alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

July 21, 2022

No. 04-22-00418-CR

Johnny GONZALES,

Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas,

Appellee

From the 437th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2019-CR-0573

Honorable Melisa C. Skinner, Judge Presiding

O R D E R

The trial court imposed sentence in the underlying cause on May 21, 2022. Because 

appellant did not file a motion for new trial, the notice of appeal was due to be filed July 1, 

2022. TEX. R. APP. P. 26.2(a)(1). A motion for extension of time to file the notice of appeal was 

due on July 15, 2022. TEX. R. APP. P. 26.3. Appellant filed a notice of appeal on July 1, 2022, 

but he did not file a motion for extension of time. 

A timely notice of appeal is necessary to invoke a court of appeals’ jurisdiction. See 

Olivo v. State, 918 S.W.2d 519, 522 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). A late notice of appeal may be 

considered timely so as to invoke a court of appeals’ jurisdiction if (1) it is filed within fifteen 

days of the last day allowed for filing, (2) a motion for extension of time is filed in the court of 

appeals within fifteen days of the last day allowed for filing the notice of appeal, and (3) the 

court of appeals grants the motion for extension of time. See id. Having reviewed the record, it 

appears that the notice of appeal was untimely filed, and no motion for extension of time was 

filed. It is therefore ORDERED that appellant show cause in writing no later than August 5, 

2022 why this appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. See id.; see also Ater v. 

Eighth Court of Appeals, 802 S.W.2d 241 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)(out-of-time appeal from final 

felony conviction may be sought by filing a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to article 11.07 of the 

Texas Code of Criminal Procedure). 

If appellant does not respond by August 5, 2022, this appeal will be dismissed. 

All appellate deadlines are suspended until further order of the court. 

FILE COPY
_________________________________

Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 21st day of July, 2022.

___________________________________

MICHAEL A. CRUZ, Clerk of Court

FILE COPY
§ 1740.95 Compliance with applicable laws. Any recipient of funds under this regulation shall be required to comply with all applicable federal, tribal and state laws, including but not limited to: ( a ) The Architectural Barriers Act of 1968, as amended (42 U.S.C. 4151 *et seq.*);
( b ) The Uniform Federal Accessibility Standards (UFAS) (Appendix A to 41 CFR subpart 101-19.6); and
( c ) All applicable federal, tribal and state communications laws and regulations, including, for example, the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, (47 U.S.C. 151 *et seq.*) the Telecommunications Act of 1996, as amended (Pub. L. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996), and CALEA. For further information, *see http://www.fcc.gov .*
**Exhibit 32.1**

 

**CERTIFICATION**

 

Eachof the undersigned hereby certifies, for the purposes of section 1350 ofchapter 63 of title 18 of the United States Code, as adopted pursuant to Section906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, in his capacity as an officer ofBidz.com, Inc. (“Bidz.com”), that, to his knowledge, the Quarterly Report ofBidz.com on Form 10-Q for the period ended September 30, 2009 fully complieswith the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934and that the information contained in such report fairly presents, in allmaterial respects, the financial condition and results of operation ofBidz.com.

 
| Date:  November 9, 2009 | By     | /s/ David Zinberg       |
|------------------------------|--------|-------------------------|
|                         |   | David Zinberg           |
|                         |   | Chief Executive Officer |
|                         |   |                    |
| Date:  November 9, 2009 | By     | /s/ Lawrence Kong       |
|                         |   | Lawrence Kong           |
|                         |   | Chief Financial Officer |

 

----
Motion GRANTED and Order filed May 27 , 2022

.

In The 

## Fourteenth Court of Appeals

____________ NO. 14

- 22

- 00366

- CV

____________ IN RE HILLIER RESTORATION, LLC , Relator

O RIGINAL PROCEEDING

WRIT OF MANDAMUS 270th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 2022

- 23268



### ORDER

On May 2 5 , 2022 , relator Hillier Restoration, LLC , filed a first amended petition for writ of mandamus in this court. Relator asks this court to order the Honorable Dedra Davis, Judge of the 270th District Court , in Harris County , Texas, to set aside her May 16, 2022 order , granting real party in interest’s verified petition for an order authorizing the taking of a deposi tion to investigate a potential claim pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 202, which was entered in trial court2 number 2022

- 23268 , styled Marlow v. Hillier Restoration LLC d/b/a Paul Davis a/k/a PDR of Greater Houston, TX

.
Relator has also filed a motion for temporary stay of proceedings below. See
Tex. R. App. P

. 52.8(b), 52.10. On May 20, 2022, relator ask ed this court to stay proceedings in the trial court pending a decision on the petition for writ of
mandamus.
It appears from the fact s stated in the petition and motion that relator’s request for relief requires further consideration and that relator will be prejudiced unless immediate temporary relief is granted. We therefore GRANT relator’s motion and issue the following order:

We OR DER the May 16, 2022 order in t rial court cause number 2022

- 23268 , Marlow v. Hillier Restoration LLC d/b/a Paul Davis a/k/a PDR of Greater Houston,
TX
, STAYED until a final decision by this court on relator’s petition for writ of mandamus, or until further order of this court.
In addition, the court requests real party in interest Sandra Shelton Marlow to file a response to the petition for writ of mandamus on or before June 1 7 , 202 2

. See Tex. R. App. P. 52.4.

PER CURIAM

Panel c onsists of Justices Zimmerer, Spain, and Poissant.
M. P. No. 79-454.

#### Walter J. Pulawski *v.*Patricia C. Pulawski.

Mr. Justice Doris did not participate.

*William Y. Chaika,*for petitioner. *Joseph E. Marran, Jr.,*for respondent.

The petition for writ of certiorari and application for stay are denied.
109TH CONGRESS REPORT " ! HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 2d Session 109–472 

PROVIDING FOR CONSIDERATION OF H.R. 5385, MILITARY 

QUALITY OF LIFE AND VETERANS AFFAIRS, AND RELATED AGENCIES APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2007 

MAY 18, 2006.—Referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed 

Mr. GINGREY, from the Committee on Rules, 

submitted the following 

R E P O R T 

[To accompany H. Res. 821] 

The Committee on Rules, having had under consideration House 

Resolution 821, by a nonrecord vote, report the same to the House 

with the recommendation that the resolution be adopted. 

SUMMARY OF PROVISIONS OF THE RESOLUTION

The resolution provides for consideration of H.R. 5385, the Military Quality of Life and Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2007, under an open rule. The rule provides one 

hour of general debate equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on Appropriations. The rule waives all points of order against consideration of 

the bill. 

Under the rules of the House the bill shall be read for amendment by paragraph. The rule waives points of order against provisions in the bill for failure to comply with clause 2 of rule XXI (prohibiting unauthorized appropriations or legislative provisions in an 

appropriations bill), except as specified in the resolution. The rule 

authorizes the Chair to accord priority in recognition to Members 

who have pre-printed their amendments in the Congressional 

Record. 

Finally, the rule provides one motion to recommit with or without instructions. 

EXPLANATION OF WAIVERS

The waiver of all points of order against consideration of the bill 

includes a waiver of clause 4(c) of Rule XIII (availability of printed 

hearings from the Committee on Appropriations). The waiver of 


jcorcoran on PROD1PC62 with HEARING
2 

clause 2 of rule XXI (prohibiting unauthorized appropriations or 

legislative provisions in an appropriations bill) against provisions 

in the bill is necessary because there are numerous unauthorized 

appropriations and legislative provisions in the bill. 

The waiver of all points of order also includes a waiver of Section 

306 of the Congressional Budget Act (prohibiting consideration of 

legislation within the jurisdiction of the Committee on the Budget 

unless reported by the Budget Committee). 

Æ 


jcorcoran on PROD1PC62 with HEARING
§ 1786.207 Prepayment premium. ( a ) A premium shall be assessed against a borrower that refinances or prepays a loan or loan advance, or any portion of a loan or advance, under this section. RUS will collect the prepayment premium as calculated by FFB. FFB will calculate this premium as described in this section. Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, the premium shall be equal to the lesser of: ( 1 ) The difference between the outstanding principal balance of the loan being refinanced and the present value of the loan discounted at a rate equal to the then current cost of funds to the Department of the Treasury for obligations of comparable maturity to the loan being refinanced or prepaid;
( 2 ) 100 percent of the amount of interest for 1 year on the outstanding principal balance of the loan or loan advance, or any portion of the loan or advance, being refinanced, multiplied by the ratio that: ( i ) The number of quarterly payment dates between the date of the refinancing or prepayment and the maturity date for the loan advance; bears to
( ii ) The number of quarterly payment dates between the first quarterly payment date that occurs 12 years after the end of the year in which the amount being refinanced was advanced and the maturity date of the loan advance; and
( 3 ) ( i ) The present value of 100 percent of the amount of interest for 1 year on the outstanding principal balance of the loan or loan advance, or any portion of the loan or advance, being refinanced or prepaid; plus
( ii ) For the interval between the date of the refinancing or prepayment and the first quarterly payment date that occurs 12 years after the end of the year in which the amount being refinanced or prepaid was advanced, the present value of the difference between: ( A ) Each payment scheduled for the interval on the loan amount being refinanced or prepaid; and
( B ) The payment amounts that would be required during the interval on the amounts being refinanced or prepaid if the interest rate on the loan were equal to the then current cost of funds to the Department of the Treasury for obligations of comparable maturity to the loan being refinanced or prepaid.
( b ) ( 1 ) Except as provided in paragraph (b)(2) of this section, the premium provided by paragraph (a)(1) of this section shall be required for refinancing or prepayment under this section.
( 2 ) In the case of a loan advanced under an agreement that permits the refinancing or prepayment of the loan advance based on the payment of 1 year of interest on the outstanding principal balance of the loan advance, a borrower may, in lieu of the premium required by paragraph (a)(1) of this section, pay a premium as provided by: ( i ) Paragraph (a)(2) of this section, if the loan advance has reached the 12-year maturity required under the loan agreement for the refinancing or prepayment; or
( ii ) Paragraph (a)(3) of this section, if the loan advance has not reached the 12-year maturity required under the loan agreement for the refinancing or prepayment.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision **

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JAMES P. CAMPBELL; CHERI A.

STADTLANDER,

 Plaintiffs - Appellants,

 v.

INDYMAC MORTGAGE SERVICES, a

division of OneWestBank, FSB;

MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC

REGISTRATION SERVICES,

 Defendants - Appellees.

No. 11-35826

D.C. No. 2:11-cv-00867-RSL

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Washington

Robert S. Lasnik, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted April 16, 2013** 

Before: CANBY, IKUTA, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.

James P. Campbell and Cheri A. Stadtlander appeal pro se from the district

FILED

APR 23 2013

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 11-35826

court’s judgment dismissing their action alleging violations of the Racketeer

Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) in connection with

foreclosure proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We

review de novo a dismissal for failure to state a claim and for an abuse of

discretion the denial of leave to amend. Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans,

Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1040-41 (9th Cir. 2011). We may affirm on any ground

supported by the record, Thompson v. Paul, 547 F.3d 1055, 1058-59 (9th Cir.

2008), and we affirm.

Dismissal of Campbell’s and Stadtlander’s RICO claims was proper because

the specific allegations in their complaint did not set forth facts demonstrating the

requisite pattern of racketeering activity involving more than one transaction, see

Sever v. Alaska Pulp Corp., 978 F.2d 1529, 1535 (9th Cir. 1992) (pattern requires

more than one scheme with a “single purpose which happen[s] to involve more

than one act taken to achieve that purpose”), and their remaining conclusory

allegations failed to allege fraud with the required particularity, see Fed. R. Civ. P.

9(b) (allegations of fraud must be “state[d] with particularity”).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying leave to amend the

complaint to add Regional Trustee Services Corporation as a defendant. See

Cervantes, 656 F.3d at 1041 (“Although leave to amend should be given freely, a
3 11-35826

district court may dismiss without leave where a plaintiff’s proposed amendments

would fail to cure the pleading deficiencies and amendment would be futile.”).

AFFIRMED.
#### Thomas R. WILLIAMS, Claimant-Appellant, v. R. James NICHOLSON, Secretary of Veterans Affairs, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 2007-7042.

United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

Feb. 1, 2007.

Thomas R. Williams, pro se.

Before LOURIE, Circuit Judge, CLEVENGER, Senior Circuit Judge, and MOORE, Circuit Judge.

PER CURIAM.

*ORDER*

The Secretary of Veterans Affairs moves to waive the requirements of Fed. Cir. R. 27(f) and to dismiss Thomas R. Williams’s appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims’ judgment in *Williams v. Nicholson,*05-0394, 2006 WL 2564378, for lack of jurisdiction. Williams has not responded.

Williams appealed to the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, challenging a 2005 decision of the Board of Veterans’ Appeals that held that there was no clear and unmistakable error when the Board denied his claim for disability compensation in 1958. The Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims held that there were numerous documents to support the 1958 decision that he had a pre-service knee injury and that a challenge to the weighing of evidence cannot constitute clear and unmistakable error. Williams appeals that decision to this court.

Under 38 U.S.C. § 7292, this court has limited jurisdiction over appeals from decisions of the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims. *See Forshey v. Principi*284 F.3d 1335, 1338 (Fed.Cir.2002) (en banc). This court “may not review (A) a challenge to a factual determination, or (B) a challenge to *973a law or regulation as applied to the facts of a particular case.” 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2).

In his brief, Williams does not raise a constitutional, statutory or regulatory issue. Williams challenges only factual determinations. Thus, this court does not have jurisdiction over the appeal. 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2).

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED THAT:

(1) The Secretary’s motions are granted.

(2) Each side shall bear its own costs.
Editorial Note on Subchapter B of Chapter XIV
Editorial Note: For Federal Register citations to regulations affecting previous program years not included in this volume, see the List of CFR Sections Affected, which appears in the Finding Aids section of the printed volume and at *www.govinfo.gov .*

§ 1471.3 Affidavit of producers of ring spun pima cotton yarn. In addition to any applicable information requirements in § 1471.1, a producer of ring spun cotton yarn must annually provide an affidavit that affirms: ( a ) During the calendar year immediately preceding the payment, the yarn spinner used pima cotton to produce ring spun cotton yarns in the U.S. measuring less than 83.33 decitex (exceeding 120 metric number), in single and plied form;
( b ) In the prior calendar year, the yarn spinner actually produced the quantity, measured in pounds, of ring spun cotton yarns measuring less than 83.33 decitex (exceeding 120 metric number), in single and plied form, reported on the affidavit;
( c ) The yarn spinner maintains supporting documentation about such production during the prior calendar year that shows the actual quantity of such yarns produced, and evidencing the yarns as ring spun pima cotton yarns measuring less than 83.33 decitex (exceeding 120 metric number), in single and plied form; and
( d ) The dollar amount of pima cotton purchased during the prior calendar year that was used in spinning any cotton yarns, and for which the producer maintains supporting documentation.
CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS AND ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS

*June 21, 2006*

[Cite as *06/21/2006 Case Announcements,*2006-Ohio-2998.]

MERIT DECISIONS WITHOUT OPINIONS

2006-0726.

#### State ex rel. Barton v. Collins.

In Mandamus. On answer of respondent. On S.Ct.Prac.R. X(5) determination, cause dismissed.

Moyer, C.J., Resnick, Pfeifer, Lundberg Stratton, O’Connor, O’Donnell and Lanzinger, JJ., concur.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EASTERN DISTRICT

IN THE INTEREST OF: Y.A.-C., A MINOR

PETITION OF: M.C.-L., MOTHER

:

:

:

:

:

No. 241 EAL 2022

Petition for Allowance of Appeal 

from the Order of the Superior Court

IN THE INTEREST OF: Y.E.C.-A.., A 

MINOR

PETITION OF: M.C.-L., MOTHER

:

:

:

:

:

No. 242 EAL 2022

Petition for Allowance of Appeal 

from the Order of the Superior Court

IN THE INTEREST OF: I.C.-A.., A MINOR

PETITION OF: M.C.-L., MOTHER

:

:

:

:

:

No. 243 EAL 2022

Petition for Allowance of Appeal 

from the Order of the Superior Court

IN THE INTEREST OF: I.E.C.A., A MINOR

PETITION OF: M.C.-L., MOTHER

:

:

:

:

:

No. 244 EAL 2022

Petition for Allowance of Appeal 

from the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 8th day of November, 2022, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal

is DENIED.
#### In the Matter of Linda Urbanski, Individually, and on Behalf of Her Minor Child, Edward Urbanski, Jr., Respondents, v Barbara Blum, as Commissioner of New York State Department of Social Services, et al., Appellants.

Judgment unanimously affirmed, with costs (see *Matter of Sehimmel v Reed,*50 AD2d 1085, affd 40 NY2d 887; *Matter of Barton v Lavine,*54 AD2d 350). (Appeals from judgment of Monroe Supreme Court— CPLR art 78.) Present—Cardamone, J. P., Simons, Hancock, Jr., Callahan

and Moule, JJ.
ex106.htm






  





  











  








Bedrick Employment Understanding


 







 


(i)       Salary. Executive shall receive initial base annual salary Compensation in the amount of $ 20,000 ("Base Salary"), which shall increase each year in the amount of twelve and one half percent of the prior year’s Base Salary, or in greater amounts as may be approved by the Board of Directors.


 


(ii)      Payment. The Base Salary Compensation shall be payable in accordance with the customary payroll practices of the Company, but in no event less frequently than monthly.


 







 


Employee to enter into a comprehensive employment agreement during Q2 2013
**EXHIBIT 32.2****Section 1350 Certification**     In connection with the Annual Report of Encore Acquisition Company (“EAC”) on Form 10-K forthe year ended December 31, 2007 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”)on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Robert C. Reeves, Chief Financial Officer of EAC, certify,pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of2002, that: (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934; and  (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, thefinancial condition and results of operations of EAC.        Date: February 26, 2008 /s/ Robert C. Reeves   Robert C. Reeves   Senior Vice President, Chief FinancialOfficer, and Treasurer        A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to EACand will be retained by EAC and furnished to the SEC or its staff upon request.Note: The certification of the registrant furnished in this exhibit is not deemed “filed” forpurposes of Section 18 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, or otherwise subjectto the liabilities of that Section. Registration statements or other documents filed with the SECshall not incorporate this exhibit by reference, except as otherwise expressly stated in suchfiling.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

TURRAY D. JONES,

Defendant BelowAppellant,

v.

STATE OF DELAWARE,

Plaintiff BelowAppellee.

§

§ No. 150, 2016

§

§

§

§ Court Below—Superior Court

§ of the State of Delaware

§ 

§ Cr. ID 0804022428

§ 

§

§

Submitted: August 25, 2016

 Decided: August 31, 2016

O R D E R

This 31st day of August 2016, it appears to the Court that, on August 11, 

2016, the Chief Deputy Clerk of the Court issued a notice to the appellant to show 

cause why this appeal should not be dismissed for his failure to file his opening 

brief and appendix on appeal. The appellant failed to respond to the notice to show 

cause within the required ten-day period; therefore, dismissal of this action is 

deemed to be unopposed.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, under Supreme Court 

Rules 3(b) and 29(b), that this appeal is DISMISSED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Karen L. Valihura

Justice
#### § 1780.34 Strategic economic and community development.

Applicants with projects that support the implementation of Strategic Community Investment Plans are encouraged to review and consider 7 CFR part 1980, subpart K, which contains provisions for providing priority to projects that support the implementation of Strategic Community Investment Plans on a multi-jurisdictional and multi-sectoral basis.

[85 FR 59393, Sept. 22, 2020]