J-S41042-16

*Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

JOHN WRIGHT, 

Appellant No. 3341 EDA 2015

Appeal from the PCRA Order October 21, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-1004742-1979

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., DUBOW, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED MAY 10, 2016

Appellant John Wright appeals pro se the order entered in the Court of 

Common Pleas of Philadelphia County on October 21, 2015, by the 

Honorable Jeffrey P. Minehart dismissing as untimely his fourth petition filed 

pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).1 Following a review of 

the record, we affirm. 

On May 2, 1980, Appellant entered a non-negotiated guilty plea to 

burglary and criminal conspiracy after he had been arrested for illegal entry 

into a bar and a roll of nickels was confiscated from him. On May 5, 1980, 

____________________________________________

1 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-46.
J-S41042-16

- 2 -

Appellant received three years of probation on the burglary charge and a 

three year concurrent sentence of probation on the conspiracy charge. 

While on probation and following a jury trial, Appellant was convicted 

of rape, aggravated assault, simple assault, involuntary deviate sexual 

intercourse, unlawful restraint, recklessly endangering another person and 

terroristic threats. On January 11, 1983, Appellant was sentenced to 

twenty-eight and one-half years to fifty-seven years in prison for those 

crimes. Additionally, on October 19, 1983, the trial court revoked 

Appellant’s probation and imposed a consecutive prison sentence of fifteen 

years to thirty years. 

The trial court denied Appellant’s petition to reconsider sentence, and 

this Court denied his direct appeal on January 27, 1986, for his failure to file 

an appellate brief. Thirteen years later on November 16, 1999, Appellant 

filed his first PCRA petition. Counsel was appointed and filed an amended 

petition on May 18, 2000. Therein, Appellant alleged his failure to file a 

timely PCRA petition was due to the interference of government officials 

(trial counsel) and that the facts upon which his claim was predicated had 

been unknown to him and could not have been ascertained sooner with due 

diligence. The PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s petition as untimely on 

March 28, 2001. 

This Court affirmed on June 19, 2002, and specifically rejected 

Appellant’s claim that his petition was an extension of his request for 
J-S41042-16

- 3 -

collateral relief that had been filed in 1984 while his direct appeal was 

pending. We also found no merit to Appellant’s argument that an exception 

to the PCRA time-bar applied and clarified that counsel’s ineffectiveness does 

not constitute after-discovered evidence under the enumerated exceptions 

to the timeliness provisions. Commonwealth v. Wright, 806 A.2d 468 

(Pa.Super. 2002) (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, 573 Pa. 666, 

820 A.2d 704 (2003). Appellant filed two, additional PCRA petitions on June 

26, 2006, and May 8, 2008, respectively. Both of these petitions were 

dismissed as untimely. 

On March 2, 2015, Appellant filed the instant PCRA petition, and after 

providing Appellant with notice pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907, the PCRA court 

dismissed it as untimely on October 21, 2015. Therein, as he had done 

previously, Appellant asserted both that the petition is an extension of the 

one he had filed in 1984 and that the newly-discovered facts exception to 

the PCRA time-bar applies because he only recently discovered prior 

counsel’s ineffectiveness. 

Appellant presents the following question for our review:

Whether the post conviction court erred in dismissing 

[A]ppellant’s post conviction petition as untimely? 

Appellant’s Brief at 2. 

Initially, we must determine whether Appellant’s fourth PCRA petition 

was timely filed. See Commonwealth v. Hutchins, 760 A.2d 50 (Pa. 

Super. 2000). “Our standard of review of the denial of PCRA relief is clear; 
J-S41042-16

- 4 -

we are limited to determining whether the PCRA court’s findings are 

supported by the record and without legal error.” Commonwealth v. 

Wojtaszek, 951 A.2d 1169, 1170 (Pa.Super. 2008) (quotation and 

quotation marks omitted).

Pennsylvania law makes it clear that no court has jurisdiction to hear 

an untimely PCRA petition. Commonwealth v. Robinson, 837 A.2d 1157 

(Pa. 2003). The most recent amendments to the PCRA, effective January 

19, 1996, provide that a PCRA petition, including a second or subsequent 

petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the underlying judgment 

becomes final. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). A judgment is deemed final “at 

the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the 

Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 

or at the expiration of the time for seeking review.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 

9545(b)(3).

The three statutory exceptions to the timeliness provisions in the PCRA 

allow for very limited circumstances under which the late filing of a petition 

will be excused. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). To invoke an exception, a 

petition must allege and the petitioner must prove:

(i) the failure to raise a claim previously was the result of 

interference by government officials with the 

presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution 

or the law of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or 

law of the United States;
J-S41042-16

- 5 -

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were 

unknown to the petitioner and could not have been 

ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or

(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was 

recognized by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after 

the time period provide in this section and has been 

held by that court to apply retroactively.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). “We emphasize that it is the petitioner 

who bears the burden to allege and prove that one of the timeliness 

exceptions applies.” Commonwealth v. Marshall, 947 A.2d 714, 719 (Pa. 

2008) (citations omitted).

Instantly, Appellant was sentenced on October 19, 1983, and this 

Court affirmed his judgment of sentence on January 27, 1986. Appellant did 

not file a petition for allowance of appeal with the Supreme Court. 

Therefore, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final thirty days 

thereafter on February 26, 1986. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3) (providing 

“a judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct review, including 

discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the 

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking the 

review[ ]”). In Appellant’s case, a timely first petition for post-conviction 

relief would have had to have been filed by January 16, 1997, pursuant to 

the grace period provided for petitioners whose judgments of sentence 

became final prior to the effective date of the amended PCRA. 

Commonwealth v. Davis, 916 A.2d 1206, 1208-09 (Pa.Super. 2007)
J-S41042-16

- 6 -

(explaining that the 1995 amendments to the PCRA provide that if a 

judgment of sentence became final before the January 16, 1996, the 

effective date of the amendments, a PCRA petition will be considered timely 

if filed within one year of the effective date of the amendments, or by 

January 16, 1997; however, this grace period applies only to first PCRA 

petitions). Appellant filed the instant PCRA petition, his fourth, on March 2, 

2015; therefore, it is patently untimely. 

Appellant argues his petition is not time-barred because it is an 

extension of his PCRA petition filed in 1984. In support of this assertion, 

Appellant relies upon Commonwealth v. Leasa, 759 A.2d 941 (Pa.Super. 

2000); Commonwealth v. Peterson, 756 A.2d 687 (Pa.Super. 2000) and 

Commonwealth v. Robinson, 781 A.2d 152 (Pa.Super. 2001) for the 

proposition that an untimely, serial PCRA petition may be construed as an 

extension of a timely filed, previously dismissed first PCRA petition where an 

appeal had been taken from the denial of the first PCRA petition but this 

Court ultimately dismissed the appeal for Appellant’s failure to file a brief. 

As the Commonwealth notes, our Supreme Court overruled this line of cases 

in Commonwealth v. Robinson, 837 A.2d 1157 (Pa. 2003). Therein, the 

Court rejected the argument Appellant presents herein, and held that neither 

the language of the PCRA nor caselaw authorizes the suspension of the PCRA 

time-bar for any reason other than the three exceptions enumerated in 42 

Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). Id. at 1163. Moreover, as this Court had previously 
J-S41042-16

- 7 -

stated when considering Appellant’s first PCRA petition, a conclusion that 

counsel had been ineffective is not the type of after-discovered evidence 

encompassed by the PCRA time-bar exception. See Gamboa-Taylor, 

supra. 

Appellant further claims Section 9545(b)(1)(ii) is applicable herein. In 

support of this position, Appellant states he just recently discovered court 

appointed counsel had been ineffective for waiving his right to be present at 

his “modification hearing” without first conferring with Appellant and that no 

sentencing order had been issued after his probationary sentence had been 

vacated which left him unsentenced. He further explains “these facts were 

made known to [him] by the law clerks at the institutional law library.” See

PCRA petition, 3/2/15 at 3. Despite these claims, Appellant attached to his 

PCRA petition a letter he had in his possession allegedly authored and signed 

by trial counsel and dated June 6, 1984, wherein counsel discussed a 

possible sentencing error in Appellant’s case. Also attached to the petition 

are additional letters allegedly authored and signed by trial counsel and 

dated October 25, 1984, and September 13, 1985, which discuss Appellant’s 

resentencing. This correspondence belies Appellant’s claim he was not 

aware of the trial court’s ruling until 2015, thirty years later. 

In addition, as the trial court notes, Appellant’s sentence was proper. 

In the letter dated June 6, 1984, counsel indicated Appellant may have 

remained “unsentenced” after he filed his motion for reconsideration of 
J-S41042-16

- 8 -

sentence; however, counsel clearly noted the trial court denied Appellant’s 

motion for reconsideration on May 9, 1984. In addition, a review of the 

docket reveals that the trial court denied Appellant’s motion for 

reconsideration and affirmed the sentence of fifteen years to thirty years in

prison. See also Trial Court Opinion, filed 12/3/15, at 4 n. 8. 

Based on the foregoing, we find the PCRA court lacked jurisdiction to 

consider the merits of Appellant’s fourth PCRA petition and properly 

dismissed it as untimely filed. Accordingly, we affirm the PCRA court’s 

October 21, 2015, Order. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/10/2016