a

GAO

United States Government Accountability Office

Report to Congressional Committees

April 2006 UNITED NATIONS

Funding 

Arrangements Impede 

Independence of 

Internal Auditors

GAO-06-575
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

April 2006

UNITED NATIONS

Funding Arrangements Impede 

Highlights of GAO-06-575, a report to Independence of Internal Auditors 

congressional committees 

With contributions to United

Nations (UN) organizations totaling 

more than $1.6 billion in 2006-2007, 

the United States has advocated 

strong UN oversight. In 1994, the

United States provided support to 

establish the Office of Internal 

Oversight Services (OIOS). The

findings of the Independent Inquiry 

Committee (IIC) into the Oil for 

Food Program have renewed

concerns about UN oversight, and

the 2005 World Summit proposed 

actions to improve OIOS. We were

asked to examine (1) the extent to

which UN funding arrangements

for OIOS ensure independent

oversight, and (2) the consistency 

of OIOS practices with key

international auditing standards. 

What GAO Recommends

We recommend that the Secretary 

of State and the Permanent

Representative of the United States

to the UN work with member states 

to support budgetary independence 

for OIOS, complete a risk 

management framework, develop a 

workforce planning methodology, 

report to the General Assembly on 

risk and control issues facing the 

UN, and institute mandatory 

training requirements, among other

things. 

The Department of State and OIOS

generally agreed with our overall 

findings and recommendations.

UN funding arrangements constrain OIOS’s ability to operate independently 

as mandated by the General Assembly and required by international auditing 

standards that OIOS has adopted. First, while OIOS is funded by a regular 

budget and 12 other revenue streams, UN financial rules severely limit 

OIOS’s ability to reallocate resources among revenue streams, locations, and 

operating divisions. Thus, OIOS cannot always direct resources at high-risk 

areas when they arise. Second, OIOS is dependent on the funds, programs, 

and other entities it audits for reimbursement for its services. The managers 

of the programs OIOS intends to examine can deny OIOS permission to 

perform work or not pay OIOS for services. UN entities could thus avoid 

OIOS audits or investigations, and high-risk areas can be and have been 

excluded from examination. 

Funding Arrangements Constrain OIOS's Ability to Operate Independently

Source: GAO analysis of OIOS data.

Extrabudgetary

(Dollars in millions)

Total budget = $85.3 million

$54.0 total extrabudgetary

63%

37%

Regular

Peacekeeping

$40.7

$.9

$5.9

$1.6

Funds

and programs

reimbursement account

UN

High 

Commissioner 

for Refugees

UN Joint 

Staff 

Pension Fund

Tribunals for 

Rwanda and 

the former 

Yugoslavia

Support costs

for technical 

operations and 

substantive 

trust funds

6 other 

programs

Resources High-risk

priority areas and 

annual work plans

$1.6 $2.1 $1.2

OIOS has begun to implement key measures for effective oversight, but 

some of its practices fall short of applicable international auditing standards. 

OIOS develops an annual work plan, but the risk management framework on 

which the work plans are based is not fully implemented. Moreover, OIOS 

annual reports do not assess risk and control issues facing the UN 

organization or the consequences if these are not addressed. OIOS officials 

report that the office does not have adequate resources, but they also do not 

have a mechanism to determine appropriate staffing levels. Moreover, OIOS 

has no mandatory training curriculum for staff or systematic procedures for 

ensuring the reliability of data used for their audits. OIOS also does not 

require all staff to document their independence. Although two OIOS 

divisions have recently undergone external reviews, the other two have not 

undergone such a review within the last 5 years. OIOS monitors and reports 

on the status of its recommendations and is making efforts to improve 

follow up on oversight recommendations. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-575.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Thomas Melito 

(202) 512-9601 (MelitoT@gao.gov). 
Page i GAO-06-575 United Nations

Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3

Background 6

UN Funding Arrangements Hinder Independent Oversight 11

OIOS Has Not Fully Met Key Elements of International Auditing 

Standards 18

UN Oversight Entities Undertake Activities to Coordinate Efforts 

but Do Not Provide Reasonable Assurance for a Comprehensive 

Approach to Oversight 30

U.S. Prioritizes Efforts to Strengthen UN Internal Oversight, but 

Influence Is Limited by a Key Vacancy at the U.S. Mission to the 

UN 34

Conclusion 35

Recommendations for Executive Action 35

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 36

Appendixes

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 38

Appendix II: OIOS Oversight Authority 40

Appendix III: OIOS Organizational Structure 42

Appendix IV: Process for Developing OIOS Budget 45

Appendix V: Resources of Selected UN Oversight Entities 48

Appendix VI: Comments from the Office of Internal Oversight Services 55

Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of State 57

GAO Comments 60

Appendix VIII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 61

Related GAO Products 62

Figures Figure 1: Development of OIOS 7

Figure 2: UN Oversight Bodies 9

Figure 3: Trends in UN and OIOS Regular Budget and 

Extrabudgetary Resources, Fiscal Bienniums 1996-1997 

to 2006-2007 13

Figure 4: OIOS Extrabudgetary Resource Estimates, by Funding 

Source, Fiscal Biennium 2006-2007 15
Contents

Page ii GAO-06-575 United Nations

Figure 5: OIOS’s Progress on Key Elements of International 

Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal 

Auditing 20

Figure 6: Key Forums to Facilitate Coordination among UN 

Oversight Entities 32

Figure 7: UN Organizations and OIOS’s Oversight Authority Over 

Selected Entities 41

Figure 8: OIOS Organizational Structure and Number of Staff 

Positions by Division, Fiscal Biennium 2006-2007 43

Figure 9: OIOS Presence Worldwide as of January 31, 2006 44

Figure 10: Process for the Preparation, Approval, and Execution of 

OIOS Regular Budgeta 46

Figure 11: Budget Comparison of Selected UN Oversight Entities, 

Biennium 2004-2005 49

Figure 12: Total Budget and Staff Resources of Selected UN 

Organizations and Number of Internal Oversight 

Professional Staff 52

Abbreviations

ACABQ Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary 

Questions

CEB Chief Executives Board

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency

IIA Institute of Internal Auditors

IIC Independent Inquiry Committee

INTOSAI International Organization of Supreme Auditing Institutions

OIOS Office of Internal Oversight Services

OPPBA Office of Program Planning, Budget, and Accounts

UN United Nations

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Page 1 GAO-06-575 United Nations

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

A

April 25, 2006 Letr

The Honorable Norm Coleman

Chairman

The Honorable Carl Levin

Ranking Minority Member

Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations

Committee on Homeland Security 

and Governmental Affairs

United States Senate

The Honorable Henry J. Hyde

Chairman

The Honorable Tom Lantos

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on International Relations

House of Representatives

As the largest financial contributor to the United Nations (UN) with 

assessed and voluntary contributions totaling more than $1.6 billion to the 

UN in 2006,1

 the United States has advocated the need for strong oversight 

for years and provided early support to establish the Office of Internal 

Oversight Services (OIOS) in 1994. The findings of the Independent Inquiry 

Committee (IIC) into the UN’s Oil for Food Program in February 2005 

renewed long-standing concerns about the independence, resources, and 

professional standards of internal oversight functions at the UN.2

 To 

address these concerns, in September 2005, heads of member states of the 

UN approved the World Summit Outcome Document that called for a series 

of reforms to strengthen the OIOS.

In response to your request for a study on the internal oversight function at 

the United Nations, we examined (1) the extent to which UN funding 

arrangements for OIOS ensure independent oversight, (2) the consistency 

1

This includes funding for the UN Secretariat, funds and programs, and peacekeeping 

operations.

2

In 1996, the UN and Iraq established the Oil for Food program to address Iraq’s 

humanitarian situation after sanctions were imposed in 1990. In April 2004, the UN 

established the IIC to investigate the administration and management of the UN Oil for Food 

program. See Independent Inquiry Committee into the United Nations Oil-for-Food Program, 

Interim Report (New York, N.Y.: Feb. 3, 2005), and The Management of the Oil-for-Food 

Program (New York, N.Y.: Sept. 7, 2005).
Page 2 GAO-06-575 United Nations

of OIOS’s practices with key international auditing standards, (3) 

coordination among UN oversight entities, and (4) U.S. government efforts 

to advance UN reforms to strengthen internal oversight. 3

 In addition, as 

requested, we are providing information on the budget and staff resources 

of selected UN oversight entities.

To address our objectives, we reviewed relevant UN and OIOS reports, 

manuals, and numerous program documents, as well as international 

auditing standards such as those of the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) 

and the International Organization of Supreme Auditing Institutions 

(INTOSAI). The IIA standards apply to internal audit activities—not to 

investigations, monitoring, evaluation, and inspection activities. However, 

we applied these standards OIOS-wide, as appropriate, in the absence of 

international standards for non-audit oversight activities. We met with 

senior Department of State (State) officials in Washington, D.C., and senior 

officials with the U.S. Missions to the UN in New York, Vienna, and Geneva. 

At these locations, we also met with OIOS management officials and staff; 

representatives of Secretariat departments and offices, as well as the UN 

funds, programs, and specialized agencies;4

 and the UN external auditors—

the Board of Auditors (in New York) and the Joint Inspection Unit (in 

Geneva). To assess the reliability of OIOS’s funding and staffing data for 

fiscal bienniums 1996-1997 to 2006-2007, we reviewed the OIOS’s budget 

documents and discussed the data with relevant officials. To review OIOS’s 

recommendations monitoring process, we discussed the data collection 

procedures with relevant officials. We determined that the data we used to 

examine the budget, staffing, and recommendations were sufficiently 

reliable for the purposes of this report. We performed our work between 

April 2005 and March 2006 in accordance with generally accepted U.S. 

government auditing standards. (Appendix I provides a detailed discussion 

on our scope and methodology.) 

3

For related work on OIOS’s oversight of UN activities, see GAO, United Nations: 

Preliminary Observations on Internal Oversight and Procurement Practices, GAO-06-

226T (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 31, 2005). See also United Nations: Procurement Internal 

Controls Are Weak, GAO-06-577 (Washington, D.C., Apr. 25, 2006) and United Nations: 

Lessons from Oil for Food Program Indicate Need to Strengthen Internal Controls and 

Oversight, GAO-06-330 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 25, 2006).

4

UN funds and programs include, for example, the UN Children’s Fund and UN Development 

Program, which have executive boards and executive heads but are under the authority of 

the UN Secretary-General. Specialized agencies, such as the Food and Agriculture 

Organization, have their own governing bodies and executive heads and are not under the 

authority of the Secretary-General.
Page 3 GAO-06-575 United Nations

Results in Brief UN funding arrangements constrain OIOS’s ability to operate 

independently as mandated by the General Assembly and required by 

international auditing standards that OIOS has adopted. According to these 

standards, an institution’s financial regulations should not restrict an audit 

organization from fulfilling its mandate, and the audit organization should 

have appropriate and sufficient resources to achieve its mandate. First, 

while OIOS is funded by the UN’s regular budget and 12 other revenue 

streams, UN financial regulations and rules severely limit OIOS’s flexibility 

to reallocate resources among revenue streams, locations, and operating 

divisions. As a result, OIOS cannot always deploy the resources necessary 

to address high-risk areas that may emerge after its budget is approved. 

Second, OIOS is dependent on UN funds and programs (and other UN 

entities) for resources for the services it provides. OIOS must obtain 

permission to perform audits or investigations from the managers of funds 

and programs, and negotiate the terms of work and payment for those 

services with them. Moreover, the heads of these entities have the right to 

deny funding for the oversight work OIOS proposes. By denying OIOS 

funding, UN entities could avoid, and have avoided, OIOS audits; high-risk 

areas could therefore be excluded from adequate examination. For 

example, the practice of allowing the heads of programs the right to 

approve funding of internal audit activities prevented OIOS from examining 

high-risk areas in the UN Oil for Food program, where billions of dollars 

were subsequently found to have been misused. 

Although OIOS has developed and begun to implement key components of 

effective oversight, some of OIOS’s audit practices fall short of meeting the 

international auditing standards it has adopted. Specifically, while OIOS 

develops an annual work plan, it has not fully implemented a risk 

management framework to provide reasonable assurance that its annual 

work plans are based on a systematic assessment of risks. As a result, OIOS 

may not be allocating resources to areas in the UN with the highest 

exposure to fraud, waste, and abuse. Moreover, OIOS annual reports do not 

provide an overall assessment of risk exposures and control issues facing 

the UN organization as a whole, or the consequences to the organization if 

the risks are not addressed. In terms of resource management, OIOS 

officials report that the office does not have adequate resources; however, 

they do not have a mechanism in place to determine appropriate staffing 

levels and help justify budget requests. Moreover, OIOS has no mandatory 

training curriculum for staff to develop their expertise, nor does the office 

have guidance and systematic procedures to ensure that the data it uses to 

support its work are reliable. Except for the Investigations Division, OIOS 
Page 4 GAO-06-575 United Nations

also has no requirement for staff to document their independence as called 

for by international auditing standards. In terms of quality assurance, 

although two OIOS divisions have undergone external reviews, the other 

two have not complied with the requirement for such a review every 5 

years. To monitor the disposition of the recommendations it has made, 

OIOS has a system to track and report regularly on the status of its 

recommendations, and efforts to strengthen this system are under way. 

The internal and external oversight bodies of the various UN organizations 

have made efforts to coordinate their activities; however, responsibilities 

for ensuring a comprehensive approach to oversight are unclear. To avoid 

duplication and leverage resources within the UN oversight community, the 

General Assembly and many member states have emphasized the 

importance of coordination between OIOS and the UN external oversight 

bodies—the Joint Inspection Unit and the Board of Auditors—and among 

the oversight offices of the UN funds and programs, specialized agencies, 

and other entities. However, existing forums to foster coordination 

primarily provide opportunities for sharing information and best practices. 

They are not meant to fully explore joint activities that could avoid 

duplication of efforts and leverage resources. OIOS, the Joint Inspection 

Unit, and the Board of Auditors share annual work plans—which can help 

identify gaps in oversight coverage and avoid unnecessary duplication. 

Also, OIOS is required to provide copies of its reports to the Joint 

Inspection Unit and the Board of Auditors for comment as appropriate. 

However, the practice of sharing work plans and the requirement to share 

reports do not apply to the internal oversight entities of separately 

administered UN funds and programs, and specialized agencies. Many of 

these UN entities are not subject to OIOS oversight but represent a 

substantial portion of UN-wide activities and report to their respective 

governing bodies. Without clear responsibilities for coordination and 

concerted efforts to collaborate on joint activities, it is difficult to ascertain 

gaps in oversight coverage, identify opportunities to avoid duplication of 

effort, or fully leverage the resources of the UN oversight community. 

The United States has made advancing UN reforms to strengthen internal 

oversight a priority, but a key senior-level vacancy at State may have 

limited the U.S. ability to influence management reforms. As part of U.S. 

efforts to reform UN management, State has adopted a multifaceted 

approach to creating a culture of transparency, accountability, and 

efficiency. In addition, a State representative co-chairs the Geneva Group 

Focal Group on Oversight. The focal group is completing an overview of 

internal oversight in the UN agencies and plans to issue its report in fall 
Page 5 GAO-06-575 United Nations

2006. Although the United States has made efforts to advance UN reforms 

to strengthen internal oversight a priority, the position of U.S. 

Representative for UN Management Reform at the U.S. Mission to the UN 

in New York was vacant for more than a year. This position was recently 

filled in March 2006. U.S. Mission officials stated that this vacancy limited 

the mission’s ability to influence oversight and other management reform 

proposals during the months leading up to the 2005 World Summit and the 

resulting document. 

This report makes recommendations to the Secretary of State and the 

Permanent Representative of the United States to the UN to work with 

member states to support budgetary independence for OIOS and OIOS’s 

efforts to more closely adhere to international auditing standards, 

including measures to

• ensure reliable funding arrangements that do not undermine the 

independence of OIOS, and provide it with sufficient resources that it 

can reallocate or deploy as may be necessary to meet high-risk areas as 

they arise;

• complete the implementation of OIOS’s risk management framework;

• report to the General Assembly on the status of significant risks and 

control issues facing the UN organization;

• develop a workforce planning methodology;

• institute a mandatory training curriculum for OIOS professional staff;

• establish guidance and procedures for assessing the reliability of data 

used to support significant findings in OIOS reports; and

• require all OIOS professional staff to file statements of independence 

and financial disclosures, and institute procedures to adequately review 

such statements.

In commenting on the official draft of this report, OIOS and State agreed 

with our overall conclusions and recommendations. OIOS stated that 

observations made in our report were consistent with OIOS’s internal 

assessments and external peer reviews. State fully agreed with GAO’s 

finding that UN member states need to ensure that OIOS has budgetary 

independence. However, State does not believe that multiple funding 
Page 6 GAO-06-575 United Nations

sources have impeded OIOS’s budgetary flexibility. We found that current 

UN regulations and rules are very restrictive, severely limiting the ability to 

move funds across revenue streams to emerging or high priority areas. 

OIOS and State also reviewed a draft of this report for technical accuracy. 

We incorporated their technical comments and updates throughout the 

report, as appropriate. We have reprinted OIOS’s and State’s comments in 

appendixes VI and VII, respectively.

Background OIOS was created in 1994 to assist the Secretary-General in fulfilling 

internal oversight responsibilities over UN resources and staff. (See fig. 1 

for a timeline of the development of OIOS since 1994.) The stated mission 

of OIOS is “to provide internal oversight for the United Nations that adds 

value to the organization through independent, professional, and timely 

internal audit, monitoring, inspection, evaluation, management consulting, 

and investigation activities and to be an agent of change that promotes 

responsible administration of resources, a culture of accountability and 

transparency, and improved program performance.” As an internal auditor, 

OIOS audit reports were previously available to only the Secretary-General 

and the heads of UN entities under examination. However, in December 

2004, the General Assembly passed a resolution making all OIOS’s reports 

available to any member state upon request.5

5

See G. A. Res. 59/272, U.N. GAOR, 59th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/59/272 (2005).
Page 7 GAO-06-575 United Nations

Figure 1: Development of OIOS

The UN oversight structure consists of internal and external oversight 

bodies (see fig. 2). Internal oversight is provided by OIOS for the UN 

Secretariat and other UN organizations under the authority of the UN 

Secretary-General; many UN funds and programs, specialized agencies, and 

other UN organizations have their own internal oversight offices. External 

oversight is provided by the Board of Auditors,6

 which examines the UN 

Secretariat and other UN organizations within the Secretary-General’s 

authority; and the Joint Inspection Unit, which has UN systemwide 

Source: GAO based on OIOS data.

1994-1995

Past Present

1996-1997 1998-1999 2000-2001 2002-2003 2004-2005 2006-2007

Jul. 1994:

OIOS

established

Nov. 1994:

First Under 

Secretary-General 

for OIOS assumed 

duties

Sept. 1999:

First meeting of 

the Conference of 

Investigators and 

Bilateral 

Organizations

Dec. 1999:

OIOS mandate 

reviewed by the 

General 

Assembly

Nov. 1997:

First Tripartite 

Oversight 

Coordination 

meeting

Apr. 2000:

Second Under 

Secretary-General 

assumed duties

Mar. 2002: 

Representatives of 

Internal Audit 

Services adopted 

Institute of Internal 

Auditors standards

May 2003: OIOS

launched Organizational 

Integrity Initiative

Apr. 2003: Uniform 

Guidelines for 

Investigations adopted

Sept. 2003: OIOS

Investigations Division 

opened in Vienna

Sept. 2002: OIOS

completed final report 

on pilot risk 

assessment project at 

UN Mission in Kosovo

Dec. 2004: OIOS

reports made 

available to any 

member state

Nov. 2001: OIOS

launched its risk 

management 

framework

Spring 2006: 

Independent 

external review 

of UN 

governance and 

oversight to be 

completed

Jul. 2005: Current 

Under SecretaryGeneral assumed 

duties

Sept. 2005: World 

Summit Outcome

Sept. 2005: 

Secretary-General 

created a committee 

to follow up on 

implementation of 

oversight 

recommendations

Nov. 2005: General 

Assembly decided to 

establish 

Independent Audit 

Advisory Committee

6

The Board of Auditors is presently composed of high-level representatives from the 

national audit offices of France, the Philippines, and South Africa.
Page 8 GAO-06-575 United Nations

authority.7 In general, the Board of Auditors audits the financial statements 

of the UN Secretariat and UN funds and programs. The Joint Inspection 

Unit primarily examines thematic areas, such as the possibility of 

outsourcing certain services that cut across UN organizations, although the 

unit also examines some single-organization issues.8

 In addition, UN 

organizations that have their own internal oversight offices appoint 

external auditors who serve fixed terms. These external auditors are often 

from the national auditing office of a member state that has an expressed 

interest in providing an external auditor.9

7

UN Secretariat, funds and programs, and specialized agencies are participating 

organizations. According to Joint Inspection Unit inspectors, the legislative bodies of all 

these UN entities, except for the International Atomic Energy Agency, have designated the 

Joint Inspection Unit as a subsidiary organ. While the agency is a participating organization, 

its legislative body has not designated the Joint Inspection Unit as a subsidiary organ.

8

Although the Joint Inspection Unit’s statute provides it with a mandate to conduct 

investigations, it does not currently have the capacity to carry out this mandate, according 

to senior officials in the unit.

9

For example, the national audit office of the United Kingdom currently serves as external 

auditor for the World Meteorological Organization; Germany serves for the International 

Atomic Energy Agency; and France for the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. 
Page 9 GAO-06-575 United Nations

Figure 2: UN Oversight Bodies

Organization of OIOS OIOS is headed by an Under Secretary-General who is appointed by the 

Secretary-General, with the concurrence of the General Assembly, for a 5-

year fixed term with no possibility of renewal.10 The Under SecretaryGeneral may be removed by the Secretary-General only for cause and with 

General Assembly approval.

OIOS’s authority spans all UN activities under the Secretary-General. These 

include the UN Secretariat in New York, Geneva, Nairobi, and Vienna; the 

five regional commissions for Africa, Asia and the Pacific, West Asia, 

Europe, and Latin America and the Caribbean; peacekeeping missions and 

humanitarian operations in various parts of the world; and numerous UN 

funds and programs, such as the UN Environment Program, UN Human 

Source: GAO based on UN data.

Joint

Inspection

Unit

Internal 

auditors

External 

auditors

• Established as a standing 

subsidiary organ of the 

United Nations in 1976. 

• The only independent 

external oversight body of 

the UN system; 

mandated to conduct 

evaluations, inspections, 

and investigations of the 

UN system, including the 

specialized agencies. 

• OIOS is the internal auditor of the 

UN Secretariat and other UN 

organizations under the authority of 

the UN Secretary-General. 

• Several UN funds and programs, 

which fall under the authority of the 

Secretary-General, have also 

established their own internal 

oversight offices. 

• Specialized agencies and the 

International Atomic Energy Agency, 

which do not fall under the authority 

of the Secretary-General, also have 

their own internal oversight offices, 

which report to their respective 

heads and governing bodies. 

• The UN Board of Auditors

carries out external audits of the 

accounts of the UN organization 

and the funds and programs

that are under the authority of 

the Secretary-General.

• Specialized agencies and other 

UN entities usually appoint an 

external auditor on a rotating 

basis, often the national 

auditing office of a member 

state that has expressed 

interest in serving as an 

external auditor. 

10The current Under Secretary-General for Internal Oversight Services was appointed in July 

2005.
Page 10 GAO-06-575 United Nations

Settlements Program (UN-HABITAT), and the Office of the UN High 

Commissioner for Refugees. OIOS’s authority does not extend to UN 

specialized agencies such as the Food and Agriculture Organization, 

International Labor Organization, and World Health Organization (see app. 

II).

To carry out its responsibilities, OIOS is organized into four operating 

divisions: (1) Internal Audit Division I (New York); (2) Internal Audit 

Division II (Geneva); (3) Monitoring, Evaluation and Consulting Division; 

and (4) Investigations Division.11 An executive office supports the Under 

Secretary-General and these four divisions. (See app. III for a chart of the 

OIOS organizational structure and the number of staff in each division.) 

Funding Structure OIOS derives its funding from (1) regular budget resources, which are 

funds from assessed contributions from member states that cover normal, 

recurrent activities such as the core functions of the UN Secretariat;12 and 

(2) extrabudgetary resources, which come from the budgets for UN 

peacekeeping missions financed through assessments from member states, 

voluntary contributions from member states for a variety of specific 

projects and activities, and budgets for the voluntarily financed UN funds 

and programs. UN regular budget resources are determined on a biennial 

basis and are estimated at approximately $3.8 billion UN-wide for 2006-

2007, the current biennium. OIOS’s share of regular budget resources is 

estimated at about $31.3 million for fiscal biennium 2006-2007. 

11Prior to 1993, the major internal oversight functions of the Secretariat were carried out by 

units within the Department of Administration and Management. These units were 

consolidated in August 1993 to form the Office for Inspections and Investigations under an 

Assistant Secretary-General. An independent investigation function has existed in the UN 

only since 1994, when it was established within OIOS. 

12The Secretariat carries out the day-to-day work of the UN Organization, such as 

administering peacekeeping operations, mediating international disputes, surveying 

economic and social trends and problems, and preparing studies on human rights and 

sustainable development. 
Page 11 GAO-06-575 United Nations

Extrabudgetary resources are estimated at $5.6 billion for the biennium 

2006-2007; OIOS’s share of extrabudgetary resources is about $54 million.13

UN Funding 

Arrangements Hinder 

Independent Oversight 

The General Assembly mandate creating OIOS calls for it to be 

operationally independent. In addition, according to international auditing 

standards, an internal oversight unit should have sufficient resources to 

effectively achieve its mandate. In practice, however, OIOS’s independence 

is impaired by constraints that UN funding arrangements impose. First, 

while OIOS is funded by a regular budget and 12 other revenue streams, UN 

financial regulations and rules severely limit OIOS from reallocating its 

resources between funding sources, locations, and operating divisions as 

may be necessary. Second, OIOS is dependent on UN funds and programs 

and other UN entities for resources and reimbursement for the services it 

provides. As a result of these structural constraints, OIOS may not be able 

to examine high-risk areas as appropriate. 

UN Mandate and 

International Auditing 

Standards Require 

Independence

In passing the resolution that established OIOS in August 1994, the General 

Assembly stated that the office shall exercise operational independence 

and that the Secretary-General, when preparing the budget proposal for 

OIOS, should take into account the independence of the office.14 The UN 

mandate for OIOS was followed by a Secretary-General’s bulletin in 

September 1994 stating that OIOS discharge its responsibilities without any 

hindrance or need for prior clearance.15

13Extrabudgetary resources cited include those estimated as available during the period for 

the programs specified in the program budget. These resources—derived from sources 

other than the regular budget—are mainly voluntary contributions and include related 

program support, such as central administrative structures. According to an official with the 

Office of Program Planning, Budget, and Accounts, the $5.6 billion figure provided includes 

the support account for peacekeeping, but does not include the majority of peacekeeping 

resources, which relate specifically to mission activities.

14G. A. Res. 48/218B, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/218 B (1994).

15Establishment of the Office of Internal Oversight Services: Secretary-General’s Bulletin, 

U.N. Doc. ST/SGB/273, at para. 4.
Page 12 GAO-06-575 United Nations

In addition, the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) standards for the 

professional practice of auditing,16 which OIOS and its counterparts in 

other UN organizations formally adopted in 2002, state that audit resources 

should be appropriate, sufficient, and effectively deployed. These 

standards also state that an internal audit activity should be free from 

interference and that internal auditors should avoid conflicts of interest. 

International auditing standards also state that financial regulations and 

the rules of an international institution should not restrict an audit 

organization from fulfilling its mandate.17

Funding Arrangements 

Hinder OIOS’s Flexibility to 

Reallocate Resources to 

Address High-Risk Areas

In addition to funding from the UN regular budget, OIOS receives 

extrabudgetary funding from 12 different revenue streams. These include 

funds and programs, a peacekeeping support account, and tribunals for 

Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia.18 Although the UN’s regular budget and 

extrabudgetary funding percentages over the years have remained 

relatively stable, an increasing share of OIOS’s budget is comprised of 

extrabudgetary resources (see fig. 3). OIOS’s extrabudgetary funding has 

steadily increased over the past decade, from 30 percent in fiscal biennium 

1996-1997 to 63 percent in fiscal biennium 2006-2007 (in nominal terms). 

The majority of OIOS’s staff (about 69 percent) is funded with 

extrabudgetary resources. The growth in the office’s budget is primarily 

due to extrabudgetary resources for audits and investigations of 

peacekeeping operations, including issues related to sexual exploitation 

and abuse. 

16IIA is recognized as the internal audit profession’s leader in certification, education, 

research, and technological guidance. Developed and maintained by the IIA, The Code of 

Ethics and Standards is mandatory guidance considered to be essential to the professional 

practice of internal auditing. The International Standards for the Professional Practice of 

Internal Auditing provides guidance for the conduct of internal auditing at both the 

organizational and individual auditor levels.

17International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI), Principles for Best 

Audit Arrangements for International Institutions (Oct. 2004).

18The 12 funding sources are peacekeeping support account, funds and programs 

reimbursement account, technical operations program support costs, substantive trust 

funds program support costs, UN Joint Staff Pension Fund, International Tribunal for the 

former Yugoslavia, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Capital Master Plan 2, 

Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs program support costs, UN High 

Commissioner for Refugees, International Trade Center, and UN Drug Control Program.
Page 13 GAO-06-575 United Nations

Figure 3: Trends in UN and OIOS Regular Budget and Extrabudgetary Resources, Fiscal Bienniums 1996-1997 to 2006-2007 

In fiscal biennium 2006-2007, the majority of OIOS’s extrabudgetary 

funds—about $40.7 million or about 75 percent of the total—represents 

funding for peacekeeping services, primarily resident auditors and 

Source: GAO analysis based on UN and OIOS data.

Regular

Extrabudgetary

UN

budget

OIOS

budget

1996-1997 1998-1999 2000-2001 2002-2003 2004-2005 2006-2007

$21.6

Total (in millions)

30%

70%

$28

36% 64%

$32.4

58% 42%

$40.1

52% 48%

$53.6

44% 56% 63%

$85.3

37%

$7,114.2

Total (in millions)

37% 63%

$6,138.5

41% 59%

$6,464.0

39% 61%

$7,286.3

60% 40%

$9,054.4

60% 60% 40%

$9,430.0

40%

OIOS

staff 

positions

1996-1997 1998-1999 2000-2001 2002-2003 2004-2005 2006-2007

Staff positions

81

43

82

50

87

68

91

76

91

164

91

202

0

50

100

150

200

200
Page 14 GAO-06-575 United Nations

investigators in the field.19 (Figure 9 in app. III shows the number of 

resident auditors and investigators OIOS has in each of its duty stations 

worldwide.) Figure 4 provides a breakdown of OIOS’s extrabudgetary 

resources by funding source.

19For the 2006-2007 biennium, the Under Secretary-General of OIOS requested funds to 

support an additional 39 regular-budget staff positions for the following areas: 27 staff 

positions for the Investigations Division, of which 24 are slated for Vienna; 10 staff positions 

for the Internal Audit Division, of which 8 are slated for New York; and 2 staff positions for 

the Office of the Under Secretary-General. In addition, the Under Secretary-General has 

stated that the need for resources for a properly staffed and structured OIOS will go far 

beyond these newly approved staff positions.
Page 15 GAO-06-575 United Nations

Figure 4: OIOS Extrabudgetary Resource Estimates, by Funding Source, Fiscal 

Biennium 2006-2007

a

The General Assembly is not expected to approve the peacekeeping budget, a key component of 

extrabudgetary resources, until May or June 2006. Extrabudgetary figures for the fiscal biennium 2006-

2007 are estimated. 

UN funding arrangements severely limit OIOS’s flexibility to reallocate its 

resources among its multiple funding sources, OIOS locations worldwide, 

or among its operating divisions—Internal Audit Divisions I and II; 

Investigations Division; and Monitoring, Evaluation, and Consulting 

Division—to address changing priorities. In addition, the movement of staff 

Source: GAO analysis of OIOS data.

(Dollars in millions)

$85.3 million

total

$54.0 total

37% 63%

Peacekeepinga

$0.9

$2.1

$1.2

$1.6

$1.6

$5.9

$40.7

Funds and programs reimbursement account

UN High Commissioner for Refugees

UN Joint Staff Pension Fund

Tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia

Support costs for technical operations and substantive trust funds

Other

Extrabudgetary

Regular
Page 16 GAO-06-575 United Nations

positions20 or funds between regular and extrabudgetary resources is not 

allowed. (Appendix IV illustrates the UN budget processes.) For example, 

one section in the Internal Audit Division may have exhausted its regular 

budget travel funds, while another section in the same division has travel 

funds available that are financed by extrabudgetary peacekeeping 

resources. However, OIOS would breach UN financial regulations and rules 

if it moved resources between the two budgets.

In addition, the movement of staff positions from one duty station to 

another can be time consuming. According to the UN budget office and 

OIOS officials, the redeployment of staff positions between duty stations 

requires approval by the Fifth Committee,21 and is reflected in the budget 

document and consequently in a staffing authorization. For example, OIOS 

officials requested a reallocation of 11 staff positions from the 

Investigations Division in New York to the Investigations Division in Vienna 

to save travel funds and to be closer to the entities they examine. 

According to OIOS officials, this change was approved only after repeated 

requests by OIOS over a number of years. Although OIOS can move staff 

positions between and across its four divisions to address priority areas, 

the positions must be funded from the same source as the priority area 

addressed. 

According to OIOS officials, for the last 5 years, OIOS has consistently 

found it necessary to address very critical cases on an urgent basis. A 

recent example is the investigations of sexual exploitation and abuse in the 

Republic of Congo and other peacekeeping operations that identified 

serious cases of misconduct and the need for increased prevention and 

detection of such cases. However, the ability to redeploy resources quickly 

when situations arise has been impeded by restrictions on the use of staff 

positions. The Under Secretary-General for OIOS has proposed that the 

office be allowed the flexibility to direct the resources as necessary.

20Throughout this report, we use the term “staff position” to refer to what the UN calls a 

“post.” For budgeting purposes, the UN defines a post as a budgetary entity at a specific 

level, in a specific work unit, for a specific purpose. 

21The Fifth Committee (or the Administrative and Budgetary Committee) is the General 

Assembly’s main committee for administration and budgetary matters and is comprised of 

all member states. 
Page 17 GAO-06-575 United Nations

Reliance on Other Entities 

for Funding Could Infringe 

on OIOS’s Independence

OIOS is dependent on UN funds and programs and other UN entities for 

resources, access, and reimbursement for the services it provides. These 

relationships present a conflict of interest because OIOS has oversight 

authority over these entities, yet it must obtain the permission of funds and 

programs to examine their operations and to receive payment for its 

services. OIOS negotiates the terms of work and payment for services with 

the manager of the program it intends to examine, and heads of these 

entities have the right to deny funding for oversight work proposed by 

OIOS. By denying OIOS funding, UN entities could avoid OIOS audits or 

investigations, and high-risk areas could potentially be excluded from 

adequate examination. In some cases, the fund and program manager have 

disputed the fees OIOS has charged after investigative services are 

rendered. For example, 40 percent of the $2 million billed by OIOS after it 

completed its work is currently in dispute, and since 2001, less than half of 

the entities have paid OIOS in full for investigative services it has provided. 

According to OIOS officials, the office has no authority to enforce payment 

for services rendered and there is no appeal process, no supporting 

administrative structure, and no adverse impact on an agency that does not 

pay or pays only a portion of the bill. 

UN funds and programs limit OIOS’s ability to independently set its work 

priorities because they exercise the power to decide whether to fund OIOS 

oversight activities and to negotiate the level of funding. OIOS officials 

stated that, because of OIOS’s funding arrangements, some high-priority 

work was not undertaken. For example, the practice of allowing the heads 

of programs the right to fund internal audit activities prevented OIOS from 

examining high-risk areas in the UN Oil for Food program where billions of 

dollars were subsequently found to be misused. The Independent Inquiry 

Committee into the Oil for Food Program previously reported that the UN 

Office of the Iraq Program denied OIOS’s request in May 2001 for two 

resident investigators to cover Iraq.22 Also, according to the head of the 

Investigations Division, the division would like to undertake more 

investigative work in certain funds and programs, but it does not have the 

resources to do so. A senior OIOS official said that there are contracts 

valued in the hundreds of millions of dollars, including certain high-risk UN 

Procurement Service air contracts that have not been audited in several 

years because OIOS does not have sufficient staff to perform the work. In 

22Independent Inquiry Committee into the United Nations Oil-for-Food Program, The 

Management of the United Nations Oil-for-Food Program (New York, N.Y.: Sept. 7, 2005).
Page 18 GAO-06-575 United Nations

addition, the official said that OIOS has not audited the UN Secretariat’s 

budget office in a systematic manner. 

In November 2005, the Under Secretary-General for OIOS proposed to the 

Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions 

(ACABQ)23 that a single source of funding be established for the office; 

however, it is unclear whether this proposal is under consideration. OIOS 

officials said they would prefer that OIOS be allocated a percentage of the 

UN budget, which would be placed in a trust fund for its use. As envisioned 

by the Under Secretary-General, the funding would come from one source 

and provide the flexibility and the independence OIOS needs to perform its 

oversight functions. Pursuant to the 2005 World Summit, in January 2006, 

the UN Secretary-General commissioned a study on governance and 

oversight in the UN. OIOS officials told us that the report is expected to be 

issued in the summer of 2006. According to OIOS officials, they intend to 

use the report to help them determine their resource requirements.

OIOS Has Not Fully 

Met Key Elements of 

International Auditing 

Standards

Since its formal adoption of the IIA international standards for the 

professional practice of internal auditing in 2002, OIOS has begun to 

develop and implement the key components of effective oversight. 

However, the office has yet to fully implement them (see fig. 5). 

Specifically, OIOS develops annual work plans, but these plans are not fully 

based on a systematic risk assessment process as required by international 

auditing standards and called for by OIOS’s risk management framework. 

Moreover, OIOS annual reports do not provide an overall assessment of 

risk exposures and control issues facing the UN organization as a whole or 

the consequence to the organization if the risks are not addressed. In terms 

of human resource management, OIOS officials report that the office does 

not have adequate resources, but they do not have a mechanism in place to 

determine appropriate staffing levels and help justify budget requests. 

OIOS has no mandatory training curriculum for staff to develop their 

expertise nor does it have guidance and systematic procedures to provide 

reasonable assurance that data it uses are reliable. OIOS also does not 

require all staff to document their independence. Although OIOS has 

quality assurance measures in place, it falls short of meeting the 

23ACABQ advises the General Assembly on the budget submitted by the Secretary-General, 

is authorized to examine the administrative budgets of the specialized agencies, and reports 

to the General Assembly on the auditors’ reports on the accounts of the UN and of the 

specialized agencies. 
Page 19 GAO-06-575 United Nations

international auditing standards in areas such as external assessments. 

OIOS monitors and reports regularly on the implementation status of its 

recommendations, but a committee established by the Secretary-General to 

follow up on the implementation of oversight recommendations is not yet 

operational.
Page 20 GAO-06-575 United Nations

Figure 5: OIOS’s Progress on Key Elements of International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing

Source: GAO based on IIA and OIOS data.

Key internal auditing standards Actions undertaken to date Actions not yet completed

• Establish plans to determine priorities based on a

risk assessment undertaken at least annually

• Report on significant risk exposures and control 

issues

• Ensure that resources are appropriate, sufficient, 

and effectively deployed

Managing the internal audit activity: Effectively manage the internal audit activity to ensure that it adds value to the organization

• Annual work plans completed

• Risk assessment framework adopted

• Informal OIOS-level risk assessments

completed annually

• Annual report contained some references to 

risks facing the Organization

• Client-level risk assessments incomplete

• Risk assessment results not 

systematically incorporated into annual 

work plans

• No full report of risk and control issues

• No OIOS-wide mechanism for 

 determining staffing needs

• Maintain a quality assurance and improvement 

program

• Conduct independent external assessments, 

such as quality assurance reviews, at least 

every 5 years

Quality assurance: Develop and maintain a quality assurance program that includes internal and external quality assessments and ongoing 

internal monitoring

• Limited external reviews conducted by Board 

of Auditors and Joint Inspection Unit

• First external assessments (peer reviews) 

completed for two divisions, the Audit Division 

in Geneva and the Investigations Division

• Some quality assurance policies in place

• No external assessment conducted for 

Audit Division in New York or the 

Monitoring, Evaluation and Consulting 

Division

• Weaknesses in quality assurance 

processes noted by external reviewers

• Staff should possess the competencies needed to 

perform their responsibilities and should enhance 

them through continuing professional development

• Staff should apply the care and skill expected of a

competent internal auditor

Proficiency and due professional care: Engagements should be performed with proficiency and due professional care

• Training available to OIOS staff

• Some external training completed by staff

• Annual training reports submitted to the 

Office of Human Resources Management

• No mandatory training curriculum

• Training not systematically tracked by 

management

• Lack of information technology expertise

• No systematic framework for assessing 

data reliability

• Establish a follow-up process to monitor and 

ensure that management actions have been 

effectively implemented, or that senior 

management has accepted the risk of not 

taking action

Monitoring progress: Establish and maintain a system to monitor the disposition of results communicated to management

• Recommendations tracked by division

• Divisions’ data on recommendations compiled 

and reported semi-annually

• Consolidated tracking system developed 

• Committee to follow up on oversight 

 recommendations proposed

• A committee established to follow up 

on oversight recommendations has

not yet met

• Auditors should avoid conflicts of interest

• Impairments to independence, in fact or 

appearance, should be disclosed

Independence and objectivity: Internal auditors should be objective in performing their work

• High-level UN staff (D-1 level and above) 

required to complete financial disclosure

• Compliance with UN staff rules and 

regulations required of all OIOS staff

• Majority of OIOS staff not required 

to complete financial disclosure

• Documentation of independence 

not required of all OIOS staff
Page 21 GAO-06-575 United Nations

OIOS Has Developed 

Annual Work Plans but Has 

Not Fully Implemented a 

Risk Management 

Framework

OIOS has adopted a risk management framework24 to link the office’s 

annual work plans to risk-based priorities, but it has not fully implemented 

this framework. Thus, OIOS cannot provide reasonable assurance that its 

annual work plans give the highest priority to the highest-risk audits. OIOS 

began implementing a risk management framework in 2001 to enable the 

office to prioritize the allocation of resources to oversee those areas that 

have the greatest exposure to fraud, waste, and abuse. OIOS’s risk 

management framework includes plans for organization-wide risk 

assessments, to categorize and prioritize risks facing the organization, and 

client-level risk assessments, to identify and prioritize risk areas facing 

each entity for which OIOS has oversight authority.25 According to OIOS 

officials, the annual work planning process included discussions of the 

work that OIOS would undertake and identified 31 risk areas for 

prioritizing its work. In addition, OIOS officials stated that they consider 

program budget size, time elapsed since the last audit, number of staff, and 

risks to the UN’s reputation if fraud and waste go undetected when 

deciding which audits to perform. Although OIOS’s framework includes 

plans to perform client-level risk assessments,26 as of April 2006, out of 25 

entities that comprise major elements of its oversight universe, three risk 

assessments had been completed, three were in progress, and four more 

are planned for 2006. 

In practice, however, OIOS annual work plans are not fully based on the 

risk assessments it has completed or called for in its risk management 

framework. OIOS officials stated that the office does not systematically 

rank audit proposals in the annual work plan by risk level or weight more 

IIA Standards for

Managing the internal audit 

activity – planning

• Establish risk-based plans to determine 

the priorities of the internal audit activity, 

consistent with the organization’s goals

• Plan of engagements should be based 

on a risk assessment undertaken at 

least annually

Source: IIA.

24OIOS defines risk management as the systematic approach to identifying, assessing, and 

acting on the probability that an event or action may adversely affect the organization. Risk 

management entails identifying and assessing past problems, current challenges, and 

overarching trends that could threaten the organization’s activities, assets, and reputation.

25The Monitoring, Evaluation, and Consulting Division does not currently perform 

systematic risk assessments. Because all of the evaluation unit’s work is mandated by the 

General Assembly, a division official said that they do not need to set risk-based priorities. 

The official stated that the division managers discuss potential risk areas informally and 

present a list of such areas to the General Assembly from which to request OIOS 

evaluations. 

26According to OIOS officials, OIOS plans to work jointly with each client to identify and 

rank areas where the client is potentially vulnerable to fraud, waste, or abuse. This process 

is called client-level risk assessment.
Page 22 GAO-06-575 United Nations

significant risk factors.27 The office’s 2005 annual report stated that 70 

percent of its work was risk-based. However, OIOS officials stated that this 

estimate includes a number of oversight activities that have risk areas 

assigned to them retroactively (instead of during the preliminary planning 

process). OIOS officials told us they plan to assign risk areas more 

consistently to audits proposed in their annual work plan during the 

planning phase so that, by 2008, at least 50 percent of their work is based 

on a systematic risk assessment. As a result, OIOS officials cannot provide 

reasonable assurance that the entities they choose to examine are those 

that pose the highest risk, nor that their audit coverage of a client focuses 

on the areas of risk facing that client. 

OIOS Not Reporting on 

Status of Overall Risk and 

Control Issues Facing the 

UN 

Although OIOS’s annual reports contain references to risks facing OIOS 

and the UN organization, the reports do not provide an overall assessment 

of the status of these risks or the consequence to the organization if the 

risks are not addressed. For instance, in February 2005, the IIC reported 

that many of the Oil for Food program’s deficiencies, identified through 

OIOS audits, were not described in the OIOS annual reports submitted to 

the General Assembly. A senior OIOS official stated that the office does not 

have an annual report to assess UN-wide risks and controls and that such 

an assessment does not belong in OIOS’s annual report in its current form, 

which focuses largely on the activities of OIOS. The official agreed that 

OIOS should communicate to senior management on areas where the office 

has not been able to examine significant risk and control issues, but that 

the General Assembly would have to determine the appropriate vehicle for 

such a new reporting requirement. 

27Officials from the Investigations Division said they give incoming cases a risk score and 

prioritize their work by ranking the scores. Because we did not have access to the division’s 

internal documents, however, we could not independently assess how effectively the 

division has implemented its risk assessments. 

IIA Standard for

Managing the internal audit 

activity – reporting to senior 

management

Reporting should include significant 

risk exposures and control issues, 

corporate governance issues, and other 

matters needed or requested by senior 

management

Source: IIA.
Page 23 GAO-06-575 United Nations

OIOS Lacks a Mechanism to 

Determine Appropriate 

Resource Levels

While OIOS officials have stated that the office does not have adequate 

resources, they do not have a mechanism in place to determine appropriate 

staffing levels to help justify budget requests, except for peacekeeping 

oversight services. For peacekeeping audit services, OIOS does have a 

metric—endorsed by the General Assembly—that provides one 

professional auditor for every $100 million in the annual peacekeeping 

budget. Although OIOS has succeeded in justifying increases for 

peacekeeping oversight services consistent with the large increase in the 

peacekeeping budget since 1994, it has been difficult to support staff 

increases in oversight areas that lack a comparable metric, according to 

OIOS officials.

OIOS Offers Training 

Opportunities but Does Not 

Require or Systematically 

Track Continuing 

Professional Development 

OIOS staff have opportunities for training and other professional 

development, and OIOS officials said that they encourage staff to seek 

training and professional certifications. UN personnel records show that 

OIOS staff took more than 400 training courses offered by the Office of 

Human Resources Management in 2005. Further, an OIOS official said that, 

since 2004, OIOS has subscribed to IIA’s online training service that offers 

more than 100 courses that are applicable to auditors. According to the 

official, the service tracks all courses completed (and who completed 

them), making this information available to OIOS management. Since 

subscribing, 49 OIOS staff have completed and passed a total of almost 200 

online IIA courses. OIOS officials reported that they encourage staff to 

seek professional certifications such as Certified Internal Auditor, for 

example, by reimbursing the costs of course materials for those who 

certify. According to an OIOS official, about 80 percent of the auditors from 

the Geneva division have current professional certifications.28

Despite these professional development opportunities, OIOS does not 

formally require staff training, nor does it systematically track training to 

provide reasonable assurance that all staff are maintaining and acquiring 

professional skills. OIOS policy manuals list no minimum training 

requirement. OIOS officials stated that, although they gather some 

information on their use of training funds for their annual training report to 

the UN Office of Human Resources Management, they do not maintain an 

IIA Standard for

Managing the internal audit 

activity – resource management

Ensure that internal audit resources are 

appropriate, sufficient, and effectively 

deployed to achieve the approved plan

Source: IIA.

IIA Standard for

Proficiency – continuing

professional development

Internal auditors should enhance their 

knowledge, skills, and other competencies

through continuing professional 

development

Source: IIA.

28Data were not available for the remaining divisions in New York and Vienna.
Page 24 GAO-06-575 United Nations

officewide database to systematically track all training their staff has 

taken. The 2005 training report, for example, lists about 50 different 

training courses and conferences attended by OIOS staff members. 

However, the report also shows that the Monitoring, Evaluation, and 

Consulting Division used 30 times more OIOS training funds than the 

Investigations Division, even though the Investigations Division has more 

than 5 times as many staff. Therefore, it is difficult to assess whether all 

OIOS staff are getting training and other professional development 

opportunities to maintain or acquire the skills needed to perform the 

oversight duties to which they are assigned. Board of Auditors’ reviews, for 

example, have noted a lack of information technology expertise in OIOS. 

OIOS Has No Guidance or 

Systematic Framework for 

Assessing Data Reliability 

Although OIOS uses program data in its oversight activities, it has not 

developed guidance or a framework to help its staff determine the 

reliability of the data it uses to support the findings and recommendations 

in its reports. OIOS division manuals do not provide guidance on data 

reliability checks. OIOS officials stated that they expect staff to use 

professional judgment in determining which data to use to support their 

findings, but that they do not require them to document that they have 

determined the data to be sufficiently reliable. The Board of Auditors 

reported that OIOS’s auditors routinely use field missions’ applications and 

databases as part of their audits, particularly in the areas of asset control, 

financial management, and procurement and that OIOS noted that their 

capacity to perform information technology audits was not sufficient. 

Computer-processed data require a more technical assessment than other 

forms of evidence and the very nature of information systems allows 

opportunities for errors to be introduced by many people. Unreliable data 

are a significant risk because key management decisions may be based on 

the information that these automated systems generate. However, because 

OIOS does not have systematic guidance or a framework on data reliability, 

it cannot provide reasonable assurance that data reliability assessments are 

risk-based and geared to the specific circumstances of the audit. 

IIA Standard for

Due professional care

Exercise due professional care by 

considering, among other things, the 

probability of significant errors, 

irregularities, or noncompliance

Source: IIA.
Page 25 GAO-06-575 United Nations

Most OIOS Staff Are Not 

Required to Submit 

Independence and Financial 

Disclosure Statements

OIOS does not require all staff to attest to their independence and, in OIOS, 

only the Under Secretary-General and senior managers are required to 

complete an annual financial disclosure statement. All UN staff are 

expected to follow UN staff rules and regulations, but OIOS has no officewide policy for documenting that oversight staff are free from impairment 

to their independence. Only the Investigations Division requires its staff to 

sign a statement of independence, which OIOS officials said is kept in 

personnel files. According to a UN official, the UN ethics policy was 

recently changed to require approximately 1,000 UN staff at the D-1 level 

and above29 to submit financial disclosures, but it still does not include 

staff-level employees in OIOS.30 OIOS officials stated that, in the absence of 

official statements of independence, they rely on individuals to voluntarily 

report potential conflicts of interest when they are assigned to work on a 

specific audit or investigation. 

IIA Standards for

Individual objectivity and 

impairments to independence 

or objectivity

• Internal auditors should have an 

impartial, unbiased attitude and avoid 

conflicts of interest

• If independence or objectivity is

impaired in fact or appearance, the 

details of the impairment should be 

disclosed to appropriate parties

Source: IIA.

29D-1 level and above are senior-level positions such as those of a division head or policy 

making positions equivalent to the Assistant Secretary-General and Under SecretaryGeneral levels.

30OIOS supported the creation of a UN Ethics Office, which was established in January 2006 

to process financial disclosures, among other things. OIOS has no enforcement authority 

over ethics violations. 
Page 26 GAO-06-575 United Nations

OIOS Has Key Quality 

Assurance Measures, but 

Work Remains to Meet 

International Standards 

OIOS has some quality assurance policies and processes in place, but 

external reviews of OIOS have revealed weaknesses. We found that all 

OIOS divisions have an internal report review process as a quality check 

before their reports are sent to the General Assembly. In addition, the 

Internal Audit Division in New York has a checklist for draft reports that 

requires supervisors to document when quality assurance processes are 

completed; and the Internal Audit Division manual contains a chapter 

devoted to quality assurance policies and procedures.

Although periodic external reviews required by the IIA could provide 

reasonable assurance of the quality of OIOS’s work, two out of four OIOS 

divisions have not undergone an external review since its inception in 1994. 

Although not required to follow IIA standards, the Investigations Division 

was reviewed in 2004 by a team from the European Anti-Fraud Office on 

the occasion of OIOS’s 10th anniversary.31 The Internal Audit Division in 

Geneva became the second division to undergo an external review. The 

final report of the team, led by the chief auditor of the UN Children’s Fund, 

was released to OIOS management in December 2005. The Internal Audit 

Division in New York and the Monitoring, Evaluation, and Consulting 

Division have not undergone an external review. Audit officials in New 

York said they must complete an external review by January 2007 in order 

for the Internal Audit Division to continue reporting that its work complies 

with IIA standards.32 The external oversight bodies of the UN—the Joint 

Inspection Unit and Board of Auditors—have never fully reviewed OIOS’s 

quality assurance framework. Both have reviewed some elements of the 

office’s management practices, but officials representing both bodies said 

that a full and regular external review of OIOS’s quality assurance 

framework is outside their mandates and would not be feasible with their 

limited resources. Without a comprehensive external review by bodies with 

access to OIOS internal documents and staff, it is difficult to fully assess 

OIOS’s compliance with IIA quality assurance standards. 

IIA Standards for

Quality assurance

• Develop and maintain a quality 

assurance and improvement program

• External assessments such as quality 

assurance reviews should be conducted 

at least once every 5 years by an 

 independent reviewer or review team 

 from outside the organization

Source: IIA.

31Although the Investigations Division does not follow a specific set of international 

standards, a division official stated that OIOS investigators must adhere to the Uniform 

Guidelines for Investigations adopted at the Fourth Conference of International 

Investigators in Brussels in 2003.

32In March 2002, OIOS formally adopted the IIA standards, which according to an OIOS 

official, went into effect in January 2002. To attest its compliance with IIA standards, OIOS 

must complete an external review by a qualified, independent reviewer by January 2007, the 

5-year point. Internal Audit Division officials in New York said that they plan to finalize the 

quality assessment required by IIA by the end of December 2006.
Page 27 GAO-06-575 United Nations

External reviews of OIOS have also found weaknesses limiting OIOS’s 

ability to provide reasonable assurance as to the quality of its work. The 

Board of Auditors has noted that OIOS work papers show inconsistent 

documentation of supervisory review, and that OIOS lacks expertise to 

assess the effectiveness of client information and communications 

technology. In this regard, an OIOS official said a vacancy announcement 

for an Information and Communications Technology Auditor has recently 

been issued, and the announcements for two more are planned. The 

European Anti-Fraud Office33 reported that some sampled files34 from the 

Investigations Division had incomplete interview records, work plans, and 

documentation regarding the results of recommendations made or 

proposed follow-up. The peer review team for the Internal Audit Division in 

Geneva reported on deficiencies in supervisory reviews and some other 

aspects of documenting their work. In response to the report, the head of 

the division issued instructions requiring supervisors to complete a 

working paper confirmation form to ensure working papers were 

completed and organized in a manner that could be easily reviewed by 

someone independent of the audit assignment.

33The European Anti-Fraud Office, based in Brussels, is an organization whose stated 

purpose is to protect the interests of the European Union and to fight fraud, corruption, 

misconduct, and any other irregular activity within European institutions.

34The European Anti-Fraud Office sampled 40 closed cases from 1999-2004, representative 

of subject areas and geographic regions.
Page 28 GAO-06-575 United Nations

OIOS Has a Process to 

Regularly Monitor 

Disposition of 

Recommendations

OIOS has a process in place that tracks and reports on the status of its 

recommendations. The recommendations from each of OIOS’s four 

divisions are consolidated into one database that is updated formally twice 

per year—once to prepare the annual report in September, and once in 

January for the semi-annual report on open recommendations to the 

Secretary-General. According to OIOS officials, OIOS has been tracking 

recommendations in various databases since at least 1997, and OIOS’s four 

divisions have seven separate databases to record and track 

recommendations. OIOS has recognized the need for a single system and 

on April 1, 2006, launched an automated recommendation tracking system. 

The system will be able to record, track, and monitor recommendations 

data for each OIOS division. OIOS officials stated that in the future, the 

system will allow online interaction and communication with OIOS clients 

for reporting the status of recommendations, rather than the current 

process of sending electronic files to clients to obtain the status of 

recommendations. 

Although OIOS reports that about 80 percent of its recommendations from 

2001 to 2005 have been implemented, some of its critical 

recommendations—including those made to high-risk areas such as 

procurement, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the UN Office 

at Nairobi, and the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo—have 

not yet started, or were not fully implemented by audited entities as of June 

2005.35 For example, the implementation of three recommendations from a 

report on the Economic Commission for Africa’s procurement and 

inventory store management issued in 2001-2002 are still in progress. 

According to OIOS, the UN Office in Nairobi has not fully implemented a 

critical recommendation issued in a report between 2001 and 2002 on 

contracting and procurement services; neither has it begun to address a 

critical recommendation issued in 2002-2003 regarding alleged 

procurement irregularities in awarding a UN staff transportation contract. 

According to OIOS officials, although they have noted a generally positive 

IIA Standards for

Monitoring progress

• Establish and maintain a system to 

monitor the disposition of results

communicated to management

• Establish a follow-up process to monitor 

and ensure that management actions

have been effectively implemented or 

that senior management has accepted 

the risk of not taking action

Source: IIA.

35From July 2001 to June 2005, OIOS issued 8,344 recommendations, of which 2,773 were 

“critical.” About 74 percent of the total critical recommendations have been implemented. 

This total does not include about 1,800 recommendations that were withdrawn. According 

to OIOS, recommendations may be withdrawn for a variety of reasons. For example, (1) the 

client may give valid arguments as to why the recommendation cannot be implemented, e.g., 

the investment outweighs the benefit; (2) after further follow-up with the client it was 

determined that there was a factual error or misunderstanding by OIOS; and (3) the client or 

the situation leading to the recommendation no longer exists, for example, in the case of a 

peacekeeping mission closure.
Page 29 GAO-06-575 United Nations

trend in implementing recommendations more expeditiously, they are not 

entirely satisfied with the situation. Several recommendations, some of 

which are critical, have remained open for up to 6 years. As a result, OIOS 

proposed and the General Assembly concurred that a high-level mechanism 

be established to address, among other things, the implementation of 

recommendations.36

In September 2005, the Secretary-General endorsed the establishment of a 

high-level committee to ensure, among other things, proper 

implementation of all oversight recommendations—including those made 

by OIOS, the Board of Auditors, and the Joint Inspection Unit.37 The 

oversight committee is to provide independent advice to the SecretaryGeneral on all Secretariat activities relating to internal and external 

oversight and investigations, including internal controls and the monitoring 

of corrective actions recommended by internal and external auditors. 

However, the committee had not convened as of March 2006. In addition, 

the Department of Management is in the process of considering a 

management control tracking system, which is expected to be operational 

within a year. According to a Department of Management official, this 

system will have the capacity to interface with the new recommendations 

tracking system that OIOS is implementing. In addition, the official stated 

that the department does not currently prepare statistics on 

implementation rates of recommendations since this responsibility is 

assigned to the oversight bodies; however, with the new monitoring 

system, the department would be able to provide these statistics. 

36G. A. Res. 59/272, U.N. GAOR, 59th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/59/272, at para. 10 (2005).

37Oversight Committee: Secretary-General’s Bulletin, U.N. Doc. ST/SGB/2005/18, at 

para. 1.1. 
Page 30 GAO-06-575 United Nations

UN Oversight Entities 

Undertake Activities to 

Coordinate Efforts but 

Do Not Provide 

Reasonable Assurance 

for a Comprehensive 

Approach to Oversight 

UN oversight entities have undertaken a number of activities to coordinate 

efforts, but these activities are not geared toward ensuring a 

comprehensive approach to oversight or minimizing duplication of effort. 

No single entity in the UN oversight community is clearly responsible for 

identifying gaps in oversight, identifying opportunities to avoid 

unnecessary duplication of effort, or leveraging the resources of the UN 

oversight community. Although several forums have been established to 

foster coordination, these forums are aimed at sharing information and 

best practices, rather than focusing on joint activities that could minimize 

duplication and leverage resources. While it is not a common practice, 

some UN oversight entities made efforts to collaborate. The Joint 

Inspection Unit, Board of Auditors, and OIOS share annual work plans and 

reports; however, these practices do not apply to the internal oversight 

entities of the separately administered UN funds, programs, and specialized 

agencies. These separately administered entities represent a significant 

part of UN activities, and report to their own respective governing bodies. 

UN Resolutions Call for 

Coordinating Efforts to 

Ensure Comprehensive 

Approach to Oversight

Although the General Assembly and many member states have emphasized 

the importance of coordination among UN oversight entities to ensure a 

comprehensive approach, avoid unnecessary duplication, and leverage 

resources, the General Assembly does not clearly designate responsibility 

for this effort. In this regard, when OIOS was established in 1994, the 

Secretary-General issued a bulletin directing the office to coordinate with 

the Board of Auditors, the Panel of External Auditors, and the Joint 

Inspection Unit; and to maintain a close working relationship with other 

inspection and internal audit offices in the UN system.38 More recently, the 

General Assembly passed a resolution reaffirming the importance of 

effective coordination between the Joint Inspection Unit, the Board of 

Auditors, and OIOS. This resolution aimed to maximize the use of 

resources, and to share experiences, knowledge, best practices, and 

lessons learned.39 Similarly, member states have also encouraged the Joint 

Inspection Unit, the Board of Auditors, and OIOS to continue working 

together to ensure greater coordination and avoid duplication. Toward this 

end, the Joint Inspection Unit—the only independent external oversight 

38Establishment of the Office of Internal Oversight Services: Secretary-General’s Bulletin, 

U.N. Doc. ST/SGB/273, at para. 5.

39G. A. Res. 59/272, U.N. GAOR, 59th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/59/272, at para. 12 (2005).
Page 31 GAO-06-575 United Nations

body whose authority includes the specialized agencies—recently 

completed a report that calls upon internal and external oversight entities 

within the UN system to provide effective coordination and cooperation 

with each other to avoid duplication and ensure leveraging resources.40

However, the report has not yet been reviewed or endorsed by the General 

Assembly.

Responsibility for Ensuring 

a Comprehensive Approach 

and Minimizing Duplication 

Is Unclear

Notwithstanding these calls for coordination, OIOS’s ability to coordinate 

is limited. Its authority does not extend to specialized agencies; in practice, 

coordination activities among the entities overseeing funds and programs 

are geared toward sharing information—not toward ensuring 

comprehensive oversight or avoiding duplication. The Board of Auditors’ 

authority also does not extend to specialized agencies and is limited to the 

UN organizations that have a direct reporting relationship to the SecretaryGeneral. The Joint Inspection Unit has systemwide authority, but is not 

required to track the work performed by the various UN oversight entities. 

Thus, no one entity in the UN oversight community is charged with the 

responsibility of tracking the work performed by all the oversight entities 

for the purpose of ensuring a comprehensive approach to oversight. 

Without clear designation of this responsibility, it is not possible to 

ascertain whether there are any gaps in oversight coverage, identify 

opportunities to avoid unnecessary duplication of efforts, or leverage the 

resources of the UN oversight community. This is of particular concern 

given the limited resources of some of these entities. (See app. V for a 

summary of the resources of selected UN oversight entities.)

Several Forums Provide 

Venues for Information 

Exchange among UN 

Oversight Entities

Several forums to coordinate efforts have been established, and OIOS 

participates in these venues (see fig. 6). However, despite calls for 

coordination, the existing forums that are meant to foster coordination do 

not optimize opportunities for collaboration to achieve these purposes. 

Rather, these forums provide opportunities to share information and best 

practices on oversight approaches and methodologies. Specifically, in the 

annual tripartite oversight coordination meetings that began in November 

1997, representatives of OIOS, the Board of Auditors, and the Joint 

Inspection Unit convene to exchange information and minimize 

duplication. In addition, since 1969, an interagency organization of internal 

40Joint Inspection Unit, Oversight Lacunae in the United Nations System, JIU/REP/2006/2.
Page 32 GAO-06-575 United Nations

auditors—the Representatives of Internal Audit Services (RIAS) of the 

United Nations Organizations and Multilateral Financial Institutions—has 

met annually to share best practices on audit approaches and 

methodologies. Similarly, a counterpart organization organized in 1998 for 

investigators—the Conference of Investigators of International Institutions 

and Bilateral Organizations—meets annually to exchange ideas, foster best 

practices, and encourage cooperation among the investigative offices of 

the participating organizations. Also, the UN Evaluation Group—a forum 

for the discussion of evaluation issues within the UN system—aims to 

simplify and harmonize evaluation reporting practices; OIOS noted that the 

UN Evaluation Group has developed norms and standards for evaluation in 

the UN system, as well as core competencies for UN evaluators.

Figure 6: Key Forums to Facilitate Coordination among UN Oversight Entities

OIOS

Other UN oversight entities

Source: GAO based on UN data.

OIOS, the Board of Auditors, 

and the Joint Inspection Unit 

convene annually to 

exchange information 

and minimize 

unnecessary 

duplication.

Investigators from OIOS and investigative 

offices of international organizations attend 

annual conference to exchange ideas, 

discuss best practices, and promote close 

cooperation among the participating 

organizations.

OIOS evaluators

and other UN entities meet

 to discuss evaluation issues within

 the UN system and simplify 

and harmonize evaluation

reporting practices.

OIOS auditors and other 

UN oversight entities

meet annually to share 

best practices on audit 

approaches

and

methodologies.

Tripartite Oversight Coordination 

Meetings

UN

Evaluation 

Group

Representatives of Internal Audit 

Services (RIAS) of the United Nations 

Organizations and Multilateral 

Financial Institutions

Conference of 

Investigators 

of International 

and Bilateral 

Organizations
Page 33 GAO-06-575 United Nations

Joint Efforts to Collaborate 

and Share Annual Work 

Plans and Reports Are 

Limited

While it is not a common practice, UN officials stated that some UN 

oversight entities made efforts to collaborate. A prime example of this took 

place during the recent UN tsunami relief efforts. In an April 2005 report to 

the Secretary-General, OIOS investigators issued an assessment of the risks 

and opportunities for corruption and waste associated with weak 

coordination, rushed procurement and recruitment decisions, and the size 

of the funding. According to OIOS, the assessment was the result of 

collaborative efforts between OIOS and the investigative offices of the UN 

Children’s Fund, UN Development Program, UN High Commissioner for 

Refugees, and the World Food Program; as well as the Anti-Fraud Office of 

the European Commission, the Asian Development Bank, and the World 

Bank.

The Joint Inspection Unit, the Board of Auditors, and OIOS do share annual 

work plans—tools that could help identify gaps in oversight coverage and 

avoid unnecessary duplication. Also, in December 1999, the General 

Assembly passed a resolution that required OIOS to provide copies of all 

reports to the Joint Inspection Unit and the Board of Auditors; it also 

requested that reports be made available within 1 month of being finalized 

and emphasized the need for comments as appropriate.41 However, the 

practice of sharing work plans and the requirement to share reports do not 

apply to the internal oversight entities of the separately administered UN 

funds, programs, and specialized agencies; these entities represent a 

significant part of UN activities and report to their own respective 

governing bodies. In September 2005, the IIC report on the management of 

the UN Oil for Food program stated that the UN’s disjointed and 

sometimes-overlapping approach to oversight left a number of contentious 

issues about the program unresolved. According to IIC, UN oversight 

agencies resisted sharing their audit reports, which could have facilitated 

coordination. OIOS officials told us that UN oversight agencies have 

subsequently begun to share lessons learned from the Oil for Food 

experience and have made a concerted effort to apply these lessons to the 

UN’s tsunami relief efforts.

41OIOS officials stated that the internal audit divisions provide all final audit reports to the 

Board of Auditors when they are forwarded to management; final audit reports are not 

routinely forwarded to the Joint Inspection Unit, although reports are provided upon 

request. Investigation reports are not routinely provided. According to these officials, some 

evaluation and inspection reports are shared with the Joint Inspection Unit but rarely with 

the Board of Auditors.
Page 34 GAO-06-575 United Nations

U.S. Prioritizes Efforts 

to Strengthen UN 

Internal Oversight, but 

Influence Is Limited by 

a Key Vacancy at the 

U.S. Mission to the UN

The United States has made it a priority to advance UN reforms to 

strengthen internal oversight. As part of U.S. efforts to reform UN 

management, the U.S. Mission has adopted a multi-faceted approach to 

creating a culture of transparency, accountability, and efficiency. Among 

other things, the U.S. strategy for UN reform includes measures to 

strengthen the independence of the OIOS, enhance internal oversight of 

peacekeeping missions, outsource internal oversight at small UN agencies 

to OIOS, reinforce the Secretary-General’s duty to waive immunity, and 

avoid even the appearance of conflict of interest.

The United States played a major role in influencing the General Assembly 

to pass a resolution allowing all member states access to OIOS audit 

reports, upon request, according to OIOS and U.S. Mission officials.42 The 

U.S. Mission to the UN in New York, which has a UN Management and 

Reform unit, regularly participates in deliberations of the Fifth Committee 

and other bodies to promote efforts to strengthen UN oversight. In January 

2006, for example, the U.S. Ambassador to the UN spoke to the press about 

the need for oversight reform in the wake of the recent procurement 

scandals. Another senior official released a statement to the General 

Assembly in late December 2005 regarding the need to limit spending until 

progress is made toward implementing reforms agreed to during the 

September 2005 World Summit. Also, the representative of the U.S. Mission 

to UN Organizations in Geneva co-chairs the Geneva Group Focal Group on 

Oversight that is completing an overview of internal oversight in the UN 

agencies, and plans to issue its report in fall 2006.43

Staffing at the U.S. Mission to the UN in New York may have limited U.S. 

influence in encouraging and formulating proposals for UN oversight 

reform. The position of U.S. Representative for UN Management and 

Reform was vacant from February 2005 until it was filled in late March 

2006. According to State officials, statements from ambassador-level 

representatives in UN bodies have more impact and influence than 

statements from other U.S. representatives. This key vacancy represents a 

missed opportunity for the United States in the formation of the UN 

Management Reform agenda agreed upon at the World Summit in 2005. As 

42G. A. Res. 59/272, U.N. GAOR, 59th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/59/272, at para. 1(c) (2005).

43The focal group, which includes representatives from 14 counties, is part of the Geneva 

Group. Formed in 1964, the Geneva Group comprises major financial contributors whose 

goal is to influence management improvement in UN specialized agencies.
Page 35 GAO-06-575 United Nations

a result, officials said, the U.S. Mission had limited capacity to influence 

reform.

Conclusion Although OIOS has a mandate establishing it as an independent oversight 

entity—and OIOS does possess many characteristics consistent with 

independence—the office does not have the budgetary independence it 

requires to carry out its responsibilities effectively. Over the years, UN 

funding arrangements for OIOS have eroded the office’s ability to conduct 

independent oversight. The office’s ability to conduct audits and respond to 

changing priorities based on developing risks have been impeded, raising 

serious questions about its independence. To perform effective oversight, 

OIOS must have budgetary independence, but it must also fully implement 

the management processes and auditing practices that would help it best 

exercise that independence. Notwithstanding funding impediments to 

OIOS’s budgetary independence, OIOS officials cannot make most effective 

use of the office’s resources and independent authority to choose its work 

because they have not fully implemented a risk management framework 

that provides reasonable assurance that the most critical work is given 

highest priority. Moreover, OIOS’s shortcomings in meeting key 

components of international auditing standards undermine the office’s 

effectiveness in carrying out its functions as the UN’s main internal 

oversight body. Further, the lack of coordination between UN oversight 

bodies hinders a comprehensive approach to oversight, which could 

minimize duplication and leverage the use of available resources. Effective 

oversight demands budgetary independence, sufficient resources, 

adherence to professional auditing standards, and coordination. OIOS is 

now at a critical point, particularly given the initiatives to strengthen UN 

oversight launched as a result of the World Summit in fall 2005. In moving 

forward, the degree to which the UN and OIOS embraces international 

auditing standards and practices will indicate the institution’s commitment 

to addressing the monumental management and oversight tasks that lie 

ahead. The failure to address these long-standing concerns would diminish 

the efficacy and impact of other management reforms to strengthen 

oversight at the UN. 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

To provide reasonable assurance of independent, effective oversight in the 

United Nations, we recommend that the Secretary of State and the 

Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations work 

with member states to support budgetary independence for OIOS and 
Page 36 GAO-06-575 United Nations

OIOS’s efforts to more closely adhere to international auditing standards, 

including measures to

• ensure reliable funding arrangements for OIOS that do not undermine 

the independence of OIOS and provide it with sufficient resources that it 

can effectively reallocate and deploy as may be necessary to meet highrisk areas as they arise;

• complete the implementation of OIOS’s risk management framework to 

ensure that its annual work plans address those areas that pose the 

highest risks;

• report to the General Assembly on the status of significant risks and 

control issues facing the UN organization, the resources necessary to 

address these issues, and the consequences to the organization if any 

risks and control weaknesses are not addressed;

• develop a workforce planning methodology to systematically assess and 

determine appropriate staffing levels for the office;

• institute a mandatory training curriculum for OIOS professional staff, 

including auditors and investigators;

• establish guidance and procedures for assessing the reliability of data 

used in support of significant findings in OIOS reports; and

• require all OIOS professional staff to file statements of independence 

and financial disclosures; institute procedures to adequately review 

such statements.

Agency Comments and 

Our Evaluation

OIOS and State provided written comments on a draft of this report, which 

are reproduced in appendixes VI and VII, respectively. OIOS and State 

agreed with our overall conclusions and recommendations. OIOS stated 

that observations made in the report were consistent with OIOS’s internal 

assessments and external peer reviews. State fully agreed with our finding 

that UN member states need to ensure that OIOS has budgetary 

independence. However, State does not believe that multiple funding 

sources have impeded OIOS’s budgetary flexibility. We found that current 

UN financial regulations and rules are very restrictive, severely limiting the 

ability to reallocate funds across revenue streams to emerging or highpriority areas when they arise. OIOS and State also reviewed a draft of this 
Page 37 GAO-06-575 United Nations

report for technical accuracy. We incorporated their technical comments 

and updates throughout the report, as appropriate.

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of 

this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days after the 

date of this report. We are sending copies of this report to interested 

members of Congress, the Secretary of State, and the U.S. Permanent 

Representative to the United Nations. We will also make copies available to 

others upon request. In addition, this report will be available at no charge 

on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me 

at (202) 512-9601 or melitot@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are 

listed in appendix VIII.

Thomas Melito

Director, International Affairs and Trade
Page 38 GAO-06-575 United Nations

Appendix I

Scope and Methodology AAppenednxidexiIs

Our objectives were to review (1) the extent to which United Nations (UN) 

funding arrangements for the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) 

ensure independent oversight, (2) the consistency of OIOS practices with 

key international auditing standards, (3) coordination among UN oversight 

entities to ensure a comprehensive approach to oversight, and (4) U.S. 

government efforts to advance UN reforms to strengthen internal 

oversight. In addition, as requested, we are providing information on the 

budget and staff resources of selected UN oversight entities.

To examine the extent to which UN funding arrangements ensure 

independent oversight, we reviewed relevant UN and OIOS reports, 

manuals, and numerous program documents. We met with senior 

Department of State (State) officials in Washington, D.C., and senior 

officials with the U.S. Missions to the UN in New York, Vienna, and Geneva. 

At these locations, we also met with UN and OIOS management officials 

and staff. To assess the reliability of UN and OIOS funding and staffing 

data, we reviewed the office’s budget reports for fiscal bienniums 1996-

1997 to 2006-2007 and discussed the data with relevant officials. We 

determined that the funding and staffing data were sufficiently reliable for 

the purposes of this report.

To assess OIOS’s consistency with key international auditing standards, we 

reviewed relevant internationally accepted standards for oversight such as 

those issued by the Institute for Internal Auditors (IIA) and the 

International Organization of Supreme Auditing Institutions (INTOSAI). 

The IIA standards apply to internal audit activities—not to investigations, 

monitoring, evaluation, and inspection activities. However, we applied 

these standards OIOS-wide, as appropriate, in the absence of international 

standards for non-audit oversight activities. We examined documentation 

for the office’s strategic planning and annual work plans; risk management 

framework; quality assurance; recommendations tracking; and ethics 

practices to assess the extent to which OIOS’s practices in these areas were 

consistent with IIA standards, which OIOS has adopted. Because we had 

limited access to certain key documentation, OIOS officials agreed to “walk 

us through” their annual plans and external peer review reports. We met 

with OIOS management officials and staff in each of the office’s divisions, 

including the executive office; the Internal Audit Divisions I and II in New 

York and Geneva; the Investigations Division in New York and Vienna; and 

the Monitoring, Evaluation, and Consulting Division in New York. We 

discussed OIOS’s process for monitoring and reporting on its 

recommendations with relevant officials. In most instances, OIOS officials 

informed us that the data they track to report on the status of their 
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 39 GAO-06-575 United Nations

recommendations are reliable. The officials added that they would like to 

perform more testing of the recommendations that have been 

implemented, but lack the resources to do so. We obtained the 

recommendations database from OIOS and performed basic reliability 

checks. We determined the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes 

of this report. 

To review coordination among UN oversight entities, we reviewed UN 

documents and reports relating to the mandates, resources, and activities 

of the oversight entities of selected UN funds and programs, specialized 

agencies, and other UN entities. We met with representatives of several of 

these entities, including the International Atomic Energy Agency; 

International Labor Organization; International Telecommunication Union; 

UN Children’s Fund; UN Development Program; UN Educational, 

Scientific, and Cultural Organization; UN High Commissioner for Refugees; 

UN Industrial Development Organization; UN Training Institute; World 

Health Organization; World Intellectual Property Organization; and the 

World Meteorological Organization. We also met with the UN external 

auditors—the Board of Auditors in New York, and the Joint Inspection Unit 

in Geneva. 

To review U.S. government efforts to advance UN reforms to strengthen 

internal oversight, we reviewed State mission program plans, position 

statements, and various program documents. We also met with senior State 

officials in Washington, D.C., and senior officials with the U.S. Missions to 

the UN in New York, Geneva, and Vienna. In addition, we met with several 

representatives of the Geneva Group to obtain information on their efforts 

to strengthen oversight in the UN system and their views on UN reforms.

For information on the budget and staff resources of selected UN oversight 

entities, we used fiscal biennium 2004-2005 data for several entities that 

participated in a survey conducted by the Joint Inspection Unit, which 

provided us with an advance copy of the report completed in February 

2006.1

 We determined the data to be sufficiently reliable for purposes of this 

report.

1

Joint Inspection Unit, Oversight Lacunae in the United Nations System, JIU/REP/2006/2. 

As of March 2006, JIU had sent the report for official editing and printing.
Page 40 GAO-06-575 United Nations

Appendix II

OIOS Oversight Authority ApendxiI

The UN organization and OIOS’s oversight authority over selected UN 

entities is presented in figure 7. The diagram shows (1) those entities over 

which OIOS has oversight authority that do not have their own oversight 

units, such as departments and offices within the UN Secretariat; (2) funds 

and programs, such as the UN Children’s Fund and the UN Development 

Program, that fall under OIOS’s oversight authority but may use OIOS 

services only upon request because they have their own oversight units; 

and (3) the International Atomic Energy Agency and the specialized 

agencies, such as the International Labor Organization and the World 

Health Organization, some of which have their own oversight units and do 

not fall under OIOS’s oversight authority.
Appendix II

OIOS Oversight Authority

Page 41 GAO-06-575 United Nations

Figure 7: UN Organizations and OIOS’s Oversight Authority Over Selected Entities

a

Includes only selected UN organizations, not a complete listing.

Source: GAO based on UN data.

General

Assembly

Governing

bodies

Departments and offices

Secretariata Specialized agencies and IAEAa

Funds and programs

Research and training institutes

Other UN entities

UN system, its oversight bodies, and OIOS’s oversight authority

OIOS has oversight authority

OIOS has no oversight authority

These organizations have their own internal oversight entities

These organizations use other UN internal oversight entities

OSG

OIOS

DM

DPKO

OCHA

OLA

UNODC

DM United Nations Department of Management 

DPKO UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations

FAO Food and Agriculture Organization

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency

ILO International Labor Organization

INSTRAW International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women

ITU International Telecommunication Union

OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

OIOS Office of Internal Oversight Services

OLA Office of Legal Affairs

OSG Office of the Secretary-General

UNAIDS Joint UN Program on HIV/AIDS

UNDP UN Development Program

UNESCO UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization

UNFPA UN Population Fund

UNHCR Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees

UNICEF UN Children’s Fund

UNITAR UN Institute for Training and Research 

UNODC UN Office on Drugs and Crime

UNOPS UN Office for Project Services

WFP World Food Program

WHO World Health Organization

WIPO World Intellectual Property Organization

WMO World Meteorological Organization

External 

auditors

Joint 

Inspection 

Unit

UN Board of 

Auditors

UNDP

UNFPA

UNHCR

UNITAR INSTRAW

UNAIDS UNOPS

UNICEF

WFP

FAO

ILO

ITU

UNESCO

WHO

WIPO

WMO
Page 42 GAO-06-575 United Nations

Appendix III

OIOS Organizational Structure ApendxiI

Based on the General Assembly approved 2006-2007 biennium budget, 

OIOS has a total of 293 funded staff positions in its executive office and 

operating divisions comprised of:

• the Office of the Under Secretary-General and the Executive Office, 

which has 16 staff positions (about 5 percent);

• Internal Audit Division I located in New York, which has 103 staff 

positions (about 35 percent);

• Internal Audit Division II in Geneva and several overseas locations, 

which has 40 staff positions (about 14 percent);

• Investigations Division in New York, Vienna, and several overseas 

locations, which has 113 staff positions (about 39 percent); and

• the Monitoring, Evaluation, and Consulting Division, which has 21 staff 

positions (about 7 percent).

As shown in figure 8, the majority of these staff positions are funded 

through extrabudgetary resources. As the General Assembly recently 

authorized, some extrabudgetary staff positions are for General Temporary 

Assistance, which provides OIOS with the flexibility to use funding to hire 

contractors as it deems necessary.
Appendix III

OIOS Organizational Structure

Page 43 GAO-06-575 United Nations

Figure 8: OIOS Organizational Structure and Number of Staff Positions by Division, Fiscal Biennium 2006-2007

Note: The information shown reflects the number of staff positions as of January 31, 2006, including 

39 General Temporary Assistance positions that the General Assembly approved for OIOS for fiscal 

biennium 2006-2007.

OIOS is located in numerous locations throughout the world. Figure 9 

shows the number of staff positions at headquarters in New York and the 

field offices in Geneva, Vienna, Nairobi, and Addis Ababa, as well as duty 

stations for peacekeeping missions and tribunals.

Monitoring, Evaluation, and 

Consulting Division

Internal Audit Division I

(New York)

Internal Audit Division II

(Geneva)

Investigations Division

Under Secretary-General

OIOS

Executive Office

• Monitoring and inspection

• Central evaluation

• Internal management 

consulting 

• Self-evaluation and 

learning

• Geneva Audit 

• UN High Commissioner for 

Refugees Audit Service

• Nairobi Audit

• Tribunals

• Regional commissions

• Peacekeeping

• General investigations

• Tribunals

• Knowledge management 

• Headquarters

• Peacekeeping Audit Service

• Capital Master Plan

• Quality Assurance and 

Special Assignments

• Field Section

• Joint Staff Pension 

 Fund

Source: GAO analysis based on OIOS data.

3

18

27

64 23

14

12

2

35

20

58

2

12 3

127

91 75

Regular-budget staff positions (91)

N = number of staff positions

Extrabudgetary-funded staff positions (127)

General Temporary Assistance staff positions (75)

Total = 293
Appendix III

OIOS Organizational Structure

Page 44 GAO-06-575 United Nations

Figure 9: OIOS Presence Worldwide as of January 31, 2006 

a

Audit staff positions in Addis Ababa, Afghanistan, Kuwait, and Sudan are not currently authorized and 

included in OIOS’s account.

b

ICTY is the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.

c

ICTR is the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.

Regular duty stations

Mission or tribunal duty stations

Source: GAO based on OIOS data; Cartesia MapArt (map).

New York

111 staff

Geneva

26 auditors

Vienna

47 investigators

Democratic

Republic of Congo

8 auditors

7 investigators

Ethiopia and Eritrea

3 auditors

Kosovo

4 auditors

Sierra Leone

4 auditors

ICTY (Netherlands)

b

ICTR (Tanzania)

c

3 auditors

3 investigators

Economic Comission 

for Africa

Addis Ababa

1 auditor

Nairobi

11 auditors

14 investigators

Liberia

8 auditors Ha 6 investigators iti

4 auditors

7 investigators Côté d’Ivoire

4 auditors

5 investigators

Burundi

4 auditors

6 investigators

Sudana

11 auditors

 5 investigators

Kuwaita

1 auditor

Afghanistana

1 auditor

Cyprus

3 auditors
Page 45 GAO-06-575 United Nations

Appendix IV

Process for Developing OIOS Budget ApendxiIV

The process for developing the OIOS’s regular budget is complex, involving 

several entities and multiple steps that begin about 16 months before the 

budget for a biennium goes into effect. Figure 10 illustrates the process 

involved in developing OIOS’s regular budget for one biennium. OIOS 

divisions submit their regular and extrabudgetary proposals first to the 

executive office of OIOS, which may revise the requests either in line with 

OIOS priorities or pursuant to instructions from the UN Secretariat’s Office 

of Program Planning, Budget, and Accounts (OPPBA). As shown in figure 

10, the OIOS budget proposal is reviewed by the OPPBA, the Advisory 

Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ), and the 

Fifth Committee before it is approved by the General Assembly. As a 

comparison, the Board of Auditors submits its budget requests directly to 

the ACABQ; the Joint Inspection Unit submits its draft budget through the 

Chief Executives Board (CEB) to all participating organizations for 

comments, which are consolidated by the CEB before the budget proposal 

is submitted to the ACABQ. 

The budget office reviews OIOS’s budget request to ensure that it conforms 

to the Secretary-General’s established budget outline. The budget outline is 

the Secretary-General’s preliminary estimate of UN Secretariat resource 

needs for the biennium, and it specifies OIOS’s share of the total budget. 

For example, the budget outline for the 2006-2007 biennium was prepared 

in October 2004, and OIOS’s preliminary estimate was $23.2 million—the 

same amount as its 2004-2005 appropriation.1

 OIOS can negotiate any 

suggested changes to its budget proposal with the budget office. If OIOS 

does not agree with the modification to its budget, the Under SecretaryGeneral of OIOS has the authority to discuss the office’s concerns directly 

with the Secretary-General.2

1

The General Assembly requests that the Secretary-General submit an outline of the 

program budget for the upcoming biennium. The budget outline was established in 1986 and 

has become an important element of the budget process. One of the main purposes was to 

help the member states achieve consensus sought on the overall level of the UN budget, in 

advance, in view of the financial constraints imposed on the UN. See G. A. Res. 41/213, U.N. 

GAOR, 41st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/41/213 (1986). 

2

OIOS officials informed us that appeals have been made to the Secretary-General in the 

past. 
Appendix IV

Process for Developing OIOS Budget

Page 46 GAO-06-575 United Nations

Figure 10: Process for the Preparation, Approval, and Execution of OIOS Regular Budgeta

Source: GAO based on data provided and validated by OIOS and OPPBA.

Budget preparation and approval

for fiscal biennium 2006 - 2007

Budget execution

for fiscal biennium 2006 - 2007

2004

1

1

2 3

2 3

4 5

4 5

6

6

7 8 10

8

9

9 10

When Sept. Dec. Apr. Oct. Dec. Nov. Nov. Dec. Jan.

2005 2006 2007

OIOS

divisions

(about 

16 months

prior)

Office of 

Human Resources

Management

(OHRM)

Procurement Service

OHRM 

recruits staff 

and 

consultants

(throughout the 

biennium)

Procurement 

Services

processes

contracts for 

services and 

goods

(throughout the 

biennium)

OIOS divisions

General 

Assembly

GA

approves final 

appropriations

for the 

biennium

(Dec.)

Who

What OIOS

divisions

formulate 

proposed 

budget 

requests

and submit 

them to 

OIOS/USG

(Sept.-Nov.)

OIOS/

Under 

Secretary 

General 

(USG) 

and 

OIOS

Executive 

Office 

Office of 

Program 

Planning, 

Budget, 

and 

Accounts

(OPPBA) 

and OIOS

OIOS/USG 

and OIOS

Executive 

Office 

review

and 

discuss

budget 

estimates

with 

division 

heads 

USG/OIOS

submits

proposed 

budget to 

OPPBA

(Nov.-Dec.)

Advisory 

Committee 

on 

Administrative 

and

Budgetary 

Questions

(ACABQ)

Administrative and 

Budgetary 

Committee 

(Fifth 

Committee)

General 

Assembly 

and 

OPPBA

OIOS/USG Fifth 

Committee 

OPPBA

reviews, seeks

clarifications, 

and makes

recommendations

(Dec.-Jan.)

OPPBA 

submits

final SG 

budget 

report to 

ACABQ 

for review

(Mar.)

Fifth 

Committee 

issues a

report on the 

SG budget 

report and 

ACABQ 

report

(Dec.)

OIOS and 

OPPBA 

justify 

OIOS

proposed 

budget to 

the 

ACABQ

(Mar.-Apr.)

OPPBA drafts

SG budget 

report and 

releases it for 

comments

(Jan.-Feb.) 

OIOS justifies

its budget 

requests to 

OPPBA; 

OPPBA may 

modify OIOS

budget

(Jan.)

OIOS/

USG 

submits

proposals

to incur 

post and 

nonpost 

obligation 

(early Jan.)

Fifth 

Committee 

reviews first 

performance 

report and 

approves

revised 

appropriations

(Nov.-Dec.)

Fifth 

Committee

Fifth 

Committee 

reviews

second 

performance 

report

(Nov.-Dec.)

ACABQ 

issues a

recommendations

report on 

the budget 

report

(Apr.-May) 

SG budget 

report and 

ACABQ 

report are 

reviewed

by the Fifth 

Committee; 

OPPBA 

and OIOS

respond to 

Fifth 

Committee 

queries

(Oct.-Dec.)

GA 

reviews

and 

approves

the 

budget 

for the 

biennium

(Dec.)

OPPBA 

issues

allotment 

advice 

to the 

departments

(Dec.-early Jan.)

OIOS divisions

perform internal 

oversight work 

(throughout the 

biennium)

7
Appendix IV

Process for Developing OIOS Budget

Page 47 GAO-06-575 United Nations

a

The budget process for trust funds and special accounts is the same as that of the regular budget 

process. However, the budget cycle for peacekeeping operation’s support account operates on a July 

to June fiscal year, and the budget is prepared annually. The Peacekeeping Finance Division provides 

budget instructions in September of each year. OIOS submits its budget to the controller in November. 

The Peacekeeping Finance Division provides comments to OIOS’s proposed budget in December; 

subsequently, they meet in January to discuss the budget. ACABQ reviews the proposed budget in 

March, and the General Assembly reviews and approves the budget around May or June of each year. 
Page 48 GAO-06-575 United Nations

Appendix V

Resources of Selected UN Oversight Entities ApendxiV

Some of the UN funds and programs falling under the authority of the 

Secretary-General have established their own internal oversight offices. 

Similarly, specialized agencies that do not fall within the authority of the 

Secretary-General and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) also 

have their own internal oversight offices that report to their respective 

executive heads and governing bodies. The capacities of these internal 

oversight offices and the services they provide vary. While some internal 

oversight offices are staffed to provide a full range of audit, investigation, 

inspection, and evaluation services, others have fewer staff and may 

augment their capabilities by engaging OIOS or outside consultants when 

necessary. 

In February 2006, the Joint Inspection Unit completed a report that, among 

other things, assessed the capacity of existing UN oversight entities to deal 

with major risks that may arise in the UN system.1

 In doing so, the Joint 

Inspection Unit developed a suggested range of resources based on the size 

of the resources managed by each of the UN organizations and their 

respective internal oversight budgets. For example, as shown in figure 11, 

the UN was below the suggested range—while its internal oversight budget 

was $58.8 million in the 2004-2005 biennium, the total resources it managed 

amounted to more than $12.2 billion. Its oversight budget was, therefore, 

0.48 percent of the organization’s total resources, which is slightly lower 

than the suggested range of 0.50 to 0.70 percent for organizations with 

resources of $800 million or more.

Based on the suggested ranges, the Joint Inspection Unit report showed 

that

• 2 of the 18 organizations surveyed (the UN Industrial Development 

Organization and the Food and Agriculture Organization) have internal 

oversight resources that exceeded the suggested range;

• 3 organizations (the UN Population Fund; the UN Educational, 

Scientific, and Cultural Organization; and the International Labor 

Organization) were within the suggested range;

• 10 organizations fell below the suggested range; and

1

See JIU/REP/2006/2.
Appendix V

Resources of Selected UN Oversight Entities

Page 49 GAO-06-575 United Nations

• the remaining 3 organizations did not have a suggested range because of 

their smaller budgets.

Figure 11: Budget Comparison of Selected UN Oversight Entities, Biennium 2004-2005

Source: GAO analysis based on Joint Inspection Unit data.

UN

UN funds and programs

Specialized agencies and IAEA

Total resources $250 million to $800 million = .6 - .9

Total resources of $800 million or more = .5 - .7

(economies of scale should allow for a slightly lower range)

Total resources of $250 million or less = nonea

Total resources

Suggested resources range

UNDP

UNFPA

Ratio of internal oversight budgets to total resources managed

UNICEF

UNHCR

WFP

ILO

FAO

UNESCO

ICAO

WHO

UPU

ITU

WMO

0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1.0

IMO

WIPO

UNIDO

IAEA

United Nations

United Nations Development Program

United Nations Population Fund

United Nations Children’s Fund

Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

World Food Program

International Labor Organization

Food and Agriculture Organization

United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization

International Civil Aviation Organization 

World Health Organization

Universal Postal Union 

International Telecommunication Union

World Meteorological Organization

International Maritime Organization 

World Intellectual Property Organization

United Nations Industrial Development Organization 

International Atomic Energy Agency
Appendix V

Resources of Selected UN Oversight Entities

Page 50 GAO-06-575 United Nations

a

For organizations with total resources of $250 million or less, the Joint Inspection Unit suggested insourcing internal oversight services because there is not enough of a resource base to justify an 

internal oversight unit.

Figure 12 provides information on the total budget and staff resources of 

selected UN organizations for the fiscal biennium 2004-2005 and the 

number of internal oversight professional staff on board.
Appendix V

Resources of Selected UN Oversight Entities

Page 51 GAO-06-575 United Nations

[This page left blank intentionally]
Appendix V

Resources of Selected UN Oversight Entities

Page 52 GAO-06-575 United Nations

Figure 12: Total Budget and Staff Resources of Selected UN Organizations and Number of Internal Oversight Professional Staff

Budget resources 

(biennium 2004-2005)

Staff members employed

0 3 6 9 12 15

0 8 16 24 32 40

0 30 60 90 120 150

0 30 60 90 120 150

0 30 60 90 120 150

0 30 60 90 120 150

0 30 60 90 120 150

0 30 60 90 120 150

United Nations funds and programs

Total organization-wide Internal oversight professional staff

UN

Dollars in U.S. billions

UNDP

UNFPA

UNICEF

UNHCR

WFP

UN

UNDP

UNFPA

UNICEF

UNHCR

WFP

33.14

7.04

.97

9.35

5.44

11.75

$12.24

$7.13

$.56

$4.87

$2.42

$5.99

UNa

United Nations

UNDP

UNFPA

UNICEF

UNHCRb

WFP

Number of staff (in thousands)

Internal audit

Investigations

Evaluation

Total internal oversight 

professional staff

82

37

16

135 (14)

Internal audit

Investigations

Evaluation

Total internal oversight 

professional staff

24

4

18

46 (10)

18

1

8

27 (1)

13

6

5

31 (3)

10

4

0

14 (4)

Internal audit

Investigations

Evaluation

Total internal oversight 

professional staff

Internal audit

Investigations

Evaluation

Total internal oversight 

professional staff

Internal audit

Investigations

Evaluation

Total internal oversight 

professional staff

Internal audit

Investigations

Evaluation

Total internal oversight 

professional staff

11

4

22

7

United Nations

Development Program

United Nations

Children’s Fund

Office of the 

United Nations

High Commissioner 

for Refugees

United Nations

Population Fund

World Food Program
Appendix V

Resources of Selected UN Oversight Entities

Page 53 GAO-06-575 United Nations

a

UN data includes 16 monitoring, evaluation, and consulting professional staff.

0 7 14 21 28

0 7 14 21 28

0 7 14 21 28 0 7 14 21 28

0 7 14 21 28 0 7 14 21 28

0 7 14 21 28 0 7 14 21 28

0 7 14 21 28 0 7 14 21 28

012 3 4

0 .5 1.0 1.5. 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5

Specialized agencies and IAEA

Total organization-wide Internal oversight professional staff

WHO

Dollars in U.S. billions

FAO

UNIDO

WIPO

ITU

UPU

WMO

IMO

UNESCO

ICAO

IAEA

ILO

$3.98

$1.34

$.43

$.40

$.25

$.22

$.15

$.14

$.85

$.45

$.80

$.90

WHO

FAO

UNIDO

WIPO

ITU

UPU

WMO

IMO

UNESCO

ICAO

IAEA

ILO

3.08

3.19

.71

1.20

.81

.22

.25

.36

2.34

2.71

2.31

2.50

WHO

Number of staff (in thousands)

Internal audit

Investigations

Evaluation

Total internal 

oversight 

professional staff

Total internal 

oversight 

professional staff

Total internal 

oversight 

professional staff

Total internal 

oversight 

professional staff

Total internal 

oversight 

professional staff

Total internal 

oversight 

professional staff

Total internal 

oversight 

professional staff

Total internal 

oversight 

professional staff

Total internal 

oversight 

professional staff

Total internal 

oversight 

professional staff

Total internal 

oversight 

professional staff

Total internal 

oversight 

professional staff

11

2

4

17 (2)

UNIDO Internal audit

Investigations

Evaluation 3

3

0

6

FAO Internal audit

Investigations

Evaluation

13

3

8

24 (2)

WIPO Internal audit

Investigations

Evaluation

0

1

2

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

2

2

(3)

ILO Internal audit

Investigations

Evaluation

4

0

0

0

3

7

ITU Internal audit

Investigations

Evaluation

UNESCO Internal audit

Investigations

Evaluation

10

6

16 (4)

UPUd Internal audit

Investigations

Evaluation

1

IAEAc Internal audit

Investigations

Evaluation

5

1

5

11

WMO Internal audit

Investigations

Evaluation

1

1

ICAO Internal audit

Investigations

Evaluation

1

1

2 (1)

IMO Internal audit

Investigations

Evaluation

2

2

Budget resources 

(biennium 2004-2005)

Staff members employed

0 7 14 21 28

0 7 14 21 28

World Health 

Organization

Food and 

Agriculture 

Organization

International 

Labor 

Organization

United Nations

Educational, 

Scientific and 

Cultural 

Organization

International 

Atomic Energy 

Agency

International 

Civil Aviation 

Organization

United Nations

Industrial 

Development 

Organization 

World 

Intellectual 

Property 

Organization

International 

Telecommunication 

Union

Universal 

Postal Union 

World 

Meteorological 

Organization

International 

Maritime

Organization

Source: GAO analysis based on Joint Inspection Unit data.

Total staff on board

(Total vacant staff positions)
Appendix V

Resources of Selected UN Oversight Entities

Page 54 GAO-06-575 United Nations

b

Breakdown of UNHCR data does not include six professional inspectors and one ethics and diversity 

officer.

c

IAEA‘s five professional evaluation staff includes two management services staff.

d

UPU’s professional staff position is part-time at 80 percent.
Page 55 GAO-06-575 United Nations

Appendix VI

Comments from the Office of Internal 

Oversight Services ApendxiVI
Appendix VI

Comments from the Office of Internal 

Oversight Services

Page 56 GAO-06-575 United Nations
Page 57 GAO-06-575 United Nations

Appendix VII

Comments from the Department of State ApendxiVI

Note: GAO comments 

supplementing those in 

the report text appear 

at the end of this 

appendix.
Appendix VII

Comments from the Department of State

Page 58 GAO-06-575 United Nations

See comment 1.
Appendix VII

Comments from the Department of State

Page 59 GAO-06-575 United Nations
Appendix VII

Comments from the Department of State

Page 60 GAO-06-575 United Nations

The following are our comments on State’s letter dated April 11, 2006.

GAO Comments 1. We maintain that UN funding arrangements hinder OIOS’s flexibility to 

reallocate resources. Our conclusion focuses on the impediments to 

redirecting resources to high-risk areas between multiple funding 

sources and does not necessarily advocate a single source of funding; 

rather, we recommend measures to ensure reliable and sufficient 

funding so OIOS can reallocate as necessary. Although the regular 

budget and peacekeeping funding sources make up the majority of 

OIOS’s budget, there are still 11 other extrabudgetary funding sources 

where there is limited flexibility to redeploy resources to high-risk 

areas. One of the lessons learned from the Oil for Food Program was 

that OIOS did not receive sufficient budgetary funding for work that it 

proposed for the program, which prevented OIOS from examining 

problems.1

 When the Office of the Iraq Program denied OIOS’s 

proposal for additional investigators to perform work it deemed 

necessary, redeploying resources to the Oil for Food Program was not a 

viable option given the restrictions that UN financial regulations and 

rules place on the movement of resources between funding sources.

1

See GAO-06-330.
Page 61 GAO-06-575 United Nations

Appendix VIII

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments ApendxiVI

GAO Contact Thomas Melito, Director, (202) 512-9601

Acknowledgments In addition to the person named above, Phyllis Anderson, Assistant 

Director; Joy Labez; Jeffrey Baldwin-Bott; Barbara Shields; Lynn Cothern; 

and Etana Finkler made key contributions to this report. Jaime Allentuck, 

Marcia Buchanan, Martin De Alteriis, Mark Dowling, Jackson Hufnagle, and 

James Michels also provided technical support.
Page 62 GAO-06-575 United Nations

Related GAO Products

United Nations: Procurement Internal Controls Are Weak, GAO-06-577.

(Washington, D.C., Apr. 25, 2006).

United Nations: Lessons from Oil for Food Program Indicate Need to 

Strengthen Internal Controls and Oversight, GAO-06-330. (Washington, 

D.C.: Apr. 25, 2006).

United Nations: Preliminary Observations on Internal Oversight and 

Procurement Practices, GAO-06-226T. (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 31, 2005).

United Nations: Sustained Oversight Is Needed for Reforms to Achieve 

Lasting Results, GAO-05-392T. (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 2, 2005).

United Nations: Oil for Food Program Audits, GAO-05-346T.

(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 15, 2005).

United Nations: Reforms Progressing, but Comprehensive Assessments 

Needed to Measure Impact, GAO-04-339. (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 13, 2004).

United Nations: Status of Internal Oversight Services, GAO/NSIAD-98-9. 

(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 19, 1997).

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