NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

DAVON THOMAS HARRIS,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________ 

2017-1233

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal 

Claims in No. 1:16-cv-00658-EDK, Judge Elaine Kaplan.

______________________ 

Decided: May 5, 2017

______________________ 

DAVON THOMAS HARRIS, New York, NY, pro se.

COURTNEY D. ENLOW, Commercial Litigation Branch, 

United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, 

for defendant-appellee. Also represented by BENJAMIN C.

MIZER, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR., CLAUDIA BURKE. 

______________________ 

PER CURIAM. 

Davon Harris alleges that the government controls an 

implant in his body that transmits his thoughts nation-
2 HARRIS v. US

wide. In June 2016, Mr. Harris sued the United States in 

the Court of Federal Claims, alleging numerous constitutional, statutory, regulatory, and contractual violations. 

The court dismissed most of Mr. Harris’s claims for lack of 

subject-matter jurisdiction, under Rule 12(b)(1) of the 

Rules of the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, and his remaining claims for failure to state a claim, under Rule 

12(b)(6). We affirm.

I 

In June 2016, Mr. Harris filed a complaint in the 

Court of Federal Claims, alleging that he is a victim of 

illegal human experimentation. See Complaint, Harris v. 

United States, No. 1:16-cv-658-EDK (Fed. Cl. June 3, 

2016), ECF No. 1. According to Mr. Harris, the government operates a device implanted in his body, which 

allows the government to transmit his thoughts nationwide for public entertainment. Mr. Harris alleges that he 

attempted to contact federal officials about the device but 

they refused to assist him. He also alleges that his mother entered into an agreement with the government permitting the experimentation on him. 

After the government moved to dismiss, Mr. Harris 

amended his complaint to include additional causes of 

action. See Complaint, Harris, No. 1:16-cv-658-EDK (Fed. 

Cl. Aug. 13, 2016), ECF No. 13. Specifically, Mr. Harris 

asserted claims for (1) conspiracy to interfere with civil 

rights, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985; (2) torture, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2340; (3) stalking, in violation of 

18 U.S.C. § 2261A; (4) deprivation of rights under color of 

law, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 242; (5) violation of the 

Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause; (6) denial of equal 

protection under the law, in violation of the Fourteenth 

Amendment; (7) slavery, in violation of the Thirteenth 

Amendment; (8) deprivation of juvenile rights, in violation 

of 42 U.S.C. § 14141; (9) taking of private property without just compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amend-
HARRIS v. US 3

ment; (10) breach of express and implied contract; and 

(11) illegal human experimentation, in violation of 45 

C.F.R. §§ 46.101(a), 46.116, and 46.117. Id. at 7–32. Mr. 

Harris requested money damages and multiple forms of 

equitable relief. Id. at 32–38.

In October 2016, the Court of Federal Claims dismissed the complaint. See Opinion & Order, Harris, No. 

1:16-cv-658-EDK (Fed. Cl. Oct. 25, 2016), ECF No. 21. 

The court concluded that it did not have jurisdiction over 

most of Mr. Harris’s constitutional, statutory, and regulatory claims because the relevant provisions did not provide for the payment of money for their violation. Id. at 4. 

The court also concluded that it did not have jurisdiction 

over various claims based on criminal statutes or civilrights statutes. Id. In addition, the court concluded that 

it lacked jurisdiction over claims against non-federal 

defendants and claims sounding in tort. Id. at 3–4. 

The court recognized that it had jurisdiction over takings and breach-of-contract claims under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1491(a), but it held that Mr. Harris had not stated a 

plausible takings or contract claim. With respect to Mr. 

Harris’s takings claim, the court concluded that the Fifth 

Amendment’s Takings Clause prohibits only the taking of 

private property for public use without just compensation 

and that private property “does not include a person’s 

body or the use of a person’s body.” Id. at 5. The court 

held that Mr. Harris’s allegation that the government had 

“taken his thoughts and transmitted them to others 

without his consent” did not plausibly allege that the 

government had taken any private property from him 

within the meaning of the Takings Clause. Id.

The court also concluded that Mr. Harris did not state 

a plausible claim for breach of contract because (1) he did 

not allege that he had entered into a contract with the 

government but instead contended that his mother had 

entered into such a contract; (2) he did not describe the 
4 HARRIS v. US

content of the contract adequately to permit the court to 

ascertain whether the contract conferred any contractual 

rights on him; and (3) he did not explain how the government had breached the contract or how he had been 

damaged by such a breach. Id. Rather, the court noted, 

Mr. Harris appeared to allege that he had been harmed 

by the existence of the contract, but that allegation, if 

anything, would give rise to a claim sounding in tort, 

which § 1491(a) excludes from the court’s jurisdiction. Id.

Mr. Harris appeals. We have jurisdiction under 28 

U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3). 

II

Mr. Harris challenges the Court of Federal Claims’ 

dismissal of his amended complaint. We review dismissal 

for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction or failure to state a 

claim without deference. See Abbas v. United States, 842 

F.3d 1371, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2016).

A 

The Tucker Act authorizes the Court of Federal 

Claims to decide “any claim against the United States 

founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or 

upon any express or implied contract with the United 

States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases 

not sounding in tort.” 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). The Tucker 

Act is “only a jurisdictional statute; it does not create any 

substantive right enforceable against the United States 

for money damages.” United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 

392, 398 (1976). Thus, to invoke jurisdiction under the 

Tucker Act, a plaintiff must identify another source of law

that defines the alleged wrong and mandates money 

damages for its violation. Id.

The Court of Federal Claims correctly concluded it 

lacked jurisdiction to decide the majority of Mr. Harris’s 

claims because the relevant constitutional, statutory, and 
HARRIS v. US 5

regulatory provisions are not money mandating. With 

respect to Mr. Harris’s constitutional claims, we have held 

that the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause and the 

Fourteenth Amendment Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses do not mandate payment of money damages. 

Le Blanc v. United States, 50 F.3d 1025, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 

1995). We have also held, in several non-precedential 

opinions, that the Thirteenth Amendment is not money 

mandating. See Harvey v. United States, No. 2017-1394, 

2017 WL 1279384, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 6, 2017) (per 

curiam); Smith v. United States, 36 F. App’x 444, 446 

(Fed. Cir. 2002) (per curiam). We see no reason to reject 

that conclusion here.

For similar reasons, the court correctly concluded that

did not have jurisdiction to decide the majority of Mr. 

Harris’s statutory and regulatory claims. Mr. Harris’s 

claims under 18 U.S.C. § 242, 18 U.S.C. § 2340, and 18 

U.S.C. § 2261A rely on criminal statutes, none of which 

mandates money damages. See Joshua v. United States, 

17 F.3d 378, 379–80 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Canuto v. United 

States, 651 F. App’x 996, 997 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (per curiam). A private person has no claim under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 14141. See Chaney v. Races & Aces, 590 F. App’x 327, 

330 (5th Cir. 2014). And a 42 U.S.C. § 1985 claim cannot 

be litigated in the Court of Federal Claims. See May v. 

United States, 534 F. App’x 930, 933–34 (Fed. Cir. 2013)

(per curiam). We also see nothing in 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(a) 

or any other section in that chapter that would support 

jurisdiction. See United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 

216–17 (1983); Testan, 424 U.S. at 400; Eastport S.S. 

Corp. v. United States, 372 F.2d 1002, 1009 (Ct. Cl. 1967). 

B 

The Court of Federal Claims correctly dismissed Mr. 

Harris’s remaining claims for failure to state a claim. We 

review dismissal for failure to state a claim without 

deference, accepting as true all factual allegations plead-
6 HARRIS v. US

ed. See Frankel v. United States, 842 F.3d 1246, 1249 

(Fed. Cir. 2016). To withstand a motion to dismiss, a 

complaint must contain “enough facts to state a claim to 

relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. (quoting Bell Atl. 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 

Mr. Harris alleges that he is entitled to just compensation for the transmission of his thoughts for public

entertainment. But although the Supreme Court has 

held that certain kinds of information, such as trade 

secrets, constitute private property within the meaning of

the Takings Clause, see Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 467 

U.S. 986, 1000–04 (1984), Mr. Harris does not allege any 

facts from which we could infer that the transmitted 

information belongs to a recognized category of private

property. For example, Mr. Harris does not allege that 

the transmitted information derives independent economic value from not being generally known, see 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1839(3)(B); Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 1(4)(i) (Nat’l 

Conference of Comm’rs on State Laws 1985), or affords 

him with an economic advantage over others, see Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 39 (Am. Law 

Inst. 1995). Nor does he describe any measures that he 

has taken to maintain the secrecy of that information. 

See 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(A); Uniform Trade Secrets Act 

§ 1(4)(ii). We see nothing in the record that would support a conclusion about the “property” status of the allegedly taken thoughts. We therefore agree with the court 

that Mr. Harris has not plausibly alleged a taking. 

We also affirm the dismissal of Mr. Harris’s breach-ofcontract claim. To state a claim for breach of contract, a 

plaintiff must allege facts that would support the existence of a contract between the plaintiff and the government, a duty arising out of that contract, a breach of that 

duty, and damages resulting from the breach. San Carlos 

Irrigation & Draining Dist. v. United States, 877 F.2d 

957, 959 (Fed. Cir. 1989). The Court of Federal Claims 

court concluded that Mr. Harris did not plausibly allege 
HARRIS v. US 7

those elements. He alleged that his mother, not he, had 

entered into a contract with the government. He did not 

describe the contract in sufficient detail to indicate 

whether the contract conferred any contractual rights 

upon him. And he did not identify any government 

breach or harm caused by such a breach. We see no error 

in that analysis.

On appeal, Mr. Harris argues that he entered into an 

implied contract with the government. Appellant’s Br. 3. 

Because Mr. Harris did not present that allegation to the 

Court of Federal Claims, however, he has forfeited the 

right to raise it at this time. Ladd v. United States, 713 

F.3d 648, 655 (Fed. Cir. 2013). In any event, he has not 

plausibly alleged the existence of a valid implied contract

or facts regarding the parties’ conduct that would permit 

us to infer such a contract. See Hercules, Inc. v. United 

States, 516 U.S. 417, 424–30 (1996).1

III

For the forgoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of 

the Court of Federal Claims.

No costs.

AFFIRMED

 

1 Because all claims were properly dismissed for 

lack of jurisdiction or failure to state a claim, we do not 

reach any issue about the availability of equitable remedies.