functions that represent an undermining of the purpose 

of policing and the mission of the police organization. At 

the basic level, opportunities for behavioral misconduct by 

members of the police are most often the subject of news 

articles and public scrutiny. Deviance, on the other hand, is 

the illicit activities in which police take part, and the majority 

of such incidents go unpunished or unnoticed. Misconduct, 

therefore, is the intentional circumventing of departmental 

rules and procedures (Punch, 2000). Lastly, criminal 

deviant activity facilitated by police officers is defined as 
38

those officers who break the law by accepting bribes or by 

committing acts, such as selling drugs or committing theft 

(Punch, 2000). Receiving goods or services for conducting 

illicit activities, or overlooking illicit activities in exchange 

for goods or services, is defined as police corruption (Punch, 

2000). Police corruption can be individual or systemic.

Systemic Corruption

Police corruption is differentiated into two levels. The rotten 

apple theory suggests that one individual, who participates 

in deviant behavior, can affect a larger group (Punch, 2003). 

However, research suggests that corruption is not limited 

to individual officers. In fact, deviance flourishes when 

supervisors tolerate officers’ deviant actions, and when 

the larger police subculture supports police deviance (Lee, 

Lim, Moore & Kim, 2013). Indeed, corruption occurs at 

a systemic level; this larger problem can be described as 

rotten orchards (Punch, 2003). Rotten orchards suggest that 

corruption is more widespread than previously thought, 

and that corruption is occurring on several levels to include 

society, individual institutions, and with larger organizations. 

Police organizations can become deviant in two 

ways—by adopting goals and means that are deviant 

(Sherman, 1978). Organizations are constructed to 

accomplish a set of societal goals, which are often set aside 

in order to accomplish other goals of increasing importance 

(Sherman, 1978). As a result, the manifestation of these 

deviant goals is for the survival of the organization itself. 

The influence of organizational goals comes from political 

interest groups, from within the community, as well as from 

various other sources. These goals may clash and render the 

organization unable to accomplish them or by accomplishing 

them with a deviant means. Sherman (1978) suggests that 

police organizations employ deviant means as a way to 

suppress crime, so injustice does not occur. This suggests 
39

that the goal of fighting crime is met with opposition by the 

concept of due process, another goal in itself. 

Because systemic corruption involves entire 

organizations, not just individual police officers, reform 

requires an exhaustive effort in regards to the extensiveness 

of deviance (Punch, 2003). Corruption is not limited to any 

one country; in fact, corruption can occur worldwide. Thus, 

combating corruption in any given country requires a great 

deal of attention. Vietnam will be used as a case study to 

explore the relationship between police corruption and 

communism.

Communism and Police Corruption in Vietnam

Research suggests that corruption is more apparent in 

countries that have adopted communism (Sandholtz and 

Taagepera, 2005). Communism has an effect on corruption 

in two ways: (1) the influence on the economy; and (2) 

the influence on cultural practices. Economically, fewer 

opportunities and entrance barriers to establish industry 

ensure that levels of competition remain low. This concept 

suggests that the increase of governmental regulation and 

policies will result in oligopolies that heavily influence 

the market. One such influence is that of the police which 

may receive payment in exchange for not enforcing a 

particular rule or law. Culturally, communism changes social 

perspectives based on the typical or expected behavior of the 

people associated with it. Furthermore, people learn concepts 

and values through the process of socialization, while also 

setting behavioral expectations (Sandholtz & Taagepera, 

2005). Corruption is a learned behavior that can be a socially 

acceptable construct within a community or region. 

Around the time of the Vietnam War, with the spread 

of communism influencing Indochina, police corruption and 

other police deviance was present throughout the region. 

COL Nguyen revealed that police corruption was extensive 
40

within Vietnam, coinciding with the rising popularity of 

communism through the region. COL Nguyen stated that “an 

honest man is very rare in Vietnam” and “many [Vietnamese] 

policemen and every branch in the Army [were corrupt during 

this time]” (Nguyen, 2015). COL Nguyen suggests that 

corruption was a normal construct, recollecting a time where 

the transportation of goods by the Chinese was stopped at a 

checkpoint by Vietnamese police: “the Chinese, he smiles as 

he hides twenty Vietnamese dollars [in his hand]” (Nguyen, 

2015). This occurrence is the result of a shakedown, which is 

defined as receiving money for not making an arrest or filing 

a complaint (Punch, 2000).

During World War II, the economy of Vietnam declined 

significantly, which had profound economic effects, such as 

work and food shortages, as well as low wage incomes. COL 

Nguyen stated that “[the] salary is not enough for a family 

... the policemen ... are very glad when they eat with us ...” 

(Nguyen, 2015). The effects of communism and World War 

II created hardships on the Vietnamese people, inclusive of 

police officers. Opportunities for deviance and corruption 

are more prevalent in areas where an economic depression is 

present. It is no wonder, then, that the Vietnamese populous, 

as well as the police, at times resorted to deviant means to 

accomplish a set of goals. In fact, research of Vietnamese 

police deviance by the Human Rights Watch (Adams, 2014) 

suggests that a sense of public insecurity regarding the 

police scales upward as violence towards citizens increases. 

COL Nguyen (2015) stated that “people ... critique the 

police”, referring to the Vietnamese attitude towards police. 

The systemic corruption of the police organization trickles 

down to individual officers, where deviance plays out on the 

streets.
41

Social Learning Theory and Deviant Opportunity

Social learning theory holds that deviant behavior is learned 

and reinforced by others. New recruits are gradually 

introduced to deviance as they learn to accept it to be a part of 

the group (Punch, 2000). Managing police deviance therefore 

begins with the individualistic approach by modifying the 

behavior of one officer in an attempt to begin a spread of 

values and beliefs which represent the department. Police 

deviance is tough to manage, as widespread organizational 

reform is often necessary to eliminating deviance and 

corruption, while also ensuring recruits are not socialized 

into a deviance subculture.

A police subculture may have its own set of values 

and beliefs, as well as behavioral expectations that are not 

consistent with acceptable behavior (Chappell & Piquero, 

2004). As a result of this subculture, police officers tend 

to spend significant time with each other, thus reinforcing 

negative behavior. Acceptable deviance within the 

subculture occurs when police officers who engage in these 

group-supported acts are not defined as deviant (Barker, 

1977). Some examples include receiving free meals, 

shakedowns, protection for vice crimes, and many others. 

Officers are provided with many opportunities for deviance. 

The structure and peer group support provided to officers 

create an environment readily accessible for assimilation 

into corrupt activity with little chance of being caught. In 

addition, the behavior of reporting fellow officers is looked 

down upon, and the reporting officer often will be disciplined 

(Barker, 1977). 

Social learning theory can be applied managerially 

to reduce police deviance by reinforcing positive behavior 

and by the adoption of acceptable goals, beliefs and values. 

Police organizations need to focus on modifying negative 

police attitudes to provide a fairer and more just police 

department (Chappell & Piquero, 2004).
Deviant Analysis and Prevention

Through their daily activities, police have ample opportunity 

to engage in deviant activities (Barker, 1977; Felson 

& Clarke, 1998). An analysis of departmental policies, 

procedures, recruitment strategies, and training elements 

must be conducted to ensure police officers are effective 

and maintain a positive image for the department, as well as 

the community or region the department represents. Perry 

(2001) suggests a method of deselection, where officers 

are only promoted if they exhibit extraordinary standards 

of integrity and performance. This process will ensure that 

high standards are upheld, so that trust can be maintained 

between the officer, the department and the community. 

The concept of deselection already is apparent in many 

police organizations; however, some organizations lack the 

resources to recruit ideal officers. The influence of systems 

theory, the dynamic interaction of information with the 

environment, is a critical component in the establishment 

of effective policing policy and procedures. This process 

allows for feedback and evaluation to properly assess those 

policy and procedures and enable needed modification.

The prevention of deviance therefore necessitates a 

three-part strategy to be deployed by a police organization. 

The first strategy is to mandate a rotational deployment 

assignment of police officers to a particular area that is more 

susceptible to corruption, which will prevent officers from 

becoming complacent within the assigned areas. Although 

random assignment is typically not effective in reducing 

crime, the goal of the department in this context is to 

prevent police corruption. Removing a police officer from 

the temptation and opportunity for deviance will reduce the 

likelihood that it will surface at all. Bribes often are made 

to persuade police officers look the other way; therefore, a 

change of scenery will discourage this opportunity. 
43

The second strategy is to retain high caliber police 

officers – those who are the most trustworthy – while 

promoting those who demonstrate leadership qualities. 

These officers will influence peer groups positively and 

will not tolerate deviance of fellow officers. Furthermore, 

individuals are receptive to fair promotional standards and 

often feel empowered by receiving commendations and 

personal recognition (Perry, 2001). This implies that officers 

who maintain an honest and trustworthy environment, and 

recognize those who are of the similar caliber, will have a 

lower potential for deviance. In doing so, police officers 

who participate in deviant acts will be shamed from the peer 

group. In addition, officers who display these high qualities 

should be promoted throughout the ranks to demonstrate a 

tiered environment of core values and beliefs. 

The third strategy refers to recruitment and 

disciplinary measures. Those who are seeking employment 

to serve the public will need to be held to a higher standard, 

and those who are already police officers will need to be 

severely disciplined for any deviant actions. Those who 

abide by these strategies, reflect leadership abilities, and 

portray trustworthiness and honesty that will be viewed as a 

prime example of integrity (Perry, 2001).

Punch (2000) suggests a similar approach to deter 

police deviance by promoting acts of integrity. With this 

approach, police organizations must place significant weight 

on ethical practices with the establishment of clear and 

concise policies and procedures. Police organizations must 

provide an environment free from negative judgement, and 

that provides positive encouragement to those who come 

forward to resolve personal issues. Effective educational 

strategies should be employed so that officers are able to learn 

from the mistakes of prior officers. Providing an environment 

that has open discussion regarding ethical dilemmas and 

resolution strategies will enable new recruits to properly 

assess and prevent situational deviance. Furthermore, an 
44

organization should recognize, award, and protect those who 

provide evidence of officer deviance, thus ensuring deviant 

acts are disciplined accordingly. Punch (2000) provides 

another strategy for the deterrence of police deviance by 

suggesting that a standardization committee be formed to 

uphold professional standards and ethics. This committee 

can provide insight and guidance under an attorney-client 

privilege protocol, where information is held in secrecy, and 

where standards can be reinforced. Lastly, Punch (2000) 

suggests that police deviance is not a new concept and that 

persistent actions from police leaders are necessary for 

prevention.

Final Thoughts

Police deviance is not a new concept by any means. 

Unpunished criminal activity that is conducted by police 

officers needs to be eliminated by promoting ethical 

beliefs and by standardizing common values and integrity 

guidelines. The concept of social learning further enhances 

the goal of eliminating police deviance by association. Those 

who are deviant will often be exposed, removed from the 

group, or disciplined accordingly. Furthermore, removing 

the opportunity for deviance will reduce the occurrence of 

the practice. Preventing deviance will require a strategy 

of rotating assignments, promoting leaders that exhibit 

integrity, and recruiting police officers, who share values 

and beliefs consistent with the mission of the organization. A 

standardization committee should be implemented to ensure 

effective practices are maintained.
45

Chapter 6

Police Violence

by Alexa Keys

Violence by police is an ongoing and long-lasting issue 

throughout the United States. Although some perceive that 

police brutality and misconduct are greater now than ever 

before, improper police behaviors were most prevalent 

in the years between 1960-1970. Further, there have been 

many cases of police violence reported over the centuries. 

Examples of police misconduct include, but are not limited 

to, the following:

•	 police brutality;

•	 dishonesty;

•	 fraud;

•	 coercion;

•	 torture to force confessions;

•	 abuse of authority; and

•	 sexual assault, including the demand for sexual favors in exchange for leniency (California Innocence Project (CIP), 2015). 

One reason it seems as though police misconduct is higher is 

the use of social media, which sensationalizes cases. Some 

of the more well-known cases of purported police brutality 

in the US include Rodney King (Los Angeles), Michael 

Brown (Ferguson) and Freddie Gray (Baltimore). 

Not only does violence by police occur in the United 

States, but in other countries as well. Although violence 

takes place in different countries, times and cultures, police 

misconduct still has similar effects. The violence that 

citizens experience by police is tragic and creates a divide in 

police and community relations. Even with every case being 

different, they all share something similar: they all leave long 

lasting effects on the community and police departments.

COL Nguyen provided opinion on police deviance 

during the Vietnam War, specifically, incidents he witnessed 
46

as a police manager, different types of corruption, a wellknown execution that occurred in Vietnam, and the backlash 

from the Vietnamese people towards the police. His personal 

experiences show how police deviance affects everyone.

History of Police Misconduct

Reflecting on police deviance that has occurred within US 

borders, many cases occurred between 1960-1970, which 

happened as a byproduct of the recurring protests surrounding 

the Civil Rights movement, the student movement, the antiVietnam War movement, the gay rights movement, the 

women’s movement, and more. All of these protests have one 

major thing in common: they all questioned the legitimacy 

of the police. 

During this era, minorities and students saw rioting 

and resisting police on television for the first time (Kelling 

& Moore, 1988). Due to this occurrence, the public began to 

question the police and their motives. In turn, police leaders 

attempted to diversify their departments by accepting 

additional minorities and women into the force, as well 

as supplementing training and upgrading recruitment in 

prospect of acquiring police legitimacy. 

An example of a protest that negatively impacted 

authorities occurred in the spring of 1970 during a protest 

against the Vietnam War. President Richard Nixon announced 

a need for more soldiers, meaning 150,000 young men were 

about to serve their country, unwillingly, as part of the draft 

(Kifner, 2010). This created massive outcry; students were 

outraged by this so-called necessity and Kent State University 

students began protesting. Protestors there became violent, 

which led to the deployment of Ohio National Guardsmen 

to the campus. When the guardsmen arrived, the students 

began throwing stones at them. Soon after, altercations 

arose, consisting of gunfire that injured nine students and 

killed four others (Foner & Garraty, 1991). What can be 
47

inferred from this protest, as well as many others, is that 

violent protests were, and are still, not the answer; they only 

create further disorder and a disconnect between the public 

and police departments as a whole. 

During the civil rights movement, there was an 

abundance of widely recognized police brutality, but not 

enough to make a change toward desegregation. Dr. Martin 

Luther King, Jr. was one of the main advocates for these 

civil rights protests and was part of the 1963 Project C, The 

Birmingham Campaign. While giving his famous “I Have A 

Dream” speech, King stated, “We must forever conduct our 

struggle on the high plane of dignity and discipline. We must 

not allow our creative protest to degenerate into physical 

violence. Again and again we must rise to the majestic 

heights of meeting physical force with soul force” (Online 

Speech Bank, 2001). Essentially, King wanted the people 

to have silent and non-violent protests to show the country 

that even without violence, the police would still attack them 

with brutal acts.

Protestors began peaceful boycotts and protests 

in Birmingham, Alabama, where King was arrested. In 

addition, protestors were shooed away by police with fire 

hoses and police dogs. Again, even though the protests were 

non-violent, there was still a presence of police brutality 

because Birmingham was such a segregated area and did 

not accept blacks under any circumstances. As unfortunate 

as the Project C was, segregation changed there because of 

the media broadcast of the mistreatment of blacks, making it 

impossible to ignore (PBS, 2015). 

Rodney King

Following the Vietnam War, police brutality and police 

corruption still occurred in the United States. There are 

many reports of violence by police, some of which became 

so famous and well known that the names of these citizens 
48

became regular household names. For instance, Rodney 

King was arrested shortly before his 26th birthday in Los 

Angeles (LA), California. King was pulled over for speeding, 

but instead of pulling over, he led the police officers on a 

high-speed chase through LA. Once King was stopped, the 

officers forced him out of the car and began to beat him to the 

ground with excessive force – specifically 56 baton blows 

– as well as clubbing and kicking him. As a result, King 

sustained broken bones all over his body. All of this violence 

occurred in just 81 seconds (Polner, 1992). The use of force 

was seen as racially motivated and was captured on video. 

The horrific footage caused public outrage and allowed King 

to be released without any charges (CNN, 2012). 

When the attack came to trial, the defense attorneys 

decided it best to move the trial outside of LA to Simi Valley, 

due to the media affecting the LA citizens’ opinions. Simi 

Valley, predominantly a white community, ensured the jury 

was largely white with two people from minority groups; 

none of which were African-Americans (Biography, 2015). 

The jury acquitted the officers, causing massive tension in 

the city and all over the world, culminating in destructive 

riots. 

The riots began in Los Angeles on April 29, 1992, and 

lasted for multiple days. Looting and arson were prevalent 

during the riots and resulted in about 50 deaths due to a 

variety of reasons, such as pulling people out of their cars 

and beating them, weapons fire within the riots, burning to 

death, stabbings, and heart attacks due to the stress of the 

riots going on outside of their homes (NY Times, 1992). LA 

enforced curfews, and even Rodney King made a plea for 

calmness on May 1, 1992, saying, “People, I just want to say, 

can we all get along? Can we get along? Can we stop making 

it horrible for the older people and the kids?” (CNN, 2012). 

Once the riots came to a halt, the United States 

Department of Justice filed charges against the four officers 

involved in the beating of King. Half of the officers were 
49

found guilty, and the other two were acquitted once again. 

Juries in part accepted defense arguments that the beating 

of King was a failure of Los Angeles Police Department 

Use of Force policy which required compliance from a 

subject before officers could attempt to handcuff the subject. 

As King never complied, officers continued to strike with 

the batons, the approved use of force. The failure of the 

supervisor on the scene to deviate from short-sighted policy 

allowed officers to continue the beating. King received $3.8 

million for damages and injuries. Although this seems like a 

good amount of money, in comparison to the effect it had on 

King and the city of LA, it is minuscule (Biography, 2015).

In 1997, Mr. Parks, the chief of police in LA, realized 

the department needed to make a change in order to keep 

their community safer and happier. A couple of these changes 

included the implementation of cameras, a multicultural 

police force, and a new policing style. The implementation 

of cameras insured that unacceptable behavior would be 

recorded and individuals held responsible for their actions, 

making the community feel safer. A multicultural police 

force with African-American and Hispanic officers ensured 

the public would not feel they were being treated differently 

due their race. Lastly, the policing style went from a 

paramilitary to a community policing style. This style builds 

a relationship with the community, so when an event like 

the Rodney King case occurs, there is a better chance the 

citizens will take time to hear the police officer’s side of the 

story (Morris, 2012).

Ferguson

Another famous case took place in Ferguson, Missouri, 

where an 18-year-old African-American male named 

Michael Brown was at a local liquor store and allegedly stole 

a box of Swisher cigars. While Brown was walking back 

to his home, Officer Wilson spotted him and believed him 
50

to match the description for the alleged thief. Once Officer 

Wilson ordered him to stop, an altercation broke out. Brown 

began to run and Wilson fired 12 rounds, killing Brown 

(Buchanan, 2015). 

A jury found Officer Wilson not guilty because 

forensic evidence supported Officer Wilson’s version of 

events that had Brown reaching into the police car at the 

time he was shot. However, witnesses in support of Brown 

lied to the press and the jury and testified that Brown had his 

“hands up.” Because of the lack of trust in the community 

of the police, similar to the case of Rodney King, Project C, 

and the Kent State shootings, riots began, leading to burned 

buildings, citizens throwing objects such as stones at police 

officers and their patrol cars, and sporadic gunfire. The 

officers were forced to protect themselves and bystanders. 

One of the main findings after the Ferguson shooting 

was that the population of Ferguson is mainly AfricanAmerican, contrary to the police department. Out of 53 

officers in Ferguson, only four were black. Although this 

racial disparity may not have been the predominant cause 

of this case, it definitely affected the community reaction. 

If a specific race in a community feels segregated from and 

not represented within the police force, then any actions 

taken against them will feel racially motivated. Like in the 

King case, a more ethnically diverse police force with a 

community policing mandate might have averted such an 

explosive situation (Buchanan, 2015). Unfortunately, as is 

often the case, the officers involved, even when they are 

acquitted, are unable to return to policing (Officer Wilson’s 

family was threatened and he resigned from policing). 
51

Freddie Gray

Another recent case of police brutality in the US involved 

another young, African-American male named Freddie 

Gray. In the spring of 2015, two officers on bicycle patrol 

in Baltimore, Maryland spotted Freddie Gray walking by, 

and when eye contact was made, Gray made a run for it. 

This gave the officers enough suspicion to chase after Gray 

and tackle him. While this take down was happening, Gray 

asked for an inhaler, which was not given to him; the first 

reckless act of the officers. After the officers searched Gray, 

the only item they found on him was a knife, which is legal 

in the state of Maryland. However, the officers decided to 

call a police van and proceeded to take him into custody on 

a weapon’s charge. 

When the van arrived to pick up Gray, he was put 

inside with no seatbelt: a second reckless act. While driving 

to central booking, the driver stopped multiple times; he did 

not bother to buckle Gray during any of these stops, leaving 

Gray handcuffed and shackled in the back of a van with no 

safety belt. At the third stop, while the driver checked on 

Gray, Gray asked for medical assistance because he could 

not breathe and was denied medical attention a second time. 

Almost at the station, the driver responded to a call 

for another arrest. As the driver was putting the new arrestee 

into the van, the driver realized Gray was unresponsive. 

The driver provided no medical assistance to Gray and 

simply proceeded to the station. Upon arrival, Gray was 

not breathing and was transported to the hospital, where he 

passed away a week later (Almukhtar, 2015).

It was determined that Gray died from a severe 

spinal injury likely caused by the rough ride in the van. The 

officers involved in this incident were all removed from duty 

immediately and suspended with pay (Barajas, 2015). These 

officers have all been tried with multiple charges ranging 

from second-degree assault to second-degree murder. All 
52

officers were tried separately and acquitted. The Department 

of Justice decided on October 5, 2017, to conduct a noncriminal, internal disciplinary trail for the officer, over the 

breach of internal protocol for not securing Mr. Gray in the 

van. The family was awarded $6.4 million, which does not 

bring back Freddie Gray (Stolberg, 2015). 

As for the community, the reaction was also similar 

to the previous cases. Multiple riots and protests took place 

including violence causing upwards of $9 million in damages 

to the city. Not only were buildings of innocent business 

owners set on fire, but also innocent individuals’ vehicles 

and other property were destroyed. Tensions became so high 

during this time that the National Guard was called in to help, 

as well as police departments from surrounding areas. The 

aftermath violence brought more awareness and attention to 

the situation (Barrabi, 2015). 

Vietnam Violence

While police misconduct occurred in the US, police 

corruption and brutality also occurred in Vietnam. One of 

the most publicized police brutality cases in Vietnam is the 

execution in Saigon of a Viet Cong captain. This execution 

took place in the middle of the city, where the Viet Cong 

captain was shot in the face. This was one of many executions 

during the war, but this one stood out because RoV General 

Loan shot the captain in the presence of a cameramen and 

a photographer. The photographer captured this gruesome 

image right as the bullet was exiting the skull of the Viet 

Cong captain, making this photo exceptionally graphic. 

People all over the world saw the photo on television and in 

local newspapers (Thomas, 1998). 

Although this picture caused an emotional 

outcry, it was not enough to stop the war, which ended seven years later. Within these seven years, the 
53

mistreatment of Vietnamese citizens by police continued day in and day out. COL Nguyen was asked 

if he was familiar with the execution, and supported 

the handling of the event by the news. “I don’t support the way Gen. Loan executed the man. He was 

a political commander, but I don’t like it. Neither a 

Vietnamese, nor American general should do that. 

I question why the general had to execute him, because the tribunal would condemn him to death. So 

why the need for execution?” (Nguyen, 2015). 

COL Nguyen’s wife added, “Well I have to 

tell you a story about Gen. Loan. When we came 

over to the United States, we had an annual reunion 

of the police with a lottery. I happened to win his 

[Gen. Loan’s] watch, a very, very expensive watch. I 

didn’t keep it; I gave it back to him. I disagree with 

him [COL Nguyen]. If the VC killed my friend, I 

would execute him immediately, no matter what!” 

(Nguyen, 2015). COL Nguyen continued, “When I 

worked with the [RoV president], many of my colleagues [oversaw] executions and assassinations [of] 

the really bad Viet Cong, simply to show [they were] 

anti-communist” (Nguyen, 2015). COL Nguyen 

(2015) further conveyed that he would not personally execute communists because then his subordinates would be capable of carrying out such actions. 

Therefore, if his subordinates carry out executions 

without following the rules, he could punish them 

because he had not set the example that it is acceptable to conduct such executions without the approval 

of the governing bodies. Had he carried out extra judicial executions, then he would have no grounds to 

punish his subordinates for doing so.

Indeed, the brutality that the RoV general 

portrayed was unacceptable and most definitely 

shocking. When asked if the execution in Saigon had 
54

any backlash from citizens, COL Nguyen’s (2015) 

opinion was that, “You know I think the majority of 

the [population was against it. However, no one criticized the event because the general is a very powerful man. Even though I was his subordinate, in my 

heart, I did not support this”. 

This is an unfortunate realization and commonality among countries, wherein the population 

does not always agree with the actions of the government, but remain silent and refrain from protest in 

an attempt to change it. Just like during the US Civil 

Rights Movement in the 1960s, there was a great deal 

of racial discrimination and mistreatment by police, 

but much of the population turned their heads until it 

became impossible to ignore. Clearly, the Vietnamese citizens reacted the same way to this type of mistreatment because, as COL Nguyen believes, many 

people did not agree with this execution, but no one 

wanted to criticize the decision of someone so powerful, such as an RoV general. 

Unfortunately, not ensuring the government 

holds police officers accountable for mistreatment 

further enables such actions without recourse. COL 

Nguyen, as a police manager, tried to ensure brutality was prevented by reminding his staff to be honest 

men. When asked if extensive corruption occurred in 

Vietnam and how he would handle it as a police manager, he responded by saying, “I think it is true of 

many policemen ... but unfortunately not only police, 

every branch in the Army... as well. [When I identify 

non-corrupt police officers, I congratulate] and decorate them with a police order and ...medal, ... [for 

being] an honest man, [because honest men are] very 

rare in Vietnam” (Nguyen, 2015). As an example of 

police corruption, COL Nguyen (2015) shared a story. When he was a police manager, he controlled the 
55

flow of traffic on the highways. There, the police established many checkpoints. Chinese trucks loaded 

with merchandise and goods would stop at the check 

points for inspection, and the Chinese drivers would 

bribe the police officers with 20 Vietnamese dollars 

to pass through without being inspected.

In more recent times, Vietnam has had significant 

amounts of police deviance within their borders to the extent 

that the deviance has drawn the attention of the Human Rights 

Watch. In the article titled, Vietnam: Pervasive Deaths, 

Injuries in Police Custody, the Human Rights Watch found 

44 out of 58 provinces in Vietnam have endured some degree 

of police deviance. The majority of the deviance resulted 

in the injury of detained individuals, most of whom were 

only being held for minor infractions. Examples of those 

victims include Nguyen Mau Thuan, who was detained for 

a neighborhood dispute, and Le Phuc Hung, who was held 

for stealing water pipes. Both were beaten to death while in 

custody (Human Right Watch, 2014).

In addition to the two previously listed individuals, 

Ngo Thanh Kieu was arrested and taken from his home on 

May 12, 2012, for being a suspect in a string of burglaries in 

Tuy Hoa City. While in custody, Kieu suffered terrible rubber 

baton beatings from five officers, while he was handcuffed 

and shackled to a chair. The beatings ultimately resulted in his 

death. The initial verdict handed down by the People’s Court 

of Tuy Hoa City sentenced the five officers to six months to 

five years in jail, but the People’s Court of Phu Yen Province 

annulled the sentence. The commuted sentences resulted in 

two officers receiving probation and the other three were 

given short term prison sentences (DurianAsean, 2014). 

Numerous victims of police brutality in Vietnam have 

not survived detention abuse, and those who have survived 

have encountered awful mistreatment by police. The police 

officers always deny the allegations of police brutality and 
56

blame their deaths on other circumstances, often blaming 

doctors’ treatment as the cause of their death. Many victims, 

lucky enough to live, were generally coerced into false 

confessions and lived the rest of their life in a prison cell 

(Human Rights Watch, 2014).

Even though these reports of police deviance are 

accurate, Vietnam denies the allegations. Media coverage in 

Vietnam is subpar in regards to police misconduct. Without 

media coverage, the police officers’ abuse of power continues 

without repercussions (Greenslade, 2014). Vietnam needs to 

improve and ensure all citizens are afforded due process. 

Until then, police brutality will continue, while innocent 

individuals suffer (VOA, 2014). 

The Effected Community

Indeed, the community is widely affected by the police 

officers’ decisions. The history of police brutality in the United 

States is certainly repetitive, but not nearly as common place 

as in other societies. As early as the 1960s, similar cases and 

patterns continuously repeat themselves. When the public 

is upset over government decisions, including those made 

by police officers, there tends to be a violent outcry, which 

includes riots and protests. Although riots and protests bring 

awareness of police unjustness to the entire population, they 

certainly are not the answer. Martin Luther King Jr stated, 

“We must not allow our creative protest to degenerate into 

physical violence” (Online Speech Bank, 2001). As such, the 

police must intervene to maintain the safety of the general 

population, and thus appear to be more of a savior, than a 

merchant of indiscriminate and unwarranted force, thus 

countering the original protest intention. Creating culturally 

representative police forces with recurrent interaction 

with the community, so they are seen as public advocates 

and representatives of the local government, will certainly 

make a difference in the way the community feels towards 

situations like these. 
57

Chapter 7

Combating Terrorism through Community 

Policing in Vietnam

by Abayomi Ayoola

The war on terrorism has had many lost souls and has been 

the most expensive war with the least degree of support from 

other countries. Terrorism is the effective use of violence to 

bring forth fear (Pressman & Flockton, 2014). Terrorism may 

be motivated by political, religious, or ideological ideals. 

The goal of terrorism is to instill fear in the population and 

force a government to change its political attitude. Violent 

extremism is similar to terrorism, but has subtle differences. 

While not all extremists resort to terrorism, all terrorists are 

extremists, but the question remains: Does employing an 

extreme political, religious, or ideological view necessarily 

entail terrorism (Pressman & Flockton, 2014)? Pressman 

and Flockton (2014) argue that while extremism does not 

require violent actions, terrorism always requires violence to 

achieve some political goals. Violent extremism is different 

to terrorism in terms of the intention to cause fear and 

terror in civilians or decision makers. For example, violent 

environmentalists or violent anti-abortionists perhaps may 

use violent means in their actions, but generally have not 

indicated the intention to kill people indiscriminately or 

destroy facilities to cause fear in the public domain (Pressman 

& Flockton, 2014). 

After September 11, 2001, American policing 

experienced a time of critical change and development, when 

the nation’s security needs increased profoundly following 

the terrorist assaults on American soil. In a moderately short 

time, police reconsidered their key missions, the nature of 

policing techniques, and the character of their relationship 

with the community they serve (Weisburd & Braga, 2006). 

Community policing in the 21st century greatly altered 

the receptivity of police and their collaboration with the 
58

community, especially focusing on their security concerns. 

England and Germany reappraised their preparation of 

the police force and reconsidered the role policing plays 

in counteracting terrorism through policing innovations 

including preventive policing (Bayley & Weisburd, 2009). 

Preventive policing can be characterized as any activity 

completed by police with the aim of recognizing and 

interceding before the occurrence of a particular crime; one 

strategy to do so is partnering with the public. Cooperation 

with the community builds trust, and, as such, the population 

feels more comfortable sharing threat information with the 

police. Such dynamic police and community relations may 

tend to reduce the potential for oppressive police behavior 

as the public is more compliant with police proceedings. 

Due to the more profound influx of information from 

community networks, police can be more selective in areas 

requiring surveillance where there is a perceived lack of 

community participation in policing support. Common 

investigative techniques, requiring varying degrees of 

government oversight and court approval, are wire-tapping, 

email capture, human and camera surveillance of suspects 

in open areas, as well as surveillance in hotel rooms and 

private living arrangements. Cutting edge technologies have 

provided policing, security and intelligence services with 

visualization tools to identify and avert terrorism, becoming 

a central component of counter-terrorism strategies. This 

expanded dependence on innovative tools was not just a 

result of its availability and decreased cost, but also public 

pressure on the government to manage the threat of terrorism. 

Camera systems enable police to observe remote locations 

without a physical presence, thus enabling the collection of 

intelligence from unwary criminal elements; a task normally 

requiring multiple personnel on foot and driving, which 

tended to highlight their activity to the perpetrator.

Another counterterrorism policing strategy includes 

high policing. High policing agencies collate data, analyze 
59

the information to develop finished intelligence products, 

such as threat assessments, and disseminate intelligence 

on a need-to-know basis. The intelligence products are 

stored in various formats, then destroyed when they have 

lost their relevance. There are two fundamental differences 

between high policing security intelligence and low 

policing or criminal intelligence. First, police forces collect 

pertinent intelligence to build a criminal case, while high 

policing intelligence focuses more on the threat of crime to 

national and regional security (Brodeur, 2007). Actionable 

intelligence is the second fundamental difference, where 

in intelligence spurs an organization to act. In this sense, 

intelligence-led policing leads to an arrest, while high 

policing is continually compiled, and only acted upon when 

there are no justifiable alternatives (Brodeur, 2007). One 

concern with high policing, though, is its effects on public 

attitudes toward police (Jonathan, 2010; Jonathan-Zamir & 

Weisburd, 2013).

Public opinion towards police, especially their 

authenticity, is essential for creating an open dialogue with 

the public and for police legitimacy (Tyler, 2004). Public 

attitudes towards police legitimacy could be influenced by 

the inclusion of police in counter-terrorism efforts (Jonathan, 

2010; Jonathan-Zamir & Weisburd, 2013). Police strengths 

in Vietnam and other majority rule nations raised their level 

of readiness by including police in counter-terrorism efforts 

(Bayley & Weisburd 2009). Community based policing 

can impact terrorist efforts, as the community, with its 

increased trust in the police, provides valuable information 

on terrorist activities and networks. Community policing is 

not an effortless endeavor, as it requires an implementation 

strategy and organizational commitment. Community 

policing is a decentralized activity, which encourages 

two-way communication between police and the general 

population. COL Nguyen implemented a problem-oriented 

policing model, requiring a responsive police force, which 
60

offered neighborhood dispute resolution assistance down 

to the household-level through community organizations 

and crime prevention programs. COL Nguyen felt that the 

absence of group insights through community engagement 

would prompt further hardline policing actions.

The participation of police in Vietnam security 

matters creates new issues. Police inclusion in Vietnam 

security is a characteristic extension of their traditional 

roles of responding to community security concerns and 

reacting to crises, for example, riots and natural catastrophes 

(Nguyen, 2015). In spite of the fact that police agencies 

in Vietnam considered terrorism as a potential threat to 

community security, they had little involvement in planning 

the country’s security capacity to respond to terrorist events. 

However, neighborhood organizations did not consider 

countering terrorist activities as a policing function requiring 

the allocation of assets and personnel (Nguyen, 2015).

COL Nguyen felt his strategy was effective as no 

incidents of terrorism occurred in his jurisdiction during the 

Vietnam War. His counter terrorism strategy was employed 

slightly differently between two urban areas: Saigon City 

and Nha Trang city; Saigon City required a more politically 

tactful approach when handling governmental issues 

(Nguyen, 2015). One of the new policing responsibilities 

of COL Nguyen’s strategy was to leverage non-military, 

non-uniformed officers in local communities to investigate, 

identify, and destroy terrorist networks. Such new policing 

roles likely increase police investment in high policing, 

which is focused more on strategic issues at the macro level, 

rather than local crime and disorder (Brodeur, 1983; Brodeur 

& Dupeyron, 1993).

As mentioned in Chapter 3, under the strategy 

of prevention, there were three main areas of policing 

activities: internal security to counter anti-government 

and anti-establishment movements, intelligence gathering 

specifically to target communists, and criminal investigation 
61

to counter criminal activities (Nguyen, 2012). The French 

policing model exploited information to gain advantage 

through the element of surprise, while the CIA model was 

more methodical and based on surveillance, which in both 

war and peace time returned the best results. The police 

played a crucial role during a time of political instability by 

securing and protecting citizens against crime and violence. 

During this time, police performed approximately 90% of 

civilian administration programs, due in large part to the 

degree of trust and respect the population had in the police, 

as they often engaged the police for advice on community 

concerns. Policing is about prevention, so COL Nguyen 

and his fellow police officers cultivated relationships with 

the community to show their sincerity and a willingness 

to serve, in order to develop a synergistic relationship, and 

enhance communication between the police and its citizens 

to identify and disrupt threats to the community, such as 

terrorists. Risk has a long history of negative outcomes in 

crisis management. Risk lies in the shadow between the 

known and the obscure. Governments and corporations have 

greatly increased their focus on risk-based methodologies 

when conducting vital strategic planning (Manning, 2006). 

In the Vietnam case with COL Nguyen at the lead, risk paid 

off in maintaining public safety.
62

Section III

Applying Lessons Learned to 

US Foreign Advising Today

For more than half a century, the USG has supported police 

forces of foreign countries during wars, as well as in postconflict regions, through foreign police assistance programs 

with the goal of building peace and maintaining safety. 

US government agencies provided advice and training on 

modifying policing systems and strategies based on previous 

experiences and the change in society.

In this section, we will discuss the change of US 

foreign police assistance since the Vietnam War and lessons 

learned from the Vietnam War for the US foreign policing 

assistance today. First, we will present US foreign policing 

advising in Vietnam by summarizing the previous chapters 

in this book. Second, we will show several trends of the US 

foreign police assistance and practical activities today. We 

will conclude by discussing lessons learned for the current 

US foreign police assistance by comparing lessons learned 

of police advising in Vietnam with existing systems and 

activities.
63

Chapter 8

Lessons Learned and Best Practices

by Eunsil Yoo

US Foreign Policing Advising in the Late 20th Century

The USG supported civil and paramilitary police 

organizations, and trained foreign police officers through 

the International Cooperation Administration (ICA) and 

the United State Agency for International Development 

(USAID) from 1954 to 1974. The ICA initiated programs 

for supporting foreign police forces and then USAID, 

established in 1961 as a successor organization of ICA, 

provided diverse programs such as technical advice, training, 

and equipment. In addition to the foreign policing advising 

overseas, USAID trained over 5,000 foreign police officers 

from 77 countries through the International Police Academy 

(IPA) in Washington D.C. Additionally, the USG provided 

specialized courses for over 3,000 officers through agencies 

other than the IPA using USAID funds (Keller, 2010). As the 

numbers above indicate, US foreign policing advisory efforts 

operated successfully within and outside of the country. 

The USG efforts during the Vietnam War exemplified 

the trend of foreign policing advising in the middle of the 

20th century, with democratic countries actively combatting 

communism (Clinton, 2007). In 1965, the US government 

became involved in the Vietnam War, and because the 

police were the front line of defense, US policing advisors 

supported the RoV national police. However, the advisors 

often overlooked the cultural differences and the nature of 

the relationship between the RoV police and their supported 

communities. Unlike the rise of community-based policing 

in the US, foreign policing advising tended to be operationbased policing by focusing on combatting communists. 
64

During the Vietnam War, police violence was a 

serious concern, which is outlined in chapter 6 and 7 of this 

book. The economic system and culture in Vietnam had a 

negative impact on increased police corruption. Moreover, 

the policing activities in Vietnam that focused on combatting 

communism resulted in conflict within local communities. 

According to COL Nguyen’s interviews, the problem of police 

deviance was even harder to solve because of a hierarchical 

system and authoritative culture that discouraged those who 

might want to speak out against such corruption. 

After the Vietnam War, criticism increased over 

foreign policing assistance. Reports of police brutality led 

to the diminution of foreign policing advising activities 

(Keller, 2010). US legislation prohibited the application of 

foreign assistance funds to the training and financing of law 

enforcement within or outside of the US Section 660 of the 

Foreign Assistance Act in 1974 essentially ended all USAID 

police training and assistance programs. Today’s foreign 

police assistance is operated under a different system from 

the Vietnam War era. 

Current US Foreign Police Assistance

Trends of Foreign Policing Assistance

The values and meaning of foreign policing advising have 

changed over several decades. After the Vietnam War, 

the USG encountered severe criticism about its military 

intervention and foreign assistance. Governmental agencies 

needed to improve their strategies for successor activities. 

Today, the USG focuses on peace and security from a longterm strategy and planning perspective. These trends take the 

form of peacebuilding and peacekeeping activities, security 

sector reform, and community-based policing.

Peacebuilding and Peacekeeping. Since the 1990s, 

a peace agenda has been promoted all over the world. 

Governmental and nongovernmental organizations involved 
65

in international conflicts realized previous short-term 

strategies actually led to further violent conflicts in host 

nations. War-time strategies rarely consider the necessary 

steps to maintain peace or consolidate gains in a post-conflict 

environment (Mitchell, 2008). The idea of peacebuilding 

normally falls into the “post-conflict reconstruction” 

environment, and encompasses “the overlapping agendas 

for peace and development in support of conflict prevention, 

conflict management and post conflict reconstruction” 

(Tschirgi, 2003). The USG often employs political 

intervention, financial support and institutional reforms as 

tactics to rebuild peace following conflict. 

Peacebuilding was developed as an evolution of 

peacekeeping and should be a component of peacekeeping 

missions. From a short-term perspective, political 

intervention and the incorporation of the international 

community are essential in peacebuilding. Non-governmental 

organizations advocate for international organizations and 

foreign governments providing support to peacebuilding and 

peacekeeping missions focusing on long-term objectives 

to solve root-causes of conflict and develop communities 

– if they want to truly support the host nation (Mitchell, 

2008). The USG recognizes that each peacebuilding and 

peacekeeping strategy will vary depending on the needs of 

the conflict areas.

Security Sector Reform (SSR). Since the early 

2000s, the USG has employed a comprehensive approach 

to security sector reform, coordinating the planning and 

implementation efforts of the defense, development and 

diplomatic departments. Security Sector Reform (SSR) 

refers to “reform efforts directed at the institutions, 

processes, and force that provide security and promote the 

rule of law” (Department of State, Department of Defense, 

& the USAID, 2009). Specifically, the US foreign assistance 

framework identifies SSR “as a key program area in support 

of the Peace and Security foreign policy objective and 
66

security sector governance as a program element in support 

of the Governing Justly and Democratically foreign policy 

objective” (Department of State, Department of Defense, 

& the USAID, 2009). The US government emphasizes that 

their programs and activities are based on the host nation’s 

history, culture, legal framework, and institutions in the 

process of SSR. 

Further, the USG effectively guides the relevant 

agencies’ implementation strategies through several SSR 

principles: (1) support host nation ownership; (2) incorporate 

principles of good governance and respecting human rights; 

(3) balance operational support with institutional reform; 

(4) link security and justice; (5) foster transparency; and (6) 

do no harm (Department of State, Department of Defense, 

& USAID, 2009). These principles are essential to achieve 

security in post conflict environments from the long-term 

perspective without severe conflicts against host nation 

communities. 

In addition to Security Sector Reform, police reform 

plays a key role in securing peace in a community and the 

peacebuilding process. Police reform, including the changing 

of power relationships, organizational culture and respect 

for human rights, contributes to building trust between the 

community and police (O’Neil, 2005). In fact, it is very 

difficult to reform police in the post-conflict areas. Militarized 

police in conflict areas are closely connected with military 

activities even after the conflicts (Mani, 1999). In the case of 

El Salvador from 1992-1994, even though the government 

received financial and training assistance for police reform 

from the US Department of Justice International Criminal 

Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), police 

officers were difficult to separate from military personnel 

because of repeated military interference in the police reform 

process. 

Community-based policing. The trend of foreign 

policing assistance has moved from operation-based 
67

policing toward community-based policing. Communitybased policing means that positive relationships with 

the community plays a vital role in effective policing and 

requiring restructuring police systems and organization. The 

objective of community-based policing is to have citizens 

and police partner together to identify and effectively address 

crime and disorder (Department of Justice, 2007). The 

benefit of community policing is the development of strong, 

positive relationships between police and the general public, 

which contributes to a culture of lawfulness and general 

voluntary compliance with criminal laws (Department 

of State, 2016). Community-based policing has evolved 

since it was formally developed in the 1960s. However, 

it was not applied to the foreign policing assistance until 

the later part of 1990s, as it was not seen as an effective 

measure for combatting communism or counterinsurgency 

in stability operations. Community-based policing has been 

implemented as a counter to increased conflict between 

police and their respective communities.

In the process of foreign policing advising, civilian 

police are encouraged to develop partnerships with citizens 

and identify problems by building trust, which is the 

foundation of this principle (Groenewald & Peake, 2004). 

Fundamental principles of community-based policing 

include: (1) policing by consent, not coercion; (2) the police 

as part of the community, not apart from it; (3) the police and 

community working together to identify community needs; 

(4) the police, public and other agencies working together 

in partnership; and (5) tailoring the business of policing 

to meet community needs (Groenewald & Peake, 2004, p. 

34). These principles provide police officers with guides to 

build relationships with communities and achieve security 

together. The USG requires foreign policing advisors to 

inculcate these community-based policing principles into 

the host nation police officers.
68

In summary, the trends of foreign police assistance 

have evolved over the last several decades to include ideas 

of peacebuilding and peacekeeping, security sector reform 

(SSR), and community-based policing. The next section 

reviews how these ideas and values are implemented into 

foreign police advising.

The Systems of Foreign Policing Assistance 

In the today’s foreign policing assistance policy, diverse 

organizations including the USG departments and private 

companies cooperatively provide advice and training to 

host nation police. This section will show the organizations 

involved in the policy implementation and their roles in 

interagency coordination and then review how the systems 

operate.

Interagency coordination. The Department of 

State’s (DOS) Bureau of International Narcotics and Law 

Enforcement Affairs (INL) is the lead USG agency for 

justice sector development and foreign police assistance. 

INL is responsible for developing the long-term strategy 

with implementation and funding assistance from USAID, 

ICITAP, and another Department of Justice agency, the 

Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance 

and Training (OPDAT). The Department of Defense provides 

support to foreign police assistance, when requested by the 

Department of State (Keller, 2010). INL, ICITAP and USAID 

are involved in the development, bidding, and awarding of 

contracts for police trainers, with much of the onus shifting 

to the Department of Defense in a non-permissive, postconflict environment. 

Since 2009, USAID has been involved in civilian 

police development and reform in over 20 countries. USAID 

cooperates with other government agencies to support 

international civilian police efforts. Since the end of the Cold 

War, DOS’s INL has played a key role in developing and 
69

operating international criminal justice programs in postconflict nations, specifically focusing on the development 

of civilian law enforcement organizational structures and 

capability. US federal law enforcement agencies also provide 

support staff and trainers for these training initiatives. 

DOJ’s ICITAP and OPDAT concentrate on sustainable 

institutional development in the justice sector in postconflict or developing countries. ICITAP supports foreign 

governments to develop their law enforcement institutions, 

protect human rights, and combat corruption, crime, and 

terrorism. OPDAT’s programs are part of the Department 

of Justice’s two-pronged law enforcement strategy: first, 

an operational prong, targeting transnational criminal 

organizations; and second, a capacity-building prong, 

designed to increase the ability of our foreign counterparts to 

investigate and prosecute these criminal groups before their 

criminal activities reach the United States. The programs 

cooperate with other organizations such as the Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS) to leverage their operational law 

enforcement training and technical assistance capabilities. 

DOD’s primary role is building the capacity of foreign 

military and paramilitary forces. DOD supports other 

organizations in developing civilian police agencies. Under 

a Transitional Public Security initiative, DOD maintains 

public order in post conflict scenarios until host nation or 

international forces are able to assume these functions. As 

shown above, today’s foreign policing assistance functions 

through interagency cooperation.

Civilian Police (CIVPOL). Many Civilian police 

(CIVPOL) programs are sponsored by the United Nations. 

In UN parlance, police are UNPOL and can be individual 

police officers (IPO) or formed police units (FPU). DOS 

has supported these programs since 1994, through police 

training and advising assistance. CIVPOL aims at promoting 

peace and stability in areas recovering from conflict by 

supporting host nation police forces to develop modern, 
70

democratic indigenous police forces to help ensure that 

peace and stability can be sustained, even after international 

peacekeepers depart. DOS contracts with private companies 

to recruit, select, equip and deploy individual civilian police. 

These contracted civilian police officers work with US 

military in some mission areas, such as Afghanistan and 

Iraq, or are seconded to international organizations such as 

the United Nations (US Department of State, 2008). The 

civilian agencies provide training and assistance to aidrecipient countries through allocated funds from successive 

waivers and exceptions to Section 660 and through new 

authorizations provided outside the Foreign Assistance Act 

(Buchanan, 2011). 

INL’s Office of Civilian Police and Rule of Law 

Programs (INL/CIV) administers police training, while 

also providing programs for prosecutorial, judicial, and 

correctional development. As of 2009, INL/CIV managed 

over 1,600 deployed US police in several foreign countries 

(US Department of State, INL/CIV, 2008). However, it 

is difficult to determine how many of these US police 

are contracted by this program or other programs. INL 

administers the programs using International Narcotics 

Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE). 

Special Training Teams and Programs in Iraq and 

Afghanistan. Police assistance is no longer exclusively 

a civilian police responsibility. DOD was authorized to 

coordinate police training and assistance in Iraq in 2004 

and Afghanistan in 2005 as part of US stabilization and 

reconstruction efforts (Buchanan, 2011, p. 9). During 

Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the US Central Command 

(USCENTCOM) created the Civilian Police Assistance 

Training Team (CPATT) concept to train and equip Iraqi 

police forces. Several private companies, such as DynCorp 

International and Military Professional Resources Inc., 

provided 882 personnel to execute the CPATT tasks of host 

nation police assessment, training, and mentoring.
71

Moreover, the International Security Assistance Force 

(ISAF), that has a UN approved mandate, made a concerted 

effort to embed US advisors with Afghan police and security 

forces from 2009 to 2010. In the fall of 2009, ISAF initiated 

the Village Stability Operations (VSO) program to develop 

effective local security forces, the Afghan Local Police 

(ALP), for selected remote villages in Afghanistan (Rust, 

2011). These special programs supplemented the host nation 

national army and police force while cooperating with 

US military in the mission areas. Under this concept, the 

Afghan government conducted oversight and could vet and 

train local security forces, but the local forces were largely 

autonomous, taking orders from local Shuras. These ALP 

forces built on the concept of the Afghan tradition of local 

defense. However, police assistance conducted by DOD has 

been widely criticized.

As shown above, the USG has transitioned the 

foreign policing assistance systems to a more long-term 

perspective. In order to reduce the abuse of US police power 

in host nations, different government agencies are involved 

in the foreign policing assistance and recruit civilian police 

through the private companies. The USG departmens have 

tried to overcome the limitation of current systems through 

special training teams and programs. 

Lessons Learned

The USG improved their foreign policing assistance systems 

and programs based on their experiences in the Vietnam 

Wars and successor operations during the last 50 years. This 

section will discuss lessons learned for current US foreign 

police assistance based on COL Nguyen and his US advisor’s 

experiences in Vietnam.
72

Understanding the culture of the host nation

Understanding the culture of the host nation is a key issue in 

the success of foreign policing assistance. The US military 

and police advisors were involved in the Vietnam War to 

combat against the spread of communism; however, they 

had insufficient understanding of the Vietnamese people 

and their culture to succeed in their roles as advisors 

(Clark, 2012). Misconceptions or prejudice against foreign 

counterparts’ involvement in governmental and security 

affairs has a negative impact on the relationship with local 

communities, often resulting in police corruption or violence. 

Clark (2012) pointed out that policing advisors, conversely, 

need host nation police officers’ and communities’ help and 

advice to conduct their duties effectively in foreign cultures. 

Advisors should learn the host nation culture and share the 

differences between US and host nation culture in order to 

build relationships with the host nation police officers and 

communities.

However, foreign police advisors need to identify 

host nation customs that thwart effective policing and 

develop advising strategies to overcome these entrenched 

practices. Even though host nation police officers learned 

new techniques from their advisors, the tendency is to quickly 

return to their former organizational culture and values after 

the departure of the foreign advisors (Keller, 2010; Kramer, 

Gaffney, Megahan, & Dempsey, 2008). For this reason, 

the USG tried to build a positive organizational culture by 

encouraging collaborative, partnered operations with their 

Afghan counterparts to highlight the efficacy of the new 

techniques, while also focusing on building relationships 

with community leaders through special programs, such as 

the Village Stability Operations (Rust, 2011). Police reform 

must be tailored to local conditions and needs, while also 

aligning with host nation national programs.
73

Providing appropriate support by understanding local 

environments

Foreign policing advisors can train host nation police officers 

effectively and support communities with appropriate 

resources when they understand the local environment. 

Modern equipment and resources are sometimes not useful in 

post-conflict regions. COL Nguyen (2012, 2015) introduced 

an example whereby Harley-Davidson motorcycles were 

provided for patrolling, but they were too big for the narrow 

roads. On the other hand, some resources are well received, 

such as in the instance of a US advisor who provided a fire 

truck because the RoV police were responsible for assisting 

in putting out fires and the local police did not have a fire 

department. Oversupply of resources takes up more space and 

adds extra expenses; therefore, the USG should effectively 

manage the provision of supplies and only allocate sufficient 

goods to meet the police officers’ and communities’ needs.

Advising strategy may differ depending on regions 

within the same country. In Vietnam, police officers had to 

not only combat North Vietnamese military forces, but also 

counter the Viet Cong insurgency in RoV (Clinton, 2007). 

Some areas rife with Viet Cong guerrillas required significant 

anti-terrorist tactics training, while also introducing 

intelligence gathering skills to differentiate the Viet Cong 

from local populations. In addition, some advisors needed 

to consider the influence of mass media or diplomatic power 

on foreign policing advising strategies in urban areas, such 

as Sai Cong, which was a common operating area for the 

press and nonprofit organizations (Nguyen, 2015). Advising 

strategies need to consider a spectrum of local influences on 

host nation police training and operations.

The permissive nature of the operational environment 

has a significant impact on policing activities. In a permissive 

environment, policing should focus on law enforcement with 

traditional and critical police techniques, such as investigation 

and community policing. In a non-permissive environment, 
74

police advising must be extended to include a paramilitary 

element by focusing on responding to insurgent, terrorist, or 

other major violent activity (Kramer et al., 2008). Therefore, 

understanding local environments or contexts contributes to 

providing appropriate supports to the local communities.

The relationship with the host nation police officers 

A mutual respect relationship with the host nation police 

officers plays a key role in foreign policing advising. Clark 

(2012) stated that open communication is important to 

the development of a personal and business relationship 

with mentored police officers. One way to establish such a 

relationship is to make an effort to understand their culture 

and communicate with them frequently. 

Moreover, cooperation with host nation police 

officers is critical for police reformation. COL Nguyen 

(2015) emphasized the importance of discussion with 

advisors when opinions differ on specific issues. Discussion 

between advisors and host nation police officers leads to 

improved police officer abilities by taking an active role 

in ensuring that both sides understand the same principles. 

Therefore, advisors should encourage host nation police 

officers to discuss diverse issues and concerns they face in 

the workplaces.

Cooperation with other organizations or advisors

Cooperation and coordination with other organizations 

is important to ensure continuity of effort and reduce 

conflicting advising principles. During the Vietnam War, 

several organizations from different countries – such as 

Australian, Korean, UN and US police – cooperated with one 

another to support RoV police officers. The challenge was 

that the disparate advising elements did not share important 

counterinsurgency information with others and did not 

coordinate their daily routine. For example, COL Nguyen 

(2015a, b) used to patrol his district with police officers 
75

from different counties at night in order to more effectively 

deal with problems caused by foreigners. Foreign policing 

advisors should carry out their duties in concert with the 

diverse organizations in the same region.

Moreover, cooperation between military and police 

forces is inevitable in conflict situations. The boundary 

between external and internal security becomes ambiguous 

in combat zones or post conflict environments, leading to the 

overlap of some security roles for military and police forces. 

During the Vietnam War, one objective of the pacification 

operation was to provide security for the people through 

force (Andrade & Willbanks, 2006). COL Nguyen intoned 

that the police rule for use of force and duties were closely 

connected with military force; therefore, foreign policing 

advisors and host nation police officers should cooperate 

with the military force strategically to achieve security in 

the host nations.

Foreign policing advisors also need to share their 

advising strategies with other advisors. The USG provided 

each local police officer with several advisors depending on 

their work duties. COL Nguyen, who had three advisors, 

mentioned the three advisors needed to have commonality and 

coordination in their advising and support strategy to better 

support the advisees. Although the need for cooperation with 

other organizations has increased, the USG does not have an 

integrated organization for foreign policing assistance, and 

often contracts civilian police through private companies. 

Different agencies and international groups must cooperate 

with one another in post-conflict areas to ensure the success 

of foreign policing assistance.

Transition from stability policing to community-based 

policing

Security is important after the support teams leave the 

conflict zone. Policing in wars tends to focus on combatting 

terrorism by cooperating with military force in stability 
76

operations. Unlike during wartime, policing in non-conflict, 

permissive environments requires close ties to the local 

community. Transitioning of policing strategies from a 

conflict to a premissive environment needs to focus on 

maintaining security and public order. However, many 

countries experienced that a militarized police force has 

a negative impact on building a democratic society after 

conflict (Clark, 2012; Mani, 2011). COL Nguyen (2015b) 

also pointed out that a militarized police during wars makes 

building trust with residents difficult. From the long-term 

perspective, advisors need to train host nation police officers 

on community-based policing tactics. 

Today’s foreign police advisors have experienced 

similar concerns from police advising in the Vietnam 

War. Even though the military force performed police 

functions during the initial response, local police forces 

play a key role in the stability of the community in postconflict countries. Keller (2010) pointed out that civilian 

police training by military personnel is not appropriate for 

a transition to community-based policing after the stability 

policing. Military personnel tends to focus on higher end 

stability policing tasks such as “riot control, convoy security, 

motorized patrolling, establishing checkpoints, and weapons 

training” (Keller, 2010, p. viii). In both OIF and Operation 

Enduring Freedom (OEF), contracted training teams 

often failed to distinguish between stability policing and 

community-based policing functions. The current foreign 

policing assistance trend is to train host nation police on 

community-based policing. 

As shown above, understanding host nation culture 

and environment and collaboration with different individuals 

and organizations play a key role in successful foreign policing 

advising in host nations. Although the systems and activities 

of foreign policing assistance changed since the Vietnam 

War, the experiences in the war still provide meaningful 

lessons for current US foreign policing assistance.
77

Summary

The US government has supported foreign countries in 

conflict areas since the middle of the 1900s. The experience 

of the Vietnam War and successive operations influenced the 

evolution of foreign policing assistance. All over the world, 

peacebuilding is one of the predominant concepts in foreign 

assistance policy and practice from a long-term perspective. 

The USG is pursuing a more sustainable foreign policing 

advising model through security sector reform. The goal 

of USG foreign policing advising is to support host nation 

police to independently maintain security and public order 

within their local communities. 

In order to succeed, current foreign policing advising 

needs to learn lessons from the previous experience. 

Understanding the host nation culture and environment 

is important to provide appropriate support in a postconflict environment, while also enhancing ties to the local 

communities. A mutual relationship with host nation 

police officers and the institution of a community-based 

policing model ultimately results in sustainable security by 

encouraging a collaborative relationship between the police 

and the community to identify causes of conflict. 

On the other hand, the USG’s reliance on contracts 

with private companies to deploy civilian police to 

provide foreign police advising leads to the expenditure 

of a considerable amount of time on contracts without the 

assurance of a synergistic effort (Keller, 2010). In addition, 

the places or areas where the police trainers or advisors 

operate are limited because of contract restrictions. Without 

a single USG entity to ensure the integrity of the foreign 

police advising effort, disparate and uncoordinated efforts 

with limited authorities will continue to erode the efficacy 

of the effort. Finally, the USG must carefully research and 

adapt their procedures based on lessons learned, lest they are 

doomed to repeat the same failures of the past. 
78

Chapter 9

Looking toward the Future: Does One Size Fit All?

by Karen Finkenbinder, Ph.D.

The Department of Defense and State Department continue 

to send advisors to enhance the security sector (military 

and police). Though as a general rule the US Department of 

Defense does not advise civilian police, there are exceptions 

in force – generally to enhance counter-terrorism and 

counter-trafficking efforts. One would hope we are getting 

better at it but sadly, that is not necessarily the case. Often, 

we forget our history. We tend not to inculcate the lessons we 

learned in past forays and have to learn them all over again. 

Congress has recognized this – in large part because of 

Congressional mandated reports from the Special Inspector 

Generals for Iraq and Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGIR/

SIGAR). Many of the reports bemoan the lack of knowledge 

within DOD when asked to do police training, mentoring 

and advising. Their reports candidly discussed the wishes of 

the host nations to have non-militarized police and DOD’s 

implementation that militarizes the police. 

But, as noted in Chapter 8, police advising ordinarily 

falls under the authority of the Department of State and it 

uses a variety of implementing partners to do such advising. 

The Department of Justice, US Agency for International 

Development, and others can implement a variety of 

programs that build the police capabilities to provide 

democratic policing. Similarly, as provided in Chapter 8, a 

variety of international actors provide police development. 

Additionally, other international organizations 

send police advisors and, occasionally, police officers that 

will have executive missions in which they serve as police 

officers, not just advisors. The European Union (EU), The 

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 

(OSCE), The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 

The African Union (AU) and other international and regional 
79

organizations, government and non-governmental, all have 

some capacity to provide assistance at varying levels to 

police. One of the hard lessons yet to be learned is that police 

cannot be developed outside the broader governance issues. 

And, military development cannot outpace police and police 

development cannot outpace the other areas of criminal 

justice (judiciary and prisons). 

10 US Code § 333 codifies into permanent US law the 

authority of the Department of Defense to provide equipment, 

services, and training to the national security forces of one or 

more foreign countries for the purpose of building capacity to 

do one or more of the following: Counterterrorism, Counterweapons of mass destruction, Counter-illicit drug trafficking, 

Counter-transnational organized crime, Maritime/border 

security, military Intelligence, or activities that contribute to 

an international coalition operations (P.L. 114-328, Section 

1241(d)(1)). As police are considered security forces, this 

has many civilian police development experts concerned. 

To allay such concerns, the Defense Security Cooperation 

Agency (DSCA), manages and executes the program 

through implementing agencies. The various country teams 

(located at the US Embassy), work through the Geographic 

Combatant Commands (GCCs) to nominate proposals to the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff for 

approval. But, this new authority, focused on longer-term 

capacity building, requires capacity building programs be 

“jointly planned and developed” with the State Department. 

Ostensibly, this will ensure that resources are used in a 

holistic manner to achieve common national goals and the 

USG is integrated in its efforts. 

Similarly, after debacles in recent efforts in which 

the means used (i.e., training and equipping) were unable 

to achieve the desired objective (end), often at great 

expense, efforts have been made to strengthen monitoring 

and assessment of all USG security cooperation efforts. In 

2017, the Department of Defense issued instructions that 
80

require all security cooperation programs to “accurately 

and transparently report to stake holders on the outcomes 

and sustainability of programs” and to conduct assessments, 

monitoring, and evaluation (AM&E) of all programming 

(DODI 5132.14, January 13, 2017). Additionally, this 

instruction requires that lessons learned be disseminated. 

This will mean that any future police advising using funds 

from 10 US Code § 333 must have the appropriate AM&E. 

Advisor-Prep Programs

There also are several programs to prepare advisors for 

their assignments. The Defense Security Cooperation 

Agency (DSCA) has its own training program. Most of their 

Ministry of Defense Advisor (MoDA) assignments are to 

Afghanistan; though, this is rapidly changing. At present, 

there are MoDAs in far-ranging places such as Indonesia, 

Ukraine, Botswana, and Georgia (DSCA, 2018). The advisor 

training program is two months – much of it working in 

a hostile/austere environment, as the program is still very 

Afghanistan-centric. The US Institute for Peace (USIP) 

also has an advising support program to prepare advisors to 

contribute to international assistance missions (USIP, 2018). 

The US Army has developed Security Force 

Assistance Brigades (SFABs) that consist of highlyexperienced soldiers that deploy to a unit to advise ministries 

of defense. At present, there is an SFAB in Afghanistan. 

Though not designed to advise police, they have two military 

police on their staff that can act as a conduit between police 

and military advising efforts (Bonin, 2018). 

The Department of Justice International Criminal 

Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), an 

implementing partner for the Department of State’s Bureaus 

of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) and 

Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism (S/CT), 

the Department of Defense combatant commands, and for 
81

the US Agency for International Development has developed 

its own model for promoting Sustainable Institutional Law 

Enforcement Development (SILED).

In-Country Analysis and Sustainable Development

Sustainable Institutional Development is a commonly 

used term that defines a goal of international development: 

“technical assistance, mentoring, training, and internships 

that help host country police improve their capacity and 

efficiency of operations, their ability to serve their citizens, 

their respect for human rights and human dignity, and their 

professional standards” (Beinhart, 2018). It is considered 

sustainable if it continues after the assistance ends. ICITAP 

proposes, and the author wholeheartedly agrees, that just 

training and equipping foreign police does not promote 

sustainable development. Instead, they promote a sequential 

model that requires extensive analysis. First, conduct a 

crime threat analysis of the country; second, conduct a job 

task analysis of the police that shows how the police are 

organized and what they do; third, conduct an institutional 

development analysis of all the police institutions; and 

lastly, conduct a training needs analysis to see what type of 

additional training is needed based on the results of the first 

three analyses. The model is displayed in Figure 1 (used by 

permission of ICITAP). 
82

Figure 2: ICITAP SILED Model

As part of the in-country analysis, it is also wise to 

determine what the citizens expect of their police. Often, we 

ask the police what they do but not what they should do. 

Recommendations for Future Advisors

Advising in Vietnam did not end in the 1970s. In 2015, the 

Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI), at 

the behest of the Secretary of Defense, sent a Ministry of 

Defense Advisor (MoDA) (the author) through the Defense 

Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) to Vietnam to support 

Vietnam’s development of peacekeeping units for support to 

the United Nations. 
83

The advisor returned from Vietnam in 2017 with 

several general recommendations, not in any order of 

priority, for future advisors to Vietnam (and in general):

•	 We are doing Security Cooperation, not 

Security Imposition. Countries are suspicious of outsiders. We must tread lightly. 

It is better to aim for incremental, positive 

change and that is likely to help them identify their own gaps, their own solutions, and 

their own way forward. If we impose, we do 

not achieve that. Instead, we have “compliance” for the short term but not over the long 

haul. For enduring change, we need cooperative exploration of problems, gaps and jointly 

created solutions. Their plan is likely never 

going to look like ours and if does, it probably will not work for them. 

•	 Just because we can, does not mean we 

should. We have a lot of capabilities and capacities and want to help – it is our nature. 

We should mentor what we know best and 

enable others with the expertise to do the rest. 

We can enable a country to advise that has a 

capability we do not possess. For example, if 

there is a need to create gendarme-type forces (GTF), we can enable countries like Italy 

and Spain that have GTF. 

•	 Sometimes the best thing to do is leave 

them alone. We have a lot of people, in the 

USG and/or DOD, who want to visit Vietnam 

to help and it can overwhelm their system. 

We take away from their work; they cannot 

absorb all our goodness. We need to firmly 

resist many offers of assistance, no matter 

how well-meaning. We are one country; there 

are many other countries also assisting. We 

step on each other. 
84

•	 Map “Who’s Who in the Zoo.” One of the 

first tasks an advisor should do is to develop 

a map of assistance – who is doing what in 

the country. This is a moving target – as trust 

develops, the host will share more and more 

information. Also, the advisor should develop relationships with those in other countries’ embassies. They will also share what 

they are doing. The coup de grace is when 

the host country hosts a partners’ meeting, 

brings in all their donors to the same room 

and gives them an update on assistance. Advisors should consider a donor management 

model. Vietnam chaired such a meeting. It 

demonstrates the host country is in charge of 

its donor management and sends a clear message to competing donors. 

•	 Enable regionally if possible. One of our 

objectives is to build regional relationships; 

thus, if a country in the region has the expertise, we should look toward that regional partner for that expertise, even if at first 

glance, this might not be to our benefit. Graciousness towards partners goes a long way 

toward building good will and trust. 

•	 If we agree to do something, do it right.

If we agree to provide equipment or build a 

building, we need to do it. Our red tape and 

bureaucratic processes are such that our partners can lose hope before we come through. 

We should be as efficient as possible and 

stress how our processes are consistent with 

our laws. For example, if federal acquisition 

law requires a particular contracting process, 

then show them that and stress how it is designed to prevent corruption. In this way, any 

delays make sense and they will not assume 
85

they are not important enough for us to do 

things quickly. 

•	 They will perform whether we think they 

are ready or not. Whether we think they are 

ready or not, political decisions drive progress. For us to underestimate their capabilities does not square with what we have been 

made to understand in the past. We should 

not underestimate them. Vietnam has been 

invaded by the Mongols, French, China, and 

Americans – and it repelled them all. 

•	 Be flexible and sensitive. Any good plan has 

to be flexible. The same holds true with an 

advisor assignment. Be prepared to constantly adjust and be sensitive to their national 

constraints and caveats. 

•	 Keep your sense of humor. A good sense of 

humor is infectious and builds relationships. 

They want to know the person, not the job 

title. They also want to know that none of us 

(or our organizations) are perfect. 

•	 Be humble and a good listener. Being open 

to learning from the host nation builds trust, 

inspires them to share more information and 

gives a better sense of what is really going 

on. Often, failing to provide information was 

not personal, it was coming from “on high” 

and they would be reprimanded for providing 

such information. One can learn a lot by being a sounding board. 

•	 Learn, learn, learn some more. Being an 

advisor is life-changing. Advisors should 

learn their history, geography, culture – use 

every opportunity to experience them and 

their country. Travel the country and region 

when allowed. One of the most profound 
86

places visited was the Son My Memorial 

(My Lai Massacre site). Vietnam is still healing from the wounds of its Civil War. It is 

not surprising to hear Southerners talk badly 

about Northerners and vice-versa. But, in the 

context of America, it makes sense. Share 

our own history – it helps put civil wars in 

perspective and give hope that things can be 

better. 

•	 Know/support the talking points of the US 

Embassy. Everything you promote should 

be consistent with the Ambassador’s talking 

points. He/she is the senior US representative. Any confusion between DOD and DOS 

can be clarified by the Country Team at the 

Embassy. 

This is of course not an exhaustive list but these 

are the things that became apparent upon reflection. As a 

former police officer, I also had the opportunity to teach at 

the Federal Police Academy in Hanoi. Vietnam is making 

great strides in reforming their police. As is often the case – 

their training and education appear to be ahead of culturallyaccepted implementation but they are moving toward a 

model consistent with the observations of Sir Robert Peel 

and the democratic policing model promoted by the US 

Government. 

After completing the four-year police academy, 

Vietnam’s police cadets can compete for Master’s degrees. 

The Office of International and Executive Programs (OIEP), 

University of Maryland, co-manages a Joint Master’s Degree 

in Justice Leadership with UMD and the People’s Police 

Academy (PPA) in Vietnam. There is a similar program 

between Vietnam and Australia. 
87

Concluding Thoughts

There is a Police Museum in Hanoi – just a few feet away 

from Hoa Lo Prison (the infamous Hanoi Hilton) which held 

American prisoners of war, most notably the late Senator 

John McCain. The police museum is free and provides a 

display of police involvement throughout Vietnam’s history. 

The emphasis for the modern era is on those community 

policing activities that many of us associate with democratic 

policing. The staff are very friendly and most are volunteers 

from the police academy who enjoy the opportunity to 

practice their English. 

The museum serves as a graphic reminder of past practices. 

Evidence of the mistreatment of Vietnamese 

prisoners at the hands of the French colonists can be seen 

in Hoa Lo. The degrading treatment of the Vietnamese is 

poignant and so are the many photographs and equipment 

from American prisoners (though nothing is said of their 

torture). Nonetheless, Senator McCain first returned in 

1985 and made several visits. He often said that he did not 

hold any grudge and, though some guards were cruel, he 

could not hold that against the Vietnamese (TIME History 

Series, 2018). Similarly, the Vietnamese have put the past 

to rest. They honor the American soldiers who stopped the 

My Lai Massacre (helicopter pilot, Chief Warrant Officer 

Thompson, Specialist 4 Larry Colburn, and Specialist 4 

Glenn Andreotta) as heroes. The 1968 massacre, in which 

approximately 500 villagers (women, children, and elderly) 

were killed by Charlie Company, 1st Battalion, 20th Infantry 

Regiment, turned many Americans against the war. 

 As is often the case, our enemies become our friends. 

As one former high-ranking officer in the Vietnamese Army 

shared with the author, “We never blamed the American 

people, and most of us never blamed the soldiers. They were 

sent to Vietnam by politicians and they did what soldiers 

do. Just as our soldiers did their duty.” (Nguyen, 2016). 
88

After almost two decades of war, many soldiers prefer to 

be advisors (or support their efforts) so that war becomes 

unnecessary. 

Lastly, my personal gratitude to Dr. Jennifer Gibbs 

and her undergraduate students for their willingness to 

support this project. It was an opportunity for the students 

to learn about a chapter in US history that is rapidly being 

forgotten and for them to tell us what they learned. Many 

thanks to Lt. Col. (Ret.) Larry Bouchat for helping us connect 

with Colonel Nguyen and Mr. Clark. And, most of all, our 

sincere thanks to the family of Colonel Nguyen (who sadly 

passed away before publication) and Mr. Frank Clark. We 

were so glad that we had the opportunity to learn from their 

experiences. 
89

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USAWC Website

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