United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Testimony before the Subcommittee on 

Federal Workforce and Agency 

Organization, Committee on Government 

Reform, House of Representatives

AVIATION SECURITY

Transportation Security 

Administration Has Made 

Progress in Managing a 

Federal Security Workforce 

and Ensuring Security at 

U.S. Airports, but 

Challenges Remain 

Statement of Cathleen A. Berrick, Director, 

Homeland Security and Justice Issues 

For Release on Delivery

Expected at 2:00 p.m. EDT

April 4, 2006

 

GAO-06-597T 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

April 4, 2006

AVIATION SECURITY

Transportation Security Administration 

Has Made Progress in Managing a 

Federal Security Workforce and Ensuring 

Security at U.S. Airports, but Challenges 

Remain

Highlights of GAO-06-597T, a testimony 

before the Subcommittee on Federal 

Workforce and Agency Organization, 

Committee on Government Reform, 

House of Representatives

It has been over 3 years since the 

Transportation Security

Administration (TSA) assumed

responsibility for passenger and 

baggage screening at commercial

airports. This testimony focuses on 

the progress TSA is making in 

strengthening aspects of aviation

security and the challenges that

remain. Particularly, this testimony 

highlights (1) progress TSA has 

made, and challenges it faces, in 

managing a federalized security 

workforce—including federal 

security directors (FSD) and 

transportation security officers 

(TSO)—with operational 

responsibility for ensuring security

of passengers and their baggage; 

and (2) actions TSA has taken, and 

the challenges it faces, to ensure

appropriate regulatory oversight of 

other airport security activities. 

What GAO Recommends

In prior reports, GAO has made

numerous recommendations

designed to strengthen aviation 

security with respect to aviation

workforce planning, deployment, 

and oversight. TSA generally

agreed with our recommendations 

and is taking actions to implement 

them. GAO also has ongoing 

reviews related to TSA staffing

models and other aviation security

issues, and may make additional 

recommendations as appropriate. 

TSA has made progress in managing, deploying, and training a federalized 

aviation security workforce, including FSDs (the lead authority at U.S. 

airports) and TSOs (formerly known as screeners). FSDs have, for example, 

formed partnerships with key federal and private-sector stakeholders at 

airports engaged in security and operations. We reported, however, that the 

guidance on FSD authority is outdated and lacks clarity, particularly

regarding security incidents when FSDs must coordinate with other 

stakeholders. Regarding TSOs, TSA has taken and has planned actions to 

strengthen the management and deployment of the TSO workforce. TSA has, 

for instance, developed a screening allocation model to determine TSO 

staffing levels at airports. However, FSDs have reported concerns that 

despite such a model, attracting, hiring, and retaining an adequate part-time 

TSO workforce remains a challenge. We have reported that, while TSA has 

expanded training opportunities for TSOs, insufficient TSO staffing and 

other problems hinder the ability of TSOs to take training. To evaluate TSO 

performance, TSA has collected performance data by conducting covert 

(undercover, unannounced) tests at passenger screening checkpoints. 

TSA has taken steps to strengthen key areas of aviation security for which it 

has regulatory and oversight responsibility, including domestic air cargo 

security, but faces challenges related to oversight and performance 

measurement. We reported in October 2005, for example, that while TSA had 

significantly increased the number of domestic air cargo inspections 

conducted, performance measures to determine to what extent air carriers 

and others are complying with air cargo security requirements had not been 

developed. Without such performance measures, and a systematic analysis 

of these results of air cargo security inspections, TSA’s ability to target its 

workforce for future inspections, and fulfill oversight responsibilities, will be 

limited. Further, while TSA has incorporated elements of risk-based decision 

making into securing air cargo, its efforts are not yet complete. To address 

these and other issues, TSA officials stated that they plan to compile 

additional information on air cargo inspections to enhance their ability to 

conduct compliance inspections of air carriers using covert testing, and to 

require random inspection of air cargo.

Screening Passengers and Cargo Are Aviation Security Concerns 

Source: FAA. Source: Cargo King Ltd.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-597T.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Cathleen A. 

Berrick at (202) 512-3404 or

berrickc@gao.gov. 
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: 

I appreciate the opportunity to participate in today’s hearing to discuss the 

management and deployment of federal employees charged with securing 

U.S. commercial airports. After the terrorist attacks of 2001, securing the

nation’s aviation system—and ensuring that a federal workforce was in 

place to carry out a wide range of aviation security responsibilities—

became a key goal of the administration and the Congress. Among the 

actions taken to address this need, the Aviation and Transportation 

Security Act (ATSA) of 2001, which established the Transportation 

Security Administration (TSA), charged the agency with, among other 

things, overseeing security operations at the nation’s more than 

400 commercial airports.1

 In TSA, the federal workforce comprises, among 

others, federal security directors (FSDs)—the ranking authority 

responsible for leading and coordinating security activities at airports; 

transportation security officers (TSO), formerly known as screeners; and 

inspectors responsible for ensuring that air carriers, airport employees 

and airport vendors comply with established security requirements. 

My testimony today addresses two separate areas related to the 

management and oversight of the federal airport security workforce: 

(1) the progress TSA has made, and the challenges it faces, in managing a 

federalized security workforce with operational responsibility for ensuring 

security of passengers and their baggage, and (2) the actions TSA has 

taken, and the challenges it faces, to ensure appropriate regulatory 

oversight of other airport security activities. 

My comments are based on issued GAO reports and testimonies 

addressing the security of the U.S. commercial aviation system and our 

ongoing work on TSA’s staffing standards for TSOs. We did our work in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Appendix I contains a list of related GAO products issued since September 

11, 2001. 

 1

ATSA created TSA as an agency within the Department of Transportation (DOT) with 

responsibility for securing all modes of transportation, including aviation. Pub. L. No. 107-

71, § 101, 115 Stat. 597 (2001). The Homeland Security Act of 2002, signed into law on 

November 25, 2002, transferred TSA from the DOT to the new Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS). Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 403, 116 Stat. 2135, 2178. 

Page 1 GAO-06-597T 
While TSA has made progress in managing the federalized aviation 

security workforce, including its FSDs and TSOs, TSA continues to face 

challenges in several key areas, including clarifying FSD roles and 

responsibilities, and managing the deployment and training of its TSO 

workforce. TSA has made changes to better support and empower the 

FSD position, including granting greater authority and flexibility to FSDs 

in carrying out their responsibilities. For example, in carrying out their 

responsibilities in overseeing security at the nation’s airports, FSDs have 

formed partnerships with key stakeholders and participated in

communication and coordination efforts to address a range of issues, 

including airport security, operations, and coordination. However, while 

TSA has developed guidance that describes the many roles and 

responsibilities of FSDs, we recently reported that TSA’s primary 

document outlining FSDs’ authority was outdated and lacked clarity 

regarding FSD authority during security incidents relative to other airport 

stakeholders with whom FSDs must coordinate closely on aviation 

security matters. For example, we found instances where confusion or 

conflicting opinions developed over whether the FSD had the authority to

take certain actions during particular security incidents. Regarding its 

TSOs, TSA has taken and has planned actions to strengthen the 

management of the TSO workforce, which must be deployed in sufficient 

numbers and trained and certified in the latest screening procedures and 

technology to accomplish its security mission. Acknowledging imbalances 

in the screener workforce, TSA developed standards for determining TSO 

staffing for all airports at which federal screening is required and 

developed a Screening Allocation Model (SAM) to determine airport 

staffing levels. In determining staffing allocations, the SAM takes into 

account not only flight and passenger data, but also data unique to each 

airport—including flight schedules, passenger and baggage distribution 

curves, and TSA passenger and baggage screening configurations. 

However, FSDs we interviewed had preliminary concerns about the 

assumptions in the model, noting, among other things, that it has been a 

challenge to attract, hire, and retain a part-time TSO workforce at the 

20 percent level indicated in the model. In addition to having an adequate

number of screeners, effective screening involves screeners properly 

trained to do their job. TSA has taken numerous steps to expand training

beyond the basic training requirement to include self-guided courses on its 

Online Learning Center; a recurrent training requirement of 3 hours per 

week, averaged over a quarter; and training on threat information, 

explosives detection, and new screening approaches. However, 

insufficient TSO staffing and a lack of high-speed Internet/intranet 

connectivity create impediments to the TSO workforce taking full 

advantage of training opportunities. With respect to evaluating TSOs, TSA 

Summary 

Page 2 GAO-06-597T 
has strengthened its efforts to measure the performance of the various 

components of the passenger and checked baggage screening systems—

people, processes and technology. Specifically, TSA has implemented and 

strengthened efforts to collect performance data by performing covert 

(undercover, unannounced) tests, using the Threat Image Projection (TIP) 

system2

 at passenger screening checkpoints, and implementing a 

congressionally mandated annual TSO recertification program. Despite 

these efforts, TSA covert testing has identified that weaknesses existed in 

the ability of TSOs to detect threat objects on passengers, in their carry-on 

bags, and in checked baggage. 

TSA has taken steps to strengthen the federal workforce responsible for 

other key areas of aviation security, including domestic air cargo and 

airport perimeters and access controls, but it faces additional challenges

in each of these areas related to performance measurement and regulatory

oversight. We reported in October 2005, for example, that TSA had 

significantly increased the number of domestic air cargo inspections. We 

noted, however, that TSA had not developed performance measures to 

determine to what extent air carriers and indirect air carriers—carriers 

that consolidate air cargo from multiple shippers and deliver it to air 

carriers to be transported—are complying with air cargo security 

requirements, and had not analyzed the results of inspections to 

systematically target future inspections on those entities that pose a higher 

security risk to the domestic air cargo system. Without these performance 

measures and systematic analyses, TSA will be limited in its ability to 

effectively target its workforce for future inspections and fulfill its 

oversight responsibilities for this important area of aviation security. In 

June 2005, TSA officials informed us that in the future they intend to 

compile information on the number of instances in which specific air 

cargo security requirements are inspected, and are taking steps to enhance

TSA’s ability to conduct compliance inspections of indirect air carriers, by, 

among other things, using undercover testing to identify air cargo security

weaknesses. We also found that TSA has made efforts to incorporate riskbased decision making into securing air cargo, but has not conducted 

assessments of air cargo vulnerabilities or critical assets (cargo facilities 

and aircraft)—two crucial elements of a risk-based management approach

without which TSA may not be able to appropriately focus its resources on 

 2

The Threat Image Projection system is designed to test TSOs’ detection capabilities by 

projecting threat images, including images of guns and explosives, into bags as they are 

screened. TSOs are responsible for positively identifying the threat image and calling for 

the bag to be searched. 

Page 3 GAO-06-597T 
the most critical security needs. Moreover, to better allocate resources for 

air cargo security, TSA established a requirement for random inspection of

air cargo to address threats to the nation’s aviation transportation 

system—a reflection of the agency’s position that inspecting 100 percent 

of air cargo was not technologically feasible and would be potentially 

disruptive to the flow of air commerce. In the area of airport perimeter and 

access control security, we reported in June 2004 that while background 

checks were not required for all airport workers, TSA requires most 

airport workers who perform duties in secured and sterile areas3

 to 

undergo a fingerprint-based criminal history records check. TSA further 

requires airport operators to compare applicants’ names against TSA’s 

aviation security watch lists. Once workers undergo this review, they are 

granted access to airport areas in which they perform duties. In addition,

ATSA mandated that TSA require airport operators and air carriers to 

develop security awareness training programs for airport workers such as 

ground crews and gate, ticket, and curbside agents of air carriers. 

According to TSA, training requirements for these airport workers had not 

been established because additional training would result in increased 

costs for airport operators. In the area of security-related training, TSA did 

not require airport vendors with direct access to the airfield and aircraft to

develop security programs, which would include security measures for 

vendor employees and property, as required by ATSA. In July 2004, in 

response to our recommendations, TSA made several improvements in 

these areas, through the issuance of a series of security directives, 

including requiring enhanced background checks and improved access 

controls for airport employees who work in restricted airport areas. 

Background 

TSA Operational 

Responsibilities for 

Passenger and Checked 

Baggage Security 

Prior to the passage of ATSA, the screening of passengers and checked 

baggage had been performed by private screening companies under 

contract to the airlines. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) was 

responsible for ensuring compliance with screening regulations. With the 

passage of ATSA and the transfer of aviation security responsibilities to 

TSA, including passenger and checked baggage screening at airports, TSA 

 3

Sterile areas are located within the terminal where passengers wait after screening to

board departing aircraft. Access to these areas is generally controlled by TSA screeners at

checkpoints where they conduct physical screening of passengers and their carry-on 

baggage for weapons and explosives. 

Page 4 GAO-06-597T 
assigned FSDs—the top-ranking TSA authorities responsible for security 

at the nation’s airports—to one or more commercial airports to oversee 

security activities. TSA has approximately 157 FSD positions at 

commercial airports nationwide to lead and coordinate TSA security 

activities. Although an FSD is responsible for security at each commercial 

airport, not every airport has an FSD dedicated solely to that airport. Most 

category X airports4

 have an FSD responsible for that airport alone, while 

at other airports the FSD located at a hub airport has responsibility over 

one or more spoke airports of the same or smaller size. 

In addition to establishing TSA and giving it responsibility for passenger 

and checked baggage screening operations, ATSA also set forth specific 

enhancements to screening operations for TSA to implement, with 

deadlines for completing many of them. These requirements include 

• assuming responsibility for screeners and screening operations at more 

than 400 commercial airports by November 19, 2002; 

• establishing a basic screener training program composed of a minimum of 

40 hours of classroom instruction and 60 hours of on-the-job training; 

• conducting an annual proficiency review of all screeners; 

• conducting operational testing of screeners;5

• requiring remedial training for any screener who fails an operational test;

and 

• screening all checked baggage for explosives using explosives detection 

systems by December 31, 2002.6

 

As mandated by ATSA, TSA hired and deployed a TSO workforce to 

assume operational responsibility for conducting passenger and checked 

baggage screening. Passenger screening is a process by which authorized 

TSA personnel inspect individuals and property to deter and prevent the 

carriage of any unauthorized explosive, incendiary, weapon, or other 

 4

TSA classifies the commercial airports in the United States into one of five security risk 

categories (X, I, II, III, IV, and V) based on various factors, such as the total number of

takeoffs and landings annually, and other special security considerations. In general, 

category X airports have the largest number of passenger boardings, and category IV 

airports have the smallest. 

5

TSA defines an operational screening test as any covert test of a TSO conducted by TSA,

on any screening function, to assess the screener’s threat item detection ability or 

adherence to TSA-approved procedures. 

6

Pursuant to the Homeland Security Act, the deadline for screening all checked baggage

using explosive detection systems was, in effect, extended until December 31, 2003. 

Page 5 GAO-06-597T 
dangerous item onboard an aircraft or into a sterile area. TSOs must 

inspect individuals for prohibited items at designated screening locations.7

The four passenger screening functions are (1) X-ray screening of 

property, (2) walk-through metal detector screening of individuals, 

(3) hand-wand or pat-down screening of individuals, and (4) physical 

search of property and trace detection for explosives. Checked baggage 

screening is a process by which authorized TSOs inspect checked baggage

to deter, detect, and prevent the carriage of any unauthorized explosive, 

incendiary, or weapon onboard an aircraft. Checked baggage screening is

accomplished through the use of explosive detection systems8

 (EDS) or 

explosive trace detection (ETD) systems,9

 and through the use of other 

means, such as manual searches, canine teams, and positive passenger bag 

match,10 when EDS and ETD systems are unavailable. 

In addition to establishing requirements for passenger and checked 

baggage screening, ATSA charged TSA with the responsibility for ensuring 

the security of air cargo, including, among other things, establishing 

security rules and regulations covering domestic and foreign passenger 

carriers that transport cargo, domestic and foreign all-cargo carriers, and 

domestic indirect air carriers—carriers that consolidate air cargo from 

multiple shippers and deliver it to air carriers to be transported; and 

overseeing implementation of air cargo security requirements by air 

carriers and indirect air carriers through compliance inspections. In 

general, TSA inspections are designed to ensure air carrier compliance 

with air cargo security requirements, while air carrier inspections focus on 

TSA Regulatory 

Responsibilities for Air 

Cargo and Airport Security 

 7

TSOs must deny passage beyond the screening location to any individual or property that 

has not been screened or inspected in accordance with passenger screening standard

operating procedures. If an individual refuses to permit inspection of any item, that item 

must not be allowed into the sterile area or aboard an aircraft. 

8

Explosive detection systems use probing radiation to examine objects inside baggage and 

identify the characteristic signatures of threat explosives. EDS equipment operates in an

automated mode. 

9

Explosive trace detection works by detecting vapors and residues of explosives. Human 

operators collect samples by rubbing bags with swabs, which are chemically analyzed to

identify any traces of explosive materials. 

10Positive passenger bag match is an alternative method of screening checked baggage that

requires that the passenger be on the same aircraft as the checked baggage. 

Page 6 GAO-06-597T 
ensuring that cargo does not contain weapons, explosives, or stowaways.11

TSA is responsible for inspecting 285 passenger and all-cargo air carriers 

with about 2,800 cargo facilities nationwide, as well as 3,800 indirect air 

carriers with about 10,000 domestic locations. In conducting inspections, 

TSA inspectors review documentation, interview carrier personnel, 

directly observe air cargo operations, or conduct tests to determine 

whether air carriers and indirect air carriers are in compliance with air 

cargo security requirements. In 2004, an estimated 23 billion pounds of air 

cargo was transported within the United States, with about a quarter of 

this amount transported on passenger aircraft. Recently, DHS reported 

that most cargo on passenger aircraft is not physically inspected. 

ATSA also granted TSA the responsibility for overseeing U.S. airport 

operators’ efforts to maintain and improve the security of commercial 

airport perimeters, access controls, and airport workers. While airport 

operators, not TSA, retain direct day-to-day operational responsibilities for 

these areas of security, ATSA directs TSA to improve the security of 

airport perimeters and the access controls leading to secured airport 

areas, as well as take measures to reduce the security risks posed by 

airport workers. Each airport’s security program, which must be approved

by TSA, outlines the security policies, procedures, and systems the airport 

intends to use in order to comply with TSA security requirements. FSDs 

oversee the implementation of the security requirements at airports. 

Of TSA’s 950 aviation security inspectors located at airports throughout 

the United States, 750 are considered generalists who conduct a variety of 

aviation security inspections, and 200 are dedicated to conducting air 

cargo inspections. The FSD at each airport is responsible for determining 

the scope and emphasis of the inspections, as well as discretion for how to 

assign local inspection staff. TSA provides local airport FSDs and 

inspectors with goals for the number of inspections to be conducted per 

quarter. 

 11Domestic passenger air carriers have 11 separate areas of cargo security that are subject 

to inspection, while indirect air carriers have 12 areas that are subject to inspection. Allcargo carriers that have implemented the voluntary all-cargo security program have 

24 areas that are subject to inspection. These areas of inspection include access to cargo, 

cargo acceptance, including cargo from known shippers, and security training and testing. 

Page 7 GAO-06-597T 
In recent years, TSA has taken numerous actions related to the 

deployment, training, and performance of their aviation security 

workforce. TSA has, for example, taken action to support the authority of

FSDs at airports, though additional clarification of their roles is needed. 

TSA also has improved the management and deployment of its TSO 

workforce with the use of a formal staffing model, though hiring and 

deployment challenges remain. TSA has also strengthened TSO training, 

and implemented various approaches to measuring TSO performance 

related to passenger and baggage screening activities. 

In recent years, TSA has taken steps to ensure that FSDs, as the ranking 

TSA authorities at airports, coordinated their security actions with various 

airport stakeholders, and had sufficient authority to carry out their 

responsibilities. In September 2005, we reported on the roles and 

responsibilities of FSDs and other issues related to the position, including 

the extent to which they formed and facilitated partnerships with airport 

stakeholders.

12 At that time, we reported that the FSDs and most 

stakeholders at the seven airports we visited had developed partnerships 

that were generally working well. TSA recognized that building and 

maintaining partnerships with airport stakeholders was essential to FSDs’ 

success in addressing security as well as maintaining an appropriate level 

of customer service. To that end, TSA established general guidance for 

FSDs to follow in building stakeholder partnerships, but left it to the FSDs 

to determine how best to achieve effective partnerships at their respective 

airports. As a part of their security responsibilities, FSDs must coordinate 

closely with airport stakeholders—airport and air carrier officials, local 

law enforcement, and emergency response officials—to ensure that 

airports are adequately protected and prepared in the event of a terrorist 

attack. FSDs’ success in sustaining and ensuring the effectiveness of 

aviation security efforts is dependent on their ability to develop and 

maintain effective partnerships with these stakeholders. FSDs need to 

partner with law enforcement stakeholders, for example, because they do

not have a law enforcement body of their own to respond to security 

incidents. Partnerships can be of mutual benefit to FSDs and airport 

stakeholders and can enhance customer service. For example, FSDs rely 

TSA Has Taken Steps 

to Strengthen the 

Management and 

Performance of an 

Aviation Security 

Workforce, but 

Continues to Face 

Challenges 

TSA Has Taken Action to 

Support FSDs, but 

Additional Clarification of 

Roles Is Needed to 

Support Stakeholder 

Coordination 

 12GAO, Transportation Security Administration: More Clarity on the Authority of 

Federal Security Directors Is Needed, GAO-05-935 (Washington D.C.: Sept. 23, 2005).

Page 8 GAO-06-597T 
on air carrier data on the number of passengers transiting through 

checkpoints to appropriately schedule screeners, and air carriers rely on 

the FSD to provide an efficient screening process to minimize wait times 

for passengers. 

At the airports we visited, FSDs and stakeholders cited several ways FSDs 

maintained partnerships, including being accessible to their stakeholders 

to help resolve problems and meeting with stakeholders to discuss how to 

implement new security policies. In addition, a variety of communication 

and coordination efforts were in place at the airports we visited, and many 

of these efforts existed before TSA assigned FSDs to airports. Formal 

mechanisms included security and general airport operations meetings, 

incident debriefings, and training exercises to help ensure a coordinated 

response in the event of a security incident. 

We also found that in response to concerns over FSD authority in 

responding to airport-specific security needs, in 2004, TSA made a number 

of changes to better support and empower the FSD. These changes 

included 

• establishing a local hiring initiative that vested more hiring authority with 

the FSDs to address airport staffing needs, 

• providing flexibility to offer training locally to screeners, 

• increasing authority to address performance and conduct problems, 

• relocating five area director positions from the headquarters to the field in 

conjunction with establishing a report group to provide operational 

support and a communication link with headquarters, and 

• establishing a mentoring program for newly appointed FSDs or their 

deputies. 

Most of the 25 FSDs we interviewed generally viewed these changes 

favorably. For example, most were satisfied with TSA’s new local hiring 

process that provided more options for FSDs to be involved with hiring 

screeners, and most said that the new process was better than the more 

centralized hiring process it replaced. TSA officials concluded, among 

other things, that TSO candidates selected at airports where the FSD and 

staff were conducting the hiring process were more selective in accepting 

offers—leading to lower attrition—because they had more knowledge of 

what the job would entail than contractors did when they handled the 

hiring process. In addition, most of the FSDs we interviewed also saw 

value in the headquarters group TSA established to provide operational 

support to the field and a communication link among headquarters, fieldbased area directors, and FSDs. 

Page 9 GAO-06-597T 
One area where we noted room for improvement at the FSD level was in 

how the FSD’s authority has been defined. In September 2005, we reported 

that TSA had developed guidance that describes the many roles and 

responsibilities of FSDs, most of which is associated with securing 

commercial airports from terrorist threats.13 However, while the guidance 

clearly defined FSD roles and responsibilities, TSA’s primary document 

outlining FSDs’ authority was outdated and lacked clarity regarding FSD 

authority relative to that of other airport stakeholders with whom FSDs 

must coordinate closely to help ensure the effectiveness of aviation 

security efforts. The absence of a clear understanding of the authority of 

the position had reportedly resulted in confusion during past security 

incidents and had raised concerns among some stakeholders at both the 

national and airport levels about possible ambiguity regarding FSDs’ 

authority during incidents. Accordingly, we recommended that steps be 

taken to update TSA’s Delegation of Authority to FSDs to clearly reflect 

the authority of FSDs relative to that of airport stakeholders during 

security incidents and communicate the authority of the position, as 

warranted, to the FSDs and all airport stakeholders. Such action would 

benefit FSDs by further enabling them to communicate and share 

consistent information about their authority with their staff and airport 

stakeholders, including law enforcement agencies. In commenting on our 

recommendation, DHS stated that a new restatement of the Delegation 

Order had been drafted by a working group composed of FSDs from the 

FSD Advisory Council and relevant stakeholders and is being internally 

coordinated for comment and clearance. 

To accomplish its security mission, TSA needs a sufficient number of 

passenger and checked baggage TSOs trained and certified in the latest 

screening procedures and technology. We reported in February 2004 that 

staffing shortages and TSA’s hiring process had hindered the ability of 

some FSDs to provide sufficient resources to staff screening checkpoints 

and oversee screening operations at their checkpoints without using 

additional measures such as overtime.14 TSA has acknowledged that its 

initial staffing efforts created imbalances in the screener workforce and 

has since been taking steps to address these imbalances over the past 

2 years, by, among other things, meeting a congressional requirement to 

TSA Has Taken Steps to 

Better Manage Its TSO 

Workforce, but Continues 

to Face Deployment 

Challenges 

 13GAO-05-935. 

14GAO, Aviation Security: Challenges Exist in Stabilizing and Enhancing Passenger and

Baggage Screening Operations, GAO-04-440T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 12, 2004). 

Page 10 GAO-06-597T 
develop a staffing model for TSOs. Specifically, the Intelligence Reform 

and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 required TSA to develop and submit 

to Congress standards for determining the aviation security staffing for all

airports at which screening is required.

15 The act also directed GAO to 

review these standards, which we are doing. These staffing standards are 

to provide for necessary levels of airport security, while also ensuring that 

security-related delays experienced by airline passengers are minimized. 

In June 2005, TSA submitted its report on aviation security staffing 

standards to Congress. Known as the Screening Allocation Model (SAM), 

these standards are intended to provide an objective measure for 

determining TSO airport staffing levels, while staying within the 

congressionally mandated limit of 45,000 FTE screeners. 

Whereas TSA’s prior staffing model was demand-driven based on flight 

and passenger data, the SAM model analyzes not only demand data but 

also data on the flow of passenger and baggage through the airport and the 

availability of the workforce. In determining the appropriate TSO staffing 

levels, the SAM first considers the workload demands unique to each 

individual airport—including flight schedules, load factors and connecting 

flights, and number of passenger bags. These demand inputs are then 

processed against certain assumptions about the processing of passengers 

and baggage—including expected passenger and baggage processing rates, 

required staffing for passenger lanes and baggage equipment, and 

equipment alarm rates. Using these and various other data, the SAM 

determines the daily workforce requirements and calculates a work 

schedule for each airport. The schedule identifies a recommended mix of 

full-time and part-time staff and a total number of TSO full-time 

equivalents (FTE) needed to staff the airport,16 consistent with a goal of 

10 minutes maximum wait time for processing passengers and baggage. 

For fiscal year 2006, the SAM model estimated a requirement of 

42,170 TSO FTEs for all airports nationwide. In order to stay within a 

43,000 TSO FTE budgetary limit for fiscal year 2006, TSA officials reduced

the number of FTEs allocated to airports to 42,056, a level that allowed it 

to fund the 615 TSO FTEs in the National Screener Force—a force 

composed of TSOs who provide screening support to all airports------and to

maintain a contingency of 329 TSO FTEs in reserve to meet unanticipated

 15Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 4023, 

118 Stat 3638, 3723-24. 

16One full-time-equivalent is equal to one work year or 2,080 non-overtime hours.

Page 11 GAO-06-597T 
demands, such as a new air carrier coming on line at an airport.17 As of 

January 2006, there were 37,501 full-time TSOs and 5,782 part-time TSOs 

on board nationwide, representing an annualized rate of 41,085 TSO FTEs. 

According to TSA headquarters officials, the SAM can be adjusted to 

account for the uniqueness of particular airport security checkpoints and 

airline traffic patterns. Further, it is up to the FSDs to ensure that all of the 

data elements and assumptions are accurate for their airports, and to bring 

to TSA’s attention any factors that should be reviewed to determine if 

changes to the SAM are appropriate. The President’s fiscal year 2007 

budget requests a total of 45,121 FTEs under the Passenger and Baggage 

TSO personnel compensation and benefits categories. 

As part of our ongoing review of the SAM model, we have identified 

several preliminary concerns about TSA’s efforts to address its staffing 

imbalances and ensure appropriate coverage at airport passenger and 

checked baggage screening checkpoints. At the five airports we visited, 

FSD staff raised concerns about the SAM assumptions as they related to

their particular airports.18 Among other things, they noted that the 

recommendation for 20 percent part-time TSO workforce—measured in 

terms of FTEs—often could not be reached, the expected processing rates 

for passenger and baggage screening were not being realized, nonpassenger screening at large airports was higher than assumed, and the

number of TSO FTEs needed per checkpoint lane and per baggage 

screening machine was not sufficient for peak periods. Regarding the SAM 

assumption of a 20 percent part-time TSO FTE level across all airports, 

FSD staff we visited stated that the 20 percent goal has been difficult to 

achieve because of, among other things, economic conditions leading to 

competition for part-time workers, remote airport locations coupled with 

a lack of mass transit, TSO base pay that has not changed since fiscal year 

2002, and part-time workers’ desire to convert to full-time status. 

According to TSA headquarters officials, while the nationwide annual TSO 

attrition rate is about 23 percent (compared to a rate of 14 percent 

reported in February 2004), it is over 50 percent for part-time TSOs. TSA 

has struggled with hiring part-time TSOs since it began actively recruiting 

them in the summer of 2003. In February 2004, we reported that FSDs at 

several of the airports we visited stated that they experienced difficulty in 

 17This budgetary FTE limit is not to be confused with the 45,000 FTE screener cap imposed 

by Congress in the FY2006 DHS Appropriations Act that limits the total number of FTE 

screeners available to TSA. 

18We interviewed FSD staff at 3 category X airports, 1 category I airports, and 1 category III 

airport. 

Page 12 GAO-06-597T 
attracting needed part-time TSOs, which they believed to be due to many

of the same factors, such as low pay and benefits, undesirable hours, the 

location of their airport, the lack of accessible and affordable parking or 

public transportation, and the high cost of living in the areas surrounding

some airports.19 These FSDs stated that very few full-time TSOs were 

interested in converting to part-time status—a condition that still exists—

and TSA officials stated that attrition rates for part-time TSOs were 

considerably higher than those for full-time TSOs. 

At two of the five airports we visited as part of our ongoing review of the 

SAM model, FSD staff told us that they had not been able to hire up to 

their authorized staffing levels. In February 2004, we reported that many of

the FSDs we interviewed expressed concern that TSA’s hiring process was 

not responsive to their needs and hindered their ability to reach their 

authorized staffing levels and adequately staff screening checkpoints. 

Specifically, FSDs expressed concern with the lack of a continuous hiring 

process to backfill screeners lost through attrition, and their lack of 

authority to conduct hiring on an as-needed basis. We reported that TSA 

was taking steps to make the hiring process more responsive to FSDs’ 

needs. Since then, TSA has provided FSDs with more input into the hiring

process in an effort to streamline the process and enable FSDs to more 

quickly meet their staffing needs. 

During our five airport visits, some FSD staff we interviewed also cited 

another limitation of the SAM—specifically, that the model does not 

account for screeners who are performing administrative or other duties. 

The officials also noted that, because they are not authorized to hire a 

sufficient number of mission support staff, TSOs are being routinely 

used—in some cases full time—to carry out non-screening and 

administrative duties, including supporting payroll, scheduling, uniform 

supplies, legal support, logistics, and operations center activities. At the 

five airports we visited in January and February 2006, out of a total of 

2,572 TSO full time equivalents (FTE) on-board at those airports, roughly 

136 FTEs (just over five percent) were being used for administrative 

duties. FSD staff stated that some of these TSOs are being used on a parttime basis, while others are used on a full-time basis. The use of TSOs in 

these support functions could adversely affect the ability of FSDs to 

adequately staff their screening checkpoints. 

 19GAO-04-440T. 

Page 13 GAO-06-597T 
To compensate for screener shortages and to enable operational flexibility 

to respond to changes in risk and threat, in October 2003, TSA established 

a National Screening Force (formerly known as the Mobile Screening 

Force established in November 2002) to provide screening support to all 

airports in times of emergency, seasonal demands, or under other special 

circumstances that require a greater number of screeners than regularly 

available to FSDs. In February 2004, we reported that the National 

Screening Force consisted of over 700 full-time passenger and baggage 

TSOs. TSA officials stated that while these screeners have a home airport 

to which they are assigned, they travel to airports in need of screening 

staff approximately 70 percent of the year. 

TSA budgeted from appropriations received in fiscal year 2006 for 

615 FTEs for the National Screening Force. The President’s fiscal year 

2007 budget request includes $35 million for operational expenses of the 

National Screening Force (not including salaries and benefits of force 

members). According to the budget request, in fiscal year 2007, the 

National Screening Force will generally be deployed only to those airports 

experiencing significant staffing shortfalls associated with increased 

seasonal traffic or when a special event, such as a Super Bowl or a large 

national conference, occurs requiring an immediate influx of additional 

TSO support. At one category X airport we recently visited, the FSD stated 

that because of challenges in hiring and retaining TSOs for this airport, he 

has had to rely on 59 members of the National Screening Force deployed 

to his airport, and had been relying on this force since 2004. The 

President’s fiscal year 2007 budget request states that TSA will continue to 

review methods for reducing costs associated with this force, including 

ensuring that each airport has a sufficient staffing program in place to 

address short-term needs. 

In the President’s fiscal year 2007 budget request, TSA identified several 

additional initiatives under way to address the management of the TSO 

workforce. These efforts include attempts to reduce attrition by creating a 

performance-based pay system, and establishing retention incentives to 

include performance bonuses, retention allowances, college credit 

reimbursement and flexible staffing. TSA also reported efforts to enhance 

opportunities for career advancement within the TSO job category, 

reducing on-the-job injuries by reengineering baggage screening areas, and 

deploying a national nurse care management program at 21 airports to 

assist TSOs in returning to work in a shorter period of time. 

Page 14 GAO-06-597T 
Since we reported on TSO training in September 2003, TSA has taken a 

number of actions designed to strengthen training available to the TSO 

workforce as part of its efforts to enhance the performance of TSOs.20 In 

September 2003, we reported that TSA had not fully developed or 

deployed a recurrent training program for passenger TSOs. At that time, 

little training was available to TSOs once they completed their basic TSO 

training. Since then, TSA has expanded training available to the TSO 

workforce, such as introducing an Online Learning Center that makes selfguided courses available over TSA’s intranet and the Internet and 

expanding training available to supervisory TSOs. TSA also established a 

recurrent training requirement of 3 hours per week, averaged over a 

quarter, and provided FSDs with additional tools to facilitate and enhance 

TSO training, including at least one modular bomb set kit—containing 

components of an improvised explosive device (IED)—and at least one 

weapons training kit. TSA has also instituted a program called Threat in 

the Spotlight that, based on intelligence TSA receives, provides screeners 

with the latest in threat information regarding terrorist attempts to get 

threat objects past screening checkpoints. Additionally, in December 2005,

TSA reported completing enhanced explosives detection training for over 

18,000 TSOs. This training included both classroom and hands-on 

experiences, and focused particularly on identifying X-ray images of IED 

component parts, not just a completely assembled bomb. TSA plans for 

the remaining TSO workforce to receive this training by June 2006 through

the Online Learning Center or other delivery methods. TSA also has 

developed new training curriculums to support new screening approaches. 

For example, TSA recently developed a training curriculum for TSOs in 

behavior observation and analysis at the checkpoint to identify passengers 

exhibiting behaviors indicative of stress, fear, or deception. 

However, as we reported in May 2005, insufficient TSO staffing and a lack

of high-speed Internet/intranet connectivity to access the Online Learning

Center have made it difficult for all TSOs screeners at many airports to 

receive required training and has limited TSO access to TSA training 

tools.21 As previously discussed, TSA is taking steps to address the TSO 

staffing challenges. However, it is too soon to determine whether TSA’s 

efforts will address TSA’s ability to provide required training while 

TSA Has Strengthened 

TSO Training, but Faces 

Challenges in Delivering 

the Training 

 20GAO, Airport Passenger Screening: Preliminary Observations on Progress Made and

Challenges Remaining, GAO-03-1173 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 24, 2003). 

21GAO, Aviation Security: Screener Training and Performance Measurement 

Strengthened but More Work Remains, GAO-05-457 (Washington, D.C.: May 2, 2005). 

Page 15 GAO-06-597T 
maintaining adequate coverage for screening operations. In terms of 

access to the Online Learning Center, TSA plans to complete the 

deployment of high-speed Internet/intranet connectivity to airports during 

fiscal year 2007. TSA established its Online Learning Center to provide 

passenger and baggage screeners with online, high-speed access to 

training courses. However, effective use of the Online Learning Center 

requires high-speed Internet/intranet access, which TSA has not been able

to provide to all airports. In May 2005, we reported that as of October 

2004, about 45 percent of the TSO workforce did not have high speed 

Internet/intranet access to the Online Learning Center. The President’s 

fiscal year 2007 budget request reports that approximately 220 of the more 

than 400 airport and field locations have full information technology 

infrastructure installation, to include high-speed network connectivity, 

while the rest of the airports operate with dial-up access to TSA systems. 

According to the budget request, TSA will use $120 million in fiscal year 

2006 to deploy high-speed connectivity to all category X and I airports and 

preliminary high-speed connectivity to all category II, III, and IV airports. 

The budget request includes a request for a total of $90 million to support 

this effort in fiscal year 2007, of which $54 million is needed to complete 

the deployment of high-speed connectivity at category II, III, and IV 

airports.22

TSA has strengthened its efforts to measure the performance of the 

various components of the passenger and checked baggage screening 

systems—people, processes, and technology—but results of covert testing 

identified that weaknesses and vulnerabilities continue to exist. In 

November 2003, we reported on the need for TSA to strengthen its efforts 

to measure the performance of its screening functions.23 At that time, TSA 

had collected limited data on the effectiveness of its aviation security 

initiatives, to include screening functions. Specifically, limited covert 

(undercover, unannounced) testing had been performed, the TIP system 

used to aid TSOs in identifying threat objects within baggage was not fully 

operational at passenger screening checkpoints and was not available for

checked baggage screening systems, and TSA had not fully implemented a

TSA Has Implemented 

Various Approaches to 

Measuring the 

Performance of TSOs 

Conducting Passenger and 

Baggage Security 

Screening Activities 

 22According to the budget request, the remaining $36 million is needed to support 

operations and maintenance costs, including recurring costs for routers, switches, circuits,

cabinets, racks, and network monitoring. 

23GAO, Aviation Security: Efforts to Measure Effectiveness and Address Challenges, 

GAO-04-232T (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 5, 2003). 

Page 16 GAO-06-597T 
congressionally mandated annual TSO proficiency review. Since then, TSA 

has implemented and strengthened efforts to collect performance data in 

each of these areas. 

In the area of covert testing, TSA headquarters increased the amount of 

passenger and checked baggage screening covert tests it performs and 

recently changed its approach to covert testing to focus its resources on 

catastrophic threats—threats that can take down an airplane or blow up 

an airplane. TSA’s Office of Inspections (OI) (formerly the Office of 

Internal Affairs and Program Review, or OIAPR) conducts unannounced

covert tests of TSOs to assess their ability to detect threat objects and to 

adhere to TSA-approved procedures. These tests, in which undercover OI 

inspectors attempt to pass threat objects through passenger screening 

checkpoints and in checked baggage, are designed to measure 

vulnerabilities in passenger and checked baggage screening systems and 

to identify systematic problems affecting performance of TSOs in the areas 

of training, procedures, and technology. OI, which began covert testing in

September 2002, conducted 836 tests in fiscal year 2003 and 2,369 tests in 

fiscal year 2004 using its staff of 183 full-time-equivalents.24 In reporting its 

covert testing results, OI makes recommendations to TSA leadership that 

address deficiencies identified during testing and are intended to improve 

screening effectiveness. As of December 2005, OI had issued 29 reports to 

management on the results of its checkpoint and checked baggage covert 

testing. In total, the reports include 19 distinct recommendations related to

passenger and checked baggage screening.25 Of these 19 recommendations, 

11 relate to screener training. In September 2005, OI began implementing a 

revamped testing process that included a more risk-based approach and 

focused its resources on catastrophic threats. OI officials stated that they 

will continue testing. However, TSA leadership is reviewing the results of 

the revised testing, and final decisions regarding the structure, content, 

and frequency of future tests have not yet been made. 

Our analysis of TSA’s covert testing results for tests conducted between 

September 2002 and September 2005 identified that overall, weaknesses 

 24Covert testing is an ancillary duty and not a full-time assignment for the majority of OI 

staff. According to OI, 14 full-time-equivalent positions in headquarters are dedicated fully 

to the covert testing program, which includes covert testing of all modes of transportation,

not just airports. These 14 full-time-equivalents are in OI’s Special Operations group and 

form the core of team leaders for the covert testing trips. 

25Some recommendations appear repeatedly in multiple reports issued by OIAPR. 

Page 17 GAO-06-597T 
existed in the ability of screeners to detect threat objects on passengers, in 

their carry-on bags, and in checked baggage. Covert testing results in this 

analysis cannot be generalized either to the airports where the tests were 

conducted or to airports nationwide.26 

In February 2004, TSA provided protocols to help FSDs conduct their own 

covert testing of local airport passenger screening activities—a practice 

that TSA had previously prohibited.27 Between May 2004 and April 2005, 

FSDs conducted a total of 17,954 local covert tests at 350 airports; as of 

February 2006, TSA reported that FSDs had conducted a total of 48,826 

local covert tests. In February 2005, TSA released a general procedures 

document for local covert testing at checked baggage screening locations. 

Between March 2005 and September 2005, 1,370 local tests of EDS 

screening were conducted at 71 airports. TSA headquarters officials stated 

that a key challenge FSDs face in conducting local testing is the lack of 

available federal staff to conduct the testing, particularly at smaller 

airports. In May 2005, we reported that TSA officials stated that they had

not yet begun to use data from local covert testing to identify training and 

performance needs because of difficulties in ensuring that local covert 

testing is implemented consistently nationwide.28 TSA officials stated in 

March 2006, that the data are available for FSDs to use to identify training

needs and levels of TSO performance. 

Covert testing is one method TSA uses to measure the security

effectiveness of passenger and checked baggage screening procedures and 

technologies in the operating environment in addition to other TSA 

measures that assess the performance of passenger and checked baggage 

TSOs. One other source of information on TSO performance in detecting 

threat objects is the results from the TIP system. TIP is designed to test 

 26Test results cannot be generalized because sample tests were not identified using the

principles of probability sampling. In a probability sample to assess screener detection of 

threat objects, each screening of a passenger or baggage would have to have a chance of 

being selected. A well-designed probability sample would enable failure rates to be

generalized to all airports. However, for cost and operational reasons, probability sampling 

may not be feasible for passenger and checked baggage screening because it would require 

a very large sample size and an exhaustive examination of each sampled passenger or

baggage to determine if there was a threat object to detect. 

27The local covert testing protocols were updated in June 2004 and August 2004 to provide 

information on alternative testing methods. 

28GAO, Aviation Security: Screener Training and Performance Measurement 

Strengthened but More Work Remains, GAO-05-457 (Washington D.C.: May 2, 2005). 

Page 18 GAO-06-597T 
passenger screeners’ detection capabilities by projecting threat images, 

including images of guns, knives, and explosives, onto bags as they are

screened during actual operations. TSOs are responsible for identifying 

the threat image and calling for the bag to be searched. Once prompted, 

TIP identifies to the screener whether the threat is real and then records 

the TSO’s performance in a database that could be analyzed for 

performance trends.29 TIP threat detection results in conjunction with OI 

covert test results and local testing are intended to assist TSA in 

identifying specific training and performance improvement efforts. 

In May 2005, we reported that in October 2003 TSA reactivated TIP as 

planned with an expanded library of 2,400 images at all but one of the 

more than 1,800 checkpoint lanes nationwide.30 In December 2005, TSA 

reported that it has further expanded the image library to include 

additional images of IEDs and IED components as part of its effort to 

improve TSOs’ detection of explosives. Additionally, the President’s fiscal 

year 2007 budget request states that TSA plans to maximize the training 

benefits of the TIP system by tailoring TIP sessions to address individual 

TSO weaknesses revealed in user performance data. For example, if a TSO 

has particular difficulty identifying IEDs, the TIP would trigger the 

projection of a higher proportion of simulated IEDs while that TSO was 

operating the machine under standard circumstances. 

Despite these improvements, TIP is not yet available for checked baggage

screening. In April 2004, we reported that TSA officials stated that they 

were working to resolve technical challenges associated with using TIP for 

checked baggage screening on explosives detection system (EDS) 

machines and have started EDS TIP image development.31 However, in 

December 2004, TSA officials stated that because of severe budget 

reductions, TSA will be unable to begin implementing a TIP program for 

checked baggage in fiscal year 2005. Officials did not specify when such a

program might begin.

 29The TIP database records both the TIP hit rate and TIP false alarm rate. These two results 

are used to determine the probability of detection and probability of false alarms, which 

determine overall TIP performance. The TIP performance measure is classified as sensitive 

security information. 

30GAO-05-457. 

31GAO, Aviation Security: Private Screening Contractors Have Little Flexibility to 

Implement Innovative Approaches, GAO-04-505T (Washington, D.C.: April 22, 2004).

Page 19 GAO-06-597T 
Another measure of TSO performance is the results of annual 

recertification testing. ATSA requires that each TSO receive an annual 

proficiency review to ensure he or she continues to meet all qualifications

and standards required to perform the screening function. To meet this 

requirement, TSA established a recertification program. The first 

recertification program—which was conducted during the period October 

2003 through March 2004—was composed of two assessment components, 

one of TSOs’ performance and the other of TSOs’ knowledge and skills. 

During the performance assessment component of the recertification 

program, TSOs are rated on both organizational and individual goals, such

as maintaining the nation’s air security, vigilantly carrying out duties with 

utmost attention to tasks that will prevent security threats, and 

demonstrating the highest levels of courtesy to travelers to maximize their 

levels of satisfaction with screening services. The knowledge and skills 

assessment component consists of three modules: (1) knowledge of 

standard operating procedures, (2) image recognition, and (3) practical

demonstration of skills. 

Across all airports, TSOs performed well on the recertification testing for 

the first 2 years the program was in place, with about 1 percent of TSOs 

subject to recertification failing to complete this requirement. In both 

years, TSOs faced the greatest difficulty on their first attempt to pass the 

practical demonstration of skills module—a hands-on simulated work 

sample used to evaluate a screener’s knowledge, skill, and ability when 

performing specific screener tasks along with the ability to provide 

customer service.32 According to TSA officials, at the completion of 

recertification at an airport, TSA management has access to reports at 

both the individual TSO and airport level, which identify the specific areas 

that were missed during testing. National level reports are also available 

that isolate areas that need improvement and can be targeted in basic and 

recurrent training. In fiscal year 2004, TSA established a performance 

measure for the recertification program.33 

During the first year of recertification testing, dual-function TSOs who 

were actively working as both passenger and checked baggage TSOs were 

required to take only the recertification test for passenger TSOs. They 

were therefore not required to take the recertification testing modules 

 32We cannot report on the specific results of the recertification testing because they are

sensitive security information.

33Information related to the measures is sensitive security information. 

Page 20 GAO-06-597T 
required for checked baggage, even though they worked in that capacity.34

TSA’s second annual recertification testing, which began in October 2004,

included components for dual-function TSOs, but did not include an image 

recognition module for checked baggage TSOs—which would include 

dual-function screeners performing checked baggage screening. TSA 

officials stated that a decision was made to not include an image 

recognition module for checked baggage TSOs during this cycle because 

not all checked baggage TSOs would have completed training on the 

onscreen resolution protocol by the time recertification testing was 

conducted at their airports.35 In October 2005, TSA released guidance for 

screener recertification that included an image recognition module for 

checked baggage and dual-function screeners trained in the onscreen 

alarm resolution protocol. 

In addition to enhancing its efforts to measure the performance of TSOs, 

TSA also has developed two performance indexes to measure the 

effectiveness of the passenger and checked baggage screening systems. 

These indexes measure overall performance through a composite of 

indicators and are derived by combining specific performance measures 

relating to passenger and checked baggage screening, respectively. Such

measures can be useful in identifying shortfalls that might be addressed by 

initiatives to enhance the workforce, such as providing special training. 

Specifically, these indexes measure the effectiveness of the screening 

systems through machine probability of detection and covert testing 

results;36 efficiency through a calculation of dollars spent per passenger or 

bag screened; and customer satisfaction through a national poll, customer 

surveys, and customer complaints at both airports and TSA’s national call

center. We reported in May 2005 that the screening performance indexes 

developed by TSA can be a useful analysis tool, but without targets for 

 34As of January 7, 2005, TSA reported that its workforce included approximately 

25,947 dual-trained screeners who were certified to serve as passenger or baggage 

screeners. 

35TSA’s onscreen resolution protocol requires that when an EDS machine alarm goes off,

indicating the possibility of explosives, TSA TSOs, by reviewing computer-generated 

images of the inside of the bag, attempt to determine whether or not a suspect item or 

items are in fact explosive materials. If the TSO is unable to make this determination, the 

bag is diverted from the main conveyor belt into an area where it receives a secondary 

screening by a TSO with an ETD machine. 

36According to TSA, the machine probabilities of detection are established by the 

certification standards for each particular model of machines, and machines are not 

deployed unless they have met those standards. 

Page 21 GAO-06-597T 
each component of the index, TSA will have difficulty performing 

meaningful analyses of the parts that make up the index. For example, 

without performance targets for covert testing, TSA will not have 

identified a desired level of performance related to screener detection of 

threat objects. Performance targets for covert testing would enable TSA to

focus its improvement efforts on areas determined to be most critical, as

100 percent detection capability may not be attainable.37 In January 2005, 

TSA officials stated that the agency planned to track the performance of 

individual index components and establish performance targets against 

which to measure these components. Since then, TSA has finalized targets 

for the indexes, including targets for passenger and checked baggage 

covert testing. 

TSA has taken steps to strengthen oversight for key areas of aviation 

security, including domestic air cargo security operations conducted by air 

carriers, and airport perimeter security operations and access controls 

carried out by airport operators. For air cargo, TSA has increased the 

number of inspectors used to assess air carrier and indirect air carrier 

compliance with security requirements, and has incorporated elements of 

risk-based decision making to guide air cargo security needs. As of 

October 2005, however, TSA had not developed performance measures to 

determine to what extent air carriers and indirect air carriers are 

complying with air cargo security requirements, limiting TSA’s ability to 

effectively target its workforce for future inspections and fulfill its 

oversight responsibilities. On airport premises, TSA had, at the time of our 

2004 review, begun evaluating the security of airport perimeters and the 

controls that limit access into secured airport areas, but had not 

completed actions to ensure that all airport workers employed in these 

areas were vetted prior to hiring and then trained.

TSA Has Made 

Progress in Providing 

Regulatory Oversight 

of Airport and Air 

Carrier Security 

Activities, but it Could 

Better Target 

Workforce Resources 

 37TSA’s measures for covert testing are passenger screener covert test results (percentage 

of TSOs correctly identifying and resolving threat images) and baggage screener covert test 

results (percentage of TSOs correctly identifying and resolving threat images). The targets 

for these measures are classified. 

Page 22 GAO-06-597T 
We reported in October 2005 that TSA had significantly increased the 

number of domestic air cargo inspections conducted of air carrier and 

indirect air carrier compliance with security requirements. 38 We noted, 

however, that TSA had not developed performance measures to determine 

to what extent air carriers and indirect air carriers were complying with 

security requirements, and had not analyzed the results of inspections to 

systematically target future inspections on those entities that pose a higher 

security risk to the domestic air cargo system. Without these performance 

measures and systematic analyses, TSA will be limited in its ability to 

effectively target its workforce for future inspections and fulfill its 

oversight responsibilities for this essential area of aviation security. We 

also reported on other actions that TSA had taken to focus limited 

resources on the most critical security needs. 

Our analysis of TSA’s inspection records39 showed that between January 1,

2003, and January 31, 2005, TSA conducted 36,635 cargo inspections of air 

carriers and indirect air carriers and found 4,343 violations.40 Although 

TSA had compiled this information, the agency had not determined what 

constitutes an acceptable level of performance or compared air carriers’ 

and indirect air carriers’ performance against this standard. Without 

measures to determine an acceptable level of compliance with air cargo 

security requirements, TSA cannot assess the performance of individual 

air carriers or indirect air carriers against national performance averages

or goals that would allow TSA to target inspections and other actions on

those that fall below acceptable levels of compliance. According to TSA 

officials, the agency was working on developing short-term and long-term 

Additional Action Needed 

to Strengthen TSA 

Inspections and Oversight 

of Domestic Air Cargo 

Security 

 38GAO, Aviation Security: Federal Action Needed to Strengthen Domestic Air Cargo 

Security, GAO-06-76 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 17, 2005).

39TSA established an automated Performance and Results Information System (PARIS) to 

compile the results of cargo inspections and the actions taken when violations are 

identified. The PARIS database, established in July 2003, provides TSA a Web-based

method for entering, storing, and retrieving performance activities and information on TSAregulated entities, including air carriers and indirect air carriers. PARIS includes profiles 

for each entity, inspections conducted by TSA, incidents that occur throughout the nation,

such as instances of bomb threats, and investigations that are prompted by incidents or 

inspection findings. 

40We requested all of TSA’s compliance inspection data, starting in November 2001. 

According to TSA, agency efforts to conduct air cargo compliance inspections during

calendar years 2001 and 2002 were minimal. Moreover, documentation of inspection results

for that period was problematic in part because of the way the Federal Aviation 

Administration reported compliance inspection data, which made it difficult to migrate the

Federal Aviation Administration’s data into TSA’s PARIS system.

Page 23 GAO-06-597T 
outcome measures for air cargo security, but they did not provide a 

timetable for when this effort would be completed. 

In addition, TSA had taken initial steps to compile information on the 

results of its compliance inspections of air carriers and indirect air carriers 

and identify the most frequent types of violations found. For example, 

from January 1, 2003, to January 31, 2005, TSA identified violations 

committed by air carriers and indirect air carriers involving

noncompliance with air cargo security requirements in several areas—

such as cargo acceptance procedures, access control to cargo facilities, 

and physical cargo inspections—that TSA had determined to be high-risk 

because they would pose the greatest risk to the safety and security of air 

cargo operations. TSA identified indirect air carriers’ failure to comply 

with their own security programs as the area with the most violations, 

which according to TSA officials is due, in part, to indirect air carriers’ 

unfamiliarity with air cargo security requirements. While TSA had 

identified frequently occurring violations, it had not yet determined the 

specific area of violation for a large number of inspections. In addition, 

TSA could not identify how many of its 36,635 inspections covered each 

air cargo security requirement. As a result, TSA could not determine the 

compliance rate for each specific area inspected. Without complete 

information on the specific air cargo security requirements that air carriers 

and indirect air carriers violated, as well as the number of times each topic 

area was inspected, TSA was limited in its ability to determine the 

compliance rates for specific air cargo security requirements and 

effectively target future inspections for air cargo security requirements 

that were most frequently violated and the air carriers and indirect air 

carriers that violate them. In June 2005, TSA officials informed us that in

the future they intended to compile information on the number of 

instances in which specific air cargo security requirements were 

inspected. 

In addition, while TSA compiled information on the results of its 

compliance inspections, the agency had not yet systematically analyzed 

these results to target future inspections on security requirements and 

entities that pose a higher risk. Analyzing inspection results would be 

consistent with our internal control standards calling for comparisons of 

data to identify relationships that could form the basis for corrective 

actions, if necessary.41 TSA officials and the agency’s fiscal year 2005 

 41GAO, Internal Control Management and Evaluation Tool, GAO-01-1008G (Washington,

D.C.: August 2001). 

Page 24 GAO-06-597T 
annual domestic inspection and assessment plan identified the need for 

such analyses. According to TSA officials, the agency had recently hired 

one staff person to begin analyzing inspection data. In June 2005, TSA 

officials also stated that the agency was working to revise its Performance 

and Results Information System database to allow for more accurate

recording of inspection violations. However, the agency had not 

systematically analyzed the results of its inspections to target future 

inspections of those entities that pose an increased security risk. Without 

an analysis of the results of its inspections, TSA had a limited basis to 

determine how best to allocate its inspection resources. 

Further, analyzing key program performance data and using the results of 

this analysis to effectively allocate resources are consistent with elements 

of a risk management approach. Specifically, analyzing the results of 

compliance inspection data could help focus limited inspection resources 

on those entities posing a higher security risk. Such targeting is important 

because TSA may not have adequate resources to inspect all air carriers 

and indirect air carriers on a regular basis. For example, as we reported in 

October 2005, according to TSA inspection data for the period from 

January 1, 2003, to January 31, 2005, compliance inspections identified a

greater incidence of violations by indirect air carriers than by air carriers. 

In addition, the percentage of inspections of air carriers that did not 

identify a violation of air cargo security requirements was significantly 

higher than that for indirect air carriers. According to TSA officials, the 

agency was taking steps to enhance its ability to conduct compliance 

inspections of indirect air carriers.42

To further target its inspections, TSA was conducting special emphasis 

assessments, which include testing to identify air cargo security 

weaknesses.43 On the basis of its review of compliance inspection results 

for the period of January 2003 to January 2005, TSA identified 25 indirect

air carriers and 11 air carriers with a history of violations related to air 

cargo security requirements. TSA officials stated that the agency began 

conducting tests on these air carriers and indirect air carriers in April 

 42Factors accounting for the limited number of TSA compliance inspections of indirect air 

carrier facilities are sensitive security information and discussed in the restricted version 

of this report, GAO-05-446SU. 

43According to TSA, special emphasis assessments are distinct from agency efforts to

conduct covert testing by TSA’s Office of Internal Affairs and Program Review. Covert

testing is typically done by undercover TSA agents and includes testing the security 

procedures at passenger check points and airport access controls.

Page 25 GAO-06-597T 
2005.

44 TSA officials stated that the agency planned to conduct additional 

tests. However, TSA officials stated that the agency had not yet 

determined how it will use the results of its testing program to help 

interpret the results from its other compliance inspection efforts. TSA had 

also not analyzed inspection results to identify additional targets for future 

testing. Such analysis could include focusing compliance testing efforts on 

air carriers and indirect air carriers with a history of air cargo security 

violations related to high-risk areas. 

TSA has made efforts to incorporate risk-based decision making into 

securing air cargo, but has not conducted assessments of air cargo 

vulnerabilities or critical assets (cargo facilities and aircraft)—two crucial 

elements of a risk-based management approach without which TSA may 

not be able to appropriately focus its resources on the most critical 

security needs. TSA also completed an Air Cargo Strategic Plan in 

November 2003 that outlined a threat-based risk management approach 

and identified strategic objectives and priority actions for enhancing air 

cargo security. Then, in November 2004, TSA issued a proposed air cargo

security rule to enhance and improve the security of air cargo

transportation.45 When finalized, TSA intends for this rule to implement 

most of the objectives set forth in the strategic plan. TSA had also not 

completed a methodology for assessing the vulnerability and criticality of 

air cargo assets, or established a schedule for conducting such 

assessments because of competing agency efforts to address other areas 

of aviation security. 

TSA had established a centralized Known Shipper database to streamline 

the process by which shippers (individuals and businesses) are made 

known to carriers with whom they conduct business. However, the 

information on the universe of shippers was incomplete because shipper 

participation was not mandatory and the data had not been thoroughly 

reviewed. TSA estimated that the database represented less than a third of

the total population of known shippers. Further, TSA had not taken steps 

to identify shippers who may pose a security threat, in part because TSA 

had incomplete information on known shippers. TSA was attempting to 

address this limitation by its November 2004 proposed air cargo security 

 44Results of TSA’s tests are considered sensitive security information and described in the

sensitive security version of this report GAO-05-446SU. 

45Air Cargo Security Requirements, 69 Fed. Reg. 65,258 (proposed Nov. 10, 2004) (to be

codified at 49 C.F.R pts. 1540-48). 

Page 26 GAO-06-597T 
rule which would make the Known Shipper database mandatory. This 

would require air carriers and indirect air carriers to submit information 

on their known shippers to TSA’s Known Shipper database. Finally, TSA 

plans to take further steps to identify those shippers who may pose a 

security risk. 

In addition, TSA established a requirement for random inspection of air 

cargo to address threats to the nation’s aviation transportation system and 

to reflect the agency’s position that inspecting 100 percent of air cargo was 

not technologically feasible and would be potentially disruptive to the flow

of air commerce. However, this requirement, which was revised in 2005 to

increase the percentage of inspections required, contained exemptions 

based on the nature and size of cargo that may leave the air cargo system 

vulnerable to terrorist attack. TSA’s plans for enhancing air cargo security 

included implementing a system for targeting elevated risk cargo for 

inspection.46 Although the agency acknowledged that the successful 

development of this system was contingent upon having complete, 

accurate, and current targeting information, the agency had not yet 

completed efforts to ensure information that will be used by the system is 

reliable. 

Further, through its proposed air cargo security rule, TSA planned to 

require air carriers and indirect air carriers to secure air cargo facilities, 

screen all individual persons boarding all-cargo aircraft, and conduct 

security checks on air cargo workers. In commenting on the proposed air 

cargo security rule, industry stakeholders representing air carriers, 

indirect air carriers and airport authorities stated that several of the 

proposals, including those mentioned above, may be costly and difficult to

implement, and that TSA may have underestimated the costs associated 

with implementing these proposed measures. Our analysis of TSA’s 

estimate also suggested that it may have been an underestimate. TSA 

stated that it plans to reassess its cost estimates before issuing its final air

cargo security rule. 

 46This system, referred to as Freight Assessment, would target elevated risk cargo for 

inspection to minimize the agency’s reliance on random inspections. This system is 

supposed to compare information on individual cargo shipments and shippers, among 

other things, against targeting criteria to assign a risk level to cargo. This would subject

elevated risk cargo to additional inspection through physical searches or non intrusive 

technology. 

Page 27 GAO-06-597T 
In October 2005, we made several recommendations to assist TSA in 

strengthening the security of the domestic air cargo transportation 

system.47 These recommendations included (1) developing a methodology 

and schedule for completing assessments of air cargo vulnerabilities and 

critical assets; (2) reexamining the rationale for existing air cargo 

inspection exemptions; (3) developing measures to gauge air carrier and 

indirect air carrier compliance with air cargo security requirements; 

(4) developing a plan for systematically analyzing and using the results of 

air cargo compliance inspections to target future inspections and identify

system wide corrective actions; (5) assessing the effectiveness of 

enforcement actions in ensuring air carrier and indirect air carrier 

compliance with air cargo security requirements; (6) and ensuring that the

data to be used in the Freight Assessment System are complete, accurate, 

and current. DHS agreed with our recommendations. We currently have an 

ongoing review assessing the security of air cargo entering the United 

States from foreign countries. 

As discussed previously, domestic commercial airport authorities have 

primary responsibility for securing airport perimeters and restricted areas, 

whereas TSA conducts regulatory inspections to help ensure that airport 

authorities are complying with TSA security requirements. We reported in 

June 2004 on TSA’s efforts to strengthen the security of airport perimeters 

(such as airfield fencing and access gates), the adequacy of controls 

restricting unauthorized access to secured areas (such as building entry 

ways leading to aircraft), and security measures pertaining to individuals

who work at airports.48 At the time of our review, we found TSA had begun 

evaluating commercial airport security but needed a better approach for 

assessing results. In addition, TSA required criminal history records 

checks and security awareness training for most, but not all, the airport 

workers called for in ATSA. Further, TSA did not require airport vendors 

with direct access to the airfield and aircraft to develop security programs, 

which would include security measures for vendor employees and 

property, as required by ATSA. 

Further Steps May Be 

Needed to Strengthen TSA 

Oversight of Commercial 

Airport Perimeters and 

Access Controls 

 47GAO-06-76. 

48GAO, Aviation Security: Further Steps Needed to Strengthen the Security of 

Commercial Airport Perimeters and Access Controls, GAO-04-728 (Washington, D.C.: June

4, 2004). 

Page 28 GAO-06-597T 
TSA is responsible for, and, at the time of our 2004 review, had begun

evaluating the security of airport perimeters and the controls that limit 

access into secured airport areas, but had not yet determined how the 

results of these evaluations could be used to make improvements to the 

nation’s airport system as a whole. Specifically, we found that TSA had 

begun conducting regulatory compliance inspections, covert testing of 

selected security procedures, and vulnerability assessments at selected 

airports. These evaluations—though not yet completed at the time of our 

report—identified perimeter and access control security concerns. For 

example, TSA identified instances where airport operators failed to 

comply with existing security requirements, including requirements 

related to access control.49 In addition, TSA identified threats to perimeter 

and access control security at each of the airports where vulnerability 

assessments were conducted in 2003. TSA had plans to begin conducting 

joint vulnerability assessments with the FBI but had not yet determined 

how it would allocate existing resources between its own independent 

airport assessments and the new joint assessments, or developed a 

schedule for conducting future vulnerability assessments. In addition, TSA 

had not yet determined how to use the results of its inspections in 

conjunction with its efforts to conduct covert testing and vulnerability 

assessments to enhance the overall security of the nation’s commercial 

airport system. 

In June 2004, we also reported that background checks were not required

for all airport workers. TSA requires most airport workers who perform 

duties in secured and sterile areas to undergo a fingerprint-based criminal 

history records check. TSA further requires airport operators to compare 

applicants’ names against TSA’s aviation security watch lists.50 Once 

workers undergo this review, they are granted access to airport areas in 

which they perform duties. For example, those workers who have been 

granted unescorted access to secured areas are authorized access to these 

areas without undergoing physical screening for prohibited items (which 

 49Our evaluation of TSA’s covert testing of airport access controls was classified and was 

discussed in a separate classified report. 

5049 U.S.C. § 44936 requires airports and air carriers to conduct fingerprint-based criminal 

history records checks for all workers seeking unescorted access to the Security 

Identification Display Area. Specifically, no individual may be given unescorted access 

authority if he or she has been convicted, or found not guilty by reason of insanity, of any 

of 28 disqualifying offenses during the 10 years before the date of the individual’s 

application for unescorted access authority, or while the individual has unescorted access 

authority. 

Page 29 GAO-06-597T 
passengers undergo prior to boarding a flight). To meet TSA requirements, 

airport operators transmit applicants’ fingerprints to a TSA contractor, 

who in turn forwards the fingerprints to TSA, who submits them to the FBI 

to be checked for criminal histories that could disqualify an applicant for 

airport employment. In March 2006, that TSA contractor reported that its 

background clearinghouse system had processed over 2 million criminal 

history record checks of airport and airline employees. TSA also requires

that airport operators verify that applicants’ names do not appear on TSA’s 

“no fly” and “selectee” watch lists to determine whether applicants are 

eligible for employment.51

According to TSA, by December 6, 2002, all airport workers who had 

unescorted access to secured airport areas—approximately 900,000 

individuals nationwide—had undergone a fingerprint-based criminal 

history records check and verification that they did not appear on TSA’s 

watch lists, as required by regulation. In late 2002, TSA required airport 

operators to conduct fingerprint-based checks and watch list verifications 

for an additional approximately 100,000 airport workers who perform 

duties in sterile areas. As of April 2004, TSA said that airport operators had 

completed all of these checks. 

ATSA also mandates that TSA require airport operators and air carriers to 

develop security awareness training programs for airport workers such as 

ground crews, and gate, ticket, and curbside agents of air carriers. 52

However, while TSA requires such training for these airport workers if 

they have unescorted access to secured areas, the agency did not require 

training for airport workers who perform duties in sterile airport areas.53

According to TSA, training requirements for these airport workers have 

not been established because additional training would result in increased

costs for airport operators. 

Further, TSA had not addressed the act’s provision that calls for the 

agency to require that airport vendors with direct access to the airfield and 

 51TSA’s no-fly list contains the names of individuals that pose, or are suspected of posing, a

threat to civil aviation or national security. Individuals on this list will not be permitted to 

board an aircraft. There is also a selectee process by which individuals who meet certain 

criteria are set aside for additional screening.

52Pub. L. No. 107-71, § 106(e), 115 Stat. at 610.

53TSA regulations governing security training are virtually the same as those required 

previously under the regulations as administered by FAA. 

Page 30 GAO-06-597T 
aircraft develop security programs to address security measures specific 

to vendor employees (companies doing business in or with the airport).54

TSA said that expanding requirements for background checks and security

awareness training for additional workers and establishing requirements 

for vendor security programs would be costly to implement and would 

require time-consuming rule-making efforts to assess potential impacts 

and obtain and incorporate public comment on any proposed regulations. 

In June 2004, we recommended, and DHS generally agreed, that TSA better 

justify future decisions on how best to proceed with security evaluations 

and implement additional measures to reduce the potential security risks 

posed by airport workers. In July 2004, in response to our 

recommendations, TSA made several improvements in these areas, 

through the issuance of a series of security directives, including requiring 

enhanced background checks and improved access controls for airport 

employees who work in restricted airport areas.55

Since its inception, TSA has achieved significant progress in deploying its 

federal aviation security workforce to meet congressional mandates 

related to establishing passenger and checked baggage screening 

operations. With the initial congressional mandates now largely met, TSA 

has turned its attention to more systematically deploying its TSO 

workforce and assessing and enhancing its effectiveness in screening 

passengers and checked baggage. TSA has developed a staffing model 

intended to identify the necessary levels of TSOs to support airport 

screening operations. However, given the challenges TSA faces in 

determining appropriate staffing levels at airports, it is critical that TSA 

carefully consider how it strategically hires, deploys and manages its TSO 

workforce to help strengthen its passenger and checked baggage 

screening programs. In addition, as threats and technology evolve, it is 

vital that TSA continue to enhance training for the TSO workforce. Over 

the past several years, TSA has strengthened its TSO training program in 

an effort to ensure that TSOs have the knowledge and skills needed to 

successfully perform their screening functions. However, without 

addressing the challenges to delivering ongoing training, including 

installing high-speed connectivity at airport training facilities, TSA may 

Concluding 

Observations 

 54See 49 U.S.C. § 44903(h)(4)(d).

55TSA has taken other actions that are considered sensitive security information. 

Page 31 GAO-06-597T 
have difficulty maintaining a screening workforce that possesses the 

critical skills needed to perform at a desired level. 

The importance of the nation’s air cargo security system and the limited 

resources available to protect it underscore the need for a risk

management approach to prioritize security efforts so that a proper 

balance between costs and security can be achieved. TSA has taken 

important steps in establishing such a risk management approach, but 

more work remains to be done to fully address the risks posed to air cargo 

security, including assessments of systemwide vulnerabilities and critical

assets. Without such assessments, TSA is limited in its ability to focus its 

resources on those air cargo vulnerabilities that represent the most critical 

security needs. In addition, without performance measures to gauge air 

carrier and indirect air carrier compliance with air cargo security 

requirements and analyzing the results of its compliance inspections, TSA

cannot effectively focus its inspection resources on those entities posing 

the greatest risk. In addition, TSA’s goal of developing a system to target 

elevated risk cargo for inspection without impeding the flow of air 

commerce will be difficult to achieve without ensuring that the 

information used to target such cargo is complete, accurate, and current.

By addressing these areas, TSA would build a better basis for 

strengthening air cargo security as it moves forward in implementing riskbased security initiatives. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer 

any questions that you or other members of the Committee may have at

this time. 

For further information on this testimony, please contact at 

Cathleen A. Berrick, (202) 512-3404 or berrickc@gao.gov. Contact points 

for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found 

on the last page of this statement. 

In addition to the contact named above, John Barkhamer, Amy Bernstein, 

Kristy Brown, Philip Caramia, Kevin Copping, Glenn Davis, 

Christine Fossett, Thomas Lombardi, Laina Poon, and Maria Strudwick 

made key contributions to this testimony. 

Contact Information 

Page 32 GAO-06-597T 
Page 33 GAO-06-597T 

Appendix I: Related GAO Products 

Aviation Security: Significant Management Challenges May Adversely 

Affect Implementation of the Transportation Security Administration’s 

Secure Flight Program. GAO-06-374T. Washington, D.C.: February 9, 2006. 

Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Could Benefit from 

Improved Planning and Controls. GAO-06-203. Washington, D.C.: 

November 28, 2005. 

Aviation Security: Federal Action Needed to Strengthen Domestic Air 

Cargo Security. GAO-06-76. Washington, D.C.: October 17, 2005. 

Transportation Security Administration: More Clarity on the Authority 

of Federal Security Directors Is Needed. GAO-05-935. Washington, D.C.: 

September 23, 2005. 

Aviation Security: Flight and Cabin Crew Member Security Training 

Strengthened, but Better Planning and Internal Controls Needed. 

GAO-05-781. Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2005. 

Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Did Not 

Fully Disclose Uses of Personal Information During Secure Flight 

Program Testing in Initial Privacy Notes, but Has Recently Taken Steps

to More Fully Inform the Public. GAO-05-864R. Washington, D.C.: July 22, 

2005. 

Aviation Security: Better Planning Needed to Optimize Deployment of 

Checked Baggage Screening Systems. GAO-05-896T. Washington, D.C.: 

July 13, 2005

Aviation Security: Screener Training and Performance Measurement 

Strengthened, but More Work Remains. GAO-05-457. Washington, D.C.: 

May 2, 2005.

Aviation Security: Secure Flight Development and Testing Under Way, 

but Risks Should Be Managed as System Is Further Developed. GAO-05-

356. Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2005 

Aviation Security: Systematic Planning Needed to Optimize the 

Deployment of Checked Baggage Screening Systems. GAO-05-365. 

Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2005. 
Aviation Security: Measures for Testing the Effect of Using Commercial

Data for the Secure Flight Program. GAO-05-324. Washington, D.C.: 

February 23, 2005. 

Transportation Security: Systematic Planning Needed to Optimize 

Resources. GAO-05-357T. Washington, D.C.: February 15, 2005. 

Aviation Security: Preliminary Observations on TSA’s Progress to Allow 

Airports to Use Private Passenger and Baggage Screening Services. 

GAO-05-126. Washington, D.C.: November 19, 2004. 

General Aviation Security: Increased Federal Oversight Is Needed, but 

Continued Partnership with the Private Sector Is Critical to Long-Term 

Success. GAO-05-144. Washington, D.C.: November 10, 2004. 

Aviation Security: Further Steps Needed to Strengthen the Security of 

Commercial Airport Perimeters and Access Controls. GAO-04-728. 

Washington, D.C.: June 4, 2004. 

Transportation Security Administration: High-Level Attention Needed 

to Strengthen Acquisition Function. GAO-04-544. Washington, D.C.: May 

28, 2004. 

Aviation Security: Challenges in Using Biometric Technologies. GAO-04-

785T. Washington, D.C.: May 19, 2004. 

Nonproliferation: Further Improvements Needed in U.S. Efforts to 

Counter Threats from Man-Portable Air Defense Systems. GAO-04-519. 

Washington, D.C.: May 13, 2004. 

Aviation Security: Private Screening Contractors Have Little Flexibility 

to Implement Innovative Approaches. GAO-04-505T. Washington, D.C.: 

April 22, 2004. 

Aviation Security: Improvement Still Needed in Federal Aviation 

Security Efforts. GAO-04-592T. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2004. 

Aviation Security: Challenges Delay Implementation of ComputerAssisted Passenger Prescreening System. GAO-04-504T. Washington, D.C.: 

March 17, 2004. 

Page 34 GAO-06-597T 
Aviation Security: Factors Could Limit the Effectiveness of the 

Transportation Security Administration’s Efforts to Secure Aerial 

Advertising Operations. GAO-04-499R. Washington, D.C.: March 5, 2004. 

Aviation Security: Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System 

Faces Significant Implementation Challenges. GAO-04-385. Washington, 

D.C.: February 13, 2004. 

Aviation Security: Challenges Exist in Stabilizing and Enhancing 

Passenger and Baggage Screening Operations. GAO-04-440T. Washington,

D.C.: February 12, 2004. 

The Department of Homeland Security Needs to Fully Adopt a 

Knowledge-based Approach to Its Counter-MANPADS Development 

Program. GAO-04-341R. Washington, D.C.: January 30, 2004. 

Aviation Security: Efforts to Measure Effectiveness and Strengthen 

Security Programs. GAO-04-285T. Washington, D.C.: November 20, 2003. 

Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Is Addressing Challenges 

of Its Expanded Mission and Workforce, but Additional Actions Needed. 

GAO-04-242. Washington, D.C.: November 19, 2003. 

Aviation Security: Efforts to Measure Effectiveness and Address 

Challenges. GAO-04-232T. Washington, D.C.: November 5, 2003. 

Airport Passenger Screening: Preliminary Observations on Progress 

Made and Challenges Remaining. GAO-03-1173. Washington, D.C.: 

September 24, 2003. 

Aviation Security: Progress Since September 11, 2001, and the 

Challenges Ahead. GAO-03-1150T. Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2003. 

Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Enhance Security 

Efforts. GAO-03-1154T. Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2003. 

Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Help Address 

Security Challenges. GAO-03-843. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2003. 

Federal Aviation Administration: Reauthorization Provides 

Opportunities to Address Key Agency Challenges. GAO-03-653T. 

Washington, D.C.: April 10, 2003. 

Page 35 GAO-06-597T 
Transportation Security: Post-September 11th Initiatives and LongTerm Challenges. GAO-03-616T. Washington, D.C.: April 1, 2003. 

Airport Finance: Past Funding Levels May Not Be Sufficient to Cover 

Airports’ Planned Capital Development. GAO-03-497T. Washington, D.C.: 

February 25, 2003. 

Transportation Security Administration: Actions and Plans to Build a 

Results-Oriented Culture. GAO-03-190. Washington, D.C.: January 17,

2003. 

Aviation Safety: Undeclared Air Shipments of Dangerous Goods and 

DOT’s Enforcement Approach. GAO-03-22. Washington, D.C.: January 10,

2003. 

Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities and Potential Improvements for the 

Air Cargo System. GAO-03-344. Washington, D.C.: December 20, 2002. 

Aviation Security: Registered Traveler Program Policy and 

Implementation Issues. GAO-03-253. Washington, D.C.: November 22, 

2002. 

Airport Finance: Using Airport Grant Funds for Security Projects Has 

Affected Some Development Projects. GAO-03-27. Washington, D.C.: 

October 15, 2002. 

Commercial Aviation: Financial Condition and Industry Responses 

Affect Competition. GAO-03-171T. Washington, D.C.: October 2, 2002. 

Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Faces 

Immediate and Long-Term Challenges. GAO-02-971T. Washington, D.C.: 

July 25, 2002.

Aviation Security: Information Concerning the Arming of Commercial

Pilots. GAO-02-822R. Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2002. 

Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities in, and Alternatives for, Preboard 

Screening Security Operations. GAO-01-1171T. Washington, D.C.: 

September 25, 2001. 

Aviation Security: Weaknesses in Airport Security and Options for 

Assigning Screening Responsibilities. GAO-01-1165T. Washington, D.C.: 

September 21, 2001. 

Page 36 GAO-06-597T 
Homeland Security: A Framework for Addressing the Nation’s 

Efforts. GAO-01-1158T. Washington, D.C.: September 21, 2001. 

Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Demonstrate Urgent Need to Improve 

Security at the Nation’s Airports. GAO-01-1162T. Washington, D.C.: 

September 20, 2001. 

Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Illustrate Severe Weaknesses in 

Aviation Security. GAO-01-1166T. Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2001. 

Page 37 GAO-06-597T (440503) 
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further 

permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or 

other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to 

reproduce this material separately. 
GAO’s Mission The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and 

investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its 

constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and 

accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO 

examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; 

and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help

Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO’s 

commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of 

accountability, integrity, and reliability. 

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no cost

is through GAO’s Web site (www.gao.gov). Each weekday, GAO posts 

newly released reports, testimony, and correspondence on its Web site. To

have GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted products every afternoon, go 

to www.gao.gov and select “Subscribe to Updates.” 

The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2 each. 

A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent of 

Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or 

more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. Orders 

should be sent to: 

U.S. Government Accountability Office 

441 G Street NW, Room LM 

Washington, D.C. 20548 

To order by Phone: Voice: (202) 512-6000 

TDD: (202) 512-2537 

Fax: (202) 512-6061 

Contact: 

Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm

E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov

Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470 

Gloria Jarmon, Managing Director, JarmonG@gao.gov (202) 512-4400 

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7125 

Washington, D.C. 20548 

Paul Anderson, Managing Director, AndersonP1@gao.gov (202) 512-4800

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 

Washington, D.C. 20548 

Obtaining Copies of 

GAO Reports and 

Testimony

Order by Mail or Phone 

To Report Fraud,

Waste, and Abuse in 

Federal Programs 

Congressional 

Relations 

Public Affairs 

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER