U.S. POLICY IN THE BALKANS:

A HOBSON'S CHOICE

Stephen J. Blank

William T. Johnsen

Earl H. Tilford, Jr.

August 28, 1995
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This report is dedicated to the memory of

S. Nelson Drew

Robert C. Frasure

Joseph J. Kruzel

who gave their lives in the pursuit of peace in the Balkans.
LLL

*******

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors

and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of

the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.

S. Government. This report is approved for public release;

distribution unlimited.

*******

Information in this report is current as of August 28, 1995.

*******

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be

forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army

War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050. Comments may also

be conveyed directly to the authors at the same address, or by

telephone: commercial (717) 245-4076 or DSN 242-4076, or via

Internet at johnsenw@carlisle-emh2.army.mil.
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FOREWORD

At this writing, the strategic balance may have shifted in

the ongoing war in the former Yugoslavia, and the region could be

on the verge of a settlement. But, the "window of opportunity"

may be fleeting, and the failures and frustrations of the past

four years temper any optimism that conflict in the former

Yugoslavia will end quickly or completely. If this opening passes

without an end to the fighting, the United States may have to

reassess its fundamental policy objectives–and the ways and means

to achieve them–if peace is to be effected in the Balkans.

The intent of this report, therefore, is to analyze and

assess existing policies, to identify any conflicts or

contradictions that may stymie U.S. efforts to bring about a

peaceful resolution of the crisis, and to offer potential

solutions. The report does not offer an ambitious criticism of

policy or an "expert's" solution to an intractable problem. Its

more modest goal is to examine current policy within a context

that fits Bosnia into the larger pattern of U.S. interests and

policy. In this manner, the report offers a broader framework for

the strategic decisions that may face the United States in the

not so distant future.

The Strategic Studies Institute offers this contribution to

assist those engaged in the national dialog over U.S. policy in

the Balkans.

RICHARD H. WITHERSPOON

Colonel, U.S. Army

Director, Strategic Studies

 Institute
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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF THE AUTHORS

STEPHEN BLANK is the Douglas MacArthur Professor of Research at

the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College. Dr.

Blank has been an Associate Professor of National Security

Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute since 1989. Prior to

this appointment Dr. Blank was Associate Professor for Soviet

Studies at the Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and

Education of Air University at Maxwell AFB. Dr. Blank's M.A. and

Ph.D. are in Russian history from the University of Chicago. He

has published numerous articles on Soviet/Russian military and

foreign policies, and is the author of The Sorcerer as

Apprentice: Stalin's Commissariat of Nationalities, 1917-1924,

Greenwood Publishing Group, 1994, and the coeditor of The Soviet

Military and the Future, Greenwood Publishing Group, 1992.

WILLIAM T. JOHNSEN joined the Strategic Studies Institute in 1991

and currently serves as an Associate Research Professor of

National Security Affairs. He has also held the Elihu Root Chair

of Military Studies of the U.S. Army War College since 1994. An

infantry officer before retiring from the U.S. Army, Dr. Johnsen

served in a variety of troop leading, command and staff

assignments in the 25th Infantry Division and 7th Infantry

Division (Light). He also served as Assistant Professor of

History at the U.S. Military Academy, and as an Arms Control

Analyst in the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE).

Dr. Johnsen holds a B.S. degree from the U. S. Military Academy,

an M.A. and Ph.D. in history from Duke University, and is a

graduate of the U.S. Army War College. He has authored or

coauthored numerous Strategic Studies Institute studies, as well

as articles in a variety of policy journals that focus on U.S.-

European security issues.

EARL H. TILFORD, JR., is Senior Research Professor and Director

of Research at the Strategic Studies Institute. He earned his

B.A. and M.A. in history at the University of Alabama and his

Ph.D. in American and European military history at George

Washington University. Dr. Tilford is the author of three books,

the latest, published by Texas A&M University Press, being

Crosswinds: The Air Force's Set Up in Vietnam. He has published

more than two dozen articles in scholarly and professional

journals. His next book, Eagle in the Desert: A Look Back at the

Persian Gulf War, will be published by Greenwood Press later
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this year.
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KEY JUDGMENTS

• While the war in Bosnia is complex and confusing, these

circumstances should not deter the United States from seeking

potential solutions to this conflict. The severity of potential

European and global consequences should drive U.S. policymakers

to take an even more proactive role in efforts to resolve the

conflict.

• Stated and de facto U.S. policy objectives are not

mutually reinforcing. Indeed, the goal of restoring the

territorial integrity of Bosnia-Hercegovina conflicts with other

objectives: preventing the spread of fighting; stemming the flow

of refugees; halting the slaughter of innocents; and helping

support NATO's central role, while maintaining the U.S. role in

shaping Europe's security architecture. The United States must

seriously reconsider whether it should retain or revise this

goal.

• The stability and security of the entire Balkan peninsula

may be at risk. Prolonged disequilibrium could set back the

development of newly emerging democracies in the region. An

expanded conflict would likely bring Greece and Turkey–key NATO

allies–into the conflict, probably on opposite sides.

• Protracted conflict in the Balkans could strain relations

between Europe and Russia, as well as between the United States

and Russia. This could lead to renationalization of security

agendas in Central and Eastern Europe that could forestall the

extension of market democracies in those critical regions. The

consequences for Western European security policies are obvious.

• Increased strains within NATO could reduce the U.S.

ability to influence events in Europe; an outcome certainly not

in long-term U.S. interests.

• Continued conflict in the former Yugoslavia is likely to

diminish U.S. public support for substantial U.S. engagement in

international affairs. The perceived ineptitude of the United

Nations and intramural squabbling within NATO could undermine

U.S. public support for both of those key security organizations.

• The inability of the United States to shape a resolution
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of the war in the former Yugoslavia could undermine U.S.

influence in key areas of the world. Concomitantly, potential

opponents might perceive that they could challenge U.S. interests

at low levels without fear of penalty. These phenomena could

contribute to a downward spiral of U.S. influence abroad that

might erode the U.S. deterrent capability to the point where an

adversary might directly confront U.S. interests.

• The long-term European and global consequences for the

United States from short-term decisions on Bosnia could be

substantial. Thus, while it may be simplistic to say it, any

decisions concerning further U.S. involvement in the Bosnian war

must be framed in light of these consequences, and not simply in

accordance with the day-to-day exigencies of the Balkan crisis.


U.S. POLICY IN THE BALKANS:

A HOBSON'S CHOICE

INTRODUCTION

The United States is already engaged militarily in the

ongoing crisis in the Balkans. Since November 1992, U.S. naval

vessels have taken part in the maritime enforcement of the U.N.

embargo of the belligerents. U.S. Air Force transport aircraft

have dropped tons of humanitarian aid to besieged enclaves. U.S.

Air Force and U.S. Navy aircraft participate daily in the

enforcement of the U.N. "no-fly zone" over Bosnia-Hercegovina,

have shot down Bosnian Serb aircraft, and have been the principal

participants in NATO bombing missions supporting the U. N.

Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia- Hercegovina. American

planes have been fired on by Bosnian Serb anti-aircraft batteries

and surface-to-air missiles and one USAF F-16 has been shot down.

U.S. Marines have already undertaken military action on the

ground in Bosnia to rescue downed Air Force pilot Captain Scott

O'Grady. To the south, over 500 U.S. soldiers are in Macedonia to

deter expansion of the conflict.1

Given the escalating nature of the conflict (e.g., Bosnian

Serb seizure of "safe havens" and Croatian offensives in the

Krajina region), U.S. engagement may deepen suddenly, requiring

quick decisions concerning increased U.S. military involvement in

the crisis. Indeed, nearly every potential turn of events could

lead to an increased commitment of U.S. military force to the

region. Potential ethnic Bosnian Serb attacks against the

remaining "safe havens" have brought NATO threats of "firm and

rapid response of NATO's air power" that would undoubtedly

involve large numbers of U.S. aircraft.2

 The United States also has pledged to assist the withdrawal

of UNPROFOR in Bosnia should that become necessary. Increased

fighting, failure to achieve a negotiated settlement, or the

unilateral U.S. lifting of the arms embargo could trigger such an

operation, involving up to 25,000 U.S. ground troops.3

 A rise in the already high levels of violence against

civilians could lead public opinion to demand increased U.S.

military involvement.4

 The current U.S. peace plan being

explained to allies, partners, and belligerents contains numerous


military "sticks" that might be employed if "carrots" fail to

bring about an end to the fighting. These "sticks" include

replacing UNPROFOR peacekeepers with NATO forces, undoubtedly

including U.S. forces.5 Should a peace settlement be brokered,

the United States has committed to providing upwards of 25,000

personnel to participate in peacekeeping operations.6

 In short,

the United States may be inexorably drawn into increased military

engagement in the Balkans.

Before U.S. political leaders make their decisions on

whether (or more likely, when and how) to increase U.S. military

involvement, they must factor a number of complicating

considerations into their deliberations.7 First, Bosnian Serbs

and Serbia are likely to see any increased NATO or U.S. military

commitment as directed against them. Second, the government of

Bosnia-Hercegovina is likely to view increased U.S. engagement as

a guarantee of Bosnia's existence and sovereignty, thereby

bolstering the will to resist. Third, Serbia will undoubtedly

perceive increased U.S. engagement as a threat to Serbian

interests, precipitating a Serbian reaction that could lead to

intervention by the Yugoslav Army and a widening of the war.

Fourth, other states in the region and Russia may view increased

U.S. or NATO military activities as a commitment to a Balkan-wide

security system.

Decisionmakers also must look beyond the current crisis and

fit Bosnia into the larger pattern of U.S. interests and policy.

For example, increased U.S. involvement in the crisis could add

to existing tensions within NATO, strain U.S. bilateral relations

with key allies or new partners in Central and Eastern Europe, or

generate substantial repercussions for U.S.- Russian relations.

Intra-European relations could also be strained. Understanding

the potential consequences of their actions offers policymakers

an opportunity to identify new or clarify existing U.S. policy

options for Bosnia-Hercegovina. To that end, this report will

explicate the wider issues involved in the current and potential

U.S. engagement in the Balkan crisis to establish a broader

framework for the strategic decisions facing the United States.

To provide this context, the report addresses four major

questions overarching the ongoing crisis in the Balkans:

• What are the key principles that the United States wishes

to uphold?


• What are U.S. objectives concerning the conflict, and are

they mutually reinforcing or in conflict?

• Under what conditions should the United States apply

military force to achieve those objectives?

• What are the potential consequences inherent in the use of

military power?

KEY PRINCIPLES OF U.S. POLICY

At the most basic level, several key principles guide the

formulation of U.S. foreign policy and are germane to the Balkan

crisis. First is the fundamental belief that "America's core

value [is] freedom, embodied in democratic governance and market

economics . . . ."8

 Also at stake is the U.S. tradition of

supporting human dignity and respect for human rights.9 Finally,

the current administration has articulated a global policy of

engagement, the very viability of which is affected by events in

the former Yugoslavia. In succinct form, our leaders hold that

"Our national security strategy is based on enlarging the

community of market democracies while deterring and containing a

range of threats to our nation, our allies, and our interests."10

Specific U.S. interests in Europe also shape U.S. policy for

 the Balkans. A National Security Strategy of Engagement and

Enlargement stipulates three major U.S. national interests in

Europe: a stable and secure Europe achieved through military

strength and cooperation; U.S. access to open and vibrant

European market economies; and support for the growth of

democracy and individual freedoms in Central and Eastern Europe,

especially Russia.11 The key issue becomes how to secure these

interests, given the current conditions in the Balkans.

A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement

also establishes broad guidelines for effecting these principles.

First, the United States will exercise global leadership.12 But,

realizing the limits of American resources and capabilities, the

United States will exercise selective engagement, ". . . focusing

on the challenges that are most relevant to our interests and

focusing our resources where we can make the most difference."13

Selective engagement, constrained resources, and the belief that


many challenges demand multinational solutions lead the United

States to participate in multilateral efforts. The conviction

that U.S. participation in a wide range of collective

decisionmaking benefits the United States reinforces this

conclusion.14 That having been said, the National Security

Strategy holds that where necessary, or where national interests

dictate, the United States will act alone.15 Finally, U.S. ". . .

global interests and historical ideals impel us to oppose those

who would endanger the survival or well-being of their peaceful

neighbors."16

U.S. POLICY OBJECTIVES FOR THE CONFLICT

IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

Turning from general principles and interests to concrete

realities, the National Security Strategy lays out five specific

U.S. policy goals in the former Yugoslavia:

• A political settlement in Bosnia that preserves the

country's territorial integrity and provides a viable future for

all its peoples;

• Preventing the spread of fighting into a broader Balkan

war that could threaten both allies and the stability of new

democratic states in Central and Eastern Europe;

• Stemming the destabilizing flow of refugees from the

conflict;

• Halting the slaughter of innocents; and

• Helping to support NATO's central role in post-Cold War

Europe while maintaining our role in shaping Europe's security

architecture.17

Not contained within the National Security Strategy, but

extremely important for the formulation and execution of U.S.

policy in the Balkans is the aversion to deploying ground forces

to the region except under certain, very circumscribed

conditions.18 Indeed, avoiding ground commitments, especially

combat troops, has been a de facto goal in its own right.

These national goals, then, should shape the policy options


 in the region.19 A first step in developing those options is

subjecting the national goals to a rigorous analysis to identify

internal contradictions or potentially conflicting objectives.

Unfortunately, the complexity of forces in the region present

such contradictions in abundance and sorting through them sheds

light on the significant challenges for those individuals charged

with crafting policies to achieve U.S. goals in the Balkans.

The Conundrum of Preserving Bosnian Territorial Integrity.

The goal of preserving the territorial integrity of BosniaHercegovina, for example, is highly problematic. Economic and

diplomatic efforts, to date, have not proved successful, and are

unlikely to be so in the future. Ethnic polarization of the

country has deepened sharply during more than three years of

fighting and ethnic cleansing. Therefore, if the U.S. goal of

preserving Bosnia's territorial integrity is to be more than a

diplomatic holding pattern, military action, to include the

deployment of ground forces, may be required. But avoiding the

deployment of ground troops remains a key–and conflicting–goal.

Unless the Bosnian government's military capacity vis-a-vis its

opponents improves markedly, or unless the United States can

prevail upon allies or partners to undertake the responsibility

for restoring the status quo ante bellum of 1991, the goal of

maintaining Bosnia's territorial integrity will likely not be

realized. To date, no other country has indicated the willingness

to undertake such action.20

Thus, so long as the United States retains the policy goal

of maintaining the territorial integrity of Bosnia-Hercegovina,

it runs the risk of engaging ground forces in the conflict.

Policymakers must recognize this policy azimuth or redefine their

goal. If the United States is unwilling to revise its objectives

concerning Bosnia's territorial integrity, then it may be better

for the United States to introduce ground forces before a crisis

emerges that makes an eventual intervention more costly in terms

of resources and lives. Here, however, lies another

contradiction. Neither our NATO allies, nor Russia, nor the

American public support direct military action to force a

settlement. Only if the war provokes a crisis of greater

proportions than has already occurred is that reluctance to

engage on the ground likely to change.


Even if military action was a realistic consideration, would

the United States and its allies be willing to exert the level of

military force that would be necessary to defeat the ethnic

Bosnian Serb forces, and, perhaps the Yugoslav Army? Are U.S. and

European publics willing to underwrite the levels of forces and

resources that might be required? Are they willing to sustain the

casualties that might result? For how long? Current indications

offer little evidence of the level of governmental or public

commitment that would likely be required.21

The remaining alternative would be to provide the Bosnians 

with the means for effective resistance. This option implies

lifting the arms embargo against Bosnia. But, to date, the United

States has been unable to build the consensus necessary to effect

such action internationally. Moreover, unilateral U.S. lifting of

the embargo is highly problematic, as Britain and France have

indicated that such a move would prompt an UNPROFOR withdrawal.22

This, in turn, would require U.S. ground troops to assist in the

withdrawal–an outcome that the United States seeks to avoid.

Lifting the arms embargo to "level the playing field," and

to allow the Bosnian government to defend the territory it

currently holds does not secure its authority over all of Bosnia.

That goal, despite the boost to it by Croatia's recent success in

the Krajina region, seems well out of reach of the Bosnian

government. Only substantial military aid, and time to receive,

distribute, and train on it, could produce such an outcome.

Whether the aid or the time would be available without largescale U.S. intervention is not known. But, even were such an

outcome to occur (i.e., military defeat of the Bosnian Serbs)

without deeper U.S. involvement, the United States and its allies

and partners would face the prospect of tens of thousands more

Serb refugees–which contradicts the objective of stemming the

destabilizing flow of refugees.

Even absent a flood of refugees, lifting the arms embargo

against Bosnia raises additional questions. First, how much aid

should be allowed to flow to the Bosnian government? This is not

a calculation that can be made with a high degree of certainty.

Too little aid simply prolongs the war by raising Bosnian

expectations, but not necessarily providing adequate capabilities

to prevail. Too much assistance could lead to an overwhelming

defeat of Bosnian Serb forces that might cause Bosnian government


forces to overreach, precipitating intervention by the Yugoslav

Army on behalf of their ethnic brethren. Finally, there is the

larger issue of whether the Yugoslav Army would permit a Bosnian

Serb defeat under any condition.

Underwriting the territorial integrity of Bosnia also

implies that the United States is unwilling to see the Bosnian

government irrevocably be defeated. To prevent such an outcome

may require direct U.S. military engagement. Air power, alone, is

not likely to provide a sufficient shield, and ground troops may

be required to preclude defeat. But, again, this option conflicts

with the existing U.S. policy of not employing U.S. ground

forces. Absent U.S. or European intervention, the only possible

way to prevent a Bosnian defeat might require introducing forces

from outside the region–such as the new U.S. initiative that

supposedly calls for the introduction of forces from the Muslim

world, which would be highly inflammatory.23

Should the parties involved agree that less than full

territorial integrity of Bosnia might be an "acceptable" goal,

who would determine and then enforce what constituted an

appropriate settlement? Certainly, the goals of the Bosnian

government are likely to exceed those of outside parties involved

in the conflict. Given recent Croatian and Bosnian successes on

the battlefield, it is highly unlikely that Bosnian expectations

for greater territory will diminish. Even should the Bosnian

government initially settle for less than the full restoration of

its borders, how long might that settlement last before

revanchist and irredentist forces began to emerge? While the

answers to such questions are not known for certain, the

probability for a return to conflict is high.

Nor would a territorial settlement envisaged under the

existing Contact Group (Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and the

United States) plan (51 percent of the territory for the BosnianCroatian federation and 49 percent for ethnic Serbs) or the

similar U.S. plan currently circulating in Europe meet the

requirement to ". . . provide a viable future for all its

peoples."24 Policymakers must recall that one of the primary

causes of this conflict is that not one ethnic group is willing

to remain under the political control of another ethnic group.

Thus, absent a massive exchange of populations after the

conclusion of hostilities–in other words, legally sanctioned


ethnic cleansing–the seeds of future conflict will be sown.25

Granted, this may be the best settlement possible at the moment,

but policymakers should be under no illusions that the

territorial divisions currently under consideration will result

in a long-term resolution of the underlying sources of the

conflict.

In a broader context, support for Bosnian territorial

integrity raises a larger issue. On the one hand, by restoring

the territorial integrity of Bosnia, the United States and its

partners would be endorsing the Bosnian desire to secede from the

Republic of Yugoslavia. On the other hand, they would be denying

ethnic Serbs their right to exercise self-determination and to

secede from Bosnia-Hercegovina. Support for Bosnian selfdetermination also directly conflicts with the concept of

preserving the territorial integrity of existing nation-states

(i.e., the former Yugoslavia) which has been the fundamental

organizing principle of modern international politics since the

Treaty of Westphalia (1648).26 Finally, where does selfdetermination logically end? How does support for selfdetermination stack up against the chaotic prospect of dozens or

hundreds of ever dividing states in Europe and elsewhere?

Squaring these interlocking circles, specifically and generally,

will be profoundly difficult and will vex policymakers as they

craft policies for resolving the conflict in the Balkans.

Containing the Conflict.

To date, efforts to contain the conflict and prevent the

spread of fighting have been largely successful. How long that

success can be sustained in the face of increasing pressures from

belligerents for a military resolution of the crisis remains to

be seen. For instance, Croatian successes have resulted in

Serbian counter-deployments along their borders and rhetoric

that could lead to a resumption of the Serbo-Croatian war.27

Croatian offensives north and east of Dubrovnik also could spark

a reaction from Serbia. Or, successful Croatian-Bosnian

offensives against Bosnian Serb areas (e.g., Banja Luka or the

Brcko corridor) could precipitate Serbian intervention. This

time, however, given the increased firepower and capabilities of

each side, the war could be substantially bloodier, with the

potential to spill over the borders of the former Yugoslavia.


Nor, given the recent successes against ethnic Serbs, is the

Bosnian government likely to agree to an early settlement. After

four years of failed negotiations and recent battlefield success,

it may have concluded that much more is to be gained through

continuing the war than by ending it. And, so long as the war

continues, the potential for the crisis to spin out of control

and escape its current bounds remains a clear possibility.

Refugees.

Stemming the destabilizing flow of refugees has been

partially successful. Internally, the past flow of refugees

within the borders of the former Yugoslavia has been extensive.28

The U.N. and other relief organizations have been able to cope,

more or less. While the levels of misery have been high, these

organizations have succeeded in keeping significant numbers of

people alive. This, in turn, has kept the overflow of refugees

into Europe, as a whole, at manageable levels.

A number of problems, however, may upset the delicate

balance within the former Yugoslavia that could have

destabilizing effects on the crisis. Within Bosnia and Croatia,

rising numbers of Bosnian refugees have already strained

relations within the Bosnian-Croat Federation.29 The "ethnic

cleansing" of Croats and Muslims in the Banja Luka region to make

way for ethnic Serbs displaced from the Krajina will undoubtedly

increase those frictions.30

The large numbers of ethnic Serbs fleeing from the Krajina

to Serbia (estimates range from 150-200,000) also pose longerterm problems.31 This influx of refugees, extremely bitter at

their perceived desertion by Serbia and, especially, Slobodan

Milosevic, could spark an internal crisis within Serbia. This

could lead Milosevic to harden his attitude toward a potential

peace settlement, or could precipitate the intervention of the

Yugoslav Army into the crisis in an effort to retain his power.32

Any massive increases resulting from further large-scale

offensive operations or ethnic cleansing, moreover, run the risk

of overwhelming local, as well as U.N. capacities and will

greatly compound these problems.

Over the long term, the number of refugees in Serbia may

form an irredentist bloc within national politics that could


exert negative influences–from a U.S. perspective–for a

considerable time. Additionally, Serb plans to settle a

proportion of these refugees in the already tense Kosovo region

could spark a crisis that holds the significant potential to

trigger a general Balkan war.33

Refugee flow outside the former Yugoslavia has remained

within manageable levels, and apparently has not overly strained

the capacity of European neighbors to absorb it. That said,

Germany, which has accommodated the largest percentage of

refugees, has called for European Union members to establish a

quota system to ensure a more equitable distribution of refugees

among member states.34 A large increase in the numbers of refugees

within Bosnia, or the former Yugoslavia, could nonetheless place

a strain on the European ability to respond. Certainly, a massive

refugee flow resulting from a wider Balkan war would place

significant strains that would have consequences for the emerging

democracies in Central and Eastern Europe that are contiguous to

the current conflict.

Halting the Slaughter of Innocents.

This goal has not been realized. While war in the former

Yugoslavia was not inevitable, the pent up emotions, strident

nationalism, inadequate political institutions, statal

disintegration, and economic dislocations that accompanied the

dissolution of the Yugoslav state made war–and its attendant

depredations on noncombatants–likely. However, individual

atrocities on a broad scale, and state-sponsored, or at least

condoned, "ethnic cleansing" have exponentially increased the

suffering. The fact that external actors (e.g., the U.N., the

Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe [OSCE], the

European Union [EU], and the Contact Group) have been unable

either rapidly to agree on goals, or the ways and means to

achieve those goals, has contributed to the prolongation of the

fighting. That having been said, too little credit, especially in

the United States, has been given to U.N. efforts to attenuate

the violence and to provide humanitarian assistance.

Supporting NATO's Central Role in Post-Cold War Europe.

The NATO experience in the conflict in the former Yugoslavia

has not "help[ed] to support NATO's central role in post-Cold War


Europe while maintaining our role in shaping Europe's security

architecture." Within the Contact Group, for example, RussoFranco-British and U.S.-German positions diverge.35 Disagreements

among Britain, France, and the United States over NATO policy

toward Bosnia have brought intra-Alliance relations to their

lowest point since France's departure from the integrated

military structure (1966) or, perhaps, the Suez Crisis (1956).36

Despite cooperation and apparent consensus over meeting Bosnian

Serb threats to the remaining "safe havens," NATO allies have

voiced strong disapproval of congressional efforts to force

President Clinton unilaterally to lift the arms embargo of

Bosnia.37 Ironically, this friction is occurring when concern over

preserving NATO cohesion ostensibly has taken priority over

reaching a solution to the Bosnian crisis.38

Avoiding the Commitment of U.S. Ground Troops.

Avoiding the employment of ground forces is fraught with

consequences. First, the United States has elevated a means

normally used to assist in achieving a national objective to the

status of a policy goal. In doing so, the United States has stood

the strategy formulation process (i.e., the balancing of

objectives, options, and resources–also known as ends, ways, and

means) on its head.39 In effect, the United States has denied

itself the use of a key element of national power, and

considerably circumscribed its ability to influence resolution of

the conflict through an integrated and complementary application

of national power.

Second, efforts to avoid deploying forces may drive U.S.

short-term decisions that are inimical to long-term U.S.

objectives and interests. For example, the United States has

promised to assist in the withdrawal of UNPROFOR should that be

required. That would, however, require the deployment of upwards

of 25,000 U.S. ground troops. To avoid that possibility, the

United States may be forced to take steps to ensure that NATO

allies do not call upon the United States. This might require

increased use of U.S. air power or the employment of additional

U.S. forces in the region (e.g., the French desire to have U.S.

helicopters airlift elements of the Franco-British Rapid Reaction

Force into Gorazde). Either case could be an incremental step

that leads to a deeper U.S. involvement in the crisis that could

eventually lead to the introduction of U.S. ground forces. Thus,


the United States may be caught in the paradoxical "Catch-22"

situation where actions taken to avoid a substantial deployment

of ground forces might actually precipitate such an event.40

Alternatively, in order to prevent the withdrawal of

UNPROFOR, U.S. policy might be heavily influenced by British or

French pressure. For example, British and French insistence that

the United States not unilaterally lift the arms embargo of

Bosnia undoubtedly contributed to President Clinton's veto of

recent congressional legislation.41 At the very least, the United

States would surrender the initiative to others. At worst, such a

possibility holds the potential to undermine long-term U.S.

leadership or influence in Europe.

CONDITIONS FOR EMPLOYING U.S. MILITARY POWER

Theoretically, once a decision has been made to engage the

United States in a crisis or conflict, and potential options for

employing the elements of national power have been assessed,

policymakers must establish the conditions under which the United

States might employ military force. To guide these deliberations,

A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement notes

that,

The decision on whether and when to use force therefore

is dictated first and foremost by our national

interests. In those specific areas where our vital or

survival interests are at stake, our use of force will

be decisive and, if necessary, unilateral. In other

situations posing a less immediate threat, our military

engagement must be targeted selectively on those areas

that most affect our national interests–for instance,

areas where we have a sizable economic stake or

commitment to allies, and areas where there is a

potential to generate substantial refugee flows into

our nation or our allies.42

The National Security Strategy also underscores that such

decisions will be undertaken only after carefully balancing costs

and risks with national interests at stake. Specifically, the

government will consider a number of key issues before committing

military forces:


• Have we considered nonmilitary means that offer a

reasonable chance of success?

• Is there a clearly defined, achievable mission?

• What is the environment of risk we are entering?

• What is needed to achieve our goals?

• What are the potential costs–human and financial–of the

engagement?

• Do we have reasonable assurance of support from the

American people and their elected representatives?

• Do we have time lines that will reveal the extent of

success or failure, and, in either case, do we have an exit

strategy?43

Not included within the criteria spelled out in the National

Security Strategy are a number of additional questions that merit

reflection. For instance, will the employment of military power

help achieve national objectives? Will allies or partners join,

or at least endorse, the U.S. resort to military force? Will the

application of military force in a specific instance have

ramifications upon broader U.S. interests (e.g., will the

employment of U.S. military power in the Balkans estrange U.S.-

Russian relations, leading to a "Cold Peace"?)?

Existing guidelines contained in the National Security

Strategy for how military force will be used are equally

explicit. U.S. troops deployed abroad will be assigned clear

missions, and should combat be expected, they will be provided

the means to fight effectively and to achieve their objectives

decisively. To ensure the latter condition, two key questions

must be answered before forces are committed: "What types of

military capabilities should be brought to bear, and is the use

of military force carefully matched to our political

objectives?"44 Moreover, whenever possible, allies and relevant

international organizations will be proportionately incorporated

into U.S. plans and activities.45

At present, it is not clear that in the case of Bosnia the


United States has sufficiently addressed these important

questions. Certainly, given the previous discussion of the

contradictions inherent in the stated U.S. policy objectives for

resolving the conflict in the Balkans, additional effort should

be devoted to focusing U.S. goals more clearly.

Nor is it entirely clear that these questions have been

thoroughly addressed for ongoing operations or for missions that

the United States has committed itself to perform. For example,

how long will the United States participate in the United

Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Macedonia? Or, how

long will the United States engage in air operations supporting

Operation DENY FLIGHT, the enforcement of the "no-fly" zone over

Bosnia? At present, the duration of these operations appears to

be indeterminable.

Looking to the future, is there a clearly defined,

achievable mission for U.S. participation in implementing a peace

plan? For how long will the United States take part? What is the

"exit strategy" if conflict resumes? And, while assisting the

withdrawal of UNPROFOR, should that become necessary, have the

key questions been answered: What is the mission; for what time

period; has a full risk assessment been accomplished; is there a

reasonable assurance of public support for such an operation?

Answering such difficult questions is not an easy task. But,

where such difficult questions are not asked and forthrightly

answered, policy failure is the likely product. As former

Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara indicates in his recent

book, In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam, the

failure to ask the difficult questions about policy, questions

the answers to which were bound to be unsettling, allowed the

Kennedy and Johnson administrations to make decisions based on

addressing short-term crises. "Over and over again . . . we

failed to address the fundamental issues; our failure to identify

them was not recognized; and deep-seated disagreements among the

president's advisers about how to proceed were neither surfaced

nor resolved."46

Potential Consequences of Minimizing Use

of U.S. Military Power.

To date, the United States has minimized the use of its


military power in the Balkans and neither the administration nor

Congress appears willing to underwrite the employment of ground

troops beyond existing U.S. commitments.47 These constraints on

the use of force seem to minimize U.S. risk by maintaining the

status quo, and avoiding a major deployment of ground forces. By

opting not to impose by force the Contact Group's plan, however,

the United States and its allies continue to allow Pale,

Belgrade, Sarajevo, and, lately, Zagreb to shape events, while

concomitantly constraining the U.S. ability to act unilaterally

or as the leader of a coalition. The net result may be a further

erosion of U.S. credibility.48

Failure to confront violence in Bosnia and the Balkans may

have additional and considerable ramifications. Since the Vietnam

War, it has been fashionable among Western intellectuals,

especially American academics, to ridicule "the Munich analogy."49

To be sure, neither Radovan Karadzic nor Slobodan Milosevic is

another Adolf Hitler, and the conditions of 1995 are not

analogous to those that caused World War II. While one can learn

from the study of the past, historical episodes are distinct and

the past does not repeat itself. Be that as it may, Serb

belligerence may encourage other potential aggressors–in Europe,

and around the world.50

Prolonged conflict could also have an adverse effect on

international security institutions. Certainly, the United

Nations would emerge greatly impaired from aggression rewarded in

Bosnia. European security organizations, which help ensure U.S.

interests in that key region of the world, would also suffer a

further erosion of credibility. The OSCE has already suffered

from its failure to resolve the crisis.51 NATO's cohesion would

likewise suffer further loss. Moreover, failure in the Balkans

could foment divisions within the EU and its military arm, the

Western European Union (WEU).

Within the United States, domestic support for any future

vigorous foreign policy initiatives could plunge. That might also

lead to reduced support for emerging democracies and purely

humanitarian relief operations. Finally, the combined effect of

an inward-looking and unilateralist U.S. attitude with weakened

support for and credibility of NATO could fragment the Atlantic

Alliance, leading to the renationalization of European security

agendas. None of these outcomes is in U.S. national interests.


Nor is there any guarantee that minimizing the use of force

will continue to contain the conflict within the borders of the

former Yugoslavia, much less within Bosnian territory. As recent

ethnic Serb attacks on the eastern Muslim enclaves and Croatian

seizure of the Krajina region amply demonstrate, a high

likelihood exists that the war can expand quickly. Should

Belgrade choose to come to the aid of ethnic Serbs in Bosnia or

decide to expand the conflict into Slavonia while Croatian forces

are preoccupied in the Krajina, the war could escalate rapidly.

And, as indicated earlier, a rising tide of ethnic Serb refugees

into Kosovo has also exacerbated already high tensions in that

explosive region. Thus, a number of scenarios are possible for

events in the region to spin out of control.

If the United States opts to continue existing policies

eschewing military force, then it will be limited to economic and

diplomatic initiatives. Such efforts have not yet yielded

substantial results at the bargaining table (although the

cumulative toll is substantial).52 This leads to two options for

further efforts. On the one hand, U.S. and European negotiators

could continue trying to isolate Bosnian Serbs by inducing

Milosevic's cooperation in more strictly enforcing the existing

embargo in return for temporarily lifting economic sanctions

against Serbia. The Contact Group, however, can agree on neither

the terms for the Serbian side of the deal nor on how long

sanctions might be lifted.53 Even if consensus could be achieved

within the Contact Group, there is little historical evidence

that Milosevic will deliver his part of the bargain.

The other option, therefore, is for the United States and

its allies and partners to strengthen the existing embargo of

Serbia and Montenegro, and use economic warfare to force Belgrade

and Pale to change their course. This would require adding to the

commodities prohibited, making the embargo more impermeable, and

subsidizing states (Hungary, Italy, and the Balkan states)

negatively affected by the increased sanctions.54 Given the split

within the Contact Group and the unlikelihood of economic

subsidies, this option offers little prospect for success. That

having been said, if the United States and its allies continue to

eschew the application of decisive military power in conjunction

with economic and diplomatic efforts, it may be the only option

available that has any chance for long-term success.


Of course, diplomatic and economic initiatives may not force

the warring parties and their supporters to yield. Indeed, such

efforts may spur them to escalate the conflict within BosniaHercegovina. At that point, the United States and its NATO allies

might be left with lifting the arms embargo against Bosnia as

their only recourse. But, lifting the embargo is likely to draw

swift Bosnian Serb, and perhaps Serbian, response (e.g., renewed

ethnic cleansing, violation of safe havens, and hostage taking).

If the United States and its NATO allies are not prepared to take

steps to forestall such potential Serb actions (such as air

strikes, supplying the Bosnians with equipment, and providing

training), lifting the arms embargo will be little more than, in

the words of U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Madeleine

Albright, "a feel-good option."55 Ignoring the arms embargo of

Bosnia also could lead to a broader war between Croatia and

Serbia, or to conflict in Kosovo that could draw Albania,

Macedonia, Greece, and their neighbors into a general Balkan war.

Beyond the likely deadly results inside Bosnia, lifting the

arms embargo would have severe repercussions throughout Europe.

Unless the United States is able to build consensus within NATO

for such an option, it has the potential to disrupt U.S.

relations with its key European allies. Moreover, Britain and

France, the nations that bear the largest portion of the UNPROFOR

burden, have threatened to remove their contingents in the event

the United States no longer complies with the arms embargo of

Bosnia.56 Undoubtedly, UNPROFOR would collapse, and the United

States would have to make good on its pledge to provide ground

forces to assist in UNPROFOR's withdrawal. Finally, Russia has

threatened to defy the trade sanctions regime against Serbia

should the United States unilaterally overturn the arms embargo

of Bosnia.57 Such an outcome would have obvious effects on U.S.-

Russian, as well as European-Russian relations.

Potential Consequences of an Increased U.S. Military Role.

Writing in the 19th century, Antoine Henri Jomini warned

that, "Wars of opinion . . . originating in religious or

political beliefs, are the most deplorable for they enlist the

worst passions and become vindictive, cruel, and terrible."58

Jomini went on to state that, "No army, however disciplined, can

contend successfully against such resistance unless it be strong


enough to hold all the essential points of the country, cover its

communications, and at the same time furnish an active force

sufficient to beat the enemy wherever he may present himself."59

It is far better, according to Jomini, to let time be "the true

remedy for all bad passions . . . to attempt to restrain such a

mob by force is to attempt to restrain the explosion of a mine

when the powder has already been ignited: it is far better to

await the explosion and afterward fill up the crater."60

Should the United States choose to exert greater levels of

military force in the region, the consequences could be, in our

time, just as significant as they were in Jomini's day. In the

near term, increased involvement will remove the veil of

impartiality in the eyes of the belligerents, for regardless of

how evenhanded the United States and its allies try to be, the

perception will be that they have chosen sides–against the

Bosnian Serbs. The United States also runs the risk of involving

itself in an asymmetric conflict (i.e., the United States

perceives such involvement to be of a limited nature, while the

current belligerents see themselves engaged in a total war of

survival), a circumstance which has caused the United States much

agony in the past.61 Moreover, the conflict would divert U.S.

attentions, energies, and resources away from other, equally

pressing issues and initiatives–domestic and external. Finally,

national leaders must reckon with the potential for loss of life

and expenditure of national treasure.

Longer-term consequences are equally daunting. U.S.

policymakers must understand that increased military involvement

in the ongoing conflict indicates, de facto at least, a U.S.

willingness to uphold a Balkan security order. Decisionmakers

must look, therefore, beyond the confines of the existing crisis

in Bosnia-Hercegovina and examine issues in a broader context.

For example, does U.S. intervention to establish the territorial

integrity of Bosnia-Hercegovina extend to border guarantees for

Albania or Macedonia, and what would be the repercussions in

Serbia or Greece? What does supporting the self-determination of

Bosnians mean for ethnic Serbs in Bosnia or for ethnic rights in

Kosovo or Vojvodina or for minorities in Macedonia?

Expanded U.S. military involvement in the Balkans may also

risk increasing friction with Russia. Such an outcome could have

consequences not only in the Balkans, but throughout Europe or


globally.62 That said, other issues impinging on U.S.-Russian

relations may also contribute to such an outcome.63 Hence, the

United States must be aware of potential Russian consequences,

but not necessarily be severely circumscribed by them.

Enlarged U.S. military participation in the conflict also

opens a host of post-conflict questions that require forethought.

Will the United States assist in the apprehension and prosecution

of war criminals? What will be the U.S. role in the repatriation

of peoples and compensation? Will the United States facilitate

the mass exchange of populations and the establishment of

"ethnically pure" states? To what extent will the United States

assist in the development and funding of a comprehensive Balkan

aid package to assist in post-conflict reconstruction?64

Finally, should the United States be unable to sustain an

internal consensus for the prolonged deployment of U.S. forces in

the region, are policymakers prepared for the potential

consequences? Premature removal of U.S. forces from peacekeeping

operations would undermine U.S. credibility throughout the world,

not just in the Balkans or Europe, as the "demonstration effect"

of failure might encourage other states or groups to test U.S.

resolve.65 Such an outcome would also have a similar effect on the

credibility of the United Nations and NATO, two institutions that

loom large in the U.S. global security architecture.66 Key allies

within NATO might question the level of U.S. commitment to

Europe, with repercussions that extend to U.S. interests

elsewhere in the world (e.g., the Middle East). Finally, a U.S.

withdrawal may add impetus to the rising tide of "neoisolationism" or unilateralism in the United States that will

further undermine U.S. support of international institutions,

which one must emphasize, generally serve U.S. interests.

CONCLUSIONS

As the foregoing discussion indicates, there are no easy

alternatives for U.S. policymakers to pursue in their efforts to

resolve the ongoing war in the former Yugoslavia. Each has its

pluses and minuses; each is fraught with risk–including staying

on the present course. But, while the war is complex, confusing,

and appears intractable, the United States should not be deterred

from seeking potential solutions. In fact, the severity of

potential consequences should drive U.S. policymakers to take an


even more proactive role in conflict resolution efforts, for much

more is at stake than simply the fighting in Bosnia.

Should the fighting spill over the borders of the former

Yugoslavia, for example, the stability and security of the entire

Balkan peninsula may be at risk. This disequilibrium could set

back the development of newly emerging market-based democracies

in the region that have struggled successfully, to date, to

change their national and international behavior. An expanded war

also would likely involve Greece and Turkey–two key U.S. and NATO

allies, probably on opposite sides. The ramifications for Balkan

security and NATO would be significant.

Instability in the Balkans naturally influences security

within the remainder of Europe. Most immediately, a massive

exchange of populations could generate a wave of refugees that

destabilizes the region. Of greater importance, perhaps,

prolonged strife in the Balkans could strain relations between

Western Europe and Russia, as well as between the United States

and Russia. This could lead to a nationalization of security

agendas throughout Eastern Europe, which would have cascading

effects for security agendas in Central and Western Europe, as

well.

Continued war in the Balkans also holds significant

potential to increase strains within NATO. As discussed above,

differences with key NATO allies over the course of policy

regarding Bosnia already have placed a heavy strain on relations

within the Alliance. These tensions could be exacerbated by

continued stagnation of the peace process, escalation of the

fighting to include Greece and Turkey, or the withdrawal of

British, French, or other NATO forces from UNPROFOR.

Increased strains within NATO could spur European efforts to

build a Common Security and Foreign Policy based on the European

Union and a European Security and Defense Identity based on the

Western European Union. Either result would reduce the U.S.

ability to influence events in Europe–especially if combined with

a withering of NATO; an outcome certainly not in long-term U.S.

interests.

Continued conflict in the former Yugoslavia is also likely

to diminish support within the United States for substantial U.S.


engagement in international affairs. The apparent ineffectualness

of the United Nations, and the intramural squabbling within NATO

could undermine U.S. public support for both of those key

security organizations; thereby undercutting the larger role

anticipated for these institutions in supporting and promoting

U.S. security interests.

The inability of the United States to shape a resolution of

the war in the former Yugoslavia is likely to have additional

indirect consequences for U.S. global security interests. Should

nations question the depth of U.S. commitment to security and

stability or its willingness to confront aggression, U.S.

influence might be undermined in key areas of the world. At the

same time, potential opponents might perceive that they could

challenge U.S. interests at low levels without fear of penalty.

At the very least, subnational and transnational groups may draw

the lesson that they have a fairly free hand to pursue their

agendas in this new security order. If combined, these phenomena

could have a "snowball" effect that contributes to a downward

spiral of U.S. influence abroad. Eventually, the United States

might find its deterrent capability sufficiently eroded that an

adversary might directly confront major U.S. interests.

Whether a creative and decisive application of U.S. military

power could contribute to a satisfactory conclusion to the war

without causing more harm than good is unknown and probably

unknowable at this juncture. In the wake of its experiences in

Korea, Vietnam, Lebanon, and Somalia, the United States

understands that there are limits to what even great powers can

accomplish. Memories of these ordeals, especially when combined

with the frustrations resulting from past efforts to resolve the

apparently intractable Balkan tragedy, temper any inclination to

use military power.

Continued frustration at apparently ineffective economic and

diplomatic initiatives, and a reluctance to use military power to

force a resolution of the crisis might tempt the United States to

withdraw from efforts to end the fighting. But the United States

cannot simply throw up its collective hands and walk away.

Frustrating as the crisis in the Balkans may be, and even if new

efforts fall short, the larger issues involved require continued

U.S. engagement. The consequences for U.S. European and global

security interests are too great.


Moreover, the first major setback of the war for ethnic

Serbs has changed conditions sufficiently to offer an opening for

flexible and innovative approaches to end the fighting. This is a

welcome opportunity and the United States must make the most of

it.

Because so much is at stake, the United States must use this

opportunity to reassess its policies for ending the war in

Bosnia. This reassessment must take into account not only the

changed conditions on the ground in the former Yugoslavia, but

also larger U.S. European and global security interests. This may

require, for example, that the United States reconsider whether

continued pursuit of the goal of restoring the territorial

integrity of Bosnia-Hercegovina serves either its short-term

objective of stopping the fighting or long-term U.S. European and

global security interests. In short, while it may be simplistic

to say it, any decisions concerning further U.S. involvement in

the Bosnian war must be framed in light of the broader

consequences, and not simply to accommodate exigencies of the

day.

ENDNOTES

1. The United States began participating in maritime

enforcement in July 1992. U.S. participation in Operation SKY

MONITOR began in October 1992, and became Operation DENY FLIGHT

in April 1993. U.S aircraft supporting NATO operations shot down

four Serbian aircraft in February 1994. The first close air

support missions occurred in March 1993. U.S. soldiers first

deployed to Macedonia under Operation ABLE SENTRY in July 1993.

2. The quotation is taken from Press Statement by the

Secretary General Following North Atlantic Council Meeting on

July 25, 1995, NATO Information Service, p. 1, as evidenced by

the waves of NATO airstrikes and the high U.S. level of

participation that commenced on August 29, 1995.

3. See, e.g., Ann Devroy and Bradley Graham, "Seeking to

Reassure Europe, Clinton Alarmed Congress," The Washington Post,

June 5, 1995, p. 1.

4. For example, a broad coalition of 27 groups that normally


support only peaceful initiatives has called for U.S. and western

military forces to protect the remaining Bosnian "safe havens"

and to take military action to ensure the delivery of

humanitarian aid in Bosnia. Dana Priest, "Coalition Calls for

Action in Bosnia," The Washington Post, August 1, 1995, p. 14.

5. Potential "carrots" include a land swap that would favor

each side, lifting sanctions against Serbia, and a "mini-Marshall

Plan" for Bosnia. "Sticks" include, if Serbs refuse, lifting the

arms embargo against Bosnia and replacing UNPROFOR with NATO

troops. Should the Bosnians refuse to accede to the terms of the

plan, UNPROFOR could be withdrawn and the embargo lifted against

all sides. See various reports in e.g., Ann Devroy, "Europeans

Respond Favorably to Ideas for Bosnia Settlement, Clinton Is

Told," The Washington Post, August 16, 1995, pp. 1, 26; and "U.S.

Talks with Serb President ‘Useful,'" The Washington Times, August

18, 1995, p. 13.

6. The United States first announced it would provide

peacekeeping forces in the wake of a negotiated settlement in

February 1993. See, for instance, Elaine Sciolino, "U.S. Backs

Bosnian Peace Plan; Serbs May Keep Occupied Land," The New York

Times, February 11, 1993, p. A1. The numbers of troops have

fluctuated, but 25,000 has been articulated since September 1993.

See, e.g., John Lancaster and Daniel Williams, "U.S. Shapes Terms

For Role in Bosnia," The Washington Post, September 26, 1993, p.

A1. Changes in the situation in Bosnia and Croatia may reduce the

required U.S. commitment. See Eric Schmitt, "Fortunes of Bosnian

War Ease U.S. Military Tasks," The New York Times, August 21,

1995, p. 6; and "Administration Retreats from Troop Plan for

Bosnia," The Washington Post, August 28, 1995, p. A24.

7. Administration officials have begun to hint that U.S.

troops will be dispatched to the region in 1996, either to assist

in an UNPROFOR withdrawal or to implement a peace settlement.

Schmitt, "Fortunes of Bosnian War Ease, U.S. Military Tasks," p.

6.

8. A National Security Strategy of Engagement and

Enlargement, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,

February 1995, p. 1.

9. Ibid., pp. 2 and 24, respectively.


10. Ibid., p. 3.

11. Ibid., pp. 25-28.

12. Ibid., p. ii.

13. Ibid., p. 7.

14. Ibid., p. 8.

15. Ibid., p. ii.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid., p. 25.

18. Granted, U.S. Army forces are engaged in a preventive

deployment in Macedonia, and the Clinton administration has

promised to provide forces to oversee peacekeeping operations in

Bosnia or to help extract UNPROFOR from Bosnia. But, the

administration is adamantly opposed to deploying U.S. ground

forces except under stringent conditions. See, for example,

President Clinton's recent statement in President Clinton, "The

Risk of ‘Americanizing' the War," Newsweek, August 7, 1995, p.

40: "From the beginning of my presidency, I have refused to cross

that line [‘a massive NATO commitment, including U.S. ground

forces'], and I will continue to do so." And, importantly, there

has been some wavering within Washington on the number of troops

that might be required to support an UNPROFOR withdrawal. See,

Thomas E. Ricks and Carla Anne Robbins, "Pentagon Officials Say

Fewer Troops May Be Needed for U.N Bosnia Pullout," The Wall

Street Journal, July 20, 1995, pp. 1, 2. Nor are U.S. European

allies convinced of the depth of U.S. commitment. See, e.g.,

William Drozdiak, "Allies Set to Prod U.S. Into Role in Bosnia,"

The Washington Post, July 19, 1995, p. 1, 17.

19. As Clausewitz cautions policymakers. See Karl von

Clausewitz, On War, ed. and translated by Michael Howard and

Peter Paret, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976, p. 81.

20. Even within the Contact Group, which nominally has

achieved consensus on its current peace plan, individual members


do not universally share U.S. goals. Britain and France appear

more intent on halting the fighting sufficiently to facilitate

the withdrawal of their forces. Germany is unwilling to provide

substantial military forces, and has taken a largely pro-Croatian

stance. Russia, on the other hand, has consistently and openly

supported Serbia. Increasingly, the United States has assumed

what many perceive to be a pro-Bosnian position.

21. One need only look as far as congressional opposition to

the participation of U.S. ground forces at the current levels of

violence. See, e.g., Michael Dobbs, "Dole, Gingrich Attack Use of

Pentagon Funds for U.N. Reaction Force," The Washington Post,

June 30, 1995, p. 20; William Branigin, "U.N. Vote on New Bosnia

Force Delayed by Republican Concerns," The Washington Post, June

16, 1995, p. 29; and Art Pine and Doyle McManus, "U.S. Support

for New Rapid Reaction Force in Bosnia Wanes," Los Angeles Times

(Washington ed.), June 15, 1995, p. 4.

22. Michael Dobbs, "Serbs May Have Dealt a Death Blow to

U.N. Peacekeeping," The Washington Post, July 12, 1995, p. 15;

and Eric Schmitt, "U.S. and NATO Face Unhappy Choices for U.N.

Force in the Balkans," The New York Times, July 12, 1995, pp. 1,

6.

23. Steven Greenhouse, "U.S. Presses Bosnian Rivals to

Accept New Peace Plan," The New York Times, August 15, 1995, p.

10; Devroy, "Europeans Respond Favorably to Ideas for Bosnia

Settlement, Clinton is Told," pp. 1, 26, and Francois

Raitberger, "U.S. Plan Adds Force of Muslim Nations," The

Washington Times, August 16, 1995, p. 10.

24. A National Security Strategy of Engagement and

Enlargement, p. 25.

25. Given the massive population shifts already accomplished

or underway, a large-scale post-hostilities population exchange

may be unnecessary. See, e.g., Richard Gross, "Refugees Creating

Ethnic States," The Washington Times, August 14, 1995, p. 1. That

said, such shifts may only establish the basis for future

irredentist movements.

26. Rene Albrecht-Carrie, A Diplomatic History of Europe,

rev. ed., New York: Harper and Row, 1973, p. 4; and Derek Mc Kay


and H.M. Scott, The Rise of the Great Powers, 1648-1815, London:

Longmans, 1983, p. 8. The concept of the fundamental importance

of the territorial integrity of the nation-state was reconfirmed

formally as late as 1975 in the Helsinki Final Act. See Helsinki

Final Act, Questions Relating to Security in Europe, Articles I,

III, and IV. Moreover, A National Security Strategy of Engagement

and Enlargement, p. ii, stipulates that the United States will

continue to support the principle that national borders and

national sovereignty should remain intact.

27. See, for instance, Christine Spolar, "Yugoslav Tanks,

Artillery Move to Croatian Border," The Washington Post, August

9, 1995, p. 15; and James Rupert, "Croatia Claims Victory in Serb

Breakaway Region," The Washington Post, August 8, 1995, p. 1.

28. Estimates indicate 405,000 refugees in Serbia or Serbian

held land, and 385,000 in Croatia. Gross, "Refugees Creating

Ethnic States." Total refugee figures are not known. Estimates in

1992, after the first year of the war, indicated over 630,000

refugees. (Bill Frelick, Yugoslavia Torn Asunder: Lessons for

Protecting Refugees From Civil War, Washington, DC: U.S.

Committee for Refugees, 1992, p. 1.) These figures are in

addition to refugees living outside the former Yugoslavia that

are estimated to exceed 530,000 (United Nations Press Release REF

95-08-11, p. 1).

29. John Pomfret, "Refugees Straining Muslim-Croat Pact,"

The Washington Post, July 27, 1995, p. 30.

30. For reports of ethnic cleansing in Banja Luka region,

see, e.g., Raymond Bonner, "Croats Bid Tearful Farewell to Serbheld City in Bosnia," The New York Times, August 18, 1995, p. 4.

31. Jane Perlez, for example, estimates approximately

200,000 ethnic Serb refugees from the Krajina region. Jane

Perlez, "Bosnian Serbs, Angry at Setback and Tired of War, Blame

Leaders," The New York Times, August 14, 1995, p. 1. This figure

is an increase from an estimate of 150,000 on August 11, 1995,

and totals may continue to rise. See Jane Perlez, "Croatian Serbs

Blame Belgrade for Their Rout," The New York Times, August 11,

1995, p. 1.

32. For examples of bitterness, see Ibid., and Christine


Spolar, "Milosevic Faces Charges of Betrayal Over Loss of Serb

Area in Croatia," The Washington Post, August 10, 1995, p. 22.

33. Llazar Semini, "Albania Warns Serbia on Kosovo," The

Washington Post, August 16, 1995, p. 26. If Albania were drawn

into the conflict, it is highly likely that Macedonia and,

possibly, Greece and Turkey would enter the fray, precipitating a

general Balkan war.

34. "Germany Calls For EU Quota for Refugees" in Foreign

Broadcast Information Service (FBIS)-WEU-95-152, p. 1.

35. Segodnya, Moscow, May 26, 1995, in FBIS-SOV-95-102, May

26, 1995, p. 5; "Russia and US Split on NATO's Roles in Bosnia,"

Financial Times, June 8, 1995, pp. 1, 14. Aleksandr Zotov,

President Yeltsin's special envoy to the group, recently

remarked that the Contact Group is divided, cannot agree on a

peace plan, and, because it works on consensus, no one can impose

a solution. Vecernje Novosti, Belgrade, FBIS-SOV-95-099, May 23,

1995, pp. 8-9.

36. Reference to the Suez Crisis is taken from Henry

Kissinger, "Expand NATO Now," The Washington Post, December 19,

1994, p. A27.

37. "Russia, Germany Slam Embargo Vote," The Washington

Times, August 3, 1995, p. 17; Dobbs, "Serbs May Have Dealt a

Death Blow to U.N. Peacekeeping," and Schmitt, "U.S. and NATO

Face Unhappy Choices for U.N. Force in the Balkans," pp. 1, 6.

38. See, e.g., Daniel Williams, "In Policy Switch, U.S. Puts

Bosnia Aside to Preserve Alliance," The Washington Post, November

30, 1994, p. A32.; and Michael R. Gordon, "U.S. In Shift, Gives

Up Its Talk of Tough Action Against Serbs," The Washington Post,

November 29, 1994, p. A1.

39. A discussion of the ends, ways, and means model is found

in Arthur F. Lykke, Jr., "Toward an Understanding of Military

Strategy," in Military Strategy: Theory and Application, Arthur

F. Lykke, Jr., ed., Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College,

1993, pp. 3-8.

40. For details of the French initiative and U.S. reactions,


see Craig R. Whitney, "Disunity Imperils French Proposal for

Bosnia Force," The New York Times, July 18, 1995, p. 1; Eric

Schmitt, "U.S. Sees French Plan as Nudging It to the Brink of

War," The New York Times, July 18, 1995, p. 7; Ann Devroy and

Michael Dobbs, "U.S.: Unity Must Precede Balkan Action," The

Washington Post, July 18, 1995, p. 17; and Drozdiak, "Allies Set

to Prod U.S. Into Role in Bosnia, " p. 1. For the "Catch-22"

predicament, see Rick Atkinson, "Near Catastrophe Forced West to

Prop Up U.N. in Bosnia," The Washington Post, July 30, 1995, p.

23.

41. For allied influence on President Clinton's decision to

veto legislation directing that the United States unilaterally

lift the arms embargo against Bosnia, see Clinton, "The Risk of

‘Americanizing' the War," p. 40.

42. A National Security Strategy of Engagement and

Enlargement, pp. 12-13. The hierarchy of interests conforms to

those laid out by Donald Nuechterlein in America Overcommitted,

United States National Interests in the 1980s, Lexington:

University of Kentucky Press, 1985, Chapter I: "National Interest

as a Basis of Foreign Policy Formulation." The Clinton

administration has maintained a consistent position on the

critical issues of when and how military forces should be

deployed. Compare The Clinton Administration's Policy on

Performing Multilateral Peace Operations, May 4, 1994, pp. 3-5; A

National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement,

Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 1994, pp.

10, 13-14; and A National Security Strategy of Engagement and

Enlargement, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,

February 1995, pp. 12-13 and 16-17.

43. A National Security Strategy of Engagement and

Enlargement, p. 13.

44. Ibid.

45. Ibid.

46. Robert S. Mc Namara (with Brian Van De Mark), In

Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam, New York: Times

Books, 1995, pp. 331-332.


47. Katharine Q. Seelye, "Many in Congress Reluctant To

Widen U.S. Role in Bosnia," The New York Times, June 2, 1995, p.

1; Pine and McManus, "US Support of New Rapid-Reaction Force in

Bosnia Wanes," p. 4; and Barbara Crossette, "Washington Seeks

Delay on Expanding U.N. Force in Bosnia," The New York Times,

June 14, 1995, pp. 1, 15.

48. Bruce George, MP, and John Borawski, "Continental

Drift," European Security, Vol. IV, No. 1, Spring 1995, pp. 1-2.

49. George C. Herring, "America and Vietnam: The Unending

War," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 5, Winter 1991, pp. 1-2.

50. Richard H. Schultz, Jr. and William J. Olson, Ethnic and

Religious Conflict: Emerging Threat to U.S. Security, Washington,

DC: National Strategy Information Service, 1994, p. 42.

51. George and Borawski, "Continental Drift," pp. 1-2.

52. See, for example, the discussion of the differences in

Croatian and Serbian economies and standards of living in John

Pomfret and Christine Spolar, "Croatian Drive Turns Tables on

Serbians," The Washington Post, August 22, 1995, p. 1.

53. Steven Greenhouse, "U.S. Still Opposes European Plan for

Bosnia," The New York Times, August 4, 1995, p. A3. Carl Bildt,

the EU negotiator recommends a nine month suspension of the

sanctions against Serbia, while the United States argues for no

more than two or three months. Also, significantly under the

Bildt plan, sanctions could not be reimposed for at least nine

months, even if Milosevic reneges on his promises.

54. Otherwise those states will only more loudly call for

ending the embargo. Budapest, Nepszabadsag, in Hungarian, May 23,

1995, FBIS-EEU-95-101, May 25, 1995, pp. 8-9, for Hungary's

burden from the embargo.

55. John Pomfret and Dana Priest, "Bosnia Force May Be Used

This Week," The Washington Post, June 5, 1995, p. 1.

56. See, e.g., Dobbs, "Serbs May Have Dealt a Death Blow to

U.N. Peacekeeping," p. 15, and Schmitt, "U.S. and NATO Face

Unhappy Choices for U.N. Force in the Balkans," pp. 1, 6.


57. Lee Hockstader, "Yeltsin Threatens to Defy Yugoslav

Trade Embargo," The Washington Post, August 11, 1995, p. 30.

58. Jomini and His Summary of the Art of War, J. D. Hittle,

ed., Harrisburg, PA: The Telegraph Press, 1947, pp. 47-48.

59. Ibid., p. 51.

60. Ibid., pp. 48-49.

61. As the U.S. experiences in Korea, Vietnam, Lebanon, and

Somalia demonstrate.

62. For example, within the ongoing crisis the Russians have

resisted any increase in the use of force. Moreover, friction

over the Balkans extends into pan-European issues, such as NATO's

Partnership for Peace initiative and NATO enlargement. See,

Lenard Cohen, "Russia and the Balkans: Pan-Slavism, Partnership,

and Power, International Journal, Vol. 46, No. 4, Autumn 1994, p.

844; and Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev's statement in Kozyrev

Welcomes U.S. Role in Bosnia Peacekeeping," in FBIS-SOV- 95-106,

June 2, 1995, p. 9.

63. For example, Russian actions in Chechnya and Moldova,

events in the Transcaucasus, CFE Treaty implementation,

implementation of START I Treaty; ratification of START II

Treaty; or NATO enlargement.

64. Substantial reconstruction aid is an incentive contained

in the latest U.S. peace plan. See, e.g., Greenhouse" "U.S.

Presses Bosnian Rivals to Accept Peace Plan," p. 10, and "U.S.

Talks with Serb President Useful," p. 13.

65. Schultz and Olson, Ethnic and Religious Conflict:

Emerging Threat to U.S. Security, p. 42.

66. "The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming

Multilateral Peace Operations," pp. 1-2, and A National Security

Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, p. 26, respectively.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Richard A. Chilcoat

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Colonel Richard H. Witherspoon

Director of Research

Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr.

Authors

Dr. Stephen J. Blank

Dr. William T. Johnsen

Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr.

Editor

Mrs. Marianne P. Cowling

Secretary

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Mary Jane Semple

Cover Artist

Mr. James E. Kistler