a

GAO

United States Government Accountability Office

Report to Congressional Committees

March 2006 DEFENSE LOGISTICS

Several Factors 

Limited the 

Production and 

Installation of Army 

Truck Armor during 

Current Wartime 

Operations

GAO-06-160
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

March 2006

DEFENSE LOGISTICS

Several Factors Limited the Production 

and Installation of Army Truck Armor 

during Current Wartime Operations 

Highlights of GAO-06-160, a report to 

congressional committees 

In April 2005, GAO reported on 

factors affecting the timely

production of up-armored highmobility multi-purpose wheeled 

vehicles (HMMWV) and add-on 

armor kits for HMMWVs, as well as 

other items critically needed by

deployed forces during Operation

Iraqi Freedom. Due to high interest 

by Congress and the public 

regarding vehicle armor, GAO 

initiated this subsequent 

engagement to examine issues

affecting the production and 

installation of armor for medium 

and heavy trucks. The objectives

were to (1) determine the extent to

which truck armor was produced

and installed to meet identified

requirements, (2) identify what

factors affected the time to provide 

truck armor, and (3) identify what

actions the Department of Defense 

(DOD) and the Army have taken to

improve the timely availability of 

truck armor. To address these 

objectives, GAO collected and 

analyzed supply data for medium

and heavy tactical trucks used by

Army forces. 

What GAO Recommends

Expanding on one of its April 2005 

recommendations, GAO is

recommending that the Secretary 

of Defense direct the Army to

establish a process to document

and communicate all urgent

wartime funding requirements for

supplies and equipment when

identified and the disposition of

funding decisions. DOD concurred 

with the intent of the 

recommendation. 

The Army expects to have met its current requirements for the production 

and installation of truck armor by the end of January 2006 except for fuel 

tankers. Completion of armor kit installation for tankers is expected by 

January 2007. Although the Army first identified a requirement for 3,780 

truck armor kits for five types of trucks in November 2003, it did not 

produce all of the kits until February 2005 and did not install the kits to fully 

meet the requirement until May 2005 – 18 months after the initial 

requirement was identified. However, by that time, requirements had 

increased substantially. As subsequent requirements for an additional 7,847 

kits, excluding tankers, were identified, the time lag to meet them lessened. 

Time to Meet Initial Truck Armor Requirements by Truck Type 

Truck type 

Initial November

2003 requirement

Date required 

quantities 

produced 

Date required 

quantities 

installed 

Total months to

fully meet initial 

requirement 

HEMTT 1,080 January 2005 February 2005 15

HET 500 February 2005 March 2005 16

PLS 800 January 2005 May 2005 18

FMTV 1,150 February 2005 March 2005 16

M915 250 December 2004 March 2005 16

Source: GAO analysis of Army data. 

Note: Does not include the 5-ton truck or fuel tankers, which had not been identified at the time of 

the initial November 2003 requirement. 

A number of factors contributed to the time to provide truck armor kits to 

deployed troops, placing them at greater risk as they conducted wartime 

operations in vehicles not equipped with the preferred level of protection. 

For example, the Army missed a valuable opportunity to have substantial 

numbers of truck armor kits available for Operation Iraqi Freedom by not 

fully capitalizing on approved operational requirements established in 1996. 

In addition, production time lengthened because contracts were awarded for 

amounts less than total requirements due to increasing needs for truck 

armor and inadequate funding. As was the case for other critical wartime 

shortages that GAO previously examined, sufficient documentation was 

lacking to determine why funding was not available when needed, limiting 

effective oversight over funding decisions. Material shortages and limited 

tanker kit installation rates also impacted the availability of truck armor. 

DOD and the Army have taken a number of short-term actions, such as 

leveraging available funding, to improve truck armor availability during 

current operations. The Army is also developing a long-term armoring plan 

to improve the availability of truck armor for future operations. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-160.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact William Solis at 

(202) 512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov. 
Page i GAO-06-160 Defense Logistics

Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3

Background 6

Army Expects to Have Met Most Truck Armor Requirements by 

January 2006 11

Several Factors Lengthened the Time to Provide Truck 

Armor Kits 13

DOD and the Army Took Actions to Improve Truck Armor 

Availability 24

Conclusions 28

Recommendation for Executive Action 29

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 29

Appendixes

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 31

Appendix II: Assessment of Truck Armoring Efforts 34

Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck 34

Heavy Equipment Transporter 38

Palletized Load System 42

M939 5-Ton Truck 46

Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles 48

M915 Truck Family 54

Tankers 57

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense 61

Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgements 63

Tables Table 1: Time to Meet Initial Truck Armor Requirements by Truck 

Type 12

Table 2: Time to Meet Latest Truck Armor Requirements by Truck 

Type 13

Table 3: Comparison of Types of Vehicles Requiring Armor Kits in 

1996, 2003, and 2005 and Quantities of Kits Needed and 

Available 16

Table 4: Organizations Interviewed during Review 32

Figures Figure 1: Production and Installation of Truck Armor Kits to Meet 

Army Requirements 11
Contents

Page ii GAO-06-160 Defense Logistics

Figure 2: Army Truck Armor Requirements, November 2003 

through September 2005 20

Figure 3: Availability of Funding Compared to Truck Armor 

Requirements 21

Figure 4: Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck 35

Figure 5: Comparison of HEMTT Armor Kit Requirements to Kits 

Produced and Installed 36

Figure 6: Comparison of HEMTT Armor Kit Requirements to Kits 

Funded and Ordered 37

Figure 7: Heavy Equipment Transporter 39

Figure 8: Comparison of HET Armor Kit Requirements to Kits 

Produced and Installed 40

Figure 9: Comparison of HET Armor Kit Requirements to Kits 

Funded and Ordered 41

Figure 10: Palletized Load System 42

Figure 11: Comparison of PLS Armor Kit Requirements to Kits 

Produced and Installed 44

Figure 12: Comparison of PLS Armor Kit Requirements to Kits 

Funded and Ordered 45

Figure 13: M939 5-Ton Truck 46

Figure 14: Comparison of M939 5-Ton Truck Armor Kit 

Requirements to Kits Produced and Installed 48

Figure 15: FMTV RACK Truck 50

Figure 16: FMTV LSAC Truck 51

Figure 17: Comparison of FMTV Armor Kit Requirements to Kits 

Produced and Installed 52

Figure 18: Comparison of FMTV Armor Kit Requirements to Kits 

Funded and Ordered 53

Figure 19: M915 Truck Tractor 54

Figure 20: Comparison of M915 Family of Trucks Armor Kit 

Requirements to Kits Produced and Installed 55

Figure 21: Comparison of M915 Armor Kit Requirements to Kits 

Funded and Ordered 57

Figure 22: An M969 Tanker 58

Figure 23: Comparison of Tanker Armor Kit Requirements to Kits 

Produced and Installed 59
Contents

Page iii GAO-06-160 Defense Logistics

Abbreviations

AR2B Army Requirements and Resourcing Board

ASBP Army Strategic Planning Board

CENTCOM U.S. Central Command

CFLCC Coalition Forces Land Component Command

DOD Department of Defense

FMTV Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles

GSIE Ground Systems Industrial Enterprise

HEMTT Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck

HET Heavy Equipment Transporter

HMMWV High-Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle

IED Improvised Explosive Device

LSAC Low Signature Armored Cab

OEF Operation Enduring Freedom

OIF Operation Iraqi Freedom

ONS Operational Needs Statement

ORD Operational Requirements Document

PLS Palletized Load System

RACK Radian Armor Crew Kit

TRADOC Training and Doctrine Command

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Page 1 GAO-06-160 Defense Logistics

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

A

March 22, 2006 Letr

The Honorable John W. Warner

Chairman

The Honorable Carl Levin

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Duncan Hunter

Chairman

The Honorable Ike Skelton

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

When combat operations were declared over during Operation Iraqi 

Freedom (OIF), U.S. and coalition forces transitioned to stabilization 

operations to restore public order and infrastructure in Iraq. Since that 

time, U.S. forces have come under frequent and deadly attacks from 

insurgents using a variety of weapons that include improvised explosive 

devices (IED), mortars, and rocket launchers. During this situation there 

have been numerous attacks on military convoys as they carry supplies and 

equipment throughout the region. The threat of IEDs, in particular, has 

become increasingly frequent and has been ranked as the number one killer 

of U.S. troops in Iraq. The explosives used in IEDs consist mainly of 

dynamite, land mines, old artillery shells or other types of military 

ordnances. Many IEDs are hidden and disguised along traffic routes and 

are remotely detonated against unsuspecting military personnel.

As a result of experiences in Iraq, the Department of Defense (DOD) and 

the services have taken several immediate steps to improve the protection 

of military forces operating in the region. Among these is the fielding of 

new capabilities to counter emerging threats encountered in Iraq, to 

include such improvements as add-on-armor for trucks and systems for 

detecting and defeating IEDs.
Page 2 GAO-06-160 Defense Logistics

Since the onset of OIF, we have reported on several supply chain 

management issues that have impeded support to the warfighter.1 For 

example, after visiting the theater in 2003, we provided our preliminary 

observations on the effectiveness of logistics support during OIF. 2

 Among 

the problems we observed were the unavailability of spare parts, hundreds 

of backlogged shipments, and an inability to track shipments at the 

distribution centers. In April 2005, we reported on shortages of a number 

of critical items during OIF, to include certain protective items such as 

body armor and armored high mobility multi-purpose wheeled vehicles 

(HMMWV).3

 We identified a number of systemic causes for these 

shortages, including inaccurate requirements, delayed funding, and 

ineffective distribution processes. As a result, we made several 

recommendations to the Secretary of Defense calling for actions, such as 

ensuring the accuracy of Army war reserve requirements and developing 

and exercising deployable distribution capabilities, to improve DOD’s 

system for supplying items to U.S. forces.

Due to high interest by Congress and the public regarding the availability of 

armor for HMMWVs and other vehicles, we initiated this subsequent 

engagement under the authority of the Comptroller General of the United 

States to examine issues affecting the production and installation of armor 

for medium and heavy trucks used by Army forces during OIF and other 

ongoing operations in the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) area of 

responsibility.4

 Our objectives were to (1) determine the extent to which 

truck armor was produced and installed to meet identified requirements, 

(2) identify what factors affected the time to provide truck armor to 

1

DOD relies on a number of individual processes and activities, known collectively as supply 

chain management, to purchase, produce, and deliver products and services to the 

warfighter during contingency operations. The goal of supply chain management is to 

deliver the “right items” to the “right place” at the “right time.”

2

GAO, Defense Logistics: Preliminary Observations on the Effectiveness of Logistics 

Activities During Operation Iraqi Freedom, GAO-04-305R (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 18, 

2003).

3

GAO, Defense Logistics: Actions Needed to Improve the Availability of Critical Items 

during Current and Future Operations, GAO-05-275 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 8, 2005).

4

CENTCOM is one of DOD’s five geographic combatant commands, whose area of 

responsibility encompasses 27 countries in Southwest Asia, South and Central Asia, and the 

Horn of Africa. In addition to OIF, CENTCOM is involved in Operation Enduring Freedom 

(OEF) in Afghanistan. The other four geographic combatant commands are U.S. European 

Command, U.S. Pacific Command, U.S. Southern Command, and U.S. Northern Command.
Page 3 GAO-06-160 Defense Logistics

deployed forces, and (3) identify what actions DOD and the Army have 

taken to improve the timely availability of truck armor.

In conducting this review, we focused on medium and heavy tactical trucks 

used by Army forces in the CENTCOM area of responsibility, which 

included those in Iraq and Afghanistan.5

 We also reviewed the production 

and installation of truck armor for Marine Corps forces, which we will 

report separately. To identify the extent to which truck armor was 

produced and installed to meet identified requirements, we visited 

numerous DOD and Army organizations to obtain data on the 

requirements, funding, production, and installation of truck armor kits. We 

considered the armor requirement as met for each type of truck when the 

quantity of armor kits produced and installed onto vehicles equaled the 

requirement. Based on the information gathered, we identified factors that 

affected the time to provide truck armor kits to deployed forces. We also 

identified DOD’s and the Army’s short-term and long-term efforts to 

improve the availability of truck armor. We assessed the reliability of the 

data we obtained and determined that they were sufficiently reliable for the 

purposes of this report. We performed our review from April 2005 to 

January 2006 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. A detailed discussion of our scope and methodology is located 

in appendix I.

Results in Brief The Army expects to have met its current requirements for the production 

and installation of truck armor by the end of January 2006 except for fuel 

tankers. Completion of armor kit installation for tankers is expected by 

January 2007. Although the Army first identified a requirement for 3,780 

truck armor kits for five types of trucks in November 2003, it did not 

produce all of the kits until February 2005 and did not install the kits to 

fully meet the initial requirement until May 2005—18 months after the 

requirement was identified. However, by that time, requirements had 

increased substantially. As subsequent requirements for an additional 

7,847 kits, excluding tankers, were identified, the time lag to meet them 

lessened. Until add-on armor kits were installed, units in the theater 

5

The Army also developed armor for HMMWVs, a light tactical wheeled vehicle. We 

examined issues affecting the production of armor for HMMWVs in our prior report on 

wartime supply availability, so we did not include them in this review. See GAO, Defense 

Logistics: Actions Needed to Improve the Availability of Critical Items during Current 

and Future Operations, GAO-05-275 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 8, 2005).
Page 4 GAO-06-160 Defense Logistics

developed their own interim improvised armor of locally fabricated steel 

armor plates to obtain some level of protection for their vehicles. 

We identified a number of factors that contributed to the time to provide 

truck armor kits to deployed troops, placing them at greater risk as they 

conducted wartime operations in vehicles that were not equipped with the 

preferred level of protection. The factors we identified include:

• The Army did not fully capitalize on approved operational requirements 

for truck armor that were established in 1996. The 1996 requirements 

were similar to those developed in 2003 in response to experiences in 

Iraq and Afghanistan, addressing similar threats for most of the same 

types of trucks. Generally, official requirements such as these lead to 

the development and production of new systems to address the 

specified required capabilities. Production of armor kits based on the 

1996 requirements may have increased the availability of truck armor 

for current operations in Iraq and elsewhere in the Middle East. 

• The Army’s award of contracts to armor contractors for amounts less 

than the total requirement caused production schedules to be longer 

than they might have otherwise been. Instead of awarding contracts in a 

way that maximized production rates, the Army awarded contracts in 

amounts less than the total requirement because requirements 

increased due to operational conditions and the Army received its 

allocation of funding from DOD at less than the total requirement. 

Funding was not always available to award contracts at the time 

requirements were identified, but neither DOD nor Army officials could 

explain or document why increased funding was not provided earlier or 

how funding decisions were made. In April 2005, we reported that 

insufficient and delayed funding also contributed to critical wartime 

shortages of armored vehicle track shoes, lithium batteries, and tires, 

and that we could not determine why sufficient funding was not 

provided earlier because adequate documentation of funding requests 

was not available. Without formal documentation and communication 

of urgent wartime funding requirements and the disposition of funding 

decisions, the rationale for funding decisions and the officials and 

organizations accountable for making those decisions may not be 

subject to effective oversight by Congress or the Secretary of Defense. 

• Material shortages impacted the availability of Army truck armor. For 

example, production levels for several Army kits were constrained, in 

part, by shortages of material and components such as steel and door 
Page 5 GAO-06-160 Defense Logistics

handles. Further, competition between the Army and Marine Corps for 

limited contractors and materials exacerbated problems with limited 

availability of materials.

• Limited installation rates affected the Army’s ability to install armor kits 

onto tankers. The rotation of fuel trucks into the maintenance area as 

they returned from missions paced the installation of armor. In addition, 

unique requirements to coat the tankers with a protective chemical 

limited the numbers of armor installation sites available for armor 

installation due to the need for controlled environmental conditions. As 

a result, the total length of time to field tanker armor was stretched out 

over a longer period.

DOD and the Army have taken several actions to improve truck armor 

availability. Several short-term solutions to increase the rate of production 

were instituted during operations in Iraq. For example, to mitigate the 

effects of funding requirements at less than the total requirements, the 

Army used money budgeted for other procurement programs to award 

contracts for production of armor kits before additional armor funds 

arrived. In addition, Army headquarters also developed the initial armor kit 

requirements based on emerging needs 5 months before units in the theater 

formally submitted their requirements for validation, which allowed it to 

begin seeking funds for armor kits and award contracts for design and 

production earlier. The Army also expanded its armor installation capacity 

to increase installation rates. Further, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Joint Staff) 

established a team, called the Joint Armor Fusion Cell, to monitor the 

progress of armoring trucks as well to provide assistance to the Army to 

expedite the availability of armor kits. For example, the Joint Armor 

Fusion Cell helped identify and deploy personnel from the Air Force and 

Navy to perform armor installations in the theater and in the United States, 

thereby speeding up the availability of truck armor to the units. The Army 

is also developing a long-term plan to address future truck armoring needs. 

While we did not evaluate the plan’s potential for success, we did note that 

it is aimed at identifying long-term requirements for truck armor and 

developing solutions to address these requirements. 

We are expanding upon a recommendation in our April 2005 report that 

was directed at improving the effectiveness of the Army’s wartime supply 

support—to address a broader systemic problem that affected the 

availability of truck armor. To ensure that funding needs for urgent 

wartime requirements are identified quickly, requests for funding are well 
Page 6 GAO-06-160 Defense Logistics

documented, and funding decisions are based on risk and an assessment of 

the highest priority requirements, we are recommending that the Secretary 

of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to establish a process to 

document and communicate all urgent wartime funding requirements for 

supplies and equipment at the time they are identified and the disposition 

of funding decisions. 

In commenting on a draft of this report, the Department of Defense stated 

it agreed with the intent of our recommendation but stated that it believes 

the Army’s current requirements validation process conforms to the 

process described in our recommendation. Our work has demonstrated, 

however, that once requirements are validated, funding must be made 

available to execute programs to respond to those requirements. Because, 

as we noted in this report and in April 2005, funding requests from the 

Army to DOD to resource validated requirements and the corresponding 

decisions as to the amount and timing of funding to be provided were not 

adequately documented, we were unable to determine the reasons why 

funding was not made available to respond to urgent wartime requirements 

as needed. We continue to believe these events in the funding process for 

urgent wartime requirements must be fully documented to provide 

effective program oversight and to ensure funding decisions are made 

based on risk and an assessment of the highest priority requirements. The 

Department’s responses are reprinted in appendix III and our evaluation of 

them appears later in this report.

Background Army convoys carrying supplies and equipment in the CENTCOM area of 

responsibility have been subjected to deadly attacks by insurgents using 

IEDs and other weapons. In response to these attacks, the Army has 

undertaken several force protection measures such as adding armor to a 

number of medium and heavy trucks operating in Iraq, Afghanistan, and 

other CENTCOM locations. 

Deployed Army Forces Face 

a Significant Threat from 

IEDs

Army convoys operating in the CENTCOM area of responsibility have been 

subjected to deadly attacks by enemy forces. In particular, attacks in Iraq 

by insurgents using IEDs have placed trucks and personnel at tremendous 

risk as they carry supplies and equipment throughout the region. In May 

2003, U.S. and coalition forces began stabilization operations in Iraq that 

continue today. However, since that time, the United States has incurred 

more casualties than during major combat operations, mostly due to 
Page 7 GAO-06-160 Defense Logistics

ambushes and IED attacks by insurgents operating in Iraq. The threat from 

IEDs has grown progressively, from single mortar rounds, to multiple 

explosives linked together, to suicide car bombs. In the spring of 2004, 

nearly every attack from an IED resulted in a coalition casualty. In 

particular, U.S. military convoys have been the targets of these types of 

attacks. In addition to attacks in Iraq, U.S. forces operating in Afghanistan 

have been subjected to IED attacks.

IEDs take a variety of shapes and sizes and have been employed in a 

number of different ways. They can contain commercial or military 

explosives, homemade explosives, or military ordnance and ordnance 

components. For example, mortar and artillery projectiles have been 

employed as IEDs in Iraq. In addition, IEDs have been placed in many 

vehicles—from small sedans to large cargo trucks—and stationed along the 

roadways. Furthermore, “person-borne” suicide bombs have also been 

used, with explosives contained in a vest, belt, or clothing that is 

specifically modified to conceal and carry this material.

Outfitting Army Trucks with 

Armor

In light of the threat posed by IEDs and other weapons, such as mortars 

and rocket launchers, the Army has taken several force protection 

measures to include adding armor to a number of medium and heavy trucks 

operating in Iraq, and Afghanistan.6

 The Army’s medium and heavy tactical 

trucks that are being armored include: M939 5-ton trucks, family of medium 

tactical vehicles (FMTV), heavy expanded mobility tactical trucks 

(HEMTT), heavy equipment transporters (HET), palletized load systems 

(PLS), the M915 truck family, and tankers. Appendix II contains a detailed 

description of each Army vehicle in addition to a discussion of the armor 

kit availability and the significant factors that affected armor availability 

for each truck. 

The Army’s medium tactical trucks include the M939 5-ton and FMTV. The 

M939 tactical truck is a general-purpose military vehicle, primarily 

designed for tactical, off-road use. The M-939 is a 5-ton capacity, six-wheel 

drive cargo truck used for transportation of all types of supplies and comes 

in various vehicle types, including a cargo truck, dump truck, and wrecker. 

The Army’s FMTV addresses medium tactical-vehicle requirements for unit 

mobility and unit resupply, and transportation of equipment and personnel. 

6

Other force protection measures taken include the fielding of personal body armor and 

electronic IED countermeasures, as well as changes to unit level tactics and training.
Page 8 GAO-06-160 Defense Logistics

The FMTV consists of the light medium tactical vehicle, which has a 2.5-ton 

capacity, and the medium tactical vehicle, which has a 5-ton capacity. 

The Army’s heavy tactical trucks include the HEMTT, HET, PLS, M915, and 

tankers. The Army utilizes the HEMTT to provide transport capabilities for 

the resupply of various combat vehicles and weapons systems. The HET is 

used to transport, deploy, recover, and evacuate main battle tanks and 

other heavy tracked and wheeled vehicles to and from the battlefield. The 

PLS performs long distance and local hauls and unit resupply in the tactical 

environment to support combat units. The PLS consists of a truck with 

self-loading capabilities and a trailer. The Army’s family of M915 trucks 

consists of highway tractors used primarily for the long distance transport 

of containers, which is similar to commercial tractor-trailer trucks. 

The Army uses its tankers to haul and dispense bulk fuel. Four models of 

fuel tankers are involved in the Army’s armoring program: the M967, the 

M969, the M978, and the M1062. The primary component of the tanker 

armoring effort is a self-sealing coating material that is sprayed onto the 

exterior of the fuel tank. When a small arms round penetrates the coating 

material and the fuel tank, the hole self seals and the fuel leak is stopped 

within minutes. A secondary component is composed of a set of armor 

panel kits mounted at select locations on the fuel tanker to protect critical 

equipment that is not protected by the coating material. 

Processes for Developing 

Truck Armor Requirements 

and Solutions 

The Army identified wartime truck armor requirements and initiated a 

procurement program to develop an armor solution, which involved 

seeking funding from a variety of sources, identifying and contracting with 

suppliers for armor materials and components, designing and testing armor 

solutions, and installing armor onto trucks in the CENTCOM area of 

responsibility or other installation sites in the United States and Europe. 

Process for Developing Wartime 

Requirements

When a need for new equipment is identified by Army warfighters deployed 

to Iraq and other CENTCOM locations in support of the global war on 

terrorism, official requirements for these items are developed through the 

submission of the Army’s operational needs statement (ONS). Army field 

commanders prepare an ONS, which documents the urgent need for a 

materiel solution to correct a deficiency or to improve a capability that 

impacts mission accomplishment. The ONS is sent forward through the 

unit’s chain of command to the Coalition Forces Land Component 

Command (CFLCC) for theater-level approval, while an information copy is 
Page 9 GAO-06-160 Defense Logistics

provided directly to Army headquarters for an initial check to ensure the 

requested capability and operational concept are clearly stated. 

Once approved by CFLCC, the ONS is forwarded to the Office of the 

Deputy Chief of Staff G-3 at Army headquarters where it is reviewed and 

validated by the Army Strategic Planning Board (ASPB).7

 The ASPB is 

chaired by the G-3, with representatives from other Army headquarters 

staff offices and major Army commands. In the case of truck armor, once 

the requirement is validated by the ASPB, it is transmitted to the Program 

Executive Office-Combat Support and Combat Service Support, which 

manages the procurement of truck armor through its Project Manager for 

Tactical Vehicles (Project Manager). Validated requirements are also 

passed to the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff G-8 and the Army Budget 

Office to obtain the necessary funding.

Development of Truck Armor 

Solutions

To address validated requirements for truck armor, the Army initiated a 

procurement program to develop an armor solution for its deployed trucks. 

Procurement is funded through congressional appropriations. However, at 

the time requirements for current operations were identified in November 

2003, there were no truck armor kit procurement programs in place. 

Consequently, funding for armor kits in the current Army procurement 

budgets did not exist. Because no funding was available at the time the 

requirements were identified, the Army obtained funding for its program 

from a variety of sources. While the Army can reprogram a small amount 

of funds from one program budget to another, the majority of funding had 

to be approved by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 

(Comptroller) and in some cases, Congress. Specifically, to obtain funding 

for truck armor, the Army sought approval from the DOD Comptroller and 

Congress to reprogram funding from other procurement or appropriations

7

The ASPB was established by the Army on September 14, 2001 in response to the terrorists 

attacks in New York, Washington, D.C., and Pennsylvania on September 11, 2001. The 

charter of the ASPB is to manage the Army’s rapid transition to a wartime focus as well as 

sustain the Army’s continuing contribution to homeland security and the war against 

terrorism. 
Page 10 GAO-06-160 Defense Logistics

accounts,8 requested funding from the DOD-managed Iraqi Freedom Fund,9

and requested armor funding through supplemental appropriations.

The Army’s approved armor protection for medium and heavy tactical 

vehicles consisted of add-on armor kits to be installed on vehicles already 

in use in the theater of operations or prior to deployment. These kits 

included armor panels and ballistic glass, as well as other components such 

as air conditioners. For all trucks except the M939 5-ton, the Army awarded 

contracts to armor companies to produce add-on kits for each type of 

truck. According to Army officials, as needed production quantities 

increased, the Army modified these contracts to reflect the additional 

quantities and revised prices. In the case of the 5-ton truck, the armor kits 

were produced by the Ground Systems Industrial Enterprise (GSIE), an 

Army organization of depots and other facilities.10 Instead of a contract, 

agreements on quantities and costs for work were provided through 

Military Inter-departmental Purchase Requests (MIPR), which were issued 

to GSIE for each new production order. Once armor kits were produced by 

contractors or Army depots, they were shipped to installation sites in the 

United States, Middle East, and Europe, where they were installed onto 

trucks by military or contractor personnel.

8

The services are allowed to reprogram, without DOD approval, a total of up to $20 million 

per year into the procurement account that includes armor kits. However, because the 

funding needed for armor kits exceeded this amount, the services had to request approval 

for any funding reprogramming in excess of the $20 million from the DOD Comptroller, 

which in turn had to be approved by Congress.

9

The Iraqi Freedom Fund is a special account providing funds for additional expenses for 

military forces in Iraq and those operations authorized by Pub. L. No. 107-40 (Sept. 13, 2001), 

Authorization for Use of Military Force, and other operations and related activities in 

support of the global war on terrorism.

10GSIE comprises Anniston Army Depot, Red River Army Depot, Sierra Army Depot, Rock 

Island Arsenal, Watervliet Arsenal, the Lima Tank Plant (a government-owned, contractoroperated facility), and a business center staff located at Rock Island Arsenal. GSIE’s 

objective is to operate as a single business unit, efficiently using the industrial capabilities of 

each installation while simultaneously transforming those capabilities to meet the needs of 

Army forces. GSIE’s goal is to continuously improve support to the soldiers and reduce the 

cost of GSIE products and services.
Page 11 GAO-06-160 Defense Logistics

Army Expects to Have 

Met Most Truck Armor 

Requirements by 

January 2006

The Army expects to have met its current requirements for the production 

and installation of truck armor by the end of January 2006 except for fuel 

tankers. Completion of armor kit installation for tankers is expected by 

January 2007. Figure 1 shows the overall production and installation 

quantities of truck armor as compared to requirements. The Army’s 

solution to addressing truck armor requirements focused on developing 

add-on armor kits to be attached to the vehicles. These add-on armor kits 

included armor panels and ballistic glass, as well as other components such 

as air conditioners. 

Figure 1: Production and Installation of Truck Armor Kits to Meet Army 

Requirements

Although the Army first identified a requirement for 3,780 truck armor kits 

for five types of trucks in November 2003, it did not produce all of the kits 

until February 2005 and did not install the kits to fully meet the initial 

requirement until May 2005, or 18 months later. As shown in table 1, the 

0

2,000

4,000

6,000

8,000

10,000

12,000

14,000

16,000

Armor kits

Source: GAO analysis of Army data.

Fiscal year

Requirements

Production

Installations

2003 2004 2005

Au

Sept.

g.

July

June

Ma

Apr.

May

r.

O

Nov.

Dec.

Jan.

Feb.

ct.

Au

Sept.

g.

July

June

Nov.

Dec.

Jan.

Feb.

Mar.

Apr.

May
Page 12 GAO-06-160 Defense Logistics

time to produce and install armor kits to meet initial requirements varied 

by truck type, and ranged from 15 to 18 months. However, as shown in 

figure 1, by that time requirements had increased substantially. More 

detailed information on requirements, production, and installation times 

for each specific truck is provided in appendix II.

Table 1: Time to Meet Initial Truck Armor Requirements by Truck Type

Source: GAO analysis of Army data.

Note: Does not include the 5-ton truck or fuel tankers, which had not been identified at the time of the 

initial November 2003 requirement.

As subsequent requirements for an additional 7,847 kits, excluding tankers, 

were identified, the time lag to meet them lessened. The Army now 

estimates that the total demand for all 11,627 required truck armor kits, 

excluding tankers, will have been met in January 2006, or 10 months after 

the latest requirements increase was validated in March 2005.11 Table 2 

shows the time needed to complete production and installation of armor 

kits to meet the latest validated requirements increase from March 2005. 

The Army estimates that production of a sufficient number of tanker kits to 

meet requirements will be completed by May 2006, but does not expect to 

complete installation of tanker kits until January 2007. 

Truck type

Initial November 2003

requirement

Date required 

quantities produced

Date required 

quantities installed

Total months to fully 

meet initial requirement

HEMTT 1,080 January 2005 February 2005 15

HET 500 February 2005 March 2005 16

PLS 800 January 2005 May 2005 18

FMTV 1,150 February 2005 March 2005 16

M915 250 December 2004 March 2005 16

11In March 2005 the Army validated a requirement for 13,377 trucks and tankers, which was 

the last validated requirement for truck armor. However, in September 2005, the total 

requirement decreased slightly to 12,819 based on revised nonvalidated needs from units in 

the theater. 
Page 13 GAO-06-160 Defense Logistics

Table 2: Time to Meet Latest Truck Armor Requirements by Truck Type

Source: GAO analysis of Army data.

Note: Does not include the 5-ton truck, for which requirements decreased in March 2005 or tankers, for 

which requirements did not increase in March 2005. As of September 2005, the current 5-ton truck 

armor requirement was 2,592 and the tanker requirement was 1,192. 

Before armor kits were available, units operating in the CENTCOM area of 

responsibility developed their own interim improvised armor, consisting of 

locally fabricated steel armor plates, to obtain some level of protection for 

their vehicles. As a result, interim armor with minimum protection 

standards in accordance with Army policy was in place on some vehicles 

by the time the preferred add-on armor kits were available for installation. 

In addition, CFLCC issued a directive in February 2005 stating that no 

unarmored vehicles would be allowed to operate in Iraq outside of secured 

forward operating bases. During congressional testimony held in the spring 

and summer of 2005, Army officials confirmed that this policy had been 

fully implemented with use of approved interim improvised armor or addon armor kits.

Several Factors 

Lengthened the Time 

to Provide Truck 

Armor Kits

We identified a number of factors that contributed to the time to provide 

truck armor to deployed troops. First, the Army did not fully capitalize on a 

requirement for truck armor that had been identified prior to operations in 

OIF. Second, availability of armor kits was constrained by the Army’s 

funding of contracts at less than the total requirement. Third, material 

shortages also affected the availability of armor kits. Finally, limited 

installation rates lengthened the time to provide armor kits for tankers. As 

a result, troops were placed at greater risk as they conducted wartime 

operations in vehicles not equipped with the preferred level of protection.

Truck type

Current requirement as 

of September 2005

Date required 

quantities produced

Date required 

quantities installed

Total months to fully 

meet requirement from 

March 2005 increase

HEMTT 2,246 September 2005 December 2005 9

HET 663 August 2005 September 2005 6

PLS 944 March 2005 July 2005 4

FMTV 3,377 August 2005 December 2005 9

M915 1,805 December 2005 January 2006 

(estimated)

10
Page 14 GAO-06-160 Defense Logistics

Army Did Not Fully 

Capitalize on Truck Armor 

Requirements Identified 

Prior to Operations in Iraq

The Army did not fully capitalize on an earlier operational requirement for 

truck armor that was identified several years before current operations in 

Iraq began, which caused the Army to lose an opportunity to have a 

significant number of armor kits already available when operational needs 

arose in Iraq for this capability. An official requirement for truck add-on 

armor kits was identified and approved by the Army in 1996 to address 

threats similar to what deployed forces are currently facing in Iraq. On 

January 19, 1996, the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) 

issued an operational requirement document (ORD) for the tactical 

wheeled vehicle crew protection kit.12 Generally, official requirements 

documents lead to the development and production of new systems to 

address the specified required capabilities.

According to Army officials, the Army developed this ORD because 

officials recognized that operations in Haiti, Rwanda, and Somalia exposed 

troops to a civilian threat and led to concerns over countermine protection 

for supply and troop transport vehicles. The crew protection kit was to 

provide increased crew survivability in tactical wheeled vehicles against 

small arms fire, artillery/mortar fire, mines, submunitions, and IEDs where 

needed while operating throughout an area of operations. The ORD 

described the threat against U.S. forces usually consisting of small arms, 

hand portable antitank weapons such as light antitank weapons and rocket 

propelled grenades, and IEDs. According to the document, tactical 

wheeled vehicles at that time lacked armor protection to provide crew 

survivability against these threats. No existing ballistic protection systems 

had met this requirement, with one exception of the Up-Armored Heavy 

HMMWV. According to the ORD, the kit’s capabilities would enable all 

units to provide ballistic protection to crews of tactical wheeled vehicles, 

including most of the same types of trucks being armored today in the 

Middle East.

Once the ORD was approved, the Army Tank-Automotive Research, 

Development and Engineering Center built prototype armor kits for the 

HMMWV and 5-ton truck, and blast testing was also done at Fort A.P. Hill. 

12During this time, the need for and operational capabilities required of new systems were 

documented in an ORD, which is a statement containing operational effectiveness, 

suitability, and related operational parameters for a proposed concept or system. ORDs 

were approved by the Commander of TRADOC. In 2003, the ORD was replaced by the 

Capability Development Document and the Capability Production Document in accordance 

with a new joint requirements determination process as part of the Joint Capabilities 

Integration and Development System.
Page 15 GAO-06-160 Defense Logistics

The ORD specified a number of kits to be built and available to add on to 

vehicles as operations dictated the need for them. However, the Army 

never fully addressed this requirement. The need for armor kits after 

Somalia never materialized, and, according to Army officials, the ORD was 

not completed because funding was not available to fully meet the 1996 

requirement due to other higher funding priorities in the Army. According 

to one Army official, given the amount of effort expended to develop and 

approve the ORD, it is relatively uncommon for an ORD not to be funded 

through production, especially when research and development funds had 

been spent, prototypes developed, and blast testing performed.

Even though the 1996 requirement was not fully addressed, a small number 

of armor kits were produced around this time period for two types of 

trucks, the HEMTT and the PLS, to support operations in Bosnia.13

According to the Army’s Project Manager, development of these kits was 

initiated in response to an ONS from units deployed to Bosnia. The ONS 

was submitted prior to completion of the ORD. However, these kits did not 

meet all the protective requirements specified in the ORD, such as 

providing blast protection. The Bosnia kits were never installed on 

vehicles and were placed into storage because the need for them was never 

realized. 

The Army’s November 2003 armor requirement, developed in response to 

experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, addressed the same vehicles 

confronting similar threats as those found in the January 1996 ORD. This 

November 2003 requirement for the crew protection kit validated an 

operational wartime need for add-on armor kits for light, medium, and 

heavy tactical wheeled vehicles in support of OIF and OEF. The 

requirement cites the January 1996 ORD as providing the basis for add-on 

armor and extends the requirement to continue identifying alternative 

capabilities for development, testing, and procurement. The November 

2003 requirement noted that the armor kits are necessary to provide a 

capability to protect against small arms fire, IEDs, mine blast protection, 

and artillery fragmentation; and to minimize degradation of the vehicle 

mission. Army officials in theater modified the November 2003 

requirement by changing the distribution of armor and prioritizing armor 

needs; however, the amounts of armor kits required remained the same. 

Table 3 shows the 1996 and 2003 requirements, as well as the most recent 

armor requirements. 

13These kits included approximately 182 kits for the HEMTT and 32 kits for the PLS.
Page 16 GAO-06-160 Defense Logistics

Table 3: Comparison of Types of Vehicles Requiring Armor Kits in 1996, 2003, and 

2005 and Quantities of Kits Needed and Available

Source: GAO analysis of Army data.

NOTE: The kits for the HEMTT and PLS were not developed in response to the 1996 ORD. Rather, 

they were developed in response to anticipated needs for operations in Bosnia and did not meet the 

blast protection requirements specified in the ORD.

Because not all the kits required under the 1996 ORD were developed, the 

Army went into Iraq with less protective capability than it might otherwise 

have done. However, the Army’s work done in support of the ORD and the 

Bosnia kits laid a foundation to meet future truck armor requirements. For 

example, the limited number of kits developed for military operations in 

Bosnia was pulled from storage and used in Iraq. Furthermore, according 

to Army officials, the knowledge gained and the processes for design, 

research, development, and testing of these kits, as well as the kits 

themselves, were used to address and meet the need for armor during 

current operations. Based on these efforts, the Army’s Project Manager for 

truck armor in 2003 had knowledge of the concepts of designing and 

building armor kits, the necessary materials in terms of weight and 

protective capabilities, and system performance requirements and 

technical specifications for ballistic protection. In addition, the 2003 

requirement for kits cites the January 1996 ORD as providing the basis for 

add-on armor. 

Types of 

vehicles

Quantities of armor kits

1996 ORD 

requirement

Kits available as 

of November 

2003

Initial 2003

requirement

Current 2005 

requirement

5-Ton 750 0 0 2,592

HET 50 0 500 663

PLS 50 32 800 944

HEMTT 450 182 1,080 2,246

M915 200 0 250 1,805

FMTV 500 0 1,150 3,377

Tanker 0 0 0 1,192
Page 17 GAO-06-160 Defense Logistics

Army’s Awarding of 

Contracts for Less Than the 

Total Requirement 

Constrained Armor Kit 

Production

The Army’s award of armor contracts for quantities less than the total 

requirement constrained the production of armor kits. The award of 

contract quantities in amounts less than the total requirements instead of 

all at one time affected production rates and caused production schedules 

to be longer than they might otherwise have been. The award of contracts 

in this manner was, in part, a result of several increases in requirements 

over time due to changing operational conditions. Another factor that 

contributed to obtaining less than the total requirement was the delayed 

flow of funding available for armor kits.

Awarding Contracts at Less Than 

the Total Requirement 

Lengthened the Time to Meet 

Requirements

For all of the Army trucks we reviewed except for the 5-ton truck, the 

Army’s award of contracts for quantities less than the total requirement 

instead of all at one time caused production schedules to be longer than 

they might otherwise have been. Contractors tend to size their production 

levels to the contract orders they have on hand. Thus, larger contract 

quantities generally mean increased production rates. Larger up-front 

contracts can affect a contractor’s production capacity for a number of 

reasons. For example, according to one contractor producing armor kits 

for all four of the Army’s heavy trucks, ordering smaller quantities of armor 

kits caused a lack of continuity for its supply base and fluctuations in kit 

deliveries. More specifically, the contractor experienced (1) a lack of 

supplier commitment, which wavered with the uncertainty of future orders; 

(2) fluctuations in its labor force; (3) constrained ability to make process 

improvements to expedite production, such as the creation of specialized 

tooling, due to a short-term focus of work; and (4) insufficient support for 

investment and facility decisions that would have resulted in more efficient 

production operations for the contractor and its supply base.

In some cases, increases in requirements caused contracts to be awarded 

in an intermittent fashion. In other cases, funding was not available to 

award complete contract quantities to meet requirements at the time 

requirements were identified. Although it is difficult to determine the exact 

effects of intermittent contracting on the availability of armor kits, we 

identified a number of specific cases where it lengthened the production 

schedule. For example, there were breaks in production for three different 

types of truck kits (the FMTV, HEMTT, and HET) because the contractors 

had completed their current contact orders and new orders were not 

placed early enough to maintain continuous production. In one of these 

cases regarding an armor kit for the FMTV, the contractor received an 

additional contract from the Army in December 2004 for 1,049 kits as it 

neared completion of its current requirement of 771 kits. Although the new 
Page 18 GAO-06-160 Defense Logistics

requirement for additional kits was validated by the Army in April 2004, 

funding was not available to award the new contract until December 2004, 

which was not early enough to overcome the required 15-week material 

lead time. As a result, production stopped and new production did not 

resume until 2 months later. According to the contractor, production could 

have been maintained or even accelerated if the new contract had been 

awarded in time to meet the long lead time item requirements.

In the cases of the HEMTT and the HET armor kits, the production lines 

stopped when the contractor completed the current contract quantities of 

1,598 and 665 armor kits respectively. The contractor did not receive 

additional contract awards of 791 HEMTT kits and 131 HET kits until April 

2005, or about a month after completion of the previous contract quantities 

in March 2005. By that time, production had already stopped, employees 

and subcontractors were released, and equipment and facility space were 

given up for other uses. As a result, there was a two and a half month break 

in production. The reason the additional production quantities were not 

awarded earlier was that validated requirements did not increase until 

March 2005, which, according to Army Project Manager officials, was too 

late to avoid a production stoppage.

In another example of the impact of intermittent contract awards, the 

initial armor kit production contract for the M915 was awarded in April 

2004 for 250 kits, which was based on the validated Army requirement at 

the time. However, when subsequent contracts for 240 and 136 kits were 

awarded in September and October 2004 respectively, due to increasing 

Army requirements, the manufacturer, an Israeli subcontractor to the 

primary contractor, did not have sufficient capacity to keep up with the 

demand. This was due, in part, to other commitments the manufacturer 

already had for producing Marine Corps truck armor. As a result, the 

production levels for M915 kits were lower than desired based on the new 

requirements and remained so until July 2005 when the contractor was able 

to transition production from the Israeli subcontractor to its own facilities 

in the United States. According to contractor officials, if they had known in 

the beginning that the total quantities needed by the Army would have been 

as high as they were, they would have proceeded differently from the 

outset, such as using a different manufacturer.

In one instance, the quantities of contracts also adversely affected the costs 

of armor kits. Specifically, the first contract for the FMTV armor kits was 

awarded in February 2004 for 270 kits. Subsequently, in March 2004, a 

second contract was placed for 501 kits. According to the contractor, the 
Page 19 GAO-06-160 Defense Logistics

quantity in the initial contract was too low for the Army to receive the 

highest price break, which was received for the second contract. As a 

result, the first 270 kits cost the Army over $1.7 million more than if the two 

production quantities had been combined. The Army made the two orders 

separately because funding was not available to award all quantities at one 

time.

Truck Armor Requirements 

Increased Due to Changing 

Operational Conditions

The Army’s requirements for truck armor increased numerous times since 

November 2003 due to changing operational conditions. Army 

headquarters developed and approved the first requirement for truck armor 

kits in November 2003 in consultation with Army officials from the theater 

of operations. Army headquarters validated an operational wartime need 

for kits in support of OIF and other CENTCOM operations, and approved 

3,780 armor kits for medium and heavy tactical wheeled vehicles. 

According to Army officials, this requirement arose based on an 

identification of the need for truck armor and an August 2003 requirement 

from Army units in the theater for additional up-armored HMMWVs. All 

subsequent requirements for specific numbers of armor kits have been 

generated by Army theater commanders in the field and forwarded to Army 

headquarters for approval and funding. 

The Army has continued to validate additional requirements for truck 

armor as the need has evolved and increased over the course of operations 

to the present, with March 2005 being the most recent date for validated 

requirements increases. In September 2005, the total requirement for truck 

armor decreased slightly based on revised unit needs.14 Army theater level 

commanders have requested additional kits by documenting their 

requirements in ONSs. Army headquarters validated these requirements on 

several occasions between April 2004 and March 2005. Figure 2 illustrates 

the increases in the Army’s requirements for truck armor according to the 

approval of the multiple ONSs. 

14In March 2005 the Army validated a requirement for 13,377 trucks and tankers, which was 

the last validated requirement for truck armor. However, in September 2005, the total 

requirement decreased slightly to 12,819 based on revised nonvalidated needs from units in 

the theater.
Page 20 GAO-06-160 Defense Logistics

Figure 2: Army Truck Armor Requirements, November 2003 through September 

2005

Increasing requirements for truck armor from the first requirement in 

November 2003 were a direct result of operational conditions. Army 

officials from the theater of operations attributed these increasing 

requirements to the enemy’s changing tactics and the increase in frequency 

and lethality of IEDs. In addition, the number of trucks in Iraq increased 

over time, which drove a corresponding increase in truck armor 

requirements. As noted previously, changing requirements necessitated the 

Army awarding production contracts in an intermittent manner; and, in 

some cases, led directly to gaps in production levels.

0

2,000

4,000

6,000

8,000

10,000

12,000

14,000

16,000

18,000

20,000

Armor kits

Source: GAO analysis of Army data.

2003

Fiscal year

2004 2005

Sept.

Aug.

July

Ma

Apr.

May

June

r.

No

Dec.

Jan.

Feb.

v.

Oct.

Au

Sept.

g.

July

Feb.

Mar.

Apr.

May

June

Nov.

Dec.

Jan.

Tanker

M915

FMTV

5-ton

PLS

HET

HEMTT
Page 21 GAO-06-160 Defense Logistics

Incremental Funding Lagged 

Behind Requirements, Delaying 

Contract Awards

The flow of funding for truck armor kits was initially provided in amounts 

less than total requirements and lagged significantly behind validated 

requirements. As a result, the Army could not award contracts for the full 

required quantities of armor kits at the time requirements were validated. 

Instead, the Army awarded contracts as funding became available. Figure 3 

shows the availability of funding for truck armor kits as compared to armor 

kit requirements.15

Figure 3: Availability of Funding Compared to Truck Armor Requirements

Although funding was not always available to award contracts at the time 

requirements were identified, the Army did provide some advanced funding 

to the contractors to buy items with long lead times, such as steel and 

ballistic glass, to mitigate some of the effects of delayed production 

15Funding requirements and availability data provided includes armor kits for HMMWVs as 

well as medium and heavy tactical trucks.

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

Dollars in millions

Source: GAO analysis of Army data.

Fiscal year

Funding received

Funding required

2003 2004 2005

Sept.

Aug.

July

Fe

Mar.

Apr.

May

June

b.

Oct.

Nov.

Dec.

Jan.

Au

Sept.

g.

July

June

Apr

May

.

Nov.

Dec.

Jan.

Feb.

Mar.
Page 22 GAO-06-160 Defense Logistics

contracts. To do this, the Army Project Manager used funds designated for 

the installation of armor kits already under contract until sufficient armor 

kit production funding was made available. However, according to Army 

Project Manager officials, they only used this advanced funding approach 

when they were certain additional funding would be administratively 

approved, because of the risks associated with using these installation 

funds and not being able to replace them. 

We could not specifically determine why the required funds for armor kits 

were not made available when the Army first identified the requirements 

because neither the Army nor DOD could provide us with sufficient records 

to track when the Department of the Army requested funding from the 

DOD Comptroller. Special funding requests from the Army to the DOD 

Comptroller were required because funding for armor kits was not 

available in the Army’s procurement budget. According to Army officials, 

the Army requested full funding for the truck armor requirements when 

first identified, but the DOD Comptroller denied the requests and provided 

only a limited amount of funding over several months. However, the Army 

was not able to document these funding requests. 

Additionally, DOD Comptroller officials were unable to verify or document 

how much funding the Army asked for and when it was requested. DOD 

Comptroller officials further noted that although there was sufficient 

funding available in the Iraqi Freedom Fund to fund all of the truck armor 

requirements at the time they were initially identified by the Army, there 

were other competing funding priorities that would have prevented DOD 

from fully funding the entire truck armor requirement at once. Examples 

of these competing priorities include other force protection requirements 

such as the procurement of up-armored HMMWVs and night vision 

equipment, IED countermeasures, reimbursements to other coalition 

forces for logistics support, operational costs associated with deploying a 

Marine Expeditionary Force to Iraq, financing clearance of captured 

munitions, and funding for various classified programs. 

In April 2005, we reported that insufficient and delayed funding also 

contributed to critical wartime shortages of armored vehicle track shoes, 

lithium batteries, and tires. However, we could not determine why 

sufficient funding was not provided earlier because adequate 

documentation was not available to track when the Army requested the
Page 23 GAO-06-160 Defense Logistics

additional funding from DOD.16 Without formal documentation and 

communication of urgent wartime funding requirements and the 

disposition of funding decisions, the rationale for funding decisions and the 

officials and organizations accountable for making those decisions may not 

be subject to effective oversight by Congress or the Secretary of Defense. 

Material Shortages Affected 

Availability of Army Truck 

Armor Kits

Material shortages negatively impacted the Army’s ability to meet 

requirements for all of its vehicles except for the FMTV and tankers. For 

example, the contractor producing armor kits for the Army’s heavy trucks 

stated that shortages of armor-grade steel and aluminum constrained 

production rates for the HEMTT, HET, PLS, and M915 armor kits between 

July 2004 and November 2004. The shortage was alleviated through Army, 

Joint Staff, and congressional efforts to work directly with material 

suppliers to increase the amount of armor plates for the military.

In addition, shortages of material negatively impacted the production of 

M939 5-ton armor kits, which were produced by the Army depots. 

According to GSIE officials, the production capacity for 5-ton truck armor 

kits was established based on the availability of material and components 

that are used to build the armor kits. When GSIE was asked to accelerate 

the production of M939 5-ton kits, the lack of availability of certain 

materials limited GSIE’s ability to increase production levels. Examples of 

items that were difficult to obtain included several sizes and types of steel, 

door handles, and wiper components. 

Army and Marine Corps officials also found themselves in competition for 

armor contractors and materials, which exacerbated the problems with 

material shortages. For example, as mentioned previously, the initial 

manufacturer for the Army’s M915 armor kits did not have sufficient 

capacity to meet needed production levels as requirements increased. This 

was due, in part, to the fact that the company had committed most of its 

capacity to producing Marine Corps truck armor by the time additional 

Army requirements were identified. Although minor schedule 

improvements were achieved as a result of discussions and agreements on 

joint schedules between the two services, it was still insufficient to meet 

the Army’s needs. As a result, the Army moved production of the M915 to 

another company in the United States, which created further delays.

16GAO, Defense Logistics: Actions Needed to Improve the Availability of Critical Items 

during Current and Future Operations, GAO-05-275 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 8, 2005).
Page 24 GAO-06-160 Defense Logistics

Limited Installation Rates 

Constrained the Availability 

of Tanker Armor Kits 

A significant factor that affected the availability of armor kits for tankers 

was a limited installation rate. For example, the installation of add-on 

armor kits was slowed by the rate of rotation of trucks into the in-theater 

installation facilities as they returned from missions. Operational 

constraints limited the number of vehicles that could be taken out of use at 

any one time. In addition, unique requirements to coat the tankers with a 

protective chemical prior to installing armor panels also limited the 

installation rate. The primary component of the tanker armoring effort is a 

self-sealing coating material that is sprayed onto the exterior of the fuel 

tank. When a small arms round penetrates the coating material and the fuel 

tank, the hole self-seals and the fuel leak stops. The proper application of 

the chemical coating requires controlled environmental conditions, such as 

humidity and temperature, which has led to a limited number of spray 

locations accessible to the Army. Thus, although production of armor kits 

for tankers is expected to be completed by May 2006, because of these 

constraints, installation of enough kits to meet requirements is not 

expected to be finished until 8 months later in January 2007.

DOD and the Army 

Took Actions to 

Improve Truck Armor 

Availability 

DOD and the Army have taken a number of actions to improve the timely 

availability of truck armor. Some of the actions were short-term and were 

meant to address the immediate armor need for deployed forces in Iraq and 

other CENTCOM locations. Other efforts are long-term plans designed to 

improve the overall availability of truck armor for future operations. 

DOD and the Services Took 

Actions to Improve 

Availability of Truck Armor 

during Current Operations

DOD and the Army have taken a number of short-term actions to improve 

the availability of truck armor to meet the needs of forces deployed for OIF 

and other CENTCOM operations. Examples of these efforts include the 

following:

• Leveraging of available Army funds. The Army’s Project Manager for 

Tactical Vehicles took a number of steps to leverage available funding in 

an attempt to mitigate the effects of an inadequate funding flow for 

truck armor. For example, it used funding designated for future armor 

kit installations to buy long lead time materials and award some 

contracts for armor kits until additional armor kit funding could be 

made available. In addition, when the Project Manager received funding 

for armor kits from Army headquarters, it allocated the funding among 

all the armor kit contracts to maintain sufficient work flow to keep all 
Page 25 GAO-06-160 Defense Logistics

production lines open, rather than fund some truck kits to the full level 

of requirements. While these efforts may have improved the timely 

availability of armor kits, as we noted earlier, the inadequate availability 

of funding still contributed to a longer schedule in many cases.

• Early identification of Army requirements. Army headquarters 

developed the initial requirements for truck armor based on emerging 

needs before formal requirements were submitted by units in the 

theater. As noted earlier, the first requirement for truck armor was 

developed and validated by Army headquarters in November 2003, while 

the first requirements submitted from units in the theater were not 

actually validated until April 2004. As a result, the Army was able to 

begin seeking funding and awarding contracts for design and production 

of armor kits earlier than if it had waited for an official request from 

units in the theater. 

• Addition of armor installation sites. To reduce armor installation 

time, as requirements and production levels for truck armor increased, 

the Army expanded its installation capacity in the CENTCOM area of 

responsibility through the addition of installation sites, going from one 

initial facility in Kuwait to nine facilities in Kuwait, Iraq, and Afghanistan 

between August 2004 and July 2005. As indicated in figure 1, during this 

period, production levels increased dramatically from 220 kits per 

month in August 2004 to a peak level of almost 1,800 kits per month by 

May 2005. After increasing the numbers of installation facilities, 

according to Army officials, total installation capacity has grown from 

approximately 50 kits per week to more than 350 kits per week. 

• Establishment of Joint Staff fusion cell. In December 2004, the Joint 

Staff’s Directorate of Logistics established a team, called the Joint 

Armor Fusion Cell, to monitor the progress of the services’ armoring 

efforts to enhance visibility of the program to DOD and congressional 

leadership. In addition, the armor fusion cell was established to 

accelerate the availability of armor kits by identifying and fixing gaps in 

the supply chain. For example, the Joint Staff armor fusion cell, 

working with the Army, helped identify and deploy certified welders 

from the Air Force and Navy to assist with production and installation of 

armor in the United States and in the CENTCOM area of responsibility, 

thereby speeding up the availability of truck armor to the units. The cell 

also worked with the U.S. Transportation Command to increase the use 

of airlift for armor kits within the CENTCOM area of operations, which 
Page 26 GAO-06-160 Defense Logistics

reduced the need for ground transportation and increased the speed of 

deliveries to armor installation sites.

Army Has Developed a 

Long-term Plan to Address 

the Availability of Truck 

Armor for Future 

Operations

The Army is taking long-term actions to improve the availability of truck 

armor for future operations through the development of a long-term 

armoring plan. While we did not evaluate the plan’s potential for success, 

we did note it is aimed at identifying long-term requirements for truck 

armor and developing solutions to address these requirements.

The Army’s long-term plans, designed to improve the overall availability of 

truck armor for future operations, are outlined in the Army Tactical 

Wheeled Vehicle Long Term Armoring Strategy. The Army’s G8 division for

programming, analysis, and materiel integration tasked TRADOC to 

develop this plan in January 2005. The Long Term Armoring Strategy 

incorporates the Army’s plan to provide add-on armor to its tactical 

wheeled vehicle fleet. Under the plan, add-on armor will consist of two kits, 

one that includes hardware to be placed on the vehicle to receive the 

armor, and another that contains the actual armor. The plan also includes 

provisions to facilitate the production and availability of armor. Estimated 

costs for the armor are based on current armor models that use heavy 

metals, such as steel and aluminum; however, according to Army program 

office officials, they are considering the use of lighter metals for greater 

efficiency but at higher costs.

According to the Long Term Armoring Strategy, its purpose is to 

demonstrate the Army’s deliberate process to outline a path forward and 

avoid long response times for providing truck armor in the future. The plan 

further notes that the framework supports a balanced approach for 

procurement of armoring kits that mitigates risk and enhances safety and 

force protection. According to the plan, the end state is a tactical wheeled 

vehicle fleet that provides the commanders with flexibility to increase the 

protection level when needed and ensures the Army’s ability to rapidly 

acquire additional kits. The initial draft concept was completed in March 

2005 and a final plan was presented to the G8 division in June 2005. 

According to the program office, Army headquarters approved the plan in 

August 2005 with a few outstanding issues to be resolved. The necessary 

protection level for trucks is based on the Department of the Army’s 

approved threat assessment, developed by the intelligence community, 

which spans through 2018. The Long Term Armoring Strategy will be 

implemented in concert with the Army’s Tactical Wheeled Vehicle and 
Page 27 GAO-06-160 Defense Logistics

Trailer Modularity and Modernization Strategy,17 which is aimed at 

addressing the Army’s truck needs through fiscal year 2018. 

The Army’s long-term plan for add-on armor for trucks requires two kits. 

The A kit provides a basic framework of fixtures for all trucks ready to 

accept armor and includes hard to install parts and permanent mounting 

provisions for the B kit. The B kit contains the actual armor to be applied to 

all trucks fitted with an A kit and includes modular components to be 

installed and removed by two crewmen. The B kits will be procured based 

on operational and training requirements, while all trucks will be outfitted 

with A kits. The A kits will be installed by 2018 on current trucks during 

recapitalization and on newly produced vehicles at the factory. The second 

quarter of fiscal year 2006 is the program manager’s proposed deadline to 

begin installing all trucks with A kits; however, as of September 2005 the 

date was not finalized. Program officials advocate the use of lighter 

materials for producing the kits instead of the heavier metals currently 

being used. According to these officials, lighter materials like ceramics are 

more expensive but could provide greater efficiencies such as reducing the 

amount of weight on a vehicle, preventing wear and tear, and allowing for 

more weight to be apportioned for operational purposes. 

The long-term plan includes provisions to facilitate the production and 

availability of armor in the future. As part of the plan, the Army will own 

the blueprints for the armor to expand competition from multiple sources 

and avoid relying on one contractor at critical decision points when more 

kits are needed. According to Army officials, contractors currently own the 

blueprints, and the Army’s ability to buy quantities on demand could be 

restricted by the contractors’ production capabilities. Technical 

requirements to facilitate the availability of armor in the future include 

maximizing the commonality of kit components among vehicles, and 

ensuring compatibility of the A and B kits with future armor upgrades. 

17The purpose of the Army’s Tactical Wheeled Vehicle and Trailer Modularity and 

Modernization Strategy is to lay out a comprehensive strategy for meeting modularity 

requirements and modernizing the current tactical wheeled vehicle fleet. The strategy aims 

to fill shortages of vehicles through new tactical wheeled vehicle procurements; modernize 

the fleet through recapitalization of existing vehicles and acquisition of new vehicles; 

conduct future competition for certain trucks in fiscal year 2007; and use advanced concept 

and technology demonstrations and analysis of alternative results to determine whether to 

improve the future vehicle fleet by either continuing modernization or beginning a new 

program.
Page 28 GAO-06-160 Defense Logistics

Army program officials stated that preliminary budget estimates for the 

armoring plan have been developed and included in the Army’s future 

budget plans for fiscal years 2006 through 2011. However, these estimates 

are based on the costs of the current armor kits produced with heavy 

metals and do not include estimates of the costs of lighter armor as 

advocated by the program office. Final cost estimates and a decision about 

the types of armor to be used have not yet been finalized.

Conclusions A number of challenges hindered the Army’s ability to provide truck armor 

in the timeliest manner to its deployed forces operating in the Middle East. 

While some of these challenges may have resulted from operational 

conditions in the region that the Army and DOD had little control over, 

other limitations were a direct result of key decisions and ineffective 

supply processes within the Army and DOD. The availability of truck 

armor was limited by the Army’s decision not to fully fund previously 

identified requirements, numerous increases in requirements, the Army’s 

inability to timely obtain funding for current wartime needs from DOD or 

within its own budget, and limited industrial base resources. 

In our prior report examining critical supply shortages during Operation 

Iraqi Freedom, we recommended that the Army take actions to address two 

of these same issues.18 Specifically, we recommended the Army expedite 

the funding process to support timely and sufficient funding for wartime 

requirements, and assess the industrial base capacity to minimize 

acquisition delays. One of these recommendations, to assess the industrial 

base, would also apply to the Army’s approach to armoring trucks. The 

other related recommendation to improve the timeliness of the funding 

process was specific to the individual types of supplies we examined, and 

may not be directly applicable to truck armor as it was written. 

The results of both our current and prior work indicate a broader systemic 

problem of not documenting and communicating urgent wartime funding 

requirements and the disposition of funding decisions. We reported in 

April 2005 that funding delays also contributed to critical wartime 

shortages of armored vehicle track shoes, lithium batteries, and tires, but 

we could not determine why sufficient funding was not provided earlier 

because adequate documentation of funding requests was not available. 

18GAO, Defense Logistics: Actions Needed to Improve the Availability of Critical Items 

during Current and Future Operations, GAO-05-275 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 8, 2005).
Page 29 GAO-06-160 Defense Logistics

Without formal documentation and communication of urgent wartime 

funding requirements and the disposition of funding decisions, the 

rationale for funding decisions and the officials and organizations 

accountable for making those decisions may not be subject to effective 

oversight by Congress or the Secretary of Defense. It is likely DOD could 

again face urgent requirements to rapidly develop and produce materiel 

solutions to improve force capability or protection of deployed forces. 

Without improving DOD’s ability to provide that support to the warfighters 

in the timeliest manner, deployed military personnel and their missions 

may be placed at significant risk because they lack the necessary 

equipment and supplies at the critical times they may be needed.

Recommendation for 

Executive Action

To ensure funding needs for urgent wartime requirements are identified 

quickly, requests for funding are well documented, and funding decisions 

are based on risk and an assessment of the highest priority requirements, 

we recommend the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army 

to establish a process to document and communicate all urgent wartime 

funding requirements for supplies and equipment at the time they are 

identified and the disposition of funding decisions. 

Agency Comments and 

Our Evaluation

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD agreed with the intent 

of our recommendation, but stated that it believes the Army Requirements 

and Resourcing Board (AR2B) process, previously the ASPB process 

discussed earlier in this report, conforms to the process described in our 

recommendation. As noted by DOD, the AR2B is a forum where urgent 

wartime requirements are reviewed, staffed, and validated. However, as 

demonstrated by our work, once requirements are validated, funding must 

be made available to execute programs to respond to those requirements. 

When sufficient funding is not available in the Army’s budget for the 

validated requirement, the Army must seek additional funding through 

DOD. Because, as we noted in this report and in April 2005, funding 

requests from the Army to DOD to resource validated requirements and the 

corresponding decisions as to the amount and timing of funding to be 

provided were not adequately documented, we were unable to determine 

the reasons why funding was not made available to respond to urgent 

wartime requirements as needed. In addition, in April 2005 we also 

reported that funding requests for critical wartime supplies such as 

armored vehicle track shoes, lithium batteries, and tires also could not be 

tracked from the Army Materiel Command, where they originated, to Army 
Page 30 GAO-06-160 Defense Logistics

headquarters for validation, which precluded our ability to determine why 

funding for these items lagged behind the time the need was identified. We 

continue to believe these events in the funding process for urgent wartime 

requirements must be fully documented to provide effective program 

oversight and to ensure funding decisions are made based on risk and an 

assessment of the highest priority requirements. DOD’s comments are 

reprinted in appendix III. DOD also provided technical comments that 

have been incorporated where appropriate.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 

committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretaries of the Army and the 

Navy and the Commandant of the Marine Corps; and the Director of the 

Office of Management and Budget. We will also make copies available to 

others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge 

on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff members have any questions regarding this report, 

please contact me at (202) 512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov. Contact points for 

our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 

the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this 

report are listed in appendix IV.

William M. Solis, Director

Defense Capabilities and Management
Page 31 GAO-06-160 Defense Logistics

Appendix I

Scope and Methodology AAppenednxidexiIs

To address our objectives, we examined the Army’s programs to produce 

and install armor for each of its medium and heavy tactical wheeled 

vehicles, or trucks, operating in the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) 

area of responsibility, which included Iraq and Afghanistan.1

 The Army 

trucks we examined included the family of medium tactical vehicles 

(FMTV), heavy expanded mobility tactical truck (HEMTT), heavy 

equipment transporter (HET), palletized load system (PLS), M915 truck 

tractor, M939 5-ton tactical truck, and fuel tankers. Descriptions of each of 

these trucks along with detailed information on the availability of armor for 

each truck are included in appendix II. 

To determine the extent to which truck armor was produced and installed 

to meet identified requirements, we interviewed DOD and Army officials 

involved in identifying armor requirements, providing funding, and 

acquiring truck armor for deployed forces. We also met with truck armor 

contractors from the industrial base. A complete list of the DOD and other 

organizations that we met with during this review is found in table 4. We 

also collected and analyzed armor supply data such as requirements, 

funding levels, contract order awards, production levels, and installations 

for the period November 2003 (when truck armor requirements were first 

formally identified) through September 2005, which we obtained from the 

Army based on source documents. We considered the armor requirement 

met for each type of truck when the quantity of armor kits installed onto 

vehicles equaled the requirement. We did not, however, visit the 

CENTCOM area of responsibility to validate the extent to which armor kits 

had been installed and were actually in use by trucks.

1

The Army also developed armor for HMMWVs, a light tactical wheeled vehicle. We 

examined issues affecting the timely production of armor for HMMWVs in our prior report 

on wartime supply availability, so we did not include them in this review. See GAO, Defense 

Logistics: Actions Needed to Improve the Availability of Critical Items during Current 

and Future Operations, GAO-05-275 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 8, 2005).
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 32 GAO-06-160 Defense Logistics

Table 4: Organizations Interviewed during Review

Source: GAO.

To determine what factors affected the time to provide truck armor to 

deployed forces, we analyzed the armor supply data we collected to 

identify trends and isolate factors that impacted the timeliness of 

producing and installing armor. We also met with and collected additional 

information from DOD, Army and armor contractor officials involved with 

the armor acquisition programs to evaluate the significance of these factors 

and to determine the extent of their impact on the availability of truck 

armor.

To determine what actions DOD and the Army have taken to improve the 

availability of truck armor for current and future operations, we 

interviewed military service and Joint Staff personnel to identify short- and 

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Arlington, Va. 

Joint Staff, Directorate of Logistics, Arlington, Va. 

U.S. Army

 Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management and Comptroller, Arlington, Va. 

 Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff (Logistics), Arlington, Va.

 Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff (Operations), Arlington, Va. 

 Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisitions, Logistics, and Technology, Arlington, Va.

 Program Executive Office Combat Support and Combat Service Support, 

Project Manager Tactical Vehicles, Warren, Mich.

U.S. Army Central Command/Coalition Forces Land Component Command (Logistics), Fort McPherson, Ga. 

 U.S. Army Materiel Command

 Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff (Operations), Fort Belvoir, Va.

 Tank-automotive and Armaments Command, Warren, Mich. 

 Ground Systems Industrial Enterprise, Rock Island, Ill.

 U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Va.

 U.S. Army Transportation Center, Fort Eustiss, Va.

 U.S. Army Reserve Command, Fort McPherson, Ga.

National Guard Bureau, Arlington, Va.

Defense Contract Management Agency, District West, Phoenix, Ariz.

Armor Holdings, Inc. and Simula, Inc., Phoenix, Ariz.

Stewart and Stevenson, Inc., Sealy, Tex.

Radian, Inc., Troy, Mich.

VSE Corporation, Alexandria, Va.
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 33 GAO-06-160 Defense Logistics

long-term efforts to address supply shortages. We also reviewed 

documentation related to addressing future truck armor needs. However, 

we did not evaluate the identified solutions’ potential for success. 

We assessed the reliability of the truck armor supply data we obtained for 

this review by interviewing agency officials knowledgeable about the data 

and corroborating it with other information gathered from other military 

service organizations and armor contractors, and by reviewing existing 

documentation about the data and the sources that produced the data. We 

determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this 

report. We performed our audit from April 2005 through January 2006 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Page 34 GAO-06-160 Defense Logistics

Appendix II

Assessment of Truck Armoring Efforts ApendxiI

We assessed the armoring efforts for each of the following medium and 

heavy trucks: heavy expanded mobility tactical trucks, heavy equipment 

transporters, palletized load systems, M939 5-ton trucks, family of medium 

tactical vehicles, M915 truck family, and tankers. For these seven types of 

trucks we reviewed, each assessment provides the status of the armoring 

efforts at the time of our review. The profile presents a general description 

of the truck and the approach to developing armor solutions. The 

assessments also include our evaluation of the extent to which armor kits 

were produced and installed to meet identified requirements and the 

significant factors that affected armor availability.

The Army’s efforts to armor its heavy and medium tactical wheeled 

vehicles have been hindered by awarding contracts for quantities less than 

the total requirement, material shortages, and a limited rate of installation. 

The Army’s efforts to armor its trucks experienced 12 to 18 month delays 

between when initial requirements were identified and when the initial 

requirements were met, although requirements for all vehicles increased 

over time such that by the time the initial requirements were met, the 

actual requirements were in excess of that initial amount. The schedule for 

contract orders constrained the Army’s ability to meet requirements for all 

vehicles except 5-ton trucks. Material shortages negatively impacted the 

Army’s ability to meet requirements for all vehicles except for medium 

tactical vehicles and tankers. Limited installation rates constrained the 

availability of tanker armor.

Heavy Expanded 

Mobility Tactical Truck 

The Army uses its heavy expanded mobility tactical truck (HEMTT) to 

provide transport capabilities for the resupply of various combat vehicles 

and weapons systems. Figure 4 shows an example of a HEMTT. To protect 

the HEMTT crew from enemy fire in Iraq, the Army contracted with Simula 

Inc. to develop and build add-on armor kits for installation on HEMTTs. 

The Army’s armoring program involves applying armor kits to 2,705 

HEMTTs. 
Appendix II

Assessment of Truck Armoring Efforts

Page 35 GAO-06-160 Defense Logistics

Figure 4: Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck

Simula developed about 180 armor kits for the HEMTT in 1996 to support 

operations in the Balkans. However, the kits were placed in storage and 

never actually used. When armor requirements were identified for 

operations in Iraq, the Army and Simula retrieved and tested the stored kits 

and subsequently shipped them to southwest Asia for use in Iraq. In 

February 2004, the Army contracted with Simula to begin production of 

new kits. 

Extent Armor Kits Were 

Produced and Installed to 

Meet Identified 

Requirements 

Requirements for 1,080 HEMTT armor kits were first identified in 

November 2003, but a sufficient number of kits to meet that requirement 

were not installed until February 2005, or 15 months after the first 

requirement was established. Identified requirements continued to grow to 

a level of 2,430 armor kits by March 2005, but dropped slightly in 

September 2005 to 2,246. However, as of September 2005 the total amount 

of kits installed was 2,088, or 158 fewer than the quantity required. Figure 5 

compares the time elapsed from the identification of armor kit 

requirements to the time when kits were produced and installed. According 

Source: U.S. Army.
Appendix II

Assessment of Truck Armoring Efforts

Page 36 GAO-06-160 Defense Logistics

to Army officials, the total number of required armor kits was installed by 

December 2005. 

Figure 5: Comparison of HEMTT Armor Kit Requirements to Kits Produced and 

Installed

Significant Factors 

Affecting Availability of 

Armor Kits

Two significant factors affected the availability of armor kits for the 

HEMTT. First, the Army’s lack of timeliness of contract awards over the 

life of the program constrained the overall production schedule. Second, a 

shortage of key materials, specifically steel and aluminum negatively 

impacted the contractor’s ability to maximize production in the early stages 

of the program. 

Contracts Constrained 

Production

The Army issued five contracts for HEMTT armor kits, which affected the 

contractor’s ability to produce more kits faster. For example, according to 

contractor officials, they have not had capacity constraints in the building 

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

3,000

Armor kits

Source: GAO analysis of Army data.

Fiscal year

Requirements

Production

Installations

2003 2004 2005

Au

Sept.

g.

July

Feb.

Mar.

Apr.

May

June

D

Jan.

ec.

Au

Sept.

Oct.

Nov.

g.

July

M

June

ay

Nov.

Dec.

Jan.

Feb.

Mar.

Apr.
Appendix II

Assessment of Truck Armoring Efforts

Page 37 GAO-06-160 Defense Logistics

of HEMTT armor kits; however, they sized production capacity to meet the 

quantities in the contract that the contractor had been awarded. Therefore, 

production levels were lower than they could have been if the contractor 

had received a contract for larger quantities of kits upfront, which 

prevented production of more of the kits sooner. One reason for the 

Army’s use of a contract in this manner was the fact that funding was 

received in amounts less than the total requirements and initially lagged 

several months behind requirements. As shown in figure 6, the availability 

of funding affected the pace of contract awards. 

Figure 6: Comparison of HEMTT Armor Kit Requirements to Kits Funded and 

Ordered

Another reason for the lower quantity of contract orders was the changing 

requirements for HEMTT armor kits. For example, armor kit production 

output for the HEMTT dropped to zero in April and May because the 

contractor had completed production for the current requirement. 

However, subsequent contract orders were awarded after the contractor 

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

3,000

Armor kits

Source: GAO analysis of Army data.

Fiscal year

Requirements

Funded

Ordered

2003 2004 2005

Au

Sept.

g.

July

Feb.

Mar.

Apr.

May

June

D

Jan.

ec.

Au

Sept.

Oct.

Nov.

g.

July

M

June

ay

Nov.

Dec.

Jan.

Feb.

Mar.

Apr.
Appendix II

Assessment of Truck Armoring Efforts

Page 38 GAO-06-160 Defense Logistics

had ceased production. By the time that the contractor had received the 

last two contracts for 791 and 319 HEMTT armor kits, respectively, 

production had already stopped, employees and sub-contractors were 

released, and equipment and facility space were given up for other uses. 

Consequently, production of the 791 and 319 kits had to wait about two 

months until the contractor could restart this industrial base. 

Although an additional requirement had been identified in March 2005, a 

contract to meet this requirement was not awarded until April 2005, which 

was not soon enough to prevent the stoppage of the production line. 

According to the Army’s program manager, to prevent a production 

stoppage the requirement would have had to be identified and the contract 

order issued several months earlier. 

Material Shortages Negatively 

Impacted Production

A shortage of armor materials, specifically steel and aluminum, negatively 

impacted the HEMTT armor kit program. Shortages of high hard armor 

steels and aluminum negatively affected the start up and pace of 

production through the end of 2004. The material shortages were 

eventually rectified by the intervention of the Army’s Tactical Wheeled 

Vehicle Office to set priorities and by various congressional staff appealing 

directly to the material suppliers. 

Heavy Equipment 

Transporter

The heavy equipment transporter (HET) is a system used by the Army to 

transport, deploy, recover, and evacuate main battle tanks and other heavy 

tracked and wheeled vehicles to and from the battlefield. The HET system 

consists of a truck tractor and HET trailer, as shown in figure 7. The Army’s 

armoring effort involves applying armor to a total of 796 HETs. In April 

2004, the Army contracted with Simula Inc. to begin producing armor kits 

for the HET. 
Appendix II

Assessment of Truck Armoring Efforts

Page 39 GAO-06-160 Defense Logistics

Figure 7: Heavy Equipment Transporter

Extent Armor Kits Were 

Produced and Installed to 

Meet Identified 

Requirements 

Requirements for 500 HET armor kits were first identified in November 

2003; however, a sufficient number of kits to meet that requirement were 

not installed until March 2005, or 16 months after the first requirement was 

established. Identified requirements continued to grow to 758 by March 

2005, but dropped in September 2005 to 663. As of September 2005 the 

total number of kits installed was 700, or 37 greater than the quantity 

required. Figure 8 compares the time elapsed from the identification of 

armor kit requirements to the time when kits were produced and installed. 

Source: U.S. Army.
Appendix II

Assessment of Truck Armoring Efforts

Page 40 GAO-06-160 Defense Logistics

Figure 8: Comparison of HET Armor Kit Requirements to Kits Produced and 

Installed 

Significant Factors 

Affecting Availability of 

Armor Kits

Two significant factors affected the contractor’s ability to produce armor 

kits for the HET. First, the award of contracts over the armoring program’s 

life and a lack of contractor visibility into upcoming contracts affected HET 

production. Second, the HET armoring program was also negatively 

impacted by a material shortage. 

Contracts Constrained 

Production

The Army issued four contracts for the HET, which lagged behind 

requirements. This limited the contractor’s ability to maximize production 

of HET kits. Specifically, contractor officials told us that they did not have 

capacity constraints in the building of HET armor kits; however, they sized 

production capacity to meet the quantities in the contract orders that they 

had been awarded. Therefore, production levels were lower than they 

could have been if the contractor had received contract orders for larger 

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

Armor kits

Source: GAO analysis of Army data.

Fiscal year

Requirements

Production

Installations

2003 2004 2005

Au

Sept.

g.

July

Feb.

Mar.

Apr.

May

June

Oct.

Nov.

Dec.

Jan.

Au

Sept.

g.

July

Feb.

Mar.

Apr.

May

June

Nov.

Dec.

Jan.
Appendix II

Assessment of Truck Armoring Efforts

Page 41 GAO-06-160 Defense Logistics

quantities of kits upfront, which prevented production of more of the kits 

sooner. Significant reasons for awarding less than the total requirements 

were changing requirements and delayed and less than the total funding. 

Figure 9 demonstrates the relationship among timing of requirements, 

funding, and contracts. 

Figure 9: Comparison of HET Armor Kit Requirements to Kits Funded and Ordered

A lack of contractor visibility into upcoming contract awards also affected 

HET production. Specifically, the Army awarded a contract for 131 

additional HET add-on-armor kits in April 2005. However, in February 2005 

the contractor’s supply base had completed production for HET 

components related to the previous contract order for 66 HET kits. 

Consequently, the supply base required two months to reinitiate production 

of these components from a cold start. If the contractor had had visibility 

into the upcoming contract, it could have maintained the needed supply 

base and reduced production time for the additional 131 HETs by 2 months. 

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

Armor kits

Source: GAO analysis of Army data.

Fiscal year

Requirements

Funded

Ordered

2003 2004 2005

Au

Sept.

g.

July

Feb.

Mar.

Apr.

May

June

Oct.

Nov.

Dec.

Jan.

Au

Sept.

g.

July

Feb.

Mar.

Apr.

May

June

Nov.

Dec.

Jan.
Appendix II

Assessment of Truck Armoring Efforts

Page 42 GAO-06-160 Defense Logistics

Material Shortages Negatively 

Impacted Production 

The HET armoring program was also negatively impacted by a material 

shortage. The shortage of materials, specifically of high-hard armor steels 

and aluminum, affected the start up of heavy tactical vehicle contract 

orders and the pace of production through the end of 2004. The material 

shortages were eventually rectified by the intervention of the Army’s 

Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Office to set priorities and by various 

congressional staff appealing directly to the material suppliers. 

Palletized Load System The Army’s palletized load system (PLS) performs long distance and local 

haul, and unit resupply in the tactical environment to support combat units. 

The PLS is supposed to facilitate the rapid movement of combat configured 

loads of ammunition as well as all classes of supplies and containers. The 

PLS consists of a truck with self-loading capabilities and a trailer, as shown 

in figure 10. 

Figure 10: Palletized Load System

According to contractor officials, the Army’s Tank-Automotive Research, 

Development and Engineering Center had developed and built around 30 

armored kits to support operations in the Balkans; however, the kits were 

placed in storage and never used. Subsequently, when armor requirements 

Source: U.S. Army.
Appendix II

Assessment of Truck Armoring Efforts

Page 43 GAO-06-160 Defense Logistics

were identified for operations in Iraq, the Army retrieved the kits from 

storage and shipped them to southwest Asia for use in Iraq. In February 

2004, the Army issued contract orders to Simula Inc. to produce additional 

PLS armor kits. Simula Inc. has completed production of a total of 1,282 

armor kits, which satisfies the current requirement for 914 armor kits and 

provides 368 spare PLS armor kits for future requirements. 

Extent Armor Kits Were 

Produced and Installed to 

Meet Identified 

Requirements 

Requirements for 800 PLS armor kits were first identified in November 

2003; however, a sufficient number of kits to meet that requirement were 

not installed until May 2005, or 18 months after the first requirement was 

established. By March 2005, the identified requirements had increased by 

114, which were met in July 2005. In September 2005, the identified 

requirements increased again by 30, which were met in September 2005. 

Figure 11 compares the time elapsed from the identification of armor kit 

requirements to the time when kits were produced and installed. In 

anticipation of a greater requirement, the Army program office ordered 338 

kits above the Army’s current requirement. 
Appendix II

Assessment of Truck Armoring Efforts

Page 44 GAO-06-160 Defense Logistics

Figure 11: Comparison of PLS Armor Kit Requirements to Kits Produced and 

Installed

Significant Factors 

Affecting Availability of 

Armor Kits

Two significant factors affected the availability of armor kits for the PLS. 

First, the Army’s use of contracts for quantities less than total requirements 

over the life of the program constrained the overall production schedule. 

Second, a shortage of key materials, specifically steel and aluminum, 

negatively impacted the contractor’s ability to maximize production. 

Contracts Constrained 

Production

The Army issued four contracts for PLS kits, which initially lagged behind 

requirements and affected the contractor’s ability to maximize the 

production of PLS kits. According to contractor officials, they have not had 

capacity constraints in the building of PLS armor kits; however, they sized 

production capacity to meet the quantities in the contracts that the 

contractor had been issued. Therefore, production levels were lower than 

they could have been if the contractor had received contracts for larger 

quantities of kits upfront, which prevented the production of more of the 

0

200

400

600

800

1,000

1,200

1,400

Armor kits

Source: GAO analysis of Army data.

Fiscal year

Requirements

Production

Installations

2003 2004 2005

Au

Sept.

g.

July

Fe

Mar.

Apr.

May

June

b.

D

Jan.

ec.

Au

Sept.

Oct.

Nov.

g.

July

Feb.

Mar.

Apr.

May

June

Nov.

Dec.

Jan.
Appendix II

Assessment of Truck Armoring Efforts

Page 45 GAO-06-160 Defense Logistics

kits sooner. Significant reasons for awards for less than the total 

requirements were changing requirements and delayed and less than total 

funding. Figure 12 demonstrates the relationship among timing of 

requirements, funding, and contracts.

Figure 12: Comparison of PLS Armor Kit Requirements to Kits Funded and Ordered

Material Shortages Negatively 

Impacted Production

The PLS armoring program was also negatively impacted by material 

shortages. The shortage of materials, specifically of high-hard armor steels 

and aluminum, affected the start up of heavy tactical vehicle contract 

orders and the pace of production through the end of 2004. The material 

shortages were eventually rectified by the intervention of the Army’s 

Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Office to set priorities and by various 

Congressional staff appealing directly to the material suppliers. 

0

200

400

600

800

1,000

1,200

1,400

Armor kits

Source: GAO analysis of Army data.

Fiscal year

Requirements

Funded

Ordered

2003 2004 2005

Au

Sept.

g.

July

Feb.

Mar.

Apr.

May

June

N

Dec.

Jan.

ov.

Oct.

Au

Sept.

g.

July

Feb.

Mar.

Apr.

May

June

Nov.

Dec.

Jan.
Appendix II

Assessment of Truck Armoring Efforts

Page 46 GAO-06-160 Defense Logistics

M939 5-Ton Truck The Army’s M939 5-ton tactical truck is a general-purpose military vehicle, 

primarily designed for tactical, off-road use. The M-939 is a 5-ton capacity, 

six-wheel drive cargo truck used for transportation of all types of supplies 

and comes in various vehicle types, including a cargo truck, dump truck, 

and wrecker. Figure 13 shows an example of an M-939 5-ton truck.

Figure 13: M939 5-Ton Truck 

The M939 5-ton truck armoring effort includes manufacturing armoring kits 

for 3,000 5-ton trucks at six army facilities through a program manager 

agreement with the Army’s Ground Systems Industrial Enterprise (GSIE).1

1

GSIE is composed of Anniston Army Depot, Red River Army Depot, Sierra Army Depot, 

Rock Island Arsenal, Watervliet Arsenal, the Lima Tank Plant (a government-owned, 

contractor-operated facility), and a business center staff located at TACOM Rock Island. 

GSIE’s objective is to operate as a single business unit, efficiently utilizing the industrial 

capabilities of each installation, while simultaneously transforming those capabilities to 

meet the needs of the Army. 

Source: U.S. Army.
Appendix II

Assessment of Truck Armoring Efforts

Page 47 GAO-06-160 Defense Logistics

GSIE began producing truck kits in December 2004 and completed the last 

kits in July 2005. 

Extent Armor Kits Were 

Produced and Installed to 

Meet Identified 

Requirements 

Requirements for 2,229 M939 5-ton truck armor kits were first identified in 

April 2004; however, a sufficient number of kits to meet that requirement 

were not produced until June 2005, or 14 months after the first requirement 

was established. As of September 2005, 2,224 kits had been installed. 

Identified requirements grew to 3,073 by August 2004, but dropped 2,688 by 

March 2005, and dropped again slightly in September 2005 to 2,592. By 

June 2005 a sufficient quantity of kits had been produced to meet those 

requirements. Figure 14 compares the time elapsed from the identification 

of armor kit requirements to the time when kits were produced and 

installed. The Army estimated the required quantity of kits would have 

been installed by January 2006. According to GSIE officials, GSIE does not 

anticipate any further production orders for the M939 armor kits. 
Appendix II

Assessment of Truck Armoring Efforts

Page 48 GAO-06-160 Defense Logistics

Figure 14: Comparison of M939 5-Ton Truck Armor Kit Requirements to Kits 

Produced and Installed

Material Shortages 

Negatively Impacted 

Availability of Armor Kits

Shortages of material negatively impacted the production of M939 5-ton 

armor kits. According to GSIE officials, the production capacity for the 5-

ton truck armor kits was established based on the availability of material 

and components that are used to build the armor kits. When GSIE was 

asked to accelerate the production of M939 5-ton kits, the lack of 

availability of certain materials limited GSIE’s ability to increase the 

production quantity of the armor kit. Examples of items that were difficult 

to obtain included armor grade steel, door handles, and wiper components. 

Family of Medium 

Tactical Vehicles

The Army’s family of medium tactical vehicles (FMTV) addresses medium 

tactical-vehicle requirements for unit mobility and unit resupply, and 

transportation of equipment and personnel. The FMTV consists of the Light 

Medium Tactical Vehicle, which has a 2.5-ton capacity, and the Medium 

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

3,000

Armor kits

Source: GAO analysis of Army data.

Fiscal year

Requirements

Production

Installations

2003 2004 2005

Au

Sept.

g.

July

Feb.

Mar.

Apr.

May

June

D

Jan.

ec.

Au

Sept.

Oct.

Nov.

g.

July

M

June

ay

Nov.

Dec.

Jan.

Feb.

Mar.

Apr.
Appendix II

Assessment of Truck Armoring Efforts

Page 49 GAO-06-160 Defense Logistics

Tactical Vehicle, which has a 5-ton capacity. Variants of the FMTV include 

cargo trucks and tractor, van, wrecker, and dump truck models. The FMTV 

armoring effort involves producing a total of 3,890 armor kits.

The FMTV armoring production is split between two separate contractors, 

Radian Inc. and Stewart and Stevenson Inc. The Army’s Tank-Automotive 

Research, Development and Engineering Center designed and produced a 

small number (approximately 35) of FMTV armor kits with components 

that bolt onto the cab. In March 2003, the Army arranged for Radian to help 

with the installation of these kits onto vehicles. In February 2004, Radian 

received a contract to produce 270 kits based on the Army design. The kit 

being produced by Radian is called the Radian Armor Crew Kit (RACK). 

Figure 15 shows an example of an FMTV RACK truck. Stewart and 

Stevenson produces an armored cab, called the Low Signature Armored 

Cab (LSAC), that replaces the FMTV cab in its entirety. Figure 16 shows an 

example of an FMTV LSAC truck. On its own initiative, in 2002, Stewart and 

Stevenson developed an FMTV armored cab design to protect against mine 

blasts. Subsequent to its first armored cab design, Stewart and Stevenson 

modified its design based on the emerging threats in Iraq, and in October 

2004, after completing design and testing, received its initial contract from 

the Army to produce 385 LSAC cabs. 
Appendix II

Assessment of Truck Armoring Efforts

Page 50 GAO-06-160 Defense Logistics

Figure 15: FMTV RACK Truck

Source: U.S. Army.
Appendix II

Assessment of Truck Armoring Efforts

Page 51 GAO-06-160 Defense Logistics

Figure 16: FMTV LSAC Truck

Extent Armor Kits Were 

Produced and Installed to 

Meet Identified 

Requirements 

Requirements for 1,150 FMTV armor kits were first identified in November 

2003; however, a sufficient number of kits to meet that requirement were 

not installed until March 2005, or 16 months after the first requirement was 

established. Identified requirements continued to grow to 3,335 by March 

2005, and again to 3,377 by September 2005. However, as of September 

2005 only 3,053 RACK and LSAC kits had been installed, or 324 fewer than 

the quantity required. Figure 17 compares the time elapsed from the 

identification of armor kit requirements to the time when kits were 

produced and installed. According to Army officials, the total number of 

required armor kits was installed by December 2005. 

Source: U.S. Army.
Appendix II

Assessment of Truck Armoring Efforts

Page 52 GAO-06-160 Defense Logistics

Figure 17: Comparison of FMTV Armor Kit Requirements to Kits Produced and 

Installed

Contracts Constrained 

Production

Orders for FMTV armor kits were awarded for less than the total 

requirement and lagged behind requirements. These contracts slowed 

production of armor kits for both FMTV contractors. For Radian, there 

was a complete break in production because the final contract for 1,049 

FMTV armor kits was received after its long lead time for ordering items 

needed to maintain continuous production. According to the Radian 

officials, production could have been maintained or even accelerated if the 

requirements had been identified and funding provided in time to meet the 

long lead time. However, the contractor did not have any visibility into the 

pending requirements and was told by the Army that there would be no 

further contracts for kits. In addition, according to a Stewart and 

Stevenson official, if they had been awarded the contract for the final 292 

armor kits in the March/April 2005 time frame, they could have finished 

producing the kits in the July/August 2005 time frame, or 3 months earlier 

than the October/November 2005 time frame when the kits were estimated 

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

3,000

3,500

4,000

Armor kits

Source: GAO analysis of Army data.

Fiscal year

Requirements

Production

Installations

2003 2004 2005

Au

Sept.

g.

July

Feb.

Mar.

Apr.

May

June

Oct.

Nov.

Dec.

Jan.

Au

Sept.

g.

July

Feb.

Mar.

Apr.

May

June

Nov.

Dec.

Jan.
Appendix II

Assessment of Truck Armoring Efforts

Page 53 GAO-06-160 Defense Logistics

to be completed. Significant reasons for ordering in this manner were 

changing requirements and delayed and less than total funding. Figure 18 

demonstrates the relationship between timing of requirements, funding, 

and contracts. 

Figure 18: Comparison of FMTV Armor Kit Requirements to Kits Funded and 

Ordered

Contracts Affected Price The award of contracts in quantities less than total requirements resulted in 

the Army not receiving the best price available for the RACK. The Army 

ordered FMTV kits from Radian in increments of 270 and 501 in February 

2004 and March 2004, respectively. The 270 kits that the government 

ordered did not allow for receiving the highest price break for production 

quantities, while the 501 kits the government ordered allowed for the best 

price break available. For the 272 kit contract, the cost was about $51,603 

for each kit, and for the 501 kit contract, the cost was $45,271 for each kit, a 

difference of $6,332 per kit. According to the Army program officials, the 

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

3,000

3,500

4,000

Armor kits

Source: GAO analysis of Army data.

 Fiscal year

Requirements

Funded

Ordered

2003 2004 2005

Au

Sept.

g.

July

Feb.

Mar.

Apr.

May

June

Oct.

Nov.

Dec.

Jan.

Au

Sept.

g.

July

Feb.

Mar.

Apr.

May

June

Nov.

Dec.

Jan.
Appendix II

Assessment of Truck Armoring Efforts

Page 54 GAO-06-160 Defense Logistics

reason there were two contract awards was that funding was not available 

for the full quantity in February 2004. 

M915 Truck Family The Army’s family of M915 trucks comprises highway tractors used 

primarily for the long distance transport of containers. The M915 is very 

similar to commercial tractor-trailer trucks. Figure 19 illustrates an M915 

truck. To protect the M915 crew from enemy fire in Iraq, the Army 

contracted with Simula Inc., Radian Inc. and Armor Works Inc. to develop 

and build add-on armor kits. The Army’s armoring program involves 

producing armor kits for 2,026 M915s.

Figure 19: M915 Truck Tractor

Source: U.S. Army.
Appendix II

Assessment of Truck Armoring Efforts

Page 55 GAO-06-160 Defense Logistics

Extent Armor Kits Were 

Produced and Installed to 

Meet Identified 

Requirements 

Requirements for 250 M915 truck armor kits were first identified in 

November 2003, but a sufficient number of kits to meet that requirement 

were not installed until March 2005, or 16 months after the first 

requirement was established. Identified requirements continued to grow to 

1,877 armor kits by March 2005, but dropped slightly in September 2005 to 

1,805. However, as of September 2005 the total number of kits installed 

was 1,295, or 510 fewer than the quantity required. Figure 20 compares the 

time elapsed from the identification of armor kit requirements to the time 

when kits were produced and installed. Army officials estimated that the 

total number of required armor kits would have been installed by January 

2006. 

Figure 20: Comparison of M915 Family of Trucks Armor Kit Requirements to Kits 

Produced and Installed

0

200

400

600

800

1,000

1,200

1,400

1,600

1,800

2,000

Armor kits

Source: GAO analysis of Army data.

Fiscal year

Requirements

Production

Installations

2003 2004 2005

Au

Sept.

g.

July

Feb.

Mar.

Apr.

May

June

Oct.

Nov.

Dec.

Jan.

Au

Sept.

g.

July

M

June

ay

Nov.

Dec.

Jan.

Feb.

Mar.

Apr.
Appendix II

Assessment of Truck Armoring Efforts

Page 56 GAO-06-160 Defense Logistics

Significant Factors 

Affecting Availability of 

Armor Kits

Two significant factors affected the availability of armor kits for the M915. 

First, the Army’s award of contracts for less than the total requirement over 

the life of the program constrained production. Second, a shortage of key 

materials, specifically steel and aluminum, negatively impacted the 

contractor’s ability to maximize production. 

Contracts Constrained 

Production

Contracts for the M915 truck armor kits were awarded in quantities less 

than the total requirement and generally lagged behind requirements. This 

manner of contracting for M915 armor kits constrained production, 

particularly for Simula. The Army issued four contracts to Simula for 1,228 

of the M915 armor kits over a 9-month period. According to Simula 

officials, they subcontracted the workload to Plasan Sasa in Israel based on 

the first contract of 250. However, subsequent to the first contract, the 

Army validated additional requirements of 1,627 kits between April 2004 

and March 2005. However, Simula was not aware when the first contract 

was awarded that the total quantities could eventually exceed 1,600. Had 

the contractor been aware of this, it would have proceeded differently from 

the outset, such as using a different manufacturer. By the time the 

additional contracts came into Simula, Plasan Sasa was facing capacity 

constraints in the production of the M915 armor kits. Unable to overcome 

the capacity constraints at Plasan Sasa, Simula negotiated with Plasan Sasa 

to bring some of the M915 production to the United States. In total, Simula 

arranged to complete 738 of the 1,228 M915 armor kits in the United States. 

Significant reasons for awarding contracts in this manner were changing 

requirements and delayed and less than total funding. Figure 21 

demonstrates the relationship among timing of requirements, funding, and 

contracts.
Appendix II

Assessment of Truck Armoring Efforts

Page 57 GAO-06-160 Defense Logistics

Figure 21: Comparison of M915 Armor Kit Requirements to Kits Funded and 

Ordered

Material Shortages Negatively 

Impacted Production

Shortages of strategic armor materials negatively impacted M915 armor kit 

production. Shortages of high-hard armor steels and aluminum affected 

the start up of contract orders and the pace of production through the end 

of 2004. The material shortages were eventually rectified by the 

intervention of the Army’s Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Office to set priorities 

and by various congressional staff appeals directly to the material 

suppliers. 

Tankers The Army uses its tankers to haul and dispense bulk fuel. There are four 

models of fuel tankers involved in the Army’s armoring program: the M967, 

the M969, the M978, and the M1062. Figure 22 shows an example of an 

M969 tanker. The primary component of the tanker armoring effort is a selfsealing coating material that is sprayed onto the exterior of the fuel tank. 

When a small arms round penetrates the coating material and the fuel tank, 

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

Armor kits

Source: GAO analysis of Army data.

Fiscal year

Requirements

Funded

Ordered

2003 2004 2005

Au

Sept.

g.

July

May

June

D

Jan.

Feb.

Mar.

Apr.

ec.

Au

Sept.

Oct.

Nov.

g.

July

M

June

ay

Nov.

Dec.

Jan.

Feb.

Mar.

Apr.
Appendix II

Assessment of Truck Armoring Efforts

Page 58 GAO-06-160 Defense Logistics

the hole self-seals and the fuel leak is stopped within minutes. The second 

component of tanker armoring comprises armor panel kits mounted at 

select locations on the fuel tanker to protect critical equipment not 

protected by the coating material. VSE Corporation is applying the selfsealing coating to the tankers and is manufacturing the armor kit for the 

M967, the M969, and the M1062 tankers. Oshkosh Truck Corporation is 

manufacturing the armor kit for the M978 tanker. 

Figure 22: An M969 Tanker

Extent Armor Kits Were 

Produced and Installed to 

Meet Identified 

Requirements 

Requirements for armoring 371 tankers were first identified in August 2004; 

however, a sufficient number of kits to meet that requirement were not 

produced and installed until August 2005, 12 months after the initial 

requirement was identified. Identified requirements have continued to 

grow to 1,375 armor kits by January 2005, but dropped in September 2005 

to 1,192. However, as of September 2005 the total amount of armor kits 

installed was 443, or 749 fewer than the quantity required. Figure 23 

compares the time elapsed from the identification of armor kit 

requirements to the time when kits were produced and installed. Army 

officials estimate that the total number of required armor kits will be 

produced by May 2006 and installed by January 2007. 

Source: U.S. Army.
Appendix II

Assessment of Truck Armoring Efforts

Page 59 GAO-06-160 Defense Logistics

Figure 23: Comparison of Tanker Armor Kit Requirements to Kits Produced and 

Installed

Significant Factors 

Affecting Availability of 

Armor Kits

Two significant factors affected the availability of armor kits for tankers. 

First, the Army’s award of contracts for less than the total requirement over 

the life of the program constrained production. Second, installation of 

armor kits was constrained by a limited rate of rotation for tankers into 

installation facilities and unique requirements for applying the protective 

spray-on coating.

Contracts Constrained 

Availability of Armor Kits

The production time line for one of the armor kits, for the M967 tanker, is 

longer than it would have been if contract awards had been for the total 

requirement. The Army awarded two contracts for M967 armoring with 

quantities of 171 and 152, with an 8-month interval between the two 

contracts. According to the contractor, if all 323 tanker kits had been 

awarded together, the total production time line would have decreased due 

to production efficiencies. Contracts for the other three tankers, the M969, 

0

200

400

600

800

1,000

1,200

1,400

1,600

Armor kits

Source: GAO analysis of Army data.

Fiscal year

Requirements

Production

Installations

2003 2004 2005

Au

Sept.

g.

July

May

June

Oct.

Nov.

Dec.

Jan.

Feb.

Mar.

Apr.

Sept.

Aug.

July

May

June

Nov.

Dec.

Jan.

Feb.

Mar.

Apr.
Appendix II

Assessment of Truck Armoring Efforts

Page 60 GAO-06-160 Defense Logistics

the M978, and the M1062, were awarded for the total requirement and, 

therefore, the contractor stated that production has gone as efficiently as 

possible.

Limited Installation Rates Paced 

Availability of Armor Kits 

A significant factor that affected the availability of armor kits for tanker 

trailers was a limited installation rate. For example, the installation of addon armor kits was slowed by the rate of rotation of trucks into the intheater installation facilities as they returned from missions. Operational 

constraints limited the number of vehicles that could be taken out of use at 

any one time. In addition, unique requirements to coat the tankers with a 

protective chemical prior to installing armor panels also limited the rate of 

installation. The proper application of the chemical coating requires 

controlled environmental conditions, such as humidity and temperature, 

which has led to a limited number of spray locations accessible to the 

Army. Thus, although production of armor kits for tankers is expected to 

be completed by May 2006, because of these constraints, installation of 

enough kits to meet requirements is not expected to be finished until 8 

months later in January 2007.
Page 61 GAO-06-160 Defense Logistics

Appendix III

Comments from the Department of Defense ApendxiI
Appendix III

Comments from the Department of Defense

Page 62 GAO-06-160 Defense Logistics
Page 63 GAO-06-160 Defense Logistics

Appendix IV

GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgements ApendxiIV

GAO Contact William M. Solis, (202) 512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov

Acknowledgements In addition to the contact named above, David Schmitt, Assistant Director; 

Renee S. Brown, Judith C. Collins, Kenneth E. Patton, Richard G. Payne, 

Jay Rangaram, Maria-Alaina I. Rambus, Paulina T. Reaves, Cary B. Russell, 

Patricia Sari-Spear, Rebecca Shea, and John D. Strong also made key 

contributions to this report. 

(350658)
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