J-S10007-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

DAVID E. BALLARD,

Appellant No. 3427 EDA 2013

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence November 15, 2013

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at Nos.: CP-51-CR-0006464-2011

CP-51-CR-0014219-2011

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., STABILE, J., and PLATT, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.: FILED MARCH 12, 2015

Appellant, David E. Ballard, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

imposed following his jury conviction of two counts of receiving stolen 

property.1 He challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. Specifically, 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 Receiving stolen property

(a) Offense defined.─A person is guilty of theft if he 

intentionally receives, retains, or disposes of movable property 

of another knowing that it has been stolen, or believing that it 

has probably been stolen, unless the property is received, 

retained, or disposed with intent to restore it to the owner.

(b) Definition.─As used in this section the word 

“receiving” means acquiring possession, control or title, or 

lending on the security of the property.

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Appellant maintains that the evidence did not support the inference that he 

had guilty knowledge that the property was stolen. We affirm.

The facts of this case are not in substantial dispute. Appellant and the 

victims were all renters at the same storage facility. Renters received a 

code to gain access to the floor of their storage unit, but not to other floors. 

However, the storage units were covered with chicken wire instead of 

ceilings, for ventilation and sprinkler system access, creating an accessible 

crawl space. The evidence established that Appellant was storing multiple 

televisions, video games, musical equipment and similar items in his rented 

storage unit, stolen from other renters in the same storage facility, and 

selling them on Craigslist, often at steeply discounted prices. Appellant’s 

unit, and the units of the victims, had their chicken wire pulled back. Using 

his cell phone records, police identified several buyers, and were able to 

confirm purchases as items stolen from the storage unit victims. A jury 

convicted Appellant of receiving stolen property.2 

The court sentenced Appellant to a term of not less than eleven and 

one-half months’ nor more than twenty-three months’ incarceration, plus 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3925. 

2 The jury could not reach a verdict on the companion charges of burglary, 

theft by unlawful taking, criminal trespass, and criminal mischief. The 

Commonwealth declined to re-prosecute, and after the sentencing on the 

conviction of receiving stolen property, it nolle prossed the remaining 

charges. 
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two years’ probation, all consecutive to a federal sentence for identity theft 

based on evidence discovered when the police were searching his storage 

unit in connection with the thefts involved in this appeal. This timely appeal 

followed.3 

Appellant raises one question for our review on appeal.

Was not the evidence insufficient to prove the defendant 

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime of receiving stolen 

property because the evidence was insufficient to prove that the 

defendant received the property knowing that it was stolen or 

believing that it was probably stolen?

(Appellant’s Brief, at 3).

Appellant’s sole contention on appeal is that the evidence was 

insufficient to prove “guilty knowledge as to the larcenous status of the 

property.” (Id. at 13). We disagree. 

Our standard of review is well established. In reviewing 

sufficiency of the evidence claims, we must determine whether 

the evidence admitted at trial and all reasonable inferences 

drawn therefrom, when viewed in the light most favorable to the 

verdict winner, are sufficient to support all the elements of the 

offense. We may not weigh the evidence and substitute our 

judgment for the fact-finder. Moreover, the facts and 

circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not 

preclude every possibility of innocence. 

Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be resolved 

by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and 

____________________________________________

3 Appellant filed a statement of errors on March 18, 2014. See Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b). The trial court and the suppression court filed opinions on June 9, 

2014. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a). Appellant does not raise any issues related 

to the suppression claims in this appeal. Accordingly, we deem them 

abandoned. 
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inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be 

drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth 

may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime 

beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial 

evidence. Furthermore, the entire record must be evaluated and 

all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the 

trier of fact, while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and 

the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part, 

or none of the evidence. 

Commonwealth v. Marrero, 914 A.2d 870, 872 (Pa. Super. 2006) 

(citations omitted). 

Appellant concedes that “the evidence presented at trial might have 

been ample to show that [he] sold merchandise which had been stolen[.]” 

(Appellant’s Brief, at 19). Nevertheless, he maintains that it was insufficient 

to show that he knew or should have known that the property was stolen. 

(See id.). 

Appellant presents two main arguments in support of this claim. First, 

he cites various alleged inconsistencies in the evidence, e.g., claiming that 

the history of his access code/key pad activity was improbable. (See id. at 

17). Secondly, he asserts that his maintenance of sales records, as well as 

his advertisement on Craigslist, were “open and obvious.” (Id. at 18). He 

claims such factors “militate against . . . guilty knowledge.” (Id.). In fact, 

they do not. Appellant offers no pertinent legal authority in support of the 

assertion that they do. 

Such [“guilty”] knowledge can be established by entirely 

circumstantial evidence. Circumstances that can establish the 

requisite knowledge on the part of the defendant include: a short 

time between the theft and defendant’s possession; the 
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defendant’s conduct at arrest and while in possession of the 

stolen property; the type of property; the location of the theft in 

comparison to the location where the defendant gained 

possession; the value of the property compared to the price paid 

for it; and the quantity of the stolen property.

Marrero, supra at 873 (citations omitted); accord, Commonwealth v. 

Foreman, 797 A.2d 1005, 1012 (Pa. Super. 2002).

More fundamentally, however, Appellant’s claims misconceive our 

standard of review, which views the evidence in the light most favorable to 

the Commonwealth as verdict winner. See Marrero, supra at 872. 

Appellant’s claims amount to an implicit invitation for this Court to 

engage in an impermissible re-weighing of the evidence. We decline. 

Weighing the evidence was the province of the jury as fact-finder. See id. 

We conclude that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to 

the Commonwealth as verdict winner, was more than sufficient to establish 

that Appellant was guilty of receiving stolen property.

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/12/2015