United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Testimony 

Before the Committee on Government 

Reform, House of Representatives

HURRICANE KATRINA

Improving Federal 

Contracting Practices in 

Disaster Recovery 

Operations 

Statement of William T. Woods, Director 

Acquisition and Sourcing Management 

For Release on Delivery

Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT 

Thursday, May 4, 2006

 

GAO-06-714T 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

May 4, 2006

HURRICANE KATRINA

Improving Federal Contracting Practices 

Highlights of GAO-06-714T, a testimony in Disaster Recovery Operations 

before the Committee on Government 

Reform, House of Representatives 

The devastation experienced 

throughout the Gulf Coast region in 

the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and

Rita has called into question the 

government’s ability to effectively

respond to such disasters. The 

government needs to understand 

what went right and what went

wrong, and to apply these lessons

to strengthen its disaster response 

and recovery operations. 

The federal government relies on 

partnerships across the public and 

private sectors to achieve critical

results in preparing for and 

responding to natural disasters,

with an increasing reliance on 

contractors to carry out specific

aspects of its missions. 

This testimony discusses how three 

agencies—the General Services 

Administration, the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency

(FEMA), and the U.S. Army Corps 

of Engineers (the Corps)—

conducted oversight of 13 key

contracts awarded to 12

contractors for hurricane response,

as well as public and private sector 

practices GAO identified that

provide examples of how the 

federal government could better 

manage its disaster-related

procurements. 

What GAO Recommends

While GAO is not making any new 

recommendations in this 

testimony, GAO highlights previous 

recommendations for improving 

federal procurement in

contingency operations. 

Agency acquisition and contractor personnel have been recognized for their 

hard work in providing the goods and services required to be responsive. 

The response efforts nonetheless suffered from three primary deficiencies: 

First, there was inadequate planning and preparation in anticipating 

requirements for needed goods and services. Some key agencies did not 

always have adequate plans for contracting in a major contingency situation. 

For example, FEMA did not adequately anticipate needs for temporary 

housing and public buildings. Tensions also existed between selecting 

national contractors and the Stafford Act requirement for a preference for 

contractors from the affected area. 

Second, there was a lack of clearly communicated responsibilities for 

contracting activities across agencies and jurisdictions. When disasters

occur, local or state officials sometimes determine contract requirements 

and send them to FEMA, which writes and awards the contract or passes 

that responsibility on to another agency. FEMA or another agency may then 

oversee contract performance. Although this process requires clear 

alignment of responsibilities and good communications, our fieldwork found 

examples that did not meet that standard. Although the process for ordering 

and delivering ice depends on good communications between FEMA and the 

Corps, for example, Corps officials said FEMA did not fully understand the 

contracting approach they used and ordered at least double the amount of 

ice required, resulting in an oversupply of ice and a lack of distribution sites 

to handle the volume ordered. 

Third, there were insufficient numbers and inadequate deployment of 

personnel to provide for effective contractor oversight. For example, 

FEMA’s contracts to install temporary housing in four states had only 17 of 

the 27 technical monitors that were needed for oversight. 

GAO has identified practices in the public and private sectors that provide 

insight into how federal agencies can better manage their disaster-related 

procurements, including: 

• developing knowledge of contractor capabilities and prices by 

identifying commodities and services and establishing vendor 

relationships before they are needed; 

• establishing a scalable operations plan to adjust the level of capacity 

required to effectively respond to needs; 

• formally assigning and communicating disaster-related 

responsibilities, with joint training for government and contractor 

personnel; and 

• providing sufficient numbers of field-level contracting staff with the 

authority needed to meet mission requirements. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-714T.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact William T. 

Woods at (202) 512-4841 or

woodsw@gao.gov. 
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: 

Thank you for inviting me here today to discuss the practices for managing 

federal disaster recovery contracts related to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita 

and how these practices can be improved. The size and strength of 

Hurricane Katrina resulted in one of the largest natural disasters in our 

nation’s history, and in its aftermath major questions have been raised 

about our nation’s readiness and ability to respond to catastrophic 

disasters. Hurricane Rita increased demands on an already stressed 

response and recovery effort at all levels of government. 

GAO has a large body of ongoing work on a range of issues relating to all

phases of the preparation, response, recovery, and rebuilding efforts 

related to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. GAO’s work has been coordinated 

with the rest of the accountability community at the federal, state, and 

local levels to ensure that all significant issues associated with relief and 

recovery, including contracting, are addressed while avoiding unnecessary 

duplication of efforts. 

Comptroller General Walker recently testified on GAO’s preliminary 

observations on the challenges encountered in the response to Hurricane 

Katrina, and he identified four themes that are similar to lessons learned 

from past catastrophic disasters.1

 These include the central importance of 

(1) clearly defining and communicating leadership roles, responsibilities, 

and lines of authority for response in advance of a catastrophic disaster; 

(2) clarifying the procedures for activating the National Response Plan and 

applying them to emerging catastrophic disasters; (3) conducting strong 

advance planning and robust training and exercise programs; and 

(4) strengthening response and recovery capabilities for a catastrophic 

disaster. 

These themes directly relate to what I will discuss today, namely how 

three agencies planned for and conducted oversight of several key 

contracts in support of Katrina and Rita response and recovery efforts: the 

General Services Administration (GSA), the Federal Emergency 

Management Agency (FEMA), and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (the 

Corps). 2 For those areas where we identified deficiencies, I will also 

 1 GAO, Hurricane Katrina: GAO’s Preliminary Observations Regarding Preparedness, 

Response, and Recovery, GAO-06-442T, (Washington D.C.: Mar. 8, 2006). 

2

 See GAO, Agency Management of Contractors Responding to Hurricanes Katrina and

Rita, GAO-06-461R (Washington, D.C.: March 2006). 

Page 1 GAO-06-714T
discuss public and private sector practices that provide examples of how 

the federal government could better manage its disaster-related 

procurements. In doing our review, we selected 13 mission-critical 

contracts, each with a dollar value in excess of $5 million, that were 

awarded to 12 contractors performing work for the three agencies. We 

analyzed how monitoring policies and processes were put into practice. 

We also reviewed the practices of selected federal agencies, state 

emergency management agencies, commercial businesses, and a major 

utility that responded to Hurricane Katrina, analyzing their policies and 

procedures to identify successful practices and alternative approaches for 

managing disaster-related procurements. We conducted our work from

October 2005 through March 2006 in accordance with generally accepted 

government auditing standards. 

Given the environment in which they were operating, agency acquisition 

and contractor personnel have been recognized for their hard work in 

providing the goods and services required to be responsive. The response 

efforts nonetheless suffered from three primary deficiencies: 

Summary 

• inadequate planning and preparation in anticipating requirements for 

needed goods and services, 

• lack of clearly communicated responsibilities across agencies and 

jurisdictions to ensure effective acquisition outcomes, and 

• insufficient numbers and inadequate deployment of personnel to provide 

for effective contractor oversight. 

A number of efforts are under way by these agencies to address the issues 

we and others have identified. 

In reviewing contracts awarded in another contingency situation, 

rebuilding Iraq, GAO found that without effective acquisition planning, 

management processes, and sufficient numbers of capable people, poor 

acquisition outcomes resulted. GAO made recommendations for improving 

procurements in contingency operations, including the need for sufficient 

numbers of trained staff who have clear responsibilities and guidance for 

overseeing contractor performance. In more recent work, we identified a

number of practices in the public and private sectors that provide insight 

into how the federal government can better manage its disaster-related 

procurements. These practices include 

• developing knowledge of contractor capabilities and prices by identifying 

available commodities and services and establishing vendor relationships 

before they are needed,

Page 2 GAO-06-714T
• establishing a scalable operations plan to adjust the level of capacity

required to effectively respond to the need, 

• formally assigning and communicating disaster-related responsibilities, 

with joint training for government and contractor personnel, and 

• providing sufficient numbers of field-level contracting staff with the 

authority needed to meet mission requirements. 

The private sector is an important partner with the government in 

responding to and recovering from natural disasters such as Hurricanes 

Katrina and Rita. As we recently noted,

3

 such partnerships increasingly 

underlie critical government operations. With hundreds of billions of tax 

dollars spent each year on goods and services, it is essential that federal 

agency acquisitions be handled in an efficient, effective, and accountable

manner. 

Over $87 billion of federal funding has been appropriated in response to 

the recent hurricanes. In responding to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the 

government depended heavily on contractors to deliver ice, water, and 

food supplies; patch rooftops; and provide housing to displaced residents 

and temporary facilities to local government agencies. Overall, the 

circumstances caused by the hurricanes created a difficult environment in 

which agencies had to balance the need to deliver goods and services 

quickly with the need for appropriate controls. Although achieving that 

balance is sometimes hard to accomplish, that fact must not be allowed to

serve as an excuse for poor contracting practices. 

The need for strong planning is one of the themes identified by the 

Comptroller General in regard to the government’s overall response to the 

hurricanes. Planning also must explicitly address the need for and 

management of the contractor community. In previous work we said that 

for federal agencies to be effective they need to develop the knowledge 

necessary to identify, select, and manage contractors, including having

competitively awarded contracts in place prior to a disaster. We found that 

some key agencies did not always have adequate plans for contracting in a 

major contingency situation. We also noted the competing tensions 

between the selection of national contractors and the requirement under 

Contractor Roles in 

Emergency Response 

Operations Are 

Increasing 

There Was Inadequate 

Planning and 

Preparation in 

Anticipating 

Requirements for 

Needed Goods and 

Services 

 3

GAO, 21st Century Challenges: Reexamining the Base of the Federal Government, 

GAO-05-325SP (Washington, D.C.: February 2005). 

Page 3 GAO-06-714T
the Stafford Act for a preference for contractors from the affected area.

Better planning could have alleviated those tensions. 

For example: 

• While contracts for some items were in place prior to the storm, FEMA did 

not adequately anticipate needs for such services as providing temporary 

housing and public buildings. 

• The practice of the Corps is to establish Planning and Response Teams for 

various missions assigned to it by FEMA prior to an event, with specific 

responsibilities assigned to team members. However, the Corps indicated 

it did not know prior to the hurricane that it would be tasked by FEMA 

with some of the mission assignments it received. In one case, faced with a 

compressed time frame for acquiring portable classrooms and with no 

prior knowledge about the classroom mission they were assigned, Corps 

contracting officials placed an order, under an existing agreement, with a 

subsidiary of an Alaska Native Corporation under the Small Business 

Administration’s section 8(a) Business Development Program. The Corps 

accepted the contractor’s proposed price of $39.5 million even though it 

had information that the cost for the classrooms was significantly less 

than that. Based on our analysis of a quote obtained by the contractor 

from a local Mississippi business, the price the contractor actually paid for 

the classrooms, and prices for similar units from GSA schedule contracts,

our conclusion4

 is that the Corps could have, but failed to, negotiate a 

lower price. 

• Similarly, better management of requirements development could have

avoided costs to house workers and victims. Based on information 

provided by local officials, FEMA spent $3 million for 4,000 base camp 

beds that were never used. 

• Preparation was also lacking in implementation of the Stafford Act 

preference for contractors residing or doing business in the affected area.

5

The Corps staff expressed uncertainty regarding how to apply preferences

 4

GAO, Hurricane Katrina: Army Corps of Engineers Contract for Mississippi Classrooms, 

GAO- 06-454 (Washington, D.C.: May 2006). 

5

42 U.S.C. § 5150. 

Page 4 GAO-06-714T
or determine if a company was in an affected area.

6

 Several GSA and 

FEMA officials indicated they were aware of the Stafford Act, but stated it

is difficult to immediately factor in local businesses in such a catastrophic 

event. GSA officials stated they plan to review the Federal Acquisition 

Regulation (FAR) to see if additional Stafford Act guidance is necessary.7

In discussing our findings and observations with FEMA officials, they said

they are taking steps to improve in areas such as staffing and 

premobilization capabilities. However, they also stated that such preplanning and preparedness has a cost. The Corps commented that 

contracting staff need to have defined requirements in order to get the

right type of contracts put in place, and the contracting staff did not 

always get defined requirements in a timely manner. Additionally, a Corps 

official commented that until funding for a particular mission is secured,

preparation for it cannot go forward and this also delayed contracting 

efforts. Finally, both GSA and the Corps noted that they tried to reach out 

to local and small businesses through forums and other means to make 

them aware of opportunities to contract with the federal government. 

Officials that we talked to in the public and private sectors considered preidentification of commodities, scalable operations, and pre-established 

vendor relationships to be essential for ensuring adequate planning and 

preparation for providing needed goods and services following a disaster. 

For example: 

Examples of Federal, State, and 

Private Sector Practices for 

Improving Planning and 

Preparation 

• Florida’s Division of Emergency Management developed a database that 

pre-identifies over 200 supplies and services that may be needed to 

respond to a disaster. Florida also pre-qualifies vendors, recording 

quantities and locations of vendor supplies, and establishes rates before 

each hurricane season, giving it the knowledge it needs to quickly procure

supplies and services at a reasonable price. Similarly, Wal-Mart uses a 

database to review historical buying trends to identify what goods will be 

 6

GAO recently issued a decision on a protest of the terms of a solicitation issued by the

Corps for demolition and debris removal in the State of Mississippi. The protester asserted, 

in part, that the Corps decision to limit the competition for this work to Mississippi firms

improperly exceeded the authority granted under a provision of the Stafford Act to provide 

a preference to firms residing, or primarily doing business, in the area affected by a major 

disaster. GAO’s decision did not view the Corps decision to implement the Stafford Act 

preference with a set-aside as an abuse of the agency’s discretion, and the Corps did not act 

improperly by limiting this competition to Mississippi firms. AshBritt, Inc. B-297889, March 

20, 2006. 

7

See FAR, Subpart 26.2-Disaster or Emergency Assistance Activities. 

Page 5 GAO-06-714T
in demand both before and after a hurricane, and to stock the merchandise 

in its stores accordingly.

• The Corps awards Advanced Contracting Initiative (ACI) contracts to 

fulfill its anticipated disaster response missions. ACI contracts are used to 

jump start the missions following a disaster, with the Corps bringing in 

other contracts as necessary to complete the work. 

• Part of Mississippi Power’s operations plan is to identify multiple potential 

staging areas, and multiple housing and food supply options for its own 

and outside workers, which enables the company to expand or reduce its 

operations depending on the size of the disaster. After Hurricane Katrina, 

Mississippi Power’s scalable operations plan enabled it to shelter and 

manage more than twice the number of outside personnel it had planned 

for, but that were needed to restore service as quickly as possible to all 

customers able to receive power. 

We also found that processes for executing contracts were hindered by 

poor communication of responsibilities. As envisioned under the National

Response Plan (NRP), federal agencies responding to a disaster carry out

their acquisition functions through a network of federal, state, and local 

agencies. In some instances, the local or state officials determine the 

requirements and communicate them to FEMA; FEMA may write and 

award the contract or communicate the requirements to another agency

that writes and awards the contract; and then FEMA or another agency 

oversees contract performance. This approach puts a premium on aligning 

roles and responsibilities clearly and maintaining good communications to

ensure effective execution of the contract. 

Our fieldwork identified examples where unclear responsibilities and poor 

communications resulted in poor acquisition outcomes. For example: 

There Was a Lack of 

Clearly

Communicated 

Responsibilities 

across Agencies and 

Jurisdictions 

• FEMA officials stated that a contractor spent approximately 

$10 million to renovate 160 rooms and furnish another 80 rooms in military 

barracks in Alabama that a FEMA survey team identified for use as 

temporary housing. To renovate the facility, FEMA headquarters awarded 

a contract without consulting local FEMA officials in Alabama. According 

to FEMA officials in Alabama, however, the facility was not needed and 

they tried to stop the renovation. These same FEMA officials stated that 

few evacuees agreed to live at the facility, and when officials decided to

close the facility, it had only six occupants. 

Page 6 GAO-06-714T
• The process for ordering and delivering ice heavily depends on effective 

communications between FEMA and the Corps. However, according to 

Corps officials, FEMA did not fully understand the contracting approach

used by the Corps and ordered at least double the amount of ice required,

resulting in an oversupply of ice and a lack of distribution sites available to 

handle the volume ordered. Additionally, the local Corps personnel were 

not always aware of where ice might be delivered and did not have the 

authority to redirect ice as shipments arrived, resulting in inefficient 

distribution and receipt at the state level. 

• FEMA tasked GSA to write three contracts in Louisiana for base camps, 

hotel rooms, and ambulances, with a total value of over 

$120 million. GSA contracting officers awarded the contracts, but could 

not tell us which FEMA officials would be responsible for overseeing 

contractor performance. The FEMA official identified as the main point of 

contact by GSA did not have any knowledge of these contracts or who was 

responsible for oversight. Only after contacting multiple FEMA officials 

over a 3-week period were we able to determine the agency officials 

responsible for contract oversight. 

In commenting on our findings, GSA officials stated that their role is to 

provide resource support in the response phase of a disaster, meaning 

they are responsible for executing contracts under the NRP, and FEMA is 

responsible for monitoring the contracts. FEMA officials commented that 

there needs to be more clarity regarding procurement roles and indicated

one of their goals is to work with GSA to clarify procurement 

responsibilities for the future. GSA officials indicated that the current 

memorandum of understanding between GSA and FEMA is being updated 

to reflect the standards of the new NRP as well. 

To clearly establish and communicate disaster-related responsibilities, 

public and private sector officials told us they use such practices as 

conducting joint disaster response training for agency employees and 

contractors and formally assigning their employees specific disasterrelated responsibilities. For example: 

Examples of State and Private 

Sector Practices for 

Establishing and 

Communicating 

Responsibilities 

• The employees at CSX Transportation Railroad and their suppliers 

participate jointly in both disaster planning and training exercises. This 

allows each supplier to know its responsibilities and the railroad’s 

expectations in the event of a natural disaster. As a part of its preparation 

for disaster response, the Florida Division of Emergency Management 

holds joint state-wide training exercises every year with suppliers. 

Page 7 GAO-06-714T
• Management-level personnel at Mississippi Power are assigned disaster 

director roles aligned to their day-to-day functions, which they assume 

during the company’s storm preparation phase. Each disaster director has 

a designated backup and directs all disaster-related activities within his or 

her functional areas. Each functional area has a specific disaster plan that

is integral to the overall corporate disaster recovery plan. Each Mississippi 

Power employee also has a storm assignment and receives annual training 

on that assignment. 

The purpose of agencies’ monitoring processes is to ensure that 

contracted goods and services are delivered in accordance with the 

agreed-upon schedule, cost, quality, and quantity provisions stated in the 

contract. Without sufficient numbers of trained people properly deployed, 

however, effective monitoring is hampered and agencies may not be able

to identify and correct poor contractor performance in a timely manner. 

Furthermore, agencies can be at risk of paying contractors more than the 

value of the services performed. 

Our work indicated that while monitoring was occurring on the contracts

we reviewed, the number of monitoring staff available was not always 

sufficient, and staff were not always effectively deployed. For example:

There Were 

Insufficient Numbers 

and Inadequate 

Deployment of 

Personnel to Provide 

for Effective 

Contractor Oversight 

• FEMA’s contracts for installing temporary housing in four states had only 

17 of the 27 technical monitors that had been determined necessary to 

oversee contractor performance.8

• Corps officials responsible for overseeing the “blue roof” program’s field 

operations told us it was slowed down due to the lack of sufficient 

monitors.9

Deployment practices did not always provide for appropriate notification 

of responsibilities or overlap of rotating contracting officers and oversight

personnel, thus making knowledge transfer and continuity of contract 

management operations difficult. For example: 

 8

Data provided by FEMA official were dated November 18, 2005. 

9

 The Corps manages the Operation Blue Roof mission for FEMA. Operation Blue Roof

provides assistance to storm victims in disaster areas through the installation of rolled

plastic sheeting on damaged roofs, helping to protect property and allowing residents to 

remain in their homes. 

Page 8 GAO-06-714T
• For four of the contracts we reviewed, officials were either unaware or not 

notified by FEMA of their oversight responsibilities. 

• The lack of overlap between oversight personnel for a large temporary 

housing contract left the most recent contract administrator with no 

knowledge or documentation of who had authorized the contractor to 

perform certain activities or why the activities were being performed. 

While discussing our findings and observations with FEMA officials, they 

emphasized that they lacked adequate staffing, but said they have made 

efforts to fill staffing gaps. Additionally, FEMA officials stated they 

recognize the need for continuity in contract oversight and indicated they

are implementing a process to ensure workload and knowledge sharing 

among rotating personnel. However, they also believe that fewer transition 

difficulties exist now as a result of hiring more people and having more 

oversight officials staying in the affected areas. GSA officials indicated 

there may also be other alternatives for ensuring adequate contract 

oversight, such as designating GSA employees to conduct oversight on 

some contracts. Corps officials stated their policy is to rotate certain 

personnel every 29 days to keep personnel costs to a minimum because of

regulations under the Fair Labor Standards Act.10

Practices we identified to better ensure sufficient numbers and adequate 

deployment of personnel in a disaster situation include establishing 

response structures that employees can be “plugged” into and moving 

employees from routine service into disaster response. For example: 

Examples of Federal and 

Private Sector Practices for 

Improving the Deployment of 

the Contracting Workforce 

• The Corps and the Forest Service deploy pre-established trained teams to 

disaster locations to manage specific missions, such as debris removal and

base camp support. These teams include specialists with the authority 

needed to provide on the ground procurement support to meet mission 

needs. 

• In response to Katrina, Landstar, a transportation services company under 

contract to the U.S. Department of Transportation, diverted agents from 

routine customer service activities to emergency response activities, 

including staffing logistics staging areas, while continuing to meet the 

basic needs of commercial clients. Similarly, Wal-Mart reassigned 

employees from their regular duties in the corporate office to serve as 

 105 CFR § 551.208. 

Page 9 GAO-06-714T
operators in the company’s call center for associates affected by the 

hurricane. 

In closing, in any acquisition agencies must have in place sound 

acquisition plans, processes to make and communicate good business 

decisions, and a capable acquisition workforce to monitor contractor 

performance so that the government receives good value for the money 

spent. These components are critical to successfully managing contracts in 

any environment—even in contingency situations such as those presented

by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be happy to respond

to any questions you or other Members of the Committee may have at this

time. 

For further information regarding this testimony, please contact 

William T. Woods at (202) 512-4841 or woodsw@gao.gov. Individuals 

making key contributions to this testimony included Penny Augustine, 

James Kim, John Needham, Kenneth Patton, Matthew Saradjian, David 

Schilling, Shannon Simpson, and Katherine Trimble. 

Page 10 GAO-06-714T
Page 11 GAO-06-714T

Appendix I: Recent GAO Products on 

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita 

Hurricane Katrina: Planning for and Management of Federal Disaster

Recovery Contracts. GAO-06-622T. (Washington, D.C.: April 10, 2006). 

Hurricane Katrina: Comprehensive Policies and Procedures Are Needed 

to Ensure Appropriate Use of and Accountability for International 

Assistance. GAO-06-460. (Washington, D.C.: April 6, 2006) 

Hurricane Katrina: Policies and Procedures Are Needed to Ensure 

Appropriate Use of and Accountability for International Assistance.

GAO-06-600T. (Washington, D.C.: April 6, 2006). 

Hurricane Katrina: Status of the Health Care System in New Orleans 

and Difficult Decisions Related to Efforts to Rebuild It Approximately 6 

Months After Hurricane Katrina. GAO-06-576R. (Washington, D.C.: 

March 28, 2006). 

Agency Management of Contractors Responding to Hurricanes Katrina 

and Rita. GAO-06-461R. (Washington, D.C.: March 16, 2006).

Hurricane Katrina: GAO’s Preliminary Observations Regarding 

Preparedness, Response, and Recovery. GAO-06-442T. (Washington D.C.: 

March 8, 2006). 

Emergency Preparedness and Response: Some Issues and Challenges 

Associated with Major Emergency Incidents. GAO-06-467T. (Washington: 

D.C.: February 23, 2006). 

Disaster Preparedness: Preliminary Observations on the Evacuation of 

Hospitals and Nursing Homes Due to Hurricanes. GAO-06-443R. 

(Washington: D.C.: February 16, 2006). 

Investigation: Military Meals, Ready-To-Eat Sold on eBay. GAO-06-410R. 

(Washington: D.C.: February 13, 2006). 

Expedited Assistance for Victims of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: 

FEMA’s Control Weaknesses Exposed the Government to Significant 

Fraud and Abuse. GAO-06-403T. (Washington: D.C.: February 13, 2006). 

Statement by Comptroller General David M. Walker on GAO’s 

Preliminary Observations Regarding Preparedness and Response to 

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. GAO-06-365R. (Washington, D.C.: 

February 1, 2006). 
Federal Emergency Management Agency: Challenges for the National 

Flood Insurance Program. GAO-06-335T. (Washington, D.C.: January 25, 

2006). 

Hurricane Protection: Statutory and Regulatory Framework for Levee 

Maintenance and Emergency Response for the Lake Pontchartrain 

Project. GAO-06-322T. (Washington, D.C.: December 15, 2005). 

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Provision of Charitable Assistance. 

GAO-06-297T. (Washington, D.C.: December 13, 2005). 

Army Corps of Engineers: History of the Lake Pontchartrain and 

Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project. GAO-06-244T. (Washington, D.C.: 

November 9, 2005). 

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Preliminary Observations on Contracting 

for Response and Recovery Efforts. GAO-06-246T. (Washington, D.C.: 

November 8, 2005). 

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Contracting for Response and Recovery 

Efforts. GAO-06-235T. (Washington, D.C.: November 2, 2005). 

Federal Emergency Management Agency: Oversight and Management of 

the National Flood Insurance Program. GAO-06-183T. (Washington, D.C.: 

October 20, 2005). 

Federal Emergency Management Agency: Challenges Facing the National 

Flood Insurance Program. GAO-06-174T. (Washington, D.C.: October 18, 

2005). 

Federal Emergency Management Agency: Improvements Needed to 

Enhance Oversight and Management of the National Flood Insurance 

Program. GAO-06-119. (Washington, D.C.: October 18, 2005). 

Army Corps of Engineers: Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity Hurricane 

Projection Project. GAO-05-1050T. (Washington, D.C.: September 28, 

2005). 

Hurricane Katrina: Providing Oversight of the Nation’s Preparedness, 

Response, and Recovery Activities. GAO-05-1053T. (Washington, D.C.: 

September 28, 2005). 

(120556) 

Page 12 GAO-06-714T
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