*U.S.NRC

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Protecting People and the Environment

NUREG-0980

Vol. 3, No. 9

Nuclear Regulatory

Legislation

1 1 1 th Congress; 2 nd Session

Office of the General Counsel
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* U.S.NRC

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

lrotecting People and the Environment

NUREG-0980

Vol. 3, No. 9

Nuclear Regulatory

Legislation

111th Congress; 2 nd Session

Prepared by:

Office of the General Counsel

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Washington, DC 20555-0001

Date Published: February 2011

FOREWORD

This compilation of statutes and materials pertaining to nuclear regulatory

legislation through the 111th Congress, 2nd Session, has been prepared by the

Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, with the

assistance of staff, for use as an internal resource document. The compilation is

not to be used as an authoritative citation in lieu of the primary legislative

sources. Furthermore, while every effort has been made to ensure the

completeness and accuracy of this material, neither the United States

Government, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, nor any of their employees

makes any expressed or implied warranty or assumes liability for the accuracy

or completeness of the material presented in this compilation.

If you have any questions concerning this compilation, please contact:

Anthony de Jesfis

Legislative Specialist

Office of the General Counsel

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Washington, DC 20555-0001

Anthony.deJesus@nrc.gov

This document, published in three bound volumes, is available from the NRC

Home Page at:

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr0980/.

iii

Contents-Volume 3

PART II: NON-PR OLIFERA TION AND OTHER

INTERNATIONAL MATERIALS .......................... ix

1. Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Export Licensing

Statutes ................................................................. 1023

A. NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION ACT OF 1978 ..................................... 1029

B. FOREIGN RELATIONS AUTHORIZATION ACT, FISCAL YEARS

19 9 4 A N D 19 9 5 ..................................................................................................... 106 3

C. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE AND ARMS EXPORT

C O N T R O L A C T O F 1976 .................................................................................. 1073

D. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT

C O O PERAT IO N AC T O F 1980 ........................................................................ 1087

E. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT

C O O PER A T IO N A C T O F 1981 ........................................................................ 1088

F. FOREIGN OPERATIONS APPROPRIATIONS (IRAQ SANCTIONS) ...... 1092

G. EMERGENCY WARTIME SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS

A C T, 2003 (IRAQ SA NCTIO NS) ....................................................................... 1100

H. MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE SUSPENDING

TH E IR A Q SA N C T IO N S A C T .......................................................................... 1101

I. NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR

1993 (IRAN-IRAQ ARMS NON-PROLIFERATION OF 1992) ..................... 1102

J. NORTH KOREA THREAT REDUCTION (SUBTITLE B) ........................... 1106

K. IRAN NONPROLIFERATION ACT OF 2000 ............................................... 1108

L. HENRY J. HYDE U.S. - INDIA PEACEFUL ATOMIC ENERGY

COOPERATION ACT OF 2006 (TITLE 1) ..................................................... 1116

M. UNITED STATES-INDIA NUCLEAR COOPERATION APPROVAL

AND NONPROLIFERATION ENHANCEMENT ACT ................................. 1131

2. Selected Treaties, Agreements, and Implementing Legislation ............................................................ 1139

A. NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY ............................................ 1149

B. THE CONVENTION ON THE PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF

N U C L EA R M A T E R IA L ..................................................................................... 1158

C. CONVENTION ON THE PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR

MATERIAL IMPLEMENTATION ACT OF 1982 ......................................... 1171

D. CONVENTION ON EARLY NOTIFICATION OF A NUCLEAR

A C C ID E N T .......................................................................................................... 11 7 5

E. CONVENTION ON NUCLEAR SAFETY ....................................................... 1184

F. CONVENTION ON ASSISTANCE IN THE CASE OF A NUCLEAR

ACCIDENT OR RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY ....................................... 1196

G. ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL I TO THE TREATY FOR THE

PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN LATIN AMERICA ............ 1206

H. ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL If TO THE TREATY FOR THE

PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN LATIN AMERICA ............ 1210

V
I. TREATY FOR THE PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN

L A T IN A M E R IC A .............................................................................................. 12 13

J. INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY PARTICIPATION

A C T O F 19 5 7 ....................................................................................................... 12 26

K. STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY ..1230

L. AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND

THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY FOR THE

APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS IN THE UNITED STATES OF

A M E R IC A ............................................................................................................ 124 8

M. U.S. SENATE RESOLUTION CONSENTING TO THE

RATIFICATION OF THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE U.S. AND

THE IAEA FOR THE APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS .......................... 1276

N. PROTOCOL ADDITIONAL TO THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE INTERNATIONAL

ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY FOR THE APPLICATION OF

SAFEGUARDS IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA .......................... 1277

0. UNITED STATES ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL IMPLEMENTATION

A C T ....................................................................................................................... 12 8 6

P. STATUS WITH REGARD TO CONCLUSION OF SAFEGUARDS

AGREEMENTS AND ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS AND SMALL

Q U A NT ITIES PRO TO C O LS ............................................................................. 1298

Q. TABLE: IAEA SUPPLY AGREEM ENTS ...................................................... 1312

R. TABLE: UNITED STATES AGREEMENTS FOR PEACEFUL

N UC LEA R C O O PER AT IO N ............................................................................ 1315

S. TABLE: TRILATERALS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES, THE

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY AND OTHER

COUNTRIES FOR THE APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS BY THE

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY TO EQUIPMENT

CONCERNING CIVIL USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY .................................. 1317

T. TABLE: TRILATERALS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES, THE

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY AND OTHER

COUNTRIES FOR THE APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS

PURSUANT TO THE NONPROLIFERATION TREATY ............................ 1318

U. CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION OF MARINE POLLUTION

BY DUMPING OF WASTES AND OTHER MATTERS ................................ 1319

V. JOINT CONVENTION ON THE SAFETY OF SPENT FUEL

MANAGEMENT AND ON THE SAFETY OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE

M A N A G E M E N T ................................................................................................. 1330

W. CODE OF CONDUCT ON THE SAFETY AND SECURITY OF

RA D IO A C TIV E SO U RC ES ............................................................................... 1350

3. Miscellaneous International Legislation and

Executive Orders .................................................. 1367

A. EXECUTIVE ORDER 10841-PROVIDING FOR THE CARRYING

OUT OF CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF THE ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

OF 1954, AS AMENDED, RELATING TO INTERNATIONAL

C O O P E R A T IO N ................................................................................................. 137 1

B. EXECUTIVE ORDER 10956-AMENDMENT OF EXECUTIVE

O R D E R 10 84 1 ...................................................................................................... 13 72

C. EXECUTIVE ORDER 12058-FUNCTIONS RELATING TO

NUCLEAR NON-PRO LIFERATION ............................................................... 1373

D. EXECUTIVE ORDER 12730-CONTINUATION OF EXPORT

vi
C O NTRO L R EG U LATIO NS ............................................................................. 1374

E. EXECUTIVE ORDER 12114-ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS

ABROAD OF MAJOR FEDERAL ACTIONS ................................................. 1376

vii

PART II: NONPROLIFERATION AND

OTHER INTERNATIONAL

MATERIALS

ix

Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Export Licensing Statutes 1023 Nuclar Nn-Pr~ifeatio an ExotLcnig ttts12

1. Nuclear Non-Proliferation and

Export Licensing Statutes

Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Export Licensing Statutes 1025

1. Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Export Licensing Statutes

Contents

A. NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION ACT OF 1978 ..................................... 1029

S ec. I. S h o rt T itle ......................................................................................... 102 9

Sec. 2. Statement Of Policy .......................................................................... 1029

Sec. 3. Statement Of Purpose ...................................................................... 1029

S ec. 4 . D efin itio n s ......................................................................................... 10 30

Title I-United States Initiatives To Provide Adequate Nuclear Fuel Supply .1030

S ec. 10 1. P o licy .............................................................................................. 10 30

Sec. 102. Uranium Enrichment Capacity ................................................... 1031

S ec. 103 . R ep o rt ............................................................................................ 103 1

Sec. 104. International Undertaking .......................................................... 1031

Sec. 105. Reevaluation of Nuclear Fuel Cycle ............................................ 1032

Title lI-United States Initiatives To Strengthen The International

S afeguards System ........................................................................................... 1032

S ec. 2 0 1. P o licy ............................................................................................. 10 32

Sec. 202. Training Program ........................................................................ 1033

S ec. 203. N egotiations .................................................................................. 1033

Title IlI-Export Organization And Criteria ..................................................... 1033

Sec. 301. Government-To-Government Transfers .................................... 1033

Sec. 302. Special Nuclear Material Production ......................................... 1034

Sec. 303. Subsequent Arrangements .......................................................... 1035

See. 304. Export Licensing Procedures ...................................................... 1040

Sec. 305. Criteria Governing United States Nuclear Exports .................. 1044

See. 306. Additional Export Criterion And Procedures ........................... 1045

Sec. 307. Conduct Resulting In Termination Of Nuclear Exports .......... 1046

Sec. 308. Congressional Review Procedures .............................................. 1047

Sec. 309. Component And Other Parts Of Facilities ................................. 1049

Title IV-Negotiation Of Further Export Controls ............................................ 1050

Sec. 401. Cooperation W ith Other Nations ................................................ 1050

Sec. 402. Additional Requirements ............................................................. 1054

Sec. 403. Peaceful Nuclear Activities .......................................................... 1054

Sec. 404. Renegotiation Of Agreements For Cooperation ........................ 1055

Sec. 405. Authority To Continue Agreements ........................................... 1056

S ec. 4 0 6. R ev iew ........................................................................................... 10 56

Sec. 407. Protection Of The Environment ................................................. 1057

Title V-United States Assistance To Developing Countries ............................. 1057

See. 50 1. P olicy: R eport .............................................................................. 1057

S ec. 502. P rog ram s ....................................................................................... 1057

S ec. 503 . R ep o rt ............................................................................................ 1058

Title VI-Executive Reporting ............................................................................. 1058

Sec. 601. Reports Of The President ............................................................ 1058

Sec. 602. Additional Reports ....................................................................... 1060

Sec. 603. Savings C lause .............................................................................. 106 1

Other Provisions: Provision Of Certain Information To Congress ................ 1061

B. FOREIGN RELATIONS AUTHORIZATION ACT, FISCAL YEARS

199 4 A N D 19 9 5 ..................................................................................................... 10 63

Title VIII- Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act ............................................ 1063

Part B-Sanctions For Nuclear Proliferation .................................................. 1063
1026 Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Export Licensing Statutes

Sec. 821. Imposition Of Procurement Sanction On Persons Engaging

In Export Activities That Contribute To Proliferation .......................... 1063

Sec. 822. Eligibility For A ssistance .............................................................. 1066

Sec. 823. Role Of International Financial Institutions ............................... 1066

Sec. 824. Prohibition On Assisting Nuclear Proliferation Through The

P rovision O f Financing ............................................................................. 1067

Part C-International Atomic Energy Agency ................................................ 1069

Sec. 841. Bilateral And M ultilateral Initiatives .......................................... 1069

See. 842. IA EA Internal R eform s ................................................................ 1070

Sec. 843. R eporting R equirem ent ................................................................ 1071

S ee. 844. D efin itio ns ...................................................................................... 107 1

P art D -T erm ination .......................................................................................... 1072

Sec. 851. Termination Upon Enactment Of Next Foreign Relations Act. 1072

C. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE AND ARMS EXPORT

C O N T R O L A C T O F 1976 .................................................................................. 1073

T itle ll ................................................................................................................... 10 7 3

Sec. 38. Control Of Arms Exports And Imports ....................................... 1073

Sec. 101. Nuclear Enrichm ent Transfers ................................................... 1082

Sec. 102. Nuclear Reprocessing Transfers, Illegal Exports For Nuclear

Explosive Devices, Transfers Of Nuclear Explosive Devices, And

N uclear D eto n atio ns .................................................................................. 1083

D. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT

CO O PERAT IO N ACT O F 1980 ........................................................................ 1087

S ec. I. S h o rt T itle ......................................................................................... 10 87

Title I-Military And Related Assistance And Sales Programs ........................ 1087

Sec. 110. Exportation Of Uranium Depleted In The Isotope 235 ............. 1087

E. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT

CO O PERA TIO N ACT O F 1981 ........................................................................ 1088

S ec. 1. S h o rt T itle ......................................................................................... 10 8 8

T itle VI I-M iscellaneous Provisions .................................................................... 1088

Sec. 735. Report O n Nuclear Activities ...................................................... 1088

Sec. 737. Prohibitions Relating To Nuclear Transfers And Nuclear

D eto n a tio n s ................................................................................................ 10 8 8

F. FOREIGN OPERATIONS APPROPRIATIONS (IRAQ SANCTIONS) ..... 1092

T itle V-Iraq Sanctions A ct O f 1990 ................................................................... 1092

Sec. 586. S hort T itle .................................................................................... 1092

Sec. 586A. Declarations Regarding Iraq's Invasion Of Kuwait ................ 1092

Sec. 586B. Consultations W ith Congress .................................................... 1092

Sec. 586C. Trade Em bargo Against Iraq .................................................... 1092

Sec. 586D. Compliance With United Nations Sanctions Against Iraq ...... 1093

Sec. 586E. Penalties For Violations Of Embargo ....................................... 1094

Sec. 586F. Declarations Regarding Iraq's Long-Standing Violations

O f International L aw ................................................................................ 1094

Sec. 586G . Sanctions A gainst Iraq ............................................................... 1096

Sec. 586H . W aiver A uthority ....................................................................... 1097

Sec. 5861. Denial Of Licenses For Certain Exports To Countries

Assisting Iraq's Rocket Or Chemical, Biological, Or Nuclear

W eapons C apability .................................................................................. 1098

Sec. 586J. R eports To C ongress ................................................................... 1098

G. EMERGENCY WARTIME SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS

ACT, 2003 (IRAQ SANCTIO NS) ....................................................................... 1100
Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Export Licensing Statutes 1027

H. MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE SUSPENDING

T H E IR A Q SA N C T IO N S A C T .......................................................................... 1101

I. NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR

1993 (IRAN-IRAQ ARMS NON-PROLIFERATION OF 1992) ..................... 1102

Title XVI-lran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act Of 1992 .............................. 1102

S ec. 160 1. S h o rt T itle ................................................................................... 1102

Sec. 1602. U nited States Policy ..................................................................... 1102

Sec. 1603. Application To Iran Of Certain Iraq Sanctions ....................... 1102

Sec. 1604. Sanctions Against Certain Persons ............................................ 1102

Sec. 1605. Sanctions Against Certain Foreign Countries .......................... 1103

S ec. 16 0 6 . W a iv er .......................................................................................... 1 104

Sec. 1607. R eporting R equirem ent .............................................................. 1104

S ec. 160 8. D efin itio ns .................................................................................... 1104

J. NORTH KOREA THREAT REDUCTION (SUBTITLE B) ........................... 1106

S ec. 82 1. S h o rt T itle ..................................................................................... 1 10 6

Sec. 822. Restrictions On Nuclear Cooperation With North Korea ........ 1106

See. 823. D efi n itions ..................................................................................... 1107

K. IRAN NONPROLIFERATION ACT OF 2000 ............................................... 1108

S ec. 1. S h o rt T itle .......................................................................................... 1 10 8

Sec. 2. Reports On Proliferation Relating To Iran And Syria .................. 1108

See. 3. Application Of Measures To Certain Foreign Persons .................. 1109

Sec. 4. Procedures If Measures Are Not Applied ....................................... 1110

Sec. 5. Determination Exempting Foreign Person From Sections 3 And

4 .................................................................................................................. 1 1 10

Sec. 6. Restriction On Extraordinary Payments In Connection With

T he International Space Station .............................................................. 1111

S ec. 7. D efi n itio n s .......................................................................................... 11 14

L. HENRY J. HYDE U.S. - INDIA PEACEFUL ATOMIC ENERGY

COOPERATION ACT OF 2006 (TITLE 1) ..................................................... 1116

Title I-United States And India Nuclear Cooperation ..................................... 1116

S ec. 10 1. S h o rt T itle ...................................................................................... 11 16

Sec. 102. Sense O f C ongress ........................................................................ 1116

Sec. 103. Statem ents O f Policy ..................................................................... 11 17

Sec. 104. Waiver Authority And Congressional Approval ........................ 1119

Sec. 105. United States Compliance With Its Nuclear Nonproliferation

T reaty O b ligations .................................................................................... 112 7

Sec. 106. Inoperability Of Determination And Waivers ............................ 1127

Sec. 107. M T C R A dherent Status ................................................................ 1127

Sec. 108. Technical A m endm ent .................................................................. 1127

Sec. 109. United States-India Scientific Cooperative Nuclear

N onproliferation Program ........................................................................ 1128

S ec. 110 . D efin itio n s ...................................................................................... 1 12 8

M. UNITED STATES-INDIA NUCLEAR COOPERATION APPROVAL

AND NONPROLIFERATION ENHANCEMENT ACT ................................. 1131

Sec. 1. Short Title And Table O f Contents ................................................. 1131

S ec. 2 . D efin itio n s .......................................................................................... 1 13 1

Title I--Approval Of United States-India Agreement For Cooperation On

Peaceful U ses O f N uclear Energy ................................................................... 1132

Sec. 101. A pproval O f A greem ent ............................................................... 1132

Sec. 102. Declarations Of Policy; Certification Requirement; Rule Of

C o n stru ctio n .............................................................................................. 1 132
1028 Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Export Licensing Statutes

Sec. 103. Additional Protocol Between India And The IAEA ................... 1133

Sec. 104. Implementation Of Safeguards Agreement Between India

A n d T he IA E A ........................................................................................... 1133

Sec. 105. M odified Reporting To Congress ................................................ 1133

Title li--Strengthening United States Nonproliferation Law Relating To

Peaceful N uclear C ooperation ......................................................................... 1135

Sec. 201. Procedures Regarding A Subsequent Arrangement On

R ep rocessin g .............................................................................................. 1 13 5

Sec. 202. Initiatives And Negotiations Relating To Agreements For

Peaceful N uclear C ooperation .................................................................. 1135

Sec. 203. Actions Required For Resumption Of Peaceful Nuclear

C oo p era tio n ............................................................................................... 1136

Sec. 204. United States Government Policy At The Nuclear Suppliers

Group To Strengthen The International Nuclear Nonproliferation

R eg im e ........................................................................................................ 1 13 6

Sec. 205. C onform ing A m endm ents ............................................................ 1136
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-242) 1029

A. NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION ACT OF 1978

Public Law 95-242 92 Stat. 120

March 10, 1978

An Act

To provide for more efficient and effective control over the proliferation

of nuclear explosive capability.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the

United States of America in Congress assembled,

22 uSC3201 note. See. 1. Short Title

Nuclear Non- That this Act may be cited as the "Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of

Proliferation Act of 1978."

1978.

22 USC 3201. Sec. 2. Statement Of Policy

The Congress finds and declares that the proliferation of nuclear

explosive devices or of the direct capability to manufacture or otherwise

acquire such devices poses a grave threat to the security interests of the

United States and to continue international progress toward world peace

and development. Recent events emphasize the urgency of this threat and

the imperative need to increase the effectiveness of international

safeguards and controls on peaceful nuclear activities to prevent

proliferation. Accordingly, it is the policy of the United States to-

(a) actively pursue through international initiatives mechanisms for

fuel supply assurances and the establishment of more effective

international controls over the transfer and use of nuclear materials and

equipment and nuclear technology for peaceful purposes in order to

prevent proliferation, including the establishment of common

international sanctions;

(b) take such actions as are required to confirm the reliability of the

United States in meeting its commitments to supply nuclear reactors and

fuel to nations which adhere to effective non-proliferation policies by

establishing procedures to facilitate the timely processing of requests for

subsequent arrangements and export licenses;

(c) strongly encourage nations which have not ratified the Treaty on

the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to do so at the earliest

possible date; and

(d) cooperate with foreign nations in identifying and adapting suitable

technologies for energy production and, in particular, to identify

alternative options to nuclear power in aiding such nations to meet their

energy needs, consistent with the economic and material resources of

those nations and environmental protection.

22 USC 3202. Sec. 3. Statement Of Purpose

It is the purpose of this Act to promote the policies set forth above

by-

(a) establishing a more effective framework for international

cooperation to meet the energy needs of all nations and to ensure that the

worldwide development of peaceful nuclear activities and the export by

any nation of nuclear materials and equipment and nuclear technology

intended for use in peaceful nuclear activities do not contribute to

proliferation; (b) authorizing the United States to take such actions as are required

to ensure that it will act reliably in meeting its commitment to supply
1030 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-242)

nuclear reactors and fuel to nations which adhere to effective nonproliferation policies;

(c) providing incentives to the other nations of the world to join in

such international cooperative efforts and to ratify the Treaty; and

(d) ensuring effective controls by the United States over its exports of

nuclear materials and equipment and of nuclear technology.

22 USC 3203. Sec. 4. Definitions

(a) As used in this Act, the term-

(1) "Commission" means the Nuclear Regulatory Commission;

(2) "IAEA" means International Atomic Energy Agency;'

(3) "nuclear materials and equipment" means source material,

special nuclear material, production facilities, utilization facilities,

and components, items or substances determined to have significance

for nuclear explosive purposes pursuant to subsection 109b. of the

1954 Act;

(4) "physical security measures" means measures to reasonably

ensure that source or special nuclear material will only be used for

authorized purposes and to prevent theft and sabotage;

(5) "sensitive nuclear technology" means any information

(including information incorporated in a production or utilization

facility or important component part thereof) which is not available to

the public and which is important to the design, construction,

fabrication, operation or maintenance of a uranium enrichment or

nuclear fuel reprocessing facility or a facility for the production of

heavy water, but shall not include Restricted Data controlled pursuant

to Chapter 12 of the 1954 Act;

42 USC 2011 (6) "1954 Act" means the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as

note. amended; and

(7) "the Treaty" means the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of

Nuclear Weapons.

(b) All other terms used in this Act not defined in this section shall

have the meanings ascribed to them by the 1954 Act, the Energy

Reorganization Act of 1974, and the Treaty.

Title I-United States Initiatives To Provide Adequate Nuclear

Fuel Supply

22 USC 3221. Sec. 101. Policy

42 tJSC 5801 The United States, as a matter of national policy, shall take such actions

note. and institute such measures as may be necessary and feasible to assure

other nations and groups of nations that may seek to utilize the benefits

of atomic energy for peaceful purposes that it will provide a reliable

42 USC 2201. supply of nuclear fuel to those nations and groups of nations which

adhere to policies designed to prevent proliferation Such nuclear fuel

shall be provided under agreements entered into pursuant to section 161

of the 1954 Act or as otherwise authorized by law. The United States

shall ensure that it will have available the capacity on a long-term basis

to enter into new fuel supply commitments consistent with its

nonproliferation policies and domestic energy needs. The Commission

shall, on a timely basis, authorize the export of nuclear materials and

equipment when all the applicable statutory requirements are met.

'P.L. 105-277, Div. G, Title XII, § 1225(e)(1), 112 Stat. 2681-775 (1998).
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-242) 1031

22 USC 3222.

22 USC 3222

note.

Study.

Report to

Congress.

22 USC 3223.

Discussions

and

negotiations.

Proposals.

submitted to

Congress.

Sec. 102. Uranium Enrichment Capacity

The Secretary of Energy is directed to initiate construction planning

and design, construction, and operation activities for expansion of

uranium enrichment capacity, as elsewhere provided by law. Further the

Secretary as well as the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the

Secretary of State2 are directed to establish and implement procedures

which will ensure to the maximum extent feasible, consistent with this

Act, orderly processing of subsequent arrangements and export licenses

with minimum time delay.

Sec. 103. Report

The President shall promptly undertake a study to determine the need

for additional United States enrichment capacity to meet domestic and

foreign needs and to promote United States non-proliferation objectives

abroad. The President shall report to the Congress on the results of this

study within twelve months after the date of enactment of this Act.

Sec. 104. International Undertaking

(a) Consistent with section 105 of this Act, the President shall

institute prompt discussions with other nations and groups of nations,

including both supplier and recipient nations, to develop international

approaches for meeting future worldwide nuclear fuel needs. In

particular, the President is authorized and urged to seek to negotiate as

soon as practicable with nations possessing nuclear fuel production

facilities or material, and such other nations and groups of nations, such

as the IAEA, as may be deemed appropriate, with a view toward the

timely establishment of binding international undertakings providing for-

(I) the establishment of an international nuclear fuel authority

(INFA) with responsibility for providing agreed fuel services and

allocating agreed upon quantities of fuel resources to ensure fuel

supply on reasonable terms in accordance with agreements between

INFA and supplier and recipient nations;

(2) a set of conditions consistent with subsection (d) under which

international fuel assurances under INFA auspices will be provided to

recipient nations, including conditions which will ensure that the

transferred materials will not be used for nuclear explosive devices;

(3) devising, consistent with the policy goals set forth in section

403 of this Act, feasible and environmentally sound approaches for

the siting, development, and management under effective

international auspices and. inspection of facilities for the provision of

nuclear fuel services, including the storage of special nuclear

material;

(4) the establishment of repositories for the storage of spent

nuclear reactor fuel under effective international auspices and

inspection;

(5) the establishment of arrangements under which nations

placing spent fuel in such repositories would receive appropriate

compensation for the energy content of such spent fuel if recovery of

such energy content is deemed necessary or desirable; and

(6) sanctions for violations of the provisions of or for abrogation

of such binding international undertakings.

(b) The President shall submit to Congress not later than six months

after the date of enactment of this Act proposals for initial fuel

assurances, including creation of an interim stockpile of uranium

enriched to less than 20 percent in the uranium isotope 235 (low-enriched

'P.L. 105-277, Div. G, Title XII, § 1225(e)(2), 112 Stat. 2681-775 (1998).
1032 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-242)

uranium) to be available for transfer pursuant to a sales arrangement to

nations which adhere to strict policies designed to prevent proliferation

when and if necessary to ensure continuity of nuclear fuel supply to such

nations. Such submission shall include proposals for the transfer of lowenriched uranium up to an amount sufficient to produce 100,000 NWe

years of power from light water nuclear reactors, and shall also include

proposals for seeking contributions from other supplier nations to such an

interim stockpile pending the establishment of INFA.

(c) The President shall, in the report required by section 103, also

address the desirability of and options for foreign participation, including

investment, in new United States uranium enrichment facilities. This

report shall also address the arrangements that would be required to

implement such participation and the commitments that would be

Proposed required as a condition of such participation. This report shall be

lcgislation, accompanied by any proposed legislation to implement these

arrangements.

(d) The fuel assurances contemplated by this section shall be for the

benefit of nations that adhere to policies designed to prevent

proliferation. In negotiating the binding international undertakings called

for in this section, the President shall, in particular, seek to ensure that

the benefits of such undertakings are available to non-nuclear-weapon

states only if such states accept IAEA safeguards on all their peaceful

nuclear activities, do not manufacture or otherwise acquire any nuclear

explosive device; do not establish any new enrichment or reprocessing

facilities under their de facto or de jure control, and place any such

existing facilities under effective international auspices and inspection.

(e) The report required by section 601 shall include information on

the progress made in any negotiations pursuant to this section.

(0(1) The President may not enter into any binding international

undertaking negotiated pursuant to subsection (a) which is not a treaty

until such time as such proposed undertaking has been submitted to the

Congress and has been approved by concurrent resolution.

(2) The proposals prepared pursuant to subsection (b) shall be

submitted to the Congress as part of an annual authorization Act for

the Department of Energy.

22 USC 3224. See. 105. Reevaluation of Nuclear Fuel Cycle

The President shall take immediate initiatives to invite all nuclear

supplier and recipient nations to reevaluate all aspects of the nuclear fuel

cycle, with emphasis on alternatives to an economy based on the

separation of pure plutonium or the presence of high enriched uranium,

methods to deal with spent fuel storage, and methods to improve the

safeguards for existing nuclear technology. The President shall, in the

first report required by section 601, detail the progress of such

international reevaluation.

Title II-United States Initiatives To Strengthen The

International Safeguards System

22 USC 3241. Sec. 201. Policy

The United States is committed to continued strong support for the

principles of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to

a strengthened and more effective International Atomic Energy Agency

and to a comprehensive safeguards system administered by the Agency

to deter proliferation. Accordingly, the United States shall seek to act

with other nations to-
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-242) 1033

(a) continue to strengthen the safeguards program of the IAEA and, in

order to implement this section, contribute funds, technical resources,

and other support to assist the IAEA in effectively implementing

safeguards;

(b) ensure that the IAEA has the resources to carry out the provisions

of Article XII of the Statute of the IAEA;

(c) improve the IAEA safeguards system (including accountability) to

ensure-

(I) the timely detection of a possible diversion of source or

special nuclear materials which could be used for nuclear explosive

devices;

(2) the timely dissemination of information regarding such

diversion; and

(3) the timely implementation of internationally agreed

procedures in the event of such diversion;

(d) ensure that the IAEA receives on a timely basis the data needed

for it to administer an effective comprehensive international safeguards

program and that the IAEA provides timely notice to the world

community of any evidence of a violation of any safeguards agreement to

which it is a party; and

(e) encourage the IAEA, to the maximum degree consistent with the

Statute, to provide nations which supply nuclear materials and equipment

with the data needed to assure such nations of adherence to bilateral

commitments applicable to such supply.

22 USC 3242. Sec. 202. Training Program The Department of Energy, in consultation with the Commission,

shall establish and operate a safeguards and physical security training

program to be made available to persons from nations and groups of

nations which have developed or acquired, or may be expected to

develop or acquire, nuclear materials and equipment for use for peaceful

purposes. Any such program shall include training in the most advanced

safeguards and physical security techniques and technology consistent

with the national security interests of the United States.

22 USC 3243. See. 203. Negotiations

The United States shall seek to negotiate with other nations and

groups of nations to-

(1) adopt general principles and procedures, including common

international sanctions, to be followed in the event that a nation

violates any material obligation with respect to the peaceful use of

nuclear materials and equipment or nuclear technology, or in the

event that any nation violates the principles of the Treaty, including

the detonation by a non-nuclear-weapon state of a nuclear explosive

device; and

(2) establish international procedures to be followed in the event

of diversion, theft, or sabotage of nuclear materials or sabotage of

nuclear facilities, and for recovering nuclear materials that have been

lost or stolen, or obtained or used by a nation or by any person or

group in contravention of the principles of the Treaty.

Title Ill-Export Organization And Criteria

See. 301. Government-To-Government Transfers

(a) Section 54 of the 1954 Act is amended by adding a new

subsection d. thereof as follows:
1034 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-242)

42 usc 2074. d. The authority to distribute special nuclear material under this

section other than under an export license granted by the Nuclear

Regulatory Commission shall extend only to the following small

quantities of special nuclear material (in no event more than five hundred

grams per year of the uranium isotope 233, the uranium isotope 235, or

plutonium contained in special nuclear material to any recipient):

(1) which are contained in laboratory samples, medical devices, or

monitoring or other instruments; or

(2) the distribution of which is needed to deal with an emergency

situation in which time is of the essence.

42 USC 2094. (b) Section 64 of the 1954 Act is amended by inserting the following

immediately after the second sentence thereof: "The authority to

distribute source material under this section other than under an export

license granted by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission shall in no case

extend to quantities of source material in excess of three metric tons per

year per recipient."

(c) Chapter 10 of the 1954 Act is amended by adding a new section

I ll as follows:

42 USC 2141. Sec. I ll .a. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is authorized to

license the distribution of special nuclear material, source material, and

byproduct material by the Department of Energy pursuant to section 54,

64, and 82 of this Act, respectively, in accordance with the same

procedures established by law for the export licensing of such material by

42 LJSC 2112. any person: Provided, That nothing in this section shall require the

Supra. licensing of the distribution of byproduct material by the Department of

Energy under section 82 of this Act.

b. The Department of Energy shall not distribute any special nuclear

material or source material under section 54 or 64 of this Act other than

under an export license issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission

until (1) the Department has obtained the concurrence of the Department

of State and has consulted with the Arms Control and Disarmament

Agency, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the Department of

Defense under mutually agreed procedures which shall be established

within not more than ninety days after the date of enactment of this

provision and (2) the Department finds based on a reasonable judgment

of the assurances provided and the information available to the United

States Government, that the criteria in section 127 of this Act or their

equivalent and any applicable criteria in sub section 128 are met, and that

the proposed distribution would not be inimical to the common defense

and security.

Special nuclear Sec. 302. Special Nuclear Material Production

material, Subsection 57b. of the 1954 Act is amended to read as follows:

production. b. It shall be unlawful for any person to directly or indirectly engage

in the production of any special nuclear material outside of the United

42 USC 2077. States except (1) as specifically authorized under an agreement for

Standards and cooperation made pursuant to section 123, including a specific

criteria, authorization in a subsequent arrangement under section 131 of this Act,

Technology or (2) upon authorization by the Secretary of Energy after a

transfers, determination that such activity will not be inimical to the interest of the

United States: Provided. That any such determination by the Secretary

of Energy shall be made only with the concurrence of the Department of

State and after consultation with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

the Department of Commerce, and the Department of Defense. Secretary Authorization of Energy shall, within ninety days after the enactment of the Nuclear

requests. Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, establish orderly and expeditious

procedures.
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-242) 1035

procedures, including provision for necessary administrative actions and

inter-agency memoranda of understanding, which are mutually agreeable

to the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Commerce, and the Nuclear

Regulatory Commission for the consideration of requests for

authorization under this subsection. Such procedures shall include, at a

minimum, explicit direction on the handling of such requests, express

deadlines for the solicitation and collection of the views of the consulted

agencies (with identified officials responsible for meeting such

deadlines), an interagency coordinating authority to monitor the

processing of such requests, predetermined procedures for the

expeditious handling of intra-agency and inter-agency disagreements and

appeals to higher authorities, frequent meetings of interagency

administrative coordinators to review the status of all pending requests,

and similar administrative mechanisms. To the extent practicable, an

applicant should be advised of all the information required of the

applicant for the entire process for every agency's needs at the beginning

of the process. Potentially controversial requests should be identified as

quickly as possible so that any required policy decisions or diplomatic

consultations can be initiated in a timely manner. An immediate effort

should be undertaken to establish quickly any necessary standards and

criteria, including the nature of any required assurances or evidentiary

showing, for the decision required under this subsection. The processing

of any request proposed and filed as of the date of enactment of the

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 shall not be delayed pending the

Trade secrets, development and establishment of procedures to implement the

protection. requirements of this subsection. Any trade secrets or proprietary

information submitted by any person seeking an authorization under this

42 USC 2014. subsection shall be afforded the maximum degree of protection allowable

42 USC 7172. by law: Provided.fiurther, That the export of component parts as defined

in subsection I lv.(2) or I lcc.(2) shall be governed by sections 109 and

126 of this Act: Provided further, That notwithstanding subsection

402(d) of the Department of Energy Organization Act (Public Law 95-

42 USC 2074. 91), the Secretary of Energy and not the Federal Energy Regulatory

42 LJSC 2094. Commission shall have sole jurisdiction within the Department of Energy

over any matter arising from any function of the Secretary of Energy in

this section, section 54d., section 64, or section I I lb.

Sec. 303. Subsequent Arrangements

(a) Chapter I I of the 1954 Act, as amended by sections 304, 305,

306, 307, and 308, is further amended by adding at the end

thereof the following:

42 USC 2160. Sec. 13 1. SUBSEQUENT ARRANGEMENTS.-

Consultation. a. (I) Prior to entering into any proposed subsequent arrangement

under an agreement for cooperation (other than an agreement for

cooperation arranged pursuant to subsection 91 c., 144b., or 144c. of this

2 U SC 2121. Act), the Secretary of Energy shall obtain the concurrence of the

42 USC 2164. Secretary of State and shall consult with the Director, the Commission,

and the Secretary of Defense: Provided, That the Secretary of State shall have

the leading role in any negotiations of a policy nature pertaining to any

proposed subsequent arrangement regarding arrangements for the storage

or disposition of irradiated fuel elements or approvals for the transfer, for

which prior approval is required under an agreement for cooperation, by

a recipient of source or special nuclear material, production or utilization Notice, facilities, or nuclear technology. Notice of any proposed subsequent

publication in arrangement shall be published in the Federal Register, together with the

the Federal written determination of the Secretary of Energy that such arrangement

Register.
1036 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-242)

will not be inimical to the common defense and security, and such

proposed subsequent arrangement shall not take effect before fifteen days

after publication. Whenever the Director declares that he intends to

prepare a Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement pursuant to

paragraph (2) of this subsection, notice of the proposed subsequent

arrangement which is the subject of the Director's declaration shall not

be published until after the receipt by the Secretary of Energy of such

Statement or the expiration of the time authorized by subsection c. for the

preparation of such Statement, whichever occurs first.

Nuclear (2) If in the Director's view a proposed subsequent arrangement

Proli'cration might significantly contribute to proliferation, he may prepare an

Assessment unclassified Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement with regard to

Statement. such proposed subsequent arrangement regarding the adequacy of the

safeguards and other control mechanisms and the application of the

peaceful use assurances of the relevant agreement to ensure that

assistance to be furnished pursuant to the "subsequent arrangement" will

Subsequent not be used to further any military or nuclear explosive purpose. For the

arrangements. purposes of this section, the term "subsequent arrangements"

means arrangements entered into by any agency or department of the

United States Government with respect to cooperation with any

nation or group of nations (but not purely private or domestic

arrangements) involvingContracts. (A) contracts for the furnishing of nuclear materials and

equipment;

(B) approvals for the transfer, for which prior approval is

required under an agreement for cooperation, by a recipient of any

source or special nuclear material, production or utilization

facility, or nuclear technology;

(C) authorization for the distribution of nuclear materials and

equipment pursuant to this Act which is not subject to the

procedures set forth in section I I lb., section 126, or section 09b.;

(D) arrangements for physical security;

(E) arrangements for the storage or disposition of irradiated

fuel elements;

(F) arrangements for the application of safeguards with respect

to nuclear materials and equipment; or

(G) any other arrangement which the President finds to be

important from the standpoint of preventing proliferation.

(3) The United States will give timely consideration to all requests

for prior approval, when required by this Act, for the reprocessing of

material proposed to be exported, previously exported and subject to

the applicable agreement for cooperation, or special nuclear material

produced through the use of such material or a production or

utilization facility transferred pursuant to such agreement for

cooperation, or to the altering of irradiated fuel elements containing

such material, and additionally, to the maximum extent feasible, will

attempt to expedite such consideration when the terms and conditions

for such actions are set forth in such agreement for cooperation or in

some other international agreement executed by the United States and

subject to congressional review procedures comparable to those set

forth in section 123 of this Act.

(4) All other statutory requirements under other sections of this

Act for the approval or conduct of any arrangement subject to this

subsection shall continue to apply and other such requirements for

prior approval or conditions for entering such arrangement shall also
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-242) 1037

Report to

congressional

committees.

Nuclear

materials,

reprocessing or

transfer

procedures.

be satisfied before the arrangements takes effect pursuant to

subsection a.

(M).

b. With regard to any special nuclear material exported by the United

States or produced through the use of any nuclear materials and

equipment or sensitive nuclear technology exported by the United

States-

(1) the Secretary of Energy may not enter into any subsequent

arrangements for the retransfer of any such material to a third country

for reprocessing, for the reprocessing of any such material, or for the

subsequent retransfer of any plutonium in quantities greater than 500

grams resulting from the reprocessing of any such material until he has

provided the Committee on International Relations of the House of

Representatives and the Committee of Foreign Relations of the Senate

with a report containing his reasons for entering into such arrangement

and a period of 15 days of continuous session (as defined in subsection

130g. of this Act) has elapsed: Provided, however, That if in the view

of the President an emergency exists due to unforeseen circumstances

requiring immediate entry into a subsequent arrangement, such period

shall consist of fifteen calendar days;

(2) the Secretary of Energy may not enter into any subsequent

arrangement for the reprocessing of any such material in a facility

which has not processed power reactor fuel assemblies or been the

subject of a subsequent arrangement therefor prior to the date of

enactment of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 or for

subsequent retransfer to a non-nuclear-weapon state of any plutonium

in quantities greater than 500 grams resulting from such reprocessing,

unless in his judgment, and that of the Secretary of State, such

reprocessing or retransfer will not result in a significant increase of the

risk of proliferation beyond that which exists at the time that approval

is requested. Among all the factors in making this judgment, foremost

consideration will be given to whether or not the reprocessing or

retransfer will take place under conditions that will ensure timely

warning to the United States of any diversion well in advance of the

time at which the non-nuclear-weapon state could transform the

diverted material into a nuclear explosive device; and

(3) the Secretary of Energy shall attempt to ensure, in entering

into any subsequent arrangement for the reprocessing of any such

material in any facility that has processed power reactor fuel

assemblies or been the subject of a subsequent arrangement therefor

prior to the date of enactment of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of

1978, or for the subsequent retransfer to any non-nuclear-weapon state

of any plutonium in quantities greater than 500 grams resulting from

such reprocessing, that such reprocessing or retransfer shall take place

under conditions .comparable to those which in his view, and that of the

Secretary of State, satisfy the standards set forth in paragraph (2).

c. The Secretary of Energy shall, within ninety days after the

enactment of this section, establish orderly and expeditious procedures,

including provisions for necessary administrative actions and interagency

memoranda of understanding, which are mutually agreeable to the

Secretaries of State, Defense, and Commerce, the Director of the Arms

Control and Disarmament Agency, and the Nuclear Regulatory

Commission for the consideration of requests for subsequent

arrangements under this section. Such procedures shall include, at a

minimum, explicit direction on the handling of such requests, express
1038 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-242)

deadlines for the solicitation and collection of the views of the consulted

agencies (with identified officials responsible for meeting such

deadlines), an inter-agency coordinating authority to monitor the

processing of such requests, predetermined procedures for the

expeditious handling of intra-agency and inter-agency disagreements and

appeals to higher coordinators to review the status of all pending

requests, and similar administrative mechanisms. To the extent

Controversial practicable, an applicant should be advised of all the information required

requests. of the applicant for the entire process for every agency's needs at the

identitication. beginning of the process. Potentially controversial requests be should

Standards and identified as quickly as possible so that any required policy or decisions

criteria, diplomatic consultations can be initiated in a timely manner. An

immediate effort should be undertaken to establish quickly as necessary

standards and criteria, including the nature of any required assurance or

evidentiary showings, for the decisions required under this section.

Nuclear Further, such procedure shall specify that if he intends to prepare a

Proliferation Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement, the Director shall so declare

Assessment in his response to the Department of Energy. If the Director declares that

Statement. he intends to prepare such a Statement he shall do so within sixty days of

his receipt of a copy of the proposed subsequent arrangement (during which time the Secretary of Energy may not enter into the subsequent

Presidential arrangement), unless pursuant to the Director's request the President

waiver, waives the sixty-day requirement and notifies the Committee on

Notice to International Relations of the House of Representatives and the

congressional Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate of such waiver and the

committees. justification therefor. The processing of any subsequent arrangement proposed and filed as of the date of enactment of this section shall not be

delayed pending the development and establishment of procedures to

implement the requirements of this section.

d. Nothing in this section is intended to prohibit, permanently or

unconditionally, the reprocessing of spent fuel owned by a foreign nation

which fuel has been supplied by the United States, to preclude the United

States from full participation in the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle

Evaluation provided for in section 105 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation

Act of 1978; to in any way limit the presentation or consideration in that

evaluation of any nuclear fuel cycle by the United States or any other

participation; nor to prejudice open and objective consideration of the

results of the evaluation.

42 USC 7172. e. Notwithstanding subsection 402(d) of the Department of Energy

Organization Act (Public Law 95-91), the Secretary of Energy, and not

the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, shall have sole jurisdiction

within the Department of Energy every any matter arising from any function of the Secretary of Energy in this section.

Presidential f.(I) With regard to any subsequent arrangement under subsection

plan, submittal a.(2)(E) (for the storage or disposition of irradiated fuel elements), where

to Congress. such arrangement involves a direct or indirect commitment of the United

States for the storage or other disposition, interim or permanent, of any

foreign spent nuclear fuel in the United States, the Secretary of Energy

may not enter into any such subsequent arrangement, unless:

(A)(i) Such commitment of the United States has been submitted

to the Congress. for a period of sixty days of continuous session (as

defined in subsection 130g. of this Act) and has been referred to the

Committee on International Relations of the House of

Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the

Senate, but any such commitment shall not become effective if during
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-242) 1039

such sixty-day period the Congress adopts a concurrent resolution

stating in substance that it does not favor the commitment, any such

commitment to be considered pursuant to the procedures set forth in

section 130 of this Act for the consideration of Presidential

submissions; or (ii) if the President has submitted a detailed generic

plan for such disposition or storage in the United States to the

Congress for period of sixty days of continuous session (as defined in

subsection 130g. of this Act), which plan has been referred to the

Committee on International Relations of the House of

Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the

Senate and has not been disapproved during such sixty-day period by

the adoption of a concurrent resolution stating in substance that

Congress does not favor the plan; and the commitment is subject to

the terms of an effective plan. Any such plan shall be considered

pursuant to the procedures set forth in section 130 of this Act for the

consideration of Presidential submissions;

(B) The Secretary of Energy has complied with subsection a.; and

(C) The Secretary of Energy has complied, or in the arrangement

will comply with all other statutory requirements of this Act, under

sections 54 and 55 and any other applicable sections, and any other

Notice to requirements of law.

congressional (2) Subsection (I) shall apply to the storage or other disposition in the congrtteessa United States of limited quantities of foreign spent nuclear fuel if the President determines that (A) a commitment under section 54 or 55 of

this Act of the United States for storage or other disposition of such

limited quantities in the United States is required by an emergency

situation, (B) it is in the national interest to take such immediate action,

and (C) he notifies the Committees on International Relations and

Science and Technology of the House of Representatives and the

Committees on Foreign Relations and Energy and Natural Resources of

the Senate of the determination and action, with a detailed explanation

and justification thereof, as soon as possible.

Plan, contents. (3) Any plan submitted by the President under subsection f.(l) shall

include a detailed discussion, with detailed information, and any

supporting documentation thereof, relating to policy objectives, technical

description, geographic information, costs data and justifications, legal

and regulatory consideration, environmental impact information and any

related international agreements, arrangements or understandings.

Foreign spent (4) For the purposes of this subsection, the term "foreign spent

nuclear fuel. nuclear fuel" shall include any nuclear fuel irradiated in any nuclear

power reactor located outside of the United States and operated by any

foreign legal entity, government or nongovernment, regardless of the

legal ownership or other control of the fuel or the reactor and regardless

of the origin or licensing of the fuel or reactor, but not including fuel

irradiated in a research reactor.

(b)(1) Section 54 of the 1954 Act is amended by adding new

subsection e. as follows,

e. The authority in this section to commit United States funds for

any activities pursuant to any subsequent arrangement under section

13 1a.(2)(E) shall be subject to the requirements of section 131.

42 USC 2075. (2) Section 55 of the 1954 Act is amended by adding a proviso

at the end of the section as follows, "Providing, That the authority in

this section to commit United States funds for any activities pursuant

to any subsequent arrangement under section 131a.(2)(E) shall be

subject to the requirements of section 131."
1040 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-242)

Sec. 304. Export Licensing Procedures

(a) Chapter II of the 1954 Act is amended by adding a new section

126 as follows:

Sec 126.Export Licensing Procedures.-

42 USC 2155. a. No license may be issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission

E-xemption. (the "Commission") for the export of any production or utilization

S,2p2a. facility 42 USC 2112. or any source material or special nuclear material, including distributions

of any material by the Department of Energy under section 54, 64, or 82, Executive for which a license is required or requested, and no exemption from any

branch requirement for such an export license may be granted by the

Judgment, Commission, as the case may be, until - notice to (1) the Commission has been notified by the Secretary of State that it is

Commission. the judgment of the executive branch that the proposed export or

exemption will not be inimical to the common defense and security, or

that any export in the category to which the proposed export belongs

would not be inimical to the common defense and security because it

Procedures. lacks significance for nuclear explosive purposes. The Secretary of State

shall, within ninety days after the enactment of this section, establish

orderly and expeditious procedures, including provision for necessary

administrative actions and inter-agency memoranda of understanding,

which are mutually agreeable to the Secretaries of Energy, Defense, and

Commerce, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 3 and the executive

Contents. branch judgment on export applications under this section. Such

procedures shall include, at a minimum, explicit direction on the

handling of such applications, express deadlines for the solicitation and

collection of the views of the consulted agencies (with identified officials

responsible for meeting such deadlines), an inter-agency coordinating

authority to monitor the processing of such applications, predetermined

procedures for the expeditious handling of intra-agency and interagency

disagreements and appeals to higher authorities, frequent meetings of

inter-agency administrative coordinators to review the status of all

pending applications, and similar administrative mechanisms. To the

extent practicable, an applicant should be advised of all the information

required of the applicant for the entire process for every agency's needs

at the beginning of the process. Potentially controversial applications

should be identified as quickly as possible so that any required policy

Standards and decisions or diplomatic consultations can be initiated in a timely manner.

citedrdia. An immediate effort should be undertaken to establish quickly any necessary standards and criteria, including the nature of any required

assurances or evidentiary showing, for the decisions required under this

section. The processing of any export application proposed and filed as

of the date of enactment of this section shall not be delayed pending the

development and establishment of procedures to implement the

requirements of this section. The executive branch judgment shall be

completed in not more than sixty days from receipt of the application or

request unless the Secretary of State in his discretion specifically

authorizes additional time for consideration of the application or request

because it is in the national interest to allow such additional time. The

Secretary shall notify the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate

and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives of

any such authorization. In submitting any such judgment, the Secretary

'P.L. 105-277, Div. G. Title XIt, Ch. 3, § 1225(d)(5), as amended, 112 Stat. 2681-774 (1998).
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-242) 1041

of State shall specifically address the extent to which the export criteria

then in effect are met and the extent to which the cooperating party' has

adhered to the provisions of the applicable agreement for cooperation. In

the event he considers it warranted, the Secretary may also address the

following additional factors, among others:

(A) whether issuing the license or granting the exemption will

materially advance the non-proliferation policy of the United

States by encouraging the recipient nation to adhere to the Treaty,

or to participate in the undertakings contemplated by section 403

or 404(a) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978;

(B) whether failure to issue the license or grant the exemption

would otherwise be seriously prejudicial to the non-proliferation

objectives of the United States; and

(C) whether the recipient nation or group of nations has

agreed that conditions substantially identical to the export criteria

set forth in section 127 of this Act will be applied by another

nuclear supplier nation or group of nations to the proposed United

States export, and whether in the Secretary's judgment those

conditions will be implemented in a manner acceptable to the

United States.

Data and The Secretary of State shall provide appropriate data and

recommendations, recommendations, subject to requests for additional data and

recommendations, as required by the Commission or the Secretary of

Energy, as the case may be ; and

(2) the Commission finds, based on a reasonable judgment of the

assurances provided and other information available to the Federal

Government, including the Commission, that the criteria in section 127

of this Act or their equivalent, and any other applicable statutory

requirements, are met: Provided, That continued cooperation under an

42 USC 2154. agreement for cooperation as authorized in accordance with section 124

of this Act shall not be prevented by failure to meet the provisions of

paragraph (4) or (5) of section 127 for a period of thirty days after

enactment of this section, and for a period of twenty-three months

thereafter if the Secretary of State notifies the Commission that the nation

or group of nations bound by the relevant agreement has agreed to

negotiations as called for in section 404(a) of the Nuclear NonProliferation Act of 1978; however, nothing in this subsection shall be

deemed to relinquish any rights which the United States may have under

agreements for cooperation in force on the date of enactment of this

section:

Extension, Provided fitrther, That, if upon the expiration of such twenty-four

notice to month period, the President determines that failure to continue

Congress. cooperation with any group of nations which has been exempted pursuant

to the above proviso from the provisions of paragraph (4) or (5) of

section 127 of this Act, but which has not yet agreed to comply with

those provisions would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of

United States non-proliferation objectives or otherwise jeopardize the

common defense and security, he may, after notifying the Congress of

his determination, extend by Executive order the duration of the above

proviso for a period of twelve months, and may further extend the

duration of such proviso by one year, increments annually thereafter if he

again makes such determination and so notifies the Congress. In the

event that the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of

Representatives or the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate

reports a joint resolution to take any action with respect to any such
Findings.

Judicial review,

exception.

Presidential

review.

Report to

Congress and

congressional

committees.

1042 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-242)

extension, such joint resolution will be considered in the House or

Senate, as the case may be, under procedures identical to those provided

for the consideration of resolutions pursuant to section 130 of this Act:

And additionally provided, That the Commission is authorized to-

(A) make a single finding under this subsection for more than

a single application or request, where the applications or requests

involve exports to the same country, in the same general time frame,

or similar significance for nuclear explosive purposes and under

reasonably similar circumstances, and

(B) make a finding under this subsection that there is no

material changed circumstance associated with a new application or

request from those existing at the time of the last application or

request for an export to the same country, where the prior application

or request was approved by the Commission using all applicable

procedures of this section, and such finding of no material changed

circumstance shall be deemed to satisfy the requirement of this

paragraph for findings of the Commission. The decision not to make

any such finding in lieu of the findings which would otherwise be

required to be made under this paragraph shall not be subject to

judicial review: And provided further, That nothing contained in this

section is intended to require the Commission independently to

conduct or prohibit the Commission from independently conducting

country or site specific visitations in the Commission's consideration

of the application of IAEA safeguards.

b. (I) Timely consideration shall be given by the Commission

to requests for export licenses and exemptions and such requests shall

be granted upon a determination that all applicable statutory

requirements have been met.

(2) If, after receiving the executive branch judgment that the

issuance of a proposed export license will not be inimical to the

common defense and security, the Commission does not issue the

proposed license on a timely basis because it is unable to make the

statutory determinations required under this Act, the Commission

shall publicly issue its decision to that effect, and shall submit the

license application to the President. The Commission's decision shall

include application to the President. The Commission's decision shall

include an explanation of the basis for the decision and any dissenting

or separate views. If, after receiving the proposed license application

and reviewing the Commission's decision, the President determines

that withholding the proposed export would be seriously prejudicial to

the achievement of United States non-proliferation objectives, or

would otherwise jeopardize the common defense and security, the

proposed export may be authorized by Executive order Provided,

That prior to any such export, the President shall submit the Executive

order, together with his explanation of why in light of the

Commission's decision, the export should nonetheless be made, to the

Congress for a period of sixty days of continuous session (as defined

in subsection 130g.) and shall be referred to the Committee on

Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee

on Foreign Relations of the Senate, but any such proposed export shall not occur if during such sixty-day period the Congress adopts a

concurrent resolution stating in substance that it does not favor the

proposed export. Any such Executive order shall be considered

pursuant to the procedures set forth in section 130 of this Act for the

consideration of Presidential submissions: And providedfurther, That
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-242) 1043

Review.

Concerns and

requests,

transmittal to

executive

branch.

Relferral to

congressional

committees.

42 ISC 2155n.

Regulations.

the procedures established pursuant to subsection (b) of section 304 of

the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 shall provide that the

Commission shall immediately initiate review of any application for a

license under this section and to the maximum extent feasible shall

expeditiously process the application concurrently with the executive

branch review, while awaiting the final executive branch judgment. In

initiating its review, the Commission may identify a set of concerns

and requests for information associated with the projected issuance of

such license and shall transmit such concerns and requests to the

executive branch which shall address such concerns and requests in

its written communications with the Commission. Such procedures

shall also provide that if the Commission has not completed action on

the application within sixty days after the receipt of an executive

branch judgment that the proposed export or exemption is not

inimical to the common defense and security or that any export in the

category to which the proposed export belongs would not be inimical

to the common defense and security because it lacks significance for

nuclear explosive purposes, the Commission shall inform the

applicant in writing of the reason for delay and provide follow-up

reports as appropriate. If the Commission has not completed action by

the end of an additional sixty days (a total of one hundred and twenty

days from receipt of the executive branch judgment), the President

may authorize the proposed export by Executive order, upon a finding

that further delay would be excessive and upon making the findings

required for such Presidential authorization under this subsection, and

subject to the Congressional review procedures set forth herein.

However, if the Commission has commenced procedures for public

participation regarding the proposed export under regulations

promulgated pursuant to subsection (b) of section 304 of the Nuclear

Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, or-within sixty days after receipt of

the executive branch judgment on the proposed export-the

Commission has identified and transmitted to the executive branch a

set of additional concerns or requests for information, the President

may not authorize the proposed export until sixty days after public

proceedings are completed or sixty days after a full executive branch

response to the Commission's additional concerns or requests has

been made consistent with subsection a. (1) of this section: Provided

fiirther, That nothing in this section shall affect the right of the

Commission to obtain data and recommendations from the Secretary

of State at any time as provided in subsection a.(l) of this section.

c. In the event that the House of Representatives or the Senate passes

a joint resolution which would adopt one or more additional export

criteria, or would modify any existing export criteria under this Act, any such joint resolution shall be referred in the other House to the

Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate or the Committee on

Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, and

shall be considered by the other House under applicable procedures

provided for the consideration of resolutions pursuant to section 130 of

this Act.

(b) Within one hundred and twenty days of the date of enactment of

this Act, the Commission shall, after consultations with the Secretary of

State, promulgate regulations establishing procedures (1) for the

granting, suspending, revoking, or amending of any nuclear export

license or exemption pursuant to its statutory authority; (2) for public

participation in nuclear export licensing proceedings when the
1044 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-242)

Commission finds that such participation will be in the public interest

and will assist the Commission in making the statutory determinations

required by the 1954 Act, including such public hearings and access to

information as the Commission deems appropriate: Provided, That

judicial review as to any such finding shall be limited to the

determination of whether such finding was arbitrary and capricious; (3)

for a public written Commission opinion accompanied by the dissenting

or separate views of any Commissioner, in those proceedings where one

or more Commissioners have dissenting or separate views on the

issuance of an export license; and (4) for public notice of Commission

proceedings and decisions, and for recording of minutes and votes of the

Commission: ProvidedfJurther, That until the regulations required by this

subsection have been promulgated, the Commission shall implement the

provisions of this Act under temporary procedures established by the

Commission.

42 USC 2155a. (c) The procedures to be established pursuant to subsection (b) shall

42 USC 2239. constitute the exclusive basis for hearings in nuclear export licensing

I learings, proceedings before the Commission and, notwithstanding section 189a.

of the 1954 Act, shall not require the Commission to grant any person an

on-the-record hearing in such a proceeding.

42 USC 2156a. (d) Within sixty days of the date of enactment of this Act, the

Regulations. Commission shall, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the

Secretary of Energy, and the Secretary of Defense, promulgate (and may

from time to time amend) regulations establishing the levels of physical

security which in its judgment are no less strict than those established by

any international guidelines to which the United States subscribes and

which in its judgment will provide adequate protection for facilities and

material referred to in paragraph (3) of section 127 of the 1954 Act

taking into consideration variations in risks to security as appropriate.4

See. 305. Criteria Governing United States Nuclear Exports

Chapter II of the 1954 Act, as a amended by section 304, is further

amended by adding at the end thereof the following:

42 USC 2156. Sec. 127. CRITERIA GOVERNING UNITED STATES NUCLEAR

EXPORTSThe United States adopts the following criteria which, in addition to

other requirements of law, will govern exports for peaceful nuclear uses

from the United States of source material, special nuclear material,

production or utilization facilities, and any sensitive nuclear technology:

(1) IAEA safeguards, as required by Article 111(2) of the Treaty will

be applied with respect to any such material or facilities proposed to be

exported, to any such material or facilities previously exported and

subject to the applicable agreement for cooperation, and to any special

nuclear material used in or produced through the use thereof.

(2) No such material, facilities, or sensitive nuclear technology

proposed to be exported or previously exported and subject to the

applicable agreement for cooperation, and no special nuclear material

producer through the use of such materials, facilities or sensitive nuclear

technology, will be used for any nuclear explosive device or for research

on or development of any nuclear explosive device.

(3) Adequate physical security measures will be maintained with

respect to such material or facilities proposed to be exported and to any

special nuclear material used in or produced through the use thereof.

4

As amended, P.L. 105-277, Div. G, Title XII, Ch. 3, § 1225(e)(3), 112 Stat. 2681-775 (1998).
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-242) 1045

Following the effective date of any regulations promulgated by the

Commission pursuant to section 304(d) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation

Act of 1978, physical security measures shall be deemed adequate if such

measures provide a level of protection equivalent to that required by the

applicable regulations.

(4) No such materials, facilities, or sensitive nuclear technology

proposed to be exported, and no special nuclear material produced

through the use of such material, will be retransferred to the jurisdiction

of any other nation or group of nations unless the prior approval of the

United States is obtained for such retransfer. In addition to other

requirements of law, the United States may approve such retransfer only

if the nation or group of nations designated to receive such retransfer

agrees that it shall be subject to the conditions required by this section.

(5) No such material proposed to be exported and no special nuclear

material produced through the use of such material will be reprocessed,

and no irradiated fuel elements containing such material removed from a

reactor shall be altered in form or content, unless the prior approval of

the United States is obtained for such reprocessing or alteration.

(6) No such sensitive nuclear technology shall be exported unless the

foregoing conditions shall be applied to any nuclear material or

equipment which is produced or constructed under the jurisdiction of the

recipient nation or group of nations by or through the use of any such

exported sensitive nuclear technology.

Sec. 306. Additional Export Criterion And Procedures

Chapter II of the 1954 Act, as amended by sections 304 and 305, is

further amended by adding at the end thereof the following:

42 USC 2157. Sec. 128. ADDITIONAL EXPORT CRITERIA AND

PROCEDURESa. (I) As a condition of continued United States export source

material, special nuclear material, production or utilization facilities, and

any sensitive nuclear technology to non-nuclear-weapon states, no such

export shall be made unless IAEA safeguards are maintained with respect

to all peaceful nuclear activities in, under the jurisdiction of, or carried

out under the control of such state at the time of the export.

(2) The President shall seek to achieve adherence to the foregoing

criterion by recipient non-nuclear-weapon states.

Export b. The criterion set forth in subsection a. shall be applied as an export

applications, criterion with respect to any application for the export of materials,

criterion facilities, or technology specified in subsection a. which is filed after

enforcement, eighteen months from the date of enactment of this section, or for any

such application under which the first export would occur at least twentyfour months after the date of enactment of this section, except as

provided in the following paragraphs:

(1) If the Commission or the Department of Energy, as the case

may be, is notified that the President has determined that failure to

approve an export to which this subsection applies because such

criterion has not yet been met would be seriously prejudicial to the

achievement of United States non-proliferation objectives or

otherwise .jeopardize the common defense and security, the license or

authorization may be issued sublect to other applicable requirements Report to of law Provided, That no such export of any production or utilization

congressional facility or of any source of special nuclear material (intended for use

committees, as fuel in any production or utilization facility) which has been

licensed or authorized pursuant to this subsection shall be made to

any non-nuclear- weapon state which has failed to meet such criterion
Congressional

disapproval,

resolution.

Export

authorizations.

congressional

review.

Expolr

terminations.

criterion.

42 USC 2158.

1046 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-242)

until the first such license or authorization with respect to such state

is submitted to the Congress (together with a detailed assessment of

the reasons underlying the President's determination, the judgment of

the executive branch required under section 126 of this Act and any

Commission opinion and views) for a period of sixty days of

continuous session (as defined in subsection 130g. of this Act) and

referred to the Committee on International Relations of the House of

Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the

Senate, but such export shall not occur if during such sixty-day period

the Congress adopts a concurrent resolution stating in substance that

the Congress does not favor the proposed export. Any such license or

authorization shall be considered pursuant to the procedures set forth

in section 130 of this Act for the consideration of Presidential

submissions.

(2) If the Congress adopts a resolution of disapproval pursuant to

paragraph (1), no further export of materials, facilities, or technology

specified in subsection a. shall be permitted for the remainder of that

Congress, unless such state meets the criterion or the President

notifies the Congress that he has determined that significant progress

has been made in achieving adherence to such criterion by such state

or that United States foreign policy interests dictate reconsideration

and the Congress, pursuant to the procedure of paragraph (1), does

not adopt a concurrent resolution stating in substance that it disagrees

with the President's determination.

(3) If the Congress does not adopt a resolution of disapproval with

respect to a license or authorization submitted pursuant to paragraph

(I), the criterion set forth in subsection a. shall not be applied as an

export criterion with respect to exports of materials, facilities and

technology specified in subsection a. to that state: Provided, That the

first license or authorization with respect to that state which is issued

pursuant to this paragraph after twelve months from the elapse of the

sixty-day period specified in paragraph (1), and the first such license

or authorization which is issued after each twelve-month period

thereafter, shall be submitted to the Congress for review pursuant to

the procedures specified in paragraph (1): Provided further, That if

the Congress adopts a resolution of disapproval during any review

period provided for this paragraph, the provisions of paragraph (2)

shall apply with respect to further exports to such state.

Sec. 307. Conduct Resulting In Termination Of Nuclear Exports

Chapter I I of the 1954 Act, as amended by sections 304, 305, and

306, is further amended by adding at the end thereof:

Sec. 129. Conduct Resulting In Termination Of Nuclear ExportsNo nuclear materials and equipment or sensitive nuclear technology

shall be export to-

(I) any non-nuclear-weapon state that is found by the President to

have, at any time after the effective date of this section,

(A) detonated a nuclear explosive device; or

(B) terminated or abrogated IAEA safeguards; or

(C) materially violated an IAEA safeguards agreement; or

(D) engaged in activities involving source or special nuclear

material and having direct significance for the manufacture or

acquisition of nuclear explosive devices, and has failed to take

steps which, in the President's judgment, represent sufficient

progress toward terminating such activities; or
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-242) 1047

(2) any nation or group of nations that is found by the President to

have, at any time after the effective date of this section,

(A) materially violated an agreement for cooperation with the

United States, or, with respect to material or equipment not

supplied under an agreement for cooperation, materially violated

the terms under which such material or equipment was supplied or

the terms of any commitments obtained with respect thereto

pursuant to section 402(a) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of

1978; or

(B) assisted, encouraged, or inducted any non-nuclearweapon state to engage in activities involving source or special

nuclear material and having direct significance for the

manufacture or acquisition of nuclear explosive devices, and has

failed to take steps which, in the President's judgment, represent

sufficient progress toward terminating such assistance,

encouragement, or inducement; or

(C) entered into an agreement after the date of enactment of

this section for the transfer of reprocessing equipment, materials,

or technology to the sovereign control of a non-nuclear-weapon

state except in connection with an international fuel cycle

evaluation in which the United States is a participant or pursuant

to a subsequent international agreement or understanding to which

the United States subscribes; unless the President determines that

cessation of such exports would be seriously prejudicial to the

achievement of United States non-proliferation objectives or

otherwise jeopardize the common defense and security: Provided,

That prior to the effective date of any such determination, the

President's determination, together with a report containing the

reasons for his determination, shall be submitted to the Congress

and referred to the Committee on International Relations of the

House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign

Relations of the Senate for a period of sixty days of continuous

session (as defined in subsection 130g. of this Act), but any such

determination shall not become effective if during such sixty-day

period the Congress adopts a concurrent resolution stating in

substance that it does not favor the determination. Any such

determination shall be considered pursuant to the procedures set

forth in section 130 of this Act for the consideration of

Presidential submissions.

Sec. 308. Congressional Review Procedures

Chapter I I of the 1954 Act, as amended by sections 304, 305, 306,

and 307, is further amended by adding at the end thereof the following:

Sec. 130. CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW PROCEDURESa. Not later than forty-five days of continuous session of Congress

after the date of transmittal to the Congress of any submission of the

President required by subsection 123d., 126a.(2), 126b.(2), 128b., 129,

131a.(3), or 131f.(1)(A) of this Act, the Committee on Foreign Relations

of the Senate and the Committee on International Relations of the House

of Representatives and in addition, in the case of a proposed agreement

for cooperation arranged pursuant to subsection 91c., 144b., or 144c., the

Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the

Committee on Armed Services of the Senate, shall each submit a report

to its respective House on its views and recommendations respecting

such Presidential submission together with a resolution, as defined in

subsection f., stating in substance that the Congress approves or

Report to

Congress.

42 USC 2159.

Congressional

committee

reports.

42 USC 2121.

42 1.ISC 2164.
1048 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-242)

disapproves such submission, as the case may be: Provided, That if any

such committee has not reported such a resolution at the end of such

forty-five day period, such committee shall be deemed to be discharged

from further consideration of such submission and if, in the case of a

proposed agreement for cooperation arranged pursuant to subsection

91c., 144b., or 144c. of this Act, the other relevant committee of that

House has reported such a resolution, such committee shall be deemed

discharged from further consideration of that resolution. If no such

resolution has been reported at the end of such period, the first resolution,

as defined in subsection f., which is introduced within five days

thereafter within such House shall be placed on the appropriate calendar

of such House.

b. When the relevant committee or committees have reported such a

resolution (or have been discharged from further consideration of such a

resolution pursuant to subsection a.) or when a resolution has been

introduced and placed on the appropriate calendar pursuant to subsection

a., as the case may be it is at any time thereafter in order (even though a

previous motion to the same effect has been disagreed to) for any

Member of the respective House to move to proceed to the consideration

of the resolution. The motion is highly privileged and is not debatable.

The motion shall not be subject to amendment, or to a motion to

postpone, or to a motion to proceed to the consideration of other

business. A motion to reconsider the vote by which the motion of other

business. A motion to reconsider the vote by which the motion is agreed

to or disagreed to shall not be in order. If a motion to proceed to the

consideration of the resolution is agreed to, the resolution shall remain

the unfinished business of the respective House until disposed of.

c. Debate on the resolution, and on all debatable motions and appeals

in connection therewith, shall be limited to not more than ten hours,

which shall be divided equally between individuals favoring and

individuals opposing the resolution. A motion further to limit debate is

in order and not debatable. An amendment to a motion to postpone, or a

motion to recommit the resolution, or a motion to proceed to the

consideration of other business is not in order. A motion to reconsider

the vote by which the resolution is agreed to or disagreed to shall not be

in order. No amendment to any concurrent resolution pursuant to the

procedures of this section is in order except as provided in subsection d.

d. Immediately following (1) the conclusion of the debate on such

concurrent resolution, (2) a single quorum call at the conclusion of

debate if requested in accordance with the rules of the appropriate House,

and (3) the consideration of an amendment introduced by the Majority

Leader or his designee to insert the phrase, "does not" in lieu of the word

"does" if the resolution under consideration is a current resolution of

approval, the vote on final approval of the resolution shall occur.

e. Appeals from the decisions of the Chair relating to the application

of the rules of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case

may be, to the procedure relating to such a resolution shall be decided

without debate.

Resolution. f. For the purposes of subsections a. through e. of this section, the

term "resolution" means a concurrent resolution of the Congress, the

matter after the resolving clause of which is as follows: That the

Congress (does or does not) favor the ' transmitted to the Congress

by the President on, the blank spaces therein to be

appropriately filled, and the affirmative or negative phrase within the

parenthetical to be appropriately selected.
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-242) 1049

Continuous g. For the purposes of this sectionsession of (1) continuity of session is broken only by an adjournment of

Congress, Congress sine die; and

computation. (2) the days on which either House is not in session because of an

adjournment of more than three days to a day certain are excluded in

the computation of any period of time in which Congress is in

continuous session.

h. This section is enacted by Congress-

(1) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the Senate and the

House of Representatives, respectively, and as such they are deemed

part of the rules of each House, respectively, but applicable only with

respect to the procedure to be followed in that House in case of

resolutions described by subsection f. of this section; and they

supersede other rules only to the extent that they are inconsistent

therewith; and

(2) with full recognition of the constitutional right of either House

to change the rules (so far as relating to the procedures of that House)

at any time, in the same manner and to the same extent as in the case

of any other rule of that House.

Sec. 309. Component And Other Parts Of Facilities

42 USC 2139. (a) Section 109 of the 1954 Act is amended to read as follows:

Sec. 109. Component And Other Parts Of Facilitiesa. With respect to those utilization and production facilities which

Domestic are so determined by the Commission pursuant to subsection II v.(2) or

activities I lcc.(2) the Commission may issue general licenses for domestic

licenses. issuance activities required to be licensed under section 101, if the Commission

authorization, determines in writing that such general licensing will not constitute an

42 USC 2139. unreasonable risk to the common defense and security.

Export licenses. b. After consulting with the Secretaries of State, Energy, and

Commerce, the Commission is authorized and directed to determine

which component parts as defined in subsection I lv.(2) or I lcc.(2) and

which other items or substances are especially relevant from the

standpoint of export control because of their significance for nuclear

explosive purposes. Except as provided in section 126 b.(2), no such

component, substance, or item which is so determined by the

Commission shall be exported unless the Commission issues a general or

specific license for its export after finding, based on a reasonable

judgment of the assurances provided and other information available to

the Federal Government, including the Commission, that the following

criteria or their equivalent are met: (1) IAEA safeguards as required by

Article 111(2) of the Treaty will be applied with respect to such

component, substance, or item; (2) no such component, substance, or

item will be used for any nuclear explosive device or for research on or

development of any nuclear explosive device; and (3) no such

component, substance, or item will be retransferred to the.jurisdiction of

any other nation or group of nations unless the prior consent of the

United States is obtained for such retransfer; and after determining in

writing that the issuance of each such general or specific license or

category of licenses will not be inimical to the common defense and

security: Provided, That a specific license shall not be required for an

export pursuant to this section if the component, item or substance is

covered by a facility license issued pursuant to section 126 of this Act. 5

5

P.L. 105-277, Div. G, Title XII, Ch. 3, § 1225(d)(2), 112 Stat. 2681-774.
42 USC 2139a.

Regulations.

42 L.SC2139a.

Export control

procedures,

Presidential

publications.

42 USC 2139

note.

Savings

provisions.

1050 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-242)

c. The Commission shall not issue an export license under the

authority of subsection b. if it is advised by the executive branch, in

accordance with the procedures established under subsection 126a., that

the export would be inimical to the common defense and security of the

United States.

(b) The Commission, not later than one hundred and twenty days

after the date of the enactment of this Act, shall publish regulations to

implement the provisions of subsections b. and c. of section 109 of the

1954 Act. Among other things, these regulations shall provide for the

prior consultation by the Commission with the Department of State, the

Department of Energy, the Department of Defense, the Department of

Commerce, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

(c) The President, within not more than one hundred and twenty days

after the date of enactment of the Act, shall publish procedures regarding

the control by the Department of Commerce over all export items, other

than those licensed by the Commission, which could be, if used for

purposes other than those for which the export is intended, of

significance for nuclear explosive purposes. Among other things, these

procedures shall provide for prior consultations, as required, by the

Department of Commerce with the Department of State, the Arms

Control and Disarmament Agency, the Commission, the Department of

Energy, and the Department of Defense.

(d) The amendments to section 109 of the 1954 Act made by this

section shall not affect the approval of exports contracted for prior to

November I, 1977, which are made within one year of the date of

enactment of such amendments.

Title IV-Negotiation Of Further Export Controls

See. 401. Cooperation With Other Nations

42 USC 2153. Section 123 of the 1954 Act is amended to read as follows:

Sec. 123. Cooperation With Other Nations42 USC 2073. No cooperation with any nation, group of nations or regional defense

2074, 2177, organizations pursuant to section 53, 54a., 57, 64, 82, 91, 103, 104, or

2094,2112, 144 shall be undertaken until-"a. the proposed agreement for cooperation

2121, 2133. has been submitted to the President, which proposed agreement shall

2134 2164. include the terms, conditions, duration, nature, and scope of the

Cooperative cooperation; and shall include the following requirements:

agreements, (1) a guaranty by the cooperating party that safeguards as set forth

submittal to in the agreement for cooperation will be maintained with respect to

President. all nuclear materials and equipment transferred pursuant thereto, and

Contents. with respect to all special nuclear material used in or produced through the use of such nuclear materials and equipment, so long as

the material or equipment remains under the jurisdiction or control of

the cooperating party, irrespective of the duration of other provisions

in the agreement or whether the agreement is terminated or suspended

for any reason;

(2) in the case of non-nuclear-weapon states, a requirement, as a

condition of continued United States nuclear supply under the

agreement for cooperation, that IAEA safeguards be maintained with

respect to all nuclear materials in all peaceful nuclear activities within

the territory of such state, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under

its control anywhere;

(3) except in the case of those agreements for cooperation

arranged pursuant to subsection 91c., a guaranty by the cooperating
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-242) 1051

42 USC 2121.

42 USC 2164.

party that no nuclear materials and equipment or sensitive nuclear

technology to be transferred pursuant to such agreement, and no

special nuclear material produced through the use of any nuclear

materials and equipment or sensitive nuclear technology transferred

pursuant to such agreement, will be used for any nuclear explosive

device, or for research on or development of any nuclear explosive

device, or for any other military purpose;

(4) except in the case of those agreements for cooperation

arranged pursuant to subsection 91 c. and agreements for cooperation

with nuclear-weapon states, a stipulation that the United States shall

have the right to require the return of any nuclear materials and

equipment transferred pursuant thereto and any special nuclear

material produced through the use thereof if the cooperating party

detonates a nuclear explosive device or terminates or abrogates an

agreement providing for IAEA safeguards;

(5) a guaranty by the cooperating party that any material or any

Restricted Data transferred pursuant to the agreement for cooperation

and, except in the case of agreements arranged pursuant to subsection

91 c., 144b., or 144c any production or utilization facility

transferred pursuant to the agreement for cooperation or any special

nuclear material produced through the use of any such facility or

through the use of any material transferred pursuant to the agreement,

will not be transferred to unauthorized persons or beyond the

jurisdiction or control of the cooperating party without the consent of

the United States;

(6) guaranty by the cooperating party that adequate physical

security will be maintained with respect to any nuclear material

transferred pursuant to such agreement and with respect to any

special nuclear material used in or produced through the use of any

material, production facility, or utilization facility transferred

pursuant to such agreement;

(7) except in the case of agreements for cooperation arranged

pursuant to subsection 91c., 144b., or 144c., a guaranty by the

cooperating party that no material transferred pursuant to the

agreement for cooperation and no material used in or produced

through the use of any material, production facility, or utilization

facility transferred pursuant to the agreement for cooperation will be

reprocessed, enriched or (in the case of plutonium, uranium 233, or

uranium enriched to greater than twenty percent in the isotope 235, or

other nuclear materials which have been irradiated) otherwise altered

in form or content without the prior approval of the United States;

(8) except in the case of agreements for cooperation arranged

pursuant to subsection 91c., 144b., or 144c., a guaranty by the

cooperating party that no plutonium, no uranium 233, and no uranium

enriched to greater than twenty percent in the isotope 235, transferred

pursuant to the agreement for cooperation, or recovered from any

source or special nuclear material so transferred or from any source or

special nuclear material used in any production facility or utilization

facility transferred pursuant to the agreement for cooperation, will be

stored in any facility that has not been approved in advance by the

United States; and

(9) except in the case of agreements for cooperation arranged

pursuant to subsection 91c., 144b., or 144c., a guaranty by the

cooperating party that any special nuclear material, production

facility, or utilization facility produced or constructed under the
42 USC 2121.

42 USC 2164.

Agreement

requirements.

Presidential

exemptions.

Nuclear

Prolifieration

Assessment

Statement.

Proposed

cooperation

agreements,

submitted to

President.

Submittal to

congressional

committees.

1052 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-242)

jurisdiction of the cooperating party by or through the use of any

sensitive nuclear technology transferred pursuant to such agreement

for cooperation will be subject to all the requirements specified in this

subsection.

The President may exempt a proposed agreement for cooperation.

(except an agreement arranged pursuant to subsection 9 1c., 144b., 144c

or 144d.) from any of the requirements of the foregoing sentence if he

determines that inclusion of any such requirement would be seriously

prejudicial to the achievement of United States non-proliferation

objectives or otherwise jeopardize the common defense and security.

Except in the case of those agreements for cooperation arranged pursuant

to subsection 91c., 144b., 144c., or 144d., any proposed agreement for

cooperation shall be negotiated by the Secretary of State, with the

technical assistance and concurrence of the Secretary of Energy; and

after consultation with the Commission shall be submitted to the

President jointly by the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Energy

accompanied by the views and recommendations of the Secretary of

State, the Secretary of Energy, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

The Secretary of State shall also provide to the President an unclassified

Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement (A) which shall analyze the

consistency of the text of proposed agreement for cooperation with all the

requirements of this Act with specific attention to whether the proposed

agreement is consistent with each of the criteria set forth in this

subsection, and (B) regarding the adequacy of the safeguards and other

control mechanisms and the peaceful use assurances contained in the

agreement for cooperation to ensure that any assistance furnished

thereunder will not be used to further any military or nuclear explosive

purpose. Each Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement prepared

pursuant to this Act shall be accompanied by a classified annex, prepared

in consultation with the Director of Central Intelligence, summarizing

relevant classified information. In the case of those agreements for

cooperation arranged pursuant to subsection 91c., 144b., 144c., or 144d.,

any proposed agreement for cooperation shall be submitted to the

President by the Secretary of Energy or, in the case of those agreements

for cooperation arranged pursuant to subsection 91c., 144b., or 144d.,

which are to be implemented by the Department of Defense, by the

Secretary of Defense;

b. the President has approved and authorized the execution of the

proposed agreement for cooperation and has made a determination in

writing that the performance of the proposed agreement will promote,

and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to, the common defense and

security;

c. the proposed agreement for cooperation (if not an agreement

subject to subsection d.), together with the approval and determination of

the President, has been submitted to the Committee on International

Relations of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign

Relations of the Senate for a period of thirty days of continuous session

(as defined in subsection 130g.): Provided, however, That these

committees, after having received such agreement for cooperation, may

by resolution in writing waive the conditions of all or any portion of such

thirty-day period; and
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-242) 1053

42 USC 2073.

2074, 2133.

2073. 2074,

21331 2134.

42 USC 2121.

42 tJSC 2164.

Agency views

to

congressional

committees.

d. the proposed agreement for cooperation (if arranged pursuant to

subsection 91c., 144b., 144c., or 144d., or if entailing implementation of

section 53, 54a., 103, or 104 in relation to a reactor that may be capable

of producing more than five thermal megawatts or special nuclear

material for use in connection therewith) has been submitted to the

Congress, together with the approval and determination of the President,

for a period of sixty days of continuous session (as defined in subsection

130g. of this Act) and referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of

the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of

the Senate, and in addition, in the case of a proposed agreement for

cooperation arranged pursuant to subsection 91c., 144b., 144c., or 144d.,

the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives and

the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate, but such proposed

agreement for cooperation shall not become effective if during such

sixty-day period the Congress adopts, and there is enacted, a joint

resolution stating in substance that the Congress does not favor the

proposed agreement for cooperation: Provided, That the sixty-day period

shall not begin until a Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement

prepared by the Secretary of State, and any annexes thereto, when

required by subsection 123a., has been submitted to the Congress:

Providedffurther, That an agreement for cooperation exempted by the

President pursuant to subsection a. from any requirement contained in

that subsection shall not become effective unless the Congress adopts,

and there is enacted, a joint resolution stating that the Congress does

favor such agreement. During the sixty-day period the Committee on

Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on

Foreign Relations of the Senate shall each hold hearings on the proposed

agreement for cooperation and submit a report to their respective bodies

recommending whether it should be approved or disapproved. Any such

proposed agreement for cooperation shall be considered pursuant to the

procedures set forth in section I30i. of this Act.

Following submission of a proposed agreement for cooperation

(except an agreement for cooperation arranged pursuant to subsection

9 1c., 144b., or 144c.) to the Committee on International Relations of the

House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the

Senate, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Department of State,

the Department of Energy, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,

and the Department of Defense shall, upon the request of either of those

committees, promptly furnish to those committees their views as to

whether the safeguards and other controls contained therein provide an

adequate framework to ensure that any exports as contemplated by such

agreement will not be inimical to or constitute an unreasonable risk to the

common defense and security.

If, after the date of enactment of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of

1978, the Congress fails to disapprove a proposed agreement for

cooperation which exempts the recipient nation from the requirement set

forth in subsection 123a.(2), such failure to act shall constitute a failure

to adopt a resolution of disapproval pursuant to subsection 128b.(3) for

purposes of the Commission's consideration of applications and requests

under section 126a.(2) and there shall be no congressional review

pursuant to section 128 of any subsequent license or authorization with

respect to that state until the first such license or authorization which is

issued after twelve months from the elapse of the sixty-day period in

which the agreement for cooperation in question is reviewed by the

Congress.
42 USC 2153a.

Nuclear

material

enrichment,

approval.

42 USC 2121.

42 USC 2164.

Enrichment

facilitV

components.

export

prohibition.

Major critical

component.

42 LISC 2153b.

Export policies.

1054 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-242)

Sec. 402. Additional Requirements

(a) Except as specifically provided in any agreement for cooperation,

no source or special nuclear material hereafter exported from the United

States may be enriched after export without the prior approval of the

United States for such enrichment: Provided, That the procedures

governing such approvals shall be identical to those set forth for the

approval of proposed subsequent arrangements under section 13 1 of the

1954 Act, and any commitments from the recipient which the Secretary

of Energy and the Secretary of State deem necessary to ensure that such

approval will be obtained prior to such enrichment shall be obtained prior

to the submission of the executive branch judgment regarding the export

in question and shall be set forth in such submission: And provided

.further, That no source or special nuclear material shall be exported for

the purpose of enrichment or reactor fueling to any nation or group of

nations which has, after the date of enactment of this Act, entered into a

new or amended agreement for cooperation with the United States,

except pursuant to such agreement.

(b) In addition to other requirements of law, no major critical

component of any uranium enrichment, nuclear fuel reprocessing, or

heavy water production facility shall be exported under any agreement

for cooperation (exempt an agreement for cooperation pursuant to

subsection 9 1c., 144b., 144c. of the 1954 Act) unless such agreement for

cooperation specifically designates such components as items to be

exported pursuant to the agreement for cooperation. For purposes of this

subsection, the term "major critical component" means any component

part or group of component parts which the President determines to be

essential to the operation of a complete uranium enrichment, nuclear fuel

reprocessing, or heavy water production facility.

Sec. 403. Peaceful Nuclear Activities

The President shall take immediate and vigorous steps to seek

agreement from all nations and groups of nations to commit themselves

to adhere to the following export policies with respect to their peaceful

nuclear activities and their participation in international nuclear trade:

(a) No nuclear materials and equipment and no sensitive nuclear

technology within the territory of any nation or group of nations, under

its jurisdiction, or under its control anywhere will be transferred to the

jurisdiction of any other nation or group of nations unless the nation or

group of nations receiving such transfer commits itself to strict

undertakings including, but not limited to, provisions sufficient to ensure

that-

(I) no nuclear materials and equipment and no nuclear technology

in, under the jurisdiction of, or under the control of any non-nuclearweapon state, shall be used for nuclear explosive devices for any

purpose or for research on or development of nuclear explosive

devices for any purpose, except as permitted by Article V, the Treaty;

(2) IAEA safeguards will be applied to all peaceful nuclear

activities in, under the jurisdiction of, or under control of any nonnuclear-weapon state;

(3) adequate physical security measures will be established and

maintained by any nation or group of nations on all of its nuclearactivities;

(4) no nuclear materials and equipment and no nuclear technology

intended for peaceful purposes in, under the jurisdiction of, or under

the control of any nation or group of nations shall be transferred to

the jurisdiction of any other nation or group of nations which does not
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-242) 1055

42 USC 2104.

Enriched

nuclear

material and

sources.

prohibition.

Proposed

international

agreements.

Enriched

nuclear

material, shorttern1 storage.

International

inspection.

42 LUSC 2153c.

agree to stringent undertakings meeting the objectives of this section;

and

(5) no nation or group of nations will assist, encourage, or induce

any non-nuclear-weapon state to manufacture or otherwise acquire

any nuclear explosive device.

(b)(1) No source or special nuclear material within the territory of

any nation or group of nations, under its jurisdiction, or under its control

anywhere will be enriched (as described in paragraph AA.(2) of section

II of the 1954 Act) or reprocessed, no irradiated fuel elements

containing such material which are to be removed from a reactor will be

altered in form or content, and no fabrication or stockpiling involving

plutonium, uranium 233, or uranium enriched to greater than 20 percent

in the isotope 235 shall be performed except in a facility under effective

international auspices and inspection, and any such irradiated fuel

elements shall be transferred to such a facility as soon as practicable after

removal from a reactor consistent with safety requirements. Such

facilities shall be limited in number to the greatest extent feasible and

shall be carefully sited and managed so as to minimize the proliferation

and environmental risks associated with such facilities. In addition, there

shall be conditions to limit the access of non-nuclear-weapon states other

than the host country to sensitive nuclear technology associated with

such facilities.

(2) Any facilities within the territory of any nation or group of

nations, under its jurisdiction, or under its control anywhere for the

necessary short-term storage of fuel elements containing plutonium,

uranium 233, or uranium enriched to greater than 20 percent in the

isotope 235 prior to placement in a reactor or of irradiated fuel

elements prior to transfer as required in subparagraph (I) shall be

placed under effective international auspices and inspection.

(c) Adequate physical security measures will be established and

maintained with respect to all nuclear activities within the territory of

each nation and group of nations, under its jurisdiction, or under its

control anywhere, and with respect to any international shipment of

significant quantities of source or special nuclear material or irradiated

source or special nuclear material, which shall also be conducted under

international safeguards.

(d) Nothing in this section shall be interpreted to require international

control or supervision of any United States military activities.

See. 404. Renegotiation Of Agreements For Cooperation

(a) The President shall initiate a program immediately to renegotiate

agreements for cooperation in effect on the date of enactment of this Act,

or otherwise to obtain the agreement of parties to such agreements for

cooperation to the undertakings that would be required for new

agreement under the 1954 Act. To the extent that an agreement for

cooperation in effect on the date of enactment of this Act with a

cooperating party contains provisions equivalent to any or all of the

criteria set forth in section 127 of the 1954 Act with respect to materials

and equipment transferred pursuant thereto or with respect to any special

nuclear material used in or produced through the use of any such material

or equipment, any renegotiated agreement with that cooperating party shall continue to contain an equivalent provision with respect to such

transferred materials and equipment and such special nuclear material.

To the extent that an agreement for cooperation in effect on the date of

enactment of this Act with a cooperating party does not contain

provisions with respect to any nuclear materials and equipment which
1056 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-242)

Export

agreerent

conditions and

policy, goals,

Presidential

review.

IPresidential

export criteria

proposals,

submittal to

Congress.

42 USC 2153d.

Savings

provision.

42 USC 2160a.

have previously been transferred under an agreement for cooperation

with the United States and which are under the jurisdiction or control of

the cooperating party and with respect to any special nuclear material

which is used in or produced through the use thereof and which is under

the jurisdiction or control of the cooperating party, which are equivalent

to any or all of those required for new and amended agreements for

cooperation under section 123a. of the 1954 Act, the President shall

vigorously seek to obtain the application of such provisions with respect

to such nuclear materials and equipment and such special nuclear

material. Nothing in this Act or in the 1954 Act shall be deemed to

relinquish any rights which the United States may have under any

agreement for cooperation in force on the date of enactment of this Act.

(b) The President shall annually review each of requirements (1)

through (9) set forth for inclusion in agreements for cooperation under

section 123a. of the 1954 Act and the export policy goals set forth in

section 401 to determine whether it is in the interest of United States

non-proliferation objectives for any such requirements or export policies

which are not already being applied as export criteria to be enacted as

additional export criteria.

(c) If Presidential export criteria proposals, submittal to Congress.

the President proposes enactment of any such requirements or export

policies as additional export criteria or to take any other action with

respect to such requirements or export policy goals for the purpose of

encouraging adherence by nations and groups of nations to such

requirements and policies, he shall submit such a proposal together with

an explanation thereof to the Congress.

(d) If the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate or the

Committee on Foreign Affairs6 of the House of Representatives, after

reviewing the President's annual report or any proposed legislation,

determines that it is in the interest of United States non-proliferation

objectives to take any action with respect to such requirements or export

policy goals, it shall report a joint resolution to implement such

determination. Any .joint resolution so reported shall be considered in the

Senate and the House of Representatives, respectively, under applicable

procedures provided for the consideration of resolutions pursuant to

subsection 130b. through g. of the 1954 Act.

Sec. 405. Authority To Continue Agreements

(a) The amendments to section 123 of the 1954 Act made by this Act

shall not affect the authority to continue cooperation pursuant to

agreements for cooperation entered into prior to the date of enactment of

this Act.

(b) Nothing in this Act shall affect the authority to include dispute

settlement provisions, including arbitration, in any agreement made

pursuant to an Agreement of Cooperation.

See. 406. Review

No court or regulatory body shall have any jurisdiction under any law

to compel the performance of or to review the adequacy of the

performance of any Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement, or any

annexes thereto, called for in this Act or in the 1954 Act.7

6

P.L. 103.437, 108 Stat. 4581, substituted "Foreign Affairs" for "International Relations."

'P.L. 105-277, Div. G, § 1225(e)(5), inserted ", or any annexes thereto."
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-242) 1057

42 USC 2153e.

22 USC 3261.

Nuclear, and

non-nuclear

energy,

resource

development.

22 USC 3262.

Developing

countries,

energy

development

programs.

Assessment

and cooperative

projects.

Experts.

exchange.

Appropriation

authorization.

Sec. 407. Protection Of The Environment

The president shall endeavor to provide in any agreement entered into

pursuant to section 123 of the 1954 Act for cooperation between the

parties in protecting the international environment from radioactive,

chemical or thermal contamination arising from peaceful nuclear

activities.

Title V-United States Assistance To Developing Countries

Sec. 501. Policy: Report

The United States shall endeavor to cooperate with other nations,

international institutions, and private organizations in establishing

programs to assist in the development of non-nuclear energy resources, to

cooperate with both developing and industrialized nations in protecting

the international environment from contamination arising from both

nuclear and non-nuclear energy activities, and shall seek to cooperate

with and aid developing countries in meeting their energy needs through

the development of such resources and the application of non-nuclear

technologies consistent with the economic factors, the material resources

of those countries, and environmental protection. The United States shall

additionally seek to encourage other industrialized nations and groups of

nations to make commitments for similar cooperation and aid to

developing countries. The President shall report annually to Congress on

the level of other nations' and groups of nations' commitments under

such program and the relation of any such commitments to United States

efforts under this Title. In cooperating with and providing such assistance

to developing countries, the United States shall give priority to parties to

the Treaty.

Sec. 502. Programs

(a) The United States shall initiate a program, consistent with the

aims of section 501, to cooperate with developing countries for the

purpose of-

(I) meeting the energy needs required for the development of

such countries;

(2) reducing the dependence of such countries on petroleum fuels,

with emphasis given to utilizing solar and other renewable energy

resources; and

(3) expanding the energy alternatives available to such countries.

(b) Such program shall include cooperation in evaluating the energy

alternatives of developing countries, facilitating international trade in

energy commodities, developing energy resources, and applying suitable

energy technologies. The program shall include both general and

country-specific energy assessments and cooperative projects in resource

exploration and production, training, research and development.

(c) As an integral part of such program, the Department of Energy,

under the general policy guidance of the Department of State and in

cooperation with the Agency for International Development and other

Federal agencies as appropriate, shall initiate, as soon as practicable, a

program for the exchange of United States scientists, technicians, and

energy experts with those of developing countries to implement the

purposes of this section.

(d) For the purposes of carrying out this section, there is authorized to

be appropriated such sums as are contained in annual authorization Acts

for the Department of Energy, including such sums which have been

authorized for such purposes under previous legislation.
22 USC 2151a.

22 USC 2151d.

22 USC 2151q.

22 USC 3262

note.

Presidential

report to

Congress.

22 USC 328 1.

Govern mental

nuclear nonproliferation

activities.

1058 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-242)

(e) Under the direction of the President, the Secretary of State shall

ensure the coordination of the activities authorized by this Title with

other related activities of the United States conducted abroad, including

the programs authorized by sections 103(c), 106(a)(2), and 119 of the

Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.

See. 503. Report

Not later than twelve months after the date of enactment of this Act,

the President shall report to the Congress on the feasibility of expanding

the cooperative activities established pursuant to section 502(c) into an

international cooperative effort to include a scientific peace corps

designed to encourage large numbers of technically trained volunteers to

live and work in developing countries for varying periods of time for the

purpose of engaging in projects to aid in meeting the energy needs of

such countries through the search for and utilization of indigenous energy

resources and the application of suitable technology, including the

widespread utilization of renewable and unconventional energy

technologies. Such report shall also include a discussion of other

mechanisms to conduct a coordinated international effort to develop,

demonstrate, and encourage the utilization of such technologies in

developing countries.

Title VI-Executive Reporting

Sec. 601. Reports Of The President

(a) The President shall review all activities of Government

departments and agencies relating to preventing proliferation and shall

make a report to Congress in January of 1979 and annually in January of

each year thereafter on the Government's efforts to prevent proliferation.

This report shall include but not be limited to-

(1) a description of the progress made toward-

(A) negotiating the initiatives contemplated in sections 104

and 105 of this Act;

(B) negotiating the international arrangements or other mutual

undertakings contemplated in section 403 of this Act;

(C) encouraging non-nuclear-weapons states that are not party

to the Treaty to adhere to the Treaty or, pending such adherence,

to enter into comparable agreements with respect to safeguards

and to forswear the development of any nuclear explosive

devices, and discouraging nuclear exports to non-nuclear-weapon

states which have not taken such steps;

(D) strengthening the safeguards of the IAEA as contemplated

in section 201 of this Act; and

(E) renegotiating agreements for cooperation as contemplated

in section 404(a) of this Act;

(2) an assessment of the impact of the progress, described in

paragraph (I) on the non-proliferation policy of the United States; an

explanation of the precise reasons why progress has not been made on

any particular point and recommendations with respect to appropriate

measures to encourage progress; and a statement of what legislative

modifications, if any, are necessary in his judgment to achieve the

non-proliferation policy of the United States;

(3) a determination as to which non-nuclear-weapon states with

which the United States has an agreement for cooperation in effect or

under negotiation, if any, have-

(A) detonated a nuclear device; or
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-242) 1059

(B) refused to accept the safeguards of the IAEA on all of

their peaceful nuclear activities; or

(C) refused to give specific assurances that they will not

manufacture or otherwise acquire any nuclear explosive device; or

(D) engaged in activities involving source or special nuclear

material and having direct significance for the manufacture or

acquisition of nuclear explosive devices;

(4) an assessment of whether any of the policies set forth in this

Act have, on balance, been counterproductive from the standpoint of

preventing proliferation;

(5) a description of the progress made toward establishing

procedures to facilitate the timely processing of requests for

subsequent arrangements and export licenses in order to enhance the

reliability of the Unites States in meeting its commitments to supply

nuclear reactors and fuel to nations which adhere to effective nonproliferation policies;

(6) a description of the implementation of nuclear and nuclearrelated dual-use export controls in the preceding calendar year,

including a summary by type of commodity and destination of-

(A) all transactions for which-

(i) an export license was issued for any good controlled

under section 309(c) of this Act;

(ii) an export license was issued under section 109b. of the

1954 Act;

(iii) approvals were issued under the Export

Administration Act of 1979, or section 109b.(3) of the 1954

Act, for the retransfer of any item, technical data, component,

or substance; or (iv) authorizations were made as required by section

57b.(2) of the 1954 Act to engage, directly or indirectly, in the

production of special nuclear material;

(B) each instance in which-

(i) a sanction has been imposed under section 821(a) or

section 824 of the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of

1994 or section 102(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act;

(ii) sales or leases have been denied under section 3(f) of

the Arms Export Control Act or transactions prohibited by

reason of acts relating to proliferation of nuclear explosive

devices as described in section 40(d) of that Act;

(iii) a sanction has not been imposed by reason of section

821(c)(2) of the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994

or the imposition of a sanction has been delayed under section

102(b)(4) of the Arms Export Control Act; or

(iv) a waiver of a sanction has been made under-

(1) section 821(f) or section 824 of the Nuclear

Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994,

(11) section 620E(d) of the Foreign Assistance Act of

1961, or paragraph (5) or (6)(B) of section 102(b) of the

Arms Export Control Act,

(1ll) section 40(g) of the Arms Export Control Act with

respect to the last sentence of section 40(d) of that Act, or

(IV) section 614 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961

with respect to section 620E of that Act or section 3(f), the

last sentence of section 40(d), or 102(b)(l) of the Arms

Export Control Act; and
Current civil

agreements,

analysis.

22 USC 3282.

Governmental

nuclear nonproliferation

activities.

Reports to

Congress.

1060 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-242)

(C) the progress of those independent states of the former

Soviet Union that are non-nuclear-weapon states and of the Baltic

states towards achieving the objective of applying full scope

safeguards to all their peaceful nuclear activities. Portions of the

information required by paragraph (6) may be submitted in

classified form, as necessary. Any such information that may not

be published or disclosed under section 12(c)(1) of the Export

Administration Act of 1979 shall be submitted as confidential.

(b) In the first report required by this section, the President shall

analyze each civil agreement for cooperation negotiated pursuant to

section 123 of the 1954 Act, and shall discuss the scope and adequacy of

the requirements and obligations relating to safeguards and other control

therein,

Sec. 602. Additional Reports

(a) Reports by Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Department of

Energy. The annual reports to the Congress by the Commission and the

Department of Energy which are otherwise required by law shall also

include views and recommendations regarding the policies and actions of

the United States to prevent proliferation which are the statutory

responsibility of those agencies. The Department's report shall include a

detailed analysis of the proliferation implications of advanced enrichment

and reprocessing techniques, advanced reactors, and alternative nuclear

fuel cycles. This part of the report shall include a comprehensive version

which incltudes any relevant classified information and a summary

unclassified version.

(b) Additional reporting requirements. The reporting requirements of this

title are in addition to and not in lieu of any other reporting requirements

under applicable law.

(c) Congressional notification of nonproliferation activities.

(1) The Department of State, the Department of Defense, the

Department of Commerce, the Department of Energy, the Commission,

and, with regard to subparagraph (B), the Director of Central

Intelligence, shall keep the Committees on Foreign Relations and

Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on International

Relations of the House of Representatives fully and currently informed

with respect to--

(A) their activities to carry out the purposes and policies of this Act

and to otherwise prevent proliferation, including the proliferation of

nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, or their means of delivery; and

(B) the current activities of foreign nations which are of significance

friom the prolifcration standpoint.

(2) For the purposes of this subsection with respect to paragraph (I)(B),

the phrase "fully and currently informed" means the transmittal of

credible information not later than 60 days after becoming aware of the

activity concerned.

(d) Classified portions of reports. Any classified portions of the reports

required by this Act shall be submitted to the Senate Foreign Relations

Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

(e) [Omitted]

(f) Access by Secretary of Defense to information regarding nuclear

proliferation matters; applicability.

(I) The Secretary of Defense shall have access, omi atimely basis, to all

information regarding nuclear proliferation matters which the Secretary

'P.L. 103-236, 108 Stat. 507-511 (1994), added § 6.
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-242) 1061

42 USC 2153f.

42 USC 21531'

42 USC 2121.

42 USC 2164.

22 USC 3201

note.

Effective date.

of State or the Secretary of Energy has or is entitled to have. Such access

shall include access to all communications, materials, documents, and

records relating to nuclear proliferation matters.

(2) This subsection does not apply to any intradepartnmental document

of the Department of State or the Department of Energy. or any portion

of such document, that is solely concerned with internal, confidential

advice on policy concerning the conduct of interagency deliberations on

nuclear proliferation matters. 9

See. 603. Savings Clause

(a) All orders, determinations, rules, regulations, permits, contracts,

agreements, certificates, licenses, and privileges-

(]) which have been issued, made, granted, or allowed to become

effective in the exercise of functions which are the subject of this Act,

by (i) any agency or officer, or part thereof, in exercising the

functions which are affected by this Act, or (ii) any court of

competent jurisdiction, and

(2) which are in effect at the time this Act takes effect, shall

continue in effect according to their terms until modified, terminated,

superseded, set aside, or repealed as the case may be, by the parties

thereto or by any court of competent jurisdiction.

(b) Nothing in this Act shall affect the procedures or requirements

applicable to agreements for cooperation entered into pursuant to section

91c., 144b., or 144c. of the 1954 Act or arrangements pursuant thereto as

it was in effect immediately prior to the date of enactment of this Act.

(c) Except where otherwise provided, the provisions of this Act shall

take effect immediately upon enactment regardless of any requirement

for the promulgation of regulations to implement such provisions.

Other Provisions: Provision Of Certain Information To Congress

42 USC 3282 (a) REQUIREMENT TO PROVIDE INFORMATION.-The head of

note. each department and agency described in section 602(c) of the Nuclear

Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (22 USC 3282(c)) shall promptly provide

information to the chairman and ranking minority member of the

Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on

International Relations of the House of Representatives in meeting the

requirements of subsection (c) or (d) of section 602 of such Act.

(b) ISSUANCE OF DIRECTIVES.-Not later than February 1, 2000,

the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of

Commerce, the Secretary of Energy, the Director of Central Intelligence,

and the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission shall issue

directives, which shall provide access to information, including

information contained in special access programs, to implement their

responsibilities under subsections (c) and (d) of section 602 of the

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (22 USC 3282(c) and (d)).

Copies of such directive shall be forwarded promptly to the Committee

on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on International

'P.L. 99-661, Div. A, Title XIII, Part F, § 1370, 100 Star. 4004 (1986); P.L. 103-437, § 9(a)(8), 108 Star. 4588

(1994); P.L. 105-277, Div. G, Title X1I, Ch. 3, § 1225(e)(6), 112 Stat. 2681-775 (1998); P.L. 106-113, Div. B,

§ I000(a)(7), 113 Stat. 1536 (1999).
1062 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-242)

Relations of the House of Representatives upon the issuance of the

directives.1°

'"P.L. 106-113, Div. B, § 1000(a)(7), 113 Stat. 1536 (enacting into law § 1134 of Subtitle B ofTitle XI of

Div. B of H.R. 3427 (113 Stat. 1501A-494), as introduced on November 17, 1999).
Foreign Relations Auth. Act, FY 1994 & 1995 (P.L. 103-236) 1063

B. FOREIGN RELATIONS AUTHORIZATION ACT,

FISCAL YEARS 1994 AND 1995

Public Law 103-236 108 Stat. 382

April 30, 1994

An Act

Nuclear

Proliferation

Prevention Act

of 1994.

22 USC 3201

Note.

22 USC 6301.

To provide for more efficient and effective control over the proliferation

of nuclear explosive capability.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the

United States ofA merica in Congress assembled,

0000

Title VIII-Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act

0000

Part B-Sanctions For Nuclear Proliferation

Sec. 821. Imposition Of Procurement Sanction On Persons Engaging

In Export Activities That Contribute To Proliferation

(a) DETERMINATION BY THE PRESIDENT.-

(I) IN GENERAL-Except as provided in subsection (b)(2), the

President shall impose the sanction described in subsection (c) if the

President determines in writing that, on or after the effective date of

this part, a foreign person or a United States person has materially

and with requisite knowledge contributed, through the export from

the United States or any other country of any goods or technology (as

defined in section 830(2)), to the efforts by any individual, group, or

non-nuclear-weapon state to acquire unsafeguarded special nuclear

material or to use, develop, produce, stockpile, or otherwise acquire

any nuclear explosive device.

(2) PERSONS AGAINST WHICH THE SANCTION IS TO BE

IMPOSED.-The sanction shall be imposed pursuant to paragraph (I)

on-

(A) the foreign person or United States person with respect to

which the President makes the determination described in that

paragraph;

(B) any successor entity to that foreign person or.United States

person;

(C) any foreign person or United States person that is a parent

or subsidiary of that person if that parent or subsidiary materially

and with requisite knowledge assisted in the activities which were

the basis of that determination; and

(D) any foreign person or United States person that is an

affiliate of that person if that affiliate materially and with requisite

knowledge assisted in the activities which were the basis of that

determination and if that affiliate is controlled in fact by that

person.

(3) OTHER SANCTIONS AVAILABLE.-The sanction which is

required to be imposed for activities described in this subsection is in
1064 Foreign Relations Auth. Act, FY 1994 & 1995 (P.L. 103-236)

addition to any other sanction which may be imposed for the same

activities under any other provision of law.

(4) DEFINITION.-For purposes of this subsection, the term "requisite knowledge" means situations in which a person "knows",

as "knowing" is defined in section 104 of the Foreign Corrupt

Practices Act of 1977 (15 USC 78dd-2).

(b) CONSULTATION WITH AND ACTIONS BY FOREIGN

GOVERNMENT OF JURISDICTION.-

(1) CONSULTATIONS.-If the President makes a determination

described in subsection (a)(1) with respect to a foreign person, the

Congress urges the President to initiate consultations immediately

with the government with primary jurisdiction over that foreign

person with respect to the imposition of the sanction pursuant to this

section.

(2) ACTIONS BY GOVERNMENT OF JURISDICTION.-In

order to pursue such consultations with that government, the

President. President may delay imposition of the sanction pursuant to this

section for up to 90 days. Following these consultations, the President

shall impose the sanction unless the President determines and certifies

in writing to the Congress that that government has taken specific and

effective actions, including appropriate penalties, to terminate the

involvement of the foreign person in the activities described in

subsection (a)(1). The President may delay the imposition of the

sanction for up to an additional 90 days if the President determines

and certifies in writing to the Congress that that government is in the

process of taking the actions described in the preceding sentence.

President. (3) REPORT TO CONGRESS.-Not later than 90 days after

making a determination under subsection (a)(1), the President shall

submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on

Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign

Affairs of the House of Representatives a report on the status of

consultations with the appropriate government under this subsection,

and the basis for any determination under paragraph (2) of this

subsection that such government has taken specific corrective actions.

(c) SANCTION.-

(I) DESCRIPTION OF SANCTION.-The sanction to be imposed

pursuant to subsection (a)(]) is, except as provided in paragraph (2) of

this subsection, that the United States Government shall not procure, or

enter into any contract for the procurement of, any goods or services

from any person described in subsection (a)(2).

(2) EXCEPTIONS.-The President shall not be required to apply

or maintain the sanction under this section-

(A) in the case of procurement of defense articles or defense

services-

(i) under existing contracts or subcontracts, including the

exercise of options for production quantities to satisfy

requirements essential to the national security of the United

States;

(ii) if the President determines in writing that the person or

other entity to which the sanction would otherwise be applied

is a sole source supplier of the defense articles or services, that

the defense articles or services are essential, and that

alternative sources are not readily or reasonably available; or
Foreign Relations Auth. Act, FY 1994 & 1995 (P.L. 103-236) 1065

(iii) if the President determines in writing that such articles

or services are essential to the national security under defense

coproduction agreements;

(B) to products or services provided under contracts entered

into before the date on which the President publishes his intention

to impose the sanction;

(C) to-

(i) spare parts which are essential to United States products

or production;

(ii) component parts, but not finished products, essential to

United States products or production; or

(iii) routine servicing and maintenance of products, to the

extent that alternative sources are not readily or reasonably

available;

(D) to information and technology essential to United States

products or production; or

(E) to medical or other humanitarian items.

(d) ADVISORY OPINIONS.-Upon the request of any person, the

Secretary of State may, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense,

issue in writing an advisory opinion to that person as to whether a

proposed activity by that person would subject that person to the sanction

under this section. Any person who relies in good faith on such an

advisory opinion which states that the proposed activity would not

subject a person to such sanction, and any person who thereafter engages

in such activity, may not be made subject to such sanction on account of

such activity.

(e) TERMINATION OF THE SANCTION.-The sanction imposed

pursuant to this section shall apply for a period of at least 12 months

following the imposition of the sanction and shall cease to apply

thereafter only if the President determines and certifies in writing to the

Congress that-

(I) reliable information indicates that the foreign person or United

States person with respect to which the determination was made

under subsection (a)(]) has ceased to aid or abet any individual,

group, or non-nuclear-weapon state in its efforts to acquire

unsafeguarded special nuclear material or any nuclear explosive

device, as described in that subsection; and

(2) the President has received reliable assurances from the foreign

person or United States person, as the case may be, that such person

will not, in the future, aid or abet any individual, group, or nonnuclear-weapon state in its efforts to acquire unsafeguarded special

nuclear material or any nuclear explosive device, as described in

subsection (a)( I).

(f) WAIVER.-

(1) CRITERION FOR WAIVER.-The President may waive the

application of the sanction imposed on any person pursuant to this

section, after the end of the 12-month period beginning on the date on

which that sanction was imposed on that person, if the President

determines and certifies in writing to the Congress that the continued

imposition of the sanction would have a serious adverse effect on vital

United States interests.

(2) NOTIFICATION OF AND REPORT TO CONGRESS.-If the

President decides to exercise the waiver authority provided in

paragraph (I), the President shall so notify the Congress not less than

20 days before the waiver takes effect. Such notification shall include
1066 Foreign Relations Auth. Act, FY 1994 & 1995 (P.L. 103-236)

a report fully articulating the rationale and circumstances which led

the President to exercise the waiver authority.

See. 822. Eligibility For Assistance

(a) AMENDMENTS TO THE ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT.-

(1) PROHIBITION.-Section 3 of the Arms Export Control Act (22

U.S.C. 2753) is amended by adding at the end the following new

subsection:

"(f) No sales or leases shall be made to any country that the President

has determined is in material breach of its binding commitments to the

United States under international treaties or agreements concerning the

nonproliferation of nuclear explosive devices (as defined in section

830(4) of the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994) and

unsafeguarded special nuclear material (as defined in section 830(8) of

that Act).".

(2) DEFINITION OF SUPPORT FOR INTERNATIONAL

TERRORISM.- Section 40 of such Act (22 U.S.C. 2780) is amended-

(A) in subsection (d), by adding at the end the following new

sentence: "For purposes of this subsection, such acts shall include

all activities that the Secretary determines willfully aid or abet the

international proliferation of nuclear explosive devices to

individuals or groups or willfully aid or abet an individual or

groups in acquiring unsafeguarded special nuclear material."; and

(B) in subsection (I)-

(i) in paragraph (2), by striking "and" after the semicolon;

(ii) in paragraph (3), by striking the period at the end and

inserting a semicolon; and

(iii) by adding at the end the following:

"(4) the term 'nuclear explosive device' has the meaning given that

term in section 830(4) of the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of

1994; and

"(5) the term 'unsafeguarded special nuclear material' has the

meaning given that term in section 830(8) of the Nuclear Proliferation

Prevention Act of 1994.".

(b) FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 196 1.-

(I) PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION 82-7.-Notwithstanding

any other provision of law, Presidential Determination No. 82-7 of

February 10, 1982, made pursuant to section 670(a)(2) of the Foreign

Assistance Act of 1961, shall have no force or effect with respect to

any grounds for the prohibition of assistance under section 102(a)(1)

of the Arms Export Control Act arising on or after the effective date

of this part.

(2) AMENDMENT.-Section 620E(d) of the Foreign Assistance

Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2375(d)) is amended to read as follows:

"(d) The President may waive the prohibitions of section 101 of the

Arms Export Control Act with respect to any grounds for the prohibition

of assistance under that section arising before the effective date of part B

of the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994 to provide assistance

to Pakistan if he determines that to do so is in the national interest of the

United States.".

See. 823. Role Of International Financial Institutions

(a) IN GENERAL.-The Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct the

United States executive director to each of the international financial

institutions described in section 701(a) of the International Financial

Institutions Act (22 U.S.C. 262d(a)) to use the voice and vote of the

United States to oppose any use of the institution's funds to promote the

22 USC 6302.
22 USC 6303.

Foreign Relations Auth. Act, FY 1994 & 1995 (P.L. 103-236) 1067

acquisition of unsafeguarded special nuclear material or the development,

stockpiling, or use of any nuclear explosive device by any non-nuclearweapon state.

(b) DUTIES OF UNITED STATES EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS.-

Section 701(b)(3) of the International Financial Institutions Act (22

U.S.C. 262d(b)(3)) is amended to read as follows:

"(3) whether the recipient country-

"(A) is seeking to acquire unsafeguarded special nuclear

material (as defined in section 830(8) of the Nuclear Proliferation

Prevention Act of 1994) or a nuclear explosive device (as defined

in section 830(4) of that Act);

"(B) is not a State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation

of Nuclear Weapons; or

"(C) has detonated a nuclear explosive device; and".

Sec. 824. Prohibition On Assisting Nuclear Proliferation Through

The Provision Of Financing

(a) PROHIBITED ACTIVITY DEFINED.-For purposes of this

section, the term "prohibited activity" means the act of knowingly,

materially, and directly contributing or attempting to contribute, through

the provision of financing, to-

(I) the acquisition of unsafeguarded special nuclear material; or

(2) the use, development, production, stockpiling, or other

acquisition of any nuclear explosive device, by any individual, group,

or non-nuclear-weapon state.

(b) PROHIBITION.-To the extent that the United States has

jurisdiction to prohibit such activity by such person, no United States

person and no foreign person may engage in any prohibited activity.

(c) PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION AND ORDER WITH

RESPECT TO UNITED STATES AND FOREIGN PERSONS.-If the

President determines, ,that a United States person or a foreign person has

engaged in a prohibited activity (without regard to whether subsection (b)

applies), the President shall, by order, impose the sanctions described in

subsection (d) on such person.

(d) SANCTIONS.-The following sanctions shall be imposed pursuant

to any order issued under subsection (c) with respect to any United States

person or any foreign person:

(I) BAN ON DEALINGS IN GOVERNMENT FINANCE.-

(A) DESIGNATION AS PRIMARY DEALER.-Neither the

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System nor the Federal

Reserve Bank of New York may designate, or permit the

continuation of any prior designation of, the person as a primary

dealer in United States Government debt instruments.

(B) SERVICE AS DEPOSITARY.-The person may not serve

as a depositary for United States Government funds.

(2) RESTRICTIONS ON OPERATIONS.-The person may not,

directly or indirectly-

(A) commence any line of business in the United States in

which the person was not engaged as of the date of the order; or

(B) conduct business from any location in the United States at

which the person did not conduct business as of the date of the

order.

(e) CONSULTATION WITH AND ACTIONS BY FOREIGN

GOVERNMENT OF JURISDICTION.-

(1) CONSULTATIONS.-If the President makes a determination

under subsection (c) with respect to a foreign person, the Congress
1068 Foreign Relations Auth. Act, FY 1994 & 1995 (P.L. 103-236)

urges the President to initiate consultations immediately with any

appropriate foreign government with respect to the imposition of any

sanction pursuant to this section.

(2) ACTIONS BY GOVERNMENT OF JURISDICTION.-

(A) SUSPENSION OF PERIOD FOR IMPOSING

SANCTIONS.- In order to pursue consultations described in

paragraph (I) with any government referred to in such paragraph,

the President may delay, for up to 90 days, the effective date of an

order under subsection (c) imposing any sanction.

(B) COORDINATION WITH ACTIVITIES OF FOREIGN

GOVERNMENT.-Following consultations described in paragraph

(1), the order issued by the President under subsection (c)

imposing any sanction on a foreign person shall take effect unless

the President determines, and certifies in writing to the Congress,

that the government referred to in paragraph (1) has taken specific

and effective actions, including the imposition of appropriate

penalties, to terminate the involvement of the foreign person in

any prohibited activity.

(C) EXTENSION OF PERIOD.-After the end of the period

described in subparagraph (A), the President may delay, for up to

an additional 90 days, the effective date of an order issued under

subsection (b) imposing any sanction on a foreign person if the

President determines, and certifies in writing to the Congress, that

the appropriate foreign government is in the process of taking

actions described in subparagraph (B).

(3) REPORT TO CONGRESS.-Before the end of the 90-day

period beginning on the date on which an order is issued under

subsection (c), the President shall submit to the Congress a report on-

(A) the status of consultations under this subsection with the

government referred to in paragraph (I); and (B) the basis for any

determination under paragraph (2) that such government has taken

specific corrective actions.

(1) TERMINATION OF THE SANCTIONS.-Any sanction imposed

on any person pursuant to an order issued under subsection (c) shall-

(I) remain in effect for a period of not less than 12 months; and

(2) cease to apply after the end of such 12-month period only if the

President determines, and certifies in writing to the Congress, that-

(A) the person has ceased to engage in any prohibited activity;

and

(B) the President has received reliable assurances from such

person that the person will not, in the future, engage in any

prohibited activity.

(g) WAIVER.-The President may waive the continued application of

any sanction imposed on any person pursuant to an order issued under

subsection (c) if the President determines, and certifies in writing to the

Congress, that the continued imposition of the sanction would have a

serious adverse effect on the safety and soundness of the domestic or

international financial system or on domestic or international payments

systems.

(h) ENFORCEMENT ACTION.-The Attorney General may bring an

action in an appropriate district court of the United States for injunctive

and other appropriate relief with respect to-

(1) any violation of subsection (b); or

(2) any order issued pursuant to subsection (c).

(i) KNOWINGLY DEFINED.-
22 LJSC 3201

note.

22 USC 632 1.

Foreign Relations Auth. Act, FY 1994 & 1995 (P.L. 103-236) 1069

(1) IN GENERAL.-For purposes of this section, the term

"knowingly" means the state of mind of a person with respect to

conduct, a circumstance, or a result in which-

(A) such person is aware that such person is engaging in such

conduct, that such circumstance exists, or that such result is

substantially certain to occur; or

(B) such person has a firm belief that such circumstance exists

or that such result is substantially certain to occur.

(2) KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXISTENCE OF A PARTICULAR

CIRCUMSTANE.-If knowledge of the existence of a particular

circumstance is required for an offense, such knowledge is established

if a person is aware of a high probability of the existence of such

circumstance, unless the person actually believes that such

circumstance does not exist.

(j) SCOPE OF APPLICATION.-This section shall apply with respect

to prohibited activities which occur on or after the date this part takes

effect.'

0000

Part C-International Atomic Energy Agency

Sec. 841. Bilateral And Multilateral Initiatives

It is the sense of the Congress that in order to maintain and enhance

international confidence in the effectiveness of IAEA safeguards and in

other multilateral undertakings to halt the global proliferation of nuclear

weapons, the United States should seek to negotiate with other nations

and groups of nations, including the IAEA Board of Governors and the

Nuclear Suppliers Group, to-

(1) build international support for the principle that nuclear supply

relationships must require purchasing nations to agree to full-scope

international safeguards;

(2) encourage each nuclear-weapon state within the meaning of

the Treaty to undertake a comprehensive review of its own procedures

for declassifying information relating to the design or production of

nuclear explosive devices and to investigate any measures that would

reduce the risk of such information contributing to nuclear weapons

proliferation;

(3) encourage the deferral of efforts to produce weapons grade

nuclear material for large-scale commercial uses until such time as

safeguards are developed that can detect, on a timely and reliable

basis, the diversion of significant quantities of such material for

nuclear explosive purposes;

(4) pursue greater financial support for the implementation and

improvement of safeguards from all IAEA member nations with

significant nuclear programs, particularly from those nations that are

currently using or planning to use weapons grade nuclear material for

commercial purposes;

(5) arrange for the timely payment of annual financial

contributions by all members of the IAEA, including the United

States;

'Amended by P.L. 104-164, Title I, § 157(b), 110 Stat. 1440 (1996). The double commas in subsection (c) are actually in the statute. It also redesignated subsection (f) as (e) and struck out former subsection (e), which had

provided for judicial review of determinations of the President under subsection (c).
1070 Foreign Relations Auth. Act, FY 1994 & 1995 (P.L. 103-236)

(6) pursue the elimination of international commerce in highly

enriched uranium for use in research reactors while encouraging

multilateral cooperation to develop and to use low-enriched

alternative nuclear fuels;

(7) oppose efforts by non-nuclear-weapon states to develop or use

unsafeguarded nuclear fuels for purposes of naval propulsion;

(8) pursue an international open skies arrangement that would

authorize the IAEA to operate surveillance aircraft and would

facilitate IAEA access to satellite information for safeguards

verification purposes;

(9) develop an institutional means for IAEA member nations to

share intelligence material with the IAEA on possible safeguards

violations without compromising national security or intelligence

sources or methods;

(10) require any exporter of a sensitive nuclear facility or sensitive

nuclear technology to a non-nuclear-weapon state to notify the IAEA

prior to export and to require safeguards over that facility or

technology, regardless of its destination; and

(1I) seek agreement among the parties to the Treaty to apply

IAEA safeguards in perpetuity and to establish new limits on the right

to withdraw from the Treaty.

22 USC 6322. Sec. 842. IAEA Internal Reforms

In order to promote the early adoption of reforms in the

implementation of the safeguards responsibilities of the IAEA, the

Congress urges the President to negotiate with other nations and groups

of nations, including the IAEA Board of Governors and the Nuclear

Suppliers Group, to-

(1) improve the access of the IAEA within nuclear facilities that

are capable of producing, processing, or fabricating special nuclear

material suitable for use in a nuclear explosive device;

(2)(A) facilitate the IAEA's efforts to meet and to maintain its own

goals for detecting the diversion of nuclear materials and equipment,

giving particular attention to facilities in which there are bulk

quantities of plutonium; and

(B) if it is not technically feasible for the IAEA to meet those

detection goals in a particular facility, require the IAEA to declare

publicly that it is unable to do so;

(3) enable the IAEA to issue fines for violations of safeguards

procedures, to pay rewards for information on possible safeguards

violations, and to establish a "hot line" for the reporting of such

violations and other illicit uses of weapons grade nuclear material;

(4) establish safeguards at facilities engaged in the manufacture of

equipment or material that is especially designated or prepared for the

processing, use, or production of special fissionable material or, in the

case of non-nuclear-weapon states, of any nuclear explosive device;

(5) establish safeguards over nuclear research and development

activities and facilities;

(6) implement special inspections of undeclared nuclear facilities,

as provided for under existing safeguards procedures, and seek

authority for the IAEA to conduct challenge inspections on demand at

suspected nuclear sites;

(7) expand the scope of safeguards to include tritium, uranium

concentrates, and nuclear waste containing special fissionable

material, and increase the scope of such safeguards on heavy water;
Public

iniormation.

22 USC 6323.

President.

22 USC 6324.

Foreign Relations Auth. Act, FY 1994 & 1995 (P.L. 103-236) 1071

(8) revise downward the IAEA's official minimum amounts of

nuclear material ("significant quantity") needed to make a nuclear

explosive device and establish these amounts as national rather than

facility standards;

(9) expand the use of full-time resident IAEA inspectors at

sensitive fuel cycle facilities;

(10) promote the use of near real time material accountancy in the

conduct of safeguards at facilities that use, produce, or store

significant quantities of special fissionable material;

(11) develop with other IAEA member nations an agreement on

procedures to expedite approvals of visa applications by IAEA

inspectors;

(12) provide the IAEA the additional funds, technical assistance,

and political support necessary to carry out the goals set forth in this

subsection; and

(13) make public the annual safeguards implementation

information, report of the IAEA, establishing a public registry of

commodities in international nuclear commerce, including dual-use

goods, and creating a public repository of current nuclear trade

control laws, agreements, regulations, and enforcement and judicial

actions by AEA member nations.

Sec. 843. Reporting Requirement

(a) REPORT REQUIRED.-The President shall, in the report required

by section 601(a) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, describe-

(1) the steps he has taken to implement sections 841 and 842, and

(2) the progress that has been made and the obstacles that have

been encountered in seeking to meet the objectives set forth in

sections 841 and 842.

(b) CONTENTS OF REPORT.-Each report under paragraph (1) shall

describe-

(1) the bilateral and multilateral initiatives that the President has

taken during the period since the enactment of this Act in pursuit of

each of the objectives set forth in sections 841 and 842;

(2) any obstacles that have been encountered in the pursuit of

those initiatives;

(3) any additional initiatives that have been proposed by other

countries or international organizations to strengthen the

implementation of IAEA safeguards;

(4) all activities of the Federal Government in support of the

objectives set forth in sections 841 and 842; (5) any recommendations

of the President on additional measures to enhance the effectiveness

of IAEA safeguards; and

(6) any initiatives that the President plans to take in support of

each of the objectives set forth in sections 841 and 842.

See. 844. Definitions

As used in this part-

(I) the term "highly enriched uranium" means uranium enriched to

20 percent or more in the isotope U-35;

(2) the term "IAEA" means the International Atomic Energy

Agency;

(3) the term "near real time material accountancy" means a method

of accounting for the location, quantity, and disposition of special

fissionable material at facilities that store or process such material, in

which verification of peaceful use is continuously achieved by means
1072 Foreign Relations Auth. Act, FY 1994 & 1995 (P.L. 103-236)

of frequent physical inventories and the use of in-process

instrumentation;

(4) the term "special fissionable material" has the meaning given

that term by Article XX(I) of the Statute of the International Atomic

Energy Agency, done at the Headquarters of the United Nations on

October 26, 1956;

(5) the term "the Treaty" means the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons, signed at Washington, London,

and Moscow on July 1, 1968; and

(6) the terms "IAEA safeguards", "non-nuclear-weapon state", "nuclear explosive device", and "special nuclear material" have the

meanings given those terms in section 830 of this Act.

22 USC 3201 Part D-Termination

note.

Sec. 851. Termination Upon Enactment Of Next Foreign Relations

Act

On the date of enactment of the first Foreign Relations Authorization

Act that is enacted after the enactment of this Act, the provisions of parts

A and B of this title shall cease to be effective, the amendments made by

those parts shall be repealed, and any provision of law repealed by those

parts shall be reenacted.
Intl. Sec. Assist. & Arms Export Ctrl. Act of 1976 (P.L. 94-329) 1073

C. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE AND

ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT OF 1976

Public Law 94-329 90 Stat. 729

June 30, 1976

An Act

To amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the Foreign Military

Sales Act, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the

United States ofAmerica in Congress assembled,

International That this Act may be cited as the "International Security Assistance

Security and Arms Export Control Act of 1976."

Assistance and

Arns Export

Control Act of Title !1

1976.

22 USC 2778. See. 38. Control Of Arms Exports And Imports

(a) Presidential control of exports and imports of defense articles and

services, guidance of policy, etc.; designation of United States Munitions

List; issuance of export licenses; condition for export; negotiations

information.

(1) In furtherance of world peace and the security and foreign policy of

the United States, the President is authorized to control the import and

the export of defense articles and defense services and to provide foreign

policy guidance to persons of the United States involved in the export

and import of such articles and services. The President is authorized to

designate those items which shall be considered as defense articles and

defense services for the purposes of this section and to promulgate

regulations for the import and export of such articles and services. The

items so designated shall constitute the United States Munitions List.

(2) Decisions on issuing export licenses under this section shall take

into account whether the export of an article would contribute to an arms

race, aid in the development of weapons of mass destruction, support

international terrorism, increase the possibility of outbreak or escalation

of conflict, or prejudice the development of bilateral or multilateral arms

control or nonproliferation agreements or other arrangements.

(3) In exercising the authorities conferred by this section, the President

may require that any defense article or defense service be sold under this

Act as a condition of its eligibility for export, and may require that

persons engaged in the negotiation for the export of defense articles and

services keep the President fully and currently informed of the progress

and future prospects of such negotiations.

(b) Registration and licensing requirements for manufacturers, exporters,

or importers of designated defense articles and defense services;

exceptions.

(I) (A) (i) As prescribed in regulations issued under this section, every

person (other than an officer or employee of the United States

Government acting in an official capacity) who engages in the business

of manufacturing, exporting, or importing any defense articles or defense

services designated by the President under subsection (a)(]) shall register

with the United States Government agency charged with the

administration of this section, and shall pay a registration fee which shall
1074 Intl. Sec. Assist. & Arms Export Ctrl. Act of 1976 (P.L. 94-329)

be prescribed by such regulations. Such regulations shall prohibit the

return to the United States for sale in the United States (other than for the

Armed Forces of the United States and its allies or for any State or local

law enforcement agency) of any military firearms or ammunition of

United States manufacture furnished to foreign governments by the

United States under this Act or any other foreign assistance or sales

program of the United States, whether or not enhanced in value or

improved in condition in a foreign country. This prohibition shall not

extend to similar firearms that have been so substantially transformed as

to become, in effect, articles of foreign manufacture.

(ii) (1) As prescribed in regulations issued under this section, every

person (other than an officer or employee of the United States

Government acting in official capacity) who engages in the business of

brokering activities with respect to the manufacture, export, import, or

transfer of any defense article or defense service designated by the

President under subsection (a)(]), or in the business of brokering

activities with respect to the manufacture, export, import, or transfer of

any foreign defense article or defense service (as defined in subclause

(IV)), shall register with the United States Government agency charged

with the administration of this section, and shall pay a registration fee

which shall be prescribed by such regulations.

(11) Such brokering activities shall include the financing,

transportation, freight forwarding, or taking of any other action that

facilitates the manufacture, export, or import of a defense article or

defense service.

(111) No person may engage in the business of brokering activities

described in subclause (I) without a license, issued in accordance with

this Act, except that no license shall be required for such activities

undertaken by or for an agency of the United States Government--

(aa) for use by an agency of the United States Government; or

(bb) for carrying out any foreign assistance or sales program

authorized by law and subject to the control of the President by other

means.

(IV) For purposes of this clause, the term "foreign defense article

or defense service" includes any non-United States defense article or

defense service of a nature described on the United States Munitions List

regardless of whether such article or service is of United States origin or

whether such article or service contains United States origin components.

(B) The prohibition under such regulations required by the second

sentence of subparagraph (A) shall not extend to any military firearms (or

ammunition, components, parts, accessories, and attachments for such

firearms) of United States manufacture furnished to any foreign

government by the United States under this Act or any other foreign

assistance or sales program of the United States if--

(i) such firearms are among those firearms that the Secretary of the

Treasury is, or was at any time, required to authorize the importation of

by reason of the provisions of section 925(e) of title 18, United States

Code (including the requirement for the listing of such firearms as curios

or relics under section 921(a)(13) of that title); and

(ii) such foreign government certifies to the United States

Government that such firearms are owned by such foreign government.

[(C)](B) A copy of each registration made under this paragraph shall

be transmitted to the Secretary of the Treasury for review regarding law

enforcement concerns. The Secretary shall report to the President

regarding such concerns as necessary.
Intl. Sec. Assist. & Arms Export Ctrl. Act of 1976 (P.L. 94-329) 1075

(2) Except as otherwise specifically provided in regulations issued

under subsection (a)(]), no defense articles or defense services

designated by the President under subsection (a)(l) may be exported or

imported without a license for such export or import, issued in

accordance with this Act and regulations issued under this Act, except

that no license shall be required for exports or imports made by or for an

agency of the United States Government (A) for official use by a

department or agency of the United States Government, or (B) for

carrying out any foreign assistance or sales program authorized by law

and subject to the control of the President by other means.

(3) (A) For each of the fiscal years 1988 and 1989, $ 250,000 of

registration fees collected pursuant to paragraph (I) shall be credited to a

Department of State account, to be available without fiscal year

limitation. Fees credited to that account shall be available only for the

payment of expenses incurred for--

(i) contract personnel to assist in the evaluation of munitions

control license applications, reduce processing time for license

applications, and improve monitoring of compliance with the terms of

licenses; and

(ii) the automation of munitions control functions and the

processing of munitions control license applications, including the

development, procurement, and utilization of computer equipment and

related software.

(B) The authority of this paragraph may be exercised only to such

extent or in such amounts as are provided in advance in appropriation

Acts.

(c) Criminal violations; punishment. Any person who willfully violates

any provision of this section, section 39 [22 USCS § 2779], a treaty

referred to in subsection (j)(l)(C)(i), or any rule or regulation issued

under this section or section 39 [22 USCS § 2779], including any rule or

regulation issued to implement or enforce a treaty referred to in

subsection (j)(I)(C)(i) or an implementing arrangement pursuant to such

treaty, or who willfully, in a registration or license application or required

report, makes any untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a

material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the

statements therein not misleading, shall upon conviction be fined for each

violation not more than $ 1,000,000 or imprisoned not more than 20

years, or both.

(d) [Repealed]

(e) Enforcement powers of President. In carrying out functions under

this section with respect to the export of defense articles and defense

services, including defense articles and defense services exported or.

imported pursuant to a treaty referred to in subsection (j)(l)(C)(i), the

President is authorized to exercise the same powers concerning violations

and enforcement which are conferred upon departments, agencies and

officials by subsections (c), (d), (e), and (g) of section 11 of the Export

Administration Act of 1979 [50 USCS Appx § 2410], and by subsections

(a) and (c) of section 12 of such Act [50 USCS Appx § 2411 (a) and (c)],

subject to the same terms and conditions as are applicable to such powers

under such Act, except that section 1 I(c)(2)(B) of such Act [50 USCS

Appx. § 2410(c)(2)(B)] shall not apply, and instead, as prescribed in

regulations issued under this section, the Secretary of State may assess

civil penalties for violations of this Act and regulations prescribed

thereunder and further may commence a civil action to recover such civil

penalties, and except further that the names of the countries and the types
1076 Intl. Sec. Assist. & Arms Export Ctrl. Act of 1976 (P.L. 94-329)

and quantities of defense articles for which licenses are issued under this

section shall not be withheld from public disclosure unless the President

determines that the release of such information would be contrary to the

national interest. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed as

authorizing the withholding of information from the Congress.

Notwithstanding section I l(c) of the Export Administration Act of 1979

[50 USCS Appx § 24 10(c)], the civil penalty for each violation involving

controls imposed on the export of defense articles and defense services

under this section may not exceed $ 500,000.

(f) Periodic review of items on the munitions list; notification regarding

exemption from licensing requirements for export of defense items.

(I) The President shall periodically review the items on the United

States Munitions List to determine what items, if any, no longer warrant

export controls under this section. The results of such reviews shall be

reported to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the

Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate. The President may not remove

any item from the Munitions List until 30 days after the date on which

the President has provided notice of the proposed removal to the

Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives

and to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate in accordance

with the procedures applicable to reprogramming notifications under

section 634A(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 [22 USCS §

2394-1]. Such notice shall describe the nature of any controls to be

imposed on that item under any other provision of law.

(2) The President may not authorize an exemption for a foreign country

from the licensing requirements of this Act for the export of defense

items under subsection (j) or any other provision of this Act until 30 days after the date on which the President has transmitted to the Committee on

International Relations of the House of Representatives and the

Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a notification 'that

includes--

(A) a description of the scope of the exemption, including a detailed

summary of the defense articles, defense services, and related technical

data covered by the exemption; and

(B) a determination by the Attorney General that the bilateral

agreement concluded under subsection (j) requires the compilation and

maintenance of sufficient documentation relating to the export of United

States defense articles, defense services, and related technical data to

facilitate law enforcement efforts to detect, prevent, and prosecute

criminal violations of any provision of this Act, including the efforts on

the part of countries and factions engaged in international terrorism to

illicitly acquire sophisticated United States defense items.

(3) Paragraph (2) shall not apply with respect to an exemption for

Canada from the licensing requirements of this Act for the export of

defense items.

(4) Paragraph (2) shall not apply with respect to an exemption under

subsection (j)(l) to give effect to a treaty referred to in subsection

(j)(I)(C)(i) (and any implementing arrangements to such treaty),

provided that the President promulgates regulations to implement and

enforce such treaty under this section and section 39 [22 USCS § 2779].

(g) Identification of persons convicted or subject to indictment for

violations of certain provisions.

(I) The President shall develop appropriate mechanisms to identify, in

connection with the export licensing process under this section--
Intl. Sec. Assist. & Arms Export Ctrl. Act of 1976 (P.L. 94-329) 1077

(A) persons who are the subject of an indictment for, or have been

convicted of, a violation under--

(i) this section,

(ii) section 1 I of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C.

App. 2410),

(iii) section 793, 794, or 798 of title 18, United States Code

(relating to espionage involving defense or classified information) or

section 2339A of such title (relating to providing material support to

terrorists),

(iv) section 16 of the Trading with the Enemy Act (50 U.S.C. App.

16),

(v) section 206 of the International Emergency Economic Powers

Act (relating to foreign assets controls; 50 U.S.C. App. 1705),

(vi) section 30A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C.

78dd-l) or section 104 of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (15 U.S.C.

78dd-2),

(vii) chapter 105 of title 18, United States Code [18 USCS §§ 2151

et seq.] (relating to sabotage), (viii) section 4(b) of the Internal Security Act of 1950 (relating to

communication of classified information; 50 U.S.C. 783(b)),

(ix) section 57, 92, 101, 104, 222, 224, 225, or 226 of the Atomic

Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2077, 2122, 2131, 2134, 2272, 2274,

2275, and 2276),

(x) section 601 of the National Security Act of 1947 (relating to

intelligence identities protection; 50 U.S.C. 421),

(xi) section 603(b) or (c) of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act

of 1986 (22 U.S.C. 5113 (b) and (c));[,] or

(xii) section 3, 4, 5, and 6 of the Prevention of Terrorist Access to

Destructive Weapons Act of 2004, relating to missile systems designed

to destroy aircraft (18 U.S.C. 2332g), prohibitions governing atomic

weapons (42 U.S.C. 2122), radiological dispersal devices (18 U.S.C.

2332h), and variola virus (18 U.S.C. 175b);

(B) persons who are the subject of an indictment or have been

convicted under section 371 of title 18, United States Code, for

conspiracy to violate any of the statutes cited in subparagraph (A); and

(C) persons who are ineligible--

(i) to contract with,

(ii) to receive a license or other form of authorization to export

from, or

(iii) to receive a license or other form of authorization to import

defense articles or defense services from, any agency of the United States

Government.

(2) The President shall require that each applicant for a license to

export an item on the United States Munitions List identify in the

application all consignees and freight forwarders involved in the

proposed export.

(3) If the President determines--

(A) that an applicant for a license to export under this section is the

subject of an indictment for a violation of any of the statutes cited in

paragraph (I),

(B) that there is reasonable cause to believe that an applicant for a

license to export under this section has violated any of the statutes cited

in paragraph (1), or

(C) that an applicant for a license to export under this section is

ineligible to contract with, or to receive a license or other form of
1078 Intl. Sec. Assist. & Arms Export Ctrl. Act of 1976 (P.L. 94-329)

authorization to import defense articles or defense services from, any

agency of the United States Government,

the President may disapprove the application. The President shall

consider requests by the Secretary of the Treasury to disapprove any

export license application based on these criteria.

(4) A license to export an item on the United States Munitions List may

not be issued to a person--

(A) if that person, or any party to the export, has been convicted of

violating a statute cited in paragraph (I), or

(B) if that person, or any party to the export, is at the time of the

license review ineligible to receive export licenses (or other forms of

authorization to export) from any agency of the United States

Government,

except as may be determined on a case-by-case basis by the President,

after consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, after a thorough

review of the circumstances surrounding the conviction or ineligibility to

export and a finding by the President that appropriate steps have been

taken to mitigate any law enforcement concerns.

(5) A license to export an item on the United States Munitions List may

not be issued to a foreign person (other than a foreign government).

(6) The President may require a license (or other form of authorization)

before any item on the United States Munitions List is sold or otherwise

transferred to the control or possession of a foreign person or a person

acting on behalf of a foreign person.

(7) The President shall, in coordination with law enforcement and

national security agencies, develop standards for identifying high-risk

exports, for regular end-use verification. These standards shall be

published in the Federal Register and the initial standards shall be

published not later than October 1, 1988.

(8) Upon request of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense and

the Secretary of the Treasury shall detail to the office primarily

responsible for export licensing functions under this section, on a

nonreimbursable basis, personnel with appropriate expertise to assist in

the initial screening of applications for export licenses under this section

in order to determine the need for further review of those applications for

foreign policy, national security, and law enforcement concerns.

(9) For purposes of this subsection--

(A) the term "foreign corporation" means a corporation that is not

incorporated in the United States;

(B) the term "foreign government" includes any agency or

subdivision of a foreign government, including an official mission of a

foreign government;

(C) the term "foreign person" means any person who is not a citizen

or national of the United States or lawfully admitted to the United States

for permanent residence under the Immigration and Nationality Act, and

includes foreign corporations, international organizations, and foreign

governments;

(D) the term "party to the export" means--

(i) the president, the chief executive officer, and other senior

officers of the license applicant;

(ii) the freight forwarders or designated exporting agent of the

license application; and

(iii) any consignee or end user of any item to be exported; and
Intl. Sec. Assist. & Arms Export Ctrl. Act of 1976 (P.L. 94-329) 1079

(E) the term "person" means a natural person as well as a corporation, business association, partnership, society, trust, or any other entity,

organization, or group, including governmental entities.

(h) Judicial review of designation of items as defense articles or services.

The designation by the President (or by an official to whom the

President's functions under subsection (a) have been duly delegated), in

regulations issued under this section, of items as defense articles or

defense services for purposes of this section shall not be subject to

judicial review.

(i) Reports relating to exportation of items on the munitions list. As

prescribed in regulations issued under this section, a United States person

to whom a license has been granted to export an item on the United

States Munitions List shall, not later than 15 days after the item is

exported, submit to the Department of State a report containing all

shipment information, including a description of the item and the

quantity, value, port of exit, and end-user and country of destination of

the item.

(j) Requirements relating to country exemptions for licensing of defense

items for export to foreign countries.

(1) Requirement for bilateral agreement.

(A) In general. The President may utilize the regulatory or other

authority pursuant to this Act to exempt a foreign country from the

licensing requirements of this Act with respect to exports of defense

items only if the United States Government has concluded a binding

bilateral agreement with the foreign country. Such agreement shall--

(i) meet the requirements set forth in paragraph (2); and

(ii) be implemented by the United States and the foreign country in

a manner that is legally-binding under their domestic laws.

(B) Exception for Canada. The requirement to conclude a bilateral

agreement in accordance with subparagraph (A) shall not apply with

respect to an exemption for Canada from the licensing requirements of

this Act for the export of defense items.

(C) Exception for defense trade cooperation treaties.

(i) In general. The requirement to conclude a bilateral agreement in

accordance with subparagraph (A) shall not apply with respect to an

exemption from the licensing requirements of this Act for the export of

defense items to give effect to any of the following defense trade

cooperation treaties, provided that the treaty has entered into force

pursuant to article II, section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution of the United

States:

(I) The Treaty Between the Government of the United States of

America and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain

and Northern Ireland Concerning Defense Trade Cooperation, done at

Washington and London on June 21 and 26, 2007 (and any implementing

arrangement thereto).

(I1) The Treaty Between the Government of the United States of

America and the Government of Australia Concerning Defense Trade

Cooperation, done at Sydney September 5, 2007 (and any implementing

arrangement thereto).

(ii) Limitation of scope. The United States shall exempt from the

scope of a treaty referred to in clause (i)--

(I) complete rocket systems (including ballistic missile systems,

space launch vehicles, and sounding rockets) or complete unmanned

aerial vehicle systems (including cruise missile systems, target drones,

and reconnaissance drones) capable of delivering at least a 500 kilogram
1080 Intl. Sec. Assist. & Arms Export Ctrl. Act of 1976 (P.L. 94-329)

payload to a range of 300 kilometers, and associated production facilities,

software, or technology for these systems, as defined in the Missile

Technology Control Regime Annex Category 1, Item 1;

(II) individual rocket stages, re-entry vehicles and equipment,

solid or liquid propellant motors or engines, guidance sets, thrust vector

control systems, and associated production facilities, software, and

technology, as defined in the Missile Technology Control Regime Annex

Category I, Item 2;

(l1l) defense articles and defense services listed in the Missile

Technology Control Regime Annex Category II that are for use in rocket

systems, as that term is used in such Annex, including associated

production facilities, software, or technology;

(IV) toxicological agents, biological agents, and associated

equipment, as listed in the United States Munitions List (part 121.1 of

chapter I of title 22, Code of Federal Regulations), Category XIV,

subcategories (a), (b), (f)(l), (i), () as it pertains to (f)(I), (I) as it pertains

to (f)(1), and (m) as it pertains to all of the subcategories cited in this

paragraph;

(V) defense articles and defense services specific to the design

and testing of nuclear weapons which are controlled under United States

Munitions List Category XVI(a) and (b), along with associated defense

articles in Category XVI(d) and technology in Category XVI(e);

(VI) with regard to the treaty cited in clause (i)(1), defense articles

and defense services that the United States controls under the United

States Munitions List that are not controlled by the United Kingdom, as

defined in the United Kingdom Military List or Annex 4 to the United

Kingdom Dual Use List, or any successor lists thereto; and

(VII) with regard to the treaty cited in clause (i)(ll), defense

articles for which Australian laws, regulations, or other commitments

would prevent Australia from enforcing the control measures specified in

such treaty.

(2) Requirements of bilateral agreement. A bilateral agreement referred

to paragraph (I)--

(A) shall, at a minimum, require the foreign country, as necessary, to

revise its policies and practices, and promulgate or enact necessary

modifications to its laws and regulations to establish an export control

regime that is at least comparable to United States law, regulation, and

policy requiring--

(i) conditions on the handling of all United States-origin defense

items exported to the foreign country, including prior written United

States Government approval for any reexports to third countries;

(ii) end-use and retransfer control commitments, including securing

binding end-use and retransfer control commitments from all end-users,

including such documentation as is needed in order to ensure compliance

and enforcement, with respect to such United States-origin defense items;

(iii) establishment of a procedure comparable to a "watchlist" (if

such a watchlist does not exist) and full cooperation with United States

Government law enforcement agencies to allow for sharing of export and

import documentation and background information on foreign businesses

and individuals employed by or otherwise connected to those businesses;

and

(iv) establishment of a list of controlled defense items to ensure

coverage of those items to be exported under the exemption; and

(B) should, at a minimum, require the foreign country, as necessary,

to revise its policies and practices, and promulgate or enact necessary
Intl. Sec. Assist. & Arms Export Ctrl. Act of 1976 (P.L. 94-329) 1081

modifications to its laws and regulations to establish an export control

regime that is at least comparable to United States law, regulation, and

policy regarding--

(i) controls on the export of tangible or intangible technology,

including via fax, phone, and electronic media;

(ii) appropriate controls on unclassified information relating to

defense items exported to foreign nationals;

(iii) controls on international arms trafficking and brokering;

(iv) cooperation with United States Government agencies,

including intelligence agencies, to combat efforts by third countries to

acquire defense items, the export of which to such countries would not be

authorized pursuant to the export control regimes of the foreign country

and the United States; and

(v) violations of export control laws, and penalties for such

violations.

(3) Advance certification. Not less than 30 days before authorizing an

exemption for a foreign country from the licensing requirements of this

Act for the export of defense items, the President shall transmit to the

Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives

and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a certification

that--

(A) the United States has entered into a bilateral agreement with that

foreign country satisfying all requirements set forth in paragraph (2);

(B) the foreign country has promulgated or enacted all necessary

modifications to its laws and regulations to comply with its obligations

under the bilateral agreement with the United States; and

(C) the appropriate congressional committees will continue to receive

notifications pursuant to the authorities, procedures, and practices of

section 36 of this Act [22 USCS § 2776] for defense exports to a foreign

country to which that section would apply and without regard to any

form of defense export licensing exemption otherwise available for that

country.

(4) Definitions. In this section:

(A) Defense items. The term "defense items" means defense articles,

defense services, and related technical data.

(B) Appropriate congressional committees. The term "appropriate

congressional committees" means--

(i) the Committee on International Relations and the Committee on

Appropriations of the House of Representatives; and

(ii) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the

Committee on Appropriations of the Senate.'

'Oct. 22, 1968, P.L. 90-629, Ch 3, § 38, as added June 30. 1976, P.L. 94-329, Title 11, § 212(a)(1), 90 Stat.

744; Aug. 4, 1977, P.L. 95-92, § 20, 91 Stat. 623; Sept. 27, 1979, P.L. 96-70, Title 111, Ch 3, § 3303(a)(4), 93

Slat. 499; Sept. 29, 1979, P.L. 96-72, § 22(a), 93 Stat. 535; Oct. 29, 1979, P.L. 96-92, § 21,93 Slat. 710; Dec.

16, 1980, P.L. 96-533, Title I, § 107(a), (c), 94 Stat. 3136; Dec. 29, 1981, P.L. 97-113, Title I, §§ 106, 107, 95

Stat. 1522; July 12, 1985, P.L. 99-64, Title 1, § 123(a), 99 Stat. 156; Aug. 8, 1985, P.L. 99-83, Title I, § 119(a),

(b), 99 Stat. 203; Dec. 22, 1987, P.L. 100-202, § 101(b) [Title VIII, § 8142(a)], 101 Slat. 1329-88; Dec. 22,

1987, P.L. 100-204, Title XII, § 1255, 101 Slat. 1429; Dee. 12, 1989, P.L. 101-222, §§ 3(a), 6, 103 Stat. 1896,

1899; April 30, 1994, P.L. 103-236, Title VII, Part A, § 714(a)(1), 108 Slat. 497; July 21, 1996, P.L. 104-164,

Title 1, Ch 5, §§ 151(a), 156, 110 Slat. 1437, 1440; Oct. 21, 1998, P.L. 105-277, Div. G, Title XII, Ch. 3, § 1225(a)(2), 112 Slat. 2681-773; Nov. 29, 1999, P.L. 106-113, Div. B, § 1000(a)(7), 113 Stat. 1536; Oct. 6,

2000, P.L. 106-280, Title I, Subtitle A, § 102(a), (b), 114 Stat. 846; Sept. 30, 2002, P.L. 107-228, Div. B, Title

XIV, § 1406, 116 Slat. 1458; Dec. 17, 2004, P.L. 108-458, Title VI. Subtitle J, § 6910, 118 Slat. 3774; July 1,

2010, P.L. 111-195, Title I, § 107(a)(2), 124 Stat. 1337; Oct. 8,2010, P.L. 111-266, Title 1, §§ 102(b),

103(a)-(c), 124 Stat. 2797.
1082 Intl. Sec. Assist. & Arms Export Ctrl. Act of 1976 (P.L. 94-329)

22 USC 2799aa. Sec. 101. Nuclear Enrichment Transfers

(a) PROHIBITIONS; SAFEGUARDS AND MANAGEMENT.

Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, no funds made

available to carry out the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 or this Act may

be used for the purpose of providing economic assistance (including

assistance under chapter 4 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of

1961 [22 USCS §§ 2346 et seq.]), providing military assistance or grant

military education and training, providing assistance under chapter 6 of

part ii of that Act [22 USCS §§ 2348 et seq.], or extending military

credits or making guarantees, to any country which the President

determines delivers nuclear enrichment equipment, materials, or

technology to any other country on or after August 4, 1977, or receives

such equipment, materials, or technology from any other country on or

after August 4, 1977, unless before such delivery--

(1) the supplying country and receiving country have reached

agreement to place all such equipment, materials, or technology, upon

delivery, under multilateral auspices and management when available;

and

(2) the recipient country has entered into an agreement with the

International Atomic Energy Agency to place all such equipment,

materials, technology, and all nuclear fuel and facilities in such country

under the safeguards system of such Agency.

(b) Certification by President of necessity of continued assistance;

disapproval by Congress. (I) Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section, the President may

furnish assistance which would otherwise be prohibited under such

subsection if he determines and certifies in writing to the Speaker of the

House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the

Senate that--

(A) the termination of such assistance would have a serious adverse

effect on vital United States interests; and

(B) he has received reliable assurances that the country in question

will not acquire or develop nuclear weapons or assist other nations in

doing so.

Such certification shall set forth the reasons supporting such

determination in each particular case.

(2) (A) A certification under paragraph (1) of this subsection shall take

effect on the date on which the certification is received by the Congress.

However, if, within thirty calendar days after receiving this certification,

the Congress enacts a joint resolution stating in substance that the

Congress disapproves the furnishing of assistance pursuant to the

certification, then upon the enactment of that resolution the certification

shall cease to be effective and all deliveries of assistance furnished under

the authority of that certification shall be suspended immediately.

(B) Any joint resolution under this paragraph shall be considered in

the Senate in accordance with the provisions of section 601(b) of the

International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976.2

ýThis was previously See. 669 (22 USC 2429). It was repealed by P.L. 103-236, Title VIII, § 826(b),

108 Stat. 519 (1994). § 826(c) states, "Any reference in law as of the date of enactment of this Act to section

669 or 670 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 shall, after such date, be deemed to be a reference to section

101 or 102, as the case may be, of the Arms Export Control Act." Section 101 was added April 30, 1994, to

P.L. 103-236, Title VIII, Part B, § 826(a), 108 Stat. 515.
Intl. Sec. Assist. & Arms Export Ctrl. Act of 1976 (P.L. 94-329) 1083

22 USC 2799aa-1. Sec. 102. Nuclear Reprocessing Transfers, Illegal Exports For

Nuclear Explosive Devices, Transfers Of Nuclear Explosive Devices,

And Nuclear Detonations

(a) Prohibitions on assistance to countries involved in transfer of nuclear

reprocessing equipment, materials, or technology; exceptions; procedures

applicable.

(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, no funds

made available to carry out the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 or this

Act may be used for the purpose of providing economic assistance

(including assistance under chapter 4 of part I! of the Foreign Assistance

Act of 1961 [22 USCS §§ 2346 et seq.]), providing military assistance or

grant military education and training, providing assistance under chapter

6 of part II of that Act [22 USCS §§ 2348 et seq.], or extending military

credits or making guarantees, to any country which the President

determines--

(A) delivers nuclear reprocessing equipment, materials, or technology

to any other country on or after August 4, 1977, or receives such

equipment, materials, or technology from any other country on or after

August 4, 1977 (except for the transfer of reprocessing technology

associated with the investigation, under international evaluation

programs in which the United States participates, of technologies which

are alternatives to pure plutonium reprocessing), or

(B) is a non-nuclear-weapon state which, on or after August 8, 1985,

exports illegally (or attempts to export illegally) from the United States

any material, equipment, or technology which would contribute

significantly to the ability of such country to manufacture a nuclear

explosive device, if the President determines that the material,

equipment, or technology was to be used by such country in the

manufacture of a nuclear explosive device.

For purposes of clause (B), an export (or attempted export) by a person

who is an agent of, or is otherwise acting on behalf of or in the interests

ot, a country shall be considered to be an export (or attempted export) by

that country.

(2) Notwithstanding paragraph (1) of this subsection, the President in

any fiscal year may furnish assistance which would otherwise be

prohibited under that paragraph if he determines and certifies in writing

during that fiscal year to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and

the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate that the termination of

such assistance would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of

United States nonproliferation objectives or otherwise jeopardize the

common defense and security. The President shall transmit with such

certification a statement setting forth the specific reasons therefor.

(3) (A) A certification under paragraph (2) of this subsection shall take

effect on the date on which the certification is received by the Congress.

However, if, within 30 calendar days after receiving this certification, the

Congress enacts a joint resolution stating in substance that the Congress

disapproves the furnishing of assistance pursuant to the certification, then

upon the enactment of that resolution the certification shall cease to be

effective and all deliveries of assistance furnished under the authority of

that certification shall be suspended immediately.

(B) Any joint resolution under this paragraph shall be considered in

the Senate in accordance with the provisions of section 601(b) of the

International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976.

(b) Prohibitions on assistance to countries involved in transfer or use of

nuclear explosive devices; exceptions; procedures applicable.
1084 Intl. Sec. Assist. & Arms Export Ctrl. Act of 1976 (P.L. 94-329)

(I) Except as provided in paragraphs (4), (5), and (6), in the event that

the President determines that any country, after the effective date of part

B of the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994--

(A) transfers to a non-nuclear-weapon state a nuclear explosive

device,

(B) is a non-nuclear-weapon state and either--

(i) receives a nuclear explosive device, or

(ii) detonates a nuclear explosive device,

(C) transfers to a non-nuclear-weapon state any design information or

component which is determined by the President to be important to, and

known by the transferring country to be intended by the recipient state

for use in, the development or manufacture of any nuclear explosive

device, or

(D) is a non-nuclear-weapon state and seeks and receives any design

information or component which is determined by the President to be

important to, and intended by the recipient state for use in, the

development or manufacture of any nuclear explosive device,

then the President shall forthwith report in writing his determination to

the Congress and shall forthwith impose the sanctions described in

paragraph (2) against that country.

(2) The sanctions referred to in paragraph (I) are as follows:

(A) The United States Government shall terminate assistance to that

country under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, except for

humanitarian assistance or food or other agricultural commodities.

(B) The United States Government shall terminate--

(i) sales to that country under this Act of any defense articles,

defense services, or design and construction services, and

(ii) licenses for the export to that country of any item on the United

States Munitions List.

(C) The United States Government shall terminate all foreign military

financing for that country under this Act.

(D) The United States Government shall deny to that country any

credit, credit guarantees, or other financial assistance by any department,

agency, or instrumentality of the United States Government, except that

the sanction of this subparagraph shall not apply--

(i) to any transaction subject to the reporting requirements of title V

of the National Security Act of 1947 [50 USCS §§ 413 et seq.] (relating

to congressional oversight of intelligence activities),

(ii) to medicines, medical equipment, and humanitarian assistance,

or

(iii) to any credit, credit guarantee, or financial assistance provided

by the Department of Agriculture to support the purchase of food or other

agricultural commodity.

(E) The United States Government shall oppose, in accordance with

section 701 of the International Financial Institutions Act (22 U.S.C.

262d), the extension of any loan or financial or technical assistance to

that country by any international financial institution.

(F) The United States Government shall prohibit any United States

bank from making any loan or providing any credit to the government of

that country, except for loans or credits for the purpose of purchasing

food or other agricultural commodities, which includes fertilizer.

(G) The authorities of section 6 of the Export Administration Act of

1979 [50 USCS Appx. § 24051 shall be used to prohibit exports to that

country of specific goods and technology (excluding food and other

agricultural commodities), except that such prohibition shall not apply to
Intl. Sec. Assist. & Arms Export Ctrl. Act of 1976 (P.L. 94-329) 1085

any transaction subject to the reporting requirements of title V of the

National Security Act of 1947 [50 USCS §§ 413 et seq.] (relating to

congressional oversight of intelligence activities).

(3) As used in this subsection--

(A) the term "design information" means specific information that

relates to the design of a nuclear explosive device and that is not

available to the public; and

(B) the term "component" means a specific component of a nuclear

explosive device.

(4) (A) Notwithstanding paragraph (I) of this subsection, the President

may, for a period of not more than 30 days of continuous session, delay

the imposition of sanctions which would otherwise be required under

paragraph (1)(A) or (1)(B) of this subsection if the President first

transmits to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and to the

chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, a

certification that he has determined that an immediate imposition of

sanctions on that country would be detrimental to the national security of

the United States. Not more than one such certification may be

transmitted for a country with respect to the same detonation, transfer, or

receipt of a nuclear explosive device.

(B) If the President transmits a certification to the Congress under

subparagraph (A), a joint resolution which would permit the President to

exercise the waiver authority of paragraph (5) of this subsection shall, if

introduced in either House within thirty days of continuous session after

the Congress receives this certification, be considered in the Senate in

accordance with subparagraph (C) of this paragraph.

(C) Any joint resolution under this paragraph shall be considered in

the Senate in accordance with the provisions of section 601(b) of the

International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976

[unclassified].

(D) For purposes of this paragraph, the term "joint resolution" means

a joint resolution the matter after the resolving clause of which is as

follows: "That the Congress having received on ------ a certification by

the President under section 102(b)(4) of the Arms Export Control Act

with respect to ------ , the Congress hereby authorizes the President to

exercise the waiver authority contained in section 102(b)(5) of that Act

[subsec. (b)(5) of this section].", with the date of receipt of the

certification inserted in the first blank and the name of the country

inserted in the second blank.

(5) Notwithstanding paragraph (1) of this subsection, if the Congress

enacts a joint resolution under paragraph (4) of this subsection, the

President may waive any sanction which would otherwise be required

under paragraph (I)(A) or (I)(B) if he determines and certifies in writing

to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Committee on

Foreign Relations of the Senate that the imposition of such sanction

would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of United States

nonproliferation objectives or otherwise jeopardize the common defense

and security. The President shall transmit with such certification a

statement setting forth the specific reasons therefor.

(6) (A) In the event the President is required to impose sanctions

against a country under paragraph (1)(C) or (I)(D), the President shall

forthwith so inform such country and shall impose the required sanctions

beginning 30 days after submitting to the Congress the report required by

paragraph (I) unless, and to the extent that, there is enacted during the

30-day period a law prohibiting the imposition of such sanctions.
1086 Intl. Sec. Assist. & Arms Export Ctrl. Act of 1976 (P.L. 94-329)

(B) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the sanctions which

are required to be imposed against a country under paragraph (I)(C) or

(I)(D) shall not apply if the President determines and certifies in writing

to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on

Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign

Affairs of the House of Representatives that the application of such

sanctions against such country would have a serious adverse effect on

vital United States interests. The President shall transmit with such

certification a statement setting forth the specific reasons therefor.

(7) For purposes of this subsection, continuity of session is broken only

by an adjournment of Congress sine die and the days on which either

House is not in session because of an adjournment of more than three

days to a day certain are excluded in the computation of any period of

time in which Congress is in continuous session.

(8) The President may not delegate or transfer his power, authority, or

discretion to make or modify determinations under this subsection.

(c) Non-nuclear-weapon state defined. As used in this section, the term "non-nuclear-weapon state" means any country which is not a nuclearweapon state, as defined in Article IX(3) of the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

t'his was previously § 670 (22 USC 2429a). It was repealed by P.L. 103-236, Title VIII, § 826(b), 108 Stat. 519 (1994). Section 826(c) states, "Any reference in law as of the date of enactment of this Act to

section 669 or 670 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 shall, after such date, be deemed to be a reference to

section 101 or 102, as the case may be, of the Arms Export Control Act." Section 101 was added

April 30, 1994, to P.L. 103-236, Title VIIl, Part B, § 826(a), 108 Stat. 515; and July' 14. 1998. to P.L. 105-194.

§ 2(a)-(c), 112 Stat. 627.
Intl. Sec. & Dvlp. Cooperation Act of 1980 (P.L. 96-533) 1087

D. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT

COOPERATION ACT OF 1980

Public Law 96-533 94 Stat. 3131

22 USC 2151

note.

International

Security and

I)evelopment

Cooperation Act

22 USC 2778a.

22 USC 3201

note.

42 USC 201

note.

December 16, 1980

An Act

To authorize appropriations for the fiscal year 1981 for international

security and development assistance, the Peace Corps, and refugee

assistance, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the

United States of America in Congress assembled,

Sec. 1. Short Title

This Act may be cited as the "International Security and

Development Cooperation Act of 1980."

Title I-Military And Related Assistance And Sales Programs

Sec. 110. Exportation Of Uranium Depleted In The Isotope 235

Upon a finding that an export of uranium depleted in the isotope 235

is incorporated in defense articles or commodities solely to take

advantage of high density or pyrophoric characteristics unrelated to its

radioactivity, such exports shall be exempt from the provisions of the

Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of

1978 when such exports are subject to the controls established under the

arms Export Control Act or the Export Administration Act of 1979.
1088 Intl. Sec. & Dvlp. Cooperation Act of 1981 (P.L. 97-113)

E. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND

DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION ACT OF 1981

Public Law 97-113 95 Stat. 1519

December 29, 1981

An Act

To authorize appropriations for the fiscal years 1982 and 1983 for

international security and development assistance and for the Peace

Corps, to establish the Peace Corps as an autonomous agency, and for

other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the

United States ofAinerica in Congress assembled,

Sec. I. Short Title

22 tJSC 2151 note. This Act may be cited as the "International Security and

International Development Cooperation Act of 1981.

Security and

Development

Cooperation Act of Title VII-Miscellaneous Provisions

1981.

22 USC 2429a-1. Sec. 735. Report On Nuclear Activities

Report to Beginning with the fiscal year 1983 and for each fiscal year

Congress. thereafter, the President shall prepare and trausmit to the Congress, as

part of the presentation materials for foreign assistance programs 22 USC 2429. proposed for that fiscal year, a classified report describing the nuclear

22 USC 2429a. programs and related activities of any country for which a waiver of

section 669 or 670 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is in effect,

including an assessment of--

(I) the extent and effectiveness of International Atomic Energy

Agency safeguards at that country's nuclear facilities; and

(2) the capability, actions, and intentions of the government of

that country with respect to the manufacture or acquisition of a

nuclear explosive device.

Sec. 737. Prohibitions Relating To Nuclear Transfers And Nuclear

Detonations'

22 USC 2429a (a) The Congress finds that any transfer of a nuclear explosive device

note. to a non-nuclear-weapon state or, in the case of a non-nuclear-weapon

state, any receipt or detonation of a nuclear explosive device would cause

grave damage to bilateral relations between the United States and that

country. 22 USC 2429. (b) Section 669(b)(2) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is

amended to read as follows:

(2)(A) A certification under paragraph (1) of this subsection shall

take effect on the date on which the certification is received by the

Congress. However, if, within thirty calendar days after receiving this

certification, the Congress adopts a concurrent resolution stating in

substance that the Congress disapproves the furnishing of assistance

pursuant to the certification, then upon the adoption of that resolution

the certification shall cease to be effective and all deliveries of

'22 USC 2429 and 22 USC 2429a were repealed by P.L. 103-236, Title VIII, § 826(b), 108 Stat. 519 (1994).

Section 826(c) states, "Any reference in law as of the dale of enactment of this Act to section 669 or 670 of the

Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 shall, after such date, be deemed to be a reference to section 101 or 102, as the case may be, of the Arms Export Control Act." Section 101 was added April 30, 1994, to P.L. 103-236,

Title VIII, Part B, § 826(a), 108 Stat. 515.
Intl. Sec. & Dvlo. Cooneration Act of 1981 (P.L. 97-113) 1089

22 USC 2429a.

22 USC 2151

note.

22 USC 2346.

22 USC 2348.

22 USC 2751

note.

Transmittal of

certification to

Congress.

Congressional

disapproval.

assistance furnished under the authority of that certification shall be

suspended immediately. (B) Any concurrent resolution under this paragraph shall be

considered in the Senate in accordance with the provisions of

section 601(b) of the International Security Assistance and Arms

Export Control Act of 1976.

(C) For the purpose of expediting the consideration and

adoption of concurrent resolutions under this paragraph, a motion

to proceed to the consideration of any such resolution after it has

been reported by the appropriate committee shall be treated as

highly privileged in the House of Representatives.

(c) Section 670 of such Act is amended to read as follows:2

"Sec. 670. Nuclear Reprocessing Transfers, Transfers Of Nuclear

Explosive Devices, And Nuclear Detonations

(a)(l) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, no funds

authorized to be appropriated by this Act or the Arms Export Control Act

may be used for the purpose of providing economic assistance (including

assistance under Chapter 4 of Part II), providing military assistance or

grant military education and training, providing assistance under of Part

1I, or extending military credits or making guarantees, to any country

which on or after the date of enactment of the International Security

Assistance Act of 1977 delivers nuclear reprocessing equipment,

materials or technology to any other country or receives such equipment,

materials, or technology from any other country (except for the transfer

of reprocessing technology associated with the investigation, under

international evaluation programs in which the United States participates,

of technologies which are alternatives to pure plutonium reprocessing).

(2) Notwithstanding paragraph (I) of this subsection, the

President may furnish assistance which would otherwise be

prohibited under that paragraph if he determines and certifies in

writing to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the

Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate that the termination of

such assistance would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of

United States nonproliferation objectives or otherwise jeopardize the

common defense and security. The President shall transmit with such

certification a statement setting forth the specific reasons therefor.

(3)(A) A certification under paragraph (2) of this subsection shall

take effect on the date on which the certification is received by the

Congress. However, if, within 30 calendar days after receiving this

certification, the Congress adopts a concurrent resolution stating in

substance that the Congress disapproves the furnishing of assistance

pursuant to the certification, then upon the adoption of that resolution

the certification shall cease to be effective and all deliveries of

assistance furnished under the authority of that certification shall be

suspended immediately.

(B) Any concurrent resolution under this paragraph shall be

considered in the Senate in accordance with the provisions of

section 601(b) of the International Security Assistance and Arms

Export Control Act of 1976.

2 22 USC 2429 and 22 USC 2429a were repealed by P.L. 103-236, Title VIII, § 826(b), 108 Stat. 519 (1994).

Section 826(c) states, "Any reference in law as of the date of enactment of this Act to section 669 or 670 of the

Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 shall, after such date, be deemed to be a reference to section 101 or 102, as the case may be, ol'the Arms Export Control Act." Section 101 was added April 30, 1994, to P.L. 103-236,

Title VIII, Part B, § 826(a), 108 Stat. 515.
22 tJSC 2346.

22 USC 2458,

22 USC 2751

note.

22 USC 2151

note.

Transmittal of

certification to

Congress.

Joint

resolution.

22 USC 2429a.

1090 Intl. Sec. & Dvlp. Cooperation Act of 1981 (P.L. 97-113)

(C) For the purpose of expediting the consideration and

adoption of concurrent resolutions under this paragraph, a motion

to proceed to the consideration of any such resolution after it has

been reported by the appropriate committee shall be treated as

highly privileged in the House of Representatives.

(b)(l) Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3) of this subsection,

no funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or the Arms Export

Control Act may be used for the purpose of providing economic

assistance (including assistance under Chapter 4 of Part 1i), providing

military assistance or grant military education and training, providing

assistance under Chapter 6 of Part II, or extending military credits or

making guarantees, to any country which on or after the date of

enactment of the International Security Assistance Act of 1977-

(A) transfers a nuclear explosive device to a non-nuclearweapon state, or

(B) is a non-nuclear-weapon state and either-

(i) receives a nuclear explosive device, or

(ii) detonates a nuclear explosive device.

(2)(A) Notwithstanding paragraph (I) of this subsection, the

President may, for a period of not more than 30 days of continuous

session, furnish assistance which would otherwise be prohibited

under paragraph (1) of this subsection if, before furnishing such

assistance, the President transmits to the Speaker of the House of

Representatives, and to the chairman of the Committee on Foreign

Relations of the Senate, a certification that he has determined that an immediate termination of assistance to that country would be

detrimental to the national security of the United States. Not more

than one such certification may be transmitted for a country with

respect to the same detonation, transfer, or receipt of a nuclear

explosive device.

(B) If the President transmits a certification to the Congress

under subparagraph (A), a joint resolution which would permit the

President to exercise the waiver authority of paragraph (3) of this

subsection shall, if introduced in either House within thirty days

of continuous session after the Congress receives this

certification, be considered in the Senate and House of

Representatives in accordance with subparagraphs (C) and (D) of

this paragraph.

(C) Any joint resolution under this paragraph shall be

considered in the Senate in accordance with the provisions of

section 601(b) of the International Security Assistance and Arms

Export Control Act of 1976.

(D) For the purpose of expediting the consideration and

adoption of joint resolutions under this paragraph, a motion to

proceed to the consideration of such a joint resolution after it has

been reported by the appropriate committee shall be treated as

highly privileged in the House of Representatives.

(E) For purposes of this paragraph, the term "joint resolution"

means a joint resolution the matter after the resolving clause of

which is as follows: "That the Congress having received on a

certification by the President under section 670(b)(2) of the

Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 with respect to _ , the

Congress hereby authorizes the President to exercise the waiver

authority contained in section 670(b)(3) of that Act," with the date
Intl. Sec. & Dvlp. Cooperation Act of 1981 (P.L. 97-113) 1091

Transmittal of

certification to

Congrcss.

Non-nuclear

weapon State.

See 21 USC

483.

of receipt of the certification inserted in the first blank and the

name of the country inserted in the second blank.

(3) Notwithstanding paragraph (1) of this subsection, if the

Congress enacts a joint resolution under paragraph (2) of this

subsection, the President may furnish assistance which would

otherwise be prohibited under paragraph (I) if he determines and

certifies in writing to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and

the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate that the

termination of such assistance would be seriously prejudicial to the

achievement of United States nonproliferation objectives or otherwise

jeopardize the common defense and security. The President shall

transmit with such certification a statement setting forth the specific

reasons therefor.

(4) For purposes of this subsection, continuity of session is

broken only by an adjournment of Congress sine die and the days on

which either House is not in session because of an adjournment of

more than three days to a day certain are excluded in the computation

of any period of time in which Congress is in continuous session.

(5) As used in this subsection, the term "non-nuclear-weapon

state" means any country which is not a nuclear-weapon state, as

defined in article IX(3) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of

Nuclear Weapons.
1092 Foreign Ops. Appropriations (Iraq Sanctions) (P.L. 101-5 13)

F. FOREIGN OPERATIONS APPROPRIATIONS (IRAQ

SANCTIONS)

Public Law 101-513 104 Stat. 2047

November 5, 1990

Title V-Iraq Sanctions Act Of 1990

Iraq Sec. 586. Short Title

Sanctions Act Sections 586 through 586J of this Act may be cited as the 'Iraq

ol 1990. Sanctions Act of 1990'.

50 LISC 1701 Sec. 586A. Declarations Regarding Iraq's Invasion Of Kuwait

note. The Congress-

(1) condemns Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990;

(2) supports the actions that have been taken by the President

in response to that invasion;

(3) calls for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of

Iraqi forces from Kuwait;

(4) supports the efforts of the United Nations Security Council

to end this violation of international law and threat to international

peace;

(5) supports the imposition and enforcement of multilateral

sanctions against Iraq;

(6) calls on United States allies and other countries to support

fully the efforts of the United Nations Security Council, and to

take other appropriate actions, to bring about an end to Iraq's

occupation of Kuwait; and

(7) condemns the brutal occupation of Kuwait by Iraq and its

gross violations of internationally recognized human rights in

Kuwait, including widespread arrests, torture, summary

executions, and mass extrajudicial killings.

See. 586B. Consultations With Congress

President. The President shall keep the Congress fully informed, and shall

consult with the Congress, with respect to current and anticipated events

regarding the international crisis caused by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait,

including with respect to United States actions.

Sec. 586C. Trade Embargo Against Iraq

Prcsident. (a) CONTINUATION OF EMBARGO-Except as otherwise provided

in this section, the President shall continue to impose the trade embargo

and other economic sanctions with respect to Iraq and Kuwait that the

United States is imposing, in response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait,

pursuant to Executive Orders Numbered 12724 and 12725 (August 9,

1990) and, to the extent they are still in effect, Executive Orders

Numbered 12722 and 12723 (August 2, 1990). Notwithstanding any

other provision of law, no funds, credits, guarantees, or insurance

appropriated or otherwise made available by this or any other Act for

fiscal year 1991 or any fiscal year thereafter shall be used to support or

administer any financial or commercial operation of any United States

Government department, agency, or other entity, or of any person subject

to the jurisdiction of the United States, for the benefit of the Government

of Iraq, its agencies or instrumentalities, or any person working on behalf
Foreign Ops. Appropriations (Iraq Sanctions) (P.L. 101-513) 1093

of the Government of Iraq, contrary to the trade embargo and other

economic sanctions imposed in accordance with this section.

(b) HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE-To the extent that

transactions involving foodstuffs or payments for foodstuffs are

exempted 'in humanitarian circumstances' from the prohibitions

established by the United States pursuant to United Nations Security

Council Resolution 661 (1990), those exemptions shall be limited to

foodstuffs that are to be provided consistent with United Nations Security

Council Resolution 666 (1990) and other relevant Security Council

resolutions.

(c) NOTICE TO CONGRESS OF EXCEPTIONS TO AND

TERMINATION OF SANCTIONS-

(I) NOTICE OF REGULATIONS-Any regulations issued after

the date of enactment of this Act with respect to the economic

sanctions imposed with respect to Iraq and Kuwait by the United

States under Executive Orders Numbered 12722 and 12723 (August

2, 1990) and Executive Orders Numbered 12724 and 12725 (August

9, 1990) shall be submitted to the Congress before those regulations

take effect.

President. (2) NOTICE OF TERMINATION OF SANCTIONS-The

President shall notify the Congress at least 15 days before the

termination, in whole or in part, of any sanction imposed with respect

to Iraq or Kuwait pursuant to those Executive orders.

(d) Relation to Other Laws-

(I) SANCTIONS LEGISLATION-The sanctions that are

described in subsection (a) are in addition to, and not in lieu of the

sanctions provided for in section 586G of this Act or any other

provision of law.

(2) NATIONAL EMERGENCIES AND UNITED NATIONS

LEGISLATION-Nothing in this section supersedes any provision of

the National Emergencies Act or any authority of the President under

the International Emergency Economic Powers Act or section 5(a) of

the United Nations Participation Act of 1945.

See. 586D. Compliance With United Nations Sanctions Against Iraq

(a) DENIAL OF ASSISTANCE-None of the funds appropriated or

otherwise made available pursuant to this Act to carry out the Foreign

Assistance Act of 1961 (including Title IV of Chapter 2 of Part I, relating

to the Overseas Private Investment Corporation) or the Arms Export

Control Act may be used to provide assistance to any country that is not

in compliance with the United Nations Security Council sanctions

against Iraq unless the President determines and so certifies to the

Congress that-

(I) such assistance is in the national interest of the United States;

(2) such assistance will directly benefit the needy people in that

country; or (3) the assistance to be provided will be humanitarian assistance

for foreign nationals who have fled Iraq and Kuwait.

(b) IMPORT SANCTIONS-If the President considers that the taking

of such action would promote the effectiveness of the economic

sanctions of the United Nations and the United States imposed with

respect to Iraq, and is consistent with the national interest, the President

may prohibit, for such a period of time as he considers appropriate, the

importation into the United States of any or all products of any foreign

country that has not prohibited-
1094 Foreign Ops. Appropriations (Iraq Sanctions) (P.L. 101-513)

(1) the importation of products of Iraq into its customs territory,

and

(2) the export of its products to Iraq.

Sec. 586E. Penalties For Violations Of Embargo

Notwithstanding section 206 of the International Emergency

Economic Powers Act (50 USC 1705) and section 5(b) of the United

Nations Participation Act of 1945 (22 USC 287c(b))-

(I) a civil penalty of not to exceed $250,000 may be imposed on

any person who, after the date of enactment of this Act, violates or

evades or attempts to violate or evade Executive Order Numbered

12722, 12723, 12724, or 12725 or any license, order, or regulation

issued under any such Executive order; and

(2) whoever, after the date of enactment of this Act, willfully violates or evades or attempts to violate or evade Executive Order

Numbered 12722, 12723, 12724, or 12725 or any license, order, or

regulation issued under any such Executive order-

(A) shall, upon conviction, be fined not more than $1,000,000,

if a person other than a natural person; or

(B) if a natural person, shall, upon conviction, be fined not

more than $1,000,000, be imprisoned for not more than 12 years,

or both.

Any officer, director, or agent of any corporation who knowingly

participates in a violation, evasion, or attempt described in paragraph (2)

may be punished by imposition of the fine or imprisonment (or both)

specified in subparagraph (B) of that paragraph.

See. 586F. Declarations Regarding Iraq's Long-Standing Violations

Of International Law

(a) IRAQ'S VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW-The

Congress determines that-

(I) the Government of Iraq has demonstrated repeated and blatant

disregard for its obligations under international law by violating the

Charter of the United Nations, the Protocol for the Prohibition of the

Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of

Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (done at Geneva, June 17,

1925), as well as other international treaties;

(2) the Government of Iraq is a party to the International

Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant

on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights and is obligated under the

Covenants, as well as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to

respect internationally recognized human rights;

(3) the State Department's Country Reports on Human Rights

Practices for 1989 again characterizes Iraq's human rights record as

abysmal";

(4) Amnesty International, Middle East Watch, and other

independent human rights organizations have documented extensive,

systematic, and continuing human rights abuses by the Government

of Iraq, including summary executions, mass political killings,

disappearances, widespread use of torture, arbitrary arrests and

prolonged detention without trial of thousands of political opponents,

forced relocation and deportation, denial of nearly all civil and

political rights such as freedom of association, assembly, speech, and

the press, and the imprisonment, torture, and execution of children;

(5) since 1987, the Government of Iraq has intensified its severe

repression of the Kurdish minority of Iraq, deliberately destroyed

more than 3,000 villages and towns in the Kurdish regions, and
Foreign Ops. Appropriations (IraQ Sanctions) (P.L. 101-513) 1095

forcibly expelled more than 500,000 people, thus effectively

depopulating the nrral areas of Iraqi Kurdistan;

(6) Iraq has blatantly violated international law by initiating use of

chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war;

(7) Iraq has also violated international law by using chemical

weapons against its own Kurdish citizens, resulting in tens of

thousands of deaths and more than 65,000 refugees;

Saddam (8) Iraq continues to expand its chemical weapons capability, and

Hussein. President Saddam Hussein has threatened to use chemical weapons

against other nations;

(9) persuasive evidence exists that Iraq is developing biological

weapons in violation of international law;

(10) there are strong indications that Iraq has taken steps to

produce nuclear weapons and has attempted to smuggle from the

United States, in violation of United States law, components for

triggering devices used in nuclear warheads whose manufacture

would contravene the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear

Weapons, to which Iraq is a party; and

Saddarn (11) Iraqi President Saddam Hussein has threatened to use

Il ussein. terrorism against other nations in violation of international law and

has increased Iraq's support for the Palestine Liberation Organization

and other Palestinian groups that have conducted terrorist acts.

(b) HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS-The Congress determines that

the Government of Iraq is engaged in a consistent pattern of gross

violations of internationally recognized human rights. All provisions of

law that impose sanctions against a country whose government is

engaged in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally

recognized human rights shall be fully enforced against Iraq.

(c) SUPPORT FOR INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM-

(I) The Congress determines that Iraq is a country which has

repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism, a

country which grants sanctuary from prosecution to individuals or

groups which have committed an act of international terrorism,

and a country which otherwise supports international terrorism.

The provisions of law specified in paragraph (2) and all other

provisions of law that impose sanctions against a country which

has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism,

which grants sanctuary from prosecution to an individual or group

which has committed an act of international terrorism, or which

otherwise supports international terrorism shall be fully enforced

against Iraq.

(2) The provisions of law referred to in paragraph (I) are-

(A) section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act;

(B) section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961;

(C) sections 555 and 556 of this Act (and the

corresponding sections of predecessor foreign operations

appropriations Acts); and

(D) section 555 of the International Security and

Development Cooperation Act of 1985.

(d) MULTILATERAL COOPERATION-The Congress calls on the

President to seek multilateral cooperation-

(I) to deny dangerous technologies to Iraq;

(2) to induce Iraq to respect internationally recognized human

rights; and
1096 Foreign Ops. Appropriations (Iraq Sanctions) (P.L. 101-513)

(3) to induce Iraq to allow appropriate international humanitarian

and human rights organizations to have access to Iraq and Kuwait,

including the areas in northern Iraq traditionally inhabited by Kurds.

See. 586G. Sanctions Against Iraq

(a) IMPOSITION-Except as provided in section 586H, the following

sanctions shall apply with respect to Iraq:

(I) FMS SALES-The United States Government shall not enter

into any sale with Iraq under the Arms Export Control Act.

(2) COMMERCIAL ARMS SALES- Licenses shall not be issued

for the export to Iraq of any item on the United States Munitions List.

(3) EXPORTS OF CERTAIN GOODS AND TECHNOLOGYThe authorities of section 6 of the Export Administration Act of 1979

(50 USC App. 2405) shall be used to prohibit the export to Iraq of

any goods or technology listed pursuant to that section or section

5(c)(1) of that Act (50 USC App. 2404(c)(1)) on the control list

provided for in section 4(b) of that Act (50 USC App. 2403(b)).

(4) Nuclear equipment, materials, and technology-

(A) NRC LICENSES-The Nuclear Regulatory Commission

shall not issue any license or other authorization under the Atomic

Energy Act of 1954 (42 USC 2011 and following) for the export

to Iraq of any source or special nuclear material, any production

or utilization facility, any sensitive nuclear technology, any

component, item, or substance determined to have significance for

nuclear explosive purposes pursuant to section 109b. of the

Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 USC 2139(b)), or any other

material or technology requiring such a license or authorization.

(B) DISTRIBUTION OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS-The

authority of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 shall not be used to

distribute any special nuclear material, source material, or

byproduct material to Iraq.

(C) DOE AUTHORIZATIONS-The Secretary of Energy shall

not provide a specific authorization under section 57b. (2) of the

Atomic Energy Act of 1954(42 USC 2077(b)(2)) for any activity

that would constitute directly or indirectly engaging in Iraq in

activities that require a specific authorization under that section.

(5) ASSISTANCE FROM INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL

INSTITUTIONS-The United States shall oppose any loan or

financial or technical assistance to Iraq by international financial

institutions in accordance with section 701 of the International

Financial Institutions Act (22 USC 262d).

Credit. (6) ASSISTANCE THROUGH THE EXPORT-IMPORT BANKCredits and credit guarantees through the Export-Import Bank of the

United States shall be denied to Iraq.

(7) ASSISTANCE THROUGH THE COMMODITY CREDIT

CORPORATION-Credit, credit guarantees, and other assistance

through the Commodity Credit Corporation shall be denied to Iraq.

(8) FOREIGN ASSISTANCE-All forms of assistance under the

Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 USC 2151 and following) other

than emergency assistance for medical supplies and other forms of

emergency humanitarian assistance, and under the Arms Export

Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 and following) shall be denied to Iraq.

(b) CONTRACT SANCTITY-For purposes of the export controls

imposed pursuant to subsection (a)(3), the date described in subsection

(m)(1) of section 6 of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 USC

App. 2405) shall be deemed to be August 1, 1990,
Foreign Ops. Appropriations (Iraq Sanctions) (P.L. 101-513) 1097

See. 586H. Waiver Authority

(a) IN GENERAL-The President may waive the requirements of any

paragraph of section 586G(a) if the President makes a certification under

subsection (b) or subsection (c).

(b) CERTIFICATION OF FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES IN IRAQI

POLICIES AND ACTIONS-The authority of subsection (a) may be

exercised 60 days after the President certifies to the Congress that-

(I) the Government of Iraq-

(A) has demonstrated, through a pattern of conduct,

substantial improvement in its respect for internationally

recognized human rights;

(B) is not acquiring, developing, or manufacturing (i)

ballistic missiles, (ii) chemical, biological, or nuclear

weapons, or (iii) components for such weapons; has forsworn

the first use of such weapons; and is taking substantial and

verifiable steps to destroy or otherwise dispose of any such

missiles and weapons it possesses; and

(C) does not provide support for international terrorism;

(2) the Government of Iraq is in substantial compliance with its

obligations under international law, including-

(A) the Charter of the United Nations;

(B) the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

(done at New York, December 16, 1966) and the International

Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (done at New

York, December 16, 1966);

(C) the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the

Crime of Genocide (done at Paris, December 9, 1948);

(D) the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of

Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological

Methods of Warfare (done at Geneva, June 17, 1925);

(E) the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

(done at Washington, London, and Moscow, July 1, 1968); and

(F) the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,

Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and

Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (done at Washington,

London, and Moscow, April 10, 1972); and

(3) the President has determined that it is essential to the national

interests of the United States to exercise the authority of subsection

(a).

(c) CERTIFICATION OF FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES IN IRAQI

LEADERSHIP AND POLICIES-The authority of subsection (a) may be

exercised 30 days after the President certifies to the Congress that-

(I) there has been a fundamental change in the leadership of the

Government of Iraq; and

(2) the new Government of Iraq has provided reliable and credible

assurance that-

(A) it respects internationally recognized human rights and it

will demonstrate such respect through its conduct;

(B) it is not acquiring, developing, or manufacturing and it

will not acquire, develop, or manufacture (i) ballistic missiles, (ii)

chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons, or (iii) components for

such weapons; has forsworn the first use of such weapons; and is

taking substantial and verifiable steps to destroy or otherwise

dispose of any such missiles and weapons it possesses;
1098 Foreign Ops. Appropriations (Iraq Sanctions) (P.L. 101-513)

(C) it is not and will not provide support for international

terrorism; and(D) it is and will continue to be in substantial

compliance with its obligations under international law, including

all the treaties specified in subparagraphs (A) through (F) of

subsection (b)(2).

(d) INFORMATION TO BE INCLUDED IN CERTIFICATIONSAny certification under subsection (b) or (c) shall include the justification

for each determination required by that subsection. The certification shall

also specify which paragraphs of section 586G(a) the President will

waive pursuant to that certification.

See. 5861. Denial Of Licenses For Certain Exports To Countries

Assisting Iraq's Rocket Or Chemical, Biological, Or Nuclear

Weapons Capability

(a) RESTRICTION ON EXPORT LICENSES-None of the funds

appropriated by this or any other Act may be used to approve the

licensing for export of any supercomputer to any country whose

government the President determines is assisting, or whose government

officials the President determines are assisting, Iraq to improve its rocket

technology or chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons capability.

(b) NEGOTIATIONS-The President is directed to begin immediate

negotiations with those governments with which the United States has

bilateral supercomputer agreements, including the Government of the

United Kingdom and the Government of Japan, on conditions restricting

the transfer to Iraq of supercomputer or associated technology.

See. 586J. Reports To Congress.

(a) STUDY AND REPORT ON THE INTERNATIONAL EXPORT

TO IRAQ OF NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, CHEMICAL, AND

BALLISTIC MISSILE TECHNOLOGY-

(I) The President shall conduct a study on the sale, export, and

third party transfer or development of nuclear, biological, chemical,

and ballistic missile technology to or with Iraq including-

(A) an identification of specific countries, as well as

companies and individuals, both foreign and domestic, engaged in

such sale or export of, nuclear, biological, chemical, and ballistic

missile technology;

(B) a detailed description and analysis of the international

supply, information, support, and coproduction network,

individual, corporate, and state, responsible for Iraq's current

capability in the area of nuclear, biological, chemical, and ballistic

missile technology; and

(C) a recommendation of standards and procedures against

which to measure and verify a decision of the Government of Iraq

to terminate the development, production, coproduction, and

deployment of nuclear, biological, chemical, and offensive

ballistic missile technology as well as the destruction of all

existing facilities associated with such technologies.

(2) The President shall include in the study required by paragraph

(1) specific recommendations on new mechanisms, to include, but not

be limited to, legal, political, economic and regulatory, whereby the

United States might contribute, in conjunction with its friends, allies,

and the international community, to the management, control, or

elimination of the threat of nuclear, biological, chemical, and ballistic

missile proliferation.

(3) Not later than March 30, 1991, the President shall submit to

the Committee on Appropriations and the Committee on Foreign
Foreign Ops. Appropriations (Iraq Sanctions) (P.L. 101-513) 1099

Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Appropriations and the

Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, a

report, in both classified and unclassified form, setting forth the

findings of the study required by paragraph (I) of this subsection.

(b) STUDY AND REPORT ON IRAQ'S OFFENSIVE MILITARY

CAPABILITY-

(1) The President shall conduct a study on Iraq's offensive

military capability and its effect on the Middle East balance of power

including an assessment of Iraq's power projection capability, the

prospects for another sustained conflict with Iran, joint IraqiJordanian military cooperation, the threat Iraq's arms transfer

activities pose to United States allies in the Middle East, and the

extension of Iraq's political-military influence into Africa and Latin

America.

(2) Not later than March 30, 1991, the President shall submit to

the Committee on Appropriations and the Committee on Foreign

Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Appropriations and the

Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, a

report, in both classified and unclassified form, setting forth the

findings of the study required by paragraph (I).

(c) REPORT ON SANCTIONS TAKEN BY OTHER NATIONS

AGAINST IRAQ-

(1) The President shall prepare a report on the steps taken by other

nations, both before and after the August 2, 1990, invasion of Kuwait,

to curtail the export of goods, services, and technologies to Iraq

which might contribute to, or enhance, Iraq's nuclear, biological,

chemical, and ballistic missile capability.

(2) The President shall provide a complete accounting of

international compliance with each of the sanctions resolutions

adopted by the United Nations Security Council against Iraq since

August 2, 1990, and shall list, by name, each country which to his

knowledge, has provided any assistance to Iraq and the amount and

type of that assistance in violation of each United Nations resolution.

(3) The President shall make every effort to encourage other

nations, in whatever forum or context, to adopt sanctions toward Iraq

similar to those contained in this section.

(4) Not later than every 6 months after the date of enactment of

this Act, the President shall submit to the Committee on

Appropriations and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate

and the Committee on Appropriations and the Committee on Foreign

Affairs of the House of Representatives, a report in both classified

and unclassified form, setting forth the findings of the study required

by paragraph (I) of this subsection.
1100 Emerg. Wartime Supp. Appr. (Iraq Sanctions) (P.L. 108-11)

G. EMERGENCY WARTIME SUPPLEMENTAL

APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2003 (IRAQ SANCTIONS)

Public Law 108-11 117 Stat. 579

April 16, 2003

An Act

Making emergency wartime supplemental appropriations for the fiscal

year 2003, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United

States ofAmerica in Congress assembled,

Sec. 1503.

The President may suspend the application of any provision of the Iraq

Sanctions Act of 1990: Provided, That nothing in this section shall affect

the applicability of the Iran-Iraq Arms Non- Proliferation Act of 1992

(Public Law 102-484), except that such Act shall not apply to

humanitarian assistance and supplies: Provided further, That the

President may make inapplicable with respect to Iraq section 620A of the

Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 or any other provision of law that applies

to countries that have supported terrorism: Provided further, That

military equipment, as defined by Title XVI, section 1608(I)(A) of

Public Law 102-484, shall not be exported under the authority of this

section: Providedfiurther, That section 307 of the Foreign Assistance Act

of 1961 shall not apply with respect to programs of international

organizations for Iraq: Provided further, That provisions of law that

direct the United States Government to vote against or oppose loans or

other uses of funds, including for financial or technical assistance, in

international financial institutions for Iraq shall not be construed as

applying to Iraq: Provided firther, That the President shall submit a

President. notification 5 days prior to exercising any of the authorities described in

Notilication. this section to the Committee on Appropriations of each House of the

Congress, the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, and the

Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives:

Provided further, That not more than 60 days after enactment of this Act

and every 90 days thereafter the President shall submit a report to the

Deadllines. Committee on Appropriations of each House of the Congress, the

President. Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, and the Committee on

Reports. International Relations of the House of Representatives containing a

summary of all licenses approved for export to Iraq of any item on the

Commerce Control List contained in the Export Administration

Regulations, 15 CFR Part 774, Supplement 1, including identification of

end users of such items: Provided further, That the authorities contained

in this section shall expire on September 30, 2004, or on the date of

Expiration enactment of a subsequent Act authorizing assistance for Iraq and that

date. specifically amends, repeals or otherwise makes inapplicable the

authorities of this section, whichever occurs first.
Memo Suspending the Iraq Sanctions Act 1101

H. MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE SUSPENDING

THE IRAQ SANCTIONS ACT

For Immediate Release

Office of the Press Secretary

May 7, 2003

Memorandum for the Secretary of State

Presidential Determination

No. 2003-23

THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE

SUBJECT: Suspending the Iraq Sanctions Act, Making Inapplicable Certain Statutory

Provisions Related to Iraq, and Delegating Authorities, under the Emergency Wartime

Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2003

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the laws of the United

States, including sections 1503 and 1504 of the Emergency Wartime Supplemental Act,

2003, Public Law 108-11 (the "Act"), and section 301 of Title 3, United States Code, I

hereby:

(I) suspend the application of all of the provisions, other than section 586E, of the Iraq

Sanctions Act of 1990, Public Law 101-5 13, and

(2) make inapplicable with respect to Iraq section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of

1961, Public Law 87-195, as amended (the "FAA"), and any other provision of law that

applies to countries that have supported terrorism.

In addition, I delegate the functions and authorities conferred upon the President by:

(1) section 1503 of the Act to submit reports to the designated committees of the

Congress to the Secretary of Commerce, or until such time as the principal licensing

responsibility for the export to Iraq of items on the Commerce Control List has reverted

to the Department of Commerce, to the Secretary of the Treasury; and,

(2) section 1504 of the Act to the Secretary of State.

The functions and authorities delegated herein may be further delegated and redelegated

to the extent consistent with applicable law.

The Secretary of State is authorized and directed to publish this determination in the

Federal Register.

GEORGE W. BUSH

H ##N
1102 Nat. Def. Auth. Act, 1993 (Iran-Iraq Nonprol) (P.L. 102-484)

I. NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT

FOR FISCAL YEAR 1993 (IRAN-IRAQ ARMS NONPROLIFERATION OF 1992)

Public Law 102-484 106 Stat. 2571

Iran-Iraq Arms

NonProliferation

Act of 1992.

50 USC 1701

note.

President.

October 23, 1992

Division*A *Title XVI

Title XVI-Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act Of 1992

Sec. 1601. Short Title

This Title may be cited as the "Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act

of 1992".

Sec. 1602. United States Policy

(a) IN GENERAL-It shall be the policy of the United States to

oppose, and urgently to seek the agreement of other nations also to

oppose, any transfer to Iran or Iraq of any goods or technology, including

dual-use goods or technology, wherever that transfer could materially

contribute to either country's acquiring chemical, biological, nuclear, or

destabilizing numbers and types of advanced conventional weapons.

(b) SANCTIONS-

(I) In the furtherance of this policy, the President shall apply

sanctions and controls with respect to Iran, Iraq, and those nations

and persons who assist them in acquiring weapons of mass

destruction in accordance with the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961,

the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, the Chemical and

Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991,

Chapter 7 of the Arms Export Control Act, and other relevant

statutes, regarding the non-proliferation of weapons of mass

destruction and the means of their delivery.

(2) The President should also urgently seek the agreement of other

nations to adopt and institute, at the earliest practicable date,

sanctions and controls comparable to those the United States is

obligated to apply under this subsection.

(c) PUBLIC IDENTIFICATION-The Congress calls on the President

to identify publicly (in the report required by section 1607) any country

or person that transfers goods or technology to Iran or Iraq contrary to the

policy set forth in subsection (a).

See. 1603. Application To Iran Of Certain Iraq Sanctions

The sanctions against Iraq specified in paragraphs (I) through (4) of

section 586G(a) of the Iraq Sanctions Act of 1990 (as contained in Public

Law 101-513), including denial of export licenses for United States

persons and prohibitions on United States Government sales, shall be

applied to the same extent and in the same manner with respect to Iran.

See. 1604. Sanctions Against Certain Persons

(a) PROHIBITION-If any person transfers or retransfers goods or

technology so as to contribute knowingly and materially to thq efforts by

Iran or Iraq (or any agency or instrumentality of either such country) to

acquire chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons or destabilizing

numbers and types of advanced conventional weapons, then the sanctions

described in subsection (b) shall be imposed.
Nat. Def. Auth. Act, 1993 (Iran-Iraq Nonprol) (P.L. 102-484) 1103

(b) MANDATORY SANCTIONS-The sanctions to be imposed

pursuant to subsection (a) are as follows:

(1) PROCUREMENT SANCTION-For a period of two years, the

United States Government shall not procure, or enter into any

contract for the procurement of, any goods or services from the

sanctioned person.

(2) EXPORT SANCTION- For a period of two years, the United

States Government shall not issue any license for any export by or to

the sanctioned person.

Sec. 1605. Sanctions Against Certain Foreign Countries

President. (a) PROHIBITION-If the President determines that the government

of any foreign country transfers or retransfers goods or technology so as

to contribute knowingly and materially to the efforts by Iran or Iraq (or

any agency or instrumentality of either such country) to acquire

chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons or destabilizing numbers and

types of advanced conventional weapons, then-

(1) the sanctions described in subsection (b) shall be imposed on

such country; and

(2) in addition, the President may apply, in the discretion of the

President, the sanction described in subsection (c).

(b) MANDATORY SANCTIONS- Except as provided in paragraph

(2), the sanctions to be imposed pursuant to subsection (a)(1) are as

follows:

(1) SUSPENSION OF UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE-The

United States Government shall suspend, for a period of one year,

United States assistance to the sanctioned country.

(2) MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT BANK

ASSISTANCE-The Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct the

United States Executive Director to each appropriate international

financial institution to oppose, and vote against, for a period of one

year, the extension by such institution of any loan or financial or

technical assistance to the sanctioned country.

(3) SUSPENSION OF CODEVELOPMENT OR

COPRODUCTION AGREEMENTS-The United States shall

suspend, for a period of one year, compliance with its obligations

under any memorandum of understanding with the sanctioned

country for the codevelopment or coproduction of any item on the

United States Munitions List (established under section 38 of the

Arms Export Control Act), including any obligation for

implementation of the memorandum of understanding through the

sale to the sanctioned country of technical data or assistance or the

licensing for export to the sanctioned country of any component part.

(4) SUSPENSION OF MILITARY AND DUAL-USE

TECHNICAL EXCHANGE AGREEMENTS-The United States

shall suspend, for a period of one year, compliance with its

obligations under any technical exchange agreement involving

military and dual-use technology between the United States and the

sanctioned country that does not directly contribute to the security of

the United States, and no military or dual-use technology may be

exported from the United States to the sanctioned country pursuant to

that agreement during that period.

(5) UNITED STATES MUNITIONS LIST-No item on the

United States Munitions List (established pursuant to section 38 of

the Arms Export Control Act) may be exported to the sanctioned

country for a period of one year.
1104 Nat. Def. Auth. Act, 1993 (Iran-Iraq Nonprol) (P.L. 102-484)

(c) DISCRETIONARY SANCTION-The sanction referred to in

subsection (a)(2) is as follows:

(I) USE OF AUTHORITIES OF INTERNATIONAL

EMERGENCY ECONOMIC POWERS ACT-Except as provided in

paragraph (2), the President may exercise, in accordance with the

provisions of that Act, the authorities of the International Emergency

Economic Powers Act with respect to the sanctioned country.

(2) EXCEPTION-Paragraph (I) does not apply with respect to

urgent humanitarian assistance.

See. 1606. Waiver

President. The President may waive the requirement to impose a sanction

described in section 1603, in the case of Iran, or a sanction described in

section 1604(b) or 1605(b), in the case of Iraq and Iran, 15 days after the

President determines and so reports to the Committees on Armed

Services and Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committees on

Armed Services and Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives that

it is essential to the national interest of the United States to exercise such

waiver authority. Any such report shall provide a specific and detailed

rationale for such determination.

Sec. 1607. Reporting Requirement

President. (a) ANNUAL REPORT-Beginning one year after the date of the

enactment of this Act, and every 12 months thereafter, the President shall

submit to the Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations of

the Senate and the Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Affairs

of the House of Representatives a report detailing-

(1) all transfers or retransfers made by any person or foreign

government during the preceding 12-month period which are subject

to any sanction under this Title; and

(2) the actions the President intends to undertake or has

undertaken pursuant to this Title with respect to each such transfer.

(b) REPORT ON INDIVIDUAL TRANSFERS-Whenever the

President determines that a person or foreign government has made a

transfer which is subject to any sanction under this Title, the President

shall, within 30 days after such transfer, submit to the Committees on

Armed Services and Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committees

on Armed Services and Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives a

report-

(1) identifying the person or government and providing the details

of the transfer; and

(2) describing the actions the President intends to undertake or has

undertaken under the provisions of this Title with respect to each such

transfer.

(c) FORM OF TRANSMITTAL-Reports required by this section

may be submitted in classified as well as in unclassified form.

See. 1608. Definitions

For purposes of this Title:

(I) The term "advanced conventional weapons" includes-

(A) such long-range precision-guided munitions, fuel air

explosives, cruise missiles, low observability aircraft, other radar

evading aircraft, advanced military aircraft, military satellites,

electromagnetic weapons, and laser weapons as the President

determines destabilize the military balance or enhance offensive

capabilities in destabilizing ways;

(B) such advanced command, control, and communications

systems, electronic warfare systems, or intelligence collection
Nat. Def. Auth. Act, 1993 (Iran-iraci Nonprol) (P.L. 102-484) 1105

systems as the President determines destabilize the military

balance or enhance offensive capabilities in destabilizing ways;

and

(C) such other items or systems as the President may, by

regulation, determine necessary for purposes of this Title.

(2) The term "cruise missile" means guided missiles that use

aerodynamic lift to offset gravity and propulsion to counteract drag.

(3) The term "goods or technology" means-

(A) any article, natural or manmade substance, material,

supply, or manufactured product, including inspection and test

equipment; and

(B) any information and know-how (whether in tangible form,

such as models, prototypes, drawings, sketches, diagrams,

blueprints, or manuals, or in intangible form, such as training or

technical services) that can be used to design, produce,

manufacture, utilize, or reconstruct goods, including computer

software and technical data.

(4) The term "person" means any United States or foreign

individual, partnership, corporation, or other form of association, or

any of their successor entities, parents, or subsidiaries.

(5) The term "sanctioned country" means a country against which

sanctions are required to be imposed pursuant to section 1605.

(6) The term "sanctioned person" means a person that makes a

transfer described in section 1604(a).

(7) The term "United States assistance" means-

(A) any assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961,

other than-

(i) urgent humanitarian assistance or medicine, and

(ii) assistance under Chapter I I of Part I (as enacted by the

Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian Democracies and

Open Markets Support Act of 1992);

(B) sales and assistance under the Arms Export Control Act;

(C) financing by the Commodity Credit Corporation for export

sales of agricultural commodities; and

(D) financing under the Export-import Bank Act.
1106 North Korea Threat Reduction (Subtitle B) (P.L. 106-113)

J. NORTH KOREA THREAT REDUCTION (SUBTITLE B)

Public Law 10.6-113 113 Stat. 1501-472

November 29, 1999

An Act

making consolidated appropriations for the fiscal )ear ending September

30, 2000, and for other purposes.

Sec. 821. Short Title

This subtitle may be cited as the "North Korea Threat Reduction Act

of 1999"

Sec. 822. Restrictions On Nuclear Cooperation With North Korea

(a) IN GENERAL.-Notwithstanding any other provision of law or

any international agreement, no agreement for cooperation (as defined in

section lIb. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 USC 2014 b.))

between the United States and North Korea may become effective, no

license may be issued for export directly or indirectly to North Korea of

any nuclear material, facilities, components, or other goods, services, or

technology that would be subject to such agreement, and no approval

may be given for the transfer or retransfer directly or indirectly to North

Korea of any nuclear material, facilities, components, or other goods,

services, or technology that would be subject to such agreement, until the

President determines and reports to the Committee on International

Relations of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign

Relations of the Senate that-

(I) North Korea has come into full compliance with its safeguards

agreement with the IAEA (INFCIRC/403), and has taken all steps

that have been deemed necessary by the IAEA in this regard;

(2) North Korea has permitted the IAEA full access to all

additional sites and all information (including historical records)

deemed necessary by the IAEA to verify, the accuracy and

completeness of North Korea's initial report of May 4, 1992, to the

IAEA on all nuclear sites and material in North Korea;

(3) North Korea is in full compliance with its obligations under

the Agreed Framework;

(4) North Korea has consistently taken steps to implement the

Joint Declaration on Denuclearization, and is in full compliance with

its obligations under numbered paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of the Joint

Declaration on Denuclearization (excluding in the case of numbered

paragraph 3 facilities frozen pursuant to the Agreed Framework);

(5) North Korea does not have uranium enrichment or nuclear

reprocessing facilities (excluding facilities frozen pursuant to the

Agreed Framework), and is making no significant progress toward

acquiring or developing such facilities;

(6) North Korea does not have nuclear weapons and is making no

significant effort to acquire, develop, test, produce, or deploy such

weapons; and

(7) the transfer to North Korea of key nuclear components, under

the proposed agreement for cooperation with North Korea and in

accordance with the Agreed Framework, is in the national interest of

the United States.

(b) CONSTRUCTION.-The restrictions contained in subsection (a)

shall apply in addition to all other applicable procedures, requirements,
North Korea Threat Reduction (Subtitle B) (P.L. 106-113) 1107

and restrictions contained in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and other

laws.

See. 823. Definitions

In this subtitle:

(1) AGREED FRAMEWORK.-The term "Agreed

Framework" means the "Agreed Framework Between the United

States of America and the Democratic People's Republic of

Korea", signed in Geneva on October 21, 1994, and the

Confidential Minute to that Agreement.

(2) IAEA.-The term "IAEA" means the International Atomic

Energy Agency.

(3) NORTH KOREA.-The term "North Korea" means the

Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

(4) JOINT DECLARATION ON DENUCLEARIZATION.-

The term "Joint Declaration on Denuclearization" means the Joint

Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,

issued by the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People's

Republic of Korea on January 1, 1992.
1108 Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-178)

K. IRAN NONPROLIFERATION ACT OF 2000

Public Law 106-178 114 Stat. 38

I ran

Nonprolit'eration

Act of 2000.

Armis and

munitions.

Weapons.

50 USC 1701

note.

President.

March 14, 2000

An Act

to provide for the application of measures to foreign persons who transfer

to Iran certain goods, services, or technology, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the

United States ofAmerica in Congress assembled,

Sec. 1. Short Title

This Act may be cited as the "Iran and Syria Nonproliferation Act".

Sec. 2. Reports On Proliferation Relating To Iran And Syria 2

(a) REPORTS.-The President shall, at the times specified in

subsection (b), submit to the Committee on International Relations of the

House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the

Senate a report identifying every foreign person with respect to whom

there is credible information indicating that that person, on or after

January I, 1999, transferred to or acquired from Iran, or on or after

January 1, 2005, transferred to or acquired from Syria- 3

(I) goods, services, or technology listed on-

(A) the Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines for the Export of

Nuclear Material, Equipment and Technology (published by the

International Atomic Energy Agency as Information Circular

INFCIRC/254/ Rev.3/ Part I, and subsequent revisions) and

Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment,

Material, and Related Technology (published by the International

Atomic Energy Agency as Information Circular INFCIRC/254/

Rev.3/ Part 2, and subsequent revisions);

(B) the Missile Technology Control Regime Equipment and

Technology Annex of June I1, 1996, and subsequent revisions;

(C) the lists of items and substances relating to biological and

chemical weapons the export of which is controlled by the

Australia Group;

(D) the Schedule One or Schedule Two list of toxic chemicals

and precursors the export of which is controlled pursuant to the

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production,

Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their

Destruction; or

(E) the Wassenaar Arrangement list of Dual Use Goods and

Technologies and Munitions list of July 12, 1996, and subsequent

revisions; or

(2) goods, services, or technology not listed on any list identified

in paragraph (I) but which nevertheless would be, if they were United

States goods, services, or technology, prohibited for export to Iran or

Syria, as the case may be, 4 because of their potential to make a

P.L. 109-112, § 4(e)(I), 119 Stat. 2366 (2005), struck out "Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000" and substituted

"Iran and Syria Nonproliferation Act." 2

P.L. 109-112, §.4(a)(I), 119 Stat. 2366 (2005), struck out "TO IRAN" and substituted "RELATING TO

IRAN AND SYRIA."

'P.L. 109-112, § 4(a)(2)(A), 119 Stat. 2366 (2005), inserted "or acquired from" and "or on or after

January I, 2005, transferred to or acquired from Syria." 4

P.L. 109-112, § 4(a)(2)(B), 119 Stat. 2366 (2005), inserted "or Syria, as the case may be."
Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-178) 1109

material contribution to the development of nuclear, biological, or

chemical weapons, or of ballistic or cruise missile systems.

Deadline. (b) TIMING OF REPORTS.-The reports under subsection (a) shall

be submitted not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this

Act, not later than 6 months after such date of enactment, and not later

than the end of each 6-month period thereafter.

(c) EXCEPTIONS.-Any foreign person who-

(1) was identified in a previous report submitted under subsection

(a) on account of a particular transfer; or

(2) has engaged in a transfer on behalf of, or in concert with, the

Government of the United States, is not required to be identified on

account of that same transfer in any report submitted thereafter under

this section, except to the degree that new information has emerged

indicating that the particular transfer may have continued, or been

larger, more significant, or different in nature than previously

reported under this section.

(d) Submission in Classified Form--When the President considers it

appropriate, reports submitted under subsection (a), or appropriate parts

thereof, may be submitted in classified form.

Sec. 3. Application Of Measures To Certain Foreign Persons

(a) APPLICATION OF MEASURES.-Subject to sections 4 and 5,

the President is authorized to apply with respect to each foreign person

identified in a report submitted pursuant to section 2(a), for such period

of time as he may determine, any or all of the measures described in

subsection (b).

(b) DESCRIPTION OF MEASURES.-The measures referred to in

subsection (a) are the following:

(1) EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 12938 PROHIBITIONS.-The

measures set forth in subsections (b) and (c) of section 4 of Executive

Order No. 12938.

(2) ARMS EXPORT PROHIBITION.-Prohibition on United

States Government sales to that foreign person of any item on the

United States Munitions List as in effect on August 8, 1995, and

termination of sales to that person of any defense articles, defense

services, or design and construction services under the Arms Export

Control Act.

(3) DUAL USE EXPORT PROHIBITION.-Denial of licenses

and suspension of existing licenses for the transfer to that person of

items the export of which is controlled under the Export

Administration Act of 1979 or the Export Administration

Regulations.

(c) EFFECTIVE DATE OF MEASURES.-Measures applied

pursuant to subsection (a) shall be effective with respect to a foreign

person no later than-

(]) 90 days after the report identifying the foreign person is

submitted, if the report is submitted on or before the date required by

section 2(b);

(2) 90 days after the date required by section 2(b) for submitting

the report, if the report identifying the foreign person is submitted

within 60 days after that date; or

(3) on the date that the report identifying the foreign person is

submitted, if that report is submitted more than 60 days after the date

required by section 2(b).
1110 Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-178)

(d) PUBLICATION IN FEDERAL REGISTER.-The application of

measures to a foreign person pursuant to subsection (a) shall be

announced by notice published in the Federal Register.

See. 4. Procedures If Measures Are Not Applied.

(a) REQUIREMENT TO NOTIFY CONGRESS.-Should the

President not exercise the authority of section 3(a) to apply any or all of

the measures described in section 3(b) with respect to a foreign person

identified in a report submitted pursuant to section 2(a), he shall so notify

the Committee on International Relations of the House of

Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate

no later than the effective date under section 3(c) for measures with

respect to that person.

(b) WRITTEN JUSTIFICATION.-Any notification submitted by the

President under subsection (a) shall include a written justification

describing in detail the facts and circumstances relating specifically to

the foreign person identified in a report submitted pursuant to section

2(a) that support the President's decision not to exercise the authority of

section 3(a) with respect to that person.

(c) SUBMISSION IN CLASSIFIED FORM.-When the President

considers it appropriate, the notification of the President under subsection

(a), and the written justification under subsection (b), or appropriate parts

thereof, may be submitted in classified form.

Sec. 5. Determination Exempting Foreign Person From Sections 3

And 4

(a) IN GENERAL-Sections 3 and 4 shall not apply to a foreign

person 15 days after the President reports to the Committee on

International Relations of the House of Representatives and the

Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate that the President has

determined, on the basis of information provided by that person, or

otherwise obtained by the President, that-

(I) the person did not, on or after January 1, 1999, knowingly

transfer to or acquire from Iran or Syria, as the case may be, 5 the

goods, services, or technology the apparent transfer of which caused

that person to be identified in a report submitted pursuant to section

2(a);

(2) the goods, services, or technology the transfer of which caused

that person to be identified in a report submitted pursuant to section

2(a) did not materially contribute to the efforts of Iran or Syria, as the

case may be,6 to develop nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons, or

ballistic or cruise missile systems;

(3) the person is subject to the primary jurisdiction of a

government that is an adherent to one or more relevant

nonproliferation regimes, the person was identified in a report

submitted pursuant to section 2(a) with respect to a transfer of goods,

services, or technology described in section 2(a)(1), and such transfer

was made consistent with the guidelines and parameters of all such

relevant regimes of which such government is an adherent; or.

(4) the government with primary jurisdiction over the person has

imposed meaningful penalties on that person on account of the

transfer of the goods, services, or technology which caused that

person to be identified in a report submitted pursuant to section 2(a).

5

P. L. 109-112, § 4(b)(1), 119 Star. 2366 (2005), struck out "transfer to Iran" and inserted "transfer to or acquire from Iran or Syria. as the case may be."

"'P,.L 109-112, § 4(b)(2), 119 Stat. 2366 (2005), struck out "Iran's efforts" and inserted "the efforts of Iran or Syria, as the case may be."
Iran Nonr)roliferation Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-178) 1111

(b) OPPORTUNITY TO PROVIDE INFORMATION.-Congress

urges the President-

(I) in every appropriate case, to contact in a timely fashion each

foreign person identified in each report submitted pursuant to section

2(a), or the government with primary jurisdiction over such person, in

order to afford such person, or governments, the opportunity to

provide explanatory, exculpatory, or other additional information

with respect to the transfer that caused such person to be identified in

a report submitted pursuant to section 2(a); and

(2) to exercise the authority in subsection (a) in all cases where

information obtained from a foreign person identified in a report

submitted pursuant to section 2(a), or from the government with

primary jurisdiction over such person, establishes that the exercise of

such authority is warranted.

(c) SUBMISSION IN CLASSIFIED FORM.-When the President

considers it appropriate, the determination and report of the President

under subsection (a), or appropriate parts thereof, may be submitted in

classified form.

Sec. 6. Restriction On Extraordinary Payments In Connection With

The International Space Station

Russian (a) RESTRICTION ON EXTRAORDINARY PAYMENTS IN

Federation. CONNECTION WITH THE INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION.-

President. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no agency of the United

States Government may make extraordinary payments in connection with

the International Space Station to the Russian Aviation and Space

Agency, any organization or entity under the jurisdiction or control of the

Russian Aviation and Space Agency, or any other organization, entity, or

element of the Government of the Russian Federation, unless, during the

fiscal year in which the extraordinary payments in connection with the

International Space Station are to be made, the President has made the

determination described in subsection (b), and reported such

determination to the Committee on International Relations and the

Committee on Science of the House of Representatives and the

Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Commerce,

Science, and Transportation of the Senate.

(b) DETERMINATION REGARDING RUSSIAN COOPERATION

IN PREVENTING PROLIFERATION RELATING TO IRAN OR

SYRIA. 7

-The determination referred to in subsection (a) is a

determination by the President that-

(I) it is the policy of the Government of the Russian Federation to

oppose the proliferation to or from Iran and Syria of weapons of mass

destruction and missile systems capable of delivering such weapons;

(2) the Government of the Russian Federation (including the law

enforcement, export promotion, export control, and intelligence agencies of such government) has demonstrated and continues to

demonstrate a sustained commitment to seek out and prevent the

transfer to or from Iran and Syria 8 of goods, services, and technology

that could make a material contribution to the development of

nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons, or of ballistic or cruise

missile systems; and

7

P.L. 109-112, § 4(c)(I), 119 Stat. 2366 (2005), struck out "to Iran" and inserted "RELATING TO IRAN OR

SYRIA."

'P.L. 109-I 12, § 4(c)(2), 119 Stat. 2366 (2005), struck out "to Iran" in paragraphs I and 2 and inserted "to or from Iran and Syria."
1112 Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-178)

(3) neither the Russian Aviation and Space Agency, nor any

organization or entity under the jurisdiction or control of the Russian

Aviation and Space Agency, has, during the I-year period prior to the

date of the determination pursuant to this subsection, made transfers

to or from Iran or Syria9 reportable under section 2(a) of this Act

(other than transfers with respect to which a determination pursuant

to section 5 has been or will be made).

Deadline. (c) PRIOR NOTIFICATION.-Not less than 5 days before making a

determination under subsection (b), the President shall notify the

Committee on International Relations and the Committee on Science of

the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations

and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the

Senate of his intention to make such determination.

(d) WRITTEN JUSTIFICATION.-A determination of the President

under subsection (b) shall include a written justification describing in

detail the facts and circumstances supporting the President's conclusion.

(e) SUBMISSION IN CLASSIFIED FORM.-When the President

considers it appropriate, a determination of the President under

subsection (b), a prior notification under subsection (c), and a written

justification under subsection (d), or appropriate parts thereof, may be

submitted in classified form.

(f) EXCEPTION FOR CREW SAFETY.-

(I) EXCEPTION.-The National Aeronautics and Space

Administration may make extraordinary payments that would

otherwise be prohibited under this section to the Russian Aviation

and Space Agency or any organization or entity under the jurisdiction

or control of the Russian Aviation and Space Agency if the President

has notified the Congress in writing that such payments are necessary

to prevent the imminent loss of life by or grievous injury to

individuals aboard the International Space Station.

Deadline. (2) REPORT.-Not later than 30 days after notifying Congress

that the National Aeronautics and Space Administration will make

extraordinary payments under paragraph (1), the President shall

submit to Congress a report describing-

(A) the extent to which the provisions of subsection (b) had

been met as of the date of notification; and

(B) the measures that the National Aeronautics and Space

Administration is taking to ensure that-

(i) the conditions posing a threat of imminent loss of life

by or grievous injury to individuals aboard the International

Space Station necessitating the extraordinary payments are not

repeated; and

(ii) it is no longer necessary to make extraordinary

payments in order to prevent imminent loss of life by or

grievous injury to individuals aboard the International Space

Station.

(g) SERVICE MODULE EXCEPTION.-

(1) The National Aeronautics and Space Administration may

make extraordinary payments that would otherwise be prohibited

under this section to the Russian Aviation and Space Agency, any

organization or entity under the jurisdiction or control of the Russian

Aviation and Space Agency, or any subcontractor thereof for the

construction, testing, preparation, delivery, launch, or maintenance of

'P.L. 109-112, § 4(c)(3), 119 Stat. 2366 (2005), struck out "to Iran" and inserted "to or from Iran or Syria."
Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-178) 1113

the Service Module, and for the purchase (at a total cost not to exceed

$14,000,000) of the pressure dome for the Interim Control Module

and the Androgynous Peripheral Docking Adapter and related

hardware for the United States propulsion module, if-

(A) the President has notified Congress at least 5 days before

making such payments;

(B) no report has been made under section 2 with respect to an

activity of the entity to receive such payment, and the President

has no credible information of any activity that would require

such a report; and

(C) the United States will receive goods or services of value to

the United States commensurate with the value of the

extraordinary payments made.

(2) For purposes of this subsection, the term "maintenance"

means activities which cannot be performed by the National

Aeronautics and Space Administration and which must be performed

in order for the Service Module to provide environmental control, life

support, and orbital maintenance functions which cannot be

performed by an alternative means at the time of payment.

Termination (3) This subsection shall cease to be effective 60 days after a

date. United States propulsion module is in place at the International Space

Station.

(h) EXCEPTION.-Notwithstanding subsections (a) and (b), no

agency of the United States Government may make extraordinary

payments in connection with the International Space Station, or any other

payments in connection with the International Space Station,1° to any

foreign person subject to measures applied pursuant to-

(I) section 3 of this Act; or

(2) section 4 of Executive Order No. 12938 (November 14, 1994),

as amended by Executive Order No. 13094 (July 28, 1998).

Such payments shall also not be made to any other entity if the agency of

the United States Government anticipates that such payments will be

passed on to such a foreign person.

(i) REPORT ON CERTAIN PAYMENTS RELATED TO

INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION.-

President. (1) IN GENERAL.-The President shall, together with each

report submitted under section 2(a), submit to the Committee on

Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on

International Relations of the House of Representatives a report

that identifies each Russian entity or person to whom the United

States Government has, since the date of the enactment of the Iran

Nonproliferation Amendments Act of 2005, made a payment in

cash or in kind for work to be performed or services to be rendered

under the Agreement Concerning Cooperation on the Civil

International Space Station, with annex, signed at Washington

January 29, 1998, and entered into force March 27, 2001, or any

protocol, agreement, memorandum of understanding, or contract

related thereto.

(2) CONTENT.-Each report submitted under paragraph (1) shall

include-

(A) the specific purpose of each payment made to each entity

or person identified in the report; and

•'Amended by P.L. 109-1 12, § 3(b), 119 Stat. 2366 (2005).
1114 Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-178)

(B) with respect to each such payment, the assessment of the

President that the payment was not prejudicial to the

achievement of the objectives of the United States

Government to prevent the proliferation of ballistic or cruise

missile systems in Iran and other countries that have

repeatedly provided support for acts of international

terrorism, is determined by the Secretary of State under

section 620A(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22

U.S.C. 2371(a)), section 6(j) of the Export Administration

Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2405(j)), or section 40(d) of the

Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2780(d)).''

Sec. 7. Definitions

For purposes of this Act, the following terms have the following

meanings:

(1) EXTRAORDINARY PAYMENTS IN CONNECTION WITH

THE INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION.-

The term "extraordinary payments in connection with the

International Space Station" means payments in cash or in kind made

or to be made by the United States Government-

(A) for work on the International Space Station which the

Russian Government pledged at any time to provide at its

expense; or

(B) for work on the International Space Station, or for the

purchase of goods or services relating to human space flight, that are not

required to be made under the terms of a contract or other agreement that

was in effect on January 1, 1999, as those terms were in effect on such

date, except that such term does not mean payments in cash or in kind

made or to be made by the United States Government prior to January I,

2012, for work to be performed or services to be rendered prior to that

date necessary to meet United States obligations under the Agreement

Concerning Cooperation on the Civil International Space Station, with

annex, signed at Washington January 29, 1998, and entered into force

March 27, 2001, or any protocol, agreement, memorandum of

understanding, or contract related thereto."

(2) FOREIGN PERSON; PERSON.-The terms "foreign person"

and "person" mean-

(A) a natural person that is an alien;

(B) a corporation, business association, partnership, society,

trust, or any other nongovernmental entity, organization, or group,

that is organized under the laws of a foreign country or has its

principal place of business in a foreign country;

(C) any foreign government, including any foreign

governmental entity; and' 3

(D) any successor, subunit, or subsidiary of any entity described

in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C), including any entity in which

any entity, described in any such subparagraph owns a controlling

interest.

(3) EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 12938. The term "Executive

Order No. 12938" means Executive Order No. 12938 as in effect on

January I, 1999.

''Amended by P.L. 109-112, § 3(c), 119 Stat. 2366 (2005).

"

2

Amended by P.L. 109-112, § 3(a), 119 Stat. 2366 (2005).

"Amended by P.L. 109-112, § 4(d)(I ), 119 Stat. 2366 (2005).

"4Amended by P.L. 109-112, § 4(d)(2), 119 Stat. 2366 (2005).
Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-178) 1115

(4) ADHERENT TO RELEVANT NONPROLIFERATION

REGIME.-A government is an "adherent" to a "relevant

nonproliferation regime" if that government-

(A) is a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group with respect

to a transfer of goods, services, or technology described in section 2(a)(l)(A);

(B) is a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime

with respect to a transfer of goods, services, or technology

described in section 2(a)(1)(B), or is a party to a binding

international agreement with the United States that was in effect

on January I, 1999, to control the transfer of such goods, services,

or technology in accordance with the criteria and standards set

forth in the Missile Technology Control Regime;

(C) is a member of the Australia Group with respect to a

transfer of goods, services, or technology described in section

2(a)(1)(C);

(D) is a party to the Convention on the Prohibition of the

Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical

Weapons and on Their Destruction with respect to a transfer of

goods, services, or technology described in section 2(a)(I )(D); or

(E) is a member of the Wassenaar Arrangement with respect

to a transfer of goods, services, or technology described in section

2(a)(I)(E).

(5) ORGANIZATION OR ENTITY UNDER THE

JURISDICTION OR CONTROL OF THE RUSSIAN AVIATION

AND SPACE AGENCY.-

(A) The term "organization or entity under the jurisdiction or

control of the Russian Aviation and Space Agency." means an

organization or entity that-

(i) was made part of the Russian Space Agency upon its

establishment on February 25, 1992;

(ii) was transferred to the Russian Space Agency by decree

of the Russian Government on July 25, 1994, or May 12,

1998;

(iii) was or is transferred to the Russian Aviation and

Space Agency or Russian Space Agency by decree of the

Russian Government at any other time before, on, or after the

date of the enactment of this Act; or

(iv) is a joint stock company in which the Russian

Aviation and Space Agency or Russian Space Agency has at

any time held controlling interest.

(B) Any organization or entity described in subparagraph (A)

shall be deemed to be under the jurisdiction or control of the

Russian Aviation and Space Agency regardless of whether-

(i) such organization or entity, after being part of or

transferred to the Russian Aviation and Space Agency or

Russian Space Agency, is removed from or transferred out of

the Russian Aviation and Space Agency or Russian Space

Agency; or

(ii) the Russian Aviation and Space Agency or Russian

Space Agency, after holding a controlling interest in such

organization or entity, divests its controlling interest.
1116 US-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Coop. Act (P.L. 109-40 1)

L. HENRY J. HYDE U.S. - INDIA PEACEFUL ATOMIC

ENERGY COOPERATION ACT OF 2006 (TITLE 1)

Public Law 109-401 120 Stat. 2726

December 18, 2006

An Act

To exempt from certain requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954

a proposed nuclear agreement for cooperation with India.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United

States ofAmerica in Congress assembled,

Title I-United States And India Nuclear Cooperation

22 USC 8001. Sec. 101. Short Title

This title may be cited as the "Henry J. Hyde United StatesIndia Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006".

22 USC 8001. Sec. 102. Sense Of Congress

It is the sense of Congress that-

(I) preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, other

weapons of mass destruction, the means to produce them, and the

means to deliver them are critical objectives for United States foreign

policy; (2) sustaining the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and

strengthening its implementation, particularly its verification and

compliance, is the keystone of United States nonproliferation policy;

(3) the NPT has been a significant success in preventing the

acquisition of nuclear weapons capabilities and maintaining a stable

international security situation;

(4) countries that have never become a party to the NPT and

remain outside that treaty's legal regime pose a potential challenge to

the achievement of the overall goals of global nonproliferation,

because those countries have not undertaken the NPT obligation to

prohibit the spread of nuclear weapons capabilities;

(5) it is in the interest of the United States to the fullest extent

possible to ensure that those countries that are not States Party to the

NPT are responsible in the disposition of any nuclear technology they

develop;

(6) it is in the interest of the United States to enter into an

agreement for nuclear cooperation arranged pursuant to section 123

of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) with a country

that has never been a State Party to the NPT if--

(A) the country has demonstrated responsible behavior

with respect to the nonproliferation of technology related to

nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them;

(B) the country has a functioning and uninterrupted

democratic system of government, has a foreign policy that is

congruent to that of the United States, and is working with the

United States on key foreign policy initiatives related to

nonproliferation;

(C) such cooperation induces the country to promulgate

and implement substantially improved protections against the
US-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Coop. Act (P.L. 109-401) 1117

proliferation of technology related to nuclear weapons and the

means to deliver them, and to refrain from actions that would

further the development of its nuclear weapons program; and

(D) such cooperation will induce the country to give

greater political and material support to the achievement of United

States global and regional nonproliferation objectives, especially

with respect to dissuading, isolating, and, if necessary,

sanctioning and containing states that sponsor terrorism and

terrorist groups that are seeking to acquire a nuclear weapons

capability or other weapons of mass destruction capability and the

means to deliver such weapons;

(7) the United States should continue its policy of engagement,

collaboration, and exchanges with and between India and Pakistan;

(8) strong bilateral relations with India are in the national interest

of the United States;

(9) the United States and India share common democratic values

and the potential for increasing and sustained economic engagement;

(10) commerce in civil nuclear energy with India by the United

States and other countries has the potential to benefit the people of all

countries;

(11) such commerce also represents a significant change in United

States policy regarding commerce with countries that are not States

Party to the NPT, which remains the foundation of the international

nonproliferation regime;

(12) any commerce in civil nuclear energy with India by the

United States and other countries must be achieved in a manner that

minimizes the risk of nuclear proliferation or regional arms races and

maximizes India's adherence to international nonproliferation

regimes, including, in particular, the guidelines of the Nuclear

Suppliers Group (NSG); and

(13) the United States should not seek to facilitate or encourage

the continuation of nuclear exports to India by any other party if such

exports are terminated under United States law.

22 USC 8002. See. 103. Statements Of Policy.

(a) In General.--The following shall be the policies of the United

States:

(I) Oppose the development of a capability to produce nuclear

weapons by any non-nuclear weapon state, within or outside of the

NPT.

(2) Encourage States Party to the NPT to interpret the right to

"develop research, production and use of nuclear energyfor peaceful

purposes", as set forth in Article IV of the NPT, as being a right that

applies only to the extent that it is consistent with the object and

purpose of the NPT to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and

nuclear weapons capabilities, including by refraining from all nuclear

cooperation with any State Party that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) determines is not in full compliance with its NPT

obligations, including its safeguards obligations. (3) Act in a manner fully consistent with the Guidelines for

Nuclear Transfers and the Guidelines for Transfers of NuclearRelated Dual-Use Equipment, Materials, Software and Related

Technology developed by the NSG, and decisions related to the those

guidelines, and the rules and practices regarding NSG decision

making.
1118 US-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Coop. Act (P.L. 109-401)

(4) Strengthen the NSG guidelines and decisions concerning

consultation by members regarding violations of supplier and

recipient understandings by instituting the practice of a timely and

coordinated response by NSG members to all such violations,

including termination of nuclear transfers to an involved recipient,

that discourages individual NSG members from continuing

cooperation with such recipient until such time as a consensus

regarding a coordinated response has been achieved.

(5) Given the special sensitivity of equipment and technologies

related to the enrichment of uranium, the reprocessing of spent

nuclear fuel, and the production of heavy water, work with members

of the NSG, individually and collectively, to further restrict the

transfers of such equipment and technologies, including to India.

(6) Seek to prevent the transfer to a country of nuclear equipment, materials, or technology from other participating governments in the

NSG or from any other source if nuclear transfers to that country are

suspended or terminated pursuant to this title, the Atomic Energy Act

of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.), or any other United States law.

(b) With Respect to South Asia.--The following shall be the policies

of the United States with respect to South Asia:

India. (1) Achieve, at the earliest possible date, a moratorium on the

Pakistan. production of fissile material for nuclear explosive purposes by India,

People's Pakistan, and the People's Republic of China.

Republic of (2) Achieve, at the earliest possible date, the conclusion and

China. implementation of a treaty banning the production of fissile material

for nuclear weapons to which both the United States and India

become parties.

(3) Secure India's--

(A) full participation in the Proliferation Security

Initiative;

(B) formal commitment to the Statement of Interdiction

Principles of such Initiative;

(C) public announcement of its decision to conform its

export control laws, regulations, and policies with the Australia

Group and with the Guidelines, Procedures, Criteria, and Control

Lists of the Wassenaar Arrangement;

(D) demonstration of satisfactory progress toward

implementing the decision described in subparagraph (C); and

(E) ratification of or accession to the Convention on

Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, done at

Vienna on September 12, 1997.

(4) Secure India's full and active participation in United States

efforts to dissuade, isolate, and, if necessary, sanction and contain

Iran for its efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction, including a

nuclear weapons capability and the capability to enrich uranium or

reprocess nuclear fuel, and the means to deliver weapons of mass

destruction.

(5) Seek to halt the increase of nuclear weapon arsenals in South

Asia and to promote their reduction and eventual elimination.

(6) Ensure that spent fuel generated in India's civilian nuclear

power reactors is not transferred to the United States except pursuant

to the Congressional review procedures required under section 131 f.

of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2160 (f)).

(7) Pending implementation of the multilateral moratorium

described in paragraph (I) or the treaty described in paragraph (2),
US-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Coop. Act (P.L. 109-40 1) 1119

22 USC 8003.

encourage India not to increase its production of fissile material at

unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.

(8) Ensure that any safeguards agreement or Additional Protocol

to which India is a party with the IAEA can reliably safeguard any

export or reexport to India of any nuclear materials and equipment. (9) Ensure that the text and implementation of any agreement for

cooperation with India arranged pursuant to section 123 of the

Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) meet the requirements

set forth in subsections a.(l) and a.(3) through a.(9) of such section.

(10) Any nuclear power reactor fuel reserve provided to the

Government of India for use in safeguarded civilian nuclear facilities

should be commensurate with reasonable reactor operating

requirements.

Sec. 104. Waiver Authority And Congressional Approval

(a) In general. If the President makes the determination described in

subsection (b), the President may--

(I) exempt a proposed agreement for cooperation with India arranged

pursuant to section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C.

2153) from the requirement of subsection a.(2) of such section [42 USCS

§ 2153(a)(2)];

(2) waive the application of section 128 of the Atomic Energy Act of

1954 (42 U.S.C. 2157) with respect to exports to India; and

(3) waive with respect to India the application of--

(A) section 129 a.(I)(D) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42

U.S.C. 2158(a)(I)(D)); and

(B) section 129 of such Act (42 U.S.C. 2158) regarding any actions

that occurred before July 18, 2005.

(b) Determination by the President. The determination referred to in

subsection (a) is a determination by the President that the following

actions have occurred:

(1) India has provided the United States and the IAEA with a credible

plan to separate civil and military nuclear facilities, materials, and

programs, and has filed a declaration regarding its civil facilities and

materials with the IAEA.

(2) India and the IAEA have concluded all legal steps required prior to

signature by the parties of an agreement requiring the application of

IAEA safeguards in perpetuity in accordance with IAEA standards,

principles, and practices (including IAEA Board of Governors Document

GOV/1621 (1973)) to India's civil nuclear facilities, materials, and

programs as declared in the plan described in paragraph (I), including

materials used in or produced through the use of India's civil nuclear

facilities.

(3) India and the IAEA are making substantial progress toward

concluding an Additional Protocol consistent with IAEA principles,

practices, and policies that would apply to India's civil nuclear program.

(4) India is working actively with the United States for the early

conclusion of a multilateral treaty on the cessation of the production of

fissile materials for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive

devices.

(5) India is working with and supporting United States and

international efforts to prevent the spread of enrichment and reprocessing

technology to any state that does not already possess full-scale,

functioning enrichment or reprocessing plants.

(6) India is taking the necessary steps to secure nuclear and other

sensitive materials and technology, including through--
1120 US-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Coop. Act (P.L. 109-401)

(A) the enactment and effective enforcement of comprehensive

export control legislation and regulations;

(B) harmonization of its export control laws, regulations, policies,

and practices with the guidelines and practices of the Missile Technology

Control Regime (MTCR) and the NSG; and

(C) adherence to the MTCR and the NSG in accordance with the

procedures of those regimes for unilateral adherence.

(7) The NSG has decided by consensus to permit supply to India of

nuclear items covered by the guidelines of the NSG.

(c) Submission to Congress.

(1) In general. The President shall submit to the appropriate

congressional committees the determination made pursuant to subsection

(b), together with a report detailing the basis for the determination.

(2) Information to be included. To the fullest extent available to the

United States, the report referred to in paragraph (1) shall include the

following information:

(A) A summary of the plan provided by India to the United States

and the IAEA to separate India's civil and military nuclear facilities,

materials, and programs, and the declaration made by India to the IAEA

identifying India's civil facilities to be placed under IAEA safeguards,

including an analysis of the credibility of such plan and declaration,

together with copies of the plan and declaration.

• (B) A summary of the agreement that has been entered into between

India and the IAEA requiring the application of safeguards in accordance

with IAEA practices to India's civil nuclear facilities as declared in the

plan described in subparagraph (A), together with a copy of the

agreement, and a description of the progress toward its full

implementation.

(C) A summary of the progress made toward conclusion and

implementation of an Additional Protocol between India and the IAEA,

including a description of the scope of such Additional Protocol.

(D) A description of the steps that India is taking to work with the

United States for the conclusion of a multilateral treaty banning the

production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, including a

description of the steps that the United States has taken and will take to

encourage India to identify and declare a date by which India would be

willing to stop production of fissile material for nuclear weapons

unilaterally or pursuant to a multilateral moratorium or treaty.

(E) A description of the steps India is taking to prevent the spread of

nuclear-related technology, including enrichment and reprocessing

technology or materials that can be used to acquire a nuclear weapons

capability, as well as the support that India is providing to the United

States to further United States objectives to restrict the spread of such

technology.

(F) A description of the steps that India is taking to secure materials

and technology applicable for the development, acquisition, or

manufacture of weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver

such weapons through the application of comprehensive export control

legislation and regulations, and through harmonization with and

adherence to MTCR, NSG, Australia Group, and Wassenaar

Arrangement guidelines, compliance with United Nations Security

Council Resolution 1540, and participation in the Proliferation Security

Initiative.

(G) A description and assessment of the specific measures that India

has taken to fully and actively participate in United States and
US-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Coop. Act (P.L. 109-401) 1121

international efforts to dissuade, isolate, and, if necessary, sanction and

contain Iran for its efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction,

including a nuclear weapons capability and the capability to enrich

uranium or reprocess nuclear fuel and the means to deliver weapons of

mass destruction.

(H) A description of the decision of the NSG relating to nuclear

cooperation with India, including whether nuclear cooperation by the

United States under an agreement for cooperation arranged pursuant to

section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) is

consistent with the decision, practices, and policies of the NSG.

(I) A description of the scope of peaceful cooperation envisioned by

the United States and India that will be implemented under the agreement

for nuclear cooperation, including whether such cooperation will include

the provision of enrichment and reprocessing technology.

(J) A description of the steps taken to ensure that proposed United

States civil nuclear cooperation with India will not in any way assist

India's nuclear weapons program.

(d) Restrictions on nuclear transfers.

(1) In general. Pursuant to the obligations of the United States under

Article I of the NPT, nothing in this title constitutes authority to carry out

any civil nuclear cooperation between the United States and a country

that is not a nuclear-weapon State Party to the NPT that would in any

way assist, encourage, or induce that country to manufacture or otherwise

acquire nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices.

(2) NSG transfer guidelines. Notwithstanding the entry into force of an

agreement for cooperation with India arranged pursuant to section 123 of

the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) and pursuant to this

title, no item subject to such agreement or subject to the transfer

guidelines of the NSG, or to NSG decisions related thereto, may be

transferred to India if such transfer would be inconsistent with the

transfer guidelines of the NSG in effect on the date of the transfer.

(3) Termination of nuclear transfers to India.

(A) In general. Notwithstanding the entry into force of an agreement

for cooperation with India arranged pursuant to section 123 of the

Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) and pursuant to this title,

and except as provided under subparagraph (B), exports of nuclear and

nuclear-related material, equipment, or technology to India shall be

terminated if there is any materially significant transfer by an Indian

person of--

(i) nuclear or nuclear-related material, equipment, or technology

that is not consistent with NSG guidelines or decisions, or

(ii) ballistic missiles or missile-related equipment or technology

that is not consistent with MTCR guidelines,

unless the President determines that cessation of such exports would

be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of United States

nonproliferation objectives or otherwise jeopardize the common defense

and security.

(B) Exception. The President may choose not to terminate exports of

nuclear and nuclear-related material, equipment, and technology to India

under subparagraph (A) if--

(i) the transfer covered under such subparagraph was made without

the knowledge of the Government of India;

(ii) at the time of the transfer, either the Government of India did

not own, control, or direct the Indian person that made the transfer or the

Indian person that made the transfer is a natural person who acted
1122 US-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Coop. Act (P.L. 109-401)

without the knowledge of any entity described in subparagraph (B) or (C)

of section 110(5) [22 USCS § 8008(5)]; and

(iii) the President certifies to the appropriate congressional

committees that the Government of India has taken or is taking

appropriate judicial or other enforcement actions against the Indian

person with respect to such transfer.

(4) Exports, reexports, transfers, and retransfers to India related to

enrichment, reprocessing, and heavy water production.

(A) In general.

(i) Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The Nuclear Regulatory

Commission may only issue licenses for the export or reexport to India of

any equipment, components, or materials related to the enrichment of

uranium, the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, or the production of

heavy water if the requirements of subparagraph (B) are met.

(ii) Secretary of Energy. The Secretary of Energy may only issue

authorizations for the transfer or retransfer to India of any equipment,

materials, or technology related to the enrichment of uranium, the

reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, or the production of heavy water

(including under the terms of a subsequent arrangement under section

131 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2160)) if the

requirements of subparagraph (B) are met.

(B) Requirements for approvals. Exports, reexports, transfers, and

retransfers referred to in subparagraph (A) may only be approved if--

(i) the end user--

(1) is a multinational facility participating in an IAEA-approved

program to provide alternatives to national fuel cycle capabilities; or

(I1) is a facility participating in, and the export, reexport, transfer,

or retransfer is associated with, a bilateral or multinational program to

develop a proliferation-resistant fuel cycle;

(ii) appropriate measures are in place at any facility referred to in

clause (i) to ensure that no sensitive nuclear technology, as defined in

section 4(5) of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 (22 U.S.C.

3203(5)), will be diverted to any person, site, facility, location, or

program not under IAEA safeguards; and

(iii) the President determines that the export, reexport, transfer, or

retransfer will not assist in the manufacture or acquisition of nuclear

explosive devices or the production of fissile material for military

purposes.

(5) Nuclear export accountability program.

(A) In general. The President shall ensure that all appropriate

measures are taken to maintain accountability with respect to nuclear

materials, equipment, and technology sold, leased, exported, or

reexported to India so as to ensure--

(i) full implementation of the protections required under section

123 a.(I) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153 (a)(l)); and

(ii) United States compliance with Article I of the NPT.

(B) Measures. The measures taken pursuant to subparagraph (A) shall

include the following:

(i) Obtaining and implementing assurances and conditions pursuant

to the export licensing authorities of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission

and the Department of Commerce and the authorizing authorities of the

Department of Energy, including, as appropriate, conditions regarding

end-use monitoring.

(ii) A detailed system of reporting and accounting for technology

transfers, including any retransfers in India, authorized by the
US-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Coop. Act (P.L. 109-401) 1123

Department of Energy pursuant to section 57 b. of the Atomic Energy

Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2077(b)). Such system shall be capable of

providing assurances that--

(1) the identified recipients of the nuclear technology are

authorized to receive the nuclear technology;

(II) the nuclear technology identified for transfer will be used

only for peaceful safeguarded nuclear activities and will not be used for

any military or nuclear explosive purpose; and

(Ill) the nuclear technology identified for transfer will not be

retransferred without the prior consent of the United States, and facilities,

equipment, or materials derived through the use of transferred technology

will not be transferred without the prior consent of the United States.

(iii) In the event the IAEA is unable to implement safeguards as

required by an agreement for cooperation arranged pursuant to section

123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153), appropriate

assurance that arrangements will be put in place expeditiously that are

consistent with the requirements of section 123 a.(l) of such Act (42

U.S.C. 2153(a)(1)) regarding the maintenance of safeguards as set forth

in the agreement regardless of whether the agreement is terminated or

suspended for any reason.

(C) Implementation. The measures described in subparagraph (B)

shall be implemented to provide reasonable assurances that the recipient

is complying with the relevant requirements, terms, and conditions of any

licenses issued by the United States regarding such exports, including

those relating to the use, retransfer, safe handling, secure transit, and

storage of such exports.

(e) [Omitted]

(f) Sunset. The authority provided under subsection (a)(l) to exempt an

agreement shall terminate upon the date of the enactment of the United

States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Nonproliferation

Enhancement Act [enacted Oct. 8, 2008].

(g) Reporting to Congress.

(I) Information on nuclear activities of India. The President shall keep

the appropriate congressional committees fully and currently informed of

the facts and implications of any significant nuclear activities of India,

including--

(A) any material noncompliance on the part of the Government of

India with--

(i) the nonproliferation commitments undertaken in the Joint

Statement of July 18, 2005, between the President of the United States

and the Prime Minister of India;

(ii) the separation plan presented in the national parliament of India

on March 7, 2006, and in greater detail on May 11,2006;

(iii) a safeguards agreement between the Government of India and

the IAEA;

(iv) an Additional Protocol between the Government of India and

the IAEA;

(v) an agreement for cooperation between the Government of India

and the United States Government arranged pursuant to section 123 of

the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) or any subsequent

arrangement under section 131 of such Act (42 U.S.C. 2160);

(vi) the terms and conditions of any approved licenses regarding the

export or reexport of nuclear material or dual-use material, equipment, or

technology; and

(vii) United States laws and regulations regarding such licenses;
1124 US-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Coop. Act (P.L. 109-401)

(B) any material inconsistencies between the content or timeliness of

notifications by the Government of India pursuant to paragraph 14(a) of

the Safeguards Agreement and the facilities and schedule described in

paragraph (14) of the separation plan presented in the national parliament

of India on May 11, 2006, taking into account the later initiation of

safeguards than was anticipated in the separation plan;

(C) the construction of a nuclear facility in India after the date of the

enactment of this title [enacted Dec. 18, 2006];

(D) significant changes in the production by India of nuclear weapons

or in the types or amounts of fissile material produced; and

(E) changes in the purpose or operational status of any unsafeguarded

nuclear fuel cycle activities in India.

(2) Implementation and compliance report. Not later than 180 days after the date on which an agreement for cooperation with India arranged

pursuant to section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C.

2153) enters into force, and annually thereafter, the President shall

submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report including--

(A) a description of any additional nuclear facilities and nuclear

materials that the Government of India has placed or intends to place

under IAEA safeguards;

(B) a comprehensive listing of--

(i) all licenses that have been approved by the Nuclear Regulatory

Commission and the Secretary of Energy for exports and reexports to

India under parts 110 and 810 of title 10, Code of Federal Regulations;

(ii) any licenses approved by the Department of Commerce for the

export or reexport to India of commodities, related technology, and

software which are controlled for nuclear nonproliferation reasons on the

Nuclear Referral List of the Commerce Control List maintained under

part 774 of title 15, Code of Federal Regulation, or any successor

regulation;

(iii) any other United States authorizations for the export or

reexport to India of nuclear materials and equipment; and

(iv) with respect to each such license or other form of authorization

described in clauses (i), (ii), and (iii)--

(1) the number or other identifying information of each license or

authorization;

(11) the name or names of the authorized end user or end users;

(111) the name of the site, facility, or location in India to which the

export or reexport was made;

(IV) the terms and conditions included on such licenses and

authorizations;

(V) any post-shipment verification procedures that will be applied

to such exports or reexports; and

(VI) the term of validity of each such license or authorization;

(C) a description of any significant nuclear commerce between India

and other countries, including any such trade that--

(i) is not consistent with applicable guidelines or decisions of the

NSG; or

(ii) would not meet the standards applied to exports or reexports of

such material, equipment, or technology of United States origin;

(D) either--

(i) an assessment that India is in full compliance with the

commitments and obligations contained in the agreements and other

documents referenced in clauses (i) through (vi) of paragraph (1)(A); or
US-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Coop. Act (P.L. 109-401) 1125

(ii) an identification and analysis of all compliance issues arising

with regard to the adherence by India to its commitments and obligations,

including--

(I) the measures the United States Government has taken to

remedy or otherwise respond to such compliance issues;

(11) the responses of the Government of India to such measures;

(Ill) the measures the United States Government plans to take to

this end in the coming year; and

(IV) an assessment of the implications of any continued

noncompliance, including whether nuclear commerce with India remains

in the national security interest of the United States;

(E) (i) an assessment of whether India is fully and actively

participating in United States and international efforts to dissuade,

isolate, and, if necessary, sanction and contain Iran for its efforts to

acquire weapons of mass destruction, including a nuclear weapons

capability (including the capability to enrich uranium or reprocess nuclear fuel), and the means to deliver weapons of mass destruction,

including a description of the specific measures that India has taken in

this regard; and

(ii) if India is not assessed to be fully and actively participating in

such efforts, a description of--

(I) the measures the United States Government has taken to

secure India's full and active participation in such efforts;

(II) the responses of the Government of India to such measures;

and

(111) the measures the United States Government plans to take in

the coming year to secure India's full and active participation; (F) an analysis of whether United States civil nuclear cooperation

with India is in any way assisting India's nuclear weapons program,

including through--

(i) the use of any United States equipment, technology, or nuclear

material by India in an unsafeguarded nuclear facility or nuclear-weapons

related complex;

(ii) the replication and subsequent use of any United States

technology by India in an unsafeguarded nuclear facility or

unsafeguarded nuclear weapons-related complex, or for any activity

related to the research, development, testing, or manufacture of nuclear

explosive devices; and

(iii) the provision of nuclear fuel in such a manner as to facilitate

the increased production by India of highly enriched uranium or

plutonium in unsafeguarded nuclear facilities;

(G) a detailed description of--

(i) United States efforts to promote national or regional progress by India and Pakistan in disclosing, securing, limiting, and reducing their

fissile material stockpiles, including stockpiles for military purposes,

pending creation of a worldwide fissile material cut-off regime, including the institution of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty; (ii) the responses of India and Pakistan to such efforts; and

(iii) assistance that the United States is providing, or would be able

to provide, to India and Pakistan to promote the objectives in clause (i),

consistent with its obligations under international law and existing

agreements;

(H) an estimate of--

(i) the amount of uranium mined and milled in India during the

previous year;
1126 US-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Coop. Act (P.L. 109-401)

(ii) the amount of such uranium that has likely been used or

allocated for the production of nuclear explosive devices; and

(iii) the rate of production in India of--

(1) fissile material for nuclear explosive devices; and

(II) nuclear explosive devices;

(1) an estimate of the amount of electricity India's nuclear reactors

produced for civil purposes during the previous year and the proportion

of such production that can be attributed to India's declared civil reactors;

(J) an analysis as to whether imported uranium has affected the rate

of production in India of nuclear explosive devices;

(K) a detailed description of efforts and progress made toward the

achievement of India's--

(i) full participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative;

(ii) formal commitment to the Statement of Interdiction Principles

of such Initiative;

(iii) public announcement of its decision to conform its export

control laws, regulations, and policies with the Australia Group and with

the Guidelines, Procedures, Criteria, and Controls List of the Wassenaar

Arrangement; and

(iv) effective implementation of the decision described in clause

(iii);

(L) the disposal during the previous year of spent nuclear fuel from

India's civilian nuclear program, and any plans or activities relating to

future disposal of such spent nuclear fuel; and

(M) with. respect to the United States-India Agreement for

Cooperation on Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (hereinafter in this

subparagraph referred to as the "Agreement") approved under section

101(a) of the United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and

Nonproliferation Enhancement Act [22 USCS § 8001 note]--

(i) a listing of--

(1) all provision of sensitive nuclear technology to India, and

other such information as may be so designated by the United States or

India under Article I(Q); and

(II) all facilities in India notified pursuant to Article 7(1) of the

Agreement;

(ii) a description of--

(1) any agreed safeguards or any other form of verification for byproduct material decided by mutual agreement pursuant to the terms of

Article I (A) of the Agreement;

(1I) research and development undertaken in such areas as may be

agreed between the United States and India as detailed in Article 2(2)(a.)

of the Agreement;

(111) the civil nuclear cooperation activities undertaken under

Article 2(2)(d.) of the Agreement;

(IV) any United States efforts to help India develop a strategic

reserve of nuclear fuel as called for in Article 2(2)(e.) of the Agreement;

(V) any United States efforts to fulfill political commitments

made in Article 5(6) of the Agreement;

(VI) any negotiations that have occurred or are ongoing under

Article 6(iii.) of the Agreement; and

(VII) any transfers beyond the territorial jurisdiction of India

pursuant to Article 7(2) of the Agreement, including a listing of the

receiving country of each such transfer;

(iii) an analysis of--
US-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Coop. Act (P.L. 109-401) 1127

(1) any instances in which the United States or India requested

consultations arising from concerns over compliance with the provisions

of Article 7(1) of the Agreement, and the results of such consultations;

and

(11) any matters not otherwise identified in this report that have

become the subject of consultations pursuant to Article 13(2) of the

Agreement, and a statement as to whether such matters were resolved by

the end of the reporting period; and

(iv) a statement as to whether--

(I) any consultations are expected to occur under Article 16(5) of

the Agreement; and

(II) any enrichment is being carried out pursuant to Article 6 of

the Agreement.

(3) Submittal with other annual reports.

(A) Report on proliferation prevention. Each annual report submitted

under paragraph (2) after the initial report may be submitted together

with the annual report on proliferation prevention required under section

601 (a) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (22 U.S.C. 3281 (a)).

(B) Report on 'progress toward regional nonproliferation. The

information required to be submitted under paragraph (2)(F) after the

initial report may be submitted together with the annual report on

progress toward regional nonproliferation required under section 620F(c)

of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2376(c)).

(4) Form. Each report submitted under this subsection shall

be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified

annex.

See. 105. United States Compliance With Its Nuclear

Nonproliferation Treaty Obligations

Nothing in this title constitutes authority for any action in

violation of an obligation of the United States under the NPT.

Sec. 106. Inoperability Of Determination And Waivers.

A determination and any waiver under section 104 shall cease to

be effective if the President determines that India has detonated a nuclear

explosive device after the date of the enactment of this title.

Sec. 107. MTCR Adherent Status

Congress finds that India is not an MTCR adherent for the

purposes of section 73 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C.

2797b).

Sec. 108. Technical Amendment

Section 11 12(c)(4) of the Arms Control and Nonproliferation

Act of 1999 (title XI of the Admiral James W. Nance and Meg Donovan

Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2000 and 2001 (as

enacted into law by section 1000(a)(7) of Public Law 106-113 and

contained in appendix G of that Act; 113 Stat.

1501 A-486)) is amended--

(I) in subparagraph (B), by striking "and" after the semicolon at

the end;

(2) by redesignating subparagraph (C) as subparagraph (D); and

(3) by inserting after subparagraph (B) the following new

subparagraph:

"(C) so much of the reports required under section 104 of the

Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy

22 USC 8004.

22 USC 8005.

President.

22 USC 8006.

22 USC 2652c.

'As amended October 8, 2008, P.L. 110-369, Title 1, §§ 101(c), 105, 122 Stat. 4029, 4030.
1128 US-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Coop. Act (P.L. 109-401)

Cooperation Act of 2006 as relates to verification or compliance

matters; and".

22 USC 8007. See. 109. United States-India Scientific Cooperative Nuclear

Nonproliferation Program

(a) Establishment.--The Secretary of Energy, acting through the

Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration, is

authorized to establish a cooperative nuclear nonproliferation program to

pursue jointly with scientists from the United States and India a program

to further common nuclear nonproliferation goals, including scientific

research and development efforts, with an emphasis on nuclear

safeguards (in this section referred to as "the program").

(b) Consultation.--The program shall be carried out in

consultation with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense.

(c) National Academies Recommendations.--

Contracts. (1) In general.--The Secretary of Energy shall enter into an

agreement with the National Academies to develop recommendations

for the implementation of the program.

(2) Recommendations.--The agreement entered into under

paragraph (1) shall provide for the preparation by qualified

individuals with relevant expertise and knowledge and the

communication to the Secretary of Energy each fiscal year of--

(A) recommendations for research and related programs

designed to overcome existing technological barriers to nuclear

nonproliferation; and

(B) an assessment of whether activities and programs

funded under this section are achieving the goals of the activities

and programs.

(3) Public availability.--The recommendations and assessments

prepared under this subsection shall be made publicly available.

(d) Consistency With Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.--All

United States activities related to the program shall be consistent with

United States obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

(e) Authorization of Appropriations. --There are authorized to be

appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out this section for

each of fiscal years 2007 through 2011.

22 USC 8008. See. 110. Definitions

In this title:

(1) The term "Additional Protocol" means a protocol additional to

a safeguards agreement with the IAEA, as negotiated between a

country and the IAEA based on a Model Additional Protocol as set

forth in IAEA information circular

(INFCIRC) 540.

(2) The term "appropriate congressional committees" means the

Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on

International Relations of the House of Representatives.

(3) The term "dual-use material, equipment, or technology" means

material, equipment, or technology that may be used in nuclear or

nonnuclear applications.

(4) The term "IAEA safeguards" has the meaning given the term

in section 830(3) of the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994

(22 U.S.C. 6305(3)).

(5) The term "Indian person" means--

(A) a natural person that is a citizen of India or is subject

to the jurisdiction of the Government of India;
US-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Coop. Act (P.L. 109-40 1) 1129

(B) a corporation, business association, partnership,

society, trust, or any other nongovernmental entity, organization,

or group, that is organized under the laws of India or has its

principal place of business in India; and

(C) any Indian governmental entity, including any governmental entity operating as a business enterprise.

(6) The terms "Missile Technology Control Regime",

"MTCR", and "MTCR adherent" have the meanings given the

terms in section 74 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C.

2797c).

(7) The term "nuclear materials and equipment" means source

material, special nuclear material, production and utilization facilities

and any components thereof, and any other items or materials that are

determined to have significance for nuclear explosive purposes

pursuant to subsection 109 b. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42

U.S.C. 2139(b)).

(8) The terms "Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty" and "NPT"

mean the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done

at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968, and entered into

force March 5, 1970 (21 UST 483).

(9) The terms "Nuclear Suppliers Group" and "NSG" refer to a

group, which met initially in 1975 and has met at least annually since

1992, of Participating Governments that have promulgated and

agreed to adhere to Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers (currently IAEA

INFCIRC/254/Rev.8/Part I) and Guidelines for Transfers of NuclearRelated Dual-Use Equipment, Materials, Software, and Related

Technology (currently IAEA INFCIRC/254/Rev.7/Part 2).

(10) The terms "nuclear weapon" and "nuclear explosive device"

mean any device designed to produce an instantaneous release of an

amount of nuclear energy from special nuclear material that is greater

than the amount of energy that would be released from the detonation

of one pound of trinitrotoluene (TNT).

(I I) The term "process" includes the term "reprocess".

(12) The terms "reprocessing" and "reprocess" refer to the

separation of irradiated nuclear materials and fission products from

spent nuclear fuel.

(13) The term "sensitive nuclear technology" means any information, including information incorporated in a production or

utilization facility or important component part thereof, that is not

available to the public and which is important to the design,

construction, fabrication, operation, or maintenance of a uranium

enrichment or nuclear fuel reprocessing facility or a facility for the

production of heavy water.

(14) The term "source material" has the meaning given the term in

section 11 z. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2014(z)).

(15) The term "special nuclear material" has the meaning given

the term in section II aa. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42

U.S.C. 2014(aa)).

(16) The term "unsafeguarded nuclear fuel-cycle activity" means

research on, or development, design, manufacture, construction,

operation, or maintenance of--

(A) any existing or future reactor, critical facility,

conversion plant, fabrication plant, reprocessing plant, plant for

the separation of isotopes of source or special fissionable material,

or separate storage installation with respect to which there is no
1130 US-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Coop. Act (P.L. 109-401)

obligation to accept IAEA safeguards at the relevant reactor,

facility, plant, or installation that contains source or special

fissionable material; or

(B) any existing or future heavy water production plant

with respect to which there is no obligation to accept IAEA

safeguards on any nuclear material produced by or used in

connection with any heavy water produced therefrom.
US-IN Nu. Coop. Appvl. & Nonpro. Enhc. Act (P.L. 110-369) 1131

M. UNITED STATES-INDIA NUCLEAR COOPERATION

APPROVAL AND NONPROLIFERATION

ENHANCEMENT ACT

Public Law 110-369 122 Stat. 4028

October 8, 2008

An Act To approve the United States-India Agreement for Cooperation

on Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the

United States ofAmerica in Congress assembled,

See. 1. Short Title And Table Of Contents

22 USC 8001. (a) SHORT TITLE.--This Act may be cited as the "United

Note. States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Nonproliferation

Enhancement Act".

(b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.--The table of contents for this Act

is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title and table of contents.

Sec. 2. Definitions.

Title i--Approval Of United States-India Agreement For

Cooperation On Peaceful Uses Of Nuclear Energy

Sec. 1 01. Approval of Agreement.

Sec. 102. Declarations of policy; certification requirement; rule of

construction.

Sec. 103. Additional Protocol between India and the IAEA.

Sec. 104. Implementation of Safeguards Agreement between India and

the IAEA.

Sec. 105. Modified reporting to Congress.

Title ll--Strengthening United States Nonproliferation Law Relating

To Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation

Sec. 201. Procedures regarding a subsequent arrangement on

reprocessing.

Sec. 202. Initiatives and negotiations relating to agreements for peaceful

nuclear cooperation.

Sec. 203. Actions required for resumption of peaceful nuclear

cooperation.

Sec. 204. United States Government policy at the Nuclear Suppliers

Group to strengthen the international nuclear nonproliferation regime.

Sec. 205. Conforming amendments.

Sec. 2. Definitions

In this Act:

(1) AGREEMENT.--The term "United States-India

Agreement for Cooperation on Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy" or

"Agreement" means the Agreement for Cooperation Between the

Government of the United States of America and the Government of

India Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy that was

transmitted to Congress by the President on September 10, 2008.
1132 US-IN Nu. Coop. Appvl. & Nonpro. Enhc. Act (P.L. 110-369)

(2) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.--

The term "appropriate congressional committees" means the

Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and

the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.

Title I--Approval Of United States-India Agreement For

Cooperation On Peaceful Uses Of Nuclear Energy

Sec. 101. Approval Of Agreement

(a) IN GENERAL.--Notwithstanding the provisions for

congressional consideration and approval of a proposed agreement for

cooperation in section 123 b. and d. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954

(42 U.S.C. 2153 (b) and (d)), Congress hereby approves the United

States-India Agreement for Cooperation on Peaceful Uses of Nuclear

Energy, subject to subsection (b).

(b) APPLICABILITY OF ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1954,

HYDE ACT, AND OTHER PROVISIONS OF LAW.--The Agreement

shall be subject to the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42

U.S.C. 2011 et seq.), the Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful

Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006 (22 U.S.C. 8001 et. seq; Public

Law 109-401), and any other applicable United States law as if the

Agreement had been approved pursuant to the provisions for

congressional consideration and approval of a proposed agreement for

cooperation in section 123 b. and d. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.

(c) SUNSET OF EXEMPTION AUTHORITY UNDER HYDE

ACT.--Section 104(f) of the Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful

Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006 (22 U.S.C. 8003(f)) is amended

by striking "the enactment of' and all that follows through "agreement"

and inserting "the date of the enactment of the United States-India

Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Nonproliferation Enhancement Act".

Sec. 102. Declarations Of Policy; Certification Requirement; Rule Of

Construction

(a) DECLARATIONS OF POLICY RELATING TO

MEANING AND LEGAL EFFECT OF AGREEMENT.--Congress

declares that it is the understanding of the United States that the

provisions of the United States-India Agreement for Cooperation on

Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy have the meanings conveyed in the

authoritative representations provided by the President and his

representatives to the Congress and its committees prior to September 20,

2008, regarding the meaning and legal effect of the Agreement.

(b) DECLARATIONS OF POLICY RELATING TO

TRANSFER OF NUCLEAR EQUIPMENT, MATERIALS, AND

TECHNOLOGY TO INDIA.--Congress makes the following

declarations of policy:

(1) Pursuant to section 103(a)(6) of the Henry J. Hyde United

States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006 (22

U.S.C. 8002(a)(6)), in the event that nuclear transfers to India are

suspended or terminated pursuant to title I of such Act (22 U.S.C.

8001 et seq.), the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 et

seq.), or any other United States law, it is the policy of the United

States to seek to prevent the transfer to India of nuclear equipment,

materials, or technology from other participating governments in the

Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) or from any other source.

(2) Pursuant to section 103(b)(10) of the Henry J. Hyde United

States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006 (22
US-IN Nu. Coop. Appvl. & Nonpro. Enhc. Act (P.L. 110-369) 1133

U.S.C. 8002(b)(10)), any nuclear power reactor fuel reserve provided

to the Government of India for use in safeguarded civilian nuclear

facilities should be commensurate with reasonable reactor operating

requirements.

President. (c) CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENT.--Before exchanging

diplomatic notes pursuant to Article 16(1) of the Agreement, the

President shall certify to Congress that entry into force and

implementation of the Agreement pursuant to its terms is consistent with

the obligation of the United States under the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London, and

Moscow July 1, 1968, and entered into force March 5, 1970 (commonly

known as the "Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty"), not in any way to

assist, encourage, or induce India to manufacture or otherwise acquire

nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

(d) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.--Nothing in the Agreement shall

be construed to supersede the legal requirements of the Henry J. Hyde

United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006 or

the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.

Sec. 103. Additional Protocol Between India And The IAEA

Congress urges the Government of India to sign and adhere to

an Additional Protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), consistent with IAEA principles, practices, and policies, at the

earliest possible date.

Sec. 104. Implementation Of Safeguards Agreement Between India

And The IAEA

President. Licenses may be issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Certification. for transfers pursuant to the Agreement only after the President

determines and certifies to Congress that--

(1) the Agreement Between the Government of India and the

International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of

Safeguards to Civilian Nuclear Facilities, as approved by the Board of

Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency on August 1,

2008 (the "Safeguards Agreement"), has entered into force; and

(2) the Government of India has filed a declaration of facilities

pursuant to paragraph 13 of the Safeguards Agreement that is not

materially inconsistent with the facilities and schedule described in

paragraph 14 of the separation plan presented in the national

parliament of India on May I1, 2006, taking into account the later

initiation of safeguards than was anticipated in the separation plan.

See. 105. Modified Reporting To Congress

(a) INFORMATION ON NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES OF

INDIA.--Subsection (g)(I) of section 104 of the Henry J. Hyde United

States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006 (22

U.S.C. 8003) is amended--

(1) by redesignating subparagraphs (B), (C), and (D) as

subparagraphs (C), (D), and (E), respectively; and

(2) by inserting after subparagraph (A) the following new

subparagraph:

"(B) any material inconsistencies between the content or

timeliness of notifications by the Government of India

pursuant to paragraph 14(a) of the Safeguards Agreement and

the facilities and schedule described in paragraph (14) of the

separation plan presented in the national parliament of India

on May 11, 2006, taking into account the later initiation of

safeguards than was anticipated in the separation plan;".
1134 US-IN Nu. Coop. Appvl. & Nonpro. Enhc. Act (P.L. 110-369)

(b) IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE REPORT.--

Subsection (g)(2) of such section is amended--

(I) in subparagraph (K)(iv), by striking "and" at the end;

(2) in subparagraph (L), by striking the period at the end and

inserting "; and"; and

(3) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:

"(M) with respect to the United States-India Agreement

for Cooperation on Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy

(hereinafter in this subparagraph referred to as the

'Agreement') approved under section 101(a) of the United

States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and

Nonproliferation Enhancement Act--

"(i) a listing of--

"(I) all provision of sensitive nuclear

technology to India, and other such information as

may be so designated by the United States or India

under Article I(Q); and

"(II) all facilities in India notified pursuant to

Article 7(l) of the Agreement;

"(ii) a description of--

"(1) any agreed safeguards or any other form of

verification for by-product material decided by

mutual agreement pursuant to the terms of Article

I(A) of the Agreement; "(11) research and development undertaken in

such areas as may be agreed between the United

States and India as detailed in Article 2(2)(a.) of the

Agreement;

"(I11) the civil nuclear cooperation activities

undertaken under Article 2(2)(d.) of the Agreement;

"(IV) any United States efforts to help India

develop a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel as called

for in Article 2(2)(e.) of the Agreement; "(V) any United States efforts to fulfill political

commitments made in Article 5(6) of the

Agreement;

"(VI) any negotiations that have occurred or are

ongoing under Article 6(iii.) of the Agreement; and

"(VII) any transfers beyond the territorial

jurisdiction of India pursuant to Article 7(2) of the

Agreement, including a listing of the receiving

country of each such transfer;

"(iii) an analysis of--

"(1) any instances in which the United States or

India requested consultations arising from concerns

over compliance with the provisions of Article 7(1)

of the Agreement, and the results of such

consultations; and

"(II) any matters not otherwise identified in this

report that have become the subject of consultations

pursuant to Article 13(2) of the Agreement, and a

statement as to whether such matters were resolved

by the end of the reporting period; and

"(iv) a statement as to whether--

"(I) any consultations are expected to occur
US-IN Nu. Coop. Appvl. & Nonpro. Enhc. Act (P.L. 110-369) 1135

under Article 16(5) of the Agreement; and

"(I1) any enrichment is being carried out

pursuant to Article 6 of the Agreement.".

Title l1--Strengthening United States Nonproliferation Law Relating

To Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation

See. 201. Procedures Regarding A Subsequent Arrangement On

Reprocessing

(a) IN GENERAL.--Notwithstanding section 131 of the Atomic

Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2160), no proposed subsequent

arrangement concerning arrangements and procedures regarding

reprocessing or other alteration in form or content, as provided for in

Article 6 of the Agreement, shall take effect until the requirements

specified in subsection (b) are met.

(b) REQUIREMENTS.--The requirements referred to in

subsection (a) are the following:

Presidenl. (I) The President transmits to the appropriate congressional

Reporis. committees a report containing-- (A) the reasons for entering into such proposed

subsequent arrangement;

(B) a detailed description, including the text, of such

proposed subsequent arrangement; and

(C) a certification that the United States will pursue efforts to ensure that any other nation that permits India to

reprocess or otherwise alter in form or content nuclear

material that the nation has transferred to India or nuclear

material and by-product material used in or produced through the use of nuclear material, non-nuclear material, or

equipment that it has transferred to India requires India to do

so under similar arrangements and procedures.

Time period. (2) A period of 30 days of continuous session (as defined by section 130 g. (2) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2159

(g)(2)) has elapsed after transmittal of the report required under

paragraph (I).

(c) RESOLUTION OF DISAPPROVAL.--Notwithstanding the

requirements in subsection (b) having been met, a subsequent

arrangement referred to in subsection (a) shall not become effective if

during the time specified in subsection (b)(2), Congress adopts, and there

is enacted, a joint resolution stating in substance that Congress does not

favor such subsequent arrangement. Any such resolution shall be

considered pursuant to the procedures set forth in section 130 i. of the

Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2159 (i)), as amended by section

205 of this Act.

See. 202. Initiatives And Negotiations Relating To Agreements For

Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation

Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153)

is amended by adding at the end the following:

President. "e. The President shall keep the Committee on Foreign

Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on

Foreign Relations of the Senate fully and currently informed

of any initiative or negotiations relating to a new or amended

agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation pursuant to this

section (except an agreement arranged pursuant to section 91

c., 144 b., 144 c., or 144 d., or an amendment thereto).".
1136 US-IN Nu. Coop. Appvl. & Nonpro. Enhc. Act (P.L. 110-369)

Sec. 203. Actions Required For Resumption Of Peaceful Nuclear

Cooperation

Section 129 a. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C.

2158 (a)) is amended by striking "Congress adopts a concurrent

resolution" and inserting "Congress adopts, and there is enacted, a joint

resolution".

President. See. 204. United States Government Policy At The Nuclear Suppliers

Group To Strengthen The International Nuclear Nonproliferation

Regime

(a) CERTIFICATION.--Before exchanging diplomatic notes

pursuant to Article 16(1) of the Agreement, the President shall certify to

the appropriate congressional committees that it is the policy of the

United States to work with members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group

(NSG), individually and collectively, to agree to further restrict the

transfers of equipment and technology related to the enrichment of

uranium and reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel.

(b) PEACEFUL USE ASSURANCES FOR CERTAIN BYPRODUCT MATERIAL.--The President shall seek to achieve, by the

earliest possible date, either within the NSG or with relevant NSG

Participating Governments, the adoption of principles, reporting, and

exchanges of information as may be appropriate to assure peaceful use

and accounting of by-product material in a manner that is substantially

equivalent to the relevant provisions of the Agreement.

(c) REPORT.--

(I) IN GENERAL.--Not later than six months after the date of

the enactment of this Act, and every six months thereafter, the

President shall transmit to the appropriate congressional committees a

report on efforts by the United States pursuant to subsections (a) and

(b).

(2) TERMINATION.--The requirement to transmit the report

under paragraph (1) terminates on the date on which the President

transmits a report pursuant to such paragraph stating that the

objectives in subsections (a) and (b) have been achieved.

Sec. 205. Conforming Amendments

Section 130 i. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C.

2159 (i)) is amended--

(]) in paragraph (I), by striking "means a joint resolution" and

all that follows through ", with the date" and inserting the following: "means--

"(A) for an agreement for cooperation pursuant to

section 123 of this Act, a joint resolution, the matter after the

resolving clause of which is as follows: 'That the Congress

(does or does not) favor the proposed agreement for

cooperation transmitted to the Congress by the President

on____

"(B) for a determination under section 129 of this Act, a

joint resolution, the matter after the resolving clause of which

is as follows: 'That the Congress does not favor the

determination transmitted to the Congress by the President

on_ .', or

"(C) for a subsequent arrangement under section 201 of

the United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and

Nonproliferation Enhancement Act, a joint resolution, the

matter after the resolving clause of which is as follows: 'That

the Congress does not favor the subsequent arrangement to
US-IN Nu. Coop. Appvl. & Nonpro. Enhc. Act (P.L. I10-369) 1137

the Agreement for Cooperation Between the Government of

the United States of America and the Government of India

Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy that was

transmitted to Congress by the President on September 10,

2008.', with the date"; and

(2) in paragraph (4)--

(A) by inserting after "45 days after its introduction" the

following "(or in the case of ajoint resolution related to a subsequent

arrangement under section 201 of the United States-India Nuclear

Cooperation Approval and Nonproliferation Enhancement Act, 15

days after its introduction)"; and

(B) by inserting after "45-day period" the following: "(or in

the case of a joint resolution related to a subsequent arrangement

under section 201 of the United States-India Nuclear Cooperation

Approval and Nonproliferation Enhancement Act, 15-day period)".

Selected Treaties, Agreements, and Implementing Legislation 1139

Seece Tetis Agemns an mlmning Leisaio 13

2. Selected Treaties, Agreements,

and Implementing Legislation

Selected Treaties, Agreements, and Implementing Legislation 1141

2. Selected Treaties, Agreements, and Implementing

Legislation

Contents

A. NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY ............................................ 1149

Table: Signature, Ratification, Acceptance, Approval Or Accession By

States O r O rganization ................................................................................ 1153

B. THE CONVENTION ON THE PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF

N U C L E A R M A T E R IA L ..................................................................................... 1158

Table: Convention On The Physical Protection Of Nuclear Material ............ 1167

C. CONVENTION ON THE PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR

MATERIAL IMPLEMENTATION ACT OF 1982 ......................................... 1171

S ec . I. S h o rt T itle ......................................................................................... 1 17 1

Sec. 2. Implementation Of Convention And Prohibition Of Related

O ffe n se s ...................................................................................................... 1 17 1

D. CONVENTION ON EARLY NOTIFICATION OF A NUCLEAR

A C C ID E N T .......................................................................................................... 1 17 5

A rticle I - Scope O f A pplication .................................................................. 1175

A rticle 2 - Notification A nd Inform ation .................................................... 1175

A rticle 3 - O ther N uclear A ccidents ............................................................ 1175

A rticle 4 - Functions O f T he A gency ........................................................... 1175

A rticle 5 - Inform ation To Be Provided ...................................................... 1176

A rticle 6 - C onsu ltations ............................................................................... 1 176

Article 7 - Competent Authorities And Points Of Contact ........................ 1176

A rticle 8 - A ssistance To State Parties ........................................................ 1176

Article 9 - Bilateral And Multilateral Arrangements ................................ 1177

Article 10 - Relationship To Other International Agreements ................. 1177

A rticle I I - Settlem ent O f D isputes ............................................................. 1177

A rticle 12 - E ntry Into Force ........................................................................ 1177

A rticle 13 - Provisional A pplication ............................................................ 1178

A rticle 14 - A m end m ents .............................................................................. 1178

A rticle 15 - D en unciatio n ............................................................................. 1178

A rticle 16 - D eposita ry .................................................................................. 1178

Article 17 - Authentic Texts And Certified Copies .................................... 1178

Table: Convention On Early Notification Of A Nuclear Accident .................. 1180

E. CONVENTION ON NUCLEAR SAFETY ....................................................... 1184

P re a m b le ........................................................................................................ 1 18 4

Chapter I Objectives, Definitions And Scope Of Application ...................... 1184

A rticle I - O bjectiv es .................................................................................... 1 184

A rticle 2 - D efin itio n s .................................................................................... 1184

A rticle 3 - Scope O f A pplication .................................................................. 1185

C hapter 2 O bligations ...................................................................................... 1 185

A rticle 4 - Im plem enting M easures ............................................................. 1185

A rticle 5 - R epo rtin g ..................................................................................... 1 185

A rticle 6 - Existing N uclear Installations .................................................... 1185

Article 7 - Legislative And Regulatory Framework ................................... 1185

A rticle 8 - R egulatory B ody ......................................................................... 1 186

Article 9 - Responsibility Of The License Holder ...................................... 1186

A rticle 10 - P riority T o Safety ...................................................................... 1 186
1142 Selected Treaties, Agreements, and Implementing Legislation

Article I I - Financial And Human Resources ............................................ 1186

A rticle 12 - H um an Factors .......................................................................... 1 186

Article 13 - Quality Assurance ..................................................................... 1186

Article 14 - Assessment And Verification Of Safety .................................. 1186

Article 15 - Radiation Protection ................................................................. 1187

Article 16 - Emergency Preparedness ......................................................... 1187

A rticle 17 - S itin g .......................................................................................... 1 1 87

Article 18 - Design And Construction ......................................................... 1187

A rticle 19 - O peratio n ................................................................................... 11 87

Chapter 3 Meetings Of The Contracting Parties ........................................... 1188

Article 20 - Review Meetings ....................................................................... 1188

A rticle 2 1 - T im etab le ................................................................................... 1188

Article 22 - Procedural Arrangements ........................................................ 1188

Article 23 - Extraordinary Meetings ........................................................... 1189

A rticle 24 - A ttend ance ................................................................................. 1189

Article 25 - Summary Reports ..................................................................... 1189

A rticle 26 - L anguages .................................................................................. 1189

A rticle 27 - C onfidentiality ........................................................................... 1189

A rticle 28 - S ecreta riat ................................................................................. 1190

Chapter 4 Final Clauses And Other Provisions ............................................. 1190

Article 29 - Resolution Of Disagreements ................................................... 1190

Article 30 - Signature, Ratification, Acceptance, Approval, Accession .... 1190

Article 31 - Entry Into Force ........................................................................ 1190

Article 32 - Amendments To The Convention ............................................ 1191

A rticle 33 - D enunciation ............................................................................. 1 19 1

A rticle 34 - D eposita ry .................................................................................. 1 19 1

A rticle 35 - A uthentic T exts ......................................................................... 1 192

Table: Signatories And Parties On The Convention On Nuclear Safety ........ 1193

F. CONVENTION ON ASSISTANCE IN THE CASE OF A NUCLEAR

ACCIDENT OR RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY ....................................... 1196

Article 1 - General Provisions ...................................................................... 1196

Article 2 - Provisions Of Assistance ............................................................. 1196

Article 3 - Direction And Control Of Assistance ........................................ 1197

Article 4 - Competent Authorities And Points Of Contact ........................ 1197

Article 5 - Functions Of The Agency ........................................................... 1197

Article 6 - Confidentiality And Public Statements ..................................... 1198

Article 7 - Reimbursement Of Costs ........................................................... 1198

Article 8 - Privileges, Immunities And Facilities ........................................ 1199

Article 9 - Transit Of Personnel, Equipment And Property ..................... 1199

Article 10 - Claims And Compensation ....................................................... 1199

Article I I - Termination Of Assistance ....................................................... 1200

Article 12 - Relationship To Other International Agreements ................. 1200

Article 13 - Settlement Of Disputes ............................................................. 1200

A rticle 14 - E ntry Into Force ........................................................................ 120 1

Article 15 - Provisional Application ............................................................ 1201

A rticle 16 - A m end m ents .............................................................................. 120 1

A rticle 17 - D enu nciation ............................................................................. 1202

A rticle 18 - D eposita ry ................................................................................. 1202

Article 19 - Authentic Texts And Certified Copies .................................... 1202

Table: Convention On Assistance In The Case Of A Nuclear Accident Or

R ad iological E m ergency .................................................................................. 1202
Selected Treaties, Agreements, and Implementing Legislation 1143

G. ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL I TO THE TREATY FOR THE

PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN LATIN AMERICA ............ 1206

A P rocla m a tio n ............................................................................................. 120 6

Understandings And Declarations Attached By The United States To

Its Ratification Of Additional Protocol I! ............................................... 1207

A d d itional P rotocol I .................................................................................... 1208

H. ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL !1 TO THE TREATY FOR THE

PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN LATIN AMERICA ............ 1210

A d d itio n al P rotocol I ................................................................................... 12 10

1. TREATY FOR THE PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN

L A T IN A M E R IC A .............................................................................................. 12 13

P rea m b le ........................................................................................................ 12 13

A rticle I - O b ligatio ns ................................................................................... 12 14

Article 2 - Definition Of The Contracting Parties ...................................... 1214

A rticle 3 - D efinition O f Territory ............................................................... 1214

A rticle 4 - Z one O f A pplication ................................................................... 1214

Article 5 - Definition O f Nuclear W eapons ................................................. 1215

A rticle 6 - M eeting O f Signatories ............................................................... 1215

A rticle 7 - O rgan ization ................................................................................ 12 15

A rticle 8 - O rg a n s .......................................................................................... 12 15

A rticle 9 - T he G eneral C onference ............................................................. 1215

A rticle 10 - T he C ou ncil ............................................................................... 12 16

A rticle 11 - T he Secretariat .......................................................................... 12 16

A rticle 12 - C ontrol System .......................................................................... 12 17

A rticle 13 - IA EA Safeguards ...................................................................... 1217

A rticle 14 - R eports O f T he Parties ............................................................. 1217

Article 15 - Special Reports Requested By The General Secretary .......... 1218

A rticle 16 - Special Inspections .................................................................... 12 18

Article 17 - Use Of Nuclear Energy For Peaceful Purposes ...................... 1218

Article 18- Explosions For Peaceful Purposes ........................................... 1218

Article 19 - Relations With International Atomic Energy Agency ........... 1219

Article 20 - Relations With Other International Agencies ........................ 1219

Article 21 - Measures In The Event Of Violation Of The Treaty ............. 1219

Article 22 - United Nations And Organizations Of American States ....... 1219

A rticle 23 - Privileges A nd Im m unities ....................................................... 1219

Article 24 - Notification Of Other Agreements .......................................... 1220

A rticle 25 - Settlem ent O f D isputes ............................................................. 1220

A rticle 26 - S ignatu re .................................................................................... 1 220

A rticle 27 - Ratification A nd Deposit .......................................................... 1220

A rticle 28 - R eservations .............................................................................. 1220

A rticle 29 - E ntry Into Force ........................................................................ 1220

A rticle 30 - A m end m ents .............................................................................. 122 1

A rticle 31 - D uration A nd Denunciation ..................................................... 1221

Article 32 - Authentic Texts And Registration ........................................... 1221

T ra n sitio n a l A rticle ....................................................................................... 12 2 2

A d d ition a l P ro to col ....................................................................................... 1222

Table: Treaty For The Prohibition Of Nuclear Weapons In Latin America.. 1223

Table: Additional Protocol I To The Treaty For The Prohibition Of

N uclear W eapons In Latin A m erica ............................................................... 1225

Table: Additional Protocol I1 To The Treaty For The Prohibition Of

N uclear W eapons In Latin A m erica ............................................................... 1225
1144 Selected Treaties, Agreements, and Implementing Legislation

J. INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY PARTICIPATION

A C T O F 195 7 ....................................................................................................... 122 6

S ec. I. S h o rt T itle ......................................................................................... 12 2 6

Sec. 2. R ep resentatives ................................................................................. 1226

S ec. 3 . P a rticip ation .................................................................................... 1227

S ec. 4 . V o tin g ................................................................................................ 12 2 7

Sec. 5. Salaries A nd Expenses ..................................................................... 1227

Sec. 6. CSR/FEGLI Status ..................................... 1228

Sec. 7. Special Nuclear Material Compensation ........................................ 1228

Sec. 8. A uthority T erm ination .................................................................... 1229

K. STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY .. 1230

Article I - Establishm ent O f The Agency .................................................... 1230

A rticle I! - O bjectives .............. .................................................................... 12 30

A rticle III - F u nctio n .................................................................................... 1230

A rticle IV - M em bership .............................................................................. 123 1

A rticle V - G eneral C onference ................................................................... 1232

A rticle V I - Board O f G overnors ................................................................. 1233

A rticle V ill - S taff .......................................................................................... 1234

A rticle V iii - Exchange O f Inform ation ..................................................... 1235

A rticle IX - Supplying O f M aterials ............................................................ 1235

Article X - Services, Equipment, And Facilities ......................................... 1236

A rticle X I - A gency P rojects ........................................................................ 1237

A rticle X II - A gency Safeguards .................................................................. 1238

Article X1II - Reimbursement Of Members ............................................... 1239

A rticle X IV - F inance ................................................................................... 1240

A rticle XV - Privileges A nd Im m unities ..................................................... 1241

Article XVI - Relationship With Other Organizations .............................. 1241

A rticle X V II - Settlem ent O f Disputes ........................................................ 1241

Article XVIII - Amendments And Withdrawals ........................................ 1242

A rticle X IX - Suspension O f Privileges ....................................................... 1242

A rticle X X - D efinitions ................................................................................ 1242

Article XXI - Signature, Acceptance, And Entry Into Force .................... 1243

Article.XXII - Registration With The United Nations ............................... 1243

Article XXIII - Authentic Texts And Certified Copies .............................. 1244

Annex I - Preparatory C om m ission ............................................................ 1245

Summary Of The Statute Of The International Atomic Energy Agency ........ 1246

L. AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND

THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY FOR THE

APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS IN THE UNITED STATES OF

A M E R IC A ............................................................................................................ 124 8

M. U.S. SENATE RESOLUTION CONSENTING TO THE

RATIFICATION OF THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE U.S. AND

THE IAEA FOR THE APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS .......................... 1276

N. PROTOCOL ADDITIONAL TO THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE INTERNATIONAL

ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY FOR THE APPLICATION OF

SAFEGUARDS IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA .......................... 1277

0. UNITED STATES ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL IMPLEMENTATION

A C T ................................................................................................................. . . 12 8 6

Title Il-United States Additional Protocol Implementation ............................ 1286

S ec. 20 1. S ho rt T itle ..................................................................................... 12 86
Selected Treaties, Agreements, and Implementing Legislation 1145

S ec. 20 2 . F in d in gs .......................................................................................... 12 86

S ec. 203. D efi n itions ...................................................................................... 1287

See. 204. Severability .................................................................................... 1288

Subtitle A --G eneral Provisions ........................................................................ 1288

S ee. 2 11. A u th o rity ........................................................................................ 12 88

Subtitle B--C om plem entary A ccess ................................................................ 1288

Sec. 221. Requirement For Authority To Conduct Complementary

A c c e ss ......................................................................................................... 12 8 8

Sec. 222. Procedures For Complementary Access ................................. 1289

See. 223. Consents, Warrants, And Complementary Access ..................... 1290

Sec. 224. Prohibited Acts Relating To Complementary Access ................ 1291

Subtitle C--Confidentiality of Inform ation .................................................... 1291

Sec. 231. Protection Of Confidentiality Of Information ............................ 1291

S u btitle D --E nforcem ent .................................................................................. 129 1

Sec. 241. R ecordkeeping V iolations ............................................................. 1291

S ec. 2 4 2 . P en a lties ......................................................................................... 12 92

Sec. 243. Specific Enforcem ent .................................................................... 1293

Subtitle E--Environm ental Sam pling ............................................................. 1294

See. 251. Notification To Congress Of IAEA Board Approval Of WideA rea Environm ental Sam pling ................................................................ 1294

Sec. 252. Application Of National Security Exclusion To Wide-Area

E nvironm ental Sam pling .......................................................................... 1294

Sec. 253. Application Of National Security Exclusion To LocationSpecific Environm ental Sam pling ............................................................ 1294

Sec. 254. R ule O f C onstruction .................................................................... 1295

Subtitle F--Protection of National Security Information and Activities ...... 1295

Sec. 261. Protection O f Certain Information .............................................. 1295

Sec. 262. IA EA Inspections A nd V isits ........................................................ 1295

S u btitle G -- R epo rts ......................................................................................... 1296

Sec. 271. Report On Initial United States Declaration ............................... 1296

Sec. 272. Report On Revisions To Initial United States Declaration ........ 1296

Sec. 273. Content Of Reports On United States Declarations ................... 1296

Sec. 274. Report On Efforts To Promote The Implementation Of

A d d itio na l P rotoco ls ................................................................................. 1296

Sec. 275. Notice O f IA EA Notifications ....................................................... 1297

Subtitle H--Authorization of Appropriations ................................................ 1297

Sec. 281. Authorization Of Appropriations ............................................... 1297

P. STATUS WITH REGARD TO CONCLUSION OF SAFEGUARDS

AGREEMENTS AND ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS AND SMALL

Q U A N T IT IES PR O TO C O LS ............................................................................. 1298

Q. TABLE: IAEA SUPPLY AGREEMENTS ...................................................... 1312

R. TABLE: UNITED STATES AGREEMENTS FOR PEACEFUL

N U C LEA R C O O PER A T IO N ............................................................................ 1315

S. TABLE: TRILATERALS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES, THE

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY AND OTHER

COUNTRIES FOR THE APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS BY THE

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY TO EQUIPMENT

CONCERNING CIVIL USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY .................................. 1317

T. TABLE: TRILATERALS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES, THE

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY AND OTHER
1146 Selected Treaties, Agreements, and Implementing Legislation

COUNTRIES FOR THE APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS

PURSUANT TO THE NONPROLIFERATION TREATY ............................ 1318

U. CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION OF MARINE POLLUTION

BY DUMPING OF WASTES AND OTHER MATTERS ................................ 1319

Table: Parties to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by

Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, with Annexes .................................. 1327

V. JOINT CONVENTION ON THE SAFETY OF SPENT FUEL

MANAGEMENT AND ON THE SAFETY OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE

M A N A G E M E N T ................................................................................................. 1330

P rea m b le ........................................................................................................ 13 3 2

Chapter 1. Objectives Definitions And Scope Of Application ..................... 1333

A rticle I - O bjectives .................................................................................... 1333

A rticle 2 - D efi nitions ................................................................................... 1333

A rticle 3 - Scope O f A pplication ................................................................. 1334

Chapter 2. Safety Of Spent Fuel Management ............................................. 1335

Article 4 - General Safety Requirements ................................................... 1335

A rticle 5 - E xisting Facilities ....................................................................... 1335

A rticle 6 - Siting O f Proposed Facilities .................................................. 1335

Article 7 - Design And Construction Of Facilities ..................................... 1335

Article 8 - Assessment Of Safety Of Facilities ............................................ 1336

A rticle 9 - O peration O f Facilities .............................................................. 1336

A rticle 10 - Disposal O f Spent Fuel ............................................................. 1336

Chapter 3. Safety Of Radioactive Waste Management ................................ 1336

Article I I - General Safety Requirements ................................................. 1336

Article 12- Existing Facilities And Past Practices ..................................... 1337

Article 13 - Siting O f Proposed Facilities ................................................... 1337

Article 14 - Design And Construction Of Facilities ................................... 1337

Article 15 - Assessment Of Safety Of Facilities .......................................... 1337

A rticle 16 - O peration O f Facilities ............................................................. 1338

Article 17- Institutional Measures After Closure ..................................... 1338

C hapter 4. G eneral Safety Provisions ............................................................ 1338

A rticle 18- Im plem enting M easures .......................................................... 1338

Article 19 - Legislative And Regulatory Framework ................................ 1338

A rticle 20 - R egulatory Body ....................................................................... 1339

Article 21 - Responsibility Of The License Holder ................................... 1339

Article 22- Human And Financial Resources ........................................... 1339

A rticle 23 - Q uality A ssurance .................................................................... 1339

Article 24 - Operational Radiation Protection ........................................... 1339

Article 25 - Em ergency Preparedness ........................................................ 1340

A rticle 26 - D ecom m issioning ...................................................................... 1340

C hapter 5. M iscellaneous Provisions ............................................................. 1340

Article 27 - Transboundary M ovem ent ...................................................... 1340

A rticle 28 - D isused Sealed Sources ............................................................ 1341

Chapter 6. Meetings Of The Contracting Parties ......................................... 1341

A rticle 29 - Preparatory M eeting ................................................................ 1341

A rticle 30 - R eview M eetings ....................................................................... 134 1

A rticle 31 - Extraordinary M eetings .......................................................... 1342

A rticle 32 - R ep o rting .................................................................................. 134 2

A rticle 33 - A ttendance ............................................................................. 1342

A rticle 34 - Sum m ary R eports .................................................................... 1343

A rticle 35 - L anguages ................................................................................. 1343
Selected Treaties, Agreements, and Implementing Legislation 1147

A rticle 36 - C onfidentiality .......................................................................... 1343

A rticle 37 - S ecretariat ................................................................................. 1343

Chapter 7. Final Clauses And Other Provisions ........................................... 1344

Article 38 - Resolution O f Disagreem ents .................................................. 1344

Article 39 - Signature, Ratification, Acceptance, Approval, Accession ... 1344

A rticle 40 - E ntry Into Force ....................................................................... 1344

Article 41 - Amendments To The Convention ........................................... 1344

A rticle 42 - D enunciation ............................................................................. 1345

A rticle 43 - D epositary ................................................................................. 1345

A rticle 44 - A uthentic T exts ........................................................................ 1345

Table: Joint Convention On The Safety Of Spent Fuel Management And

On The Safety Of Radioactive Waste Management ...................................... 1346

Declarations/Reservations On The Joint Convention On The Safety Of

Spent Fuel Management And On The Safety Of Radioactive Waste

M a n a g em e n t ..................................................................................................... 134 8

W. CODE OF CONDUCT ON THE SAFETY AND SECURITY OF

R A D IO A C T IV E SO U R C ES ............................................................................... 1350

Measures To Strengthen International Cooperation In Nuclear, Radiation

And Transport Safety And Waste Management ........................................... 1351

Revised Code Of Conduct On The Safety And Security Of Radioactive

S o u rces (A n nex 1) ......................................................................................... 135 3

T he IA E A 's M em ber States ......................................................................... 1353

I. D efi n itio n s .................................................................................................. 13 54

11. Scope A nd O bjectives .............................................................................. 1355

III. B asic P rin cip les ....................................................................................... 135 5

Annex: List of Sources Covered by the Code ............................................. 1361

Open-Ended Meeting Of Technical And Legal Experts To Review A

Draft Revised Code Of Conduct On The Safety And Security Of

R adioactive Sources (A nnex 2) .................................................................... 1364

R eport of the C hairm an ............................................................................... 1364

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 1149

A. NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the "Parties to the Treaty",

Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war

and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to

take measurements to safeguard the security of peoples,

Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the

danger of nuclear war,

In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for

the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear

weapons,

Undertaking to cooperate in facilitating the application of International Atomic

Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities.

Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts to further the

application, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency

safeguards system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and

special fissionable materials by use of instruments and other techniques at certain

strategic points,

Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear

technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclearweapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available

for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or nonnuclear-weapon States,

Convinced that, in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to the Treaty are entitled

to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to

contribute alone or in cooperation with other States, to the further development of the

applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,

Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the

nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear

disarmament,

Urging the cooperation of all States in the attainment of this objective,

Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty banning

nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere in outer space and under water in its Preamble to

seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time

and to continue negotiations to this end,

Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust

between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons,

the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals

of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a treaty on general and

complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must

refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial

integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with

the Purposes of the United Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of

international peace and security are to be promoted with the least diversion for

armaments of the world's human and economic resources,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any

recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over

such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist,

encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire
1150 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or

explosive devices.

ARTICLE !1

Each non-nuclear weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the

transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive

devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not

to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;

and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other

nuclear explosive devices.

ARTICLE III

1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept

safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the

International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International

Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency's safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose

of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view

to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or

other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this article

shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is

being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such

facility. The safeguards required by this article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State,

under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.

2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special

fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the

processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon

State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be

subject to the safeguards required by this article.

3. The safeguards required by this article shall be implemented in a manner designed

to comply with article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or

technological development of the Parties or international cooperation in the field of

peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and

equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful

purposes in accordance with the provisions of this article and the principle of

safeguarding set forth in the Preamble of the Treaty.

4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the

International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this article either

individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of International

Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180

days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their

instruments of ratification or accession after the 180-day period, negotiation of such

agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements

shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of

negotiations.

ARTICLE IV

I. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all

the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for

peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of this

Treaty.

2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to

participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and

technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty

in a position to do so shall also cooperate in contributing alone or together with other
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 1151

States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of

nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclearweapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the

developing areas of the world.

ARTICLE V

Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that, in

accordance with this Treaty, under appropriate international observation and through

appropriate international procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful applications of

nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the

Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive

devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and

development. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall be able to obtain such

benefits, pursuant to a special international agreement or agreements, through an

appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon

States. Negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon as possible after the Treaty

enters into force. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty so desiring may also

obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements.

ARTICLE VI

Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on

effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to

nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and compete disarmament under strict

and effective international control.

ARTICLE VII

Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional

treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective

territories.

ARTICLE VIII

I. Any Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any

proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall

circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or

more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a

conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an

amendment.

2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all

the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the

Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members

of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment

shall enter into force for each Party that deposits its instrument of ratification of the

amendment upon the deposit of such instruments of ratification by a majority of all the

Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the

Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members

of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thereafter, it

shall enter into force for any other Party upon the deposit of its instrument of ratification

of the amendment.

3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the

Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this

Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of

the Treaty are being realized. At intervals of five years thereafter, a majority of the

Parties to the Treaty may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary

Governments, the convening of further conferences with the same objective of

reviewing the operation of the Treaty.
1152 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

ARTICLE IX

I. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign

the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may

accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of

ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the

United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are hereby designated the Depositary

Governments.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by the States, the

Governments of which are designated Depositaries of the Treaty, and forty other States

signatory to this Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the

purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and

exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1, 1967.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification of accession are deposited subsequent

to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of

their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding

States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of

any requests for convening a conference or other notices.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to article

102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

ARTICLE X

I. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw

from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of

this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of

such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United National Security

Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the

extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be

convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue to force indefinitely, or shall be

extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty.

ARTICLE XI

This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments.

Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments

to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty.

DONE in triplicate, at the cities of Washington, London and Moscow, this first day

of July one thousand nine hundred sixty-eight.
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 1153

Table: Signature, Ratification, Acceptance, Approval Or Accession By States Or

Organization

Date of

Date of Deposit of

Date of Deposit of Accession (A) or

Country Signature Ratification Successions (S)

A fghanistan* ................................................. 7/1/68 ................. 2/4/70 ............................

Albania* .............................................. 9/12/90(A)

A lg eria * ................................................................... ........................... .......... 1/12 /9 5 (A )

Andorra* ....................................................................................................... 6/07/96(A)

Angola* ....................................................................................................... 10/14/96(A)

Antigua and Barbuda* ................................................................................... 6/17/85(S)

Argentina* .................................................................................................... 2/10/95(A)

Arm enia* ...................................................................................................... 7/15/93(A)

Australia* .................................................... 2/27/70 ............... 1/23/73 ............................ Austria* ......................................................... 7/1/68 ............... 6/27/69 ............................

Azerbaijan* ................................................................................................... 9/22/92(A)

Baham as, The* ............................................................................................... 8/11/76(S)

Bahrain* ........................................................................................................ 11/3/88(A)

Bangladesh* ................................................................................................. 8/31/79(A)

Barbados* ..................................................... 7/1/68 ............... 2/21/80 ............................ Belarus* ........................................................................................................ 7/22/93(A)

Belgium * ..................................................... 8/20/68 ................. 5/2/75 ............................ B e lize * ..................................................................... ........................... ............. 8/9 /8 5 (S )

B e n in ............................................................. 7/1 /6 8 ............. 10 /3 1/7 2 ............................ B h u ta n * .................................................................... ........................... .......... 5/2 3/8 5 (A )

Bolivia* ......................... 7/l/68....... 5/26/70 .................. Bosnia and Herzegovina* .............................................................................. 8/15/94(S)

Botswana* ..................................................... 7/1/68 ............... 4/28/69 ............................

B raz il* ...................................................................... ........................... .......... 9/18/9 8 (A )

Brunei* .......................................................................................................... 3/26/85(A)

Bulgaria* ....................................................... 7/1/68 ................. 9/5/69 ............................ Burkina Faso* ............................................ 11/25/68 ................. 3/3/70 ............................ Burundi* ....................................................................................................... 3/19/7 1(A)

Cam bodia* ...................................................................................................... 6/2/72(A)

Cam eroon* .................................................. 7/17/68 ................. 1/8/69 ............................ Canada* ...................................................... 7/23/68 ................. 1/8/69 ............................ Cape Verde ................................................................................................. 10/24/79(A)

Central African Republic* .......................................................................... 10/25/70(A)

Chad* ............................................................ 7/1/68 ............... 3/10/71 ............................

C h ile * ....................................................................... ........................... .......... 5 /2 5/9 5 (A )

China* ............................................................................................................. 3/9/92(A)

Colombia* ..................................................... 7/1/68 ................. 4/8/86 ............................ Comoros* ...................................................................................................... 10/4/95(A)

Congo .......................................................................................................... 10/23/78(A)

Costa Rica* ................................................... 7/1/68 ................. 3/3/70 ............................ Cote d'Ivoire* ............................................... 7/1/68 ................. 3/6/73 ............................ Croatia* .......................................................................................................... 6/29/92(S)

C u b a * ....................................................................... ........................... .......... I 1/4 /0 2 (A )

Cyprus* .......................................................... 7/1/68 ............... 2/10/70 ............................ Czech Republic* ............................................................................................ 1/1/93(S)

Democratic People's Republic of

Korea (Withdrew from treaty

I/f10/03; Effective 4/10/2003) ..................................................................... 12/12/85(A)
1154 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

Date of

Date of Deposit of

Date of Deposit of Accession (A) or

Country Signature Ratification Successions (S)

Democratic Republic of the

Congo (Form erly Zaire)* ............................ 7/22/68 ................. 8/4/70 ............................

Denmark* ...................................................... 7/1/68 ................. 1/3/69 ............................

Djibouti* ..................................................................................................... 10/16/96(A)

Dom inica* ...................................................................................................... 8/10/84(S)

Dom inican Republic* .................................. 7/1/68 ....... 7/24/71 ..................

Ecuador* ....................................................... 7/9/68 ................. 3/7/69 ............................

Egypt* ........................................................... 7/1/68 .............. 2/26/81' ............................

El Salvador* .................................................. 7/1/68 ............... 7/11/72 ............................

Equatorial Guinea ........................................................................................ I /1/84(A)

E ritrea ....................................................................... .......................... ............ 3 /3 /9 5 (A )

E sto n ia * ................................................................... ........................... ............ 1/7 /9 2 (A )

Ethiopia* ....................................................... 9/5/68 ................. 2/5/70 ............................

F i-ji* .......................................................................... ........................... ........... 7 / 14 /7 2 (S )

Finland* ........................................................ 7/1/68 ................. 2/5/69 ............................

F ran ce * ..................................................................... ........................... ............ 8 /3/9 2 (A )

Gabon* .......................................................................................................... 2/19/74(A)

Gambia* ........................................................ 9/4/68 ............... 5/12/75 ............................

Georgia* .......................................................................................................... 3/7/94(A)

Germany*, Fed. Republic of ...................... 11/28/69 ............. 5/2/75 ' . ............................

Ghana* .......................................................... 7/1/68 ................. 5/4/70 ............................

Greece* ......................................................... 7/1/68 ............... 3/11/70 ............................

Grenada* .......................................................................................................... 9/2/75(S)

Guatemala* ................................................. 7/26/68 ............... 9/22/70 ............................

Guinea ........................................................................................................... 4/29/85(A)

Guinea-Bissau ................................................................................................ 8/20/76(S)

Guyana* ...................................................................................................... 10/19/93(A)

Haiti* ............................................................ 7/1/68 ................. 6/2/70 ............................

Holy See* ..................................................................................................... 2/25/71 (A)'

Honduras* ....................... 7/1/68 ....... 5/16/73 ..................

Hungary*, Republic of .................................. 7/1/68 ............... 5/27/69 ............................

Iceland* ......................................................... 7/1/68 ............... 7/18/69 ............................

Indonesia* ..................................................... 3/2/70 .............. 7/12/79' ............................

Iran * .............................................................. 7 /1/6 8 ................. 2 /2 /7 0 ............................

Iraq*.............................................................. 7/1/68 ............. 10/29/69 ............................

Ireland* ......................................................... 7/1/68 ................. 7/1/68 ............................

Italy* ........................................................... 1/28/69 ................ 5/2/75 ' ............................

Jamaica* ...................................................... 4/14/69 ................. 3/5/70 ............................

Japan* ........................................................... 2/3/70 ................ 6/8/76' ............................

Jordan* ....................................................... 7/10/68 ....... 2/11/70 ..................

Kazakhstan* .................................................................................................. 2/14/94(A)

Kenya* .......................................................... 7/1/68 ............... 6/11/70 ............................

Kiribati* ......................................................................................................... 4/18/85(S)

Kuwait* ....................................................... 8/15/68 ............ 11/17/89 ............................

Kyrgyzstan* ............................................. 7/5/94(A)

Laos* ............................................................. 7/1/68 ............... 2/20/70 ............................

L atv ia * ..................................................................... ........................... .......... 1/3 1/9 2 (A )

Lebanon* ...................................................... 7/1/68 ............... 7/15/70..................

Lesotho* ........................................................ 7/9/68 ............... 5/20/70 ............................

Liberia .......................................................... 7/1/68 ................. 3/5/70 ............................

Libya* ......................... 7/18/68 ....... 5/26/75 ..................
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 1155

Date of

Date of Deposit of

Date of Deposit of Accession (A) or

Country Signature Ratification Successions (S)

Liechtenstein* .............................................................................................. 4/20/78(A )'

Lithuania* ..................................................................................................... 9/23/91(A)

Luxem bourg* .............................................. 8/14/68 ................. 5/2/75 ............................ Madagascar* ..................... 8122/6$....... 10/8/70 .................. M alaw i* ............................................... 2/18/86(S)

M alaysia* ..................................................... 7/1/68 ........ 3/5/70 .................. M aldive Islands* ......................................... 9/11/68 ................. 4/7/70 ............................

M ali* .......................................................... 7/14/69 ....... 2/10/70 .................. M alta* ......................................................... 4/17/69 ................. 2/6/70 ............................

M arshall Islands* ......................................................................................... 1/30/95(A)

M auritania* ................................................................................................. 10/26/93(A)

M auritius* ..................................................... 7/1/68 ................. 4/8/69 ............................ M exico* ...................................................... 7/26/68 .............. 1/21/69 ............................

M icronesia .................................................................................................... 4/14/95(A)

M oldova* .................................................................................................... l0/l 1/94(A)

M onaco* ....................................................................................................... 3/13/95(A)

M ongolia* ..................................................... 7/1/68 ............... 5/14/69 ............................ M ontenegro ..................................................................................................... 6/3/06(A)

M orocco* ...................................................... 7/1/68 ............. 11/27/70 ............................ M ozam bique ................................................................................................... 9/4/90(A)

Myanmar (Burma) * ................... 12/2/92(A)

N am ibia* ....................................................................................................... 10/2/92(A)

N auru* ............................................................................................................ 6/7/82(A)

N epal* ........................................................... 7/1/68 ................. 1/5/70 ............................ N etherlands* ............................................... 8/20/68 ................ 5/2/75. ............................ N ew Zealand* ............................................... 7/1/68 ............... 9/10/69 ............................ N icaragua* .................................................... 7/1/68 ................. 3/6/73 ............................ N iger* ........................................................................................................... 10/9/92(A)

N igeria* ........................................................ 7/1/68 ............... 9/27/68 ............................ N orway* ........................................................ 7/1/68 ................. 2/5/69 ............................ Om an* ........................................................................................................... 1/23/97(A )

Palau* ............................................................................................................ 4/12/95(A)

Panam a* ........................................................ 7/1/68 ............... 1/13/77 ............................ Papua New G uinea* .................................................................................... 1/13/82(A)

Paraguay* ...................................................... 7/1/68 ................. 2/4/70 ............................ Peru* ............................................................. 7/1/68 ................. 3/3/70 ............................ Philippines* .................................................. 7/1/68 ............... 10/5/72 ............................

Poland* ......................................................... 7/1/68 ............... 6/12/69 ............................ Portugal* ..................................................................................................... 12/15/77(A)

Q atar* .............................................................................................................. 4/3/89(A)

Republic of Korea* ....................................... 7/1/68 ............... 4/23/75 ............................

Rom ania* ...................................................... 7/1/68 ................. 2/4/70 ............................

Russia*. ........................................................ 7/1/68 ................. 3/5/70 ............................ Rw anda* ....................................................................................................... 5/20/75(A)

St. K itts and N evis* ............................................. .... .................................. 3/22/93(S)

St. Lucia* ..................................................................................................... 12/28/79(S)

St. Vincent and the Grenadines* ................................ . I /6/84(S)

Sam oa* ...................................................................................................... 3/17/1975(A )

San Marino* ...................... 7/1/68 ....... 8/10/70 ................. Sao Tom e and Principe ................................................................................. 7/20/83(A )

Saudi Arabia* ................................................................................................ 10/3/88(A)
1156 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

Date of

Date of Deposit of

Date of Deposit of Accession (A) or

Country Signature Ratification Successions (S)

Senegal* ........................................................ 7/1/68 ............. 12/17/70 ............................ Serbia*. .................................................................................................... 1/ 1/93; 9/5/01

Seychelles* ................................................................................................... 3/12/85(A)

Sierra Leone* ................................................................................................ 2/26/75(A)

Singapore* .................................................... 2/5/70 ............... 3/10/76 ............................

Slovakia* ............................................... 1/1/93(S)

Slovenia* ......................................................................................................... 4/7/92(S)

Solom on Islands* ......................................................................................... 6/17/8 I(S)

Som alia ........................................................ 7/1/68 ................. 3/5/70 ............................

South Africa* ................................................................................................ 7/10/91 (A)

Spain* ........................................................................................................... I 1/5/87(A)

Sri Lanka* ..................................................... 7/1/68 ................. 3/5/79 ............................

Sudan* ....................................................... 12/24/68 ............. 10/31/73 ............................

Surinam e* ...................................................................................................... 6/30/76(S)

Swaziland* .................................................. 6/24/69 ............. 12/11/69 ............................

Sweden* ...................................................... 8/19/68 ................. 1/9/70 ............................ Switzerland* .................... 11/27/69 ....... 3/9/77' ..................

Syrian Arab Republic* .................................. 7/1/68 ............... 9/24/69 ............................

Taiwan' ......................................................... 7/1/68 ............... 1/27/70 ............................

Tajikistan* .................................................................................................... 1/1 7/95(A)

Tanzania* ...................................................................................................... 5/31/91 (A)

Thailand* ...................................................................................................... 12/2/72(A )

The Former Yugoslav Republic

of M acedonia* .............................................................................................. 4/12/95(A)

Tim or-Leste ............................................................................................... 5/5/2003 (A)

Togo .............................................................. 7/1/68 ............... 2/26/70 ............................ Tonga* ............................................................................................................. 7/7/71(S)

Trinidad and Tobago* ................................ 8/20/68 ...... 10/30/86 ..................

Tunisia* ........................................................ 7/1/68 ............... 2/26/70 ............................

Turkey* ....................................................... 1/28/69 ............. 4/17/80' ............

Turkm enistan* .............................................................................................. 9/29/94(A)

Tuvalu* .......................................................................................................... 1/19/79(S)

Uganda* ...................................................................................................... 10/20/82(A)

Ukraine* ........................................................................................................ 12/5/94(A)

United Arab Em irates* .................................................................................. 9/26/95(A)

United Kingdom of Great Britain

and Northern Ireland* ................................... 7/1/68 ............ 11/27/68. ............................

United States* ............................................... 7/1/68 ................. 3/5/70 ............................

Uruguay* ...................................................... 7/1/68 ............... 8/31/70 ............................

Uzbekistan* .................................................................................................... 5/2/92(A)

Vanuatu ......................................................................................................... 8/26/95(A)

Venezuela* .................................................... 7/1/68 ............... 9/25/75 ............................

V ietnam * ....................................................................................................... 6/14/82(A)

Yem en*b ..................................................... 11/14/68 ................. 6/1/79 ............................

Zam bia* ........................................................................................................ 5/15/91 (A )

Zimbabwe* ....................................... ..... 9/26/91 (A)

TOTAL: 190 (Total does not include Taiwan.)
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 1157

* - Entries with asterisk have NPT safeguards agreements that have entered into

force as of 10/31/92.

** - Non-NPT, full-scope safeguards agreement in force.

a - Dates given are the earliest dates on which a country signed the Treaty or

deposited its instrument of ratification or accession-whether in Washington, London, or

Moscow. In the case of a country that was a dependent territory which became a party

through succession, the date given is the date on which the country gave notice that it

would continue to be bound by the terms of the Treaty.

b - Effective 11/25/75.

With Statement.

2 The former German Democratic Republic, which united with the Federal Republic

of Germany on 10/3/90, had signed the NPT on 7/1/68 and deposited its instrument of

ratification on 10/31/69. Extended to Netherlands Antilles and Aruba.

4 Extended to Aguilla and territories under the territorial sovereignty of the United

Kingdom.

Russia has given notice that it would continue to exercise the rights and fulfill the

obli gations of the former Soviet Union arising from the NPT.

The Republic of Yemen resulted from the union of the Yemen Arab Republic and

the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. The table indicates the date of signature

and ratification by the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen; the first of these two

states to become a party to the NPT. The Yemen Arab Republic signed the NPT on

9/23/68 and deposited its instrument of ratification on 5/14/86. 7 On 1/27/70, an instrument of ratification was deposited in the name of the Republic

of China. Effective 1/1/79, the United States recognized the People's Republic of China

as the sole legal government of China. The authorities on Taiwan state that they will

continue to abide by the provisions of the Treaty and the United States regards them as

bound by the obligations imposed by the Treaty. 8 Effective date of succession to the Treaty by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is

April 27, 1992; the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia signed the Treaty

on July 10, 1968 and deposited an instrument of ratification, with a declaration, on

March 4, 1970 and 5 March 1970. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia changed its

name to Serbia and Montenegro on February 4, 2003.

November 17, 2010
1158 The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material

B. THE CONVENTION ON THE PHYSICAL PROTECTION

OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL

THE STATES PARTIES TO THIS CONVENTION,

RECOGNIZING the right of all States to develop and apply nuclear energy for peaceful

purposes and their legitimate interests in the potential benefits to be derived from the

peaceful application of nuclear energy,

CONVINCED of the need for facilitating international co-operation in the peaceful

application of nuclear energy,

DESIRING to avert the potential dangers posed by the unlawful taking and use of

nuclear material,

CONVINCED that offences relating to nuclear material are a matter of grave concern

and that there is an urgent need to adopt appropriate and effective measures to ensure the

prevention, detection and punishment of such offences,

AWARE OF THE NEED FOR international co-operation to establish, in conformity

with the national law of each State Party and with this Convention, effective measures

for the physical protection of nuclear material,

CONVINCED that this Convention should facilitate the safe transfer of nuclear material,

STRESSING also the importance of the physical protection of nuclear material in

domestic use, storage and transport,

RECOGNIZING the importance of effective physical protection of nuclear material

used for military purposes, and understanding that such material is and will continue to

be accorded stringent physical protection,

HAVE AGREED as follows:

Article I

For the purposes of this Convention:

(a) "nuclear material" means plutonium except that with isotopic concentration

exceeding 80% in plutonium-238; uranium-233; uranium enriched in the isotope 235

or 233; uranium containing the mixture of isotopes as occurring in nature other than

in the form of ore or ore-residue; any material containing one or more of the

foregoing;

(b) "uranium enriched in the isotope 235 or 233" means uranium containing the

isotope 235 or 233 or both in an amount such that the abundance ratio of the sum of

these isotopes to the isotope 238 is greater than the ratio of the isotope 235 to the

isotope 238 occurring in nature;

(c) "international nuclear transport" means the carriage of a consignment of

nuclear material by any means of transportation intended to go beyond the territory of the State where the shipment originates beginning with the departure from a

facility of the shipper in that State and ending with the arrival at a facility of the

receiver within the State of ultimate destination.

Article 2

1. This Convention shall apply to nuclear material used for peaceful purposes while

in international nuclear transport.

2. With the exception of articles 3 and 4 and paragraph 3 of article 5, this

Convention shall also apply to nuclear material used for peaceful purposes while in

domestic use, storage and transport. 3. Apart from the commitments expressly undertaken by States Parties in the articles

covered by paragraph 2 with respect to nuclear material used for peaceful purposes

while in domestic use, storage and transport, nothing in this Convention shall be

interpreted as affecting the sovereign rights of a State regarding the domestic use,

storage and transport of such nuclear material.
The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material 1159

Article 3

Each State Party shall take appropriate steps within the framework of its national

law and consistent with international law to ensure as far as practicable that, during

international nuclear transport, nuclear material within its territory, or on board a ship or

aircraft under its jurisdiction insofar as such ship or aircraft is engaged in the transport to

or from that State, is protected at the levels described in Annex I.

Article 4

1. Each State Party shall not export or authorize the export of nuclear material

unless the State Party has received assurances that such material will be protected during

t he international nuclear transport at the levels described in Annex I.

2. Each State Party shall not import or authorize the import of nuclear material from

a State not party to this Convention unless the State Party has received assurances that

such material will during the international nuclear transport be protected at the levels

described in Annex I.

3. A State Party shall not allow the transit of its territory by land or internal

waterways or through its airports or seaports of nuclear material between States that are

not parties to this Convention unless the State Party has received assurances as far as practicable that this nuclear material will be protected during international nuclear

transport at the levels described in Annex 1.

4. Each State Party shall apply within the framework of its national law the levels of

physical protection described in Annex I to nuclear material being transported from a

part of that State to another part of the same State through international waters or

airspace.

5. The State Party responsible for receiving assurances that the nuclear material will

be protected at the levels described in Annex I according to paragraphs I to 3 shall

identify and inform in advance States which the nuclear material is expected to transit by

land or internal waterways, or whose airports or seaports it is expected to enter.

6. The responsibility for obtaining assurances referred to in paragraph I may be

transferred, by mutual agreement, to the State Party involved in the transport as the

importing State.

7. Nothing in this article shall be interpreted as in any way affecting the territorial

sovereignty and jurisdiction of a State, including that over its airspace and territorial sea.

Article 5

I. States Parties shall identify and make known to each other directly or through the

International Atomic Energy Agency their central authority and point of contact having

responsibility for physical protection of nuclear material and for co-ordinating recovery

and response operations in the event of any unauthorized removal, use or alteration of

nuclear material or in the event of credible threat thereof.

2. In the case of theft, robbery or any other unlawful taking of nuclear material or of

credible threat thereof, States Parties shall, in accordance with their national law,

provide co-operation and assistance to the maximum feasible extent in the recovery and

protection of such material to any State that so requests. In particular:

(a) a State Party shall take appropriate steps to inform as soon as possible other

States, which appear to it to be concerned, of any theft, robbery or other unlawful

taking of nuclear material or credible threat thereof and to inform, where appropriate,

international organizations;

(b) as appropriate, the States Parties concerned shall exchange information with

each other or international organizations with a view to protecting threatened nuclear

material, verifying the integrity of the shipping container, or recovering unlawfully

taken nuclear material and shall:

(i) co-ordinate their efforts through diplomatic and other agreed channels;

(ii) render assistance; if requested;
1160 The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material

(iii) ensure the return of nuclear material stolen or missing as a consequence

of the above-mentioned events.

The means of implementation of this co-operation shall be determined by the States

Parties concerned.

3. States Parties shall co-operate and consult as appropriate, with each other directly

or through international organizations, with a view to obtaining guidance on the design,

maintenance and improvement of systems of physical protection of nuclear material in

international transport.

Article 6

I. States Parties shall take appropriate measures consistent with their national law to

protect the confidentiality of any information which they receive in confidence by virtue

of the provisions of this Convention form another State Party or through participation in

an activity carried out for the implementation of this Convention. If States Parties

provide information to international organizations in confidence, steps shall be taken to

ensure that the confidentiality of such information is protected.

2. States Parties shall not be required by this Convention to provide any information

which they are not permitted to communicate pursuant to national law or which would

jeopardize the security of the State concerned or the physical protection of nuclear

material.

Article 7

I. The intentional commission of:

(a) an act without lawful authority which constitutes the receipt, possession, use,

transfer, alteration, disposal or dispersal of nuclear material and which causes or is

likely to cause death or serious injury to any person or substantial damage to

property;

(b) a theft of robbery of nuclear material;

(c) an embezzlement or fraudulent obtaining of nuclear material;

(d) an act constituting a demand for nuclear material by threat or use of force or

by any other form of intimidation;

(e) a threat:

(i) to use nuclear material to cause death or serious injury to any person

or substantial property damage, or

(ii) to commit an offence described in sub-paragraph (b) in order to

compel a natural or legal person, international organization or State to do or

to refrain from doing any act;

(I) an attempt to commit any offence described in paragraphs (a), (b) or (c);

and

(g) an act which constitutes participation in any offence described in paragraphs (a) to (f) shall be made a punishable offence by each State Party under its national

law.

2. Each State Party shall make the offences described in this article punishable by appropriate penalties which take into account their grave nature.

Article 8

1. Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish its

jurisdiction over the offences set forth in article 7 in the following cases;

(a) when the offence is committed in the territory of that State or on board a ship

or aircraft registered in that State;

(b) when the alleged offender is a national of that State.

2. Each State Party shall likewise take such measures as may be necessary to

establish its jurisdiction over these offences in cases where the alleged offender is

presented in its territory and it does not extradite him pursuant to article I I to any of the

States mentioned in paragraph I.
The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material 1161

3. This Convention does not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in

accordance with national law.

4. In addition to the States Parties mentioned in paragraphs I and 2, each State Party

may, consistent with international law, establish its jurisdiction over the offences set

forth in article 7 when it is involved in international nuclear transport as the exporting or

importing State.

Article 9

Upon being satisfied that the circumstances so warrant, the State Party in whose territory

the alleged offender is present shall take appropriate measures, including detention,

under its national law to ensure his presence for the purpose of prosecution or

extradition. Measures taken according to this article shall be notified without delay to

the States required to establish jurisdiction pursuant to Article 8 and, where appropriate,

all other States concerned.

Article 10

The State Party in whose territory the alleged offender is present shall, if it does not

extradite him, submit, without exception whatsoever and without undue delay, the case

to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution, through proceedings in

accordance with the laws of that State.

Article II

1. The offences in article 7 shall be deemed to be included as extraditable offences in

any extradition treaty existing between States Parties. States Parties undertake to

include those offences as extraditable offences in every future extradition treaty to be

concluded between them.

2. If a State Party which makes extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty

receives a request for extradition from another State Party with which it has no

extradition treaty, it may at its option consider this Convention as the legal basis for

extradition in respect of those offences. Extradition shall be subject to the other

conditions provided by the law of the requested State.

3. States Parties which do not make extradition conditional on the existence of a

treaty shall recognize those offences as extraditable offences between themselves subject

to the conditions provided by the law of the requested State.

4. Each of the offences shall be treated, for the purpose of extradition between

States Parties, as if it had been committed not only in the place in which it occurred but

also in the territories of the States Parties required to establish their jurisdiction in

accordance with paragraph I of Article 8.

Article 12

Any person regarding whom proceedings are being carried out in connection with any of

the offences set forth in article 7 shall be guaranteed fair treatment at all stages of the

proceedings.

Article 13

1. States Parties shall afford one another the greatest measure of assistance in

connection with criminal proceedings brought in respect of the offences set forth in

article 7, including the supply of evidence at their disposal necessary for the

proceedings. The law of the State requested shall apply in allcases.

2. The provisions of paragraph I shall not affect obligations under any other treaty,

bilateral or multilateral, which governs or will govern, in whole or in part, mutual

assistance in criminal matters.
1162 The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material

Article 14

I. Each State Party shall inform the depositary of its laws and regulations which

give effect to this Convention. The depositary shall communicate such information

periodically to all States Parties.

2. The State Party where an alleged offender is prosecuted shall, wherever

practicable, first communicate the final outcome of the proceedings to the States directly concerned. The State Party shall also communicate the final outcome to the depositary who shall inform all States.

3. Where an offence involves nuclear material used for peaceful purposes in

domestic use, storage or transport, and both the alleged offender and the nuclear material

remain in the territory of the State Party in which the offence was committed, nothing in

this Convention shall be interpreted as requiring that State Party to provide information

concerning criminal proceedings arising out of such an offence.

Article 15

The Annexes constitute an integral part of this Convention.

Article 16

I. A conference of States Parties shall be convened by the depositary of five years after the entry into force of this Convention to review the implementation of the

Convention and its adequacy as concerns the preamble, the whole of the operative part and the annexes in the light of the then prevailing situation.

2. At intervals of not less than five years thereafter, the majority of States Parties

may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the depositary, the convening of

further conferences with the same objective.

Article 17

I. In the event of a dispute between two or more States Parties concerning the

interpretation or application of this Convention, such States Parties shall consult with a

view to the settlement of the dispute by negotiation, or by any other peaceful means of

settling disputes acceptable to all parties to the dispute. 2. Any dispute of this character which cannot be settled in the manner prescribed in

paragraph I shall, at the request of any party to such dispute, be submitted to arbitration

or referred to the International Court of Justice for decision. Where a dispute is

submitted to arbitration, if, within six months from the date of the request, the parties to

the dispute are unable to agree on the organization of the arbitration, a party may request the President of the International Court of Justice or the Secretary-General of the United

Nations to appoint one or more arbitrators. In case of conflicting requests by the parties

to the dispute, the request to the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall have

priority. Each State Party may at the time of signature, ratification, acceptance or

approval of this Convention or accession thereto declare that it does not consider itself

bound by either or both of the dispute settlement procedures provided for in paragraph 2.

The other States Parties shall not be bound by a dispute settlement procedure provided

for in paragraph 2, with respect to a State Party which has made a reservation to that

procedure. 3. Any State Party which has made a reservation in accordance with paragraph 3

may at any time withdraw that reservation by notification to the depositary.

Article 18

I. This Convention shall be open for signature by all States at the Headquarters of

the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna and at the Headquarters of the

United Nations in New York from 3 March 1980 until its entry into force.

2. This Convention is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by the

signatory States.

3. After its entry into force, this Convention will be open for accession by all States.
The Convention on the Phvsical Protection of Nuclear Material 1163

(a) This Convention shall be open for signature or accession by international

organizations and regional organizations of an integration or other nature, provided that any such organization is constituted by sovereign States and has competence in

respect of the negotiation, conclusion and application of international agreements in

matters covered by this Convention.

(b) In matters within their competence, such organizations shall, on their own

behalf, exercise the rights and fulfil the responsibilities which this Convention

attributes to States Parties.

(c) When becoming party to this Convention such an organization shall

communicate to the depository a declaration indicating which States are members

thereof and which articles of this Convention do not apply to it.

(d) Such an organization shall not hold any vote additional to those of its

Member States.

4. Instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall be deposited

with depositary.

Article 19

1. This Convention shall enter into force on the thirtieth day following the date of

deposit of the twenty-first instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval with the

depositary.

2. For each State ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to the Convention after

the date of deposit of the twenty-first instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval, the Convention shall enter into force on the thirtieth day after the deposit by such State

of its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.

Article. 20

I. Without prejudice to article 16 a State Party may propose amendments to this

Convention. The proposed amendment shall be submitted to the depositary who shall

circulate it immediately to all States Parties. If a majority of States Parties request the

depositary to convene a conference to consider the proposed amendments, the depositary shall invite all States Parties to attend such a conference to being not sooner than thirty

days after the invitations are issued. Any amendment adopted at the conference by a

two-thirds majority of all States Parties shall be promptly circulated by the depositary to

all States Parties.

2. The amendment shall enter into force for each State Party that deposits its

instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval of the amendment on the thirtieth day

after the date on which two thirds of the States Parties have deposited their instruments

of ratification, acceptance or approval with the depositary. Thereafter, the amendment

shall enter into force for nay other State Party on the day on which that State Party

deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval of the amendment.

Article 21

I. Any State Party any denounce this Convention by written notification to the

depositary.

2. Denunciation shall take effect one hundred and eighty days following the date on

which notification is received by the depositary.

Article 22

The depositary shall promptly notify all States of:

(a) each signature of this Convention;

(b) each deposit of an instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or

accession;

(c) any reservation or withdrawal in accordance with article 17;

(d) any communication made by an organization in accordance with paragraph

4(c) of article 18;
1164 The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material

(e) the entry into force of this Convention;

(f) the entry into force of any amendment to this Convention; and

(g) any denunciation made under article 2 1.

Article 23

The original of this Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian

and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Director General of

the International Atomic Energy Agency who shall send certified copies thereof to all

States.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorized, have signed this

Convention, opened for signature at Vienna and at New York on 3 March 1980.
The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material 1165

ANNEX I

Levels of Physical Protection to be Applied in International Transport of Nuclear

Materials as Categorized in Annex 1I

1. Levels of physical protection for nuclear material during storage incidental to

international nuclear transport include:

(a) For Category Ill materials, storage within an area to which access is

controlled;

(b) For Category II materials, storage within an area under constant surveillance

by guards or electronic devices, surrounded by a physical barrier with a limited

number of points of entry under appropriate control or any area with an equivalent

level of physical protection;

(c) For Category I material, storage within a protected area as defined for

Category il above, to which, in addition, access is restricted to persons whose

trustworthiness has been determined, and which is under surveillance by guards who

are in close communication with appropriate responses forces. Specific measures

taken in this context should have as their object the detection and prevention of any

assault, unauthorized access or unauthorized removal of material.

2. Levels of physical protection for nuclear material during international transport

include:

(a) For Category II and Ill materials, transportation shall take place under special

precautions including prior arrangements among sender, receiver, and carrier, and

prior agreement between natural or legal persons subject to the jurisdiction and

regulation of exporting and importing States, specifying time, place and procedures

for transferring transport responsibility;

(b) For Category I materials, transportation shall take place under special

precautions identified above for transportation of Category II and Ill materials, and

in addition, under constant surveillance by escorts and under conditions which assure

close communication with appropriate response forces;

(c) For natural uranium other than in the form of ore or ore-residue;

transportation protection for quantities exceeding 500 kilograms uranium shall

include advance notification of shipment specifying mode of transport, expected time

of arrival and confirmation of receipt of shipment.
1166 The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material

ANNEX IH

TABLE: CATEGORIZATION OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL

Category Material Form I II I!II'

I. Plutonium 2 Unirradiated3 2 kg or Less than 2 kg but 500 g or less but more

more more than 500 g than 15 g

2. Uranium-235 Unirradiated 3

*uranium enriched to 20% 5 kg or Less than 5 kg but 1 kg or less but more 235U or more more more than I kg than 15 g

*uranium enriched to 10% 10 kg or more Less than 10 kg but 235U but less than 20% more than 1 kg

-uranium enriched above 10 kg or more

natural, but less than 10% 235u

3. Uranium-233 Unirradiated3 2 kg or Less than 2 kg but 500 g or less but more

more more than 500 g than 15 g

4. Irradiated fuel Depleted or

natural uranium,

thorium or lowenriched fuel (less

than 10% fossile

content) 4 5

'Quantities not falling in Category III and natural uranium should be protected in accordance with prudent

management practice. 2

1AWl plutonium except that with isotopic concentration exceeding 80% in plutonium-238. Material not irradiated in a reactor or material irradiated in a reactor but with a radiation level equal to or less

than 4 100 rads/hour at one metre unshielded. Although this level of protection is recommended, it would be open to States, upon evaluation of the specific

circumstances, to assign a different category of physical protection.

'Other fuel which by virtue of its original fissiJe material content is classified as Category I and II before

irradiation may be reduced one category level while the radiation level from the fuel exceeds 100 rads/hour at one metre unshielded.
The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material 1167

The Convention le on t he Physical Protection o f Nuclear Material 16

Signature, Ratification, Acceptance, Approval or Accession by States or

Organizations

Country/Organization

Afghanistan

Albania

Algeria

Andorra

Antigua & Barbuda

Argentina

Armenia

Australia

Austria'

Azerbaij an

Bahamas

Bahrain

Bangladesh

Belarus

Belgium*-

Bolivia

Bosnia and

H-erzegovina

Botswana

Brazil

Bulgaria

Burkina Faso

Cambodia

Cameroon

Canada

Cape Verde

Central African Republic

Chile

China

Columbia

Comoros

Costa Rica

Croatia

Cuba

Cyprus

Czech Republic

Democratic Rep. of

the Congo

Denmark*

D~jibouti

Dominica

Dominican Republic

Ecuador

El Salvador

Equatorial Guinea

Date of Means/Date of Deposit Sigatue o of Expression of Signture Consent to be Bound

acceded

acceded

acceded

acceded

acceded

28 Feb 1986 ratified

acceded

22 Feb 1984 ratified

03 Mar 1980 ratified

acceded

acceded

acceded

acceded

succession

13 Jun 1980 ratified

acceded

succession

acceded

15 May 1981 ratified

23 Jun 1981 ratified

acceded

acceded

acceded

23 Sep 1980 ratified

acceded

acceded

acceded

acceded

acceded

acceded

acceded

succession

acceded

acceded

succession

acceded

13 Jun 1980 ratified

acceded

acceded

12 Sep 2003

05 Mar 2002

30 Apr 2003

27 Jun 2006

04 Aug 1993

06 Apr 1989

24 Aug 1993

22 Sep 1987

22 Dec 1988

19 Jan 2004

21 May 2008

10 May 2010

11 May 2005

09 Sep 1993

06 Sep 1991

24 Jan 2002

30 Jun 1998

19 Sep 2000

17 Oct 1985

10 Apr 1984

13 Jan 2004

04 Aug 2006

29 Jun 2004

21 Mar 1986

23 Feb 2007

20 Feb 2008

27 Apr 1994

10 Jan 1989

28 Mar 2003

18 May 2007

02 May 2003

29 Sep 1992

26 Sep 1997

23 Jul 1998

24 Mar 1993

2 1 Sep 2004

06 Sep 1991

22 Jun 2004

08 Nov 2004

17 Jan 1996

15 Dec 2006

24 Nov 2003

Entry into

Force

12 Oct 2003

04 Apr 2002

03 May 2003

27 Jull2006

03 Sep 1993

06 May 1989

23 Sep 1993

22 Oct 1987

21 Jan 1989

18 Feb 2004

20 Jun 2008

09 Jun 2010

10 Jun 2005

14 Jun 1993

06 Oct 1991

23 Feb 2002

01 Mar 1992

19 Oct 2000

08 Feb 1987

08 Feb 1987

12 Feb 2004

03 Sep 2006

29 Jul 2004

08 Feb 1987

25 Mar 2007

21 Mar 2008

27 May 1994

09 Feb 1989

27 Apr 2003

17 Jun 2007

01 Jun 2003

08 Oct 1991

26 Oct 1997

22 Aug 1998

01 Jan 1993

21 Oct 2004

06 Oct 1991

22 Jul 2004

08 Dec 2004

16 Feb 1996

14 Jun 2007

24 Dec 2003

03 Mar 1980

26 Jun 1986 ratified

acceded

acceded
1168 The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material

Table: Convention On The Physical Protection Of Nuclear Material

Signature, Ratification, Acceptance, Approval or Accession by States or

Organizations

Country/Organization

Estonia

Fi.i

Finlanda

France"

Gabon

Georgia Germany".

Ghana

Greece`.

Grenada

Guatemala

Guinea

Guinea-Bissau

Guyana

Haiti

Honduras

Hungary

Iceland

India

Indonesia

Ireland"

Israel

Italy"

Jamaica

Japan

Jordan

Kazakhstan

Kenya

Korea, Republic of

Kuwait

Lao PDR

Latvia

Lebanon

Lesotho

Libyan Arab

Jamahiriya

Liechtenstein

Lithuania

Luxembourg"

Madagascar

Mali

Malta

Marshall Islands

Mauritania

Mexico

Means/Date of Deposit Date of of Expression of

Signature Consent to be Bound

acceded

acceded

25 Jun 1981 accepted

13 Jun 1980 approved

acceded

acceded

13 Jun 1980 ratified

acceded

03 Mar 1980 ratified

acceded

12 Mar 1980 ratified

acceded

acceded

acceded

09 Apr 1980

acceded

17 Jun 1980 ratified

acceded

acceded

03 Jul 1986 ratified

13 Jun 1980 ratified

17 Jun 1983 ratified

13 Jun 1980 ratified

acceded

acceded

acceded

acceded

acceded

29 Dec 1981 ratified

acceded

acceded

acceded

acceded

acceded

acceded

13 Jan 1986 ratified

acceded

13 Jun 1980 ratified

acceded

acceded

acceded

acceded

acceded

acceded

09 May 1994

23 May 2008

22 Sep 1989

06 Sep 1991

19 Feb 2008

07 Sep 2006

06 Sep 1991

16 Oct 2002

06 Sep 1991

09 Jan 2002

23 Apr 1985

29 Nov 2005

08 Oct 2008

13 Sep 2007

28 Jan 2004

04 May 1984

18 Jun 2002

12 Mar 2002

05 Nov 1986

06 Sep 1991

22 Jan 2002

06 Sep 1991

16 Aug 2005

28 Oct 1988

07 Sep 2009

02 Sep 2005

11 Feb 2002

07 Apr 1982

23 Apr 2004

29 Sep 2010

06 Nov 2002

16 Dec 1997

18 Aug 2010

18 Oct 2000

25 Nov 1986

07 Dec 1993

06 Sep 1991

28 Oct 2003

07 May 2002

16 Oct 2003

07 Feb 2003

29 Jan 2008

04 Apr 1988

Entry into

Force

08 Jun 1994

22 Jun 2008

22 Oct 1989

06 Oct 1991

20 Mar 2008

07 Oct 2006

06 Oct 1991

15 Nov 2002

06 Oct 1991

08 Feb 2002

08 Feb 1987

29 Dec 2005

07 Nov 2008

13 Oct 2007

27 Feb 2004

08 Feb 1987

18 Jul 2002

11 Apr 2002

08 Feb 1987

06 Oct 1991

21 Feb 2002

06 Oct 1991

15 Sep 2005

27 Nov 1988

07 Oct 2009

02 Oct 2005

13 Mar 2002

08 Feb 1987

23 May 2004

29 Oct 2010

06 Dec 2002

15 Jan 1998

17 Sep 2010

17 Nov 2000

08 Feb 1987

06 Jan 1994

06 Oct 1991

27 Nov 2003

06 Jun 2002

15 Nov 2003

09 Mar 2003

28 Feb 2008

04 May 1988
The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material 1169

Table: Convention On The Physical Protection Of Nuclear Material

Signature, Ratification, Acceptance, Approval or Accession by States or

Organizations

Country/Organization

Monaco

Mongolia

Montenegro

Morocco

Mozambique

Namibia

Nauru

Netherlands"

New Zealand

Nicaragua

Niger

Nigeria

Niue

Norway'

Oman

Pakistan

Palau

Panama

Paraguay

Peru

Philippines

Poland

Portugal"

Qatar

Republic of Moldova

Romania

Russian Federation

Rwanda

Saint Kitts and Nevis

Saudi Arabia

Senegal

Serbia

Seychelles

Slovakia

Slovenia

South Africa

Spain'"

Sudan

Swaziland

Sweden'

Switzerland'

Tajikistan

The Frmr. Yug. Rep.

Macedonia

Togo

Date of Means/Date of Deposit

Signature of Expression of

Consent to be Bound

Entry into

Force

acceded 09 Aug 1996 08 Sep 1996

23 Jan 1986 ratified 28 May 1986 08 Feb 1987

succession 21 Mar 2007 03 Jun 2006

25 Jul 1980 ratified 23 Aug 2002 22 Sep 2002

acceded 03 Mar 2003 02 Apr 2003

acceded 02 Oct 2002 01 Nov 2002

acceded 12 Aug 2005 11 Sep 2005

13 Jun 1980 accepted 06 Sep 1991 06 Oct 1991

acceded 19 Dec 2003 18 Jan 2004

acceded 10 Dec 2004 09 Jan 2005

07 Jan 1985 ratified 19 Aug 2004 18 Sep 2004

acceded 04 Apr 2007 04 May 2007

acceded 19 Jun 2009 19 Jul 2009

26 Jan 1983 ratified 15 Aug 1985 08 Feb 1987

acceded 11 Jun 2003 II Jul 2003

acceded 12 Sep 2000 12 Oct 2000

acceded 24 Apr 2007 24 May 2007

18 Mar 1980 ratified 01 Apr 1999 01 May 1999

21 May 1980 ratified 06 Feb 1985 08 Feb 1987

acceded 11 Jan 1995 10 Feb 1995

19 May 1980 ratified 22 Sep 1981 08 Feb 1987

06 Aug 1980 ratified 05 Oct 1983 08 Feb 1987

19 Sep 1984 ratified 06 Sep 1991 06 Oct 1991

acceded 09 Mar 2004 08 Apr 2004

acceded 07 May 1998 06 Jun 1998

15 Jan 1981 ratified 23 Nov 1993 23 Dec 1993

22 May 1980 ratified 25 May 1983 08 Feb 1987

acceded 28 Jun 2002 28 July 2002

acceded 29 Aug 2008 28 Sep 2008

acceded 07 Jan 2009 06 Feb 2009

acceded 03 Nov 2003 03 Dec 2003

15 Jul 1980 succession 05 Feb 2002 27 Apr 1992

acceded 13 Aug 2003 12 Sep 2003

succession 10 Feb 1993 01 Jan 1993

succession 07 Jul 1992 25 Jun 1991

18 May 1981 ratified 17 Sep 2007 17 Oct 2007

07 Apr 1986 ratified 06 Sep 1991 06 Oct 1991

acceded 18 May 2000 17 Jun 2000

acceded 17 Apr 2003 17 May 2003

02 Jul 1980 ratified 01 Aug 1980 08 Feb 1987

09 Jan 1987 ratified 09 Jan 1987 08 Feb 1987

acceded I I Jul 1996 10 Aug 1996

succession 20 Sep 1996 17 Nov 1991

acceded 07 Jun 2006 07 Jul 2006
1170 The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material

Table: Convention On The Physical Protection Of Nuclear Material

Signature, Ratification, Acceptance, Approval or Accession by States or

Organizations

Country/Organization

Tonga

Trinidad and

Tobago

Tunisia

Turkey

Turkmenistan

Uganda

Ukraine

United Arab Emirates

United Kingdom*.a

United Republic of

Tanzania

United States

of America

Uruguay

Uzbekistan

Yemen

EURATOM8

Means/Date of Deposit Date of of Expression of Signature Consent to be Bound

Entry into

Force

acceded

acceded

acceded

23 Aug 1983 ratified

acceded

acceded

acceded

acceded

13 Jun 1980 ratified

acceded

03 Mar 1980 ratified

acceded

acceded

acceded

13 Jun 1980 confirmed

24 Jan 2003 23 Feb 2003

25 Apr2001

08 Apr 1993

27 Feb 1985

07 Jan 2005

10 Dec 2003

06 Jul 1993

16 Oct 2003

06 Sep 1991

25 May 2001

08 May 1993

08 Feb 1987

06 Feb 2005

10 Jan 2004

05 Aug 1993

15 Nov 2003

06 Oct 1991

24 May 2006 23 Jun 2006

13 Dec 1982

24 Oct 2003

09 Feb 1998

31 May 2007

06 Sep 1991

08 Feb 1987

23 Nov 2003

II Mar 1998

30 Jun 2007

06 Oct 1991

*Signed/ratified as a EURATOM Member State.

aDeposited an objection to the declaration of Pakistan.

Notes: The Convention entered into force on 8 February 1987, i.e., on the

thirtieth day following the deposit of the twenty-first instrument of

ratification, acceptance or approval with the Director General pursuant to

Article 19, paragraph 1.

Status: 145 parties

45 signatories

Last change of status: 29 September 2010
Conv. on the Phys. Prot. of Nucl. Mat. Impl. Act (P.L. 97-35 1) 1171

C. CONVENTION ON THE PHYSICAL PROTECTION

OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL IMFLEMENTATION

ACT OF 1982

Public Law 97-351 96 Stat. 1663

October 18, 1982

An Act

To amend Title 18 of the United States Code to implement the

Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, and for

other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the

United States ofAmerica in Congress assembled,

See. 1. Short Title

18 I.USC' 831 This Act may be cited as the "Convention on the Physical Protection

note. of Nuclear Material Implementation Act of 1982."

18 USC 831. Sec. 2. Implementation Of Convention And Prohibition Of Related

Offenses

(a) Chapter 39 of Title 18 of the United States Code is amended by inserting after the table of sections at the beginning of such Chapter the

following new section:

Sec. 831. Prohibited transactions involving nuclear materials

(a) Whoever, if one of the circumstances described in subsection

(c) of this section occurs-

(I) without lawful authority, intentionally receives, possesses,

uses, transfers, alters, disposes of, or disperses any nuclear

material for nuclear byproduct material and-

(A) thereby knowingly causes the death of or serious

bodily injury to any person or substantial damage to property

or to the environment; or

(B) circumstances exist, or have been represented to the

defendant to exist, that are likely to cause the death or serious

bodily injury to any person, or substantial damage to property

or to the environment;

(2) with intent to deprive another of nuclear material or

nuclear byproduct material, knowingly-

(A) takes and carries away nuclear material or nuclear

byproduct material of another without authority; (B) makes an unauthorized uses, disposition, or transfer, of

nuclear material or nuclear byproduct material belonging to

another; or

(C) uses fraud and thereby obtains nuclear material or

nuclear byproduct material belonging to another;

(3) knowingly-

(A) uses force; or

(B) threatens or places another in fear that any person other than the actor will imminently be subject to bodily injury; and thereby takes nuclear material or nuclear

'Added October 15, 1982, P.L. 97-351, § 2(a), 96 Stat. 1663; November 18, 1988, P.L. 100-690, Title VII,

Subtitle B, § 7022, 102 Stat. 4397; July 5, 1994, P.L. 103-272, § 5(e)(6), 108 Stat. 1374; September 13, 1994,

P.L. 103-322, Title XXXIII, § 330016(2)(C), 108 Stat. 2148. As amended April 24, 1996,P.L. 104-132,

Title V, Subtitle A, § 502, 110 Stat. 1282.
1172 Cony. on the Phys. Prot. ofNucl. Mat. Impl. Act (P.L. 97-351)

byproduct material belonging to another from the person or

presence of any other;

(4) intentionally intimidates any person and thereby obtains

nuclear material or nuclear byproduct material belonging to

another;

(5) with intent to compel any person, international

organization, or governmental entity to do or refrain from doing

any act, knowingly threatens to engage in conduct described in

paragraph

(2)(A) or (3) of this subsection;

(6) knowingly threatens to use nuclear material or nuclear

byproduct material to cause death or serious bodily injury to any

person or substantial damage to property or to the environment

under circumstances in which the threat may reasonably be

understood as an expression of serious purposes;

(7) attempts to commit an offense under paragraph (1), (2),

(3), or (4) of this subsection; or

(8) is a party to a conspiracy of two or more persons to

commit an offense under paragraph (1), (2), (3), or (4) of this

subsection, if any of the parties intentionally engages in any

conduct in furtherance of such offense; shall be punished as

provided in subsection (b) of this section.

(b) The punishment for an offense under-

(1) paragraphs (1) through (7) of subsection (a) of this section is-

(A) a fine under this Title; and

(B) imprisonment-

(i) for any term of years or for life

(I) if, while committing the offense, the

offender knowingly causes the death of any person;

or

(11) if, while committing an offense under

paragraph (I) or (3) of subsection (a) of this

section, the offender, under circumstances

manifesting extreme indifference to the life of an

individual, knowingly engages in any conduct and

thereby recklessly causes the death of or serious

body injury to any person; and

(ii) for not more than 20 years in any other case; and

(2) paragraph (8) of subsection (a) of this section is-

(A) a fine under this Title; and

(B) imprisonment-

(i) for not more than 20 years if the offense which is

the object of the conspiracy is punishable under paragraph

(1)(B)(i); and

(ii) for not more than 10 years in any other case.

(c) The circumstances referred to in subsection (a) of this section

are that-

(1) the offense is committed in the United States or the special

maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, or the

special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States (as defined in

section 46501 of Title 49);

(2) an offender or a victim is-

(A) a national of the United States; or

(B) a United States corporation or other legal entity;
I0 USC 371 et

seq.

18 USC 1385.

Emergency

situation.

Conv. on the Phys. Prot. of Nucl. Mat. Impl. Act (P.L. 97-351) 1173

(3) after the conduct required for the offense occurs the

defendant is found in the United States, even if the conduct

required for the offense occurs outside the United States; or

(4) the conduct required for the offense occurs with respect to

the carriage of a consignment of nuclear material or nuclear

byproduct mater by any means of transportation intended to go

beyond the territory of the state where the shipment originates

beginning with the departure from a facility of the shipper in that

state and ending with the arrival at a facility of the receiver within

the state of ultimate destination and either of such states is the

United States; or

(5) either-

(A) the governmental entity under subsection (a)(5) is the

United States; or

(B) the threat under subsection (a)(6) is directed at the

United States

(d) The Attorney General may request assistance from the

Secretary of Defense under Chapter 18 of Title 10 in the enforcement

of this section and the Secretary of Defense may provide such

assistance in accordance with Chapter 18 of Title 10, except that the

Secretary of Defense may provide such assistance through any

Department of Defense personnel.

(e)(1) The Attorney General may also request assistance from the

Secretary of Defense under this subsection in the enforcement of this

section. Notwithstanding section 1385 of this Title, the Secretary of

Defense may, in accordance with other applicable law, provide such

assistance to the Attorney General if-

(A) an emergency situation exists (as jointly determined by

the Attorney General and the Secretary of Defense in their

discretion); and

(B) the provision of such assistance will not adversely

affect the military preparedness of the United States (as

determined by the Secretary of Defense in such Secretary's

discretion).

(2) As used in this subsection, the term "emergency situation"

means a circumstance-

(A) that poses a serious threat to the interests of the United

States; and

(B) in which-

(i) enforcement of the law would be seriously impaired

if the assistance were not provided; and

(ii) civilian law enforcement personnel are not capable

of enforcing the law.

(3) Assistance under this section may include-

(A) use of personnel of the Department of Defense to

arrest persons and conduct searches and seizures with respect

to violations of this section; and

(B) such other activity as is incidental to the enforcement

of this section, or to the protection of persons or property from

conduct that violates this section.

(4) The Secretary of Defense may require reimbursement as a

condition of assistance under this section.

(5) The Attorney General may delegate the Attorney General's

function under this subsection only to a Deputy, Associate, or

Assistant Attorney General.
1174 Cony. on the Phys. Prot. of Nucl. Mat. Impl. Act (P.L. 97-351)

Dcfinitions. (f) As used in this section-

(1) the term "nuclear material" means material containing

any-

(A) plutonium;

(B) uranium not in the form of ore or ore residue that

contains the mixture of isotopes as occurring in nature;

(C) enriched uranium, defined as uranium that contains the

isotope 233 or 235 or both in such amount that the abundance

ratio of the sum of those isotopes to the isotope 238 is greater

than the ratio of the isotope 235 to the isotope 238 occurring

in nature; or

(D) uranium 233;

(2) the term "nuclear byproduct material" means any material

containing any radioactive isotope created through an irradiation

process in the operation of a nuclear reactor or accelerator;

(3) the term "international organization" means a public

international organization designated as such pursuant to section 1

of the International Organizations Immunities Act (22USC288)

or a public organization created pursuant to treaty or other

agreement under international law as an instrument through or by

which two or more foreign governments engage in some aspect of

their conduct of international affairs;

(4) the term "serious bodily injury" means bodily injury which

involves-

(A) a substantial risk of death;

(B) extreme physical pain;

(C) protracted and obvious disfigurement; or

(D) protracted loss or impairment of the function of a

bodily member, organ, or mental faculty;

(5) the term "bodily injury" means-

(A) a cut, abrasion, bruise, burn, or disfigurement;

(B) physical pain;

(C) illness;

(D) impairment of a function of a bodily member, organ,

or mental faculty; or

(E) any other injury to the body, no matter how temporary.

(6) the term "national of the United States" has the same

meaning as in section 101(a)(22) of the Immigration and

Nationality Act (8 USC I 101 (a)(22)); and

(7) the term "United States corporation or other legal entity"

means any corporation or other entity organized under the laws of

the United States or any State, Commonwealth, territory,

possession, or district of the United States.
1175 Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident

D. CONVENTION ON EARLY NOTIFICATION OF A NUCLEAR

ACCIDENT

Adopted September 26, 1986, Entered into Force October 27, 1986

THE STATES PARTIES TO THIS CONVENTION,

AWARE that nuclear activities are being carried out in a number of States,

NOTING THAT comprehensive measures have been and are being taken to ensure a

high level of safety in nuclear activities, aimed at preventing nuclear accidents and

minimizing the consequences of any such accident, should it occur,

DESIRING to strengthen further international co-operation on the safe development

and use of nuclear energy,

CONVINCED of the need for States to provide relevant information about nuclear

accidents as early as possible in order that transboundary radiological consequences can

be minimized,

NOTING the usefulness of bilateral and multilateral arrangements on information

exchange in this area,

HAVE AGREED as follows:

Article I-Scope Of Application

1. This Convention shall apply in the event of any accident involving facilities or

activities of a State Party or of persons or legal entities under its jurisdiction or control,

referred to in paragraph 2 below, from which a release of radioactive material occurs or

is likely to occur and which has resulted or may result in an international transboundary

release that could be of radiological safety significance for another State.

2. The facilities and activities referred to in paragraph I are the following:

(a) any nuclear reactor wherever located;

(b) any nuclear fuel cycle facility;

(c) any radioactive waste management facility;

(d) the transport and storage of nuclear fuels or radioactive wastes;

(e) the manufacture, use, storage, disposal and transport of radioisotopes for

agricultural, industrial, medical and related scientific and research purposes; and

(f) the use of radioisotopes for power generation in space objects.

Article 2-Notification And Information

In the event of an accident specified in article I (hereinafter referred to as a "nuclear

accident"), the State Party referred to in that article shall:

(a) forthwith notify, directly or through the International Atomic Energy Agency

(hereinafter referred to as the "Agency"), those States which are or may be physically

affected as specified in article I and the Agency of the nuclear accident, its nature, the

time of its occurrence and its exact location where appropriate; and

(b) promptly provide the States referred to in subparagraph (a), directly or

through the Agency, and the Agency with such available information relevant to

minimizing the radiological consequences in those States, as specified in article 5.

Article 3-Other Nuclear Accidents

With a view to minimizing the radiological consequences, States Parties may notify

in the event of nuclear accidents other than those specified in article I.

Article 4-Functions Of The Agency

The Agency shall:

(a) forthwith inform States Parties, Member States, other States which are or may

be physically affected as specified in article I and relevant international

intergovernmental organizations (hereinafter referred to as "international organizations")

of a notification received pursuant to subparagraph (a) of article 2; and
1176 Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident

(b) promptly provide any State Party, Member State or relevant international

organization, upon request, with the information received pursuant to sub-paragraph (b)

of article 2.

Article 5 - Information To Be Provided

1. The information to be provided pursuant to subparagraph (b) of article 2 shall

comprise the following data as then available to the notifying State Party: (a) the time, exact location where appropriate, and the nature of the nuclear

accident;

(b) the facility or activity involved-

(c) the assumed or established cause and the foreseeable development of the

nuclear accident relevant to the transboundary release of the radioactive materials;

(d) the general characteristics of the radioactive release, including, as far as is

practicable and appropriate, the nature, probable physical and chemical form and the

quantity, composition and effective height of the radioactive release;

(e) information on current and forecast meteorological and hydrological

conditions, necessary for forecasting the transboundary release of the radioactive

materials;

(0 the results of environmental monitoring relevant to the transboundary release

of the radioactive materials;

(g) the off-site protective measures taken or planned;

(h) the predicted behavior over time of the radioactive release.

2. Such information shall be supplemented as appropriate intervals by further

relevant information on the development of the emergency situation, including its

foreseeable or actual termination.

3. Information received pursuant to sub-paragraph (b) of article 2 may be used

without restriction, except when such information is provided in confidence by the

notifying State Party.

Article 6 - Consultations

A State Party providing information pursuant to subparagraph (b) of article 2 shall,

as far as is reasonably practicable, response promptly to a request for further information

or consultations sought by an affected State Party with a view to minimizing the

radiological consequences in that State.

Article 7 - Competent Authorities And Points Of Contact

1. Each State Party shall make known to the Agency and to other States Parties,

directly or through the Agency, its competent authorities and point of contact

responsible for issuing and receiving the notification and information referred to in

article

2. Such points of contact and a focal point within the Agency shall be available

continuously. 2. Each State Party shall promptly inform the Agency of any changes that

may occur in the information referred to in paragraph 1.

3. The Agency shall maintain an up-to-date list of such national authorities and

points of contact as well as points of contact of relevant international organizations and

shall provide it to States Parties and Member States and to relevant international

organizations.

Article 8 - Assistance To State Parties

The Agency shall, in accordance with its Statute and upon a request of a State Party which does not have nuclear activities itself and borders on a State having an active

nuclear programme but not Party, conduct investigations into the feasibility and

establishment of an appropriate radiation monitoring system in order to facilitate the

achievement of the objectives of this Convention.
Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident 1177

Article 9 - Bilateral And Multilateral Arrangements

In furtherance of their mutual interests, States Parties may consider, where deemed

appropriate, the conclusion of bilateral or multilateral arrangements relating to the

subject matter of this Convention.

Article 10 - Relationship To Other International Agreements

This Convention shall not affect the reciprocal rights and obligations of States

Parties under existing international agreements which relate to the matters covered by

this Convention, or under future international agreements concluded in accordance with

the object and purpose of this Convention.

Article 1i - Settlement Of Disputes

1. In the event of a dispute between States Parties, or between a State Party and

the Agency, concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention, the parties

to the dispute shall consult with a view to the settlement of the dispute by negotiation or

by any other peaceful means of settling disputes acceptable to them.

2, If a dispute of this character between States Parties cannot be settled within

one year from the request for consultation pursuant to paragraph 1, it shall, at the request

of any party to such dispute, be submitted to arbitration or referred to the International

Court of Justice for decision. Where a dispute is submitted to arbitration, if, within six

months from the date of the request, the parties to the dispute are unable to agree on the

organization of the arbitration, a party may request the President of the International

Court of Justice or the Secretary-General of the United Nations to appoint one or more

arbitrators. In cases of conflicting requests by the parties to the dispute, the request to the

Secretary-General of the United Nations shall have priority.

3. When signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to this Convention,

a State may declare that it does not consider itself bound by either or both of the dispute

settlement procedures provided for in paragraph 2. The other States Parties shall not be

bound by a dispute settlement procedure provided for in paragraph 2 with respect to a

State Party for which such a declaration is in force.

4. A State Party which made a declaration in accordance with paragraph 3 may at

any time withdraw it by notification to the depositary.

Article 12 - Entry Into Force

I. This Convention shall be open for signature by all States and Namibia,

represented by the United Nations Council for Namibia, at the Headquarters of the

International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna and at the Headquarters of the United

Nations in New York, from 26 September 1986 and 6 October 1986 respectively, until

its entry into force or for twelve months, whichever period is longer.

2. A State and Namibia, represented by the United Nations Council for Namibia,

may express its consent to be bound by this Convention either by signature, or by

deposit of an instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval following signature made

subject to ratification, acceptance or approval, or by deposit of an instrument of

accession. The instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall be

deposited with the depositary.

3. This Convention shall enter into force thirty days after consent to be bound has

been expressed by three States.

4. For each State expressing consent to be bound by this Convention after its

entry into force, this Convention shall enter into force for that State thirty days after the

date of expression of consent.

5. (a) This Convention shall be open for accession, as provided for in this article,

by international organizations and regional integration organizations constituted by

sovereign States, which have competence in respect of the negotiation, conclusion and

application of international agreements in matters covered by this Convention.
1178 Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident

(b) In matters within their competence such organizations shall, on their own

behalf, exercise the rights and fulfill the obligations which this Convention attributes to

States Parties.

(c) When depositing its instrument of accession, such an organization shall

communicate to the depositary a declaration indicating the extent of its competence in

respect of matters covered by this Convention.

(d) Such an organization shall not hold any vote additional to those of its

Member States.

Article 13 - Provisional Application

A State may, upon signature or at any later date before this Convention enters into

force for it, declare that it will apply this Convention provisionally.

Article 14 - Amendments

I. A State Party may propose amendments to this Convention. The proposed

amendment shall be submitted to the depositary who shall circulate it immediately to all

other States Parties.

2. If a majority of the States Parties request the depositary to convene a

conference to consider the proposed amendments, the depositary shall invite all States

Parties to attend such a conference to begin not sooner than thirty days after the

invitations are issued. Any amendment adopted at the conference by a two-thirds

majority of all States Parties shall be laid down in a protocol which is open to signature

in Vienna and New York by all States Parties.

3. The protocol shall enter into force thirty days after consent to be bound has

been expressed by three States. For each State expressing consent to be bound by the

protocol after its entry into force, the protocol shall enter into force for that State thirty

days after the date of expression of consent.

Article 15 - Denunciation

I. A State Party may denounce this Convention by written notification to the

depositary.

2. Denunciation shall take effect one year following the date on which the

notification is received by the depositary.

Article 16 - Depositary

I. The Director General of the Agency shall be the depositary of this Convention.

2. The Director General of the Agency shall promptly notify States Parties and all

other States of:

(a) each signature of this Convention or any protocol of amendment;

(b) each deposit of an instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or

accession concerning this Convention or any protocol of amendment;

(c) any declaration or withdrawal thereof in accordance with article 11;

(d) any declaration of provisional application of this Convention in accordance

with article 13;

(e) the entry into force of this Convention and of any amendment thereto; and

(f) any denunciation made under article 15.

Article 17 - Authentic Texts And Certified Copies

The original of this Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French,

Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Director

General of the International Atomic Energy Agency who shall send certified copies to

States Parties and all other States.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized, have signed

this Convention, open for signature as provided for in paragraph I of article 12.
Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident 1179

ADOPTED by the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency meeting in special session at Vienna on the twenty -sixth day of September one

thousand nine hundred and eighty-six.
1180 Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident

Table: Convention On Early Notification Of A Nuclear Accident

Signature, Ratification, Acceptance, Approval or Accession by States or

Organizations

Means/Date of Deposit of

Expression of Consent to be

Bound

Country/ Date of Date of

Organization Signature Instrument Deposit D / W" Entry into Force

Afthanistan 26 en 1Se 1/ , 

Albania

Algeria

Angola

Argentina

Armenia

Australia

Austria

Bangladesh

Belarus

Belgium

Bolivia

Bosnia and

Herzegovina

Brazil

Bulgaria

Cameroon

Canada

Chile

China

Colombia

Costa Rica

C6te d'Ivoire

Croatia

Cuba

Cyprus

Czech Republic

Dem. P.R. of Korea

Dem. Republic of

the Congo

Denmark

Dominican Republic

Egypt

El Salvador

Estonia

Finland

France

Gabon

Georgia

Germany

24 Sep 1987

26 Sep 1986

26 Sep 1986

26 Sep 1986

26 Sep 1986

26 Sep 1986

26 Sep 1986

25 Sep 1987

26 Sep 1986

26 Sep 1986

26 Sep 1986

26 Sep 1986

26 Sep 1986

26 Sep 1986

29 Sep 1986

30 Sep 1986

26 Sep 1986

26 Sep 1986

accession

ratification

accession

accession

accession

ratification

ratification

accession

ratification

ratification

accession

succession

ratification

ratification

ratification

ratification

ratification

ratification

accession

ratification

succession

ratification

accession

succession

signature

accession

ratification

30 Sep 2003

15 Jan 2004

22 Dec 2004

17 Jan 1990

24 Aug 1993

22 Sep 1987

18 Feb 1988

07 Jan 1988

26 Jan 1987

04 Jan 1999

22 Aug 2003

30 Jun 1988

04 Dec 1990

24 Feb 1988

17 Jan 2006

18 Jan 1990

15 Nov 2005

10 Sep 1987

28 Mar2003

16 Sep 1991

29 Sep 1992

08 Jan 1991

04 Jan 1989

24 Mar 1993

26 Sep 1986

29 Apr 2010

06 Jul 1988

09 May 1994

II Dec 1986

06 Mar 1989

19 Feb 2008

06 Oct 2010

14 Sep 1989

30 Oct2003

/15 Feb 2004

22 Jan 2005

17 Feb 1990

24 Sep 1993

/23 Oct1987

20 Mar 1988

07 Feb 1988

26 Feb 1987

04 Feb 1999

/ 21 Sep 2003

01 Mar 1992

04 Jan 1991

/ 26Mar1988

16 Feb 2006

S 18 Feb 1990

15 Dec 2005

1II Octl987

28 Apr 2003

17 Oct 1991

08 Oct 1991

/ 08 Feb 1991

04 Feb 1989

01 Jan 1993

v

27 Oct 1986

29 May 2010

/ 06 Aug 1988

/ 26 Feb 2005

09 Jun 1994

II Jan 1987

/ 06 Apr 1989

20 Mar 2008

05 Nov 2010

/15 Oct1989

accession

accession

26 Sep 1986 approval

26 Sep 1986 approval

accession

accession

26 Sep 1986 ratification
Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident 1181

Table: Convention On Early Notification Of A Nuclear Accident

Signature, Ratification, Acceptance, Approval or Accession by States or

Organizations

NMeans/Date of Deposit of

Expression of Consent to be

Bound

Country/ Date of Date of

Organization Signature Instrument Deposit D / W" Entry into Force

Greece 26 Sep 1986 ratification 06 Jun 1991 v, 07 Jul 1991

Guatemala 26 Sep 1986 ratification 08 Aug 1988 08 Sep 1988

Holy See

Hungary

Iceland

India

Indonesia

Iran, Islamic

Republic of

Iraq

Ireland

Israel

Italy

Japan

Jordan

Kazakhstan

Korea, Republic of

Kuwait

Latvia

Lebanon

Libyan Arab

Jamahiriya

Liechtenstein

Lithuania

Luxembourg

Malaysia

Mali

Mauritius

Mexico

Monaco

Mongolia

Montenegro

Morocco

Mozambique

Myanmar

Netherlands

New Zealand

Nicaragua

Niger

Nigeria

Norway

Oman

26 Sep 1986

26 Sep 1986

26 Sep 1986

29 Sep 1986

26 Sep 1986

ratification

ratification

ratification

ratification

26 Sep 1986 ratification

12 Aug 1987 ratification

26 Sep 1986 ratification

26 Sep 1986 ratification

26 Sep 1986 ratification

06 Mar 1987 acceptance

02 Oct 1986 ratification

accession

accession

accession

accession

26 Sep 1986 ratification

accession

26 Sep 1986 ratification

accession

26 Sep 1986 ratification

01 Sep 1987 signature

02 Oct 1986 ratification

accession

26 Sep 1986 ratification

26 Sep 1986 approval

08 Jan 1987 ratification

succession

26 Sep 1986 ratification

accession

accession

26 Sep 1986 acceptance

accession

accession

10 Mar 1987

27 Sep 1989

28 Jan 1988

12 Nov 1993

09 Oct 2000

21 Jul 1988

13 Sep 1991

25 May 1989

08 Feb 1990

09 Jun 1987

II Dec 1987

10 Mar2010

08 Jun 1990

13 May 2003

28 Dec 1992

17 Apr 1997

13 Aug 2009

19 Apr 1994

16 Nov 1994

26 Sep 2000

01 Sep 1987

01 Oct2007

17 Aug 1992

10 May 1988

19 Jul 1989

11 Jun 1987

21 mar2007

07 Oct 1993

30 Oct2009

18 Dec 1997

23 Sep 1991

I1 Mar 1987

II Nov 1993

10 Aug 1990

26 Sep 1986

09 Jul 2009

/ 10 Apr 1987

28 Octl989

28 Feb 1988

13 Dec 1993

/ 09 Nov 2000

21 Aug 1988

14 Oct 1991

25 Jun 1989

I I1Mar1990

10 Jul 1987

II Jan 1988

09 Apr 2010

09 Jul 1990

13 Jun 2003

28 Jan 1993

18 May 1997

12 Sep 2009

20 May 1994

17 Dec 1994

27 Oct 2000

02 Oct 1987

31 Oct2007

/17 Sep 1992

10 Jun 1988

/19 Aug 1989

/ v/ 12 Jul 1987

03 Jun 2006

07 Nov 1993

29 Nov 2009

18 Jan 1998

24 Octl991

11 Apr 1987

12 Dec 1993

10 Sep 1990

27 Oct 1986

/ 08 Aug 2009

26 Sep 1986

21 Jan 1987

26 Sep 1986

ratification

signature

accession
1182 Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident

Table: Convention On Early Notification Of A Nuclear Accident

Signature, Ratification, Acceptance, Approval or Accession by States or

Organizations

Means/Date of Deposit of

Expression of Consent to be

Bound

Country/ Date of Date of

Organization Signature Instrument Deposit D/W' Entry into Force

Pakistan accesinn I I Sen 1989 1/ 12 Oct I989

Panama

Paraguay

Peru

Philippines

Poland

Portugal

Qatar

Republic of Moldova

Romania

Russian Federation

St. Vincent & the

Grenadines

Saudi Arabia

Senegal

Serbia

Sierra Leone

Singapore

Slovakia

Slovenia

South Africa

Spain

Sri Lanka

Sudan

Sweden

Switzerland

Syrian Arab

Republic

Thailand

The Fmr.Yug. Rep.

of Macedonia

Tunisia

Turkey

Ukraine

United Arab

Emirates

United Kingdom

United Republic of

Tanzania

United States of

America

Uruguay

26 Sep 1986 ratification 01 Apr 1999

02 Oct 1986

accession 17 Jul 1995

accession 05 May 1997

26 Sep 1986 ratification 24 Mar 1988

26 Sep 1986 ratification 30 Apr 1993

accession 04 Nov 2005

accession 07 May 1998

accession 12 Jun 1990

26 Sep 1986 ratification 23 Dec 1986

15 Jun 1987

27 May 1987

25 Mar 1987

10 Aug 1987

26 Sep 1986

26 Sep 1986

26 Sep 1986

26 Sep 1986

02 Jul 1987

25 Sep 1987

24 Feb 1987

26 Sep 1986

26 Sep 1986

accession

accession

ratification

succession

accession

succession

succession

ratification

ratification

accession

18 Sep 2001

03 Nov 1989

24 Dec 2008

05 Feb 2002

15 Dec 1997

10 Feb 1993

07 Jul1992

10 Aug 1987

13 Sep 1989

11 Jan 1991

02 May 1999

I 17 Aug 1995

05 Jun 1997

V / 24 Apr1988

31 May 1993

04 Dec 2005

07 Jun 1998

113 Jul 1990

24 Jan 1987

19 Oct2001

/ 04 Dec 1989

23 Jan 2009

27 Apr 1992

15 Jan 1998

/ 01 Jan 1993

25 Jun 1991

/ 10 Sep 1987

14 Oct1989

I I Feb 1991

30 Mar 1987

01 Jul 1988

ratification 27 Feb 1987

ratification 31 May 1988

ratification 21 Mar 1989 / 21 Apr 1989

succession 20 Sep 1996 17 Nov 1991

ratification 24 Feb 1989 27 Mar 1989

ratification 03 Jan 1991 1 03 Feb 1991

ratification 26 Jan 1987 / 26 Feb 1987

accession 02 Oct 1987 / 02 Nov 1987

26 Sep 1986 ratification 09 Feb 1990 , 12 Mar 1990

accession 27 Jan 2005

26 Sep 1986 ratification 19 Sep 1988

accession 21 Dec 1989

26 Feb 2005

/ 20 Oct 1988

21 Jan 1990
Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident 1183

.Table: Convention On Early Notification Of A Nuclear Accident

Signature, Ratification, Acceptance, Approval or Accession by States or

Organizations

Means/Date of Deposit of

Expression of Consent to be

Bound

Country/ Date of Date of

Organization Signature Instrument Deposit D/W* Entry into Force

Viet Nam accession 29 Sep 1987 / 30 Oct 1987

Zimbabwe 26 Sep 1986

EURATOM accession 14 Nov 2006 " 14 Dec 2006

Food & Agriculture

Org. (FAO) accession 19 Oct 1990 " 19 Nov 1990

World Health

Org. (WHO) accession 10 Aug 1988 / 10 Sep 1988

World

Meteorological

Org. (WMO) accession 17 Apr 1990 / 18 May 1990

*"D" denotes Declaration etc. / "W" denotes Withdrawal.

Note: The Convention entered into force on 27 October 1986, i.e. thirty days after the date on

which the third State expressed their consent to be bound, pursuant to Article 12, para. 3.

Number of Parties: 109

Signatories: 70

Last change of status: 06 October 2010
1184 Convention on Nuclear Safety

E. CONVENTION ON NUCLEAR SAFETY

Adopted September 20, 1994, Entered into Force October 27, 1986

Preamble

The Contracting Parties,

(i) Aware of the importance to the international community of ensuring that the use

of nuclear energy is safe, well regulated and environmentally sound;

(ii) Reaffirming the necessity of continuing to promote a high level of nuclear safety

worldwide;

(iii) Reaffirming that responsibility for nuclear safety rests with the State having

jurisdiction over a nuclear installation;

(iv) Desiring to promote an effective nuclear safety culture;

(v) Aware that accidents at nuclear installations have the potential for transboundary

impacts;

(vi) Keeping in mind the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material

(1979), the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident (1986), and the

Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency

(1986);

(vii) Affirming the importance of international cooperation for the enhancement of

nuclear safety through existing bilateral and multilateral mechanisms and the

establishment of this incentive Convention;

(viii) Recognizing that this Convention entails a commitment to the application of

fundamental safety principles for nuclear installations rather than of detailed safety

standards and that there are internationally formulated safety guidelines which are

updated from time to time and so can provide guidance on contemporary means of

achieving a high level of safety;

(ix) Affirming the need to begin promptly the development of an international

convention on the safety of radioactive waste management as soon as the ongoing

process to develop waste management safety fundamentals has resulted in broad

international agreement;

(x) Recognizing the usefulness of further technical work in connection with the

safety of other parts of the nuclear fuel cycle, and that this work may, in time, facilitate

the development of current or future international instruments;

Have agreed as follows:

Chapter 1

Objectives, Definitions And Scope

Of Application

Article I - Objectives The objectives of this Convention are:

(i) to achieve and maintain a high level of nuclear safety worldwide through the

enhancement of national measures and international co-operation including, where

appropriate, safety-related technical co-operation;

(ii) to establish and maintain effective defenses in nuclear installations against potential radiological hazards in order to protect individuals, society and the

environment from harmful effects of ionizing radiation from such installations;

(iii) to prevent accidents with radiological consequences and to mitigate such

consequences should they occur.

Article 2 - Definitions

For the purpose of this Convention:

(i) "nuclear installation" means for each Contracting Party any land-based civil

nuclear power plant under its jurisdiction including such storage, handling and treatment
Convention on Nuclear Safetv 1185

facilities for radioactive materials as are on the same site and are directly related to the

operation of the nuclear power plant. Such a plant ceases to be a nuclear installation

when all nuclear fuel elements have been removed permanently from the reactor core

and have been stored safely in accordance with approved procedures, and a

decommissioning program has been agreed to by the regulatory body;

(ii) "regulatory body" means for each Contracting Party any body or bodies given

the legal authority by that Contracting Party to grant licences and to regulate the siting,

design, construction, commissioning, operation or decommissioning of nuclear

installations;

(iii) "licence" means any authorization granted by the regulatory body to the

applicant to have the responsibility for the siting, design, construction, commissioning,

operation or decommissioning of a nuclear installation.

Article 3 - Scope Of Application

This Convention shall apply to the safety of nuclear installations.

Chapter 2

Obligations

(a) General Provisions

Article 4 - Implementing Measures

Each Contracting Party shall take, within the framework of its national law, the

legislative, regulatory and administrative measures and other steps necessary for

implementing its obligations under this Convention.

Article 5 - Reporting

Each Contracting Party shall submit for review, prior to each meeting referred to in

Article 20, a report on the measures it has taken to implement each of the obligations of

this Convention.

Article 6 - Existing Nuclear Installations

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that the safety of

nuclear installations existing at the time the Convention enters into force for that

Contracting Party is reviewed as soon as possible. When necessary in the context of this

Convention, the Contracting Party shall ensure that all reasonably practicable

improvements are made as a matter of urgency to upgrade the safety of the nuclear

installation. If such upgrading cannot be achieved, plans should be implemented to shut

down the nuclear installation as soon as practically possible. The timing of the shutdown

may take into account the whole energy context and possible alternatives as well as the

social, environmental and economic impact.

(b) Legislation and Regulation

Article 7 - Legislative And Regulatory Framework

1. Each Contracting Party shall establish and maintain a legislative and regulatory

framework to govern the safety of nuclear installations.

2. The legislative and regulatory framework shall provide for:

(i) the establishment of applicable national safety requirements and

regulations;

(ii) a system of licensing with regard to nuclear installations and the

prohibition of the operation of a nuclear installation without a license;

(iii) a system of regulatory inspection and assessment of nuclear installations

to ascertain compliance with applicable regulations and the terms of licenses;

(iv) the enforcement of applicable regulations and of the terms of licenses,

including suspension, modification or revocation.
1186 Convention on Nuclear Safety

Article 8 - Regulatory Body

1. Each Contracting Party shall establish or designate a regulatory body entrusted

with the implementation of the legislative and regulatory framework referred to in

Article 7, and provided with adequate authority, competence and financial and human

resources to fulfill its assigned responsibilities.

2. Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure an effective

separation between the functions of the regulatory body and those of any other body or

organization concerned with the promotion or utilization of nuclear energy.

Article 9 - Responsibility Of The License Holder

Each Contracting Party shall ensure that prime responsibility for the safety of a

nuclear installation rests with the holder of the relevant license and shall take the

appropriate steps to ensure that each such license holder meets its responsibility.

(c) General Safety Considerations

Article 10 - Priority To Safety

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that all

organizations engaged in activities directly related to nuclear installations shall establish

policies that give due priority to nuclear safety.

Article I I - Financial And Human Resources

1. Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that adequate

financial resources are available to support the safety of each nuclear installation

throughout its life.

2. Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that sufficient

numbers of qualified staff with appropriate education, training and retraining are

available for all safety-related activities in or for each nuclear installation, throughout its

life.

Article 12 - Human Factors

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that the capabilities and limitations of human performance are taken into account throughout the life of a

nuclear installation.

Article 13 - Quality Assurance

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that quality

assurance programs are established and implemented with a view to providing

confidence that specified requirements for all activities important to nuclear safety are

satisfied throughout the life of a nuclear installation.

Article 14- Assessment And Verification Of Safety Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that:

(i) comprehensive and systematic safety assessments are carried out before the

construction and commissioning of a nuclear installation and throughout its life.

Such assessments shall be well documented, subsequently updated in the light of

operating experience and significant new safety information, and reviewed under the

authority of the regulatory body;

(ii) verification by analysis, surveillance, testing and inspection is carried out to

ensure that the physical state and the operation of a nuclear installation continue to

be in accordance with its design, applicable national safety requirements, and

operational limits and conditions.
Convention on Nuclear Safety 1187

Article 15- Radiation Protection

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that in all

operational states the radiation exposure to the workers and the public caused by a

nuclear installation shall be kept as low as reasonably achievable and that no individual

shall be exposed to radiation doses which exceed prescribed national dose limits.

Article 16- Emergency Preparedness I. Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that there are onsite and off-site emergency plans that are routinely tested for nuclear installations and

cover the activities to be carried out in the event of an emergency. For any new nuclear

installation, such plans shall be prepared and tested before it commences operation

above a low power level agreed by the regulatory body.

2. Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that, insofar as

they are likely to be affected by a radiological emergency, its own population and the

competent authorities of the States in the vicinity of the nuclear installation are, provided with appropriate information for emergency planning and response.

3. Contracting Parties which do not have a nuclear installation on their territory, insofar as they are likely to be affected in the event of a radiological emergency at a

nuclear installation in the vicinity, shall take the appropriate steps for the preparation

and testing of emergency plans for their territory that cover the activities to be carried

out in the event of such an emergency.

(d) Safety of Installations

Article 17 - Siting

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that appropriate

procedures are established and implemented:

(i) for evaluating all relevant site-related factors likely to affect the safety of a

nuclear installation for its projected lifetime;

(ii) for evaluating the likely safety impact of a proposed nuclear installation on

individuals, society and the environment;

(iii) for re-evaluating as necessary all relevant factors referred to in subparagraphs (i) and (ii) so as to ensure the continued safety acceptability of the

nuclear installation; (iv) for consulting Contracting Parties in the vicinity of a

proposed nuclear installation, insofar as they are likely to be affected by that

installation and, upon request providing the necessary information to such

Contracting Parties, in order to enable them to evaluate and make their own

assessment of the likely safety impact on their own territory of the nuclear

installation.

Article 18 - Design And Construction

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that:

(i) the design and construction of a nuclear installation provides for several

reliable levels and methods of protection (defense in depth) against the release of

radioactive materials, with a view to preventing the occurrence of accidents and to

mitigating their radiological consequences should they occur;

(ii) the technologies incorporated in the design and construction of a nuclear

installation are proven by experience or qualified by testing or analysis;

(iii) the design of a nuclear installation allows for reliable, stable and easily

manageable operation, with specific consideration of human factors and the manmachine interface.

Article 19 - Operation

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that:
1188 Convention on Nuclear Safety

(i) the initial authorization to operate a nuclear installation is based upon an

appropriate safety analysis and a commissioning program demonstrating that the

installation, as constructed, is consistent with design and safety requirements; (ii) operational limits and conditions derived from the safety analysis, tests and

operational experience are defined and revised as necessary for identifying safe

boundaries for operation;

(iii) operation, maintenance, inspection and testing of a nuclear installation are

conducted in accordance with approved procedures;

(iv) procedures are established for responding to anticipated operational

occurrences and to accidents;

(v) necessary engineering and technical support in all safety related fields is

available throughout the lifetime of a nuclear installation;

(vi) incidents significant to safety are reported in a timely manner by the holder

of the relevant license to the regulatory body;

(vii) programs to collect and analyze operating experience are established, the

results obtained and the conclusions drawn are acted upon and that existing mechanisms are used to share important experience with international bodies and

with other operating organizations and regulatory bodies;

(viii) the generation of radioactive waste resulting from the operation of nuclear

installation is kept to the minimum practicable for the process concerned, both in

activity and in volume, and any necessary treatment and storage of spent fuel and

waste directly related to the operation and on the same site as that of the nuclear

installation take into consideration conditioning and disposal.

Chapter 3

Meetings Of The Contracting Parties

Article 20 - Review Meetings I. The Contracting Parties shall hold meetings (hereinafter referred to as "review

meetings") for the purpose of reviewing the reports submitted pursuant to Article 5 in

accordance with the procedures adopted under Article 22.

2. Subject to the provisions of Article 24 sub-groups comprised of representatives of

Contracting Parties may be established and may function during the review meetings as

deemed necessary for the purpose of reviewing specific subjects contained in the reports. 3. Each Contracting Party shall have a reasonable opportunity to discuss the reports submitted by other Contracting Parties and to seek clarification of such reports.

Article 21 - Timetable

1. A preparatory meeting of the Contracting Parties shall be held not later than six

months after the date of entry into force of this Convention.

2. At this preparatory meeting, the Contracting Parties shall determine the date for

the first review meeting. This review meeting shall be held as soon as possible, but not

later than thirty months after the date of entry into force of this Convention.

3. At each review meeting, the Contracting Parties shall determine the date for the

next such meeting. The interval between review meetings shall not exceed three years.

Article 22 - Procedural Arrangements I. At the preparatory meeting held pursuant to Article 21 the Contracting Parties

shall prepare and adopt by consensus Rules of Procedure and Financial Rules. The

Contracting Parties shall establish in particular and in accordance with the Rules of

Procedure:

(i) guidelines regarding the form and structure of the reports to be submitted

pursuant to Article 5;

(ii) a date for the submission of such reports;

(iii) the process for reviewing such reports;
Convention on Nuclear Safety 1189

2. At review meetings the Contracting Parties may, if necessary, review the

arrangements established pursuant to subparagraphs (i)-(iii) above, and adopt revisions

by consensus unless otherwise provided for in the Rules of Procedure. They may also

amend the Rules of Procedure and the Financial Rules, by consensus.

Article 23 - Extraordinary Meetings

An extraordinary meeting of the Contracting Parties shall be held:

(i) if so agreed by a majority of the Contracting Parties present and voting at a

meeting, abstentions being considered as voting; or

(ii) at the written request of a Contracting Party, within six months of this request having been communicated to the Contracting Parties and notification having been

received by the secretariat referred to in Article 28, that the request has been

supported by a majority of the Contracting Parties.

Article 24 - Attendance

1. Each Contracting Party shall attend meetings of the Contracting Parties and be

represented at such meetings by one delegate, and by such alternates, experts and

advisers as it deems necessary.

2. The Contracting Parties may invite, by consensus, any intergovernmental organization which is competent in respect of matters governed by this Convention to

attend, as an observers, any meeting, or specific sessions thereof. Observers shall be

required to accept in writing, and in advance, the provisions of Article 27.

Article 25 - Summary Reports

The Contracting Parties shall adopt, by consensus, and make available to the public a

document addressing issues discussed and conclusions reached during a meeting.

Article 26 - Languages

I. The languages of meetings of the Contracting Parties shall be Arabic, Chinese,

English, French, Russian and Spanish unless otherwise provided in the Rules of

Procedure.

2. Reports submitted pursuant to Article 5 shall be prepared in the national language of the submitting Contracting Party or in a single designated language to be agreed in the

Rules of Procedure. Should the report be submitted in a national language other than the

designated language, a translation of the report into the designated language shall be

provided by the Contracting Party.

3. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 2, if compensated, the secretariat will

assume the translation into the designated language of reports submitted in any other

language of the meeting.

Article 27 - Confidentiality

1. The provisions of this Convention shall not affect the rights and obligations of the

Contracting Parties under their law to protect information from disclosure. For the

purposes of this Article, "information" includes, inter alia:

(i) personal data;

(ii) information protected by intellectual property rights or by industrial or

commercial confidentiality; and

(iii) information relating to national security or to the physical protection of

nuclear materials or nuclear installations.

2. When, in the context of this Convention, a Contracting Party provides information

identified by it as protected as described in paragraph I, such information shall be used

only for the purposes for which it has been provided and its confidentiality shall be

respected.

3. The content of the debates during the reviewing of the reports by the Contracting

Parties at each meeting shall be confidential.
1190 Convention on Nuclear Safety

Article 28 - Secretariat

1. The International Atomic Energy Agency, (hereinafter referred to as the

"Agency") shall provide secretariat for the meetings of the Contracting Parties.

2. The secretariat shall:

(i) convene, prepare and service the meetings of the Contracting Parties;

(ii) transmit to the Contracting Parties information received or prepared in

accordance with the provisions of this Convention.

The costs incurred by the Agency in carrying out the functions referred to in

subparagraphs (i) and (ii) above shall be borne by the Agency as part of its regular

budget.

3. The Contracting Parties may, by consensus, request the Agency to provide other

services in support of meetings of the Contracting Parties. The Agency may provide

such services if they can be undertaken within its program and regular budget. Should

this not be possible, the Agency may provide such services if voluntary funding is

provided from another source.

Chapter 4

Final Clauses And Other Provisions

Article 29 - Resolution Of Disagreements

In the event of a disagreement between two or more Contracting Parties concerning

the interpretation or application of this Convention, the Contracting Parties shall consult

within the framework of a meeting of the Contracting Parties with a view to resolving

the disagreement.

Article 30 - Signature, Ratification, Acceptance, Approval, Accession

1. This Convention shall be open for signature by all States at the Headquarters of

the Agency in Vienna from 20 September 1994 until its entry into force.

2. This Convention is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by the signatory

States.

3. After its entry into force, this Convention shall be open for accession by all States.

4. (i) This Convention shall be open for signature or accession by regional organizations of an integration or other nature, provided that any such organization is

constituted by sovereign States and has competence in respect of the negotiation, conclusion and application of international agreements in matters covered by this

Convention.

(ii) In matters within their competence, such organizations shall, on their own

behalf, exercise the rights and fulfill the responsibilities which this Convention attributes

to States Parties.

(iii) When becoming party to this Convention, such an organization shall

communicate to the Depositary referred to in Article 34, a declaration indicating which

States are members thereof, which articles of this Convention apply to it, and the extent

of its competence in the field covered by those articles.

(iv) Such an organization shall not hold any vote additional to those of its

Member States.

5. Instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall be deposited

with the Depositary.

Article 31 - Entry Into Force

1. This Convention shall enter into force on the ninetieth day after the date of deposit

with the Depositary of the twenty-second instrument of ratification, acceptance or

approval, including the instruments of seventeen States, each having at least one nuclear

installation which has achieved criticality in a reactor core.
Convention on Nuclear Safety 1191

2. For each State or regional organization of an integration or other nature which

ratifies, accepts, approves or accedes to this Convention after the date of deposit of the

last instrument required to satisfy the conditions set forth paragraph 1, this Convention

shall enter into force on the ninetieth day after the date of deposit with the Depositary of

the appropriate instrument by such a State or organization.

Article 32 - Amendments To The Convention

I. Any Contracting Party may propose an amendment to this Convention. Proposed

amendments shall be considered at a review meeting or an extraordinary meeting.

2. The text of any proposed amendment and the reasons for it shall be provided to the

Depositary who shall communicate the proposal to the Contracting Parties promptly and

at least ninety days before the meeting for which it is submitted for consideration. Any

comments received on such a proposal shall be circulated by the Depositary to the

Contracting Parties.

3. The Contracting Parties shall decide after consideration of the proposed

amendment whether to adopt it by consensus, or, in the absence of consensus, to submit

it to a Diplomatic Conference. A decision to submit a proposed amendment to a

Diplomatic Conference shall require a two-thirds majority vote of the Contracting

Parties present and voting at the meeting, provided that at least one half of the

Contracting Parties are present at the time of voting. Abstentions shall be considered as

voting.

4. The Diplomatic Conference to consider and adopt amendments to this Convention

shall be convened by the Depositary and held no later than one year after the appropriate

decision taken in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article. The Diplomatic

Conference shall make every effort to ensure amendments are adopted by consensus.

Should this not be possible, amendments shall be adopted with a two-thirds majority of

all Contracting Parties.

5. Amendments to this Convention adopted pursuant to paragraphs 3 and 4 above

shall be subject to ratification, acceptance, approval, or confirmation by the Contracting

Parties and shall enter into force for those Contracting Parties which have ratified,

accepted, approved or confirmed them on the ninetieth day after the receipt by the

Depositary of the relevant instruments by at least three fourths of the Contracting

Parties. For a Contracting Party which subsequently ratifies, accepts, approves or

confirms the said amendments, the amendments will enter into force on the ninetieth day

after that Contracting Party has deposited its relevant instrument.

Article 33 - Denunciation

1. Any Contracting Party may denounce this Convention by written notification to

the Depositary.

2. Denunciation shall take effect one year following the date of the receipt of the

notification by the Depositary, or on such later date as may be specified in the

notification.

Article 34 - Depositary

I. The Director General of the Agency shall be the Depositary of this Convention.

2. The Depositary shall inform the Contracting Parties of:

(i) the signature of this Convention and of the deposit of instruments of

ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, in accordance with Article 30;

(ii) the date on which the Convention enters into force, in accordance with

Article 3 1;

(iii) the notifications of denunciation of the Convention and the date thereof,

made in accordance with Article 33;

(iv) the proposed amendments to this Convention submitted by Contracting

Parties, the amendments adopted by the relevant Diplomatic Conference or by
1192 Convention on Nuclear Safety

the meeting of the Contracting Parties, and the date of entry into force of the said

amendments, in accordance with Article 32.

Article 35 - Authentic Texts

The original of this Convention of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French,

Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Depositary,

who shall send certified copies thereof to the Contracting Parties.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorized to that effect, have

signed this Convention.

DONE AT VIENNA on the 20th day of September 1994.
Convention on Nuclear Safety 1193

Table: Signatories And Parties On The

Convention On Nuclear Safety

Signature, Ratification, Acceptance, Approval or Accession by States or

Organizations

State/

Organization

Algeria

Argentina*

Armenia*

Australia

Austriaa

Bangladesh

Belarus

Belgium*

Bosnia and

Herzegovina

Brazil*

Bulgaria*

Canada*

Chile

China*

Croatia

Cuba

Cyprus

Czech Republic*

Denmark

Egypt

Estonia

Finland*

France*

Germany*

Ghana

Greece

Hungary*

Iceland

India*

Indonesia

Ireland

Israel

Italy

Japan*

Jordan

Kazakhstan*

Korea*, Republic of

Kuwait

Latvia

Lebanon

Libyan Arab

Jamahiriya

Lithuania*

Luxembourg

Mali

Date of

Signature

20 Sep 1994

20 Oct 1994

22 Sep 1994

20 Sep 1994

20 Sep 1994

21 Sep 1995

20 Sep 1994

20 Sep 1994

20 Sep 1994

20 Sep 1994

20 Sep 1994

20 Sep 1994

10 Apr 1995

20 Sep 1994

20 Sep 1994

20 Sep 1994

20 Sep 1994

20 Sep 1994

20 Sep 1994

20 Sep 1994

06 Jul 1995

01 Nov 1994

20 Sep 1994

21 Sep 1995

20 Sep 1994

20 Sep 1994

20 Sep 1994

22 Sep 1994

27 Sep 1994

20 Sep 1994

06 Dec 1994

20 Sep 1996

20 Sep 1994

Means and Date of

Expression of

Consent to be Bound

Entry into

Force

ratified 17 Apr 1997

ratified 21 Sep 1998

ratified 24 Dec 1996

ratified 26 Aug 1997

accepted 21 Sep 1995

acceded 29 Oct 1998

ratified 13 Jan 1997

acceded 21 Jul 2010

ratified 04 Mar 1997

ratified 08 Nov 1995

ratified 12 Dec 1995

ratified 20 Dec 1996

ratified 09 Apr 1996

approved 18 Apr 1996

acceded 17 Mar 1999

approved 18 Sep 1995

accepted 13 Nov 1998

acceded 03 Feb 2006

accepted 22 Jan 1996

approved 13 Sep 1995

ratified 20 Jan 1997

ratified 20 Jun 1997

ratified 18 Mar 1996

ratified 04 Jun 2008

ratified 31 Mar 2005

ratified 12 Apr 2002

ratified 11 Jul 1996

ratified 15 Apr 1998

accepted 12 May 1995

ratified 12 Jun 2009

ratified 10 Mar 2010

ratified 19 Sep 1995

acceded I 1 May 2006

acceded 25 Oct 1996

ratified 05 Jun 1996

acceded 13 Aug 2009

ratified 12 Jun 1996

ratified 07 Apr 1997

ratified 13 May 1996

16 Jul 1997

20 Dec 1998

24 Mar 1997

24 Nov 1997

.24 Oct 1996

27 Jan 1999

13 Apr 1997

19 Sep 2010

02 Jun 1997

24 Oct 1996

24 Oct 1996

20 Mar 1997

24 Oct 1996

24 Oct 1996

15 Jun 1999

24 Oct 1996

11 Feb 1999

04 May 2006

24 Oct 1996

24 Oct 1996

20 Apr 1997

18 Sep 1997

24 Oct 1996

02 Sep 2008

29 Jun 2005

1 ]Jul 2002

24 Oct 1996

14 Jul 1998

24 Oct 1996

10 Sep 2009

08 Jun 2010

24 Oct 1996

09 Aug 2006

23 Jan 1997

24 Oct 1996

11 Nov 2009

24 Oct 1996

06 Jul 1997

24 Oct 1996

07 Mar 1995

22 Mar 1995

20 Sep 1994

22 May 1995
1194 Convention on Nuclear Safety

Means and Date of

State/ Date of Expression of Entry into

Organization Signature Consent to be Bound Force

Malta

Mexico*

Monaco

Morocco

Netherlands"

Nicaragua

Nigeria

Norway

Pakistan*

Peru

Philippines

Poland

Portugal

Republic of Moldova

Romania*

Russian Federation*

Saudi Arabia

Senegal

Singapore

Slovakia*

Slovenia*

South Africa*

Spain*

Sri Lanka

Sudan

Sweden*

Switzerland*

Syrian Arab Repub.

The Frmr. Yug, Rep.

of Macedonia

Tunisia

Turkey

Ukraine*

United Arab

Emirates

United Kingdom'-C

United States*

Uruguay

Vietnam

EURATOM

09 Nov 1994

16 Sep 1996

01 Dec 1994

20 Sep 1994

23 Sep 1994

21 Sep 1994

21 Sep 1994

20 Sep 1994

22 Sep 1994

14 Oct 1994

20 Sep 1994

03 Oct 1994

20 Sep 1994

20 Sep 1994

20 Sep 1994

20 Sep 1994

20 Sep 1994

15 Nov 1994

20 Sept 1994

20 Sep 1994

31 Oct 1995

23 Sep 1994

20 Sep 1994

20 Sep 1994

20 Sep 1994

20 Sep 1994

20 Sep 1994

28 Feb 1996

acceded 15 Nov 2007

ratified 26 Jul 1996

accepted 15 Oct 1996

ratified 04 Apr 2007

ratified 29 Sep 1994

ratified 30 Sep 1997

ratified 01 Jul 1997

ratified 14 Jun 1995

ratified 20 May 1998

acceded 07 May 1998

ratified 01 Jun 1995

accepted 12 Jul 1996

acceded 18 Mar 2010

acceded 18 Mar 2010

acceded 15 Dec 1997

ratified 07 Mar 1995

ratified 20 Nov 1996

ratified 24 Dec 1996

ratified 04 Jul 1995

acceded II Aug 1999

ratified 11 Sep 1995

ratified 12 Sep 1996

acceded 15 Mar 2006

ratified 21 Apr 2010

ratified 08 Mar 1995

ratified 08 Apr 1998

acceded 31 Jul 2009

ratified 17 Jan 1996

ratified II Apr 1999

ratified 03 Sep 2003

acceded 16 Apr 2010

acceded 31 Jan 2000

13 Feb 2008

24 Oct 1996

13 Jan 1997

03 Jul 2007

24 Oct 1996

29 Dec 1997

29 Sep 1997

24 Oct 1996

18 Aug 1998

05 Aug 1998

24 Oct 1996

24 Oct 1996

16 Jun 2010

16 Jun 2010

15 Mar 1998

24 Oct 1996

18 Fed 1997

24 Mar 1997

24 Oct 1996

09 Nov 1999

24 Oct 1996

I1 Dec 1996

13 Jun 2006

20 Jul 2010

24 Oct 1996

07 Jul 1998

29 Oct 2009

24 Oct 1996

10 Jul 1999

02 Dec 2003

15 Jul 2010

30 Apr 2000

Indicates that the State has at least one nuclear installation which has achieved

criticality in a reactor core; sources: Table I "Nuclear Power Reactors in Operation and

Under Construction, 31 Dec 1997", Apr 1998 Edition of "Nuclear Power Reactors in the

World", Reference Data Series No. 2, IAEA, Vienna; Government notification. a On 9 April 1999, Austria deposited an objection to reservation by Ukraine.

b for the Kingdom in Europe.

for the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Bailiwick of

Guernsey, the Bailiwick of Jersey and the Isle of Man.
Convention on Nuclear Safety 1195

Notes: The Convention, pursuant to Article 31.1, entered into force on the ninetieth day

after the date of deposit with the Depositary of the twenty-second instrument of

ratification, acceptance or approval, including the instruments of seventeen States, each

having at least one nuclear installation which has achieved criticality in a reactor core,

i.e. 24 October 1996.

Number of Parties: 71

Signatories: 65

Last change of status: 21 June 2010
1196 Cony. on Assistance in the Case of A Nuc. Accident or Radiolog. Emerg

F. CONVENTION ON ASSISTANCE IN THE CASE OF A NUCLEAR

ACCIDENT OR RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY

ADOPTED SEPTEMBER 26, 1986

THE STATES PARTIES TO THIS CONVENTION,

AWARE that nuclear activities are being carried out in a number of States,

NOTING THAT comprehensive measures have been and are being taken to ensure a

high level of safety in nuclear activities, aimed at preventing nuclear accidents and

minimizing the consequences of any such accident, should it occur,

DESIRING to strength further international co-operation in the safe development

and use of nuclear energy,

CONVINCED of the need for an international framework which will facilitate the

prompt provision of assistance in the event of a nuclear accident or radiological

emergency to mitigate its consequences,

NOTING the usefulness of bilateral and multilateral arrangements on mutual

assistance in this area,

NOTING the activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency in developing

guidelines for mutual emergency assistance arrangements in connection with a nuclear

accident or radiological emergency,

HAVE AGREED as follows:

Article I - General Provisions

1. The States Parties shall cooperate between themselves and with the

International Atomic Energy Agency (hereinafter referred to as the "Agency") in

accordance with the provisions of this Convention to facilitate prompt assistance in the

event of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency to minimize its consequences and

to protect life, property and the environment from the effects of radioactive releases.

2. To facilitate such cooperation States Parties may agree on bilateral or

multilateral arrangements or, where appropriate, a combination of these, for preventing

or minimizing injury and damage which may result in the event of a nuclear accident or

radiological emergency.

3. The States Parties request the Agency, acting within the framework of its

Statute, to use its best endeavours in accordance with the provisions of this Convention

to promote, facilitate and support the cooperation between States Parties provided for in

this Convention.

Article 2 - Provisions Of Assistance

I. If a State Party needs assistance in the event of a nuclear accident or

radiological emergency, whether or not such accident or emergency originates within its

territory, jurisdiction or control, it may call for such assistance from any other State

Party, directly or through the Agency, and from the Agency, or, where appropriate, from

other international intergovernmental organizations (hereinafter referred to as

"international organizations"). 2. A State Party requesting assistance shall specify the scope and type of

assistance required and, where practicable, provide the assistance party with such

information as may be necessary for that party to determine the extent to which it is able

to meet the request. In the event that it is not practicable for the requesting State Party to

specify the scope and type of assistance required, the requesting State Party and the

assisting party shall, in consultation, decide upon the scope and type of assistance

required.

3. Each State Party to which a request for such assistance is directed shall

promptly decide and notify the requesting State Party, directly or through the Agency, whether it is in a position to render the assistance requested, and the scope and terms of

the assistance that might be rendered.
Cony. on Assistance in the Case of A Nuc. Accident or Radiolog. Emerv.1 1197

4. States Parties shall, within the limits of their capabilities, identify and notify

the Agency of experts, equipment and materials which could be made available for the

provision of assistance to other States Parties in the event of a nuclear accident or

radiological emergency as well as the terms, especially financial, under which such

assistance could be provided.

5. Any State Party may request assistance relating to medical treatment or

temporary relocation into the territory of another State Party of people involved in a

nuclear accident or radiological emergency.

6. The Agency shall respond, in accordance with its Statute and as provided for

in this Convention, to a requesting State Party's or a Member State's request for

assistance in the event of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency by:

(a) making appropriate resources allocated for this purpose;

(b) transmitting promptly the request to other States and international

organizations which, according to the Agency's information, may possess the necessary

resources; and

(c) if so requested by the requesting State, coordinating the assistance at the

international level which may thus become available.

Article 3 - Direction And Control Of Assistance

Unless otherwise agreed:

(a) the overall direction, control, co-ordination and supervision of the assistance

shall be the responsibility within its territory of the requesting State. The assisting party

should, where the assistance involves personnel, designate in consultation with the

requesting State, the person who should be in charge of and retain immediate operational

supervision over the personnel and the equipment provided by it. The designated person

should exercise such supervision in cooperation with the appropriate authorities of the

requesting State;

(b) the requesting State shall provide, to the extent of its capabilities, local

facilities and services for the proper and effective administration of the assistance. It

shall also ensure the protection of personnel, equipment and materials brought into its

territory by or on behalf of the assisting party for such purpose;

(c) ownership of equipment and materials provided by either party during the

periods of assistance shall be unaffected, and their return shall be ensured;

(d) a State Party providing assistance in response to a request under paragraph 5

of article 2 shall co-ordinate that assistance within its territory.

Article 4 - Competent Authorities And Points Of Contact

1. Each State Party shall make known to the Agency and to other States Parties,

directly or through the Agency, its competent authorities and point of contact authorized

to make and receive requests for and to accept offers of assistance. Such points of

contact and a focal point within the Agency shall be available continuously.

2. Each State Party shall promptly inform the Agency of any changes that may

occur in the information referred to in paragraph I.

3. The Agency shall regularly and expeditiously provide to States Parties,

Member States and relevant international organizations the information referred to in

paragraphs I and 2.

Article 5 - Functions Of The Agency

The States Parties request the Agency, in accordance with paragraph 3 of article I

and without prejudice to other provisions of this Convention, to:

(a) collect and disseminate to States Parties and Member States information

concerning: (i) experts, equipment and materials which could be made

available in the event of nuclear accidents or radiological emergencies;
1198 Conv. on Assistance in the Case of A Nuc. Accident or Radiolog. Emerg

(ii) methodologies, techniques and available results of research

relating to response to nuclear accidents or radiological emergencies; (b) assist a State Party or a Member State when requested in any of the following

or other appropriate matters:

(i) preparing both emergency plans in the case of nuclear accidents

and radiological emergencies and the appropriate legislation;

(ii) developing appropriate training programmes for personnel to

deal with nuclear accidents and radiological emergencies; (iii) transmitting requests for assistance and relevant information in

the event of nuclear accident or radiological emergency;

(iv) developing appropriate radiation monitoring programmes,

procedures and standards;

(v) conducting investigations into the feasibility of establishing

appropriate radiation monitoring systems; and public (c) make available to a State Party or a Member State requesting assistance in the

event of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency appropriate resources allocated for

the purpose of conducting an initial assessment of the accident or emergency; (d) offer its good offices to the States Parties and Member States in the event of a

nuclear accident or radiological emergency; (e) establish and maintain liaison with relevant international organizations for the

purposes of obtaining and exchanging relevant information and data, and make a list of

such organizations available to States Parties, Member States and the aforementioned

organizations.

Article 6 - Confidentiality And Public Statements

I. The requesting State and the assisting party shall protect the confidentiality of

any confidential information that becomes available to either of them in connection with

the assistance in the event of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency. Such

information shall be used exclusively for the purpose of the assistance agreed upon.

2. The assisting party shall make every effort to coordinate with the requesting State before releasing information to the public on the assistance provided in connection

with a nuclear accident or radiological emergency.

Article 7 - Reimbursement Of Costs

I. An assisting party may offer assistance without costs to the requesting State.

When considering whether to offer assistance on such a basis, the assisting party shall

take into account:

(a) the nature of the nuclear accident or radiological emergency;

(b) the place of origin of the nuclear accident or radiological emergency;

(c) the needs of developing countries;

(d) the particular needs of countries without nuclear facilities; and

(e) any other relevant factors.

2. When assistance is provided wholly or partly on a reimbursement basis, the

requesting State shall reimburse the assisting party for the costs incurred for the services

rendered by persons or organizations acting on its behalf, and for all expenses in

connection with the assistance to the extent that such expenses are not directly defrayed

by the requesting State. Unless otherwise agreed, reimbursement shall be provided promptly after the assisting party has presented its request for reimbursement to the

requesting State, and in respect of costs other than local costs, shall be freely

transferable.

3. Notwithstanding paragraph 2, the assisting party may at any time waive, or

agree to the postponement of, the reimbursement in whole or in part. In considering such

waiver or postponement, assisting parties shall give due consideration to the needs of

developing countries.
Cony. on Assistance in the Case of A Nuc. Accident or Radiolog. Emerg. 1199

Article 8 - Privileges, Immunities And Facilities

1. The requesting State shall afford to personnel of the assisting party and

personnel acting on its behalf the necessary privileges, immunities and facilities for the

performance of their assistance functions.

2. The requesting State shall afford the following privileges and immunities to

personnel of the assisting party or personnel acting on its behalf who have been duly

notified to and accepted by the requesting State:

(a) immunity from arrest, detention and legal process, including criminal, civil

and administrative jurisdiction, of the requesting State, in respect of acts or

omissions in the performance of their duties; and

(b) exemption from taxation, duties or other charges, except those which are

normally incorporated in the price of goods or paid for services rendered, in respect

of the performance of their assistance functions.

3. The requesting State shall:

(a) afford the assisting party exemption from taxation, duties or other charges on

the equipment and property brought into the territory of the requesting State by the

assisting party for the purpose of the assistance; and

(b) provide immunity from seizure, attachment, or requisition of such equipment

and property.

4. The requesting State shall ensure the return of such equipment and property. If

requested by the assisting party, the requesting State shall arrange, to the extent it is able

to do so, for the necessary decontamination of recoverable equipment involved in the

assistance before its return.

5. The requesting State shall facilitate the entry into, stay in and departure from

its national territory of personnel notified pursuant to paragraph 2 and of equipment and

property involved in the assistance.

6. Nothing in this article shall require the require the requesting State to provide

its nationals or permanent residents with the privileges and immunities provided for in

the foregoing paragraphs.

7. Without prejudice to the privileges and immunities, all beneficiaries enjoying

such privileges and immunities under this article have a duty to respect the laws and

regulations of the requesting State. They shall also have the duty not to interfere in the

domestic affairs of the requesting State.

8. Nothing in this article shall prejudice rights and obligations with respect to

privileges and immunities afforded pursuant to other international agreements or the

rules of customary international law.

9. When signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to this Convention,

a State may declare that it does not consider itself bound in whole or in part by

paragraphs 2 and 3.

10. A State Party which has made a declaration in accordance with paragraph 9

may at any time withdraw it by notification to the depositary.

Article 9 - Transit Of Personnel, Equipment And Property

Each State Party shall, at the request of the requesting State or the assisting party,

seek to facilitate the transit through its territory of duly notified personnel, equipment

and property involved in the assistance to and from the requesting State.

Article 10 - Claims And Compensation

I. The States Parties shall closely cooperate in order to facilitate the settlement of

legal proceedings and claims under this article.

2. Unless otherwise agreed, a requesting State shall in respect of death or injury

to persons, damage to or loss of property, or damage to the environment caused within

its territory or other area under its jurisdiction or control in the course of providing the

assistance requested:
1200 Cony. on Assistance in the Case of A Nuc. Accident or Radiolog. Emerg

(a) not bring any legal proceedings against the assisting party or persons or other

legal entities acting on its behalf;

(b) assume responsibility for dealing with legal proceedings and claims brought by third parties against the assisting party or against persons or other legal entities

acting on its behalf;

(c) hold the assisting party or persons or other legal entities acting on its behalf

harmless in respect of legal proceedings and claims referred to in sub-paragraph (b);

and

(d) compensate the assisting party or persons or other legal entities acting on its

behalf for:

(i) death of or injury to personnel of the assisting party or persons acting on

its behalf,

(ii) loss of or damage to non-consumable equipment or materials related to

the assistance; except in cases of willful misconduct by the individuals who

caused the death, injury, loss or damage.

3. This article shall not prevent compensation or indemnity available under any applicable international agreement or national law of any State.

4. Nothing in this article shall require the requesting State to apply paragraph 2 in

whole or in part to its nationals or permanent residents.

5. When signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to this Convention,

a State may declare:

(a) that it does not consider itself bound in whole or in part by paragraph 2;

(b) that it will not apply paragraph 2 in whole or in part in cases of gross negligence by the individuals who caused the death, injury, loss or damage.

6. A State Party which has made a declaration in accordance with paragraph 5

may at any time withdraw it by notification to the depositary.

Article I I - Termination Of Assistance

The requesting State or the assisting party may at any time, after appropriate consultations and by notification in writing, request the termination of assistance

received or provided under this Convention. Once such a request has been made, the

parties involved shall consult with each other to make arrangements for the proper

conclusion of the assistance.

Article 12 - Relationship To Other International Agreements

This Convention shall not affect the reciprocal rights and obligations of States

Parties under existing international agreements which relate to the matters covered by this Convention, or under future international agreements concluded in accordance with

the object and purpose of this Convention.

Article 13 - Settlement Of Disputes

I. In the event of a dispute between States Parties, or between a State Party and

the Agency, concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention, the parties

to the dispute shall consult with a view to the settlement of the dispute by negotiation or

by any other peaceful means of settling disputes acceptable to them.

2. If a dispute of this character between States Parties cannot be settled within

one year from the request for consultation pursuant to paragraph I, it shall, at the request of any party to such dispute, be submitted to arbitration or referred to the International

Court of Justice for decision. Where a dispute is submitted to arbitration, if, within six

months from the date of the request, the parties to the dispute are unable to agree on the

organization of the arbitration, a party may request the President of the International

Court of Justice or the Secretary-General of the United Nations to appoint one or more

arbitrators. In cases of conflicting requests by the parties to the dispute, the request to the

Secretary-General of the United Nations shall have priority.
Cony. on Assistance in the Case of A Nuc. Accident or Radiolog. Emerg. 1201

3. When signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to this Convention,

a State may declare that it does not consider itself bound by either or both of the dispute

settlement procedures provided for in paragraph 2. The other States Parties shall not be

bound by a dispute settlement procedure provided for in paragraph 2 with respect to a

State Party for which such a declaration is in force.

4. A State Party which has made a declaration in accordance with paragraph 3

may at any time withdraw it by notification to the depositary.

Article 14 - Entry Into Force

I. This Convention shall be open for signature by all States and Namibia,

represented by the United Nations Council for Namibia, at the Headquarters of the

International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna and at the Headquarters of the United

Nations in New York, from 26 September 1986 and 6 October 1986 respectively, until

its entry into force or for twelve months, whichever period is longer.

2. A State and Namibia, represented by the United Nations Council for Namibia,

may express its consent to be bound by this Convention either by signature, or by

deposit of an instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval following signature made

subject to ratification, acceptance or approval, or by deposit of an instrument of

accession. The instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall be

deposited with the depositary.

3. This Convention shall enter into force thirty days after consent to be bound has

been expressed by three States.

4. For each State expressing consent to be bound by this Convention after its

entry into force, this Convention shall enter into force for that Sate thirty days after the

date of expression of consent.

5. (a) This Convention shall be open for accession, as provided for in this article,

by international organizations and regional integration organizations constituted by

sovereign States, which have competence in respect of the negotiation, conclusion and

application of international agreements in matters covered by this Convention.

(b) In matters within their competence such organizations shall, on their own

behalf, exercise the rights and fulfill the obligations which this Convention attributes to

States Parties.

(c) When depositing its instrument of accession, such an organization shall

communicate to the depositary a declaration indicating the extent of its competence in

respect of matters covered by this Convention.

(d) Such an organization shall not hold any vote additional to those of its

Member States.

Article 15 - Provisional Application

A State may, upon signature or at any later date before this Convention enters into

force for it, declare that it will apply this Convention provisionally.

Article 16 - Amendments

I. A State Party may propose amendments to this Convention. The proposed

amendment shall be submitted to the depositary who shall circulate it immediately to all

other States Parties.

2. If a majority of the States Parties request the depositary to convene a

conference to consider the proposed amendments, the depositary shall invite all States

Parties to attend such a conference to begin not sooner than thirty days after the

invitations are issued. Any amendment adopted at the conference by a two-thirds

majority of all States Parties shall be laid down in a protocol which is open to signature

in Vienna and New York by all States Parties.

3. The protocol shall enter into force thirty days after consent to be bound has

been expressed by three States. For each State expressing consent to be bound by the
1202 Conv. on Assistance in the Case of A Nuc. Accident or Radiolog. Emerg

protocol after its entry into force, the protocol shall enter into force for that State thirty

days after the date of expression of consent.

Article 17 - Denunciation

I. A State Party may denounce this Convention by written notification to the

depositary.

2. Denunciation shall take effect one year following the date on which the

notification is received by the depositary.

Article 18 - Depositary

1. The Director General of the Agency shall be the depositary of this Convention.

2. The Director General of the Agency shall promptly notify States Parties and all

other States of:

(a) each signature of this Convention or any protocol of amendment;

(b) each deposit of an instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or

accession concerning this Convention or any protocol of amendment;

(c) any declaration or withdrawal thereof in accordance with articles 8, 10 and

13;

(d) any declaration of provisional application of this Convention in accordance

with article 15;

(e) the entry into force of this Convention and of any amendment thereto; and

() any denunciation made under article 17.

Article 19 - Authentic Texts And Certified Copies

The original of this Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French,

Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Director

General of the International Atomic Energy Agency who shall send certified copies to

States Parties and all other States.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized, have signed this

Convention, open for signature as provided for in paragraph I of article 14.

ADOPTED by the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency

meeting in special session at Vienna on the twenty-sixth day of September one thousand

nine hundred and eighty-six.

Table: Convention On Assistance In The Case Of A

Nuclear Accident Or Radiological Emergency

Signature, Ratification, Acceptance, Approval or Accession by States or

Organizations

Means and Date of

Country/ Date of Expression of Entry into

Organization Signature Consent to be Bound Force

Afghanistan 26 Sep 1986

Albania acceded 30 Apr 2003 31 May 2003

Algeria 24 Sep 1987 ratified 15 Jan 2004 15 Feb 2004

Argentina acceded 17 Jan 1990 17 Feb 1990

Armenia acceded 24 Aug 1993 24 Sep 1993

Australia 26 Sep 1986 ratified 22 Sep 1987 23 Oct 1987

Austria 26 Sep 1986 ratified 21 Nov 1989 22 Dec 1989

Bangladesh acceded 07 Jan 1988 07 Feb 1988

Belarus 26 Sep 1986 ratified 26 Jan 1987 26 Feb 1987

Belgium 26 Sep 1986 ratified 04 Jan 1999 04 Feb 1999

Bolivia acceded 22 Aug 2003 21 Sep 2003
Conv, on Assistance in the Case of A Nuc. Accident or Radiolog. Emerg. 1203

Means and Date of

Country/ Date of Expression of Entry into

Organization Signature Consent to be Bound Force

Bosnia and

Herzegovina

Brazil

Bulgaria

Cameroon

Canada

Chile

China

Colombia

Costa Rica

Cote d'lVOire

Croatia

Cuba

Cyprus

Czech Republic

Dem. P.R. of Korea

Dem. Rep. Of the

Congo

Denmark

Egypt

El Salvador

Estonia

Finland

France

Gabon

Germany

Greece

Guatemala

Holy See

Hungary

Ice land

India

Indonesia

Iran, Islamic

Republic of

Iraq

Ireland

Israel

Italy

Japan

Jordan

Kazakhstan

Korea, Rep. of

Kuwait

Latvia

Lebanon

Libyan Arab

Jamahiriya

Liechtenstein

Lithuania

26 Sep 1986

26 Sep 1986

25 Sep 1987

26 Sep 1986

26 Sep 1986

26 Sep 1986

26 Sep 1986

26 Sep 1986

26 Sep 1986

29 Sep 1986

30 Sep 1986

26 Sep 1986

26 Sep 1986

26 Sep 1986

26 Sep 1986

26 Sep 1986

26 Sep 1986

26 Sep 1986

26 Sep 1986

216 Sep 1986

26 Sep 1986

29 Sep 1986

26 Sep 1986

26 Sep 1986

12 Aug 1987

26 Sep 1986

26 Sep 1986

26 Sep 1986

06 Mar 1987

02 Oct 1986

succeeded

ratified

ratified

ratified

ratified

ratified

ratified

acceded

ratified

succeeded

ratified

acceded

succeeded

ratified

ratified

acceded

acceded

approved

approved

acceded

ratified

ratified

ratified

ratified

ratified

ratified

ratified

30 June 1998

04 Dec 1990

24 Feb 1988

17 Jan 2006

12 Aug 2002

22 Sep 2004

10 Sep 1987

23 Jun 2005

16 Sep 1991

29 Sep 1992

08 Jan 1991

04 Jan 1989

24 Mar 1993

26 Sep 2008

17 Oct 1988

28 Jul 2005

09 May 1994

27 Nov 1990

06 Mar 1989

19 Feb 2008

14 Sep 1989

06 Jun 1991

08 Aug 1988

10 Mar 1987

27 Jan 2006

28 Jan 1988

12 Nov 1993

09 Oct 2000

21 Jul 1988

13 Sep 1991

25 May 1989

25 Oct 1990

09 Jun 1987

11 Dec 1987

10 Mar 2010

08 Jun 1990

13 May 2003

28 Dec 1992

17 Apr 1997

27 Jun 1990

19 Apr 1994

21 Sep 2000

01 Mar 1992

04 Jan 199

26 Mar 1988

16 Feb 2006

12 Sep 2002

23 Oct 2004

I11 Oct 1987

23 Jul12005

17 Oct 1991

08 Oct 1991

08 Feb 1991

04 Feb 1989

01 Jan 1993

26 Oct 2008

17 Nov 1988

27 Aug 2005

09 Jun 1994

28 Dec 1990

06 Apr 1989

20 Mar 2008

15 Oct 1989

07 Jul 1991

08 Sep 1988

10 Apr 1987

26 Feb 2006

28 Feb 1988

13 Dec 1993

09 Nov 2000

21 Aug 1988

14 Oct 1991

25 Jun 1989

25 Nov 1990

10 Jul 1987

I1I Jan 1988

09 Apr 20 10

09 Jul 1990

13 Jun 2003

28 Jan 1993

18 May 1997

28 Jul 1990

20 May 1994

22 Oct 2000

ratified

ratified

ratified

ratified

ratified

accepted

ratified

acceded

acceded

acceded

acceded

26 Sep 1986 ratified

acceded

26 Sep 1986 ratified

acceded
1204 Cony, on Assistance in the Case of A Nuc. Accident or Radiolog. Ernerg

Means and Date of

Date of Expression of Entry into

Signature Consent to be Bound Force

Country!

Organization

Luxembourg

Malaysia

Mali

Mauritius

Mexico

Monaco

Mongolia

Montenegro

Morocco

Mozambique

Netherlands

New Zealand

Nicaragua

Niger

Nigeria

Norway

Oman

Pakistan

Panama

Paraguay

Peru

Philippines

Poland

Portugal

Qatar

Republic of

Moldova

Romania

Russian Federation

Saint Vincent & the

G renad ines

Saudi Arabia

Senegal

Serbia

Sierra Leone

Singapore

Slovakia

Slovenia

South Africa

Spain

Sri Lanka

Sudan

Sweden

Switzerland

Syrian Arab

Republic

Thai land

The Frmnr.Yug.Rep.

of Macedonia

Tunisia

Turkey

01 Sep 1987

02 Oct 1986

26 Sep 1986

26 Sep 1986

08 Jan 1987

26 Sep 1986

26 Sep 1986

26 Sep 1986

21 Jan 1987

26 Sep 1986

26 Sep 1986

02 Oct 1986

acceded

signature

ratified

acceded

ratified

approval

ratified

succeeded

ratified

acceded

accepted

acceded

acceded

ratified

signature

acceded

acceded

ratified

acceded

acceded

26 Sep 1986 ratified

26 Sep 1986 ratified

acceded

26 Sep 2000

01 Sep 1987

0 1 Oct 2007

17 Aug 1992

10 May 1988

19 Jul 1989

11 Jun 1987

21 Mar 2007

07 Oct 1993

30 Oct 2009

23 Sep 1991

11 Mar 1987

11 Nov 1993

10 Aug 1990

26 Sep 1986

09 Jul 2009

11 Sep 1989

01 Apr 1999

17 Jul 1995

05 May 1997

24 Mar 1988

23 Oct 2003

04 Nov 2005

07 May 1988

12 Jun 1990

23 Dec 1986

18 Sep 2001

03 Nov 1989

24 Dec 2008

05 Feb 2002

15 Dec 1997

10 Feb 1993

07 Jul 1992

10 Aug 1987

13 Sep 1989

11 Jan 1991

24 Jun 1992

31 May 1988

27 Oct 2000

02 Oct 1987

31 Oct 2007

17 Sep 1992

10 Jun 1988

19 Aug 1989

12 Jul 1987

03 Jun 2006

07 Nov 1993

29 Nov 2009

24 Oct 1991

11 Apr 1987

12 Dec 1993

10 Sep 1990

26 Feb 1987

08 Aug 2009

12 Oct 1989

02 May 1999

17 Aug 1995

05 Jun 1997

24 Apr 1988

23 Nov 2003

04 Dec 2005

07 Jun 1998

13 Jul 1990

26 Feb 1987

19 Oct 2001

04 Dec 1989

23 Jan 2009

27 Apr 1992

15 Jan 1998

0 1 Jan 1993

25 Jun 1991

10 Sep 1987

14 Oct 1989

11 Feb 1991

25 Jul 1992

01 Jul 1988

21 Apr 1989

17 Nov 1991

27 Mar 1989

03 Feb 1991

26 Sep 1986

15 Jun 1987

25 Mar 1987

10 Aug 1987

26 Sep 1986

26 Sep 1986

26 Sep 1986

26 Sep 1986

02 Jul 1987

25 Sep 1987

24 Feb 1987

26 Sep 1986

acceded

acceded

ratified

acceded

acceded

ratified

succeeded

acceded

succeeded

succeeded

ratified

ratified

acceded

ratified

ratified

ratified 21 Mar 1989

succeeded

ratified

ratified

20 Sep 1996

24 Feb 1989

03 Jan 1991
Cony. on Assistance in the Case of A Nuc. Accident or Radiolog. Emerg. 1205

Means and Date of

Country/ Date of Expression of Entry into

Organization Signature Consent to be Bound Force

Ukraine 26 Sep 1986 ratified 26 Jan 1987 26 Feb 1987

United Arab

Emirates

United Kingdom

United Republic of

Tanzania

United States of

America

Uruguay

Viet Nam

Zimbabwe

EURATOM

Food & Agriculture

Org (FAO)

World Health Org

Org (WHO)

World

Meteorological

Org (WMO)

acceded 02 Oct 1987 02 Nov 1987

26 Sep 1986 ratified 09 Feb 1990 12 Mar 1990

acceded 27 Jan 2005 26 Feb 2005

26 Sep 1986 ratified

acceded

acceded

26 Sep 1986

19 Sep 1988

21 Dec 1989

29 Sep 1987

20 Oct 1988

21 Jan 1990

30 Oct 1987

acceded 14 Nov 2006 14 Dec 2006

acceded 19 Oct 1990 19 Nov 1990

acceded 10 Aug 1988 10 Sep 1988

acceded 17 Apr 1990 18 May 1990

Note: The Convention entered into force on 26 February 1987, i.e. thirty days after the

date on which the third State expressed its consent to be bound, pursuant to Article 14,

paragraph 3.

Number of Parties:

Number of Signatories:

105

68

10 March 2010
1206 Add'! Protocol I to the Treaty for the Prohib. of Nuc. Weapons in Lat. Amer.

G. ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL I TO THE TREATY FOR THE

PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN LATIN AMERICA

Done at Mexico February 14, 1967;

Transmitted by the President of the United States of America to the Senate May 24,

1978 (S. Ex. I, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.);

Reported favorably by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations October 19, 1981 (S.

Ex. Rep. No. 97-23, 97th Cong., I st Sess.);

Advice and consent to ratification by the Senate, with understandings, November 13,

1981;

Ratified by the President, with said understandings, November 19, 198 1;

Ratification of the United States of America deposited with Mexico November 23, 1981;

Proclaimed by the President December 14, 1981;

Entered into force with respect to the United States of America November 23, 1981.

By the President of the United States of America

A Proclamation

Considering that:

Additional Protocol I to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin

America was signed on behalf of the United States of America at Mexico City on May

26, 1977, a certified copy of which is hereto annexed;'

The Senate of the United States of America by its resolution of November 13, 1981,

two-thirds of the Senators present concurring therein, gave its advice and consent to

ratification of Additional Protocol 1, subject to the following understandings:

I) That the provisions of the Treaty made applicable by this Additional Protocol do

not affect the exclusive power and legal competence under international law of a State

adhering to this Protocol to grant or deny transit and transport privileges to its own or

any other vessels or aircraft irrespective of cargo or armaments.

2) That the provisions of the Treaty made applicable by this Additional Protocol do

not affect rights tinder the international law of a State adhering to this Protocol regarding

the exercise of the freedom of the seas, or regarding passage through or over waters

subject to the sovereignty of a State.

3) That the understandings and declarations attached by the United States to its

ratification of Additional Protocol II (text attached) apply also to its ratification of

Additional Protocol 1.

The President of the United States of America on November 19, 1981, ratified

Additional Protocol 1, subject to the said understandings, in pursuance of the advice and

consent of the Senate, and the United States of America deposited its instrument of

ratification with the Government of the United Mexican States on November 23, 1981;

Pursuant to the provisions of Additional Protocol 1, Additional Protocol I, subject to

the said understandings, entered into force for the United States of America on

November 23, 198 1;

Now, Therefore, 1, Ronald Reagan, President of the United States of America, proclaim

and make public Additional Protocol 1, subject to the said understandings, to the end that

it shall be observed and fulfilled with good faith by the United States of America and by

the citizens of the United States of America and all other persons subject to the

jurisdiction thereof.

In testimony whereof, I have signed this proclamation and caused the seal of the

United States of America to be affixed.

'Texts of the English, French, Portuguese, and Spanish languages as certified by the Department of Foreign

Relations of Mexico.
Add'l Protocol I to the Treaty for the Prohib. of Nuc. Weapons in Lat. Amer. 1207

(seal)

Done at the city of Washington this fourteenth day of December in the year of our Lord

one thousand nine hundred eighty-one and of the Independence of the United States

of America the two hundred sixth.

Ronald Reagan

By the President:

Alexander M. Haig, Jr.

Secretary of State

Understandings And Declarations Attached By The United States To Its

Ratification Of Additional Protocol II

1.2 That the United States Government understands the reference in Article 3 of the

treaty to "its own legislation" to relate only to such legislation as is compatible with the

rules of international law and as involves an exercise of sovereignty consistent with

those rules, and accordingly that ratification of Additional Protocol 11 by the United

States Government could not be regarded as implying recognition, for the purpose of

this treaty and its protocols, or for any other purpose, of any legislation which did not, in

the view of the United States, comply with the relevant rules of international law.

That the United States Government takes note of the Preparatory Commission's

interpretation of the treaty, as set forth in the Final Act, that, governed by the principles

and rules of international law, each of the contracting parties retains exclusive power

and legal competence, unaffected by the terms of the treaty, to grant or deny noncontracting parties transit and transport privileges.

That as regards the undertaking in Article 3 of Protocol 11 not to use or threaten to

use nuclear weapons against the Contracting Parties, the United States Government

would have to consider that an armed attack by a Contracting Party, in which it was

assisted by a nuclear-weapon state, would be incompatible with the Contracting Party's

corresponding obligations under Article 1 of the treaty.

II. That the United States Government considers that the technology of making

nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes is indistinguishable from the technology

of making nuclear weapons, and that nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices for

peaceful purposes are both capable of releasing nuclear energy in an uncontrolled

manner and have the common group of characteristics of large amounts of energy

generated instantaneously from a compact source. Therefore the United States

Government understands the definition contained in Article 5 of the treaty as necessarily

encompassing all nuclear explosive devices. It also understood that Articles I and 5

restrict accordingly the activities of the contracting parties under paragraph I of Article

18.

That the United States Government understands that paragraph 4 of Article 18 of the

treaty permits, and that United States adherence to Protocol 11 will not prevent, collaboration by the United States with contracting parties for the purpose of carrying

out explosions of nuclear devices for peaceful purposes in a manner consistent with a

policy of not contributing to the proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities. In this

connection, the United States Government notes Article V of the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons, under which it joined in an undertaking to take

appropriate measures to ensure that potential benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear

explosions would be made available to non-nuclear-weapons states party to that treaty, and reaffirms its willingness to extend such undertaking, on the same basis, to states

precluded by the present treaty from manufacturing or acquiring any nuclear explosive

device.

2 May 8, 1971, TIAS 7137; 22 USED 760.
1208 Add'l Protocol I to the Treaty for the Prohib. of Nuc. Weapons in Lat. Amer.

III. That the United States Government also declares that, although not required by

Protocol II, it will act with respect to such territories of Protocol I adherents as are

within the geographical area defined in paragraph 2 of Article 4 of the treaty in the same manner as Protocol 1I requires it to act with respect to the territories of contracting

parties.

Additional Protocol I

The undersigned Plenipotentiaries, furnished with full powers by their respective

Governments,

Convinced that the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America,3

negotiated and signed in accordance with the recommendations of the General Assembly

of the United Nations in Resolution 1911 (XVIII) of 27 November 1963, represents an

important step towards ensuring the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons,

Aware that the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is not an end in itself but, rather, a means of achieving general and complete disarmament at a later stage, and

Desiring to contribute, so far as lies in their power, towards ending the armaments

race, especially in the field of nuclear weapons, and towards strengthening a world at

peace, based on mutual respect and sovereign equality of States,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I. To undertake to apply the status of denuclearization in respect of

warlike purposes as defined in articles 1, 3, 5 and 13 of the Treaty for the Prohibition of

Nuclear Weapons in Latin America in territories for which, dejure or defacto, they are internationally responsible and which lie within the limits of the geographical zone

established in that Treaty.

ARTICLE 2. The duration of this protocol shall be the same as that of the Treaty for

the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America of which this Protocol is an annex,

and the provisions regarding ratification and denunciation contained in the Treaty shall

be applicable to it.

ARTICLE 3. This Protocol shall enter into force, for the States which have ratified

it, on the date of the deposit of their respective instruments of ratification.

In witness whereof the undersigned Plenipotentiaries, having deposited their full

powers, found in good and due form, sign this Protocol on behalf of their respective

Governments.

FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND:

N.J.A. Cheetham

FOR THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS:

S. Van Heemstra

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

Jimmy Carter

NUCLEAR FREE ZONE-LATIN AMERICA 4

'Done February 14, 1967. TAIS 7137; 22 USED 762. 4

The United States is not a party to the treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America (the Treaty of Tiatelolco). For the English text of the treaty, see 22 USC 762 and TIAS 7137: for the text in other

languages, see 634 UNTS 281.
Add'l Protocol I to the Treaty for the Prohib. of Nuc. Weapons in Lat. Amer. 1209

NOTE:

Additional protocol 1 to the treaty of February 14, 1967 for the prohibition of nuclear

weapons in Latin America. Done at Mexico February 14, 1967; entered into force

December II, 1969; for the United States November 23, 1981. 33 USED 1792; TAIS

10147; 634 UNTS 362. States which are parties: Netherlands,5 United Kingdom, 6

United States7

Additional protocol ii to the treaty of February 14, 1967 for the prohibition of nuclear

weapons in Latin America. Done at Mexico February 14, 1967; entered into force

December 11, 1969; for the United States May 12, 1971. 22 USED 754; TAIS 7137; 634

UNTS 364. States which are parties: China, 8 France, 9 Union of Soviet Socialist Reps.,' 0

United Kingdom'' 2, United States.'3

'With statement(s).

'Applicable to Anguilla, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Falkland Islands, Montserrat, and Turks and

Caicos Islands. 7

With understanding and declarations. KWith statement(s).

'With statement(s).

"'With statement(s).

''With declaration.

1

2

Applicable to Anguilla, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Falkland Islands, Montserrat, Turks and

Caicos Islands.

13With understanding and declarations.
1210 Add'l Protocol I1 to the Treaty for the Prohib. of Nuc. Weapons in Lat. Amer.

H. ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL II TO THE TREATY FOR THE

PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN LATIN AMERICA

Signed by the United States at Mexico April 1, 1968

Underlying Treaty signed by others at Mexico February 14, 1967

U.S. ratification with understandings and declarations deposited May 12, 1971

Entered into force for the United States May 12, 19711

By The President Of The United States Of America

A Proclamation

Considering that:

Additional Protocol 11 to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin

America, done at the City of Mexico on February 14, 1967, was signed on behalf of the

United States of America on April 1, 1968, the text of which Protocol is word for word

as follows:

Additional Protocol 1I

The undersigned Plenipotentiaries, furnished with full powers by their respective

Governments,

Convinced that the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America,

negotiated and signed in accordance with the recommendations of the General Assembly

of the United Nations in Resolution 1911 (XVIII) of 27 Noveniber 1963, represents an

important step towards ensuring the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Aware that the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is not an end in itself but, rather,

a means of achieving general and complete disarmament at a later stage, and

Desiring to contribute, so far as lies in their power, towards ending the armaments

race, especially in the field of nuclear weapons, and towards promoting and

strengthening a world at peace, based on mutual respect and sovereign equality of States.

Have agreed as follows:

Article I. The statute of denuclearization of Latin America in respect of warlike

purposes, as defined, delineated and set forth in the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear

Weapons in Latin American of which this instrument is an annex, shall be fully respected by the Parties to this Protocol in all its express aims and provisions.

Article 2. The Governments represented by the undersigned Plenipotentiaries undertake, therefore, not to contribute in any way to the performance of acts involving a

violation of the obligations of article I of the Treaty in the territories to which the Treaty

applies in accordance with article 4 thereof.

Article 3. The Governments represented by the undersigned Plenipotentiaries also

undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the Contracting Parties

of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America.

Article 4. The duration of this Protocol shall be the same as that of the Treaty for the

Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin American of which this protocol is an annex,

and the definitions of territory and nuclear weapons set forth in articles 3 and 5 of the

Treaty shall be applicable to this Protocol, as well as the provisions regarding

ratification, reservations, denunciation, authentic texts and registration contained in

articles 26, 27, 30 and 31 of the Treaty.

Article 5. The Protocol shall enter into force, for the States which have ratified it, on

the date of the deposit of their respective instruments of ratification.

In witness whereof the undersigned, Plenipotentiaries, having deposited their full

powers, found in good and due form, sign this Additional Protocol on behalf of their

respective Governments.

'The United Kingdom, France, and the People's Republic of China are also parties to Protocol II.
Add'l Protocol 11 to the Treaty for the Prohib. of Nuc. Weapons in Lat. Amer. 1211

The Senate of the United States of America by its resolution of April 19, 1971, twothirds of the Senators present concurring, gave it advice and consent to the ratification of

Additional Protocol I1, with the following understandings and declarations:

I

That the United States Government understands the reference in Article 3 of the

treaty to "its own legislation" to relate only to such legislation as is compatible with the

rules of international law and as involves an exercise of sovereignty consistent with

those rules, and accordingly that ratification of Additional Protocol 11 by the United

States Government could not be regarded as implying recognition, for the purposes of

this treaty and its protocols or for any other purpose, of any legislation which did not, in

the view of the United States, comply with the relevant rules of international law.

That the United States Government takes note of the Preparatory Commission's

interpretation of the treaty, as set forth in the Final Act, that, governed by the principles

and rules of international law, each of the Contracting Parties retains exclusive power

and legal competence, unaffected by the terms of the treaty, to grant or deny nonContracting Parties transit and transport privileges.

That as regards the undertaking in Article 3 of Protocol !1 not to use or threaten to

use nuclear weapons against the Contracting parties, the United States Government

would have to consider that an armed attack by a Contracting Party, in which it was

assisted by a nuclear-weapon state, would be incompatible with the Contracting Party's

corresponding obligations under Article I of the Treaty.

II

That the United States Government considers that the technology of making nuclear

explosive devices for peaceful purposes is indistinguishable from the technology of

making nuclear weapons, and that nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices for

peaceful purposes are both capable of releasing nuclear energy in an uncontrolled

manner and have the common group of characteristics of large amounts of energy

generated instantaneously from a compact source. Therefore, the United States

Government understands the definition contained in Article 5 of treaty as necessarily

encompassing all nuclear explosive devices. It is also understood that Articles I and 5

restrict accordingly the activities of the Contracting Parties under paragraph I of Article

18.

That the United States Government understands that paragraph 4 of Article 18 of the

treaty permits, and the United States adherence to Protocol ii will not prevent,

collaboration by the United States with Contracting Parties for the purpose of carrying

out explosions of nuclear devices for peaceful purposes in a manner consistent with a

policy of not contributing to the proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities. In this

connection, the United States Government notes Article V of the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons, under which it joined in an undertaking to take

appropriate measures to ensure that potential benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear

explosions would be made available to non-nuclear-weapon states party to that treaty,

and reaffirms its willingness to extend such undertaking, on the same basis, to states

precluded by the present treaty from manufacturing or acquiring any nuclear explosive

device.

III

That the United States Government also declares that, although not required by

Protocol I1, it will act with respect to such territories of Protocol I adherents as are

within the geographical area defined in paragraph 2 of Article 4 of the treaty in the same

manner as Protocol It requires it to act with respect to the territories of Contracting

Parties.

The President ratified Additional Protocol 11 on May 8, 1971, with the above-recited

understandings and declarations, in pursuance of the advice and consent of the Senate.
1212 Add'I Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohib. of Nuc. Weapons in Lat. Amer.

It is provided in Article 5 of Additional Protocol 11 that the Protocol shall enter into

force, for the States which have ratified it, on the date of the deposit of their respective

instruments of ratification.

The instrument of ratification of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern

Ireland was deposited on December 1H, 1969 with understandings and a declaration, and

the instrument of ratification of the United States of America was deposited on May 12,

1971 with the above-recited understandings and declarations.

In accordance with Article 5 of Additional Protocol It, the Protocol entered into

force for the United States of America on May 12, 1971, subject to the above recited

understandings and declarations.

Now, therefore, 1, Richard Nixon, President of the United States of America,

proclaim and make public Additional Protocol il to the Treaty for the Prohibition of

Nuclear Weapons in Latin America to the end that it shall be observed and fulfilled with

good faith, subject to the above-recited understandings and declarations, on and after

May 12, 1971 by the United States of America and by the citizens of the United States

of America and all other persons subject to the jurisdictions thereof.

In testimony whereof I have signed this proclamation and caused the Seal of the

United States of America to be affixed.

Done at the city of Washington this eleventh day of June in the year of our Lord one

thousand nine hundred seventy-one and of the Independence of the United States of,

America the one-hundred ninety-fifth.

(Seal)
Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America 1213

I. TREATY FOR THE PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN

LATIN AMERICA

Preamble

In the name of their peoples and faithfully interpreting their desires and aspirations, the Governments of the States which sign the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear

Weapons in Latin America.

Desiring to contribute, so far as lies in their power, towards ending the armaments

race, especially in the field of nuclear weapons, and towards strengthening a world at

peace, based on the sovereign equality of States, mutual respect and good neighbourliness,

Recalling that the United Nations General Assembly, in its Resolution 808 (XI),

adopted unanimously as one of the three points of a coordinated programme of

disarmament "the total prohibition of the use and manufacture of nuclear weapons and

weapons of mass destruction of every type",

Recalling that militarily denuclearized zones are not an end in themselves but rather

a means of achieving general and complete disarmament at a later stage,

Recalling United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1911 (XVIII), which

established that the measures that should be agreed upon for the denuclearization of

Latin America should be taken "in the light of the principles of the Charter of the United

Nations and of regional agreements",

Recalling United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2028 (XX), which

established the principle of an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and duties

for the nuclear non-nuclear powers, and

Recalling that the Charter of the Organization of American States proclaims that it is

an essential purpose of the Organization to strengthen the peace and security of the

hemisphere,

Convinced:

That the incalculable destructive power of nuclear weapons has made it imperative

that the legal prohibition of war should be strictly observed in practice if the survival of

civilization and of mankind itself is to be assured,

That nuclear weapons, whose terrible effects are suffered, indiscriminately and

inexorably, by military forces and civilian population alike, constitute, through the

persistence of the radioactivity they release, and attack on the integrity of the human

species and ultimately may even render the whole earth uninhabitable.

That the general and complete disarmament under effective international control is a

vital matter which all the peoples of the world equally demand,

That the proliferation of nuclear weapons, which seems inevitable unless States, in

the exercise of their sovereign rights, impose restrictions on themselves in order to

prevent it, would make an agreement of disarmament enormously difficult and would

increase the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear conflagration,

That the establishment of militarily denuclearized zones is closely linked with the

maintenance of peace and security in the respective regions,

That the military denuclearization of vast geographical zones, adopted by the

sovereign decision of the States comprised therein, will exercise a beneficial influence

on other regions where similar conditions exist,

That the privileged situation of the signatory States, whose territories are wholly free

from nuclear weapons, imposes upon them the inescapable duty of preserving that

situation both in their own interests and for the good of mankind,

That the existence of nuclear weapons in any country of Latin America would make

it a target for possible nuclear attacks and would inevitable set off, throughout the

region, a ruinous race in nuclear weapons which would involve the unjustifiable diversion, for warlike purposes, of the limited resources required for economic and

social development,
1214 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America

That the foregoing reasons, together with the traditional peace-loving outlook of

Latin America, give rise to an inescapable necessity that nuclear energy should be used

in that region exclusively for peaceful purposes, and that the Latin American countries

should use their right to the greatest and most equitable access to this new source of

energy in order to expedite the economic and social development of their peoples.

Convinced finally:

That the military denuclearization of Latin America-being understood to mean the

undertaking entered into internationally in this Treaty to keep their territories forever

free from nuclear weapons-will constitute a measure which will spare their peoples from

the squandering of their limited resources on nuclear armaments and will protect them

against possible nuclear attacks on their territories, and will also constitute a significant

contribution towards preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and a powerful

factor of general and complete disarmaments, and

That Latin America, faithful to its tradition of universality, must not only endeavor to

banish from its homelands the scourge of a nuclear war, but must also strive to promote

the well-being and advancement of its peoples, at the same time co-operating in the

fulfillment of the ideals of mankind, that is to say, in the consolidation of a permanent

peace based on equal rights, economic fairness and social justice for all, in accordance

with the principles and purposes set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and in the

Charter of the Organization of American States,

Hcn,e agreed asoillows:

Article 1 - Obligations

I. The Contracting Parties hereby undertake to use exclusively for peaceful purposes

the nuclear material and facilities which are under this jurisdiction, and to prohibit and

prevent in their respective territories:

(a) The testing, use, manufacture, production or acquisition by any means

whatsoever of any nuclear weapons, by the Parties themselves, directly or indirectly,

on behalf of anyone else or in any other way, and

(b) The receipt, storage, installation, deployment and any form of possession of

any nuclear weapons, directly or indirectly, by the Parties themselves, by anyone on

their behalf or in any other way.

2. The Contracting Parties also undertake to refrain from engaging in, encouraging or

authorizing, directly or indirectly, or in any way participating in the testing, use,

manufacture, production, possession or control of any nuclear weapon.

Article 2- Definition Of The Contracting Parties

For the purposes of this Treaty, the Contracting Parties are those for whom the

Treaty is in force.

Article 3- Definition Of Territory For the purposes of this Treaty, the term "territory" shall include the territorial sea,

air space and any other space over which the State exercises sovereignty in accordance

with its own legislation.

Article 4 - Zone Of Application I. The zone of application of this Treaty is the whole of the territories for which the

Treaty is in force.

2. Upon fulfillment of the requirements of Article 28, paragraph 1, the zone of

application of the Treaty shall also be that which is situated in the western hemisphere with the following limits (except the continental part of the territory of the United States

of America and its territorial waters): starting at a point located 35 north latitude, 75

west longitude; from this point directly southward to a point at 30 north latitude, 75 west

longitude; from there, directly eastward to a point at 30 north latitude, 50 west longitude;

from there along a loxodromic line to a point at 5 north latitude, 20 west longitude; from
Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America 1215

there directly southward to a point at 60 south latitude, 20 west longitude; from there

directly westward to a point at 60 south latitude, 115 west longitude; from there directly

northward to a point at 0 latitude, 115 west longitude; from there, along a loxodromic

line to a point at 35 north latitude, 150 west longitude; from there, directly eastward to a

point at 35 north latitude, 75 west longitude.

Article 5 - Definition Of Nuclear Weapons

For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear weapon is any device which is capable of

releasing nuclear energy in an uncontrolled manner and which has a group of

characteristics that are appropriate for use for warlike purposes. An instrument that may

be used for the transport or propulsion of the device is not included in this definition if it

is separable from the device and not an indivisible part thereof.

Article 6 - Meeting Of Signatories

At the request of any of the signatory States or if the Agency established by article 7

should so decide, a meeting of all the signatories may be convoked to consider in

common questions which may affect the very essence of this instrument, including

possible amendments to it. In either case, the meeting will be convoked by the General

Secretary.

Article 7 - Organization

1. In order to ensure compliance with the obligations of this Treaty, the Contracting

Parties hereby establish an international organization to be known as the "Agency for the

Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean"' hereinafter

referred to as "the Agency." Only the Contracting Parties shall be affected by its

decisions.

2. The Agency shall be responsible for the holding of periodic or extraordinary

consultations among Member States on matters relating to the purposes, measures and

procedures set forth in this Treaty and to the supervision of compliance with the

obligations arising therefrom.

3. The Contracting Parties agree to extend to the Agency full and prompt cooperation

in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, of any agreements they may conclude

with the Agency and of any agreements the Agency may conclude with any other

international organization or body.

4. The headquarters of the Agency shall be in Mexico City.

Article 8 - Organs

1. There are hereby established as principal organs of the Agency a General

Conference, a Council and a Secretariat.

2. Such subsidiary organs as are considered necessary by the General Conference

may be established within the purview of this Treaty.

Article 9 - The General Conference

I. The General Conference; the supreme organ of the Agency, shall be composed of

all the Contracting Parties; it shall hold regular sessions every two years and may also

hold special sessions whenever this Treaty so provides or, in the opinion of the Council,

the circumstances so require.

2. The General Conference:

(a) May consider and decide on any matters or questions covered by this Treaty,

within the limits thereof, including those referring to powers and functions of any

organ provided for in this Treaty.

'Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL), Gen. Conf. Res. 267 (E-V),

OPANAL Doc. CG/EIRes. 267 (E-V) (July 3, 1990), amended treaty to include "and the Caribbean."
1216 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America

(b) Shall establish procedures for the control system to ensure observance of this

Treaty in accordance with its provisions.

(c) Shall elect the Members of the Council and the General Secretary.

(d) May remove the General Secretary from office if the proper functioning of

the Agency so requires.

(e) Shall receive and consider the biennial and special reports submitted by the

Council and the General Secretary.

(f) Shall initiate and consider studies designed to facilitate the optimum

fulfillment of the aims of this Treaty, without prejudice to the power of the General

Secretary independently to carry out similar studies for submission to and

consideration by the Conference.

(g) Shall be the organ competent to authorize the conclusion of agreements with

Governments and other international organizations and bodies.

3. The General Conference shall adopt the Agency's budget and fix the scale of

financial contributions to be paid by Member States, taking into account the systems and

criteria used for the same purpose by the United Nations.

4. The General Conference shall elect its officers for each session and may establish

such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions.

5. Each Member of the Agency shall have one vote. The decisions of the General

Conference shall be taken by a two-thirds majority of the Members present and voting in

the case of matters relating to the control system and measures referred to in article 20,

the admission of new Members, the election or removal of the General Secretary,

adoption of the budget and matters related thereto. Decisions on other matters, as well as

procedural questions and also determination of which questions must be decided by a

two-thirds majority, shall be taken by a simple majority of the Members present and

voting.

6. The General Conference shall adopt its own rules of procedure.

Article 10 - The Council

I. The Council shall be composed of five Members of the Agency elected by the

General Conference from among the Contracting Parties, due account being taken

equitable geographic distribution.

2. The Members of the Council shall be elected for a term of four years. However, in

the first election three will be elected for two years. Outgoing Members may not be reelected for the following period unless the limited number of States for which the Treaty

is in force so requires.

3. Each Member of the Council shall have one representative.

4. The Council shall be so organized as to be able to function continuously.

5. In addition to the functions conferred upon it by this Treaty and to those which

may be assigned to it by the General Conference, the Council shall, through the General

Secretary, ensure the proper operation of the control system in accordance with the

provisions of this Treaty and with the decisions adopted by the General Conference.

6. The Council shall submit an annual report on its work to the General Conference

as well as such special reports as it deems necessary or which the General Conference

requests of it.

7. The Council shall elect its officers for each session.

8. The decisions of the Council shall be taken by a simple majority of its Members

present and voting.

9. The Council shall adopt its own rules of procedure.

Article 1I - The Secretariat

I. The Secretariat shall consist of a General Secretary, who shall be the chief

administrative officer of the Agency, and of such staff as the Agency may require. The

term of office of the General Secretary shall be four years and he may be re-elected for a

single additional term. The General Secretary may not be a national of the country in
Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America 1217

which the Agency has its headquarters. In case the office of General Secretary becomes

vacant, a new election shall be held to fill the office for the remainder of the term.

2. The staff of the Secretariat shall be appointed by the General Secretary, in

accordance with rules laid down by the General Conference.

3. In addition to the functions conferred upon him by this Treaty and to those which

may be assigned to him by the General Conference-the General Secretary shall ensure,

as provided by article 10, paragraph 5, the proper operation of the control system

established by this Treaty, in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty and the

decisions taken by the General Conference.

4. The General Secretary shall act in that capacity in all meetings of the General

Conference and of the Council and shall make an annual report to both bodies on the

work of the Agency and any special reports requested by the General Conference or the

Council or which the General Secretary may deem desirable.

5. The General Secretary shall establish the procedures for distributing to all

Contracting Parties information received by the Agency from governmental sources and

such information from non-governmental sources as may be of interest to the Agency.

6. In the performance of their duties the General Secretary and the staff shall not

seek or receive instructions from any Government or from any other authority external

to the Agency and shall refrain from any action which might reflect on their position as

international officials responsible only to the Agency; subject to their responsibility to

the Agency, they shall not disclose any industrial secrets or other confidential

information coming to their knowledge by reason of their official duties in the Agency.

7. Each of the Contracting Parties undertakes to respect the exclusively international

character of the responsibilities of the General Secretary and the staff and not to seek to

influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities.

Article 12 - Control System

I. For the purpose of verifying compliance with the obligations entered into by the

Contracting Parties in accordance with article 1, a control system shall be established

which shall be put into effect in accordance with the provisions of articles 13-18 of this

Treaty.

2. The control system shall be used in particular for the purpose of verifying:

(a) That devices, services and facilities intended for peaceful uses of nuclear

energy are not used in the testing or manufacture of nuclear weapons.

(b) That none of the activities prohibited in article I of this Treaty are carried out

in the territory of the Contracting Parties with nuclear materials or weapons

introduced from abroad, and

(c) That explosions for peaceful purposes are compatible with article 18 of this

Treaty.

Article 13 - IAEA Safeguards

Each Contracting Party shall negotiate multilateral or bilateral agreements with the

International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of its safeguards to its nuclear

activities. Each Contracting Party shall initiate negotiations within a period of 180 days

after the date of the deposit of its instrument of ratification of this Treaty. These

agreements shall enter into force, for each Party, not later than eighteen months after the

date of the initiation of such negotiations except in case of unforeseen circumstances or

force majeure.

Article 14 - Reports Of The Parties

1. The Contracting Parties shall submit to the Agency and to the International

Atomic Energy Agency, for their information, semi-annual reports stating that no

activity prohibited under this Treaty has occurred in their respective territories.
1218 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America

2. The Contracting Parties to the Treaty shall simultaneously transmit to the Agency

a copy of the reports submitted to the International Atomic Energy Agency which relate

to matters subject of this Treaty that are relevant to the work of the Agency.

3. The information furnished by the Contracting Parties shall not be, totally or

partially, disclosed or transmitted to third parties, by the addresses of the reports, except when the Contracting Parties give their express consent. 2

Article 15- Special Reports Requested By The General Secretary

I. At the request of any of the Contracting Parties and with the authorization of the

Council, the General Secretary may request any of the Contracting Parties to provide the

Agency with complementary or supplementary information regarding any extraordinary

event or circumstance which affects the compliance with this Treaty, explaining his

reasons. The Contracting Parties undertake to co-operate promptly and fully with the

General Secretary.

2. The General Secretary shall inform the Council and the Contracting Parties

forthwith of such requests and of the respective replies.3

Article 16 - Special Inspections 1. The International Atomic Energy Agency has the power of carrying out special

inspections in accordance with Article 12 and with the agreements referred to in Article

13 of this Treaty.

2. At the request of any of the Contracting Parties and in accordance with the

procedures established in Article 15 of this Treaty, the Council may submit for the

consideration of the International Atomic Energy Agency a request that the necessary

mechanisms be put into operation to carry out a special inspection.

3, The General Secretary shall request the Director General of the International

Atomic Energy Agency to transmit to him in a timely manner the information forwarded

to the Board of Governors of the IAEA relating to the conclusion of the special inspection. The General Secretary shall make this information available to the Council

promptly.

4. The Council, through the General Secretary, shall transmit this information to all

the Contracting Parties.

Article 17 - Use Of Nuclear Energy For Peaceful Purposes Nothing in the provisions of this Treaty shall prejudice the rights of the Contracting

Parties, in conformity with this Treaty, to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, in

particular for their economic development and social progress.

Article 18 - Explosions For Peaceful Purposes 1. Contracting Parties may carry out explosions of nuclear devices for peaceful purposes-including explosions which involve devices similar to those used in nuclear

weapons-or collaborate with third parties for the same purpose, provide that they do so

in accordance with the provisions of this article and the other articles of the Treaty,

particularly Articles I and 5.

2. Contracting Parties intending to carry out, or to cooperate in carrying out, such an

explosion shall notify the Agency and the International Atomic Energy Agency, as far in

advance as the circumstances require, of the date of the explosion and shall at the same

time provide the following information:

(a) The nature of the nuclear device and the source from which it was obtained.

(b) The place and purpose of the planned explosion,

(c) The procedures which will be followed in order to comply with paragraph 3

of this article.

2

Paragraphs 2 and 3 were amended by OPANAL, Gen. Conf Res. 290 (VII), OPANAL Doc. CG/E/Res. 290

&August 26, 1992). Section amended by OPANAL, Gen. Conf. Res. 290 (VII), OPANAL Doc. CG/E/Res. 290 (August 26, 1992).
Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America 1219

(d) The expected force of the device, and

(e) The fullest possible information on any possible radioactive fall-out that may

result from the explosion or explosions, and measures which will be taken to avoid

danger to the population, flora, fauna and territories of any other Party or Parties.

3. The General Secretary and the technical personnel designated by the Council and

the International Atomic Energy Agency may observe all the preparations, including the

explosion of the device, and shall have unrestricted access to any area in the vicinity .of

the site of the explosion in order to ascertain whether the device and the procedures

followed during the explosion are in conformity with the information supplied under

paragraph 2 of this article and the other provisions of this Treaty.

4. The Contracting Parties may accept the collaboration of third parties for the

purpose set forth in paragraph I of the present article, in accordance with paragraphs 2

and 3 thereof.

Article 19 - Relations With International Atomic Energy Agency 1. The Agency may conclude such agreements with the International Atomic Energy

Agency, as are authorized by the General Conference and as it considers likely to

facilitate the efficient operation of the Control System established by this Treaty.4

Article 20 - Relations With Other International Agencies

1. The Agency may also enter into relations with any international organization or

body, especially any which may be established in the future to supervise disarmament or

measures for the control of armaments in any part of the world.

2. The Contracting Parties may, if they see fit, request the advice of the InterAmerican Nuclear Energy Commission on all technical matters connected with the

application of this Treaty with which the Commission is competent to deal under its

Statute.5

Article 21 - Measures In The Event Of Violation Of The Treaty

1. The General Conference shall take note of all cases in which, in its opinion, any

Contracting Party is not complying fully with its obligations under this Treaty and shall

draw the matter to the attention to the Party concerned, making such recommendations

as it deems appropriate.

2. If, in its opinion, such non-compliance constitutes a violation of this Treaty which

might endanger peace and security, the General Conference shall report thereon

simultaneously to the United Nations Security Council and the General Assembly

through the Secretary-General of the United Nations and to the Council of the

Organization of American States. The General Conference shall likewise report to the

International Atomic Energy Agency for such purposes as are relevant in accordance

with its Statute.

Article 22 - United Nations And Organizations Of American States

None of the provisions of this Treaty shall be construed as impairing the rights and

obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or, in the case of States

Members of the Organization of American States, under existing regional treaties.

Article 23 - Privileges And Immunities

I. The Agency shall enjoy in the territory of each of the Contracting Parties such

legal capacity and such privileges and immunities as may be necessary for the exercise

of its functions and the fulfillment of its purposes.

4

Article inserted by OPANAL, Gen. Conf. Res. 290 (Vii), OPANAL Doc. CG/E/Res. 290 (August 26, 1992). 5

Article renumbered and amended by OPANAL, Gen. Conf. Res. 290 (VII), OPANAL Doc. CG/E/Res. 290

(August 26, 1992).
1220 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America

2. Representatives of the Contracting Parties accredited to the Agency and officials

of the Agency shall similarly enjoy such privileges and immunities as are necessary for

the performance of their functions.

3. The Agency may conclude agreements with the Contracting Parties with a view to

determining the details of the application of paragraphs I and 2 of this article.

Article 24 - Notification Of Other Agreements

Once this Treaty has entered into force, the Secretariat shall be notified immediately

of any international agreement concluded by any of the Contracting Parties on matters

with which this Treaty is concerned; the Secretariat shall register it and notify the other

Contracting Parties.

Article 25 - Settlement Of Disputes

Unless the Parties concerned agree on another mode of peaceful settlement, any

question or dispute concerning the interpretation or application of this Treaty which is

not settled shall be referred to the International Court of Justice with the prior consent of

the Parties to the controversy.

Article 26 - Signature

1. This Treaty shall be open indefinitely for signature by:

(a) All the Latin American Republics, and

(b) All other sovereign States situated in their entirety south of latitude 35x north

in the western hemisphere; and, except as provided in paragraph 2 of this article, all

such States which become sovereign, when they have admitted by the General

Conference.

2. The condition of State Party to the Treaty of Tlatelolco shall be restricted to

Independent States which are situated within the Zone of application of the Treaty in

accordance with Article 4 of same, and with paragraph I of the present Article, and

which were Members of the United Nations as of December 10, 1985 as well as to the

non-autonomous territories mentioned in document OEA/CER.P, AG/doc. 1939/85 of

November 5, 1985, once they attain their independence.6

Article 27 - Ratification And Deposit

I. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States in accordance with

their respective constitutional procedures.

2. This Treaty and the instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the

Government of the Mexican United States, which is hereby designated the Depositary

Government.

3. The Depositary Government shall send certified copies of this Treaty to the

Governments of signatory States and shall notify them of the deposit of each instrument

of ratification.

Article 28 - Reservations

This Treaty shall not be subject to reservations.

.Article 29 - Entry Into Force

1. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 2 of this article, this Treaty shall enter into

force among the States that have ratified it as soon as the following requirements have

been met:

(a) Deposit of the instruments of ratification of this Treaty with the Depositary

Government by the Governments of the States mentioned in article 25 which are in

"Paragraph 2 was amended by OPANAL, Gen. Conf. Res. 268 (Xll), OPANAL Doc. CG/Res. 268

(May 9, 1991).
Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America 1221

existence on the date when this Treaty is opened for signature and which are not

affected by the provisions of article 25, paragraph 2;

(b) Signature and ratification of Additional Protocol 1 annexed to this Treaty by

all extra-continental or continental States have de jure or de facto international

responsibility for territories situated in the zone of application of the Treaty;

(c) Signature and ratification of the Additional Protocol II annexed to this Treaty

by all powers possessing nuclear weapons;

(d) Conclusion of bilateral or multilateral agreements on the agreements on the

application of the Safeguards System of the International Atomic Energy Agency in

accordance with article 13 of this Treaty.

2. All signatory States shall have the imprescriptible right to waive, wholly or in part,

the requirements laid down in the preceding paragraph. They may do so by means of a

declaration which shall be annexed to their respective instrument of ratification and

which may be formulated at the time of deposit of the instrument or subsequently. For

those States which exercise this right, this Treaty shall enter into force upon deposit of

the declaration, or as soon as those requirements have been met which have not been

expressly waived.

3. As soon as this Treaty has entered into force in accordance with the provisions of

paragraph 2 for eleven States, the Depositary Government shall convene a preliminary

meeting of those States in order that the Agency may be set up and commence its work.

4. After the entry into force of this treaty for all the countries of the zone, the rise of

a new power possessing nuclear weapons shall have the effect of suspending the

execution of this Treaty for those countries which have ratified it without waiving

requirements of paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (c) of this article, and which request such

suspension; the Treaty shall remain suspended until the new power, on its own initiative

or upon request by the General Conference ratifies the annexed Additional Protocol 11.

Article 30 - Amendments

1. Any Contracting Party may propose amendments to this Treaty and shall submit

its proposals to the Council through the General Secretary, who shall transmit them to all

the other Contracting Parties and, in addition, to all other signatories in accordance with

article 6. The Council, through the General Secretary, shall immediately following the

meeting of signatories convene a special session of the General Conference to examine

the proposals made, for the adoption of which a two-thirds majority of the Contracting

Parties present and voting shall be required.

2. Amendments adopted shall enter into force as soon as the requirements set forth in

article 28 of this Treaty have been complied with.

Article 31 - Duration And Denunciation

1. This Treaty shall be of a permanent nature and shall remain in force indefinitely,

but any Party may denounce it by notifying the General Secretary of the Agency if, in

the opinion of the denouncing State, there have arisen or may arise circumstances

connected with the content of this Treaty or of the annexed Additional Protocols I and II

which affect its supreme interests or the peace and security of one or more Contracting

Parties.

2. The denunciation shall take effect three months after the delivery to the General

Secretary of the Agency of the notification by the Government of the signatory State

concerned. The General Secretary shall immediately communicate such notification to

the other Contracting Parties and to the Secretary-General of the United Nations for the

information of the United Nations Security Council and the General Assembly. He shall

also communicate it to the Secretary-General of the Organization of American States.

Article 32 - Authentic Texts And Registration

This Treaty, of which the Spanish, Chinese, English, French, Portuguese and Russian

texts are equally authentic, shall be registered by the Depositary Government in
1222 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America

accordance with article 102 of the United Nations Charter. The Depositary Government

shall notify the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the signatures, ratifications

and amendments relating to this Treaty and shall communicate them to the SecretaryGeneral of the Organization of American States for its information.

Transitional Article

Denunciation of the declaration referred to in article 28, paragraph 2, shall be subject

to the same procedures as the denunciation of this Treaty, except that it will take effect

on the date of delivery of the respective notification.

In Witness Whereof the undersigned Plenipotentiaries, having deposited their full

powers, found in good and due form, sign this Treaty on behalf of their respective

Governments.

Done at Mexico, Distrito Federal, on the Fourteenth day of February, one thousand

nine hundred and sixty-seven.

Additional Protocol

The undersigned Plenipotentiaries, furnished with full powers by their respective

Governments.7

Convinced that the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America,

negotiated and signed in accordance with the recommendations of the General Assembly

of the United Nations in Resolution 1911 (XVIII) of 27 November 1963, represents an

important step towards ensuring the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Aware that the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is not an end in itself but, rather,

a means of achieving general and complete disarmament at a later stage, and

Desiring to contribute, so far as lies in their power, towards ending the armaments

race, especially in the field of nuclear weapons, and towards strengthening a world at

peace, based on mutual respect and sovereign equality of States.

Have agreed as follows.

Article 1. To undertake to apply the statute of denuclearization in respect of warlike

purposes as defined in articles 2, 3, 5 and 13 of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear

Weapons in Latin America in territories for which, de jure or de facto, they are

internationally responsible and which lie within the limits of the geographical zone

established in that treaty.

Article 2. The duration of this Protocol shall be the same as that of the Treaty for the

Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America of which this Protocol is an annex,

and the provisions regarding ratification and denunciation contained in the Treaty shall

be applicable to it.

Article 3. This Protocol shall enter into force, for the States which have ratified it, on the

date of the deposit of their respective instruments of ratification. In Witness Whereof the

undersigned Plenipotentiaries, having deposited their full powers, found in good and due

form, sign this Protocol on behalf of their respective Governments.

7

The United Kingdom and the Netherlands are parties to this Protocol. The United States has signed.
Table: Treaty For The Prohibition Of Nuclear Weapons In Latin America

__________________ ________ Signature and Ratifi~cation by States or Organizations____________

Amendments to Art. 14, 15,

Amendment to Art. 7 Amendment to Art. 25 16, 19,20

Res. 267 (E-V) Res. 268 (XII) Res. 290 (VII)

Country Signature Ratification Signature Ratification Signature Ratification Signature Ratification

Antigua & Barbuda ..... 10/11/83 10/ 11/83 T ______ I_________

Argentina.................... 9/27167 1/18/94 12/10/90 1/18/94 10/14/91 1/18/94 8/26/92 1/18/94

Bahamas, The .............. 11/29/76 4/26/77 3/18/92 _____ __________

Barbados.................... 10/18/68 4/25/69 2/14/97 2/14/97 2/14/97 2/14/97 2/14/97 2/14/97

Belize ............... 2/14/92 11/9/94 11/23/95 11/23/95 ______ _____ 11/23/95 11/23/95

Bolivia...................... 2/14/67 2/18/69 12/10/90 9/10/91 _____ 8/31/92 _____

Brazil........................ 5/9/67 1/29/68 __ 12/5/90 5/30/94 1/23/92 5/30/94 8/26/92 5/30/94

Chile........................ 2/14/67 10/9/74 __ 1/16/91 1/18/94 9/3/91 1/18/94 8/26/92 1/20/99

Colombia................... 2/14/67 8/4/72 12/5/90 1/18/99 8/10/91 1/18/99 12/14/92 1/18/99

Costa Rica ............ 2/14/67 8/25/69 12/10/90 1/20/99 9/3/91 1/20/99 8/26/92 1/20/99

Cuba........................ 3/25/95 10/23/02 12/5/95 10/23/02 12/5/95 10/23/02 12/5/95 10/23/02

Dominica ................... 5/2/89 6/4/93 _____ __________ _____ __________

Dominican Republic .... 7/29/67 6/14/68 1/16/91 9/10/91 _____ 8/26/92 3/27/98

Ecuador .............. 2/14/67 2/11/69 12/5/90 10/18/95 9/13/91 8/30/00 8/26/92 8/30/00

El Salvador................. 2/14/67 4/22/68 2/21/91 5/22/92 9/10/91 1/14/02 9/8/92 6/19/06

Grenada .............. 4/29/7 5 6/20/75 9/17/91 9/17/91 9/17/91 ___________ _____

Guatemala ............ 2/14/67 2/6/70 12/10/90 8/21/98 10/23/97 11/26/03 8/26/92 11/26/03

Guyana .............. 1/16/95 1/16/95 1__ /16/95 1/16/95 1/16/951 1/16/95 1/16/95 1/16/95

Haiti......................... 2/14/67 5/23/69 __ 1/16/91 1/21/92______ 10/22/92 _____

Honduras ............. 2/14/67 9/23/68 1__ /16/91 3/4/92 _____ 8/26/92 _____

Jamaica..................... 110/26/671 6/26/69 1 2/21/91 3/13/92 9/17/91 5/17/91 6/8/931 4/17/95

Mexico .............. 1 2/14/671 9/20/67 1 11/5/90 10/24/91 9/2/91 4/10/921 8/26/921 9/1/93

Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America 1223
1224 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America

Amendments to Art. 14, 15,

Amendment to Art. 7 Amendment to Art. 25 16, 19,20

Res. 267 (E-V) Res. 268 (X II) Res. 290 (V11)

Country Signature Ratification Signature Ratification Signature Ratification Signature Ratification

N icaragua ............ 2/15/67 10/24/68 12/10/90 1/28/92 _____ 8/26/92 11/8/99

Panama...................... 2/14/67 6/1 1/71 _____ 8/8/00 _____ 8/8/00 _____ 8/8/00

Paraguay .................... 4/26/67 3/19/69 2/19/91 10/22/96 1/21/92 10/22/96 8/26/92 10/22/96

Peru.......................... 2/14/67 3/4/69 12/5/90 7/14/95 1/21/92 7/14/95 2/9/931 7/14/95

St. Lucia ............. 8/25/92 6/2/95 _____ _____ ___________

Saint Kitts and Nevis 2/18/94 4/18/95 2/18/94 ______ 2/18/94 2/18/94 _____

St. Vincent/Grenadines ... 2/14/92 2/14/92 _____ _______________________

Suriname................... 2/13/76 6/10/77 Accession Accession Accession

Trinidad & Tobago ........ 6/27/67 12/3705 6/13/94__ 6/13/94__ 6/13/94_____________

Uruguay .................... 2/14/67 8/20/68 11/16/90 8/30/94 9/17/9 1 8/30/94 8/29/92 2/20/95

Venezuela .................. 2/14/67 3/23/70 2/16/91 2/14/97 9/10/91 2/14/97 8/26/92 2/20/95

TOTAL 33 33 26 21 24 19 24 22

'Dates given are the earliest dates on which countries signed the agreements or deposited their ratifications or access ions-whether in Washington, London, Moscow, or New York. In

the case of a country that was a dependent territory which became a party through succession, the date given is the date on which the country gave notice that it would continue to be

bound by the terms of the agreement.

'The declaration of waiver was deposited 6/27/75, which is date of entry into force for Trinidad and Tobago.
A111111111IF111110411111110w

Table: Additional Protocol I To The Treaty For The Prohibition Of Nuclear Weapons In Latin America

Signature and Ratification by States or Organizations

Country

France .....................................................

Netherlands ............................................

United Kingdom .....................................

United States ..........................................

Date of

Signature

3/2/79

4/1/68

12/20/67

5/26/77

Date of

Deposit of

Ratification

8/24/92

7/26/71

12/11/69

11/23/81

Table: Additional Protocol I! To The Treaty For The Prohibition Of Nuclear Weapons In Latin America

Signature and Ratification by States or Organizations

Date of

Date of Deposit of

Country Signature Ratification

China, Peoples Republic of .................... 8/21/73 6/12/74

France ..................................................... 7/18/73 3/22/74

U SSR ...................................................... 5/18/78 1/8/79

United Kingdom ..................................... 12/20/67 12/11/69

U nited States ......................................... 4/1/68 5/12/71

Status as of 10 Jun 2007

Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America 1225

Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America 1225
1226 Intl. Atomic Energy Agency Participation Act (P.L. 85-177)

J. INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

PARTICIPATION ACT OF 1957

Public Law 85-177 71 Stat. 453

August 28, 1957

An Act

To provide for the appointment of representatives of the United States of

the organs of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and to make

other provisions with respect to the participation of the United States

in that Agency, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the

United States of America in Congress assembled,

See. 1. Short Title

That this Act may be cited as the "International Atomic Energy

Agency Participation Act of 1957."

Sec. 2. Representatives

(a) The President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate,

shall appoint a representative and a deputy representative of the United

States to the International Atomic Energy Agency (hereinafter referred to

as the "Agency"), who shall hold office at the pleasure of the President.

Such representative and deputy representative shall represent the United

States on the Board of Governors of the Agency, may represent the

United States at the General Conference, and may serve exofficio as

United States representative on any organ of that Agency, and shall

perform such other functions in connection with the participation of the

United States in the Agency as the President may from time to time

direct.

(b) The President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate,

may appoint or designate from time to time to attend a specified session

or specified sessions of the General Conference of the Agency a

representative of the United States and such number of alternates as he

may determine consistent with the rules of procedure of the General

Conference.

(c) The President may also appoint or designate from time to time

such other persons as he may deem necessary to represent the United

States in the organs of the Agency. The President may designate any

officer of the United States Government, whose appointment is subject to

confirmation by the Senate, to act, without additional compensation, for

temporary periods as the representative of the United States on the Board

of Governors or to the General Conference of the Agency in the absence

or disability of the representative and deputy representative appointed

under section 2(a) or in lieu of such representative in connection with a

specified subject matter.

(d) All persons appointed or designated in pursuance of authority

contained in this section shall receive compensation at rates determined

by the President upon the basis of duties to be performed but not in

excess of rates authorized by sections 411 and 412 of the Foreign Service

Act of 1946, as amended (22 USC 866, 867), for Chiefs of Mission and

Foreign Service officers occupying positions of equivalent importance,

except that no Member of the Senate or House of Representatives or

officer of the United States who is designated under subsection (b) or
Intl. Atomic Energy Agency Participation Act (P.L. 85-177) 1227

subsection (c) of this section as a delegate or representative of the United

States or as an alternate to attend any specified session or specified

sessions of the General Conference shall be entitled to receive such

compensation. Any person who receives compensation pursuant to the

provisions of this subsection may be granted allowances and benefits not

the exceed those received by Chiefs of Mission and Foreign Service

officers occupying positions of equivalent importance.

Sec. 3. Participation

The participation of the United States in the International Atomic

Energy Agency shall be consistent with and in furtherance of the

purposes of the Agency set forth in its Statute and the policy concerning

the development, use, and control of atomic energy set forth in the

Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. [The President shall, from time

to time as occasion may require, but not less that once each year, make

reports to the Congress on the activities of the International Atomic

Energy Agency and on the participation of the United States therein.]' In

addition to any other requirements of law the Department of State and the

Atomic Energy Commission shall keep the Joint Committee on Atomic

Energy, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Senate

Committee on Foreign Relations, as appropriate, currently informed with

respect to the activities of the Agency and the participation of the United

States therein.

See. 4. Voting

The representatives provided for in section 2 hereof, when

representing the United States in the organs of the Agency, shall, at all

times, act in accordance with the instructions of the President, and such

representatives shall, in accordance with such instructions, cast any and

all votes under the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

See. 5. Salaries And Expenses

There is hereby authorized to be appropriated annually to the

Department of State, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise

appropriated, such sums as may be necessary for the payment by the

United States of its share of the expenses of the International Atomic

Energy Agency as apportioned by the Agency in accordance with

paragraph (D) of article XIV of the Statute of the Agency, and for all

necessary salaries and expenses of the representatives provided for in

section 2 hereof and of their appropriate staffs, including personal

services without regard to the civil service laws and the Classification

Act of 1949, as amended, travel expenses without regard to the

Standardized Government Travel Regulations, as amended, the Travel

Expense Act of 1949, as amended, and section 10 of the Act of March 3,

1933, as amended; salaries as authorized by the Foreign Service Act of

1946, as amended,.or as authorized by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,

as amended, and expenses and allowances of personnel and dependents

as authorized by the Foreign Service Act of 1946, as amended; services

as authorized by section 15 of the Act of August 2, 1946 (5 USC 55a); 2

translating and other services, by contract; hire of passenger motor

vehicles and other local transportation; printing and binding without

regard to section II of the Act of March 1, 1919 (44 USC 11); official

functions and courtesies; such sums as may be necessary to defray the

expenses of United States participation in the Preparatory Commission

'P.L. 89-348, § 1(20), 79 Stat. 1310, amended P.L. 85-177 by repealing the requirement of a report to the

Congress by the President not less than once each year on the activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency and on the participation of the United States in those activities. 2

P.L. 89-554, 80 Stat. 416, codiflied § 15 of the Act of August 2, 1946. as 5 USC 3109.
1228 Intl. Atomic Energy Agency Participation Act (P.L. 85-177)

for the Agency, established pursuant to annex I of the Statute of the

Agency; and such other expenses as may be authorized by the Secretary

of State.

Sec. 6. CSR/FEGLI Status

5 USC 8301. (a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, Executive order or

5 USC 8701. regulation, a Federal employee who, with the approval of the Federal

agency or the head of the department by which he is employed, leaves his

position to enter the employ of the Agency shall not be considered for the

purposes of the Civil Service Retirement Act, as amended, and the

Federal Employees' Group Life Insurance Act of 1954, as amended, as

separated from his Federal position during such employment with the

Agency but not to extend beyond the first three consecutive years of his

entering the employ of the Agency: Provided; (I) That he shall pay to

the Civil Service Commission within ninety days from the date he is

separated without prejudice from the Agency all necessary deductions

and agency contributions for coverage under the Civil Service Retirement

Act for the period of his employment by the Agency, and (2) That all

deductions and agency contributions necessary for continued coverage

under the Federal Employees' Group life Insurance Act of 1954, as

amended, shall be made during the term of his employment with the

International Atomic Energy Agency. If such employee, within three

years from the date of his employment with the Agency, and within

ninety days from the date he is separated without prejudice from the

Agency, applies to be restored to his Federal position, he shall within

thirty days of such application be restored to such position or to a

position of like seniority, status and pay.3

(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, Executive order or

regulation, and Presidential appointee or elected officer who leaves his

position to enter, or who within ninety days after the termination of his

position enters, the employ of the Agency, shall be entitled to the

coverage and benefits of the Civil Service Retirement Act, as amended,

and the Federal Employees' Group Life insurance Act of 1954, as

amended, but not beyond the earlier of either the termination of his

employment with the Agency or the expiration of three years from the

date he entered employment with the Agency: Provided, (1) That he shall

pay to the Civil Service Commission within ninety days from the date he

is separated without prejudice from the Agency all necessary deductions

and agency contributions for coverage under the Civil Service Retirement

Act for the period of his employment by the Agency and (2) That all

deductions and agency contributions necessary for continued coverage

under the Federal Employees' Group Life Insurance Act of 1954, as

amended, shall be made during the term of his employment with the

Agency.

(c) The President is authorized to prescribe such regulations as may

be necessary to carry out the provisions of this section and to protect the

retirement, insurance and such other civil service rights and privileges as

the President may find appropriate.

Sec. 7. Special Nuclear Material Compensation

Section 54 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, is

amended by adding the following new sentences: "Unless hereafter

'Section 7 of P.L. 85-795, 72 Stat. 959, approved August 28, 1958, repealed § 6(a), "except that it shall be

considered to remain in effect with respect to any employee subject thereto who is serving as an employee of

the International Atomic Energy Agency on the date of enactment of this Act and who does not make the

election referred to in section 6 and for the purposes of any rights and benefits vested thereunder prior to such

date."
Intl. Atomic Energy Agency Participation Act (P.L. 85-177) 122)9

otherwise authorized by law the Commission shall be compensated for

special nuclear material so distributed at not less than the Commission's

published charges applicable to the domestic distribution of such

material, except that the Commission to assist and encourage research on

peaceful uses or for medical therapy may so distribute without charge

during any calendar year only a quantity of such material which at the

time of transfer does not exceed in value $10,000 in the case of one

nation or $50,000 in the case of any group of nations. The Commission

may distribute to the International Atomic Energy Agency, or to any

group of nations, only such amounts of special nuclear materials and for

such periods of time as are authorized by Congress: Provided, however,

That, notwithstanding this provision, the Commission is hereby

authorized subject to the provisions of section 123, to distribute to the

Agency five thousand kilograms of contained uranium 235, together with

the amounts of special nuclear material which will match in amount the

sum of all quantities of special nuclear materials made available by all

other members of the Agency to July I, 1960."

See. 8. Authority Termination

In the event of an amendment to the Statute of the Agency being adopted in accordance with article XVIII-C of the Statute to which the

Senate by formal vote shall refuse its advice and consent, upon notification by the Senate to the President of such refusal to advise and

consent, all further authority under sections 2, 3, 4, and 5 of this Act, as

amended, shall terminate: Provided, however, That the Secretary of State,

under such regulations as the President shall promulgate, shall have the

necessary authority to complete the prompt and orderly settlement of

obligations and commitments to the Agency already incurred and pay salaries, allowances, travel expenses, and other expenses required for a

prompt and orderly termination of United States participation in the

Agency: And providedfia'ther, That the representative and the deputy

representative of the United States to the Agency, and such other officers

or employees representing the United States in the Agency, under such

regulations as the President shall promulgate, shall retain their authority

under this Act for such time as may be necessary to complete the

settlement of matters arising out of the United States participation in the

Agency.
1230 Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency

K. STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC

ENERGY AGENCY

Article I - Establishment Of The Agency

The Parties hereto establish an International Atomic Energy Agency

(hereinafter referred to as "the Agency" upon the terms and conditions

hereinafter set forth.

Article Ii - Objectives

The Agency shall seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of

atomic energy to peace, health, and prosperity throughout the world. It

shall ensure, so far as it is able, that assistance provided by it or at its

request or under its supervision or control is not used in such a way as to

further any military purpose.

Article III - Function

A. The Agency is authorized:

I. To encourage and assist research on, and development and

practical applications of, atomic energy for peaceful uses throughout

the world; and, if requested to do so, to act as an intermediary for the

purposes of securing the performance of services or the supplying of

materials, equipment, or facilities by one member of the Agency for

another; and to perform any operation or service useful in research

on, or development or practical application of, atomic energy for

peaceful purposes.

2. To make provision, in accordance with this Statute, for

materials, services, equipment, and facilities to meet the needs of

research on, and development and practical application of, atomic

energy for peaceful purposes, including the production of electric

power, with due consideration for the needs of the underdeveloped

areas of the world.;

3. To foster the exchange of scientific and technical information

on peaceful use of atomic energy;

4. To encourage the exchange of scientific and training of

scientists and experts in the field of peaceful uses of atomic energy;

5. To establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that

special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities,

and information made available by the Agency or at its request or

under its supervision or control are not used in a way as to further any

military purposes; and to apply safeguards, at the request of the

parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request

of a State, to any of that State's activities in the field of atomic

energy;

6. To establish or adopt, in consultation and, where appropriate,

in collaboration with the competent organs of the United Nations and

with the specialized agencies concerned, standards of safety for

protection of health and minimization of danger to life and property

(including such standards for labour conditions), and to provide for

the applications of these standards to its own operations as well as to

the operations making use of materials, services, equipment,

facilities, and information made available by the Agency or at its

request or under its control or supervision; and to provide for the
Statute of the Inter-national Atomic Enerav A2encv 1231

application of these standards, at the request of the parties, to

operations under any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or, at the

request of a State, to any of that State's activities in the field of

atomic energy;

7. To acquire or establish any facilities, plant and equipment

useful in carrying out its authorized functions, whenever the facilities,

plant, and equipment otherwise available to it in the area concerned

are inadequate or available only on terms it deems unsatisfactory.

B. In carrying out its functions, the Agency shall:

I. Conduct its activities in accordance with the purposes and

principles of the United Nations to promote peace and international

cooperation, and in conformity with policies of the United Nations

furthering the establishment of safeguarded worldwide disarmament

and in conformity with any international agreements entered into

pursuant to such policies;

2. Establish control over the use of special fissionable materials

received by the Agency, in order to ensure that these materials are

used only for peaceful purposes;

3. Allocate its resources in such a manner as to secure efficient

utilization and the greatest possible general benefit in all areas of the

world, bearing in mind the special needs of the underdeveloped areas

of the world;

4. Submit reports on the activities annually to the General

Assembly of the United Nations and, when appropriate, to the

Security Council, if in connection with the activities of the Agency

there should arise questions that are within the competence of the

Security Council, the Agency shall notify the Security Council, as the

organ bearing the main responsibility for the maintenance of

international peace and security, and may also take the measures open

to it under this Statute, including those provided in paragraph C of

Article XII;

5. Submit reports to the Economic and Social Council and other

organs of the United Nations on matters within the competence of

these organs.

C. In carrying out its functions, the Agency shall not make assistance

to members subject to any political, economic, military, or other

conditions incompatible with the provisions of this Statute.

D. Subject to the provisions of this Statute and to the terms of

agreement concluded between a State or a group of States and the

Agency which shall be in accordance with the provisions of the Statute,

the activities of the Agency shall be carried out with due observance of

the sovereign rights of States.

Article IV - Membership

A. The initial members of the agency shall be those States Members

of the United Nations or of any of the specialized agencies which shall

have signed this Statute within ninety days after it is opened for signature

and shall have deposited an instrument or ratification.

B. Other members of the Agency shall be those States, whether or

not Members of the United Nations or of any of the specialized agencies,

which deposit an instrument of acceptance of this Statute after their

membership has been approved by the General Conference upon the

recommendation of the Board of Governors. In recommending and

approving a State for membership, the Board of Governors and the
1232 Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency

General Conference shall determine that the State is able and willing to

carry out the obligations of membership in the Agency, giving due

consideration to its ability and willingness to act in accordance with the

purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

C. The Agency is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of

all its members, and all members, in order to ensure to all of them the

rights and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfill in good faith

the obligations assumed by them in accordance with this Statute.

Article V - General Conference

A. A General Conference consisting of representatives of all

members shall meet in regular annual session and in such special sessions as shall be convened by the District General at the request of the

Board of Governors or of a majority of members. The sessions shall take

place at the headquarters of the Agency unless otherwise determined by

the General Conference.

B. At such sessions, each member shall be represented by one

delegate who may be accompanied by alternates and by advisers. The

cost of attendance of any delegation shall be borne by the member

concerned.

C. The General Conference shall elect a President and such other

officers as may be required at the beginning of each session. They shall

hold office for the duration of the session. The General Conference,

subject to the provisions of this Statute, shall adopt its own rules of

procedure. Each member shall have one vote. Decisions pursuant to

paragraph H of Article XIV, paragraph C of article XVIII, and paragraph

B of Article XIX shall be made by a two-thirds majority of the members

present and voting. Decisions on other questions, including the

determination of additional questions or categories of questions to be

decided by a two-thirds majority, shall be made by a majority of the

members present and voting. A majority of members shall constitute a

quorum.

D. The General Conference may discuss any questions or any

matters within the scope of this Statute or relating to the powers and

functions of any organs provided for in this Statute, and may make

recommendations to the membership of the Agency or to the Board of

Governors or to both on any such questions or matters.

E. The General Conference shall:

1. Elect members of the Board of Governors in accordance with

article VI;

2. Approve States for membership in accordance with article IV;

3. Suspend a member from the privileges and rights of

membership in accordance with Article XIX;

4. Consider the annual report of the Board;

5. In accordance with Article XIV, approve the budget of the

Agency recommended by the Board or return it with

recommendations as to its entirety or parts to the Board, for

resubmission to the General Conference;

6. Approve reports to be submitted to the United Nations as

required by the relationship agreement between the Agency and the

United Nations, except report referred to in paragraph C of Article

XII, or return them to the Board with its recommendations;

7. Approve any agreement or agreements between the Agency

and the United Nations and other organizations as provided in Article
Statute of the Intemational Atomic Energy Agency 1233

XVI or return such agreements with its recommendations to the

Board, for resubmission to the General Conference;

8. Approve rules and limitations regarding the exercise of

borrowing powers by the Board, in accordance with paragraph G of

Article XIV; approve rules regarding the acceptance of voluntary

contributions to the Agency; and approve, in accordance with

paragraph F of Article XIV, the manner in which the general fund

referred to in that paragraph may be used;

9. Approve amendments to this Statute in accordance with

paragraph C of Article XVIII.

10. Approve the appointment of the Director General in

accordance with paragraph A of Article VII.

F. The General Conference shall have the authority:

I. To take decisions on any matter specifically referred to the

General Conference for this purpose by the Board;

2. To propose matters for consideration by the Board and request

from the Board reports on any matter relating to the functions of the

Agency.

Article VI - Board Of Governors

A. The Board of Governors shall be composed as follows:

I. The outgoing Board of Governors shall designate for

membership on the Board the ten members most advanced in the

technology of atomic energy including the production of source

materials, and the member most advanced in the technology of atomic

energy including the production of source materials in each of the

following areas in which none of the aforesaid ten is located:

(I) North America

(2) Latin America

(3) Western Europe

(4) Eastern Europe

(5) Africa

(6) Middle East and South Asia

(7) South East Asia and the Pacific

(8) Far East

2. The outgoing Board of Governors (or in the case of the first

Board, the Preparatory Commission referred to in Annex I) shall

designate for membership on the Board two members from among

the following other producers of source materials: Belgium,

Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Portugal; and shall also designate for

membership on the Board one other member as a supplier of technical

assistance. No member in this category in any one year will be

eligible for redesignation in the same category for the following year.

3. The General Conference shall elect ten members to

membership on the Board of Governors, with due regard to equitable

representation on the Board as a whole of the members in the areas

listed in subparagraph A-I of this article, so that the Board shall at all

times include in this category a representative of each of those areas

except North America. Except for the five members chosen for a term

of one year in accordance with paragraph D of this article, no member

in this category in any one term of office will be eligible for

reelection in this same category for the following term of office.

B. The designations provided for in subparagraphs A-I and A-2 of

this article shall take place not less that sixty days before each regular
1234 Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency

annual session of the General Conference. The elections provided for in

subparagraph A-3 of this article shall take place at regular annual

sessions of the General Conference.

C. Members represented on the Board of Governors in accordance

with subparagraph A-I and A-2 of this article shall hold office from the

end of the next regular annual session of the General Conference after

their designation until the end of the following regular annual session for

the General Conference.

D. Members represented on the Board of Governors in accordance

with subparagraph A-3 of this Article shall hold office from the end of

the regular annual session of the General Conference at which they are

elected until the end of the second regular annual session of the General

Conference thereafter. In the election of these members for the first

Board, however, five shall be chosen for a term of one year.

E. Each member of the Board of Governors shall have one vote.

Decisions on the amount of the Agency's budget shall be made by a twothirds majority of those present and voting, as provided in paragraph H of

Article XIV. Decisions on other questions, including the determination of

additional questions or categories of questions to be decided by a twothirds majority, shall be made by a majority of those present and voting.

Two-thirds of all members of the Board shall constitute a quorum.

F. The Board of Governors shall have authority to carry out the

functions of the Agency in accordance with this Statute, subject to its

responsibilities to the General Conference as provided in the Statute.

G. The Board of Governors shall meet at such times as it may

determine. The meetings shall take place at the headquarters of the

Agency unless otherwise determined by the Board.

I-I. The Board of Governors shall elect a Chairman and other officers

from among its members and, subject to the provisions of this Statute,

shall adopt its own rules of procedure.

I. The Board of Governors may establish such committees as it

deems advisable. The Board may appoint persons to represent it in its

relations with other organizations.

J. The Board of Governors shall prepare an annual report to the

General Conference concerning the affairs of the Agency and any

projects approved by the Agency. The Board shall also prepare for

submission to the General Conference such reports as the Agency is or

may be required to make to the United Nations or to any other

organization the work of which is related to that of the Agency. These

reports, along with the annual reports, shall be submitted to members of

the Agency at least one month before the regular annual session of the

General Conference.

Article VII - Staff

A. The staff of the Agency shall be headed by a Director General.

The Director General shall be appointed by the Board of Governors with

the approval of the General Conference for a ternm of four years. He shall

be the chief administrative officer of the Agency.

B. The Director General shall be responsible for the appointment,

organization, and functioning of the staff and shall be under the authority

of and subject to the control of the Board of Governors. He shall perform

his duties in accordance with regulations adopted by the Board.

C. The staff shall include such qualified scientific and technical and

other personnel as may be required to fulfill the objectives and functions
Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency 1235

of the Agency. The Agency shall be guided by the principal that its

permanent staff shall be kept to a minimum.

D. The paramount consideration in the recruitment and employment

of the staff and in the determination of the conditions of service shall be

to secure employees of the highest standards of efficiency, technical

competence, and integrity. Subject to this consideration, due regard shall

be paid to the contributions of members of the Agency and to the

importance of recruiting the staff on as wide a geographical basis as

possible.

E. The terms and conditions on which the staff shall be appointed,

renumerated, and dismissed shall be in accordance with regulations made

by the Board of Governors, subject to provisions of this Statute and to

general rules approved by the General Conference on the

recommendation of the Board.

F. In the performance of their duties, the Director General and the

staff shall not seek or receive instruction from any source external to the

Agency. They shall refrain from any action which might reflect on their

position as officials of the Agency; subject to their responsibilities to the

Agency, they shall not disclose any industrial secret or other confidential

information coming to their knowledge by reason of their official duties

for the Agency. Each member undertakes to respect the international

character of the responsibilities of the Director General and the staff shall

not seek to influence them in the discharge of their duties.

G. In this article the term "staff' includes guards.

Article VIII - Exchange Of Information

A. Each member should make available such information as would,

in the judgment of the member, be helpful to the Agency.

B. Each member shall make available to the Agency all scientific

information developed as a result of assistance extended by the Agency

pursuant to article XI.

C. The Agency shall assemble and make available in an accessible

form the information made available to it under paragraphs A and B of

this article. It shall take positive steps to encourage the exchange among

its members of information relating to the nature and peaceful uses of

atomic energy and shall serve as an intermediary among its members for

this purpose.

Article IX - Supplying Of Materials

A. Members may make available to the Agency such quantities of

special fissionable materials, as they deem advisable and on such terms

as shall be agreed with the Agency. The materials made available to the

Agency may, at the discretion of the member making them available, be

stored either by the member concerned or, with the agreement of the

Agency, in the Agency's depots.

B. Members may also make available to the Agency source materials

as defined in article XX and other materials. The Board of Governors

shall determine the quantities of such materials which the Agency will

accept under agreements provided for in article XIII.

C. Each member shall notify the Agency of the quantities, form, and

composition of special fissionable materials, source materials, and other

materials which that member is prepared, in conformity with its laws, to
1236 Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency

make available immediately or during a period specified by the Board of

Governors.

D. On request of the Agency a member shall, from the materials

which it has made available, without delay deliver to another member or

group of members such quantities of such materials as the Agency may

specify, and shall without delay deliver to the Agency itself such

quantities of such materials as are really necessary for operations and

scientific research in the facilities of the Agency.

E. The quantities, form and composition of materials made available

by any member may be changed at any time by the member with the

approval of the Board of Governors.

F. An initial notification in accordance with paragraph C of this

article shall be made within three months of the entry into force of this

Statute with respect to the member concerned. In the absence of a

contrary decision of the Board of Governors, the materials initially made

available shall be for the period of the calendar year succeeding the year

when this Statute takes effect with respect to the member concerned.

Subsequent notifications shall likewise, in the absence of a contrary

action by the Board, relate to the period of the calendar year following

the notification and shall be made no later than the first day of November

of each year.

G. The Agency shall specify the place and method of delivery and,

where appropriate, the form and composition, of materials which it has

requested a member to deliver from the amounts which that member has

notified the Agency it is prepared to make available. The Agency shall

also verify the quantities of materials delivered and shall report those

quantities periodically to the members.

The Agency shall be responsible for storing and protecting materials

in its possession. The Agency shall ensure that these materials shall be

safeguarded against (1) hazards of the weather, (2) unauthorized removal

or diversion, (3) damage or destruction, including sabotage, and (4)

forcible seizure. In storing special fissionable materials in its possession,

the Agency shall ensure the geographical distribution of these materials

in any one country or region of the world.

I. The Agency shall as soon as practicable establish or acquire such

of the following as may be necessary:

I. Plant, equipment, and facilities for the receipt, storage, and

issue of materials;

2. Physical safeguards;

3. Adequate health and safety measures;

4. Control laboratories for the analysis and verification of

materials received;

5. Housing and administrative facilities for any staff required for

the foregoing.

J. The materials made available pursuant to this article shall be used

as determined by the Board of Governors in accordance with the

provisions of this Statute. No member shall have the right to require that

the materials it makes available to the Agency be kept separately by the

Agency or to designate the specific project in which they must be used.

Article X - Services, Equipment, And Facilities

Members may make available to the Agency services, equipment, and

facilities which may be of assistance in fulfilling the Agency's objectives

and functions.
Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency 1237

Article XI - Agency Projects

A. Any member or group of members of the Agency desiring to set

up any project for research on, or development or practical application of

atomic energy for peaceful purposes may request the assistance of the

Agency in securing special fissionable and other materials, services,

equipment, and facilities necessary for this purpose. Any such request

shall be accompanied by an explanation of the purpose and extent of the

project and shall be considered by the Board of Governors.

B. Upon request, the Agency may also assist any member or group of

members to make arrangements to secure necessary financing from

outside sources to carry out such projects. In extending this assistance,

the Agency will not be required to provide any guarantees or to assume

any financial responsibility for the project.

C. The Agency may arrange for the supplying of any materials,

services, equipment, and facilities necessary for the project by one or

more members or may itself undertake to provide any or all of these

directly, taking into consideration the wishes of the member or members

making the request.

D. For the purpose of considering the request, the Agency may send

into the territory of the member or group of members making the request

a person or persons qualified to examine the project. For this purpose the

Agency may, with the approval of the member or group of members

making the request, use members of its own staff or employ suitably

qualified nationals of any member.

E. Before approving a project under this article, the Board of

Governors shall give due consideration to:

I. The usefulness of the project, including its scientific and

technical feasibility;

2. The adequacy of plans, funds, and technical personnel to assure

the effective execution of the project;

3. The adequacy of proposed health and safety standards for

handling and storing materials and for operating facilities;

4. The inability of the member or group of members making the

request to secure the necessary finances, materials, facilities,

equipment, and services;

5. The equitable distribution of materials and other resources

available to the Agency;

6. The special needs of the underdeveloped areas of the world;

7. Such other matters as may be relevant.

F. Upon approving a project, the Agency shall enter into an

agreement with the member or group of members submitting the project,

which agreement shall:

I. Provide for allocation to the project of any required special

fissionable or other materials;

2. Provide for transfer of special fissionable materials from their

then place of custody, whether the materials be in the custody of the

Agency or of the member making them available for use in Agency

projects, to the member or group of members submitting the project,

under conditions which ensure the safety of any shipment required

and meet applicable health and safety standards;

3. Set forth the terms and conditions, including charges, on which

any materials, services, equipment, and facilities are to be provided

by the Agency itself, and, if any such materials, services, equipment,

and facilities are to be provided by a member, the terms and
1238 Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency

conditions as arranged for by the member or group of members

submitting the project and the supplying member;

4. Include undertakings by the member or group of members

submitting the project: (a) that the assistance provided shall not be

used in such a way as to further any military purpose; and (b) that the

project shall be subject to the safeguards provided for in article XII,

the relevant safeguards being specified in the agreement;

5. Make appropriate provisions regarding the rights and interests

of the Agency and the member or members concerned in any

inventions or discoveries, or any patents therein, arising from the

project;

6. Make appropriate provision regarding settlement of disputes;

7. Include such other provisions as may be appropriate.

G. The provisions of this article shall also apply where appropriate to

a request for materials, services, facilities, or equipment in connection

with an existing project.

Article XlI - Agency Safeguards

A. With respect to any Agency project, or other arrangement where

the Agency is requested by the parties concerned to apply safeguards, the

Agency shall have the following rights and responsibilities to the extent

relevant to the project or arrangement:

I. To examine the design of specialized equipment and facilities,

including nuclear reactors, and to approve it only from the viewpoint

of assuring that it will not further any military purpose, that it

complies with applicable health and safety standards, and that it will

permit effective application of the safeguards provided for in this

article;

2. To require the observance of any health and safety measures

prescribed by the Agency;

3. To require the maintenance and production of operating records

to assist in ensuring accountability for source and special fissionable

materials used or produced in the project or arrangement;

4. To call for and receive progress reports;

5. To approve the means to be used for the chemical processing of

irradiated materials solely to ensure that this chemical processing will

not lend itself to diversion of materials for military purposes and will

comply with applicable health and safety standards; to require that

special fissionable materials recovered or produced as a by-product

be used for peaceful purposes under, continuing Agency safeguards

for research or in reactors, existing or under construction, specified

by the member or members concerned; and to require deposit with the

Agency of any excess of any special fissionable materials recovered

or produced as a by-product over what is needed for the above-stated

uses in order to prevent stockpiling of these materials, provided that

thereafter at the request of the member or members concerned special

fissionable materials so deposited with the Agency shall be returned

promptly to the member or members concerned for use under the

same provisions as stated as above;

6. To send into the territory of the recipient State or States

inspectors, designated by the Agency after consultation with the State

or States concerned, who shall have access at all times to all places

and data and to any person who by reason of his occupation deals

with materials, equipment, or facilities which are required by this
Statute of the Interriational Atomic Energv AP 1239

Statute to be safeguarded, as necessary to account for source and

special fissionable materials supplied and fissionable products and to

determine whether there is a compliance with the undertaking against

use in furtherance of any military purpose referred to in subparagraph

F-4 of article XI, with the health and safety measures referred to in

subparagraph A-2 of this article, and with any other conditions

prescribed in the agreement between the Agency and the State or

States concerned. Inspectors designated by the Agency shall be

accompanied by representatives of the authorities of the State

concerned, if that State so requests, provided that the inspectors shall

not thereby be delayed or otherwise impeded in the exercise of their

functions.

7. In the event of noncompliance and failure by the recipient State

or States to take requested corrective steps within a reasonable time,

to suspend or terminate assistance and withdraw any materials and

equipment made available by the Agency or a member in furtherance

of the project.

B. The Agency shall, as necessary, establish a staff of inspectors.

The staff of inspectors shall have the responsibility of examining all

operations conducted by the Agency itself to determine whether the

Agency is complying with the health and safety measures prescribed by it

for application to projects subject to its approval, supervision or control,

and whether the Agency is taking adequate measures to prevent the

source and special fissionable materials in its custody or used or

produced in its own operations from being used in furtherance of any

military purpose. The Agency shall take remedial action forthwith to

correct any noncompliance or failure to take adequate measures.

C. The staff of inspectors shall also have the responsibility of

obtaining and verifying the accounting referred to in subparagraph A-6 of

this article and of determining whether there is compliance with the

undertaking referred to in subparagraph A-2 of this article, and with all

other conditions of the project prescribed in the agreement between the

Agency and the State or States concerned. The inspectors shall report

any noncompliance to the Director General who shall thereupon transmit

the report to the Board of Governors. The Board shall call upon the

recipient State or States to remedy forthwith any noncompliance which it

finds to have occurred. The Board shall report the noncompliance to all

members and to the Security Council and General Assembly of the

United Nations. In the event of failure of the recipient State or States to

take fully corrective action within a reasonable time, the Board may take

one or both of the following measures: direct curtailment or suspension

of assistance beingprovided by the Agency or by a member, and call for

the return of materials and equipment made available to the recipient

members or groups of members. The Agency may also, in accordance

with article XIX, suspend any noncomplying member from the exercise

of the privileges and rights of membership.

Article XlII - Reimbursement Of Members

Unless otherwise agreed upon between the Board of Governors and

the members furnishing to the Agency materials, services, equipment, or

facilities, the Board shall enter into an agreement with such member

providing for reimbursement for the items furnished.
1240 Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency

Article XIV - Finance

A. The Board of Governors shall submit to the General Conference

the annual budget estimates for the expenses of the Agency. To facilitate

the work of the Board in this regard, the Director General shall initially

prepare the budget estimates. If the General Conference does not approve

the estimates, it shall return them together with its recommendations to

the Board. The Board shall then submit further estimates to the General

Conference for its approval.

B. Expenditures of the Agency shall be classified under the

following categories:

1. Administrative expenses: These shall include:

(a) Costs of the staff of the Agency other than the staff

employed in connection with materials, services, equipment, and

facilities referred to in subparagraph B-2 below; costs of meetings; and

expenditures required for the preparation of Agency projects and for the

distribution of information;

(b) Costs of implementing the safeguards referred to in

Article XII in relation to agency projects or, under subparagraph A-5 of

article 111, in relation to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement,

together with the costs of handling and storage of special fissionable

material by the Agency other than the storage and handling charges

referred to in paragraph E below,

2. Expenses, other than those included in subparagraph I of this

paragraph in connection with any materials, facilities, plant, and

equipment acquired or established by the Agency in carrying out its

authorized functions, and the costs of materials, services, equipment, and

facilities provided by it under agreements with one or more members.

C. In fixing the expenditures under subparagraph B-l(b) above, the

Board of Governors shall deduct such amounts as are recoverable under

agreements regarding the application of safeguards between the Agency

and parties to bilateral or multilateral arrangements.

D. The Board of Governors shall apportion the expenses referred to

in subparagraph B-I above, among members in accordance with a scale

to be fixed by the General Conference. In fixing the scale the General

Conference shall be guided by the principles adopted by the United

Nations in assessing contributions of Member States to the regular

budget of the United Nations.

E. The Board of Governors shall establish periodically a scale of

charges, including reasonable uniform storage and handling charges, for

materials, services, equipment, and facilities furnished to members by the

Agency. The scale shall be designed to produce revenues for the Agency

adequate to meet the expenses and costs referred to in subparagraph B-2

above, less any voluntary contributions which the Board of Governors

may, in accordance with paragraph F, apply for this purpose. The

proceeds of such charges shall be placed in a separate fund which shall

be used to pay members for any materials, services, equipment, or

facilities furnished by them and to meet other expenses referred to in

subparagraph B-2 above, which may be incurred by the Agency itself.

F. Any excess of revenues referred to in paragraph E over the

expenses and costs there referred to, and any voluntary contributions to

the Agency, shall be placed in a general fund which may be used as the

Board of Governors, with the approval of the General Conference, may

deterrnine.
Statute of the International Atomic Enerev Aeencv 1241

G. Subject to rules and limitations approved by the General

Conference, the Board of Governors shall have the authority to exercise

borrowing powers on behalf of the Agency without, however, imposing

on members of the Agency any liability in respect of loans entered into

pursuant to this authority, and to accept voluntary contributions made to

the Agency..

H. Decisions of the General Conference on financial questions and of

the Board of Governors on the amount of the Agency's budget shall

require a two-thirds majority of those present and voting.

Article XV - Privileges And Immunities

A. The Agency shall enjoy in the territory of each member such legal

capacity and such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the

exercise of its functions.

B. Delegates of members together with their alternates and advisers,

Governors appointed to the Board together with their alternates and

advisers, and the Director General and the staff of the Agency, shall

enjoy such privileges and immunities as are necessary in the independent

exercise of their functions in connection with the Agency.

C. The legal capacity, privileges and immunities referred to in this

article shall be defined in a separate agreement or agreements between

the Agency, represented for this purpose by the Director General acting

under instructions of the Board of Governors, and the members.

Article XVI - Relationship With Other Organizations

A. The Board of Governors, with the approval of the General

Conference, is authorized to enter into an agreement or agreements

establishing an appropriate relationship between the Agency and the

United Nations and any other organizations the work of which is related

to that of the Agency.

B. The agreement or agreements establishing the relationship of the

Agency and the United Nations shall provide for:

I. Submission by the Agency of reports as provided for in

subparagraphs B-4 and B-5 of Article Ill;

2. Consideration by the Agency of resolutions relating to it

adopted by the General Assembly or any of the Councils of the

United Nations and the submission of reports, when requested, to the

appropriate organ of the United Nations on the action taken by the

Agency or by its members in accordance with this Statute as a result

of such consideration.

Article XVII - Settlement Of Disputes

A. Any question or dispute concerning the interpretation or

application of this Statute which is not settled by negotiation shall be

referred to the International Court of Justice in conformity with the

Statute of the Court unless the parties concerned agree on another mode

of settlement.

B. The General Conference and the Board of Governors are

separately empowered, subject to authorization from the General

Assembly of the United Nations, to request the International Court of

Justice to give an advisory, opinion on any legal question arising within

the scope of the Agency's activities.
1242 Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency

Article XVIII - Amendments And Withdrawals

A. Amendments to this Statute may be proposed by any member.

Certified copies of the text of any amendment proposed shall be prepared

by the Director General and communicated by him to all members at

least ninety days in advance of its consideration by the General

Conference.

B. At the fifth annual session of the General Conference following

the coming into force of this Statute, the question of a general review of

the provisions of this Statute shall be placed on the agenda of that

session. On approval by a majority of the members present and voting,

the review will take place at the following General Conference.

Thereafter, proposals on the question of a general review of this Statute

may be submitted for decision by the General Conference under the same

procedure.

C. Amendments shall come into force for all members when:

(i) Approved by the General Conference by a two-thirds

majority of those present and voting after consideration of

observations submitted by the Board of Governors on each

proposed amendment, and

(ii) Accepted by two-thirds of all the members in

accordance with their respective constitutional processes.

Acceptance by a member shall be effected by the deposit of an

instrument of acceptance with the depository Government

referred to in paragraph C of Article XXI.

D. At any time after five years from the date when this Statute shall

take effect in accordance with paragraph E of Article XXI or whenever a

member is unwilling to accept an amendment to this Statute, it may

withdraw from the Agency by notice in writing to that effect given to the

depository Government referred to in paragraph C of Article XXI, which

shall promptly inform the Board of Governors and all members.

E. Withdrawal by a member from the Agency shall not affect its

contractual obligations entered into pursuant to Article Xl or its

budgetary obligations for the year in which it withdraws.

Article XIX - Suspension Of Privileges

A. A member of the Agency which is in arrears in the payment of its

financial contributions to the agency shall have no vote in the Agency if

the amount of its arrears equals or exceeds the amount of the

contributions due from it for the preceding two years. The General

Conference may, nevertheless, permit such a member to vote if it is

satisfied that the failure to pay is due to conditions beyond the control of

the member.

B. A member which has persistently violated the provisions of this

Statute or of any agreement entered into by it pursuant to this Statute

may be suspended from the exercise of the privileges and rights of

membership by the General Conference acting by a two-thirds majority

of the members present and voting upon recommendation by the Board

of Governors.

Article XX - Definitions

As used in this Statute:
Statute of the Intemational Atomic Enerav AP-encv 1243

I. The term "special fissionable materials" means plutonium-239;

uranium-233; uranium enriched in the isotopes 235 or 233; any material

containing one or more of the foregoing; and such other fissionable

material as the Board of Governors shall from time to time determine;

but the term "special fissionable material" does not include source

material.

2. The term "uranium enriched in the isotopes 235 or 233" means

uranium containing the isotopes 235 or 233 or both in an amount such as

the abundance ratio of the sum of these isotopes to the isotope 238 is

greater than the ratio of the isotope 235 to the isotope 238 occurring in

nature.

3. The term "source material" means uranium containing the mixture

of isotopes occurring in nature; uranium depleted in the isotope 235;

thorium; any of the foregoing in the form of metal, alloy, chemical

compound, or concentrate; any other material containing one of more of

the foregoing in such concentration as the Board of Governors shall from

time to time determine; and such other materials as the Board of

Governors shall from time to time determine.

Article XXI - Signature, Acceptance, And Entry Into Force

5 USC 5101. A. This Statute shall be open for signature on 26 October 1956 by all

5 USC 5701. States Members of the United Nations or of any of the specialized

5 USC 5731. agencies and shall remain open for signature by those States for a period

of ninety days.

B. The signatory States shall become parties to this Statute by

deposit of an instrument of ratification.

C. Instruments of ratification by signatory States and instruments of

acceptance by States whose membership has been approved under

paragraph B of article IV of this Statute shall be deposited with the

Government of the United States of America, hereby designated as

depository Government.

D. Ratification or acceptance of this Statute shall be effected by

States in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.

E. This Statute, apart from the Annex, shall come into force when

eighteen States have deposited instruments of ratification in accordance

with paragraph B of this article, provided that such eighteen States shall

include at least three of the following States: Canada, France, the Union

of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and

Northern Ireland, and the United States of America. Instruments of

ratification and instruments of acceptance deposited thereafter shall take

effect on the date of their receipt.

F. The depository Government shall promptly inform all States

signatory to this Statute of the date of each deposit of ratification and the

date of entry into force of the Statute. The depository Government shall

promptly inform all signatories and members of the dates on which

States subsequently become parties thereto.

G. The Annex to this Statute shall come into force on the first day

this Statute is open for signature.

Article XXII - Registration With The United Nations

A. This Statute shall be registered by the depository Government

pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.
1244 Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency

B. Agreements between the Agency and any member or members,

agreements between the Agency and any organization or other

organizations, and agreements between members subject to approval of

the Agency, shall be registered with the Agency. Such agreements shall

be registered by the Agency with the United Nations if registration is

required under Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Article XXIII - Authentic Texts And Certified Copies

This Statute, done in the Chinese, English, French, Russian and

Spanish languages, each being equally authentic, shall be deposited in the

archives of the depository Government. Duly certified copies of this

Statute shall be transmitted by the depository Government to the

Governments of the other signatory States and to the Governments of

States admitted to membership under paragraph B of Article IV.

In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this

Statute.

Done at the Headquarters of the United Nations, this twenty-sixth day

of October, one thousand nine hundred and fifty-six.
Statute of the International Atomic Enerav Ap-encv 1245

Annex I - Preparatory Commission

A. A Preparatory Commission shall come into existence on the first

day this Statute is open for signature. It shall be composed of one

representative each of Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada,

Czechoslovakia, France, India, Portugal, Union of South Africa, Union

of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and

Northern Ireland, and United States of America, and one representative

each of six other States to be chosen by the International Conference on

the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The Preparatory

commission shall remain in existence until this Statute comes into force

and thereafter until the general Conference has convened and a Board of

Governors has been selected in accordance with Article VI.

B. The expenses of the Preparatory Commission may be met by a

loan provided by the United Nations and for this purpose the Preparatory

Commission shall make the necessary arrangements with the appropriate

authorities of the United Nations, including arrangements for repayment

of the loan by the Agency. Should these funds be insufficient, the

Preparatory Commission may accept advances from Governments. Such

advances may be set off against the contributions of the Governments

concerned to the Agency.

C. Preparatory commission shallI. Elect its own officers, adopt its own rules of procedure, meet

as often as necessary, determine its own place of meeting and

establish such committees as it deems necessary.

2. Appoint an executive secretary and staff as shall be necessary,

who shall exercise such powers and performs such duties as the

Commission may determine;

3. Make arrangements for the first session of the General

Conference, including the preparation of a provisional agenda and

draft rules of procedure, such session to be held as soon as possible

after the entry into force of this Statute;

4. Make designations for membership on the first Board of

Governors in accordance with subparagraph A-] and A-2 and

paragraph B of Article VI;

5. Make studies, reports, and recommendations for the first

session of the General conference and for the first meeting of the

Board of Governors on subjects of concern to the Agency requiring

immediate attention, including (a) the financing of the Agency; (b)

the programs and budget for the first year of the Agency; (c) technical

problems relevant to advance planning of Agency operations; (d) the

establishment of a permanent Agency staff; and (e) the location of the

permanent headquarters of the Agency;

6. Make recommendations for the first meeting of the Board of

Governors concerning the provisions of a headquarters agreement

defining the status of the Agency and the rights and obligations which

will exist in the relationship between the Agency and the host

Government;

7. (a) Enter into negotiations with the United Nations with a view

to the preparation of a draft agreement in accordance with Article

XVI of this Statute, such draft agreement to be submitted to the first

session of the general Conference and to the first meeting of the

Board of Governors; and (b) make recommendations to the first

session of the General Conference and to the first meeting of the

Board of Governors concerning the relationship of the Agency to
1246 Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency

other international organizations as contemplated in article XVI of

this Statute.

Summary Of The Statute Of The International Atomic Energy

Agency

ARTICLES I AND I!

The statute upon its entry into force will establish the International

Atomic Energy Agency, the basic objective of which is to seek to

accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health,

and prosperity throughout the world without at the same time furthering

any military purpose.

ARTICLE III

The functions of the Agency set forth in article III of the statute are

(a) to encourage and assist research on, and development and practical

application of, atomic energy for peaceful purposes throughout the

world; (b) to make provisions for materials, services, equipment, and

facilities needed to carry out the foregoing purposes; (c) to foster the

exchange of scientific and technical information on, and the exchange

and training of scientist and experts in, the peaceful uses of atomic

energy; (d) to establish and administer safeguards to ensure that

fissionable or other materials, services, equipment, facilities, and

information with which the Agency deals are not uses to further any

military purpose; (e) to participate in the establishment, adoption, and

application of standards of safety for the protection of health and the

minimization of danger to life and property from activities in the field of

atomic energy; and (f) to acquire or establish any facilities, plant, and

equipment useful in carrying out its authorized functions.

In carrying out its functions, the Agency is required by the statute (a)

to conduct its activities in accordance with the purposes and principals of

the United Nations and, in particular in conformity with United Nations

policies furthering the establishment of a safeguarded worldwide

disarmament; (b) to control the use of such fissionable materials as are

received by the Agency so as to ensure that they are used only for

peaceful purposes; (c) to allocate its resources so as to secure efficient

utilization and wide distribution of their benefits throughout the world,

bearing in mind the special needs of the underdeveloped areas; (d) to

submit annual reports on its activities to the General Assembly of the

United Nations; (e) when appropriate, to submit reports and information

to the Security Council, Economic and Social Council, and other organs

of the United Nations; (1) to refuse to give assistance to member

countries under political economic, military, or other conditions that are

inconsistent with the statute; and (g) subject to the terms of any

agreements that may be made between a state or group of states and the

Agency, to give due observance to the sovereign rights of states.

ARTICLE IV

Initial members of the Agency are to be states members of the United

Nations or of any of the specialized agencies which signed the statute

within 90 days after it was opened for signature and which deposit

instruments of ratification. The following 30 states signed the statute
Statute of the International Atomic Enerev Ap-encv 1247

during the period it was open for signature: (From Oct. 26, 1956 for a

period of 90 days.)

NOTE:

While the list of 30 initial member states is not provided here, eighteen

ratifications were required to bring the IAEA's Statute into force. By

July 29, 1957, the States in italics-as well as the former Czechoslovakiahad ratified the Statute. By the end of 1957, the following states had

signed the Statute: (Names of States are not necessarily their historical

designations.)

.fghanistan

Argentina

Austria

Brazil

Canada

Denmark

Egypt

Ethiopia

Germany

Guatemala

Holy See

Iceland

Indonesia

Italy

Republic of Korea

Morocco

Netherlands

Norway

Paraguay

Poland

Romania

South Africa

Sri Lanka

Switzerland

Tunisia

Ukraine

United States

Viet Nam

Albania

Australia

Belarus

Bulgaria

Cuba

Dominican Republic

El Salvador

France

Greece

Haiti

Hungary

India

Israel

Japan

Monaco

Myanmar

New Zealand

Pakistan

Peru

Portugal

Russian Federation

Spain

Sweden

Thailand

Turkey

United Kingdomn

Venezuela

Yugoslavia
1248 Agmt. Btw. the US & IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in the US

L. AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

AND THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY FOR THE

APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS IN THE UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA

Whereas the United States of America (hereinafter referred to as the "United States")

is a Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (hereinafter

referred to as the "Treaty") which was opened for signature at London, Moscow and

Washington on I July 1968 and which entered into force on 5 March 1970;

Whereas States Parties to the Treaty undertake to co-operate in facilitating the

application of International Atomic Energy Agency (hereinafter referred to as the

"Agency") safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities;

Whereas non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty undertake to accept

safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the Agency, on all source or special fissionable material in all their peaceful nuclear activities for the

exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of their obligations under the Treaty

with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear

weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;

Whereas the United States, a nuclear-weapon State as defined by the Treaty, has

indicated that at such time as safeguards are being generally applied in accordance with

paragraph I of Article Ill of the Treaty, the United States will permit the Agency to

apply its safeguards to all nuclear activities in the United States-excluding only those

with direct national security significance-by concluding a safeguards agreement with the

Agency for that purpose;

Whereas the United States has made this offer and has entered into this agreement

for the purpose of encouraging widespread adherence to the Treaty by demonstrating to

no-nuclear-weapon States that they would not be placed at a commercial disadvantage

by reason of the application of safeguards pursuant to the Treaty;

Whereas the purpose of a safeguard agreement giving effect to this offer by the

United States would thus differ necessarily from the purposes of safeguards agreements

concluded between the Agency and non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty;

Whereas it is in the interest of Members of the Agency, that, without prejudice to the

principles and integrity of the Agency's safeguards system, the expenditure of the

Agency's financial and other resources for implementation of such an agreement not

exceed that necessary to accomplish the purpose of the Agreement;

Whereas the Agency is authorized, pursuant to Article II of the Statute of the

International Atomic Energy Agency (hereinafter referred to as the "Statute"), to

conclude such a safeguards agreement;

Now, therefore, the United States and the Agency have agreed as follows:

PART I

ARTICLE I

(a) The United States undertakes to permit the Agency to apply safeguards, in

accordance with the terms of this Agreement, on all source or special fissionable

material in all facilities within the United States, excluding only those facilities

associated with activities with direct national security significance to the United States,

which a view to enabling the Agency to verify that such material is not withdrawn,

except as provided for in this Agreement, from activities in facilities while such material

is being safeguarded under this Agreement.

(b) The United States shall, upon entry in force of this Agreement, provide the

Agency with a list of facilities within the United States not associated with activities

with direct national security significance to the United States and may, in accordance

with the procedures set forth in Part I1 of this Agreement, add facilities to or remove

facilities from that list as it deems appropriate.
Aemt. Btw. the US & IAEA for the ADnlication of Safeauards in the US 1249

(c) The United States may, in accordance with the procedures set forth in this

Agreement, withdraw nuclear material from activities in facilities included in the list

referred to in Article I(b).

ARTICLE 2

(a) The Agency shall have the right to apply safeguards in accordance with the terms

of this Agreement on all source or special fissionable material in all facilities within the

United States, excluding only those facilities associated with activities with direct

national security significance to the United States, with a view to enable the Agency to

verify that such material is not withdrawn, except as provided for in this Agreement,

from activities in facilities while such material is being safeguarded under this

Agreement.

(b) The Agency shall, from time to time, identify to the United States those

facilities, selected from the then current list provided by the United States in accordance

with Article l(b) in which the Agency wishes to apply safeguards, in accordance with

the terms of this Agreement.

(c) In identifying facilities and in applying safeguards thereafter on source or special

fissionable material in such facilities, the Agency shall proceed in a manner which the

Agency and the United States mutually agrees takes into account the requirement on the

United States to avoid discriminatory treatment as between United States commercial

firms similarly situated.

ARTICLE 3

(a) The United States and the Agency shall co-operate to facilitate the

implementation of the safeguards provided for in this Agreement.

(b) The source or special fissionable material subject to safeguards under this

Agreement shall be that material in those facilities which shall have been identified by

the Agency at any given time pursuant to Article 2(b).

(c) The safeguards to be applied by the Agency under this agreement on source or

special fissionable materials in facilities in the United States shall be implemented by the

same procedures followed by the Agency in applying its safeguards on similar material

in similar facilities in non-nuclear-weapon States under agreement pursuant to paragraph

I of Article III of the Treaty.

ARTICLE 4

The safeguards provided for in this Agreement shall be implemented in a manner

designed:

(a) To avoid hampering the economic and technological development of the United

States or international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including

international exchange of nuclear material;

(b) To avoid undue interference in peaceful nuclear activities of the United States

and in particular in the operation of the facilities; and

(c) To be consistent with prudent management practices required for the economic

and safe conduct of nuclear activities.

ARTICLE 5

(a) The Agency shall take every precaution to protect commercial and industrial

secrets and other confidential information coming to its knowledge in the

implementation of this Agreement.

(b)(i) The Agency shall not publish or communicate to any State, organization or

person any information obtained by it in connection with the implementation of this
1250 Agmt. Btw. the US & IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in the US

Agreement, except that specific information relating to the implementation thereof may be given to the Board of Governors of the Agency (hereinafter referred to as "the

Board") and to such Agency staff members as require such knowledge by reason of their

official duties in connection with safeguards, but only to the extent necessary for the

Agency to fulfill its responsibilities in implementing this Agreement.

(ii) Summarized information on nuclear material subject to safeguards under this

Agreement may be published upon the decision of the Board if the United States

agrees thereto.

ARTICLE 6

(a) The Agency shall, in implementing safeguards pursuant to this Agreement, take

full account of technological developments in the field of safeguards, and shall make

every effort to ensure optimum cost-effectiveness and the application of the principle of

safeguarding effectively the flow of nuclear material subject to safeguards under this

Agreement by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points to the

extent that present or future technology permits.

(b) In order to ensure optimum cost-effectiveness, use shall be made, for example,

of such means as:

(i) Containment as a means of defining material balance areas for accounting

purposes;

(ii) Statistical techniques and random sampling in evaluating the flow of nuclear

material; and

(iii) Concentration of verification procedures on those stages in the nuclear fuel

cycle involving the production, processing, use or storage of nuclear material from

which nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices could readily be made,

and minimization of verification procedures in respect of other nuclear material, on

condition that this does not hamper the Agency in applying safeguards under this

Agreement.

ARTICLE 7

(a) The United States shall establish and maintain a system of accounting for and

control of all nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement.

(b) The Agency shall apply safeguards in accordance with Article 3(c) in such a

manner as to enable the Agency to verify, in ascertaining that there has been no

withdrawal of nuclear material, except as provided for in this Agreement, from activities

in facilities while such material is being safeguarded under this Agreement, findings of

the accounting and control system of the United States. The Agency's verification shall

include, inter alia, independent measurements and observations conducted by the

Agency in accordance with the procedures specified in Part 11. The Agency, in its

verification, shall take due account of the technical effectiveness of the system of the

United States.

ARTICLE 8

(a) In order to ensure the effective implementation of safeguards under this

Agreement, the United States shall, in accordance with the provisions set out in Part II,

provide the Agency with information concerning nuclear material subject to safeguards

under this Agreement and the features of facilities relevant to safeguarding such

material.

(b)(i) The Agency shall require only the minimum amount of information and data

consistent with carrying out its responsibilities under this Agreement.

(ii) Information pertaining to facilities shall be the minimum necessary for

safeguarding nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement.
Agmt. Btw. the US & IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in the US 1251

(c) If the United States so requests, the Agency shall be prepared to examine on

premises of the United States design information which the United States regards as

being of particular sensitivity. Such information need not be physically transmitted to

the Agency provided that it remains readily available for further examination by the

Agency on premises of the United States.

ARTICLE 9

(a)(i) The Agency shall secure the consent of the United States to the designation of

Agency inspectors to the United States.

(ii) If the United States, either upon proposal of a designation or at any other time

after designation has been made, objects to the designation, the Agency shall propose

to the United States and alternative designation or designations.

(iii) If, as a result of the repeated refusal of the United States to accept the

designation of the Agency inspectors, inspections to be conducted under this

Agreement would be impeded, such refusal shall be considered by the Board, upon

referral by the Director General of the Agency (hereinafter referred to as "the

Director General") with a view to its taking appropriate action.

(b) The United States shall take the necessary steps to ensure that Agency inspectors

can effectively discharge their functions under this Agreement.

(c) The visits and activities of Agency inspectors shall be so arranged as:

(i) To reduce to a minimum the possible inconvenience and disturbance to the

United States and to the peaceful nuclear activities inspected; and

(ii) To ensure protection of industrial secrets or any other confidential

information coming to the inspectors' knowledge.

ARTICLE 10

The Provisions of the International Organizations Immunities Act of the United

States of America shall apply to Agency inspectors performing functions in the United

States under this Agreement and to any property of the Agency used by them.

ARTICLE 1I

Safeguards shall terminate on nuclear material upon determination by the Agency that the material has been consumed, or has been diluted in such a way that it is no

longer usable for any nuclear activity relevant from the point of view of safeguards, or

has become practicably irrecoverable.

ARTICLE 12

(a) If the United States intends to exercise its right to withdraw nuclear material

from activities in facilities identified by the Agency pursuant to Article 2(b) and 39(b)

(other than those facilities removed, pursuant to Article 34(b)(i) from the list provided for by Article 1(b)) and to transfer such material to a destination in the United States

other than to a facility included in the list established and maintained pursuant to Article

l(b) and 34, the United States shall notify the Agency in advance of such withdrawal.

Nuclear material in respect of which such notification has been given shall cease to be

subject to safeguards under this Agreement as from the time of its withdrawal.

(b) Nothing in this Agreement shall effect the right of the United States to transfer

material subject to safeguards under this Agreement to destinations not within or under

the jurisdiction of the United States. The United States shall provide the Agency with

information with respect to such transfers in accordance with Article 89. The Agency

shall keep records of each such transfer and, where applicable, of the re-application of

safeguards to the transferred nuclear material.
1252 Agmt. Btw. the US & IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in the US

ARTICLE 13

Where nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement is to be used in

non-nuclear activities, such as the production of alloys or ceramics, the United States

shall agree with the Agency, before the material is so used, on the circumstances under

which the safeguards on such material may be terminated.

ARTICLE 14

The United States and the Agency will bear the expenses incurred by them in

implementing their respective responsibilities under this Agreement. However if, the

United States or persons under its jurisdiction incur extraordinary expenses as a result of

a specific request by the Agency, the Agency shall reimburse such expenses provided

that it has agreed in advance to do so. In any case the Agency shall bear the cost of any

additional measuring or sampling which inspectors may request.

ARTICLE 15

In carrying out its functions under this Agreement within the United States, the

Agency and its personnel shall be covered to the same extent as nationals of the United

States by any protection against third-party liability provided under the Price-Anderson

Act, inciuding insurance or other indemnity coverage that may be required by the PriceAnderson Act with respect to nuclear incidents.

ARTICLE 16

Any claim by the United States against the Agency or by the Agency against the

United States in respect of any damage resulting from the implementation of safeguards

under this Agreement, other than damage arising out of a nuclear incident, shall be

settled in accordance with international law.

ARTICLE 17

If the Board, upon report of the Director General, decides that an action by the

United States is essential and urgent in order to ensure compliance with this Agreement, the Board may call upon the United States to take the required action without delay, irrespective of whether procedures have been invoked pursuant to Article 21 for the

settlement of a dispute.

ARTICLE 18

If the Board, upon examination of relevant information reported to it by the Director

General, determines there has been any non-compliance with this Agreement, the Board

may call upon the United States to remedy forthwith such non-compliance. In the event

there is a failure to take fully corrective action within a reasonable time, the Board may

make the reports provided for in paragraph C of Article XII of the Statute and may also

take, where applicable, the other measures provided for in that paragraph. In taking such

action the Board shall take account of the degree of assurance provided by the

safeguards measures that have been applied and shall afford the United States every reasonable opportunity to furnish the Board with any necessary reassurance.
Agmt. Btw. the US & IAEA for the Atolication of Safeuards in the US 1253

ARTICLE 19

The United States and the Agency shall, at the request of either, consult about any

question arising out of the interpretation or application of this Agreement.

ARTICLE 20

The United States shall have the right to request that any question arising out of the

interpretation or application of this Agreement be considered by the Board. The Board

shall invite the United States to participate in the discussion of any such question by the

Board.

ARTICLE 21

Any dispute arising out of the interpretation or application of this Agreement, except

a dispute with regard to a determination by the Board under Article 18 or an action taken

by the Board pursuant to such a determination which is not settled by negotiation or

another procedure agreed to by the United States and the Agency shall, at the request of

either, be submitted to an arbitral tribunal composed as follows: The United States and

the Agency shall each designate one arbitrators, and the two arbitrators so designated

shall elect a third, who shall be the Chairman. If, within thirty days of the request for

arbitration, either the United States or the Agency has not designated an arbitrator, either

the United States or the Agency may request the President of the International Court of

Justice to appoint an arbitrator. The same procedure shall apply if, within thirty days of

the designation or appointment of the second arbitrator, the third arbitrator has not been

elected. A majority of the members of the arbitral tribunal shall constitute a quorum, and

all decisions shall require the concurrence of two arbitrators. The arbitral procedure shall

be fixed by the tribunal. The decisions of the tribunal shall be binding on the United

States and the Agency.

ARTICLE 22

The Parties shall institute steps to suspend the applications of Agency safeguards in

the United States under other safeguards agreements with the Agency while this

Agreement is in force. However, the United States and the Agency shall ensure that

nuclear material being safeguarded under this Agreement shall be at all times at least

equivalent in amount and composition to that which would be subject to safeguards in

the United States under the agreements in question. The detailed arrangements for the

implementation of this provision shall be specified in the subsidiary arrangements

provided for in Article 39, and shall reflect the nature of any undertaking given under

such other safeguards agreement.

ARTICLE 23

(a) The United States and the Agency shall, at the request of either, consult each

other on amendments to this Agreement.

(b) All amendments shall require the agreement of the United States and the

Agency.

ARTICLE 24

This Agreement or any amendment thereto shall enter into force on the date on

which the Agency receives from the United States written notification that statutory and

constitutional requirements of the United States for entry into force have been met.
1254 Agmt. Btw. the US & IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in the US

ARTICLE 25

The Director General shall promptly inform all Member States of the Agency of the

entry into force of this Agreement, or of any amendments thereto.

ARTICLE 26

The Agreement shall remain in force as long as the United States is a party to the

Treaty except that the Parties to this Agreement shall, upon the request of either of them,

consult and, to the extent mutually agreed, modify this Agreement in order to ensure that

it continues to serve the purpose for which it was originally intended. If the Parties are

unable after such consultation to agree upon necessary modifications, either Party may,

upon six months' notice, terminate this Agreement.

PART II

ARTICLE 27

The purpose of this part of the Agreement is to specify the procedures to be applied

in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I.

ARTICLE 28

The objective of the safeguards procedures set forth in this part of the Agreement is

the timely detection of withdrawal, other than in accordance with the terms of this

Agreement, of significant quantities of nuclear material from activities in facilities while

such material is being safeguarded under this Agreement.

ARTICLE 29

For the purpose of achieving the objective set forth in Article 28, material

accountancy shall be used as a safeguards measure of fundamental importance, with

containment and surveillance as important complementary measures.

ARTICLE 30

The technical conclusion of the Agency's verification activities shall be a statement,

in respect of each material balance area, of the amount of material unaccounted for over

a specific period, and giving the limits of accuracy of the amounts stated.

ARTICLE 31

Pursuant to Article 7, the Agency, in carrying out its verification activities, shall

make full use of the United States' system of accounting for and control of all nuclear

material subject to safeguards under this Agreement and shall avoid unnecessary

duplication of the United States' accounting and control activities.

ARTICLE 32

The United States' system of accounting for and control of all nuclear material

subject to safeguards under this Agreement shall be based on a structure of material

balance areas, and shall make provision, as appropriate and specified in the Subsidiary

Arrangements, for the establishment of such measures as :

(a) A measurement system for the determination of the quantities of nuclear material

received, produced, shipped, lost or otherwise removed from inventory, and the

quantities on inventory;
Agmt. Btw. the US & IAEA for the ADtlication of Safeguards in the US 1255

(b) The evaluation of precision and accuracy of measurements and the estimation of

measurement uncertainty;

(c) Procedure for identifying, reviewing and evaluating differences in

shipper/receiver measurements;

(d) Procedure for taking a physical inventory;

(e) Procedures for the evaluation of accumulations of unmeasured inventory and

unmeasured losses;

(f) A system of records and reports showing, for each material balance area, the

inventory of nuclear material and the changes in that inventory including receipts into

and transfers out of the material balance area;

(g) Provisions to ensure that the accounting procedures and arrangements are being

operated correctly; and

(h) Procedures for the provision of reports to the Agency in accordance with Article

57 through 63 and 65 through 67.

ARTICLE 33

Safeguards under this Agreement shall not apply to material in mining or ore

processing activities.

ARTICLE 34

The United States may, at any time, notify the Agency of any facility or facilities to

be added to or removed from the list provided for in Article 1(b):

(a) In case of addition to the list, the notification shall specify the facility or facilities

to be added to the list and the date upon which the addition is to take effect;

(b) In the case of removal from the list of a facility or facilities then currently

identified pursuant to Article 2(b) or 39(b):

(i) The Agency shall be notified in advance and the notification shall specify: the

facility or facilities being removed, the date of removal, and the quantity and

composition of the nuclear material contained therein at the time of notification. In

exceptional circumstances, the United States may remove facilities without giving

advance notification;

(ii) Any facility in respect of which notification has been given in accordance

with sub-paragraph (i) shall be removed from the list and nuclear material contained

therein shall cease to be subject to safeguards under this Agreement in accordance

with and at the time specified in the notification by the United States.

(c) In the case of removal from the list of a facility or facilities not then currently

identified pursuant to Article 2(b) or 39(b), the notification shall specify the facility or

facilities being removed and the date of removal. Such facility or facilities shall be

removed from the list at the time specified in the notification by the United States.

ARTICLE 35

(a) Safeguards shall terminate on nuclear material subject to safeguards under this

Agreement, under the conditions set forth in Article 11. Where the conditions of the

Article are not met, but the United States considers that the recovery of safeguarded

nuclear material from residues is not for the time being practicable or desirable, the

United States and the Agency shall consult on the appropriate safeguards measures to be

applied.

(b) Safeguards shall terminate on nuclear material subject to safeguards under this

Agreement, under the conditions set forth in Article 13, provided that the United States

and the Agency agree that such nuclear material is practicably irrecoverable.
1256 Agmt. Btw. the US & IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in the US

ARTICLE 36

At the request of the United States, the Agency shall exempt from the safeguards

nuclear material, which would otherwise be subject to safeguards under this Agreement,

as follows:

(a) Special fissidnable material, when it is used in gram quantities or less as a

sensing component in instruments;

(b) Nuclear material, when it is used in non-nuclear activities in accordance with

Article 13, if such nuclear material is recoverable; and

(c) Plutonium with an isotopic concentration of plutonium-238 exceeding 80%.

ARTICLE 37

At the request of the United States, the Agency shall exempt from safeguards nuclear

material that would otherwise be subject to safeguards under this Agreement, provided

that the total quantity of nuclear material which has been exempt in the United States in

accordance with this Article may not at any time exceed:

(a) One kilogram in total of special fissionable material, which may consist of one

or more of the following:

(i) Plutonium;

(ii) Uranium with an enrichment of 0.2 (20%) and above, taken account of by

multiplying its weight by its enrichment; and

(iii) Uranium with an enrichment below 0.2 (20%) and above that of natural

uranium, taken account of by multiplying its weight by five times the square of its

enrichment;

(b) Ten metric tons in total of natural uranium and depleted uranium with an

enrichment above 0.005 (0.5%);

(c) Twenty metric tons of depleted uranium with and enrichment of 0.005 (0.5%) or

below; and

(d) Twenty metric tons of thorium;

or such greater amounts as may be specified by the Board for uniform application.

ARTICLE 38

If exempted nuclear material is to be processed or stored together with nuclear

material subject to safeguards under this Agreement, provision shall be made for the reapplication of safeguards thereto.

ARTICLE 39

(a) The United States and the Agency shall make Subsidiary Arrangements which

shall:

(i) contain a current listing of those facilities identified by the Agency pursuant

to Article 2(b) and thus containing nuclear material subject to safeguards under this

Agreement; and

(ii) specify in detail, to the extent necessary to permit the Agency to fulfill its

responsibilities under this Agreement in an effective and efficient manner, how the

procedures laid down in this Agreement are to be applied.

(b)(i) After entry into force of this Agreement, the Agency shall identify to the

United States, from the list provided in accordance with Article I(b), those facilities to

be included in the initial Subsidiary Arrangements listing; (ii) The Agency may thereafter identify for inclusion in the Subsidiary Arrangements listing additional facilities from the list provided in accordance with

Article I(b) as that list may have been modified in accordance with Article 34.
Agmt. Btw. the US & IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in the US 1257

(c) The Agency shall also designate to the United States those facilities to be

removed from the Subsidiary Arrangements listing which have not otherwise been

removed pursuant to notification by the by the United States in accordance with Article

34. Such facility or facilities shall be removed from the Subsidiary Arrangements listing

upon such designation to the United States.

(d) The Subsidiary Arrangements may be extended or charged by agreement

between the Agency and the United States without amendment of this Agreement.

ARTICLE 40

(a) With respect to those facilities which shall have been identified by the Agency in

accordance with Article 39(b)(i), such Subsidiary Arrangement shall enter into force at

the same time as, or as soon as possible after, entry into force of this Agreement. The

United States and the Agency shall make every effort to achieve their entry into force

within 90 days after entry into force of this Agreement; an extension of that period shall

require agreement between the United States and the Agency.

(b) With respect to facilities which, after the entry into force of this Agreement,

have been identified by the Agency in accordance with Article 39(b)(ii) for inclusion in

the Subsidiary Arrangements listing, the United States and the Agency shall make every

effort to achieve the entry into force of such Subsidiary Arrangements within ninety

days following such identification to the United States; an extension of that period shall

require agreement between the Agency and the United States.

(c) Upon identification of a facility by the Agency in accordance with Article 39(b),

the United States shall provide the Agency promptly with the information required for

completing the Subsidiary Arrangements, and the Agency shall have the right to apply

the procedures set forth in this Agreement to the nuclear material listed in the inventory

provided for in Article 41, even if the Subsidiary Arrangements have not yet entered into

force.

ARTICLE 41

The Agency shall establish, on the basis of the initial reports referred to in Article

60(a) below, a unified inventory of all nuclear material in the United States subject to

safeguards under this Agreement, irrespective of its origin, and shall maintain this

inventory on the basis of subsequent reports concerning those facilities, of the initial

reports referred to in Article 60(b), of subsequent reports concerning the facilities listed

pursuant to Article 39(b)(ii), and of the results of its verification activities. Copies of the

inventory shall be made available to the United States at intervals to be agreed.

ARTICLE 42

Pursuant to Article 8, design information in respect of facilities identified by the

Agency in accordance with Article 39(b)(i) shall be provided to the Agency during the

discussion of the Subsidiary Arrangements. The time limits for the provision of design

information in respect of any facility which is identified by the Agency in accordance

with Article 39(b)(ii) shall be specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements and such

information shall be provided as early as possible after such identification.

ARTICLE 43

The design information to be provided to the Agency shall include, in respect of each

facility identified by the Agency in accordance with Article 39(b), when applicable:

(a) The identification. of the facility, stating its general character, purpose, nominal

capacity and geographic location, and the name and address to be used for routine

business purposes;
1258 Agmt. Btw. the US & IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in the US

(b) A description of the general arrangement of the facility with reference, to the

extent feasible, to the form, location and flow of nuclear material and to the general

layout of important items of equipment which use, produce or process nuclear material;

(c) A description of features of the facilities relating to material accountancy, containment and surveillance; and

(d) A description of the existing and proposed procedures at the facility for nuclear

material accountancy and control, with special reference to material balance areas

established by the operator, measurements of flow and procedures for physical inventory

taking.

ARTICLE 44

Other information relevant to the application of safeguards shall also be provided to

the Agency in respect of each facility identified by the Agency in accordance with

Article 39(b), in particular on organizational responsibility for material accountancy and

control. The United States shall provide the Agency with supplementary information on

the health and safety procedures which the Agency shall observe and with which the

inspectors shall comply at the facility.

ARTICLE 45

The Agency shall be provided with design information in respect of a modification

relevant for safeguards purposes, for examination, and shall be informed of any change

in the information provided to it under Article 44, sufficiently in advance for the

safeguards procedures to be adjusted when necessary.

ARTICLE 46

The design information provided to the Agency shall be used for the following

purposes:

(a) To identify the features of facilities and nuclear material relevant to the

application of safeguards to nuclear material in sufficient detail to facilitate verification;

(b) To determine material balance areas to be used for Agency accounting purposes and to select those strategic points which are key measurement points and which will be

used to determine flow and inventory of nuclear material; in determining such material

balance areas the Agency shall, inter alia, use the following criteria:

(i) The size of the material balance area shall be related to the accuracy with

which the material balance can be established;

(ii) In determining the material balance area, advantage shall be taken of any

opportunity to use containment and surveillance to help ensure the completeness of

flow measurements and thereby to simplify the application of safeguards and to

concentrate measurement efforts at key measurement points;

(iii) A number if material balance areas in use at a facility or at distinct sites may

be combined in one material balance area to be used for Agency accounting purposes

when the Agency determines that this is consistent with its verification requirements;

and

(iv) A special material balance area may be established at the request of the

United States around a process step involving commercially sensitive information;

(c) To establish the nominal timing and procedure for taking of physical inventory of

nuclear material for the Agency accounting purposes;

(d) To establish the records and reports requirements and records evaluation

procedures;

(e) To establish requirements and procedures for verification of the quality and

location of nuclear material; and
Apmt. Btw. the US & IAEA for the ADnlication of Safeguards in the US 1259

(f) To select appropriate combinations of containment and surveillance methods and

techniques at the strategic points at which they are to be applied.

The results of the examination of the design information shall be included in the

Subsidiary Arrangements.

ARTICLE 47

Design information shall be re-examined in the light of changes in operating

conditions, of developments in safeguards technology or of experience in the application

of verification procedures, with a view to modifying the action the Agency has taken

pursuant to Article 46.

ARTICLE 48

The Agency in co-operation with the United States, may send inspectors to facilities

to verify the design information provided to the Agency pursuant to Article 42 through

45, for the purposes stated in Article 46.

ARTICLE 49

In establishing a national system of materials control as referred to in Article 7, the

United States shall arrange that records are kept in respect of each material balance area

determined in accordance with Article 46(b). The records to be kept shall be described in

the Subsidiary Arrangements.

ARTICLE 50

The United States shall make arrangements to facilitate the examination of records

referred to in Article 49 by inspectors.

ARTICLE 51

Records referred to in Article 49 shall be retained for at least five years.

ARTICLE 52

Records referred to in Article 49 shall consist, as appropriate, of

(a) Accounting records of all nuclear material subject to safeguards under this

Agreement; and

(b) Operating records for facilities containing such nuclear material.

ARTICLE 53

The system of measurements on which the record used for the preparation of reports

are based shall either conform to the latest international standards or be equivalent in

quality to such standards.

ARTICLE 54

The accounting records referred to in Article 52(a) shall set forth the following in

respect of each material balance area determined in accordance with Article 46(b):

(a) All inventory changes, so as to permit a determination of the book inventory at

any time;

(b) All measurement results that are used for determination of the physical inventory;

and
1260 Agmt. Btw. the US & IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in the US

(c) All adjustments and corrections that have been made in respect of inventory

changes, book inventories and physical inventories.

ARTICLE 55

For all inventory changes and physical inventories the records referred to in Article

52(a) shall show, in respect of each batch of nuclear material: material identification,

batch data and source data. The records shall account for uranium, thorium and

plutonium separately in each batch of nuclear material. For each inventory change, the

data of the inventory change and, when appropriate, the originating material balance

area and the receiving material balance area of the recipient shall be indicated.

ARTICLE 56

The operating records referred to in Article 52(b) shall set forth, as appropriate, in

respect of each material balance area determined in accordance with Article 46(b):

(a) Those operating data which are used to establish changes in the quantities and

composition of nuclear material;

(b) The data obtained from the calibration of tanks and instruments and from

sampling and analyses, the procedures to control the quality of measurements and the

derived estimates of random and systematic error;

(c) A description of the sequence of the actions taken in preparing for, and in taking

a physical inventory, in order to ensure that it is correct and complete; and

(d) A description of the actions taken in order to ascertain the cause and magnitude

of any accidental or unmeasured loss that might occur.

ARTICLE 57

The United States shall provide the Agency with reports as detailed in Article 58

through 67 in respect of nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement.

ARTICLE 58

Reports shall be made in English.

ARTICLE 59

Reports shall be based on the records kept in accordance with Article 49 through 56

and shall consist, as appropriate, of accounting reports and special reports.

ARTICLE 60

The United States shall provide the Agency with an initial report on all nuclear

material contained in each facility which becomes listed in the Subsidiary Arrangements

in accordance with Article 39(b):

(a) With respect to those facilities listed pursuant to Article 39(b)(i), such reports shall be dispatched to the Agency within thirty days of the last day of the calendar

month in which this Agreement enters into force, and shall reflect the situations as of the

last day of that month.

(b) With respect to each facility listed pursuant to Article 39(b)(ii), an initial report shall be dispatched to the Agency within thirty days of the last day of the calendar

month in which the Agency identifies the facility of the United States and shall reflect

the situation as of the last day of the month.
Aamt. Btw. the US & IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in the US 1261

ARTICLE 61

The United States shall provide the Agency with the following accounting reports for

each material balance area determined in accordance with Article 46(b):

(a) Inventory change reports showing all charges in the inventory of nuclear material.

The reports shall be dispatched as soon as possible and in any event within thirty days

after the end of the month in which the inventory changes occurred or were established;

and

(b) Material balance reports showing the material balance based on a physical

inventory of nuclear material actually present in the material balance area. The reports

shall be dispatched as soon as possible and in any event within thirty days after the

physical inventory has been taken.

The reports shall be based on data available as of the date of reporting and may be

corrected at a later date, as required.

ARTICLE 62

Inventory change reports submitted in accordance with Article 61(a) shall specify

identification and batch data for each batch of nuclear material, the date of the inventory

change, and, as appropriate, the originating material balance area and the receiving

material balance area or the recipient. These reports shall be accompanied by concise

notes:

(a) Explaining the inventory changes, on the basis of the operating data contained in

the operating records provided for under Article 56(a); and

(b) Describing, as specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements, the anticipated

operational programme, particularly the taking of a physical inventory.

ARTICLE 63

The United States shall report each inventory change, adjustment and correction,

either periodically in a consolidated list or individually. Inventory changes shall be

reported in terms of batches. As specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements, small

changes in inventory of nuclear material, such as transfers of analytical samples, may be

combined in one batch and reported as one inventory change.

ARTICLE 64

The Agency shall provide the United States with semi-annual statements of book

inventory of nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement, for each

material balance area, as based on the inventory change reports for the period covered by

each such statement.

ARTICLE 65

Material balance reports submitted in accordance with Article 61(b) shall include

the following entries, unless otherwise agreed by the United States and the Agency:

(a) Beginning physical inventory;

(b) Inventory changes(first increases, then decreases);

(c) Ending book inventory;

(d) Shipper/receiver differences;

(e) Adjusted ending book inventory;

(f) Ending physical inventory; and

(g) Material unaccounted for.
1262 Agmt. Btw. the US & IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in the US

A statement of the physical inventory, listing all batches separately and specifying

material identification and batch data for each batch, shall be attached to each material

balance report.

ARTICLE 66

The United States shall make special reports without delay:

(a) If any unusual incident or circumstances lead the United States to believe that

there is or may have been loss of nuclear material subject to safeguards under this

Agreement that exceeds the limits specified for this purpose in the Subsidiary

Arrangement; or

(b) If the containment has unexpectedly changed from that specified in the

Subsidiary Arrangement to the extent that unauthorized removal of nuclear material

subject to safeguards under this Agreement has become possible.

ARTICLE 67

If the Agency so requests, the United States shall provide it with amplifications or

clarifications of any report submitted in accordance with Article 57 through 63, 65 and

66, in so far as relevant for the purpose of safeguards.

ARTICLE 68

The Agency shall have the right to make inspections as provided for in Article 69

through 82.

ARTICLE 69

The Agency may make ad hoc inspections in order to:

(a) Verify the information contained in the initial reports submitted in accordance

with Article 60;

(b) Identify and verify changes in the situation which have occurred since the date of

the relevant initial report; and

(c) Identify and if possible verify the quality and composition of the nuclear material

subject to safeguards under this Agreement in respect of which the information referred

to in Article 89(a) has been provided to the Agency.

ARTICLE 70

The Agency may make routine inspections in order to:

(a) Verify that reports submitted pursuant to Articles 57 through 63, 65 and 66 are

consistent with records kept pursuant to Articles 49 through 56;

(b) Verify the location, identify, quantity and composition of all nuclear material

subject to safeguards under this Agreement; and

(c) Verify information on the possible causes of material unaccounted for,

shipper/receiver differences and uncertainties in the book inventory.

ARTICLE 71

Subject to the procedures laid down in Article 75, the Agency may make special

inspections:

(a) In order to verify the information contained in special reports submitted in

accordance with Article 66; or
Agmt. Btw. the US & IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in the US 1263

(b) If the Agency considers that information made available by the United States,

including explanations from the United States and information obtained from routine

inspections, is not adequate for the Agency to fulfill its responsibilities under this

Agreement.

An inspection shall be deemed to be special when it is either additional to the routine

inspection effort provided for in Article 76 through 80, or involves access to information

or locations in addition to the access specified in Article 74 for ad hoc and routine

inspections, or both.

ARTICLE 72

For the purposes specified in Article 69 through 7 1, the Agency may:

(a) Examine the records kept pursuant to Articles 49 through 56;

(b) Make independent measurements of all nuclear material subject to safeguards

under this Agreement;

(c) Verify the functioning and calibration of instruments and other measuring and

control equipment;

(d) Apply and make use of surveillance and containment measures; and

(e) Use other objective methods which have been demonstrated to be technically

feasible.

ARTICLE 73

Within the scope of Article 72, the Agency shall be enabled:

(a) To observe that samples at key measurement points for material balance

accountancy are taken in accordance with procedures which produce representative

samples, to observe the treatment and analysis of the samples and to obtain duplicates of

such samples;

(b) To observe that the measurements of nuclear material at key measurement points

for material balance accountancy are representative, and to observe the calibration of the

instruments and equipment involved;

(c) To make arrangements with the United States that, if necessary:

(i) Additional measurements are made and additional samples taken for the

Agency's use;

(ii) The Agency's standard analytical samples are analyzed;

(iii) Appropriate absolute standards are used in calibrating instruments and other

equipment; and

(iv) Other calibrations are carried out;

(d) To arrange to use its own equipment for independent measurement and

surveillance, and if so agreed and specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements to arrange to

install such equipment;

(e) To apply its seals and other identifying tamper-indicating devices to

containments, if so agreed and specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements; and

(f) To make arrangements with the United States for the shipping of samples taken

for the Agency's use.

ARTICLE 74

(a) For the purposes specified in Article 69(a) and (b) and until such time as the

strategic points have been specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements, Agency inspectors

shall have access to any location where the initial report or any inspections carried out

therewith indicate that nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement is

present.
1264 Agmt. Btw. the US & IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in the US

(b) For the purposes specified in Article 69(c), the inspectors shall have access to any facility identified pursuant to Article 2(b) or 39(b) in which nuclear material referred to

in Article 69(c) is located.

(c) For the purposes specified in Article 70 the inspectors shall have access only to

the strategic points specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements and to the records

maintained pursuant to Articles 49 through 56; and

(d) In the event of the United States concluding that any unusual circumstances

require extended limitations on access by the Agency, the United States and the Agency

shall promptly make arrangements with a view to enabling the Agency to discharge its

safeguards responsibilities in the light of these limitations. The Director General shall

report each such arrangement to the Board.

ARTICLE 75

In circumstances which may lead to special inspections for purposes specified in

Article 71 the United States and the Agency shall consult forthwith. As a result of such

consultations the Agency may:

(a) Make inspections in addition to the routine inspection effort provided for in

Article 76 through 80; and

(b) Obtain access, in agreement with the United States, to information or locations in

addition to those specified in Article 74. Any disagreement concerning the need for

additional access shall be resolved in accordance with Articles 20 and 21; in case action

by the United States is essential and urgent, Article 17 shall apply.

ARTICLE 76

The Agency shall keep the number, intensity and duration of routine inspections, applying optimum timing, to the minimum consistent with the effective implementation of the safeguards procedures set forth in this Agreement, and shall make the optimum

and most economical use of inspection resources available to it.

ARTICLE 77

The Agency may carry out one routine inspection per year in respect of facilities

listed in the Subsidiary Arrangements pursuant to Article 39 with a content or annual

throughput, whichever is greater, of nuclear material not exceeding five effective

kilograms.

ARTICLE 78

The number, intensity, duration, timing and mode of routine inspections in respect of

facilities listed in the Subsidiary Arrangements pursuant to Article 39 with a content or

annual throughput of nuclear material exceeding five effective kilograms shall be

determined on the basis that in the maximum or limiting case the inspection regime shall

be no more intensive than is necessary and sufficient to maintain continuity of

knowledge of the flow and inventory of nuclear material, and the maximum routine

inspection effort in respect of such facilities shall be determined as follows:

(a) For reactors and sealed storage installations the maximum total of routine

inspection per year shall be determined by allowing one sixth of a man-year of

inspection for each such facility.

(b) For facilities, other than reactors or sealed storage installations, involving plutonium or uranium enriched to more than 5 percent, the maximum total of routine

inspection per year shall be determined by allowing for each facility 30 x E mandays of

inspection per year, where E is the inventory or annual throughput of nuclear material,
Agmt. Btw. the US & IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in the US 1265

whichever is greater, expressed in effective kilograms. The maximum established for

any such facility shall not, however, be less than 1.5 man-years of inspection; and

(c) For facilities not covered by paragraphs (a) or (b), the maximum total of routine

inspection per year shall be determined by allowing for each such facility one third of a

man-year of inspection plus 0.4 x E man-days of inspection per year, where E is the

inventory or annual throughput of nuclear material, whichever is greater, expressed in

effective kilograms.

The United States and the Agency may agree to amend the figures for the maximum

inspection effort specified in this Article, upon determination by the Board that such

amendment is reasonable.

ARTICLE 79

Subject to Articles 76 through 78 the criteria to be used for determining the actual

number, intensity, duration, timing and mode of routine inspections in respect of any

facility listed in the Subsidiary Arrangements pursuant to Article 39 shall include:

(a) The form of the nuclear material, in particular, whether the nuclear material is in

bulk form or contained in a number of separate items; its chemical composition and, in

the case of uranium, whether it is of low or high enrichment; and its accessibility;

(b) The effectiveness of the United States' accounting and control system, including

the extent to which the operators of facilities are functionally independent of the United

States' accounting and control system; the extent to which the measures specified in

Article 32 have been implemented by the United States; the promptness of reports

provided to the Agency; their consistency with the Agency's independent verification;

and the amount and accuracy of the material unaccounted for, as verified by the Agency;

(c) Characteristics of that part of the United States fuel cycle in which safeguards are

applied under this Agreement, in particular, the number and types of facilities containing

nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement, the characteristics of such

facilities relevant to safeguards, notably the degree of containment; the extent to which

the design of such facilities facilitates verification of the flow and inventory of nuclear

material; and the extent to which information from different material balance areas can

be correlated;

(d) International interdependence; in particular the extent to which nuclear material,

safeguarded under this Agreement, is received from or sent to other States for use or

processing; any verification activities by the Agency in connection therewith; and the

extent to which activities in facilities in which safeguards are applied under this

Agreement are interrelated with those of other States; and

(e) Technical developments in the field of safeguards, including the use of statistical

techniques and random sampling in evaluating the flow of nuclear material.

ARTICLE 80

The United States and the Agency shall consult if the United States considers that the

inspection effort is being deployed with undue concentration on particular facilities.

ARTICLE 81

The Agency shall give advance notice to the United States of the arrival of inspectors

at facilities listed in the Subsidiary Arrangements pursuant to Article 39, as follows:

(a) For ad hoc inspections pursuant to Article 69(c), at least 24 hours; for those

pursuant to Article 69 (a) and (b), as well as the activities provided for in Article 48, at

least one week;

(b) For special inspections pursuant to Article 71, as promptly as possible after the

United States and the Agency have consulted as provided for in Article 75, it being
1266 Agmt. Btw. the US & IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in the US

understood that notification of arrival normally will constitute part of the consultations;

and

(c) For routine inspections pursuant to Article 70 at least twenty-four hours in respect of the facilities referred to in Article 78(b) and sealed storage installations containing

plutonium or uranium enriched to more than 5 percent and one week in all other cases.

Such notice of inspections shall include the names of the inspectors and shall

indicate the facilities to be visited and the periods during which they will be visited. If

the inspectors are to arrive from outside the United States the Agency shall also give

advance notice of the place and time of their arrival in the United States.

ARTICLE 82

Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 81, the Agency may, as a supplementary

measure, carry out without advance notification a portion of the routine inspections

pursuant to Article 78 in accordance with the principle of random sampling. In

performing any unannounced inspections, the Agency shall fully take into account any

operational programme provided by the United States pursuant to Article 62(b).

Moreover, whenever practicable, and on the basis of the operational programme, it shall

advise the United States periodically of its general programme of announced and

unannounced inspections, specifying the general periods when inspections are foreseen.

In carrying out any unannounced inspections, the Agency shall make every effort to

minimize any practical difficulties for the United States and facilities operators bearing

in mind the relevant provisions of Articles 44 and 87. Similarly the United States shall

make every effort to facilitate the task of the inspectors.

ARTICLE 83

The following procedures shall apply to the designation of inspectors:

(a) The Director General shall inform the United States in writing of the name,

qualifications, nationality, grade and such other particulars as may be relevant, of each

Agency official he proposes for designation as an inspector for the United States;

(b) The United States shall inform the District General within thirty days of the

receipt of such a proposal whether it accepts the proposal;

(c) The Director General may designate each official who has been accepted by the

United States as one of the inspectors for the United States as one of the inspectors tor

the United States, and shall inform the United States of such designations; and

(d) The Director General, acting in response to a request by the United States or on

his own initiative, shall immediately inform the United States of the withdrawal of the

designation of any official as an inspector for the United States.

However, in respect of inspectors needed for the activities provided for in Article 48

and to carry out ad hoc inspections pursuant to Article 69 (a) and (b) the designation

procedures shall be completed if possible within thirty days after the entry into force of

this Agreement. If such designation appears impossible within this time limit, inspectors

for such purposes shall be designated on a temporary basis.

ARTICLE 84

The United States shall grant or renew a quickly as possible appropriate visas, where

required, for each inspector designated for the United States.

ARTICLE 85

Inspectors, in exercising their functions under Articles 48 and 69 to 73, shall carry

out their activities in a manner designed to avoid hampering or delaying the

construction, commissioning or operation of facilities, or affecting their safety. In
Agmt. Btw. the US & IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in the US 1267

particular inspectors shall not operate any facility themselves or direct the staff of a

facility to carry out any operation. If inspectors consider that in pursuance of paragraph

72 and 73, particular operations in a facility should be carried out by the operator, then

shall make a request therefor.

ARTICLE 86

When inspectors require services available in the United States, including the use of

equipment, in connection with the performance of inspections, the United States shall

facilitate the procurement of such services and the use of such equipment by inspectors.

ARTICLE 87

The United States shall have the right to have inspectors accompanied during their

inspections by its representatives, provided that inspectors shall not thereby be delayed

or otherwise impeded in the exercise of their functions.

ARTICLE 88

The Agency shall inform the United States of:

(a) The results of inspections, at intervals to be specified in the Subsidiary

Arrangements; and

(b) The conclusions it has drawn from its verification activities in the United States,

in particular by means of statements in respect of each material balance area determined

in accordance with Article 46(b) which shall be made as soon as possible after a

physical inventory has been taken and verified by the Agency and a material balance

has been stuck.

ARTICLE 89

(a) Information concerning nuclear material exported from and imported into the

United States shall be provided to the Agency in accordance with arrangements made

with the Agency as, for example, those set forth in INFCIRC/207.

(b) In the case of international transfers to or from facilities identified by the Agency

pursuant to Articles 2(b) and 39(b) with respect to which information has been

provided to the Agency in accordance with arrangements referred to in paragraph(a), a

special report, as envisaged in Article 66, shall be made if any unusual incidents or

circumstances lead the United States to believe that there is or may have been loss of

nuclear material, including the occurrence of significant delay, during the transfer.

DEFINITIONS

ARTICLE 90

For the purpose of this Agreement:

A. Adjustment means an entry into and accounting record or a report showing a

shipper/receiver difference of material unaccounted for.

B. Annual throughput means, for the purposes of Article 77 and 78, the amount of

nuclear material transferred annually out of a facility working at nominal capacity.

C. Batch means a portion of nuclear material handled as a unit for accounting

purposes at a key measurement point and for which the composition and quantity are

defined by a single set of specifications or measurements. The nuclear material may be

in bulk form or contained in a number of separate items.

D. Batch data means the total weight of each element of nuclear material and, in the

case of plutonium and uranium, the isotopic composition when appropriate. The units of

account shall be as follows:
1268 Agmt. Btw. the US & IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in the US

(a) Grams of contained plutonium;

(b) Grams of total uranium and grams of contained uranium-235 plus uranium-233

for uranium enriched in these isotopes; and

(c) Kilograms of contained thorium, natural uranium or depleted uranium.

For reporting purposes the weight of individual items in the batch shall be added

together before rounding to the nearest unit.

E. Book inventory of a material balance area means the algebraic sum of the most

recent physical inventory of that material balance area and of all inventory changes that

have occurred since that physical inventory was taken.

F. Correction means an entry into an accounting record or a report to rectify an

identified mistake or to reflect an improved measurement of a quantity previously

entered into the record or report. Each corrections must identify the entry to which it

pertains.

G. Effective kilogram means a special unit used in safeguarding nuclear material.

The quantity in effective kilograms is obtained by taking

(a) For plutonium, its weight in kilograms;

(b) For uranium with an enrichment of 0.01 (1 percent) and above, its weight in

kilograms multiplied by the square of its enrichment;

(c) For uranium with an enrichment below 0.01 (1 percent) and above 0.005 (0.5

percent), its weight in kilograms multiplied by 0.0001; and

(d) For depleted uranium with an enrichment of 0.005 (0.5 percent) or below, and

for thorium, its weight in kilograms multiplied by 0.00005.

H. Enrichment means the ratio of the combined weight of the isotopes uranium-233

and uranium-235 to that of the total uranium in question.

1. Facility means;

(a) A reactor, a critical facility, a conversion plant, a fabrication plant, a

reprocessing plant, an isotope separation plant or a separate storage installation; or

(b) Any location where nuclear material in amounts greater than one effective

kilogram is customarily used.

J. Inventory change means an increase or decrease, in terms of batches, of nuclear

material in a material balance area; such a change shall involve one of the following:

(a) Increases:

(i) Import;

(ii) Domestic receipt: receipts from other material balance areas, receipts from a

non-safeguarded activity or receipts at the starting point of.safeguards;

(iii) Nuclear production: production of special fissionable material in a rector;

and

(iv) De-exemption: replication of safeguards on nuclear material previously

exempted therefrom on account of its use or quantity.

(b) Decreases:

(i) Export; (ii) Domestic shipments: shipments to other material balance areas or shipments

for a non-safeguarded activity;

(iii) Nuclear loss: loss of nuclear material due to its transformation into other

element(s) or isotope(s) as a result of nuclear reactions;

(iv) Measured discard: nuclear material which has been measured, or estimated

on the basis of measurement, and disposed of in such a way that it is not suitable for

further nuclear use;

(v) Retained waste: nuclear material generated from processing or from an

operational accident, which is deemed to be unrecoverable for the time being but which

is stored;

(vi) Exemption: exemption of nuclear material from safeguards on account of its use

or quantity; and

(vii) Other loss: for example, accidental loss (that is, irretrievable and inadvertent

loss of nuclear material as the result of an operational accident) or theft.
Agmt. Btw. the US & IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in the US 1269

K. Key measurement point means a location where nuclear material appears in such

a form that it may be measured to determined material flow or inventory. Key

measurement points thus include, but are not limited to, the inputs and outputs

(including measured discards) and storages in material balance areas.

L. Man-year of inspection means, for the purposes of Article 78, 300 man-days of

inspection, a man-day being a day during which a single inspector has access to a

facility at any time for a total of not more than eight hours.

M. Material balance area means an area in our outside of a facility such that:

(a) The quantity of nuclear material in each transfer into or out of each material

balance area can be determined; and

(b) The physical inventory of nuclear material in each material balance area can be

determined when necessary in accordance with specified procedures, in order that the

material balance for Agency safeguards purposes can be established.

N. Material unaccounted for means the difference between book inventory and

physical inventory.

0. Nuclear material means any source or any special fissionable material as defined

in Article XX of the Statute. The term source material shall not be interpreted as

applying to ore or ore residue. Any determination by the Board under Article XX of the

Statute after the entry into force of this Agreement which adds to the materials

considered to be source material or special fissionable material shall have effect under

this Agreement only upon acceptance by the United States.

P. Physical inventory means the sum of all the measured or derived estimates of

batch quantities of nuclear material on hand at a given time within a material balance

area, obtained in accordance with specified procedures.

Q. hipper/receiver difference means the difference between the quantity of nuclear

material in a batch as stated by the shipping material balance area and as measured at the

receiving balance area.

R. Source data means those data, recorded during measurement or calibration or

used to derive empirical relationships, which identify nuclear material and provide batch

data. Source data may include, for example, weight of compounds, conversion factors to

determine weight of element, specific gravity, element concentration, isotopic ratios,

relationship between volume and manometer readings and relationships between

plutonium produced and power generated.

S. Strategic point means a location selected during examination of design

information where, under normal conditions and when combined with the information

from all strategic points taken together, the information necessary and sufficient for the

implementation of safeguards measures is obtained and verified; a strategic point may

include any location where key measurements related to material balance accountancy

are made where containment and surveillance measures are executed.

PROTOCOL

ARTICLE I

This Protocol specifies the procedures to be followed with respect to facilities

identified by the Agency pursuant to Article 2 of this Protocol.

ARTICLE 2

(a) The Agency may from time to time identify to the United States those facilities

included in the list, established and maintained pursuant to Article l(b) and 34 of the

Agreement, of facilities not associated with activities having direct national security significance to the United States, other than those which are then currently identified by

the Agency pursuant to Article 2(b) and 39(b) of the Agreement, to which the

provisions of this Protocol shall apply.
1270 Agmt. Btw. the US & IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in the US

(b) the Agency may also include among the facilities identified to the United States

pursuant to the foregoing paragraph, any facility which had previously been identified

by the Agency pursuant to Article 2(b) and 39(b) of the Agreement but which had

subsequently been designated by the Agency pursuant to Article 39(c) of the Agreement

for removal from the Subsidiary Arrangements listing.

(c) In identifying facilities pursuant to the forgoing paragraphs and in the preparation

of Transitional Subsidiary Arrangements pursuant to Article 3 of this Protocol, the

Agency shall proceed in a manner which the Agency and the United States mutually

agree takes into account the requirement on the United States to avoid discriminatory

treatment as between United States commercial firms similarly situated.

ARTICLE 3

The United States and the Agency shall make Transitional Subsidiary Arrangements

which shall:

(a) contain a current listing of those facilities identified by the Agency pursuant to

Article 2 of this Protocol;

(b) specify in detail how the procedures set forth in this Protocol are to be applied.

ARTICLE 4

(a) The United States and the Agency shall make every effort to complete the

Transitional Subsidiary Arrangements with respect to each facility identified by the

Agency pursuant to Article 2 of this Protocol within ninety days following such

identification to the United States.

(b) With respect to any facility identified pursuant to Article 2(b) of this Protocol,

the information previously submitted to the Agency in accordance with Article 42

through 45 of the Agreement, the results of the examination of the design information

and other provisions of the Subsidiary Arrangements relative to such facilities, to the

extent that such information, results and provisions satisfy the provisions of this Protocol

relating to the submission and examination of information and the preparation of

Transitional Subsidiary Arrangements, shall constitute the Transitional Subsidiary

Arrangements for such facility, until and unless the United States and the Agency shall

otherwise complete Transitional Subsidiary Arrangements for such facility in

accordance with the provisions of this Protocol.

ARTICLE 5

In the event that a facility currently identified by the Agency pursuant to Article 2(a)

of this Protocol is identified by the Agency pursuant to Articles 2(b) and 39(b) of the

Agreement, the Transitional Subsidiary Arrangements relevant to such facility shall, to

the extent that such Transitional Subsidiary Arrangements satisfy the provisions of the

Agreement, be deemed to have been made part of the Subsidiary Arrangements to the

Agreement.

ARTICLE 6

Design information in respect of each facility identified by the Agency pursuant to

Article 2 of this Protocol shall be provided to the Agency during the discussion of the

relevant Transitional Subsidiary Arrangements. The information shall include, when

applicable:

(a) The identification of the facility, stating its general character, purpose, nominal

capacity and geographic location, and the name and address to be used for routine

business purpose;
Agmt. Btw. the US & IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in the US 1271

(b) A description of the general arrangement of the facility with reference, to the

extent feasible, to the form, location and flow of nuclear material and to the general layout of important items of equipment which use, produce or process nuclear material;

(c) A description of features of the facility relating to material accountancy,

containment and surveillance; and

(d) A description of the existing and proposed procedures at the facility for nuclear

material accountancy and control, with special reference to material balance areas

established by the operator, measurements of flow and procedures for physical inventory

taking.

ARTICLE 7

Other information relevant to the application of the provisions of this Protocol shall

also be provided to the Agency in respect of each facility identified by the Agency in

accordance with Article 2 of this Protocol in particular on organizational responsibility for material accountancy and control. The United States shall provide the Agency with

supplementary information on the health and safety procedures which the Agency shall

observe and with which inspectors shall comply when visiting the facility in accordance

with Article I1 of this Protocol.

ARTICLE 8

The Agency shall be provided with design information in respect of a modification

relevant to the application of the provisions of this Protocol, for examination, and shall

be informed of any change in the information provided to it under Article 7 of this

Protocol, sufficiently in advance for the procedures under this Protocol to be adjusted

when necessary.

ARTICLE 9

The design information provided to the Agency in accordance with the provisions of

this Protocol, in anticipation of the application of safeguards under the Agreement, shall

be used for the following purposes: (a) To identity the features of facilities and nuclear material relevant to the

application of safeguards to nuclear material in sufficient detail to facilitate verification;

(b) To determine material balance areas to be used for Agency accounting purposes

and to select those strategic points which are key measurement points and which will be

used to determine flow and inventory of nuclear material; in determining such material

balance areas the Agency shall, inter alia, use the following criteria:

(i) The size of the material balance area shall be related to the accuracy with

which the material balance can be established;

(ii) In determining the material balance area, advantage shall be taken of any opportunity to use containment and surveillance to help ensure the completeness of

flow measurements and thereby to simplify the application of safeguards and to

concentrate measurement efforts at key measurement points;

(iii) A number of material balance areas in use at a facility or at distinct sites may be combined in one material balance area to be used for Agency accounting purposes

when the Agency determines that this is consistent with its verification requirements;

and

(iv) A special material balance area may be established at the request of the

United States around a process step involving commercially sensitive information;

(c) To establish the nominal timing and procedures for taking of physical inventory

of nuclear material for Agency accounting purposes; . (d) To establish the records and reports requirements and records evaluation

procedures;
1272 Agmt. Btw. the US & IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in the US

(e) To establish requirements and procedures for verification of the quantity and

location of nuclear material; and

(f) To select appropriate combinations of containment and surveillance methods and

techniques and the strategic points at which they are to be applied.

The results of the examination of the design information shall be included in the

relevant Transitional Subsidiary Arrangements.

ARTICLE 10

Design information provided in accordance with the provisions of this Protocol shall

be re-examined in the light of changes in operating conditions, of developments in

safeguards technology or of experience in the application of verification procedures,

with a view to modifying the action taken pursuant to Article 9 of this Protocol.

ARTICLE I I

(a) The Agency, in co-operation with the United States, may send inspectors to

facilities identified by the Agency pursuant to Article 2 of this Protocol to verify the

design information provided to the Agency in accordance with the provisions of this

Protocol, for the purposes stated in Article 9 of this Protocol or for such other purposes

as may be agreed between the United States and the Agency. (b) The Agency shall give notice to the United States with respect to each such visit

at least one week prior to the arrival of inspectors at the facility to be visited.

ARTICLE 12

In establishing a national system of materials control as referred to in Article 7(a) of

the Agreement, the United States shall arrange that records are kept in respect of each

material balance area determined in accordance with Article 9(b) of this Protocol. The

records to be kept shall be described in the relevant Transitional Subsidiary

Arrangements.

ARTICLE 13

Records referred to in Article 12 of this Protocol shall be retained for at least five

years.

ARTICLE 14

Records referred to in Article 12 of this Protocol shall consist, as appropriate, of:

(a) Accounting records of all nuclear material stored, processed, used or produced in

each facility; and

(b) Operating records for activities within each facility.

ARTICLE 15

The system of measurements on which the records used for the preparation of reports

are based shall either conform to the latest international standards or be equivalent in

quality to such standards.

ARTICLE 16

The accounting records referred to in Article 14(a) of this Protocol shall set forth the

following in respect of each material balance area determined in accordance with Article

9(b) of this Protocol:
Agmt. Btw. the US & IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in the US 1273

(a) All inventory changes, so as to permit a determination of the book inventory at

any time;

(b) All measurement results that are used for determination of the physical inventory;

and

(c) All adjustments and corrections that have been made in respect of inventory changes, book inventories and physical inventories.

ARTICLE 17

For all inventory changes and physical inventories the records referred to in Article

14(a) of this Protocol shall show, in respect of each batch of nuclear material: material

identification, batch data and source data. The records shall account for uranium,

thorium and plutonium separately in each batch of nuclear material. For each inventory

change, the date of the inventory change and, when appropriate, the originating material

balance area and the receiving material balance area or the recipient, shall be indicated.

ARTICLE 18

The operating records referred to in Article 14(b) of this Protocol shall set forth, as

appropriate, in respect of each material balance area determined in accordance with

Article 9(b) of this Protocol:

(a) Those operating data which are used to establish changes in the quantities and

composition of nuclear material;

(b) The data obtained from the calibration of tanks and instruments and from

sampling and analyses, the procedures to control the quality of measurements and the

derived estimates of random and systematic error;

(c) A description of the sequence of the actions taken in preparing for, and in taking,

a physical inventory, in order to ensure that it is correct and complete; and

(d) A description of the actions taken in order to ascertain the cause and magnitude

of any accidental or unmeasured loss that might occur.

ARTICLE 19

The United States shall provide the Agency with accounting reports as detailed in

Article 20 through 25 of this Protocol in respect of nuclear material in each facility

identified by the Agency pursuant to Article 2 of this Protocol.

ARTICLE 20

The accounting reports shall be based on the records kept in accordance with Articles

12 to 18 to this Protocol. They shall be made in English.

ARTICLE 21

The United States shall provide the Agency with an initial report on all nuclear

material in each facility identified by the Agency pursuant to Article 2 of this Protocol.

Such report shall be dispatched to the Agency within thirty days of the last day of the

Calendar month in which the facility is identified by the Agency and shall reflect the

situation as of the last day of that month.

ARTICLE 22

The United States shall provide the Agency with the following accounting reports for

each material balance areas determined in accordance with Article 9(b) of this Protocol:
1274 Agmt. Btw. the US & IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in the US

(a) Inventory change reports showing all changes in the inventory of nuclear

material. The reports shall be dispatched as soon as possible and in any event within

thirty days after the end of the month in which the inventory changes occurred or were

established; and

(b) Material balance reports showing the material balance based on a physical

inventory of nuclear material actually present in the material balance area. The reports shall be dispatched as soon as possible and in any event within thirty days after tile

physical inventory has been taken.

The reports shall be based on data available as of the date of reporting and may be

corrected at a later date, as required.

ARTICLE 23

Inventory change reports submitted in accordance with Article 22(a) of this Protocol

shall specify identification and batch data for each batch of nuclear material, the date of

the inventory change, and, as appropriate, the originating material balance area and the

receiving material balance area or the recipient. These reports shall be accompanied by

concise notes:

(a) Explaining the inventory changes, on the basis of the operating data contained in

the operating records provided for in Article 18(a) of this Protocol, and

(b) Describing, as specified in the relevant Transitional Subsidiary Arrangements,

the anticipated operational programme, particularly the taking of a physical inventory.

ARTICLE 24

The United States shall report each inventory change, adjustment and correction,

either periodically in a consolidated list or individually. Inventory changes shall be

reported in terms of batches. As specified in the relevant Transitional Subsidiary

Arrangements, small changes in inventory of nuclear material, such as transfers of

analytical samples, may be combined in one batch and reported as one inventory change.

ARTICLE 25

Material balance reports submitted in accordance with Article 22(b) of this Protocol

shall include the following entries, unless otherwise agreed by the United States and the

Agency:

(a) Beginning physical inventory;

(b) Inventory changes (first increases, then decreases);

(c) Ending book inventory;

(d) Shipper/receiver differences;

(e) Adjusted ending book inventory;

(f) Ending physical inventory; and

(g) Material unaccounted for.

A statement of the physical inventory, listing all batches separately and specifying material identification and batch data for each batch, shall be attached to each material

balance report.

ARTICLE 26

The Agency shall provide the United States with semi-annual statements of book

inventory of nuclear material in facilities identified pursuant to Article 2 of this Protocol,

for each material balance area, as based on the inventory change reports for the period

covered by each such statement.
Agmt. Btw. the US & IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in the US 1275

ARTICLE 27

(a) If the Agency so requests, the United States shall provide it with amplifications

or clarifications of any report submitted in accordance with Article 19 of this Protocol,

insofar as consistent with the purpose of the Protocol.

(b) The Agency shall inform the United States of any significant observations

resulting from its examination of reports received pursuant to Article 19 of this Protocol

and from visits of inspectors made pursuant to Article I I of this Protocol.

(c) The United States and the Agency shall, at the request of either, consult about

any question arising out of the interpretation or application of this Protocol, including corrective action which, in the opinion of the Agency, should be taken by the United

States to ensure compliance with its terms, as indicated by the Agency in its

observations pursuant to paragraph (b) of this Article.

ARTICLE 28

The definition set forth in Article 90 of the Agreement shall apply, to the extent

relevant, to this Protocol.

Done in Vienna on the 18th day of November, 1977, in duplicate, in the English

language.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

FOR THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY:
1276 US Senate Resolution Consenting to Ratification of Agmt. Btw. US & IAEA

M. U.S. SENATE RESOLUTION CONSENTING TO THE

RATIFICATION OF THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE U.S. AND

THE IAEA FOR THE APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS

Senate of the United States

IN EXECUTIVE SESSION

July 2, 1980

Resolved, (two-thirds of the Senators present concurring therein), That the Senate

advised and consent to the ratification of the Agreement between the United States of

America and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of the

Safeguards in the United States of America, with attached Protocol, signed at Vienna on

November 18, 1977 (Ex. B, Ninety-fifth Congress, second session, hereinafter referred

to as "the Agreement"), subject to the following understandings:

1. That the President shall notify the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate

and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives of any proposed

addition to the list, to be provided to the International Atomic Energy Agency pursuant

to Article 1(b) of the Agreement, of nuclear facilities within the United States eligible

for International Atomic Energy Agency inspections, together with an explanation of the

basis upon which the determination was made that any such facility did not have a direct

national security significance, not less than 60 day prior to such proposed addition being

provided to the International Atomic Energy Agency, during which period the Congress

may disapprove such addition by joint resolution by reason of direct national security

significance, under procedures identical to those provided for the consideration of

resolutions pursuant to section 130 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 as amended.

2. That the President shall assure that concerned licensees within the United States

are consulted in advance of, and that their views and interests are considered in, any

negotiations with the International Atomic Energy Agency concerning the application to

a particular facility of Subsidiary Arrangements made pursuant to Article 39 of the

Agreement.

3. That the President shall establish and maintain an appropriate interagency

mechanism, comprised of the relevant Executive Branch agencies, and with the

participation of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, under the chairmanship of the

Department of State, for the purpose of coordinating policy, and of resolving disputes,

relating to the implementation of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards under

the Agreement, and, further, that the Congress shall be kept informed of the functions

and procedures of such interagency mechanism.

4. That in the event of any question of interpretation of the Agreement, the Nuclear

Regulatory Commission shall seek and be bound by guidance from the President.

Neither this understanding nor any other in this resolution shall in any way alter the

responsibilities of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission under the Agreement or in any

way limit the existing authority and responsibility of the Nuclear Regulatory

Commission.

5. That the Agreement shall not be constructed to require the communication to the

International Atomic Energy Agency of "Restricted Data" controlled by the provisions

of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, including data concerning the design,

manufacture, or utilization of atomic weapons.

Attest:

Secretary
Protocol Additional to the US-IAEA Agmt. for Application of Safeguards 1277

N. PROTOCOL ADDITIONAL TO THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE INTERNATIONAL

ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY FOR THE APPLICATION OF

SAFEGUARDS IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

WHEREAS the United States of America (hereinafter referred to as "the United States")

and the International Atomic Energy Agency (hereinafter referred to as the "Agency")

are parties to an Agreement for the Application of Safeguards in the United States of

America done at Vienna on November 18, 1977 (hereinafter referred to as the

"Safeguards Agreement"), which entered into force on December 9, 1980;

AWARE OF the desire of the international community to further enhance nuclear

nonproliferation by strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the

Agency's safeguards system;

RECALLING that the Agency must take into account in the implementation of

safeguards the need to: avoid hampering the economic and technological development of

the United States or international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities;

respect health, safety, physical protection and other security provisions in force and the

rights of individuals; and take every precaution to protect commercial, technological and

industrial secrets as well as other confidential information coming to its knowledge;

WHEREAS the frequency and intensity of activities described in this Protocol shall be

kept to the minimum consistent with the objective of strengthening the effectiveness and

improving the efficiency of Agency safeguards;

NOW THEREFORE the United States and the Agency have agreed as follows:

Article I - RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PROTOCOL AND THE

SAFEGUARDS

a, The provisions of the Safeguards Agreement shall apply to this Protocol to the extent

that they are relevant to and compatible with the provisions of this Protocol. In case of

conflict between the provisions of the Safeguards Agreement and those of this Protocol,

the provisions of this Protocol shall apply.

b. The United States shall apply, and permit the Agency to apply, this Protocol,

excluding only instances where its application would result in access by the Agency to

activities with direct national security significance to the United States or to locations or

information associated with such activities.

c. Without prejudice to paragraph b. above, the United States shall have the right to use

managed access in connection with activities with direct national security significance to

the United States or in connection with locations or information associated with such

activities.

Article 2 - PROVISION OF INFORMATION

a. The United States shall provide the Agency with a declaration containing.

(i) A general description of and information specifying the location of

nuclear fuel cycle-related research and development activities not

involving nuclear material carried out anywhere that are funded,

specifically authorized or controlled by, or carried out on behalf of, the

United States.

(ii) Information identified by the Agency on the basis of expected gains in

effectiveness or efficiency, and agreed to by the United States, on
1278 Protocol Additional to the US-IAEA Agmt. for Application of Safeguards

operational activities of safeguards relevance at facilities and locations

outside facilities where nuclear material is customarily used.

(iii) A general description of each building on each site, including its use

and, if not apparent from that description, its contents. The description

shall include a map of the site.

(iv) A description of the scale of operations for each location engaged in

the activities specified in Annex I to this Protocol.

(v) Information specifying the location, operational status and the

estimated annual production capacity of uranium mines and

concentration plants and thorium concentration plants, and the current

annual production of such mines and concentration plants for the

United States as a whole. The United States shall provide, upon

request by the Agency, the current annual production of an individual

mine or concentration plant. The provision of this information does

not require detailed nuclear material accountancy.

(vi) Information regarding source material which has not reached the

composition and purity suitable for fuel fabrication or for being

isotopically enriched, as follows:

(a) The quantities, the chemical composition, the use or intended

use of such material, whether in nuclear or non-nuclear use,

for each location in the United States at which the material is

present in quantities exceeding ten metric tons of uranium

and/or twenty metric tons of thorium, and for other locations

with quantities of more than one metric ton, the aggregate for

the United States as a whole if the aggregate exceeds ten

metric tons of uranium or twenty metric tons of thorium. The

provision of this information does not require detailed nuclear

material accountancy;

(b) The quantities, the chemical composition and the destination

of each export out of the United States, of such material for

specifically nonnuclear purposes in quantities exceeding: (I) Ten metric tons of uranium, or for successive

exports of uranium from the United States to the

same State, each of less than ten metric tons, but

exceeding a total often metric tons for the year; (2) Twenty metric tons of thorium, or for successive

exports of thorium from the United States to the

same State, each of less than twenty metric tons, but

exceeding a total of twenty metric tons for the year, (c) The quantities, chemical composition, current location and

use or intended use of each import into the United States of

such material for specifically non-nuclear purposes in

quantities exceeding;

(1) Ten metric tons of uranium, or for successive

imports of uranium into the United States each of

less than ten metric tons, but exceeding a total often

metric tons for the year;,

(2) Twenty metric tons of thorium, or for successive

imports of thorium into the United States each of

less than twenty metric tons, but exceeding a total of

twenty metric tons for the year;

it being understood that there is no requirement to provide information

on such material intended for a non-nuclear use once it is in its nonnuclear end-use form.
Protocol Additional to the US-IAEA Agmt. for Application of Safeguards 1279

(vii) (a) Information regarding the quantities, uses and locations of

nuclear material exempted from safeguards pursuant to

Article 37 of the Safeguards Agreement;

(b) Information regarding the quantities (which may be in the

form of estimates) and uses at each location, of nuclear

material exempted from safeguards pursuant to Article 36(b)

of the Safeguards Agreement but not yet in a non-nuclear

end-use form, in quantities exceeding those set out in Article

37 of the Safeguards Agreement. The provision of this

information does not require detailed nuclear material

accountancy. (viii) Information regarding the location or further processing of

intermediate or high-level waste containing plutonium, high enriched

uranium or uranium-233 on which safeguards have been terminated

pursuant to Article II of the Safeguards Agreement. For the purpose

of this paragraph, "further processing" does not include repackaging of

the waste or its further conditioning not involving the separation of

elements, for storage or disposal.

(ix) The following information regarding specified equipment and nonnuclear material listed in Annex II:

(a) For each export out of the United States of such equipment

and material: the identity, quantity, location of intended use

in the receiving State and date or, as appropriate, expected

date, of export; (b) Upon specific request by the Agency, confirmation by the

United States, as importing State, of information provided to

the Agency by another State concerning the identity, quantity

and location of intended use in the United States, and date of

import or, as appropriate, expected date of the import, of such

equipment and material into the United States.

(x) General plans for the succeeding ten-year period relevant to the

development of the nuclear fuel cycle (including planned nuclear fuel

cycle-related research and development activities) when approved by

the appropriate authorities in the United States.

b. The United States shall make every reasonable effort to provide the Agency with the

following information:

(i) A general description of and information specifying the location of

nuclear fuel cycle-related research and development activities not

involving nuclear material which are specifically related to

enrichment, reprocessing of nuclear fuel or the processing of

intermediate or high-level waste containing plutonium, high enriched

uranium or uranium-233 that are carried out anywhere in the United

States but which are not funded, specifically authorized or controlled

by, or carried out on behalf of, the United States. For the purpose of

this paragraph, "processing" of intermediate or high-level waste does

not include repackaging of the waste or its conditioning not involving

the separation of elements, for storage or disposal.

(ii) A general description of activities and the identity of the person or

entity carrying out such activities, at locations identified by the

Agency outside a site which the Agency considers might be

functionally related to the activities of that site. The provision of this

information is subject to a specific request by the Agency. It shall be

provided in consultation with the Agency and in a timely fashion.
1280 Protocol Additional to the US-IAEA Agmt. for Application of Safeguards

c. Upon request by the Agency, the United States shall provide amplifications or clarifications of any information it has provided under this Article, in so far as relevant

for the purpose of safeguards.

Article 3

a. The United States shall provide to the Agency the information identified in Article

2.a.(i), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi)(a), (vii) and (x) and Article 2.b.(i) within 180 days of the entry

into force of this Protocol.

b. The United States shall provide to the Agency, by 15 May of each year, updates of the

information referred to in paragraph a. above for the period covering the previous

calendar year. If there has been no change to the information previously provided, the

United States shall so indicate.

c. The United States shall provide to the Agency, by 15 May of each year, the

information identified in Article 2.a.(vi)(b) and (c) for the period covering the previous

calendar year.

d. The United States shall provide to the Agency on a quarterly basis the information

identified in Article 2.a.(ix)(a). This information shall be provided within sixty days of

the end of each quarter.

e. The United States shall provide to the Agency the information identified in Article

2.a.(viii) 180 days before further processing is carried out and, by 15 May of each year,

information on changes in location for the period covering the previous calendar year.

f. The United States and the Agency shall agree on the timing and frequency of the

provision of the information identified in Article 2.a.(ii).

g. The United States shall provide to the Agency the information in Article 2.a.(ix)(b)

within sixty days of the Agency's request.

Article 4 - COMPLEMENTARY ACCESS

The following shall apply in connection with the implementation of

complementary access under Article 5 of this Protocol:

a. The Agency shall not mechanistically or systematically seek to verify the information

referred to in Article 2; however, the Agency shall have access to:

(i) Any location referred to in Article 5.a.(i) or (ii) on a selective basis in

order to assure the absence of undeclared nuclear material and

activities;

(ii) Any location referred to in Article 5.b. or c. to resolve a question

relating to the correctness and completeness of the information

provided pursuant to Article 2 or to resolve an inconsistency relating

to that information;

(iii) Any location referred to in Article 5.a.(iii) to the extent necessary for

the Agency to confirm, for safeguards purposes, the United States'

declaration of the decommissioned status of a facility or location

outside facilities where nuclear material was customarily used.

b. (i) Except as provided in paragraph (ii) below, the Agency shall give the

United States advance notice of access of at least 24 hours;

(ii) For access to any place on a site that is sought in conjunction with

design information verification visits or ad hoc or routine inspections on that site, the period of advance notice shall, if the Agency so

requests, be at least two hours but, in exceptional circumstances, it

may be less than two hours. c. Advance notice shall be in writing and shall specify the reasons for access and the

activities to be carried out during such access. d. In the case of a question or inconsistency, the Agency shall provide the United States

with an opportunity to clarify and facilitate the resolution of the question or

inconsistency. Such an opportunity will be provided before a request for access, unless

the Agency considers that delay in access would prejudice the purpose for which the
Protocol Additional to the US-IAEA Agmt. for Application of Safeguards 1281

access is sought. In any event, the Agency shall not draw any conclusions about the

question or inconsistency until the United States has been provided with such an

opportunity.

e. Unless otherwise agreed to by the United States, access shall only take place during

regular working hours.

f. The United States shall have the right to have Agency inspectors accompanied during

their access by representatives of the United States, provided that the inspectors shall not

thereby be delayed or otherwise impeded in the exercise of their functions.

Article 5

The United States shall provide the Agency with access to:

a. (i) Any place on a site;

(ii) Any location identified by the United States under Article 2.a.(v)-

(viii);

(iii) Any decommissioned facility or decommissioned location outside

facilities where nuclear material was customarily used.

b. Any location identified by the United States under Article 2.a.(i), Article 2.a.(iv),

Article 2.a.(ix)(b) or Article 2.b., other than those referred to in paragraph a.(i) above,

provided that if the United States is unable to provide such access, the United States

shall make every reasonable effort to satisfy Agency requirements, without delay,

through other means,

c. Any location specified by the Agency, other than locations referred to in paragraphs a.

and b. above, to carry out location-specific environmental sampling, provided that if the

United States is unable to provide such access, the United States shall make every

reasonable effort to satisfy Agency requirements, without delay, at adjacent locations or

through other means,

Article 6

When implementing Article 5, the Agency may carry out the following

activities:

a. For access in accordance with Article 5.a.(i) or (iii): visual observation; collection of

environmental samples; utilization of radiation detection and measurement devices;

application of seals and other identifying and tamper indicating devices specified in

Subsidiary Arrangements; and other objective measures which have been demonstrated

to be technically feasible and the use of which has been agreed by the Board of

Governors (hereinafter referred to as the "Board") and following consultations between

the Agency and the United States.

b. For access in accordance with Article 5.a.(ii): visual observation; item counting of

nuclear material; non-destructive measurements and sampling; utilization of radiation

detection and measurement devices; examination of records relevant to the quantities,

origin and disposition of the material; collection of environmental samples; and other

objective measures which have been demonstrated to be technically feasible and the use

of which has been agreed by the Board and following consultations between the Agency

and the United States.

c. For access in accordance with Article 5.b.: visual observation; collection of

environmental samples; utilization of radiation detection and measurement devices;

examination of safeguards relevant production and shipping records; and other objective

measures which have been demonstrated to be technically feasible and the use of which

has been agreed by the Board and following consultations between the Agency and the

United States.

d. For access in accordance with Article 5.c.: collection of environmental samples and,

in the event the results do not resolve the question or inconsistency at the location

specified by the Agency pursuant to Article 5.c., utilization at that location of visual

observation, radiation detection and measurement devices, and, as agreed by the United

States and the Agency, other objective measures.
1282 Protocol Additional to the US-IAEA Agmt. for Application of Safeguards

Article 7

a. Upon request by the United States, the Agency and the United States shall make

arrangements for managed access under this Protocol in order to prevent the

dissemination of proliferation sensitive information, to meet safety or physical

protection requirements, or to protect proprietary or commercially sensitive information.

Such arrangements shall not preclude the Agency from conducting activities necessary

to provide credible assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and

activities at the location in question, including the resolution of a question relating to the

correctness and completeness of the information referred to in Article 2 or of an

inconsistency relating to that information.

b. The United States may, when providing the information referred to in Article 2,

inform the Agency of the places at a site or location at which managed access may be

applicable.

c. Pending the entry into force of any necessary Subsidiary Arrangements, the United

States may have recourse to managed access consistent with the provisions of paragraph

a. above.

Article 8

Nothing in this Protocol shall preclude the United States from offering the

Agency access to locations in addition to those referred to in Articles 5 and 9 or from

requesting the Agency to conduct verification activities at a particular location. The

Agency shall, without delay, make every reasonable effort to act upon such a request.

Article 9

The United States shall provide the Agency with access to locations specified by the Agency to carry out wide-area environmental sampling, provided that if the

United States is unable to provide such access it shall make every reasonable effort to

satisfy Agency requirements at alternative locations. The Agency shall not seek such

access until the use of wide-area environmental sampling and the procedural

arrangements therefore have been approved by the Board and following consultations

between the Agency and the United States.

Article 10

The Agency shall inform the United States of:

a. The activities carried out under this Protocol, including those in respect of any

questions or inconsistencies the Agency had brought to the attention of the United

States, within sixty days of the activities being carried out by the Agency. b, The results of activities in respect of any questions or inconsistencies the Agency had

brought to the attention of the United States, as soon as possible but in any case within

thirty days of the results being established by the Agency.

c. The conclusions it has drawn from its activities under this Protocol. The conclusions

shall be provided annually.

Article I I - DESIGNATION OF AGENCY INSPECTORS

a. (i) The Director General shall notify the United States of the

Board's approval of any Agency official as a safeguards inspector.

Unless the United States advises the Director General of its rejection

of such an official as an inspector for the United States within three

months of receipt of notification of the Board's approval, the inspector

so notified to the United States shall be considered designated to the

United States.

(ii) The Director General, acting in response to a request by the United

States or on his own initiative, shall immediately inform the United
Protocol Additional to the US-IAEA Agmt. for Application of Safeguards 1283

States of the withdrawal of the designation of any official as an

inspector for the United States.

b. A notification referred to in paragraph a. above shall be deemed to be received by the

United States seven days after the date of the transmission by registered mail of the

notification by the Agency to the United States.

Article 12 - VISAS

The United States shall, within one month of the receipt of a request therefor,

provide the designated inspector specified in the request with appropriate multiple

entry/exit and/or transit visas, where required, to enable the inspector to enter and

remain on the territory of the United States for the purpose of carrying out his/her

functions, Any visas required shall be valid for at least one year and shall be renewed, as

required, to cover the duration of the inspector's designation to the United States.

Article 13 - SUBSIDIARY ARRANGEMENTS

a. Where the United States or the Agency indicates that it is necessary to specify in

Subsidiary Arrangements how measures laid down in this Protocol are to be applied, the

United States and the Agency shall agree on such Subsidiary Arrangements within

ninety days of the entry into force of this Protocol or, where the indication of the need

for such Subsidiary Arrangements is made after the entry into force of this Protocol,

within ninety days of the date of such indication.

b. Pending the entry into force of any necessary Subsidiary Arrangements, the Agency

shall be entitled to apply the measures laid down in this Protocol.

Article 14 - COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS

a. The United States shall permit and protect free communications by the Agency for

official purposes between Agency inspectors in the United States and Agency

Headquarters and/or Regional Offices, including attended and unattended transmission

of information generated by Agency containment and/or surveillance or measurement

devices. The Agency shall have, in consultation with the United States, the right to make

use of internationally established systems of direct communications, including satellite

systems and other forms of telecommunication, not in use in the United States. At the

request of the United States or the Agency, details of the implementation of this

paragraph with respect to the attended or unattended transmission of information

generated by Agency containment and/or surveillance or measurement devices shall be

specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements.

b. Communication and transmission of information as provided for in paragraph a.

above shall take due account of the need to protect proprietary or commercially sensitive

information or design information which the United States regards as being of particular

sensitivity.

Article 15- PROTECTION OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION

a. The Agency shall maintain a stringent regime to ensure effective protection against

disclosure of commercial, technological and industrial secrets and other confidential

information coming to its knowledge, including such information coming to the

Agency's knowledge in the implementation of this Protocol.

b. The regime referred to in paragraph a. above shall include, among others, provisions

relating to:

(i) General principles and associated measures for the handling of confidential

information;

(ii) Conditions of staff employment relating to the protection of confidential

information;

(iii) Procedures in cases of breaches or alleged breaches of confidentiality.

c. The regime referred to in paragraph a. above shall be approved and periodically

reviewed by the Board.
1284 Protocol Additional to the US-IAEA Agmt. for Application of Safeguards

Article 16 - ANNEXES

a. The Annexes to this Protocol shall be an integral part thereof. Except for the purposes

of amendment of the Annexes, the term "Protocol" as used in this instrument means the

Protocol and the Annexes together.'

b. The list of activities specified in Annex I, and the list of equipment and material

specified in Annex 11, may be amended by the Board upon the advice of an open-ended

working group of experts established by the Board. Any such amendment shall take

effect four months after its adoption by the Board.

Article 17- ENTRY INTO FORCE

a. This Protocol shall enter into force on the date on which the Agency receives from the

United States written notification that the United States' statutory and constitutional

requirements for entry into force have been met.

b. The United States may, at any date before this Protocol enters into force, declare that

it will apply this Protocol provisionally.

c. The Director General shall promptly inform all Member States of the Agency of any

declaration of provisional application of, and of the entry into force of, this Protocol.

Article 18 - DEFINITIONS

For the purpose of this Protocol:

a. Nuclear fuel cycle-related research and development activities means those activities

which are specifically related to any process or system development aspect of any of the

following:

- conversion of nuclear material,

- enrichment of nuclear material,

- nuclear fuel fabrication,

- reactors, critical facilities,

- reprocessing of nuclear fuel,

- processing (not including repackaging or conditioning not involving the

separation of elements, for storage or disposal) of intermediate or high level

waste containing plutonium, high enriched uranium or uranium-233,

but do not include activities related to theoretical or basic scientific research or to

research and development on industrial radioisotope applications, medical,

hydrological and agricultural applications, health and environmental effects and

improved maintenance.

b. Site means that area delimited by the United States in the relevant design information

fbr a facility, including a closed-down facility, and in the relevant information on a

location outside facilities where nuclear material is customarily used, including a closeddown location outside facilities where nuclear material was customarily used (this is

limited to locations with hot cells or where activities related to conversion, enrichment,

fuel fabrication or reprocessing were carried out). It shall also include all installations,

co-located with the facility or location, for the provision or use of essential services,

including hot cells for processing irradiated materials not containing nuclear material;

installations for the treatment, storage and disposal of waste; and buildings associated

with specified activities identified by the United States under Article 2.a.(iv) above.

c. Decommissioned facility or decommissioned location outside facilities means an

installation or location at which residual structures and equipment essential for its use

have been removed or rendered inoperable so that it is not used to store and can no

longer be used to handle, process or utilize nuclear material.

'To view the Annexes, see the Model Additional Protocol at the International Atomic Energy Agency Web

site: http://www. iaea.org/Publications/Docuiwents/Infcircs/1997/infcirc540c.pdf. The Model Additional

Protocol is the basis of this agreement, with the one exception being the National Security Exclusion.
Protocol Additional to the US-IAEA Agmt. for Application of Safeguards 1285

d. Closed-down facility or closed-down location outside facilities means an installation

or location where operations have been stopped and the nuclear material removed but

which has not been decommissioned.

e. High enriched uranium means uranium containing 20 percent or more of the isotope

uraniumr-235.

f. Location-specific environmental sampling means the collection of environmental

samples (e.g., air, water, vegetation, soil, smears) at, and in the immediate vicinity of, a

location specified by the Agency for the purpose of assisting the Agency to draw

conclusions about the absence of undeclared nuclear material or nuclear activities at the

specified location.

g. Wide-area environmental sampling, means the collection of environmental samples

(e.g., air, water, vegetation, soil, smears) at a set of locations specified by the Agency for

the purpose of assisting the Agency to draw conclusions about the absence of undeclared

nuclear material or nuclear activities over a wide area.

h. Nuclear material means any source or any special fissionable material as defined in

Article XX of the Statute. The term source material shall not be interpreted as applying

to ore or ore residue. Any determination by the Board under Article XX of the Statute of

the Agency after the entry into force of this Protocol which adds to the materials

considered to be source material or special fissionable material shall have effect under

this Protocol only upon acceptance by the United States.

i. Facility means:

(i) A reactor, a critical facility, a conversion plant, a fabrication plant, a

reprocessing plant, an isotope separation plant or a separate storage

installation; or

(ii) Any location where nuclear material in amounts greater than one

effective kilogram is customarily used.

j. Location outside facilities means any installation or location, which is not a facility,

where nuclear material is customarily used in amounts of one effective kilogram or less.

DONE at Vienna on the __ day of 19 in duplicate in the English language.

FOR THE UNITED STATES

OF AMERICA

FOR THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC

ENERGY AGENCY
1286 U.S. Additional Protocol Implementation Act (P.L. 109-401)

0. UNITED STATES ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL

IMPLEMENTATION ACT

Public Law 109-401 120 Stat. 2741

December 18, 2006

Title Il-United States Additional Protocol Implementation

Sec. 201. Short Title

This title may be cited as the "United States Additional Protocol

Implementation Act".

Sec. 202. Findings

Congress makes the following findings:

(I) The proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear

explosive devices poses a grave threat to the national security of the

United States and its vital national interests.

(2) The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has proven critical to

limiting such proliferation.

(3) For the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to be effective,

each of the non-nuclear-weapon State Parties must conclude a

comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA, and such

agreements must be honored and enforced.

(4) Recent events emphasize the urgency of strengthening the

effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the safeguards system.

This can best be accomplished by providing IAEA inspectors with

more information about, and broader access to, nuclear activities

within the territory of non-nuclear-weapon State Parties.

(5) The proposed scope of such expanded information and

access has been negotiated by the member states of the IAEA in the

form of a Model Additional Protocol to its existing safeguards

agreements, and universal acceptance of Additional Protocols by nonnuclear weapons states is essential to enhancing the effectiveness of

the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

(6) On June 12, 1998, the United States, as a nuclear-weapon

State Party, signed an Additional Protocol that is based on the Model

Additional Protocol, but which also contains measures, consistent

with its existing safeguards agreements with its members, that protect

the right of the United States to exclude the application of IAEA

safeguards to locations and activities with direct national security

significance or to locations or information associated with such

activities.

(7) Implementation of the Additional Protocol in the United

States in a manner consistent with United States obligations under the

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty may encourage other parties to the

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, especially non- nuclear-weapon

State Parties, to conclude Additional Protocols and thereby strengthen

the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty safeguards system and help

reduce the threat of nuclear proliferation, which is of direct and

substantial benefit to the United States.

(8) Implementation of the Additional Protocol by the United

States is not required and is completely voluntary given its status as a

nuclear-weapon State Party, but the United States has acceded to the

Additional Protocol to demonstrate its commitment to the nuclear

nonproliferation regime and to make United States civil nuclear
U.S. Additional Protocol Implementation Act (P.L. 109-40 1) 1287

activities available to the same IAEA inspections as are applied in the

case of non-nuclear- weapon State Parties.

(9) In accordance with the national security exclusion contained

in Article I.b of its Additional Protocol, the United States will not

allow any inspection activities, nor make any declaration of any

information with respect to, locations, information, and activities of

direct national security significance to the United States.

(10) Implementation of the Additional Protocol will conform to

the principles set forth in the letter of April 30, 2002, from the United

States Permanent Representative to the International Atomic Energy

Agency and the Vienna Office of the United Nations to the Director

General of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Sec. 203. Definitions

In this title:

(1) Additional protocol.--The term "Additional Protocol", when

used in the singular form, means the Protocol Additional to the

Agreement between the United States of America and the

International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of

Safeguards in the United States of America, with Annexes, signed at

Vienna June 12, 1998 (T. Doc. 107-7).

(2) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term "appropriate congressional committees" means the Committee

on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the

Committee on Appropriations of the Senate and the Committee on

Armed Services, the Committee on International Relations, the

Committee on Science, and the Committee on Appropriations of the

House of Representatives.

(3) Complementary access.--The term "complementary access"

means the exercise of the IAEA's access rights as set forth in Articles

4 to 6 of the Additional Protocol.

(4) Executive agency.--The term "executive agency" has the

meaning given such term in section 105 of title 5, United States Code.

(5) Facility.--The term "facility" has the meaning set forth in

Article 18i. of the Additional Protocol.

(6) IAEA.--The term "IAEA" means the International Atomic

Energy Agency.

(7) Judge of the united states.--The term "judge of the United

States" means a United States district judge, or a United States

magistrate judge appointed under the authority of chapter 43 of title

28, United States Code.

(8) Location.--The term "location" means any geographic point

or area declared or identified by the United States or specified by the

International Atomic Energy Agency.

(9) Nuclear non-proliferation treaty--The term "Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty" means the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of

Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1,

1968, and entered into force March 5, 1970 (21 UST 483).

(10) Nuclear-weapon state party and non-nuclear-weapon state

party.--The terms "nuclear-weapon State Party" and "non- nuclearweapon State Party" have the meanings given such terms in the

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

(11) Person.--The term "person", except as otherwise provided,

means any individual, corporation, partnership, firm, association,

trust, estate, public or private institution, any State or any political

subdivision thereof, or any political entity within a State, any foreign
1288 U.S. Additional Protocol Implementation Act (P.L. 109-401)

government or nation or any agency, instrumentality, or political

subdivision of any such government or nation, or other entity located

in the United States.

(12) Site.--The term "site" has the meaning set forth in Article

18b. of the Additional Protocol.

(13) United states.--The term "United States", when used as a

geographic reference, means the several States of the United States,

the District of Columbia, and the commonwealths, territories, and

possessions of the United States and includes all places under the

jurisdiction or control of the United States, including--

(A) the territorial sea and the overlying airspace;

(B) any civil aircraft of the United States or public

aircraft, as such terms are defined in paragraphs (17) and (41),

respectively, of section 40102(a) of title 49, United States Code;

and

(C) any vessel of the United States, as such term is

defined in section 3(b) of the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement

Act (46 U.S.C. App. 1903(b)).

(14) Wide-area environmental sampling.--The term "wide-area

environmental sampling" has the meaning set forth in Article I 8g. of

the Additional Protocol.

See. 204. Severability.

If any provision of this title, or the application of such,provision

to any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the remainder of this title,

or the application of such provision to persons or circumstances other

than those as to which it is held invalid, shall not be affected thereby.

Subtitle A--General Provisions

Sec. 211. Authority

(a) In General.--The President is authorized to implement and

carry out the provisions of this title and the Additional Protocol and shall

designate through Executive order which executive agency or agencies of

the United States, which may include but are not limited to the

Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Department of

Justice, the Department of Commerce, the Department of Energy, and the

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, shall issue or amend and enforce

regulations in order to implement this title and the provisions of the

Additional Protocol.

(b) Included Authority.--For any executive agency designated

under subsection (a) that does not currently possess the authority to

conduct site vulnerability assessments and related activities, the authority

provided in subsection (a) includes such authority.

(c) Exception.--The authority described in subsection (b) does

not supersede or otherwise modify any existing authority of any Federal

department or agency already having such authority.

Subtitle B--Complementary Access

Sec. 221. Requirement For Authority To Conduct Complementary

Access

(a) Prohibition.--No complementary access to any location in

the United States shall take place pursuant to the Additional Protocol

without the authorization of the United States Government in accordance

with the requirements of this title.

(b) Authority.--
U.S. Additional Protocol Implementation Act (P.L. 109-40 1) 1289

(1) In general.--Complementary access to any location in the

United States subject to access under the Additional Protocol is

authorized in accordance with this title.

(2) United states representatives.--

(A) Restrictions.--In the event of complementary access

to a privately owned or operated location, no employee of the

Environmental Protection Agency or of the Mine Safety and

Health Administration or the Occupational Safety and Health

Administration of the Department of Labor may participate in

the access.

(B) Number.--The number of designated United States

representatives accompanying IAEA inspectors shall be kept to

the minimum necessary.

Sec. 222. Procedures For Complementary Access

(a) In General.--Each instance of complementary access to a

location in the United States under the Additional Protocol shall be

conducted in accordance with this subtitle.

(b) Notice.--

(I) In general.--Complementary access referred to in subsection

(a) may occur only upon the issuance of an actual written notice by

the United States Government to the owner, operator, occupant, or

agent in charge of the location to be subject to complementary access.

(2) Time of notification.--The notice under paragraph (1) shall

be submitted to such owner, operator, occupant, or agent as soon as

possible after the United States Government has received notification

that the IAEA seeks complementary access. Notices may be posted

prominently at the location if the United States Government is unable

to provide actual written notice to such owner, operator, occupant, or

agent.

(3) Content of notice.--

(A) In general.--The notice required by paragraph (1)

shall specify--

(i) the purpose for the complementary access;

(ii) the basis for the selection of the facility, site, or

other location for the complementary access sought;

(iii) the activities that will be carried out during the

complementary access;

(iv) the time and date that the complementary

access is expected to begin, and the anticipated period

covered by the complementary access; and

(v) the names and titles of the inspectors.

(4) Separate notices required.--A separate notice shall be

provided each time that complementary access is sought by the IAEA.

(c) Credentials.--The complementary access team of the IAEA

and representatives or designees of the United States Government shall

display appropriate identifying credentials to the owner, operator,

occupant, or agent in charge of the location before gaining entry in

connection with complementary access.

(d) Scope.--

()) In general.--Except as provided in a warrant issued under

section 223, and subject to the rights of the United States Government

under the Additional Protocol to limit complementary access,

complementary access to a location pursuant to this title may extend

to all activities specifically permitted for such locations under Article

6 of the Additional Protocol.
1290 U.S. Additional Protocol Implementation Act (P.L. 109-401)

(2) Exception.--Unless required by the Additional Protocol, no

inspection under this title shall extend to--

(A) financial data (other than production data);

(B) sales and marketing data (other than shipment data);

(C) pricing data;

(D) personnel data;

(E) patent data;

(F) data maintained for compliance with environmental

or occupational health and safety regulations; or

(G) research data.

(e) Environment, Health, Safety, and Security.--In carrying out

their activities, members of the IAEA complementary access team and

representatives or designees of the United States Government shall

observe applicable environmental, health, safety, and security regulations

established at the location subject to complementary access, including

those for protection of controlled environments within a facility and for

personal safety.

Sec. 223. Consents, Warrants, And Complementary Access

(a) In General.--

(I) Procedure.--

(A) Consent.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), an

appropriate official of the United States Government shall seek

or have the consent of the owner, operator, occupant, or agent in

charge of a location prior to entering that location in connection

with complementary access pursuant to sections 221 and 222.

The owner, operator, occupant, or agent in charge of the

location may withhold consent for any reason or no reason.

(B) Administrative search warrant--In the absence of

consent, the United States Government may seek an

administrative search warrant from a judge of the United States

under subsection (b). Proceedings regarding the issuance of an

administrative search warrant shall be conducted ex parte,

unless otherwise requested by the United States Government.

(2) Expedited access--For purposes of obtaining access to a

location pursuant to Article 4b.(ii) of the Additional Protocol in order

to satisfy United States obligations under the Additional Protocol

when notice of two hours or less is required, the United States

Government may gain entry to such location in connection with

complementary access, to the extent such access is consistent with the

Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, without

obtaining either a warrant or consent.

(b) Administrative Search Warrants for Complementary

Access.-

(I) Obtaining administrative search warrants.--For

complementary access conducted in the United States pursuant to the

Additional Protocol, and for which the acquisition of a warrant is

required, the United States Government shall first obtain an

administrative search warrant from a judge of the United States. The

United States Government shall provide to such judge all appropriate information regarding the basis for the selection of the facility, site, or

other location to which complementary access is sought.

(2) Content of affidavits for administrative search warrants.--A

judge of the United States shall promptly issue an administrative

search warrant authorizing the requested complementary access upon

an affidavit submitted by the United States Government--
U.S. Additional Protocol Implementation Act (P.L. 109-40 1) 1291

(A) stating that the Additional Protocol is in force;

(B) stating that the designated facility, site, or other

location is subject to complementary access under the

Additional Protocol;

(C) stating that the purpose of the complementary access

is consistent with Article 4 of the Additional Protocol;

(D) stating that the requested complementary access is in

accordance with Article 4 of the Additional Protocol;

(E) containing assurances that the scope of the IAEA's

complementary access, as well as what it may collect, shall be

limited to the access provided for in Article 6 of the Additional

Protocol;

(F) listing the items, documents, and areas to be searched

and seized;

. (G) stating the earliest commencement and the

anticipated duration of the complementary access period, as well

as the expected times of day during which such complementary

access will take place; and

(H) stating that the location to which entry in connection

with complementary access is sought was selected either--

(i) because there is probable cause, on the basis of

specific evidence, to believe that information required to

be reported regarding a location pursuant to regulations

promulgated under this title is incorrect or incomplete,

and that the location to be accessed contains evidence

regarding that violation; or

(ii) pursuant to a reasonable general administrative

plan based upon specific neutral criteria.

(3) Content of warrants.--A warrant issued under paragraph (2)

shall specify the same matters required of an affidavit under that

paragraph. In addition, each warrant shall contain the identities of the

representatives of the IAEA on the complementary access team and

the identities of the representatives or designees of the United States

Government required to display identifying credentials under section

222(c).

See. 224. Prohibited Acts Relating To Complementary Access

It shall be unlawful for any person willfully to fail or refuse to

permit, or to disrupt, delay, or otherwise impede, a complementary

access authorized by this subtitle or an entry in connection with such

access.

Subtitle C--Confidentiality of Information

Sec. 231. Protection Of Confidentiality Of Information

Information reported to, or otherwise acquired by, the United

States Government under this title or under the Additional Protocol shall

be exempt from disclosure under section 552 of title 5, United States

Code.

Subtitle D--Enforcement

Sec. 241. Recordkeeping Violations

It shall be unlawful for any person willfully to fail or refuse--

(I) to establish or maintain any record required by any

regulation prescribed under this title;
1292 U.S. Additional Protocol Implementation Act (P.L. 109-401)

(2) to submit any report, notice, or other information to the

United States Government in accordance with any regulation

prescribed under this title; or

(3) to permit access to or copying of any record by the United

States Government in accordance with any regulation prescribed

under this title.

Sec. 242. Penalties

(a) Civil.--

(1) Penalty amounts.--Any person that is determined, in

accordance with paragraph (2), to have violated section 224 or section

241 shall be required by order to pay a civil penalty in an amount not

to exceed $ 25,000 for each violation. For the purposes of this

paragraph, each day during which a violation of section 224 continues

shall constitute a separate violation of that section.

(2) Notice and hearing.--

(A) In general.--Before imposing a penalty against a

person under paragraph (I), the head of an executive agency

designated under section 21 l(a) shall provide the person with

notice of the order. If, within 15 days after receiving the notice,

the person requests a hearing, the head of the designated

executive agency shall initiate a hearing on the violation.

(B) Conduct of hearing.--Any hearing so requested shall

be conducted before an administrative judge. The hearing shall

be conducted in accordance with the requirements of section

554 of title 5, United States Code. If no hearing is so requested,

the order imposed by the head of the designated agency shall

constitute a final agency action.

(C) Issuance of orders.--If the administrative judge

determines, upon the preponderance of the evidence received,

that a person named in the complaint has violated section 224 or

section 241, the administrative judge shall state the findings of

fact and conclusions of law, and issue and serve on such person

an order described in paragraph (1).

(D) Factors for determination of penalty amounts.-- In

determining the amount of any civil penalty, the administrative

judge or the head of the designated agency shall take into

account the nature, circumstances, extent, and gravity of the

violation or violations and, with respect to the violator,, the

ability to pay, effect on ability to continue to do business, any

history of such violations, the degree of culpability, the

existence of an internal compliance program, and such other

matters as justice may require.

(E) Content of notice.--For the purposes of this

paragraph, notice shall be in writing and shall be verifiably

served upon the person or persons subject to an order described

in paragraph (I). In addition, the notice shall--

(i) set forth the time, date, and specific nature of

the alleged violation or violations; and

(ii) specify the administrative and judicial

remedies available to the person or persons subject to the

order, including the availability of a hearing and

subsequent appeal.

(3) Administrative appellate review.--The decision and order of

an administrative judge shall be the recommended decision and order

and shall be referred to the head of the designated executive agency
U.S. Additional Protocol Implementation Act (P.L. 109-401) 1293

for final decision and order. If, within 60 days, the head of the

designated executive agency does not modify or vacate the decision

and order, it shall become a final agency action under this subsection.

(4) Judicial review.-- A person adversely affected by a final

order may, within 30 days after the date the final order is issued, file a

petition in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

or in the Court of Appeals for the district in which the violation

occurred.

(5) Enforcement of final orders.--

(A) In general.--If a person fails to comply with a final

order issued against such person under this subsection and--

(i) the person has not filed a petition for judicial

review of the order in accordance with paragraph (4), or

(ii) a court in an action brought under paragraph

(4) has entered a final judgment in favor of the designated

executive agency, the head of the designated executive

agency shall commence a civil action to seek compliance

with the final order in any appropriate district court of the

United States.

(B) No review.--In any such civil action, the validity and

appropriateness of the final order shall not be subject to review.

(C) Interest.--Payment of penalties assessed in a final

order under this section shall include interest at currently

prevailing rates calculated from the date of expiration of the 60-

day period referred to in paragraph

(3) or the date of such final order, as the case may be.

(b) Criminal.--Any person who violates section 224 or section

241 may, in addition to or in lieu of any civil penalty which may be

imposed under subsection (a) for such violation, be fined under title 18,

United States Code, imprisoned for not more than five years, or both.

See. 243. Specific Enforcement

(a) Jurisdiction.--The district courts of the United States shall

have jurisdiction over civil actions brought by the head of an executive

agency designated under section 211(a)--

(1) to restrain any conduct in violation of section 224 or section

241; or

(2) to compel the taking of any action required by or under this

title or the Additional Protocol.

(b) Civil Actions.--

(I) In general.--A civil action described in subsection (a) may be

brought--

(A) in the case of a civil action described in paragraph (I)

of such subsection, in the United States district court for the

judicial district in which any act, omission, or transaction

constituting a violation of section 224 or section 241 occurred or

in which the defendant is found or transacts business; or

(B) in the case of a civil action described in paragraph (2)

of such subsection, in the United States district court for the

judicial district in which the defendant is found or transacts

business.

(2) Service of process--In any such civil action, process shall be

served on a defendant wherever the defendant may reside or may be

found.
1294 US. Additional Protocol Implementation Act (P.L. 109-401)

Subtitle E--Environmental Sampling

Sec. 251. Notification To Congress Of IAEA Board Approval Of

Wide-Area Environmental Sampling

(a) In General--Not later than 30 days after the date on which

the Board of Governors of the IAEA approves wide-area environmental

sampling for use as a safeguards verification tool, the President shall

notify the appropriate congressional committees.

(b) Content.--The notification under subsection (a) shall

contain--

(I) a description of the specific methods and sampling

techniques approved by the Board of Governors that are to be

employed for purposes of wide-area sampling;

(2) a statement as to whether or not such sampling may be

conducted in the United States under the Additional Protocol; and

(3) an assessment of the ability of the approved methods and

sampling techniques to detect, identify, and determine the conduct,

type, and nature of nuclear activities.

Sec. 252. Application Of National Security Exclusion To Wide-Area

Environmental Sampling

In accordance with Article I(b) of the Additional Protocol, the

United States shall not permit any wide-area environmental sampling

proposed by the IAEA to be conducted at a specified location in the

United States under Article 9 of the Additional Protocol unless the

President has determined and reported to the appropriate congressional

committees with respect to that proposed use of environmental sampling

that--

(I) the proposed use of wide-area environmental sampling is

necessary to increase the capability of the IAEA to detect undeclared

nuclear activities in the territory of a non-nuclear- weapon State

Party;

(2) the proposed use of wide-area environmental sampling will

not result in access by the IAEA to locations, activities, or

information of direct national security significance; and

(3) the United States--

(A) has been provided sufficient opportunity for

consultation with the IAEA if the IAEA has requested

complementary access involving wide-area environmental

sampling; or

(B) has requested under Article 8 of the Additional

Protocol that the IAEA engage in complementary access in the

United States that involves the use of wide-area environmental

sampling.

Sec. 253. Application Of National Security Exclusion To LocationSpecific Environmental Sampling

In accordance with Article I(b) of the Additional Protocol, the

United States shall not permit any location-specific environmental

sampling in the United States under Article 5 of the Additional Protocol

unless the President has determined and reported to the appropriate

congressional committees with respect to that proposed use of

environmental sampling that--

(I) the proposed use of location-specific environmental

sampling is necessary to increase the capability of the IAEA to detect

undeclared nuclear activities in the territory of a non- nuclear-weapon

State Party;
U.S. Additional Protocol Implementation Act (P.L. 109-401) 1295

(2) the proposed use of location-specific environmental

sampling will not result in access by the IAEA to locations, activities,

or information of direct national security significance; and

(3) with respect to the proposed use of environmental sampling,

the United States--

(A) has been provided sufficient opportunity for

consultation with the IAEA if the IAEA has requested

complementary access involving location-specific

environmental sampling; or

(B) has requested under Article 8 of the Additional

Protocol that the IAEA engage in complementary access in the

United States that involves the use of location- specific

environmental sampling.

See. 254. Rule Of Construction

As used in this subtitle, the term "necessary to increase the

capability of the IAEA to detect undeclared nuclear activities in the

territory of a non-nuclear-weapon State Party" shall not be construed to

encompass proposed uses of environmental sampling that might assist

the IAEA in detecting undeclared nuclear activities in the territory of a

non-nuclear-weapon State Party by--

(I) setting a good example of cooperation in the conduct of such

sampling; or

(2) facilitating the formation of a political consensus or political

support for such sampling in the territory of a non- nuclear-weapon

State Party.

Subtitle F--Protection of National Security Information and

Activities

Sec. 261. Protection Of Certain Information

(a) Locations and Facilities -of Direct National Security

Significance.--No current or former Department of Defense or

Department of Energy location, site, or facility of direct national security

significance shall be declared or be subject to IAEA inspection under the

Additional Protocol.

(b) Information of Direct National Security Significance.--No

information of direct national security significance regarding any

location, site, or facility associated with activities of the Department of

Defense or the Department of Energy shall be provided under the

Additional Protocol.

(c) Restricted Data.--Nothing in this title shall be construed to

permit the communication or disclosure to the IAEA or IAEA employees

of restricted data controlled by the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act

of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.), including in particular "Restricted

Data" as defined under paragraph (I) of section II y. of such Act (42

U.S.C. 2014(y)).

(d) Classified Information.--Nothing in this Act shall be

construed to permit the communication or disclosure to the IAEA or

IAEA employees of national security information and other classified

information.

Sec. 262. IAEA Inspections And Visits

(a) Certain Individuals Prohibited From Obtaining Access.--No

national of a country designated by the Secretary of State under section

620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371) as a

government supporting acts of international terrorism shall be permitted
1296 U.S. Additional Protocol Implementation Act (P.L. 109-401)

access to the United States to carry out an inspection activity under the

Additional Protocol or a related safeguards agreement.

(b) Presence of United States Government Personnel.--IAEA

inspectors shall be accompanied at all times by United States

Government personnel when inspecting sites, locations, facilities, or

activities in the United States under the Additional Protocol.

(c) Vulnerability and Related Assessments.--The President shall

conduct vulnerability, counterintelligence, and related assessments not

less than every 5 years to ensure that information of direct national

security significance remains protected at all sites, locations, facilities,

and activities in the United States that are subject to IAEA inspection

under the Additional Protocol.

Subtitle G-- Reports

Sec. 271. Report On Initial United States Declaration

Not later than 60 days before submitting the initial United States

declaration to the IAEA under the Additional Protocol, the President

shall submit to Congress a list of the sites, locations, facilities, and

activities in the United States that the President intends to declare to the

IAEA, and a report thereon.

Sec. 272. Report On Revisions To Initial United States Declaration

Not later than 60 days before submitting to the IAEA any

revisions to the United States declaration submitted under the Additional

Protocol, the President shall submit to Congress a list of any sites,

locations, facilities, or activities in the United States that the President

intends to add to or remove from the declaration, and a report thereon.

Sec. 273. Content Of Reports On United States Declarations

The reports required under section 271 and section 272 shall

present the reasons for each site, location, facility, and activity being

declared or being removed from the declaration list and shall certify that-

(I) each site, location, facility, and activity included in the list

has been examined by each agency with national security equities

with respect to such site, location, facility, or activity; and

(2) appropriate measures have been taken to ensure that

information of direct national security significance will not be

compromised at any such site, location, facility, or activity in

connection with an IAEA inspection.

Sec. 274. Report On Efforts To Promote The Implementation Of

Additional Protocols

Not later than 180 days after the entry into force of the

Additional Protocol, the President shall submit to the appropriate

congressional committees a report on--

(1) measures that have been or should be taken to achieve the

adoption of additional protocols to existing safeguards agreements

signed by non-nuclear-weapon State Parties; and

(2) assistance that has been or should be provided by the United

States to the IAEA in order to promote the effective implementation

of additional protocols to existing safeguards agreements signed by

non-nuclear-weapon State Parties and the verification of the

compliance of such parties with IAEA obligations, with a plan for

providing any needed additional funding.
U.S. Additional Protocol Implementation Act (P.L. 109-401) 1297

See. 275. Notice Of IAEA Notifications

The President shall notify Congress of any notifications issued

by the IAEA to the United States under Article 10 of the Additional

Protocol.

Subtitle H--Authorization of Appropriations

Sec. 281. Authorization Of Appropriations

There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be

necessary to carry out this title.
1298 Status With Regard to Conclusion of Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols and Small Quantities Protocols

P. STATUS WITH REGARD TO CONCLUSION OF SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS AND ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS

AND SMALL QUANTITIES PROTOCOLS

State/Party

AfLghanistan

_____ Algeria

Andorra

Angola

Antigua and Barbuda 2

Armenia

Australia

Austriaý

Azerbaijan

Bahamas2

Bahrain

Bangladesh

Barbads

SQP2

x

In Force: 28 Apr 2010

x. . . . . .

Amended: 20 Nov 2006

Amended: 25 Jul 2007

In Force: 10 May 2009

x

Amended: 15 Apr 2008

X,

Status of Safeguards

Agreement(s) b

In Force: 20 Feb 1978

In Force: 25 Mar 1988

In Force: 07 Jan 1997

In Force: 18 Oct 2010

.In Force:_28_A2r 2010

In Force: 09 Sep 1996

In Force:_04_ Mar 1994

In Force: 05 May 1994

In Force: 10 Jul 1974

Accession: 31 Jul 1996

In Force: 29 Apr 1999

In Force: 12 Sep 1997

In Force: 10 May 2009

In Force: I I Jun 1982

In Force: 14 Aug 196

In Force: 02 Au1995__

In Force: 21 Feb 1977

In Force: 21 Jan 1997

Signed: 7 Jun 2005

In Force: 24 Oct 1989

In Force: 06 Feb 1995

In Force: 28 Dec 1973

INFCIRC

257

359

531

800

528

435/Mod.

455

217

193

580

544

767

301

527 .. _4_95 .

193

532

Additional Protocol

Status

In Force: 19 July 2005

In Force: 03 Nov 20 10

Approved: 1.. S•.2004

Signed: 09 Jan 2001

In Force: 28 Apr 2•_1_

In Force: 28 Jun 2004

In Force: 12 Dec 1997

In Force: 30 Apr 2004

In Force: 29 Nov 2000

Signed: 21 Sept 2010

In Force: 30 Mar 2001

_ Signed:- 15_Nov 2005

In Force: 30 Apr 2004

Signed: 7 Jun 2005

Belarus

Belgium

Belize --

Benin

Bhutan

Boni.ad.Beol-ivia- -- Bosnia and Herzegoin

371

465

204
P. STATUS WITH REGARD TO CONCLUSION OF SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS AND ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS

AND SMALL QUANTITIES PROTOCOLS

State/Party

Botswana

Brazilr

Brunei Darussalam

Burkina Faso

Burundi

Cambodia

Cameroon

Canada

_-Cape Verde

Central African Republic

Chad

Chile 9

China ....... Colombia•

Comoros

Congo, Republic of the

Costa Rica2

C6te d'Ivoire

Croatia

C__e__ h R Cuba 2

Czech Republic"r

x

Amended: 18 Feb 2008

In Force: 27 Sep 2007

x

X

Amended.: 2 7 AMar 2006

In Force: 7 Sep 2009

•In-Force: 13 May 201.0..

In Force: 20 Jan 2009

Signed: 13 Apr 2010

Amended: 12 Jan 2007-7

Amended: 26 May 2008

SQP2 Status of SafeguardsAgreement(s) b

In Force: 24 Aug 2006-.

In Force: 04 Mar 1994

In Force: 04 Nov 1987

Accession: 1 May 2009

In Force: 17 Apr 2003

In Force: 27 Sep 2007

In Force: 17 Dec 1999

In Force: 17 Dec 2004

In Force: 21 Feb 1972

Signed. 28 Jun 2005

-In Force: _7 Sep 2_0_0_9__

In Force: 13 May 2010

In Force: 05 Apr 1995

In Force: 18 Sep 1989

In Force: 22 Dec 1982

In Force: 20 Jan 2009

Signed: 13 Apr 2010

In Force: 22 Nov 1979

In Force: 08 Sep !9_83

In Force: 19 Jan 1995

In Force: 03 Jun 2004

Accession: I May 2008

In Force: II Sep 1997

INFCIRC

694

435

365

193

618

719

586

641

164

777

802

476

369*

306

752

278

309

463

633

193

541

Additional Protocol

Status

In Force: 24 Aug 2006

Accession: I May 2009

In Force: 17 Apr 2003

In Force: 27 Sep 2007

Signed: 16 Dec 2004

In Force: 08 Sep 2000

Signed: 28 Jun 2005

In Force: 7 Sep 2009

In Force: 13 May 2010

In Force: 03 Nov 2003

In Force: 28 Mar 2002

In Force: 5 Mar 2009

In Force: 20 Jan 2009

Signed: 13 Apr 2010

Signed: 12 Dec 2001

Signed: 22 Oct 2008

In Force: 06 Jul 2000

In Force: 03 Jun 2004

Accession: I May 2008

In Force: 01 Jul 2002

Status With Regard to Conclusion of Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols and Small Quantities Protocols 1299
1300 Status With Regard to Conclusion of Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols and Small Quantities Protocols

P. STATUS WITH REGARD TO CONCLUSION OF SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS AND ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS

AND SMALL QUANTITIES PROTOCOLS

State/Party

Democratic_ Peop-es RePp of Korea

Democratic Republic of the Conjo

..... .. ... . -. - Denmark -r

Djibouti

_ _Dom inica

Dominican Republic

Ecuador

Egypt

El Salvador2

...... _Equatorial Guinea

Eritrea . ... .... . . .. . . ....... E ston i-a ,'

...... ..... Ethiopia

Fiji

. .. . . . Finland

France

Gabon

Gambia

Georgia ..... . ...... . . . ... .. G erm any 16-

SQpa

Signed: 13 April 2010

X

Amended: II Oct 2006

Amended: 7 April 2006

x

x

x

x

x

x

x ___

Status of Safeguards

Agreement(s) b

__In Force:_ 10- AprI 992

In Force: 09 Nov 1972

In Force: 21 Feb 1977

Signed: _ 3April 2010

In Force: 03 Mav 1996

In Force: II Oct 1973

In Force: 10 Mar 1975

In Force: 30 Jun 1982

InForce: 22 Apr 1975

•Approved:13 Jun 1986

Accession: I Dec 2005

In Force: 02 Dec 1977

In Force: 22 Mar 1973

Accession: 01 Oct 1995

In Force: 12 Sep 1981 -

In Force:. 26 Oct 2007'5

In Force: 25 Mar 2010

In Force: 08 Aug 1.978

In Force: 03 Jun 2003

In Force: 21 Feb 1977

In Force: 17 Feb 1975

Accession: 17 Dec 1981

INFCIRC

403

183 _

193

513

201

231

302

232

193

261

192

193

290*

718

792

277

617

193

226

193

Additional Protocol

Status

In Force: 09 Apr 2003

In Force: 30 Apr 2004

Signed: 13 April 2010

In Force: 5 May 2010

In Force: 24 Oct 2001

In Force: 24 May 2004__

Accession: I Dec 2005

In Force: 14 July 2006

In Force: 30 Apr 2004

In Force: 30 Apr 2004..

In Force: 25 Mar 2010

Approved: 3 Mar 2010

In Force: 03 Jun 2003

In Force: 30 Apr2004

In Force: II Jun 2004

In Force: 30 Apr 2004

Ghana

Greeceer

7
P. STATUS WITH REGARD TO CONCLUSION OF SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS AND ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS

AND SMALL QUANTITIES PROTOCOLS

State/Party

- Grena a-

- duaem'a--2

Guinea

Guinea-biss-au .. 

Holy See

SQP2

x

x

Amended: II Sep 2006

Amended: 20 Sep 2007

Amended: 15 Mar 2010

Honduras 2

Hungary

Iceland

India

Status of Safeguards

Agreement(s) b

In Force: 23 Jul 1996

In Force: 01 Feb 1982

In Force: 23 May 1997

In Force: 9 Mar 2006

In Force: 01 Aug 1972

In Force: 18 Apr 1975

Accession: I Jul 2007

In Force: 16 Oct 1974

In Force: 30 Sep 1971

In Force: 17Nov 1977

In Force: 27 Sep 1988

In Force: II Oct 1989

In Force: 01 Mar 1994

In Force: 11 May 2009

In Force: 14 Jul 1980

In Force: 15 May 1974

In Force: 29 Feb 1972

In Force: 21 Feb 1977

In Force: 04 AEr 1975

In Force: 21 Feb 1977

In Force: 06 Nov 1978

Additional Protocol

INFCIRC Status

525

543

681

187

235

193

215

211

260

360

374

433

754

283

214

172

193

249/Add.

193

265

In Force: 9 Mar 2006

In Force: 24 Sep 1998

Signed: 7 Jul 2005

Accession: 1 Jul 2007

In Force: 12 Sep 2003

In Force: 28 May 2008 -

Indonesia

Iran, Islamic .Republic of

Iraq

Signed: 15 May 2009

In Force: 29 Sep 1999

Signed: 18 Dec 2003

Signed: 9 Oct 2008"

In Force: 30 Apr 2004

In Force: 30 Apr 2004

In Force: 19 Mar 2003

Ireland

Israel

Italy Janaicaa2 Rescinded: 15 Dec 2006 a £ 1 .5.

Status With Regard to Conclusion of Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols and Small Ouantities Protocols 1301
1302 Status With Regard to Conclusion of Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols and Small Quantities Protocols

P. STATUS WITH REGARD TO CONCLUSION OF SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS AND ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS

AND SMALL QUANTITIES PROTOCOLS

State/Party

Japan

Jordan

Kazakhstan

Kenya

Kiribati

Korea, Rep. of

Kuwait ..... ... . ... . . .... ... . .. K )y gy z~stan

Lao Peoples Democratic Republic

Latvia 2-

Lebanon

Lesotho

... ...._Liberia

Libyan Arab Jamnahiriya

Liechtenstein

.... _Lithuania2

' _._Luxembourg

Madagascar

Malawi . ....... Mala-ysia

Maldives

Mali ... ... M alFta 22

5QP.

X

In Force: 18 Sep 2009

X

X

Amended: 5 Sep 2007 _

Amended: 8 Sep 2009

Amended: 29 May 2008

Amended: 29 Feb 2008

X

Amended: 18 Apr 2006

Status of Safeguards

Agreement(s) b

In Force: 02 Dec 1977

In Force: 21 Feb 1978

In Force: 11 Aug 1995

In Force: 18 Sep-2009

In Force: 19 Dec 1990

In Force: 14 Nov 1975

In Force: 07 Mar 2002

In Force: 03 Feb 2004

In Force: 05 Apr 2001

Accession: 1 Oct 2008

In Force: 05 Mar 1973

In Force: 12 Jun 1973

In Force: 08 Jul 1980

In Force: 04 Oct 1979

Accession: 1 Jan 2008

In Force: 21 Feb 1977

In Force: 14 Jun 1973

In Force: 03 Aug 1992

In Force: 29 Feb 1972

In Force: 02 Oct 1977

In Force: 12 Sep 2002

Accession: 1 Jul 2007

INFC1RC

255

258

504

778

390

236

607

629

599

193

191

199

282

275

193

193

200

409

182

253

615

193

Additional Protocol

Status

In Force: 16 Dec-1999

In Force: 28 Jul 1998

In Force: 9 May 2007

In Force: 18 Sep 2009

In Force: 09 Nov 2004

In Force: 19 Feb 2004

In Force: 02 Jun 2003

Signed: 29 Jan 2007

Accession: I Oct 2008

I Force: 26 Apr 2010

In Force: II Aug 2006

Signed: 14 Jul 2006

Accession: I Jan 2008

In Force: 30 Apr 2004

In Force: 18 Sep 2003

In Force: 26 July 2007

Signed: 22 Nov 2005

In Force: 12 Sep 2002

Accession: I Jul 2007
P. STATUS WITH REGARD TO CONCLUSION OF SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS AND ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS

AND SMALL QUANTITIES PROTOCOLS

State/Party

Marshall Islands

Mauritania

Mauritius

Mexico

Micronesia, Federated States o

Monaco

_-Mongolia_

Montenegro

Morocco

Mozambique

Myanmar

Namibia

Nauru

Nepal

Netherlands

New Zealand 2-

Nicaragua2 Niger ------Nigeria

Norway

Oman

X -Amended: 26 Sep 2008d

SQpa

Amended: 27 Nov 2008

X

Signed: 26 May 2008

Rescinded: 15 Nov 2007

Signed. 8 July 201

X .. . .. ... . .. . .. . . .

X

X____

X __

Status of Safeguards

Agreement(s) b

In Force: 03 May 2005

In Force: 10 Dec 2009

In Force: 31 Jan 1973

In Force: 14 Sep 1973

In Force: 13 Jun 1996

In Force: 05 Sep 1972

Signed: 26 May 2008

In Force: 18 Feb 1975

" Signed: 8 July2010 -

In Force: 20 Apr 1995

In Force: 15 Apr 1998

In Force: 13 Apr 1984

In Force: 22 Jun 1972

In Force: 05 Jun 197*5 IS

In Force: 21 Feb 1977

In Force: 29 Feb 1972

In Force: 29 Dec 1976

In Force: 16 Feb 2005

In Force: 29 Feb 1988

InForce: 01 Mar 1972

In Force: 5 SeD 2006

INFCIRC

653

788

190

197

524

188

228

477

551

317

186

229

193

185

246

664

358

177

691

Additional Protocol

Status

In Force: 03 May 2005

In Force: 10 Dec 2009

In Force: 17 Dec 2007

Signed: 29 Mar 2004

In Force: 30 Sep 1999

In Force: 12 May 2003

Signed: 26 May 2008

Signed: 22 Sep 2004

Signed:8Julv2010_

Signed: 22 Mar2000 --

In Force: 30 Apr 2004

In Force: 24 Sep 1998

In Force: 18 Feb 2005

In Force: 2 May 2007

In Force: 4 Apr 2007

In Force: 16 May 2000

Amended: 12 Jun 2009

X

Status With Regard to Conclusion of Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols and Small Quantities Protocols 1303
1304 Status With Regard to Conclusion of Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols and Small Quantities Protocols

P. STATUS WITH REGARD TO CONCLUSION OF SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS AND ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS

AND SMALL QUANTITIES PROTOCOLS

State/Party

Pakistan

Palau

P aama°-

Papua New Guinea

Paraguay

PeruL

Philippines

Poland

25

Qatar

Republic of Moldova

Romania-7

Russian Federation

Rwanda

St. Kitts and Nevis

St. LEucia5

SQpa

Amended: 15 Mar 2006

X

X_

In Force: 21 Jan 2009

Amended: 20 Sep 2010

In Force: 17 May 2010

x

Status of Safeguards

Agreement(s) b

In Force: 05 Mar 1962

In Force: 17 Jun 1968

In Force: 17 Oct 1969

In Force: 18 Mar 1976

In Force: 02 Mar 1977

In Force: 10 Sep 1991

In Force: 24 Feb 1993

In Force: 22 Feb 2007

In Force: 13 May 2005

In Force: 23 Mar 1984

In Force: 13 Oct 1983

In Force: 20 Mar 1979

In Force: 01 Aug 1979

In Force: 16 Oct 1974

Accession: I Mar 2007

Accession: 01 Jul 1986

In Force: 21 Jan 2009

In Force: 17 May 2006

Accession: I May 2010

In Force: 10 Jun 1985

In Force: 17 May 2010

In Force: 07 May 1996

In Force: 02 Feb 1990

INFC[RC

34

116

135

239

248

393

418

705

650

316

312

279

273

216

193

193

747

690

193

327*

801

514

379

Additional Protocol

Status

In Force: 13 May 205_

In Force: II Dec 2001

In Force: 15 Sep 2004

In Force: 23 Jul 2001

In Force: 26 Feb 2010

Accession: I Mar 2007

In Force: 30 Apr 2004

Approved: 13 Sep 2006

Accession: 1 May 2010

In Force: 16 Oct 2007

In Force: 17 May 2010
P. STATUS WITH REGARD TO CONCLUSION OF SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS AND ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS

AND SMALL QUANTITIES PROTOCOLS

State/Party

St. Vincent and the GrenadinesSamoa

San Marino

. _ S_ o Tome and Principe

Saudi Arabia

Senegal

Seychelles

Sierra Leone

Singapore

.. ova.ia 2

v

Slovenia"'

Solomon Islands

Somalia

South Africa

Spain

Sri Lanka

Sudan

Swaziland

Swedensl

Switzerland

Syrian Arab Republic

SQp-- -

Amended: 6 Jan 2010

Amended: 31 Oct 2006

Amended: 31 Mar 2008

x

Status of Safeguards

Agreement(s) b

In Force: 08 Jan 1992

In Force: 22 Jan 1979

In Force:_21 Sep 1998

In Force: 13 Jan 2009

In Force: 14 Jan 1980

In Force: 28 Dec 1973

In Force: 19 Jul 2004

in Force: -4 Dec -2009

In Force: 18 Oct 1977

Accession: 1 Dec 2005

Accession: 1 Sep 2006

In Force: 17 Jun 1993

In Force: 16 Sep 1991

Accession: 05 Apr 1989

In Force: 06 Aug 1984

In Force: 07 Jan 1977

In Force: 02 Feb 1979

In Force: 28 Jul 1975

Accession: 01 Jun 1995

In Force: 06 Sep 1978

In Force: 18 May 1992

Additional Protocol

INFCIRC Status

400

268

__575

746

276

204

635

787

259

193

193

420.

394

193

320

245

269

227

193

264

407

Signed: 15 Dec 2006

Signed: 3 July 2009

In Force: 13 Oct 2004

In Force: 31 Mar 2008

Accession: 1 Dec 2005

Accession: I Sep 2006

In Force: 13 Sep 2002

In Force: 30 Apr 2004

In Force: 8 Sep 2010

In Force: 30 Apr 2004

In Force: 01 Feb 2005

x ___ x

Amended: 23..Ju.y_0_l0

Status With Regard to Conclusion of Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols and Small Ouantities Protocols 1305
1306 Status With Regard to Conclusion of Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols and Small Quantities Protocols

P. STATUS WITH REGARD TO CONCLUSION OF SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS AND ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS

AP•'lD SMALL QUANTITIE

SQP.

Amended: 6 Mar 2006

S PROTOCOLS

State/Party

Tajikistan32-

Thailand

The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

Timor-Leste

Togo

Tonga

Trinidad and Tobago"

Tunisia

Turkey

Turkmenistan

Tuvalu

Uganda

Ukraine

United Arab Emirates

United Kingdom of Great Britain

United Kingdom....... Britain

United Kingdom of Great Britain

United Republic of Tanzania

United States of America

United States of America

- -U uayUzbekistan

Vanuatu

Amended: 9 July 2009

..Sgned.6 Oct 2009

x

x

Amended: 24 Jun 2009

x

Amended: 10 Jun 2009

x

Status of Safeguards

Agreement(s) b

In Force: 14 Dec 2004

In Force: 16 May 1974

In Force: 16 Apr 2002

Signed: 6 Oct 2009

Signed" 29 Nov 1990

In Force: 18 Nov 1993

In Force: 04 Nov 1992

In Force: 13 Mar 1990

In Force: 01 Sep 1981

In Force: 3 Jan 2006

In Force: 15 Mar 1991

In Force: 14 Feb 2006

In Force: 22 Jan 1998

In Force: 09 Oct 2003

In Force: 14 Dec 1972- 3

In Force: 14 Aug 1978

Approved: 16 Sep 1992'"

In Force: 07 Feb 2005

09 Dec 1980

In Force: 6 Apr 1989

.I n.Force: 17 Sep 1976

In Forcc: 08 Oct 1994

Approved. 8 Sep 2009

INFCIRC

639

241

610

426

414

381

295

673

391

674

550

622 .

175

263*

643

288*

366'5

157

508

Additional Protocol

Status

In Force: 14 Dec 2004

Signed: 22 Sep_20_05

In Force: 11 May 2007

Signed: 6 Oct 2009

Signed- 22 Sep 2003

Signed: 24 May 2005

In Force: 17 Jul 2001

In Force: 3 Jan 2006

In Force: 14 Feb 2006

In Force: 24 Jan 2006

Signed: 8 Apr 2009

In Force: 30 Apr 2004

In Force: 07 Feb 2005

In Force: 06 Jan 2009

In Force: 30 Apr 2004

In Force: 21 Dec 1998

Approved: 8 Sep 2009 Approved: 8 Sep 2009
P. STATUS WITH REGARD TO CONCLUSION OF SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS AND ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS

AND SMALL QUANTITIES PROTOCOLS

State/Party

Venezuela'

Vietnam

Yemen, Rep. of

Zambia

Zimbabwe

5Qpa

x

Status of Safeguards

Agreement(s) b

In Force: II Mar 1982

In Force: 23 Feb 1990

In Force: 14 Aug 2002

In Force: 22 Sep 1994

In Force: 26 Jun 1995

INFCIRC

300

376 -...

614

456

483

Additional Protocol

Status

Signed: 10 Aug 2007

Signed: 13 May 2009

Strengthened Safeguards System: Other Parties with Additional Protocols

(as of 9 October 2008).

Other Parties' Board Approved Date Signed In force

Furatom I1 .fun 1998 22 Sen 1998 30 Anr 2004

Status With Regard to Conclusion of Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols and Small Quantities Protocols 1307
1308 Status With Regard to Conclusion of Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols and Small Quantities Protocols

STATUS AS OF 7 Nov 2010

Key :

States: States not party to the NPT whose safeguards agreements are of INFCIRC/66-type.

States: Nonnuclear weapon States that are party to the NPT but have not yet brought into force comprehensive safeguards agreements (CSAs)

pursuant to Article Ill of that Treaty.

• Voluntary offer safeguards agreement for NPT nuclear-weapon States.

a

Provided that they fulfill certain conditions (including that the quantities of nuclear material do not exceed the limits set out in paragraph 37 of

INFCIRC/153), States with CSAs have the option to conclude a 'small quantities protocol' (SQP) that holds in abeyance the implementation of most of the

detailed provisions set out in Part [I of the CSA as long as these conditions continue to apply. This column contains countries whose SQP has been approved by the

Board and for which, as far as the Secretariat is aware, these conditions continue to apply. For those States that have accepted the revised standard SQP text

(approved by the Board of Governors on 20 Sept. 2005) the current status is reflected. b

The IAEA also applies safeguards in Taiwan, China under two agreements, [NFCIRC/133 and INFCIRC/158, which entered into force on 13 October

1969 and 6 December 1971, respectively.

I

Sui generis comprehensive safeguards agreement. On 28 November 2002, upon approval by the Board of Governors, an exchange of letters entered into force confirming that the

safeguards agreement satisfies the requirement of Article Ill of the NPT. 2

Safeguards agreement refers to both the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the NPT. 3

Date refers to the safeguards agreement concluded between Argentina, Brazil, ABACC and the IAEA. OnI8 March 1997, upon approval by the Board of Governors, an exchange of

letters entered into force between Argentina and the IAEA confirming that the safeguards agreement satisfies the requirements of Article 13 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and Article III

of the NPT to conclude a safeguards agreement with the IAEA.
The application of safeguards in Austria under the NPT bilateral safeguards agreement INFCIRC/156, in force since 23 July 1972, was suspended on 31 July 1996, on which date the

agreement of 5 April 1973 between the nonnuclear weapon States of EURATOM, EURATOM and the IAEA (INFCIRC/193), to which Austria had acceded, entered into force for

Austria5

Date refers to a safeguards agreement pursuant to Article Ill of the NPT. Upon approval by the Board of Governors, an exchange of letters entered into force (for Saint Lucia on 12 June 1996 and for Belize, Dominica, Saint Kitts & Nevis and Saint Vincent & Grenadines on 18 March 1997) confirming that the safeguards agreement satisfies the requirement of

Article 13 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. 6

The NPT safeguards agreement concluded with the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (INFCIRC/204), which entered into force on 28 Dec. 1973, continues to be applied in

Bosnia and Herzegovina to the extent relevant to the territory of Bosnia and HerzegovinaDate refers to the safeguards agreement concluded between Argentina, Brazil, ABACC and the IAEA. On 10 June 1997, upon approval by the Board of Governors, an exchange of

letters entered into force between Brazil and the IAEA confirming that the safeguards agreement satisfies the requirements of Article 13 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. On 20 Sept. 1999.

upon approval by the Board of Governors, an exchange of letters entered into force confirming that the safeguards agreement also satisfies the requirements of Article III of the NPT.

The application of safeguards in Bulgaria under the NPT safeguards agreement INFCIRC/178, in force since29 Feb. 1972, was suspended on I May 2009, on which date the

agreement of 5 April 1973 between the nonnuclear weapon States of EURATOM, EURATOM and the IAEA (INFCIRC/193), to which Bulgaria had acceded, entered into force for

Bulgaria.

The date refers to a safeguards agreement pursuant to Article 13 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Upon approval by the Board of Governors, an exchange of letters entered into force (for

Chile on 9 September 1996; for Colombia on 13 June 2001; for Panama on 20 November 2003) confirming that the safeguards agreement satisfies the requirement of Article Ill of the

NPT.

10

The application of safeguards in Cyprus under the NPT safeguards agreement INFCIRC/l189, in force since26 Jan. 1973, was suspended on I May 2008, on which date the agreement

of 5 April 1973 between the nonnuclear weapon States of EURATOM, EURATOM and the IAEA (INFCIRC/193) to which Cyprus had acceded, entered into force for Cyprus. II

The application of safeguards in the Czech Republic under the NPT safeguards agreement INFCIRC/541, in force since I I Sept. 1997, was suspended on I October 2009, on which

date the agreement of 5 April 1973 between the nonnuclear weapon States of EURATOM, EURATOM and the IAEA (INFCIRC/193) to which the Czech Republic had acceded,

entered into force for the Czech Republic. 12

The application of safeguards in Denmark under the bilateral NPT safeguards agreement INFCIRC/176, in force since 1 March 1972, was suspended on 5 April 1973, on which date

the agreement of 5 April 1973 (INFCIRC/193) between the nonnuclear weapon States of EURATOM, EURATOM and the IAEA (lNFCIRC/193), to which Denmark had acceded,

entered into force for Denmark. Since I May 1974, that agreement also applies to the Faroe Islands. Upon Greenland's secession from EURATOM as of 31 Jan. 1985, the agreement

between the IAEA and Denmark (INFCIRC/1 76) reentered into force for Greenland. 13

The application of safeguards in Estonia under the NPT safeguards agreement INFCIRC/547, in force since24 Nov. 1997, was suspended on I Dec. 2005, on which date the

agreement of 5 April 1973 between the nonnuclear weapon States of EURATOM, EURATOM and the IAEA (INFCIRC/193), to which Estonia had acceded, entered into force for

EstoniaStatus With Regard to Conclusion of Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols and Small Quantities Protocols 1309
1310 Status With Regard to Conclusion of Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols and Small Quantities Protocols

14

The application of safeguards in Finland under the bilateral NPT safeguards agreement [NFC[RC/155, in force since 9 Feb. 1972, was suspended on I Oct. 1995, on which date the

agreement of 5 April 1973 (INFCIRC/193) between the nonnuclear weapon States of EURATOM, EURATOM and the [AEA. to which Finland had acceded, entered into force for

Finland.

15

The safeguards agreement referred to is pursuant to Additional Protocol I to the Treaty of Tlatelolco. 16

The NPT safeguards agreement of 7 March 1972 concluded with the German Democratic Republic (INFC[RC/181) is no longer in force with effect from 3 Oct. 1990, on which date

the German Democratic Republic acceded to the Federal Republic of Germany. 17

The application of safeguards in Greece under the NPT bilateral safeguards agreement INFCIRC/166, provisionally in force since 1 March 1972, was suspended on 17 Dec. 1981, on which date the agreement of 5 April 1973between the nonnuclear weapon States of EURATOM, EURATOM and the IAEA (INFCIRC/193), to which Greece had acceded,

entered into force for Greece. 18

The application of safeguards in Hungary under the bilateral NPT safeguards agreement INFCIRC/174, in force since 30 March 1972, was suspended on 1 July 2007, on which date

the agreement of 5 April 1973 between the nonnuclear weapon States of EURATOM, EURATOM and the IAEA (INFCIRC/193), to which Hungary had acceded, entered into force

for Hungary. 19

Pending entry into force, the additional protocol is applied provisionally for Iraq as of 17 Feb. 2010. 20

The application of safeguards in Latvia under the bilateral NPT safeguards agreement INFCIRC/434, in force since 21 Dec 1993, was suspended on 1 Oct. 2008, on which date the

agreement of 5 April 1973 between the nonnuclear weapon States of EURATOM, EURATOM and the [AEA (INFCIRC/193), to which Latvia had acceded, entered into force for

Latvia.

21

The application of safeguards in Lithuania under the bilateral NPT safeguards agreement INFCIRC/413, in force since 15 Oct. 1992, was suspended on 1 Jan. 2008, on which date the

agreement of 5 April 1973 between the nonnuclear weapon States of EURATOM, EURATOM and the IAEA (INFCIRC/193), to which Lithuania had acceded, entered into force for

Lithuania.

22

The application of safeguards in Malta under the bilateral NPT safeguards agreement INFCIRC/387, in force since 13 Nov. 1990, was suspended on 1 July 2007, on which date the

agreement of 5 April 1973 between the nonnuclear weapon States of EURATOM, EURATOM and the IAEA (INFCIRC/193), to which Malta had acceded, entered into force for

Malta.

23

The safeguards agreement referred to was concluded pursuant to both the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the NPT. The application of safeguards under an earlier safeguards agreement

pursuant to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which entered into force on 6 Sept. 1968 (INFCIRC/1 18), was suspended as of 14 Sept. 1973. 24

Whereas the NPT safeguards agreement and small quantities protocol with New Zealand (INFC[RC/185) also apply toCook Islands and Niue, the additional protocol

thereto (INFCIRC/185/Add. 1) does not apply to those territories. 25

The application of safeguards in Poland under the NPT safeguards agreement INFCIRC/179, in force since I I Oct. 1972, was suspended on March 1, 2007, when the agreement of

5 April 1973 between the nonnuclear weapon States of EURATOM, EURATOM and the IAEA (INFCIRC/193) to which Poland had acceded, entered into force for Poland.
2tJ

The application of safeguards in Portugal under the bilateral NPT safeguards agreement INFCIRC/272, in force since 14 June 1979, was suspended on I July 1986, on which date the

agreement of 5 April 1973 between the nonnuclear weapon States of EURATOM, EURATOM and the IAEA (INFCIRC/193), to which Portugal had acceded, entered into force for

Portugal.

27

The application of safeguards in Romania under the NPT safeguards agreement INFCIRC/180, in force since 27 October 1972, was suspended on I May 2010, on which date the

agreement of 5 April 1973 between the normuclear weapon States of EURATOM, EURATOM and the IAEA (fNFCIRC/193) to which Romania had acceded, entered into force for

Romania.

28

The NPT safeguards agreement concluded with the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (INFCIRC/204),which entered into force on 28 Dec. 1973, continues to be applied in

Serbia (formerly Serbia and Montenegro) to the extent relevant to the territory of Serbia- 29

The application of safeguards in Slovakia under the bilateral NPT safeguards agreement with the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (INFCIRC 173), in force since 3 March 1972, was

suspended on 1 Dec. 2005, on which date the agreement of 5 April 1973 between the nonnuclear weapon States of EURATOM, EURATOM and the LAEA (INFCIRC/193), to which

Slovakia had acceded, entered into force for Slovakia. 30

The application of safeguards in Slovenia under the NPT safeguards agreement INFCIRC/538, in force since 1 Aug. 1997, was suspended on I Sept. 2006, on which date the

agreement of 5 April 1973 between the nonnuclear weapon States of EURATOM, EURATOM and the IAEA (INFCIRC/193) to which Slovenia had acceded, entered into force for

Slovenia.

The application of safeguards in Sweden under the NPT safeguards agreement INFC[RC/234. in force since 14 April 1975, was suspended on I June 1995, on which date the

agreement of 5 April 1973 between the normuclear weapon States of EURATOM, EURATOM and the IAEA (INFCIRC/193), to which Sweden had acceded, entered into force for

Sweden.

32

The SQP ceased to be operational upon entry into force of the amendments to the SQP. 33

Date refers to the INFCIRC/66type safeguards agreement, concluded between the United Kingdom and the IAEA, which remains in force.

Status With Repard to Conclusion of Safeauards Apreements and Additional Protocols and Small Ouantities Protocols 1311
1312 IAEA Supply Agreements

Q. TABLE: IAEA SUPPLY AGREEMENTS

Agreements between the International Atomic Energy Agency, the United States, and other countries for Supply of Nuclear Material or Equipment

pursuant to the Agreement for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation between the United States and the IAEA.

IAEA

Information

Agreement Date Signed Effective Date Circular Number/Citations'

Areentina

Argentina

Argentina-Peru

Canada-Jamaica

Chile

Chile

Colombia

Finland

Finland

Finland

Finland

Greece

Greece

Greece

India

India

India

India

India

India

December 2. 1964

December 13, 1964

May 9, 1978

January 25, 1984

December 19, 1969

December 31, 1974

May 30, June 7 & 17, 1994

December 30, 1960

July 8, 1966

November 5, 1967

March 1, 1972

March I, 1974

December 15, 1977

December 9, 1966

July 2, 1970

November 16, 1970

July 1, 1971

August 20, 1971

October 1, 1971

December 2. 1964

December 30, 1965

May 9, 1978

January 25, 1984

December 19, 1969

December 31, 1974

June 17, 1994

December 30, 1960

July 8, 1966

November 5, 1967

November 27, 1969

March 1, 1972

March 1, 1974

December 15, 1977

December 9, 1966

July 2, 1970

November 16, 1970

July 1, 1971

August 20, 1971

October 1, 1971

INFCIRCS/62

INFCIRCS/62/Add. I

INFCIRCS /266, TIAS No. 9263, 30 UST 1539

INFCIRCS/315, TIAS No. 10933, 35 UST 4309

INFCIRCS/137

INFCIRCS/137/Add. I

INFCIRCS /460, 1857 UNTS 105

rN FCIRCS/24

INFCIRCS/24/Add. 2

INFCIRCS/24/Add. 3

INFCIRCS/24/Add. 4

INFCIRCS/163

INFCIRCS/163/Add. I

INFCIRCS/163/Add. 2, Part II

INFCIRCS/94, Part II

INFCIRCS/94/Add. 1, Part I

INFCIRCS/94/Add. I, Part II

INFCIRCS/94/Add. 2, Part I

INFCIRCS/94/Add. 2, Part II

INFCIRCS/94/Add. 2, Part Ill

'Citations refer to IAEA Infomtation Circulars (INFCIRCS), Treaties and Other International Acts Series (TIAS), United Nations Treaty Series (UNTS), and/or United States Treaties

and Other International Agreements (UST).
IAEA

Information

Agreement Date Signed Effective Date Circular Number/Citationsi

Indonesia

Indonesia

Indonesia

Indonesia

Iran

Iraq

Malaysia

Malaysia

Mexico

Mexico

Mexico

Mexico

Mexico

Mexico

Mexico

Mexico

Morocco

Norway

Norway

Norway

Norway

Pakistan

Pakistan

Pakistan

Pakistan

Pakistan

Pakistan

Pakistan

Philippines

Philippines

Romania

December 19, 1969

April 7, 1975

September 14, 1972

December 7, 1979

June 7, 1967

December 28, 1972

September 22, 1980

June 12 & July 22, 1981

December 18. 1963

June 20, 1966

August 23, 1967

October 4, 1972

December 12, 1972

February 12, 1974

June 14, 1974

March 6, 1980

December 2, 1983

April 10, 1961

September 3, 1962

April 8, 1964

April 10, 1967

March 5, 1962

October 19, 1967

June 17, 1968

September 30, 1969

June 16. 1971

June 22, 1971

November 16, 1971

September 28, 1966

August 23, 1968

August 1. 1966

December 19, 1969

April 7. 1975

September 14, 1972

December 7, 1979

June 7, 1967

December 28, 1972

September 22, 1980

July 22. 1981

December 18, 1963

June 20, 1966

August 23. 1967

October 4, 1972

December 12, 1972

February 12, 1974

June 14, 1974

March 6, 1980

December 2, 1983

June 15, 1961

September 3, 1962

April 8, 1964

April 10, 1967

March 5, 1962

October 19, 1967

June 17, 1968

September 30, 1969

June 16, 1971

June 22, 1971

November 16, 1971

September 28, 1966

August 23. 1968

August I, 1966

INFCIRCS/136

INFCIRCS/135/Add. 1, Mod. I

INFCIRCS/136/Add. I

INFCIRCS/136/Add. 2. TIAS No. 9705.32 UST 361

INFCIRCS/97

INFCIRCS/195, Part II

INFCIRCS/287, TIAS No. 9863, 32 UST 2610

INFCIRCS/287/Mod. 1. TIAS No. 10202, 33 UST 2785

INFCIRCS/52, TIAS No. 9906, 32 UST 3607

INFCIRCS/82

INFCIRCS/ 102

INFCIRCS/52/Add. I, TIAS No. 9906,32 UST 3618

INFCIRCS/194, Part II

INFCIRCS/203, TIAS No. 10705

INFCIRCS/203/Add. 1, TIAS No. 10705

TIAS No. 9906, 32 UST 3628

lNFCIRCS/313, TIAS No. 10866, 35 UST 3531

INFCIRCS/29

rN FCIRCS/29/Add. I

INFCIRCS/29/Add. 2, Part I & II

INFCIRCS/29/Add. 3

INFCIRCSI34

INFCIRCS/34/Add. I

INFCIRCS/1 16

INFCIRCS/34/Add. 2

INFCIRCS/34/Add. 3

INFCIRCS/1 16/Add. 1

INFCIRCS/150/Add. I

INFCIRCS/88

INFCIRCS/88/Add. I

INFCIRCS/95, Part 11

IAEA Supplv A-ereernents 1313

IAEA Supply Agreements 1313
1314 IAEA Supply Agreements

IAEA

Information

Agreement Effective Date

Romania

Romania

Romania

Spain

Thailand

Turkey

Turkey

Venezuela

Yugoslavia

Yugoslavia

Yugoslavia

Yugoslavia

Yugoslavia

Yugoslavia

Yugoslavia

Yugoslavia

Yugoslavia

Yugoslavia

Zaire

Zaire

Zaire

Zaire

1314 IAEA Supply A•dements

Date Signed

March 30, 1973

September 26, 1973

July 24, 1975

June 23, 1967

September 30, 1986

February 8, 1966

May 17. 1974

November 7, 1975

October 4, 1961

September 28, 1965

February 20, 1968

December 30, 1970

December 29, 1972

June 14, 1974

October 31, 1974

January 16, 1980

December 14, 15 and 20, 1982

February 23, 1983

June 27, 1962

February 14, 1968

December 9, 1970

April 15. 1971

Circular Number/Citations'

March 30. 1973

September 26, 1973

July 24. 1975

June 23, 1967

September 30. 1986

February 8, 1966

May 17, 1974

November 7, 1975

October 4, 1961

September 28, 1965

February 20, 1968

December 30, 1970

December 29. 1972

June 14, 1974

October 31. 1974

July 14, 1980

December 20, 1982

February 23, 1983

June 27, 1962

February 14, 1968

December 9, 1970

April 15, 1971

INFCIRCS/206

INFCIRCS/95/Add. 2

INFCIRCS/206/Mod. I

INFCIRCS/99

INFCIRCS/342

INFCIRCS/83, Part II

INFCIRCS/212

INFCIRCS/238

INFCIRCS/32

[NFCIRCS/32/Add. I

INFCIRCS/32/Add. 2

INFCIRCS/32/Add. 3

INFCIRCS/32/Add. 3/Mod. I

INFC[RCS/213, TIAS No. 9728, 32 UST 773

INFCIRCS/32Add. 3/Mod. I

INFCIRCS/32/Add. 4, TIAS No. 9767, 32 UIST 1128

1NFCIRCS/32/Add. 4/Mod. I, TIAS No. 10621

lNFCIRCS/32/Add. 5, TIAS No. 10664

INFCIRCS/37, Part II

INFCIRCS/37/Add. 2

INFCIRCS/37/Add. 3

INFCIRCS/37/Add.4

July 27, 2007

Information has been compiled from the International Atomic Energy Agency and the State Department Office of the Legal Advisor, Treaty Affairs
R. TABLE: UNITED STATES AGREEMENTS FOR PEACEFUL NUCLEAR COOPERATION

List of Agreements

Agreement

Argentina

Australia'

Bangladesh

Brazil

Canada

China

Colombia

Egypt

European Atomic Energy

Community (EURATOM)4

India

Indonesia

International Atomic Energy Agency

(IAEA)

amendment

Japan

Kazakhstan

Korea, Republic of

Date Signed

February 29. 1996

May 5, 2010

October 14, 1997

October 14, 1997

June 15, 1955

July 23, 1985

January 8, 1981

June 29, 1981

November 7, 1995 &

March 29, 1996

October 10, 2008

June 30, 1980

May 11, 1959

February 12, 1974

November 4, 1987

November 18, 1997

November 24, 1972

Effective Date

October 16, 1997

December 22, 2010

September 15, 1999

September 15, 1999

July 21, 1955

December 30, 1985

September 7, 1983

December 29, 1981

April 12, 1996

December 6, 2008

December 30, 1981

August 7, 1959

May 31, 1974

July 17, 1988

November 5, 1999

March 19, 1973

Termination Date

October 15, 2027

December 21, 2040

June 24, 20122

September 14, 2029

January 1, 20303

December 29, 2015

September 6, 2013

December 28, 2021

December 5, 20485

December 30, 20316

August 6, 2014

July 16, 2018

November 4, 2029

March 18. 2014'

Citation

TIAS No. 12730

TIAS No. 9893

TIAS No. 10339

TIAS No. 7439, 23 USC 2477

TIAS No. 3304, 6 USC 2595

TIAS No. 12027

TIAS No. 10722

TIAS No. 10208

TIAS No. 10219,- USC -

TIAS No. 4291, 10 USC 1424

TIAS No. 7852,25 USC 1199

1547 UNTS 287

TIAS 12900

TIAS 7583, 24 UST 775

'Australia and the United States also signed the "Agreement for Cooperation Concerning Technology for the Separation of Isotopes of Uranium by Laser Excitation" on October 2 28, 1999, which entered into force May 24, 2000 (2117 UNS 243). This agreement was extended January 5 and February 16, 1993. 3

4This agreement has been amended and/or extended five times. It was most recently amended June 23, 1999. Euratom comprises the following Member States: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 5

6This agreement is automatically renewed for I 0-year periods unless one of the parties gives 6 months prior notice asking to terminate the agreement.

7

This agreement was extended February 20, 2004. This agreement was extended May 15, 1974 (TIAS 7842).

U.S. Agreements for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation 1315
1316 U.S. Agreements for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation

Agreement

Morocco

Norway

Russia

South Africa

Switzerland

Taiwan 8

amendment

Thailand

Turkey

Ukraine

United Arab Emirates

Date Signed

May 30, 1980

January 12, 1984

May 6, 2008

August 25, 1995

October 31, 1997

April 4, 1972

March 15, 1974

May 14, 1974

July 26, 2000

May 6, 1998

January 15, 2009

Effective Date

May 16, 1981

July 2- 1984

January t1,2011

December 4, 1997

June 23, 1998

June 22, 1972

*June 14, 1974

June 27, 1974

June 2, 2008

May 28, 1999

December 17, 2009

Termination Date

May 16, 2021

July 1. 2014

January 10, 2041

December 3, 2022

June 22, 2028

June 21,2014

June 26. 2014

June 1,2023

May 27. 2029

December 16, 2049

Citation

TIAS No. 10018,-USCTIAS No. 10979,-USCTIAS No. 12685

TAS 12894

TIAS No. 7364,23 USC 945

TIAS No. 7834, 25 USC 913

TIAS No. 7850,25 USC 1181

TIAS 12950

January 13, 2011

'Pursuant to section 6 of the Taiwan Relations Act, P.L. 96-8, 93 Stat. 14, and Executive Order 12143, 44 F.R. 37191, all agreements concluded with the Taiwan authorities before

January 1, 1979, are administered on a nongovernmental basis by the American Institute in Taiwan, a nonprofit District of Columbia corporation, and constitute neither recognition of

Taiwan authorities nor the continuation of any official relationship with Taiwan.
Trilaterals Btw. US, IAEA, & Other Countries for Safeguards of Equipment 1317

S. TABLE: TRILATERALS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES, THE

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY AND OTHER COUNTRIES

FOR THE APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS BY THE INTERNATIONAL

ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY TO EQUIPMENT CONCERNING CIVIL USES

OF ATOMIC ENERGY.

Country

A rg entin a ...................................................

A u stra lia ....................................................

A u stria ......................................................

B ra z il ........................................................

A m end ed ................................................

China, Republic of (Taiwan) .............................

C o lo m b ia ...................................................

E xten d ed ................................................

In d ia ......... ................................................

Ira n ... ...... ......... ......... ... ........................ ....

Is ra e l .........................................................

E xtended ................................................

K o re a ........................................................

A m end ed ................................................

P h ilip p ines .................................................

P o rtu g a l .....................................................

S o uth A frica ................................................

A m end ed ................................................

S p a in ........................................................

A m ended ................................................

S w ed en ......................................................

S w itzerland ................................................

'u rk e y .................. .. ..............................

E xtended ................................................

V en ezue la ...................................................

Effective Date

July 25, 1969

'Sep. 26, 1966

2

Jan. 24, 1970

Oct. 31., 1968

July 27, 1972

Dec. 6, 1971

Dec. 9, 1970

Mar. 28, 1977

Jan. 27, 1971

-Aug. 20, 1969

Apr. 4, 1975

Apr. 7, 1977

Jan. 5, 1968

Nov. 4 30, 1972 July 19, 1968

-RJuly 19, 1969

July 26, 1967

June 20, 1974

Dec. 9, 1966

June 28, 1974

bMar. 1, 1972

'Feb. 28, 1972

"June 5, 1969

June 30, 1981

Mar. 27, 1968

TIAS No.

6722

6117

6816

6583

7440

7228

7010

8556

7049

6741

8051

8554

6435

7584

6524

6718

6306

7848

6182

7856

7295

7294

6692

10201

6433

Current as of January 2010

ISuspended by agreement signed July 10, 1974. 2

Suspended by agreement signed September 21, 1971.

'Suspended by agreement signed June 19, 1973.

'Suspended by agreement signed February 21, 1973.

-Suspended by agreement signed September 23, 1980.

'Suspended by agreement signed April 14, 1975.

'Suspended by agreement signed September 23, 1980. 'Suspended by agreement signed January 15, 1985.
1318 Trilats. Btw. US, IAEA, & Other Countries for the Application of Safeguards

T. TABLE: TRILATERALS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES, THE

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY AND OTHER COUNTRIES

FOR THE APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS PURSUANT TO THE

NONPROLIFERATION TREATY

Country Effective Date TIAS No.

Australia July 10, 1974 7865

Austria July 23, 1972 7409

Denmark Mar. 1, 1972 7289

Greece Mar. 1, 1972 7290

Iran May 15, 1974 7829

Norway Sept. 25, 1973 7721

Philippines Oct. 16, 1974 7957

Portugal Sept. 23, 1980 9899

Sweden May 6, 1975 8046

Switzerland Sept. 23, 1980 9900

Thailand June 27, 1974 7849

Turkey Jan. 15, 1985 11932

Venezuela Sep. 27, 1983 10793
Cony. on the Prey. of Marine Pollution by Dump. of Wastes & Other Matters 1319

U. CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION OF MARINE POLLUTION

BY DUMPING OF WASTES AND OTHER MATTERS

Convention done at London, Mexico City, Moscow and Washington, December 29, 1972

Ratification of the United States of America deposited at Washington, London and

Mexico Cit,. April 29, 1974 and at Moscow, May 6, 1974

Entered into force, August 30, 1975

The Contracting Parties to this Convention,

Recognizing that the marine environment and the living organisms which it supports

are of vital importance to humanity, and all people have an interest in assuring that it is

so managed that its quality and resources are not impaired,

Recognizing that the capacity of the sea to assimilate wastes and render them

harmless and its ability to regenerate natural resources is not unlimited;

Recognizing that States have in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations

and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources

pursuant to their own environment policies, and the responsibility to ensure that

activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of

other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction;

Recalling Resolution 2749 (XXV) of the General Assembly of the United Nations on

the principles governing the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof, beyond

the limits of national jurisdiction;

Noting that marine pollution originates in many sources, such as dumping and

discharges through the atmosphere, rivers, estuaries, outfalls and pipelines, and that it is

important that States use the best practicable means to prevent such pollution and

develop products and processes which will reduce the amount of harmful wastes to be

disposed of;

Being convinced that the international action to control the pollution of the sea by

dumping can and must be taken without delay but that this action should not preclude

discussion of measures to control other sources of marine pollution as soon as possible;

and

Wishing to improve protection of the marine environment by encouraging States with

a common interest in particular geographical areas to enter into appropriate agreements

supplementary to this Convention;

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

Contracting Parties shall individually and collectively promote the effective control

of all sources of pollution of the marine environment, and pledge themselves especially

to take all practicable steps to prevent the pollution of the sea by the dumping of waste

and other matter that is liable to create hazards to human health, to harm living resources

and marine life, to damage amenities or to interfere with other legitimate uses of the sea.

ARTICLE If

Contracting Parties shall, as provided for in the following Articles, take effective

measures individually, according to their scientific, technical and economic capabilities,

and collectively, to prevent marine pollution caused by dumping and shall harmonize

their policies in this regard.

ARTICLE III

For the purposes of this Convention

1. (a) "Dumping" means:

(i) any deliberate disposal at sea of wastes or other matter from vessels,

aircraft, platforms or other man-made structures at sea;

(ii) any deliberate disposal at sea of vessels, aircraft, platforms or other

man-made structures at sea.
1320 Cony. on the Prey. of Marine Pollution by Dump. of Wastes & Other Matters

(b) "Dumping" does not include:

(i) the disposal at sea of wastes or other matter incidental to, or derived

from the normal operations of vessels, aircraft, platforms or other man-made

structures at sea and their equipment, other than wastes or other matter

transported by or to vessels, aircraft, platforms or other man-made structures

at sea, operating for the purpose of disposal of such matter or derived from

the treatment of such wastes or other matter on such vessels, aircraft,

platforms or structures;

(ii) placement of matter for a purpose other than the mere disposal thereof,

provided that such placement is not contrary to the aims of this Convention.

(c) The disposal of wastes or other matter directly arising from, or related to the

exploration, exploitation and associated off-shore processing of sea-bed mineral

resources will not be covered by the provisions of this Convention.

2. "Vessels and aircraft" means waterborne or airborne craft of any type whatsoever.

This expression includes air cushioned craft and floating craft, whether self-propelled or

not.

3. "Sea" means all marine waters other than the internal waters of States.

4. "Wastes or other matter" means material and substance of any kind, form of

description.

5. "Special permit" means permission granted specifically on application in advance

and in accordance with Annex I1 and Annex Ill.

6. "General permit" means permission granted in advance and in accordance with

Annex Ill.

7. "The Organization" means the Organization designated by the Contracting Parties

in accordance with Article XIV(2).

ARTICLE IV

I. In accordance with the provisions of this Convention Contracting Parties shall

prohibit the dumping of any wastes or other matter in whatever form or condition except

as otherwise specified below:

(a) the dumping of wastes or other matter listed in Annex I is prohibited;

(b) the dumping of wastes or other matter listed in Annex II requires a prior

special permit;

(c) the dumping of all other wastes or matter requires a prior general permit.

2. Any permit shall be issued only after careful consideration of all the factors set

forth in Annex Ill, including prior studies of the characteristics of the dumping site, as

set forth in sections B and C of that Annex.

3. No provision of this Convention is to be interpreted as preventing a Contracting Party from prohibiting, insofar as that Party is concerned, the dumping of wastes or

other matter not mentioned in Annex I. That Party shall notify such measures to the

Organization.

ARTICLE V

1. The provisions of Article IV shall not apply when it is necessary to secure the

safety of human life or of vessels aircraft, platforms or other man-made structures at sea

in cases of force majeure caused by stress of weather, or in any case which constitutes a

danger to human life or a real threat to vessels, aircraft, platforms or other man-made

structures at sea, if dumping appears to be the only way of averting the threat and if

there is every probability that the damage consequent upon such dumping will be less

than would otherwise occur. Such dumping shall be so conducted as to minimize the

likelihood of damage to human or marine life and shall be reported forthwith to the

organization.

2. A Contracting Party may issue a special permit as an exception to Article

IV(l)(a), in emergencies, posing unacceptable risk relating to human health and

admitting no other feasible solution. Before doing so the Party shall consult any other
Cony. on the Prey. of Marine Pollution by Dump. of Wastes & Other Matters 1321

country or countries that are likely to be affected and the Organization which, after

consulting other Parties, and international organizations as appropriate, shall, in

accordance with Article XIV promptly recommend to the Party the most appropriate

procedures to adopt. The Party shall follow these recommendations to the maximum

extent feasible consistent with the time within which action must be taken and with the

general obligation to avoid damage to the marine environment and shall inform the

Organization of the action it takes. The Parties pledge themselves to assist one another in

such situations.

3. Any Contracting Party may waive its right under paragraph (2) at the time of, or

subsequent to ratification of, or accession to this Convention.

ARTICLE VI

1. Each Contracting Party shall designate an appropriate authority or authorities to:

(a) issue special permits which shall be required prior to, and for, the dumping of

matter listed in Annex 11 and in the circumstances provided for in Article V(2);

(b) issue general permits which shall be required prior to, and for, the dumping of

all other matter;

(c) keep records of the nature and quantities of all matter permitted to be dumped

and the location, time and method of dumping;

(d) monitor individually, or in collaboration with other Parties and competent

international organizations, the condition of the seas for the purposes of this

Convention.

2. The appropriate authority or authorities of a Contracting Party shall issue prior

special or general permits in accordance with paragraph (I) in respect of matter intended

for dumping:

(a) loaded in its territory;

(b) loaded by a vessel or aircraft registered in its territory or flying its flag, when

the loading occurs in the territory of a State not party to this Convention.

3. In issuing permits under sub-paragraphs (1)(a) and (b) above, the appropriate

authority or authorities shall comply with Annex Ill, together with such additional

criteria, measures and requirements as they may consider relevant.

4. Each Contracting Party, directly or through a Secretariat established under a

regional agreement, shall report to the Organization, and where appropriate to other

Parties, the information specified in sub-paragraphs (c) and (d) of paragraph (1) above,

and the criteria, measures and requirements it adopts in accordance with paragraph (3)

above. The procedure to be followed and the nature of such reports shall be agreed by

the Parties in consultation.

ARTICLE VII

I. Each Contracting Party shall apply the measures required to implement the

present Convention to all:

(a) vessels and aircraft registered in its territory or flying its flag;

(b) vessels and aircraft loading in its territory or territorial seas matter which is to

be dumped;

(c) vessels and aircraft and fixed or floating platforms under its jurisdiction

believed to be engaged in dumping.

2. Each Party shall take in its territory appropriate measures to prevent and punish

conduct in contravention of the provisions of this Convention.

3. The Parties agree to co-operate in the development of procedures for the effective

application of this Convention particularly on the high seas, including procedures for the

reporting of vessels and aircraft observed dumping is contravention of the Convention.

4. This Convention shall not apply to those vessels and aircraft entitled to sovereign

immunity under international law. However each Party shall ensure by the adoption of

appropriate measures that such vessels and aircraft owned or operated by it act in a
1322 Conv. on the Prev. of Marine Pollution by Dump. of Wastes & Other Matters

manner consistent with the object and purpose of this Convention, and shall inform the

Organization accordingly.

5. Nothing in this Convention shall affect the right of each Party to adopt other

measures, in accordance with the principles of international law, to prevcnt dumping at

sea.

ARTICLE VIII

In order to further the objectives of this Convention, the Contracting Parties with

common interests to protect in the marine environment in a given geographical area shall

endeavor, taking into account characteristic regional features, to enter into regional

agreements consistent with this Convention for the prevention of pollution, especially by

dumping. The Contracting Parties to the present Convention shall endeavor to act

consistently with the objectives and provisions of such regional agreements, which shall

be notified to them by the Organization. Contracting Parties shall seek to co-operate

with the Parties to regional agreements in order to develop harmonized procedures to be

followed by Contracting Parties to the different conventions concerned. Special attention

shall be given to cooperation in the field of monitoring and scientific research.

ARTICLE IX

The Contracting Parties shall promote, through collaboration within the Organization

and other international bodies, support for those Parties which request it for:

(a) the training of scientific and technical personnel;

(b) the supply of necessary equipment and facilities for research and monitoring;

(c) the disposal and treatment of waste and other measures to prevent or mitigate

pollution caused by dumping; preferably within the countries concerned, so

furthering the aims and purposes of this Convention.

ARTICLE X

In accordance with the principles of international law regarding State responsibility

for damage to the environment of other States or to any other area of the environment,

caused by dumping of wastes and other mater of all kinds, the Contracting Parties

undertake to develop procedures for the assessment of liability and the settlement of

disputes regarding dumping.

ARTICLE XI

The Contracting Parties shall at their first consultative meeting consider procedures

for the settlement of disputes concerning the interpretation and application of this

Convention.

ARTICLE XII

The Contracting Parties pledge themselves to promote, within the competent

specialised agencies and other international bodies, measures to protect the marine

environment against pollution caused by:

(a) hydrocarbons, including oil, and their wastes;

(b) other noxious or hazardous matter transported by vessels for purposes other

than dumping.;

(c) wastes generated in the course of operation of vessels, aircraft, platforms and

other man-made structures at sea;

(d) radio-active pollutants from all sources, including vessels;

(e) agents of chemical and biological warfare;

(1) wastes or other matter directly arising from , or related to the exploration,

exploitation and associated off-shore processing of sea-bed mineral resources.

The Parties will also promote, within the appropriate international organization, the

codification of signals to be used by vessels engaged in dumping.
Cony. on the Prey. of Marine Pollution by Dump. of Wastes & Other Matters 1323

ARTICLE XIII

Nothing in this Convention shall prejudice the codification and developm'ent of the

law of the sea by the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea convened

pursuant to Resolution 2750 C (XXV) of the General Assembly of the United Nations

nor the present or future claims and legal views of any State concerning the law of the

sea and the nature and extent of coastal and flag State jurisdiction. The Contracting

Parties agree to consult at a meeting to be convened by the Organization after the Law of

the Sea Conference, and in any case not later than 1976, with a view to defining the

nature and extent of the right and the responsibility of a coastal State to apply the

Convention in a zone adjacent to its coast.

ARTICLE XIV

I. The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as

a depositary shall call a meeting of the Contracting Parties not later than three months

after the entry into force of this Convention to decide on organizational matters.

2. The Contracting Parties shall designate a competent Organization existing at the

time of that meeting to be responsible for Secretariat duties in relation to this

Convention. Any Party to this Convention not being a member of this Organization shall

make an appropriate contribution to the expenses incurred by the Organization in

performing these duties.

3. The Secretariat duties of the Organization shall include:

(a) the convening of consultative meetings of the Contracting Parties not less

frequently than once every two years and of special meetings of the Parties at any

time on the request of two-thirds of the Parties;

(b) preparing and assisting, in consultation with the Contracting Parties and

appropriate International Organizations, in the development and implementation of

procedures referred to in sub-paragraph (4)(e) of this Article;

(c) considering inquiries by, and information from the Contracting Parties,

consulting with them and with the appropriate International Organizations and

providing recommendations to the Parties on questions related to, but not specifically

covered by the Convention;

(d) conveying to the Parties concerned all notifications received by the

Organization in accordance with Articles IV(3), V(I) and (2), VI(4), XV, XX, and

XXI.

Prior to the designation of the Organization these functions shall, as necessary, be

performed by the depositary, who for this purpose shall be the Government of the United

Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

4. Consultative or special meetings of the Contracting Parties shall keep under

continuing review the implementation of this Convention and may, inter alia:

(a) review and adopt amendments to this Convention and its Annexes in

accordance with Article XV;

(b) invite the appropriate scientific body or bodies to collaborate with and to

advise the Parties or the Organization on any scientific or technical aspect relevant to

this Convention, including particularly the content of this Annexes;

(c) receive and consider reports made pursuant to article VI(4);

(d) promote co-operation with and between regional organizations concerned

with the prevention of marine pollution;

(e) develop or adopt, in consultation with appropriate International

Organizations, procedures referred to in Article V(2), including basic criteria for

determining exceptional and emergency situations, and procedures for consultative

advice and the safe disposal of matter in such circumstances, including the

designation of appropriate dumping areas, and recommend accordingly;

(t) consider any additional action that may be required.
1324 Conv. on the Prev. of Marine Pollution by Dump. of Wastes & Other Matters

5. The Contracting Parties at their first consultative meeting shall establish rules of

procedure as necessary.

ARTICLE XV

I. (a) At meetings of the Contracting Parties called in accordance with Article XIV

amendments to this Convention may be adopted by a two-thirds majority of those

present. An amendment shall enter into force for the Parties which have accepted it on

the sixtieth day after two-thirds of the Parties shall have deposited an instrument of

acceptance of the amendment with the Organization. Thereafter the amendment shall

enter into force for any other Party 30 days after that Party deposits its instrument of

acceptance of the amendment.

(b) The Organization shall inform all Contracting Parties of any request made for

a special meeting under Article XIV and of any amendments adopted at meetings of

the Parties and of the date on which each such amendment enters into force for each

Party.

2. Amendments to the Annexes will be based on scientific or technical

considerations. Amendments to the Annexes approved by a two-thirds majority of those

present at a meeting called in accordance with Article XIV shall enter into force for each

Contracting Party immediately on notification of its acceptance to the Organization ad

100 days after approval by the meeting for all other Parties except for those which

before the end of the 100 days make a declaration that they are not able to accept the

amendment at that time. Parties should endeavour to signify their acceptance of an

amendment to the Organization as soon as possible after approval at a meeting. A Party

may at any time substitute an acceptance for a previous declaration of objection and the

amendment previously objected to shall thereupon enter into force for that Party. 3. An acceptance or declaration of objection under this Article shall be made by the

deposit of an instrument with the Organization. The Organization shall notify all

Contracting Parties of the receipt of such instruments.

4. Prior to the designation of the Organization, the Secretarial functions herein

attributed to it, shall be performed temporarily by the Government of the United

Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, as one of the depositories of this

Convention.

ARTICLE XVI

This Convention shall be open for signature by any State at London, Mexico City,

Moscow and Washington from 29 December 1972 until 31 December 1973.

ARTICLE XVII

This Convention shall be subject to ratification. The instruments of ratification shall

be deposited with the Governments of Mexico, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,

the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of

America.

ARTICLE XVIII

After 31 December 1973, this Convention shall be open for accession by any State.

The instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of Mexico, the

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern

Ireland, and the United States of America.

ARTICLE XIX

I. This Convention shall enter into force on the thirtieth day following the date of

deposit of the fifteenth instrument of ratification or accession.

2. For each Contracting Party ratifying or acceding to the Convention after the

deposit of the fifteenth instrument of ratification or accession, the Convention shall enter
Cony. on the Prey. of Marine Pollution by Dump. of Wastes & Other Matters 1325

into force on the thirtieth day after deposit by such Party of its instrument of ratification

or accession.

ARTICLE XX

The depositories shall inform Contracting Parties:

(a) of signatures to this Convention and of the deposit of instruments of

ratification, accession or withdrawal, in accordance with Articles XVI, XVII, XVIII

and XXI, and

(b) of the date on which this Convention will enter into force, in accordance with

Article XIX.

ARTICLE XXI

Any Contracting Party may withdraw from this Convention by giving six months'

notice in writing to a depositary, which shall promptly inform all Parties of such notice.

ARTICLE XXII

The original of this Convention of which the English, French, Russian and Spanish

texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Governments of Mexico, the

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern

Ireland and the United States of America who shall send certified copies thereof to all

States.

In WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries, being duly authorized

thereto by their respective Governments have signed the present Convention.

DONE in quadruplicate at London, Mexico City, Moscow and Washington, this

twenty-ninth day of December, 1972.

ANNEX I

1. Organohalogen compounds.

2. Mercury and mercury compounds.

3. Cadmium and cadmium compounds.

4. Persistent plastics and other persistent synthetic materials, for example, netting

and ropes, which may float or may remain in suspension in the sea in such a manner as

to interfere materially with fishing, navigation or other legitimate uses of the sea.

5. Crude oil, fuel oil, heavy diesel oil, and lubricating oils, hydraulic fluids, and any

mixtures containing any of these taken on board for the purpose of dumping.

6. High-level radioactive wastes or other high-level radio-active matter, defined on

public health, biological or other grounds, by the competent international body in this

field, at present the International Atomic Energy Agency, as unsuitable for dumping at

sea.

7. Materials in whatever form (e.g. solids, liquids, semi liquids, gases or in a living

sates) produced for biological and chemical warfare.

8. The preceding paragraphs of this Annex do not apply to substances which are

rapidly rendered harmless by physical, chemical or biological processes in the sea

provided they do not:

(i) make edible marine organisms unpalatable, or

(ii) endanger human health or that of domestic animals.

The consultative procedures provided for under Article XIV should be followed by a

Party if there is doubt about the harmlessness of the substance.

9. This Annex does not apply to wastes or other materials (e.g. sewage sludges and

dredged spoils) containing the matters referred to in paragraphs 1-5 above as trace

contaminants. Such wastes shall be subject to the provisions of Annexes II and III as

appropriate.
1326 Conv. on the Prev. of Marine Pollution by Dump. of Wastes & Other Matters

ANNEX II

The following substances and materials requiring special care are listed for the

purposes of Article VI(I )(a).

A. Wastes containing significant amounts of the matters listed below:

arsenic

lead and their compounds

copper

zinc

organosilicon compounds

cyanides

fluorides

pesticides and their by-products not covered in Annex I.

B. In the issue of permits for the dumping of large quantities of acids and alkalis,

consideration shall be given to the possible presence in such wastes of the substances

listed in paragraph A and to the following additional substances:

beryllium

chromium and their compounds

nickel

vanadium

C. Containers, scrap metal and other bulky wastes liable to sink to the sea bottom

may present a serious obstacle to fishing or navigation.

D. Radioactive wastes or other radioactive matter not included in Annex I. In the

issue of permits for the dumping of this matter, the Contracting Parties should take full

account of the recommendations of the competent international body in this field, at

present the International Atomic Energy Agency.

ANNEX III

Provisions be considered in establishing criteria governing the issue of permits for

the dumping of matter at sea, taking into account Article IV (2), include:

A.-Characteristics aiid Composition of the Matter

1, Total amount of average composition of matter dumped (e.g. per year).

2, Form, e.g. solid, sludge, liquid, or gaseous.

3, Properties: physical (e.g. solubility and density), chemical and biochemical (e.g.

oxygen demand, nutrients) and biological (e.g. presence of viruses, bacteria, yeasts,

parasites).

4, Toxicity.

5, Persistence: physical, chemical and biological.

6, Accumulation and biotransformation in biological materials or sediments.

7, Susceptibility to physical, chemical and biochemical changes and interaction in

the aquatic environment with other dissolved organic and inorganic materials.

8, Probability of production of taints or other changes reducing marketability of

resources (fish, shellfish, etc.).

B.-Characteristics of Dumping Site and Method of Deposit

I, Location (e.g. co-ordinates of the dumping area, depth and distance from the

coast), location in relation to the other areas (e.g., amenity areas, spawning, nursery and

fishing areas and exploitable resources).

2, Rate of disposal per specific period (e.g. quantity per day, per week, per month).

3, Methods of packaging and containment, if any.

4. Initial dilution achieved by proposed method of release.

5. Dispersal characteristics (e.g. effects of currents, tides and wind on horizontal

transport and vertical mixing). 6. Water characteristics (e.g. temperature, pH, salinity, stratification, oxygen indices

of pollution-dissolved oxygen (DO), chemical oxygen demand (COD), biochemical
Cony. on the Prey. of Marine Pollution by Dump. of Wastes & Other Matters 1327

oxygen demand (BOD)-nitrogen present in organic and mineral form including

ammonia, suspended matter, other nutrients and productivity).

7. Bottom characteristics (e.g. topography, geochemical and geological

characteristics and biological productivity).

8. Existence and effects of other dumpings which have been made in the dumping

area (e.g. heavy metal background reading and organic carbon content).

9. In issuing a permit for dumping, Contracting Parties should consider whether an

adequate scientific basis exists for assessing the consequences of such dumping, as

outline in this Annex, taking into account seasonal variations.

C.-General Considerations and Conditions

I. Possible effects on amenities (e.g., presence of floating or stranded material,

turbidity, objectionable odour, discolouration and foaming).

2. Possible effects on marine life, fish and shellfish culture, fish stocks and fisheries,

seaweed harvesting and culture.

3. Possible effects on other uses of the sea (e.g. impairment of water quality for

industrial use, underwater corrosion of structures, interference with ship operations from

floating materials, interference with fishing or navigation through deposit of waste or

solid objects on the sea floor and protection of areas of special importance for scientific

or conservation purposes).

4. The practical availability of alternative land-based methods of treatment, disposal

or elimination, or of treatment to render the matter less harmful for dumping at sea.

Table: Parties to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by

Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, with Annexes.

Done at Washington, London, Mexico City and Moscow

December 29, 1972; entered into force August 30, 1975.

26 USC 2403; TIAS 8165; 1046 UNTS 120.

Parties:

Afghanistan

Angola

Antigua & Barbuda

Argentina'

Australia'

Azerbaijan

Barbados

Belarus

Belgium'

Belize'

Bolivia

Bosnia-Herzegovina

Brazil

Bulgaria

Canada

Cape Verde

Chile

China'

Congo, Democratic Republic of the

Costa Rica

Cote d'lvoire

Croatia

Cuba

Kenya

Kiribati

Korea

Libya

Luxembourg'

Malta

Mexico

Monaco'

Morocco

Nauru

Netherlands 6

New Zealand'

Nigeria

Norway

Oman

Pakistan

Panama

Papua New Guinea

Peru

Philippines

Poland

Portugal

Russian Federation
1328 Conv. on the Prey. of Marine Pollution by Dump. of Wastes & Other Matters

Cyprus

Denmark4

Dominican Republic

Egypt

Equatorial Guinea

Finland

France'

Gabon

German Democratic Republic'"

Germany, Fed. Rep. lb

Greece'

Guatemala

Haiti

Honduras

Hungary

Iceland

Iran

Ireland

Italy'

Jamaica

Japan

Jordan

Sierra Leone

St. Lucia

St. Vincent and the Grenadines

Serbia

Seychelles

Slovenia

Solomon Islands

South Africa

Spain

Suriname

Sweden

Switzerland

Tanzania

Tonga

Tunisia

Tuvalu " Ukraine

Union of Soviet Socialist Reps."

United Arab Emirates

United Kingdom'

United States

Vanuatu

Yugoslavia'"

Updaiedas of January 2010

Amendment: November 12, 1993.

NOTES:

With statement.

2 On September 21, 1981 Belize became an.independent state. In a letter dated September 29, 1982 to the

Secretary General of the United Nations, the Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Belize made a

statement reading in part as follows: I have the honour to inform you that the Government of Belize has

decided to continue to apply provisionally and on the basis of reciprocity, all treaties to which the Government

of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland was a party, the application of which was

extended either expressly or by necessary implication to the then dependent territory of Belize. Such

provisional application would subsist until Belize otherwise notifies Your Excellency, the depository (in the

case of a multilateral treaty), or the state party (in the case of a bilateral treaty.)

Applicable to Hong Kong and Macao. With declarations.

Extended to Faroe Is.

5 With reservation.

"Applicable to Netherlands Antilles and Aruba.

7 Not applicable to Cook Is., Niue, and Tokalau Is.

"The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics dissolved December 25, 1991. As stated in the Alma-Ata

Declaration of December 21, 1991, "... The States participating in the Commonwealth guarantee in

accordance with their constitutional procedures the discharge of the international obligations deriving from

treaties and agreements concluded by the fbrmer Union of Soviet Socialist Republics....".

' Extended to Bailiwick of Guernsey, Bermuda, British Indian Ocean Territory, British Virgin Is., Cayman

Is., Ducie and Osno Is., Falkland Is. and dependencies, Henderson, Hong Kong, Isle of Man, Bailiwick of

Jersey, Montserrat, Piteaim. St. Helena and dependencies, Turks and Caicos Is., and United Kingdom

Sovereign Base Areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia on the Island of Cyprus.

"'Yugoslavia has dissolved. Where a multilateral treaty action was taken prior to dissolution,

"'Yugoslavia" is retained: where a successor state has taken action it is listed separately. The status of the

agreements listed below is under review.
Cony. on the Prey. of Marine Pollution by Dump. of Wastes & Other Matters 1329

"The Federal Republic of Germany provided a note to the Department dated October 15, 1990, which

reads in pertinent part as follows:

The Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany presents its compliments to the Department of State

and has the honor to inform the Department that, with regard to the continued application of treaties of the

Federal Republic of Germany and the treatment of treaties of the German Democratic Republic following its

accession to the Federsl Republic of Germany with effect from 3 October 1990, the Treaty of 31 August 1990

between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic on the Establishment of

German Unity (Unilication Treaty) contains the flollowing relevant provisions.

Treaties of the Federal Republic of Germany

The Contracting Parties proceed on the understanding that international treaties and agreements to

which the Federal Republic of Germany is a Contracting Party, inchlding treaties establishing its membership

of international organizations or institutions, shall retain their validity and that the rights and obligations

arising therefrom, with the exception of the treaties named in Article I (not included herein), shall also relate

to the territory specified in Article 3. Where adjustments become necessary in individual cases, the all-German

Government shall consult with the respective Contracting Parties.

Treaties of the German Democratic Republic

(1) The Contracting Parties are agreed that, in connection with the establishment of Germai unity,

international treaties of the German Democratic Republic shall be discussed with the Contracting Parties

concerned with a view to regulating or confirming their continued application, adjustment or expiry, taking

into account protection of confidence, the interests of the states concerned, the treaty obligations of the

Federal Republic of Germany' as well as the principles of a free, democratic basic order governed by the ride

of law, and respecting the competence of the European Communities.

(2) The United Germany shall determine its position with regard to the adoption of international

treaties of tie German Democratic Republic following consultations with the respective Contracting Parties

and with the European Communities where the latter's competence is affected

'On October 1, 1978, Tuvalu became an independent state. In a note dated December 19, 1978, to the

Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Prime Minister of Tuvalu made a statement reading in part as

follows:

The Govemment of Tuvalu, conscious of the desirability of maintaining existing international legal

relationships, and conscious of its obligations under international law to honor its treaty commitments,

acknowledges that many treaty rights and obligations of the Government of the United Kingdom in respect of

the Gilbert and Ellice Islands Protectorate, the Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony and Tuvalu were succeeded to

by Tuvalu upon Independence by virtue of customary international law. Since, however, it is likely that by

virtue of that law certain of such treaties may be said to have lapsed at the date of Tuvalu's Independence, it

seems essential that each treaty purporting or deemed to bind Tuvalu before that date should be subjected to

legal examination. The Government ofiuvalu proposes after such examination has been completed to indicate

which, if any, of the treaties which may be said to have lapsed by virtue of customary international law it

proposes to treat as having lapsed.

The Government of Tuvalu desires that it should be presumed that each treaty purporting or deemed to

bind Tuvalu before Independence has been legally succeeded to by Tuvalu and that action should be based on

such presumption unless and until the Government of Tuvalu decides that any particular treaty should be

treated as having lapsed. Should the Government of Tuvalu be of opinion that it has legally succeeded to any

treaty, and wish to terminate the operation of such treaty, it will in due course give notice of termination in the

terms thereof.

For the avoidance of doubt, the Government of Tuvalu further declares that it does not regard itself as

bound by the terms of any convention creating an inter-national organization to the extent that such convention

requires the payment of any sum by any State, by virtue only of the accession of the Government of the United

Kingdom to such convention.
1330 Conv. on the Safety of Spent Fuel Mgmt. & of Radioactive Waste Mgmt.

INFCIRC/546

24 December 1997

International Atomic Energy Agency GENERAL Distr.

INFORMATION CIRCULAR Original: ARABIC, CHINESE

(Unofficial electronic edition) ENGLISH, FRENCH, RUSSIAN

and

SPANISH

V. JOINT CONVENTION ON THE SAFETY OF SPENT FUEL

MANAGEMENT AND ON THE SAFETY OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE

MANAGEMENT

I. The Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety

of Radioactive Waste Management was adopted on 5 September 1997 by a Diplomatic

Conference convened by the International Atomic Energy Agency at its headquarters

from I to 5 September 1997. The Joint Convention was opened for signature at Vienna

on 29 September 1997 during the forty-first session of the General Conference of the

International Atomic Energy Agency and will remain open for signature until its entry

into force.

2. Pursuant to article 40, the Joint Convention will enter into force on the ninetieth

day after the date of deposit with the Depositary of the twenty-fifth instrument of

ratification, acceptance or approval, including the instruments of fifteen States each

having an operational nuclear power plant.

3. The text of the Convention, as adopted, is attached hereto for the information of

Member States.

PREAMBLE

CHAPTER 1 OBJECTIVES, DEFINITIONS AND SCOPE OF APPLICATION

ARTICLE I OBJECTIVES

ARTICLE 2 DEFINITIONS

ARTICLE 3 SCOPE OF APPLICATION

CHAPTER 2 SAFETY OF SPENT FUEL MANAGEMENT

ARTICLE 4 GENERAL SAFETY REQUIREMENTS

ARTICLE 5 EXISTING FACILITIES

ARTICLE 6 SITING OF PROPOSED FACILITIES

ARTICLE 7 DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION OF FACILITIES

ARTICLE 8 ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY OF FACILITIES

ARTICLE 9 OPERATION OF FACILITIES

ARTICLE 10 DISPOSAL OF SPENT FUEL

CHAPTER 3 SAFETY OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT

ARTICLE II GENERAL SAFETY REQUIREMENTS

ARTICLE 12 EXISTING FACILITIES AND PAST PRACTICES

ARTICLE 13 SITING OF PROPOSED FACILITIES

ARTICLE 14 DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION OF FACILITIES

ARTICLE 15 ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY OF FACILITIES

ARTICLE 16 OPERATION OF FACILITIES

ARTICLE 17 INSTITUTIONAL MEASURES AFTER CLOSURE
Cony. on the Safety of Soent Fuel Mamt. & of Radioactive Waste Mamt. 1331

CHAPTER 4 GENERAL SAFETY PROVISIONS

ARTICLE 18 IMPLEMENTING MEASURES

ARTICLE 19 LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK

ARTICLE 20 REGULATORY BODY

ARTICLE 21 RESPONSIBILITY OF THE LICENCE HOLDER

ARTICLE 22 HUMAN AND FINANCIAL RESOURCES

ARTICLE 23 QUALITY ASSURANCE

ARTICLE 24 OPERATIONAL RADIATION PROTECTION

ARTICLE 25 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

ARTICLE 26 DECOMMISSIONING

CHAPTER 5

CHAPTER 6

CHAPTER 7

MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

ARTICLE 27 TRANSBOUNDARY MOVEMENT

ARTICLE 28 DISUSED SEALED SOURCES

MEETINGS OF THE CONTRACTING PARTIES

ARTICLE 29 PREPARATORY MEETING

ARTICLE 30 REVIEW MEETINGS

ARTICLE 31 EXTRAORDINARY MEETINGS

ARTICLE 32 REPORTING

ARTICLE 33 ATTENDANCE

ARTICLE 34 SUMMARY REPORTS

ARTICLE 35 LANGUAGES

ARTICLE 36 CONFIDENTIALITY

ARTICLE 37 SECRETARIAT

FINAL CLAUSES AND OTHER PROVISIONS

ARTICLE 38 RESOLUTION OF DISAGREEMENTS

ARTICLE 39 SIGNATURE, RATIFICATION, ACCEPTANCE,

APPROVAL, ACCESSION

ARTICLE 40 ENTRY INTO FORCE

ARTICLE 41 AMENDMENTS TO THE CONVENTION

ARTICLE 42 DENUNCIATION

ARTICLE 43 DEPOSITARY

ARTICLE 44 AUTHENTIC TEXTS
1332 Cony. on the Safety of Spent Fuel Mgmt. & of Radioactive Waste Mgmt.

Preamble

The Contracting Parties

(i) Recognizing that the operation of nuclear reactors generates spent fuel and

radioactive waste and that other applications of nuclear technologies also generate

radioactive waste;

(ii) Recognizing that the same safety objectives apply both to spent fuel and

radioactive waste management;

(iii) Reaffirming the importance to the international community of ensuring that

sound practices are planned and implemented for the safety of spent fuel and radioactive

waste management;

(iv) Recognizing the importance of informing the public on issues regarding the

safety of spent fuel and radioactive waste management;

(v) Desiring to promote an effective nuclear safety culture worldwide;

(vi) Reaffirming that the ultimate responsibility for ensuring the safety of spent fuel

and radioactive waste management rests with the State;

(vii) Recognizing that the definition of a fuel cycle policy rests with the State, some States considering spent fuel as a valuable resource that may be reprocessed, others

electing to dispose of it;

(viii) Recognizing that spent fuel and radioactive waste excluded from the present

Convention because they are within military or defence programmes should be managed

in accordance with the objectives stated in this Convention;

(ix) Affirming the importance of international co-operation in enhancing the safety

of spent fuel and radioactive waste management through bilateral and multilateral

mechanisms, and through this incentive Convention;

(x) Mindful of the needs of developing countries, and in particular the least

developed countries, and of States with economies in transition and of the need to

facilitate existing mechanisms to assist in the fulfillment of their rights and obligations

set out in this incentive Convention;

(xi) Convinced that radioactive waste should, as far as is compatible with the safety

of the management of such material, be disposed of in the State in which it was generated, whilst recognizing that, in certain circumstances, safe and efficient

management of spent fuel and radioactive waste might be fostered through agreements

among Contracting Parties to use facilities in one of them for the benefit of the other

Parties, particularly where waste

originates from joint projects;

(xii) Recognizing that any State has the right to ban import into its territory of

foreign spent fuel and radioactive waste;

(xiii) Keeping in mind the Convention on Nuclear Safety (1994), the Convention on

Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident (1986), the Convention on Assistance in the

Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency (1986), the Convention on the

Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (1980). the Convention on the Prevention of

Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter as amended (1994) and other

relevant international instruments;

(xiv) Keeping in mind the principles contained in the interagency "International

Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of

Radiation Sources" (1996), in the IAEA Safety Fundamentals entitled "The Principles of

Radioactive Waste Management" (1995), and in the existing international standards

relating to the safety of the transport of radioactive materials;

(xv) Recalling Chapter 22 of Agenda 21 by the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro adopted in 1992, which reaffirms the

paramount importance of the safe and environmentally sound management of

radioactive waste;

(xvi) Recognizing the desirability of strengthening the international control system

applying specifically to radioactive materials as referred to in Article 1(3) of the Basel
Cony. on the Safety of Spent Fuel Mgmt. & of Radioactive Waste Mgmt. 1333

Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and

Their Disposal (1989);

Have agreed as follows:

Chapter 1. Objectives Definitions And Scope Of Application

Article I - Objectives

The objectives of this Convention are:

(i) to achieve and maintain a high level of safety worldwide in spent fuel and

radioactive waste management, through the enhancement of national measures and

international co-operation, including where appropriate, safety-related technical cooperation;

(ii) to ensure that during all stages of spent fuel and radioactive waste management

there are effective defenses against potential hazards so that individuals, society and the

environment are protected from harmful effects of ionizing radiation, now and in the

future, in such a way that the needs and aspirations of the present generation are met

without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their needs and

aspirations;

(iii) to prevent accidents with radiological consequences and to mitigate their

consequences should they occur during any stage of spent fuel or radioactive waste

management.

Article 2 - Definitions

For the purposes of this Convention:

(a) "closure" means the completion of all operations at some time after the

emplacement of spent fuel or radioactive waste in a disposal facility. This includes the

final engineering or other work required to bring the facility to a condition that will be

safe in the long term;

(b) "decommissioning" means all steps leading to the release of a nuclear facility,

other than a disposal facility, from regulatory control. These steps include the processes

of

decontamination and dismantling;

(c) "discharges" means planned and controlled releases into the environment, as a

legitimate practice, within limits authorized by the regulatory body, of liquid or gaseous

radioactive materials that originate from regulated nuclear facilities during normal

operation;

(d) "disposal" means the emplacement of spent fuel or radioactive waste in an

appropriate facility without the intention of retrieval;

(e) "licence" means any authorization, permission or certification granted by a

regulatory body to carry out any activity related to management of spent fuel or of

radioactive waste;

(f) "nuclearfacility" means a civilian facility and its associated land, buildings and

equipment in which radioactive materials are produced, processed, used, handled, stored

or disposed of on such a scale that consideration of safety is required;

(g) "operating lifetime" means the period during which a spent fuel or a radioactive

waste management facility is used for its intended purpose. In the case of a disposal

facility, the period begins when spent fuel or radioactive waste is first emplaced in the

facility and ends upon closure of the facility;

(h) "radioactive waste" means radioactive material in gaseous, liquid or solid form

for which no further use is foreseen by the Contracting Party or by a natural or legal

person whose decision is accepted by the Contracting Party, and which is controlled as

radioactive waste by a regulatory body under the legislative and regulatory framework

of the Contracting Party;
1334 Conv. on the Safety of Spent Fuel Mgmt. & of Radioactive Waste Mgmt.

(i) "radioactive waste management" means all activities, including decommissioning

activities, that relate to the handling, pretreatment, treatment, conditioning, storage, or

disposal of radioactive waste, excluding off-site transportation. It may also involve

discharges;

(j) "radioactive waste management facility" means any facility or installation the

primary purpose of which is radioactive waste management, including a nuclear facility

in the process of being decommissioned only if it is designated by the Contracting Party

as a radioactive waste management facility; (k) "regulatory body"' means any body or bodies given the legal authority by the

Contracting Party to regulate any aspect of the safety of spent fuel or radioactive waste

management including the granting of licences;

(I) "reprocessing" means a process or operation, the purpose of which is to extract

radioactive isotopes from spent fuel for further use;

(m) "sealed source" means radioactive material that is permanently sealed in a

capsule or closely bonded and in a solid form, excluding reactor fuel elements;

(n) "spent fuel" means nuclear fuel that has been irradiated in and permanently

removed from a reactor core;

(o) "spentJuel management" means all activities that relate to the handling or storage

of spent fuel, excluding off-site transportation. It may also involve discharges;

(p) "spent fiel management facilitv" means any facility or installation the primary

purpose of which is spent fuel management;

(q) "State of destination" means a State to which a transboundary movement is

planned or takes place;

®) "State of origin" means a State from which a transboundary movement is planned

to be initiated or is initiated;

(s) "State of transit" means any State, other than a State of origin or a State of

destination, through whose territory a transboundary movement is planned or takes

place;

(t) "storage" means the holding of spent fuel or of radioactive waste in a facility that

provides for its containment, with the intention of retrieval;

(u) "transboundarv movement" means any shipment of spent fuel or of radioactive

waste from a State of origin to a State of destination.

Article 3 - Scope Of Application 1. This Convention shall apply to the safety of spent fuel management when the

spent fuel results from the operation of civilian nuclear reactors. Spent fuel held at

reprocessing facilities as part of a reprocessing activity is not covered in the scope of this

Convention unless the Contracting Party declares reprocessing to be part of spent fuel

management.

2. This Convention shall also apply to the safety of radioactive waste management

when the radioactive waste results from civilian applications. However, this Convention

shall not apply to waste that contains only naturally occurring radioactive materials and

that does not originate from the nuclear fuel cycle, unless it constitutes a disused sealed

source or it is declared as radioactive waste for the purposes of this Convention by the

Contracting Party. 3. This Convention shall not apply to the safety of management of spent fuel or

radioactive waste within military or defence programmes, unless declared as spent fuel

or radioactive waste for the purposes of this Convention by the Contracting Party. However, this Convention shall apply to the safety of management of spent fuel and

radioactive waste from military or defence programmes if and when such materials are

transferred permanently to and managed within exclusively civilian programmes. 4. This Convention shall also apply to discharges as provided for in Articles 4, 7, 11,

14, 24 and 26.
Cony, on the Safety of Soent Fuel Mgmt. & of Radioactive Waste Mgmt. 1335

Chapter 2. Safety Of Spent Fuel Management

Article 4 - General Safety Requirements

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that at all stages of

spent fuel management, individuals, society and the environment are adequately

protected against radiological hazards.

In so doing, each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to:

(i) ensure that criticality and removal of residual heat generated during spent fuel

management are adequately addressed;

(ii) ensure that the generation of radioactive waste associated with spent fuel

management is kept to the minimum practicable, consistent with the type of fuel cycle

policy adopted;

(iii) take into account interdependencies among the different steps in spent fuel

management;

(iv) provide for effective protection of individuals, society and the environment, by

applying at the national level suitable protective methods as approved by the regulatory

body, in the framework of its national legislation which has due regard to internationally

endorsed criteria and standards;

(v) take into account the biological, chemical and other hazards that may be

associated with spent fuel management;

(vi) strive to avoid actions that impose reasonably predictable impacts on future

generations greater than those permitted for the current generation;

(vii) aim to avoid imposing undue burdens on future generations.

Article 5- Existing Facilities

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to review the safety of any spent

fuel management facility existing at the time the Convention enters into force for that

Contracting Party and to ensure that, if necessary, all reasonably practicable

improvements are made to upgrade the safety of such a facility.

Article 6 - Siting Of Proposed Facilities

I. Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that procedures

are established and implemented for a proposed spent fuel management facility:

(i) to evaluate all relevant site-related factors likely to affect the safety of such a

facility during its operating lifetime;

(ii) to evaluate the likely safety impact of such a facility on individuals, society

and the environment;

(iii) to make information on the safety of such a facility available to members of

the public;

(iv) to consult Contracting Parties in the vicinity of such a facility, insofar as they

are likely to be affected by that facility, and provide them, upon their request, with

general data relating to the facility to enable them to evaluate the likely safety impact

of the facility upon their territory.

2. In so doing, each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that

such facilities shall not have unacceptable effects on other Contracting Parties by being

sited in accordance with the general safety requirements of Article 4.

Article 7 - Design And Construction Of Facilities

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that:

(i) the design and construction of a spent fuel management facility provide for

suitable measures to limit possible radiological impacts on individuals, society and the

environment, including those from discharges or uncontrolled releases;

(ii) at the design stage, conceptual plans and, as necessary, technical provisions for

the decommissioning of a spent fuel management facility are taken into account;

(iii) the technologies incorporated in the design and construction of a spent fuel

management facility are supported by experience, testing or analysis.
1336 Cony, on the Safety of Spent Fuel Mgmt. & of Radioactive Waste Mgmt.

Article 8 - Assessment Of Safety Of Facilities

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that:

(i) before construction of a spent fuel management facility, a systematic safety

assessment and an environmental assessment appropriate to the hazard presented by the

facility and covering its operating lifetime shall be carried out;

(ii) before the operation of a spent fuel management facility, updated and detailed

versions of the safety assessment and of the environmental assessment shall be prepared

when deemed necessary to complement the assessments referred to in paragraph (i).

Article 9 - Operation Of Facilities

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that:

(i) the licence to operate a spent fuel management facility is based upon appropriate

assessments as specified in Article 8 and is conditional on the completion of a

commissioning programme demonstrating that the facility, as constructed, is consistent

with design and safety requirements;

(ii) operational limits and conditions derived from tests, operational experience and

the assessments, as specified in Article 8, are defined and revised as necessary;

(iii) operation, maintenance, monitoring, inspection and testing of a spent fuel

management facility are conducted in accordance with established procedures;

(iv) engineering and technical support in all safety-related fields are available

throughout the operating lifetime of a spent fuel management facility;

(v) incidents significant to safety are reported in a timely manner by the holder of the

licence to the regulatory body; (vi) programmes to collect and analyse relevant operating experience are established

and that the results are acted upon, where appropriate;

(vii) decommissioning plans for a spent fuel management facility are prepared and

updated, as necessary, using information obtained during the operating lifetime of that

facility, and are reviewed by the regulatory body.

Article 10- Disposal Of Spent Fuel

If, pursuant to its own legislative and regulatory framework, a Contracting Party has

designated spent fuel for disposal, the disposal of such spent fuel shall be in accordance

with the obligations of Chapter 3 relating to the disposal of radioactive waste.

Chapter 3. Safety Of Radioactive Waste Management

Article 11 - General Safety Requirements

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that at all stages of

radioactive waste management individuals, society and the environment are adequately

protected against radiological and other hazards.

In so doing, each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to:

(i) ensure that criticality and removal of residual heat generated during radioactive

waste

management are adequately addressed;

(ii) ensure that the generation of radioactive waste is kept to the minimum

practicable;

(iii) take into account interdependencies among the different steps in radioactive

waste management;

(iv) provide for effective protection of individuals, society and the environment, by

applying at the national level suitable protective methods as approved by the regulatory

body, in the framework of its national legislation which has due regard to internationally

endorsed criteria and standards;

(v) take into account the biological, chemical and other hazards that may be

associated with radioactive waste management;
Cony. on the Safety of Spent Fuel Mamt. & of Radioactive Waste Mgmt. 1337

(vi) strive to avoid actions that impose reasonably predictable impacts on future

generations greater than those permitted for the current generation;

(vii) aim to avoid imposing undue burdens on future generations.

Article 12 - Existing Facilities And Past Practices

Each Contracting Party shall in due course take the appropriate steps to review:

(i) the safety of any radioactive waste management facility existing at the time the

Convention enters into force for that Contracting Party and to ensure that, if necessary,

all reasonably practicable improvements are made to upgrade the safety of such a

facility;

(ii) the results of past practices in order to determine whether any intervention is

needed for reasons of radiation protection bearing in mind that the reduction in detriment

resulting from the reduction in dose should be sufficient to justify the harm and the

costs, including the social costs, of the intervention.

Article 13 - Siting Of Proposed Facilities

1. Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that procedures

are

established and implemented for a proposed radioactive waste management facility:

(i) to evaluate all relevant site-related factors likely to affect the safety of such a

facility during its operating lifetime as well as that of a disposal facility after closure;

(ii) to evaluate the likely safety impact of such a facility on individuals, society

and the environment, taking into account possible evolution of the site conditions of

disposal facilities after closure;

(iii) to make information on the safety of such a facility available to members of

the public;

(iv) to consult Contracting Parties in the vicinity of such a facility, insofar as they

are likely to be affected by that facility, and provide them, upon their request, with

general data relating to the facility to enable them to evaluate the likely safety impact

of the facility upon their territory.

2. In so doing, each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that

such facilities shall not have unacceptable effects on other Contracting Parties by being

sited in accordance with the general safety requirements of Article 1I.

Article 14- Design And Construction Of Facilities

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that:

(i) the design and construction of a radioactive waste management facility provide

for suitable measures to limit possible radiological impacts on individuals, society and

the environment, including those from discharges or uncontrolled releases;

(ii) at the design stage, conceptual plans and, as necessary, technical provisions for

the decommissioning of a radioactive waste management facility other than a disposal

facility are taken into account;

(iii) at the design stage, technical provisions for the closure of a disposal facility are

prepared;

(iv) the technologies incorporated in the design and construction of a radioactive

waste management facility are supported by experience, testing or analysis.

Article 15 - Assessment Of Safety Of Facilities

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that:

(i) before construction of a radioactive waste management facility, a systematic

safety assessment and an environmental assessment appropriate to the hazard presented

by the facility and covering its operating lifetime shall be carried out;

(ii) in addition, before construction of a disposal facility, a systematic safety

assessment and an environmental assessment for the period following closure shall be
1338 Conv. on the Safety of Spent Fuel Mgmt. & of Radioactive Waste Mgmt.

carried out and the results evaluated against the criteria established by the regulatory

body;

(iii) before the operation of a radioactive waste management facility, updated and

detailed versions of the safety assessment and of the environmental assessment shall be

prepared when deemed necessary to complement the assessments referred to in

paragraph (i).

Article 16 - Operation Of Facilities

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that:

(i) the licence to operate a radioactive waste management facility is based upon appropriate assessments as specified in Article 15 and is conditional on the completion

of a commissioning programme demonstrating that the facility, as constructed, is

consistent with design and safety requirements;

(ii) operational limits and conditions, derived from tests, operational experience and

the assessments as specified in Article 15 are defined and revised as necessary; (iii) operation, maintenance, monitoring, inspection and testing of a radioactive

waste management facility are conducted in accordance with established procedures. For

a disposal facility the results thus obtained shall be used to verify and to review the

validity of assumptions made and to update the assessments as specified in Article 15 for

the period after closure;

(iv) engineering and technical support in all safety-related fields are available

throughout the operating lifetime of a radioactive waste management facility;

(v) procedures for characterization and segregation of radioactive waste are applied;

(vi) incidents significant to safety are reported in a timely manner by the holder of

the licence to the regulatory body; (vii) programmes to collect and analyse relevant operating experience are established

and that the results are acted upon, where appropriate;

(viii) decommissioning plans for a radioactive waste management facility other than

a disposal facility are prepared and updated, as necessary, using information obtained

during the operating lifetime of that facility, and are reviewed by the regulatory body; (ix) plans for the closure of a disposal facility are prepared and updated, as

necessary, using information obtained during the operating lifetime of that facility and

are reviewed by the regulatory body.

Article 17 - Institutional Measures After Closure

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that after closure of a

disposal facility: (i) records of the location, design and inventory of that facility required by the

regulatory body are preserved;

(ii) active or passive institutional controls such as monitoring or access restrictions

are carried out, if required; and

(iii) if, during any period of active institutional control, an unplanned release of

radioactive materials into the environment is detected, intervention measures are

implemented, if necessary.

Chapter 4. General Safety Provisions

Article 18 - Implementing Measures

Each Contracting Party shall take, within the framework of its national law, the

legislative, regulatory and administrative measures and other steps necessary for

implementing its obligations under this Convention.

Article 19- Legislative And Regulatory Framework

1. Each Contracting Party shall establish and maintain a legislative and regulatory

framework to govern the safety of spent fuel and radioactive waste management.

2. This legislative and regulatory framework shall provide for:
Cony. on the Safety of Spent Fuel M~mt. & of Radioactive Waste Memt. 1339

(i) the establishment of applicable national safety requirements and regulations

for radiation safety;

(ii) a system of licensing of spent fuel and radioactive waste management

activities;

(iii) a system of prohibition of the operation of a spent fuel or radioactive waste

management facility without a licence;

(iv) a system of appropriate institutional control, regulatory inspection and

documentation and reporting;

(v) the enforcement of applicable regulations and of the terms of the licences;

(vi) a clear allocation of responsibilities of the bodies involved in the different

steps of spent fuel and of radioactive waste management.

3. When considering whether to regulate radioactive materials as radioactive waste,

Contracting Parties shall take due account of the objectives of this Convention.

Article 20 - Regulatory Body

1. Each Contracting Party shall establish or designate a regulatory body entrusted

with the implementation of the legislative and regulatory framework referred to in

Article 19, and provided with adequate authority, competence and financial and human

resources to fulfill its assigned responsibilities.

2. Each Contracting Party, in accordance with its legislative and regulatory

framework, shall take the appropriate steps to ensure the effective independence of the

regulatory functions from other functions where organizations are involved in both spent

fuel or radioactive waste management and in their regulation.

Article 21 - Responsibility Of The License Holder

1. Each Contracting Party shall ensure that prime responsibility for the safety of

spent fuel or radioactive waste management rests with the holder of the relevant licence

and shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that each such licence holder meets its

responsibility.

2. If there is no such licence holder or other responsible party, the responsibility rests

with the Contracting Party which has jurisdiction over the spent fuel or over the

radioactive waste.

Article 22 - Human And Financial Resources

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that:

(i) qualified staff are available as needed for safety-related activities during the

operating lifetime of a spent fuel and a radioactive waste management facility;

(ii) adequate financial resources are available to support the safety of facilities for

spent fuel and radioactive waste management during their operating lifetime and for

decommissioning;

(iii) financial provision is made which will enable the appropriate institutional

controls and monitoring arrangements to be continued for the period deemed necessary

following the closure of a disposal facility.

Article 23 - Quality Assurance

Each Contracting Party shall take the necessary steps to ensure that appropriate quality

assurance programmes concerning the safety of spent fuel and radioactive waste

management are established and implemented.

Article 24 - Operational Radiation Protection

1. Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that during the

operating lifetime of a spent fuel or radioactive waste management facility:

(i) the radiation exposure of the workers and the public caused by the facility

shall be kept as low as reasonably achievable, economic and social factors being

taken into account;
1340 Conv. on the Safety of Spent Fuel Mgmt. & of Radioactive Waste Mgmt.

(ii) no individual shall be exposed, in normal situations, to radiation doses which

exceed national prescriptions for dose limitation which have due regard to

internationally endorsed standards on radiation protection; and

(iii) measures are taken to prevent unplanned and uncontrolled releases of

radioactive materials into the environment.

2. Each Contracting Party shall take appropriate steps to ensure that discharges shall

be limited:

(i) to keep exposure to radiation as low as reasonably achievable, economic and

social factors being taken into account; and

(ii) so that no individual shall be exposed, in normal situations, to radiation doses

which exceed national prescriptions for dose limitation which have due regard to

internationally endorsed standards on radiation protection.

3. Each Contracting Party shall take appropriate steps to ensure that during the

operating lifetime of a regulated nuclear facility, in the event that an unplanned or

uncontrolled release of radioactive materials into the environment occurs, appropriate

corrective measures are implemented to control the release and mitigate its effects.

Article 25 - Emergency Preparedness

1. Each Contracting Party shall ensure that before and during operation of a spent fuel or radioactive waste management facility there are appropriate on-site and, if

necessary, off-site emergency plans. Such emergency plans should be tested at an

appropriate frequency.

2. Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps for the preparation and

testing of emergency plans for its territory insofar as it is likely to be affected in the

event of a radiological emergency at a spent fuel or radioactive waste management

facility in the vicinity of its territory.

Article 26 - Decommissioning

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure the safety of

decommissioning of a nuclear facility. Such steps shall ensure that:

(i) qualified staff and adequate financial resources are available;

(ii) the provisions of Article 24 with respect to operational radiation protection,

discharges and unplanned and uncontrolled releases are applied;

(iii) the provisions of Article 25 with respect to emergency preparedness are applied;

and

(iv) records of information important to decommissioning are kept.

Chapter 5. Miscellaneous Provisions

Article 27 - Transboundary Movement

1. Each Contracting Party involved in transboundary movement shall take the

appropriate steps to ensure that such movement is undertaken in a manner consistent

with the provisions of this Convention and relevant binding international instruments.

In so doing:

(i) a Contracting Party which is a State of origin shall take the appropriate steps

to ensure that transboundary movement is authorized and takes place only with the

prior notification and consent of the State of destination;

(ii) transboundary movement through States of transit shall be subject to those

international obligations which are relevant to the particular modes of transport

utilized;

(iii) a Contracting Party which is a State of destination shall consent to a

transboundary movement only if it has the administrative and technical capacity, as

well as the regulatory structure, needed to manage the spent fuel or the radioactive

waste in a manner consistent with this Convention;
Cony. on the Safety of Spent Fuel Mgmt. & of Radioactive Waste Mgmt. 1341

(iv) a Contracting Party which is a State of origin shall authorize a transboundary

movement only if it can satisfy itself in accordance with the consent of the State of

destination that the requirements of subparagraph (iii) are met prior to transboundary

movement;

(v) a Contracting Party which is a State of origin shall take the appropriate steps

to permit re-entry into its territory, if a transboundary movement is not or cannot be

completed in conformity with this Article, unless an alternative safe arrangement can

be made.

2. A Contracting Party shall not licence the shipment of its spent fuel Or radioactive

waste to a destination south of latitude 60 degrees South for storage or disposal.

3. Nothing in this Convention prejudices or affects:

(i) the exercise, by ships and aircraft of all States, of maritime, river and air

navigation rights and freedoms, as provided for in international law;

(ii) rights of a Contracting Party to which radioactive waste is exported for

processing to return, or provide for the return of, the radioactive waste and other

products after treatment to the State of origin;

(iii) the right of a Contracting Party to export its spent fuel for reprocessing;

(iv) rights of a Contracting Party to which spent fuel is exported for reprocessing

to return, or provide for the return of, radioactive waste and other products resulting

from reprocessing operations to the State of origin.

Article 28 - Disused Sealed Sources

I. Each Contracting Party shall, in the framework of its national law, take the

appropriate steps to ensure that the possession, remanufacturing or disposal of disused

sealed sources takes place in a safe manner.

2. A Contracting Party shall allow for reentry into its territory of disused sealed

sources if, in the framework of its national law, it has accepted that they be returned to a

manufacturer qualified to receive and possess the disused sealed sources.

Chapter 6. Meetings Of The Contracting Parties

Article 29 - Preparatory Meeting 1. A preparatory meeting of the Contracting Parties shall be held not later than six

months after the date of entry into force of this Convention.

2. At this meeting, the Contracting Parties shall:

(i) determine the date for the first review meeting as referred to in Article 30.

This review meeting shall be held as soon as possible, but not later than thirty

months after the date of entry into force of this Convention;

(ii) prepare and adopt by consensus Rules of Procedure and Financial Rules;

(iii) establish in particular and in accordance with the Rules of Procedure:

(a) guidelines regarding the form and structure of the national reports to be

submitted pursuant to Article 32;

(b) a date for the submission of such reports;

(c) the process for reviewing such reports.

3. Any State or regional organization of an integration or other nature which ratifies,

accepts, approves, accedes to or confirms this Convention and for which the Convention

is not yet in force, may attend the preparatory meeting as if it were a Party to this

Convention.

Article 30 - Review Meetings

1. The Contracting Parties shall hold meetings for the purpose of reviewing the

reports submitted pursuant to Article 32.

2. At each review meeting the Contracting Parties:

(i) shall determine the date for the next such meeting, the interval between review

meetings not exceeding three years;
1342 Conv. on the Safety of Spent Fuel Mgmt. & of Radioactive Waste Mgmt.

(ii) may review the arrangements established pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article

29, and adopt revisions by consensus unless otherwise provided for in the Rules of

Procedure. They may also amend the Rules of Procedure and Financial Rules by

consensus.

3. At each review meeting each Contracting Party shall have a reasonable

opportunity to discuss the reports submitted by other Contracting Parties and to seek

clarification of such reports.

Article 31 - Extraordinary Meetings

An extraordinary meeting of the Contracting Parties shall be held:

(i) if so agreed by a majority of the Contracting Parties present and voting at a

meeting; or

(ii) at the written request of a Contracting Party, within six months of this request

having been communicated to the Contracting Parties and notification having been

received by t&e secretariat referred to in Article 37 that the request has been supported

by a majority of the Contracting Parties.

Article 32 - Reporting

I. In accordance with the provisions of Article 30, each Contracting Party shall

submit a national report to each review meeting of Contracting Parties. This report shall

address the measures taken to implement each of the obligations of the Convention. For

each Contracting Party the report shall also address its:

(i) spent fuel management policy;

(ii) spent fuel management practices;

(iii) radioactive waste management policy;

(iv) radioactive waste management practices;

(v) criteria used to define and categorize radioactive waste.

2. This report shall also include:

(i) a list of the spent fuel management facilities subject to this Convention, their

location, main purpose and essential features;

(ii) an inventory of spent fuel that is subject to this Convention and that is being

held in storage and of that which has been disposed of. This inventory shall contain a

description of the material and, if available, give information on its mass and its total

activity; (iii) a list of the radioactive waste management facilities subject to this

Convention, their location, main purpose and essential features;

(iv) an inventory of radioactive waste that is subject to this Convention that:

(a) is being held in storage at radioactive waste management and nuclear fuel

cycle facilities;

(b) has been disposed of; or

(c) has resulted from past practices.

This inventory shall contain a description of the material and other appropriate

information available, such as volume or mass, activity and specific radionuclides;

(v) a list of nuclear facilities in the process of being decommissioned and the

status of decommissioning activities at those facilities.

Article 33 - Attendance

1. Each Contracting Party shall attend meetings of the Contracting Parties and be

represented at such meetings by one delegate, and by such alternates, experts and

advisers as it deems necessary. 2. The Contracting Parties may invite, by consensus, any intergovernmental

organization which is competent in respect of matters governed by this Convention to

attend, as an observer, any meeting, or specific sessions thereof. Observers shall be

required to accept in writing, and in advance, the provisions of Article 36.
Cony. on the Safety of Spent Fuel Mgmt. & of Radioactive Waste Mgmt. 1343

Article 34 - Summary Reports

The Contracting Parties shall adopt, by consensus, and make available to the public a

document addressing issues discussed and conclusions reached during meetings of the

Contracting Parties.

Article 35 - Languages

1. The languages of meetings of the Contracting Parties shall be Arabic, Chinese,

English, French, Russian and Spanish unless otherwise provided in the Rules of

Procedure.

2. Reports submitted pursuant to Article 32 shall be prepared in the national

language of the submitting Contracting Party or in a single designated language to be

agreed in the Rules of Procedure. Should the report be submitted in a national language

other than the designated language, a translation of the report into the designated

language shall be provided by the Contracting Party.

3. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 2, the secretariat, if compensated,

will assume the translation of reports submitted in any other language of the meeting

into the designated language.

Article 36 - Confidentiality 1. The provisions of this Convention shall not affect the rights and obligations of the

Contracting Parties under their laws to protect information from disclosure. For the

purposes of this article, "information" includes, inter alia, information relating to

national security or to the physical protection of nuclear materials, information protected

by intellectual property rights or by industrial or commercial confidentiality, and

personal data.

2. When, in the context of this Convention, a Contracting Party provides information

identified by it as protected as described in paragraph 1, such information shall be used

only for the purposes for which it has been provided and its confidentiality shall be

respected.

3. With respect to information relating to spent fuel or radioactive waste falling

within the scope of this Convention by virtue of paragraph 3 of Article 3, the provisions

of this Convention shall not affect the exclusive discretion of the Contracting Party

concerned to decide:

(i) whether such information is classified or otherwise controlled to preclude

release;

(ii) whether to provide information referred to in sub-paragraph (i) above in the

context of the Convention; and

(iii) what conditions of confidentiality are attached to such information if it is

provided in the context of this Convention.

4. The content of the debates during the reviewing of the national reports at each

review meeting held pursuant to Article 30 shall be confidential.

Article 37 - Secretariat

I. The International Atomic Energy Agency, (hereinafter referred to as "the

Agency") shall provide the secretariat for the meetings of the Contracting Parties.

2. The secretariat shall:

(i) convene, prepare and service the meetings of the Contracting Parties referred

to in Articles 29, 30 and 3 1;

(ii) transmit to the Contracting Parties information received or prepared in

accordance with the provisions of this Convention.

The costs incurred by the Agency in carrying out the functions referred to in subparagraphs

(i) and (ii) above shall be borne by the Agency as part of its regular budget.

3. The Contracting Parties may, by consensus, request the Agency to provide other

services in support of meetings of the Contracting Parties. The Agency may provide
1344 Cony, on the Safety of Spent Fuel Mgmt. & of Radioactive Waste Mgmt.

such services if they can be undertaken within its programme and regular budget. Should

this not be possible, the Agency may provide such services if voluntary funding is

provided from another source.

Chapter 7. Final Clauses And Other Provisions

Article 38 - Resolution Of Disagreements

In the event of a disagreement between two or more Contracting Parties concerning the

interpretation or application of this Convention, the Contracting Parties shall consult

within the framework of a meeting of the Contracting Parties with a view to resolving the disagreement. In the event that the consultations prove unproductive, recourse can be

made to the mediation, conciliation and arbitration mechanisms provided for in

international law, including the rules and practices prevailing within the IAEA.

Article 39 - Signature, Ratification, Acceptance, Approval, Accession

I. This Convention shall be open for signature by all States at the Headquarters of

the Agency in Vienna from 29 September 1997 until its entry into force.

2. This Convention is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by the signatory

States.

3. After its entry into force, this Convention shall be open for accession by all States.

4. (i) This Convention shall be open for signature subject to confirmation, or

accession by regional organizations of an integration or other nature, provided that any

such organization is constituted by sovereign States and has competence in respect of the

negotiation, conclusion and application of international agreements in matters covered

by this Convention.

(ii) In matters within their competence, such organizations shall, on their own

behalf, exercise the rights and fulfil the responsibilities which this Convention attributes

to States Parties.

(iii) When becoming party to this Convention, such an organization shall

communicate to the Depositary referred to in Article 43, a declaration indicating which

States are members thereof, which Articles of this Convention apply to it, and the extent

of its competence in the field covered by those articles.

(iv) Such an organization shall not hold any vote additional to those of its Member

States.

5. Instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval, accession or confirmation shall

be deposited with the Depositary.

Article 40 - Entry Into Force

I. This Convention shall enter into force on the ninetieth day after the date of deposit with the Depositary of the twenty-fifth instrument of ratification, acceptance or

approval, including the instruments of fifteen States each having an operational nuclear

power plant. 2. For each State or regional organization of an integration or other nature which

ratifies, accepts, approves, accedes to or confirms this Convention after the date of

deposit of the last instrument required to satisfy the conditions set forth in paragraph 1,

this Convention shall enter into force on the ninetieth day after the date of deposit with

the Depositary of the appropriate instrument by such a State or organization.

Article 41 - Amendments To The Convention

I. Any Contracting Party may propose an amendment to this Convention. Proposed amendments shall be considered at a review meeting or at an extraordinary meeting.

2. The text of any proposed amendment and the reasons for it shall be provided to the

Depositary who shall communicate the proposal to the Contracting Parties at least ninety

days before the meeting for which it is submitted for consideration. Any comments

received on such a proposal shall be circulated by the Depositary to the Contracting

Parties.
Cony. on the Safety of Spent Fuel Mgmt. & of Radioactive Waste Mgmt. 1345

3. The Contracting Parties shall decide after consideration of the proposed

amendment whether to adopt it by consensus, or, in the absence of consensus, to submit

it to a Diplomatic Conference. A decision to submit a proposed amendment to a

Diplomatic Conference shall require a two-thirds majority vote of the Contracting

Parties present and voting at the meeting, provided that at least one half of the

Contracting Parties are present at the time of voting.

4. The Diplomatic Conference to consider and adopt amendments to this Convention

shall be convened by the Depositary and held no later than one year after the appropriate

decision taken in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article. The Diplomatic

Conference shall make every effort to ensure amendments are adopted by consensus.

Should this not be possible, amendments shall be adopted with a two-thirds majority of

all Contracting Parties.

5. Amendments to this Convention adopted pursuant to paragraphs 3 and 4 above

shall be subject to ratification, acceptance, approval, or confirmation by the Contracting

Parties and shall enter into force for those Contracting Parties which have ratified,

accepted, approved or confirmed them on the ninetieth day after the receipt by the

Depositary of the relevant instruments of at least two thirds of the Contracting Parties.

For a Contracting Party which subsequently ratifies, accepts, approves or confirms the

said amendments, the amendments will enter into force on the ninetieth day after that

Contracting Party has deposited its relevant instrument.

Article 42 - Denunciation

1. Any Contracting Party may denounce this Convention by written notification to

the Depositary.

2. Denunciation shall take effect one year following the date of the receipt of the

notification by the Depositary, or on such later date as may be specified in the

notification.

Article 43 - Depositary

1. The Director General of the Agency shall be the Depositary of this Convention.

2. The Depositary shall inform the Contracting Parties of:

(i) the signature of this Convention and of the deposit of instruments of

ratification, acceptance, approval, accession or confirmation in accordance with

Article 39;

(ii) the date on which the Convention enters into force, in accordance with

Article 40;

(iii) the notifications of denunciation of the Convention and the date thereof,

made in accordance with Article 42;

(iv) the proposed amendments to this Convention submitted by Contracting

Parties, the amendments adopted by the relevant Diplomatic Conference or by the

meeting of the Contracting Parties, and the date of entry into force of the said

amendments, in accordance with Article 4 1.

Article 44 - Authentic Texts

The original of this Convention of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian

and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Depositary, who

shall send certified copies thereof to the Contracting Parties.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF THE UNDERSIGNED, BEING DULY AUTHORIZED TO

THAT EFFECT, HAVE SIGNED THIS CONVENTION.

Done at Vienna on the fifth day of September, one thousand nine hundred and ninetyseven.
1346 Cony. on the Safety of Spent Fuel Mgmt. & of Radioactive Waste Mgmt.

Table: Joint Convention On The Safety Of Spent Fuel Management And On The

Safety Of Radioactive Waste Management

Notes: The Convention, pursuant to Article 40.1 entered into force on 18 June 2001,

i.e. on the ninetieth day after the day of deposit with the Depositary of the twenty-fifth

instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval, including the instruments of fifteen

States each having an operational nuclear power plant.

Country/

Organization

Ar2entina'

Australia

Austria

Belarus

Belgium'

Brazil'

Bulgaria'

Canada'

China'

Croatia

Cyprus

Czech

Republic'

Denmark

Estonia

Finland'

France

Gabon

Georgia

Germany'

Greece

Hungary'

Iceland

Indonesia

Ireland

Italy

.Japan'

Kazakhstan'

Korea,

Republic

Kyrgvzstan

Latvia

Lebanon

Lithuania'

Luxembourg

Macedonia

Montenegro

Morocco

Netherlands'.2

Nigeria

Norway

Peru

Philippines

Poland

Romania'

Signature

19 Dec 1997

13 Nov 1998

17 Sep 1998

13 Oct 1999

08 Dec 1997

31 Oct 1997

22 Sep 1998

07 May 1998

09 Apr 1998

30 Sep 1997

09 Feb 1998

05 Jan 2001

02 Oct 1997

.29 Sep 1997

01 Oct 1997

09 Feb 1998

29 Sep 1997

06 Oct 1997

01 Oct 1997

26 Jan 1998

29 Sep 1997

29 Sep 1997

27 Mar 2000

30 Sep 1997

30 Sep 1997

01 Oct 1997

29 Sep 1997

10 Mar 1999

29 Sep 1997

04 Jun 1998

10 Mar 1998

03 Oct 1997

30 Sep 1997

Instrument

Ratification

Ratification

Ratification

Ratification

Ratification

Ratification

Ratification

Ratification

Accession

Ratification

Accession

Approval

Acceptance

Ratification

Acceptance

Approval

Accession

Accession

Ratification

Ratification

Ratification

Accession

Ratification

Ratification

Accession

Ratification

Ratification

Accession

Acceptance

Ratification

Ratification

Accession

Accession

Ratification

Acceptance

Accession

Ratification

Date of

Deposit

14 Nov 2000

05 Aug 2003

13 Jun 2001

26 Nov 2002

05 Sep 2002

17 Feb 2006

21 Jun 2000

07 May 1998

13 Sep 2006

10 May 1999

21 Oct 2009

Decla- With- Entry into

ration draw Force

18 Jun 2001

03 Nov 2003

I I Sep 2001

24 Feb 2003

0)4 Dec 2002

18 May 2006

18 Jun 2001

18 Jun 2001

12 Dec 2006

18 Jun 2001

19 Jan 2010

25 Mar 1999

03 Sep 1999

03 Feb 2006

10 Feb 2000

27 Apr 2000

29 Apr 2010

22 Jul 2009

13 Oct 1998

18 Jul 2000

02 Jun 1998

27 Jan 2006

20 Mar 2001

08 Feb 2006

26 Aug 2003

10 Mar 2010

16 Sep 2002

18 Dec 2006

27 Mar 2000

16 Mar 2004

21 Aug 2001

31 Dec 2009

09 Aug2010

23 Jul 1999

26 Apr 2000

04 Apr 2007

12 Jan 1998

18 Jun 2001

18 Jun 2001

04 May 2006

18 Jun 2001

18 Jun 2001

28 Jul 2010

20 Oct 2009

18 Jun 2001

18 Jun 2001

18 Jun 2001

27 Apr 2006

18 Jun 2001

09 May 2006

24 Nov 2003

08 Jun 2010

15 Dec 2002

18 Mar 2007

18 Jun 2001

14 Jun 2004

19 Nov 2001

31 Mar 2010

7 Nov 2010

18 Jun 2001

18 Jun 2001

03 Jul 2007

18 Jun 2001

Ratification 05 May 2000

Ratification 06 Sep 1999

18 Jun 2001

18 Jun 2001
Cony. on the Safety of Spent Fuel Mgmt. & of Radioactive Waste Mgmt. 1347

Table: Joint Convention On The Safety Of Spent Fuel Management And On The

Safety Of Radioactive Waste Management

Notes: The Convention, pursuant to Article 40.1 entered into force on 18 June 2001,

i.e. on the ninetieth day after the day of deposit with the Depositary of the twenty-fifth

instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval, including the instruments of fifteen

States each having an operational nuclear power plant.

Country/ Date of Decla- With- Entry into

Organization Signature Instrument Deposit ration draw Force

Russian

Federation' 27 Jan 1999 Ratification 19 Jan 2006 19 Apr 2006

Senegal Accession 24 Dec 2008 24 Mar 2009

Slovakia' 30 Sep) 1997 Ratification 06 Oct 1998 18 Jun 2001

Slovenia' 29 Sep 1997 Ratification 25 Feb 1999 18 Jun 2001

South Africa Accession 15 Nov 2006 13 Feb 2007

Spain' 30 Jun 1998 Ratification I I May 1999 18 Jun 2001

Sweden' 29 Sep 1997 Ratification 29 Jul 1999 18 Jun 2001

Switzerland' 29 Sep) 1997 Ratification 05 Apr2000 18 .un 2001

Taiikistan Accession 12 Dec 2007 II Mar 2008

Ukraine' 29 Sep 1997 Ratification 24 Jul 2000 18 Jun 2001

United Arab

Emirates Accession 31 Jul 2009 29 Oct 2009

United

Kingdom' 29 Sep 1997 Ratification 12 Mar 2001 18 Jun 2001

United States

of America' 29 Sep 1997 Ratification 15 Apr 2003 14 Jul 2003

Uruguay Accession 28 Dec 2005 28 Mar 2006

Uzbekistan Accession 19 Jan 2009 19 Apr 2009

EURAI'OM Accession 04 Oct 2005 02 Jan 2006

' Indicates that the State has at least one operational nuclear power plant. 2 For the Kingdom in Europe.

Last change of status: 09 August 2010 Parties: 57 Signatories: 42
1348 Cony, on the Safety of Spent Fuel Mgmt. & of Radioactive Waste Mgmt.

Declarations/Reservations On The Joint Convention On The Safety Of Spent Fuel

Management And On The Safety Of Radioactive Waste Management

Declarations/reservations made upon expressing consent to be bound and objections thereto

China, Peoples Republic of acceded 13 Sep 2006

"].The interpretation of the Government of the People's Republic of China of 'transboundary

movement', as referred to in Article 2 subparagraph (u) and in Article 27, is as follows: before

consenting to a transboundary movement originating from another Contracting Party's domestic

entity, any Contracting Party to the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and

on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management which is a State of destination shall confirm the

said transboundary movement with the State of origin of the said transboundary movement, and

obtain authorization from the said State of origin. 2.Unless the Government of the People's

Republic of China issues a separate notice, the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel

Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management shall not apply to the Macao

Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China."

[Additional statement relating to the above declaration - received on 3 July 2007]

"In accordance with the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the

People's Republic of China and the Basic Law of the Macao Special Administrative Region of the

People's Republic of China, the Government of the People's Republic of China decides that the

Convention applies to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, and unless otherwise

notified, shall not apply to the Macao Special Administrative Region. The declaration made by the

People's Republic of China to Subparagraph (u), Article 2 and Article 27 of the Convention also

applies to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region."

Denmark, Kingdom of accepted 03 Sep 1999

"Until further notice the Convention shall not apply to Greenland and the Faroe Islands."

EURATOM acceded 04 Oct 2005

"The following States are presently members of the European Atomic Energy Community: the

Kingdom of Belgium, the Czech Republic, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Federal Republic of

Germany. the Republic of Estonia, the Hellenic Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the French

Republic, Ireland. the Italian Republic, the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Lativa, the

Republic of Lithuania, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg. the Republic of Hungary, the Republic

of Malta. the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Republic of Austria, the Republic of Poland, the

Portuguese Republic, the Republic of Slovenia, the Slovak Republic, the Republic of Finland, the

Kingdom of Sweden, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. The Community

declares that Articles I to 16, 18, 19 to 21 and 24 to 44 of the Joint Convention apply to it. The

Community possesses competences, shared with the abovementioned Member States, in the fields

covered by Articles 4, 6 to II, 13 to 16, 19 and 24 to 28 of the Joint Convention as provided by

the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community in Article 2(b) and the relevant

Articles of Title II, Chapter 3, entitled 'Health and Safety'. "When acceding to this Convention,

the European Atomic Energy Community also wishes to put forward a reservation with regard to

the non-compliance of Article 12(l) of the Directive 92/3/Euratom on the supervision and control

of shipments of radioactive waste between Member States and into and out of the Community

with the specific requirement in Article 27(l)(i) of the Joint Convention which requires the

consent of the state of destination in the framework of transboundary movements. A revision of

this Directive, which will bring the relevant Community law in conformity with this Convention,

is currently in the process of adoption."
Cony. on the Safety of Spent Fuel Mgmt. & of Radioactive Waste Mgmt. 1349

Japan accepted 26 Aug 2003

"The Government of Japan, in accedding to the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel

Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, adopted at Vienna on September 5, 1997. declares reprocessing to be part of spent fuel management pursuant to Article

3, paragraph I of the Convention."

Declarations/reservations made upon signature

Denmark, Kingdom of 09 Feb 1998

".. . for the time being, the signature on behalfof Denmark does not commit the Faroe Islands and

Greenland."
1350 Code of Conduct on the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources

'IpA EA

lis, International Atomic Energy Agency

Agence internationale de l'energie atomique

2005/Note 8

Note by the Secretariat

W. CODE OF CONDUCT ON THE SAFETY AND SECURITY OF

RADIOACTIVE SOURCES

On 8 September 2003, the Board of Governors approved the Code of Conduct on the

Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources that was contained in document

GOV/2003/49-GC(47)/9. The approved text was subsequently, in January 2004,

published with the symbol IAEA/CODEOC/2004.

The Secretariat has recently noticed a typographical error in Table I (Activities

Corresponding to Thresholds of Categories) annexed to the Code of Conduct: for Po210, the entry '6.E+02' under Category I should read '6.E+0 1'.

The Secretariat is issuing a correction slip in all official languages for insertion into

publication IAEA/CODEOC/2004.

.,Y,

7 February 2005
Code of Conduct on the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources 1351

7' n8 n ern-a ijna -tomic Energy Agency

Board of Governors GO V /2003/49-GC( 47)/9

General Conference Date: 29 July 2003

General Distribution

Original: English

For: official use only :

Item 3 of the Board's provisional agenda (GOY /2003/44)

Item 14 of the Conference's provisional agenda (GC/47)/l)

Measures To Strengthen International Cooperation

In Nuclear, Radiation

And Transport Safety And Waste Management

Revision of the Code of Conduct

on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources

Report by the Director General

Summary . .....

e The purpose of this document is to seek adoption by the Board of Governors of the

revised Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources that is

contained in Annex I to this document.

Background

e In September 1999, the Board approved an Action Plan for the Safety of Radiation

Sources and Security of Radioactive Materials (see document GOV/1999/46-GC(43)/1O

and Corr.I) and requested the Secretariat to implement it. The Action Plan included the

following action: "to initiate a meeting of technical and legal experts for exploratory

discussions relating to an international undertaking in the area of the safety of radiation

sources and the security of radioactive materials." Statements made in the Board at that

time suggested that the development of a code of conduct would be the most generally

acceptable way of proceeding.

* Early in 2000, the Secretariat convened an open-ended group of technical and legal

experts to undertake exploratory discussions on a possible Code of Conduct on the

Safety of Radiation Sources and the Security of Radioactive Materials. The group met in

March and July 2000 and produced a Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of

Radioactive Sources (see document GOV/2000/34- GC(44/7) which was taken note of

by the Board in September 2000.1 In taking note of the Code of Conduct, the Board also

took note of an accompanying report by the Chairman of the open-ended group - Mr. S.

'The Agency published the Code of Conduct (in Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian, and Spanish) in

2001 as IAEA/CODEOC/2001.
1352 Code of Conduct on the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources

McIntosh (Australia) - and requested the Director General "to organize consultations on

decisions which the Agency's policy-making organs may wish to take, in the light of the

report of the Chairman of the Open-ended Meeting, regarding - inter alia - the

application and implementation of the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of

Radioactive Sources and to make recommendations thereon to the Board."

e In May 2002, the Secretariat requested from Member States information about how

they were implementing the Code of Conduct and in August 2002, it convened an openended group of technical and legal experts to consider how the Code of Conduct might

be strengthened, particularly in response to security concerns and to questions arising

from the responses to the Secretariat's May 2002 request for information, and to examine

previously unresolved issues. The group met, under the chairmanship of Mr. S.

McIntosh (Australia), again in March and July 2003, and agreed on the revised Code of

Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources that is contained in Annex I

to this document. Annex 2 contains the report on the last meeting by the Chairman of the

open-ended group.

Recommended Action by the Board

* It is recommended that the Board approve the revised Code of Conduct on the Safety

and Security of Radioactive Sources and transmit it to the General Conference with a

recommendation that the Conference adopt it and encourage its wide implementation.
Code of Conduct on the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources 1353

Annex I

Revised Code Of Conduct On The Safety And Security Of Radioactive

Sources (Annex 1)

International Atomic Energy Agency

The IAEA's Member States

Noting that radioactive sources are used throughout the world for a wide variety of

beneficial purposes, e.g. in industry, medicine, research, agriculture and education,

Aware that the use of these radioactive sources involves risks due to potential

radiation exposure,

Recognizing the need to protect individuals, society and the environment from the

harmful effects of possible accidents and malicious acts involving radioactive sources,

Noting that ineffective, interrupted or sporadic regulatory or management control of

radioactive sources has led to serious accidents, or malicious acts, or to the existence of

orphan sources,

Aware that the risks arising from such incidents must be minimized and protected

against through the application of appropriate radiation safety and security standards,

Recognizing the importance of fostering a safety and security culture in all

organizations and among all individuals engaged in the regulatory control or the

management of radioactive sources,

Recognizing the need for effective and continuous regulatory control, in particular to

reduce the vulnerability of radioactive sources during transfers, within and between

States2,

Recognizing that States should take due care in authorizing exports, particularly

because a number of States may lack appropriate infrastructure for the safe management

and secure protection of radioactive sources, and that States should make efforts to

harmonize their systems of export control of radioactive sources,

Recognizing the need for technical facilities, including appropriate equipment and

qualified staff, to ensure the safe management and secure protection of radioactive

sources,

Noting that the International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing

Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources contain recommendations for

protection against exposure to ionizing radiation and for the safety and security of

radioactive sources,

Recalling the IAEA's Safety Requirements document on Legal and Governmental

Infrastructure for Nuclear, Radiation, Radioactive Waste and Transport Safety,

Taking account of the provisions of the Convention on Early Notification of a

Nuclear Accident (1986) and of the provisions of the Convention on Assistance in the

Case of Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency (1986),

Taking account of the provisions of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel

Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management (1997), in particular

those provisions which relate to the transboundary movement of radioactive waste and

to the possession, remanufacturing or disposal of disused sealed sources,

Recognizing that, while unsealed radioactive material is excluded from this Code,

there may be circumstances where it should be managed in accordance with the

objectives of this Code,

Recognizing the global role of the IAEA in the area of the safety and security of

radioactive sources,

Taking account of the IAEA's categorization of radioactive sources, currently found

in IAEA- TECDOC-1344 entitled "Categorization of radioactive sources", while

recognizing that TECDOC-1344 is based on deterministic health effects and does not
1354 Code of Conduct on the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources

fully take into account the range of impacts that could result from accidents or malicious

acts involving radioactive sources, and

Taking account of the approval by the Board of Governors of the activities regarding

protection against nuclear terrorism proposed to it in March 2002, including activities

relating to the security of radioactive material other than nuclear material,

DECIDE that the following Code of Conduct should serve as guidance to States for -

inter alia - the development and harmonization of policies, laws and regulations on the

safety and security of radioactive sources.

I. Definitions

I. For the purposes of this Code: "authorization" means a permission granted in a document by a

regulatory body to a natural or legal person who has submitted an application

to manage a radioactive source. The authorization can take the form of a

registration, a licence or alternative effective legal control measures which

achieve the objectives of the Code.

"disposal" means the emplacement of radioactive sources in an

appropriate facility without the intention of retrieval.

"disused source" means a radioactive source which is no longer used, and is not intended to be used, for the practice for which an

authorization has been granted. "management" means the administrative and operational activities

that are involved in the manufacture, supply, receipt, possession, storage, use,

transfer, import, export, transport, maintenance, recycling or disposal of

radioactive sources. "orphan source" means a radioactive source which is not under

regulatory control, either because it has never been under regulatory control,

or because it has been abandoned, lost, misplaced, stolen or transferred

without proper authorization. "radioactive source" means radioactive material that is

permanently sealed in a capsule or closely bonded, in a solid form and which

is not exempt from regulatory control. It also means any radioactive material

released if the radioactive source is leaking or broken, but does not mean

material encapsulated for disposal, or nuclear material within the nuclear fuel

cycles of research and power reactors. "regulatory body" means an entity or organization or a system of

entities or organizations designated by the government of a State as having legal authority for exercising regulatory control with respect to radioactive

sources, including issuing authorizations, and thereby regulating one or more

aspects of the safety or security of radioactive sources. "regulatory control" means any form of control or regulation

applied to facilities or activities by a regulatory body for reasons related to

radiation protection or to the safety or security of radioactive sources. "safety" means measures intended to minimize the likelihood of

accidents involving radioactive sources and, should such an accident occur, to

mitigate its consequences. "safety culture" means the assembly of characteristics and attitudes

in organizations and individuals which establishes that, as an overriding priority, protection and safety issues receive the attention warranted by their

significance."security" means measures to prevent unauthorized access or

damage to, and loss, theft or unauthorized transfer of, radioactive sources. "security culture" means characteristics and attitudes in

organizations and of individuals which establish that security issues receive

the attention warranted by their significance.
Code of Conduct on the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources 1355

"storage" means the holding of radioactive sources in a facility that

provides for their containment with the intention of retrieval.

II. Scope And Objectives

2. This Code applies to all radioactive sources that may pose a significant risk to

individuals, society and the environment, that is the sources referred to in the Annex

to this Code. States should also devote appropriate attention to the regulation of other

potentially harmful radioactive sources.

3. This Code does not apply to nuclear material as defined in the Convention on

the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, except for sources incorporating

plutonium-239.

4. This Code does not apply to radioactive sources within military or defence

programmes.

5. (a) The objectives of this Code are, through the development, hamlonization

and implementation of national policies, laws and regulations, and through the

fostering of international co-operation, to:

(i) achieve and maintain a high level of safety and security of radioactive

sources;

(ii) prevent unauthorized access or damage to, and loss, theft or

unauthorized transfer of, radioactive sources, so as to reduce the likelihood of

accidental harmful exposure to such sources or the malicious use of such

sources to cause harm to individuals, society or the environment; and

(iii) mitigate or minimize the radiological consequences of any accident

or malicious act involving a radioactive source.

(b) These objectives should be achieved through the establishment of an

adequate system of regulatory control of radioactive sources, applicable from the

stage of initial production to their final disposal, and a system for the restoration

of such control if it has been lost.

6. This Code relies on existing international standards relating to nuclear,

radiation, radioactive waste and transport safety and to the control of radioactive

sources. It is intended to complement existing international standards in these areas.

IlI. Basic Principles

GENERAL

7. Every State should, in order to protect individuals, society and the

environment, take the appropriate measures necessary to ensure:

(a) that the radioactive sources within its territory, or under its jurisdiction or

control, are safely managed and securely protected during their useful lives and at

the end of their useful lives; and

(b) the promotion of safety culture and of security culture with respect to

radioactive sources.

8. Every State should have in place an effective national legislative and

regulatory system of control over the management and protection of radioactive

sources. Such a system should:

(a) place the prime responsibility for the safe management of, and the

security of, radioactive sources on the persons being granted the relevant

authorizations;

(b) minimize the likelihood of a loss of control;

(c) include national strategies for gaining or regaining control over orphan

sources;

(d) provide for rapid response for the purpose of regaining control over

orphan sources;

(e) foster ongoing communication between the regulatory body and users;

(f) provide for measures to reduce the likelihood of malicious acts, including

sabotage, consistent with the threat defined by the State;
1356 Code of Conduct on the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources

(g) mitigate or minimize the radiological consequences of accidents or

malicious acts involving radioactive sources; and.

(h) provide for its own continuous improvement.

9. Every State should ensure that appropriate facilities and services for radiation

protection, safety and security are available to, and used by, the persons who are

authorized to manage radioactive sources. Such facilities and services should

include, but are not limited to, those needed for:

(a) searching for missing sources and securing found sources;

(b) intervention in the event of an accident or malicious act involving a

radioactive source;

(c) personal dosimetry and environmental monitoring; and

(d) the calibration of radiation monitoring equipment.

10. Every State should ensure that adequate arrangements are in place for the

appropriate training of the staff of its regulatory body, its law enforcement agencies

and its emergency services organizations.

I 1. Every State should establish a national register of radioactive sources. This

register should, as a minimum, include Category I and 2 radioactive sources as

described in the Annex to this Code. The information contained in that register

should be appropriately protected. For the purpose of introducing efficiency in the

exchange of radioactive source information between States, States should endeavour

to harmonize the formats of their registers.

12. Every State should ensure that information concerning any loss of control

over radioactive sources, or any incidents, with potential transboundary effects

involving radioactive sources, is provided promptly to potentially affected States

through established IAEA or other mechanisms.

13. Every State should:

(a) promote awareness among industry, health professionals, the public, and

government bodies of the safety and security hazards associated with orphan

sources; and

(b) encourage bodies and persons likely to encounter orphan sources during

the course of their operations (such as scrap metal recyclers and customs posts) to

implement appropriate monitoring programmes to detect such sources.

14. Every State should encourage the reuse or recycling of radioactive sources,

when practicable and consistent with considerations of safety and security.

15. Every State should, in implementing this Code, emphasize to designers,

manufacturers (both manufacturers of radioactive sources and manufacturers of

devices in which radioactive sources are incorporated), suppliers and users and those

managing disused sources their responsibilities for the safety and security of

radioactive sources.

16. Every State should define its domestic threat, and assess its vulnerability with respect to this threat for the variety of sources used within its territory, based on

the potential for loss of control and malicious acts involving one or more radioactive

sources.

17. Each State should take appropriate measures consistent with its national law

to protect the confidentiality of any information that it receives in confidence under

this Code of Conduct from another State or through participation in an activity carried out for the implementation of this Code of Conduct. If any State provides

information to international organizations in confidence, steps should be taken to

ensure that the confidentiality of such information is protected. A State that has

received information in confidence from another State should only provide this

information to third parties with the consent of that other State. A State is not

expected to provide any information that it is not permitted to communicate pursuant

to its national law or which would jeopardize the security of that State.
Code of Conduct on the Safetv & Securitv of Radioactive Sources 1357

LEGISLATION AND REGULATIONS

18. Every State should have in place legislation and regulations that.

(a) prescribe and assign governmental responsibilities to assure the safety

and security of radioactive sources;

(b) provide for the effective control of radioactive sources;

(c) specify the requirements for protection against exposure to ionizing

radiation; and

(d) specify the requirements for the safety and security of radioactive sources

and of the devices in which sources are incorporated. 19. Such legislation and/or regulations should provide for, in particular:

(a) the establishment of a regulatory body whose regulatory functions are

effectively independent of other functions with respect to radioactive sources,

such as the management of radioactive sources or the promotion of the use of

radioactive sources. This body should have the powers and characteristics listed

in paragraphs 20 to 22;

(b) measures to protect individuals, society and the environment from the

deleterious effects of ionizing radiation from radioactive sources;

(c) administrative requirements relating to the authorization of the

management of radioactive sources;

(d) provisions for exemption, as appropriate, from the administrative

requirements referred to in paragraph (c) above;

(e) administrative requirements relating to notifications to the regulatory

body of actions involved in the management of radioactive sources that may

engender a significant risk to individuals, society or the environment;

(f) managerial requirements relating in particular to the establishment of

adequate policies, procedures and measures for the control of radioactive sources;

(g) requirements for security measures to deter, detect and delay the

unauthorized access to, or the theft, loss or unauthorized use or removal of

radioactive sources during all stages of management; (h) requirements relating to the verification of the safety and security of

radioactive sources, through safety and security assessments, monitoring and

verification of compliance, and the maintenance of appropriate records; and

(i) the capacity to take appropriate enforcement actions

REGULATORY BODY

20. Every State should ensure that the regulatory body established by its

legislation has the authority to:

(a) establish regulations and issue guidance relating to the safety and security

of radioactive sources;

(b) require those who intend to manage radioactive sources to seek an

authorization and to submit:

(i) a safety assessment; and

(ii) a security plan or assessment as appropriate for the source and/or the facility in which the source is to be managed, if deemed

necessary in the light of the risks posed and, in the case of security, the current

national threat assessment;

(c) obtain all relevant information from an applicant for an authorization;

(d) issue, amend, suspend or revoke, as necessary, authorizations for the

management of radioactive sources.

(e) attach clear and unambiguous conditions to the authorizations issued by

it, including conditions relating to:

(i) responsibilities;

(ii) minimum operator competencies;
1358 Code of Conduct on the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources

(iii) minimum design and performance criteria, and maintenance

requirements for radioactive sources and the devices in which they are

incorporated;

(iv) minimum performance criteria and maintenance requirements for

equipment and systems used to ensure the safety and security of radioactive

sources;

(v) requirements for emergency procedures and communication links;

(vi) work procedures to be followed;

(vii) the safe and secure management of disused sources, including, where

applicable, agreements regarding the return of disused sources to a supplier;

(viii) measures to determine, as appropriate, the trustworthiness of

individuals involved in the management of radioactive sources; and

(ix) the confidentiality of information relating to the security of sources;

(f) obtain any relevant and necessary information from a person with an

authorization, in particular if that is warranted by revised safety or security

assessments;

(g) require those supplying or transferring radioactive sources or devices

incorporating radioactive sources to provide the recipient with all relevant

technical information to permit their safe and secure management.

(h) enter premises in order to undertake inspections for the verification of

compliance with regulatory requirements;

(i) enforce regulatory requirements;

(j) monitor, or request other authorized bodies to monitor, at appropriate

checkpoints for the purpose of detecting orphan sources;

(k) ensure that corrective actions are taken when a radioactive source is in an

unsafe or non-secure condition;

(I) provide, on a case-by-case basis, to a person with an authorization and the

public any information that is deemed necessary in order to protect individuals,

society and the environment;

(m) liaise and co-ordinate with other governmental bodies and with relevant

non- governmental bodies in all areas relating to the safety and. security of

radioactive sources;

(n) liaise with regulatory bodies of other countries and with international

organizations to promote co-operation and the exchange of regulatory

information;

(o) establish criteria for intervention in emergency situations;

(p) ensure that radioactive sources are stored in facilities appropriate for the

purpose of such storage; and

(q) ensure that, where disused sources are stored for extended periods of

time, the facilities in which they are stored are fit for that purpose.

2 I. Every State should ensure that its regulatory body

(a) is staffed by qualified personnel;

(b) has the financial resources and the facilities and equipment necessary to

undertake its functions in an effective manner; and

(c) is able to draw upon specialist resources and expertise from other relevant

governmental agencies.

22. Every State should ensure that its regulatory body

(a) establishes procedures for dealing with applications for authorization;

(b) ensures that arrangements are made for the safe management and secure

protection of radioactive sources, including financial provisions where

appropriate, once they have become disused;

(c) maintains appropriate records of persons with authorizations in respect of

radioactive sources, with a clear indication of the type(s) of radioactive sources

that they are authorized to use, and appropriate records of the transfer and
Code of Conduct on the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources 1359

disposal of the radioactive sources on termination of the authorizations. These

records should be properly secured against unauthorized access or alteration, and

back-up copies should be made;

(d) promotes the establishment of a safety culture and of a security culture

among all individuals and in all bodies involved in the management of

radioactive sources;

(e) establishes systems for ensuring that, where practicable, both radioactive

sources- and their containers, are marked by users with an appropriate sign to

warn members of the public of the radiation hazard, but where this is not

practicable, at least the container is so marked;

(f) establishes systems for ensuring that the areas where radioactive sources

are managed are marked by users with appropriate signs to warn workers or

members of the public, as applicable, of the radiation hazard;

(g) establishes systems for ensuring that, where practicable, radioactive

sources are identifiable and traceable, or where this is not practicable, ensures

that alternative processes for identifying and tracing those sources are in place;

(h) ensures that inventory controls are conducted on a regular basis by

persons with authorizations;

(i) carries out both announced and unannounced inspections at an appropriate

frequency taking into account past performance and the risks presented by the

radioactive source;

(j) takes enforcement actions, as appropriate, to ensure compliance with

regulatory requirements;

(k) ensures that the regulatory principles and criteria remain adequate and

valid and take into account, as applicable, operating experience and

internationally endorsed standards and recommendations;

(I) requires the prompt reporting by authorized persons of loss of control

over, and of incidents in connection with, radioactive sources;

(m) provides guidance on appropriate levels of information, instruction and

training on the safety and security of radioactive sources and the devices or

facilities in which they are housed, to manufacturers, suppliers and users of

radioactive sources;

(n) requires authorized persons to prepare emergency plans, as appropriate;

(o) is prepared, or has established provisions, to recover and restore

appropriate control over orphan sources, and to deal with radiological

emergencies and has established appropriate response plans and measures;

(p) is prepared in respect of orphan sources that may have originated within

the State to assist in obtaining technical information relating to their safe and

secure management.

IMPORT AND EXPORT OF RADIOACTIVE SOURCES

23. Every State involved in the import or export of radioactive sources should

take appropriate steps to ensure that transfers are undertaken in a manner consistent

with the provisions of the Code and that transfers of radioactive sources in

Categories I and 2 of the Annex to this Code take place only with the prior

notification by the exporting State and, as appropriate, consent by the importing

State in accordance with their respective laws and regulations.

24. Every State intending to authorize the import of radioactive sources in

Categories I and 2 of the Annex to this Code should consent to their import only if

the recipient is authorized to receive and possess the source under its national law

and the State has the appropriate technical and administrative capability, resources

and regulatory structure needed to ensure that the source will be managed in a

manner consistent with the provisions of this Code.

25. Every State intending to authorize the export of radioactive sources in

Categories I and 2 of the Annex to this Code should consent to its export only if it
1360 Code of Conduct on the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources

can satisfy itself, insofar as practicable, that the receiving State has authQrized the

recipient to receive and possess the source and has the appropriate technical and

administrative capability, resources and regulatory structure needed to ensure that the

source will be managed in a manner consistent with the provisions of this Code.

26. If the conditions in paragraphs 24 and 25 with respect to a particular import

or export cannot be satisfied, that import or export may be authorized in exceptional

circumstances with the consent of the importing State if an alternative arrangement

has been made to ensure the source will be managed in a safe and secure manner.

27. Every State should allow for re-entry into its territory of disused radioactive

sources if, in the framework of its national law, it has accepted that they be returned

to a manufacturer authorized to manage the disused sources.

28. Every State which authorizes the import or export of a radioactive source

should take appropriate steps to ensure that such import or export is conducted in a

manner consistent with existing relevant international standards relating to the

transport of radioactive materials.

29. Although not subject to the authorization procedures outlined in paragraphs

24 and 25 above, the transport of radioactive sources through the territory of a transit

or transshipment state should be conducted in a manner consistent with existing

relevant international standards relating to the transport of radioactive materials, in

particular paying careful attention to maintaining continuity of control during

international transport.

ROLE OF THE IAEA

30. The IAEA should:

(a) continue to collect and disseminate information on laws, regulations and

technical standards relating to the safe management and secure protection of

radioactive sources, develop and establish relevant technical standards and

provide for the application of these standards at the request of any State, inter alia

by advising and assisting on all aspects of the safe management and secure

protection of radioactive sources;

(b) disseminate this Code and related information widely; and

(c) in particular, implement the measures approved by its policy-making

organs.

DISSEMINATION OF THE CODE

31. Every State should, as appropriate, inform persons involved in the

management of radioactive sources, such as industry, health professionals, and

government bodies, and the public, of the measures it has taken to implement this

Code, and should take steps to disseminate that information.
Code of Conduct on the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources 1361

Annex: List of Sources Covered by the Code

Category I sources, if not safely managed or securely protected would be likely to

cause permanent injury to a person who handled them, or were otherwise in contact with

them, for more than a few minutes. It would probably be fatal to be close to this amount

of unshielded material for a period of a few minutes to an hour. These sources are

typically used in practices such as radiothermal generators, irradiators and radiation

teletherapy.

Category 2 sources, if not safely managed or securely protected, could cause

permanent injury to a person who handled them, or were otherwise in contact with them,

for a short time (minutes to hours). It could possibly be fatal to be close to this amount

of unshielded radioactive material for a period of hours to days. These sources are

typically used in practices such as industrial gamma radiography, high dose rate

brachytherapy and medium dose rate brachytherapy. Category 3 sources, if not safely managed or securely protected, could cause

permanent injury to a person who handled them, or were otherwise in contact with them,

for some hours. It could possibly - although it is unlikely - be fatal to be close to this

amount of unshielded radioactive material for a period of days to weeks. These sources

are typically used in practices such as fixed industrial gauges involving high activity

sources (for example, level gauges, dredger gauges, conveyor gauges and spinning pipe

gauges) and well logging.

Table I provides a categorization by activity levels for radionuclides that are

commonly used. These are based on D-values which define a dangerous source i.e.: a

source that could, if not under control, give rise to exposure sufficient to cause severe

deterministic effects. A more complete listing of radionuclides and associated activity levels corresponding to each category, and a fuller explanation of the derivation of the

D-values, may be found in TECDOC-1344, which also provides the underlying

methodology that could be applied to radionuclides not listed. Typical source uses are

noted above for illustrative purposes only. In addition to these categories, States should give appropriate attention to radioactive

sources considered by them to have the potential to cause unacceptable consequences if

employed for malicious purposes, and to aggregations of lower activity sources (as

defined by TECDOC 1344) which require management under the principles of this

Code.
1362 Code of Conduct on the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources

Table I. Activities Corresponding to Thresholds of Categories

Radionuclides

Am-241

Am-24 1/Be

Cf-252

Cm-244

Co-60

Cs-137

Gd- 153

Ir- 192

Pm- 147

Pu-238

Pu-239"/Bc

Ra-226

Se-75

Sr-90 (Y-90)

Tm- 170

Yb- 169

Au-198*

Cd-109*

Co-57*

Fe-55*

Ge-68*

Ni-63*

Pd-103*

Po-2 10*

Ru-106 (Rh-106)*

TI-204*

Category I

1000 x D

(TBq) (Ci)a

6.E+01 2.13+03

6.E+01 2.E+03

2.E+01 5.E+02

5.E+301 1.E+03

3.1E+0I 8.E+02

I.E+02 3.E+03

I.E+03 3.E+04

8.E+01 2.E+03

4.1E+04 I.E+06

6. E+01 2. E+03

6.1E+01 2.E+03

4.13+01 I.E+03

2.E+02 5.E+03

I.E+03 3.E+04

2.E+04 5.E+05

3.E+02 8.E+03

2.E+02 5.E+03

2.E+04 5.E+05

7.1E+02 2.1E+04

8.E+05 2.E+07

7. E+02 2.1E+04

6.E+04 2.13+06

9.E+04 2.E+06

6.E+02 2.E+03

3.E+02 8.E+03

2.E+04 5.E+05

Category 2

10xD

Category I

D

(TBq)

6. E-0I

6.13-01

2.13-01

5.1-01

3.1E-0I

I.E+00

I.E+01

8.E-01

4.±E+02

6.E-01

6.E-01

4.E-01

2.E+00

I.E+0!

2.E+02

3.E+00

2.E+00

2.E+02

7.E+00

8.E+03

7.E+00

6.13+02

9.E+02

6.E-01

3.1E+00

2.E+02

(Ci)a

2.E+01

2.E+01

5.E-00

I.E+01

8.E+00

3. E+0 I

3.E+02

2. E+0 I

I.E+04

2. E+01

2.E+01

1.E+01

5.E+01

3.E+02

5.E+03

8.1E+01

5. E+0 I

5. E+03

2.E+02

2.E+05

2. E+02

2.E+04

2. E+04

2. E+0 1

8.E+01

5.E+03

(TBq)

6.E-02

6.E-02

2.E-02

5.E-02

3.1E-02

1.1E-0I

I.E+00

8. E-02

4.1E+01

6.13-02

6.1E-02

4. E-02

2.13-01

I.E+00

2.E+01

3.13-01

2.1E-01

2. E+01

7.1E-01

8.E+02

7.1E-0 1

6.1E+01

9.E1+0I

6.E-02

3.1E-01

2. E+01

(Ci)8

2.E+00

2.E+00

5.E-01

I.E+00

8.1E-01

3.1E+00

3.E+01

2.E+00

I.E+03

2. E+00

2.E+00

1.1E+00

5.13+00

3.E+01

5.E+02

8.13+00

5.13+00

5.E+02

2.E+01

2. E1+04

2.E+01

2.E+03

2.E+03

2.E+00

8.13+00

5.E+02
Code of Conduct on the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources 1363

Table 1. Activities Corresponding to Thresholds of Categories

Category I Category 2 Category 1

Radionuclides 1000 x D 10 x D D

(TBq) (Ci)a (TBq) (Ci)- (TBq) (Ci)a

*These radionuclides are very unlikely to be used in individual radioactive sources with activity levels that

would place them within Categories I, 2 or 3 and would therefore not be subject to the paragraph relating to

national registries (I I) or the paragraphs relating to import and export control (23 to 26).

The primary values to be used are given in TBq. Curie values are provided for practical usefulness and are

rounded after conversion.

' Criticality and safeguard issues will need to be considered for multiples of D.
1364 Code of Conduct on the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources

Annex 2

Open-Ended Meeting Of Technical And Legal Experts

To Review A Draft Revised Code Of Conduct On

The Safety And Security Of Radioactive Sources (Annex 2)

Vienna, 14-18 July 2003

Report of the Chairman

I. An open-ended meeting of technical and legal experts to review and finalize a

draft revised Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources' met

from 14 to 18 July 2003 at the IAEA Headquarters in Vienna under the chairmanship of

Mr. S. McIntosh (Australia). The meeting was attended by representatives from 21

Member States (Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Canada, China, the Czech Republic,

Egypt, Ethiopia, France, Germany, India, Israel, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, the Russian

Federation, the Slovak Republic, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom and the United

States of America) and an observer from the NEA/OECD. The meeting was opened by Mr T, Taniguchi, DDG-NS, followed by introductory remarks by Mr A. Gonzalez,

NSRW.

2. At the outset, the Chairman recalled the discussions undertaken and decisions

made at the Group's previous meetings of 19-23 August 2002 and 3-7 March 2003.

Building on those discussions and decisions, the Group made a number of amendments

to the draft revised Code. These included, inter alia, changes to some of the definitions

in the Code and the addition of language concerning the establishment of systems for

mitigating or minimizing the radiological consequences of accidents or malicious acts

involving radioactive sources.

3. As foreshadowed in the report of the meeting of 3-7 March 2003, the Group gave priority to consideration of the scope of the Code. That consideration was carried out in

the light of the recent finalization of the revisions to the IAEA's Categorization of

Radioactive Sources, published as IAEA-TECDOC-1344. The Group confirmed that the

Code - with the exception of paragraphs relating to national registers and export/import

control - should apply, with some modification, to sources in Categories I to 3 of the

categorization developed in TECDOC-1344. This approach is now reflected in the

Annex to the Code. Sources containing radionuclides which, although included in

TECDOC-1344, do not meet the definition of "radioactive source" in the Code - for

example because they are not in a solid form, or are unsealed sources - are outside the

scope of the Code, and are therefore excluded from Table I in the Annex. Additionally,

radionuclides that are unlikely to be used in radioactive sources with activity levels that

would place them within Categories 1, 2 or 3 were marked with an asterisk, in order to

indicate that the Code is not currently applicable to individual sources of these types.

4. At the same time, the Group agreed that States should also devote appropriate

attention to the regulation, in accordance with the Code, of other potentially harmful

radioactive sources. Such sources include those considered by them to have the potential

to cause unacceptable consequences if employed for malicious purposes, and

aggregations of lower activity sources.

5. The Group recalled that the scope of the Code excluded unsealed radioactive

sources. The Group agreed that, although the content of the Code could not be precisely applied to unsealed radioactive sources, States should be encouraged to regulate them

under similar principles in some circumstances. A paragraph to that effect was inserted

in the preamble to the Code.

'The IAEA Board of Governors took note of an earlier version of the Code of Conduct on September 11, 2000, published as IAEAJCODEOC/2001.
Code of Conduct on the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources 1365

6. The Group agreed that the Code did not apply to radioactive sources within

military or defence programmes, although some states expressed the opinion that such

sources should be managed in accordance with the objectives of the Code and that the

Code's principles should apply to such sources during and after transfer to civilian

programmes. The vulnerability of sources during any form of transfer was highlighted in

the preamble.

7. The Group agreed on further enhancements to the paragraphs concerning the

export and import of radioactive sources. In particular, it was agreed that the scope of

these paragraphs should be restricted to sources within Categories I and 2 of the

classification structure contained in the Annex to the Code. The Group considered that

the implementation of these paragraphs would be assisted if the Secretariat could take

responsibility for the compilation, maintenance and publication of a list of contact

details of competent national regulatory bodies, and for the development of a

standardised format for importing States to use in indicating that prospective users were

properly authorized. Some experts considered that the Secretariat should also take

responsibility for providing information concerning the degree of implementation by

importing States of the Code, with the consent of the States involved. The Group noted

the importance of developing further guidance on the full implementation of the

paragraphs dealing with export and import control. In particular, the guidance should

include understandings on how an exporting State would assess the degree to which an

importing State has implemented the Code. As in the draft developed in March 2003, the

revised draft Code includes language permitting the export of a source other than in

accordance with these paragraphs only "in exceptional circumstances". The Group noted

that the guidance referred to above should include a common understanding as to the

scope of the term "exceptional circumstances". The Group encouraged supplier states to

consult on the harmonization of their export control systems.

8. The Group gave further consideration to the issue of security of sources, and

inserted additional language concerning assessment of domestic threats and

vulnerability, sabotage, mitigation and minimisation of consequences, and

confidentiality. The Group noted that interim guidance on the security of radioactive

sources had recently been published as TECDOC-1355, and that further guidance on this

issue will be published by the Agency. The Group also noted that a TECDOC regarding

security during transport was currently under development elsewhere in the Agency, and

that there was therefore no need to include detailed language in this regard in the Code.

Some states expressed concern that the strict application of the Code should not impede

international initiatives directed at securing or recovering sources in an unsafe or

insecure condition.

9. The Group noted that the Agency's revised draft Action Plan for Safety and

Security of Radioactive Sources, to be submitted to the September meeting of the IAEA'

s Board of Governors, would contain a number of actions relevant to the implementation

of the Code. The Group looked forward .to the Board's consideration of this issue. The

Chairman also noted the importance of the implementation of the Code by developing

states, and the role which the Agency's technical co-operation programme might play in

assisting that process.

10. The Group agreed that the finalized draft Code should be submitted to the

September meeting of the IAEA's Board of Governors and to the subsequent General

Conference for their adoption.

1I. The Group further considered whether, and if so by what means, the commitment

of States to the Code could be reinforced. That consideration was assisted by the

circulation of a Chairman's paper on the subject prior to the meeting. The Group agreed

that decisions and guidance on this issue were properly matters for the Agency's policy- making organs. However, some States expressed a preference for a political

commitment. Further, several experts considered that, in addition to endorsement by the

General Conference, States should be encouraged to make individual political
1366 Code of Conduct on the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources

commitments concerning their implementation of the Code. Options for the wording of

such a commitment that were proposed were:

* "[State] declares that it will fully implement the terms of the Code of Conduct

on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. Consistent with the non-legally binding status of the Code, this declaration does not create any legal obligations."

9 "[State] fully supports and endorses the IAEA's efforts to create international

standards for the safety and security of radioactive sources. [State] is working toward

full implementation of the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of

Radioactive Sources and encourages other countries to do the same."

e "[State] affirms its determination to uphold the principles of safe and secure

management of radioactive sources, as are stated in the Code of Conduct on the

Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. Consistent with the non-legally binding

status of the Code, this declaration does not create any legal obligations or any

specific reporting system." * "[State] affirms its support for the IAEA's work on the safety and security of

radioactive sources, including the completion of the recently revised IAEA Code of

Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, which is non- legally binding in nature. [State] will implement the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and urges other countries to do the same. This

declaration does not create any legal obligations or any specific reporting systems."

12. The experts agreed that the Code as revised by the Group provides the basis for

significant enhancements of the control of radioactive sources. Such control would be a

significant step towards enhancing both the safety and the security of radioactive

sources.

Steven McIntosh

Chairman

18 July 2003
Miscellaneous International Legislation and Executive Orders 1367

3. Miscellaneous International

Legislation and Executive Orders

Miscellaneous Intemational Lev-islation and Executive Orders 1369

3.Miscellaneous International Legislation and ExecutiveO

3. Miscellaneous International Legislation and Executive

Orders

Contents

A. EXECUTIVE ORDER 10841-PROVIDING FOR THE CARRYING

OUT OF CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF THE ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

OF 1954, AS AMENDED, RELATING TO INTERNATIONAL

C O O P E R A T IO N ................................................................................................. 137 1

B. EXECUTIVE ORDER 10956-AMENDMENT OF EXECUTIVE

O R D E R 10 8 4 1 ...................................................................................................... 1372

C. EXECUTIVE ORDER 12058-FUNCTIONS RELATING TO

NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION ............................................................... 1373

Section 1. Departm ent O f Energy ................................................................ 1373

Section 2. D epartm ent O f State ................................................................... 1373

Section 3. Departm ent O f Com m erce ......................................................... 1373

Section 4. C oord ination ................................................................................ 1373

Section 5. G eneral Provisions ....................................................................... 1373

D. EXECUTIVE ORDER 12730-CONTINUATION OF EXPORT

C O N T R O L R EG U LA T IO N S ............................................................................. 1374

E. EXECUTIVE ORDER 12114-ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS

ABROAD OF MAJOR FEDERAL ACTIONS ................................................. 1376

S e c tio n I ......................................................................................................... 13 7 6

S ection 2 ......................................................................................................... 13 76

S e c tio n 3 ......................................................................................................... 13 7 8

E.O. 10841--Carrving Out Certain Prov. of the AEA Relating to Int'l Coop. 1371

A. EXECUTIVE ORDER 10841-PROVIDING FOR THE CARRYING

OUT OF CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF THE ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF

1954, AS AMENDED, RELATING TO INTERNATIONAL

COOPERATION

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as

amended (42 USC 201 et seq.), hereinafter referred to as the Act, and section 301 of

Title 3 of the United States Code, and as President of the United States, it is ordered as

follows:

Section 1. Whenever the President, pursuant to section 123 of the Act, has approved

and authorized the execution of a proposed agreement providing for cooperation

pursuant to section 91c, 144a, 144b, or 144c of the Act (42 USC 2121(c), 2164(a),

2164(b), 2164(c), such approval and authorization by the President shall constitute his

authorization to cooperate to the extent provided for in the agreement and in the manner

provided for in section 91c, 144a, 144b, or 144c, as pertinent. In respect of sections 91c,

144b, and 144c, authorizations by the President to cooperate shall be subject to the

requirements of section 123d of the Act and shall also be subject to appropriate

determinations made pursuant to section 2 of this order.

Section 2. (a) The Secretary of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission are hereby

designated and empowered to exercise jointly, after consultation with executive agencies

as may be appropriate, the following-described authority without the approval,

ratification, or other action of the President:

(I) The authority vested in the President by section 91 c of the Act to determine

that the proposed cooperation and each proposed transfer arrangement referred to in

that section will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common

defense and security. (2) The authority vested in the President by section 144b of the Act to determine

that the proposed cooperation and the proposed communication of Restricted Data

referred to in that section will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to

the common defense and security.

(3) The authority vested in the President by section 144c of the Act to determine

that the proposed cooperation and the communication of the proposed Restricted

Data referred to in that section will promote and not constitute an unreasonable risk

to the common defense and security.

(b) Whenever the Secretary of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission are

unable to agree upon a joint determination under the provisions of subsection (a) of this

section, the recommendations of each of them, together with the recommendations of

other agencies concerned, shall be referred to the President, and the determination shall

be made by the President.

Section 3. This order shall not be construed as delegating the function vested in the

President by section 91 c of the Act of approving programs proposed under that section.

Section 4. (a) The functions of negotiating and entering into international agreements

under the Act shall be performed by or under the authority of the Secretary of State.

(b) International cooperation under the Act shall be subject to the responsibilities of

the Secretary of State with respect to the foreign policy of the United States pertinent

thereto.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER.

THE WHITE HOUSE.

September 30, 1959
1372 E.O. 10956-Amending E.O. 10841

B. EXECUTIVE ORDER 10956-AMENDMENT OF EXECUTIVE

ORDER 10841

Amendment Of Executive Order No 10841, Relating To International Cooperation

Under The Atomic Energy Act Of 1954, As Amended

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as

amended (42 U.S. C. 201 et seq.), and section 301 of Title 3 of the United States Code,

and as President of the United States, it is ordered as follows:

Executive Order No. 10841 of September 30, 1959, entitled "providing for the

Carrying Out of Certain Provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as Amended,

Relating to International cooperation," is hereby amended by changing the period at the

end of paragraph 92) of section 2(a) thereof to a colon and adding to such paragraph the

following: "Provided, that each determination made under this paragraph shall be

referred to the President and, unless disapproved by him, shall become effective fifteen

days after such referral or at such later time as may be specified in the determination."

JOHN F. KENNEDY.

THE WHITE HOUSE.

August 10, 1961
E.O. 12058-Functions Relatina to Nuclear Non-Proliferation 1373

C. EXECUTIVE ORDER 12058-FUNCTIONS RELATING TO

NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION

May 11, 1978,43 F.R. 20947

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978

(Public Law 95-242, 92 Stat. 120, 22 U.S.C. 3201) and the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,

as amended (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.), and section 301 of Title 3 of the United States

Code, and as President of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Section 1. Department Of Energy

The following functions vested in the President by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act

of 1978 (92 Stat. 120, 22 U.S.C. 3201), hereinafter referred to as the Act, and by the

Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.), hereinafter referred to

as the 1954 Act, are delegated or assigned to the Secretary of Energy:

(a) That function vested in section 402(b) of the Act (92 Stat. 145, 42 U.S.C. 2153a).

(b) Those functions vested by sections 131 a(2)(G), 13 1 b(1), and 131 f(2) of the 1954

Act (92 Stat. 127, 42 U.S.C. 2160).

(c) That function vested by section 131f(l)(A)(ii) of the 1954 Act to the extent it

relates to the preparation of a detailed generic plan.

Section 2. Department Of State

The Secretary of State shall be responsible for performing the following functions

vested in the President:

(a) Those functions vested by sections 104(a), 104(d), 105, 403, 404, 407, and 501 of

the Act (92 Stat. 122, 123, 146, 147, and 22 U.S.C. 3223(a), 3223(d), 3224, and 42

U.S.C. 2153b, 2153b, 2153c, 2153e, and 22 U.S.C. 3261).

(b) That function vested by section 128a(2) of the 1954 Act (92 Stat. 137, 42 U.S.C.

2157(a)(2)).

(c) That function vested by section 601 of the Act to the extent it relates to the

preparation of an annual report.

(d) The preparation of timely information and recommendations related to the

President's functions vested by sections 126, 128b, and 129 of the 1954 Act (92 Stat.

131, 137, and 138, 42 U.S.C. 2155, 2157, and 2158).

(e) That function vested by section 13 1c of the 1954 Act (92 Stat. 129, 42 U.S.C.

2160(c): except that, the Secretary shall not waive the 60-day requirement for the

preparation of a Nuclear Non-Proliferation Assessment Statement for more than 60 days

without the approval of the President.

Section 3. Department Of Commerce

The Secretary of Commerce shall be responsible for performing the function vested

in the President by section 309(c) of the Act (92 Stat. 141,42 U.S.C. 2139a).

Section 4. Coordination

In performing the functions assigned to them by this Order, the Secretary of Energy

and the Secretary of State shall consult and coordinate their actions with each other and

with the heads of other concerned agencies.

Section 5. General Provisions

(a) Executive Order No. 11902 of February 2, 1976' entitled "Procedures for an

Export Licensing Policy as to Nuclear Materials and Equipment," is revoked.

(b) The performance of functions under either the Act or the 1954 Act shall not be

delayed pending the development of procedures, even though as many as 120 days are

allowed for establishing them. Except where it would be inconsistent to do so, such

functions shall be carried out in accordance with procedures similar to those in effect

immediately prior to the effective date of the Act.

Jimmy Carter

The White House,

A',a I, 1978

'1978 U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. News Pamphlet No. 4, p. 1159.
1374 E.O. 12730-Continuation of Export Control Regulations

D. EXECUTIVE ORDER 12730-CONTINUATION OF EXPORT

CONTROL REGULATIONS

Executive Order 12730 of September 30, 1990

Continuation of Export Control Regulations

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United

States of America, including but not limited to section 203 of the International

Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702) (hereafter referred to as "the Act"),

I, GEORGE BUSH, president of the United States of America, find that the unrestricted

access of foreign parties to U.S. goods, technology, and technical data and the existence

of certain boycott practices of foreign nations, in light of the expiration of the Export Administration Act of 1979, constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the

national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States and hereby declare a

national emergency with respect to that threat.

Accordingly, in order (a) to exercise the necessary vigilance over exports from the

standpoint of their significance to the national security of the United States; (b) to

further significantly the foreign policy of the United States, including it policy with

respect to cooperation by U.S. persons with certain foreign boycott activities, and to

fulfill its international responsibilities; and (c) to protect the domestic economy from the

excessive drain of scarce materials and reduce the serious economic impact of foreign

demand, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Section I. Notwithstanding the expiration of the Export Administration Act of 1979, as

amended (50 U.S.C. App. 2401 et seq.), the provisions of that Act, the provisions for

administration of that Act, and the delegations of authority set forth in Executive Order

12002 of July 7, 1977, Executive Order 12214' of May 2, 1980, and Executive Order

No. 121312 of May 4, 1979, as amended by Executive Order No. 12551 of February 2 1,

1986, shall, to the extent permitted by law, be incorporated in this order and shall

continue in full force and effect.

Section 2. All rules and regulations issued or continued in effect by the Secretary of

Commerce under the authority of the Export Administration Act of 1979, as amended,

including those published in Title 15, Chapter III, Subchapter C, of the Code of Federal

Regulations, Parts 768 to 799 inclusive, and all orders, regulations, licenses, and other

forms of administrative action issued, taken, or continued in effect pursuant thereto,

shall, until amended or revoked by the Secretary of Commerce, remain in full force and

effect, the same as if issued or taken pursuant to this order, except that the provisions of

sections 203(b)(2) and 206 of the Act (50 U.S.C. 1702(b)(2) and 1705) shall control over

any inconsistent provisions in the regulations. Nothing in this section shall affect the

continued applicability of administrative sanctions provided for by the regulations

described above.

Section 3. Provisions for administration of section 38(e) of the Arms Export Control

Act (22 U.S.C. 2778(e)) may be made and shall continue in full force and effect until

amended or revoked under the authority of section 203 of the Act (50 U.S.C. 1702). To

the extent permitted by law, this order also shall constitute authority for the issuance and

continuation in full force and effect all rules and regulations by the President or his

delegate, and all orders, licenses, and other forms of administrative action issued, taken,

or continued in effect pursuant thereto, relating to the administration of section 38(e). Section 4. This order shall be effective as of midnight between September 30, 1990, and

October 1, 1990, and shall remain in effect until terminated. It is my intention to

'50 App. U.S C.A., § 2403 nt 250 App. U.S.C.A., § 2401 nt
E.O. 12730-Continuation of Export Control Regulations 1375

terminate this order upon the enactment into law of a bill reauthorizing the authorities

contained in the Export Administration Act.

George Bush

THE WHITE HOUSE

September 30, 1990
1376 E.O. 12114-Environmental Effects Abroad of Major Federal Actions

E. EXECUTIVE ORDER 12114-ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS

ABROAD OF MAJOR FEDERAL ACTIONS

Source: The provisions of Executive Order 12114 of Jan. 4, 1979, appear at 44 FR

1957, 3 CFR, 1979 Comp., p. 356, unless otherwise noted.

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the laws of the United

states, and as President of the United States, in order to further environmental objectives consistent with the foreign policy and national security policy of the United States, it is

ordered as follows:

Section I

1-I. Purpose and Scope. The purpose of this Executive Order is to enable responsible officials of Federal agencies having ultimate responsibility for authorizing and

approving actions encompassed by this Order to be informed of pertinent environmental

considerations and to take such considerations into account, with other pertinent

considerations of national policy, in making decisions regarding such actions. While

based on independent authority, this Order furthers the purpose of the National

Environmental Policy Act and the Marine Protection Research and Sanctuaries Act and

the Deepwater Port Act consistent with the foreign policy and national security policy of

the United States, and represents the United States government's exclusive and complete

determination of the procedural and other actions to be taken by Federal agencies to

further the purpose of the National Environmental Policy Act, with respect to the

environment outside the United States, its territories and possessions.

Section 2

2-I. Agency Procedures. Every Federal agency taking major Federal actions

encompassed hereby and not exempted herefrom having significant effects on the

environment outside the geographical borders of the United States and its territories and

possessions shall within eight months after the effective date of this Order have in effect

procedures to implement this Order. Agencies shall consult with the Department of State

and the Council on Environmental Quality concerning such procedures prior to placing

them in effect.

2-2. Information Exchange. To assist in effectuating the foregoing purpose, the

Department of State and the Council on Environmental Quality in collaboration with

other interested Federal agencies and other nations shall conduct a program for exchange

on a continuing basis of information concerning the environment. The objectives of this

program shall be to provide information for use by decisionmakers, to heighten

awareness of and interest in environmental concerns and, as appropriate, to facilitate

environmental cooperation with foreign nations.

2-3. Actions Included Agencies in their procedures under Section 2-1 shall establish

procedures by which their officers having ultimate responsibility for authority and

approving actions in one of the following categories encompassed by this Order, take

into consideration in making decisions concerning such actions, a document described in

Section 2-4(a):

(a) major Federal actions significantly affecting the environment of the global commons

outside the jurisdiction of any nation (e.g., the oceans or Antarctica);

(b) major Federal actions significantly affecting the environment of a foreign nation not

participating with the United States and not otherwise involved in the action;

(c) major Federal actions significantly affecting the environment of a foreign nation

which provide to that nation:

(I) a product, or physical project producing a principal product or an emission

or effluent, which is prohibited or strictly regulated by Federal law in the

United States because its toxic effects on the environment create a serious

public health risk; or
E.O. 12 114- Environmental Effects Abroad of Major Federal Actions 1377

(2) a physical project which in the United States is prohibited or strictly

regulated by Federal law to protect the environment against radioactive

substances.

(d) major Federal actions outside the United States, its territories and possessions which

significantly affect natural or ecological resources of global importance designated for

protection under this subsection by the President, or, in the case of such a resource

protected by international agreement binding on the United States, by the Secretary of

State. Recommendations to the President under this subsection shall be accompanied by

the views of the Council on Environmental Quality and the Secretary of State.

2-4. Applicable Procedures. (a) There are the following types of documents to be used

in connection with actions described in Section 2-3:

(i) environmental impact statements (including generic, program and specific

statements),

(ii) bilateral or multilateral environmental studies, relevant or related to the

proposed action, by the United States and one or more foreign nations, or by an

international body or organization in which the United States is a member or

participant; or

(iii) concise reviews of the environmental issues involved, including

environmental assessments, summary environmental analyses or other

appropriate documents.

(b) Agencies shall in their procedures provide for preparation of documents described in

Section 2-4(a), with respect to actions described in Section 2-3, as follows:

(i) for effects described in Section 2-3(a), an environmental impact statement

described in Section 2-4(a)(i);

(ii) for effects described in Section 2-3(b), a document described in Section 2-

4(a)(ii) or (iii), as determined by the agency;

(iii) for effects described in Section 2-3(c), a document described in Section 2-

4(a)(ii) or (iii), as determined by the agency;

(iv) for effects described in Section 2-3(d), a document described in Section 2-

4(a)(i), (ii) or (iii), as determined by the agency.

Such procedures may provide that an agency need not prepare a new document

when a document described in Section 2-4(a) already exists.

(c) Nothing in this Order shall serve to invalidate any existing regulations of any agency

which have been adopted pursuant to court order or pursuant to judicial settlement of

any case or to prevent any agency from providing in its procedures for measures in

addition to those provided for herein to further the purpose of the National

Environmental Policy Act and other environmental laws, including the Marine

Protection Research and Sanctuaries Act and the Deepwater Port Act, consistent with the

foreign and national security policies of the United States.

(d) Except as provided in Section 2-5(b), agencies taking action encompassed by this

Order shall, as soon as feasible, inform other Federal agencies with relevant expertise of

the availability of environmental documents prepared under this Order.

Agencies in their procedures under Section 2-1 shall make appropriate provision for

determining when an affected nation shall be informed in accordance with Section 3-2 of

this Order of the availability of environmental documents prepared pursuant to those

procedures.

In order to avoid duplication of resources, agencies in their procedures shall provide for

appropriate utilization of the resources of other Federal agencies with relevant

environmental jurisdiction or expertise.

2-5. Exemptions and Considerations. (a) Notwithstanding Section 2-3, the following

actions are exempt from this Order:

(i) actions not having a significant effect on the environment outside the United

States as determined by the agency;

(ii) actions taken by the President;
1378 E.O. 12 114-Environmental Effects Abroad of Major Federal Actions

(iii) actions taken by or pursuant to the direction of the President or Cabinet

officer when the national security or interest is involved or when the action

occurs in the course of an armed conflict;

(iv) intelligence activities and arms transfers;

(v) export licenses or permits or export approvals, and actions relating to

nuclear activities except actions providing to a foreign nation a nuclear

production or utilization facility as defined in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,

as amended, or a nuclear waste management facility;

(vi) votes and other actions in international conferences and organizations; (vii) disaster and emergency relief action.

(b) Agency procedures under Section 2-1 implementing Section 2-4 may provide for

appropriate modifications in the contents, timing and availability of documents to other

affected Federal agencies and affected nations, where necessary to:

(i) enable the agency to decide and act promptly as and when required; (ii) avoid adverse impacts on foreign relations or infringement in fact or

appearance of other nations' sovereign responsibilities, or

(iii) ensure appropriate reflection of:

(I) diplomatic factors;

(2) international commercial, competitive and export promotion factors;

(3) needs for governmental or commercial confidentiality;

(4) national security considerations;

(5) difficulties of obtaining information and agency ability to analyze

meaningfully environmental effects of a proposed action; and

(6) the degree to which the agency is involved in or able to affect a decision to

be made.

(c) Agency procedure under Section 2-1 may provide for categorical exclusions and for

such exemptions in addition to those specified in subsection (a) of this Section as may be

necessary to meet emergency circumstances, situations involving exceptional foreign policy and national security sensitivities and other such special circumstances. In

utilizing such additional exemptions agencies shall, as soon as feasible, consult with the

Department of State and the Council on Environmental Quality.

(d) The provisions of Section 2-5 do not apply to actions described in Section 2-3(a)

unless permitted by law.

Section 3

3-1. Rights of Action. This Order is solely for the purpose of establishing internal

procedures for Federal agencies to consider the significant effects of their actions on the

environment outside the United States, its territories and possessions, and nothing in this

Order shall be construed to create a cause of action.

3-2. Foreign Relations. The Department of State shall coordinate all communications by agencies with foreign governments concerning environmental agreements and other

arrangements in implementation of this Order.

3-3. Multi-Agency Actions. Where more than one Federal agency is involved in an action

or program, a lead agency, as determined by the agencies involved, shall have

responsibility for implementation of this Order.

3-4. Certain Terms. For purposes of this Order, "environment" means the natural and

physical environment and excludes social, economic and other environments; and an

action significantly affects the environment if it does significant harm to the

environment even though on balance the agency believes the action to be beneficial to

the environment. The term "export approvals" in Section 2-5(a)(v) does not mean or

include direct loans to finance exports. 3-5. AM! ultiple Impacts. If a major Federal action having effects on the environment of the

United States or the global commons requires preparation of an environmental impact

statement, and if the action also has effects on the environment of a foreign nation, an

environmental impact statement need not be prepared with respect to the effects on the

environment of the foreign nation.
NRC FORM 335 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 1 REPORT NUMBER (12-2010) (Assigned by NRC. Add Vol., Supp., Re,..

NRCMO 3.7 and Addendum Numbers,. If any.)

BIBLIOGRAPHIC DATA SHEET NUREG 0980

ISOSemClmonothA re-e) Vol. 3, No. 9

2. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 3. DATE REPORT PUBLISHED

Nuclear Regulatory Legislation MONTH YEAR

111 th Congress, 2nd Session Februa 2011

4. FIN OR GRANT NUMBER

5 AUTHOR(S) 6. TYPE OF REPORT

Compilation of Nuclear Legislation

7. PERIOD COVERED lerjuswe DOees)

Through the 11 1th Con. (12/10)

B. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION - NAME AND ADORESS (IfNRC. pow OeDivision. Offc oRegor. US Nu/eaRegu/atoryComnidiol. andmail3ngad00moss:ifonlector, pmoede name ano mailing address )

Office of the General Counsel

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Washington D.C. 20555-0001

9. SPONSORING ORGANIZATION - NAME AND ADDRESS ell NRC. type "Same as aboW.e dontr,•-o, pmd&, NRC Di0inn. Offc or Regvon. U S, Npc/uar Rpeulaloy Com,1a,.

end ma.1,ng addrejss )

Same as 8 above

10. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

11. ABSTRACT (200 words orless)

This document is a compilation of nuclear regulatory legislation and other rele vant material through the 11 1th Congress, 2nd

Session. This compilation has been prepared for use as a resource document, which the NRC intends to update at the end of

every congress.

The contents of NUREG 0980 include the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as Amended; Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as

Amended; Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act of 1978; Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act; Nuclear Waste Policy

Act of 1982; and NRC Authorization and Appropriation Acts. Other materials incl uded are statutes and treaties on export

licensing, nuclear non-proliferation, and environmental protection.

12 KEY WORDSDESCRIPTORS l(sbMolds Io phrases that twi aost rasearaersa ,n totaling tihe eport.l 13 AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

Nuclear Regulatory Legislation; Atomic Energy Act; Energy Reorganization Act; N uclear Waste Policy unlimited

Act; NRC Authorization and Appropriation Acts; Statutes; Treaties; Agrements on Export Licensing and 14. SECURITYCLASSIFICATION

Non-Proliferation. (This Page)

unclassified

(This Report)

unclassified

15. NUMBER OF PAGES

15. PRICE

NRC FORM 335 (12,2010)

GJ'( U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 2011-367-470


Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Export Licensing Statutes

Selected Treaties, Agreements, and Implementing Legislation

Miscellaneous International Legislation and Executive Orders