Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-SC-1648 | February 28, 2019 Page 1 of 16

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

David A. Singleton

Chad E. Romey

BLACKBURN & GREEN

Fort Wayne, Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE

Kelly A. Roth

AMERICAN FAMILY INSURANCE 

LEGAL DEPARTMENT

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

David Martin,

Appellant-Plaintiff,

v.

Jose Ramos,

Appellee-Defendant.

February 28, 2019

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-SC-1648

Appeal from the Allen Superior 

Court

The Honorable Craig J. Bobay, 

Judge

The Honorable Thomas P. Boyer, 

Magistrate

Trial Court Cause No.

02D01-1801-SC-1548

Bailey, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-SC-1648 | February 28, 2019 Page 2 of 16

Case Summary

[1] David Martin (“Martin”) filed a Notice of Claim in the Allen Superior Court 

Small Claims Division, alleging that he had sustained physical injuries in a 

vehicular collision with Jose Ramos (“Ramos”). The trial court found Ramos 

to be 100% at fault for the collision but denied Martin damages, concluding that 

Martin had not established causation. Martin filed a motion to correct error, 

which was denied, and he now appeals. We reverse and remand.

Issues

[2] Martin presents two restated issues for review:

I. Whether expert medical testimony is unnecessary in small 

claims proceedings designed to administer justice 

expediently; and

II. Whether the trial court misapplied the law in determining 

that Martin had not established causation.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Martin filed a Notice of Claim on January 30, 2018. A bench trial was 

conducted on April 30, 2018 but it was not recorded. Pursuant to Indiana 

Appellate Rule 31, the trial court certified a Statement of Evidence.1 We derive 

 

1

Indiana Appellate Rule 31(A) provides in part: “If no Transcript of all or part of the evidence is available, a 

party or the party’s attorney may prepare a verified statement of the evidence from the best available sources, 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-SC-1648 | February 28, 2019 Page 3 of 16

our recitation of facts from that Statement of Evidence, which provides in 

relevant part:

The Plaintiff testified that he was stopped while traveling on 

West Creighton Avenue in Fort Wayne, Indiana, when his 

vehicle was struck from the rear by a vehicle being driven by the 

Defendant, Jose Ramos.

Plaintiff further testified that he received treatment as a result of 

the collision at Lutheran Hospital, where he complained of pain 

in the following areas:

a. at the base of the left side of the skull;

b. along the left side of his neck;

c. in the center of his neck;

d. in the mid axillary region under his left arm; and

e. in his left shoulder.

He rated his pain as a seven (7) out of ten (10), with ten being the 

greatest amount of pain.

Plaintiff further testified that a CT scan of his cervical spine 

showed some preexisting conditions. He testified that he had 

 

which may include the party’s or the attorney’s recollection. The party shall then file a motion to certify the 

statement of evidence with the trial court[.]”
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-SC-1648 | February 28, 2019 Page 4 of 16

experienced pain in his neck prior to the wreck, but the wreck 

caused increased pain for a period of time.

Prior to discharge from Lutheran Hospital, the Plaintiff had to be 

cleared by a neurosurgeon, Dr. Jeffrey Kachmann, because the 

CT scan of his head showed “left front post traumatic 

subarachnoid hemorrhage.”

Plaintiff was released from the hospital after agreeing that he was 

required to have someone with him at all times. Dr. Kachmann 

told the Plaintiff to be on guard for any possible neurological 

changes, including seizures, weakness, numbness, or tingling in 

the legs. Plaintiff testified that this warning made him very 

worried as he left the hospital.

Plaintiff testified that he later visited Parkview Physicians Group 

on January 11, 2017, due to ongoing back pain and neck stiffness 

since the collision. His pain was achy generally, but sharp if he 

bent forward. The pain was underneath his shoulder blades 

toward the middle of the back. He also complained of sharp pain 

in his left arm when he reached backwards. He was told to 

return in four weeks, but his pain remained intense and he 

returned on January 26 with continued complaints of neck pain. 

His back pain had improved by that time, but then flared again 

which caused him to visit Parkview Hospital on March 25, 2017.

Plaintiff admitted he did have some pre-existing conditions, but 

that the collision aggravated those symptoms for a period of time. 

Overall, his symptoms went on for two (2) or three (3) months, 

after which the Plaintiff return[ed] to his baseline condition.

Plaintiff admitted that in the past he had participated in various 

sporting activities and sustained injuries.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-SC-1648 | February 28, 2019 Page 5 of 16

Plaintiff admitted that he suffers from bipolar disorder and 

receives Medicare benefits.

Defendant admitted that he was at fault in causing the rear-end 

vehicle collision with Plaintiff.

Defendant testified that he was traveling at five (5) to ten (10) 

miles per hour at the time of the collision.

Defendant testified that Plaintiff and Defendant spoke to each 

other moments after the collision, and that Plaintiff did not make 

any complaints of pain at that time.

Statement of Evidence, pgs. 1-2. Martin also submitted his medical records into 

evidence.

[4] On May 14, 2018, the trial court entered an order providing in pertinent part:

On December 8, 2016, Plaintiff was involved in an automobile 

collision on Lafayette Street. Defendant was 100% at fault in 

causing the collision.

It is Plaintiff’s contention that the collision caused injuries 

(damages) to his head, neck, chest, back, and shoulder.

Plaintiff has the burden of proving by a reasonable medical 

probability that the collision caused his injuries. Topp v. Laffers, 

838 N.E.2d 1027 (Ind. App. 2005).

Prior to December 8, 2016, Plaintiff had a history of injuries to 

his neck and back regions.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-SC-1648 | February 28, 2019 Page 6 of 16

The results of Plaintiff’s CT scans and X-rays taken on December 

8, 2016 reflect multilevel degenerative changes in his cervical 

spine and mild arthritic changes in his left shoulder.

The injuries that Plaintiff claims were caused by the collision are 

subjective in nature. A subjective complaint or injury is 

perceived or experienced by the patient and reported to the 

patient’s doctor but is not directly observable by the doctor. 

Foddrill v. Crane, 894 N.E.2d 1070 (Ind. App. 2008).

In order to establish causation based on the facts and 

circumstances of this case Plaintiff needs an expert medical 

opinion. Daub v. Daub, 629 N.E.2d 873 (Ind. App. 1994); Topp v. 

Laffers, 838 N.E.2d 1027 (Ind. App. 2005).

The medical records submitted into evidence and Plaintiff’s lay 

testimony regarding his injuries are not sufficient to establish 

within a reasonable medical probability that the collision on 

December 8, 2016 caused injuries to Plaintiff.

Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of proof on the issue of 

causation.

Appealed Order at 1.

[5] Martin filed a motion to correct error. He contended that the trial court had 

erroneously relied upon Topp and Daub “to determine that [he] needed to 

present expert medical opinion to establish causation” because those decisions 

involved jury trials. (App. at 92.) Martin also argued, “although a plaintiff in a 

small claims case still has the burden of proof for his claims, the evidentiary 

standard to meet that burden of proof cannot be equated to the standard 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-SC-1648 | February 28, 2019 Page 7 of 16

applicable in a jury setting; otherwise, the entire purpose of the small claims 

process would be defeated.” Id. at 93-94. The motion to correct error was 

denied. Martin appeals. 

Discussion and Decision

Standard of Review

[6] Small claims judgments are “subject to review as prescribed by relevant Indiana 

rules and statutes.” Ind. Small Claims Rule 11(A). Martin had the burden of 

proof on his small claims action and now appeals a negative judgment. When a 

party appeals from a negative judgment, we will reverse only if the decision of 

the trial court is contrary to law. LTL Truck Service, LLC v. Safeguard, Inc., 817 

N.E.2d 664, 667 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). A decision is contrary to law if the 

evidence and reasonable inferences lead to but one conclusion and the trial 

court has reached the opposite conclusion. Id. However, the deferential 

standard applied to findings of fact does not apply to the substantive rules of 

law, which are reviewed de novo. Hastetter v. Fetter Props., LLC, 873 N.E.2d 

679, 683 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).

Necessity for Expert Testimony in Small Claims

[7] Martin claims that “expert medical opinion is not necessary to prove causation 

of a subjective personal injury in a small claims action.” Appellant’s Brief at 

15. He points out that small claims proceedings are intended to be informal, 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-SC-1648 | February 28, 2019 Page 8 of 16

cost-effective, and expedient, even if complex issues are presented. In sum, he 

asserts that:

Requiring expert medical opinion in a small claims action is 

contrary to public policy because it will defeat the purpose of the 

small claims court; it will create a chilling effect on those 

plaintiffs with small claims for subjective injuries; it will 

unnecessarily increase the burden on superior and circuit courts; 

it will result in an unjust windfall to tortfeasors; and it will create 

confusion for both plaintiffs and defendants alike.

Id. at 23.

[8] Martin correctly observes that small claims proceedings are to be informal. 

Indiana Small Claims Rule 8(A) provides: “The trial shall be informal, with the 

sole objective of dispensing speedy justice between the parties according to the 

rules of substantive law, and shall not be bound by the statutory provisions or 

rules of practice, procedure, pleadings or evidence except provisions relating to 

privileged communications and offers of compromise.” Nonetheless, despite 

the informality of the proceedings, the parties in a small claims court bear the 

same burdens of proof as they would in a regular civil action on the same 

issues. LTL Truck Service, 817 N.E.2d at 668. Although “the method of proof 

may be informal, the relaxation of evidentiary rules is not the equivalent of 

relaxation of the burden of proof.” Id. Thus, it remains incumbent upon the 

party who bears the burden of proof to demonstrate that it is entitled to the 

recovery sought. Id. The burden of proof with respect to damages is with the 

plaintiff. Id. (citing Noble Roman’s, Inc. v. Ward, 760 N.E.2d 1132, 1140 (Ind. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-SC-1648 | February 28, 2019 Page 9 of 16

Ct. App. 2002)). Martin’s public-policy arguments are unavailing; he was 

required to prove his negligence claim without deviation from the substantive 

law. We turn to consideration of whether the trial court properly applied the 

law when it determined that Martin failed to meet his burden.

Establishment of Negligence Claim

[9] “The tort of negligence consists of three elements: (1) a duty owed to the 

plaintiff by the defendant; (2) a breach of that duty by the defendant; and (3) 

injury to the plaintiff proximately caused by that breach.” Kincade v. MAC 

Corp., 773 N.E.2d 909, 911 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). Ramos conceded, and the 

trial court found, that he was at fault for causing the collision. The third 

element was in dispute. In reliance upon Daub v. Daub, 629 N.E.2d 873 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 1994), trans. denied, and Topp v. Leffers, 838 N.E.2d 1027, 1033 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied (finding necessity of expert witness testimony when 

the issue of causation is not within the understanding of a layperson), the trial 

court concluded that Martin’s testimony and medical records were insufficient 

to establish causation. Martin argues that the trial court erroneously relied 

upon decisions that he views as “inapplicable because the concerns presented in 

those cases regarding a lay juror’s ability to comprehend medical evidence are 

not present in a small claims setting.” Appellant’s Brief at 15. He observes that 

small claims courts are routinely required to resolve complex issues.

[10] To the extent that Martin suggests the burden of proof is lessened in a small 

claims case, we have already rejected that contention. To the extent that he 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-SC-1648 | February 28, 2019 Page 10 of 16

suggests a small claims judge has specialized medical knowledge a layperson or 

juror does not, we find that argument unpersuasive. The trial court need not 

have disregarded the reasoning of Daub and Topp simply because the factfinders were jurors in those cases.

[11] That said, the cases do not create a rule of law that expert medical testimony is 

always required in personal injury cases. If a layperson can readily understand 

the causation, an expert opinion is not necessary. “An essential element in a 

cause of action for negligence is the requirement of a reasonable connection 

between a defendant’s conduct and the damages which a plaintiff has suffered.” 

Daub, 629 N.E.2d at 877. “When an injury is objective in nature, the plaintiff is 

competent to testify as to the injury and such testimony may be sufficient for 

the jury to render a verdict without expert medical testimony.” Id. But a 

“causal connection between a permanent condition, an injury, and a preexisting affliction or condition is a complicated medical question.” Topp, 838 

N.E.2d at 1033 (citing Daub, 629 N.E.2d at 877-78)). Expert testimony is 

needed then because a layperson is unable to understand causation in those 

circumstances. Id. 

[12] In Daub, Patricia Daub had slipped on snow and ice on her in-laws’ patio, 

feeling a jerk but not pain. See Daub, 629 N.E.2d at 877. The next day, she felt 

stiffening. She subsequently received chiropractic treatment and was 

hospitalized for ten days. She underwent two back surgeries, and then slipped 

and fell at a grocery store. Years earlier, she had been struck by a car and she 

had also sustained a whiplash injury. See id. Daub testified in the trial of her 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-SC-1648 | February 28, 2019 Page 11 of 16

personal injury action against her in-laws, but she was unable to distinguish 

between her various back problems. On appeal, we addressed the deficiency of 

her testimony relative to causation:

[I]t is so lacking in probative value on the question of cause in 

fact that it offers the jury at best only the mere possibility that her 

back ailment was in fact caused by the slip Mrs. Daub 

experienced at her in-laws. The distinctions between Mrs. 

Daubs’ various back problems are not objectively discernible, 

even to Mrs. Daub. The temporal congruity which Mrs. Daub 

recognized between the slip and her lower back pain is

admittedly some evidence of causation, which when coupled 

with a diagnosis of the nature of her ailment, and an application 

of scientific principles by one knowledgeable in the treatment of 

the ailment, may be sufficient to permit a jury to find for the 

Daubs without resort to speculation. But, in the absence of that 

additional evidence, Mrs. Daubs’ lay report of the facts which 

she experienced first-hand amounts to nothing more than her 

own hypothesis that her back ailment was caused by the slip. 

Alone, Mrs. Daub has established nothing more than the facts 

which make up her allegation.

Id. at 878.

[13] The Topp panel relied upon the reasoning of Daub and likewise concluded that 

the testimony of an expert medical witness was necessary to establish the 

element of causation in her claim for aggravation of pre-existing injuries. 838 

N.E.2d at 1033. Yvonne Topp was a passenger in a vehicle that was rearended; upon impact, she hit her head and experienced immediate intense pain. 

See Topp, 838 N.E.2d at 1029. The next day, she had pain in her neck and 

back. Topp, who had already been in several car accidents, sued for 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-SC-1648 | February 28, 2019 Page 12 of 16

aggravation of pre-existing injuries. Topp’s injuries were subjective in nature, 

rather than objective, because she perceived an injury and reported it to her 

doctor, but the injury was not one the doctor could observe. Id. at 1033.

[14] The Court discussed the necessary burden of proof:

Because Topp’s injuries were subjective in nature, her testimony 

alone was not sufficient to prove causation without expert 

medical testimony. Daub, 629 N.E.2d at 877. Furthermore, 

because of Topp’s pre-existing injuries, discerning the causal 

connection between the November 2000 accident and Topp’s

resulting injuries is a complicated medical question that is not 

within the understanding of a lay person. Id. at 877-78. 

Therefore, it was necessary for Topp to introduce the testimony 

of an expert medical witness on the issue of causation. Id. Here,

Topp did introduce testimony from expert witnesses[.] . . . A 

plaintiff’s burden may not be carried with evidence based merely 

upon supposition or speculation. Id. at 877. Evidence 

establishing a mere possibility of cause or which lacks reasonable 

certainty or probability is not sufficient evidence by itself to 

support a verdict. Id. 

Topp, 838 N.E.2d at 1033. Because Topp’s physicians could opine only that her 

injuries “possibly” or “may” have been aggravated in the accident, or had noted 

“apparent” aggravation, causation was not established. Id. at 1034.

[15] Martin asserts that his medical records indicate an objective injury – a “left 

front post traumatic subarachnoid hemorrhage.” Statement of the Evidence at 

2. The hemorrhage noted in Martin’s medical records was “observable by the 

doctor” and discoverable independent of a patient report. See Topp, 838 N.E.2d 

at 1033. As such, Martin documented an objective injury. The salient inquiry 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-SC-1648 | February 28, 2019 Page 13 of 16

was then whether the “occurrence was a cause in fact of his injury.” Smith v. 

Beaty, 639 N.E.2d 1029, 1033 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994). In some circumstances, 

causation may be demonstrated without a medical expert stating an opinion to 

a degree of medical certainty. Id. at 1034.

[16] In Smith, Larry Smith (“Smith”) had been involved in a rollover of his work van

and he was trapped inside when a semi-tractor trailer impacted the van, 

allowing Smith to extricate himself. See id. at 1031. Smith was treated for five 

fractured ribs. His physician could not say whether the rollover or the impact 

of the semi caused those injuries. On appeal from the grant of judgment on the 

evidence to the semi driver, a panel of this Court examined the availability of 

proving causation by circumstantial evidence:

Causation, or the requirement of a reasonable connection 

between a defendant’s conduct and the damages which a plaintiff 

has suffered, is an essential element in a negligence action. Daub 

v. Daub (1994), Ind. App., 629 N.E.2d 873, 877, trans. denied. ... 

Causation in a negligence case need not always be proven by 

expert testimony. See Barrow v. Talbott (1981), Ind. App., 417 

N.E.2d 917, 923 n.3. Causation may be proven by circumstantial 

evidence if the evidence has sufficient probative force to 

constitute a basis for a legal inference rather than mere 

speculation. Id. When the issue of causation is within the 

understanding of a lay person, testimony of an expert witness is 

not necessary. See Daub, 629 N.E.2d at 878 (causal connection 

between permanent condition, injury and pre-existing condition 

ordinarily a complicated medical question requiring expert 

opinion).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-SC-1648 | February 28, 2019 Page 14 of 16

Smith, 639 N.E.2d 1033-34. In that case, Smith had been able to testify that, 

after the rollover, he had been able to move his arm through a harness without 

rib pain and had felt pain only after the semi impact. We concluded that a lay 

person would be able to determine that the driver’s conduct “was a cause of 

Smith’s injuries.” Id. at 1034 (emphasis in original).

[17] The question of proximate cause is generally one left to the factfinder. Rhodes v. 

Wright, 805 N.E.2d 382, 388 (Ind. 2004). “This tends to be the case because the 

question of causation often requires a weighing of disputed facts.” J.B. Hunt 

Transport, Inc. v. Guardianship of Zak, 58 N.E.3d 956, 972 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). 

However, causation may be resolved as a matter of law when only a single 

conclusion can be drawn from the facts. Id. 

[18] Absent a jury, a trial court acts both as gatekeeper of the evidence to be 

considered and the fact-finder. Martin testified that he experienced an increase 

in pain after the vehicular collision. But here in addressing the question of 

causation, the court foreclosed from its consideration evidence that was not 

expert medical testimony. Yet, as we observed in Daub, the “temporal 

congruity” between an event and experiencing pain is “admittedly some 

evidence of causation.” 629 N.E.2d at 878. It was therefore error for the trial 

court to conclude as a matter of law that Martin failed to present evidence on 

the issue of causation.

[19] It is the plaintiff who determines the injuries for which he will seek 

compensation. And, it is true that the more complex the causal relationship is 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-SC-1648 | February 28, 2019 Page 15 of 16

to the injury claimed, the greater the need for expert testimony on the issue 

presented in order for the plaintiff to meet his burden of proof. But Martin’s 

claim was not for complex or permanent injuries – he simply sought 

compensation for pain associated with the rear-end automobile accident.

[20] Martin had previously experienced pain in his neck and back. He testified that 

he felt increased pain after the collision, and the degree and persistency of that 

pain caused him to seek medical treatment at a hospital. Like the plaintiff in 

Smith, Martin reported to Lutheran Hospital staff a pain that he had not 

complained of before the accident (i.e., pain at the base of the skull). A CT 

scan revealed a post traumatic subarachnoid hemorrhage. Martin’s medical 

records included documentation that Martin was considered at medical risk 

such that he could be discharged only under supervision. He was advised to be 

alert to any neurological changes. 

[21] In addition to his submitting medical records, Martin was a competent witness 

to testify regarding his pain. Daub, 629 N.E.2d at 877. As in Smith, the 

evidence of record in this non-complex claim for temporary injury is such that a

layperson could readily understand whether or not the collision was a cause of 

injury to Martin.

2

 Martin presented circumstantial evidence having “sufficient 

probative force to constitute a basis for a legal inference rather than mere 

 

2

“The defendant’s act need not be the sole cause of the plaintiff’s injuries.” Smith, 639 N.E.2d at 1034.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-SC-1648 | February 28, 2019 Page 16 of 16

speculation.” Smith, 639 N.E.2d at 1034. Martin did not fail to meet his 

burden of proof on causation.

[22] Martin testified and presented documentation regarding injury

contemporaneous with the collision for which Ramos was at fault. The lack of 

complexity is such that a factfinder can determine issues of causation and 

damages without expert testimony. We remand for such determinations by the 

fact-finder. 

Conclusion

[23] Martin was required to prove his negligence claim without deviation from the 

substantive law. However, the trial court’s conclusion that Martin failed to 

establish causation as a matter of law is contrary to the evidence. We remand 

for further consideration consistent with this opinion.

[24] Reversed and remanded.

Bradford, J., and Brown, J., concur.