69648 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 219 / Monday, November 15, 2010 / Notices 

1When DOE issued Change Notice 2, the title of 

this Standard was revised to Preparation Guide for 

U.S. Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear 

Facility Documented Safety Analyses. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION: Contact Jim 

Freeman, Deputy Advisory Committee 

Management Officer for the Department 

of Defense, 703–601–6128. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The 

Committee shall meet at the call of the 

Committee’s Designated Federal Officer, 

in consultation with the Board’s 

President. The estimated number of 

Board meetings is four per year. 

The Designated Federal Officer, 

pursuant to DoD policy, shall be a fulltime or permanent part-time DoD 

employee, and shall be appointed in 

accordance with established DoD 

policies and procedures. In addition, the 

Designated Federal Officer is required to 

be in attendance for the full duration at 

all Board and subcommittee meetings; 

however, in the absence of the 

Designated Federal Officer, an Alternate 

Designated Federal Officer shall attend 

the entire Board or subcommittee 

meeting. 

Pursuant to 41 CFR 102–3.105(j) and 

102–3.140, the public or interested 

organizations may submit written 

statements to the Defense Health 

Board’s membership about the Board’s 

mission and functions. Written 

statements may be submitted at any 

time or in response to the stated agenda 

of planned meeting of Defense Health 

Board. 

All written statements shall be 

submitted to the Designated Federal 

Officer for the Defense Health Board, 

and this individual will ensure that the 

written statements are provided to the 

membership for their consideration. 

Contact information for the Defense 

Health Board Designated Federal Officer 

can be obtained from the GSA’s FACA 

Database—http://www.fido.gov/ 

facadatabase/public.asp. 

The Designated Federal Officer, 

pursuant to 41 CFR 102–3.150, will 

announce planned meetings of the 

Defense Health Board. The Designated 

Federal Officer, at that time, may 

provide additional guidance on the 

submission of written statements that 

are in response to the stated agenda for 

the planned meeting in question. 

Dated: November 9, 2010. 

Morgan F. Park, 

Alternate OSD Federal Register Liaison 

Officer, Department of Defense. 

[FR Doc. 2010–28753 Filed 11–12–10; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 5001–06–P 

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES 

SAFETY BOARD 

[Recommendation 2010–1] 

Safety Analysis Requirements for 

Defining Adequate Protection for the 

Public and the Workers 

AGENCY: Defense Nuclear Facilities 

Safety Board. 

ACTION: Notice, recommendation. 

SUMMARY: Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 

2286a(a)(5), the Defense Nuclear 

Facilities Safety Board has made a 

recommendation to the Secretary of 

Energy requesting an amendment to the 

Department of Energy’s nuclear safety 

rule, 10 CFR part 830. 

DATES: Comments, data, views, or 

arguments concerning the 

recommendation are due on or before 

December 15, 2010. 

ADDRESSES: Send comments, data, 

views, or arguments concerning this 

recommendation to: Defense Nuclear 

Facilities Safety Board, 625 Indiana 

Avenue, NW., Suite 700, Washington, 

DC 20004–2001. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Brian Grosner or Andrew L. Thibadeau 

at the address above or telephone 

number (202–694–7000). 

Dated: November 9, 2010. 

Peter S. Winokur, 

Chairman. 

RECOMMENDATION 2010–1 TO THE 

SECRETARY OF ENERGY 

Safety Analysis Requirements for Defining 

Adequate Protection for the Public and the 

Workers 

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2286a(a)(5) Atomic 

Energy Act of 1954, As Amended 

Dated: October 29, 2010 

Background 

The Department of Energy’s (DOE) nuclear 

safety regulations were developed as a result 

of a mandate by Congress in the Price 

Anderson Act Amendments of 1988. These 

regulations now appear in Parts 820, 830, and 

835 of Title 10 in the Code of Federal 

Regulations (CFR). In this Recommendation, 

the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board 

(Board) addresses recent changes in DOE’s 

‘‘interpretation’’ of certain critical provisions 

of Title 10 CFR Part 830, Nuclear Safety 

Management (10 CFR Part 830), provisions 

which are intended to provide adequate 

protection of the public health and safety. As 

explained below, in the Board’s view this 

revised interpretative posture weakens the 

safety structure the rule is designed to hold 

firmly in place. 

10 CFR Part 830 imposes a requirement 

that a documented safety analysis, or DSA, is 

to be prepared for every DOE nuclear facility. 

This DSA, once approved by DOE, forms the 

regulatory basis for safety of the facility or 

operation. 10 CFR Part 830 does more, 

however: its Appendix A provides ‘‘safe 

harbors’’ for the preparation and approval of 

DSAs. These safe harbors are, in the main, 

references to detailed guidance issued by 

DOE. A DSA that is prepared following 

applicable guidance found in ‘‘safe harbors’’ 

should be found acceptable, meaning that the 

facility’s safety systems are adequate to 

protect public health and safety from nuclear 

hazards. 

One of the key safe harbor guides for the 

preparation of DSAs is DOE Standard 3009– 

94, Preparation Guide for U.S. Department of 

Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Safety 

Analysis Reports.1 First issued in July of 

1994, this Standard was intended to provide 

guidance on meeting the requirements 

imposed by DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear 

Safety Analysis Reports, a set of nuclear 

safety requirements that preceded and were 

supplanted by 10 CFR Part 830. The Standard 

stated that ‘‘Technical Standards, such as this 

document, support the guides by providing 

additional guidance into how the 

requirements [of Orders and Rules] should be 

met.’’ As such, it did not contain any nuclear 

safety requirements. Five years after its initial 

issuance, DOE amended Standard 3009–94 

by the addition of Appendix A, entitled 

‘‘Evaluation Guidelines.’’ These guidelines 

apply dose criteria to the results of accident 

calculations found in DSAs. Stated broadly, 

the Evaluation Guidelines mandate that 

safety class systems be installed if, as a result 

of a potential accident, the unmitigated dose 

consequences at the site boundary approach 

or exceed 25 rem Total Effective Dose 

Equivalent (TEDE). 

When 10 CFR Part 830 was promulgated in 

final form in early 2001, the version of DOE 

Standard 3009–94 incorporated into 

Appendix A of the rule as a safe harbor 

included the Evaluation Guidelines. This 

combination of the rule’s requirement for an 

approved DSA and the application of the 

Evaluation Guidelines of DOE Standard 

3009–94 formed the basis upon which 

adequate protection of the public health and 

safety would be gauged. Whenever dose 

consequence calculations showed that an 

accident scenario would result in offsite 

doses approaching or exceeding 25 rem 

TEDE, safety class systems would have to be 

chosen and installed to reduce this dose to 

a small fraction of the Evaluation Guidelines. 

Developments Since 2001 

As a safe harbor for 10 CFR Part 830, the 

Evaluation Guidelines described in DOE 

Standard 3009–94 have been enforced and 

met for the majority of DOE’s defense nuclear 

facilities, assuring adequate protection to the 

public, workers, and the environment. 

However, in December 2008, the National 

Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) 

approved a DSA for the Plutonium Facility 

at Los Alamos National Laboratory that 

represented a significant departure from the 

accepted methodology, as discussed in the 

Board’s Recommendation 2009–2, Los 

Alamos National Laboratory Plutonium 


srobinson on DSKHWCL6B1PROD with NOTICES
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 219 / Monday, November 15, 2010 / Notices 69649 

Facility Seismic Safety. The Board followed 

up its Recommendation with a letter to the 

Deputy Secretary of Energy on March 15, 

2010, that sought to determine whether 

DOE’s current interpretation of 10 CFR Part 

830 and DOE Standard 3009–94 still supports 

the principles of providing adequate 

protection of the public, workers, and the 

environment from the hazards of operating 

DOE’s defense nuclear facilities. The Board’s 

letter particularly expressed concern 

regarding the appearance that DOE’s present 

interpretation is that nuclear safety 

Evaluation Guidelines established in DOE 

Standard 3009–94 do not have to be met. 

DOE’s June 10, 2010, response to the 

Board’s letter states that DOE’s utilization 

and implementation of DOE Standard 3009– 

94 has not changed since issuance of 10 CFR 

Part 830. DOE’s response observes that DOE 

Standard 3009–94 ‘‘was not written as a 

prescriptive item-by-item requirements 

document; rather it provides an overall 

approach and guidance for preparing a DSA.’’ 

DOE’s response states that the Standard 

describes steps that the contractor may take 

if the postulated accident consequences 

cannot be mitigated below the Evaluation 

Guideline. DOE’s response also cites 

guidance for DOE approval authorities 

contained in DOE Standard 1104–2009, 

Review and Approval of Nuclear Facility 

Safety Basis and Safety Design Basis 

Documents, and notes that the Safety Basis 

Approval Authority may prescribe interim 

controls and planned improvements if the 

Evaluation Guideline is exceeded. DOE’s 

response closes by stating that its managers 

‘‘are expected to carefully evaluate situations 

that fall short of expectations and only 

provide their approval of documented safety 

analyses when they are satisfied that 

operations can be conducted safely..., that 

options to meet DOE expectations have been 

evaluated, and that adequate commitments to 

achieve an appropriate safety posture in a 

timely manner have been made.’’ 

The lack of definitive statements in DOE’s 

June 10, 2010, response illustrates the 

difficulties inherent in applying a guidance 

document as a safe harbor for implementing 

the requirements of a regulation. 

Furthermore, NNSA’s approval of the DSA 

for the Los Alamos National Laboratory’s 

Plutonium Facility in December 2008 

demonstrates that, despite DOE’s stated 

expectations, it is not always true that DOE’s 

managers will ensure safety by imposing 

conditions of approval that address 

inadequacies in the safety basis. This is 

illustrated to a lesser extent at the other 

NNSA facilities—described in follow-up 

correspondence NNSA issued to the Board 

on June 30, 2010—which have not 

implemented controls or compensatory 

measures sufficient to reduce accident 

consequences below the Evaluation 

Guideline. DOE Standard 1104–2009 serves 

as a source of guidance for DOE Safety Basis 

Approval Authorities, but it, too, is a 

guidance document, unequivocally stating, 

‘‘This Standard does not add any new 

requirements for DOE or its contractors.’’ 

DOE’s standards-based regulatory system 

needs a clear and unambiguous set of nuclear 

safety requirements to ensure that adequate 

protection of the public, workers, and the 

environment is provided. Further, it is 

imperative that DOE provide clear direction 

to its Safety Basis Approval Authorities to 

ensure that, if nuclear safety requirements 

cannot be met prior to approval of a DSA, 

DOE imposes clear conditions of approval for 

compensatory measures for the short term 

and facility modifications for the longer term 

to achieve the required safety posture. This 

acceptance of risk and commitment to future 

upgrades must be approved at a level of 

authority within DOE that is high enough to 

control both the resources needed to 

accomplish the upgrades as well as the 

programmatic decision-making involved in 

determining that the risk of continuing 

operations is offset by sufficiently compelling 

programmatic needs. 

Item 4 of the Recommendation below 

deserves a further word of explanation. The 

Board does not recommend lightly a change 

to DOE’s nuclear safety regulations. But as 

explained above, DOE has chosen over the 

past several years to drift away from the 

principles that underlay the rule as originally 

intended. The Board has chosen to 

recommend a rule change because this action 

would tend, in the long run, to prevent future 

shifts in DOE safety policy that would once 

again have to be challenged and argued 

against. For these reasons, the Board 

recommends that the nuclear safety rule, 10 

CFR Part 830, be amended as stated below. 

Recommendation 

Therefore, the Board recommends that 

DOE: 

1. Immediately affirm the previously 

understood requirement that unmitigated, 

bounding-type accident scenarios will be 

used at DOE’s defense nuclear facilities to 

estimate dose consequences at the site 

boundary, and that a sufficient combination 

of structures, systems, or components must 

be designated safety class to prevent 

exposures at the site boundary from 

approaching or exceeding 25 rem TEDE. 

2. For those defense nuclear facilities that 

have not implemented compensatory 

measures sufficient to reduce exposures at 

the site boundary below 25 rem TEDE, direct 

the responsible program secretarial officer to 

develop a plan to meet this requirement 

within a reasonable timeframe. 

3. Revise DOE Standard 3009–94 to 

identify clearly and unambiguously the 

requirements that must be met to 

demonstrate that an adequate level of 

protection for the public and workers is 

provided through a DSA. This should be 

accomplished, at a minimum, by: 

a. Clearly defining methodologies and 

providing acceptability criteria for controls, 

parameters, processes, analytical tools, and 

other data that should be used in preparation 

of a DSA. 

b. Delineating the criteria to be met for 

identification and analyses of an adequate set 

of Design Basis Accidents (for new facilities), 

or Evaluation Basis Accidents (for existing 

facilities). 

c. Providing criteria that must be met by 

the safety-class structures, systems, and 

components to (i) mitigate the consequences 

to a fraction of the Evaluation Guideline, or 

(ii) prevent the events by demonstrating an 

acceptable reliability for the preventive 

features. 

d. Establishing a process and path forward 

to meeting (a) through (c) above through 

compensatory measures and planned 

improvements if the DSA cannot demonstrate 

compliance. 

4. Amend 10 CFR Part 830 by 

incorporating the revised version of DOE 

Standard 3009–94 into the text as a 

requirement, instead of as a safe harbor cited 

in Table 2. 

5. Formally establish the minimum criteria 

and requirements that govern federal 

approval of a DSA, by revision to DOE 

Standard 1104–2009 and other appropriate 

documents. The criteria and requirements 

should include: 

a. The authorities that can be delegated, the 

required training and qualification of the 

approval authority, and the boundaries and 

limitations of the approval authority’s 

responsibilities, 

b. Actions to be taken if conditions are 

beyond the specified boundaries and 

limitations of the approval authority, 

c. The organization or the individual who 

can approve a DSA that is beyond the 

delegated approval authority’s boundaries 

and limitations, 

d. The regulatory process that must be 

followed if condition are beyond the 

specified boundaries and limitations of the 

approval authority, and any compensatory 

actions to be taken, and 

e. The criteria the approval authority must 

use to quantify the acceptance of risk for 

continued operations when offsite dose 

consequences have not been reduced to a 

small fraction of the Evaluation Guideline. 

6. Formally designate the responsible 

organization and identify the processes for 

performing oversight to ensure that the 

responsibilities identified in Item 5 above are 

fully implemented. 

Peter S. Winokur, 

Chairman. 

[FR Doc. 2010–28683 Filed 11–12–10; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 3670–01–P 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Department of the Navy 

Notice of Availability for the Draft 

Programmatic Environmental 

Assessment for the Development and 

Operation of Small-Scale Wind Energy 

Projects at United States Marine Corps 

Facilities Throughout the United States 

AGENCY: Department of the Navy, DoD. 

ACTION: Notice. 

SUMMARY: Pursuant to Section 

(102)(2)(c) of the National 

Environmental Policy Act of 1969 

(NEPA) (42 United States Code 4321), as 

implemented by the Council on 

Environmental Quality regulations for 

implementing the procedural provisions 

of NEPA (40 Code of Federal 


srobinson on DSKHWCL6B1PROD with NOTICES