U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Wildlands Fire Management: 

Federal Policies and Their 

Implications for Local Fire 

Departments

USFA-TR-045/April 1992

Homeland

Security

U.S. Fire Administration Fire Investigations Program

T

he U.S. Fire Administration develops reports on selected major fires throughout the country. 

The fires usually involve multiple deaths or a large loss of property. But the primary criterion 

for deciding to do a report is whether it will result in significant “lessons learned.” In some 

cases these lessons bring to light new knowledge about fire--the effect of building construction or 

contents, human behavior in fire, etc. In other cases, the lessons are not new but are serious enough 

to highlight once again, with yet another fire tragedy report. In some cases, special reports are developed to discuss events, drills, or new technologies which are of interest to the fire service.

The reports are sent to fire magazines and are distributed at National and Regional fire meetings. The 

International Association of Fire Chiefs assists the USFA in disseminating the findings throughout the 

fire service. On a continuing basis the reports are available on request from the USFA; announcements of their availability are published widely in fire journals and newsletters.

This body of work provides detailed information on the nature of the fire problem for policymakers 

who must decide on allocations of resources between fire and other pressing problems, and within 

the fire service to improve codes and code enforcement, training, public fire education, building 

technology, and other related areas.

The Fire Administration, which has no regulatory authority, sends an experienced fire investigator 

into a community after a major incident only after having conferred with the local fire authorities 

to insure that the assistance and presence of the USFA would be supportive and would in no way 

interfere with any review of the incident they are themselves conducting. The intent is not to arrive 

during the event or even immediately after, but rather after the dust settles, so that a complete and 

objective review of all the important aspects of the incident can be made. Local authorities review 

the USFA’s report while it is in draft. The USFA investigator or team is available to local authorities 

should they wish to request technical assistance for their own investigation.

For additional copies of this report write to the U.S. Fire Administration, 16825 South Seton Avenue, 

Emmitsburg, Maryland 21727. The report is available on the Administration’s Web site at http://

www.usfa.dhs.gov/

Wildlands Fire Management:

Federal Policies and Their Implications

for Local Fire Departments

Reported by: Christina Rossomando

This is Report 045 of the Major Fires Investigation Project conducted

by TriData Corporation under contract EMW-90-C-3338 to the United

States Fire Administration, Federal Emergency Management Agency.

Homeland

Security

Department of Homeland Security

United States Fire Administration

National Fire Data Center

U.S. Fire Administration

Mission Statement

As an entity of the Department of Homeland 

Security, the mission of the USFA is to reduce life and economic losses due to fire 

and related emergencies, through leadership, advocacy, coordination, and support. 

We serve the Nation independently, in coordination with other Federal agencies, 

and in partnership with fire protection and 

emergency service communities. With a 

commitment to excellence, we provide public education, training, technology, and data 

initiatives.

Homeland

Security

Table of Contents

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

ACTIONS SINCE 1988. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

WILDLAND/URBAN INTERFACE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

THE FIRES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

The Clover-Mist and North Fork Fires in the Greater Yellowstone Area. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

The Clover-Mist Fire. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

The North Fork Fire. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

The “49er” Fire in California Gold Rush Country. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

POLICIES AND ISSUES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Federal Fire Management Responsibilities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Development of Federal Fire Management Policies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

The “Let Burn” Policy And The Use Of Prescribed Fire In Wildlands In 1988. . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Implementation Of Federal Policies In The Yellowstone Fires. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

NPS and USFS Fire Investigation Reports. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Fire Management Policy Review Team Recommendations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Post-Yellowstone NPS and Usfs Fire Management. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

THE WILDLAND/URBAN INTERFACE FIRE PROBLEM. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Measures to Minimize Fire Danger. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Aftermath of the 1988 Wildfire Season: Lessons Learned for the Fire Service. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Appendix A – Selected Available Resources. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Wildland/Urban Interface Issues. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Boise Interagency Fire Center Publications. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Appendix B – Key Federal Fire Management Contacts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

1

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The United States Fire Administration (USFA) has prepared this report for fire service professionals 

interested in keeping abreast of developments affecting forests and wildland firefighting policies of 

the Federal government and the fire problem in the rapidly growing wildland/urban interface areas. 

This paper looks at two of the major wildfires in 1988 and the policy issues that surrounded them: 

the Greater Yellowstone Area fires and the “49er” fire that caused more than 20 million dollars in 

damage in the Gold Rush country of Nevada County, California.

Through the years, U.S. Forest Service (USFS) and National Park Service (NPS) fire management policies have taken many forms. An early belief in the importance of suppressing all fires in wildlands 

evolved into current policies that reflect a basic belief that fire is natural to many wildlands and plays 

a vital role in the ecology of those lands. The Greater Yellowstone Area (GYA) fires provided a crucial 

test under extreme conditions of NPS and USFS wildfire management policies in effect in 1988.

The Interagency Fire Management Policy Review Team was formed to review fire management policies and their implementation during the 1988 fire season. The team found that fire management 

policies were basically sound, but many of the plans devised for individual forests, parks, and wilderness areas did not conform to national policy guidelines. They recommended that steps be taken 

to strengthen and ensure operational compliance with those policies. The panel also found serious 

shortcomings in many of the fire models, or “prescriptions,” specifying in what areas and under 

what conditions natural or ignited fires will be allowed to burn in order to meet land management 

objectives.

In addition to strengthening implementation of fire management policy, the team recommended:

• Fire management plans for national parks and forests be improved by:

(a) developing joint agency fire management plans, agreements or addenda to existing plans 

for those areas where fire could cross administrative boundaries;

(b)including additional factors in the comprehensive set of criteria to be used in deciding 

whether or not to allow natural ignitions to burn as prescribed fires;1

(c) clearly describing the decision process and factors to be addressed before a fire is declared 

a prescribed natural fire;

1 Existing criteria already included: consideration of land management objectives for the area, historic fire behavior, 

natural role of fire, proposed degree of suppression, expected fire behavior, acceptable suppression techniques, adequate 

buffer zones, smoke management and effects on adjacent landowners. New criteria added include consideration of the 

effects of cumulative drought conditions on fire behavior, availability of firefighting resources and considerations of the 

regional and national wildfire situation, to name a few.

A “natural ignition” is defined as a naturally occurring fire, such as a fire started by a lightning strike. “Prescribed fires’ 

may be ignited by managers or naturally occurring fires that are allowed to burn under specific “prescribed” conditions 

to achieve established management objectives. Thus a “prescribed natural fire” is a naturally ignited fire that is allowed 

to burn because it is burning under specific, acceptable conditions and meets park or forest management objectives.
2

(d)including criteria to be used in declaring a prescribed fire a wildfire;

(e) clearly identifying areas that need protection from fire, such as developments within or 

adjacent to wilderness and park boundaries, and including within fire management plans 

actions that are to be taken to protect them, i.e., hazard fuel reduction or installing fuel 

breaks;

(f) clearly stating the management objectives being addressed by the prescribed natural fire 

program; and,

(g) clearly describing the process to be used to ensure adequate public involvement and 

coordination with local governments.

• Regional and national contingency plans be developed to constrain prescribed fires under 

extreme conditions.

• Agencies consider planned ignitions to complement prescribed natural fire programs and to 

reduce hazard fuels.

• More consideration be given to the effects of fire policies in surrounding communities and 

steps be taken to encourage more public participation in the development of individual fire 

management plans.

• Additional research and analysis on weather, fire behavior, fire history, and fire information 

integration be carried out so that future fire management programs can be more effective in 

reducing the risk of wildfires.

The panel also cited wildland/urban interface issues as an area in need of further study. Specifically, 

it recommended further study to determine the current and future effects of residential and commercial development on the ability to design and implement prescribed fire programs, and to examine the interrelationship between fire management plans and local planning and zoning functions.

ACTIONS SINCE 1988

Since then, both the NPS and the USFS have taken numerous steps to implement the recommendations of the Fire Management Policy Review Team. Among the actions taken are the following:

• A detailed review was immediately undertaken of all fire management plans in national parks 

and forests that included use of “prescribed natural fire” (naturally-ignited fires allowed to 

burn under certain “prescribed” conditions).

• Both the NPS and the USFS imposed a temporary freeze on their “let burn” policies until 

these fire management plans were revised to meet current policy and new requirements.

• The NPS instituted a daily certification process that requires verifying the availability of 

adequate firefighting resources to assure that prescribed natural fires will remain within 

prescriptions. If not, they are to be declared wildfires and suppression actions taken immediately. NPS also reviewed its policies regarding the use of prescribed burning (e.g., planned 

ignitions) in place of prescribed natural fire.

• The National Wildfire Coordinating Group (NWCG) was ordered to develop criteria for 

a national contingency plan for controlling natural fires under extreme conditions, and 

regional offices of the NPS were ordered to develop regional contingency plans.
USFA-TR-045/April 1992 3

• The USFS revised its fire management manual (Forest Service Manual 5100 – Fire Management) to 

implement the recommendations of its 1989 in-house “Task Force Report on Prescribed Fire 

Management Criteria.” This report enumerated detailed recommendations for the Forest 

Service’s policy and guidance documents spelling out how policies are to be implemented.

• The NPS issued a revised fire management policy manual (NPS-18) in early 1991. This completes a revision process that began before the 1988 wildfire season and was expanded as a 

result of the fires.

WILDLAND/URBAN INTERFACE

The wildland/urban interface is the area where relatively untouched wildlands and residential areas 

meet. The influx of new residents into these interface areas is likely to increase the incidence and 

severity of the fires and to have major implications for firefighting efforts.

Fire service organizations ought to be aware of the steps they can take to prevent and fight wildfires 

in wildland/urban interface areas. These include:

• Overall management plans for parks and national forests are revised periodically. Fire service 

organizations in areas near national forests, parks, and wilderness areas can affect wildfire 

management policies and practices by taking advantage of opportunities for public participation in the development of fire management plans by testifying at public hearings or 

submitting comments on proposed plans. Hearings and comment periods are announced 

in The Federal Register and advertised in local newspapers, and notices are posted in U.S. Post 

Offices. Nearby USFS and NPS offices are listed in local telephone directories under “U.S. 

Government.”

• Fire departments should be aware of measures to reduce fire dangers to homes and other 

structures in wildland/urban interface areas, such as using fire-resistant roof materials and 

requiring defensible space free of vegetation in areas adjacent to structures.

• Fire departments in wildland/urban interface areas often need to take aggressive steps to 

implement and strictly enforce local week abatement and brush clearance ordinances.

• Fire departments in wildland/urban interface areas can use prescribed burning as a valuable, 

cost-effective fire management tool to clear heavy brush and accumulated fuels.

• Firefighters in volunteer fire departments and fire protection districts in interface areas need 

to become more knowledgeable about wildland fire prevention and firefighting methods, 

such as compressed air foam systems.

THE FIRES

The 1988 wildfire season is one that will not soon be forgotten. When the smoke had cleared, 72,084 

wildfires had burned 4,309,316 acres in the western States and Alaska, making 1988 the worst wildfire season since the 1920s, according to the Boise (Idaho) Interagency Fire Center. Firefighting 

costs were estimated at over 500 million dollars, and seven lives were lost.

Millions of Americans watched daily as television showed flames ripping through much of the 

Nation’s favorite national park. As the Greater Yellowstone Area fires threatened a number of nearby 

communities, two million acres burned out of control in Alaska and other devastating wildfires 
4

caused damage in populated areas near wilderness, such as the Gold Rush country of California, 

where more than 100 homes were lost.

The Clover-Mist and North Fork Fires in the Greater Yellowstone Area

The Greater Yellowstone Area fires of 1988 involved the largest fire suppression effort ever undertaken in the United States and focused attention on Federal fire management policies in wilderness 

areas. The USFS estimates that more than 25,000 firefighters fought the fires over more than three 

months. At its height, an estimated 9,500 firefighters and 117 aircraft were involved in the suppression effort.

The Greater Yellowstone Area encompasses 11.7 million acres of land in Montana, Idaho, and 

Wyoming and includes parts of two national parks and six national forests, as well as State lands, 

Federal reservations, unreserved public domain and other lands. During 1988, there were 249 fires 

in this vast area, 201 of which were suppressed at less than 10 acres and 13 of which became major 

blazes that changed the face of the Yellowstone area for generations to come.

Together, the Greater Yellowstone Area fires burned an estimated 1.41 million-acre area in and around 

the park and destroyed 67 structures, including 19 cabins in the park and four houses just outside 

of it. Original estimates that the 13 major Greater Yellowstone Area fires burned approximately 

988,000 acres within the park itself were revised downward in January 1990 after park officials had 

time to carefully analyze satellite photos. The final estimate is that about 793,800 acres burned about 

36 percent of the total area of Yellowstone National Park. Still, the magnitude of the loss is staggering, especially when you consider that in the previous 100 years, only 200,000 acres of Yellowstone 

had burned.

The following is a synopsis of the two largest of the Greater Yellowstone Area fires: the Clover-Mist 

fire that burned in the northeastern part of Yellowstone National Park and was contained on October 

7; and the North Fork fire that threatened the Old Faithful village at various times during late summer and early fall of 1988.

The Clover-Mist Fire

The fire that became known as the Clover-Mist began as seven separate lightning-ignited natural fires 

on July 11. By July 21, four of the fires burned together and were declared wildfires. Suppression 

action was taken on the southern and eastern flanks. At this point, the fires covered 31,500 acres.

Strong winds July 24-26 swelled the fire to 46,800 acres and by July 28 the fire had grown to 68,035 

acres. Between August 13-21, three more fires joined with the main blaze. On August 20, the fire 

made an eleven-mile run driven by tremendous winds, and 46,500 acres were added. It soon 

involved 170,700 acres.

Between September 8-9, winds of up to 50-75 miles per hour (mph) developed and fanned fires 

burning in Sunlight, North Crandall, Jones Creek, Papoose, and Squaw Valley. Flames consumed 

structures in Crandall, just outside of the park. Damage included three residences, six outbuildings, 

13 trailers, one store, and three vehicles.

Snow in higher elevations on September 9-10 provided a break that allowed firefighters to gain 

ground, and by September 13 the tide had turned. The Clover-Mist fire was finally declared contained on October 7, after it had grown to approximately 319,000 acres in size.
USFA-TR-045/April 1992 5

The North Fork Fire

The North Fork Fire began on July 22, reportedly by a logger who carelessly discarded a cigarette 

in the Targhee National Forest north of Yellowstone National Park. It was immediately classified a 

wildfire and was fought from the start, but the blaze escaped the initial attack and grew quickly. On 

July 23, 25-40 mph winds spread the fire from the forest land into Yellowstone National Park. It was 

now 340 acres in size, and a firefighting team was immediately called in to suppress it.

The fire took a major run on July 23 and headed toward the Old Faithful area. Protection action was 

taken for structures in Old Faithful Village while the flames were about 12 miles away. That meant 

that a containment strategy was used on the western and northwestern flanks so that the main suppression efforts could be concentrated at the Village, where fuel reduction actions were taken and fire 

lines were set up. By July 26, the fire moved to within six miles of the Village. Cooling temperatures 

allowed firefighters two days of direct suppression efforts.

On July 30, strong winds came into play and the fire spread to 11,300 acres. Major runs on August 

11 and 12 caused it to grow to 34,120 acres. Strong winds on August 15 swept the blaze across 

Madison Junction, but no buildings were lost. Norris was evacuated on August 17, and structure 

protection actions were taken on August 18 as the fire grew in size to 69,000 acres. By the next day, 

it involved 72,410 acres.

August 20 was a day that firefighters in Yellowstone are not likely to forget. Forty mph winds with 

stronger gusts caused a major fire run toward the northeast. The North Fork fire, now forty miles 

long and 104,000 acres in size, split into two heads on August 25, one north and one south of Norris 

Junction.

The northern branch of the fire was 77,800 acres in size. Pushed by northerly winds on the 27th, 

it posed a renewed threat to Old Faithful Village and parts of the Targhee National Forest. U.S. Army 

forces were put on the fire lines. The North Fork fire moved downslope on September 1 and threatened the town of West Yellowstone. Bulldozers and hand crews constructed fire lines and fuel breaks 

to protect the town. Large capacity sprinklers were installed on the southern and eastern sides of 

West Yellowstone and Old Faithful Village.

On September 6, winds picked up once again and by evening the fire had advanced to within one 

mile of Old Faithful Village. Strong winds of up to 50 mph on the 7th advanced the fire on all fronts 

and evacuation was ordered. As the fire swept through the area, it damaged 19 cabins, two dorm 

rooms, three storage buildings, a restroom, five vehicles, one water tank, and a television transmitter 

tower, but spared the Old Faithful Lodge. The fire was contained by mid-October, after burning a 

385,035 acre area which included 372,199 acres within the park itself.

The “49er” Fire in California Gold Rush Country

In California, high winds fanned 11 wildfires through five rural counties in the Gold Rush country 

of the Sierra Nevada foothills in mid-September 1988. One of the largest, dubbed the “49er fire,” 

was begun on September 11 by a vagrant burning toilet paper. The 49er fire skipped through a hilly 

and heavily forested section of northern Nevada County along Highway 49. In six days, the blaze 

forced closing of the highway, scorched about 33,500 acres of timber and brush, and destroyed 

homes and other buildings valued at 22,728,701 million dollars, according to Bob Paulus of the 

California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection, the ranger in the area affected by the fire.
6

In the affluent Lake Wildwood subdivision where million-dollar houses are not uncommon, 4,500 

residents were asked to evacuate twice in two days. Residents of the nearby towns of Smartville, 

Rough and Ready, and Penn Valley were also evacuated. Firefighters were able to save most of the 

expensive Lake Wildwood homes, but in the end the blaze claimed 13 houses there, along with five 

boats and a dock.

At its height, 2,894 firefighters were involved in fighting the 49er fire, and the firefighting costs have 

been estimated in the neighborhood of 5.6 million dollars.

POLICIES AND ISSUES

Federal Fire Management Responsibilities

Wildland fire management policy is primarily an issue of land and resource management, and falls 

under the jurisdiction of the land management agencies responsible for national forests, parks, wilderness areas, and other public lands. There are five Federal land management agencies with wildfire 

management responsibilities:

• USFS

• NPS

• Bureau of Land Management (BLM)

• U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS)

• Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA)

The USFS is an agency of the Department of Agriculture. The other four agencies are within the 

Department of the Interior. In addition, State agencies, usually within departments of forestry or 

natural resources, generally are responsible for wildfire management on State- and privately-held 

lands. (See Figure 1, “Wildfire Management: Federal and Non-Federal Agency Responsibilities.”)

On the Federal level, the USFS is recognized as the leader in wildland fire management because of its 

legislative mandate, experience, resources, and expertise. The policies, and to a certain extent, the 

practices of the other four agencies closely follow those of the USFS.

There are some significant differences in the policies and practices of the NPS from the overall fire 

management direction provided by the Forest Service. NPS’s mission is fundamentally different from 

the other four agencies. The missions and objectives of the USFS, FWS, BLM, and even the BIA are 

based on multiple use principles that balance protection of land with use and orderly development 

of natural resources. The NPS, however, has a single use mission: to preserve and protect its lands 

for the enjoyment of the American people. This fundamental difference in mission has had, and no 

doubt will continue to have, major implications for wildfire management.
USFA-TR-045/April 1992 7
8
USFA-TR-045/April 1992 9

Development of Federal Fire Management Policies

The first wildland fire control program was established in 1885 in the Adirondacks Reserve in New 

York.2 By the following year, a program was established in the West in Yellowstone National Park. 

Both were based on practices in use in Germany, then considered the world’s model for forestry, and 

upon which early U.S. foresters modeled many forest management policies. The German practice 

was to put out all fires, and that practice was adopted in the United States.

In a pattern that would be repeated several times in intervening years and again following the 1988 

season, devastating fires provided the catalyst for the first significant re-examination of U.S. wildland 

fire policy. In 1910, after catastrophic blazes burned more than five million acres and killed 79 

firefighters in the Southern Rockies, the USFS adopted a clear, single fire management philosophy 

that declared “the moral equivalent of war” on forest fires. This philosophy was to guide its policy 

for the next 50 years.

The policy was simple: stress fire prevention and control all fires as quickly as possible. Fire was 

seen as a disruption of natural processes in the wilderness and should be stopped. During this time, 

U.S. foresters saw their jobs largely in terms of stopping fires, and success in fire management was 

measured by how many fires were extinguished. The area with the fewest fires was considered the 

best managed.

In the early 1920s, there was some debate over the merits of light burning versus a policy of total 

suppression, but control of forest fires continued to be the paramount concern within the Forest 

Service. During this period, a 10-acre control objective that allowed some burning to occur but 

called for suppression of all fires more than ten acres, was adopted in 1926. The revised Forest 

Service policy also reflected a new economic philosophy which assumed that the sum of suppression 

cost plus loss would be less under an all out suppression policy that eliminated uncertainty and lack 

of aggressiveness.

The Tillamook Burn and the “10 a.m. Policy”

The Tillamook burn of 1933, which destroyed three million acres of essentially virgin timberland in 

the Northwest, had a profound effect on Forest Service fire policy. The experience led the USFS to 

adopt an even more rigid form of its basic “no burn” policy. All fires were to be controlled as quickly 

as possible, preferably during the first duty shift after detection. If that wasn’t possible, fires were to 

be controlled by 10 a.m. of the following day.

This “10 a.m.” policy was made possible with the availability of labor through the newly-established 

Civilian Conversation Corps (CCC) and with the emergence of organized emergency fire crews, the 

management of organized fire suppression forces, and the development of formal line construction methods. The 10 a.m. policy was consistent with the cost-plus-loss economic-based objectives 

established in 1926. This policy survived until the early 1970s.

2 Information for this section comes primarily from Fire in American by historian Stephen J. Pyne and from written testimony and background materials that reference the Pyne book provided by Interior Secretary Donald P. Hodel and George 

S. Dunlop, Assistant Secretary of Special Services, United States Department of Agriculture, at a September 29, 1988 

hearing before two Senate subcommittees. Where information was gathered through personal interviews, it is attributed 

to its source. Other sources include several newspaper stories and an article that appeared in the September issue of 

“Roots,” published by the Minnesota Department of natural Resources. 
10 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

The “Leopold Report”: The Role of Natural Fire and Use of Prescribed Burns in the Park Service

Two events – the issuance of the “Leopold Report” in 1963 and the subsequent enactment of the 

“Wilderness Act of 1964” – challenged the principles which had guided U.S. wildland fire policy 

since its beginnings, led to a new view of the role of natural fire in wilderness and inaugurated a 

slow transformation of fire policy.

Says historian Stephen Pyne, “Fire control in itself was now considered inadequate – indeed ruinous 

– as a program of resource management.” The Leopold Report stressed the importance of letting fire 

play its natural role in the ecosystems and cited experiments in controlled burning in the Everglades. 

It recommended the controlled use of fire as one of the most natural, as well as least expensive and 

most easily applied methods of manipulating vegetation in wilderness areas, and urged that the Park 

Service institute a research program to guide its resource management objectives. Soon thereafter the 

National Academy of Sciences also recommended that the Park Service institute a research branch.

One of the first NPS studies conducted looked at the effects of fire on the giant sequoia tree and challenged conventional thinking. For years, conservationists had removed debris in sequoia groves by 

hand, even though in earlier times Indians and loggers had routinely burned slash without real damage to the huge trees. One study focused on the relationship of fire to sequoia regeneration, while 

the second was a survey of fuel hazards around sequoia groves. Both refuted the popular belief that 

fire was harmful to the sequoias and led to recommendations for use of prescribed burning.

In 1968, the NPS issued a controversial new policy handbook (NPS-18) that recognized fire as a 

natural process, encouraged letting natural fires run their course in predetermined areas, allowed the 

use of prescribed fire as a substitute for natural fire where necessary, and called for control of any fire 

that did not further management goals. It would be nearly ten years before the USFS would implement a similar policy allowing for use of prescribed fire as a land management tool.

Following introduction of the new policy handbook, Pyne writes, the Park Service experimented 

with fire, both through research and in its practices. While the handbook provided some guidance 

to the application of Park Service policies, for the next ten years the extreme flexibility of the policy 

allowed for variety and adaptability to local conditions. Pyne argues that this flexibility also left NPS 

fire policy somewhat fragmented and unduly influenced by local “peculiarities.”

Adverse public opinion led the NPS to take another look at its fire policies in the mid 1970s, when 

residents of Jackson Hole, Wyoming, were angered by thick smoke from a smoldering natural fire 

in the Tetons. The Park Service responded by issuing a set of interim guidelines that provided more 

specific instructions for conducting its fire program. In 1976, a task force was charged with reevaluating all NPS resource management plans, and a detailed handbook (NPS-18) was issued in 

1978, thus completing a ten-year implementation process that began with introduction of the Park 

Service fire management policy handbook in 1968.

Natural Fire and Use of Prescribed Burns by the Forest Service

While Park Service fire management policies changed dramatically during the 1960s, between 1935 

and the early 1970s, the Forest Service basically maintained its “no burn” policy and USFS fire management policy was the same for both wilderness and non-wilderness areas.

In 1971, the Forest Service re-examined its “10 a.m. policy,” primarily because of three concerns. 

First, there was a concern that the long history of prompt suppression had caused an increasing 
USFA-TR-045/April 1992 11

buildup of fuels in wilderness areas. Second, the 10 a.m. policy was not allowing lightning-caused 

fires to play their natural role. Third, the quick suppression policy was too expensive and did not 

allow forest managers the flexibility to weigh the cost of taking immediate suppression action against 

the resource values at risk.

As a result of the 1971 re-examination, the Forest Service adopted a major modification of its policy 

by allowing lightning-caused fires to burn under specified conditions in Congressionally-designated 

wilderness areas having an approved fire management plan. These were designated natural “prescribed fires.” All other fires, including all human-caused fires, were considered wildfires and were 

to be immediately suppressed. The 10-acre suppression policy was incorporated as a pre-suppression planning objective.3

In response to the 1971 policy change, a major fire planning effort was undertaken. As a result, 

Forest Service costs skyrocketed in the 1970s for pre-suppression activities. Numbers of fires and 

acres burned also increased in spite of expanded pre-suppression programs in many of the wildland 

fire control agencies.

The Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act of 1974 and the National Forest 

Management Act of 1976 required that both the use of prescribed fire and the control of wildfire be 

an integral part of the Forest Service land management planning process. Further, fire management 

was to be responsive to resource management objectives in a cost-effective manner. Thus, in 1977, 

the Forest Service directed that a study of pre-suppression effectiveness be conducted. The study 

concluded that fire management objectives must be directly related to resource values and to the 

costs of protecting them, and that protection should be commensurate with values and risks to that 

the program is accountable, efficient, and cost-effective.

In 1978, the Forest Service again made a significant revision in its fire management policy. The 

objective of wildfire suppression was changed from one of control of all wildfires by 10 a.m. to one 

of managing fire suppression costs and damages, consistent with land and resource management 

objectives. Prescribed fire to protect, maintain, and enhance national forest resources was reaffirmed 

as an approved management practice. 

Common Ground Is Reached

By 1978, both the NPS and the USFS reached a point where their policies institutionalized a common philosophy about the natural role of fire and the use of prescribed burns, albeit their missions 

dictated practices that implemented them directly.

Between then and 1988, there were no major revisions in Forest Service or Park Service fire management policies. In 1985, the Forest Service issued a clarification of its objectives for the use and 

management of naturally-ignited and human-caused fires in Congressionally-designated wilderness 

areas. Forest Service policy allowed natural fires to burn when necessary to meet the objectives of 

(1) allowing these fires to play their natural ecological role and (2) reducing the risks of wildfire 

3 Pre-suppression refers to activities undertaken prior to a fire’s designation as a wildfire. Pre-suppression activities 

include all risk reduction measures ranging from the development of fire plans, storing of firefighting equipment and 

supplies, and reduction of hazard fuels through the use of prescribed burns. All pre-suppression activities must be 

budgeted, and emergency firefighting dollars that fund wildfire suppression efforts are not available for these efforts. 

Forest Service and Park Service policies distinguish between suppression and pre-suppression activities to separate these 

expenditures.
12 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

and to life and property within wilderness, and to life, property, and resources outside of wilderness 

areas.

The National Park Service’s NPS-18 was already under revision when the 1988 wildfire season began. 

That process continued in the wake of the policy debate that followed, and new guidance was issued 

early in 1991.

The Role of the Natural Fire in Wilderness Areas

As noted earlier, NPS fire management policy reflects a basic belief that fire is natural to many wildlands and plays a vital role in the ecology of those lands. Rather than destroy the lands, fire actually 

aids in the perpetuation of some species of plants, including the lodgepole pines that dominate 

Yellowstone. Their seeds are not released unless the intense heat of fire opens the pine cones. Other 

species, such as the Ponderosa pine, have developed a thick bark that protects them against fire.

Fire historian Stephen Pyne of Arizona State University explained in a New York Times interview that 

fire aids regeneration by eliminating a naturally occurring chemical that inhibits excessive budding 

in healthy plants. It also seems to release a number of minerals and chemicals that otherwise would 

not be released.

The Park Service’s belief in the importance of natural fire to ecosystems such as Yellowstone is one 

shared by many conservationists. The Wilderness Society’s Barry Flamm, a former chief of fire management for the Forest Service, points out that fire has played a critical role in the evolution of the 

park. Said Flamm in a 1988 interview, “These fires are part of a natural cycle, and in the spring we 

expect to see the regeneration that always follows a fire. It happens quickly, and the changes benefit 

many species.”

That view was reiterated by a team of experts, chaired by Norman L. Christensen of Duke University, 

who met under the sponsorship of the Greater Yellowstone Coordinating Committee in November 

1988 and January 1989 to assess the ecological effects of the Greater Yellowstone Area fires. The final 

report of the Greater Yellowstone Postfire Ecological Assessment Workshop states:

Rather than ecological disasters or catastrophes, high-intensity fires in ecosystems such as 

those of the GYA are virtually inevitable, and are even essential for the successful reproduction of some species.4

In fact, regeneration had already begun in the weeks just following the fires, according to Yellowstone 

spokesperson Sandy Robinson. She reported that by mid-October 1988, grasses and other small 

plants were already six inches to a foot high in some burned areas. Rather than vast areas of charred 

landscape, the area looked more like a mosaic, with no burned area too far from another that still had 

vegetation providing a nearby source of seeds and wildlife for regeneration.

Nor do the fires destroy everything in their paths. They often flash through an area, burning brush, 

grass and fallen trees, but only searing healthy trees. Of the estimated 793,880 acres of the 2.2 million acre park reported burned, 323,291 acres sustained canopy burn, 281,098 acres sustained a 

combination of canopy and surface burn, 51,301 acres of meadow, grassland or sagebrush burned, 

and another 138,190 acres sustained burns to the edges of forest areas or to isolated stands of trees 

in unforested areas.

Before the fire, many parts of Yellowstone were dominated by large areas of old lodgepole pines and 

large blocks of vegetation limited to certain species locked in over time. Many were diseased with 
USFA-TR-045/April 1992 13

infestations of the pine bark beetle and dwarf mistletoe, which next to fire, are the major killers of 

the trees. The Park Service and many conservationists do not consider such homogeneous blocks 

of vegetation natural or desirable, and many say their development was facilitated by the earlier “no 

fire” policy that did not allow fire to play its “clean out” role through the years.

The long-standing “no fire” rule may also have helped create the huge accumulation of fuels that 

contributed to the ferocity of the Yellowstone fires. Not only were many over-age trees still standing, but many fallen trees lay in jackstrawed piles, providing a further source of fuel. A scientist at the Forest Service’s Intermountain Fire Sciences Laboratory in Missoula, Montana, estimates 

that in 1988 every acre of Yellowstone contained 40 to 45 tons of small dried matter. Just one 

Douglas fir tree with a 30-inch diameter contributes 17,000 pounds of flammable wood fibers.

However, the Greater Yellowstone Postfire Assessment Workshop concluded that fuel load was only 

one factor contributing to the ferocity of the 1988 conflagration, and may not have been the dominant factor. The final report states:

The large-scale behavior and extent of the fires appear to have been established more by 

drought and wind, although fuel distribution certainly affected fire intensity and behavior 

on a local scale. The events of 1988 demonstrated that fire suppression in heavy fuels may be 

impossible when weather is severe.4

With large stands of mature trees downed by the fire, new plants and species will now have the 

necessary space and sunlight to grow, and scientists predict that areas with more diverse vegetation 

will eventually replace most, but not all, of the areas burned this year.

Christensen and his colleagues predicted that as a result of the 1988 fires, meadows and young forests will cover larger portions of the Greater Yellowstone area for decades. Aspen forests will occupy 

a larger (albeit still small) portion of the area, and some areas will have less sagebrush for at least the 

next decade. Other parts of the park and surrounding areas will be dominated by more luxuriant 

herbaceous vegetation for several decades, while still others will remain barren for years to come.

Thus, while many conservationists believe that the huge Yellowstone area fires were ecologically 

beneficial, it could be generations before Yellowstone is restored to its former grandeur.

A Comparison: Canada’s Wildland Fire Policy

While the NPS and the USFS “let burn” policies were criticized for contributing to the huge fire 

losses in 1988, Canada lost less acreage in its national parks and forests than it had in decades. Some 

point to the Canadian policy calling for suppression of 85 to 90 percent of forest fires as soon as they 

are detected as a major factor contributing to its strikingly different experience that year, but even 

Canadian forest officials said that they were just plain lucky. The same weather pattern that caused 

the severe drought in the U.S. brought higher than average rainfall to the parts of Canada that contain large areas of park and forest land. The southern areas affected by the drought had late winter 

snowfalls that helped to mitigate its effects.

According to David Lohnes, Director of Natural Resources for the Canadian Park Service, Canada’s 

policy of immediately suppressing most forest fires is not based on a disagreement with the U.S. view 

of the role of natural fire. In a New York Times story, Lohnes explained that Canada fights almost all 

4Ibid., p. iv.
14 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

of the fires in its national parks because of their proximity to the valuable timberlands that support 

the country’s large lumber industry. In fact, after the U.S. adopted its so-called “let burn” policy, 

Canadians debated adopting a similar position. In 1979 they modified their approach by allowing 

some safe and ecologically helpful fires to burn.

Lohnes, who favors a more liberalized policy allowing natural fires to burn in Canada’s park lands, 

said that American forest management is considered the most advanced in the world. He pointed 

out that despite its policy of suppressing most natural fires, Canada too, has experienced devastating 

natural fires. The worst year was 1981, when a total of 1.7 million acres of Canada’s park land was 

consumed by fire, including 238,000 in its largest park, the Wood Buffalo National Park.

The “Let Burn” Policy And The Use Of Prescribed Fire In Wildlands In 1988

As the fires raged through Yellowstone in 1988, there was widespread public misperception of the 

NPS fire management policy, which is often referred to as its “let burn” policy. In reality, park staff 

evaluates every fire that occurs, Interior Secretary Donald P. Hodel told two Congressional committees in testimony September 29 of that year.

That continues to be true today. In fact, following the major re-examination of fire management 

policies after the 1988 wildfire season, NPS and USFS fire management policies were reaffirmed and 

strengthened. What have changed are guidelines and procedures spelling out how those policies are 

implemented.

Local Fire Management Plans

Approved plans encompassing all land management objectives are required for each national park 

and forest. Fire management plans are operational contingency plans, constitute an important component of each area’s comprehensive land management plan, and are formulated at the local level 

subject to public comment and review.5

The planning process begins with an assessment of public concerns through public hearings in 

and around the national park or forest and in communities that are dependent on these lands for 

economic, recreational, social, or other reasons. Public comments are formally sought and are then 

analyzed before a final plan is published. Once again, the public has an opportunity to appeal the 

final plan through a formal appeals process.

These comprehensive land management plans are updated periodically as needed through an amendments process, and must be revised every 10-15 years. While the amendment process is initiated 

within the Park Service or Forest Service itself, the need for amendment can be triggered by calls for 

such action from surrounding communities as well as by major changes in resources, physical, social 

or economic conditions, or other factors. Because fire affects these factors so significantly, amendments are often initiated following a major fire.

The Yellowstone Plan was developed in 1972 and updated in 1976. Like all national park management plans, it was subject to public comment and review. Ironically, the Yellowstone Plan had been 

updated again in 1988 but the new one had not yet been formally approved at the time of the fires.

5 See page 34 for information about how to investigate opportunities for involvement in this process.
USFA-TR-045/April 1992 15

Prescribed Fire Plans

Both the NPS and the Forest Service require a detailed fire management plan for each area in which 

use of prescribed fire is authorized. The prescribed fire management plan provides a specific “prescription” that, for each fire, specifies the area in which it will be allowed to burn; the weather 

conditions under which it will be allowed to burn; and a number of “contingency levels” which 

are basically decision trees that show how strategies would be affected by changes in fire behavior, 

weather conditions, availability of firefighting resources and other variables.

When a prescribed natural fire exceeds its prescription, it is reclassified as a wildfire. The primary 

criteria for reclassification are threats to life and property, ability to keep the fire within the park/

forest boundary and resources available to control the fire. If any of these change, or if weather 

conditions or other factors change, the prescribed natural fire is reclassified as a wildfire and the 

appropriate suppression action begins.

Although complex models were used to set prescriptions by predicting fire behavior under various 

conditions, these models were found to be inadequate and over-reliant on historical data on weather 

patterns and fire behavior. In 1988, neither the Park Service nor the Forest Service explicitly recognized the inherent uncertainty in setting the parameters in a fire prescription. That is, the models 

used to predict behavior or prescribe parameters did not include numerical measures of uncertainty 

(the probability of exceeding predictions) that defined the inherent limitations of the models as 

predictors.

These shortcomings meant that those fighting the blazes often failed to take into account several factors critical to making good firefighting decisions.

Detection and Suppression

According to Steve Hodap of the NPS, all fires that occur on Park Service lands are closely monitored. 

The method of monitoring varies from area to area depending on the value of resources involved 

and the area’s proximity to people, structures, and other resources. Routine monitoring may include 

flyovers as well as close monitoring by highly trained fire observers. Routine flights are made after 

lightning storms to detect small natural fires, and those detected are monitored regularly. Late detection is rarely a factor in a fire’s becoming a wildfire, according to Hodap. “We are aware of virtually 

every significant fire that starts on Park Service lands within 24 hours,” he said.

On lands protected by the USFS, about 90 percent of the time “appropriate suppression action” 

means immediate suppression, but it can also mean a decision to simply monitor a fire that is 

expected to extinguish itself or contain itself in rugged terrain. Suppression action may be taken 

later, if it appears that the fire is not behaving as originally anticipated.

If a fire escapes initial attack, an Escaped Fire Situation Analysis (EFSA) is prepared. This is a written 

document that assesses the potential suppression costs versus potential resource losses, threats to life 

and property in the short and long run, firefighter safety factors and other factors to set objectives 

for fighting the fire. Generally, this analysis is prepared by a line officer at the forest’s district or 

supervisory level.

A series of incident briefings are held and the firefighting objectives in the EFSA are translated into 

specific operational strategies by the incident management teams that fight the fires. Depending on 

the size of the blaze, these teams can be organized at the local, district, forest or regional levels. For 
16 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

the largest fires, interagency teams dispatched through the Boise Interagency Fire Center will manage 

the firefighting efforts.

A similar process is followed in the NPS, but some of the factors that go into the equation are different and produce variations in the application of fire management policies. Park Service policy dictates that “within the framework of management objectives and plans, overall wildland fire damage 

will be held to the minimum possible giving full consideration to: (1) an aggressive fire prevention 

program; (2) the least expenditure of public funds for effective suppression; (3) the methods of 

suppression least damaging to resources and the environment; and (4) the integration of cooperative actions by agencies of the Department of the Interior among themselves or with other qualified 

suppression organizations.”

Interagency and Intergovernmental Coordination of Wildland Firefighting Efforts

As wildland fire protection programs became larger and more sophisticated, Federal and State agencies found it necessary to formally coordinate programs, standards, and procedures. The NWCG was 

chartered in 1976 for this purpose.

The National Interagency Fire Qualification System (NIFQS) was developed under the sponsorship 

of the NWCG for the purpose of assuring a nationwide source of professional wildland firefighting 

personnel.

The increasing complexity of wildland fire suppression in the urban/wildland interface in southern California and a terrible 1970 fire season led to the implementation of California’s FIRESCOPE 

(Firefighting Resources of Southern California Organized against Potential Emergencies) project, 

where the Federal wildland fire service, the State of California, and various city and county jurisdictions officially work together as a single team to fight wildland/urban interface problems. The 

Large Fire Organization (LFO) and Incident Command System (ICS) evolved from this program in 

response to the need to more effectively integrate the suppression resources of Federal, State, and 

local fire protection agencies.

In 1980, the NWCG sponsored a study to evaluate the LFO and the ICS. As a result, NWCG adopted 

the National Interagency Incident Management System (NIIMS). NIIMS built on the strengths of 

the LFO, ICS, and other FIRESCOPE technologies to provide a common, integrated emergency management system for the interagency management of emergency incidents of all types. By 1982, all 

Federal land management agencies with wildfire management responsibilities and many States had 

adopted the NIIMS for implementation. The ICS element of NIIMS was fully implemented by all 

Federal agencies and in most States by 1985.

Implementation Of Federal Policies In The Yellowstone Fires

The Greater Yellowstone Area Fires provided a crucial test of the implementation of NPS and Forest 

Service wildfire management policies under extreme conditions. While many critics have deplored 

NPS policies that some say over-emphasized the role of natural fire and precluded use of the most 

aggressive suppression actions, other argued that the conditions under which the fires burned were 

so extraordinary that they could not have been suppressed anyway.

That was the conclusion reached by the academicians who participated in the Greater Yellowstone 

Postfire Ecological Workshop and the government officials who served as members of the Interagency 

Fire Management Policy Review Team.
USFA-TR-045/April 1992 17

Implementation of the “let burn” policy: Of the 13 major fires that burned in Yellowstone National 

Park in 1988, eight were fought from the start. Only the earliest lightning-ignited fires in the park 

were allowed initially to burn, in accordance with the NPS’s prescribed natural fire policy. In his 

September 29 statement to two Congressional committees, Secretary Hodel said that the “let burn” 

decision was based on the higher than average spring rainfall in the park. When rainfall fell well 

below normal later in the season, the Park Service decided to make an exception to the policy and 

began all out suppression efforts. By then, it was already too late.

According to the NPS’s “Wildland Fire Report: 1988,” unprecedented fire behavior and the severe 

weather conditions rendered most accepted firefighting techniques virtually useless. Fire lines constructed along the edges of the advancing fires to create fuel breaks and backfires to reduce fuel accumulations in front of advancing fires were frequently ineffective because fires spread long distances 

by “spotting,” a phenomenon by which wind carried embers from the tops of the 200-foot flames 

far out across unburned forest to start spot fires well ahead of the main fire. Spotting often occurred 

up to a mile and a half ahead of the main fire. The blazes regularly jumped the widest bulldozer 

lines and even jumped traditionally recognized barriers such as the Grand Canyon of the Yellowstone 

River.

The fires often moved two miles an hour and advanced up to five or ten miles per day, consuming 

light fuels that would have been unburnable in an average season. Drought conditions were so severe 

that fires could not even be fought at night, when they normally “lie down” as increased humidity 

and lower temperatures quiet them.

By July 15, the NPS report states, “The experts on site generally agreed that without help from the 

weather, in the form of rain or snow, there was no technology in existence that could stop the fires.” 

And indeed, it was not until mid-September, when a series of cold fronts began moving through the 

Northwest, that cooler temperatures and precipitation provided the break that allowed firefighters to 

attack and eventually contain the fires.

NPS and USFS Fire Investigation Reports

On December 2, the NPS and the USFS issued detailed fire investigation reports on the four largest 

Greater Yellowstone Area fires, including the North Fork and the Clover-Mist blazes. The reports 

concluded that the “let burn” policy ought to be retained, but were critical of the Park Service’s 

implementation of the policy. This early conclusion was later reiterated by two separate panels of 

experts charged with reviewing NPS/USFS policies following the 1988 fires: the Greater Yellowstone 

Postfire Ecological Workshop and the Interagency Fire Management Policy Review Team.

The NPS/USFS report on the Clover-Mist fire says that it could have been suppressed in early July if 

park managers had decided to fight the fire early. Instead, they waited until July 21 to begin suppression action, because park officials relied heavily on historical fire data when they made their critical 

early decisions not to fight the fires. Despite unprecedented drought conditions, they continued to 

believe that the fire would not exceed their “worst case scenario” of 40,000 acres. When it was over, 

the Clover-Mist fire had grown to almost ten times that size.

Implementation of the use of firefighting techniques and equipment that are “least damaging to 

resources and the environment”: According to the NPS, about 665 miles of handlines and 137 

miles of bulldozer lines were constructed to fight the GYA fires, including 32 miles of bulldozer 

line in Yellowstone Park itself. About 1.4 million gallons of fire retardant were dropped, 10 million 
18 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

gallons of water were dropped by helicopters alone, and innumerable water pumping stations were 

established. There were also 51 spike camps, 150 helispots and a major camp established for each 

fire. There were significant short term impacts to wilderness and grizzly bear habitat because of the 

use of motorized vehicles.

Still, firefighter battling the Greater Yellowstone fires were sometimes frustrated by the Park Service’s 

reluctance to allow them to use techniques and heavy equipment that they believed necessary to 

their efforts, according to accounts in the New York Times and Time magazine. One crew was reportedly reproached for crossing a meadow with their fire truck to put out a spot fire, while a number 

of helicopter pilots said that Park Service restrictions on where they could dip their massive buckets 

made their job more difficult. Even at the height of the fires, the New York Times reported, bulldozers 

were allowed in the Park only on a case-by-case basis.

Heavy equipment such as bulldozers to make fire lines and clear brush were not used to fight the 

huge Clover-Mist fire. While Interior Secretary Hodel had ordered its suppression in mid-July, a park 

spokesperson acknowledged that the portion of the Clover Mist fire within park boundaries was not 

fought until August 9 because officials thought natural barriers such as cliffs and streams would stop 

its spread.

Fire Management Policy Review Team Recommendations

In late September 1988, Interior Secretary Donald Hodel and Agriculture Secretary Richard E. Lyng 

announced formation of the Fire Management Policy Review Team to review fire management policies and their application for national parks and forests and to recommend actions addressing the 

problems experienced during the 1988 fire season.

The Fire Management Policy Review Team included representatives from the five land management 

agencies with wildfire management responsibilities – the NPS, BLM, FWS, and BIA in the Interior 

Department, the USFS in the Department of Agriculture, the Boise Interagency Fire Center and the 

National Association of State Foresters.

The panel consulted knowledgeable organizations and individuals including governors, local government officials, concessionaires and outfitters, individuals with businesses in nearby communities 

and organizations with an interest in parks and wilderness areas. The review team met regularly 

with representatives of the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), the Western Governors 

Association, and the academic community.

The team issued its draft report on December 15, 1988. Following a 60-day period for public comment, the team’s final report was submitted on May 5, 1989. The team concluded that the basic 

objectives of Federal fire management policies were sound but needed to be refined, strengthened, 

and implemented correctly. Many of the plans devised for individual forests, parks, and wilderness 

areas did not conform to policy guidelines. The panel also found serious shortcomings in many of 

the fire models or “prescriptions” specifying in what areas and under what conditions natural or 

ignited fires will be allowed to burn.

Among the major findings of the Interagency Fire Management Policy Review Team were the 

following:
USFA-TR-045/April 1992 19

The “Prescribed Natural Fire” Policy

The policy governing use of prescribed natural fire was sometimes abused. Plans were developed 

that did not meet the literal requirements of the policy, and some plans did not contain adequate 

prescription criteria. Many of the wilderness and park land managers had such a strong belief in the 

beneficial role of natural fire that they applied less stringent controls over prescribed fires than was 

required by policy.

The team cautioned against exclusive focus on the ecological benefits of natural fire, which they said 

can lead to inadequate consideration of the impacts of fires on recreation, wildlife habitat, grazing, 

and water quality. They also reported hearing from agency employees who wanted the current 

policies to be expanded to allow fires to burn without prescription as long as they are not expected 

to cross the administrative boundaries of a park or wilderness area or endanger human life and 

property.

Inadequacy of Many Fire Management Plans

The panel also found that “fire management programs would be strengthened by a combination of 

improved decision criteria in plans, additional fire expertise, and more direct line officer involvement.” They cited a lack of identified critical decision points in many fire plans, as well as a “critical 

lack of resident fire expertise in some locations.” They also pointed out that some fire management 

plans did not include the latest technology and were not complete in terms of indicators of longterm drought and impact on shared suppression resources.

Some plans did not sufficiently address suppression resource availability, values at risk outside of 

parks and wilderness and the number of fires that can be managed at one time. Also, some models 

did not address cumulative effects of drought and other potentially important considerations.

The review team noted that, as a result of these shortcomings, some fires eventually declared wildfires continued to be considered as prescribed fires until they reached an arbitrary limitation such 

as a park or wilderness boundary. Insufficient attention was given to values at risk both inside and 

outside parks and wilderness boundaries, as well as to the cumulative risks associated with multiple 

fires, large fires or fires with especially active perimeters.

Lack of research and analysis upon which to base fire behavior predictions included in models: 

The team found a need for research and analysis to provide tools for management of fire management programs. They noted that while normal climatic patterns are ordinarily used for projections, 

prolonged drought periods may affect these patterns and hamper ability to project fire behavior 

accurately. Similarly, the team found that analyses of fire history, occurrence, size, and effects were 

insufficient for many areas.

Underutilization of Ignited Prescribed Fires to Reduce Accumulated Fuels

The team noted that the reduction of hazard fuels around structural developments, parks/wilderness 

boundaries and private holdings if often desirable because it enhances the ability to protect these 

areas and reduces costs of wildfire suppression and prescribed natural fire. However, they found that 

the use of planned ignitions is too limited in some areas.

Inadequacy of agency personnel development and training programs: The team found too few professional managers in field locations with an understanding of fire management and fire management 
20 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

policies and practices. They found that many line officers did not require adherence to standards in 

fire management plans and some incident management teams, fire professionals, and line officers 

“lack knowledge of suppression tactics necessary under extreme conditions.” The team also noted 

that some agency fire staffs do not maintain expertise in fire management because of infrequent fires 

and the lack of career mobility and opportunities to gain experience in other locations.

Based on these and other findings, the team recommended the following:

• fire management plans be strengthened by:

(a) developing joint agency fire management plans, agreements, or addenda to existing plans 

for those areas where fires could cross administrative boundaries;

(b)including a comprehensive set of new criteria to be used in deciding whether or not to 

allow natural ignitions to burn as prescribed fires;6

(c) clearly describing the decision process and factors to be addressed before a fire is declared 

a prescribed natural fire;

(d)including criteria (such as consideration of the effects of cumulative drought conditions 

on fire behavior, availability of firefighting resources, and consideration of the regional 

and national wildfire situation) to be used in declaring a prescribed fire a wildfire;

(e) clearly identifying areas that need protection from fire, such as developments within or 

adjacent to wilderness and park boundaries, and including within fire management plans 

actions that are to be taken to protect them, i.e., hazard fuel reduction or installing fuel 

breaks;

(f) clearly stating the management objectives being addressed by the prescribed natural fire 

program; and,

(g) clearly describing the process to be used to ensure adequate public involvement and 

coordination with local governments.

• regional and national contingency plans be developed to constrain prescribed fires under 

extreme conditions

• agencies consider planned ignitions to complement prescribed natural fire programs and to 

reduce hazard fuels

• more consideration be given to the effects of fire policies in surrounding communities and 

steps be taken to encourage more public participation in the development of individual fire 

management plans

• additional research and analysis on weather, fire behavior, fire history, and fire information 

integration be carried out so that future fire management programs can be more effective in 

reducing the risk of wildfires.

6 Existing criteria already included: consideration of land management objectives for the area, historic fire behavior, 

natural role of fire, proposed degree of suppression, expected fire behavior, acceptable suppression techniques, adequate 

buffer zones, smoke management and effects on adjacent landowners. New criteria added include: consideration of the 

effects of cumulative drought conditions on fire behavior, availability of firefighting resources and consideration of the 

regional and national wildfire situation, to name a few.
USFA-TR-045/April 1992 21

The panel also cited wildland/urban interface issues as an area in need of further study. Specifically, 

it recommended further study to determine the current and future effects of residential and commercial development on the ability to design and implement prescribed fire programs and to examine the interrelationship between fire management plans and local planning and zoning functions.

Post-Yellowstone NPS and Usfs Fire Management

Following the 1988 wildfire season, both the NPS and the USFS took steps to implement the recommendations of the Fire Management Policy Review Team. Among the steps taken were the 

following:

• a detailed review was immediately undertaken of all fire management plans in national parks 

and forests that included use of “prescribed natural fire” (naturally-ignited fires allowed to 

burn under certain “prescribed” conditions)

• both the NPS and the USFS imposed a temporary freeze on their “let burn” policies until fire 

management plans were revised to meet current policy and new requirements

• the NPS instituted a daily certification process requiring verification of the availability of 

adequate firefighting resources to assure prescribed natural fires will remain within prescriptions. If not, they are to be declared wildfires and suppression actions are to be taken immediately. NPS also reviewed its policies regarding the use of prescribed burning (e.g., planned 

ignitions) in place of prescribed natural fire

• the NWCG was ordered to develop criteria for a national contingency plan for controlling 

natural fires under extreme conditions, and regional offices at the National Park Service were 

ordered to develop regional contingency plans

• the USFS revised its fire management manual (Forest Service Manual 5100 – Fire Management) 

to implement the recommendations of its 1989 in-house Task Force Report on Prescribed 

Fire Management Criteria. This report enumerated detailed recommendations for the Forest 

Service’s policy and guidance documents spelling out how policies are to be implemented

• the NPS issued a revised for management policy manual (NPS-18) in early 1991. This completes a revision process that began before the 1988 wildfire season and was expanded as a 

result of the fires.

The 1990 Fires

As noted earlier, there has been no real operational test of the post-Yellowstone fire management 

policies for national parks, forests, and wilderness areas although fires in two national parks during 

the 1990 wildfire season threatened, but ultimately failed to rekindle old controversies.

The 1990 wildfires that closed Yosemite National Park had all the drama, but little of the controversy that surrounded the policy debates during the Greater Yellowstone Area fires of 1988. Like 

the Yellowstone fires two years earlier, the fires in Yosemite and the adjoining Stanislaus National 

Forest were natural fires started by lightning strikes in a drought-dried area littered with decades 

of accumulated dried, dead wood. But this time there was no question that the blazes would be 

fought immediately, writes Larry B. Stammer in an August 11, 1990, Los Angeles Times article. These 

fires burned in “suppression areas,” where lives and property were at risk.
22 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

The largest of the fires, named the A-Rock fire because of its proximity to the Arch Rock at the 

entrance of Yosemite National Park, burned more than 8,500 acres in the park and 11,000 acres in 

the Stanislaus National Forest. The blaze, whose 500-foot flames burned so intensely that granite 

boulders were fractured, destroyed the small summer cabin community of Foresta.

The other large fire in 1990 supplied a partial first test of the post-Yellowstone fire management policies. Ironically, the fire occurred in Kings Canyon National Park, which along with Sequoia National 

Park, was the first to reinstate the NPS policy of letting some natural fires burn themselves out. The 

ban on allowing natural fires to burn in the Kings Canyon and Sequoia Parks was lifted late in 1989 

after NPS regional director Lew Albert approved revised fire management plans for the parks that 

allow natural fires to burn within a specific range of temperature, wind speed, and fuel moisture 

conditions.

As a result, the 1990 fire in the Kings Canyon National Park, located in remote high country away 

from people and property, was allowed to burn as a prescribed natural fire for three weeks during 

the summer. However, it was reclassified as a wildfire under the post-Yellowstone guidelines because 

the regional wildfire situation had become severe and firefighting resources were scarce, according 

to Doug Erskine, NPS fire director at the Boise Interagency Fire Center. 

The post-Yellowstone guidelines call for preparation of interagency wildfire emergency preparedness plans that include careful consideration of the availability of firefighting resources on a regional 

and national basis. Once specific thresholds are reached, the plans specify that no new fires would 

be allowed to burn as prescribed fires. When firefighting resources were stretched even further (as 

was true in the Kings Canyon fire), a second threshold is reached and fires previously classified as 

prescribed fires are to be aggressively fought.

THE WILDLAND/URBAN INTERFACE FIRE PROBLEM

The wildland/urban interface refers to the area where relatively untouched wildlands and residential 

areas meet. At one time the distinction between the two was relatively clear, but changing residential patterns in recent years have seen increasing numbers of people building homes in and around 

wildland areas in all regions of the Nation. U.S. Census figures indicate that the population in rural 

areas grew faster than urban areas during the 1970s, although the trend has slowed somewhat since 

then. Population in areas near national forests grew 23.4 percent between 1970 and 1980, according to the USFS.

In some wildland/urban interface areas, isolated homes and other structures are scattered throughout a wildland area. Individual homeowners face a significant risk because of their isolation, but 

relatively small numbers of structures are involved in any one area. Other interface areas present the 

reverse image: isolated forest and wildland areas, usually in park lands, are interspersed between 

largely urban areas. Fires in these wildland areas rarely rage out of control.

The most significant wildland/urban interface problems are posed in areas where subdivisions and 

other developments abut wildland. This was the case in the Lake Wildwood subdivision in Nevada 

County, California, where the “49er” fire in 1988 caused extensive damage and earned itself the 

dubious distinction among California firefighters as “the fire of the 90s.”7

7 “Sunset Magazine Gives Tips for Living in Wildfire Country,” Wildfire News & Notes (January/February 1990), p. 3.
USFA-TR-045/April 1992 23

In an interview with the Washington Post, fire prevention official Loren Poore of the CDF, noted that 

the 49er fire occurred in an area whose population has grown fourfold within the preceding ten to 

fifteen years. People subdivided large lots and “the problem got there before many people realized 

it,” Poore said.

This trend toward rural living has enormous implications for firefighting. The strategies and techniques that are effective in fighting wildland fires are very different from those employed for the 

protection of lives and structures in residential areas. Because wildland firefighting and structural 

firefighting have been separate from each other, firefighters have not traditionally been cross-trained 

to handle the unique problems associated with each. Protecting structures in sparsely populated 

areas not only involves special logistical problems, it often stretches limited firefighting resources to 

the limit and may preclude those fighting the wildfire from taking the most effective fire suppression 

approach.

Measures to Minimize Fire Danger

With the growth of the wildland/urban interface, the once-clear distinction between areas of 

wildland and structural firefighting has begun to blur. Fire departments in these rapidly growing 

wildland/urban interface areas face tremendous challenges and are devising effective prevention 

strategies for meeting them.

In California, where fire problems along the wildland/urban interface are not new, a State law mandates certain fire prevention measures for residents in and around wildland areas. The law governs 

areas where the State has fire suppression responsibility, which includes all State- and privately-held 

forests and wildlands.

The California law requires homeowners to provide 30 feet of “defensible space” separating their 

homes and other structures from wooded areas. This area must be kept clear of brush and undergrowth. 

The law also allows fire officials the option of increasing that requirement to 100. Homeowners are 

also required to clear pine needles off roofs and to install screens over chimney openings.

Following the 1988 “49er fire,” Ranger Bob Paulus of the California Department of Natural Resources 

and Fire Prevention reported that where the State requirements were observed, they appeared to 

effectively limit fire damages. In the Lake Wildwood subdivision, Paulus noted, most of the homes 

destroyed abutted the wildland area. While the fire did skip through the area, it did not seem to 

randomly spare some houses and gut others. Shake roofs were the biggest offenders, Paulus said. 

Houses with metal or composition roofs and Lake Wildwood subdivision homes that complied with 

the “defensible space” requirements in California State law were generally spared.8

Paulus said that while the provisions in the State law were generally sufficient, enforcement of those 

laws is often impossible. People continue to build without regard to fire safety, despite repeated 

warnings about the dangers involved. “There isn’t one person out there who lost a house that hasn’t 

received word from us about what to do,” Paulus said. “They chose not to do anything about it.”

8 The same finding resulted in fires in Pebble Beach, California. See U.S. Fire Administration Fire Investigation Report, 

“Urban Wildlands Fire, Pebble Beach, California, May 31, 1987.”
24 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

The Compliance Problem: Successful Approaches

The compliance problem is one that has been successfully addressed in some jurisdictions. The Los 

Angeles City Fire Department (LAFD) instituted a program that guarantees 100 percent compliance 

with brush clearance regulations by October of each year, when the wildfire danger is very high. 

LAFD created a system and authority to cite hazards, give a reasonable time for compliance with 

existing brush clearance laws, and then have the property cleared if the owner failed to do so, wrote 

Captain James O. Haworth, of the LAPD Brush Clearance Unit in the October 1989 issue of Fire Journal. 

Under Los Angeles’ Brush Clearance Program, an ordinance gives the fire department the authority 

to hire private brush-clearance contractors to clear brush and vegetation hazards from private property if the owner fails to do so, and to bill the owner for doing so.

Since its implementation in 1981, 94 percent of homeowners have voluntarily complied with brush 

clearance laws after being notified of the regulations each April in the department’s mass mailing 

to residents. Of the 9,000 parcels cited each year, Haworth reported that the department ends up 

contracting out only about 900, or about 10 percent. By October of each year, all properties are in 

compliance.

The small city of Orinda, California, took a similar approach and realized similar results. Using 

accepted advertising principles, the fire department carefully crafted an official letter about the need 

to clear weeds and brush. After extensive reader testing, the department sent the letter to its 7,000 

home and lot owners. They have found the method very successful in combating non-compliance 

with weed abatement ordinances.

Florida is trying another approach to wildfire prevention. The Fire Control Bureau launched a 

Statewide fire reduction initiative in January 1989 in conjunction with the Forest Education Bureau. 

The Florida Fire Reduction Initiative coordinates a number of fire prevention programs, including 

traditional fire prevention, wildland/urban interface, and services of the Florida Forestry and Arson 

Alert Association. Included in the effort is a program designed to involve local citizens in neighborhood watch-type activities to protect their neighborhoods from careless wildland fires.

The LAPD, the Los Angeles County Fire Department, and the USFS Fire Lab have also been working 

on a project to test the efficacy of using prescribed fires as a wildland fire prevention technique 

in interface areas. They completed prescribed burns on an estimated 350 acres of heavy brush on 

hillsides directly below housing developments in the Stone Canyon. Haworth predicts that the Stone 

Canyon Research Project may prove the value of prescribed burning as an efficient, cost-effective fire 

management tool for fire protection agencies in interface areas.

Ongoing Initiatives

Following a disastrous wildfire year in 1985 in which 1,400 homes were lost, representatives of 

the USFS, USFA, and the NFPA, met to discuss the potential fire problems in the wildland/urban 

interface. A task force was formed which included representatives of those organizations as well as 

from insurance, architecture, wood products industry, academia, research organizations, and State 

and local government. The need for a national awareness effort was identified. Plans for a national 

meeting also came out of the task force’s deliberations, and the first National Wildland/Urban Fire 

Protection Conference was held in September 1985.

The conference report, entitled “Wildfire Strikes Home!” concluded that the wildland/urban fire 

problem poses serious risks to life, property, and natural resources. That report cited low public 
USFA-TR-045/April 1992 25

awareness of the fire risk to homes in interface areas and recognized that the influx of new residents 

and homes was not likely to stop. The report also noted that while natural fire has always played a 

role in wildland areas, the influx of new residents was likely to increase the incidence and severity 

of the fires and to have major implications for firefighting efforts. Finally, the conference report 

concluded that while urban/wildland interface problems are likely to become national in scope, the 

involvement of regional and local players is necessary and essential to effectively implement national 

policy to meet local needs.

The effort that began in 1985 has continued to grow. Today, a variety of national and regional organizations are actively involved in issues related to the wildland/urban interface problem. The NWCG 

continues to address a number of issues related to interface problems. The National Association of 

State Foresters, whose members are directors of State forestry agencies in the 50 States and U.S. territories, has also played a leadership role in the field. In addition, a Wildland Fire Management Section 

has been established within the NFPA.

The National Association of State Foresters was the primary moving force behind legislation passed 

in 1990 that authorizes financial and technical assistance to volunteer fire departments in rural 

interface areas to purchase equipment and train firefighters in wildland firefighting methods. The 

“National Fire Forces Mobilization Act” authorizes up to 70 million dollars annually, subject to 

appropriations, to State forestry agencies and rural volunteer fire departments for activities necessary 

to enable their mobilization in the event of area, regional, and national fire emergencies.

Aftermath of the 1988 Wildfire Season: Lessons Learned for the Fire Service

The foregoing discussion presents an overview of the policies and issues brought into focus by the 

wildfires of 1988 and the wildland/urban interface problem. The discussion suggests that local firefighting organizations in areas near wildlands ought to be aware of what wildland fire management 

policies are, how those policies are made, and how they can be changed if change is necessary.

Since the “49er” fire, history has been made along the wildland/urban interface. In 1989, the Black 

Tiger Gulch fire just outside of Boulder was the worst ever in Colorado. The fire destroyed 44 structures and natural resources valued at 10 million dollars and burned for four days despite the efforts 

of an estimated 500 firefighters.

In June 1990, it was California. The price tag for damages was over 400 million dollars as a result of 

a wildfire that burned more than 600 structures and 4,900 acres and killed a woman in Santa Barbara 

County. It was the worst wildland/urban interface fire in California history, but only its scale was 

out of the ordinary.

As rural populations grow, the political pressure to concentrate efforts on protecting residents and 

structures is likely to increase. So too is the debate over Federal wildfire management policies. The 

mostly affluent new wildland dwellers are becoming more vocal in their demands for more and better fire protection. The 1988 fires in California and those in and around Yellowstone also brought 

strong and vocal criticism of “let burn” policies from nearby residents and business owners.

Fire service organizations in wildland/urban interface areas can influence the direction of USFS and 

NPS fire management plans and can implement wildland fire prevention measures to lessen the fire 

danger.
26 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

1. Representatives of fire service organizations in areas near national forests, parks, and wilderness areas can affect wildfire management policies and practices by taking advantage of 

numerous opportunities for public participation in the development of fire management 

plans included in site-specific Forest Land Management Plans and National Park General 

Management Plans.

Site-specific management plans for national forests and parks are updated periodically. Take 

advantage of opportunities to participate in the development of site-specific national forest or 

park management plans. Notices of hearings and opportunities for commenting on draft plans 

are published in The Federal Register and in local newspapers near affected parks and forests, and 

posted in U.S. post offices.

You can find out if a nearby forest or wilderness area already has an approved site-specific Forest 

Land Management Plan or if the park has an approved General Management Plan by contacting 

the forest ranger, Forest Service district office, or the local Park Service office.9

Even if there is no approved forest land or general management plan, you can obtain a copy 

of the fire management plans. Contact the district office for that national forest or the nearest 

regional office of the USFS or the NPS to find out how.

2. Volunteer fire departments and fire protection districts in interface areas need to become 

more knowledgeable about wildland fire prevention and firefighting methods.

Numerous opportunities exist for volunteers in rural departments and other interface areas to 

learn more about wildland fire prevention, protection, and suppression. (Some of these are 

described in Appendix A.)

3. Fire departments can promote implementation of measures to help reduce fire dangers to 

homes and other structures in wildland/urban interface areas.

A partial list of wildland fire prevention measures includes the following:10

The roof is the most vulnerable part of a building during a wildland fire. Shake roofs are the 

biggest offenders. Homes with metal or composition roofs are less vulnerable.

Automatic roof sprinkler systems will not substitute for safe roof material because of the unreliability of many rural water systems in a wildfire situation.

Vents, attic openings, foundation louvers, or other openings in vertical exterior walls and eave 

overhands should not exceed 144 square inches and should be covered with 1.4 inch mesh 

metal screen that is noncombustible and corrosion-resistant.

Every chimney or vent attached to any solid or liquid fuel-burning device should be provided 

with an approved, securely attached spark arrestor that is visible from the ground.

9 See Appendix B for a list of key Federal and regional fire management contacts for the USFS and NPS.

10 The list included here is excerpted primarily from “Wildfire Strikes Home!,” the report of the National Wildland/

Urban Fire Protection Conference sponsored by the USFS, the NFPA, and the USFA, published by the NFPA in January 

1987. Additional information was obtained through an interview with Bob Paulus of the CDF and from newspaper and 

magazine stories.
USFA-TR-045/April 1992 27

Exterior walls of buildings should be protected with materials of not less than one hour fireresistant construction on the exterior side. Utility buildings of less than 100 square feet which 

are at least 50 feet from other buildings can be exempted.

All flammable vegetation should be cleared away from buildings for a minimum distance of 30 

feet. Certain ornamental shrubbery, single specimens of trees, and other ground cover may be 

allowed in the fire break, provided they do not form a means of rapidly transmitting fire from 

the native growth to any structure.

Additional clearance, as far as 100 feet, may be necessary when extra hazardous conditions 

exist.

Overhanging trees within 10 feet of a chimney outlet should be cut back.

Any dead or dying wood should be removed from trees near a structure. Accumulated leaves, 

pine needles, and other dead vegetation should be removed from the roof.

4. Fire departments in wildland/urban interface areas often need to take aggressive steps to 

implement and strictly enforce local weed abatement and brush clearance ordinances.

Strong, carefully crafted letters to homeowners can be used effectively to spur compliance with 

brush clearance regulations.

Fire departments must have the authority to enforce compliance with these ordinances if the 

rules are to be effective in reducing the risk of wildfires in wildland/urban interface areas.

5. Prescribed burning in wildland/urban interface areas can be a valuable, cost-effective fire 

management tool for fire protection agencies.

The LAFD, the Los Angeles County Fire Department, and the USFS Fire Laboratory tested the 

efficacy of using carefully controlled fire service-ignited fires to prevent wildfires by burning 

heavy brush and other accumulated fuels in areas adjacent to residential areas.

29

Appendix A

Selected Available Resources

Wildland/Urban Interface Issues

Several wildland/urban interface resources for firefighters and fire service organizations have been 

developed by the Federal government and are available to fire service organizations. These include 

the following:

Wildland/Urban Interface Fire Protection: A National Problem with Local Solutions is a training kit developed by 

the USFA’s National Fire Academy for volunteer fire departments and rural fire protection districts. 

The packet includes a textbook and workbook, a multiple choice exam, and a 46-minute video, and 

is designed for volunteers committed to wildland firefighting but who have little or no experience 

combating wildland residential fire hazards.

It is available for 30 dollars from the National AudioVisual Center, 8700 Edgeworth Drive, Capitol 

Heights, Maryland 20743-3701, 800-638-1300.

Protecting People and Homes From Wildfire In the Interior West contains the proceedings of a symposium and 

workshop held in Missoula, Montana, on a wide range of issues associated with protecting homes 

from wildfire. Single copies are available free from the USFS, Intermountain Research Station, 

Publications Office, 324 25th Street, Ogden, Utah 84401, 801-625-5437.

Wildland Fire Awareness in Your Community and Wildland Fires and Your Home are two new publications developed by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) Cooperative Extension at the University of 

Massachusetts. The publications provide information about the increased potential for life and property loss in the wildland/urban interface area and provide fire protection planning guidelines for the 

public, developers, builders, and land-use planners.

Contact the USDA Cooperative Extension, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, Massachusetts 

01003, 413-545-2717.

Boise Interagency Fire Center Publications

The Boise Interagency Fire Center has a catalog of publications for fire service organizations. The 

National Fire Equipment System Catalog is a comprehensive guide to fire management equipment and publications available through the Boise Interagency Fire Center. While only Federal and State agencies 

may order equipment through the catalog, anyone with a legitimate need (including fire service 

organizations) can order publications. Also available from the Boise Interagency Fire Center are the 

National Interagency Mobilization Guide (NFES-2091) and regional mobilization guides for various areas of 

the country.

To order the publications catalog, write a letter on organizational letterhead requesting the National 

Fire Equipment Catalog: Part 2 – Publications. There is a nominal charge for the catalog for which you will 

be billed. No advance payments are accepted. Address your letters to Publications, Boise Interagency 

Fire Center, 3905 Vista Avenue, Boise, Idaho 83705. You may also call (208) 389-2542 for further 

information, but no phone orders are accepted.

31

Appendix B

Key Federal Fire Management Contacts

A. U.S. FIRE ADMINISTRATION

Tom Minnich

Associate Member, National Wildfire Coordinating Group

U.S. Fire Administration

16825 South Seton Avenue

Emmitsburg, Maryland 21727

301-447-1200

B. NATIONAL PARK SERVICE FIRE MANAGEMENT CONTACTS

National Park Service Headquarters

Elmer Hurd

Fire Director

U.S. Department of Interior

National Park Service

P.O. Box 37127, Room 3318

Washington, DC 20013-7127

202-208-6046

Regional Fire Management Officers

NPS Regional Office Fire Management Officer

MID ATLANTIC REGION Doug Wallner

143 South Third Street 215-597-7140

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19106

MIDWEST REGION Ben Holmes

1709 Jackson Street 402-221-3475

Omaha, Nebraska 68102

NORTH ATLANTIC REGION Charisse Sydoriak

15 State Street

Boston, Massachusetts 02109

NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION Carl Douhan

1100 Ohio Drive, SW 202-619-7065

Washington, DC 20242

ROCKY MOUNTAIN REGION Tom Zimmerman

P.O. Box 25287 303-969-2449

Denver, Colorado 80225
32 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

PACIFIC NORTHWEST REGION Mark Forbes

83 South King Street 206-553-5670

Suite 212

Seattle, Washington 98104

SOUTHEAST REGION Steve Smith

75 Spring Street, SW 404-331-3527

Atlanta, Georgia 30303

SOUTHWEST REGION Cliff Chetwin

P.O. Box 728 505-988-6371

Santa Fe, New Mexico 87501

WESTERN REGION Chris Cameron

600 Harrison Street 415-744-3921

Suite 600

San Francisco, California 94107

ALASKA REGION Steve Holder

2525 Gambell Street 907-257-2643

Anchorage, Alaska 99503-2892

C. U.S. FOREST SERVICE FIRE MANAGEMENT CONTACTS

U.S. Forest Service Headquarters

Lawrence A. Amicarella, Director

Fire and Aviation Management

U.S. Forest Service

1621 N. Kent Street

Arlington, Virginia 22209

202-453-9483

Regional Fire Management Contacts

National Forest Regions Fire Management Contact

NORTHERN REGION James F. Mann, Director

Federal Building Aviation & Fire Management

P.O. Box 7669 406-329-3402

Missoula, Montana 59807

John W. Mumma, Regional Forester

406-329-3316

B. NATIONAL PARK SERVICE FIRE MANAGEMENT CONTACTS (continued)

Regional Fire Management Officers

NPS Regional Office Fire Management Officer
USFA-TR-045/April 1992 33

ROCKY MOUNTAIN REGION Ray J. Evans, Director

11177 W. 8th Avenue Air, Aviation & Fire 

P.O. Box 25127 Management

Lakewood, Colorado 80225 303-236-9641

Gary E. Cargill, Regional Forester

303-236-9427

SOUTHWESTERN REGION Jimmie Hickman, Director

Federal Building Aviation & Fire Management

517 Gold Avenue, SW 505-842-3353

Albuquerque, New Mexico 87102

David F. Jolly, Regional Forester

505-842-3300

INTERMOUNTAIN REGION Bill Price, Director

Federal Building Aviation & Fire Management

324 25th Street 801-625-5507

Ogden, Utah 84401 

J.S. Tixier, Regional Forester

801-625-5605

PACIFIC SOUTHWEST REGION Director

630 Sansome Street Aviation & Fire Management

San Francisco, California 94111 415-705-2788

Paul F. Barker, Regional Forester

415-705-2870

PACIFIC NORTHWEST REGION Jim Bates, Director

319 SW Pine Street Aviation & Fire Management

P.O. Box 3623 503-326-2931

Portland, Oregon 97208

John F. Butruille, Regional Forester

503-326-3625

SOUTHERN REGION Dick A. Cox, Director

1720 Peachtree Road, NW Fire & Aviation

Atlanta, Georgia 30367 404-347-4243

John E. Alcock, Regional Forester

404-347-4177

C. U.S. FOREST SERVICE FIRE MANAGEMENT CONTACTS (continued)

Regional Fire Management Contacts

National Forest Regions Fire Management Contact
34 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

EASTERN REGION Richard Bacon, Director

310 W. Wisconsin Avenue Fire & Aviation

Room 500 414-291-1898

Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53203

Floyd J. Marita, Regional Forester

414-291-3600

ALASKA REGION Dennis Pendleton

Federal Office Building Cooperative Fire

Box 21628 Management and NFS Fire Management

Juneau, Alaska 99802-1628 907-271-2575

Michael A. Barton, Regional Forester

907-586-8863

C. U.S. FOREST SERVICE FIRE MANAGEMENT CONTACTS (continued)

Regional Fire Management Contacts

National Forest Regions Fire Management Contact