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THE CRITICAL ROLE OF THE NATIONAL GUARD

AT HOME AND ABROAD

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON

GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

OCTOBER 20, 2005

Serial No. 109–91

Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html

http://www.house.gov/reform

(II)

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

TOM DAVIS, Virginia, Chairman

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut

DAN BURTON, Indiana

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

CHRIS CANNON, Utah

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio

DARRELL E. ISSA, California

JON C. PORTER, Nevada

KENNY MARCHANT, Texas

LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania

VIRGINIA FOXX, North Carolina

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio

——— ———

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

TOM LANTOS, California

MAJOR R. OWENS, New York

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri

DIANE E. WATSON, California

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts

CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland

LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California

C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of

Columbia

———

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont

(Independent)

MELISSA WOJCIAK, Staff Director

DAVID MARIN, Deputy Staff Director/Communications Director

ROB BORDEN, Parliamentarian

TERESA AUSTIN, Chief Clerk

PHIL BARNETT, Minority Chief of Staff/Chief Counsel

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C O N T E N T S

Page

Hearing held on October 20, 2005 .......................................................................... 1

Statement of:

Kempthorne, Dirk, Governor of the State of Idaho; and Edward Rendell,

Governor of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania ...................................... 11

Kempthorne, Dirk ..................................................................................... 11

Rendell, Edward ........................................................................................ 27

Walker, David, Comptroller General of the United States, Government

Accountability Office, accompanied by Janet A. St. Laurent, Director,

Capabilities and Management, Government Accountability Office;

Thomas F. Hall, Assistant Secretary of Defense, Reserve Affairs, U.S.

Department of Defense; Lieutenant General David F. Melcher, Deputy

Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; Lieutenant General H Steven Blum, Chief,

National Guard Bureau; Major General Allen Tackett, State Adjutant

General, State of West Virginia; and Major General Raymond Rees,

State Adjutant General, State of Oregon .................................................... 60

Blum, Lieutenant General H Steven ....................................................... 134

Hall, Thomas F. ......................................................................................... 90

Melcher, Lieutenant General David F. .................................................... 119

Rees, Major General Raymond ................................................................. 156

Tackett, Major General Allen ................................................................... 149

Walker, David ............................................................................................ 60

Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:

Blum, Lieutenant General H Steven, Chief, National Guard Bureau, prepared statement of ........................................................................................ 137

Cummings, Hon. Elijah E., a Representative in Congress from the State

of Maryland, prepared statement of ............................................................ 185

Davis, Chairman Tom, a Representative in Congress from the State of

Virginia, prepared statement of ................................................................... 4

Hall, Thomas F., Assistant Secretary of Defense, Reserve Affairs, U.S.

Department of Defense, prepared statement of ......................................... 92

Kempthorne, Dirk, Governor of the State of Idaho, prepared statement

of ..................................................................................................................... 14

McHenry, Hon. Patrick T., a Representative in Congress from the State

of North Carolina, prepared statement of ................................................... 184

Melcher, Lieutenant General David F., Deputy Chief of Staff, U.S. Army,

prepared statement of ................................................................................... 121

Platts, Hon. Todd Russell, a Representative in Congress from the State

of Pennsylvania, prepared statement of ...................................................... 181

Porter, Hon. Jon C., a Representative in Congress from the State of

Nevada, prepared statement of .................................................................... 183

Rees, Major General Raymond, State Adjutant General, State of Oregon,

prepared statement of ................................................................................... 158

Rendell, Edward, Governor of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, prepared statement of ........................................................................................ 33

Tackett, Major General Allen, State Adjutant General, State of West

Virginia, prepared statement of ................................................................... 152

Walker, David, Comptroller General of the United States, Government

Accountability Office, prepared statement of ............................................. 63

Waxman, Hon. Henry A., a Representative in Congress from the State

of California, prepared statement of ........................................................... 9

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THE CRITICAL ROLE OF THE NATIONAL

GUARD AT HOME AND ABROAD

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 20, 2005

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM, Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:01 a.m., in room

2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Tom Davis (chairman

of the committee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Davis of Virginia, Shays, Gutknecht,

Souder, Platts, Issa, Dent, Foxx, Schmidt, Waxman, Kanjorski,

Sanders, Cummings, Kucinich, Clay, Watson, Van Hollen,

Ruppersberger, and Norton.

Staff present: Melissa Wojciak, staff director; David Marin, deputy staff director/communications director; Jennifer Safavian, chief

counsel for oversight and investigations; Rob White, press secretary; Drew Crockett, deputy communications director; Grace

Washbourne and Brien Beattie, professional staff members; Teresa

Austin, chief clerk; Sarah D’Orsie, deputy clerk; Leneal Scott, chief

information officer; Karen Lightfoot, minority press secretary; Andrew Su, minority professional staff member; Earley Green, minority chief clerk; Jean Gosa, minority assistant clerk; and Gilad

Wilkenfeld, minority staff assistant.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Good morning. A quorum being present,

the Committee on Government Reform will come to order.

Today, the Committee on Government Reform continues our inquiry into the responsibilities our Nation places on the National

Guard, and whether the Federal Government is fulfilling its commitment to our men and women in uniform.

Today’s Army National Guard is in a tough spot—tougher than

perhaps at any time since the Second World War. Nearly one-third

of all of the soldiers in Iraq are National Guard troops. At the same

time, the citizen soldiers of the National Guard continue their numerous domestic tasks: providing security to airports and borders;

monitoring the airspace of the continental United States; and responding to natural disasters, as we saw with Hurricane Katrina.

They do their jobs, and they do them exceedingly well. However,

the committee has learned that too often we are expecting Guard

soldiers to perform their jobs without the assurance that they have

all of the equipment and the training that we can and should provide them.

At today’s hearing, we are going to examine the Department of

Defense policies and actions affecting the future of the National

Guard, as well as hearing the critical needs of States for National

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Guard manpower and resources. Unfortunately, what we will hear

about the state of the Army National Guard’s equipment is unacceptable.

Today, the Government Accountability Office will report that:

Non-deployed Guard units now face significant equipment shortfalls because they have been equipped at less than war-time levels,

despite their vital contribution to the war on terrorism.

The Army has required Army National Guard units to transfer

or leave behind close to 100,000 items for use by follow-on forces,

but the Army can only account for about 45 percent of these items,

and has not developed a plan to replace them, as DOD policy requires. Without a completed and implemented plan to replace all

the Guard equipment left overseas, Army Guard units will face

growing equipment shortages and challenges in regaining readiness for future missions.

Although deploying Army National Guard units have been getting priority for getting the equipment they needed, readying these

forces has degraded the equipment inventory of the Guard’s nondeployed units, and it threatens the Guard’s ability to prepare

forces for future missions both at home and overseas. Quite simply,

we are robbing the non-deployed ‘‘Peter’’ to pay the deployed

‘‘Paul.’’ I understand the need to prioritize in wartime, but this

shouldn’t have to be a zero-sum game.

At the rate we are going, we will bankrupt the National Guard.

And I want to know today what we are going to do to change that

prognosis.

At a recent congressional hearing, General Steven Blum reported

that the National Guard has only one-third of the equipment it

needs to respond to domestic disasters and terrorist attacks, and

will need at least $7 billion to acquire radios, trucks, construction

machinery, and medical gear, to be in a position to support homeland operations.

As confirmed by GAO in the study being released today, General

Blum has reported that the equipment problem became worse as

Guard units deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan; taking the newest

equipment with them, leaving the home front with an outdated and

dwindling supply of gear.

Hurricane Katrina has shown us that the National Guard is our

Nation’s first military responder. And I think it is unfathomable

that they are approaching equipment bankruptcy.

Today I want to hear exactly how and when the Department of

Defense and the Department of the Army will reequip the Army

National Guard. All the policies on homeland defense and homeland security will come to naught if the Department of the Army

doesn’t equip the Guard.

I hope to hear when they will be reimbursed for their outstanding response to the citizens of the Gulf Coast. I hope to hear when

the equipment they left in Iraq is going to be replaced with new

equipment. I hope to hear how the National Guard is integrated in

all DOD and Army transformation policies, including the Guard’s

role in homeland defense and military assistance to civilian authorities.

Where is the predictability in current DOD policies for State and

local leaders to rely on? There appears to be none.

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We are honored today to have the Governor of Pennsylvania and

the Governor of Idaho, to express their deep concerns with the current equipment situation and their needs for Guardsmen to assist

with State security and emergency preparedness and response.

They are joined by the State Adjutants General of West Virginia

and Oregon. And we thank all of you for coming.

Without debating the legalities of Federal and State laws concerning the National Guard, or lamenting the traditionally weak

funding of the National Guard, it is important that we look at what

the National Guard has done and is doing for this country right

now.

It is not enough to be grateful—even amazed—as they do so well

with so little. We need to make sure that the DOD decides quickly

what its responsibilities will be here at home, and establishes requirements that result in appropriate training and equipment for

the National Guard.

We need to make sure that the Army starts recognizing that the

Army National Guard is charged with the same responsibilities of

active duty forces; should be equipped at the same readiness levels

as active duty; and it should not be funded at just 11 percent of

what the active Army receives.

And we have to be sure that Congress starts adjusting our authorizations and appropriations to recognize the resources required

by the National Guard, who are also expected to be America’s first

military responders.

I have been working closely with Senator Kit Bond and the Sen- ate Guard Caucus, to get $1.3 billion in equipment for the National

Guard included in the next applicable supplemental. This is not

even close to the amount needed, and the measure may fail in conference. We can’t let this happen.

The time to ensure the brave and dedicated men and women of

the Guard receive the training and equipment they need to fulfill

missions of safety and security for the people of the United States

is now. I look forward to hearing today from our witnesses what

we need to do to make this happen.

I would now yield to our ranking member, who has been active

on these issues as well, Mr. Waxman, for his opening statement.

[The prepared statement of Chairman Tom Davis follows:]

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Mr. WAXMAN. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased you are

continuing to focus committee attention on issues affecting the men

and women serving in the National Guard.

Over the history of this country, the Guard has played a significant role in ensuring the safety and well-being of Americans; but

the recent increasing use of Guardsmen in conflicts abroad has

placed tremendous strains on Guard members and the institution

overall. We must do everything we can to ensure the National

Guard functions effectively and efficiently.

The Guard currently faces two major problems. First, the Nation

has not been meeting its fundamental obligations to the Guard. As

this committee has learned from previous oversight hearings,

Guardsmen aren’t getting paid on time; they aren’t getting the

proper and timely health care and benefits they deserve; and they

have received sub-par equipment and training, compared to active

duty forces.

Second, the recent over-extension of Guardsmen overseas appears to be posing challenges to the Guard’s ability to respond to

domestic disasters. The recent response to Hurricane Katrina is a

case in point. When the hurricane hit, many of the Louisiana and

Mississippi Guardsmen were serving in Iraq and unavailable to

help their friends and neighbors. Moreover, National Guard equipment important for the hurricane relief effort, such as Humvees,

night goggles, and high-water trucks, were also over in Iraq.

According to DOD and Guard plans, our reliance on the National

Guard for security at home and abroad may only increase in the

coming years. That is why I am so concerned about predicaments

confronting the Guard today.

We must make sure that the country is meeting its commitments

to the individuals serving, and ensuring they have the resources

necessary to do the job right.

I look forward to hearing the witnesses today. I particularly want

to welcome our former colleague in the Congress, Governor Kempthorne. And I know Governor Rendell will be here soon.

And to the Governors, and to other witnesses, unfortunately, I

have a conflict of interest—not a conflict of interest; a conflict of

time—[laughter]—a conflict in schedule, that will keep me from

being here. But my staff will give me a full report. And I will be

working with the chairman to accomplish the goals we all seek.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Henry A. Waxman follows:]

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Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much. I have a conflict of

interest. I was in the Guard for 8 years, so I want to keep it strong.

Do any other Members wish to make opening statements?

[No response.]

Chairman TOM DAVIS. If not, we will call our first witness: a

former member of the other body, a former Mayor of Boise, ID, and

the current Governor of Idaho, the Honorable Dirk Kempthorne,

who has had a very distinguished public career.

Dirk, we appreciate you being here today. It is our policy we

swear everybody. Would you just raise your right hand?

[Witness sworn.]

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much. And thank you so

much for being here. And I would just note, as you do in your testimony, Idaho has basically put more people over in Iraq and had

more people deployed than any other State, on a proportional basis.

You have taken heavy losses. You have people down in Katrina,

helping out down there. And you had an outstanding record as

Governor.

We are just really happy to have you here today, and I thank you

for being with us to share your thoughts.

STATEMENTS OF DIRK KEMPTHORNE, GOVERNOR OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO; AND EDWARD RENDELL, GOVERNOR OF

THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

STATEMENT OF DIRK KEMPTHORNE

Governor KEMPTHORNE. Chairman Davis, thank you very much,

and I was very encouraged with your opening comments and those

comments by Congressman Waxman. And to all members of the

committee, I am very delighted to be here to have these discussions.

As we meet here today, the Idaho National Guard’s 116th Brigade Combat Team is deployed in Iraq; our 183rd Attack Helicopter Battalion is being deployed to Afghanistan; our 189th Airlift

Squadron continues to rotate its C–130 aircraft and crews in and

out of Southwest Asia.

As you noted, Mr. Chairman, there are also 400 Idaho National

Guardsmen deployed in Louisiana to assist the hurricane response

effort in the Gulf Coast States. I am proud that today, in all, Idaho

has the highest percentage of Guard forces mobilized than any

other State.

I am also proud of the fact that the Idaho National Guard has

accepted every mission that has ever been requested of it, without

exception or reservation. And I am proud of the men and women

who carry out these missions with great professionalism and honor.

They represent Idaho, and they represent the United States of

America extremely well; as to all Guard units of all States.

So I come here today with firsthand knowledge of the impact

these missions have on a State’s ability to respond to a terrorist

event or a natural disaster.

In anticipation of your first question, ‘‘What can the Federal Government do to help States prepare?’’, my first response is to ensure

that we do have equipment. Now, why would I say that, when we

have an entire National Guard? Because over the next several

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weeks, the 116th Brigade Combat Team will demobilize from Iraq

and, significantly, they will leave behind their vehicles and rolling

stock that would fill a train with 212 railroad cars—over 400 vehicles.

Additionally, in the event of a natural or manmade disaster, my

State will have a significant shortage of state-of-the-art tactical

communication equipment to enable effective communication, control, and synchronization of efforts; as well as a shortage of critical

medical equipment to facilitate immediate casualty treatment and

care.

At this time, I have not been made aware of any plan to reequip

the 116th with the basic equipment that will be left in Iraq. Couple

this with the BRAC recommendation to remove the C–130 cargo

aircraft from the Idaho Air National Guard—a move that will not

only leave Idaho, but the entire Pacific Northwest, without airlift

capabilities—and you can begin to understand the magnitude of

the gap left in our response capabilities.

These facts are in direct conflict with my ability as a Governor

to prepare for disaster and/or domestic terrorist attacks. We need

a commitment from the Federal Government that the equipment

that is left in Iraq will be replaced in quick order. And we need

further assessment of the BRAC recommendations on our ability to

respond immediately to a regional disaster.

When assets such as a C–130 are under the control of a Governor, that Governor can make one call and, within an hour, props

are turning. This is not always the case with Federal assets. A

comparison of total flights flown by Air National Guard units versus Air Force and Air Force Reserve units over a 4-day period in

response to Hurricane Katrina shows that the Guard flew 10 missions to every 1 mission flown by the Air Force and Air Force Reserve.

A case in point: I spoke to a Governor of a southern State who

said there were 60 C–130’s under Federal jurisdiction and—much

to the frustration and the disappointment of the Air Force flight

crews—few, if any, were flying.

When brigades return from a 1-year tour of duty in the Middle

East, they are at a truly proficient and efficient level of training.

How do we maintain that level of readiness upon their return, if

they now encounter a critical equipment shortage? And what does

this imply for homeland security? What are the implications for recruitment and retention?

No one can predict the magnitude of the next natural or manmade disaster, but I believe that we are prepared to sustain an

emergency response for a 24 to 48-hour period; and at that point,

based on the situation, we may well need to move additional personnel quickly to the disaster scene.

Additionally, as we begin to activate National Guard personnel,

we deplete the bank of emergency responders—such as doctors,

nurses, EMTs, firefighters, law enforcement officers—because in

many cases, these men and women are part of the National Guard.

I commend General Steven Blum and his team from the National

Guard Bureau for their efforts to coordinate State-to-State, Governor-to-Governor support during the Gulf Coast hurricanes. The

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General’s efforts truly showcased how this model can work properly.

Where it does not always work so well is in the coordination between the State and Federal Governments. Let me give you an example from Hurricane Katrina. In the days after the hurricane

devastated the Gulf Coast region, Idaho responded to an urgent request to evacuate the frail elderly from the Gulf Coast States.

We had identified more than 400 nursing home beds in Idaho for

these evacuees. We sent two C–130’s, with critical care nurses and

emergency room physicians, to Houston and to Mississippi. When

our planes touched down, our people were met with significant resistance. In one case, despite the overwhelming need for evacuation

for many of the frail elderly, we could not find anyone who would

release patients to us. It was only after the Governor of Texas personally interceded with the person in charge at the Astrodome that

we were able to get 10 individuals out. But that was the total and

the final number of individuals that we could evacuate.

In the other case, the temporary hospital that had been set up

to receive frail elderly was on a Federal installation. When our people arrived, they were warmly greeted by overworked and stressed

Mississippi medical personnel. But they were then told by a Federal official that they could not help, because they had not been

‘‘Federalized.’’ As patients were coming into the hospital, two emergency room physicians and eight critical care nurses from Idaho

were literally informed to stand against the wall, because they did

not have the necessary Federal credentials to treat patients.

It is worth noting that, had the hospital been anywhere else besides Federal property, there would have been no problems with

our doctors and nurses seeing patients.

Since when did it become illegal for one State to help another

State in these United States? This is the United States of America;

it is not ‘‘The Federal Government of America.’’

From my perspective, this is a fundamental breakdown in Stateto-State assistance, that is caused by inflexible Federal regulations.

I would encourage this committee to look at this issue as you consider various reforms to Federal emergency response policy.

Mr. Chairman, in closing, we need to ensure the men and women

of our National Guard are celebrated for their contributions to our

safety and security; that we stand for our Guard in all that they

must carry out.

I look forward to this discussion with you and the members of

the committee.

[The prepared statement of Governor Kempthorne follows:]

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Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much.

We now have our distinguished second witness today, Governor

Rendell of Pennsylvania. Let me just note, we first met when I was

chairman of the County Board in Fairfax. You were active in the

National League of Cities and the Conference of Mayors—an outstanding job as mayor, a leader in unfunded mandates; as were

you, Governor Kempthorne. We worked together. And then again,

when he was chairman of the Democratic National Committee, I

was chairman of the Campaign Committee for the Republicans in

the House.

In this business, which can be very hard-edged, you always performed very admirably; as you are now. And we are just so pleased

to have you here, Governor, today to testify on some of the problems the Guard is facing in Pennsylvania. And you do a great job.

I just want to thank you for being here.

STATEMENT OF EDWARD RENDELL

Governor RENDELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. And I know Mr. Kanjorski would say the

same thing, but I thought I would say it from this side. Thank you.

Governor RENDELL. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. And Mr. Platts, here.

Governor RENDELL. And it is great to see Congressman Platts

and Congressman Kanjorski here. And I appreciate this opportunity. I will try to shorten my written remarks a little bit, because

I am going to cover some of the same ground that Governor Kempthorne has spoken to you about.

Obviously, everyone is aware of the joint status of the National

Guard. It is the only military personnel that perform in that joint

status. It goes all the way back to the militia clause of the Constitution.

In many ways, today’s National Guard carries out the genius of

our founders, and it constitutes federalism in action in a military

context. Formation of the militia predates the founding of our country. The Massachusetts National Guard traces its lineage to the

first regiments established by the General Court of the Massachusetts Bay Colony in 1636.

And our most renowned Pennsylvanian, Benjamin Franklin,

founded the Pennsylvania National Guard when he formed the

Associators in Philadelphia in 1747. In 1755, the Colonial Assembly

passed Pennsylvania’s first militia law. And coincidentally, on November 25th, we will celebrate the 250th anniversary of the Pennsylvania National Guard.

Today’s National Guard in Pennsylvania and across America is

the modern militia reserved to the States by the U.S. Constitution.

Based on a dual enlistment system, every member of the Pennsylvania National Guard takes an oath of enlistment in a reserve component of the Armed Forces—the National Guard of the United

States—and in the modern State militia—the State national guard.

These State and Federal military entities are linked inseparably.

On a day-to-day basis, the Guard remains under the State command and control, and the Governors serve as commanders in

chief. When the Guard is called into active Federal service—as is

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the case with our soldiers and airmen in Iraq—they are under the

command and control of the Federal Government.

There are a little more than 20,000 soldiers and airmen in the

Pennsylvania Army and Air National Guard. We are proud to be,

with Texas and California, the largest National Guard in the

United States of America.

Since September 11, 2001, of those 20,000-plus soldiers and airmen, a total of 13,372 Guard members have been deployed in support of Operation Enduring Freedom, Iraqi Freedom, and Noble

Eagle. More than two out of three of our Guard have been deployed

in the fight against global terrorism. Today there are more than

3,000 members of the Pennsylvania National Guard deployed in

Iraq.

When they are not deployed overseas, Guard personnel serve in

readiness centers, armories, and the Air National Guard bases

across Pennsylvania. The Guard provides me as Governor with a

well trained and equipped military force to respond to State emergencies such as floods, blizzards, hurricanes, and local emergency

situations.

Pennsylvania is home to the National Guard’s third Weapons of

Mass Destruction Civil Support Team. These National Guard

teams provide the Defense Department with unique expertise and

capabilities to assist State Governors in preparing and responding

to chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear incidents, as part of

the States’ emergency response structure. Each team consists of 22

highly skilled, full-time National Guard members who are federally

resourced, trained, and exercised.

The National Guard is a partnership between States and Federal

Government. As any of you who have been involved in this partnership know, this involves give and take. Today’s National Guard is

supposed to involve day-to-day communication, collaboration, and

interaction between the State and Federal Governments.

The National Guard Bureau, a bureau within the Department of

Defense, serves as the channel of communication between DOD

and the States. And I join with Governor Kempthorne in saying

that General Blum has done an excellent job in trying to carry out

that function.

It is fair to say that the Federal Government is the senior partner in this partnership between the States and the Federal Government, in terms of the supply, the equipment, and the funding it

provides for most National Guard activities. But what is sometimes

overlooked is that the States provide the most precious resource of

all to the National Guard: the young men and women who serve

their State and their Nation, and who risk, and sometimes give,

their lives in service.

The States recognize how important it is to recruit and retain the

high-quality personnel necessary to maintain and strengthen the

Guard. For example, in Pennsylvania we invest about $10 million

a year in our educational assistance programs to provide public

service educational grants to new enlistees and members of the

Pennsylvania National Guard. This is an important recruitment

and retention tool that keeps the Guard strong to accomplish both

its State and Federal missions.

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So it is wrong to say that the States do not participate in the

funding of the Guard? We very much do, in recruitment efforts like

this and in other benefits that we provide.

Unfortunately, the relationship between the Guard and the

States and the Federal Government has broken down to some extent. One place where the National Guard partnership between the

States and the Federal Government broke down badly was in the

actions of the Defense Department and the Air Force with regard

to the 2005 BRAC round.

The Department of Defense and the Air Force chose to ignore

clear congressional statutes and mandates requiring the consent of

the Governors with regard to major changes in National Guard

units. They argued that the BRAC process superseded the requirement for input from the States, and that it was impractical to ask

54 National Guard entities for input.

In an incredible effort to justify elimination of Air National

Guard units and missions across America, the Air Force even suggested that the Civil Air Patrol could fill in for the Air National

Guard. Don’t get me wrong: The Civil Air Patrol is carrying out

homeland security missions and helping us in many ways. It is a

great organization. But it is no substitute for the Air National

Guard. It is ludicrous to even suggest that.

Let me take a brief moment to describe what happened with the

111th Fighter Wing of the Pennsylvania National Guard. For several years, my staff, the Adjutant General, and the Commander of

the Pennsylvania Air National Guard had received briefings that

the 111th, which flies the A–10 Warthog aircraft out of the Willow

Grove Joint Reserve Base, was likely to receive additional mission

aircraft as part of the future total force planning process. Imagine

our surprise and dismay when, on May 13th of this year, we received the DOD recommendation that the 111th Fighter Wing

should be deactivated.

The DOD recommendation came without a word of advance

warning. There was no coordination, no request for input, and certainly no request for my approval as Governor, for the elimination

of this important Air National Guard unit.

The 111th has about 1,000 full-time and part-time military personnel. It is based at Willow Grove, right outside of Philadelphia,

which of course is a key strategic location of our State. The 111th

does not just consist of pilots and airplanes. It has security forces,

mechanics, medical personnel, and all the rest that make up a

modern fighter wing. Seventy-five percent of the members of the

111th have been deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan over the last 4

years.

These personnel are also key assets to me as Governor in addressing potential threats to the security of our homeland. What is

more, I believe it is vital to maintain military flying operations at

Willow Grove to provide a surge capability to respond to emergencies in the Philadelphia region.

Make no mistake: If terrorists again hijacked a plane, and that

plane was bearing down on Independence Hall or the Liberty

Bell—two of our three most important national icons—the planes

nearest to Philadelphia who could intercept those terrorist-held

planes would be at Willow Grove. The difference between their reVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:31 Apr 17, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\24714.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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sponse time and the response time from other bases is a matter of

minutes but, as we learned on September 11th, a matter of minutes can cost thousands of lives.

Congress has mandated that the U.S. Government cannot make

changes to the branch, organization, or allotment of National

Guard units located within the States without the approval of the

Governor. That is found in Title 10 and Title 32 of the U.S. Code.

The same law provides that I, as Governor, cannot disband a National Guard unit that receives Federal funds without the approval

of the President. The law aptly describes the fundamental principles of federalism upon which the National Guard is built. Neither the State nor the Federal Government can make basic changes

to National Guard units without the input and consent of the

other.

At least, that is the way it was supposed to work. But the Air

Force decided that the BRAC law superseded these other Federal

laws passed by Congress, and that it could completely ignore the

States in making recommendations to eliminate Air National

Guard units and missions.

The 111th Fighter Wing was the only National Guard unit in the

country actually recommended for deactivation, but others were

stripped of aircraft and personnel. Aside from ignoring what we

saw as clear legal requirements, I was completely surprised by the

Air Force’s attitude toward the National Guard in general, and to

the partnership between the Guard and the States in particular.

An Air Force spokesman testifying before the BRAC Commission

said it would be unreasonable and impractical to expect the Air

Force to talk to 54, or even 28, National Guard entities in making

plans to eliminate units and missions. It was almost as if they

were saying that, ‘‘Those pesky States stand in the way of us getting our job done.’’ Somebody even suggested that Governors would

bring politics into the BRAC process—something that, as we all

know, has been immune to politics in its total existence.

As Governor of Pennsylvania, I was not going to stand by and

watch DOD attempt to eliminate one-fourth of the Air National

Guard force in my State. In late May, I wrote to Secretary Rumsfeld, to advise him that I did not consent to the proposed deactivation of the 111th. And in early July, Senators Arlen Specter, Rick

Santorum, and I filed suit in Federal court, seeking a declaratory

judgment that the DOD violated the Governor consent statutes

when they commenced action to deactivate an Air National Guard

unit without the consent of the Governor.

We filed suit not just to stand up to the Guard [sic], or to protect

the security interests of Pennsylvania; we filed suit to protect the

vital principles of federalism grounded in our Constitution that established the National Guard as a military force shared by the

State and the Federal Government. We also filed suit to stand up

for Congress, which had passed laws requiring the consent of the

Governor for certain changes to National Guard units.

As a result, I was very pleased that Senators Specter and

Santorum joined me in this litigation, because their support emphasized that DOD’s actions were not just ignoring the Governor’s

prerogative with regard to the National Guard, but also ignoring

the direction provided by Congress.

31

In the end, Federal District Judge John Pedova ruled in favor of

the Commonwealth, and held that the DOD’s recommendation for

deactivation of the 111th Fighter Wing was ‘‘null and void.’’

On the same day that the court decision was issued, the BRAC

Commission found that the DOD’s recommendation substantially

deviated from the BRAC criteria, and overturned the proposed deactivation of the 111th Fighter Wing. The Commission also ruled

that military flying operations should be maintained at Willow

Grove.

We believe the Commission should have stopped there, and had

no legal right to go forward. But unfortunately, they went ahead

to recommend that the A–10’s assigned to the 111th be distributed

to other units, even as they encouraged the Air Force to maintain

the A–10’s there. So that set up the unbelievably ludicrous proposition that we were going to continue to employ and pay and train

and equip in other ways 1,023 airmen and airwomen, but give

them no planes to carry out their mission.

Now, Senator Santorum and I have talked to the Defense Department, and we are trying to reconcile what is a very difficult situation, and one that makes no sense for the taxpayers of the

United States and the security of the State of Pennsylvania. It is

my hope that the Defense Department will settle this litigation—

and as I said, we are the only State that was successful in Federal

court—and agree to maintain the A–10’s at Willow Grove.

In fact, ironically, 12 A–10’s are headed to, essentially, a graveyard in Arizona; even though those planes are not scheduled for deactivation until 2028. Makes no sense.

Contrary to what I have just outlined, where the relationship between the Guard as a State unit and a Federal unit broke down,

in the aftermath of Hurricane Rita and Hurricane Katrina, I think

it worked fairly well. Obviously, I understand the incidents that

Governor Kempthorne talked about; but in our experience, it

worked well.

Pennsylvania sent more than 2,500 Guard personnel to Louisiana and Mississippi to respond to those emergencies. We sent the

largest Guard contingent of any outside State. We responded

promptly. Our Interim Satellite Incident Site Communication Set

deployed from Fort Indiantown Gap to the Mississippi Gulf Coast

in the first days after the storms. And for more than a week, it provided just about the only form of reliable communications in the region. It later redeployed to Texas in the wake of Hurricane Rita.

We sent security and military police forces from several units—

including, ironically, the 111th Fighter Wing—to Louisiana within

24 hours after we received the request for support. About 200

Pennsylvania National Guard personnel deployed by air to Louisiana, and elements of our 213th Area Support Group and our 56th

Brigade deployed by convoy to the area of devastation within just

a few days.

This is a great example of how the Guard can serve in a way

that is beyond our borders. I got, personally, tens and tens of letters and e-mails from citizens of Mississippi and Louisiana, thanking me for sending the Guard, sending it so quickly, and for the

caliber of service that was rendered by the Guard. I believe that,

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as I said, this was a good example of the best in the Federal-State

cooperation.

Now, you have heard Senator, Governor Kempthorne talk about

what is the second-biggest problem, and that is the equipment

problem, or the reequipment problem. My testimony is replete with

examples of Pennsylvania Guard units who went over to Iraq and

Afghanistan and were forced—and we understand this—to leave a

lot of the equipment behind; in one case, 10 of 41 Humvees; in one

case, 7 airplanes—7 CH–47D helicopters, excuse me.

The Defense Department has been slow in replacing materiel. In

many cases, we haven’t gotten that materiel back when the units

have come back. And in many cases, it has been reported to me

that the equipment that is sent to replace the equipment left behind in Iraq and Afghanistan is older, is inferior, and in many

cases just plain and simply doesn’t work. That is a second and

huge problem, when it comes to the integrity of State National

Guards and their ability to carry out their mission at home.

If in fact the Guard units are deployed, and I want to remind

you, two-thirds of Pennsylvania’s—that is the largest National

Guard in the country—two-thirds of those soldiers and airmen

have served in Iraq and Afghanistan. That is how active we have

been. We have over 3,000 members there now. The Second Combat

Brigade left from Camp Shelby, Mississippi, and 4,100 Guardsmen

went over; 2,100 were Pennsylvanians.

It is our obligation to make sure—and Congress should enforce

and make certain—that when these Guard units leave equipment

behind, that they receive commensurate equipment quickly and as

soon as they return to their States.

So those are the two problems that I see most graphically, and

the ones that I think that need to be addressed. As I said, we have

a number of specific examples about the equipment failures in my

testimony that I won’t belabor you with now.

But let me tell you that the National Guard has changed. When

I was a Reservist, Reserve and National Guard were considered

weekend warriors. The contemplation that we would go into active

duty theaters like Iraq and Afghanistan was literally something no

one ever considered. Now, as I said, two-thirds of the Pennsylvania

National Guard have been activated.

Since August 1st, 15 members of the Pennsylvania National

Guard have died in Iraq; 15 members since August 1st.

Of the 2,100 Pennsylvanians whom I said goodbye to at Camp

Shelby, Mississippi, I said that I hope to see all of them back when

their mission ended 1 year from the date that we stood in Mississippi. Unfortunately, that is not going to be the case.

The Guard makes tremendous sacrifices. Our personnel deserve

the best equipment when they are fighting on foreign soil, and

when they are doing their security missions here. The relationship

between the Guard and its Federal and State status needs to be

addressed.

I salute you, Mr. Chairman, for having these hearings. I believe

they are very, very, very important. And I wish you well in the

work ahead.

[The prepared statement of Governor Rendell follows:]

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Chairman TOM DAVIS. Governor, thank you very much. Let me

ask both of you, we know the equipment shortages. I mean, we can

just look at the funding across the board. But if you were to

prioritize, what specific equipment are you most concerned about?

Communications, airlift helicopters, trucks? Is there anything you

can, if they had to set priorities?

Governor RENDELL. Well, again, for Pennsylvania, which has a

large Air National Guard, as well—an Air National Guard of almost 4,500—the planes and the helicopters are the most important.

For example, in floods—and we were hit this past year with two

or three major floods—the helicopters are of enormous importance

at home.

For a homeland security mission—and again, the whole nature

of the Guard changed after September 11th. To say that planes in

Willow Grove under the command of the Pennsylvania Air National

Guard might be scrambled to protect the Liberty Bell or Independence Hall from airborne assault, that was a foreign concept before

September 11th.

So I think the planes the helicopters are the first, most important equipment. I think communication equipment is second, because that is important, as we showed in Hurricane Katrina and

Hurricane Rita. And then last, the trucks and vehicles that are

needed to move personnel—again, as we saw in Hurricane Rita. Of

the 2,500 Pennsylvania Guardsmen who went down to the Gulf,

only about 400 went by plane. The other 2,100 went by convoy.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Governor.

Governor KEMPTHORNE. Mr. Chairman, I would add that the airlift capability is No. 1. And again, from my testimony, you know

that they are now recommending that the C–130’s go away from

Idaho. I can show you—I would love to come back and just show

you my presentation to the BRAC Commission, to show you response time, and how there is now a void throughout the Pacific

Northwest.

We also need the rolling stock. Idaho is a large land mass, very

mountainous. If we have an earthquake, if we have something of

that nature, or floods, the idea of evacuating—we are going to have

to have a rolling stock. The fact that we are leaving over 400 vehicles in Iraq is very problematic.

Big picture: Mississippi ran out of gasoline for their first responders. That was one of the requests that they put out to the

States. So the idea was, why not take a KC–135, a tanker, fly it

down there? Well, we then determined that you cannot offload it.

You need to do an aerial offloading; not on the ground. So from

Idaho, which is a 6-day trip from Mississippi, we sent a convoy of

tanker trucks down there. When we got the urgent request from

Louisiana, we sent a convoy of 120 vehicles to Louisiana.

So just as Governor Rendell is talking about response to the Gulf

Coast, we are talking about the States helping one another, the

States of these United States, for homeland security, or natural

disasters.

Much of our equipment is now in the Middle East. We have to

have that equipment back in the area of rolling stock; airlift capability; communications; and the engineering, if in fact you have to

repair the bridges, restore the bridges, open up roads. I think much

43

of what you saw in the aftermath of Katrina was moving devastation aside so that you could get transportation realigned.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Let me ask you, the ‘‘Hot Line’’ this morning has a headline saying, in a rare split with his brother, the

President, Florida Governor Jeb Bush said he does not support

Federalizing the emergency response to future disasters.

How do you feel about easing posse comitatus restrictions on active duty forces and others performing domestic missions in your

State?

Governor KEMPTHORNE. First, I would associate myself with the

remarks of Governor Jeb Bush. He is right on target. The last

thing we need when a State has a disaster, or a local area within

a State, is to have a Federalization of the assets.

We often say that the solution is always closest to the problem.

And the idea that somehow Governors would be usurped of their

responsibilities as Governors and commanders-in-chief and that

there would be some force that would come in that would then take

over the control, I do not agree with.

There needs to be a partnership, a strong partnership, and that

is what federalism is all about. But the idea of someone immediately declaring the posse comitatus, coming in, taking over law

enforcement—I totally disagree with that.

Governor RENDELL. And let me just add, I think all Governors

would agree with, Mr. Chairman, what Governor Bush said.

But let me give you an example. And this is not meant to place

the finger of blame anywhere, but as you know, the Federal Government—and we can talk all we want about the reasons why this

happened—it wasn’t until 4 or 5 days later, till the Federal Government activated the Army. We responded to Governor Barber

and Governor Blanco the day after Katrina hit; we had our Guard

mobilized to go down there.

If we had waited for the Federal Government’s approval, it would

have been another 4 or 5 days before the Pennsylvania Guard

could have been ready to go down. And some actually left that very

next day. The communications team that I talked about in my testimony left Tuesday. And if we had waited for the Federal Government, we wouldn’t have gotten approval until Friday.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much.

Mr. Kanjorski.

Mr. KANJORSKI. Let me say, I appreciate the testimony of both

Governors; but, of course, my Governor is always superior to all

others. [Laughter.]

So, welcome to the Congress, Governor Rendell.

I am disturbed, because I have heard the same problems at home

about this equipment. And in effect, most of my Guardsmen are

telling me that they feel that they have been somewhat castrated—

I will use the term. They are there in spirit and body, but they are

not capable of functioning as a unit any more, without the use of

the equipment. And as you so rightly say, 75 percent of the Pennsylvania National Guard has gone to Iraq, and left the equipment

in Iraq. And now they are substantially uncovered.

I want to commend the chairman for having these hearings. I

certainly, when I get back to the floor, am going to be talking to

Mr. Murtha. We have to do something on an emergency basis here

44

to reequip the National Guards to make them sound. And I commit

myself to both the Governors to do that.

And, too, I happen to agree with you, Governor Kempthorne, that

the closest to the problem is the best solution. This whole idea of

going Federal—I mean, not that I want to strike out at anyone,

since I am part of the Federal Government—but we didn’t get very

high scores in Katrina.

And I think that with every disaster that I have been associated

with in Pennsylvania, we have seen what the National Guard can

do. And my constituents sleep a hell of a lot more comfortably

knowing the National Guard is there, instead of waiting for the

Army or the Federal Government to come.

So I commend both of you for coming today, and encourage your

pursuit of this. And we will do the same thing.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Yes, Governor?

Governor RENDELL. And Congressman, I think you are right on.

The Congressman used the word ‘‘castrate,’’ ‘‘emasculate,’’ whatever. Our Guards feel that.

I mean, consider the ludicrous proposition, leaving aside the Federal court decision—and we believe the Federal court decision mandates that the A–10’s stay in Willow Grove. But consider what has

happened through the BRAC process and the position that DOD

has at least temporarily taken. We have 1,023 trained airmen and

airwomen; 75 percent of whom have flown combat missions. The

111th has flown 2,500 combat missions in Afghanistan and Iraq.

And they are going to be paid by the Federal Government. They

are going to be equipped in all other ways by the Federal Government. Yet they have no planes, if the BRAC decision and the DOD

recommendation stands and withstands the court challenge.

That is a huge waste of taxpayers’ money. And think of what it

does to the morale of those people who have flown all those combat

missions, to take their planes away.

I would suggest, respectfully—and nobody knows the pressures of

balanced budgets more than we do, because we by law have to balance our budgets—I would respectfully submit, though, that you

cannot fight global terrorism abroad or at home on the cheap.

Governor KEMPTHORNE. Mr. Chairman, may I also respond to the

Congressman?

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Surely.

Governor KEMPTHORNE. Two points. One with regard to the attitude of the Guard members. I will just say that I see the communications back from the people in Louisiana and Mississippi, also,

that are so grateful. And what I hear from our Guard members

down there that are serving is this is one of the greatest deployments that they have ever participated in, because they are helping

fellow Americans. They are on home soil.

And there is such a ‘‘can-do’’ attitude by Guard members, they

bring such skill sets, that even if they do not have all of the equipment, the job they do is just exemplary. We hear that from the brigade that will be coming home, that is Guard, that is being replaced by active Army that says, ‘‘We do not have the skill sets

that you have here in the Guard.’’

The other point I would make follows onto Governor Rendell.

Think of the irony of this. Today, 62 percent of the combat soldiers

45

in Iraq, the Middle East, are Guard and Reserve. So you have brigades that then come home. They are at an all-time level of readiness, training, camaraderie, cohesiveness. What could be better for

homeland security? And yet, to deny them the very equipment, so

that we can retain that level of readiness, would be tragic for the

well-being of this Nation.

Mr. KANJORSKI. Thank you.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Mr. Souder.

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your comments today. We are hearing in each State the problem with our

Guards.

Governor Kempthorne, in your statement you talked in particular about what the Army had left. Do you know how much of

things like the trucks and the radios, the Humvees and the radios

and other communication equipment, that you also use for domestic?

According to the testimony we are going to get in the second

panel, it says some of those Guard units had additional materiel

to go over. In Indiana, I guess 70 percent of the materiel is coming

back. But do you know what percentage of that materiel in Idaho

belonged to the units before they went over?

Governor KEMPTHORNE. Congressman, you mean that when the

brigade arrived in Iraq, the equipment that was there, waiting for

them?

Mr. SOUDER. Or was shipped in, knowing they were going to be

deployed.

Governor KEMPTHORNE. Congressman, I cannot give you a percentage. I will tell you that it is the majority of our vehicles. It is

over 400 vehicles that will be left in Iraq; much of which was brand

new equipment, new trucks, etc. Those will remain behind.

We were still able to put together 120 vehicles to go to Louisiana

and, significantly, to make sure, as Governor of Idaho, that I still

have rolling stock and personnel in the event of a natural disaster

in my State. But you can well imagine, it stretches us very thin.

And that is the current situation: we are stretched thin.

Mr. SOUDER. Before I ask Governor Rendell the same question,

have any of your units been deployed twice? And how did that factor in?

Governor KEMPTHORNE. This is the first deployment of the brigade. I will tell you that the Idaho Air Guard are on continual deployment. Many of those are 8, 9, and 10 deployments of those personnel.

Mr. SOUDER. But can I clarify? My Air Guard unit that was deployed I don’t believe had the same equipment problems as the

Army. In other words, they don’t have to leave their materiel.

Governor KEMPTHORNE. I believe that is correct.

Mr. SOUDER. Any of the Army groups that were deployed twice,

how did they get resupplied then? Do you know? Governor Rendell,

do you have any——

Governor RENDELL. Again, most of the redeployment in Pennsylvania was the Air National Guard. But in my testimony—and I

didn’t read all of the different examples—but there is one example

where initially all seven helicopters that this helicopter unit had

were left behind, and they are still over in Iraq. We have gotten

46

five replacements, but it has been reported to me that the replacements are older and not nearly as effective and as efficient as the

vehicles we left behind.

If we went over again, if that unit went over again, query whether they would get the original vehicles back, or whether we would

take some of the replacement vehicles with us. But the redeployment tends to be more Air National Guard; although some of our

ground forces have been redeployed. And I think those that have

been redeployed catch up with some of the equipment.

Mr. SOUDER. And it doesn’t change the fact that we need to resupply for our State Guards, but do you know how much of the

equipment that has been left behind has been damaged; as opposed

to just not being able to be brought home?

Governor RENDELL. I don’t know that. But I can get you and submit to the chairman those figures from the adjutant general.

Mr. SOUDER. I would appreciate that. I know that the Humvees

are made in the district next to mine, but my district supplies most

of the parts. I believe 40 to 50 percent of them are damaged, and

are going through repair. And I know in Indiana we do some of our

own repair, because I have seen some of the equipment coming

back and then we are kind of reconditioning it.

Do you have that process as well in your two States? And are you

getting the things that are damaged back, and in fact they are

leaving the good things there?

Governor KEMPTHORNE. Congressman, no, I do not believe we

are. And also, just one other element. Much of the equipment that

is being left there is because it has been up-armored, and so it provides greater protection for the personnel. I do not question—I

would not suggest that I want to bring back that Humvee that in

any way puts at risk the soldier who replaced the Idaho Guard

member who comes home; nor would the Guard member. So I understand the rationale.

What I do not understand is lack of rationale: that you don’t

reequip the National Guard based on homeland security, based on

further deployments, based on natural disasters that we respond

to. It would be tragic.

Governor RENDELL. And that is absolutely correct, Congressman.

And again, it goes back to what I say. You cannot do a mission,

fight terrorism abroad—and the 62 percent figure for Reserve and

Guard is right—you can’t do that dual mission, and protect the

homeland, on the cheap. And that is the bottom line. And we have

to come to grips with that.

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much.

Mr. Ruppersberger.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Yes. I would like to keep following through

on that issue. Thank you all for being here. And there are a lot of

issues that we have to look at on a broader basis. Do you have concerns about the effect of the overseas deployments on your States’

abilities to respond to natural disasters or conduct homeland security missions?

Governor RENDELL. No. Even though there were over 3,000—almost 4,000—Pennsylvania Guardsmen in Iraq and Afghanistan at

the time we deployed 2,500 to the Gulf—which, as I said, CongressVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:31 Apr 17, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00050 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\24714.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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man, was the largest of any State Guard that went to the Gulf—

that still left us with a little bit over 13,500 Guardsmen at home

in Pennsylvania to carry out whatever missions we needed there.

And although we have complained about equipment, I echo what

Governor Kempthorne said. It still left us—even with the equipment left behind—it still left us with enough equipment to respond

to anything other than a cataclysmic event.

Governor KEMPTHORNE. And Congressman, I would just add this

element. We have an agreement with General Blum and the National Guard Bureau that no State will be drawn below 50 percent

personnel without the agreement of a Governor. And so we monitor

this closely.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Is that a formal agreement, or informal? Is

that with every State?

Governor KEMPTHORNE. It is with every State.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. OK.

Governor RENDELL. But that doesn’t apply to equipment. And I

know Governor Schwitzer from Montana has told me that at one

point his planes, that are often used for forest fires and things like

that, about 90 percent of his air capacity was abroad.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Let me ask you this. Right now, the Department of Defense does not consider equipping the National

Guard for homeland security or emergency response and its missions there; although they did make an exception for Katrina. Do

you believe that DOD should assist States with resourcing equipment for homeland use?

Governor RENDELL. I do, absolutely.

Governor KEMPTHORNE. We would love to have it.

Governor RENDELL. And you know, not only would we love to

have it, I think we all know the world has changed after September

11th. And the National Guard has changed after September 11th,

as well. There is absolutely no doubt about that.

And it is clear that the BRAC Commission, if you looked at the

military criteria—the criteria that were set up were called ‘‘military value criteria.’’ Homeland security was one of the criteria that

the Commission was supposed to pay attention to. But from my

view of all of the hearings, it played very little part in the decisionmaking process. It was basically ignored.

Governor KEMPTHORNE. I totally concur that DOD has a part to

play financially. It should not come with additional strings attached. This should not mean that there is a Federalization of the

troops.

Also, by homeland security, by being prepared, those are the very

people that are being deployed to Iraq, performing marvelously because of that training that they have received here in the States.

So, yes, it is to the benefit of all of us, including DOD, against all

enemies, foreign and domestic.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. What procedures or steps have your States

taken to identify the equipment needed to respond to natural disasters or security missions? And what types of equipment do you

think are most needed?

Governor KEMPTHORNE. I sit down with the Adjutant General of

Idaho, General Lefrenz. We go over different scenarios. For example, we have been experiencing a recent swarm of small earthVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:31 Apr 17, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00051 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\24714.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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quakes in one part of our State. So we ask ourselves, ‘‘What could

that lead to? What are our resources? What rolling stock do we

have? What personnel do we have? What have we predeployed?

What about the infrastructure of bridges? If we do lose that bridge

which is the major link between the north and the south part of

our State, how do we quickly get into that?’’ So we continually

monitor scenarios and ensure that we have the capabilities.

I will also mention that the Emergency Management Assistance

Compact [EMAC], is critical, because we may reach a point, just as

Louisiana and Mississippi did, that I may need to ask other Governors for help.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Let me ask one question. And this goes

back to Katrina and the whole issue which is going to be out there

for a while about the role of the Federal Government in natural

disasters. When you have a situation where you have like what

happened in New Orleans, where both the local and the State were

totally overwhelmed—and I believe the President did declare a disaster before the hurricane occurred—now, when you have one decisionmaker, whether that be the mayor or the Governor, and for

whatever reason—for not realizing the magnitude of the problem,

or feeling that, ‘‘This is our role; we must take care of it,’’ when

they are totally overwhelmed—do you believe that there should be

a mechanism where the Federal Government has to go in and help

Americans, if they have the equipment and the ability to do that?

And if you were in that situation, how would you all handle it?

And what systems do you believe—it is all about systems—should

be in place so that there can be immediate reaction to save American lives right away, and not about the inability to mobilize or

whatever?

Governor RENDELL. I think putting the systems in place is the

hard part of that, Congressman, because of the nature of our Government and our Constitution. And even in the interrelationship

between a Governor and a mayor, there are only certain instances

where I have the power to override a mayor in Pennsylvania on a

decision like evacuation.

But I think that you could look at the power the President has

when he declares an emergency. That would be the time. That is

the time when I get my powers to override mayors, for example.

That would be the moment that I would look toward giving some

additional powers, as long as they do not hinder the Federal relationship.

But I think it is more than just systems. It is people. And if the

situation had occurred in, let’s say, State ‘‘X,’’ and I thought that

State ‘‘X’’ needed Federal troops and the people of State ‘‘X’’ needed

Federal troops, I would have picked up the phone and I would have

said, ‘‘Governor Jones, sending in the 82nd Airborne. You can

stand with me and say ’That’s a good idea’, or you don’t have to.

But I am sending in the 82nd Airborne, because you are going to

need them.’’

I think we have to develop some form of leadership. And if you

look at the way FEMA and the State emergency management

agencies are supposed to work, we have that, I think, in most

cases. And obviously, in Katrina there were breakdowns. But in

most cases—and I think the two Pennsylvania Congressmen would

49

agree with me—when we had serious flooding all over the State,

I thought FEMA did a great job working with PEMA to get not

only aid, but to get reimbursement quickly. I thought that was as

good an example of the joint Federal-State response as possible.

But if Congress is looking to fashion something to give the President a range of powers, it would be consistent with the declaration

of the emergency. That is the way we structure it here. And of

course, when General Honore was designated as in charge of the

efforts, I think everyone fell into place. General Honore became the

commander of the Pennsylvania National Guard, in the sense of

deployment, etc., and we followed that, as well. But I would focus

on the power that is given to the President to make those declarations, if you wanted to buttress it.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. So you do believe that power should exist

and that the President should have the ability in a situation where

it is overwhelmed; whether or not the leader—the Governor or the

mayor—understands that?

Governor RENDELL. I think under certain unique situations—and

it should be framed carefully—but I think that would be the place

to do it.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. How about you, Governor?

Governor KEMPTHORNE. I believe it would be an extreme situation, because it signals a breakdown of government, of the system

that we have all come to rely upon. I think it would be a dire, dire

situation if that ever happened. It should be at the invitation of a

Governor.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Even in the sense of an emergency where—

the total overwhelm, the facts are there, and the lack of action will

cost human lives?

Governor KEMPTHORNE. I would, again, use the term ‘‘extreme.’’

When we think of pandemic, when we think of some of these scenarios with potential flus that may have an outbreak, the ideas of

quarantines, etc.—very extreme. But I think that should be the last

measure taken. Because we are 50 sovereign States, comprising the

United States, and the Governor should be the individual that invites in.

When you do have regular troops that are brought in, there is

now a concept being developed of ‘‘dual hat,’’ so that your National

Guard general can then have operational control over the military

that is brought in. I believe that is very workable.

There is one other thing, Congressman, that I would like to note.

And that is when the 82nd and the First Cav were brought into

New Orleans, National Guard, the 82nd Airborne, First Cav, could

communicate with one another with their radio equipment; the National Guard could not get in on that frequency. That is a problem.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I would like to agree that General Blum is

doing a great job running the National Guard.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. OK. Thank you.

Mr. Gutknecht.

Mr. GUTKNECHT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think a lot of the

questions that I was going to ask have already been asked.

I would like to agree with Governor Kempthorne, and it is something we sometimes forget in this city, and that is that the Federal

Government was created by the States; and not the other way

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around. And I think we have to be very careful, and try to create

systems that, ‘‘We know when someone is overwhelmed.’’ Obviously, there were some breakdowns done in Louisiana, but I think

we have to be careful we don’t use that example as an excuse if

we are going to send in the 82nd Airborne.

Let me come back, though. I think one other point I was going

to make—and I had a welcome home ceremony to some Reservists

this weekend. And they are an engineering group, and normally

their parking lot is absolutely filled with equipment. And there was

one lonely, little beat-up truck just out in their area where they

keep all their equipment. And it did seem funny that here is the

unit back, and they really couldn’t do much in terms of exercises,

because all their equipment is still over in the desert.

But I want to come back to, I think, a more serious problem, and

ask your opinions about this. One of the concerns we have heard

expressed—and we in Minnesota, I think, the numbers that I hear

are pretty good, in terms of retention and recruitment. But this offtempo thing, when you are sending people back and forth as often

as we are to places like Iraq and Afghanistan and other parts of

the world, not only are we wearing out the equipment, I think we

are wearing out our personnel. How are you doing in your two

States in terms of recruitment and retention of Guard members?

Governor RENDELL. Well, I would say in Pennsylvania retention

is remarkable. I can’t say enough about the men and women of our

Guard, and I think it holds true around the country. As worn out

as they are, as difficult as it must be, our retention rates are terrific.

I was at a welcome home ceremony in Chillington, PA, just a

couple of months ago, and this ceremony was about 2 months after

the troops had physically come back. And everyone got a special

medal, and I presented it with the commander. And they came up

one by one. Two people came up in civilian clothes. Their service

had run out, and they weren’t retained. And one of the two came

up to me afterwards with his wife, and he apologized to me. He

said, ‘‘I wanted to re-up, but she wouldn’t let me.’’ And you know,

given the multiple deployments, you can understand that from a

wife’s perspective.

But the retention and the morale remain tremendously high. It

is just—it really is remarkable. You know, these days, we are all

so jaded, there is not much that inspires us. It is almost inspiring.

But recruitment is a much, much, much different case. Recruitment, we are going to have to keep building up incentives. As I told

you, in Pennsylvania, we have made a tremendous educational incentive that we pay for, to get people to come into the Guard. But

notwithstanding that, recruitment is much more of a challenge

than retention.

Governor KEMPTHORNE. Congressman, really, I would echo much

of what Governor Rendell said. And there is a schedule—be it informal—but the concept that a brigade would not be required to go

back any sooner than 6 years, that would be a normal cycle. I think

anything more frequent than that, then you are going to have problems with the retention of families, etc.

Morale is extremely high. The brigade from Idaho are extremely

proud of the progress which they are making. They answered the

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call to duty. They are proud to have done so. When they come back,

it will be to a heroes’ welcome. And again, morale is extremely

high.

I would add this that we all need to think about. With demobilization, this is the largest single deployment ever in the history of

my State; therefore, it is the largest single demobilization. We need

to also be sure that we are in a support for those troops that have

come home—post-stress disorder—to make sure that the support

mechanism is there.

For 2 years, we have taken these wonderful people, and we have

now made them warriors. They have changed. They are going to

come home changed. Their families have had to cope. They have

had to change. And now they are going to come back together. The

world has changed at home. And so we need to help them with

those expectations, with their concerns that they go through.

With the National Guard different than coming back and going

to the fort where they live, they are dispersed throughout our rural

communities. It is tough for them to go down to a coffee shop and

say, ‘‘I am having trouble at night. I am having nightmares.’’ Because in the coffee shop, maybe nobody went with them.

I would also just say, one of the toughest assignments that I

have heard from our Guard members are those that have not been

asked to deploy. They want to be with their comrades. They are an

awesome organization.

Mr. GUTKNECHT. Thank you.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Ms. Watson.

Ms. WATSON. I want to thank both Governors for coming and

sharing with us. I have been concerned about the increasing use

of our National Guard to fight in Iraq. I think it was so appropriate

that you were able to respond and come to our own Gulf Coast and

help out there. It is an absolute essential use of our National

Guard.

I have been reading through our background materials on under

what title you are called up, and how long. And what bothers me

is the equipment left behind. But more so than that are the families and the jobs left behind.

What impact have you experienced—and I would like both Governors to respond—with your National Guard spending additional

time off our shores, and leaving equipment off our shores? There

are going to be more Katrinas and Ritas. In fact, one is headed to

the Florida coast at the moment. And I think when we talk about

homeland security, we ought to have not only the forces, but the

resources to protect our homeland. I also am worried about the

families and the jobs that are left behind.

So can you respond as to the overall effect of your National

Guards being called up for extended periods of time off our shores?

Governor KEMPTHORNE. Congresswoman, I appreciate what you

have said. I will affirm that National Guard members would tell

you they are soldiers. And they are awesome soldiers. That is my

editorial comment.

I believe that their level of morale is the highest it has been, because they are doing something that they believe in. It is helping

freedom. It is ensuring that if we can somehow bring stability to

that troubled part of the world that used to be called the cradle of

52

civilization, it allows the children back home to still grow up with

peace, and to have dreams and to be able to pursue those.

I tell them, it is so ironic. As they are hugging and kissing their

little children, as mom and dad are deployed to go overseas, by

doing that, they are ensuring that those little children are going to

continue to grow up in freedom in the United States.

Ms. WATSON. Can you address the economic impact of the extended stays?

Governor KEMPTHORNE. Yes. I will tell you that I think another

group that needs to be saluted are the employers; what they have

been asked to do, and how they have stepped up to make sure that

those jobs will be there for the Guard members when they return.

Also, it is very important that we have raised funds for family

emergency situations, so that if a family has a problem, we have

the money to step forward and to help that family so that the soldier can remain focused on his or her mission, not worry about a

family financial situation at home.

Ms. WATSON. Governor Rendell, is that the same situation in

Pennsylvania?

Governor RENDELL. If I can add, I think there are severe financial hardships that are put on Guard families. We have the same

emergency fund, and that helps in emergencies. But on the day-today hardships, you take—let’s say it is an Airwoman, and she is

activated. And she is the breadwinner, and earning $35,000 a year

for that family. And obviously, her family takes a tremendous financial hit by her service. Even if the employer keeps the job available, the employer doesn’t pay the differential.

We are working on legislation in the Pennsylvania State Legislature that will tax credit employers for paying 25 percent of the differential. But even if that gets through, it is only 25 percent of the

differential.

Then you have things like health care. You have things like student loans. A lot of these Guardsmen and women are repaying student loans. We have put legislation in that freezes their obligation

to make those payments while they are abroad serving the country,

or down in Katrina for any length of time. While they are on active

duty, we freeze those payments.

But the big gap—and something that I think Congress should

take a look at doing, now that the Guard and the Reserve, too, are

playing much bigger roles, 62 percent of the force—is filling the

gap between what ‘‘John Jones’’ or ‘‘Mary Smith’’ was making at

the time they were called to active duty, and what they are making

with the service. I think that is an area that I would love to see

the Federal Government look at. The State government can do certain things, as well. But together, we should take care of that problem.

No Guardsman’s or Guardwoman’s family should have—in addition to the hardships and the stress of actually fighting and being

abroad, they shouldn’t suffer a financial hit as well.

Ms. WATSON. Yes. I know a difference—is my time up, Mr.

Chairman?

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Your time is up. I will give you one last

question.

53

Ms. WATSON. OK. I know there is a difference from State to

State. One of the problems I face in my district, Los Angeles, CA,

is that the Guard who were in school tend to lose that time from

their course work, and then have to go back and start all over

again.

And so we do have some other problems besides equipment and

readiness, preparedness. And I just wanted to hear directly from

the States as to how they impact.

Thank you, Mr. Speaker [sic], for the additional time.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you.

Mr. Issa.

Mr. ISSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for holding

this hearing. I look forward to the second panel every bit as much

as the first.

I am a little confused, though, on some of the testimony. Governor Rendell, if the BRAC Commission base realignment and closure had sent you 50 A–10’s, would you have refused to take them

as inappropriate to take from another State? If they came from

California, would you have defended that how dare the Air Force

move California assets into your State and provide those Federal

jobs and opportunities?

Governor RENDELL. Well, I think, as a practical matter, the answer to that is, no, I don’t think any State would.

Mr. ISSA. So isn’t your basic objection to losing the A–10—a questionable aircraft in today’s environment, anyway—really all about

simply wanting to have, as something like the ninth-largest State,

the third-largest National Guard; not wanting to lose any of that?

Governor RENDELL. No. First of all, it is founded on a clear—you,

as the Congress, passed Title 32, which said nothing could be done

of any significance to the National Guard, clearly not deactivation

or——

Mr. ISSA. I mean, you actually quoted the Constitution.

Governor RENDELL. The militia clause of the Constitution, and

this Congress—not this Congress——

Mr. ISSA. Well, I will quote that. ‘‘A well-regulated militia being

necessary to security of a free State, the right of a people to keep

and bear arms shall not be infringed.’’ Where does it say the Federal Government is supposed to spend a nickel? What if we just

said, ‘‘Keep the A–10’s, but you pay for them?’’ Would anything be

wrong with that?

Governor RENDELL. The Congress said that in Title 32.

Mr. ISSA. We also passed BRAC.

Governor RENDELL. Right, but——

Mr. ISSA. Ultimately, whichever preempts—you know, I appreciate the fact that you have gone to court.

Governor RENDELL. And the Federal court decided that BRAC

did not preempt Title 32, for a whole lot of reasons.

Mr. ISSA. But your position is that your preferential amount of

National Guard substantially paid for by the Federal Government

is a right that cannot be taken away? I can’t move those? The Federal Government cannot move them to another State unless you decide that is OK?

Governor RENDELL. That is what Title 32 says, and that is what

the Federal court has said, because Congressman——

54

Mr. ISSA. Would it surprise you to know that I will seek to

change that, the idea that we should have to continue to subsidize

and pay, and not be able to move it from State to State because

a Governor who has a preferential position in the amount of their

Guard should continue to do so?

Governor RENDELL. Well, Governor—I mean Congressman, let

me say, No. 1, you would have to change Title 32, and you have

the right to try to do that. That is No. 1. And No. 2, you would

have to do something to ensure our ability to protect our homeland.

Again, the 111th is the only Air National Guard unit in the

southeastern part of the State. That is our most populous part of

the State. That has two nuclear reactors. It has all of these national icons. And we have a duty. I have a duty as Governor to protect our State.

Mr. ISSA. Sure, Governor. And with all due respect, your responsibility is from your pocketbook; not from the Federal pocketbook.

Governor RENDELL. And exercise that, when in the prior BRAC

rounds BRAC decided that it wanted to deactivate Fort Indiantown

Gap as an air base. We stepped up and said, ‘‘We will pay to run

Fort Indiantown Gap as an air base.’’ Everyone agreed that was a

good idea, and the planes were left.

We have offered to run Willow Grove as a State National Guard

facility—to pay for the upkeep, etc.—as long as the planes are kept

there. I mean, why would you want—why would you want—to be

paying the salaries of 1,023 Airmen and Airwomen, and not give

them planes?

Mr. ISSA. Look, I have no problem with us talking about the decisions of the BRAC. My question was your questioning of the Constitutional ability to move federally paid-for assets.

Governor RENDELL. It is different than a Reserve unit. You have

to understand the difference. And it comes from the founders of

this country. The militia was first and foremost a State militia. It

can be Federalized, but it is first and foremost a State militia. We

are all called ‘‘commanders-in-chief’’ of the State militia.

Mr. ISSA. I have no problem, and I am sure that——

Governor RENDELL. If we were to pay for it, for example—let’s

assume you were to transfer the whole bill to us. Then what justification would there be for ever Federalizing them?

Mr. ISSA. I would certainly say that the A–10’s that have been

parked in the desert, if you want them back and you want to go

get them, we can make arrangements to do so. But you would own

them.

Governor RENDELL. But with respect——

Mr. ISSA. And, no, we wouldn’t want to Federalize them.

Governor RENDELL [continuing]. If we paid for the entire National Guard, how could the Federal Government have any claim

to Federalize them in times of—and remember, this is the National

Guard unit that two-thirds of the members have served multiple

deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan. You are paying for them because you have the right to come in and Federalize them and use

them to fight foreign conflicts. And the way that this administration is running this war, the National Guard is becoming more and

more a part of the Federal Government.

55

Mr. ISSA. My time has expired. Hopefully, there will be a second

round. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much.

Ms. Norton.

Ms. NORTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you for calling

two important Governors in to give us some of the insights we really need as we fight our wars. This is a war on two fronts. And I

appreciate the testimony of Governor Kempthorne and Governor

Rendell.

I have to say a special ‘‘Hello’’ to my good friend, Governor

Rendell, who has been not only a good friend of mine, but a good

friend of the District of Columbia. He did so well in bringing Philadelphia back from economic crisis that the citizens of Pennsylvania

said, ‘‘Wow!’’ and made him Governor.

And I just want you to know, Ed, all we did in bringing D.C.—

which is now in extraordinary good health—back is to copy what

you did in Philadelphia.

I have a question for you both. By the way, Mr. Gutknecht raised

an interesting point, a Constitutional point, to which you both responded, about who knows best; after all, the States created the

national government. And of course, he is right.

I would suspect that your replies, which went to extreme cases,

would be not so much in natural disasters, but in a terrorist disaster, where the President and the Federal Government had information and intelligence that no Governor could have, and maybe time

was of the essence. I have the feeling that is more likely to be the

kind of circumstance where the Federal Government moves in than

a natural disaster.

I want to ask you about how we can make do. You all, I think,

can really help us. One of the reasons that support for the war in

Iraq is falling away is that there is this sense of the American people that there is some robbing of Peter to pay Paul. People are generally very favorable about helping the Iraqi people, but the more

they think that there is some sacrifice being made for themselves

over too long a time, the less support there is for the war.

And one of the ways, it seems to me, to deal with this period is

to see how we can do what Americans always try to do: do everything at once.

My question for you comes from the fact that I represent the Nation’s Capital, and so I am always concerned about two kinds of

disasters. One is the disaster that we are perhaps greater at risk

than most, and that is a terrorist disaster. And then there is the

other disaster, the kind that—well, Ed Rendell is in my region, so

he knows about those: hurricanes and floods and the rest.

I am very close to my own National Guard. Just this past—it

was October 13th, we deployed, for yet another time, some of our

MPs. They are in high demand. You could imagine why we have

more MPs, though; because it is the Nation’s Capital. And they

would be in especially high demand here in the event of any kind

of disaster, natural or terrorist. So there they go again.

My generals tell me that some have been deployed two or three

times in the last 2 years. My generals tell me, my D.C. National

Guard generals tell me, at least 70 percent of the Army National

Guard have been deployed multiple times to Iraq, Afghanistan, and

56

Guantanamo. Sometimes there is one deployment Stateside. By

that, they mean perhaps Guantanamo.

I was interested. For example, Governor Kempthorne, you talked

about your experience. I am looking at your written testimony,

where you speak very highly of Idaho having sent more, a greater

proportion, of National Guard to the Gulf Coast than any other National Guard. And there is great applause, it seems to me, due the

compact that you Governors have among the States, where you

come to the aid of one another. And that apparently happened just

like that, and no question asked, and everybody was on the ground.

You also say, Governor Kempthorne, that when you got there,

there was a lot of confusion in the Gulf Coast—Houston and Meridian. There had been an urgent request to evacuate the frail elderly.

You had identified more than 400 nursing beds. Some problem in

even getting releases; had to go all the way up to the Governor.

This is what my question is. We talk about borrowing equipment.

I am concerned that every time my guys and girls go over, whatever new equipment we get goes over. So we are in an unending

lose-lose game, because we can’t keep any of it.

Beyond that, the wonderful borrowing of National Guard means,

however, that whatever advantage, in either a terrorist disaster or

a natural disaster, that comes from the fact that you have National

Guard who have been practiced in what to do, are not where you

imagine them to be. They are abroad. This is what happened to

Governor Kempthorne. And his people went to a completely new

place, and they didn’t know the place as well. They wanted to do

their mission, and they had to go through what you had to go

through.

With equipment gone, with personnel unfamiliar with other

States, if we have to borrow—we would have to borrow from, I

don’t know, Maryland, Ohio, you in Pennsylvania—what are we to

do, and what do you do—what did you do, what can be done—if in

fact we need Guard personnel in territory where they have never

been before, have no idea about anything about that territory?

I mean, how useful can they be? And what would you suggest we

do to shore up the possibility that for some time we may be increasingly using, at least in the event of a natural disaster or a terrorist disaster, personnel from other jurisdictions?

Governor KEMPTHORNE. Ms. Norton, thank you very much for

the question. And, too, as a citizen, may I thank all of my fellow

citizens from Washington, DC, and their deployment schedule. I

know they are doing just tremendous service for all of us.

I jotted down a few things as you spoke. One are the lessons

learned. You referenced one of the situations that we experienced.

I would note, we use the Air Guard to take food and water. It was

critically needed. But on that same aircraft, we put from the private sector the emergency room physicians and the nurses. So it is

a partnership that goes down there.

Lessons learned: One of them is that we now believe that if it

is something out of the ordinary, if it is sheer manpower, if it is

to go and repair a breach in a dike, it is just sheer manpower and

equipment.

But if it is something that is a niche, if it is to help the frail elderly, if we can get an advance team to do the triage, to get on the

57

ground first—we did this in Louisiana, when we received an urgent

request from Louisiana to send additional Guard members. We

sent an advance team, so that when the convoy arrived, we immediately knew where they were assigned and what their responsibilities were; so that there was not just a gathering of hundreds of

Guard members and then trying to sort it out. So order, by sending

the advance.

The EMAC process: It does work, but one of the things that we

found is that it needs to be specific so that if you are going to indemnify—if you are going to have reciprocity of people with credentials, that in Idaho we will accept people from Louisiana who are

professionally credentialed, that may need to be noted in the

EMAC; so that we don’t run into this confusion of who is Federalized and who isn’t. But I would hope that the Federal Government

could look at that whole process, and streamline that.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much. Your time has expired.

Mr. Shays, we have a series of three votes, and the panel will

be over at that point.

Mr. SHAYS. Yes, I am going to just be 2 minutes.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Well, you can yield, then, to Mr. Dent.

Mr. SHAYS. I am told that General Honore was never in charge

of the National Guard. Not a major point——

Governor RENDELL. I don’t think in a formal way.

Mr. SHAYS. OK.

Governor RENDELL. But I think in a deployment way, people

looked to it.

Mr. SHAYS. But he wasn’t in charge. I would like to know from

both of you, do you think DHS should assist States in—no, forget

that one.

The one I want is just the NORTHCOM Control was established

to provide command and control over Federalized emergencies in

the United States. Has anyone from NORTHCOM or DOD asked

you specifically about your States’ needs and assets? Have they

asked you for your input at any time? This is NORTHCOM. I will

start with you, Governor Kempthorne.

Governor KEMPTHORNE. If we have had requests from

NORTHCOM?

Mr. SHAYS. Yes.

Governor KEMPTHORNE. I will tell you——

Mr. SHAYS. To ask your needs, etc. Has there been a dialog?

Governor KEMPTHORNE. Congressman, Shays, approximately 18

months, 2 years ago, we had General Eberhardt from

NORTHCOM, who came and met with the National Governors Association, where we discussed the whole process. I cannot tell

you——

Mr. SHAYS. Right, at the Governors’ association, but has he ever

met with your State and your National Guard people, to your

knowledge?

Governor KEMPTHORNE. I have not personally had conversation.

Mr. SHAYS. How about you?

Governor RENDELL. And I haven’t, either, but I can get that information from our adjutant general.

58

Mr. SHAYS. It would be good to know. I mean, the bottom line

is, we set NORTHCOM up to focus on protecting the North American continent, and it would seem logical that there should be this

interaction with the States on this kind of issue. I thank you, and

I would be happy to yield to Mr. Dent.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. The gentleman from Pennsylvania.

Mr. DENT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome, Governor Rendell, Governor Kempthorne. Good to see

you here. Governor Rendell, I am pleased to report to you that I

located one of Willow Grove’s aviation assets in Kuwait when I was

there this summer—big green and black stripes on the tail, with

‘‘Eagles’’ logo right on top.

Governor RENDELL. There you go.

Mr. DENT. Just thought you would appreciate that. Just very

quickly, I was part of the hearing yesterday with Governors Bush,

Perry, and Napolitano, discussing the Federal role in emergency response. And all three categorically said ‘‘No’’ to revisiting posse

comitatus. I believe both of you have said the same thing.

And just as a point of clarification, Governor Rendell, you indicated there might be some circumstances where there would be a

greater Federal role, even if perhaps the Governors weren’t willing

to accept that assistance at that particular moment. Could you just

clarify that?

Governor RENDELL. I think, and Governor Kempthorne mentioned, a pandemic. Assume there was an outbreak of some very

significant plague that had the opportunity to travel across State

lines in a flash, something of that unique nature; a terrorist attack

that involved multiple States, something of that nature, too.

And again, I think Congress should revisit that, consistent with

the President’s power to declare national emergencies; but should

revisit it very carefully.

Mr. DENT. Thank you. And my final question is, what do you

Governors see as the Federal role—whether it is the Guard or some

other aspect of the Federal Government—in implementing the

State’s evacuation plan? You know, we saw what happened in

Texas with that mass evacuation of Houston. Of course, Philadelphia and New York and all of Pennsylvania would be impacted by

either evacuation. What are your thoughts on that?

Governor RENDELL. Let me take that first, and very quickly. I

think that it should be an advisory role. And we do lean on FEMA,

we do lean on DHS, the Department of Homeland Security, for

their advice. They have come in and done table-top exercises with

us. But I think the evacuation plans should be a peculiarly State

function. But DHS and FEMA should be available to give us all of

the best advice and all of the cumulative experience from around

the country.

Governor KEMPTHORNE. Congressman, I would just add that, in

addition to that, as a preliminary, but in the actual event of an

evacuation, we may need equipment, personnel to transport people.

So it should be to augment what the State is implementing, in full

partnership.

Mr. DENT. OK, and just real quick and finally, in the event of

a natural or manmade disaster, who would you see as the lead

Federal department, DHS or DOD? And do you see enough coordiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:31 Apr 17, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00062 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\24714.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
59

nation between those two Federal departments, with respect to

how they assist States, particularly in light of Katrina? Any

thoughts?

Governor RENDELL. I would think that, in terms of a natural disaster as opposed to a terrorist attack, a natural disaster, I would

still like to see FEMA take the lead. And I am talking about FEMA

from prior days. I think that FEMA was well equipped to lead in

that effort.

And again, remember, PEMA—and of course, Congressman, you

are familiar with PEMA—PEMA has contact with FEMA almost on

a weekly basis. And they are the ones best positioned, I think, to

move in. I would like to see the role of FEMA totally reexamined

by the Federal Government and by the Congress.

Mr. DENT. Thank you.

Governor KEMPTHORNE. Congressman, I believe, if it is a natural

disaster, it would be the Department of Homeland Security. I will

add, however, we in years past have had such significant forest

fires that we have asked from the Department of Defense, and received, active battalions that have come and helped us on the front

line of firefighting. That would also be true if it were earthquakes

or floods. So I wouldn’t want to rule out that one.

Governor RENDELL. Nor would I, but the coordination of it should

be done by FEMA. I think we need to revitalize FEMA.

Mr. DENT. No further questions, just a comment. But I know in

our State we have had some difficulty with the homeland security

operations center and the way it communicates with our State

homeland security department. I know it is a problem in Pennsylvania. Is that a problem in Idaho?

Governor KEMPTHORNE. No, sir.

Mr. DENT. OK.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Can I just say, thank you, both. You have

been very generous with your time. It has been very helpful in establishing a record here. We again appreciate the accomplishments

and the trials and tribulations of being a Governor, but you both

honor us with your presence today.

We are going to recess, as we are in a series of votes right now,

and come back in about a half an hour.

Governor KEMPTHORNE. And Mr. Chairman, may I just thank

you for conducting this. This is critically important. And talking

about demobilization, Dr. Chu and the others at the Pentagon are

helping us. They are doing a great job.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Governor, thank you.

[Recess.]

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Good afternoon. And I want to thank the

witnesses for their patience. I think the Members will be trickling

in.

We now move to our second panel. And we are extremely lucky

to have with us today an outstanding group of experts on the National Guard—not only those who create and debate policies, but

those who walk the walk to serve their charges and their country—

with us today.

David Walker, the Comptroller General of the United States; accompanied by Janet Saint Laurent, the Director of Defense Capabilities and Management of the GAO; the Honorable Thomas Hall,

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the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs; Lieutenant

General David Melcher, the Deputy Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army;

Lieutenant General H Steven Blum, the Chief of the National

Guard Bureau; Major General Allen Tackett, the State Adjutant

General of West Virginia; and Major General Raymond Rees, the

State Adjutant General of Oregon.

I want to thank all of you for being here today. I remember in

my early days in the Guard, the closest I used to get to the officers’

club was when we cut the grass there, you know, on Saturday

afternoons. So we appreciate everybody being here.

Also, Mr. Walker, let me just say, the committee is just very

grateful for the outstanding work of Ms. Saint Laurent and her

team on the report that you have issued today.

It is our policy that we swear all witnesses, so if you would, rise

for me and raise your right hands.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Chairman TOM DAVIS. All right. Thank you. The entire GAO report is in the record. General Walker, and for the rest of you, try

to stay in the 5-minute timeframe. If you feel you have to go over

to make your point, that is fine. But your entire statements are in

the record. Thank you.

STATEMENTS OF DAVID WALKER, COMPTROLLER GENERAL

OF THE UNITED STATES, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY

OFFICE, ACCOMPANIED BY JANET A. ST. LAURENT, DIRECTOR, CAPABILITIES AND MANAGEMENT, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE; THOMAS F. HALL, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, RESERVE AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT

OF DEFENSE; LIEUTENANT GENERAL DAVID F. MELCHER,

DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY; LIEUTENANT GENERAL H STEVEN BLUM, CHIEF, NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU;

MAJOR GENERAL ALLEN TACKETT, STATE ADJUTANT GENERAL, STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA; AND MAJOR GENERAL

RAYMOND REES, STATE ADJUTANT GENERAL, STATE OF OREGON

STATEMENT OF DAVID WALKER

Mr. WALKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to be here today to discuss the critical role of the National

Guard, both at home and abroad. As you know, recent and ongoing

military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, and new homeland

missions, including the response to Hurricane Katrina, have led to

higher demands on the Reserve component; in particular, the Army

National Guard.

Before I address a couple of other issues, I want to mention that

I had the pleasure and privilege this last Saturday evening to attend the Secretary of Defense’s annual Freedom Awards banquet,

which is sponsored by the National Committee of Employer Support for the Guard and Reserve.

At this banquet, it became very clear to me that the Federal Government, which is the largest employer in the United States, is not

leading by example, nor practicing what it preaches, with regard

to support for the Guard and Reserve.

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For example, GAO and other Federal employers would like to

have the opportunity to make up any pay gap that any of our activated Guard and Reserve members might experience, but we are

precluded from doing so under current law. And candidly, we would

like this committee’s and the Congress’ help to be able to give us

the authority to do so, under appropriate facts and circumstances.

With regard to the other issues that you have asked me to address today, as you know, we issued our 21st Century Challenges

report, which demonstrated that a vast majority of the Federal

Government’s policies, programs, functions, and activities are based

upon conditions that existed in the 1950’s and 1960’s; and that we

face large and growing structural budget deficits that we are going

to have to deal with.

In that regard, with regard to the National Guard, we believe

that Congress and the DOD need to reexamine the current business model for the Guard, since it appears to be unsustainable in

light of recent changes in the security environment, growing recruitment challenges, and DOD’s significant use of Reserve units.

GAO believes that policymakers should be focusing on identifying

an appropriate business model for the National Guard that balances the Guard’s multiple roles with the appropriate human capital policies, readiness standards, and equipment practices.

The overall readiness of the non-deployed Army National Guard

units is declining, because the Guard has transferred large

amounts of personnel and equipment from non-deployed units to

fully staffed and equipped units deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan.

However, DOD’s increased use of the Army National Guard has

not been matched with a change in its equipping or funding strategy. Increasing equipment shortages among non-deployed Army

National Guard units illustrate the need for DOD to reexamine its

equipment strategy for the Army National Guard in order to better

match operational requirements with the Guard’s equipment inventory.

The amount of essential equipment that non-deployed National

Guard units have on hand has continued to decrease since we last

reported in 2004. For example, DOD has required Army units to

leave more than 64,000 equipment items, valued at over $1.2 billion, in Iraq, for use by follow-on forces. However, the Army has

not developed replacement plans for this equipment, as required by

DOD policy.

The Army is in the process of developing a plan, by November

2005, to replace some of that equipment. However, we are recommending that the Army develop a comprehensive replacement

plan covering all equipment that the Guard units have left in Iraq.

In addition, the overall decline in equipment levels among nondeployed units may have made it more difficult to locate and transport some equipment needed for Katrina; such as communication

equipment. We are conducting a review of the Federal response in

Katrina, including the Guard’s involvement. And as you know, Mr.

Chairman, we will be reporting more information on this within

the next several months.

DOD and the Army have some initiatives underway to improve

the Guard’s organization and readiness for these missions. However, it is too early to determine whether the Army’s initiatives toVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:31 Apr 17, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00065 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\24714.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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gether comprise a sustainable equipping and funding model for the

Army National Guard in the future, because implementation plans

are not complete and funding requirements have not been fully

identified.

The Department of Defense also produced a strategy for homeland defense and civil support in 2005, June 2005, that describes

the National Guard’s key role in these areas. However, the DOD

has not yet developed an implementation plan that outlines how

Guard units should be trained and equipped to carry them out.

Until these initiatives are more fully developed and key implementation decisions are made, DOD and the Congress will not be

in a sound position to weigh their affordability and effectiveness,

and the Army National Guard will be challenged to train and prepare and adequately equip for all of its missions.

In conclusion, the Army National Guard’s equipment problems

and personnel and recruiting challenges are symptoms of a much

larger problem of an outdated business model. While current strategies have met DOD’s immediate needs to support overseas operations, these strategies are not sustainable over the long term.

Moreover, it is not clear that DOD’s initiatives, as currently defined, will result in a comprehensive and integrated strategy for

preparing the Army National Guard for future missions.

We therefore are recommending that the Army better integrate

its initiatives and conduct a broader rethinking of the basis for

Army National Guard equipment requirements that considers both

overseas as well as homeland security requirements.

In this regard, we believe that the Congress and senior DOD

leadership must be ready to play a key role in pressing the Army

to provide more detailed plans for these initiatives and to identify

the specific funding required to implement them in the most efficient manner.

And needless to say, Mr. Chairman, the Congress will have a

critically important role to play, to make sure that we allocate limited resources to achieve the best value and mitigate the most risk.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Walker follows:]

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Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much.

Secretary Hall.

STATEMENT OF THOMAS F. HALL

Mr. HALL. Mr. Chairman, you will be happy to know that Mr.

Walker just told me that we have outsourced all the grass cutting

now. If you were still in, you wouldn’t have to cut the grass around

the club.

I deeply appreciate your support, and that of the committee, for

the National Guard and Reserve forces. And on behalf of those men

and women, I want to thank you for caring about them. They and

their families certainly appreciate it. And my job, as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, is the overall supervision of

all reserve components in the Department of Defense.

In that capacity, I make it a priority to visit with our reserve

component members in the field. And during those visits, I see

America’s finest young men and women serving their Nation with

pride and professionalism. They are performing in a superb fashion

at home and around the world, and are closely interlocked with the

States, cities, towns, and communities in America.

As you already know, there is increased stress on the force, and

we are continuing to closely monitor the impact of that stress on

our Guard and Reserve members, on their families, and their employers.

Since September 11, 2001, our Guard and Reserve have performed superbly in missions ranging from humanitarian assistance

to high-intensity combat operations and State disaster assistance

missions such as Hurricanes Katrina and Rita—and we are preparing for Wilma.

These operations have presented a number of challenges; particularly for our ground forces, which carry the larger burden of our

security and stabilization efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Currently, the deployment burden is not shared equally among all the

reserve components. It is concentrated on those specific capabilities

and skills required for stabilization and security operations in Iraq

and Afghanistan.

There are still high demands in theater for military police, civil

affairs, military intelligence, and motor transport capabilities.

Since certain of these skills reside predominantly in our reserve

components, we have called upon many of our citizen soldiers to

serve, and they have done so admirably.

Recognizing that the global war on terrorism will last for many

years, the Department established a strategic approach to ensure

the judicious and prudent use of Guard and reserve components in

support of war efforts. Innovative changes to equipping policies and

budgets have been made, and will continue.

This has involved evaluations of what equipment is currently on

hand, and how to balance these requirements with the legacy

equipment, modern equipment, and the available budget. In the

short term, the Army resolved equipment shortages with cross-leveling of equipment among mobilized units, or having units fall in

on stand-behind equipment. These actions have impacted equipment availability, training, reconstitution, and resetting of the reVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:31 Apr 17, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00094 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\24714.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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turn units’ equipment, as well as affecting the available equipment

inventory.

My staff remains engaged with the services, supporting their efforts to develop new approaches to mitigate the very complex

equipping challenges.

I want to just close in saying that we must guard against overuse of our reserve components, through judicious and prudent use.

We must encourage volunteerism. We must manage expectations

through predictability and timeliness. We must continue to address

family concerns. And finally, we must continue to encourage our

employers at every turn.

A mission-ready National Guard and Reserve is a critical element of our national security strategy. The requirement for our reserve components has not and will not lessen. Our reserve components will continue with their expanded roles in all facets of the

total force.

We cannot lose sight of the need to balance their commitment to

country with their commitment to family and civilian employers.

The idea of operational reserve components is now a fact. That

is why relieving the stress on the force is absolutely essential, rebalancing is so crucial, and ensuring that utilization not turn to

over-utilization.

Thank you for this opportunity to testify, and I look forward to

your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hall follows:]

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Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much.

General Melcher, welcome.

STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL DAVID F. MELCHER

General MELCHER. Chairman Davis, members of the committee,

thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I am

privileged to be here with the committee and this esteemed panel.

We on the Army staff share with this committee and all represented here a common goal to see that our dedicated Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve soldiers have the right equipment for the missions we have asked them to perform for the Nation.

As the Army’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Programs, G–8, I am responsible to the Army Chief of Staff and Secretary of the Army for

materiel integration and resourcing. This includes the fielding of

equipment according to our national strategy and departmental

priorities to Army units within all components of our service—active, Reserve, and National Guard.

I work closely with the Director, Army National Guard, and the

Chief, Army Reserve, to ensure that our reserve component soldiers

are equipped and resourced properly, according to their mission.

This includes everything from major weapons platforms to the soldiers’ individual equipment.

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your acknowledgement of our written

statements and entering them into the record.

Our overall equipping posture is showing great progress, thanks

to the steadfast support the Army has enjoyed from Congress and

the Department of Defense. However, we acknowledge that significant challenges remain, as reflected in reports from the Government Accountability Office; particularly with respect to equipping

the Army National Guard while at war. I am confident, though,

that by working together, we will overcome the difficulties noted.

These equipping challenges are exactly the reason why the Army

is transforming to a modular force, and why we are moving to a

force rotation model called the ‘‘Army Force Generation Model,’’ or

ARFORGEN. The modular force initiative and the ARFORGEN

model fully integrate the Army National Guard, Reserve, and active Army. We are moving from a cold war approach, in which the

Army National Guard was the strategic reserve, to a modular force

construct that counts on the Guard and Reserve as operational assets.

That means we also look at the Army National Guard and the

Army Reserve as full partners in the requirements, resourcing, and

fielding processes. The Army plans to invest approximately $21 billion on equipping and modernizing the Army National Guard during fiscal years 2005 through 2011. This compares to only $5.6 billion just 2 short years ago. This investment will provide the Army

National Guard with equipment essential to both its wartime and

homeland defense missions.

We are also conducting a comprehensive review with the Army

National Guard to determine what items of equipment needed for

major combat operations also have the greatest use for homeland

defense missions. Thus far, the list has been refined to 342 items,

such as communications equipment, including radios that can comVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:31 Apr 17, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00123 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\24714.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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municate with both military and civilian first responders; transportation equipment, including cargo, fuel, and water dispensing

trucks; engineering equipment, including the tractors and trailers

for transporting this equipment; chemical, biological, and radiological detection, contamination, and protection equipment; aviation

equipment, including support equipment essential to keep the aircraft flying; medical equipment, including dental, medical, and veterinary functions; and logistics equipment, including cranes and

forklifts, mobile containerized kitchens, and so forth.

In collaboration with the National Guard Bureau, we have determined the times and quantities of equipment we need to provide

the Army National Guard so it can perform its missions for both

homeland defense and wartime.

The Army has done a great deal to close the equipment gap for

all three components, but we must continue to focus in the areas

of tactical wheeled vehicles, aircraft, night vision devices, and force

protection equipment, as we build this next program for the period

2008 to 2013.

As we build the program, we are committed to working very

closely with the National Guard Bureau and the Army National

Guard, to ensure they are appropriately funded and equipped.

On behalf of our outstanding soldiers and civilian employees who

are serving around the world, I thank you for your support. Many

in this committee, including yourself, sir, have traveled to Afghanistan or Iraq and seen firsthand our soldiers sacrifice for the Nation. Nothing we do is more urgent or pressing than ensuring that

they have the best equipment.

I look forward to answering the committee’s questions today.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of General Melcher follows:]

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Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much.

General Blum, welcome.

STATEMENT OF LIEUTENENT GENERAL H STEVEN BLUM

General BLUM. Thank you. Chairman Davis, members of the

committee, thanks for the opportunity to appear here today and

discuss the National Guard, its role in supporting responses to

threats to our Nation both overseas and here at home.

As General Melcher has adequately stated, I totally concur with

everything that he has brought before this committee. That is a

first, probably. It shows that the U.S. Army is in fact committed,

and that we are standing as one army, all three components—active, Guard, and Reserve—in resolving and accepting the responsibility for equipping the National Guard. That is the first time

that has happened in the history of this Nation.

Today, we are faced with issues that have resulted from a deliberate and, arguably, appropriate cold war draft era strategy that

accepted large risk, significant risk, by chronically under-equipping

the Army National Guard.

The Army National Guard today is no longer a strategic reserve.

We are an operational force. You heard from the Governors that

appeared earlier about the fact that actually over half of the combat forces in Iraq of the U.S. Army are from the National Guard.

So we are no longer a strategic reserve. We are an operational

force abroad, as well as the first Department of Defense responders

for missions here in the homeland; whether it is homeland defense

or to support the homeland security operations.

I want it on the record that our soldiers from the Army National

Guard, for the first time in the history of this Nation and for the

last 2 years, have not gone in harm’s way—ever in the history of

this Nation have we ever sent soldiers into harm’s way or into a

combat zone without the very finest equipment that this Nation

could offer.

Today, I can say that for the last 24 months, because of the leadership of the U.S. Army, that is a reality. The senior leadership of

the Army is committed to ensuring that is a reality and that the

National Guard gets equipment, in some cases ahead of its active

duty counterparts, but in no cases does it go without the equipment

it needs for the overseas mission.

Now we need to focus that same sense of commitment, that same

sense of dedication and sense of urgency, to ensuring that no citizen-soldiers are called out by Governors or the President to perform missions here in the homeland without the equipment that

they need to protect them and to deliver the capabilities that our

Governors and our citizens expect; whether it would be ill effects

delivered by a terrorist organization, or by Mother Nature.

Before September 11, 2001, the Army National Guard had 75

percent of its authorized equipment on hand. Over the last 4 years,

that equipment has been cross-leveled, sent overseas to ensure the

soldiers overseas in harm’s way had the very best equipment we

could possibly provide. It was the right thing to do. Much of that

equipment has been destroyed, worn out, left in place for others;

which is rightfully the way to handle that.

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But the bottom line is, our inventory that started at 75 percent

4 years ago is now at 34 percent. And when you consider items

that are considered substitute items, that are really not appropriate for overseas deployment, the number is even smaller.

We can no longer accept the risk that this Nation once took with

its Army National Guard and its Air National Guard, and today we

must take the first steps to correcting this. We did not get into this

situation overnight; we won’t get out of it overnight. But this journey must begin immediately.

The fact that Army National Guard units were deployed to Iraq

at the same time that Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, and now

Wilma, are visiting our Nation does not mean that the National

Guard in any way had lessened its ability to respond. It made it

more difficult, but it did not lessen our capability. We had to take

measures to mitigate that, and we did.

It should be noted that the National Guard delivered 50,000 citizen-soldiers and airmen to the Gulf region to respond to Hurricanes Rita and Katrina in a historically unprecedented, largest response to a natural disaster with national implications—faster,

more forces, more capabilities delivered by every State, our territories of Guam and the Virgin Islands, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia. All closed on the affected

areas in a period of 61⁄2 days. This immediate, rapid reaction is unprecedented in military history of the world; not only the United

States.

More than 50,000 National Guard members responded. They

dropped what they were doing; interrupted their lives; had no idea

how long they were going to be there, under what conditions they

would be there. But when the Governors called and the Nation

called out the Guard, you called out America, truly, in every part

of the Nation.

Our highest equipment priorities are exactly in line with what

you heard from the two Governors that testified earlier and what

General Melcher just outlined. It is communications equipment.

You cannot coordinate, synchronize, and organize a response without effective communications.

That communications must be interoperable with the other joint

and interagency responders that are there. But first and foremost,

we must be able to talk to the Army; and then, beyond that, the

other elements of DOD; and then ultimately, hopefully, the civilian

first responders, the emergency community.

Helicopters are essential. You heard it from both Governors, and

probably the three that appeared yesterday. Tactical vehicles—

modern, reliable, economical tactical vehicles; not the M–35 series

of vehicles that are older than most of the people in this room.

Heavy engineering equipment is essential in the time of an emergency to save lives, to remove debris, to clear lines of communication, to allow both civilian and military first responders to in fact

respond.

The chemical equipment, the medical sets, the logistical equipment, the night vision goggles, are exactly the items that are on

our list.

We estimate it will take an immediate $1.3 billion to address this

need to improve the National Guard’s ability to respond in our

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homeland when we are called out either by the Governors or the

President.

Thank you, sir. I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Blum follows:]

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Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much.

General Tackett.

STATEMENT OF MAJOR GENERAL ALLEN TACKETT

General TACKETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the

committee. Thank you for giving me the opportunity to testify

today on issues that I believe are of vital importance to our Nation

as a whole and to each of our States.

As demonstrated recently in the response to Hurricane Katrina,

the National Guard is vital to recovery efforts following natural

disasters. In West Virginia, the National Guard has responded to

37 federally declared disasters in the last 10 years. The soldiers

and airmen of the Army and Air National Guard have become expert at these types of operations.

However, this mission, as vital as it is to the health, safety, and

welfare of the citizens of this Nation, has never been resourced by

the Federal Government with the equipment needed to conduct

these missions. All equipment issued to the National Guard is

issued on the basis of the National Guard unit’s Federal war-fighting mission. No consideration is given to another, equally important, mission of the National Guard, disaster relief.

As an example, our 1092d Engineer Battalion was mobilized and

deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. When the unit returned, its engineer equipment remained in theater for use by incoming units. When the battalion was called to State active duty

by the Governor for flood duty shortly after its demobilization, it

had no equipment, no end-loaders, no dump trucks, to assist with

recovery efforts. We were forced to rent Bobcats and go to the

EMAC to assist the citizens of our State to recover from flooding.

I believe that this situation must be addressed before the next

hurricane, earthquake, tsunami, finds us ill equipped to respond to

a threat as potentially deadly as any enemy attack.

The military has long recognized that preparation for combat in

a realistic environment leads to fewer casualties on the battlefield.

At the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, CA, and the Joint

Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, LA, units fight realistic

mock battles to prepare them for combat. The result can be seen

in our decisive victories in Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom. In contrast, Katrina illustrates what a lack of collective training can lead

to.

Compare this with the situation when the Ohio River flooded

parts of Ohio and West Virginia earlier this year. National Guard

units were able to work with State and county emergency services

directors, the Red Cross, and Noah’s Wish, to help the citizens of

both States in the flooded areas recover in a timely, effective manner.

The lessons of Katrina and Rita demonstrate a clear need for a

joint interagency training capability the new Joint Interagency

Training Center, established by the Chief of the National Guard

Bureau, can provide.

We must focus not only on consequence management and emergency response, but, just as importantly, on the preventive and deterrence. The Joint Interagency Training Center operated by the

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tion and intelligence sharing; chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear enhanced collective training exercises focused on interagency

and intergovernmental response; critical infrastructure protection

and mission assurance; and in the future, non-lethal weapons.

All of these are key elements of homeland defense and homeland

security; whether it is preventing or mitigating a terrorist attack,

or effectively responding to a catastrophic natural disaster.

Just as we use the Joint Readiness Training Center and the National Training Center to be the most effective fighting force in the

conventional warfare, we need to use the Joint Inter-agency Training Center concept to be the most effective force in the new realm

of homeland defense, homeland security, and emergency preparedness.

In the new threat environment, this is just as vital a mission as

any other war-fighting mission we have for the ‘‘away game.’’ It is

clearly a mission for the National Guard, but it must be effectively

resourced and supported, and not at the expense of reducing the

Guard’s resources and participation in other war-fighting missions.

The Chief of the National Guard Bureau, in conjunction with the

adjutants general, has already laid the groundwork for such efforts

with initiatives such as the Joint Inter-agency Training Center;

Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear or High-Yield Explosive Response Force Package; the CERFP; Civil Support Teams;

Full Spectrum Integrated Vulnerability Assessment Teams; and a

Rapid Reaction Force.

An example of this is the methodology the Joint Inter-agency

Training Center-East is developing on behalf of the National Guard

Bureau for assessing critical infrastructure and mission assurance.

Working jointly with the Secretary of Homeland Defense, the Defense Contract Management Agency, and NORTHCOM, we are

looking at an ‘‘all hazards’’ approach for making these assessments;

thus allowing for the identification, mitigation, and response planning for not only terrorist threats, but also natural threats.

Each of the States has, or soon will have, a civil support team

on duty as a part of its National Guard force structure. The purpose of the civil support team is to respond to chemical, biological,

or nuclear attacks, and to determine what agents have been used,

and to work with civilian first responders in consequence management.

I propose an expansion of the civil support mission to include

natural disaster response. Civil support teams are already trained

in first aid and casualty evacuation. This type of approach would

have dedicated forces in place, ready to respond quickly when needed.

The major criticism of the relief efforts after Katrina was the

perceived length of time it took to get troops on the ground. The

States and counties are responsible for providing first responders.

FEMA does not have a first responder mission; nor does any other

Federal agency. A dedicated force of National Guard first responders would reduce the time, from the call for help, to having boots

on the ground.

In addition, in 1989, Congress had the foresight to establish the

National Guard Counterdrug Program. It provided additional force

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structure for Guard soldiers to work in an interagency approach to

fighting the war on drugs.

It uses a ‘‘State plans’’ approach that tailors efforts to the specific

threats of each State and also allows for States to develop multiple

State initiatives. This program has been a model for interagency

and intergovernmental support for over 15 years. It could be rapidly expanded at a minimal cost to the broader homeland defense,

homeland security, and emergency preparedness missions.

In fact, many of its assets have already been used in key events,

such as the response to Katrina and Rita, as well as the national

political conventions, the G8 summit, and the Presidential Inauguration.

The model is there. It just needs the authorization for the expanded role and full funding of its current 4,000-troop authorization. It could become the core of a dedicated force for both the

narco-terrorism and the homeland defense, homeland security, and

emergency preparedness missions that are then augmented by traditional Guard, Reserve, and active component units, depending on

the scope of an event. If properly structured and resourced, these

units could also provide assets for key OCONUS response in training allies for homeland defense, as well as humanitarian and nation-building missions.

In my view, funding for disaster recovery operations conducted

by the National Guard should come directly from the Federal Government. Statutory authority to fund homeland security missions is

now in place, with the recently enacted Chapter 9 of Title 32, U.S.

Code. This statute allows the Secretary of Defense to fund homeland security missions at the request of a Governor for 180 days.

An amendment to this statute to provide similar authority to fund

disaster relief efforts is badly needed.

There has been some discussion of adding a disaster response

mission to our active forces. I believe that this would be a mistake.

Our active component forces are the finest in the world. One of the

reasons they are so good is their focus solely on preparedness for

war. Adding another mission would detract from the single-minded

focus required of the forces whose primary mission has always

been, and should remain, fighting our Nation’s wars.

In addition, the current OPTEMPO makes adding another mission to our active forces unwise, if not impossible. The primary mission military responsibility for natural disaster relief should rest

with the National Guard.

As a member of both the National Guard Domestic Operations

Advisory Board, and the Adjutants General Association of the U.S.

Homeland Security Committee, I can tell you that the National

Guard Bureau and the Adjutants General stand ready to work with

Congress, the President, and the Department of Defense, to quickly

and effectively address this vital need.

With the threats we face in the 21st century, this mission is too

vital to the safety and security of our Nation not to address immediately. And the Guard, in its role as the militia, is clearly the core

force for the mission.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Tackett follows:]

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Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much.

General Rees.

STATEMENT OF MAJOR GENERAL RAYMOND REES

General REES. Mr. Chairman, I am Major General Raymond

Fred Rees, the Adjutant General of Oregon. I thank you and the

committee for inviting me to testify here. I provided my written

comments for the record.

I would like to focus first on equipment. I had the opportunity,

at the direction of my Governor, to go out and survey the Oregon

National Guard in the May and June timeframe, before I assumed

office on July 1st. The No. 1 issue among soldiers was not, ‘‘When

will I deploy again?’’ It was, ‘‘Where is my equipment?’’

This affects readiness, obviously, directly; but indirectly, the attitude of soldiers toward their organizations, where most of our National Guardsmen are veterans. We have more veterans in the Oregon National Guard now than we have had since World War II,

and they have deployed with the very best equipment. They now

see they have nothing, or ‘‘in lieu of’’ equipment, and it is demoralizing. And they, I believe, will not put up with it for long and,

unfortunately, may vote with their feet, as far as staying in our organization.

Likewise, potential recruits are expecting to be part of a 21st

century organization, and they see very little evidence of it.

I strongly endorse the efforts by the National Guard Bureau, the

Army, and the Government Accountability Office, to highlight the

equipment shortage and the need for the emergency supplemental

equipment appropriation.

In the area of disaster response, Oregon is one of many States.

I believe, 50 to 54 entities out there responded to the call of the

Governors of Louisiana and Mississippi. We had 2,000 individuals

who were called, both Army and Air Guard. Basically, from a cold

start, our advance party was on the ground within 48 hours. The

main body was there within another 48 hours after that. And this

is all over a holiday weekend. The limiting factor on this was airlift.

How did we meet these standards? How did we get there in that

timeframe? I think a lot of it has to do with the fact that the 4-

years of mobilizations has improved our processes, refined and

honed our skills at calling and moving troops—certainly, a byproduct of the military training and the Federal overseas mission.

How did we do it? Three things. First of all, the authorities

under the Emergency Management Assistance Compact [EMAC],

were there and in place and could be used. No. 2, the National

Guard Bureau coordination was phenomenal, as directed by General Blum. And three, the national treasure that I call the Air National Guard was available to provide us with airlift. I can tell you,

even though I have two fighter bases in Oregon, having those two

air bases was absolutely essential to be able to move those troops

rapidly to New Orleans and to Bell Chase Naval Air Station.

What needs to be improved? General Tackett has already talked

about training. I endorse what he said about training requirements. Exercises: we need to think big in terms of how these exercises should be done. How do we stabilize and preserve State and

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local government, and not attempt to supplant it? We need to think

big, start small-scale fast, in these exercises.

The equipment, we have already talked about. And the business

of Title 32, want to thank this committee for what it did last year

to spur on revisions to Title 32. But I can tell you that, from what

I have seen, we need more work on this. The ideas that General

Tackett has just endorsed—or I endorse what Major General

Tackett has just talked about. But I see a resistance still in the

operational use of the National Guard in Title 32.

In the area of EMAC, this needs to be improved, also, because

there needs to be clarification there. I think Governor Kempthorne

talked to that. Certainly, there is a need for provisions in there to

talk about support to law enforcement.

Standardization needs to be worked on. We need to talk about

the expansion, perhaps, of the CERFP concept that the National

Guard Bureau has advocated. And I would look at certain other

areas in there, such as aviation, for composite organizations that

could help in faster response.

Finally, I would say in the area of requirements in funding that

certainly in the business of homeland defense the tightknit relationship between the Bureau and the Army has worked very well

in defining requirements in funding, but when it comes to the business of homeland security I think we need to look, and I would recommend a study directed by this committee to look at three areas.

One, is the current DOD process for getting to homeland security

activities adequate? That is where the Guard is looked at as a reserve of the Army and the Air Force. Or, No. 2, should

NORTHCOM have authorities such as the Special Operations Command has, where they can do requirements and funding specifically

aimed at homeland security?

Or, third, should we look at what I would call a reverse Coast

Guard model, where there is a direct relationship between the Bureau and DOD and DHS, so that the National Guard can respond

appropriately to the requirements of the Department of Homeland

Security?

That concludes my remarks, and I look forward to your questions. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of General Rees follows:]

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Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much. General Melcher,

I will start with you. You are kind of the point-guy here. It seems

to me that the Army is forgetting what is important in transformation and reform. That is, how does it affect the individual

Guard soldier?

First, we had the pay problems. They weren’t getting paid correctly, and I think we reported on that widely. Then we subjected

them to the administrative nightmares in medical holds, and this

committee did a hearing on that. Some very tragic cases of people

that were caught in some ‘‘catch–22s’’ in terms of getting medical

attention.

Then, just the recent revelations that we were sending some of

our Guardsmen to debt collection agencies for pay errors that they

didn’t make, that we made; ruining their credit in some cases.

And today, from the GAO, who calls the balls and strikes in

these issues for Congress, it appears that the Army is saying it is

OK that the Army Guard soldiers don’t have adequate equipment

to train; nor can they expect it any time soon, under modularity or

the non-issuance of homeland requirements.

What is the problem here? Why is the Army treating the Guard

as second-class? Given the Guard’s operational role in the global

war on terrorism, why are Guard units still equipped at less than

wartime readiness levels?

In fact, if the active duty are equipped at C–1 readiness, why not

the equally operational Guard? I mean, is this just a question of

limited resources and having to set priorities?

General MELCHER. Sir, let me start by recapping just one comment that I made in the opening statement. And that is that I

would say, up to a period of about 2 years ago, the Army National

Guard was considered, not only by the Army, but the Department

of Defense, as a strategic reserve; in that the operating assumption

was that we would have a long lead time in which to mobilize soldiers, in which to potentially make up shortfalls of equipping and

perhaps even manning, in order to prepare those units for war.

What happened 2 years ago is that the Army, in concert with

this global war on terror, embarked on a journey not only to recognize that the Army National Guard was an integral part of our

operational forces, but that we should also equip and man them

commensurate with that new status.

Where you see that being played out in this global war on terror

is in Iraq and Afghanistan today, where 7 out of the 17 combat brigades in theater are Army National Guard. The number of those

brigades with each rotation varies, but the point is, the Guard is

very much committed, as is the U.S. Army Reserve.

And so 2 years ago, we embarked upon a plan, which we have

called Army Modular Forces, to try and, first of all, standardize

each one of the types of units we have in the Army, between the

active and the Guard; and second, to fill those units with the kind

of equipment and capabilities that they require for a model that

says they must be ready to go.

And we also have aligned ourselves in terms of the rotation

scheme which I believe you are aware of, the Army Force Generation Model, where the assumption is active forces should be ready

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to go one out of every 3 years; Guard forces, one out of every 6

years.

And so that is the reason in the equipping arena that we have

gone from about $5 billion over the program years dedicated to

Army Guard equipping, to a total of $21 billion today. And what

that does is it takes each one of those Guard units, those combat

brigades, and it fills them up with equipment between now and the

fiscal year 2012 time period, in order to make them on an equal

par with their active duty counterparts.

If I were to characterize even active units at the beginning of

this war, I would tell you that I think active units were filled anywhere between 90 and 100 percent of their required equipment.

Not every one of those was at 100 percent. Guard units, as you

have heard here today, were equipped at about the 75-percent

level. At the end of this period where we intend to transform all

units, the intent is that all units be equipped at the 100-percent

level, and that is the direction that we are going.

With respect to the other things that you mentioned, I am not

an expert on pay, and I am not an expert necessarily on——

Chairman TOM DAVIS. We have had other people up here on

that.

General MELCHER. But I did just want to make a point that, in

preparing for this hearing, I reviewed some of the things that the

Army has done to try and take a harder look at our disabled soldiers and how they are being treated with respect to pay problems

and so forth. And in fact, we have taken a hard look at how to deal

with that, both for active and Guard soldiers alike.

And one case in particular of trying to look out for Guard soldiers

can be illustrated by Taskforce Care, which was an effort initiated

because of Hurricane Katrina to establish a taskforce that went to

theater; talked to soldiers from Louisiana that were about to redeploy back to their home State; tried to determine what was the situation for each one of those soldiers and their families; and, in theater and when they got back, make sure that we followed through

to find housing for them, or to find the benefits that they needed

and so forth.

And so we looked at—you know, when I say ‘‘we,’’ the U.S.

Army—looks at the Army National Guard as an equal partner in

this war on terror that we are conducting. And they should be so

equipped.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. I mean, I think in some of these areas,

particularly in the pay and the health areas, it was about systems

and procedures; and we forget about the individual soldier. There

are just too many exceptions.

Let me ask another question. I understand that the $1.3 billion

that is included in the Senate appropriations bill for Guard equipment for Katrina and other homeland emergencies isn’t included in

the House appropriation bills and, because of spending caps, it

might not get in at all.

I also understand the Army has requested $850 million, and that

the difference includes communications equipment and trucks that

might be used in other disasters. Why hasn’t the Army included

these two key items in its request?

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General MELCHER. Sir, in the Army’s supplemental requests for

2006—and I am talking about the supplemental associated with

war, and not necessarily the hurricane—the Army has requested

dollar amounts for the kind of materiel you described for the Guard

and for the active forces, in order to try and equip these units that

are converting to modular configuration. The Congress is entertaining right now a proposal for $1.3 billion, as you mentioned. Were the Congress to approve that proposal, that would go a long way, certainly, toward providing those

capabilities quicker than we might otherwise be able to do with the

ordinary appropriations cycle and year-by-year approach of how we

intend to improve over time.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Well, let me ask Secretary Hall. Why does

the Title 32 authority for Hurricane Katrina only cover pay allotments, and not the equipment used or the training required? I

think we heard testimony and we understand that as they lose

equipment, it weakens their ability to perform State-side. Why does

the Guard stand—well, the Guard, alone, has to come to the Hill

to ask for equipment for Katrina; where every other DOD department or Federal agency can be assured reimbursement through

Title 10 or through FEMA.

Mr. HALL. I think that there is little disagreement here at the

table and with either one of the Generals that we need to have

within the equipping strategy for the future, within the $21 billion

that the General mentioned, and more perhaps, equipment for

homeland defense, for resetting the force, for repair of equipment,

for the modularity, and for supporting the ARFORGEN.

So I think within that model there is a commitment to provide

that equipment for homeland defense that the Guard and the Reserve would need. So I don’t think we disagree on the requirement.

It is making sure that we maintain that funding flow over the next

few years, to provide that equipment.

Under Title 32, as you know, when requested by the Governors—

the forces remain under control of the Governor—their pay and allowances are paid for by the Federal Government. But again, the

equipment that they will need has to be included in our overall

equipping strategy, to get that equipment that they will need now

and for the future for homeland defense.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. It appears that the Army and DOD are,

I think wisely, adopting equipment requirements for Iraqi Freedom

and the global war on terror. But the Department isn’t coming up

with requirements for homeland military assistance.

Mr. HALL. No, I think they are. And separately, General Melcher

and General Blum have told me that over 300 separate items that

will be required for homeland defense are being identified for the

National Guard—in fact, I think 342, by exact number. And those

will be identified for homeland defense requirements for the Guard.

Those are coming to us in a report by the end of the month,

which we will forward to you. So they are addressing those particular requirements, and over 300 of them are identified—trucks, communications, heavy-duty hauling equipment.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Yes, General Blum.

General BLUM. And it might be useful, also, Mr. Chairman, to remind everybody that these 342 identified items are dual-use items.

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Chairman TOM DAVIS. Right.

General BLUM. They are equally applicable for both overseas war

fighting as they are for here at home.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. What has hastened this is the fact that

we are just leaving a lot of equipment over in Afghanistan or Iraq.

That just depletes it, and we are not replenishing it. And a lot of

that can be used—like you say, it could be used over there, but it

could be used here, and we are missing it. And we heard testimony

from the two Governors earlier, there is a huge deficit.

General BLUM. Exactly. And it is not that the Army and DOD

are not addressing it. The issue is that the problem is so deep and

so longstanding that the measures that they have taken—and some

of them are quite extraordinary. I mean, within the supplemental

and on the global war on terrorism there is $2.5 billion identified

to reset equipment for the Army National Guard. There is $3 billion identified by the U.S. Army in their submission for modularity

for the National Guard. But that still leaves us woefully short.

And again, we didn’t get here overnight; but we are where we

are. And we are in a different world today than we were even 4

years ago.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. That is right.

General BLUM. And we can no longer assume the risk that we

are accepting. And I, for one, welcome any emergency or extraordinary measures to solve this problem sooner than later.

Mr. HALL. Could I just add that I compliment GAO on their report, which we haven’t mentioned, for the National Guard equipment. They had three major findings. I concurred with all of those

three; sent them a letter back; asked the Army to provide information by the end of this month on addressing those three areas, so

that I may prepare a report, the Army and DOD, to you, outlining

these exact issues of what are we going to do about the equipment

left behind; how are we going to have a good accounting system for

that equipment; and how are we going to support the Army’s

ARFORGEN model in the future.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. General Walker, we don’t have any questions for you. The work that you have done, and your staff has

done, and Ms. Saint Laurent has done, on this is great. Nobody is

disputing that, so no need to give you questions. You have kind of

defined it. You have called the balls; you have called the strikes.

Nobody is disputing the calls. The question now is what we do. And

so, just again, we appreciate what you did.

Let me just ask General Tackett, what do you think about the

Army modularity?

General TACKETT. From a National Guard standpoint, it is going

to be very difficult to meet it. We are going to have a lot of our

forces that have to be retrained. It puts a lot of stress onto the National Guard. But it is something that has to be done. We have to

mirror the active duty component.

It is taking away a lot of engineer structure from the States,

which is very important for the State missions. It is going to cause

the adjutant generals and Governors to use EMAC a lot more than

what they have in the past. There are a lot of difficulties involved

in modularity.

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Chairman TOM DAVIS. OK. Thank you. How is retention coming

at this point, as people come back from the war front?

General TACKETT. Well, in the State of West Virginia, I am proud

to say that we are one of the few States that met our in-strength,

and our actual retention rate is 147 percent of what it was intended to be.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. I asked the right guy; didn’t I, General

Blum? I asked the right man.

General TACKETT. We are very fortunate. We are 106 percent of

assigned strength. And we are one of only three States in the entire Nation that is above their assigned strength. And we have

been very fortunate and lucky in the State of West Virginia.

The State supports us big-time. You heard one of the Governors—from Pennsylvania, Governor Rendell—talk about the education assistance program. We have several programs in West Virginia that help us in our recruiting, and help us with our retention

of our Guardsmen. But we have been extremely fortunate to meet

our goals.

General BLUM. Mr. Chairman, that is a great question. And the

answer that you got from West Virginia is only representative of

what you would get from almost any State that you asked.

It almost is counter-intuitive, but the more we are using the

Guard, particularly for domestic operations—hurricane relief and

humanitarian operations right here in the United States—it has

been a spike or a boon to our recruiting in the last 30 days.

It is interesting to see that, while we were the busiest, with

50,000 people in the Gulf and 80,000 people overseas fighting the

war on terrorism, where we are stretched and probably busier than

we have ever been at any time in modern history, our recruiting

was better because of it. Because the young men and women of this

Nation want to be part of an organization that is professional and

is doing something that makes a difference.

That is why having modern equipment in their hands when they

show up is so important to attract them and to keep them in our

formations. And then, when they are called to perform in such a

magnificent way, the only way they have capabilities is that people

training and equipment. So this equipment is a vital leg in the

three-legged stool of our capabilities in the Guard.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. You know, it is kind of counter-intuitive

that retention—really, recruitment—would be up in this environment. But if you go down to New Orleans, as I was there, and Mississippi, and you see these people, and you see them on the ground,

and you see their morale—and I mean, they are working hard.

They are working 24-7. They are not getting much sleep. They are

certainly not living a very luxurious life; some of them in tents. But

the morale is amazing. And you know, people do want to be part

of something helping their fellow man.

So I didn’t know what answer I would get when I asked the

question, but I am glad to hear that.

Mr. HALL. Could I just——

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Sure.

Mr. HALL. Could I also just add, we were focusing on the Guard

here, but from all the components which I look at, attrition is almost at an all-time low. And again, it is counter-intuitive, but we

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have used all the components. Look at the Marine Corps, who are

104 percent of all of their goals. We look at the other services, the

retention and attrition is at all-time highs, and so more people are

staying with us.

We have some recruiting challenges, but not in the retention for

our people that have served. And we have seen, in fact, some of our

highest levels have been the people who have gone forward into the

fight in Iraq and Afghanistan; and by the way, many of them taking advantage of reenlisting with the bonuses that you all provided.

That was probably the most effective tool, the $15,000 bonus that

you provided last year for our young men and women staying intheater.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. General Walker.

Mr. WALKER. Mr. Chairman, as has been said by several of the

panel members, for decades, the Army National Guard’s role was

to be a strategic reserve. The fact is, it is no longer strategic, and

it is no longer a reserve. It is now being used tactically, both overseas and domestically. And it is being used with recurring frequency.

People are doing a great job. People are trying very hard with

regard to the resources and the authorities they have. But the simple fact of the fundamental change in how the Guard and Reserve

are being used has significant human capital, has significant equipment, has significant operational, and has significant fiscal implications. And we need to recognize that reality.

A part of the issue is, it is not a matter of whether or not the

Guard and Reserve need more money. They do. The question is,

where is it going to come from? And is it a reallocation of existing

resources, or is it an addition added on top? And we need to engage

in that exercise, and start making some tough choices which

haven’t been made in quite a long time.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you. Mr. Shays.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. I would really like to segue. That is a

wonderful segue for me. I feel like I am in a funny environment

right now, because I feel like, as I read your statement, under the

summary: ‘‘The significant use of Army National Guard forces for

overseas and homeland missions since September 11, 2001, has resulted in declining readiness, weakening the Army National Guard

preparedness for future missions, and indicating the DOD’s business model for the Army National Guard is unsustainable and

needs to be reassessed.’’ Other than that, things are working well,

I guess.

‘‘The current heavy reliance of the Army National Guard for

overseas operations represents a fundamental change from the

Guard’s planned role as a strategic reserve force whose principal

role was to deploy in the later stages of a major conflict.’’ I will just

read a little longer. It is needed.

‘‘Under this model, which still governs how resources are provided to the Guard, the majority of Army National Guard combat

forces are only provided with 65 to 74 percent of the people, and

65 to 79 percent of the equipment needed to conduct their assigned

wartime missions.’’ I mean, I could keep going on. But then you

say: ‘‘DOD is undertaking some initiatives to improve the Guard’s

equipment readiness and to balance its multiple roles in overseas

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and domestic operations. However, it is not clear whether these initiatives will be effective in enhancing the Army National Guard’s

equipment posture, because DOD has not yet developed detailed

plans; nor has it included funding for all its initiatives in its budget.’’ Do you stand by your statement, Mr. Walker?

Mr. WALKER. I stand by that report, and my statement.

Mr. SHAYS. Have you heard anything that followed your statement that makes you want to qualify your statement?

Mr. WALKER. No. I think people here are trying to do the best

they can with the resources and authorities that they have. Candidly, Mr. Shays, as you know, I think one of the problems you

have is we need to engage in a much more strategic and integrated

review and reassessment of DOD, period. This is a small piece, but

an important piece.

Mr. SHAYS. Well, it is a very important piece. But what I am trying to understand is, I admit to not hearing all the statements, but

the statements I did hear didn’t seem to address your statements.

I mean, I feel like you have to look for the gold thread of relevance

in this lots of talk.

I would like to ask each of you how you are addressing specifically; and not a long terminology. And what I would like from DOD

is just straight talk—not bullshit; straight talk. You know, ‘‘It is

true, we haven’t done this, but this is what we are doing, and this

is how long it is going to take, and this will be the result.’’

I think the head of GAO owes it. He didn’t send someone else

here. He came himself to deliver this message. And I would like

some straight talk.

And I will just start to say why I don’t think I am hearing

straight talk. And Secretary Hall, I have a lot of respect for you.

But I am reading that the National Guard and Reserve Equipment

Report, produced by your office, indicates a total reserve component

shortfall of critical items of more than $15 billion. Yet I read in

your testimony that in fiscal year 2006, funding for the reserve

component will be only $2.5 billion for equipment procedure.

In other words, so how could DOD let the reserve component get

into a position of a shortfall of critical items of more than $15 billion?

Mr. HALL. Well, in the testimony before you came in, some of it

was addressed; in that the $21 billion that the Army has planned,

as General Melcher indicated, will address that $15 billion, and

there might be more. That $1.3 billion is immediate. Within the

supplemental, within the yearly planning, there is a total of $21

billion planned which 2 years ago was not planned, as General

Melcher indicated. So that is money to address the shortfall that

General Blum has talked about of $15 billion.

Mr. SHAYS. Well, you go on to State, I think, that in the short

term, the Army Guard’s immediate requirements have been resolved. How have they been resolved?

Mr. HALL. I think they have been resolved by the $1.3 billion

that is going to be put in for immediate requirements, plus through

cross-leveling of their equipment. As they send their forces forward,

they are provided with 100 percent of the requirements when they

go into theater. Now, that involves taking equipment and cross-levVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:31 Apr 17, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00178 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\24714.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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eling from units that are not going. So I think in the

immediate——

Mr. SHAYS. So you mean in Iraq they are resolved?

Mr. HALL. For the forces that go forward in Iraq and Afghanistan. We are resolving the homeland defense requirements, as I

said, as part of the five areas that we are looking at—resetting the

equipment, repairing the equipment—the homeland defense requirements.

Mr. SHAYS. You are giving me the impression that we are resolving it.

Mr. HALL. No, I think the problem has been identified. What I

am giving you an impression and a straight talk is that we are all

committed to providing the resources to resolve the requirements

of the National Guard in all of those five areas.

Mr. SHAYS. OK.

Mr. HALL. And that commitment from all of us at the table is

here.

Mr. SHAYS. Now, explain to me, General Blum, why he needs at

least $1.3 million of supplemental funding for Katrina.

General BLUM. I need $1.3 billion to buy equipment to do the job

here in the United States——

Mr. SHAYS. Because——

General BLUM. Because Katrina, Rita, Wilma, and the forest

fires, and the snow storms in North Dakota, and the flooding in

New Hampshire, and all of the operational requirements we respond to that the Adjutants General alluded to and the Governors

talked to, require equipment. That means night vision goggles,

communications——

Mr. SHAYS. So let me come back——

General BLUM. I need the money to buy equipment, sir, in

straight talk.

Mr. SHAYS. I understand what you need, and I hear you. So let

me go back to you, Mr. Hall. How do I say that in the short term

the Army Guard’s immediate requirements have been resolved?

Mr. HALL. I indicated for Iraq and Afghanistan. We are in the

process, as General Blum just said, of resolving their requirements

for homeland defense.

Mr. SHAYS. In the process, or have been resolved?

Mr. HALL. We are in the process.

Mr. SHAYS. So they haven’t been resolved?

Mr. HALL. They have been resolved for their forces going forward

in Iraq and Afghanistan. We still have to resolve how we provide

the necessary equipment for disasters and homeland defense.

Mr. SHAYS. And that they get proper equipment to train with.

Mr. HALL. Well, in all areas. To reset the equipment, to repair

the equipment, to train for the ARFORGEN, and to meet all the

other missions abroad and at home. So we have to do it in all five

areas.

Mr. SHAYS. Well, then walk me back to how—I am still having

trouble reconciling Mr. Walker’s statement. I mean, I don’t mean

to be dense here, but Mr. Walker stands by his statement, and you

agree with his statement. And yet you somehow feel like it is being

resolved. I don’t understand.

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If you are telling me you know he is right and somehow in the

future it is going to be resolved, I might say, OK, at least you are

acknowledging that. But you are saying it differently. You are saying it has been resolved.

Mr. HALL. Well, it has not all been resolved. And I think General

Melcher wanted to comment.

General MELCHER. Congressman, let me give this a try. One of

the things that was said in the report was that the old business

model was not sustainable, and we would agree with that. The

business model that says that the Reserve is a strategic reserve is

not complementary with the current security environment that we

live in, and so that model had to change.

The way it changed, as I described it, is to accept that the Guard

is going to be an operational force, as is the Reserve, and that they

should be equipped commensurate with that status. And so where

that is being played out in terms of a plan is in the Army’s campaign plan over time to transition both active units and Guard

units to this new design—you know, to this modular force, standardized design—and to equip them as rapidly as possible, as rapidly within resources allowed——

Mr. SHAYS. What does it mean, ‘‘in time?’’

General MELCHER. All right, sir. For the active force, we are

transitioning all 43 active brigades between now and the end of fiscal year 2007. For the Guard brigades, they have expressed the desire to transition as rapidly as possible to the new design, by the

end of fiscal year 2008.

Mr. SHAYS. The 43 is what? I’m sorry.

General MELCHER. Forty-three active, and 34 Guard brigades.

And they will transition to the new design by the end of fiscal year

2008. The equipping for those units will continue throughout this

5-year defense plan period, up through fiscal year 2011. And with

lead times, they will probably get the last of their equipment in fiscal year 2012. That is what the $21 billion that the Army has allocated is going against.

Mr. SHAYS. Yes, it is 7 years, but this $21 billion won’t begin to

address all of those needs.

General MELCHER. Sir, the $21 billion addresses all the needs of

these new formations; which, quite honestly, have more of everything. It has more trucks, it has more unmanned air-able

vehicles——

Mr. SHAYS. How much will it address?

General MELCHER. $21 billion takes care of, I would say, probably about three-quarters of the total need. There is another $7 billion on top of that, that General Blum and I have agreed is the remainder. Most of that is replacing those things that are ‘‘in lieu of’’

items, and bringing them up to the most modernized level. Some

are communications and others.

But those for the entire Army extend well into the next half of

the next decade. The U.S. Army, for example, will still have less

than modernized types of equipment that we will replace—tactical

wheel vehicles, for example—up to the 2015 timeframe. So that

condition I described for the Guard is the same as for the active.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Walker, help me out here. What are you hearing,

and what aren’t you hearing?

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Mr. WALKER. Well, what I am hearing is, I believe that there has

been general agreement with regard to not just what the report we

issued says, but also with regard to other issues that I talked about

in my statement.

At the same point in time, obviously there are limits as to the

authority and the resources that these gentlemen have. And therefore, there is a reconciliation that needs to take place, both within

the Department of Defense as well as with the Congress, as to

what the overall resource level will be and how might those resources get allocated to be able to meet the most critical needs.

And so I don’t think there is disagreement here at this table. I

think the question is, what is going to happen to engage in that

overall reconciliation.

Mr. SHAYS. Well, the one disagreement I have is that I am left

with the impression from you, ‘‘It is not clear whether these initiatives will be effective in enhancing the Army National Guard’s

equipment posture, because DOD has not yet developed detailed

plans; nor has it included funding for all initiatives in its budget.’’

And I get the impression from General Melcher and Secretary

Hall that, ‘‘Everything is all planned out; we just have to carry it

out; and by 7 years, it is all going to be done.’’ They don’t jive.

Mr. WALKER. I can explain part of that delta, or inconsistency,

Mr. Shays. And that is that there are certain things that have been

done by the Department that we have not had the opportunity to

see yet. For example, there is a listing of 342 items—or whatever

it was—of requirements for the Army National Guard, and possibly

other entities, that have been developed by the Department of Defense; but that is still pre-decisional. They haven’t made decisions.

We have not taken a look at that yet.

But even if they do make decisions that this is what they need,

there is no guarantee that they are going to get the resource allocation for it. And that is part of the other problem.

Mr. SHAYS. Which is to say, in a way, to the general public listening, ‘‘Everything is fine.’’ But to a Member of Congress, I could

leave this meeting thinking everything is fine, and then I could

have someone from the press come up to me 2 years later and say,

‘‘You had a hearing. You were told there was a problem. You didn’t

do a damn thing about it.’’ And because I am left with this feeling

like what you said is true, and it has all been taken care of.

So let me ask it differently, General Blum or anyone else. What

steps have to be taken by Congress?

Mr. HALL. Could I comment on that?

Mr. SHAYS. Yes.

Mr. HALL. Following their report, we told GAO that we concurred. I asked the Army to give us their detailed plan on how they

will accomplish this equipping. That is due by October 31st. Part

of their recommendation was that, based upon that, we, DOD, submit to Congress a report on exactly the equipping strategy of what

the Army will do. As soon as we get the report, we will be submitting by detail on how this money is going to be spent, on how future requirements. So this has flowed from that to us giving——

Mr. SHAYS. When will that report be done?

Mr. HALL. Well, it is soon after October 31st, which is 10 days.

Mr. SHAYS. OK.

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Mr. HALL. We need to review that. We need to make sure that

we have the correct and agreed upon integrated strategy. And then

we will give to you, the committee and the Congress, what we have

been saying about our future strategy, and what General Melcher

has outlined. So we are providing that based upon the work that

they did. And we are committed to doing that as soon as we can.

Mr. SHAYS. So being committed to doing it, and its being resolved, are two different issues. And I think that is maybe my

problem with your terminology. Your recognizing this has to be

done is a helpful and encouraging sign. That it has been dealt with

yet, no. That it will be dealt with, and that you are pledging to this

committee and others that you will deal with it, is another issue.

And it seems to me that this is really, Mr. Chairman, almost a

preliminary effort; that it would make good sense for us to get you

back in 4 months and see where we are at.

Mr. HALL. It could have been better terminology, I admit. But

what I want you to know is, we are committed, and as you have

heard, to addressing this problem and providing equipment that

the National Guard needs to do its missions worldwide, overseas

and here.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. Let me just tell you why I get a little anxious

about this, and I will conclude with this.

Having been to Iraq 10 times; having continually had my own

constituents in the National Guard complain about equipment;

having shown up in the Kurdish area on a base and having the

commander of, I think, North Carolina troops show me three

Humvees—one with no protection, one with makeshift, and one

with, you know, factory protection; coming back to my staff saying,

‘‘Dammit, we need to deal with this issue’’; and then having the

military say, ‘‘Done, taken care of’’; and then finding out that we

kept revising the number of targets, so they said, ‘‘We will reach

this target by—’’ but we never solve the issue with the target adequate to meet the whole needs of all our troops—and I realize that

I have to ask these questions differently.

And because we let our troops down, I know and you know there

were men and women who died because they didn’t have the proper

protection, because we continually underestimated our needs. And

the end result was, we may finally have gotten it up there, but it

took us too long. Had we agreed on day one, ‘‘This is where we

need to get, way over here,’’ we would have gotten to it sooner.

And you know, it is kind of a terrible thing to have to say, but

we cost some lives of our own troops, because we didn’t, collectively, target it right.

So I am leaving this hearing with a total recognition on the part

of the military that you buy in, do not argue with what Mr. Walker

has said and his people; that you have a plan to resolve it; that

you are going to come back with a detailed outline as to how long

it will take, how much money it will require from Congress to do

the job. And then, if we don’t appropriate the dollars, it is on our

shoulders. If you don’t tell us in plain English what you need, it

rests on your shoulders. That is kind of how I am feeling.

Do any of you disagree with that?

General BLUM. No, sir. As a matter of fact, I agree with it completely. But I want to make sure for the record you know where

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I stand on this. I think the GAO report has described the ugly baby

in perfect detail. I think that the Department of Defense recognizes

we have an ugly baby that needs to be addressed.

I think that the U.S. Army is working, the Department of Army

has recognized and has taken this on in a serious manner for the

first time ever. And we don’t have a total plan and we don’t have

a total solution, but we are working to it right now. And we are

working within the budgets that we have been provided, and we

are making some trades based on——

Mr. SHAYS. OK, now, that is the part that makes me nervous.

And let me say, General Blum, that I have heard nothing but compliments about the job you have done. Nothing but compliments

about your honesty. You are straightforward.

But to say then you are working within the budget means that

you may have been provided less than the budget you need. And

if you have, you need to tell us.

General BLUM. I will tell you now. I am currently, and we agree

on a number—and if you don’t, please say it. We think we are $7

billion short on what we are resourced to provide against what we

would like to have to be able to not have risks.

Mr. SHAYS. $7 billion above the $21? Is that the number? You

are nodding your head. Some one say ‘‘Yes’’ or ‘‘No.’’

General BLUM. Yes, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. And General, is the $21 appropriated in the budget,

or hoping to be in the budget?

General MELCHER. Sir, this amount, $21 billion, is what is in the

Army’s plan over the 5-year defense plan period.

Mr. SHAYS. So it is not in the budget yet?

General MELCHER. Well, it is partially in the 2006 budget request, the 2006 supplemental request, and so forth. But the key

point is, you are absolutely right. Once we lay this out, we will

need the support of both the administration, the Department of Defense, and Congress, in order to make this vision for what these

forces ought to be a reality.

Mr. SHAYS. So is this $21—I’m sorry, Mr. Chairman, because I am concluding here. Is the $21 now becoming $28?

General MELCHER. Well, the $21 only covers up through fiscal

year 2011, which is as far as we plan out for this point in time.

When we build a new program in the spring, we push that time

horizon out to 2013. And so there are some things for both the active and the Guard that continue to happen over time.

Mr. SHAYS. And it will be, by 2013, full? That is a long time from

now, folks. It is going to take us that long?

General MELCHER. Sir, if the Army had a lot more money in current years, we would go after this problem much quicker.

Mr. SHAYS. No, no, no. You know, I was going to conclude, but

that is not the way I would like to think about how you communicate with us. Because you have already made an assumption that

you are not going to ask for more because you are not going to tell

us—so what I am hearing is, for the next 8 years, basically, we are

going to have the problem that Mr. Walker outlined.

General MELCHER. Sir, I think we are going to continually have

a problem with equipping. And perhaps it is worth just 1 second

to explain why do we have stay-behind equipment. The reason we

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have it is because it is things like up-armored Humvees or specialized equipment, night vision goggles, that you want the next soldier to fall in on when they come over there.

Mr. SHAYS. I am not arguing that they shouldn’t have it. What

is your point?

General MELCHER. Well, my point, sir, is that we continue to

evolve and change this mission over time. For example, we have

transition teams now that are training the Iraqi army. Those

teams all had to be equipped. We are putting pre-positioned stocks

back together overseas. Those things must be created. So there is

a constant dynamic of new equipping requirements that come over

time.

What I am saying is, this plan that we have for the $21 billion

is a sound plan, but it must be seen through in each one of the

years in which it unfolds.

Mr. SHAYS. Well, I will just again recommend to our committee,

Mr. Chairman, that we have a followup, not in the too-distant future, since your report is going to come. And I appreciate all of you

being here.

And I didn’t have any questions for our National Guard folks,

but I know that your statements were pretty straightforward: You

need help. And you are proud of the people that you have working

for you, and you are happy with your enrollments, in some instances.

But we know nationwide we have a problem of enrollment, and

we are overworking our National Guard. We are totally overworking them, and under-equipping them still.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you. I just want to thank you all.

I want to thank our Guard representatives. Your statements are in

the record. I think you made a strong case. General Walker, thank

you. And I want to thank our Pentagon officials, too.

The hearing is adjourned. And we will be back in about 5 minutes to start the committee markup.

[Whereupon, at 1:42 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

[The prepared statements of Hon. Todd Russell Platts, Hon. Jon

C. Porter, Hon. Patrick T. McHenry, Hon. Elijah E. Cummings, and

additional information submitted for the hearing record follows:]

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