The Honor able L ouis F. Obe rdorf er, United States District J udg e for the District of * Columbi a, sitting by

desig nation. 06- 1099- cr ( L) U ni t ed St at es v. D ougl as 

### UN ITED STA TES C OUR T OF AP PE ALS F OR TH E S EC ON D C IR C U IT

_____________________ August Term, 2007 (Argued: May

7, 2008 Dec ided: September 25, 2008)

Docke t Nos. 06-1099-c r(L ); 06-4115-c r(c on)

_____________________ UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA, Appellee , -v.- GO DF RI ED MA RTI

N, GA RF I EL D D OU GLAS,

De fe nd an ts- Ap pe lla nts
.

_______________________ BEF ORE: HAL Land L I VI NGSTON, Circuit Judges , and OB ERDORFER, District Judge. * Appea l from the judg ment of the United States District Court for the Easter

n District of New Y ork (B lock, Judge ), se nte nc ingDe fe nd a nts -A pp e lla nts Go df ri e d M art in a

nd Ga rf ie ld Doug las to terms of imprisonment of seve nteen a nd twenty -seve n months, respec tively
. Def endants-A

ppellants wer e convic ted af ter a jury trial of conspiringto distribute and conspiring to possess with intent to di stribute marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1) a nd 84 1( b) (1 )( D) , a

nd po sse ssi on

wi th i nte nt t o d istri bute mor e tha n f ive g ra ms o f m ari

jua na wi thi n one thousand fe et of a

public elementa

ry school in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 860(a) and 84 1( a )( 1) . We ho ld t

hat 21 U. S.C. § 8 60 (a ) a

pp lie s to a

de fe nd ant who po sse sse s w ithint e nt t o dis tr ibute a

c on tr oll e d s ub sta

nc e , r e g ard le ss o f whe the r t he de fe nd ant h a d th e sp e c if ic int e nt t o2

distribute such substance within the one-thousand- foot-ra dius. W e also re aff irm this C ourt’s holding, in Un ite d S

tates v . F alu , 7 76 F .2 d 4 6, 50 (2 d Ci r. 19 85 ), that th e “ sc ho olyard statut e ” is one of stric t liabilit y

such that a de fenda

nt can violate the statute’s terms without knowing that he
wa s w ith in o ne tho us and

fe e t of a sc ho ol. We a ff

ir m.

________________________ B AR R Y S. T URNER , New Y ork, Ne w York, for Defendant-Appe llant Martin. N OR MAN T R AB UL US , New Y ork, Ne w York, for Defendant-Appe llant Do ug la s. J ONATHON N ATHANS ON , A s s i s t an tU n i t e d S t a t e s A t t o r

n e y ( S u s anC o r

k e r y, Assistant United States Attorney , on the brief ), for Be nton J . Campbell, United States Attorney , Easter

n District of Ne w York, B rookly n, New Y ork, for Appellee.

________________________ PER CU RI AM : Def endants-A

ppellants Godfr ied Martin and G arf ield Doug las appe al from the district court judg ment sentenc ing the m to terms of imprisonment of sevente en and twe nty -seve n
months , r e sp e c tiv e ly , a ft e r t he ir c on vic tio ns fo r c on sp ir ingto d istri bute and po sse ss w ithint e nt t o distribute marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a) (1) a nd 841(b)( 1)(D) , and possession with intent to di stribute more than f ive g rams of ma

rijuana w ithin one thousand fee t of a pu bli c e le me nta

ry sc ho ol i n v iol a tio n o f 2 1 U .S. C. § § 8 60 (a ) a nd 84 1( a )( 1) . O n a

pp e a l, Martin ar g ues that under

§ 860(a) the Gover

nment was re quired to prove as an e lement of the crime that he had knowle dg e of the proxi mity of the school. Additionally , both Martin and Doug las argue that their c onvictions under § 860(a ) should be re verse d beca use the district cour

t incorre ctly

deter mined that § 860(a) did not require the Gover nment to prove that they

had the
re qu isi te int e nt s pe c if

ic a lly to d istri bute the mari

jua na wi thi n o ne tho us and

fe e t of a pu bli cDoug las raise s an additional ar g ument challeng ing the sentenc e imposed by the district 1 c ourt . We a dd

re ss t his argume nt i n a

se pa rate summa

ry or de r f ile d s imu lta

ne ou sly wi th t his opinion. 3 school. We disag ree , and for the re asons that follow hold that § 860(a) applies to a de fenda nt 1 wh o p os se sse s a

c on tr oll e d s ub sta

nc e wi thi n o ne tho us and

fe e t of a sc ho ol w iththe int e nt t o distribute that controlled substance any wher e. We also re aff

irm this C ourt’s holding , in United Sta te s v . F alu , 7 76 F .2 d 4 6, 50 (2 d Ci r. 19 85 ), that th e sc ho olyard statut e is o ne of

str ic t li a bil ity such that a de fenda

nt can violate the statute’s terms without knowing that he wa s within one thousand fee t of a school. I. Bac kgr ound I n October

2004, the Gover

nment filed a supe rsedingindictment alleg ing that in J anuar y 20 04 , M art in a

nd Do ug la s h a d: ( 1) c on sp ir e d to dis tr ibu te and to p os se ss w ithint e nt t o d istri bute marijuana ; (2) possessed w ith intent to di stribute more than f ive g rams of ma

rijuana w ithin one thousand fee t of a public e lementar y school; and (3) car

ried a nd used a f

irea rm in further ance of a drugtraff icking crime. A t trial, the parties stipulated that the pa rking lot where defe ndants wer e appre hended w as within one thousand fe et of a public elementa

ry school. After

the close of evidenc e at tria l, the Def

endants moved f

or ac quittal, arguing that § 860(a) r equire d the Gover nment to prove that they

had knowledg e of the proxi mity of the school. The district court denied the motions, noting: (1) that this Court had determined that a prede cessor

statute did not contain a know ledg e re quirement; and ( 2) althoug h the issue was not ra ised by the par ties, that the statut e did

no t r e qu ir e the Go ve rnme nt t o d e mon str a te that th e de fe nd ants int e nd e d to d i s t ri b u t e t h e m ar i

j u an a w i t h i n1 0 0 0 fe et o f ap u b l i c s ch o o l
. W i thre s p ec tt o th e j ury ch ar ge applicable to § 860(a), the district court instructed the jury that “the de fenda

nt need not know that4

h e w as wi t h i no n e t h o u s an d fe et o f as ch o o l , n o r i n t en d t o p o s s es s wi thi n t en tt o d i s tri b u t e d ru gs there . The g overnme nt need only prove that the defe ndant possessed the c ontrolled substance within one thousand fee t of a public e lementar y school and intende d to distribute it s omewher e.” After deliberating, the jur

y convicted the Def

endants of the narc otics conspirac y and schooly ard c ounts, but acquitted them of the f irea rm count. This appe al followed. II. Discussion Se c tio n 8 60 (a ) p ro vid e s f or e nh anc e d p e na lti e s f

or “ [a]ny pe rs on wh o v iol a te s [21 U. S.C. § 841(a) (1)] by

distributing, possessing with intent to dis tribute, or manuf actur ing a controlled substance in or

on, or within one thousand fe et of,” inte r a lia , “t h e r ea l p ro p erty co mp ri s i n g a pu bli c or pr ivate e le me nta

ry . . . s c ho ol. ” Th e De fe nd ants argue that th e dis tr ic t c ourt e rr e d in ins tr uc tin g the jur

y that th e Go ve rnme nt w a s n ot r e qu ir e d to pr ov e e ith e r t hat th e De fe nd ants
we re awa re of the pr oximi ty

of the sc ho ol o r t

hat th e y int e nd e d to dis tr ibute the mari jua na wi thi n the distance from the sc hool proscribe d by the statute. A. Intent to Distr ibu te Within One Th ousan d Fe et of a School This Court has not addresse d the question of whe ther § 860(a ) re quires the Gove rnment to prove that a

defe ndant intended to distribute a c ontrolled substance within one thousand fee t of the re le va nt s c ho ol. Th os e Cir c uit s th a t ha ve c on sid e re d th e iss ue have ans we re d th e qu e sti on in the neg ative. Se e, e .g ., Un ite d S tates v . H arris , 3 13 F .3 d 1 22 8, 12 39 (1 0th Cir . 2 00 2) ; United Sta te s v . O rti z , 1 46 F .3 d 2 5, 28 -3 0 ( 1s t Cir . 1 99 8) ; United States v. Lloyd , 10 F.3d 1197, 1218 (6 th C ir . 1 99 3) ; Un ite d S tates v . M c Do na ld , 9 91 F .2 d 8 66 , 8 68 -7 1 ( D. C. C ir . 1 99 3) ; United States v. Rodriguez , 9 61 F .2 d 1 08 9, 10 90 -9 5 ( 3d Cir . 1 99 2) ; United States v. W ake , 948 F.2d 14 22 , 1 42 9- 34 (5 th C ir . 1 99 1) . T he De fe nd ants a dv anc e se ve ra l argume nts in s up po rt of the ir5

claim that § 860(a ) re quires the Gove rnment to prove that they intended to distribute the
c on tr oll e d s ub sta

nc e wi thi n th e on e -t

ho us and -f

oo t r a diu s p ro sc ri be d b y

the statut e . We a dd

re ss
eac h in turn. 1. Statutory Language Th e De fe nd ants fi rs t r e ly

on the langua g e of

the statut e its e lf

, a rguin g that th e phra se

“ wi thi n o ne tho us and

fe e t of ” mod if ie s th e wo rd

“ dis tr ibu te ” in t he phra se “ po sse ssi ngwi th intent to dist ribute.” A ccor ding to the D efe ndants, had Cong ress intende d for the spe cify ing ph ra se to m od if

y “ po sse ssi ng ,” it c ou ld h ave un ambi guo us ly sa id s o b y

omi tti ngthe wo rd s “ wi th intent to dist ribute” f

rom the statute. The Def endants a rgue that Cong ress’s inc lusion of the words “w ith intent to di stribute” spec ified “that the intended plac e of distribution must be in the
sc ho olyard

zon e .” F ur

the r, the De fe nd ants no te that th e phra se “ wi thi n o ne tho us and fe e t of ” is
c los e r t o th e wo rd

“ dis tr ibute ” tha

n to the wo rd

“ po sse ssi ng ,” and , th

us , s ho uld

be c on str ue d to modify “distribute.” Th e De fe nd ants ’ f

oc us on the inc lus ion

of the phra se “ po sse ssi on

wi th i nte nt t o distribute” is misplaced. As the F ifth Circuit noted in W ake , the phra se “posse ssion with int ent to distribute” denotes a

particula r categ ory of possession – felony

possession, which is made a fe lony in § 84 1( a )( 1) – c ha

ra c te ri zed by the po sse ssi on

of a su ff ic ie nt q ua nti ty of na rc oti c s to raise a n infere nce that the defe ndant intends to distribute them. See W ake , 948 F.2d at 1430-31. Acc ording to the Fifth Circuit, “the clause in issue, ‘possessing with intent to dis tribute’, equates wi th ‘ fe lony

po sse ssi on .’ Th e re fo re , b y su bs tit uti ng‘f e lony po sse ssi on ’ f

or ‘p os se ssi ngwi th intent to dist ribute’, the statute would proscr ibe ‘distributing, [felony possession] , or manufa cturingwithin one thousand fee t of . . . a . . . school.’ ” Id . at 14 31 (a lte ra tio ns in6

or ig ina l) . U nd e r t

his re a so nin g , th e sc ho olyard statut e c le arl y

c ri min a lize s th e po sse ssi on , w ith in one thousand fe et of a

public school, of a qua

ntity of nar cotics suffic ient to cre ate a n infere nce that an individual intends to distribut e them. Id . (“We viewthe statute as c lear in proscribingthe possession, within the school z one, of a felony quantity of a c ontrolled substance –that is, an amount that evidenc es an intent to distribute the drug s somewher e.”)
. Other Circ uits have also re jected a rguments simil ar to the D efe ndants’ ar g ument that, based on the ir proxim ity

to one another

in the text of the statute, the phr ase “ within one thousand fee t” must modify

the word “ distribute” in the phra se “posse ssing with intent to distribute.” See,
e .g , H arris , 313 F.3d at 1239. Severa l courts have noted that bec ause posse ssing is the actus
reus of “ po sse ssi ngwi th i nte nt t o d istri bute ,” an inte rn a lly c on sis te nt r e a din g of

the statut e
re qu ir e s a dh e re nc e to t

he int e rp re tatio n a dv anc e d b y the Go ve rnme nt: [Sec tio n 8 60 (a )] a

pp lie s to thr e e ty

pe s o f c ri min a l c on du c t: d istri butin g dr ug s, possessing dr

ug s with the intent to dist ribute, and ma nufac turing drug s. I n case s involving the distribution or manufa cture of drug s, it is clear that the actus reus must occur within 1000 fe et of a school. Acc ording ly , it is reasonable to interpret the statut e a s a

pp lyingin t

he same wa

y to t he of fe ns e of po sse ssi on

wi th i nte nt t o distribute. Since the actus reus for this offe nse is possession, it follows the possession of the drug s, not the intended location for distribution, mus t be locate d wi thi n 1 00 0 f

e e t of a sc ho ol. Rodriguez , 9 61 F .2 d at 10 92 ; se e als o H arris , 3 13 F .3 d at 12 39 ; Or tiz , 146 F.3d at 28. The District of Columbia Circuit focused on the statute’s use of g erunds in enume ratingthe offe nses included in its prohibition. That court conclude d that “[t] o g ive § 860(a ) an inter nally consistent
rea ding,” all of its verba l nouns, including “ possessing” in the phrase at issue her e, “must be treated in the same ma

nner. That is, when the ‘possessing ’ is done nea r a sc hool, § 860(a)” applies. Mc

Do na ld , 991 F.2d at 869.7 2 . Le g is la t iv e Hi s t o r y a nd P ur po s e o f § 860(a) The De fenda

nts also argue that the statute’ s leg islative history is “unreve aling and inconclusive,” beca

use there is no leg islative history expli citly

providing that the statute wa s intended to prohibit possession, without m ore, w ithin the designated ar eas. G iven that we f ind the text of the statute unambiguous, the re’ s no need to re sort to leg islative history in this case. See Leev. Bank

ers Trust Co. , 1 66 F .3 d 5 40 , 5 44 (2 d Ci r. 19 99 ) ( “ I t is a xiomatic that th e pla in meaningof a statute c ontrols its i nterpre tation, and that judicial re view must end at the statute’ s
un ambi g uo us te rm s. L e g isl a tiv e his tor y and oth e r t oo ls o f i nte rp re tatio n ma y be re lie d u

po n o nly if the te rm s o f t

he statut e are ambi g uo us .” ) ( c itatio ns omi tte d) . T he de fe nd ants ’ a rgume nt i s
err oneous in any

event. The schooly ard statute w as first ena cted in 1984 and, a t that time, proscr ibed only

the distribution of drug s within one thousand fee t of a school. See21 U.S.C. § 845(a) (1985) ( now 21 U.S.C. § 860). In 1988, Congr ess amende d the statute to include “possession with intent to dist ribute” to the list of off enses c overe d by

the statute. See P u

b
. L. No. 100-690, § 6457, 102 Stat. 4181, 4373 (1988). A t the time of the ame ndment, Senator B iden submitt ed an a

naly sis of the amendme nt on behalf of the Senate Judiciary

Commi ttee, of which he wa s chair, in whic h he stated that the offe nse had be en adde d “so that the e nhance d penalties
wo uld a pp ly to s ome on e a

pp re he nd e d n e ar a

sc ho ol w itha

qu anti ty of dr ug s su ff ic ie nt t o in dic a te an intention to distribute.” 134 Cong. Rec . S17,360, S17,365 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 1988) (s tate me nt o f S e n. B ide n) . T he De fe nd ants de fl e c t Se nator B ide n’ s st a te me nt b y

arguin g that it was intende d to describe a drugdeale r appr ehende d just before he distributed a lar g e amount of
narc otics within one thousand fee t of a school. Nothingin the senator’ s comments, howeve r, either e vokes such a

n imag e of, or

expressly limit s § 860(a) ’s re ach to, situations in which the8

dis tr ibutio n w ill ne c e ssa

ri ly oc c ur wi thi n th e pr oh ibi te d a

re a . T he De fe nd ants ’ a

rgume nt o n th is p o i n ti s eq u al l y

u n av ai l i n g. Finally , the Def

endants a rgue that the pur

pose of the statute is served by limit ing its scope to those defe ndants who intended to distribute controlled substanc es within one thousand fe et of a school. In support, the Def endants point to this C ourt’s dete rmination that the previous ve rsion of the sc ho olyard

statut e , § 84 5a , w a s “ de sig ne d to de te r d ru g dis tr ibutio n in

and aro un d s c ho ols , including tr ansac tions which take plac e in re mote outdoor are as, at loca l hang outs, or at nea rby homes or apa

rtments, there by

helping to eliminate outside neg ative influenc es ar ound schools.” Un ite d S tates v . F alu , 776 F.2d 46, 50 ( internal quotation marks) . Yet, in re lying on Fa lu , the Def endants c ite to only

a portion of this Court’s descr iption of the purpose of the schooly ard statute. They

overlook our br oader

descr iption of the statute as intended “ to cre ate a drug -fr ee zone around schools.” Id . Fur ther, we decide d Falu befor e the statute w as ame nded to include offe nses other tha

n distributing controlled substanc es. To the e x tent that the Def endants may find ref ug e in some of its languag e, the r easoningof that ca se should not be construe d to limi t the application of a

mendments that wer e made afte r it was dec ided. Cong ress’s de cision to amend t h e s t at u t e t o i n cl u d e o ff

en s es s u ch as “p o s s es s i n g wi thi n t en tt o d i s tri b u t e, ” a n d “m an u fa ct u ri n g” made it clea

r that Cong ress did not intend to confine the schooly ard statute’ s scope to those c ases in which a de fenda

nt intended to distribute drug s near a school. Rather , “Cong ress wa s more broadly conce rned a

bout serious drugcrimes that oc cur in proximit y to schools.” Rodriguez , 961 F.2d at 1092. The ame ndments to the statute demonstrate that Congre ss was foc used on pr oh ibi tin g dr

uga c tiv ity

ne ar s c ho ols , a

nd no t on the me nta l st a te of

the ind ivi du a l e ng a g e d in that activity . Acc ording ly , we hold that 21 U.S.C. § 860(a) applies to a de fenda nt who possesses9

with intent to dis tribute a c ontrolled substance , reg ardle ss of whethe r the de fenda nt had the sp e c if ic int e nt t o d istri bute su c h s ub sta nc e wi thi n a

on e -t ho us and -f

oo t r a diu s o f a

sc ho ol. B. Knowledge of

P roxim ity of S chool I n Fa lu , this Court determined that the schooly ard statute w as one of strict liability

such that a de fe nd ant c ou ld v iol a te its te rm s w ith out kn ow ingthat he ha d d ist ri bute d n arc oti c s w ith in one thousand fe et of a

school. 776 F.2d at 50. As discussed above , at the time we de cided Fa lu , the schooly ard statute w as codifie d at § 845a, a nd it did not y et proscr ibe conduc t other than the actua l distributi on of drug s. Neither the subsequent re codification of the statute nor the inc lusion of additional prohibited conduc t provides any basis for this Court to determine that the holdingof Fa lu no longe r applies to the sc hooly ard statute. We, ther efor e, re aff irm its applicability

here
. III. Conclusi on Th e re a so nin g of

our f e llo w C ir c uit s, a s w e ll a s le g isl a tiv e his tor y of § 8 60 (a ) a

nd thi s Court’s prior re cog nition, in Fa lu , of the broa der pur pose of the sc hooly ard statute, c ompel the conclusion that § 860(a ) applies to a de fenda nt who possesses a c ontrolled substance within one tho us and fe e t of a pu bli c sc ho ol w iththe int e nt t o d ist ri bute that c on tr oll e d s ub sta nc e re g ard le ss of whe ther the de fenda

nt specifica lly

intended that the distribution be within a one- thousand-foot radius of a

school. Fur

ther, we rea ffirm this Court’s holding in Fa lu , and hold that the schooly ard statute in its prese nt form re mains a strict liability offe nse for

which a de fenda

nt may be convic ted re g ardle ss of his knowledg e of the proxi mity of a sc hool. The district court pr op e rl y ins tr uc te d th e jur

y in t his c a se . We a ff

ir m.