COURT OF APPEALS

DECISION

DATED AND FILED

March 29, 2023

Sheila T. Reiff

Clerk of Court of Appeals

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further editing. If 

published, the official version will appear in 

the bound volume of the Official Reports. 

A party may file with the Supreme Court a 

petition to review an adverse decision by the 

Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 and 

RULE 809.62. 

Appeal No. 2021AP1033 Cir. Ct. Nos. 2017PR38

2018CV440

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS

DISTRICT II

CHRISTINE T. DELFELD,

 APPELLANT,

 V.

STEVEN D. DELFELD, PAULINE R. DELFELD, GREGORY J. DELFELD 

AND THE ESTATE OF THERESA M. DELFELD, BY PERSONAL 

REPRESENTATIVE BARBARA FITCH,

 RESPONDENTS.

------------------------------------------------------------

CHRISTINE T. DELFELD,

 PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,

 V.

STEVEN D. DELFELD AND PAULINE R. DELFELD,

 DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.
No. 2021AP1033

2

APPEAL from judgments of the circuit court for Fond du Lac County: 

ROBERT J. WIRTZ, Judge. Affirmed. 

Before Gundrum, P.J., Neubauer and Lazar, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent 

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3). 

¶1 PER CURIAM. Christine T. Delfeld, pro se, appeals from judgments 

closing the probate of her mother’s estate and dismissing her action to invalidate a 

real estate conveyance. Christine argues the trial court erred by failing to invalidate 

her parents’ conveyance of real property to her brother, Steven D. Delfeld. She also 

argues the court erred in its stock and partnership valuation determinations and by 

failing to award her certain tangible personal property. We reject her arguments and 

affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 John and Theresa Delfeld had four children: Christine, Steven, 

Pauline R. Delfeld, and Gregory J. Delfeld. John died on December 13, 2016. All 

of his property passed to Theresa without probate. Theresa died on August 10, 2017. 

Steven petitioned for formal administration of his mother’s estate. After a dispute, 

the siblings stipulated to having former Fond du Lac County Register in Probate 

Barbara Fitch serve as the estate’s personal representative. 

¶3 Probate was contentious between Christine and her siblings. Disputes 

arose concerning the estate’s inventory and proposed distributions. Christine also 

filed a separate civil action against Steven and Pauline, disputing a conveyance of 

commercial real estate that John and Theresa made to Steven before their deaths. 
No. 2021AP1033

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The trial court consolidated the civil and probate actions and held a four-day trial. 

We recite only those facts from trial necessary to this appeal.

I. Commercial property located at 75 S. Main Street

¶4 John and Theresa owned a commercial building located at 75 S. Main 

Street in the city and county of Fond du Lac, Wisconsin. In December 2015, John 

and Theresa met with Attorney Julie Maslowski to discuss estate planning. Steven 

and Pauline also attended the meeting. John and Theresa wanted to gift the 75 S. 

Main building to Steven, and, at John and Theresa’s instruction, Maslowski 

prepared a quit claim deed. The deed was executed on March 10, 2016 at 

Maslowski’s office, who then notarized and had it recorded. 

¶5 After her parents’ deaths, Christine wanted the conveyance 

invalidated and the building deemed part of her mother’s estate for distribution. She 

testified Theresa’s and John’s signatures were not their own. In support, she offered 

a cover letter from Maslowski, which seemed to invite the elder Delfelds to simply 

sign and return the deed without notarization. However, Pauline and Steven both 

testified Steven brought Theresa, who was then residing at a nursing home, to 

Maslowski’s office to sign the deed. John also signed the deed at Maslowski’s 

office. Maslowski testified that while she had no specific recollection of the signing 

of the deed, she would have never notarized it without seeing the Delfelds sign it. 

¶6 Christine’s handwriting expert, Jane Lewis, testified that Theresa’s 

signature was not hers. However, Steven and Pauline both testified Steven assisted 

Theresa in signing the deed. Lewis testified the signature did not show evidence of 

being guided or assisted. Lewis opined that John’s signature may be authentic; 

however, the evidence was far from conclusive. 
No. 2021AP1033

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¶7 Christine also introduced Theresa’s records from the nursing home in 

an effort to show that Theresa could not have traveled to Maslowski’s office on the 

afternoon of March 10, 2016, as Pauline, Steven and Maslowski testified, because 

the nursing home records indicated that Theresa’s vital signs had been recorded 

during this time and the records contained no notation Theresa had left the facility. 

After reviewing the records, Pauline identified several instances where Theresa’s 

verifiable off-site medical appointments were not recorded and where vital sign 

readings were not recorded at the time when they were actually taken. 

¶8 Christine then testified John and Theresa lacked capacity to execute 

the deed. Theresa’s records from the nursing home indicated her mental capacity 

and stamina were low. However, the other three Delfeld children testified their 

parents were competent at the time the deed was signed. Maslowski reached the 

same conclusion in the course of her initial two-hour meeting with them, explaining 

that she ensures her elderly clients fully understand the nature of their assets and 

what they want to do with them. Her notes indicated this property was part of 

Steven’s business and John and Theresa wanted to transfer the property to him so 

that he could continue business operations. 

¶9 The trial court concluded it did not “find that the deed that was signed 

by the Delfelds, John and Theresa, was fraudulently executed.” It reasoned 

Christine’s claim was based on the fact that three people were lying: Steven, 

Pauline, and Maslowski. The court noted that Pauline and Maslowski had nothing 

to gain by lying. Although there was competing evidence in terms of the nursing 

home records, competency, and the handwriting expert, the court explicitly found 

this evidence was not as convincing to the court as Pauline’s and Maslowski’s firsthand accounts that Theresa and John had sufficient mental capacity, were present to 

sign the deed, and did sign the deed (Theresa with the assistance from Steven). 
No. 2021AP1033

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II. Focus, Inc. shares

¶10 Focus, Inc. owns and operates the Focus hobby shop. The Focus 

hobby shop, in turn, is housed in 75 S. Main Street (the commercial building that 

John and Theresa conveyed to Steven). John owned all the Focus, Inc. shares, and 

the shares passed to Theresa upon John’s death. 

¶11 Steven testified that for the past thirty years, he played a critical role 

in running Focus. As John’s health declined, Steven assumed most of the store’s 

operational responsibilities. Steven is currently Focus’s sole employee. Fitch 

assigned the Focus stock to Steven as part of his one-fourth interest in the estate. 

The factual question before the court was the value of the Focus stock. 

¶12 Fitch testified Focus, Inc. itself had no value. She reviewed the 

company’s schedule K-1s for the last three years and stated that the business 

operated at a loss. Fitch hired Noreen Dogs to value the store’s inventory. Dogs, 

who did not testify at trial, determined the cost value of the inventory was $26,720. 

Fitch therefore determined the value of the Focus stock was $26,720. 

¶13 Steven presented the testimony of Jacob Toman, who was 

experienced in retail-clothing-store liquidations. Toman discussed two options: a 

public liquidation sale or a bulk sale to a single commercial buyer. He opined that

given the inventory’s uniqueness, obsolescence, and age (the inventory’s average 

age was over three years’ old), combined with Dogs’ $26,720 inventory cost 

valuation, a public liquidation sale would be impractical because advertising and 

staffing costs would consume profits. A better option would be to sell the inventory 

in bulk to a commercial buyer. Under this scenario, one could expect to receive ten 

to fifteen percent of the inventory’s cost value. Toman opined the value of the Focus 

inventory was no more than $5,000. 
No. 2021AP1033

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¶14 Steven testified Focus had made no profit since 2012. In 2017, the 

year Theresa died, the store lost $4,949. Steven’s salary was $12,000 per year. 

However, Steven had not actually received and cashed a Focus paycheck since 

2013. Instead, Focus issued Steven promissory notes for unpaid salary. Moreover, 

Focus was unable to pay any rent for its location at 75 S. Main Street. 

¶15 The trial court determined the value of the Focus shares was zero. The 

court found Toman’s value of the inventory more convincing than Dogs’. The court 

reasoned that, “given the amounts of unpaid rent, other expenses, and wages that 

have been deferred for such a significant period of time, the idea that there’s value 

to the corporation is, I think, fanciful. And, so, the Court places the value at zero.” 

III. 79 South Main Street Partnership.

¶16 Theresa died an equal partner with Christine in the 79 South Main 

Street Partnership. Fitch assigned Theresa’s interest in the partnership to Christine 

as part of Christine’s one-fourth interest in the estate. The factual question before 

the court was the value of Theresa’s interest in the partnership. 

¶17 The partnership’s only asset was a commercial building located at 

79 S. Main Street, which was appraised at $88,000. Fitch proposed to value 

Theresa’s share of the partnership at $44,000. However, Steven, Gregory, and 

Pauline filed an objection, contending Theresa’s interest in the partnership was 

worth more than $44,000 because Theresa had significantly over-contributed to the 

partnership’s capital expenses. 

¶18 During trial, Christine objected to some of the exhibits created by 

Pauline that detailed the partnership’s expenses and the contributions made on the 
No. 2021AP1033

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basis that the documents were not produced in discovery. The court agreed and 

excluded those exhibits. 

¶19 Pauline asserted, even without these exhibits, Theresa’s interest in the 

partnership was $65,889.72. Pauline’s counsel explained “under partnership law 

under Chapter 178, that creates an adjustment there, where the first dollars that come 

out of 79 South Main Street LLP belong to Theresa because of her overpaying her 

share.” In support, Pauline relied on a different exhibit that was admitted into 

evidence and showed Christine contributed $61,381.27 to operating expenses, but 

the partnership had amassed $181,739.92 in expenses. Pauline subsequently 

adjusted her proposed partnership interest value to $65,889.72 (in favor of 

Christine) to “giv[e] Christine credit for every penny she says she ever put in, even 

without substantiation on it.” 

¶20 The trial court rejected Christine’s assertion that the value of 

Theresa’s interest was $44,000 and instead valued the partnership interest at 

$65,889.72.1 It reasoned “even excluding the documents that came in late, that the 

Court didn’t allow, that it’s clear that Theresa Delfeld provided more capital input 

into the partnership than Christine and the difference is the number that I indicated.” 

IV. Tangible Personal Property

¶21 In regard to the estate’s personal property, Christine submitted a list 

of items she wanted from the estate. At the close of trial, in terms of the personal 

 

1

 The transcript of the court’s oral ruling states that the court valued the partnership interest 

at $67,889.72; however, the final judgment states the value is $65,889.72, which mirrors Pauline’s 

trial argument. 
No. 2021AP1033

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property, the court observed that based on the testimony, the vast majority of the 

personal property were items of sentimental value with very little worth. 

¶22 The trial court granted Christine’s request for a Japanese robe, a 

grandfather clock, a desk, a box of antique records, a set of mixing bowls, a dining 

room set, a Belgian lace tablecloth, one of the four antique record players, one of 

the two hand-built clocks, one-fourth of John’s 78 rpm antique phonograph records, 

and a picture of Christine as a young girl. In terms of her request for the dishwasher, 

the court denied that request if the dishwasher was installed in the house but granted 

it if the dishwasher was in the garage. Assuming the following items could be 

located, the court also awarded Christine books and artwork she requested, her 

childhood toys, assorted clothing from high school, canning jars, a Monk series of 

DVDs, Doris Day CDs, an electronic writing table, three sweaters Christine gave to 

John, her 33 rpm singles, John’s Leica camera, and an unfinished banjo. The court 

gave Christine three hours in the residence to find these missing items. 

¶23 The court denied Christine’s request for a dresser, some cane back 

chairs, John’s lathe, and a photography collection. The court also denied Christine’s 

request for jewelry, stating it was convinced that Theresa gifted the jewelry to 

Pauline multiple years ago. The court denied Christine’s request for John’s coin 

collection, Theresa’s wedding dress, and a black velour jacket on the basis these 

items no longer existed. Finally, the court denied Christine’s request for one-fourth

of Theresa’s ashes, noting there was testimony that Theresa wanted her ashes 

scattered in the garden. The court ordered that the ashes be scattered in the garden 

and that Steven give everyone sufficient notice beforehand. Christine appeals.
No. 2021AP1033

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DISCUSSION

¶24 Probate proceedings occur in equity, see Richardson v. Richardson, 

223 Wis. 447, 459, 271 N.W. 56 (1937), and we review decisions in equity for an 

erroneous exercise of discretion, see Richards v. Land Star Group, Inc., 224 

Wis. 2d 829, 847, 593 N.W.2d 103 (Ct. App. 1999). We will not reverse if the trial

court “applied the correct law to the relevant facts and reasoned its way to a 

reasonable conclusion.” Estate of Wheeler v. Franco, 2002 WI App 190, ¶6, 256 

Wis. 2d 757, 649 N.W.2d 711. 

¶25 On appeal, Christine argues the trial court erred by failing to invalidate 

her parents’ conveyance of 75 S. Main to Steven. She also argues the court erred in 

its valuations of the Focus stock and Theresa’s interest in the 79 South Main Street 

Partnership. Finally, Christine disputes the court’s distribution of the estate’s 

personal property. We address each argument in turn.

I. Conveyance of 75 S. Main Street to Steven

¶26 Christine argues her parents’ conveyance of 75 S. Main Street to 

Steven must be set aside. She first renews her contention that her mother’s signature 

was forged and she emphasizes the evidence she presented at trial to prove that fact. 

However, the trial court considered all of Christine’s evidence and found the 

competing witnesses’ testimony and other evidence to be more persuasive and more 

credible. See State v. Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d 493, 506, 451 N.W.2d 752 (1990)

(“It is the function of the trier of fact, and not of an appellate court, to fairly resolve 

conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences 

from basic facts to ultimate facts.”). We see no reason to overturn the trial court’s 

factual determinations in this case. See id. at 507 (“[A]ppellate court must accept 
No. 2021AP1033

10

and follow the inference drawn by the trier of fact unless the evidence on which that 

inference is based is incredible as a matter of law.”). 

¶27 Christine then argues the conveyance must be set aside based on the 

trial court’s determination that Steven assisted Theresa with her signature. She 

argues assisted signatures are not permitted to convey real estate. In support, she 

cites WIS. STAT. § 706.02(1)(d) (2021-22),

2 which provides, in relevant part, a 

transaction shall not be valid unless it “[i]s signed by or on behalf of each of the 

grantors[.]” Christine asserts that because Steven assisted Theresa with her 

signature, Theresa never “signed” the deed. 

¶28 However, “signed” as defined by WIS. STAT. § 706.01(10) “includes 

any handwritten signature or symbol on a conveyance intended by the person 

affixing or adopting the signature or symbol to constitute an execution of the 

conveyance.” Here, the trial court concluded that in the presence of Steven, Pauline, 

John, and Maslowski, Theresa had sufficient mental capacity and intended to sign 

the deed. See Nelson v. Albrechtson, 93 Wis. 2d 552, 560-61, 287 N.W.2d 811 

(1980) (“The obvious purpose of requiring the signature of the grantor to appear on 

the conveyance is to evidence his intent to become bound by the agreement.”). 

Thus, we reject Christine’s arguments with respect to the conveyance of the property 

to Steven.

II. Focus stock value

¶29 Christine next disputes the trial court’s determination that the value of 

the Focus stock was zero. She argues Steven never introduced written proof at trial 

 

2

 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2021-22 version unless otherwise 

noted.
No. 2021AP1033

11

showing what Focus owes him in rent or payroll. In support of her written proof 

requirement, she cites WIS. STAT. § 802.01(2)(b). 

¶30 WISCONSIN STAT. ch. 802 is titled “Civil Procedure – Pleadings, 

Motions and Pretrial Practice.” Section 802.01, in turn is titled “Pleadings allowed; 

form of motions.” Subsection (2) relates to Motions, and paragraph (b), relied on 

by Christine, provides that “[c]opies of all records and papers upon which a motion 

is founded ... shall be served with the notice of motion and shall be plainly referred 

to therein.” 

¶31 Christine overlooks the trial court’s value determination was not made 

pursuant a motion but rather was based on the evidence presented to the court 

following a four-day trial. Steven testified Focus owes him unpaid salary and 

unpaid rent. Steven’s testimony combined with Toman’s testimony that the store’s 

inventory was worth no more than $5,000 and Fitch’s testimony that the business 

had operated at a loss for the past three years is why the court determined the value 

of the stock was zero. We see no reason to overturn the trial court’s factual 

determinations on this issue. See Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d at 506-07. 

III. Value of Theresa’s interest in the 79 South Main Street Partnership

¶32 Christine raises numerous arguments in support of her position that 

the trial court erred by determining Theresa’s interest in the partnership was 

$65,889.72. She first renews her argument that Theresa’s interest in the partnership 

was fifty percent of the building’s value. She explains that any money she owed to 

the partnership did not affect the partnership’s value. Rather, Christine believes that 

Fitch, on behalf of her mother’s estate, should have made a claim against Christine 

to recoup any money Christine owed the partnership and because Fitch did not, her 

siblings lack standing to make such assertions. 
No. 2021AP1033

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¶33 However, in the trial court and again on appeal, Christine’s siblings 

relied on various partnership law provisions found in WIS. STAT. ch. 178 to argue 

that, in valuing the interest, the court needed to first take into account Theresa’s 

excess capital contributions. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 178.0806 (disposition of assets 

in winding up; when contributions required). In rejecting Christine’s argument 

about the need to file a separate claim, the trial court reasoned:

I am persuaded that what passes to Christine is the value of 

the partnership at that time. This isn’t a claim, as has been 

argued, that somehow there needed to be a claim made 

against Christine for certain amounts of capital that weren’t 

asked for or could have been asked for. I find that it’s a --

simply the value of ... that partnership[.] 

¶34 In her brief-in-chief and reply, Christine does not mention WIS. STAT.

ch. 178. She does not refute her siblings’ contention that “The trial court’s action 

was mandated by WIS. STAT. § 178.0806.” See United Coop. v. Frontier FS Coop., 

2007 WI App 197, ¶39, 304 Wis. 2d 750, 738 N.W.2d 578 (stating that the failure 

to refute a proposition asserted in a response brief may be taken as a concession). 

Christine also fails to develop a legal argument as to why the trial court’s 

determination that a separate claim did not need to be filed was in error. See State 

v. Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d 627, 646, 492 N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1992) (explaining that 

we may decline to review issues that are inadequately briefed or have undeveloped 

legal arguments). We decline to consider this argument further.

¶35 Christine next argues that by determining Theresa’s interest in the 

partnership was $65,889.72, the trial court sua sponte decreased the value of 

Christine’s partnership interest and this sua sponte decision was made without 

twenty days’ notice and an opportunity to be heard, as required in WIS. STAT.

§ 802.08(2). We disagree.
No. 2021AP1033

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¶36 First, Christine appears to conflate the value of the partnership interest 

with the ownership structure itself. Christine remained a fifty-percent owner and 

the court’s valuation determination did not change the ownership structure. Rather, 

the court’s valuation took into account the excess capital contributions made by 

Theresa before dividing the partnership’s assets between the two partners. As 

argued by her siblings, this was required pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 178.0806. 

¶37 Second, the court did not sua sponte issue its decision without twenty 

days’ notice and an opportunity to be heard. Her siblings’ dispute to the partnership 

interest was filed July 11, 2019. Trial started on November 2, 2020. Christine had 

more than fifteen months to prepare for the valuation dispute and, during the fourday trial, she had ample opportunity to be heard.

¶38 Third, WIS. STAT. § 802.08(2) is not applicable. Section 802.08(2) 

details when a motion for summary judgment may be brought. The court did not 

issue summary judgment on the valuation of the partnership interest. Rather, the 

court held a four-day trial and heard numerous witnesses testify regarding the value 

of Theresa’s partnership interest. The trial court adopted Pauline’s testimony and 

valued Theresa’s partnership interest at $65,889.72.

¶39 Christine next argues there is “no evidence in the court record proving 

Christine owed the partnership money.” She emphasizes the exhibits the court 

excluded from evidence at trial and argues that without these exhibits the court’s 

determination is speculative. We disagree.

¶40 The exhibit supporting the siblings’ claim regarding the value of 

partnership interest, which was relied on by the trial court and properly admitted 

into evidence, showed that Theresa contributed approximately $120,000 more in 

expenses than Christine. That exhibit valued Theresa’s partnership interest at a 
No. 2021AP1033

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greater amount than what was ultimately awarded by the court. However, as 

explained by Pauline’s counsel, the siblings adjusted the number downward in favor 

of Christine in order to “giv[e] Christine credit for every penny she says she ever 

put in, even without substantiation on it.” We see no reason to overturn the court’s 

factual and credibility determinations. See Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d at 506-07 

(reviewing court accepts the inference drawn by the trier of fact).

IV. Tangible personal property 

¶41 Finally, Christine argues the trial court failed its obligation under WIS.

STAT. § 857.09 to ensure that Christine received one-fourth of the estate’s tangible 

personal property. Section 857.09 is titled “Procedure which may be followed when 

personal representative fails to perform,” and provides in part: 

 If a personal representative fails to perform an act or file 

a document within the time required by statute or order of 

the court the court upon its own motion or upon the petition 

of any person interested may order the personal 

representative for the estate and his or her attorney to show 

cause why the act has not been performed[.]

¶42 Here, we conclude the trial court did not have an obligation under 

WIS. STAT. § 857.09 to bring its own motion against Fitch on behalf of Christine for 

Christine’s perceived slight in the distribution of tangible personal property. 

Christine, who was represented by counsel in the trial court, does not explain why, 

if she believed Fitch failed in a duty relative to the division of tangible personal 

property, she herself did not bring a motion to show cause. Christine also offers no 

explanation as to why the trial court had a duty to act on her behalf. She also does 

not explain why the trial court’s reliance on the list she provided was in error or was 

insufficient. We will not consider her argument further. See Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d at

646. 
No. 2021AP1033

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¶43 We also decline to consider the list of tangible personal property items 

Christine provided to this court and wants awarded to her. The trial court, not the 

appellate court, makes factual determinations regarding the division of personal 

property. See WIS. STAT. § 805.17(2). 

By the Court.—Judgments affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.

RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.