alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### UNITED STATES ex rel. JOSEY v. HUMPHREY.

No. 11199.

United States Court of Appeals Third Circuit.

Submitted Feb. 18, 1954.

Decided March 3, 1954.

*827John Josey, pro se.

J. Julius Levy, Scranton, Pa., Roger A. Woltjen, Milford, Pa., for respondent.

Before MARIS, KALODNER and STALEY, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal by the relator from an order of the district court denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The relator was convicted of bank robbery on his plea of nolo contendere in the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina and is now serving a term of ten years imprisonment imposed by that court. In his petition he asserts various grounds for holding his conviction invalid. It appears that prior to filing his petition for habeas corpus the relator had filed in the district court which convicted him a motion and an amended motion under section 2255 of title 28, United States Code, to vacate and set aside the judgment of conviction on similar grounds. These motions were denied and the relator failed to prosecute appeals to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit from the orders of denial.

In Meyers v. Welch, 4 Cir., 1950, 179 F.2d 707, 708, which involved a similar situation, Chief Judge Parker said: “We think that the application was properly denied. In the first place, the prisoner has no right to relief by habeas corpus where there exists the right to relief under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255; and the fact that the motion has been denied does not give the right to resort to habeas corpus, even if the movant is entitled to relief, since the remedy in such case is by appeal. Only where the remedy by motion with appeal therefrom is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of the detention may there be resort to habeas corpus.” The rule thus laid down has met with unanimous approval by the courts of appeals in which the question has arisen, Meyers v. United States, 1950, 86 U.S.App.D.C. 320, 181 F.2d 802, certiorari denied 339 U.S. 983, 70 S.Ct. 1030, 94 L.Ed. 1387; Weber v. Steele, 8 Cir., 1950, 185 F.2d 799; Weber v. Steele, 8 Cir., 1951, 191 F.2d 815; *828Bozell v. Welch, 4 Cir., 1953, 203 F.2d 711, certiorari denied 345 U.S. 977, 73 S.Ct. 1126, 97 L.Ed. 1391, and we, also, are in accord with it. Applying it the district court rightly denied the relator’s petition for habeas corpus.

The order of the district court will be affirmed.
Attachment 1

Hatfield’s Ferry FGD Wastewater Trea tment System Process Flow Diagram
<PAGE>

                                                                    Exhibit 32.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                       AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906
                        OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

      In connection with the Annual Report of Blue Dolphin Energy Company (the
"Company") on Form 10-KSB for the period ended December 31, 2004 (the "Report"),
as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof, I, Ivar
Siem, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to
18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:

      1.    The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

      2.    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.

/s/ Ivar Siem
----------------

Ivar Siem

Chairman and Chief Executive Officer

March 25, 2005
Exhibit 32

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND

CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF
THE

SARBANES-OXLEY ACT

The certification set forth below is being submitted in connection with Warner Chilcott Limiteds Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2007 (the Report) for the purpose of complying
with Rule 13a-14(b) or Rule 15d-14(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the Exchange Act) and Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of Title 18 of the United States Code.

Roger M. Boissonneault, the Chief Executive Officer and Paul Herendeen, the Chief Financial Officer of Warner Chilcott Limited, each certifies that, to
the best of his knowledge:



| | 1. | the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Exchange Act; and
| | -- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2. | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Warner Chilcott Limited.
| | -- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Date: August 10, 2007



/s/ Roger M. BoissonneaultName: Roger M. BoissonneaultPresident & Chief Executive Officer/s/ Paul HerendeenName: Paul HerendeenExecutive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer


A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document
authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906, has been provided to Warner Chilcott Limited and will be retained by
Warner Chilcott Limited and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              SEP-30-1998
<PERIOD-END>                                   SEP-30-1998
<CASH>                                         0
<SECURITIES>                                   0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  0
<ALLOWANCES>                                   0
<INVENTORY>                                    0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               0
<PP&E>                                         0
<DEPRECIATION>                                 0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 0
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          6624
<BONDS>                                        0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          0
<PREFERRED>                                    0
<COMMON>                                       8140
<OTHER-SE>                                     (14764)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   (6624)
<SALES>                                        0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               0
<CGS>                                          0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                0
<INCOME-TAX>                                   0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            0
<DISCONTINUED>                                 0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                0
<CHANGES>                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                   0
<EPS-BASIC>                                  0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  0



</TABLE>
**Exhibit 32.2**

**Certification      Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,**

**As      Adopted Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**

|   | (1) | The                Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d),                as                applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;                and |
|--------|-----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | (2) | The                information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material                respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the                Company. |
|--------|-----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| /s/                Christopher W. Vieth                                                                     |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Christopher                W. Vieth                                                                         |
| Executive                Vice President, Chief Operating Officer and Chief Financial                Officer |
| (principal                financial and accounting officer)                                                 |

*This      certification shall not be deemed “filed” for purposes of Section 18 of the      Securities Exchange Act of 1934, or otherwise subject to the liability of that      section, nor shall it be deemed to be incorporated by reference into any filing      under the Securities Act of 1933 or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, except      to the extent the Company specifically incorporates it by      reference.*

----
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-09-00505-CV

Gregory Daniels, Appellant

v.

Edith Funes, Appellee

FROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 4 OF WILLIAMSON COUNTY,

NO. 09-1912-FC4, HONORABLE JOHN McMASTER, JUDGE PRESIDING 

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Appellant Gregory Daniels filed his notice of appeal on August 25, 2009. The clerk’s

record and reporter’s record were due in this Court on September 8, 2009. On September 30, 2009,

this Court received notice from the Williamson County district clerk’s office that appellant had not

paid or made arrangements to pay for the clerk’s record. On October 6, 2009, the clerk of this Court

sent notice to appellant that this appeal would be dismissed for want of prosecution if he did not

respond to this Court’s notice on or before October 16, 2009. See Tex. R. App. P. 37.3(b). To date,

appellant has not responded to this Court’s notice. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for want of

prosecution. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(b), (c).
2

__________________________________________

Jan P. Patterson, Justice

Before Justices Patterson, Puryear and Pemberton

Dismissed for Want of Prosecution

Filed: December 2, 2009
-84 -82 -80 -78 -76 -74

38 40 42



### ★ ▲ ▲ ▲ ▲



### ★ ▲ ▲ ▲ ▲ 500 1000 1500 100 18 12 06 00 07/17 

### NOAA HYSPLIT MODEL 

## Backward trajectory ending at 2300 UTC 17 Jul 06

EDAS Meteorological DataSource★at 38.92 N 77.01 WMeters AGL
## Court of Appeals Sixth Appellate District of Texas

J U D G M E N T

Above Hell Trucking, LLC , Appellant

No. 06

- 23

- 00079

- CV v.

Garrett LaGrone Services, LLC d/b/a Garrett's Wrecker Service , Appellee Appeal from the 123rd District Court of Panola C ounty, Texas (Tr. Ct. No. 2022

- 195 ). Panel consists of Chief Justice Stevens and Justices van Cleef and Rambin. Memorandum Opinion delivered by Justice

van Cleef

.

As stated in the Court’s opinion of this date, we find no error in the judgment of the court below. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. We further order that the appellant, Above Hell Trucking, LLC , pay all costs incurred by reason of this appeal.

RENDERED J UNE 5 , 2024 BY ORDER OF THE COURT SCOTT E. STEVENS CHI EF JUSTICE

ATTEST: D ebra K. Autrey , Clerk
<PAGE>   1


                                                                    EXHIBIT 21-1


                           THE NAVIGATORS GROUP, INC.
                                AND SUBSIDIARIES



SUBSIDIARIES OF THE REGISTRANT AT DECEMBER 31, 1998

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                                               JURISDICTION IN
NAME                                                           WHICH ORGANIZED
----                                                           ---------------
<S>                                                            <C>
Navigators Insurance Company                                   New York
NIC Insurance Company                                          New York
Somerset Marine, Inc.                                          New York
Somerset Insurance Services of Texas, Inc.                     Texas
Somerset Insurance Services of California, Inc.                California
Somerset Insurance Services of Washington, Inc.                Washington
Somerset Marine Aviation Property Managers, Inc.               New Jersey
Somerset Asia Pacific Pty Ltd.                                 Sydney, Australia
Somerset Marine (UK) Ltd.                                      England
Navigators Corporate Underwriters Ltd.                         England
Navigators Holdings (UK) Ltd.                                  England
Somerset Services Pte Ltd.                                     Singapore
Mander, Thomas & Cooper
   (Underwriting Agencies) Ltd.                                England
Millennium Underwriting Ltd.                                   England
</TABLE>
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision **

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

NHY/Research

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

RONALD MAGAOAY GARCIA,

 Petitioner,

 v.

ERIC H. HOLDER Jr., Attorney General,

 Respondent.

No. 05-74903

Agency No. A044-527-531

MEMORANDUM *

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted February 16, 2010** 

Before: FERNANDEZ, GOULD, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

Ronald Magaoay Garcia, a native and citizen of the Philippines, petitions for

review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order affirming an immigration

judge’s decision denying his application under 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4)(B) for a

FILED

FEB 25 2010

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
NHY/Research 2 05-74903

waiver of the requirement to file a joint petition with his former spouse to remove

the conditional basis of his lawful permanent resident status. We have jurisdiction

pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence the agency’s

finding of removability, Nakamoto v. Ashcroft, 363 F.3d 874, 882 (9th Cir. 2004)

and the agency’s order denying the waiver, Damon v. Ashcroft, 360 F.3d 1084,

1088 (9th Cir. 2004). We deny the petition for review. 

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s finding that Garcia is removable

because he failed to satisfy his burden of establishing that his marriage was entered

into in good faith since he did not submit sufficient documentation indicating that

he and his former spouse intended to establish a life together at the time of their

marriage. Cf. Damon, 360 F.3d at 1088-89 (evidence of joint insurance policies,

property leases, income tax forms or bank accounts, and shared residence was

substantial evidence of intent to establish a life together); see also 8 C.F.R.

§ 216.5(e)(2)(i)-(iv). 

Petitioner’s remaining contentions are unavailing. 

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
I 

113TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 1798 

To amend the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 to ensure 

health care coverage value and transparency for dental benefits under 

group health plans. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

APRIL 26, 2013 

Mr. GOSAR (for himself, Mr. SIMPSON, Mr. ANDREWS, and Mr. LOEBSACK) 

introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on 

Education and the Workforce 

A BILL 

To amend the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 

of 1974 to ensure health care coverage value and transparency for dental benefits under group health plans. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Dental Insurance Fair5 ness Act of 2013’’. 

6 SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 

7 Congress finds the following: 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 1798 IH

1 (1) Dental coverage helps approximately 173 

2 million Americans get the dental care that is vital to 

3 ensuring good oral and overall health. 

4 (2) Unfair practices of dental benefit plans 

5 hinder patients’ ability to receive the full benefits for 

6 which they pay and, in some cases, provide the den7 tal insurance industry with windfall profits. 

8 (3) The Dental Insurance Fairness Act of 2013 

9 will help consumers receive the full value of their 

10 dental coverage. 

11 SEC. 3. VALUE REQUIREMENTS FOR DENTAL BENEFITS. 

12 Subpart B of part 7 of subtitle B of title I of the 

13 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (29 

14 U.S.C. 1185 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end 

15 the following: 

16 ‘‘SEC. 716. VALUE REQUIREMENTS FOR DENTAL BENEFITS. 

17 ‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.—The requirements of this section 

18 shall apply to self-insured group health plans insofar as 

19 they provide dental benefits (including, notwithstanding 

20 section 732(c)(1), self-insured limited scope dental bene21 fits (described in section 733(c)(2))). 

22 ‘‘(b) VALUE.—In order to ensure that participants 

23 and beneficiaries in a group health plan receive full value 

24 from dental benefits, the plan shall meet the following re25 quirements: 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
3 

•HR 1798 IH

1 ‘‘(1) UNIFORM COORDINATION OF BENEFITS.— 

2 The plan shall provide for coordination of benefits in 

3 a manner so that the plan pays the same amount re4 gardless of other coverage for such benefits so long 

5 as the total amount paid does not exceed 100 per6 cent of the amount of the applicable claim. Such co7 ordination shall be effected consistent with such 

8 rules as the Secretary establishes, based upon simi9 lar model regulations developed by the National As10 sociation of Insurance commissioners. 

11 ‘‘(2) EQUITY FOR DENTAL PATIENTS THROUGH

12 ASSIGNMENT OF BENEFITS.—In the case of a plan 

13 that provides dental benefits through a network of 

14 providers, the plan shall permit a participant or ben15 eficiary to designate payment of dental benefits to a 

16 provider who is not participating in the network.’’. 

Æ 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
###### Editorial Note on Part 1962

#### Editorial Note:

Nomenclature changes to part 1962 appear at 80 FR 9902, Feb. 24, 2015.

#### § 1962.15 [Reserved]
§ 1781.19 Approval, closing, and cancellation. ( a ) Approval and closing actions will be taken in accordance with the applicable provisions of part 1780 of this chapter and the following requirements have been met: ( 1 ) The WS or RCD plan has been approved for operations by NRCS and the applicant is an official sponsoring or cosponsoring local organization for the plan as evidenced by being included in the list of sponsoring or co-sponsoring local organizations in the plan.
( 2 ) Closing instructions or a preliminary legal opinion has been prepared by the Regional Attorney.
( 3 ) The governing body of the applicant's sponsoring local organization has formally passed and approved the loan resolution.
( 4 ) The Rural Development State Director and NRCS State Conservationist have determined that all planned actions can be carried out as proposed in the project plan and the docket.
( 5 ) The NRCS State Conservationist and Rural Development State Director have mutually agreed on the priority to be given the WS loan or WS advance, or RCD loan. In making this determination, consideration will be given to the relative priority of the WS works of improvement or RCD measures to all other such work in the State and the anticipated availability of Federal and local funds to assure continuity of action and work until the project is completed. When funds are to be provided by NRCS for a WS or RCD loan or a WS advance such funds must be obligated by NRCS before closing.
( 6 ) Public bodies will be required to use bond counsel in accordance with subpart D of part 1780 of this chapter.
( b ) When favorable action is not taken on a WS loan, WS advance, or RCD loan, the Rural Development State Director will notify the NRCS State Conservationist and the applicant in writing and, if possible, arrange for a meeting of RUS and NRCS representatives with the applicant to explain the action. WS loans, WS advances, or RCD loans may be canceled before closing.
Court of Appeals

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA,____________________

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:

A20A0898. SAM LOUIS LEVINE v. DAVID NAHMIAS et al.

In this civil action, plaintiff Sam Louis Levine filed a notice of appeal of the

trial court’s order staying discovery. However, because the case remains pending

below, Levine was required to use the interlocutory appeal procedures – including

obtaining a certificate of immediate review from the trial court – to appeal the order.

See OCGA § 5-6-34 (b); Boyd v. State, 191 Ga. App. 435, 435 (383 SE2d 906)

(1989); see also Johnson & Johnson v. Kaufman, 226 Ga. App. 77, 78 (485 SE2d

525) (1997) (discovery orders generally are interlocutory and not directly appealable

as final judgments). Levine’s failure to do so deprives us of jurisdiction over this

appeal, which is hereby DISMISSED. See Bailey v. Bailey, 266 Ga. 832, 833 (471

SE2d 213) (1996).

Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk’s Office, Atlanta,____________________

I certify that the above is a true extract from

the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court

hereto affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

February 18, 2020

02/18/2020
M. P. No. 79-371.

#### Rev. James C. Rawlinson *et al. v.*Board of Canvassers of City of Woonsocket *et al.*

Mr. Justice Doris did not participate.

*Rev. James C. Rawlinson,*pro se, for petitioners. *Dennis J. Roberts II,*Attorney General, *John S. Foley,*Special Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.

The petition for writ of certiorari is granted.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Yut Wai Tom, Appellant.

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County, rendered on July 26, 1976, convicting defendant, after jury trial, of murder in the second degree (Penal Law, § 125.25, subd 1), and sentencing him thereon, is affirmed. The Trial Judge’s participation in the trial was certainly much more active and extensive than is customary. But in part, this was justifiable because of the language difficulty with most of the witnesses and the need for clarifying their answers. We do not think the Trial Judge exhibited partiality, nor, on balance, do we think that defendant was deprived of a fair trial or of a fair opportunity to present his defense. Concur—Birns, Fein, Bloom and Silverman, JJ.

Murphy, P. J.,

dissents in a memorandum as follows: The Trial Justice propounded approximately 1,300 questions, which figure represents approximately 40% of all questions asked during the trial. In view of the language difficulties experienced by certain witnesses, some participation on his part was justified in order to clarify matters for the jury. However, the Trial Justice exceeded the bounds of proper intervention in this proceeding by usurping the authority of both the prosecutor, and defense counsel to determine the content, course and manner of their presentations. *(People v Mees,*47 NY2d 997, 998; *People v Brown,*53 AD2d 867.) Furthermore, the interruptions often tended to bolster the prosecution’s case and to rehabilitate its witnesses. *(People v Richards,*48 AD2d 792.) In this case involving close issues of alibi and identification, the defendant was denied a fair and impartial trial by the nature and extent of the Trial Justice’s unwarranted intrusions *(People v Ellis,*62 AD2d 469). For that reason, the judgment of the Supreme Court, New York County, rendered July 26, 1976, convicting defendant of murder in the second degree and sentencing him to an indeterminate sentence of 15 years to life should be reversed, on the law, and a new trial should be ordered.