Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed October 9, 2018.

In The 

Fourteenth Court of Appeals 

NO. 14-17-00561-CV

CAROLE EHLERT BENTLEY, INDEPENDENT EXECUTRIX OF THE 

ESTATE OF LEIGH JOHN BENTLEY, SR.-DECEASED, Appellant 

V.

DUANE BENTLEY PECK, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS TRUSTEE OF THE 

STELLA KENNELLY BENTLEY FAMILY TRUST; LEIGH JOHN 

BENTLEY D/B/A SECOND AMENDMENT SHOOTING CENTER, 

Appellees 

On Appeal from the 434th Judicial District Court 

Fort Bend County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. 12-DCV-202291 

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N 

In a single issue, appellant Carole Ehlert Bentley, Independent Executrix of 

the Estate of Leigh John Bentley, Sr.-Deceased, (Carole) contends that the trial court 

“abused its discretion in granting the Final Judgment on July 10, 2017 thereby 

violating Appellant’s due process rights.” She asks this court to deem the judgment 
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void. However, Carole fails to make a clear and concise argument with appropriate 

citations to authorities, and she fails to demonstrate error in the record. Accordingly, 

we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

This case initially began as a family dispute about a purported lease between 

members of the Bentley family: appellees Leigh John Bentley (Leigh Jr.) and Duane 

Bentley Peck (Duane). Following the death of Leigh Jr.’s grandfather (Carl) and 

father (Leigh Sr.), Carole intervened. Carole is Leigh Jr.’s mother and was married 

to Leigh Sr. at the time of Leigh Sr.’s death. She was the independent executor and 

sole beneficiary of Leigh Sr.’s estate. Duane and Carole inherited, or stood to inherit, 

fifty percent undivided interests in the tract of land that included the leased premises. 

Carole stated in the petition that the basis for her intervention was her status 

as the executor of Leigh Sr.’s estate: 

 “As the personal representative of [Leigh Sr.’s] estate Carole 

Bentley therefore has a justiciable interest in the subject matter of 

this suit and standing to intervene as a necessary party.” 

 “Carole Bentley, as the Independent Executrix of his estate, must be 

made a party to the action.” 

Later, Carole filed a verified motion for continuance “in her capacity as Executrix 

of the Estate of Leigh John Bentley, Sr., Deceased.” 

Eventually, all parties to this appeal appeared before the trial court and agreed 

to a settlement, which included termination of the lease, partition of the land between 

Duane and Carole, disposition of livestock, and the building of a fence. The trial 

court delayed signing a written judgment so the parties could obtain a survey of the 

land. 
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Carole, represented by a different lawyer, then filed a document titled “Estate 

of Leigh John Bentley, Sr., Deceased’s Petition in Intervention,” in which Carole 

purportedly filed the petition in her capacity as independent executor of the estate. 

She alleged a claim against Duane for breach of fiduciary duties that Duane owed 

because of Duane’s status as trustee of a trust and executor of Carl’s estate. 

After a survey of the land was completed, the parties attended a hearing on 

Duane’s motion to enter a judgment. Carole’s new lawyer explained that “the estate” 

had standing and “the estate does not agree to the settlement agreement.” He argued 

that Carole, individually, had her own legal counsel, but that he represented “the 

Bentley estate.” He argued that the settlement agreement was made “prior to my 

client being in this court.” 

After additional briefing, the trial court signed an order denying Carole’s 

second petition in intervention. The court found that Carole, “individually and as 

Independent Executrix of the Estate of Leigh John Bentley Sr., Deceased, has 

previously intervened and participated in the case and was present and participated 

in a settlement agreement agreed to in open court.” 

The trial court signed a final judgment incorporating the terms of the 

settlement. Carole brings this appeal. 

II. ANALYSIS

On appeal, Carole contends that the settlement agreement “was without 

Appellant’s participation in violation of Appellant’s due process rights and should 

be deemed void ab initio.” And she claims that the trial court “denied Appellant’s 

legal right to participate in the underlying lawsuit thus violating Appellant’s due 

process rights.” 
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The record belies Carole’s contentions that she did not participate in the 

lawsuit. Carole had intervened in the lawsuit and based her justiciable interest on her 

status as the independent executor of Leigh Sr.’s estate. The record from the 

settlement hearing evidences her participation: 

[Duane’s Lawyer]: Excuse me. Now, Carol Bentley is here also. 

THE COURT: Okay. 

[Carole’s Lawyer]: I would like to put her on the record, too. 

(Carol Bentley approaches) 

[Duane’s Lawyer]: My client asks that we say in plain English that this 

is going to end the lawsuit, this lawsuit, and it’s going to settle all the 

claims in this lawsuit. 

THE COURT: I’ll get to that right at the end. All right, ma’am. Will 

you identify yourself for the record, please? 

MS. BENTLEY: Carol Bentley. 

THE COURT: All right. Miss Bentley, will you raise your right hand 

for me. 

(Miss Carol Bentley sworn) 

THE COURT: Have you heard what has been said as the agreement to 

end this lawsuit? 

MS. BENTLEY: Yes. 

THE COURT: Is that your agreement? 

MS. BENTLEY: Yes. 

THE COURT: Do you believe it to be fair under the circumstances? 

MS. BENTLEY: Yes. 

THE COURT: All right. 

On appeal, this court struck Carole’s initial brief because it contained no 

citations to the record or legal authorities. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(g), (i). She filed 

an amended brief that includes some citations to the record and citations to legal 

authorities concerning the standard of review for an abuse of discretion, but she 
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includes no citations to support her legal or factual assertions concerning due process 

or whether the trial court’s judgment is void. 

Although we construe briefs liberally and require only substantial compliance 

with briefing rules, see Tex. R. App. P. 38.9, if an appellant’s issues are unsupported 

by a clear and concise legal argument with appropriate citations to authorities, the 

appellant waives error. See, e.g., Canton-Carter v. Baylor Coll. of Med., 271 S.W.3d 

928, 931–32 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.); see also Izen v. 

Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline, 322 S.W.3d 308, 321–22 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st 

Dist.] 2010, pet. denied) (“[A]ppellate issues are waived when the brief fails to 

contain a clear argument for the contentions made.”). “An appellate court has no 

duty, or even the right, to perform an independent review of the record and 

applicable law to determine whether there was error.” Canton-Carter, 271 S.W.3d 

at 930. 

Carole, as the appellant, has the burden to show error. See Budd v. Gay, 846 

S.W.2d 521, 524 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, no writ) (citing 

Christiansen v. Prezelski, 782 S.W.2d 842, 843 (Tex. 1990)); see also Garcia v. 

Sasson, 516 S.W.3d 585, 590 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, no pet.). She

has the burden to demonstrate that the record supports her contentions. See Russell 

v. City of Bryan, 919 S.W.2d 698, 706 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, writ 

denied). But, as noted above, Carole has not demonstrated in her amended brief that 

she was prevented from participating in the settlement agreement that prompted the 

trial court’s judgment. The record shows only that the trial court prevented Carole 

from litigating—in this lawsuit between the appellees about a lease—Carole’s claim 

for breach of fiduciary duty against one appellee regarding the appellee’s status as a 

trustee of a trust and executor of an estate. Carole does not explain how the trial 
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court’s denial of her second petition may have been erroneous, how she was denied 

due process, or how the trial court’s judgment is void. 

When an appellant’s brief is deficient, it is a “settled rule that an appellate 

court has some discretion to choose between deeming a point waived and allowing 

amendment or rebriefing.” Fredonia State Bank v. Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co., 881 

S.W.2d 279, 284 (Tex. 1994). We have already allowed Carole to file an amended 

brief. Due to inadequate briefing, she has waived her issue on appeal. See, e.g., 

Canton-Carter, 271 S.W.3d 931–32. And, our review of the record reveals no 

obstacle to the trial court’s jurisdiction that might result in a void judgment. 

The trial court’s judgment is affirmed. 

 

 /s/ Ken Wise

 Justice 

Panel consists of Justices Jamison, Wise, and Jewell.