1

Filed 10/17/17

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

MICHAEL R. LEWELLING,

Defendant and Appellant. A147248

(San Francisco County

Super. Ct. No. 14032274 )

We began a recent opinion with the observation that “[o] ne of the more

disconcerting things that can occur at a criminal trial is the discovery that there is no

CALCRIM instruction for the offense charged, thus requiring the judge

— hopefully with

the assistance of counsel

— to formulate appropriate instructions from scratch. ” ( People

v. Starski (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 215, 218.) That observa tion is apt here, as there is no

CALCRIM instruction for Penal Code section 149, 1 which criminalizes a “ public officer

who, under color of authority, without lawful necessity, assaults or beats any

person

. . . . ” We went on in People v. Starski to hold t hat the trial court had crafted a

jury instruction that properly told the jury the elements of the crime, and we affirmed

Starski’s conviction. We reach the opposite result here, concluding that the

instruction

— more accurately, instructions

— prepared by t he trial court were inaccurate

and misleading, allowing the district attorney to present and argue a case on a basis that

allowed defendant to be wrongfully convicted. We conclude the error in instructions was

prejudicial, and reverse on that ground, with out the need to address defendant’s other

arguments.

1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.2 BACKGROUND

The Setting

San Francisco General Hospital is a renowned safety net hospital

, particularly well

known for its emergency department. That department has a diverse and unpredictable

patient population, much of it consist ing of the homeless, the mentally ill, and those

suffering from substance abuse problems. The chaotic population can make the

emergency department a dangerous place : s taff have been strangled, sexually assaulted,

punched, ki cked, and spit upon. Abuse by patients, both physical and verbal, is a daily

,

sometimes hourly

, occurrence. As a result , patient behavior is tracked in a database

provided by the Department of Public Health, so staff can communicate with other s to

alert them of potentially violent or abusive patients.

This has also resulted in the development of protocols and procedures to protect

staff and patients. For example, patients without pending business in the emergency

department are not permitted to loiter. P eople who are sleeping or lingering in the

waiting area in the early morning hours without medical necessity are asked to leave.

And o nce they are screened and cleared for discharge, verbally abusive or physically

threatening patients are rem oved.

The e mergency department is overseen by armed deputies from the San Francisco

Sheriff’s Department, who are on the premises 24 hours a day to provide security.

During the midnight shift, three officers are on duty, one at a podium just outside the

department w aiting area, another at a post behind the security doors to the department,

and a third on foot patrol around the campus. There is also a dispatcher who monitors

security cameras throughout the facility, one of which is pointed at the eme rgency

department waiting room.

According to hospital training and protocols, emergency room nurses are required

to rely on the deputies when a disruptive or potentially violent patient is observed

. And if

requested, the deputies assist the staff with handling potentially violent patients

, escorting

them out of the emergency department once they are medically cleared. In short, the

deputies rely on the staff to decide who should be removed , and the staff rely on the3

deputies to step in when alerted to a potentially danger ous patient. Generally speaking,

on a nightly basis several people are escorted off campus for verbally or physically

abusing the staff or other patients.

On November 3, 2014, the sheriff’s deputy on duty at the podium was defendant

Michael Lewelling

.

Fernando Guanill Arrives at the Emergency Department

A t 3:27 a.m. on that date , Fernando Guanill walked in through the main

emergency department entrance. Guanill was 60 years old, about five feet, seven inches

tall, and weighed approximately 140 pounds. He was on disability and received social

security income due to a disability with his left leg. He was homeless, and had been for

approximately three and a half years. Guanill had a 9:00 a.m. appointment at an

orthopedic trauma unit

, but decided to go t o the hospital early in the hope he could get

some pain medication before the appointment

. He was in extreme pain

— 1 0 out of 10.

Guanill had been seeing Dr. Yee

- Bun Benjamin Lui at the Chinatown Public

Health Center as his primary care physician for some t wo and a half years. During that

ti me, Guanill had various encounters with the staff at the health center, and Dr. Lui had

Guanill sign a behavior contact under which Guanill agreed not to use demeaning

language, insulting terms, or foul language when spe aking to staff. Guanill also agreed to

a pain contract

, under which only Dr. Lui could prescribe narcotics to him, and using

opiates outside of what Dr. Lui prescribed would be a violation of the contract. Guanill

took pain medication such as Percocet, N aproxen, and Nortriptyline, for which he got

prescriptions once a month. He also tried to manage his pain with alcohol, often with bad

results. As Guanill himself put it, this affected the way he interacted with other people:

usually when under the infl uence he became louder ; and wh en the pain got really bad he

automatically raised his voice. 2

2 San Francisco Police O fficer Jesse Heredia described Guanill as a habitual

drunk, constantly belligerent

, and very combative. Guanill had thrown an alco holic

beverage container at him, had atta cked Heredia’s partner

, and had resisted arrest and

verbally abused officers while they tried t o restrain him. San Francisco P olice O fficer4

Tim Coyle was working the exam ination room as a triage nurse. Coyle asked

Guanill if he needed to see a doctor. Guanill responded, in a verbally abusive manner

,

that he was checking in for his appointment

, though reluctant to give Coyle any

information about it. Coyle checked Guanill’s chart and noted that his appointment was

lat er that morning. He also noted that Guanill’s chart contained numerous behavioral

alerts, including aggressiveness, assaultive behavior, and narcotic

- seeking behavior, and

that he had a pain contract.

Coyle tried to encourage Guanill to attend his appointment instead of being

admitted to the emergency departme nt, explaining that Guanill did n ot need to check in.

Guanill responded he wanted a prescri ption for Oxycodone. Coyle told Guanill

emergency doctors did not treat chronic pain by writing prescriptions, and advised

Guanill to see his doctor at his appointment later in the day, addi tionally reminding

Guanill that he had a pain contract.

While it appeared to Coyle that Guanill was at the emergency departm ent to

acquire opiates

, Coyle nevertheless medically screened Guanill, and asked if there were

any changes in the condition of his wound. This question made Guanill even more

agitated and angry, to the point Coyle felt threatened by Guanill’s behavior, as he became

tense and started cursing and calling Coy le profane names. Coyle asked Guanill to take a

seat in the waiting room. Th ere

, Guanill continued being abusive and uncooperative and

cursing under his breath.

Coyle told nurse Laura Bandura that he had examined Guanill, informing her

about Guanill’s aggressive and hostile behavior

, and advising that she should not triage

Guanill by herself and not bring him behind the closed doors of the triage.

Christopher Ritter arrested Guanill for drinking in a public place and threatening police

officers with a knife. American Medical Response paramedic Kenneth Deroque testified

that when he and his p artner responded to a call in North Beach

, Guanill was aggressive

and abusive

, and spit on Deroque. Another EMT who treated Guanill for the injuries to

his face testified that Guanill was verbally abusive, and threw a bloody gauze the EMTs

were using to clean his wounds.5

Shortly thereafter

, Guanill was called by t he registration staff and asked to sign

some forms that were part of th e admission process. Agitated and upset, Guanill

continued to interact n egatively with the staff

, acting disruptively

, walking back and

forth, and talking very loudly

, continu ing in this fashion for several minutes. Guanill was

registered, after which he sat down and was quiet for a few minutes

, bu t soon started

talking out l oud, ranting, ra ving, and waving his cane. Eventually, Guanill went back to

the waiting area and fell asleep on a bench.

Coyle spoke to nurses Bandura and Vala rie Bochenek about Guanill’s abusive

behavior

, after which Bochenek went to observe Guanill, who appeared t o be asleep.

Defendant Intervene s

The three nurses collectively decided to follow department policy and have

Guanill escorted out of the waiting room. Bochenek went to defendant and told him

Guanill was being abusive towards Coyle and the reg istration staff, and needed to be

escorted out of the waiting room for safety reasons.

Defendant approached Guanill, who was still sleeping in the same position. No

one else was in the waiti ng room at the time. Defendant approached Guanill from

behind, and stood on his right side in a “bladed stance,” such that his gun was as far as

p ossible from Guanill. Defendant tried to wake Guanill verbally, without success

. He

then woke him by tapping him on his right shoulder. Defendant told Guanill he had to

leave and come back later, pointing to the exits.

Coyle

, testifying for the People, heard something that drew his attention, and

described what he saw when he looked over: “Mr. Guanill was seated with his back on

the chair, kind of turned to the side, wit h his hand on his cane. And Deputy Lewelling

was in front of him and trying to take the cane away, or his hand w as on the cane, too.”

Prosecution witness Karen Jones, an eligibility worker in the department, described what

she saw this way: Guanill was shouting, “ you can’t take my cane. I need my cane.6

I need it to walk with

. I’ m disabled.” 3 D efendant tr ied to put handcuffs on Guanill

, and

m atters deteriorated from that point : Guanill verbally and physically resisted, the officers

used additional force, and eventually they placed him under arrest.

Deputy Sheriff Brandon Kutches investigated the case that led to the charges

against defendant

, an investigation that actually began as a criminal case defendant had

initiated against Guanill. Kutches co nducted a number of interviews

, including one with

Guanill on November 25. Initially, Guanill did not tell Kutches that he had b een beaten

or choked. Guanill understood defendant had been asked to have Guanill removed, and

recalled that he was awakened b y defendant who was “ ‘ demanding and forceful ’ ” and

telling him “ to get

. . . out.” Guanill denied making any threats to defendant o r resisting

arrest.

The Expert Testimony

The prosecution put on no expert testimony in its case in chief.

Testifying for defendant, Napa Valley College professor of criminal justice Sean

McCann testified that the techniques and approaches defendant used were sound.

Defendant’s approach to Guanill from behind instead of the front was reasonable

, as

walking up in front of an aggressive subject seated in a chair could subject one to

potential assault. According to McCann, since Guanill already had mobility issues,

immobilizing him in the chair was a sound decision. The cane that comes up in

defendant ’s view can be treated as a potential weapon, and an officer should remove it as

soon as possible. Using the reasonable officer standard, defendant’s reaction to the cane

was appropriate and an attempt to remove it showed that defendant was resolving the

sit uation a ppropriately. In sum, McCann’s expert opinion was that everything defendant

did was consistent with professional industry stand ards

— and reasonable.

3 Guanill ’s version of events was essentially as follows: He told defendant,

“ I can’t walk. ” Then he picked up his cane and slowly got up, leaving his belongings.

He went to the closest exit to his left. He did not think about his b elongings. He wanted

to avoid the hostility. Then he got punched, he was being choked, and he was frigh tened

for his life.7

San Francisco Sheriff’s Sergeant Daniel Rosen

, who reviewed defendant’s report,

testified on rebuttal for the People

. Concerning the interaction with Guanill, Rosen

agreed that defendant’s approach to Guanill, the bladed stance, the tap on Guanill’s

shoulder, were reasonable. Rosen testified that e ven if a patient verbally abuses the

officer, at the same ti me complying with the request to leave, there is no justification for

grabbing the patient by the back of the collar and arm, and that choking was not an

appropriate use of fo rce in the situation. However, Rosen agreed that defendant’s use of

force to ove rcome Guanill’s resistance to being handcuffed was reasonable

, that

considering Guanill was resisting lawful arrest, the force used was appropriate

. And he

agreed that the strikes to Guanill that appeared on the videotape after the initial detention

were “appropriate uses of force, if there hadn’t be en an improper de tention or previous

interaction. ” 4

THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW

The Charges

In May 2015, de fendant was charged by information with five feloni es: count

1

— assault by a public officer ( Pen. Code, § 149) ; count 2

— filing a false or forged

instrument (§ 115, subd. (a)); count 3

— perjury (§ 118, subd. (a)); count 4

— filing a false

report (§ 118.1); an d count 5

— assault by means of force likely to cause great bodily

injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4)).

4 This was Rosen’s specific testimony:

“Q. Your fundamental assumption that led to your opinion on this case is that Mr.

Guanill w as getting ready to leave the hospital, correct?

“A. Yes.

“Q. And that is what led to your opinion that the force was excessive, right?

“A. Yes.

“Q. So, in fact, you conclude your report by opining . . . that the strikes, including

the elbow strikes an d the palm strikes at the end of the video, are appropriate uses of

force, if there hadn’t been an improper detention or previous interaction, correct?

“A. Yes.”8

Section 149, the basis on which defendant was convicted, is in Title 7 of the Penal

Code, entitled “ O ther O ffenses A gainst P ublic J ustice

, ” a c hapter enacted i n 1872.

Section 149 provides in its entirety as follows: “ Every public officer who, under color of

authority, without lawful necessity, assaults or beats any person, is punishable by a fine

not exceeding ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or by imprisonment in a county jail not

exceeding one year, or pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170, or by both that fine

and imprisonment. ” Witkin’s discussion of section 149 describes it as “ Assault By

Public Officer .” (1 Witkin & Epstein, Cal . Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against

the Person, § 56, p. 847.)

As best we can determine, in the 145 years that section 149 has been on the books,

there have been a total of four published opinions addressing it. Not one of them deals

with any instruction issue. And not one with the phrase “without lawful necessity.” 5

At the same time the Legislature enacted section 149, it also enacted section 146,

the terms of which were to become implicated here. We thus quote that section as well:

“Every public officer

. . . who, under the pretense or color of any process or other legal

authority, does any of the following, without a regular process or other lawful authority,

is guilty of a misdemeanor: [¶] (a) Arrests any person or detains that p erso n against his

or her will. ” W itkin describes this section as “misdemeanors deal[ing] with unlawful

restraints.” ( 1 Witkin & Epstein, supra

, § 274, p. 1101.)

The Bill of Particulars

Prior to trial, defendant moved for a bill of particulars, claiming i t was impossible

from the information to understand the theory of the section 149 charge

. A hearing was

held, at which the court confirmed defendant’s position

, that “ the defense is unclear of

what specific acts c onstitute each count.” The court then ask ed the prosecutor for her

5 That said , in People v. Mehserle (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1125, the notorious

case involving the death of Oscar Grant at a BART station, our colleagues in Division

One noted that there “the trial court instructed the jury that it could find defendant guilty

of violating section 149 if, while arresting Grant, he used ‘more force than was necessary

under the circumstances.’ ” ( People v. Mehserle, supra, at p. 1140.) And as to this , the

court said it saw “ no error.” ( Id. at p. 1156, fn. 20.)9

response

, which began as follows: “ the People’s broad response to it is that Deputy

Lewelling’s

. . . actions at the very inception were illegal, and therefore, everything that

flows fr om it was illegal.” The court said, “So you ’re saying that those first acts were

illegal?” The prosecutor responded, “Correct. The initial touch, which is grabbing him

by the back of the collar as he’s walking away from the defendant. And so everything

else after that i s illegal as well.” As th e prosecutor would later come to describe it,

section “149 is a 1 46 plus force.”

As will be seen, that was the prosecution’s position throughout, from the hearing

on the bill of particulars through closing argument.

The Proposed Instructions

As noted, t here is no CALCRIM instruction for section 149

, and both the

prosecution and defendant proposed special instructions. The prosecution filed her

propo sed jury instructions on July 21

, 2015. “Special Instruction 1 (Count 1)” addressed

the section 149 charg e. There was no definition of “without lawful necessity.”

Defendant’s proposed instruction s were filed the same day

. His proposed instructions

defined “without lawful necessity” as follows: “In order to prove that defendant acted

without legal necessit y, the People must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the

defendant used more force than was necessary unde r the circumstances.”

While t he prosecution ’s proposed special instruction contained no express

definition of the phase “without lawful necessity

, ” the instruction included a lengthy, two

and a half page instruction that the district attorney would later explain was a

modification of CALCRIM No. 2670

. That instruction, entitled “Lawful Performance :

Peace Officer,” describes circumstances in which a police officer is “not lawfully

performing his or her duties,” and explain s the circumstances in which a police officer

can lawfully detain and arrest a citizen, including descriptions of reasonable suspicion

an d probable cause. As will be discussed in detail below, the court included this lengthy

exposition in its instruction here.

On July 29, the defense rested, following which the court met with counsel

concerning remaining instruction issues. The only instruction discussed involved the10

“149” charge

. Counsel for defendant objected to the People’s proposed instruction

, and

at one point, the court asked the prosecutor

, “W hy does the Court have to go beyond the

language of t he statute? ”

The People presented a brief rebuttal, and rested

, following which the court and

counsel went “throug h jury instructions.” At one p o int the court asked if “we need an

instruction that

. . . a detention needs reasonable cause and arrest needs probable cause?”

The prosecutor responded “that is in the lawful performan ce instruction. ” “ It’s 2670.”

That day, the instructions were “memoria lized on the record.”

The Closing Argument

Against the background of those settled instructions, the prosecutor argued the

theory of liability that had been articulated at the hearing on the bill of particulars

— if

there was no basis for an arrest, any touching was a violation of section 149. This is how

the argument began: “Mr. Guanill spent a long time in the waiting room at the

emergency department before this happened. He was asleep for half an hour before

Deputy Lewelling approached him, woke him, told him to leave the emergency room,

and then assaulted him. According to his authority, he assaulted him without cause,

without lawful authority, and he assaulted hi m with gre at force.” “ [ L ] awful authority,” of

course, is not the language in section 149. It is the language used by section 146, the

unlawful detention statute.

From there, the prosecutor went on for several pages focused on Guanill’s conduct

leading up to the de tention, a predicate for the claim that the detention its elf was

unjustified. Only once in her argument did she refer to “without lawful necessity,” only

in her mention of the element of the charged crime. Doing so, she urged the exact

definition the court later gave

, that “without lawful necessity” is tied to the question

whether an officer’s decision to detain is justified by facts amounting to reasonable

suspicion. 6 But in doing so, the prosecutor again used the word “authority,” this time

6 This was the sole reference: “Now, assault by a peace officer has these four

elements. Defendant was a peace officer at the time of the conduct. He was acting under

color of authority. He assaulted or beat another person. And then he acted without legal11

changing the phrase to “legal authority,” again the term in section 146 but not section

149

.

Turning briefly to what she described as the critical element in section 149, the

prosecutor argued that the question was “whether or not Mr. Lewelling acted with proper

legal authority in order to do that t o Mr. Guanill.” The prosecutor then described the

grounds for a valid detention (reasonable suspicion) and arrest (probable cause), thus

tethering the essential concept

— “legal necessity”

— to the question whether defenda nt

had a legally reasonable basi s to arrest Guanill. And she argued, “ It’s kind of like a little

law school primer about reasonable suspicion to make a detention. And there’s a

definition for it. It’s that there’s specific facts known, apparent to the o fficer, that lead

him to suspect that Mr. Guanill is about to be involved in an activity relating to crime.

And then there’s probable cause to make arrest. [¶] That’s probably more than you

actually get, you know, watching TV or legal dramas. But it’s facts known to the

arresting officer at the time of the arrest that will persuade someone of reasonable caution

that the person to be arrested has comm itted a crime.”

And from there the prosecutor argued her theory of guilt: “Now, what you have to

do is go back to the beginning. Go back to the first point of contact. Because if that’s

illegal, then everything else is unlawful. Ask yourself, did the defendant have a reason to

use force on Mr. Guanill .” The prosecutor then tied that theory in Sergeant Rosen’s

opinion

— that the unreasonable use of force was in the initial detention

. Thus: “And

think back to Sergeant Rosen’s testimony yesterday. He said under a number of

hypotheticals, is it reasonable to use force in this situation, where he’s getting up and he’s

moving toward an exit when you ordered him to leave? Is it reasonable to use force upon

him if he said, ‘I’m going to talk to the nurses,’ but he’s getting up and leaving. Is it

reasonable to use force upon him if he says something rude like ‘If you touch me, I’ll

fuck you up.’ And Sergeant Rosen said, no. I mean, he might get the last word, but he’s

necessity. [¶] I think Mr. Stern [counsel for defendant] will agree that the first three are

without contention, but it’s whether or not Mr. Lewelling acted with proper legal

authority in order to do that to Mr. Guanill. [¶] So you’ll get some instr uctions.

. . .”12

doing exactly what he’s been told. He’s getting up and leaving. He’s complying with the

defendant’s order. He hasn’t done anything wrong exc ept for maybe contempt of cop.

And that means that the defendant did not have grounds to detain, d id not have grounds

to arrest.”

The next page was similar: “And how much time does it take for Deputy

Lewelling to go ahead and go hands on? One step. Mr. Guanill gets one step before he’s

thrown back down into that chair. One step is all you get in San Francisco General

Hospital. [¶] T he force is not reasonable.” The prosecutor continued, emphasizing that

if the jurors “determine that the defendant does not have a lawful justification f or the

force that he used on Mr. Guanill,” they should convict. And so t he prosecutor

concluded : “So in terms of Count 5, if you determine that the defendant does not have a

lawful justification for the force that he used on Mr. Guanill, you go to Count 5. And this

is the definition of an assault, lots of words there. In the absence of some lawful

justification, this is an assault

, ” making the point as plainly and forcefu lly as she could

possibly have done: in light of the unjustified detention, defendant “had no reason to use

any type of force on Mr. Guanill.”

This argument

— which urges conviction not based on the use of too much force,

but because defendant used any forc e without justification

— is identical to the

prosecutor ’s description of her theory at the start of the case ; it is consistent with the

opinions of her use

- of

- force expert Rosen ; and

, as will be seen, it is identical to her

description of her theory as she admitted in the post

- trial proceedings: section “ 149 is a

146 plus force

. ”

The Instructions

The trial court first defined the elements of section 149 this way: “A police officer

acting under color of authority and without lawful necessity who assaults or beats any

person is guilty of a crime. In order to prove this crime, the People must establish each of

the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: [¶] One, the defendant was a peace

officer at the time of the conduct. [¶] Two, the defendant was a cting under color of13

authority. [¶] Three, the defendant assaulted or beat another person. [¶] Four, the

defendant ac ted without legal necessity.”

The instruction next told the jurors that “Assault is defined in another instruction.

Legal necessity is defined in another instruction. Both of those follow this instruction.” 7

The instruction continued:

“In order to prove that the defendant acted without legal neces sity, the People

must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant used more force than was

necessary under the circumstances.

“A police officer may use reasonable force to arrest or detain a person, to prevent

escape, or to overcome resistance when he has reasonable cause to believe the person has

committed a crime.

“In deciding whether the defendant used unreasonable or excessive force, you

must determine the amount of f orce that would have appeared reasonable to a police

officer in defendant’s posi tion, under the same or similar circumstances.

“A police officer who detains or who makes or attempts to make an arrest is not

required to retreat or cease from his efforts because of the resistance or threatened

resistance of the person being arrested.

“T he reasonableness inquiry is an objective one. The question is whether an

officer’s actions are objectively reasonable, in light of all the facts and circumstances

confronting him, without regard to his underlying intent or motivation. Evil intentions

wi ll not make a crime out of an objectively reasonable use of force, and good intentions

will not make an unrea sonable use of force proper.”

The court then instructed the jurors

, the first of three times

, on the meaning of

assault, including that “The People are not required to prove that the defendant actua lly

touched anyone. The People are not required to prove that the defendant actually

7 In written instructions the jurors took into the jury room, this sentence was more

expl icit: “Legal necessity is defined in instruction number 2670 , which follows this

instruction .” The court later made the same point orally: “Instruction . . . 2670, explains

when an arrest or detention is unlawful and when a force is unreasonable or exce ssive.”14

intended to use force against someone when he acted. No one needs to actually have

been injured by the defendant’s act .”

Finally, the court instructed the jurors using a modified version of CALCRIM No.

2670 which, in both its oral instructions and in the written instructions later furnished the

jury, explained would provide a definition of the key phrase “legal necessity” :

“The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the

defendant was not lawfully performing his duties as a peace officer. If the People have

not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of Counts 1 and 5. A peace

off icer is not lawfully performing his duties if he is unlawfully arresting or detaining

someone or using unreasonable or excessive force when making or attempting to make an

otherwise lawful arrest or detention

.

“An unlawful detention. A peace officer may legally detain someone if, one,

specific facts known or apparent to the officer lead him to suspect that Fernando Guanill

is or is about to be involved in activity related to a crime. And, two, a reasonable officer

who knew the same f

acts would have the same suspicion. Any other detention is

unlawful.

“ In deciding whether detention was lawful, consider the evidence of the officer’s

training and experience and all the circumstances known by the officer when he or she

detained the per son.

“B, unlawful arrest. A peace officer may legally arrest someone if he or she has

probable cause to make the arrest. Any other arrest is unlawful. Probable cause exists

when the facts known to the arresting officer at the time of the arrest would pe rsuade

someone of reasonable caution that the person to be arrested has committed a crime. In

deciding whether the arrest was lawful, consider evidence of the officer’s training and

experience and all the circumstances known by the officer when he or she arrested

Fernando Guanill.

“C, use of force. Special rules control the use of force. A peace officer may use a

reasonable force to arrest or detain someone, to prevent escape, to overcome res istance,

or in self

- defense.”15

The court next instructed the jur ors on the elements of the “charges that Deputy

Lewelling arrested Mr. Guanill on,” which included trespass, resisting arrest, preventing

an executive officer from performing his or her duty, and assault on a police officer. And

during these several pages of instruction, the court three more times instructed the jury

that the question was whether defendant was a “peace officer

. . . lawfully performing his

duties.

. . .” 8

The Deliberations and the Verdict

The jury began its deliberations on the afternoon o f July 30. They deliberated all

the next day

, July 31. On August 3, the jury sent this question to the court: “Can you

clarify what Section 240 is? It seems like a discrepancy with the code li sted on Count 1

(Section 149).”

The next day

, August 4, following discussion with counsel, the court delivered this

answer:

“ Simple assault, Penal Code section 240, is referenced in two counts: Counts 1

and 5. It is also referenced on page 31 in your instruction on Assault on a Peace Officer.

“As to Assault on a Peace Officer, as described on page 31, the assault does not

require an actual touching.

“Simple Assault, jury instruction number 915, page 25, defines assault in the jury

instruction on page 24, Count 1 Assault by a Public Officer (Penal Code sectio n 149).

You also need to consider jury instruction number 2670, pages 26

– 27, Lawful

Performance of a Peace Officer. These three instructions should be read together.

Simple Assault is an element of the offense as charged in Count 1, not a lesser includ ed

offense.

8 The first two were in the context of instruction on section 148, where the court

told the jurors, “A peace officer is not lawfully performing his duties or her duties if he is

or she is unlawfully arresting or detaining someone or using unreason able or excessive

force in his or her duties.” T he third was in th e context of section 69 instruction: “A

peace officer is not lawfully performing his or her duties if he is unlawfully arresting or

detaining someone or using unreasonable or excessive for ce in his duties.”16

“ Simple Assault, jury instruction 915, page 40, is a lesser included offense of

Count 5, Assault with Force Likely to Produce Great Bo dily Injury, pages 36

– 37.”

Later, o n August 4, the jury sent a note to the court that asked, “To clarify, sh ould

this read ‘Section 240’ or ‘Section 149’ as it says on page 24 of the Instructions?” The

court’s response said, “ The verdict form is correct.”

The jury returned its verdicts on the afternoon of August 4 finding defendant

guilty of count 1, violation of section 149, and also guilty of misdemeanor violation of

section 240, a lesser offense to count 5. 9 The jury found defendant not guilty on the oth er

three charges. As best we can tell, the jury deliberated over three and a half days.

Defendant Moves fo r New Trial

In December 2015, defendant moved for judgment of acquittal or new trial, set for

hearin g on January 6, 2016. The P eople filed opposition, defendant a reply

, and the

motion came on for hearing

. D efendant’s attorney began by recognizing the di fficulties

in prevailing in the usual new trial situation. However, he went on, “This is one in which

I expect to prevail, and that is because more or less the parties are not in disagreement

about the underlying question. More or less the parties are no t in disagreement about the

underlying circumstances and the way the district attorney proceeded in the case and the

way Your Honor instructed the jury.

“So the question is whether those instructions and arguments which follow them

are correct. And I thin k that our papers are just very, very clear that they are not correct.

“In my reply papers, I asked Your Honor to ask the district attorney a question.

And that question is really simple. Is an unjustified, meaning

— unjustified detention a

detention witho ut reasonable suspicious [ sic ] plus any force a violation of 149. And we

don’t need to get to the answer to that question because the district attorney actually

answered the question in her sentencing memorandum, and she said yes.

9 The district att orney later conceded the lesser included assault count should be

dismissed, and the court did so.17

“She told the Court, the standards by which the defendant’s conduct was

measured, that is reasonableness, did he have reasonable suspicion to detain, and did he

use reasonable force. So she has said that the question of reasonable suspicion is part of

the lawful

— the lawful neces sity and calculus. And as we make clear in our papers, that’s

just absolutely wrong. It can’t be true because of the way the statutes are interpreted

because of a 146, because of all the reasons we’ve set forth.

“And then the question is whether the Cour t allowed the jury to convict Mr.

Lewe lling of 149 on that theory.”

Defendant’s attorney went on for several pages with specific reference to the

court’s instructions, and then concluded as follows: “So the combination of the

instructions and the argument is absolutely clear what the argument here was. And of

course, that was the only argument she had, because her expert told the jury the only

reason this was a bad interaction was because of that initial

— that initial detention, which

was, in his view, unr easonable, unnecessary, unjustified, without cause. He credited the

rest of the interaction. He said if that detention is good, everything else was fine.”

The prosecutor ’s response was brief indeed, barely over two pages. After a short

introduction, the prosecutor said this: “The reason police officers get to touch people

without it being an assault or a battery is because they are lawfully performing their

duties. And so, in terms of what Mr. Shaffer [defendant’s attorney] said, that is the

People’s legal theory. Yes, if you do not have a legal detention, if you do not have a

legal arrest, you don’t get to walk up to somebody on the street and grab them, put your

hand s on them or touch them.

. . . [¶] [ T ] he People’s [theory] is in accordance with the

law. And to say that what the defendant did was merely a 146, which is an illegal arrest

or illegal detention simply ignores the fact that he put his hands on him; that he assaulted

him; that he forced him into a chair.

“So, there are many ways a peace officer can effect an illegal detention or an

illegal arrest without the use of force. 149 is a 146 plus force. A police officer could say

stop. That is a detention. A police officer could use a siren to effect a detention. And

that is not force upon a person. But what we have here is that combination.18

“And I don’t think it’s a mischaracterization for [defendant’s attorney] to say that.

I think that’s exact ly how the People proceeded.”

In sum, the prosecutor ’s position was that there need not be unreasonable or

excessive force. No, an unlawful detention plus any touching violat ed section 149.

Responding to the arguments, the trial court made clear it understood how t he case

had been presented, argued, and instructed, and thus how defendant had been convicted.

In the court’s words, “The video shows that the victim is walking away towards an exit

after the defendant told him to leave. The defendant grabs the victim an d pushes him

down in the seat. No evidence was presented regarding the reasonableness of the

defendant’s action. [ 10 ] After all, if the defendant was concerned that the victim was

walking towards the nurse’s station that is also in the direction of an exit

, the defendant

could merely have told him to stop. There was no reasonable basis for any force. ”

(Italics added.)

The trial court went on to deny the motion without reaching the merits, ruling that

defendant’s claim had been forfeited. In the court’s w ords: “[T]he defense attributes the

blame to the Court as it must because the record is devoid of his objections to that which

he most strenuously objects today. [¶]

. . . [¶] The DA’s argument is built around,

according to the defense, her erroneous th eory of the case culminating in her closing

argument. The Court searched the record, all eight volumes. The defense did not object

to the Court’s instruction 2670, and nowhere does the defense object to this aspect of the

DA’s closing argument

, nor the t heory that the defendant claims she built upon from the

very beginning of the trial. [¶]

. . . [¶] The Court does not agree that prejudice occurred.

But assuming for a moment the prejudic e resulted from this tripart fusion, the error does

not rest with the Court. The defendant is not excused from making timely objections so

that the Court is made aware at the soonest opportunity that prejudice may be occurring

and has an opportunity to cure it.”

10 This was not accurate, as Professor McCann testified as set forth above

.19

We digress momentarily from the chronology to note that th e trial court’s reliance

on forfeiture is interesting, i n light of the prosecutor ’s own position below. Not only did

the prosecutor not argue forfeiture, but in her opposition to the new trial motion said that

“To the extent that Defendant’s motions are q uestions of law that implicate his

substantial rights, the People agree that it is proper for the Court t o pass on the matters at

hand.”

The court denied the motion for new trial and dismissed the misdemeanor assault

conviction. As to the conviction for s ection 149, the court suspended imposition of

sentence and placed defendant on three years ’ probation.

Defendant f

iled a timely notice of appeal.

REVIEW

Introduction

Defendant’s appeal has three arguments: first, the jury instruction s misstated the

elements of section 149 which, in light of the prosecution ’s argument, permitted an

improper conviction ; second, section 149 is void for vagueness, both faci ally and as

applied ; and third, the evidence is insufficie nt to sustain the convicti on.

Elaborating, defendant’s first argument is that the instructions on the fundamental

element of the offense

— “without lawful necessity”

— were clearly erroneous, with the

result that the jury was allowed to reach an improper verdict. The argument is lengt hy,

and has four components, all discussed in detail: (1) on no fewer than four separate

occasions (and perhaps as many as seven) the court directed the jurors to CALCRIM No.

2670 to define “without lawful necessity,” which expressly permitted the jurors to find

that the prosecutor proved that element if defendant carried out an unjustified detention;

(2) the court referred the jurors to the incorrect instruction in its response to the jury

question in the midst of deliberations; (3) the evidenc e, includin g most importantly, the

expert testimony by both sides

, was susceptible only to the conclusion that defendant’s

use of force in carrying out the detention was not excessive; and (4) the prosecutor ’s

closing argument focused the jurors over and over again o n precisely the invalid theory of

guilt that was permitted by the trial court’s repeated misinstruction.20

The Attorney General’s brief does not meaningfully respond to defendant’s

primary argument, her fundamental contention being that the instructions pro perly stated

the elements of section 149. Doing so, the Attorney General glosses over most of the

instructions, for example stating that the trial court gave the instruction “furnished by the

defense, adding references to instructions 915 and 2670

. . . . ” However, the “references

to

. . . 2670” are never discussed, its essence never quoted

— this, despite that 2670 is at

the heart of the problem. Along the same lines, the Attorney General quotes the

prosecutor ’s one reference to “ ‘ used more force than wa s n ecessary under the

circumstance

, ’ ” and then notes that “ ‘ [ t ] his requirement was not altered by the

subsequent instructions

, ’ ” an assertion made without anything more. And as to the

prosecutor ’s closing argument that is also at the heart of defendant’s argument, the

Attorney General’s brief ignores almost all of it

— and meaningfully addresses none of

it. 11

All this will be described in detail below. But w e begin with the Attorney

General’s arg ument that the instruction issue has been forfeited.

Defendant’s Claim Was Not Forfeited

Defendant’s opening brief addressed the trial court’s forfeiture holding head on,

with four separate arguments. The first pointed to the district attorney’s concessio n

below, to the extent the claim of instructional error implicated defendant’s substantial

rights, the court should address the merits of the claim. The second contended that as the

parties submitted competing instructions, and the court sided with the di strict attorney, no

further objection as to the contents of the instruction was required. The third contended

that a trial court must properly instruct even without request on the general principles of

law governing the case, which obligation is sua spont e, the effect of which is that absence

of a formal objection cannot forfeit the claim. And the fourth contended that section

11 A fter quoting 11 lines from the district attorney’s argument, and two pages later,

citing the same few lines, the Attorney General’s brief says that “a fair reading of the

argument set out a requirement that [defen dant] used unreasonable force.”21

1259 allows this c ourt to review instructional error that impacts the substantial rights of

the defendant without regard for any o bjection.

T he Attorney General ’s argument for forfeiture consists of some eight lines, in

two passages. The first is this short paragraph: “[Defendant] provided most of the

language in the instruction and did not claim error in the court’s reference to o ther

instructions. A defendant may not contend on appeal that jury instructions are

impermissibly ambiguous without first requesting a clarifying instruction at trial. Failure

to make such a request forfeits the claim on appeal ( People v. Hart (1999) 20 Cal.4th

546, 622.) [Defendant’s] claim sho uld be deemed waived.” The second is five pages

later where

, citing People v. Moon (2005) 37 Cal.4th 1, 29, the Attorney General argues

that defendant forfeited the issue because “he did not request modification or objec t to the

instruction.” We reject the argument

.

To begin with, a trial court has a sua sponte duty to provide proper instructions on

all of the elements of the charged offenses. ( People v. Cummings (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1233,

1311; People v. Sedeno (1 974) 10 Cal.3d 703, 715 .)

Beyond that, section 1259 states that “ Upon an appeal taken by the defendant, the

appellate court may ” “ review any instruction given, refused or modified, even though no

objection was made thereto in the lower court, if the subs tantial rights of the defendant

were affected thereby. ” (See People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 503

[instructions regarding elements of crime affect substantial rights and require no

objection for appellate review].)

And superimposed on all this i s the prosecution ’s concession, urging the trial court

to address the merits. The trial court refused. We do not, and turn to the merits of

defendant’s claim.

The Standard of Review

Defendant asserts that instructional error regarding the elements of a crime

“requires reversal

. . . unless the reviewing court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt

that the error did not contribute to the verdict

, ” citing to People v. Chun (2009)

45 Cal.4 th 1172, 1201, Hedgpeth v. Pulido (2008) 555 U.S. 57, 64

, and Neder v. United22

States (1999) 527 U.S. 1, 15. Defendant asserts that the same standard applies in the

situation, as here, when the jury is given the option of relying on one of two theories of

guilt, one of which is legally correct, the other of which is not, and thus reversal is

required unless the record demonstrates beyond a reasonable doubt that the verdict was

act ually based on a valid ground. ( People v. McDonald (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 16, 27.)

Eschewing all reference to the cases cited by defendant, the Attorney General

responds that we are to independently examine the instruction “to determine whether

there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury misunderstood a nd misapplied the

instruction.”

Defendant replies that the “reasonable likelihood” test has no application where, as

here, the instruction is clearly erroneous or facially incorrect. Quoting federal case s,

d efendant contends that “ ‘this c ourt is not required to use the “reasonable likelihood”

standard employed for ambiguous jury instructions when the disputed instruction is

erroneous on its face.’ ( Ho v. Carey, 332 F.3d 587, 592 (9th Cir. 2003); accord, e.g.,

Wade v. Calderon

, 29 F.3d 1312, 1321 (9th Cir. 1994); Murtishaw v. Woodford

, 255 F.3d

926, 967

– 9 68 (9th Cir. 2001).” Defendant goes on to assert that instructions that “ permit

the jury to ‘convict based on legally impermissible grounds’ ( Murtishaw ) are ‘flatly’ or

‘clearly’ erroneous. In that instance, the reviewing court skips the ‘reasonable likelihood’

analysis and proceeds to determine whether the clearly erroneous instruction requires

reversal under the applicable prejudice standard.”

We agree with defendant. But even were we to apply the Attorney General’s

proposed standard

, we conclude there was a reasonable likelihood of an improper verdict

here.

The Instructions Were Misleading

— If Not Downright Wrong23

As quoted in detail above, reciti ng the contents of section 149, the first thing the

instructions told the jurors was that the “without legal necessity” element 12

— the element

the prosecutor tied over and over again in her closing argument to the question whether

defendant had lawful authority to detain Guanill

— would be “defined in another

instruct ion.” Defendant asserts that “That directive was both wrong a nd badly

misleading.” We agree on both counts.

The phrase “without legal necessity” does not appear in CALCRIM No. 2670. So,

at a minimum, the jurors would have been confused if, as directed, they had turned to

CALCRIM No. 2670 in search of language setting forth a definition of “without legal

necessity.” So, the directive was wrong. Also misleading.

CALCRIM No. 2670 focuses on whether the officer is lawfully performing his or

her duties, expressly providing that an officer is “not lawfully performing his duties” if

either of two things is true: “[(a)] he is unlawfully arresting or detaining someone or

[(b)] using unreasonable or excessive force when making or attempting to make an

otherwise lawful arrest or detention.” (Italics added.) So, the trial court told the jurors

,

an element of the charged offense could be satisfied with proof of (a) or (b)

, allowing the

jury to accept the “without lawful necessity” element of section 149 pursuant to the

district attorney’s theory of guilt.

The trial court’s instruction that the jurors look to CALCRIM No. 2670 for the

definition of “without legal necessity” was also confusing because, in their next breath,

the instructions told the jurors that “In order to prove that the defendant acted without

legal necessity, the People must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant used

more force than was necessary under the circumstances,” which is probably a correct

12 As quoted above, b oth in its recitation of the statute and its indication that the

element would be defined later, the trial court used the ph r ase “ without legal necessity.”

The actual language in section 149 is “without lawful necessity.”24

statement of the law. 13 The trial court never again mentioned the “withou t legal

necessity” element

.

But when the trial court told the jurors at the start of its instruction on the elements

of section 149 that “without legal necessity” would be “defined in another instruction,” it

did not mean the next instruction. What it meant, as noted, was CALCRIM No. 2670.

Indeed, the court mad e the point expressly in the written instructions it provided to

accompany the jury to the jury room : “Legal necessity is defined in inst ruction number

2670.” T he CALCRIM numbers were printed on the written instructions, so the jury

could not have mi stak en the court’s directive.

W hen the jurors asked a question about section 240 (the definition of assault), the

court did not refer the jurors to its lone reference to the correct definition of excessive

force. Rather, the court sent the jurors back to CAL CRIM No. 2670. The court later

emphasized the point: “Instruction

. . . 2670, explains when an arrest or detention is

unlawful and when a force is unreaso nable or excessive.” And there was no mistaking

that when the jurors looked to CALCRIM No. 2670, th ey would have seen that it

expressly allowed the district attorney to satisfy the “without lawful necessity” element

simply by proving that defendant carried out an unlawful detention. That directive, in the

midst of deliberations, is of particular signif icance here. (See People v. Gay (2008)

42 Cal.4th 1195, 1226; People v. Thompkins (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 244, 252

– 253.)

In sum, on no fewer than four separate occasio ns

, the court told the jurors they

should define an element of the charged crime by reference to CALCRIM No. 2670.

And there can be no doubt that CALCRIM No. 2670 expressly permitted the jurors to

conclude that the prosecution had satisfied that element of the charged offense by proving

that a police officer detains without proper cau se: “A peace officer is not lawfully

performing his duties if he is unlawfully arresting or detaining someone or using

13 See fn. 5

, ante , and People v. Mehserle , supra, 206 Cal.App. 4th at pp. 1140,

1156. The Attorney General relies on this single statement by the trial court to argue that

the jurors were properly instructed, and could not have been misled by the other

instructions, viewed in light of the prosecutor ’s closing argumen t.25

unreasonable or excessive force when making or attempting to make an otherwise lawful

arrest o r detention.” (Italics added.)

Indeed, th e instruction went on to specifically tie that definition to Guanill’s

detent ion: “An unlawful detention. A peace officer may legally detain someone if, one,

specific facts known or apparent to the officer lead him to suspect that Fernando Guanill

is or is about to be involved in activity related to a crime. And, two, a reasonable officer

who knew the same facts would have the same suspicion. Any other detention is

unlawful.” That was in the reporter’s transcript

.

Three pages later, there was more of t he same, emphasizing that jurors look

to CALCRIM No. 2 670 for the meaning of “unlawful

. ” Five paragraphs later this wa s

repeated verbatim. These instructions accompanied the jury to the jury room. And all

this was exacerbated by the court’s response to the jury’s question, directing the jury in

the midst of deliberations to the very same

— and inappropriate

— instruction.

Superimposed on this error was the prosecutor ’s closing argument, quoted in detail

above

, every aspect of which argument was consistent w ith its theory of guilt

. Such

argument compounded the error. (See, for example, People v. Morgan (2007) 42 Cal.4th

593 [legally inadequate theory can occur through the prosecutor’s argument, when

combined with instructions which could be susceptible to the same interpretation].)

In addition to all the above, defendant contends there are five other reasons

demonstrating that section 149 cannot justify the conviction here. Two are worth

mentioning.

The first is that section 146 expressly covers detention “without

. . . lawful

authority

, ” so interpreting section 149 to cover the same conduct is illogical. As

defendant asserts, sections 146 and 149 were passed together in 1872, part of a statutory

scheme applying to the conduct of police officers. Section 146 applies to the district

attorney’s theory here, making illegal the detention of any person by a police officer

“without

. . . lawful authority

. ” V iolation of section 146 is a misdemeanor.

To conclude that section 149 should also be read to cover such conduct would

bump up against a fundamental rule of construction, that statutes passed as part of a26

single statutory scheme should be harmonized if possible. T o put it slightly differently

,

to read the statute to cover the same conduct would not only make little sense, it would

penalize unlawful detention under one statute as a misdemeanor

, and under the other as a

felony.

The second is that parallel civil instructions are contrary to the prosecution ’s

theory. That is, CACI No. 3020, entitled “ Excessive U se of Force

— Unreasonable Arrest

or Other Seizure

— Essential Factual Elements ,” provides that to prevail on an “excessive

force” case, plaintiff must prove among other things that defendant used force that was

“ excessive ,” and that defendant “ was acting or p urporting to act in the performance of

[his/her] official duties .” In short, for a peace officer to be liable in tort, he or she must

use “excessive force.” So, defendant would not be liable in tort under the prosecution ’s

theory here, b ut the instructio ns allowed defendant to be convicted of a crime

— an

anomalous conclusion to be sure.

The Attorney General contend s that even assuming the trial court erred in the

inclusion of CALCRIM No. 2670, any error was harmless

, citing to People v. Watson

(1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 and People v. McCaskey (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 248, 259

.

The Attorney General addresses its no prejudice claim in a single paragraph

, concluding

that “the video evidence establishing that [defendant] grabbed the victim and pushed him,

coupled with the instructions permitting reasonable forc e, render any error harmless.”

We disagree.

Numerous cases have held that giving instructions that are contradictory or so

inconsistent to confuse the jury was reversible error. (See, for examp le, People v. Baker

(1954) 42 Cal.2d 550, 567 [instruction on insanity and presumption were “confused,

contradictory, and ambiguous”]; People v. Dail (1943) 22 Cal.2d 642, 653 [contradictory

accomplice instructions; “Inconsistent instructions have frequent ly been held to constitute

reversible error where it was impossible to tell which of the conflicting rules was

followed by the jury ”]; People v. Jeter ( 2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1212, 1217

– 1218

[conflicting instructions on assault with deadly weapons].)27

The in structions here were at the least confusing

, shown

, for example, by the fact

that the jurors twice asked specific questions that were at the heart of the issue.

As Witkin describes it, “Misstatement of the law concerning the elements of the

offense or the defenses available to the accused is of course serious error. Reversal is

usually grounded on a number of these misstatements, or on erroneous instructions

coupled with other errors, where the evidence is in substantial conflict.” However

,

following cita tion and distillation of numerous cases, the author goes on, “Occasionally,

in a close case, a single erroneous instruction on a vital element or defense is reversible

error. [Citations.] ” ( 5 Witkin & Epstein

, Criminal Law ( 4 th ed. 20 12 ) Trial

, § 748,

pp

. 1166

– 1167.) Such reversible error is present here.

This, it cannot be gainsaid, was a close case, the jury deliberating for what appears

to be the better part of four days.

That this was a close case is also shown by the fact that the jurors rejected the

false reporting and perjury counts, which were based on the prosecution ’s theory that

,

contrary to the assertions in defendant’s report, Guanill never threatened defendant with

his cane or told defendant “ ‘I’ll fuck you up if you t ouch me

. ’ ” In light of these

acquittals, there is reason to believe the jurors concluded Guanill did threaten defendant

with his cane and with physical violence. Those facts further support both experts’

conclusion that defendant’s conduct after the ini tial detention was reasonable, which

means the jurors must have relied on the prosecution ’s invalid theory of unlawful

detention to convict defendant under section 149.

Finally, we note that w hen the jurors posed a question about an apparent conflict

betwe en the simple assault charge and the section 149 charge, among other things, the

court ’s response told the jurors, “You also need to consider jury instruction number 2670,

pages 26

– 27, Lawful Performance of a Peace Officer. These three instructions shou l d be

read together.” That response again focused the jurors on the erroneous “lawful

performance” rules which, as the court had erroneously informed the jurors in its oral and

written instructions, should be used to define the phrase “legal necessity” und er section

149.28

Because of the result we reach, we need not address defendant’s argument s that

section 149 is void for vagueness or that the evidence is legally insufficie nt to sustain the

conviction.

DISPOSITION

The judgment of conviction is reversed.29 _________________________ Richman, J.

We concur:

_________________________ Kline, P.J.

_________________________ Miller, J.

A147248: P. v. Lewelling30

Trial Court: San Francisco County Superior Court

Trial Judge: Hon. Ellen Chaitlin

Counsel:

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney

General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Assistant Attorney General, Donn a M. Provenzano and

Aileen Bu nney, Deputy Attorney s General for Plaintiff a nd Respondent

.

Kerley Schaffer, D ylan Leon Schaffer, Jesse Suarez; Rains Lucia Stern, Harry Sandel

Stern for Defendant and Appellant.