United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Report to the Chairman, Committee on 

Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 

U.S. Senate 

COMMUTER RAIL

Commuter Rail Issues 

Should Be Considered 

in Debate over Amtrak

April 2006 

 

GAO-06-470 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

April 2006

COMMUTER RAIL

Commuter Rail Issues Should Be 

Highlights of GAO-06-470, a report to the Considered in Debate over Amtrak 

Chairman, Senate Committee on Banking, 

Housing and Urban Affairs 

Commuter rail agencies provide

mobility to millions of people

across the country, often using 

Amtrak infrastructure and services. 

Given these interactions, an abrupt 

Amtrak cessation could have a 

significant impact on commuter rail 

operations. Amtrak’s chronic 

financial problems and recent 

budget proposals make such a 

cessation a possibility. GAO was 

asked to examine (1) the extent to

which commuter rail agencies rely

on Amtrak for access to

infrastructure and services, 

(2) issues that commuter rail 

agencies would face if Amtrak

abruptly ceased to provide them 

with services and infrastructure

access, and (3) the options 

available to commuter rail agencies

should Amtrak abruptly cease to 

provide them services and 

infrastructure access. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the 

Department of Transportation 

(DOT) further refine cost estimates

of commuter rail directed-service 

scenarios. GAO also recommends 

that Amtrak improve its accounting

practices as well as its financial 

reports. DOT generally agreed with 

the report’s findings and the 

intention of the recommendation,

but expressed concern about 

refining the cost estimate at this 

time because of data and resource 

limitations. Amtrak generally

agreed with the report’s findings,

conclusions, and

recommendations. 

Most commuter rail agencies rely on the National Railroad Passenger 

Corporation (Amtrak) for some level of access to infrastructure and 

services, particularly those that operate over Amtrak-owned portions of the 

Northeast Corridor (NEC). This reliance includes the use of key stations, 

access to the NEC, and equipment maintenance services (see figure below). 

Commuter rail agencies typically pay Amtrak for access to infrastructure 

and services, although their financial relationships with Amtrak vary and 

often lack clarity. Several issues contribute to the lack of clarity, including

limitations in Amtrak’s accounting practices, the lack of transparency in 

Amtrak’s financial reports, and the structure of the financial arrangements 

between Amtrak and commuter rail agencies. This makes it difficult to fully 

understand the financial relationship between these agencies and Amtrak 

and whether they are contributing their fair share for improvements and 

maintenance of Amtrak’s infrastructure. Also, this lack of clarity hinders 

Amtrak management’s ability to make fully informed decisions about its 

commuter rail line-of-business. 

An abrupt Amtrak cessation would raise two critical operational issues for 

commuter rail agencies that rely on Amtrak. Specifically, agencies would 

face the potential loss of skilled Amtrak labor and access to Amtrak-owned 

infrastructure, which could make it difficult for some to avoid severe service

disruptions. For example, agencies both on and off the NEC could not 

continue to fully operate their services without continued access to Amtrakowned track and other facilities. 

Most commuter rail agencies that rely on Amtrak have identified ways to 

mitigate service disruptions in an abrupt Amtrak cessation. However, these 

options are largely dependent on retaining Amtrak employees and access to 

Amtrak’s infrastructure. Federal agencies could provide short-term options 

to mitigate potential impacts on commuter rail agencies through their 

authority to order continued commuter service (called “directed service”), 

although federal officials stated that service disruptions are likely and the 

cost estimates are unreliable. Private transportation companies could 

provide options for commuter rail agencies in the long term; however, other 

issues would need to be addressed to ensure a smooth transition. 

Types of Services and Infrastructure Access Provided by Amtrak to Commuter Rail Agencies

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-470.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact JayEtta Z. 

Hecker at (202) 512-2834 or 

heckerj@gao.gov. 
Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 2

Background 5

Most Commuter Rail Agencies Rely to Some Extent on Amtrak for 

Access to Infrastructure and Services 9 

Abrupt Amtrak Cessation Could Raise Critical Issues for Some 

Commuter Rail Agencies 25 

Some Options Are Available to Commuter Rail Agencies in the 

Event of an Abrupt Amtrak Cessation, but Service Disruptions 

and Financial Difficulties Would Be Likely 31 

Conclusions 40

Recommendations 42

Agency Comments 42 

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 45 

Appendix II Commuter Rail Agency Use of Amtrak Services and 

Infrastructure 49 

Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 51 

Tables 

Table 1: Key Aspects of Recent Amtrak Reform Proposals and 

Legislation That Could Affect Commuter Rail Agencies 9 

Table 2: Percent of Commuter Rail Passengers Served by Railroad 

Service Providers 15 

Table 3: Commuter Rail Agency Reliance on Amtrak Services 16 

Table 4: Names and Locations of Commuter Rail Agencies, State 

Departments of Transportation, Class I Freight Railroads, 

and Private Non-Railroad Companies Interviewed 45 

Table 5: List of Labor Unions 48 

Table 6: Commuter Rail Agency Use of Amtrak Services and 

Infrastructure 49

Page i GAO-06-470 Commuter Rail
Figures 

Figure 1: NEC Ownership and Operations Map 6 

Figure 2: Overview of Commuter Rail Agency Reliance on Amtrak 

for Infrastructure and Services 10 

Figure 3: Amtrak’s Key Facilities for Selected Commuter Rail

Agencies 12

Figure 4: Sound Transit Trains in Amtrak’s Holgate Yard, Seattle, 

WA 14

Page ii GAO-06-470 Commuter Rail
Abbreviations 

AAR Association of American Railroads 

Amtrak National Railroad Passenger Corporation 

APTA American Public Transportation Association 

ASLRRA American Short Line and Regional Railroad Association 

CETC Centralized Electrification and Traffic Control 

CSX CSX Transportation 

DELDOT Delaware Department of Transportation 

DOT Department of Transportation 

FRA Federal Railroad Administration 

FTA Federal Transit Administration 

ICC Interstate Commerce Commission

LIRR Long Island Rail Road 

MARC Maryland Rail Commuter Service 

MBCR Massachusetts Bay Commuter Railroad Company 

MBTA Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority 

NEC Northeast Corridor 

NICTD Northern Indiana Commuter Transportation District 

NJT New Jersey Transit 

PENNDOT Pennsylvania Department of Transportation 

RFP request for proposal 

SEPTA Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority 

SLE Shore Line East 

STB Surface Transportation Board 

TRE Trinity Railway Express 

VRE Virginia Railway Express 

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Page iii GAO-06-470 Commuter Rail
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

April 21, 2006

The Honorable Richard Shelby 

Chairman, Committee on Banking, 

 Housing and Urban Affairs 

United States Senate 

Dear Mr. Chairman: 

Commuter rail is an important component of regional transportation 

systems throughout the country, accounting for over 400 million passenger 

trips in 2004. While most of these trips occurred in the densely populated 

Northeast, commuter rail services are now provided in eight urban areas 

outside of the Northeast. A total of 18 commuter rail agencies now exist, 

and seven more commuter rail systems are in planning or design stages 

throughout the country according to the Federal Transit Administration 

(FTA). Regardless of location, most commuter rail agencies interact with 

the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) for access to 

infrastructure or services, such as train crews and equipment 

maintenance. Given these interactions, there is concern that if Amtrak 

abruptly ceased to provide services and infrastructure, commuter rail 

operations could be adversely affected. Amtrak’s chronic financial 

problems and recent budget proposals make such a cessation a possibility.

Commuter rail is an important component of regional transportation 

systems throughout the country, accounting for over 400 million passenger 

trips in 2004. While most of these trips occurred in the densely populated 

Northeast, commuter rail services are now provided in eight urban areas 

outside of the Northeast. A total of 18 commuter rail agencies now exist, 

and seven more commuter rail systems are in planning or design stages 

throughout the country according to the Federal Transit Administration 

(FTA). Regardless of location, most commuter rail agencies interact with 

the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) for access to 

infrastructure or services, such as train crews and equipment 

maintenance. Given these interactions, there is concern that if Amtrak 

abruptly ceased to provide services and infrastructure, commuter rail 

operations could be adversely affected. Amtrak’s chronic financial 

problems and recent budget proposals make such a cessation a possibility.

Although commuter rail agencies are typically owned and operated by 

state and local governments, there are several federal agencies involved in

rail transportation and in specific aspects of commuter rail service. The

Surface Transportation Board (STB) is responsible for the economic 

regulation of freight railroads and also has the authority to order other rail

carriers to provide infrastructure and service(s) to commuter rail agencies

(called “directed service”) if Amtrak were to shut down. The Federal 

Railroad Administration (FRA), which is primarily focused on ensuring the 

safe operation of railroads, including commuter rail, would provide 

funding to STB to direct commuter rail service if ordered by STB. FTA 

helps fund the planning and development of commuter rail projects. 

Although commuter rail agencies are typically owned and operated by 

state and local governments, there are several federal agencies involved in

rail transportation and in specific aspects of commuter rail service. The

Surface Transportation Board (STB) is responsible for the economic 

regulation of freight railroads and also has the authority to order other rail

carriers to provide infrastructure and service(s) to commuter rail agencies

(called “directed service”) if Amtrak were to shut down. The Federal 

Railroad Administration (FRA), which is primarily focused on ensuring the 

safe operation of railroads, including commuter rail, would provide 

funding to STB to direct commuter rail service if ordered by STB. FTA 

helps fund the planning and development of commuter rail projects. 

In response to your request, we examined (1) the extent to which 

commuter rail agencies rely on Amtrak for access to infrastructure and 

services, (2) issues that commuter rail agencies would face if Amtrak 

abruptly ceased to provide them with services and access to 

infrastructure, and (3) the options available to commuter rail agencies 

In response to your request, we examined (1) the extent to which 

commuter rail agencies rely on Amtrak for access to infrastructure and 

services, (2) issues that commuter rail agencies would face if Amtrak 

abruptly ceased to provide them with services and access to 

infrastructure, and (3) the options available to commuter rail agencies 

Page 1 GAO-06-470 Commuter Rail
should Amtrak abruptly cease to provide them services and access to 

infrastructure. To address these objectives, we interviewed officials at all

18 existing commuter rail agencies and two of the seven proposed 

commuter rail services. We also visited seven commuter rail agencies and 

one proposed commuter rail service. During these site visits, we 

interviewed senior-level management and toured operation, dispatching, 

and equipment maintenance facilities. We interviewed officials at STB, 

FRA, FTA, and Amtrak, as well as representatives from the largest Class I 

railroads,1

 10 of Amtrak’s 15 railroad labor unions, all of the private 

transportation companies that currently operate commuter rail service in

the U.S., and industry associations. Additionally, we reviewed federal laws, 

internal documents from the STB, FRA, and Amtrak, and contracts 

between Amtrak and various commuter rail agencies. 

Our report focuses on the impact of an abrupt Amtrak cessation on 

commuter rail operations. For example, if policy makers acted on 

legislative proposals that end or substantially reduce federal funding, an 

Amtrak bankruptcy or shutdown could quickly follow. However, multiple 

bills to reform intercity passenger rail have been proposed in recent 

years—and these bills, if enacted, could result in outcomes other than an 

abrupt Amtrak cessation. We did not examine how other potential 

outcomes would impact commuter rail operations. We conducted our 

work from July 2005 through April 2006 in accordance with generally 

accepted government auditing standards. (See app. I for a more detailed

discussion of the report’s scope and methodology.) 

Most existing 18 commuter rail agencies rely on Amtrak for some level of

access to infrastructure and services. Although the level of reliance varies 

among these commuter rail agencies, access to Amtrak’s infrastructure or 

Amtrak services is critical to the operations of many commuter rail 

agencies. For example, seven of the nine commuter rail agencies in the 

Northeast operate over Amtrak-owned portions of the Northeast Corridor 

(NEC). According to officials from these agencies, access to Amtrak’s 

infrastructure is essential to their services. Commuter rail agencies 

typically pay Amtrak for access to infrastructure and providing services, 

although the financial relationships between commuter rail agencies and

Results in Brief 

 1

Class I railroads are the largest railroads, as defined by operating revenue, and account for 

the majority of U.S. rail freight activity. There are three classes of railroads. The Surface 

Transportation Board (STB) designates the class of railroad and in 2004 defined Class I 

railroads as railroads with operating revenues of $289 million or more.

Page 2 GAO-06-470 Commuter Rail
Amtrak vary widely and often lack clarity. Several issues contribute to the

lack of clarity, including limitations in Amtrak’s accounting practices, the 

lack of transparency in Amtrak’s financial reports, and the structure of the 

financial arrangements between Amtrak and commuter rail agencies. The

lack of clarity makes it difficult to determine the full extent of the financial

relationship between commuter rail agencies and Amtrak and whether 

commuter rail agencies are contributing their fair share to the cost of 

capital improvements to Amtrak-owned infrastructure. Amtrak’s fiscal 

year 2006 appropriation directs the Secretary of Transportation to assess a 

fee on commuter rail agencies that use the NEC. This fee is designed to 

compensate Amtrak for maintenance and capital expenditures resulting 

from commuter rail agencies’ use of the NEC and has important budgetary 

implications for some commuter rail agencies. 

An abrupt Amtrak cessation could raise two critical operational issues for 

commuter rail agencies that rely on Amtrak services and infrastructure. 

Specifically, commuter rail agencies would be confronted with the 

potential loss of skilled Amtrak labor and access to Amtrak-owned 

infrastructure. For example, some commuter rail agencies could not take 

over train operations or dispatching services provided by Amtrak 

employees because they do not have the workforce capabilities or 

expertise to do so in a short time period. Additionally, some commuter rail 

agencies on the NEC and in other parts of the country could not continue 

to fully operate service—or would cease service—without the ability to 

access Amtrak-owned tracks and other key facilities. Commuter rail 

agencies also identified other issues they would face if Amtrak abruptly 

ceases to provide services and infrastructure, such as the loss of revenue

from Amtrak for the services or infrastructure that a few commuter rail 

agencies provide to Amtrak. 

Most commuter rail agencies that rely on Amtrak services and 

infrastructure have identified options to mitigate service disruptions if 

Amtrak abruptly ceased to provide services and infrastructure access. 

However, these options are largely dependent on the ability to retain 

Amtrak employees and access Amtrak-owned infrastructure, particularly 

in the short term. STB could provide short-term options to mitigate 

potential impacts on commuter rail agencies in the event of an abrupt 

Amtrak cessation by using their directed-service authority to gain access 

to Amtrak’s infrastructure and equipment, and, with the FRA, continue to 

fund affected commuter operations. Although directed service could be

used as a short-term solution, federal officials stated that commuter rail 

service disruptions are likely under any directed-service scenario. Further, 

the costs of providing directed service are unknown, and the logistics and 

Page 3 GAO-06-470 Commuter Rail
time required to implement directed services are unknown because STB 

has never issued directed-service orders for passenger rail. According to

FRA officials, the major concern in a directed service scenario is whether 

former Amtrak employees will agree to work for the new provider. A 

longer-term solution in the event of an abrupt Amtrak cessation is for 

commuter rail agencies to contract with private transportation companies 

for the services currently provided by Amtrak. Private transportation 

companies with whom we spoke expressed interest in providing the 

services that Amtrak currently provides to commuter rail agencies. 

However, transitioning from Amtrak to private transportation companies 

would take months, not weeks. Moreover, labor and liability issues would

need to be addressed to ensure a smooth transition. 

To help ensure that policy makers have the needed information to make 

fully informed decisions, we recommend that the Department of 

Transportation (DOT), in consultation with STB and commuter rail 

agencies, further refine cost estimates of directed-service scenarios and 

that Amtrak improve its accounting practices—and financial reporting—to 

clearly show the revenues and costs of providing services and

infrastructure access to commuter rail agencies. We provided draft copies

of this report to DOT and Amtrak for their review and comment. DOT 

officials generally agreed with the draft report’s findings and the intention 

of the recommendation. However, FRA officials expressed concerns about 

limitations in the data required to refine the estimates as well as limited 

staff resources to devote to such an effort. Consequently, FRA officials 

indicated their preference to focus on other priorities. We recognize that

FRA, like other federal agencies, has resource constraints and must focus 

those resources on certain priorities. However, given previous and current

debate over the future of Amtrak, we believe providing policy makers with

accurate information as to the implications of directed service—including

the costs of such services—is a worthwhile investment of agency 

resources and deserves some level of attention. Further, we believe that 

refinements to the cost estimates could be made using existing 

information from Amtrak and commuter rail agencies. DOT officials 

acknowledged that the current estimates are inaccurate, and most likely 

significantly underestimate the true costs of directed service. Therefore, 

any refinements would be a step in the right direction in providing better 

information to policy makers. Amtrak generally agreed with the report’s 

findings, conclusions, and recommendations. 

Page 4 GAO-06-470 Commuter Rail
Commuter rail is a type of public transit that is characterized by passenger

trains operating on railroad tracks and providing regional service (e.g., 

between a central city and adjacent suburbs). Commuter rail systems are 

traditionally associated with older industrial cities, such as Boston, New 

York City, Philadelphia, and Chicago. However, over the past decade,

commuter rail systems have been inaugurated in such cities as Dallas and 

Seattle, and seven new systems are in various stages of planning in cities 

across the country. Currently, there are 18 commuter rail agencies 

throughout the country, and, in 2004, these agencies provided an average 

of 1.1 million passenger trips each weekday. Advocates of commuter rail 

contend that it provides a number of public benefits, including reductions

in highway congestion, pollution, and energy dependence. Moreover, 

commuter rail service can operate on existing railroad rights-of-way,2

which eliminates the time and significant expense associated with 

constructing new infrastructure. 

Background 

Most commuter rail service uses rights-of-way (to run over tracks) that are

owned by Amtrak, freight railroads, or are publicly owned. Amtrak owns 

most of the NEC between Boston, MA, and Washington, D.C., but there are 

several portions of the NEC owned by either commuter rail agencies or 

states. The NEC is also the busiest rail corridor in the U.S. For example, on 

an average weekday, over 1,800 commuter rail and Amtrak trains operate 

on the NEC.3

 Figure 1 shows the ownership of—and Amtrak and 

commuter rail operations on—the NEC. Commuter rail agencies located 

outside of the NEC for the most part use rights-of-way owned by freight 

railroads. 

 2

Rights-of-way include the fixed infrastructure required for train operations, including 

tracks and signals. 

3

In addition, in fiscal year 2001, an average of 38 freight trains used the NEC each day. 

Page 5 GAO-06-470 Commuter Rail
Figure 1: NEC Ownership and Operations Map

Note: Only service on the main portion of the NEC between Washington, D.C., and Boston is shown. 

This represents commuter rail agencies’ primary operating routes on the NEC and does not include 

smaller segments of their service operating over the NEC. For example, New Jersey Transit also 

operates over 7 miles of the NEC between Shore Interlocking and 30th Street Station in Philadelphia, 

and VRE operates over a small portion of the NEC into Washington Union Station. Amtrak’s right-ofway from Harrisburg, PA, to Philadelphia, over which PENNDOT service operates, is not shown on 

this graphic. SEPTA also operates service over this portion of Amtrak’s right-of-way between 

Philadelphia and Parkesburg, Pennsylvania. 

Page 6 GAO-06-470 Commuter Rail
Commuter Railroads

Long Island Rail Road (LIRR) 

Maryland Rail Commuter Service (MARC) 

Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) 

Metro North Commuter Railroad (MNCR) 

New Jersey Transit (NJT) 

Connecticut Department of Transportation’s Shore Line East service (SLE) 

Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA)

Virginia Railway Express (VRE)

Departments of Transportation

Connecticut Department of Transportation (CDOT) 

Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (PENNDOT) 

Three federal agencies—FRA, STB, and FTA—are responsible for different 

aspects of federal rail transportation policy, including freight, intercity 

passenger, and commuter rail service. FRA administers and enforces the 

federal laws and related regulations that are designed to promote safety on

railroads, such as track maintenance, inspection standards, equipment 

standards, and operating practices.4

 Commuter rail agencies are subject to 

FRA regulations. FRA provides funding for Amtrak’s operating and capital

improvements, and since fiscal year 2003 has administered these funds 

through grants. STB is responsible for the economic regulation of freight

railroads, which encompasses those instances when there is an impasse in 

negotiations over Amtrak’s access to freight rail facilities. STB also has 

authority to issue directed (or emergency) service orders to continue rail 

service if a rail carrier is unable to provide service to its customers.5

 In 

2004, this authority was amended to authorize such orders in the event 

that there is a failure of freight or commuter rail service due to a cessation

of service by Amtrak. Directed-commuter-service orders could enable one 

or more operators to gain access to Amtrak’s facilities and equipment. In 

addition, directed-service orders could provide these operators the ability 

to offer employment to former Amtrak personnel for the provision of 

essential commuter service.6

 The Secretary of Transportation, through the 

FRA, would be the funding agency for any STB directed-service order for 

 4

The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) exercises jurisdiction over all areas of railroad

safety under title 49 U.S.C., chapter 201.

5

STB has this authority under section 11123 of title 49 U.S.C. STB’s predecessor, the 

Interstate Commerce Commission, also had this authority. 

6

“Final Report: Directed Service for Amtrak-Dependent Carriers,” prepared by The 

Woodside Consulting Group, Inc., for the FRA (Palo Alto, CA: Oct., 2005), 2. 

Page 7 GAO-06-470 Commuter Rail
commuter rail operations.7

 According to STB staff, while the STB (and its 

predecessor agency, the Interstate Commerce Commission) have directed

freight service in the past when freight railroads have experienced service 

failures, STB has not issued any directed-service orders explicitly for 

passenger rail service. Unlike FRA and STB, FTA is not principally a 

regulatory agency. FTA is the primary federal financial resource for 

supporting locally planned, implemented, and operated transit capital 

investments. As a form of public transit, commuter rail projects are 

eligible for FTA funding.

Amtrak has struggled to become financially solvent since its founding in 

1971, receiving over $29 billion in federal funds for operational and capital

improvements. Despite federal subsidies, Amtrak’s financial situation 

reached critical points when it had to mortgage Pennsylvania Station in 

New York City in 2001 and obtain an emergency loan of $100 million in 

2002 to meet expenses and continue operations. Although Amtrak has 

made progress in containing its operating expenses, its operating losses 

have increased to over $1 billion a year.8

 In light of Amtrak’s continuing 

financial difficulties, different Amtrak reform proposals and legislation 

have been introduced, some of which could impact commuter rail 

agencies. For example, the administration’s fiscal year 2006 budget 

proposal for Amtrak did not include any federal funds for Amtrak, 

however it did include $360 million to maintain commuter and freight 

service operated by Amtrak.9

 Other proposals and legislation included, 

among other things, curtailing money-losing operations and transferring 

Amtrak assets to other companies or directly to the federal government. 

(See table 1.) 

 7

Congress directed the Secretary of Transportation to withhold $60 million for directed 

commuter and freight service from Amtrak’s fiscal year 2004, 2005, and 2006

appropriations. 

8

GAO, Amtrak Management: Systemic Problems Require Actions to Improve Efficiency,

Effectiveness, and Accountability, GAO-06-145 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 2005), 6.

9

Amtrak’s fiscal year 2006 appropriation was $1.3 billion. 

Page 8 GAO-06-470 Commuter Rail
Table 1: Key Aspects of Recent Amtrak Reform Proposals and Legislation That 

Could Affect Commuter Rail Agencies 

Key aspects of

reform proposals Description of proposed change

Zero funding • No operating or capital federal funding for Amtrak 

• $360 million provided to STB to fund directed commuter and 

freight service

Infrastructure 

separation 

• Separate Amtrak operations from infrastructure into different 

companies 

• Separate Amtrak infrastructure from operations by creating a 

subsidiary company under Amtrak’s Board of Directors 

NEC commuter rail fee • Fee for maintenance and capital costs assessed on 

commuter rail agencies that use the NEC 

Multi-state NEC 

compact 

• Passenger rail operations on the NEC would be transferred 

to multi-state compact of Northeastern states 

DOT ownership of 

NEC 

• Ownership of NEC would be transferred to the Secretary of

Transportation, who, in turn, would competitively procure 

contractors for maintenance and operations of NEC 

Cost-reduction 

proposals 

• Would require Amtrak to reduce losses on sleeper car, and 

food and beverage service 

Accounting reforms • Would require Amtrak to acquire a new accounting system 

that would enable Amtrak to assign revenue and expenses to 

each of its lines of business and to distinguish infrastructure

revenue and expenses from its operational revenue and 

expenses 

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. House and Senate bills from the first session of the 109th Congress. 

Most commuter rail agencies rely on Amtrak to some extent for access to 

infrastructure and services. This dependence can range from heavy use of

Amtrak infrastructure and services to limited reliance on Amtrak 

infrastructure and services. (See fig. 2.) Having access to Amtrak-owned 

infrastructure, rights-of-way, stations, platforms, equipment maintenance 

facilities, and storage yards is critical to many commuter rail agencies’ 

operations. The reliance on Amtrak for infrastructure and services by 

many commuter rail agencies has led to a variety of financial relationships 

between commuter rail agencies and Amtrak. In general, these financial

relationships are complicated and lack clarity. This lack of clarity makes it 

difficult to determine if commuter rail agencies are paying their fair share 

for access to infrastructure and services. Amtrak’s fiscal year 2006

appropriation directs the Secretary of Transportation to levy a fee on 

commuter rail agencies that use the NEC as compensation for 

maintenance and capital expenditures resulting from their use of the NEC. 

This fee has important budgetary, and other, implications for commuter 

rail agencies. 

Most Commuter Rail 

Agencies Rely to 

Some Extent on 

Amtrak for Access to 

Infrastructure and 

Services 

Page 9 GAO-06-470 Commuter Rail
Figure 2: Overview of Commuter Rail Agency Reliance on Amtrak for Infrastructure and Services 

Source: GAO.

Train operations

Maintenance of equipment 

Maintenance-of-way

Dispatching

Amtrak-owned or Amtrak-operated stations and platforms

Operates on Amtrak-owned NEC

*

ACE

Caltrain

Coaster TRE NICTD

Metra PENNDOT SLE Metro-North

NJT

LIRR

Sounder MBTA

Metrolink

VRE

SEPTA

Tri-Rail MARC

Other services (includes police/security, ticketing, and traction power)

No dependence No dependence No dependence

No dependence

Amtrak services

Amtrak infrastructure

Note: This figure indicates whether a commuter rail agency relies on Amtrak for services or access to 

infrastructure. Darkened figures do not necessarily mean that Amtrak is the primary provider of a 

service; rather, it means that Amtrak provides some level of service or access to infrastructure. See 

appendix II for detailed data on the extent to which each commuter rail agency relies on Amtrak. 

Page 10 GAO-06-470 Commuter Rail
Access to Amtrak-owned 

Infrastructure Is Critical to 

Many Commuter Rail 

Agencies’ Operations 

Most existing commuter rail agencies (12 of 18) rely on Amtrak-owned or 

Amtrak-operated infrastructure, such as stations or platforms; rights-ofway; and maintenance facilities. Amtrak owns most of the NEC, which 

runs from Washington, D.C., to Boston. Of the nine commuter rail agencies

in the Northeast, eight agencies—including the Long Island Rail Road 

(LIRR) and New Jersey Transit (NJT), two of the largest commuter rail 

agencies in the country—operate over Amtrak-owned infrastructure.10

Seven of these nine commuter rail agencies operate on the NEC between 

Washington, D.C., and Boston.11 On an average weekday, these seven 

commuter rail agencies run approximately 1,630 trains on the NEC, which 

represents over 90 percent of all passenger train traffic on the NEC. 

According to officials from the commuter rail agencies that operate over 

Amtrak-owned portions of the NEC, access to this infrastructure is 

essential for their services. In addition to providing access to the Amtrakowned portions of the NEC, Amtrak also maintains its rights-of-way and 

dispatches all trains on its rights-of-way, including commuter rail traffic; 

these are critical services for commuter rail agencies using the NEC. For 

example, from its centralized dispatching center in Boston, Amtrak 

dispatches all of the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority’s 

(MBTA) trains on one of its lines and provides initial dispatching for twothirds of all other MBTA trains, as well as its own intercity trains. Amtrak

also distributes power to commuter rail agencies that use electrically 

powered trains on the NEC. These trains, which may be hauled by 

locomotives or made up of self-propelled, multiple-unit cars, require 

electric power (called “traction power”) delivered directly from overhead 

power lines.12

 10The nine commuter rail agencies in the Northeast are the Long Island Rail Road, the

Maryland Transit Administration’s MARC Commuter Service, the Massachusetts Bay 

Transportation Authority, Metro-North Railroad, New Jersey Transit (NJT), the 

Pennsylvania Department of Transportation’s Keystone Service from Harrisburg to 

Philadelphia, the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA), the

Connecticut Department of Transportation’s Shore Line East service, and the Virginia Rail 

Express. Metro-North, which operates in New York and Connecticut, is the only commuter 

rail agency in the Northeast that does not use any Amtrak-owned track or infrastructure. 

11The Pennsylvania Department of Transportation service uses Amtrak-owned

infrastructure from Harrisburg, PA, to Philadelphia that connects with the NEC. 

12Amtrak also provides traction power for one SEPTA-owned line in its entirety (other than 

those lines that are on the NEC) and for certain other NJT lines.

Page 11 GAO-06-470 Commuter Rail
In addition to owning most of the track comprising the NEC, Amtrak also 

owns or controls a number of key facilities both on and off the NEC, many 

of which are critical to commuter rail service. (See fig. 3.) 

Figure 3: Amtrak’s Key Facilities for Selected Commuter Rail Agencies 

30th Street Station

Location: Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

Type of facility: Passenger

Used by: Amtrak, SEPTA, NJT, PennDOT

Train movements per day:

 Amtrak 

 Commuter

100

277

Pa.

N.H.

Mass.

R.I.

N.Y.

Maine

Vt.

Conn.

N.J.

Del.

Md.

D.C.

Canada

Holgate Yard

Location: Seattle, Washington

Type of facility: Maintenance

Used by: Amtrak, Sounder

Train movements per day: N/A

Chicago Union Station

Location: Chicago, Illinois

Type of facility: Passenger

Used by: Amtrak, Metra

Train movements per day:

 Amtrak 

 Commuter

48

268

Route 128 Station

Location: Boston, Massachusetts

Type of facility: Passenger

Used by: Amtrak, MBTA

Train movements per day:

 Amtrak 

 Commuter

34

73

Sunnyside Yard

Location: New York, New York

Type of facility: Maintenance

Used by: Amtrak, NJT

Train movements per day: N/A

New York Penn Station

Location: New York, New York

Type of facility: Passenger

Used by: Amtrak, LIRR, NJT

Train movements per day:

 Amtrak 

 Commuter

127

919

Washington Union Station

Location: Washington, D.C.

Type of facility: Passenger

Used by: Amtrak, MARC, VRE

Train movements per day:

 Amtrak 

 Commuter

86

116

Wilmington Station

Location: Wilmington, Delaware

Type of facility: Passenger

Used by: Amtrak, SEPTA

Train movements per day:

 Amtrak 

 Commuter

84

37

Baltimore Penn Station

Location: Baltimore, Maryland

Type of facility: Passenger

Used by: Amtrak, MARC

Train movements per day:

 Amtrak 

 Commuter

84

48

Ivy City Yard

Location: Washington, D.C.

Type of facility: Maintenance

Used by: Amtrak, MARC, VRE

Train movements per day: N/A

Source: Amtrak.

Page 12 GAO-06-470 Commuter Rail
These facilities include many of the busiest passenger stations in the 

country, such as Pennsylvania Station in New York City and Chicago 

Union Station, as well as the platforms and train storage facilities outside 

of Washington Union Station. For example, according to LIRR officials, 

LIRR and NJT trains account for 87.4 percent of the trains coming into 

Pennsylvania Station in New York City, while Amtrak intercity trains 

represent the remaining 12.6 percent.

13 Amtrak also owns or controls a 

number of equipment maintenance and storage yards that are strategically

located near key urban or downtown stations. For example, some 

commuter locomotives and coaches used by Virginia Railway Express 

(VRE) and Maryland Transit Administration, which owns Maryland Rail 

Commuter Service (MARC), are maintained at Amtrak’s Ivy City Yard, just 

north of Washington Union Station. These trains are also stored in 

Washington, D.C., during midday so that they can make evening rush hour 

trips. This allows VRE and MARC to avoid running trains back out to 

storage yards in outlying areas during the middle of the day—a practice 

officials from both agencies said would make the service too costly to 

provide. Similarly, Sound Transit in Seattle relies on Amtrak to maintain 

and store its trains during the midday at Holgate Yard, an Amtrak 

maintenance facility near Sound Transit’s King Street Station in downtown 

Seattle, which serves both Sound Transit and Amtrak trains. (See fig. 4 for 

a picture of Holgate Yard.) According to Sound Transit officials, the use of

Amtrak’s facility saved Sound Transit the one-time cost of building its own 

multi-million dollar maintenance facility. 

 13Based on passenger counts, LIRR and NJT account for 92.6 percent of arriving 

passengers, while Amtrak accounts for 7.4 percent. 

Page 13 GAO-06-470 Commuter Rail
Figure 4: Sound Transit Trains in Amtrak’s Holgate Yard, Seattle, WA

Source: GAO.

Many Commuter Railroads 

Rely on Amtrak for 

Services, with Reliance on 

Amtrak Greater along the 

NEC 

Out of the 18 existing commuter rail agencies, 14 rely on Amtrak for some 

level and type of service—including the operation of commuter trains, 

maintenance of equipment (i.e., locomotives and train cars), maintenanceof-way (i.e., track and related infrastructure), train dispatching, and other 

services such as ticketing and security. Although most passengers ride 

commuter rail lines that use their own in-house employees for services 

critical to the operation of their service, Amtrak is a key player when 

commuter rail agencies do contract with other providers for services, 

compared to other individual companies (see table 2). 

Page 14 GAO-06-470 Commuter Rail
Table 2: Percent of Commuter Rail Passengers Served by Railroad Service

Providers 

Dispatching

Maintenance 

of equipment 

Maintenanceof-way Train

operations

Commuter rail 

agency in-house 

employees 51.2% 71.5% 64.4% 74.7%

Amtrak 30.4% 8.2% 11.7% 4.7%

Freight 17.9% 7.2% 14.1% 8.1%

BNSF Railway 1.7% 1.7% 1.6% 2.1%

Union Pacific 

Railroad 6.0% 5.2% 6.3% 5.2%

Other freights 10.1% 0.3% 6.2% 0.8%

Private operators 0.6% 13.2% 10.0% 12.6%

Herzog 0.6% 1.6% 2.8% 1.3%

Massachusetts 

Bay Commuter

Railroad N/A 8.9% 7.2% 8.9%

Other N/A 2.7% N/A 2.4%

Total 100.1% a100.1% 100.2% 100.1%

Source: GAO analysis of commuter rail agency information. 

Note: This table estimates the percentage of services provided by the various railroad service 

providers to commuter rail agencies. In order to account for the relative size of the commuter rail 

agencies, we weighted the percentages in our calculations. Specifically, we used the total number of 

passengers riding each commuter rail agency during July – September 2005 as a rough proxy for the 

size and service requirements of each agency. Totals may not add to 100% due to rounding. 

a

Data on dispatching was not available for MBTA, and MBTA was excluded from the dispatching 

column. MBTA data was available, and was included in the other service categories. 

However, the extent to which commuter rail agencies rely on Amtrak for 

services varies. In general, those commuter rail agencies that use Amtrakowned segments of the NEC have a greater level of reliance on Amtrak for 

services than those who do not. For example, all eight commuter rail 

agencies that use Amtrak-owned portions of the NEC rely on Amtrak for 

services related to that infrastructure—specifically, dispatching and 

maintenance-of-way—and they also are more likely to contract with 

Amtrak for additional services. Five of the eight commuter rail agencies 

accessing the Amtrak-owned NEC also contract with Amtrak for train 

operation and maintenance of equipment. By comparison, three of the ten 

commuter rail agencies, which do not operate over Amtrak-owned 

Page 15 GAO-06-470 Commuter Rail
portions of the NEC, contract with Amtrak for train crews and 

maintenance of equipment.14

As shown in table 3, we classified the commuter rail agencies we 

contacted based on their level of reliance on Amtrak for services in one of

four categories—heavy reliance, moderate reliance, limited reliance, or 

little to no reliance on Amtrak. Specifically: 

Table 3: Commuter Rail Agency Reliance on Amtrak Services 

Heavy 

reliance 

Moderate 

reliance 

Limited 

reliance 

Little to no 

reliance 

Existing commuter rail agencies 

Altamont Commuter Express (ACE) X 

Connecticut Department of Transportation’s Shore Line 

East and New Haven Lines (SLE) 

X

Maryland Transit Administration (MARC) X 

Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) X 

MTA Long Island Rail Road (LIRR) X 

MTA Metro-North Rail Road X 

New Jersey Transit Corporation (NJT) X 

North County Transit District (Coaster) X 

Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter Railroad 

Corporation (Metra) 

X

Northern Indiana Commuter Transportation District 

(NICTD) 

X

Peninsula Corridor Joint Powers Board (Caltrain) X 

Pennsylvania Department of Transportation 

(PENNDOT) 

X

Sound Transit, Central Puget Sound Regional 

Transportation Authority (Sounder) 

X

Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority 

(SEPTA) 

X

Southern California Regional Rail Authority (Metrolink) X 

Tri-County Commuter Rail Authority (Tri-Rail) X 

Trinity Railway Express (TRE) X 

Virginia Railway Express (VRE) X 

 14This number will be reduced to two in 2006, as Amtrak was not selected to be the service 

provider for San Diego’s Coaster service. 

Page 16 GAO-06-470 Commuter Rail
Heavy 

reliance 

Moderate 

reliance 

Limited 

reliance 

Little to no 

reliance 

Proposed commuter rail agencies 

Nashville Music City Star X 

New Mexico Rail Runner Express X 

Source: GAO analysis.

Notes: 

(1) We determined the level of reliance on Amtrak for services through interviews with commuter rail

agencies in which we discussed to what extent Amtrak provided services critical to the commuter rail 

operations, the results of which are summarized in appendix II. For the purposes of this classification,

we considered train operation crews, maintenance of equipment, maintenance-of-way, and 

dispatching, as services critical to commuter rail operations. 

(2) We used the following definitions to classify the commuter rail agencies: 

Heavy reliance: Commuter rail agency contracts with Amtrak for at least half of two (or more) of the 

services critical to the commuter rail agency’s operations. 

Moderate reliance: Commuter rail agency contracts with Amtrak for at least half of one service critical 

to the commuter rail agency’s operations. 

Limited reliance: Commuter rail agency contracts with, or in some other way relies on, Amtrak for less 

than half of any service critical to the commuter rail agency’s operations. 

Little to no reliance: Commuter rail agency does not contract with, or in some other way rely on, 

Amtrak for any services critical to the commuter rail agency’s operations. 

• Heavy reliance on Amtrak: We classified six commuter rail agencies as 

having a heavy reliance on Amtrak for services. For example, Caltrain—a 

commuter rail service connecting San Francisco and San Jose—contracts 

with Amtrak for all train operations, maintenance of equipment, and 

dispatching services. In addition, Amtrak provides maintenance-of-way 

services for about 65 percent of the track Caltrain uses. Commuter rail 

agencies that rely heavily on Amtrak services told us they would face 

significant challenges, such as having to conduct emergency procurement 

for replacement service providers and potential service shutdowns, if 

Amtrak suddenly ceased to provide these services. Of these six agencies, 

four use the Amtrak-owned NEC. 

• Moderate reliance on Amtrak: We classified five agencies as having a 

moderate reliance on Amtrak for services. For example, the Southeastern

Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA), a service linking 

Philadelphia to its outlying suburbs and Newark/Wilmington, Delaware, 

contracts with Amtrak to maintain almost 40 percent of the track that 

SEPTA traverses, and to dispatch more than half of SEPTA’s trains.15

 15The remainder of the services (e.g., train operations, equipment maintenance, and the rest

of the dispatching) are provided by SEPTA employees. 

Page 17 GAO-06-470 Commuter Rail
Amtrak also provides traction power for many SEPTA trains. One of these 

five agencies classified as having moderate reliance on Amtrak—Sound 

Transit in Seattle, which contracts with Amtrak for all of its maintenance 

of equipment service—does not travel on Amtrak-owned NEC tracks. The 

impact of an abrupt Amtrak shutdown on agencies with moderate reliance 

is the most uncertain and depends on the particular circumstances of a 

shutdown. For example, if an Amtrak shutdown included discontinuation 

of propulsion power to the NEC, SEPTA’s service would cease. However, 

if power remained, SEPTA could potentially operate its service, although

other challenges such as dispatching services currently provided by 

Amtrak would still need to be addressed. 

• Limited reliance on Amtrak: We classified three agencies as having 

limited reliance on Amtrak for service. None of these agencies use the 

NEC, and these agencies could likely cope with an abrupt shutdown of 

Amtrak services by using existing resources until more resources became

available. For example, Metra, a commuter rail agency in Chicago, relies 

on Amtrak for dispatching services and access to infrastructure in and 

around Chicago Union Station—a key station for several of Metra’s lines 

that is owned and operated by Amtrak. Provided that Metra was granted 

the authority to assume responsibility for Chicago Union Station and 

obtained information regarding the employees it would need to hire to 

operate the station, a senior Metra official stated that it would be able to 

take over the operation of the station, and could do so over a weekend if 

necessary. 

• Little to no reliance on Amtrak: We classified six commuter rail 

agencies, including two proposed commuter rail services, as having little 

to no reliance on Amtrak. These agencies either have their own in-house 

employees or they contract for services with private transportation 

companies or freight railroads. For example, the Northern Indiana 

Commuter Transportation District (NICTD) operates commuter rail 

service from South Bend, Indiana, to Chicago with its own employees and 

equipment on its own track. In addition, none of the agencies require 

access to Amtrak-owned NEC tracks, and all reported that they could

continue service with minimal or no disruption in the event of an abrupt

Amtrak cessation of services. Although these six agencies do not rely on 

Amtrak for services, most of these agencies have some kind of relationship 

with Amtrak. For example, the Fort Worth Transportation Authority—one 

of the two transit agencies that owns Trinity Railway Express (TRE)—

built a multi-modal transportation facility that serves as a train, bus, and 

cab station for commuters in Fort Worth, Texas. In developing the center,

Amtrak requested a number of features that would allow its intercity trains 

to use the station, and in turn Amtrak agreed to a 10-year operating lease

Page 18 GAO-06-470 Commuter Rail
of the station. According to TRE officials, the transportation authority 

would stand to lose a revenue stream of more than $500,000 per year if 

Amtrak ceased to use the station. 

The reliance on Amtrak for infrastructure and services by many commuter 

rail agencies has led to a variety of financial arrangements between these 

parties. While information on these arrangements could help decision 

makers in their efforts to reform Amtrak, these arrangements vary 

significantly and frequently lack clarity. As a result, it is difficult for 

Amtrak’s internal and external stakeholders to identify the overall amount 

of revenues Amtrak generates, and the costs it incurs, in providing 

services and infrastructure access to commuter rail agencies. Several 

factors contribute to the lack of clarity, including limitations in Amtrak’s 

accounting practices, lack of transparency in Amtrak’s financial reports, 

and the structure of some of the arrangements. Amtrak’s fiscal year 2006

appropriations bill directs DOT to levy a fee on commuter rail agencies 

that use the NEC to compensate Amtrak for maintenance and capital 

expenditures resulting from their use of the NEC. This fee could increase 

the transparency of Amtrak’s—and commuter rail agencies’ financial—

arrangements, but it does pose some challenges. 

The financial arrangements between commuter rail agencies and Amtrak 

vary. One reason for this variation is the negotiation process. Although 

some financial arrangements have grown from the historical relationships 

between Amtrak and commuter rail agencies, most of today’s 

arrangements are the product of individual negotiations. Through these 

negotiations, Amtrak and a commuter rail agency reach agreement on the 

terms and conditions—including price—for the commuter rail agency’s 

use of Amtrak services and infrastructure. This agreement is typically

documented in a contract between Amtrak and the commuter rail agency. 

The specific contract terms and conditions vary due to a number of 

factors, such as the comparative bargaining power of each party, the 

Financial Arrangements 

between Amtrak and 

Commuter Rail Agencies 

Vary and Lack Clarity 

Financial Arrangements 

between Commuter Rail 

Agencies and Amtrak Vary 

Page 19 GAO-06-470 Commuter Rail
specific services and infrastructure used, and the extent of competition for 

the contract.16

According to Amtrak officials, another factor that influences the specific 

terms and conditions of some of Amtrak’s commuter rail contracts is the 

Interstate Commerce Commission’s17 1983 ruling known as Ex Parte 417. 

This ruling governed compensation for access to the NEC for some 

commuter rail agencies, but not necessarily others.18

• Amtrak officials stated that NEC commuter rail agencies that were 

established prior to the ruling—namely, LIRR, SEPTA, NJT, MBTA, and 

MARC—start from an avoidable cost basis in NEC-access negotiations 

with Amtrak. Avoidable costs refer to only those expenses above what 

Amtrak would pay if the commuter rail did not use Amtrak infrastructure. 

• Amtrak officials stated that other commuter rail agencies must negotiate

NEC-access agreements from a fully allocated cost basis, which could 

include all of Amtrak’s costs for running commuter rail trains over the 

NEC (e.g., including avoidable costs, depreciation, and overhead). These 

agencies include PENNDOT, SLE, and VRE.19

Commuter rail agencies’ financial arrangements with Amtrak also vary in

relation to the terms of their capital contributions for shared 

infrastructure. Some commuter rail agencies contribute significantly more 

 16Commuter rail contracts can either be a product of a competitive or non-competitive 

process. In a competitive process, a commuter rail agency requests proposals for a certain

set of services and several companies submit offers to provide that service. The companies

may be given feedback and an opportunity to refine their offers. One or more companies

are ultimately selected for a contract. Where Amtrak owns the infrastructure necessary for 

commuter service, commuter rail agencies have entered into non-competitive contracts 

with Amtrak—for example, to access the Amtrak-owned NEC, Chicago Union Station, or 

Holgate Maintenance Yard in Seattle. A non-competitive contract is one in which the cost is 

developed through negotiations with a single provider such as Amtrak. 

17STB is the successor to the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC). 

18According to STB staff, no commuter rail agency has petitioned the Board to apply the 

ICC ruling. Nevertheless, it serves as an option should Amtrak and those commuter rail 

agencies subject to the ruling fail to reach agreement as to the terms and conditions of 

access. Moreover, a senior Amtrak official stated that commuter rail agencies covered by

the ICC ruling use it as the basis for access negotiations. 

19SEPTA provides commuter rail service for the Delaware Department of Transportation

between Newark/Wilmington, DE, and Philadelphia, PA. This service was initiated after 

Amtrak’s inception, and therefore, Delaware’s Department of Transportation also 

negotiates a price for accessing the NEC. 

Page 20 GAO-06-470 Commuter Rail
to capital projects that benefit both the commuter rail agency and Amtrak 

than others. For example, NJT has negotiated a $600 million, 10-year 

(1997-2006) joint benefit capital investment program with Amtrak. In 

contrast, SEPTA made over $30 million in capital investments on Amtrakowned portions of the NEC between fiscal years 1995 and 2005.20

The financial arrangements between Amtrak and commuter rail agencies 

also vary in terms of how they are structured. For example, Amtrak may 

have separate contracts for services, infrastructure access, and capital

investment with one commuter rail agency, while another agency might 

have only one contract that bundles several services and access fees 

together in a fixed price. In addition, a few commuter railroads have 

entered into “quid-pro-quo” exchange arrangements with Amtrak. For 

example, Sound Transit and Amtrak have an exchange arrangement where 

monetary values are not established for maintenance of the two stations 

they share—that is, Amtrak uses the Tukwila Station, which is maintained 

by Sound Transit, and in turn Sound Transit uses the King Street Station,

which is maintained by Amtrak. No recognition is given to this exchange in

Amtrak’s financial records and reports. Similarly, Amtrak grants MBTA 

commuter service access to 5.7 miles of track that Amtrak owns and 

maintains; in exchange, MBTA grants Amtrak the right to run intercity 

trains over 37 miles of track owned by MBTA. No money is exchanged 

between Amtrak and MBTA for the use of those portions of track. 

The financial arrangements between Amtrak and commuter rail agencies 

also lack clarity. That is, although such information could help decision 

makers consider potential reforms to Amtrak, it is difficult for commuter 

rail agencies, Amtrak’s management, and external stakeholders (such as 

Congress and DOT) to identify the overall amount of revenue Amtrak 

generates and the costs it incurs in providing services and infrastructure 

access to commuter rail agencies. It is also difficult to determine whether 

commuter rail agencies are being over- or under-charged for services and

infrastructure access. Several factors contribute to the lack of clarity, 

including limitations in Amtrak’s accounting practices, a lack of 

transparency in Amtrak’s financial reports, and the structure of some of 

the arrangements. Specifically: 

Financial Arrangements 

between Amtrak and 

Commuter Rail Agencies Lack 

Clarity 

 20SEPTA and Amtrak are finalizing an agreement to invest $380 million on portions of the

Amtrak-owned Keystone Corridor over 11 years. 

Page 21 GAO-06-470 Commuter Rail
• Limitations in Amtrak’s accounting practices: Limitations of Amtrak’s 

cost-accounting practices produce a lack of clarity in the financial 

relationships between commuter rail agencies and Amtrak—particularly 

with respect to Amtrak’s ability to clearly show all of the costs it incurs in 

providing access to infrastructure and various services. While Amtrak can 

support amounts in periodic billing statements to some of its commuter 

rail customers, it cannot identify (and does not allocate and bill) the full 

cost of providing these services or access. In prior reports, we noted that 

Amtrak has insufficient unit cost metrics to measure the full costs of its 

core functions, such as train operations or infrastructure maintenance. 

Amtrak officials acknowledged that the methods for assigning its costs are 

not exact, and some commuter rail agencies with whom we spoke 

expressed dissatisfaction with Amtrak’s ability to clearly document these 

costs. For example, officials from one commuter rail agency explained 

that Amtrak relied on historical cost data from prior negotiations and 

regularly adjusted these amounts for inflation rather than on clear and

transparent actual annual costs. As a result, these commuter rail agency 

officials believed that Amtrak significantly overcharges for some items and 

significantly undercharges for others. In October 2005, we recommended 

that Amtrak enhance financial management transparency by lines-ofbusiness (which include commuter operations) and establish unit cost 

measures, which could help Amtrak increase the accuracy of its cost 

information in providing services and infrastructure access to commuter 

railroads.21 Amtrak received $5 million in its fiscal year 2006 

appropriations to develop and implement a new managerial accounting 

system, which could also help improve its financial transparency.22

• Lack of clarity in Amtrak’s financial reports: Amtrak’s financial 

reports do not clearly and transparently present useful information for all 

amounts of revenue generated and all costs incurred for providing 

infrastructure access and services to commuter rail agencies. Amtrak has 

made some progress in showing its revenues and costs in its monthly 

performance reports; however, the total amount of revenue and costs from 

providing infrastructure access and services to commuter rail agencies is 

still unclear. For example, income generated from Amtrak’s operation of

commuter rail service is shown as commuter revenue; however, 

infrastructure access fees from commuter rail agencies are included with 

other railroads’ access fees as infrastructure management revenue. 

 21GAO-06-145. 

22According to FRA officials, they are currently working with Amtrak to develop a plan for

revamping its accounting system. 

Page 22 GAO-06-470 Commuter Rail
Similarly, Amtrak’s audited consolidated financial statements—while they 

properly report all items of revenue, cost, and offsets to capital items from 

commuter rail activities—Amtrak’s management does not separately 

disclose all of this activity in one place, which would increase its 

usefulness. The lack of transparency in Amtrak’s financial reports is due, 

in part, to limitations in Amtrak’s accounting practices. Although 

commuter rail activities are not the focus of Amtrak’s financial reports, the 

lack of transparency about the revenues and costs incurred as a result of 

Amtrak’s commuter rail activities makes it difficult for Amtrak’s 

management and external stakeholders to make fully informed decisions

about its commuter line-of-business. 

• Structure of financial arrangements: The structure of Amtrak’s 

financial arrangements with commuter rail agencies also contributes to 

the lack of clarity. For example, as noted above, some commuter rail 

agencies have a single contract for both infrastructure access and services. 

According to Amtrak officials, while these contracts separate charges for 

infrastructure access and services, commuter rail agencies are not able to

identify Amtrak’s specific costs associated with these charges. As a result, 

several commuter rail agencies stated that this makes it difficult to 

determine the value of the specific services or access that they are 

purchasing from Amtrak. In addition, the “quid-pro-quo” arrangements are 

not recorded as revenues or expenses by Amtrak. Because these 

arrangements are not assigned monetary values, it is difficult to quantify

the financial value or impact to Amtrak’s or commuter rail agencies’ 

bottom line. 

Officials from Amtrak acknowledged that there is a lack of clarity in the 

current financial arrangements between Amtrak and commuter rail 

agencies. In particular, officials noted that because of Ex Parte 417 and the 

practice of some (but not all) commuter rail agencies contributing to 

capital projects, there is a built-in imbalance in access fees and capital

contributions paid to Amtrak from commuter railroads on the NEC. 

Amtrak officials said they would welcome a uniform capital contribution 

and access fee policy from the federal government. 

As part of Amtrak’s fiscal year 2006 appropriation, Congress directed the 

Secretary of Transportation to assess a fee on commuter rail agencies 

using the NEC. According to the statute, the fee will be based on annual

NEC maintenance and capital costs—net of any current contributions 

from commuter rail agencies—attributable to commuter rail use of the 

infrastructure. The statute directs the Secretary of Transportation to 

calculate the fee based on relative use of the NEC (e.g., train mile usage or 

another factor). The revenue generated from this fee would be used to 

New NEC Fee Could Improve 

Transparency but Poses 

Potential Challenges 

Page 23 GAO-06-470 Commuter Rail
support capital projects on the NEC. As of March 2006, FRA was working 

to develop and implement the fee.

FRA and FTA officials identified several challenges in implementing this 

new fee. First, FRA officials stated that developing a formula for assessing 

the fee could be complicated; several factors could be used as a basis for 

the fee, including ridership or train miles—both of which are already used 

in other federal funding formulas—or other factors. Second, FTA officials 

noted that most commuter rail agencies already have negotiated 

agreements with Amtrak concerning cost-sharing approaches for capital 

investments, which will complicate the development of a separate formula 

for assessing the fee. Finally, FTA officials stated that they will need 

clarification regarding whether the Congress intended this fee as a 

rescission to federal funding of capital projects from FTA to commuter rail 

agencies, or as a new federal funding source to Amtrak. 

Commuter rail agencies using Amtrak-owned NEC share many of these 

concerns—especially that the contracts they have negotiated with Amtrak 

already establish their contribution for infrastructure access and capital 

contributions. These agencies also noted to us that their state fiscal year 

2006 budgets have already been passed and did not include any funding for 

such a fee. As a result, these agencies may face difficulties in securing 

funding to pay the fee if DOT levies the charge as directed during the 

remainder of fiscal year 2006. In addition, because commuter rail agencies

and Amtrak use the NEC in different ways (e.g., Amtrak high-speed 

intercity trains require more costly maintenance-of-way requirements as 

compared to slower commuter trains) and have different levels of use, 

commuter rail agencies argue that there are valid reasons for cost 

differentials between commuter rail agencies and Amtrak. Finally, officials 

from several commuter rail agencies expressed concern that they were not 

consulted prior to the enactment of this fee and believe that Amtrak, the 

federal government, and representatives of the affected states and 

commuter rail properties should cooperatively develop a formula for 

determining and allocating costs and compensation for shared-track 

operations on the NEC. According to FRA officials, FRA is in the process 

of meeting with commuter rail agencies to develop a methodology to 

calculate and apply this fee. 

Page 24 GAO-06-470 Commuter Rail
Decisions made by federal policy makers in the debate over Amtrak will 

play a critical role in whether or not Amtrak abruptly ceases to provide 

services and infrastructure to commuter rail agencies. In the event that 

Amtrak abruptly ceases to provide services and infrastructure, commuter 

rail agencies would face two critical operational issues that could make it

difficult for some to continue operations and avoid severe service 

disruptions. One critical issue they would face would be the potential loss

of Amtrak skilled labor. Another critical issue would be the potential loss

of access to Amtrak-owned infrastructure. Some commuter rail agencies 

also described facing additional issues, such as the loss of revenue or a 

strain on capacity. 

Decisions made by federal policy makers will play a critical role in 

whether or not Amtrak abruptly ceases to provide services and 

infrastructure to commuter rail agencies.23 The most likely cause for an 

abrupt Amtrak cessation is bankruptcy. Amtrak has been on the edge of 

bankruptcy several times. For example, in 2001, Amtrak lost over 

$1.2 billion and had to mortgage a portion of Pennsylvania Station in New 

York City to generate enough cash to meet its expenses. As we reported in 

October 2005, Amtrak’s financial troubles have continued since that time, 

with operating losses now totaling over $1 billion per year.24 Given 

Amtrak’s precarious financial position, federal policy makers’ decisions 

could either usher Amtrak into bankruptcy or prevent Amtrak from 

slipping into bankruptcy. For example, if policy makers acted on 

legislative proposals that end or substantially reduce federal funding, an 

Amtrak bankruptcy or shutdown could quickly follow. Specifically, 

Amtrak officials have stated that proposals with zero funding for Amtrak 

operating or capital costs would promptly trigger an Amtrak bankruptcy. 

In contrast, federal policy makers could also act to prevent Amtrak from 

declaring bankruptcy, as was the case in July 2002 when DOT approved an

emergency loan because the railroad was running out of cash. 

Abrupt Amtrak 

Cessation Could Raise 

Critical Issues for 

Some Commuter Rail 

Agencies 

Decisions Made by Federal 

Policy Makers Will Play a 

Critical Role in Whether 

Amtrak Abruptly Ceases to 

Provide Infrastructure and 

Services to Commuter Rail 

Agencies

 23Our report focuses on the impact of an abrupt Amtrak cessation on commuter rail 

operations. For example, if policy makers acted on legislative proposals that end or

substantially reduce federal funding, an Amtrak bankruptcy or shutdown could quickly 

follow. Multiple bills to reform intercity passenger rail service have been proposed in 

recent years—and these bills, if enacted, could result in outcomes other than an Amtrak 

cessation. However, we did not examine how these other outcomes or scenarios would 

impact commuter rail operations. 

24GAO-06-145. 

Page 25 GAO-06-470 Commuter Rail
If federal policy makers allow an Amtrak bankruptcy to occur, a trustee 

would be appointed to oversee the bankruptcy proceedings. Under current 

law, the trustee, along with the bankruptcy court, would make decisions 

about Amtrak’s future.25 Although it is difficult to predict what decisions a 

bankruptcy court would make, there is no guarantee that all of Amtrak 

services—such as the services it provides to commuter rail agencies—

would continue. In October 2005, we suggested that as a first major step 

toward implementing and rationalizing the provision of intercity passenger 

rail service, Congress should consider establishing a clear national policy 

for intercity passenger rail service that would address, among other things,

the interests of the diverse set of Amtrak stakeholders and limit 

unintended consequences to these parties.26 Commuter rail agencies are 

one kind of stakeholder, and the effect of an abrupt Amtrak shutdown on 

commuter rail agencies could be one such unintended consequence. 

For those commuter rail agencies that contract with Amtrak to provide 

services, an abrupt Amtrak cessation could result in a shortage of qualified 

labor needed to maintain commuter service and avoid severe disruptions 

or a shutdown of service. Amtrak employees provide a number of services 

to commuter rail agencies that support a wide range of commuter rail 

functions. In addition, these employees have institutional knowledge 

regarding the use and maintenance of the equipment and infrastructure 

needed to provide safe and efficient passenger rail service. If Amtrak 

employees no longer provided these services, commuter rail agencies 

would need to replace Amtrak labor with other experienced railroad 

employees or hire new employees and train them. However, the narrowed 

available pool of qualified rail employees due to the recent increase in 

freight traffic as discussed by freight railroad officials, as well as the time 

required to train new employees, could limit the ability of commuter rail 

agencies to replace Amtrak employees in the short term. 

STB staff placed Amtrak employees that provide services to commuter rail 

agencies in the following categories based on the type of service they

provide to commuter rail agencies: 

One Critical Issue 

Commuter Rail Agencies 

Would Face Would Be the 

Potential Loss of Skilled 

Amtrak Labor 

 25For more information on issues involved in an Amtrak liquidation, see GAO, Intercity 

Passenger Rail: Potential Financial Issues in the Event That Amtrak Undergoes 

Liquidation, GAO-02-871 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 20, 2002).

26GAO-06-145. 

Page 26 GAO-06-470 Commuter Rail
• Dedicated-contract employees: these employees are mainly dedicated to a 

single commuter rail service and include conductors, engineers, and 

maintenance of equipment personnel. For example, the Amtrak engineers 

and conductors that operate VRE commuter trains are dedicated to this 

service by contract, although they may occasionally work on Amtrak 

service. 

• Cross-cutting employees: these employees provide services, such as 

maintenance-of-way, signals and communications, or dispatching, for 

more than one passenger rail service. For example, Amtrak and LIRR 

dispatchers working in Pennsylvania Station Central Control facility in 

New York City are jointly managed by Amtrak and LIRR. These 

dispatchers control the movement of Amtrak intercity trains as well as 

LIRR and NJT commuter trains. 

• Overhead employees: these employees take care of functions such as 

payroll and training, and provide support to both Amtrak and the various 

commuter operations. These employees support dedicated, cross-cutting, 

and other overhead functions. It is unclear how many of these employees 

would be needed to support each individual commuter service contract.

According to STB staff, dedicated-contract employees may be easier for

commuter rail agencies to replace or assume in the short term than 

employees that provide either cross-cutting or overhead functions. For 

instance, dedicated-contract employees are easier to identify because they

generally work for only one commuter rail service. In addition, the costs 

associated with dedicated-contract employees, such as salaries and 

benefits, are easier to quantify than costs associated with employees that 

support functions for more than one passenger rail service. 

If Amtrak abruptly ceased to provide services and infrastructure to 

commuter rail agencies, officials from a few commuter rail agencies told 

us they might be able to replace the Amtrak employees who are dedicated

to their particular commuter rail service with employees from another 

railroad. For example, SLE, which operates between New London and 

New Haven, Connecticut, may be able to replace Amtrak train and engine 

crews with Metro-North employees that are already familiar with SLE’s 

operation in 6 to 12 months. Similarly, according to a senior Coaster 

official, the Coaster service operating between San Diego and Oceanside, 

California, would be able to replace Amtrak maintenance-of-way 

employees more quickly than other employees because either Burlington 

Northern Santa Fe, a Class I freight railroad, or local contractors could 

step in to perform this type of work. 

Page 27 GAO-06-470 Commuter Rail
In most cases, however, commuter rail agencies told us they could not 

quickly replace current Amtrak employees because of workforce 

limitations, such as the availability of a qualified labor pool. For example, 

according to officials from several Class I freight railroads, their current 

workforce is already strained due to a growing demand for freight rail 

transportation and a narrow labor pool of qualified applicants. In addition, 

freight railroad employees could not immediately take over services 

provided by Amtrak employees without first obtaining training on 

commuter rail equipment. According to officials from one freight railroad, 

it would take at least 9 months to train someone to safely operate 

commuter service if existing Amtrak train crews were unavailable. 

Commuter rail agencies also told us they do not have the workforce 

capabilities or expertise to take over the services provided by Amtrak 

(especially overhead, dispatching, or maintenance services) in the short 

term. As a result, some commuter rail agencies would have to limit or shut 

down service in the short term unless current Amtrak employees could

continue providing these services. For example:

• Caltrain bundles the services required to operate, maintain, and dispatch 

its commuter trains into one contract with Amtrak. According to one 

Caltrain official, if Amtrak no longer provided these services, Caltrain 

would likely go out of business and discontinue its commuter operations, 

because, among other things, Caltrain employees are not equipped to 

assume overhead functions currently provided by Amtrak, such as payroll, 

training, and human resources. Moreover, because of the small size of the 

commuter operation, it would be cost-prohibitive for Caltrain to handle 

these overhead functions compared to Amtrak, which can centralize such

functions for its national network and all of its commuter services. 

• While MBTA no longer contracts with Amtrak for operations and 

maintenance of equipment services, Amtrak personnel still provide some 

services, including maintenance-of-way, signal maintenance, and 

dispatching for some of its trains. In particular, Amtrak employees 

dispatch MBTA trains at the joint Centralized Electrification and Traffic 

Control (or CETC) center in Boston’s South Station. The technical skills 

required to dispatch trains take time to develop and could not be replaced

in a short time period. An official from the Massachusetts Bay Commuter 

Railroad Company (MBCR), the contract operator of the MBTA commuter 

service, stated that if Amtrak no longer provided dispatching services for 

MBTA trains, it would need to hire 18 dispatchers—and hiring and training 

these dispatchers would take about 15 months if it could not hire the 

existing, qualified Amtrak employees. Until these dispatchers were trained 

and in place, MBTA’s service would be limited. 

Page 28 GAO-06-470 Commuter Rail
Other commuter rail agencies on the NEC that rely on Amtrak’s skilled 

workforce would also face issues in the event of an abrupt Amtrak 

cessation. For example, NJT relies on Amtrak employees to dispatch some 

of its trains out of the CETC center in Philadelphia’s 30th Street Station.

SEPTA also relies on Amtrak dispatchers to provide overhead electric 

power and dispatch both power and some of its trains out of this CETC 

center. According to NJT and SEPTA officials, these employees could not 

be replaced in the short term because of the training and expertise 

required to provide these services. 

To avoid disruptions or shutdowns, commuter rail agencies would need to

be able to continue accessing Amtrak-owned infrastructure if Amtrak 

abruptly shut down. Commuter rail agencies on the NEC, in particular, 

could face severe service disruptions without the ability to access Amtrakowned track and stations along the NEC. For example: 

Potential Loss of Access to 

Amtrak Infrastructure Is 

Another Critical Issue 

Commuter Rail Agencies 

Would Face 

• Officials from LIRR stated that without access to Pennsylvania Station, 

which is the LIRR’s major access point to downtown New York City, about 

87.4 percent of LIRR’s daily passengers would have to be taken to 

temporary west-end terminals and transferred to various subway stations 

in order to complete their trips into Manhattan. 

• NJT officials estimated that over 77 percent of its daily passengers would 

be affected each day if it could no longer operate its trains over the NEC. 

According to these officials, there are not enough suitable alternative 

transportation options to accommodate these passengers because of 

capacity limitations on area highways and lack of additional bus 

equipment.

• According to a SEPTA official, almost all of its passengers would be 

affected without access to Amtrak-owned right-of-way and traction power, 

which is provided through the CETC Center in Philadelphia’s 30th Street 

Station. This is because almost all SEPTA passengers begin or end their 

commute in the city center, where all of SEPTA’s routes are connected 

through a central tunnel that has traction power provided by Amtrak. If 

access to Amtrak-owned infrastructure and power is unavailable, limited

bus service to SEPTA heavy rail and light rail lines might be available to 

some passengers. 

As discussed previously, Amtrak also owns and controls infrastructure 

outside the NEC, including stations and maintenance yards that are used 

by commuter rail agencies. These commuter rail agencies would also need

Page 29 GAO-06-470 Commuter Rail
continued access to these facilities in order to limit service disruptions if

Amtrak abruptly ceased service. For example, over half of Metra’s 

commuter rail lines could not complete their trips without access to 

Chicago Union Station. In Seattle, Sound Transit officials stated that they 

would have to obtain access to another maintenance facility, which would 

likely cause severe service disruptions, or discontinue service if access to

Amtrak’s Holgate maintenance yard was unavailable due to an abrupt 

Amtrak cessation. 

While access to labor and infrastructure present critical issues for 

commuter rail agencies that rely on Amtrak, a number of other issues 

could also face commuter rail agencies in the event of an abrupt Amtrak 

cessation. These include loss of revenue and a strain on capacity. 

Commuter Rail Agencies 

Also Described Other 

Issues They Would Face 

with Abrupt Amtrak 

Cessation • Loss of revenue: some commuter rail agencies could lose revenue

received from access fees paid by Amtrak to operate its trains over tracks 

owned by the commuter authority. For example, the Coaster service in 

California receives $1.9 million a year from Amtrak to operate over 

infrastructure owned by Coaster. According to one Coaster official, 

without this revenue, service reductions or fare increases would likely 

result. 

• Strain on capacity: some commuter rail agencies could also face a strain

on capacity as a result of an abrupt Amtrak cessation. For example, some 

commuter rail services may have to accommodate passengers from 

Amtrak’s intercity service or take over portions of Amtrak’s intercity 

service. However, commuter rail agencies may not have adequate 

resources or the capacity to accommodate additional intercity passengers.

For example, both Metro-North and Metrolink expect they would have to 

add equipment to their service in order to accommodate Amtrak intercity

passengers. However, according to a Metrolink official, it is uncertain how 

quickly it could procure additional equipment to meet increased demand 

in the short term. In addition, some commuter rail agencies have crossticketing programs with Amtrak that allow one or both parties to increase

capacity on their lines without having to add cars or trains to their service. 

For example, both Coaster and Metrolink have initiated “rail-to-rail” 

ticketing programs with Amtrak that allow commuters who hold monthly 

passes to ride Amtrak trains within the commuter rail’s service territory. 

This effectively increases the number of trains that Coaster passengers can 

use each day from 22 to 44. An Amtrak cessation, therefore, would 

significantly reduce these commuter rail agencies’ capacity. 

Page 30 GAO-06-470 Commuter Rail
Most commuter rail agencies that rely on Amtrak services and Amtrakowned infrastructure have identified short- and long-term options to 

mitigate service disruptions in the event that Amtrak abruptly ceases 

operations. However, those options are largely dependent on the ability to

retain Amtrak employees and access to Amtrak’s infrastructure, 

particularly in the short term. Federal agencies could provide short-term 

options to mitigate potential impacts on commuter rail agencies in the 

event of an abrupt Amtrak cessation. However, service disruptions are 

likely and the cost of funding such options is unknown. Private 

transportation companies could take over commuter rail services provided 

by Amtrak; however, labor and liability issues, among others, would need

to be addressed. 

Contingencies identified by commuter rail agencies to respond to an 

abrupt Amtrak cessation vary depending on the reliance of that agency on

Amtrak for services and access to infrastructure. Commuter rail agencies 

that have little to no reliance on Amtrak would be able to continue 

operating commuter service with little or no service disruption if Amtrak 

abruptly ceased to provide services and infrastructure. Nevertheless, some 

of these agencies have identified some options to mitigate the potential

non-service impacts, such as the potential strain on capacity as a result of

an Amtrak cessation. For example, Metro-North would add train cars to its 

current service in order to accommodate passengers from Amtrak’s 

intercity service. 

Commuter rail agencies with limited to heavy reliance on Amtrak, 

however, could face minor to severe service disruptions depending on 

their ability to retain Amtrak employees and use Amtrak infrastructure—

which is particularly critical for commuter rail agencies on the NEC. 

Commuter rail agencies identified short-term contingencies ranging from 

assuming portions of the service to curtailing or shutting down service if 

Amtrak abruptly ceases to provide services and access to infrastructure to 

them. 

Some Options Are 

Available to 

Commuter Rail 

Agencies in the Event 

of an Abrupt Amtrak 

Cessation, but Service 

Disruptions and 

Financial Difficulties 

Would Be Likely

Most Commuter Rail 

Agencies Have Identified 

Contingencies for an 

Amtrak Cessation that are 

Largely Dependent on 

Access to Amtrak 

Employees and 

Infrastructure 

• Assume portions of service: In some cases, commuter rail agencies may 

be able to assume management of some of the services provided by 

Amtrak. For example, MBTA has the option to add dispatching and 

infrastructure maintenance functions to its contract with MBCR. These 

functions are currently provided by Amtrak on those portions of the NEC 

that MBTA operates commuter service. However, MBTA stated it would 

prefer to hire the current Amtrak personnel or would need the current 

Page 31 GAO-06-470 Commuter Rail
workers to continue to provide these services until other workers were 

hired and trained—a process that could take more than 1 year. 

• Find alternate service provider: A few commuter rail agencies would 

make arrangements for an alternate provider to take over services 

provided by Amtrak. For example, a commuter rail agency official told us

that they would either conduct an emergency procurement to replace the 

current contract with Amtrak or would go directly to another operator and 

ask them to fill in. However, this process would likely be very expensive 

because there would not be sufficient time to competitively procure the 

contract. It would also require the willingness of Amtrak employees 

currently dedicated to that commuter rail agency’s service to hire on with 

the new contractor. 

• Curtail or shut down service: Several commuter rail agencies, 

particularly on the NEC, stated they would either have to curtail portions 

of their service or shut down service entirely, particularly if access to 

Amtrak employees and infrastructure were unavailable. For example, 

MARC officials told us if MARC could no longer access Washington Union

Station, they would run only the trains that operate over CSX 

Transportation (CSX) infrastructure to stations outside of Washington, 

D.C., and passengers would need to transfer to subway or bus lines to 

complete their trips into Washington, D.C. Other commuter rail agencies 

told us they would likely shut down service if Amtrak abruptly ceased to 

provide services and infrastructure. For example, a Caltrain official stated

that it would likely end all of its commuter rail service because it does not

have the workforce capabilities to take over all of the services provided by

Amtrak. 

Commuter rail agencies also identified long-term contingencies in the 

event of an Amtrak cessation. Commuter rail agencies that use Amtrak for 

services would issue request-for-proposals (RFP) to hire new contractors 

to replace Amtrak. However, several commuter rail officials told us that 

the procurement process takes an average of 18 months from the time the 

RFP is issued to the time the new contractor can begin providing service.

These contractors would also need to hire a qualified workforce, which 

may or may not include Amtrak employees, and would require access to 

Amtrak-owned infrastructure in order to provide services to commuter rail 

agencies. 

Page 32 GAO-06-470 Commuter Rail
STB has the statutory authority to direct a rail carrier to provide services, 

previously provided by Amtrak, to commuter rail agencies in the event of 

an abrupt Amtrak cessation of services. According to the statute, in order

for STB to issue a directed-service order (1) a commuter rail agency must 

be adversely affected by an Amtrak shutdown and (2) funding must have 

been appropriated for directed service. The statute also establishes 

parameters for the use of directed service. For example, a single directedservice order cannot last more than 270 days (about 9 months). In 

addition, in a directed-service scenario, STB must require the use of the 

employees who would have normally performed the work, to the extent 

practicable. Such employees could be former Amtrak employees or 

employees from another railroad,27 including commuter or freight 

railroads. The statute also gives STB the authority to direct a service 

provider to take over the provision of infrastructure functions related to 

operations, such as traction power, dispatching, and maintenance. 

Therefore, according to STB staff, STB could direct service over the NEC 

so that current commuter rail agencies could continue to operate on the 

NEC for a limited period of time. However, STB’s authority to direct 

service for commuter rail agencies has never been used, and a number of 

uncertainties about directed service—such as the time required to 

implement a directed service order and the costs of such efforts—exist. 

Consequently, FRA officials believed that service disruptions under a 

directed-service scenario would be unavoidable and could be either brief 

or extended, depending on the particular situation of the commuter rail 

agency. 

Companies that could be directed to provide the services now performed 

by Amtrak for commuter rail agencies include freight railroads, the 

commuter rail agencies themselves, and possibly other entities. For 

example, Metra in Chicago might be directed to take over the operation, 

maintenance, and dispatching for Chicago Union Station—a responsibility 

Metra officials stated they would be able to do. STB staff did note that 

even though STB has the authority to direct entities to serve as a directed 

service provider, it would have to weigh their willingness to perform this 

task. For example, although STB can direct a freight railroad to provide 

train crews to operate commuter rail service, freight railroad officials with 

whom we spoke have consistently expressed a lack of interest in being 

Federal Agencies Could 

Provide Short-Term 

Options for Commuter Rail 

Agencies, but Service 

Disruptions Are Likely and 

Costs Are Unknown 

 27According to the statute, “[for purposes of the section with regard to directed service,] the 

National Railroad Passenger Corporation and any entity providing commuter rail passenger

transportation shall be considered rail carriers subject to the Board’s jurisdiction.” 49 

U.S.C. § 11123(e). 

Page 33 GAO-06-470 Commuter Rail
directed-service providers. STB staff did note, however, that the freight 

railroads operating in the Northeast do have an interest in Amtrak’s 

continued operations. For example, Norfolk Southern (NS) relies on 

Amtrak dispatching and infrastructure to provide freight service over 

some of the NEC to several major mid-Atlantic markets. According to a 

Norfolk Southern official, the NEC is the only practical route NS freight 

trains can use to reach Baltimore, Wilmington, and the Delmarva 

Peninsula,28 which are all major rail markets. STB staff recognize that 

directing an unwilling entity to provide service is an undesirable situation 

that could result in service delays, and STB staff stated that they would 

prefer to avoid this type of scenario.

STB staff and FRA officials believe that directed service would be highly

problematic and should be avoided if at all possible.29 FRA officials stated 

that the current directed service implementation plan contains some 

questionable assumptions, particularly the assumptions about labor and 

the cost of directed commuter service. For example, implementation plans 

assume that Amtrak employees (especially on the NEC) would be willing 

to continue performing their same duties for the directed-service provider. 

However, according to FRA and FTA officials as well as STB staff, former 

Amtrak employees would have no legal obligation to accept an 

employment offer from the directed-service provider. The labor unions we 

spoke with stated that they believed that in a directed-service scenario, 

Amtrak employees would be much more likely to accept jobs with 

employers that participate in the railroad retirement-system, such as 

freight railroads. These jobs would be more secure and would allow 

 28The Delmarva Peninsula refers to the peninsula between the Chesapeake Bay and the

Atlantic Ocean made up of territory from the states of Delaware, Maryland, and Virginia. 

29STB staff have been working with FRA officials to identify possible implementation plans, 

but STB staff said that there has been no need for a meeting of the working group tasked 

with this activity since Amtrak’s fiscal year 2006 appropriation was passed, which provided 

Amtrak nearly $1.3 billion. The Secretary of Transportation holds an additional $40 million 

that may be released to Amtrak for efficiency incentive grants. This appropriation made 

Amtrak’s financial situation potentially less dire and significantly reduced the chance that

Amtrak would be in a bankruptcy situation in fiscal year 2006. 

Page 34 GAO-06-470 Commuter Rail
employees to remain in the railroad retirement-system.30 Not all commuter 

rail agencies participate in the railroad retirement-system, which would 

make jobs with those commuter rail agencies less desirable to employees

currently covered by the retirement system. According to FRA officials, 

the biggest concern and unknown in a directed service scenario is whether 

former Amtrak employees will agree to work for the new provider. 

In addition, FRA officials stated that the estimates of the costs of 

providing directed service are unreliable and not based on a robust set of 

assumptions. In fiscal years 2004 - 2006, Congress directed the Secretary of

Transportation to withhold $60 million from Amtrak’s federal grant to use 

if STB issued a directed-service order.31 According to STB staff and FRA 

officials, the $60 million figure is a rough estimate of the cost of providing 

directed service that FRA developed based on Amtrak’s overall cash burn 

rate per month. However, because of the assumptions used to calculate 

the estimate, officials from FRA and STB staff questioned the reliability of

the estimate and the length of time this level of funding could cover. For 

example, FRA officials suggested that $60 million could cover no more 

than 2 months—and likely far less—of directed commuter rail service. 

These officials stated that this estimate assumed only minimal services for 

the 2-month period. For instance, according to FRA officials, this level of 

funding would not allow for any significant mechanical work on any piece 

of commuter rolling stock, which would force any equipment requiring 

such servicing to be parked until additional funding was made available.

Taking equipment that needs maintenance out of service is not sustainable 

for more than a few months. In addition, STB staff and FRA officials stated

that the estimate reflects only the operational costs associated with 

providing directed service, and therefore, did not include funding for 

capital maintenance or for the backlog of capital improvements on the 

NEC. It also does not account for the access fees commuter rail agencies 

would presumably continue paying to the residual Amtrak (or new 

 30The railroad retirement-system provides retirement and disability benefits to the nation’s 

retired railroad workers and their survivors, including those of Amtrak. If employees leave 

a company that participates in the railroad retirement-system, they may face reduced

retirement benefits. Employees moving from one participant company to another (e.g.,

from Amtrak to a freight railroad) would retain their full benefits. For more information on

the railroad retirement-system, see GAO, Intercity Passenger Rail: Potential Financial

Issues in the Event That Amtrak Undergoes Liquidation, GAO-02-871 (Washington, D.C.: 

Sept. 20, 2002). 

31In fiscal years 2004 and 2005, this money was released to Amtrak in the fourth quarter 

when it was clear that Amtrak would not run out of money and enter into bankruptcy 

before the end of the fiscal year. 

Page 35 GAO-06-470 Commuter Rail
infrastructure owner) for the use of its infrastructure. STB staff and FRA 

officials stated that long-term directed-service scenarios (i.e., when 

directed service lasts longer than 1 or 2 months) would require additional 

funds for train operations, equipment maintenance, and capital funding for

critical infrastructure. Some commuter rail agencies noted that directed

service would probably be needed for more than a few months due to the 

time required to transition to a new service provider. 

Although the accuracy of the $60 million estimate for 2 months of directed 

service is questionable, it was used to calculate the costs of providing 

directed service for 12 months in the administration’s fiscal year 2006 

budget proposal. Specifically, the administration’s fiscal year budget 

proposed that no capital or operating funds be provided to Amtrak, and 

that $360 million be set aside for directed service for commuter and freight 

rail. According to FRA officials, the $360 million was based on FRA’s 

2-month estimate and multiplied out to cover an entire year. However, as 

the original estimate was not based on robust assumptions, officials do not 

think that $360 million would be able to cover 1 year of directed commuter 

rail service in the event of an Amtrak shutdown, much less commuter and 

freight rail services. 

In addition to Amtrak, freight railroads and other private transportation 

companies currently provide services, including train operations, 

equipment maintenance, infrastructure maintenance, and dispatching, to

commuter rail agencies. Freight railroads typically provide some level of 

services to commuter rail agencies in cases where the commuter service 

operates in part (or entirely) over infrastructure owned and maintained by 

the freight railroad. For example, Burlington Northern Sante Fe provides 

access to—and maintenance of—its infrastructure for Metrolink, Sounder,

and Metra. In addition, private transportation companies, including 

Bombardier, Connex, and Herzog, provide services to seven commuter rail 

agencies. These companies provide a range of services, including 

operations, equipment maintenance, infrastructure maintenance, and 

dispatching.

While some freight railroads currently provide services to commuter rail 

agencies, most are not actively pursuing additional commuter rail 

contracts and would be hesitant to take over services provided by Amtrak 

if it abruptly ceased to provide services and infrastructure. Freight railroad 

officials told us they have limited resources to dedicate to commuter rail 

service because the freight industry continues to grow and expand. The 

growth of freight traffic also presents a greater opportunity for freight 

Private Transportation 

Companies Could Provide 

Options for Commuter Rail 

Agencies, but Challenges 

Exist 

Page 36 GAO-06-470 Commuter Rail
railroads to make a profit and limits the capacity freight railroads have to

add commuter trains on their infrastructure. In addition, most of the 

freight railroad officials with whom we spoke told us liability is an issue in 

providing commuter rail service. 

Private transportation providers, on the other hand, expressed interest in 

expanding their role in the commuter rail market and in taking over 

services provided by Amtrak if Amtrak was to abruptly cease providing 

services and infrastructure access to commuter rail agencies. However, 

officials from some private transportation companies told us that they

would need sufficient time to ensure a smooth transition, noting it would 

take months to work out all the operational and administrative details, 

such as complying with FRA safety regulations—particularly if the new 

operator was unable to hire Amtrak employees. For example, in taking

over Metrolink’s service from Amtrak in July 2005, Connex had to take 

responsibility for all regulatory requirements pertaining to the operation of 

the railroad, including, among other things, setting up a drug and alcohol

testing regime, obtaining engineer certification, and setting up operating 

rules. According to Metrolink officials, it took Connex about 4 months to 

satisfy these regulatory requirements from the time the contract was 

awarded. 

In addition to addressing these issues, private transportation companies 

would need time to secure a workforce to provide the services. The 

private transportation companies do not have a pool of available and 

qualified rail employees to take over commuter rail services. Rather, these 

companies would need to hire, and possibly train, employees. Officials 

from the private transportation companies told us that the quickest and 

easiest option would be to hire the Amtrak employees currently providing 

the commuter rail services. Hiring these employees would provide the 

private transportation company a qualified workforce that is 

knowledgeable about the specific service, and therefore help ensure a 

smooth transition, according to officials from these private transportation 

companies. However, there is no guarantee that the Amtrak employees 

would want to switch to the private transportation company providing the 

commuter service. For example, in taking over MBTA’s services from 

Amtrak, MBCR entered into labor agreements with 14 separate unions 

representing 1,600 Amtrak employees within 6 months of winning the 

Page 37 GAO-06-470 Commuter Rail
contract.32 According to union representatives, MBCR was successful in 

hiring Amtrak employees because it was willing to “come to the table” and 

negotiate a fair contract that continued to participate in the railroad 

retirement-system and offered higher wages to employees than what they

received working for Amtrak. As a result, MBCR was able to reach an

agreement with all Amtrak employees in 3 months. In contrast, 

Bombardier was unable to hire sufficient Amtrak employees when it took 

over Amtrak’s maintenance-of-equipment contract with Metrolink. 

According to union representatives, this situation can be expected as 

experienced railroad labor seeks to remain in the railroad retirementsystem and retain other labor protections—conditions that Bombardier 

did not offer. As a result, Bombardier had to hire new maintenance staff 

with very little railroad experience and train them on Metrolink’s 

procedures and equipment. According to Metrolink officials, this 

contributed to a “turbulent” and lengthy transition. 

The labor union representatives with whom we spoke told us that many 

senior Amtrak employees would be hesitant to accept a job offer from a 

private transportation company that did not have Amtrak’s experience and 

understanding of the railroad business. In accepting an offer with another 

company, Amtrak employees may not only lose their employee benefits 

and collective bargaining agreements, but also could lose their seniority.

That is, these employees would not likely transition to a new service 

provider and expect to maintain the same level of seniority they had with 

Amtrak. As a result, despite Amtrak’s long-term financial uncertainty, 

Amtrak employees are cautious about taking on the risk of working for a 

private transportation company. 

In addition to securing a workforce, officials from private transportation 

companies with whom we spoke identified several other challenges, such 

as the regulatory process, in competing for or assuming commuter rail 

services. The most frequently cited challenge was liability. According to 

private transportation company officials, they carefully review liability and 

insurance language in evaluating whether or not they will bid on a 

particular commuter rail contract; although, according to an official from 

one private transportation company, liability and insurance language has 

never prevented it from submitting a bid for a commuter rail contract. 

 32As part of its request for proposal process, MBTA required all bidders to offer comparable

positions to the existing workforce, including key terms of the current contract, such as 

wages and benefits. 

Page 38 GAO-06-470 Commuter Rail
These factors are particularly important when negotiating with a 

commuter rail agency that operates its service over infrastructure owned 

by freight railroads. According to an official from one private 

transportation company, freight railroads require public entities, including 

commuter rail agencies, to carry upwards of $200 million for liability 

insurance to operate over their track and also include expensive 

indemnification language in commuter contracts. Therefore, some 

commuter rail agencies are now using shared-liability contracts for 

services, in which the operator and commuter rail agency share exposure 

to liability risk. For example, in taking over the train operations contract

from Amtrak, one commuter rail agency required its private operator to 

assume some of the liability if it was found to have shown willful 

misconduct in causing an accident. Specifically, if that operator is found 

responsible for an incident causing over $500,000 in damages, the operator 

is responsible for contributing $500,000 toward the damages up to two 

times a year.

Seven commuter rail agencies currently contract with private 

transportation companies to provide services, such as operations and 

equipment maintenance. Of these seven commuter rail agencies, two 

agencies had contracted with Amtrak for services in the past, but in one 

case, moved away from Amtrak because of dissatisfaction with the service 

Amtrak was providing and its unresponsiveness in meeting the needs of 

the commuter rail agency. In the other case, Amtrak withdrew from the 

commuter rail agency’s most recent procurement process and did not 

submit a proposal in response to the agency’s RFP to continue providing 

services. 

Other commuter rail agencies have also expressed interest in moving away 

from contracting with Amtrak for services, including commuter rail 

agencies on the NEC. These agencies cited a number of reasons, including

Amtrak’s unstable federal funding and long-term planning challenges, in

their decisions to reduce their reliance on Amtrak—either by conducting 

more of their services in-house, or by contracting with a private 

transportation company. For example, one commuter rail agency 

constructed its own maintenance facilities so it would not have to rely

entirely on Amtrak to service its equipment at Amtrak facilities. In 

addition, another commuter rail agency recently conducted a procurement 

process and recommended that a private transportation company be

awarded the contract to provide the services previously provided by 

Amtrak. According to officials from the American Public Transportation 

Association, Amtrak’s threatened service shutdown in 2002 over the level

Some Commuter Rail Agencies 

Are Moving away from Amtrak 

to Provide Services, but Others 

Like Having Amtrak as an 

Option 

Page 39 GAO-06-470 Commuter Rail
of federal funding for Amtrak may also have caused some commuter rail 

agencies to contemplate other service providers more seriously. 

Although some commuter rail agencies have moved away from contracting 

with Amtrak for services, officials from a few commuter rail agencies 

stated that they would like Amtrak to continue providing services to 

commuter rail agencies. According to these officials, Amtrak has a history 

of providing services to commuter rail agencies and its employees are 

knowledgeable about the commuter rail business. In addition, commuter 

rail agencies would like to have a number of firms or companies to choose 

from when competitively procuring service contracts. Two commuter rail 

agency officials mentioned that having more competition provides 

commuter rail agencies more flexibility in choosing a service provider, and 

can reduce costs. 

Given the dependence of most commuter rail agencies on Amtrak for 

services and infrastructure, an abrupt Amtrak cessation would likely result 

in major disruptions or shutdowns of commuter rail services throughout 

the country. This could strain regional transportation systems, as 

hundreds of thousands of regular commuter rail passengers would be 

forced to seek alternative forms of transportation. Although commuter rail 

agencies have some contingency plans and the STB has the authority to 

direct commuter rail service, an abrupt Amtrak cessation would create a 

worst-case scenario for many commuter rail agencies, especially those 

that use Amtrak-owned infrastructure in the densely populated NEC. 

Certainly, commuter rail issues should not drive or derail policy-makers’ 

efforts to reform Amtrak. However, given the importance of commuter rail 

services to many regions and the negative impact an abrupt Amtrak exit 

would create, it seems appropriate that these issues are included as 

federal policy makers consider the debate over Amtrak. In our October 

2005 report on Amtrak’s management,33 we suggested that Congress 

consider establishing a nationwide policy for intercity passenger rail that 

would address, among other things, the interests of the diverse set of 

Amtrak stakeholders and limit unintended consequences to these parties.

Given the complex relationships between commuter rail agencies and 

Amtrak, commuter rail agencies are one such stakeholder, and the effect

of an abrupt Amtrak shutdown on commuter rail agencies would be an

Conclusions 

 33GAO-06-145. 

Page 40 GAO-06-470 Commuter Rail
unintended consequence of some Amtrak reform proposals. Any such 

negative impact on commuter rail agencies should be taken into account

when developing any national policy for intercity passenger rail. 

Our work indicates that two critical issues for commuter rail agencies that

would need to be addressed in the event of an abrupt Amtrak shutdown 

are (1) the potential loss of Amtrak’s skilled labor force and (2) access to 

Amtrak-owned infrastructure. Without access to key infrastructure, such

as the NEC, and a skilled labor force to crew trains and maintain the rightof-way, among other things, commuter rail service disruptions throughout 

the nation are inevitable. A related issue is the time that commuter rail 

agencies need to transition from Amtrak to other operators in the event of 

an Amtrak shutdown. According to some commuter rail agencies and 

private transportation operators, a transition between qualified operators 

takes months, not weeks. To date, the various Amtrak reform proposals do 

not comprehensively address these issues. As deliberations about Amtrak

move forward, such issues should be considered and addressed so that 

disruptions to commuter rail service can be minimized. 

To fully understand the relationship between commuter rail agencies and 

Amtrak, it will also be important to obtain better information on the costs 

Amtrak incurs—and the revenue it earns—in providing services and 

infrastructure access to commuter rail agencies. Although Amtrak has 

made some progress in improving its accounting systems and practices, its 

current practices do not allow for full transparency. In particular, 

Amtrak’s financial reports do not clearly show the revenues earned and 

costs incurred for providing services and infrastructure access to 

commuter rail agencies. Moreover, Amtrak lacks a methodology to 

adequately allocate shared costs to different commuter rail users. 

Consequently, it is difficult to determine what Amtrak’s true costs are in 

providing services and infrastructure to commuter rail agencies, and 

whether commuter rail agencies are paying their “fair share.” Furthermore, 

the lack of this type of information clouds the negotiation process 

between commuter rail agencies and Amtrak—that is, commuter rail 

agencies do not necessarily know if they are being over- or undercharged 

for services. Likewise, Amtrak management cannot make fully informed 

decisions about competing for commuter rail contracts. 

As Amtrak’s precarious financial position raises the possibility of an 

Amtrak cessation of service, it is prudent that commuter rail agencies and 

the responsible federal agencies plan for such an event. These plans are in 

place in many commuter rail agencies and include a range of options—

from shutting down service to taking over control of key infrastructure by 

Page 41 GAO-06-470 Commuter Rail
the commuter rail agency. STB and FRA’s ability to order and fund 

directed service for commuter rail agencies is a limited, short-term option. 

However, directed service is not a panacea—rather there is agreement that 

service disruptions would occur in a directed-commuter-service scenario.

Moreover, the cost of providing directed service is unknown. Current 

estimates of providing this service—including the $60 million estimate for 

2 months of directed service, or the $360 million estimate for an entire 

year of service—are, at best, rough estimates of how much such service 

would cost. Without accurate cost estimates, federal policy makers cannot 

make fully informed decisions about directed service. 

In order to provide more information to federal policy makers involved in

the debate over Amtrak, we recommend that the Secretary of 

Transportation direct FRA, in consultation with STB and commuter rail 

agencies, to further refine cost estimates of commuter rail directed-service 

scenarios. 

To ensure that Amtrak provides useful information to both its internal and 

external stakeholders, including commuter rail agencies that contract with 

Amtrak, we recommend that the president of Amtrak improve its 

accounting practices, as well as its financial reports, to clearly show all 

revenues earned and all costs incurred when providing services and 

infrastructure access to commuter rail agencies. This information could 

increase the clarity of Amtrak’s costs for providing services and access to 

infrastructure to Amtrak management, commuter rail agencies, and 

Congress. It would also allow for a more informed debate about how 

commuter rail agencies interact with Amtrak and compensate it for access 

to critical infrastructure and services. 

We provided DOT officials a copy of our draft report for their review and 

comment. On April 6, 2006, we met with DOT officials, including DOT’s 

Audit Liaison, FRA’s Assistant Chief Counsel, and an FTA Economist; as 

well as STB staff, including the Associate Director for the Office of 

Economics, Environmental Analysis, and Administration, to obtain their 

comments on our draft. These officials and staff represented the views of 

their respective agencies. Overall, they generally agreed with the draft 

report’s findings and the intention of the recommendation. DOT officials 

indicated that the draft report provides useful information about the 

implications of directed service for commuter railroads. Further, they 

indicated that the draft report does a good job of explaining how Amtrak’s 

internal costing and contracting systems do not adequately or accurately 

Recommendations 

Agency Comments 

Page 42 GAO-06-470 Commuter Rail
identify the costs incurred and the revenues received for specific lines-ofbusiness, such as those provided for commuter railroads. DOT officials 

recognized that these Amtrak accounting systems were not designed with 

this intent in mind. As a result, DOT officials stated that until Amtrak 

accounting and contracting systems provide better documentation and 

greater clarity with respect to individual lines of business, further 

refinements of cost estimates associated with various commuter rail 

directed-service scenarios will continue to prove problematic. According 

to FRA officials, in light of the data limitations, attempting further 

refinements in the cost scenarios associated with the unlikely event of an 

Amtrak shutdown does not represent the best possible use of the limited 

staff resources. FRA officials indicated their preference is to continue 

focusing their resources on priorities related to maintaining and improving 

Amtrak operations. FRA and FTA officials and STB staff also provided 

technical clarifications to the draft report, which we incorporated as 

appropriate.

We recognize that FRA, like other federal agencies, has resource 

constraints and must focus those resources on certain priorities. However, 

given previous and current debate over the future of Amtrak, we believe 

providing policy makers with accurate information as to the implications 

of directed service—including the costs of such services—is a worthwhile 

investment of agency resources and deserves some level of attention. 

Moreover, although the limitations in Amtrak’s accounting systems that we 

detail in the report would prevent the development of a precise cost 

estimate of directed service, we believe that refinements could be made

using existing information from Amtrak and commuter rail agencies. 

Further, as FRA works with Amtrak to improve its accounting systems—

and thus improve its cost data—it could further refine the directed service 

cost estimates. DOT officials acknowledged that the current estimates—

which are based on a limited set of assumptions—are inaccurate, and most 

likely significantly underestimate the true costs of directed service. 

Therefore, any refinements would be a step in the right direction in 

providing better information to policy makers. 

We also provided Amtrak officials a copy of the draft report for their 

review and comment. Amtrak generally agreed with the report’s findings, 

conclusions, and recommendations. Amtrak provided technical 

clarifications to the draft report, which we incorporated as appropriate. 

Page 43 GAO-06-470 Commuter Rail
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of

this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the 

report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to 

congressional committees with responsibilities for commuter rail issues; 

the Secretary of Transportation; the Acting President of Amtrak; the 

Administrators of FRA and FTA; the Chairman of STB; and the Director, 

Office of Management and Budget. We also will make copies available to 

others upon request. In addition, this report will be available at no charge 

on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions on matters discussed in this report, 

please contact me on (202) 512-2834 or at heckerj@gao.gov. Contact points 

for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found 

on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report can be found 

in appendix III. 

Sincerely, 

JayEtta Z. Hecker 

Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues 

Page 44 GAO-06-470 Commuter Rail
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

To address our objectives, we contacted officials from all existing (and 

two proposed) commuter rail agencies, the four largest Class I railroads, 

and private transportation companies that currently operate commuter rail

service in the U.S. To identify the universe of existing and proposed 

commuter rail systems, we used information published by and provided to

us by the American Public Transportation Association (APTA). We 

reviewed this information with APTA in order to identify transit agencies 

that are currently providing commuter rail services and proposed 

commuter rail agencies that were the closest to becoming operational. 

APTA categorized proposed commuter rail agencies as either “immediate,” 

“midway,” or “later”; those in the immediate category were considered 

closest to becoming operational. Using these sources we identified 18 

existing commuter rail agencies and 2 proposed commuter rail agencies. 

While APTA considered 8 proposed commuter rail agencies as immediate, 

we selected the 2 proposed commuter rail agencies APTA officials 

indicated were likely to begin operations during the course of our review. 

To identify the four largest Class I railroads, we reviewed the February 

2005 Surface Transportation Board (STB) Report of Railroad Employment 

and information provided by the Association of American Railroads 

(AAR). AAR also provided contact information for each Class I railroad. 

To identify private transportation providers, we interviewed officials from 

APTA, the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak), freight 

railroads, and commuter rail agencies to ask about companies that 

currently operate commuter trains or provide other services. We 

subsequently interviewed officials at all of the private transportation 

companies identified by these officials. Table 4 lists the names and 

locations of the commuter rail agencies, freight railroads, and private 

transportation providers we contacted. 

Table 4: Names and Locations of Commuter Rail Agencies, State Departments of Transportation, Class I Freight Railroads, 

and Private Non-Railroad Companies Interviewed

Name Location 

Existing commuter rail agencies 

Altamont Commuter Express Stockton, CA 

Connecticut Department of Transportation (Shore Line East line) New Haven, CT

Maryland Transit Administration (MARC) Baltimore, MD

Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) Boston, MA 

MTA Long Island Rail Road New York, NY

MTA Metro-North New York, NY

New Jersey Transit Corporation Newark, NJ 

Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter Railroad Corporation (Metra) Chicago, IL 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Page 45 GAO-06-470 Commuter Rail
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Name Location 

North County Transit District (Coaster) Oceanside, CA

Northern Indiana Commuter Transportation District Chesterton, IN 

Peninsula Corridor Joint Powers Board (Caltrain) San Francisco, CA 

Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (PennDOT) Harrisburg, PA 

Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA) Philadelphia, PA 

Southern California Regional Rail Authority (Metrolink) Los Angeles, CA

Sound Transit, Central Puget Sound Regional Transportation Authority Seattle, WA

Tri-County Commuter Rail Authority Pompano Beach, FL

Trinity Rail Express Dallas, TX

Virginia Railway Express Alexandria, VA 

Proposed commuter rail agencies 

Nashville Regional Transportation Authority Nashville, TN

New Mexico Rail Runner Albuquerque, NM 

State Department of Transportation

Delaware Department of Transportation (DELDOT)

a

Wilmington, DE 

Class I railroads

BNSF Railway Fort Worth, TX

CSX Transportation Jacksonville, FL

Norfolk Southern Norfolk, VA 

Union Pacific Railroad Company Omaha, NE 

Private transportation providers 

Massachusetts Bay Commuter Railroad Boston, MA 

Bombardier, Inc. Montreal, Quebec, Canada 

Connex North America Silver Spring, MD 

Herzog Transit Services St. Joseph, MO

Washington Group International Boise, ID 

Source: GAO.

Note: The commuter rail agencies that we visited are listed in italics.

a

In addition to its regular commuter rail service, SEPTA also provides a “turnkey,” or contracted

commuter rail service, for the Delaware Department of Transportation (DELDOT) between 

Newark/Wilmington, DE and Philadelphia, PA. Information on SEPTA’s use of Amtrak services and 

infrastructure for the Delaware service are included in SEPTA’s data. Therefore, we did not consider 

DELDOT as a separate commuter rail agency. 

We conducted site visits to seven existing commuter rail agencies and one 

proposed commuter rail agency. We selected these agencies based on their 

dependence on Amtrak for services and access to infrastructure, as well as 

their location. Specifically, based on interviews with each commuter rail 

agency, we divided each commuter rail agency’s relationship into several 

Page 46 GAO-06-470 Commuter Rail
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

categories based on their reliance on Amtrak’s infrastructure and services, 

and their current or past relationship with Amtrak. These categories 

included: the extent to which commuter rail agencies rely on Amtrak for 

infrastructure and services, whether the commuter rail agency operates on

the Northeast Corridor (NEC), whether the commuter rail agency no

longer contracts with Amtrak for services, and whether a newer commuter 

rail agency chose not to contract with Amtrak. Some commuter rail 

agencies were placed into multiple categories. Using this categorization, 

we selected commuter rail agencies that represent a range of reliance on 

Amtrak and are geographically disperse. During the site visits, we 

interviewed senior level management and toured operation, dispatching, 

and maintenance facilities. In addition to the site visits, we conducted 

semi-structured interviews with officials from all 18 existing commuter rail 

agencies and 2 proposed commuter rail agencies. We analyzed the 

information we collected from the site visits and semi-structured 

interviews to identify shared concerns across the commuter rail agencies

we interviewed. 

In addition, to obtain information on the options commuter rail agencies 

will have if Amtrak abruptly ceased to provide services and infrastructure 

access, we conducted semi-structured interviews with all of the existing 

commuter rail agencies and asked them to identify short- and long-term 

contingencies if Amtrak abruptly ceases to provide services and 

infrastructure to commuter rail agencies. We also interviewed 

representatives from the American Short Line and Regional Railroad 

Association (ASLRRA) to get an understanding of non-Class I railroads’ 

interest in providing services to commuter rail agencies. We analyzed the 

information we collected from the semi-structured interviews to determine 

private transportation companies’ and freight railroads’ interest in entering

the commuter rail market, as well as barriers to doing so. 

We also conducted informational interviews with the Federal Railroad 

Administration, STB, the Federal Transit Administration, and Amtrak; and 

with representatives from industry and government associations, including 

AAR, APTA, ASLRRA, the Coalition of Northeastern Governors and the 

National Railroad Construction and Maintenance Association. We also 

interviewed representatives from 10 of Amtrak’s 15 total labor unions. 

(See table 5.) In addition, we interviewed a representative from the Law 

Office of Jenner and Block to get background information on railroad 

bankruptcy law. 

Page 47 GAO-06-470 Commuter Rail
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Table 5: List of Labor Unions

Name 

Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen

Transport Workers Union of America 

United Transportation Union 

Transportation Workers Union

Sheet Metal Workers International Association

American Train Dispatchers Association 

International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers

Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees 

Transportation Communications International Union 

Brotherhood of Railroad Signalmen 

Source: GAO.

Finally, we reviewed statutes, government reports on Amtrak, recent 

Amtrak reform proposals from the 109th Congress, and our past reports. 

Additionally, we reviewed Amtrak, STB, FRA, and APTA documents and 

statistics, as well as contracts and requests for proposals for services and 

access to infrastructure between several commuter railroads and Amtrak 

(or other operators). 

To ensure the reliability of the information presented in this report, we 

corroborated information provided from commuter rail agency officials 

and Amtrak officials about aspects of their contractual relationship with 

other sources. For example, we compared information we obtained from

commuter rail agencies about the extent to which they rely on Amtrak for 

access to infrastructure and services against information obtained from 

Amtrak, as well as statistics compiled by STB staff and FRA. Based on our 

assessment, we concluded that the information provided from commuter 

rail agency officials and Amtrak officials about aspects of their contractual 

relationship was sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. 

A limitation of our review is that we only focused on the impact of an

abrupt Amtrak cessation on commuter rail operations. For example, if 

policy makers acted on legislative proposals that end or substantially 

reduce federal funding, an Amtrak bankruptcy or shutdown could quickly 

follow. Multiple bills to reform intercity passenger rail have been proposed 

in recent years—and these bills, if enacted, could result in outcomes other 

than an Amtrak cessation. However, we did not examine how these other 

outcomes or scenarios would impact commuter rail operations. 

Page 48 GAO-06-470 Commuter Rail
Appendix II: Commuter Rail Agency Use of 

Amtrak Services and Infrastructure 

Table 6: Commuter Rail Agency Use of Amtrak Services and Infrastructure 

 

Train

operations

Maintenance

of 

equipment

Maintenanceof-way Dispatching

Amtrakowned or

Amtrakmanaged 

stations and 

platforms 

Other

services 

Does this 

commuter 

operate 

over 

Amtrakowned 

NEC? 

Existing commuter rail agencies 

Altamont Commuter Express 

(ACE) 

0% 0% 7% 7% Minimal Minimal No

Connecticut Department of 

Transportation’s Shore Line East 

and New Haven Lines (SLE) 

100% 100% 100% 100% Significant Significant Yes

Maryland Transit Administration 

(MARC) 

50% 83% 50% 50% Critical point Significant Yes 

Massachusetts Bay Transportation 

Authority (MBTA) 

0% 0% 7% N/AaMinimal None Yes

MTA Long Island Rail Road (LIRR) 0% 0% 3% 50% Critical point Significant Yes 

MTA Metro-North Rail Road 0% 0% 0% 0% None None No 

New Jersey Transit Corporation 

(NJT) 

0% 19% 27% 55% Critical point Significant Yes

North County Transit District 

(Coaster)b

100% 100% 100% 0% None None No

Northeastern Illinois Commuter 

Railroad Corporation (Metra) 

0% 0% 2.3% 0.5% Critical point Minimal No 

Northern Indiana Commuter 

Transportation District (NICTD) 

0% 0% 0% 0% None None No

Peninsula Corridor Joint Powers 

Board (Caltrain) 

100% 100% 65% 100% Significant Significant No

Pennsylvania Department of 

Transportation (PENNDOT)

100% 100% 100% 100% Significant Significant Yes

Sound Transit, Central Puget 

Sound Regional Transportation 

Authority (Sounder) 

0% 100% 0% 0% Minimal None No

Southeastern Pennsylvania 

Transportation Authority (SEPTA)

c

0% 0% 39% 54% Minimal Significant Yes

Southern California Regional Rail 

Authority (Metrolink) 

0% 0% 5% 0% None None No

Trinity Railway Express (TRE) 0% 0% 0% 0% None None No 

Tri-County Commuter Rail 

Authority (Tri-Rail) 

0% 0% 0% 0% None None No

Virginia Railway Express (VRE) 100% 66% 1% 2% Critical point Minimal Yes 

Appendix II: Commuter Rail Agency Use of 

Amtrak Services and Infrastructure 

Page 49 GAO-06-470 Commuter Rail
Appendix II: Commuter Rail Agency Use of 

Amtrak Services and Infrastructure 

 

Train

operations

Maintenance

of 

equipment

Maintenanceof-way Dispatching

Amtrakowned or

Amtrakmanaged 

stations and 

platforms 

Other

services 

Does this 

commuter 

operate 

over 

Amtrakowned 

NEC? 

Proposed commuter rail agencies 

New Mexico Rail Runner Express 0% 0% 0% 0% None None No 

Nashville Music City Star 0% 0% 0% 0% None None No 

Source: GAO analysis of commuter rail agency responses. 

a

With the exception of one route dispatched entirely by Amtrak, all of MBTA’s routes are dispatched

by more than one company. Because of this, MBTA officials stated that it is not possible to represent 

the percent of trains dispatched by each of its dispatching service providers. MBTA officials indicated

that Amtrak provides dispatching for MBTA’s 34 Attelboro line trains, and the initial dispatching for 

about two-thirds of all other MBTA trains before transferring them to another provider.

b

Coaster’s contract with Amtrak expires on June 30, 2006. Amtrak was not selected to continue the 

service beyond this point. 

c

In addition to its regular commuter rail service, SEPTA also provides a “turnkey,” or contracted

commuter rail service, for the Delaware Department of Transportation between Newark/Wilmington, 

DE and Philadelphia, PA. Information on SEPTA’s use of Amtrak services and infrastructure for the

Delaware service are included in SEPTA’s data. 

Table Definitions: 

“Other services” includes police/security, ticketing, and traction power. 

The following definitions refer to the station and platform category and other services .

None = No reliance on Amtrak for access to—or management of—stations and platforms. No reliance

on Amtrak for “other services.” 

Minimal = Amtrak provides access to—or management of—less than 25 percent of the stations and 

platforms used by the commuter rail agency. Amtrak provides less than half of one “other service.” 

Significant = Amtrak provides access to—or management of—more than 25 percent of the stations 

and platforms used by the commuter rail agency. Amtrak provides more than half of one or more of 

the “other services,” or provides less than half of one or more “other services”—but the service allows 

the commuter rail agency to access a critical point for its operations (e.g., a critical station). 

Critical point = Although the commuter rail agency may rely on Amtrak for access to—or management 

of—less than 25 percent of the stations and platforms it uses, one of these Amtrak-owned stations is 

critical to the service (e.g., a majority of riders enter or exit the commuter service at this point, or the 

station is a terminus for several of the agency’s lines). 

Page 50 GAO-06-470 Commuter Rail
Appendix III: GAO

A

 Contact and Staff 

cknowledgments 

Page 51 GAO-06-470

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

JayEtta Z. Hecker, Director, (202) 512-2834, heckerj@gao.gov

In addition to those named above, Jay Cherlow, Nikki Clowers, Greg 

Hanna, Joah Iannotta, Bert Japikse, Nancy Lueke, Sara Ann Moessbauer, 

Josh Ormond, Robert Owens, Eileen Tumalad, and Alwynne Wilbur made 

key contributions to this report. 

GAO Contact 

Acknowledgments 

(544111) Commuter Rail
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Washington, D.C. 20548 

Paul Anderson, Managing Director, AndersonP1@gao.gov (202) 512-4800

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 

Washington, D.C. 20548 

Obtaining Copies of 

GAO Reports and 

Testimony

Order by Mail or Phone 

To Report Fraud,

Waste, and Abuse in 

Federal Programs 

Congressional 

Relations 

Public Affairs 

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