a

GAO

United States Government Accountability Office

Report to the Subcommittee on Strategic 

Forces, Committee on Armed Services, 

House of Representatives

May 2006 DEFENSE 

MANAGEMENT

Actions Needed to 

Improve Operational 

Planning and Visibility 

of Costs for Ballistic 

Missile Defense

GAO-06-473
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

May 2006

DEFENSE MANAGEMENT 

Actions Needed to Improve Operational 

Planning and Visibility of Costs for 

Ballistic Missile Defense 

Highlights of GAO-06-473, a report to the 

Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, 

Committee on Armed Services, House of 

Representatives 

The Department of Defense (DOD)

has spent about $91 billion since 

the mid-1980s to develop a 

capability to destroy incoming

ballistic missiles. In 2002, 

recognizing the new security

environment after the September 

11 attacks, President Bush directed 

that an initial set of defensive 

ballistic missile capabilities be put 

in place in 2004. Although DOD is

developing the Ballistic Missile

Defense System (BMDS) to meet 

an urgent need, preparing to

operate and support a system 

under continuous development 

poses significant challenges. GAO 

was asked to assess the extent to 

which (1) DOD has made progress 

in planning to operate the BMDS, 

and (2) the Future Years Defense 

Program (FYDP) provides 

complete and transparent data on 

BMDS operational costs. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO is recommending that DOD 

develop operational criteria that

must be met and a comprehensive 

plan specifying actions that must 

be taken before declaring BMDS

operational, and provide Congress

and DOD complete data on BMDS 

operational costs. Although DOD 

concurred or partially concurred 

with our recommendations, DOD 

did not state that they planned to 

take corrective actions. Therefore, 

GAO added a Matter for 

Congressional Consideration 

because GAO continues to believe 

its recommended actions are 

needed to prepare for BMDS

operations and assist oversight. 

DOD has made progress in planning to operate BMDS; however, it has not 

established criteria that would have to be met before declaring BMDS 

operational, nor has DOD resolved security issues or completed training and 

personnel plans. DOD officials agree that operational criteria are typically 

established and met prior to declaring a system operational, and that 

planning for new systems includes identifying personnel requirements, 

developing training programs, and identifying logistics and maintenance

requirements. DOD has developed BMDS procedures and guidance, created 

an organization to integrate planning and operational support, and 

conducted some training and exercises. However, DOD has not established 

formal criteria for declaring that limited defensive operations or subsequent 

blocks of capability are operational or completed planning for security, 

training, and personnel. DOD has not done this because it is developing 

BMDS in a unique way and BMDS is exempted from traditional requirements

guidance. Without specific operational criteria, the Secretary of Defense will 

not be in a sound position to objectively assess combatant commands’ and 

services’ preparations to conduct BMDS operations nor have a transparent 

basis for declaring BMDS operational, which will become more important as 

capabilities are added in subsequent blocks and Congress considers requests 

to fund operations. Without adequate planning, clear criteria, and 

identification of responsibility for ensuring necessary actions have been 

completed, it may be difficult for DOD to identify and prioritize actions, 

assure itself or Congress that the necessary pieces are in place before 

declaring the system operational, and determine whether the return on its 

significant development investment in BMDS can be realized. 

The FYDP, a major source of budget information, does not provide complete 

and transparent data on ballistic missile defense operational costs. DOD and 

GAO have repeatedly recognized the need to link resources to capabilities to 

facilitate decision making and oversight. However, complete and 

transparent ballistic missile defense operational costs are not visible in the 

FYDP because the FYDP’s structure does not provide a way to identify and 

aggregate these costs. Four primary factors impair the visibility of ballistic 

missile defense operational costs in the current FYDP structure: 

(1) operational costs are included in many program elements and there is no 

mechanism to link and compile these costs, (2) the Missile Defense Agency

is authorized to use research and development funds to pay for operational 

costs, (3) DOD has not included all known operational costs in its budget 

estimates, and (4) DOD has not identified all costs associated with the New 

Triad, of which BMDS is an important part. Without the ability to identify 

and assess total ballistic missile defense operational costs, neither the 

Secretary of Defense nor Congress has complete information to make 

funding and trade-off decisions among competing priorities; provide 

assurance that ballistic missile defense capabilities are affordable over time; 

and assess the costs of employing the New Triad. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-473.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Janet St. 

Laurent at (202) 512-4402 or 

stlaurentj@gao.gov. 
Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3

Background 5

DOD Has Made Progress in Planning to Operate BDMS but 

Planning Is Incomplete 13 

The Future Years Defense Program Does Not Provide Complete 

and Transparent Ballistic Missile Defense Operational Costs 28 

Conclusions 34

Recommendations for Executive Action 36 

Matter for Congressional Consideration 37 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 37 

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 40 

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 43 

Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 46 

Related GAO Products 47 

Tables 

Table 1: Ballistic Missile Defense Elements and Their Roles 9 

Table 2: Missile Defense Agency’s Planned Delivery of Ballistic 

Missile Defense Elements by Block 11 

Table 3: Status of Operational Criteria Development for Ballistic 

Missile Defense Elements 20 

Figure 

Figure 1: Notional Ballistic Missile Defense Engagement 7 

Page i GAO-06-473 Ballistic Missile Defense
Abbreviations 

BMDS Ballistic Missile Defense System 

DOD Department of Defense 

FYDP Future Years Defense Program 

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense 

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Page ii GAO-06-473 Ballistic Missile Defense
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

May 31, 2006

The Honorable Terry Everett 

Chairman 

The Honorable Silvestre Reyes 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Strategic Forces 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

The Department of Defense (DOD) has spent about $91 billion since the 

mid-1980s to develop the capability to intercept and destroy incoming 

ballistic missiles. DOD initially focused its attention exclusively on 

research and development activities. In 2002, recognizing the changed 

security environment after the terrorist attacks of September 11, President 

Bush directed that an initial set of capabilities be put in place in 2004 to 

defend against ballistic missiles that may carry weapons of mass 

destruction. This missile defense capability is a major part of DOD’s New 

Triad of capabilities, which also includes offensive nuclear and 

conventional capabilities and a revitalized defense infrastructure to 

provide more options to address future contingencies.1

 In 2003, the U.S. 

Strategic Command was assigned responsibility for coordinating global 

ballistic missile defense operations. Each combatant command is 

responsible for ballistic missile operations in their geographic area and 

individual ballistic missile defense elements will be operated by the 

services or the Missile Defense Agency. 

Acknowledging that hostile states are investing resources to develop 

ballistic missiles that could be used against the United States and its 

friends and allies, the President directed in 2002 that this initial set of 

capabilities be available to the warfighter on an emergency or contingency 

basis as the system’s development continues. To expedite development, 

the Secretary of Defense exempted ballistic missile defense development 

 1

 DOD’s 2001 Nuclear Posture Review was required by the Floyd D. Spence National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (Pub.L. No. 106-398, § 1041. (2000)), which 

directed the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of Energy, to “conduct 

a comprehensive review of the nuclear posture of the United States for the next 5 to 10

years.” The result of this review was DOD’s proposal for the New Triad, which significantly 

expanded the range of strategic capabilities. 

Page 1 GAO-06-473 Ballistic Missile Defense
from the traditional requirements guidance.2

 DOD refers to this initial 

capability as limited defensive operations, with the development and 

fielding of additional capabilities planned in 2-year blocks. 

In an era of increased fiscal challenges, DOD and Congress face difficult 

decisions concerning how to allocate available defense resources to 

provide for the range of capabilities needed to meet 21st century threats. 

The ballistic missile defense mission involves a substantial investment 

prior to achieving operational status as well as significant ongoing costs to

operate and sustain this capability. Complete information on planned 

defense spending for the ballistic missile defense system can assist 

decision makers in making choices among the competing demands for 

DOD’s resources. The Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), a 

centralized report to Congress consisting of the budget year and the 4 

succeeding years, is one of the principal tools used to inform DOD senior 

leaders and Congress about resources planned to support various 

programs, and reflects DOD decisions in allocating federal resources. 

You asked us to assess the extent to which (1) DOD has made progress in 

planning to operate the ballistic missile defense system (BMDS), and (2) 

the FYDP provides complete and transparent data on ballistic missile 

defense operational costs. During this review, we focused on the 

warfighter’s preparations to operate the ballistic missile defense system. 

Specifically, to assess DOD’s planning to operate the ballistic missile 

defense system, we compared the planning DOD had completed for 

operating BMDS with plans and actions that DOD generally performs for 

new weapon systems and discussed the results of our comparison with 

DOD officials. In this report, our discussion of declaring BMDS 

operational refers to both limited defensive operations and subsequent 

blocks of capability. To assess the extent to which the FYDP provides 

complete and transparent data for ballistic missile defense operational 

costs, we assessed the FYDP structure to determine if it could be used to 

identify program elements related to BMDS operations. We also 

corroborated our methodology and data with agency officials and 

determined the data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes. We 

conducted our work between January 2005 and February 2006 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. See 

appendix I for a more complete description of our scope and 

methodology. 

 2

 Secretary of Defense Memorandum re: Missile Defense Program Direction (Jan. 2, 2002). 

Page 2 GAO-06-473 Ballistic Missile Defense
This report is one in a series of reports that we have issued on ballistic 

missile defense (see the list of related GAO products at the end of this 

report). During this review, we did not evaluate DOD’s testing plans, 

research and development programs, or the technical effectiveness of 

individual elements. Rather, we focused on assessing issues DOD faces in 

planning to operate BMDS such as operational criteria, training, security, 

and cost transparency. However, we have issued two reports on the status 

of BMDS that included assessments of program goals, testing plans, and 

progress in developing each element.3

 Our March 2005 report found that 

system performance remains uncertain and unverified because DOD has 

not successfully conducted an end-to-end flight test using operationally 

representative hardware and software. We also reported in September 

2005 on DOD’s criteria for transferring missile defense elements to the 

services and the need to ensure operational costs are included in future 

budgets.4

DOD has made progress in planning to operate BMDS; however, it has not

established operational criteria or fully completed training, security, and 

personnel plans. As part of the planning that has been completed, DOD 

has developed procedures for operating the ground-based element to 

defend the United States against attacks from incoming ballistic missiles 

and the U.S. Strategic Command has established a subcommand focused 

on supporting ballistic missile defense operations. However, DOD has not 

established formal criteria for what needs to be accomplished before 

declaring that limited defensive operations or subsequent blocks of 

capability are operational. Moreover, issues involving responsibility for 

funding and providing security remain unresolved and training and 

personnel plans are still evolving. DOD officials agree that operational 

criteria are typically established prior to declaring weapon systems 

operational and that actions such as identifying personnel requirements, 

developing training programs, and establishing unit readiness reporting 

are generally part of these criteria in addition to completion of successful 

system testing. However, DOD has not developed operational criteria or 

Results in Brief 

 3

 GAO, Missile Defense: Actions Are Needed to Enhance Testing and Accountability, 

GAO-04-409 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 23, 2004); GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Status of 

Ballistic Missile Defense Program in 2004, GAO-05-243 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2005). 

4

 GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Actions needed to Ensure Adequate Funding for Operation 

and Sustainment of the Ballistic Missile Defense System, GAO-05-817 (Washington, D.C.: 

Sept. 6, 2005). 

Page 3 GAO-06-473 Ballistic Missile Defense
fully completed planning for BMDS because its development has been 

unique in several aspects, including the pace of the system’s development 

and the Secretary of Defense’s decision to exempt it from some DOD 

requirements guidance. Without operational criteria, it may be difficult for 

the Secretary of Defense to objectively assess combatant commands’ and 

services’ preparations to conduct BMDS operations, and the Secretary may 

not have a transparent basis for declaring BMDS operational, which will 

become more important as capabilities are added in subsequent blocks 

and Congress considers requests to fund operations. Without adequate 

planning, clear criteria, and identification of responsibility for ensuring 

necessary actions have been completed, it may be difficult for DOD to 

identify and prioritize actions, assure itself or Congress that the necessary 

pieces are in place before declaring the system operational, and determine 

whether the return on its significant development investment in BMDS can 

be realized. We are recommending that DOD develop operational criteria, 

comparable to those developed for new weapon systems, assign 

responsibility to specific organizations and hold them accountable for 

developing the criteria and ensuring they are met, and develop a 

comprehensive plan specifying actions that must be completed before 

declaring the system operational for either limited defensive operations or 

subsequent blocks of capability. 

The FYDP does not provide complete and transparent data on ballistic 

missile defense operational costs. We and DOD have repeatedly 

recognized the need to link resources to capabilities to facilitate DOD’s 

decision making and congressional oversight. For example, we previously 

recommended that DOD should identify New Triad costs, and ballistic 

missile defense is an important part of the New Triad. However, complete

and transparent ballistic missile defense operational costs are not visible 

in DOD’s FYDP because the FYDP’s structure does not provide a way to 

identify and aggregate these costs, even though DOD plans to field an 

increasing number of elements (such as sensors, missiles, launchers, 

ships, and command and control nodes) between 2006 and 2011. There is a 

mechanism in the FYDP, called defense mission categories, that has been

used to identify costs for certain missions, but this mechanism does not 

provide a way to effectively identify operational costs for the ballistic 

missile defense system. DOD Comptroller and Program Analysis and 

Evaluation officials agreed that ballistic missile defense operational cost 

data are not visible in the FYDP; instead, they have to rely on special data

requests to the services and the Missile Defense Agency which may not be 

answered using a consistent methodology. These officials agreed, 

however, that being able to collect and analyze these data would enable

DOD to analyze trends over time as more elements are added to the 

Page 4 GAO-06-473 Ballistic Missile Defense
system and begin operating. Four primary factors impair the visibility and 

transparency of ballistic missile defense operational costs in the current 

FYDP structure. First, operational costs are contained in many program 

elements throughout the FYDP and there is no mechanism to link and 

compile these costs. Second, the Missile Defense Agency is funding some 

operational costs with research and development funds, as authorized by 

statute.5

 Third, DOD has not included all known ballistic missile defense 

costs in its budget.6

 Fourth, DOD has not yet identified all costs associated 

with the New Triad, of which the ballistic missile defense system is an 

important part. Without the ability to identify and assess total ballistic 

missile defense operational costs, neither DOD nor Congress has complete 

information to make funding and trade-off decisions among competing 

priorities; provide assurance that DOD’s plans to field ballistic missile 

defense capabilities are affordable over time; and assess the costs of 

operating the New Triad. We are recommending that DOD develop a 

structure within the FYDP to identify all ballistic missile defense 

operational costs. 

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred or partially 

concurred with our recommendations. However, DOD did not state 

whether it plans to take any corrective actions in response to our 

recommendations, and for this reason, we have added a Matter for 

Congress to consider directing the Secretary of Defense to develop a 

comprehensive plan which includes operational criteria and to develop a

structure within the FYDP to identify all ballistic missile defense 

operational costs. We continue to believe that the specific actions we 

recommended are needed to prepare for conducting BMDS operations and 

assist in DOD and congressional oversight of ballistic missile defense 

operational costs. The department’s comments and our evaluation of them

begins on page 37. 

In response to the growing threat of weapons of mass destruction, in 

December 2002 President Bush signed National Security Presidential 

Directive 23, which stated an initial ballistic missile defense capability to 

Background 

 5

 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Pub.L.No. 108-375, § 231 (2004); 

and National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub.L.No. 109-163, § 233. 

6

 GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Actions Needed to Ensure Adequate Funding for Operation

and Sustainment of the Ballistic Missile Defense System, GAO-05-817 (Washington, D.C.: 

Sept. 6, 2005). 

Page 5 GAO-06-473 Ballistic Missile Defense
defend the United States and deployed forces should be deployed in 2004. 

Also in 2002, the Secretary of Defense created the Missile Defense Agency 

to develop an integrated system that would have the ability to intercept 

incoming missiles in all phases of their flight. The Secretary of Defense’s 

goals for the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) included using 

prototypes and test assets to provide an early capability and enable the 

services to field elements of the system as soon as possible. In order to 

develop a system that can more readily respond to a changing threat and 

be more easily modified to enhance system performance using new 

technologies, the Secretary of Defense exempted the Missile Defense 

Agency from the traditional requirements processes. 

BMDS Capabilities and 

Elements 

Ballistic missile defense is a challenging mission for DOD, simultaneously 

involving multiple combatant commands and services employing complex 

capabilities that require the development of many elements. Figure 1 

shows how a notional scenario to engage an incoming ballistic missile, 

including the commands and services involved, could unfold.

Page 6 GAO-06-473 Ballistic Missile Defense
Figure 1: Notional Ballistic Missile Defense Engagement 

2

Overhead satellites detect a missile launch and notify appropriate commands of a possible attack. (U.S. Strategic Command) 

The battle management element receives alert of a possible launch. Land- and sea-based sensors are directed to search for the incoming missile and 

identify the warhead. (U.S. Pacific Command, U.S. Northern Command, Navy, Air Force, U.S. Strategic Command)

Aegis ship uses its radar to detect and track the incoming missile. (Navy and U.S. Pacific Command). The tracking data are transmitted to the groundbased element.

Based on this tracking data, an interceptor, consisting of a “kill vehicle” mounted atop a booster, is launched. (U.S. Northern Command, Army, U.S. 

Strategic Command)

A ground-based radar tracks the incoming missile out of boost phase. (Air Force)

A ground-based radar provides course corrections for the interceptor and releases the “kill vehicle”. (Air Force, Army)

The interceptor’s “kill vehicle” moves towards the incoming missile based on coordinates provided from the battle management element and its on-board 

sensors.

The inteceptor’s “kill vehicle” intercepts and destroys the incoming missile.

1

5

6

7

8

4

3

Source: GAO compilation of DOD information, clipart by Art Explosion, and images by GAO.

Refinement of 

Target Track

8

5

Page 7 GAO-06-473 Ballistic Missile Defense
BMDS is eventually intended to be capable of defeating ballistic missiles 

during all three phases of a missile’s flight.7

 However, the initial capability 

is intended to have the capability to intercept missiles in the midcourse 

and terminal phases. BMDS requires a unique combination of elements—

space-based sensors, surveillance and tracking radars, advanced 

interceptors, command and control, and reliable communications—

working together as an integrated system.8

 Table 1 below explains the role 

of the BMDS elements that DOD plans to be available to the warfighter 

between fiscal years 2006-11. 

 7

 The boost phase is from launch until the missile stops accelerating under its own power,

and typically lasts 3-5 minutes for intercontinental ballistic missiles. The midcourse phase, 

lasting for about 20 minutes, begins after the missile has stopped accelerating and the 

warhead travels through space on a predictable path. The final or terminal phase begins 

when the warhead reenters the atmosphere and lasts approximately a minute or less. 

8

 In viewing the parts of BMDS from a technical and engineering viewpoint, the Missile 

Defense Agency has identified certain parts as “elements”. However, in discussing 

warfighters’ operating BMDS and lead service roles, the Joint Staff refers to the following 

as BMDS elements: the space-based sensor; early warning radars; Aegis Ballistic Missile 

Defense; C2BMC; Ground-based Midcourse Defense; Terminal High Altitude Area Defense;

the forward-based radar; and the sea-based radar. We continue this practice throughout

this report. 

Page 8 GAO-06-473 Ballistic Missile Defense
Table 1: Ballistic Missile Defense Elements and Their Roles 

Element Missile defense role 

Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense is a ship-based capability designed to destroy short- and 

medium-range ballistic missiles during the midcourse phase of flight. Its mission is two-fold: 

to protect deployed U.S. forces, allies, and friends against ballistic missile attacks, and to 

serve as a forward-deployed BMDS sensor, especially in support of the ground-based 

mission. The Missile Defense Agency plans to deliver up to 81 Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense 

missiles—the Standard Missile 3—and 18 ships by the end of fiscal year 2011. 

Sensors Sensors include Upgraded Early Warning Radars to provide updated midcourse missile 

tracking data to the ground-based element. The Space Tracking and Surveillance System is 

a space-based sensor to identify and track ballistic missiles from boost phase through 

reentry. 

Command, Control, Battle 

Management, and Communications 

(C2BMC) 

C2BMC is the integrating and controlling element of the BMDS. Although it was part of the 

Block 2004 defensive capability, its role during this period was limited to mission planning 

and situational awareness—monitoring system status and missile trajectories. 

Ground-based Midcourse Defense This ground-based element is designed to destroy ballistic missiles during the midcourse

phase of flight. Its mission is to protect the U.S. homeland against ballistic missile attacks 

from Northeast Asia and the Middle East. The Missile Defense Agency plans to field up to 48

interceptors by the end of 2011. 

PATRIOT Advanced Capability-3 The Patriot is a hit-to-kill interceptor that uses active seeker radar and guidance to hit and 

destroy targets. The Patriot element defends against short- and medium-range ballistic 

missiles, protecting advance forces, strategic assets, and population centers against tactical 

ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and hostile aircraft. The Missile Defense Agency plans to

field 862 Patriot PAC-3 missiles by the end of 2011. 

Terminal High Altitude Area Defense The Terminal High Altitude Area Defense is a ground-based element designed to destroy

short- and medium-range ballistic missiles during the late-midcourse and terminal phases of 

flight. Its mission is to defend deployed U.S. forces and population centers. The Missile 

Defense Agency plans to field two units consisting of 24 missiles each, the first one in 2009 

and the second one by December 2011. 

X-Band Radars X-band Radars are capable of searching, detecting, and tracking missiles, as well as picking 

out warheads from decoys. After an interception of an incoming missile, the radar can provide 

an assessment of success. The Missile Defense Agency will field two types of X-band radars. 

First, the Sea-Based X-Band Radar (built upon a movable sea platform), will improve the 

ability to acquire, track, and discriminate decoys during the midcourse phase of flight. The 

single sea-based radar is expected to be on station in 2006. Second, the Forward-Based XBand Radar is a transportable, land-based radar system that would be placed in strategic 

areas overseas in order to provide additional advance warning of ballistic missile launches. 

The first of four radars is expected to be fielded in 2006. 

Source: GAO summary of DOD information.

BMDS Development and 

Force Structure 

In developing BMDS, the Missile Defense Agency is using an incremental 

development and acquisition process to field militarily useful capabilities 

as they become available. Under this process, the Missile Defense Agency 

will develop ballistic missile defense elements and then transition 

elements to the military services for operation after approval by DOD 

senior leadership. In preparing for each element’s transition, the Missile 

Page 9 GAO-06-473 Ballistic Missile Defense
Defense Agency is expected to collaborate with the services to develop

agreements explaining each organization’s responsibilities, including 

which organization will pay for operational costs. Most of these transition 

plans are currently being drafted. The only BMDS element that has 

transferred to a service is the Patriot, which was transferred to the Army 

in 2003. 

The Missile Defense Agency plans to develop and field capabilities in 2-

year blocks. The configuration of a given block is intended to build on the 

work completed in previous blocks. Block 2004, which was scheduled to 

be deployed during calendar years 2004-2005, is the first biennial 

increment of BMDS that is intended to provide an integrated set of 

capabilities. Table 2 below shows, for each block of capability, the 

cumulative total number of each element that the Missile Defense Agency 

plans to deliver. The capabilities in bolded text show cumulative totals and 

show new or additional capabilities from the previous block. 

Page 10 GAO-06-473 Ballistic Missile Defense
Table 2: Missile Defense Agency’s Planned Delivery of Ballistic Missile Defense Elements by Block 

December 2005 December 2007 December 2009 December 2011

Fixed Site 

Interceptors 

• 8 Ground-Based 

Interceptors, Alaska 

• 2 Ground-Based 

Interceptors, California 

• Up to 20 Ground-Based 

Interceptors, Alaska 

• 2 Ground-Based 

Interceptors, California 

• Up to 36 Ground-Based 

Interceptors, Alaska 

• 2 Ground-Based 

Interceptors, California 

• 36 Ground-Based 

Interceptors, Alaska 

• 2 Ground-Based

Interceptors, California 

• 10 Ground-Based 

Interceptors, Europe

Fixed Site 

Sensors 

• Cobra Dane Radar, Alaska 

• 2 Upgraded Early Warning 

Radars (1 expected to be 

integrated into the system

in 2006) 

• Cobra Dane Radar, Alaska 

• 2 Upgraded Early Warning

Radars

• Cobra Dane Radar, Alaska 

• 3 Upgraded Early Warning

Radars

• Cobra Dane Radar, 

Alaska 

• 3 Upgraded Early Warning 

Radars 

• Clear Radar, Alaska

Mobile/ 

Transportable 

Sensors 

• 1 Sea-Based X-Band 

Radar, Alaska (expected to 

be integrated into the 

system in 2006). 

• 1 Forward-Based X-Band 

Radar (expected to be 

integrated into the system

in 2006). 

• 10 Aegis Search & Track 

Destroyers 

• 1 Sea-Based X-Band 

Radar, Alaska 

• 2 Forward-Based X-Band 

Radars 

• 7 Aegis Search & Track 

Destroyers 

• 1 Sea-Based X-Band 

Radar, Alaska 

• 3 Forward-Based X-Band 

Radars 

• 1 Discrimination X-Band 

Radar 

• Initial Space Tracking and 

Surveillance Satellites

• 1 Sea-Based X-Band 

Radar, Alaska 

• 4 Forward-Based XBand Radars

• 2 Discrimination X-Band 

Radars

Mobile 

Interceptors 

• 2 Aegis Engagement 

Cruisers 

• 9 Standard Missile-3s 

• 313 Patriot PAC-3 missiles 

• 3 Aegis Engagement

Cruisers 

• 7 Aegis Engagement

Destroyers 

• 24 Standard Missile-3s 

• 534 Patriot PAC-3 

missiles 

• 3 Aegis Engagement 

Cruisers 

• 15 Aegis Engagement

Destroyers

• 54 Standard Missile-3s 

• 24 Terminal High Altitude 

Area Defense Missiles 

• 734 Patriot PAC-3 

missiles

• 3 Aegis Engagement 

Cruisers 

• 15 Aegis Engagement 

Destroyers 

• 81 Standard Missile-3s

• 48 Terminal High

Altitude Area Defense 

Missiles 

• 862 Patriot PAC-3 

missiles 

Command and 

Control, Battle 

Management, and 

Communication

(C2BMC) 

• C2BMC Suites at U.S. 

Strategic Command, U.S. 

Northern Command, U.S. 

Pacific Command, and the 

Joint National Integration 

Center 

• C2BMC Suites at U.S. 

Central Command, U.S. 

European Command, 

other locations to be

determined

• Upgraded C2BMC Suites

at U.S. Strategic

Command, U.S. Pacific 

Command, U. S. Northern 

Command (Incorporate 

new situational 

awareness)

• 2 C2BMC Suites at 

locations to be 

determined

• Upgraded C2BMC Suites

at U.S. Central Command, 

U.S. European Command, 

and other locations to be 

determined (incorporate 

new situational 

awareness)

• C2BMC Suites at 2 

locations to be 

determined

• Upgraded C2BMC Suites

at 3 locations to be 

determined

Source: GAO summary of DOD information. 

Note: Aegis Engagement cruisers and destroyers can perform the search and track function as well 

as fire standard missiles at incoming targets. 

Page 11 GAO-06-473 Ballistic Missile Defense
DOD’s framework for BMDS ground and flight testing through block 2006 

(December 2007) is established in the Integrated Master Test Plan. This 

plan defines the test plans for the BMDS and its elements and identifies 

test objectives. In 2006, the Missile Defense Agency plans to conduct 10 

flight tests—3 for the Aegis ballistic missile defense element, 4 for the 

Terminal High Altitude Area Defense element, and 3 for the Ground-based 

Midcourse Defense element. We reported last year that the Missile 

Defense Agency has conducted a variety of tests that provide some degree

of confidence that the limited defensive operations will operate as 

intended. However, we also pointed out that some elements have not been 

fully tested and that performance of the system remains uncertain because

the Missile Defense Agency has not conducted an end-to-end flight test 

using operationally representative hardware and software.9

 In addition, 

DOD’s fiscal year 2005 annual test report states that “...there is insufficient 

evidence to support a confident assessment of Limited Defensive 

Operations...” 

Whereas the Missile Defense Agency is the developer of BMDS, the U.S. 

Strategic Command is responsible for coordinating ballistic missile 

defense operations that will be conducted by multiple commands, such as 

U.S. Northern Command and U.S. Pacific Command. Strategic Command 

developed an overall strategic concept of operations for ballistic missile 

defense in November 2003 that explains how all aspects of the system are 

to be integrated. Strategic Command is also tasked with directing, 

coordinating, and reporting Military Utility Assessments of the ballistic 

missile defense system. Military Utility Assessments are iterative, eventdriven assessments that document the combatant commanders’ views on 

the expected military utility of the system. These assessments are intended 

to independently examine the degree to which delivered capabilities 

support the warfighter’s ability to execute the missile defense mission, 

record all data and results from flight tests, ground tests, and 

wargame/exercises, and focus on the overall ballistic missile defense 

system rather than the individual elements. As of January 2006, one 

assessment had been completed (April 2005) and the scope was limited 

due to the system’s immaturity at that time. 

 9

 GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Status of Ballistic Missile Defense Program in 2004, 

GAO-05-243 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2005). 

Page 12 GAO-06-473 Ballistic Missile Defense
Operations and support costs (hereafter called operational costs) are the 

resources required to operate and support a weapon system and include 

maintenance of equipment/infrastructure, operations of forces, training 

and readiness, base operations, personnel, and logistics. Operational costs 

for weapons systems typically account for 72 percent of a weapon 

system’s total life-cycle cost and can generally be found in the Future 

Years Defense Program (FYDP). The FYDP is a DOD centralized report 

consisting of thousands of program elements10 that provides information 

on DOD’s current and planned budget requests. It is one of DOD’s 

principal tools to manage the spending for its capabilities and is available 

to help inform DOD and Congress about spending plans for the next 5 

years and to make resource decisions in light of competing priorities. The 

FYDP is a report that resides in an automated database, which is updated

and published to coincide with DOD’s annual budget submission to 

Congress. It provides projections of DOD’s near and midterm funding 

needs and reflects the total resources programmed by DOD, by fiscal year. 

DOD has made progress in planning to operate BMDS, but aside from 

testing issues we have previously reported on, planning is incomplete in 

that it lacks several critical elements such as establishing operational 

criteria, resolving security issues, and completing training plans. DOD has 

developed procedures and guidance, created an organization to integrate

contingency plans, and planned and conducted some training and 

exercises. However, this planning lacks critical elements such as 

development of operational criteria, resolution of security issues, 

completion of training plans, and approval of dual status for the 

commanders of the National Guard units responsible for operating the 

ground-based element. DOD’s operational planning is incomplete because 

it is developing BMDS in a unique way and exempted BMDS from the 

department’s traditional requirements guidance. DOD officials agreed that 

planning for new weapon systems generally includes critical planning 

elements such as development of training plans, assessment of military 

specialties, identifying support requirements, and successful operational 

testing. U.S. Strategic Command officials agreed that this level of detailed 

planning is necessary but has not been done because BMDS is being 

developed in a nontraditional way, and further stated that warfighters are 

Weapon System 

Operational Costs 

DOD Has Made 

Progress in Planning 

to Operate BDMS but 

Planning Is 

Incomplete 

 10 Program elements are the primary data elements in the FYDP that represent 

organizational entities, their related resources, and descriptions of various DOD missions. 

Program elements may be aggregated in different ways, such as to show total resources

assigned to a specific program or to identify selected functional groupings of resources. 

Page 13 GAO-06-473 Ballistic Missile Defense
ready to use the system on an emergency basis. However, without a 

comprehensive plan establishing what needs to be accomplished before 

declaring BMDS operational and assigning responsibility for doing such 

planning, the Secretary of Defense may not have a transparent basis for 

declaring BMDS operational, which will become more important as 

capabilities are added in subsequent blocks and Congress considers 

requests to fund operations. Moreover, it may be difficult for DOD to 

identify and prioritize actions and determine whether the return on its 

significant development investment can be realized. 

DOD Has Made Progress in 

Planning to Operate the 

Ballistic Missile Defense 

System 

DOD has taken positive steps in planning to operate the BMDS. For 

example, some operating plans and guidance are either in development or 

in place. In addition, the U.S. Strategic Command has created a 

subcommand, the Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated 

Missile Defense, to integrate planning and operational support for missile 

defense.11 The Missile Defense Agency and the combatant commands have 

also been actively planning and conducting training and exercises. 

DOD has developed some operational plans, established guidance, and 

conducted capability demonstrations to refine operating procedures. In 

2003, the U.S. Strategic Command was assigned responsibility for 

planning, integrating, and coordinating global missile defense operations 

including developing a concept of operations. Since then, U.S. Strategic 

Command has coordinated development of plans and orders that explain

how the ballistic missile defense mission will be conducted, including 

command relationships, who authorizes missile launches, and other 

policies. For example, some combatant commands have developed plans 

that specify how they will defend against incoming ballistic missiles and 

how they will support other combatant commands in doing so. DOD has 

also developed tactics, techniques, and procedures for how the ballistic 

missile defense mission would be conducted. Strategic Command’s 

subcommand for missile defense is working with the combatant 

commands to ensure these plans are integrated. The services have also 

published service doctrine and DOD is currently developing joint doctrine 

that will explain concepts for planning, coordinating, and conducting the 

Some Operational Planning Has 

Taken Place 

 11 U.S. Strategic Command established several subcommands, each responsible for a 

specific mission area. In this report, the term subcommand refers specifically to the Joint 

Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense. 

Page 14 GAO-06-473 Ballistic Missile Defense
ballistic missile defense mission. The doctrine will be revised as BMDS 

capabilities increase and as procedures for conducting the mission evolve. 

In addition to developing plans, DOD has established some policy 

guidance clarifying command and control for the ballistic missile defense 

mission. The Joint Staff has issued several orders providing guidance for 

ballistic missile defense mission planning which reflect policy decisions 

made by senior DOD leadership. For example, orders issued in fall 2005 

resolved policy issues regarding weapons release authority, defined 

various system readiness conditions and defense priorities, and explained 

the rules of engagement and the relationships between combatant 

commands.

Since the fall of 2004, DOD has been in a transitional period (called 

“shakedown”) to move from development to operations. As part of this 

process, the Missile Defense Agency, in conjunction with operational 

commanders and contractors, has completed 11 capability demonstrations

and U.S. Strategic Command’s subcommand for missile defense is 

planning the twelfth for March 2006. The capability demonstrations are 

being conducted to practice and refine procedures for transitioning BMDS 

from a developmental configuration to an operational configuration and 

maintain the system in the operational configuration for a specific time 

period. The purpose behind these demonstrations is to reduce operational 

risks by demonstrating capabilities prior to combat use, using trained 

military personnel to exercise procedures in an operational environment. 

According to officials, there is no plan to conduct a specific number of 

these capability demonstrations; rather, they will be conducted as needed.

In addition, U.S. Strategic Command officials said that the subcommand 

for missile defense will conduct readiness exercises to practice and refine 

warfighter tactics and procedures. 

Because U.S. Strategic Command has several other broad missions in 

addition to missile defense, it created a subcommand to integrate planning 

and operational support for ballistic missile defense. This subcommand, 

called the Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile 

Defense, was created in early 2005 for the purpose of integrating and 

globally synchronizing missile defense plans to meet strategic objectives. 

This subcommand is drafting a global concept of operations for ballistic 

missile defense and is working with other combatant commands to 

integrate their ballistic missile defense operating plans. The subcommand 

is also operating the BMDS asset management process, which is a tool for 

scheduling and tracking the status of each ballistic missile defense 

element. This process uses a real-time database that shows when each 

U.S. Strategic Command 

Created a Subcommand to Plan 

and Integrate Ballistic Missile 

Defense Operations 

Page 15 GAO-06-473 Ballistic Missile Defense
BMDS element is being used for testing, exercises, maintenance, 

development, or operations. The asset management process schedules 

activities for the coming fiscal year and is updated throughout the year. 

The Missile Defense Agency and combatant commands have planned and

conducted some training and exercises for ballistic missile defense to 

practice and refine command and control, tactics, procedures, and firing

doctrine specified in the contingency and supporting plans. The Missile 

Defense Agency works with the combatant commands to incorporate 

ballistic missile defense training into each other’s exercises. For example, 

the combatant commands will include training on their mission-essential 

tasks during the Missile Defense Agency’s exercise and wargame program, 

and the Missile Defense Agency will try to incorporate ballistic missile 

defense training into the exercises scheduled by the combatant 

commands. For example, U.S. Strategic Command integrated ballistic 

missile defense with all of its other missions in its fall 2005 command 

exercise and will include ballistic missile defense to a limited extent in the 

command’s upcoming spring exercise for the first time. 

Missile Defense Agency and 

Combatant Commands Have 

Planned and Conducted Some 

Training and Exercises 

The Missile Defense Agency also provides some ballistic missile defense 

training programs and course development for individuals, units, and 

combatant command staffs. The Missile Defense Agency provides initial 

operator training on specific elements and the crews are subsequently

certified by their unit commanders. The agency also provides training to 

combatant command staffs on BMDS policy and procedures and command 

and control. For example, during an exercise we observed at the training 

center in Colorado, the Northern Command staff, Army crews from the 

battalion in Alaska, and Navy crews from the Aegis training center in 

Virginia were linked electronically. In the future, this type of training will 

be enhanced via the Distributed Multi-echelon Training System, which will 

enable warfighters to participate in live, virtual, and integrated training 

from their duty station. The Missile Defense Agency also cochairs the 

Integrated Training Working Group with U.S. Strategic Command to 

address training and education goals, objectives, roles, missions, and 

policy decisions among the combatant commands and services. 

Some Aspects of Planning 

to Operate the Ballistic 

Missile Defense System 

Are Incomplete 

Despite the progress made since 2002, DOD’s planning to operate BMDS is

incomplete and lacks several critical elements. DOD officials agreed that 

planning for new weapon systems articulated in requirements guidance 

generally includes critical planning elements such as establishing 

operational criteria, identifying personnel requirements, developing 

training programs, completing successful testing, and establishing 

Page 16 GAO-06-473 Ballistic Missile Defense
readiness reporting. However, DOD’s BMDS planning is missing several of 

these critical elements, such as specific operational criteria for the overall 

BMDS and most of the system’s elements that must be met before 

declaring that either limited defensive operations or subsequent blocks of 

capability are operational. Furthermore, security issues involving 

responsibility for and funding of necessary security remain unresolved and 

training plans are still evolving. In addition, DOD has not approved dual 

status for the commanders of the National Guard units responsible for 

operating the ground-based element. U.S. Strategic Command officials 

agreed that this level of detailed planning is necessary but has not been 

done because BMDS is being developed in a nontraditional way and 

further stated that warfighters are ready to use the system. However, 

without comprehensive planning laying out steps that need to be 

completed before declaring the system operational, development of 

operational criteria, and assigning responsibility for doing such planning,

DOD may face uncertainty about the basis that will be used to declare 

BMDS operational. This, in turn, may make it difficult for DOD to identify 

and prioritize actions needed to achieve this end effectively and efficiently. 

Moreover, the Secretary of Defense and Congress may not have a sound 

basis for assessing the system’s status and progress toward an operational 

capability. 

Prior to initially employing a new weapon system, DOD customarily 

prepares planning documents that identify actions that must be taken and 

criteria that must be met before the system can be declared operational. 

DOD officials agree that requirements guidance states that these planning 

documents identify any changes needed to doctrine, organizations, 

training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities. Our 

prior work on successful management of complex defense programs 

shows that such planning provides a basis for knowing what steps need to

be completed before a weapon system can be declared operational. 

Planning for New Weapon 

Systems Generally Includes 

Identifying Specific Actions and

Criteria 

As part of the planning for new weapon systems, DOD guidance, as well as 

DOD practices based on discussions with defense officials, requires initial 

operating capability criteria (hereafter called operational criteria) to be 

met to ensure that necessary planning has been completed to initially 

employ a new weapon system. These operational criteria12 include critical

elements such as: 

 12 These criteria are generally contained in specific documents required by DOD’s

traditional requirements and acquisition processes. 

Page 17 GAO-06-473 Ballistic Missile Defense
• an assessment of the military specialties needed; 

• identification of personnel requirements; 

• development of individual, unit, and joint training programs; 

• system supportability, including identifying logistics and maintenance 

requirements; 

• successful operational testing; and 

• the ability to report system and unit readiness. 

If the new system is a part of a system of systems, then these operational 

criteria are to be integrated with those of the related system elements. 

DOD officials told us that these operational criteria also describe actions 

that the services typically take to prepare to operate a new system. 

Likewise, the services have developed instructions that embody these 

principles for new systems. For example, an Air Force instruction states 

that an initial operating capability can be declared for a system when it has 

successfully completed operational testing, key logistics support is in 

place, and the personnel necessary to operate, maintain, and support the 

system are trained. This instruction further states that the following items 

should be met before declaring that operational capability has been 

achieved: concept of operations, system training plan, personnel plan, 

operational protection guide, logistics support plan, system security 

design, successful operational testing and completion of a successful trial

period, and the ability to report readiness at a certain level. Army and 

Navy regulations also specify operational criteria. For example, new Army 

weapon systems must have adequately trained operators who are 

equipped and supported to execute the mission before the system can be 

declared operational. Furthermore, a Navy instruction states that a logistic

support strategy, identification of personnel requirements, manpower 

estimates, and a plan for training shall be developed for new weapon 

systems. 

As of February 2006, according to DOD officials, DOD had not yet 

developed any overarching operational criteria to be met before declaring

the overall BMDS operational either for limited defensive operations or 

subsequent blocks of capability. Instead, officials stated that the Secretary 

of Defense will declare BMDS operational based on test results, 

confidence in the system, threat, and recommendations from the 

Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, the Commander of the 

subcommand for missile defense, commanders of other combatant 

commands, and the Director, Missile Defense Agency. Additionally, the 

Missile Defense Support Group, which was formed to advise senior DOD 

leaders on policy, operations, acquisition, and resources for BMDS, has 

DOD Has Not Developed 

Operational Criteria for the 

Overall BMDS 

Page 18 GAO-06-473 Ballistic Missile Defense
not defined any criteria with which to make recommendations about 

operational capability. DOD officials have told us that while operational 

criteria describe actions that services customarily take to prepare to 

operate a new system, these actions have not been taken for BMDS. Some 

DOD officials have suggested that DOD should not have to meet 

operational criteria due to the urgency of emplacing a ballistic missile 

capability as soon as possible. 

DOD has done some assessments in which warfighters raised issues in 

areas that the operational criteria are intended to address. For example, 

combatant commanders have raised concerns about security and 

personnel. Recognizing that there may be planning gaps, the Army Space 

and Missile Defense Command13 has begun to identify what actions need to 

be taken—such as security planning, force design analysis, personnel 

requirements, training sustainment program, and system training plan—for 

the warfighter to use the BMDS and some of the elements. The officials 

acknowledged that, ideally, a master plan should be developed to track 

these actions. However, even though the Army Space and Missile Defense 

Command’s preliminary analysis and the other DOD assessments may 

provide a foundation for developing operational criteria, the Command 

officials stated they are not responsible for doing so and have not been 

tasked with ensuring that the services do so when an element is 

transitioned to the service. 

In August 2005, the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command recognized that

as BMDS approached operational status, DOD needed to take necessary 

actions to put the ballistic missile defense elements in the hands of the 

warfighters that would address base operations, manning, force 

protection, and other aspects of military support. The Commander 

recommended a lead service be named for each BMDS element. This lead

service would be responsible for developing doctrine, training,

organizations, and personnel. This concept was briefed to the Joint Staff in 

November 2005 and in January 2006. The Joint Staff recommended that the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 

Logistics name a lead service for only two elements—Army was 

recommended to be lead service for the forward-based radar and the Air 

Force was recommended to be lead service for the ballistic missile 

 13 The Commander, Army Space and Missile Defense Command is also the Commander of 

the U.S. Strategic Command Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile 

Defense. Staff in both organizations are working together to identify actions that need to be

taken for the warfighter to use BMDS elements. 

Page 19 GAO-06-473 Ballistic Missile Defense
defense mission of the Cobra Dane radar. On February 11, 2006, the 

Deputy Secretary of Defense approved this recommendation. 

According to DOD officials, operational criteria also have not been 

developed for most BMDS elements. As shown in table 3, DOD has not 

developed any operational criteria for five of eight ballistic missile defense 

elements and criteria for two more are being drafted. 

Table 3: Status of Operational Criteria Development for Ballistic Missile Defense 

Elements 

DOD Has Not Developed 

Operational Criteria for Most 

Ballistic Missile Defense 

System Elements 

BMDS element 

Without 

operational 

criteria 

Operational criteria 

in development 

With 

operational 

criteria 

Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense X 

Command, Control, Battle 

Management, and Communications 

X

Forward-based X-Band Radar

Transportable 

X

Ground-based Midcourse Defense X 

Sea-based X-Band Radar X 

Terminal High Altitude Area Defense X 

Upgraded Early Warning Radars X 

Patriot Advanced Capability - 3 X

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

Note: Table includes only those elements expected to be fielded by 2011. 

DOD has developed and approved operational criteria for only one BMDS 

element, the Patriot PAC-3 Missile System. The Army developed 

operational criteria to ensure the Army was prepared to operate Patriot 

and specified these criteria in two capabilities documents (dated 

November 2000 and July 2003).14 These documents included criteria in 

areas such as support equipment, training and training support for system 

users, a logistics support concept and logistics standards, security, 

maintenance planning, and personnel. The Army determined these criteria

 14 The Missile Defense Agency was not involved in developing or approving these Army 

capabilities documents. 

Page 20 GAO-06-473 Ballistic Missile Defense
were met and declared operational capability15 was achieved in June 2004 

after the system transferred to the Army from the Missile Defense Agency 

in 2003. 

Although DOD is developing plans to transition some BMDS elements to 

the services,16 these plans, according to DOD officials, are not required to 

include operational criteria. However, the Air Force and the Army have 

elected to develop operational criteria for two BMDS elements as part of 

the transition plans. For example, Air Force Space Command officials 

stated they have drafted operational criteria for the Upgraded Early 

Warning Radar that include: 

• testing to demonstrate the radar meets required performance standards 

for existing missions and the ballistic missile defense mission; 

• training for operators, maintainers, and logistics support personnel; 

• a successful trial period to validate system performance; and

• adequate support capability and sufficient spare parts. 

The draft plan to transition the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense 

element to the Army is also supposed to include operational criteria such

as: 

• system training plan and identification of leader development courses; 

• system security requirements; 

• supportability strategy; 

• manpower estimate; and 

• development of a Capabilities Development Document which, according

to DOD guidance, typically includes operational criteria. 

DOD officials stated that operational criteria—such as the criteria in DOD 

guidance required to be met before initially employing a new weapon 

system—for some elements may not be developed. For example, 

operational criteria will probably not be developed for elements that either 

 15 The DOD dictionary defines initial operational capability as the first attainment of the 

capability to employ effectively a weapon, item of equipment, or system of approved 

specific characteristics, and which is manned and operated by an adequately trained, 

equipped, and supported military force or unit. 

16 As discussed in the Background section, the transfer plans are being negotiated between 

the Missile Defense Agency and one of the services for each BMDS element and will specify 

tasks and milestones, funding requirements, and identify how the service, combatant

commander, and the Missile Defense Agency will share responsibilities. 

Page 21 GAO-06-473 Ballistic Missile Defense
are not likely to transition from the Missile Defense Agency to a service or

are expected to be contractor operated, such as the sea-based radar and 

the forward-based radar.17 Moreover, the Navy has not developed 

operational criteria for the Aegis ballistic missile defense element. Navy 

officials stated that they would only develop operational criteria and 

establish a timeline for achieving an initial capability if the Navy decides to

buy ballistic missile defense capability for more ships than the Missile 

Defense Agency currently plans to buy. 

Although DOD has developed security policies specifically for BMDS, 

unresolved security issues remain and it is not clear when these issues will 

be resolved. Specifically, DOD has not resolved issues of who is 

responsible for security of BMDS elements and which organization is 

financially responsible for funding required security. In addition, DOD may 

have difficulty meeting security requirements at some locations because 

not all the funding has been allocated. Despite this situation, Joint Staff 

and combatant command officials stated that a decision to declare BMDS 

operational does not necessarily depend on resolving these issues. 

In July 2004, the Deputy Secretary of Defense designated the highest 

security level for BMDS when it is operational because damage to this 

system would harm the strategic capability of the United States.18 The 

Deputy Secretary also designated U.S. Strategic Command as the oversight 

authority responsible for coordinating security issues with other 

combatant commands, the services, and the Missile Defense Agency. This

was done, in part, to identify budget requirements. This policy was further 

clarified in a May 2005 memo stating that the Commander, U.S. Strategic 

Command has the authority to designate the security level for each BMDS 

element and is responsible for developing security standards, policies, and

procedures for BMDS. In October 2005, U.S. Strategic Command issued a 

directive specifying the standards for BMDS security and setting the 

security level for each BMDS element. 

Despite these directives, however, combatant commands have expressed 

concerns about which DOD commands are responsible for actually 

providing and paying for BMDS security, particularly for those elements 

that will be contractor operated and are expected to be available to the 

DOD Has Unresolved Security 

Issues 

 17 DOD plans to operate these elements using contractor personnel. 

18 According to U.S. Strategic Command officials, the command is not recommending 

protecting the BMDS sites to the same degree as nuclear sites. 

Page 22 GAO-06-473 Ballistic Missile Defense
warfighter in fiscal year 2006. According to U.S. Strategic Command 

officials, BMDS elements at the highest security level require, for example, 

two lines of defensive security, including sensor fences and sufficient 

personnel to achieve a specific response rate; integrated electronic 

security systems; entry control; and access delay and denial systems. 

These measures are expensive—the Missile Defense Agency estimated 

that security measures for three BMDS elements will cost about $350 

million over fiscal years 2006-2011.19 However, Office of the Secretary of 

Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Joint Staff, and other 

DOD officials said that service estimates of security requirements 

(personnel and costs) are generally higher and that some of these costs are 

not budgeted by either the services or the Missile Defense Agency. 

Furthermore, although U.S. Strategic Command has oversight 

responsibility and has conducted some security inspections, Command 

officials told us that ensuring security requirements are met will actually 

be done by a service or the combatant command where the element is 

located. 

As discussed above, the U.S. Strategic Command and the Joint Staff 

recommended that the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) for 

Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics assign a “lead service” for each 

BMDS element that would be responsible for providing security, ensuring

security standards are met, and budgeting for any associated costs in the 

next Future Years Defense Program (which will be for fiscal years 2008-

13). Although negotiations on this issue are ongoing, the Missile Defense 

Agency agreed in December 2005 to fund the sea-based radar and forwardbased radar costs for fiscal years 2006 and 2007, Air Force Cobra Dane 

radar costs for fiscal year 2007, and contractor logistic support through 

fiscal year 2013. However, DOD officials stated that there are significant 

disagreements between the services and the Missile Defense Agency over

the levels of support and force protection required. Further, the services 

and the Missile Defense Agency have not resolved disagreements over 

which organization will fund operational costs or which organization will 

provide and fund force protection beyond fiscal year 2007. It is not clear 

whether the recent designation of lead service for only two BMDS 

elements will help resolve these issues in time to be reflected in the 

development of the fiscal years 2008-13 Future Years Defense Program. 

 19 These three elements are the sea-based radar, the forward-based radar, and the Cobra 

Dane radar in Alaska. 

Page 23 GAO-06-473 Ballistic Missile Defense
Funding issues could prevent DOD from meeting security requirements at 

some locations before the system is declared operational. For example, 

both Vandenberg and Schreiver Air Force Bases require a combination of 

additional security personnel and technology improvements to meet 

security requirements. Although some personnel were recently added and 

the Air Force has requested funding for the technology improvements, as 

of February 8, 2006, not all the required personnel and technology were in

place. The Army also had to increase the military police unit to protect the 

missile fields at Fort Greely, Alaska, and the cost for snow removal is 

nearly a million dollars a year. Security will become increasingly important 

and costly as additional BMDS elements are placed in more locations, 

particularly those outside the continental United States (see table 2). For 

example, DOD is planning a third site for the ground-based element and is 

planning for four forward-based radars, and officials have noted that the 

estimated cost for protecting the forward-based radar could double for 

austere locations. 

Although DOD has made progress in developing some training, the training 

plans prepared by the combatant commands under the Joint Training 

System are evolving as are readiness assessments for BMDS. The Joint 

Training System20 is DOD’s authoritative process for combatant commands 

and others to develop training plans, conduct training, and assess 

proficiency. This system requires combatant commands to develop annual 

training plans based on the mission-essential tasks required to perform 

assigned missions. The Joint Training System also includes an automated,

Web-based system to track progress. The mission-essential tasks are also 

the basis for DOD readiness assessments such as the Defense Readiness 

Reporting System and the Joint Quarterly Readiness Review. 

DOD has not yet completed all the planning as part of the Joint Training 

System for ballistic missile defense. For example, the U.S. Strategic 

Command subcommand for missile defense is developing but has not yet 

completed an annual training plan and a list of mission-essential tasks 

under the Joint Training System. Although some combatant commands 

have individually drafted some mission-essential tasks for ballistic missile

defense, the subcommand’s efforts are intended to develop a list that will 

be standardized and integrated across combatant commands. Once 

developed, these mission-essential tasks need to be entered into the Joint

Combatant Commands’

Training Plans and Readiness 

Assessments for BMDS Are 

Evolving 

 20 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3500.01B, Joint Training Policy for the 

Armed Forces of the United States (Dec. 31, 1999). 

Page 24 GAO-06-473 Ballistic Missile Defense
Training System’s Web-based tracking system, which currently does not 

include ballistic missile defense tasks. 

The roles of organizations involved in ballistic mission defense training are 

evolving and DOD is still developing some important aspects of its training 

program. The Missile Defense Agency has done a lot of work to develop

BMDS element and command training as well as develop and conduct 

exercises for the combatant commands and services. However, the U.S. 

Strategic Command’s subcommand is beginning to assume more 

responsibilities for training, such as developing the annual training plan 

and mission-essential tasks. The two organizations are negotiating which 

organization will assume which training functions, but, as of November 

2005, according to DOD officials, no final decisions had been made. The 

subcommand, with a supporting working group, is working on several 

important aspects of ballistic missile defense training that are not yet 

complete even though additional elements, such as the forward-based 

radar and the sea-based radar, are expected to be made available to the 

warfighter in 2006. The subcommand and working group are also 

developing:

• an overarching training vision, 

• a global BMDS employment guide for how to “fight the system” with more 

elements than just the ground-based element, 

• a method to systematically integrate ballistic missile defense into the Joint 

Staff’s exercise program and crosswalk these exercises with the ballistic 

missile defense annual training plan, and 

• a training and certification program for nonservice-owned elements such 

as the sea-based radar and the forward-based radar. 

Development of a standardized list of joint mission-essential tasks will 

form the basis for DOD readiness assessments such as the Defense 

Readiness Reporting System and the Joint Quarterly Readiness Review.21

Joint Staff officials told us that in some of the recent quarterly reviews, 

U.S. Strategic Command submitted a subjective evaluation of ballistic 

missile defense as part of the review. However, the officials said that the

Joint Staff could not assess the Command’s input during the review 

 21 The Department of Defense Readiness Reporting System measures and reports on the

readiness of military forces to execute the National Military Strategy as assigned by the 

Secretary of Defense. This system is supported by the Joint Quarterly Readiness Review, a 

scenario-based assessment to identify capability shortfalls and risks in executing missions

assigned by the Secretary of Defense. 

Page 25 GAO-06-473 Ballistic Missile Defense
because there is not yet an approved, common list of mission tasks and the 

system has not been declared operational; thus, there was no “yardstick” 

for them to use to assess the readiness to conduct the ballistic missile 

defense mission. Regarding input into the Defense Readiness Reporting 

System, U.S. Strategic Command officials stated that inputs are usually 

based on the mission-essential tasks, which are assessed using objective 

effectiveness measures and some subjective commander’s judgment. 

However, since the mission-essential tasks are evolving and the combatant 

commands are just beginning to develop measures of effectiveness, the 

inputs into this system are currently limited and predominantly subjective. 

Although the Secretary of the Army recently approved the model for using 

National Guard units to operate the ground-based BMDS element, DOD 

has not approved dual status for the commanders of these units, according 

to DOD officials.22 The Army decided in 1999 to establish National Guard 

units to perform the ballistic missile defense mission. In 2003, the Army 

assigned National Guard soldiers to the Colorado Army National Guard 

100th Missile Defense Brigade and the Alaska Army National Guard 49th 

Missile Defense Battalion.23

The model for using these National Guard units and roles/responsibilities 

of all parties involved are specified in a memorandum of agreement 

between the Army’s Space and Missile Defense Command, National Guard 

Bureau, and the Colorado and Alaska State Adjutants General, which was 

signed in December 2005. The model states that once BMDS is declared

operational, the National Guard soldiers will serve in a federal status when 

performing ballistic missile defense mission duties, including controlling, 

operating, maintaining, securing, or defending the ground-based element 

or site. Otherwise, the soldiers will serve in a state status and be 

responsible for performing National Guard duties, such as organizing, 

administering, recruiting, instructing, or training reserve components. 

Until BMDS is declared operational, the National Guard soldiers are in a 

DOD Has Not Approved Dual 

Status for National Guard Unit 

Commanders 

 22 The ground-based element, known as Ground-based Midcourse Defense, consists of 

interceptors and a fire control system. The ground-based element relies on other sensors

and radars for tracking data. 

23 The brigade is an approved Army Multiple Component Unit with active Army and

Colorado National Guard soldiers, while the battalion is solely comprised of Alaska 

National Guard Soldiers. Soldiers performing the ballistic missile defense mission are on 

full-time National Guard duty through the Active Guard/Reserve program. When the 

proposed model is approved, the National Guard soldiers are expected to alternate 

between federal status (Title 10) and state status (Title 32). 

Page 26 GAO-06-473 Ballistic Missile Defense
state status all of the time.

24 The Secretary of the Army approved this 

model on March 3, 2006.

The model states that the commanders of these National Guard units will 

serve in a dual status—meaning they can command soldiers in either a 

federal or state status. According to an official in the Secretary of the 

Army’s office, the governors of Colorado and Alaska have signed the 

document authorizing dual status of the unit commanders. However, 

according to Army officials, either the Secretary of Defense or the 

President must sign approval for dual-status authority. As of March 3, 

2006, this had not been done. However, DOD officials stressed that these 

National Guard soldiers are trained and certified by their unit commanders 

and are thus prepared to operate the ground-based BMDS element 

whenever the system is declared operational. 

DOD’s incomplete planning to operate BMDS has created uncertainty 

about the basis that will be used to declare the system operational. DOD 

does not have a comprehensive plan laying out steps that need to be taken 

and criteria that should be met before declaring that either the limited 

defensive operations or subsequent system blocks are operational. DOD 

officials agreed that planning for new weapon systems articulated in 

requirements guidance generally includes critical planning elements such 

as development of operational criteria, a plan to adequately staff units, 

provide security, and complete training and personnel plans. However, no 

organization has been officially assigned responsibility for developing a 

comprehensive plan—to include operational criteria—specifying what 

needs to be accomplished before declaring that BMDS is operational 

either for limited defensive operations or subsequent blocks of capability. 

Although DOD has conducted some assessments that could be used to 

form the basis for developing operational criteria, no organization is 

clearly in charge of developing such criteria and ensuring they are met. 

Some DOD officials have suggested that the “lead service” could do this 

planning, but DOD has not clearly defined lead service responsibilities and 

has not fully implemented this proposal. 

Without comprehensive planning, the services and the combatant 

commands may not be as well prepared to operate the complex, integrated 

BMDS as they are for other new weapon systems for which DOD 

Incomplete Planning Creates 

Uncertainty About the Basis for 

Declaring the BMDS 

Operational 

 24 According to Army officials, these National Guard soldiers would be federalized if an 

emergency occurred before the manning model is approved.

Page 27 GAO-06-473 Ballistic Missile Defense
establishes criteria for achieving operational capability. Without 

operational criteria, it may be difficult for the Secretary of Defense to 

objectively assess combatant commands’ and services’ preparations to 

conduct BMDS operations, and the Secretary may not have a transparent 

basis for declaring BMDS operational, which will become more important 

as capabilities are added in subsequent blocks. Further, operational 

criteria are important because they specify actions that need to be 

completed for users to be prepared to use the system, such as security, 

training, and personnel. Without resolving the outstanding security issues, 

there is uncertainty about personnel requirements, and which organization 

will provide security for each element and pay the related costs. Without 

complete training plans, it is unknown how training for the integrated 

BMDS and some elements will be conducted, particularly the radars that 

will be fielded in 2006. Furthermore, it is not clear which mission-essential

tasks will be used in DOD readiness assessments. The absence of 

comprehensive planning to operate BMDS may result in uncertainty about

the basis that will be used to declare the system operational for limited 

defensive operation and subsequent blocks of capability. Thus, it may be 

difficult for DOD to identify and prioritize actions across the department 

needed to achieve this end effectively and efficiently and identify specific 

DOD organizations responsible and accountable for making this happen.

As a result, the Secretary of Defense and Congress may not have the 

information to assess the system’s status and progress toward an 

operational capability as they consider funding requests from DOD. 

The Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) does not provide complete and 

transparent ballistic missile defense operational costs for use by either 

DOD or Congress. The FYDP is a major source of budget information that 

reports projected spending for the current budget year and at least 4 

succeeding years.25 We and DOD have repeatedly recognized the need to

link resources to capabilities to facilitate DOD’s decision making and 

congressional oversight. However, complete and transparent ballistic 

missile defense operational costs are not visible in the FYDP because the 

FYDP’s structure does not provide a way to identify and aggregate these 

costs, even though DOD plans to field an increasing number of elements 

between fiscal years 2006-2011. Several factors impair the visibility of 

ballistic missile defense operational costs. For example, we have reported 

The Future Years 

Defense Program 

Does Not Provide 

Complete and 

Transparent Ballistic 

Missile Defense 

Operational Costs 

 25 The FYDP submitted with DOD’s fiscal year 2006 budget includes data through fiscal year 

2011. 

Page 28 GAO-06-473 Ballistic Missile Defense
that although expected operational costs for fiscal years 2005-2011 total

$1.7 billion, DOD has not included all known operational costs in its 

budget.26 Also, these operational costs are contained in many program 

elements throughout the FYDP and are not linked in any way, making it 

difficult to compile these costs. Without the ability to clearly identify and 

assess the total ballistic missile defense operational costs, neither the 

Secretary of Defense nor Congress has complete information to use when 

making funding and trade-off decisions among competing priorities; 

provide assurance that DOD’s plans to field ballistic missile defense 

capabilities are affordable over time; and assess the costs of operating the 

New Triad. 

Complete and transparent budget information facilitates the ability of 

DOD officials to make informed resource decisions, which is increasingly 

important given the current strategic environment and growing demand 

for resources at a time when the department is facing significant 

affordability challenges. DOD acknowledged in its fiscal year 2004 

Performance and Accountability Report that transparent budget 

submissions will facilitate DOD leaders’ ability to make better-informed 

resource decisions. In addition, DOD has acknowledged that defense 

decision making requires accurate, consistent computation of costs for 

each type of military capability and thus has modified the FYDP over time 

to capture the resources associated with particular areas of interest, such 

as space activities. Moreover, we have previously recommended DOD take 

actions designed to provide greater visibility of projected spending and 

future investments. For example, our report on DOD’s New Triad 

explained that ballistic missile defense is an important element of the New 

Triad and the current FYDP structure does not readily identify and 

aggregate New Triad–related costs. We recommended in June 2005 that

DOD establish a virtual major force program to identify New Triad costs.27

Subsequently, because DOD disagreed with our recommendation in its 

comments on our report, we also recommended that Congress consider 

requiring the Secretary of Defense to establish a virtual major force 

Complete and Transparent 

Budget Information 

Facilitates Decision

Making and Oversight 

 26 GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Actions Needed to Ensure Adequate Funding for Operation

and Sustainment of the Ballistic Missile Defense System, GAO-05-817 (Washington, D.C.: 

Sept. 6, 2005). 

27 GAO, Military Transformation: Actions Needed by DOD to More Clearly Identify New 

Triad Spending and Develop a Long-term Investment Approach, GAO-05-540 

(Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2005). 

Page 29 GAO-06-473 Ballistic Missile Defense
program to identify New Triad costs and report annually on these funding

levels.28

Complete and transparent budget information also facilitates 

congressional oversight of DOD programs. To this end, we recommended 

in 2004 that DOD enhance its FYDP report to provide better information 

for congressional decision makers’ use during budget deliberations.29 Also, 

a congressional committee has expressed specific interest in obtaining 

ballistic missile defense cost data. For example, in the Report of the House 

Committee on Appropriations on the Department of Defense 

Appropriations Bill for Fiscal Year 2006, congressional committee 

members noted that the large level of funding in individual program 

elements “obscures funding details and creates significant oversight 

issues.” Another committee also expressed frustration with the lack of 

transparency in budgeting and, in the Conference Report on the National

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 (December 18, 2005) 

directed the Comptroller General to conduct a study of the current 

program element structure (for research, development, test, and 

evaluation projects), particularly those that employ the system of systems 

concept. 

Complete costs to operate ballistic missile defense elements that will be 

fielded between fiscal years 2006-2011 are not visible to DOD or Congress 

in the FYDP because the current FYDP structure does not provide a way 

to identify and aggregate all ballistic missile defense system operational 

costs. Officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense Comptroller and 

Program, Analysis, and Evaluation agreed that such data are necessary in

making fully informed resource decisions and will become more important 

as more ballistic missile defense elements are fielded over time; however, 

these officials also agreed that these data are not transparent in the FYDP 

and that they have not developed a new structure for capturing these 

costs. 

Complete and Transparent 

Ballistic Missile Defense 

Operational Costs Are Not 

Visible in DOD’s FYDP 

 28 GAO, Military Transformation: Actions Needed by DOD to More Clearly Identify New 

Triad Spending and Develop a Long-term Investment Approach, GAO-05-962R 

(Washington, D.C.: Aug. 4, 2005). 

29 GAO, Future Years Defense Program: Actions Needed to Improve Transparency of 

DOD’s Projected Resource Needs, GAO-04-514 (Washington, D.C.: May 7, 2004). 

Page 30 GAO-06-473 Ballistic Missile Defense
We analyzed the fiscal year 2006 FYDP30 to determine whether the program 

elements related to ballistic missile defense operations could be identified. 

In 1995, DOD’s Office of Program, Analysis, and Evaluation created a 

defense mission category structure in the FYDP to identify resources 

devoted to different military missions, because this type of data was not 

available from the FYDP. This defense mission category structure can be

used to identify the program elements and costs for various missions such 

as suppression of enemy air defenses because they are linked to related 

program elements in the FYDP. Our analysis showed, and a Program, 

Analysis, and Evaluation official agreed, that neither the current FYDP 

structure nor its associated defense mission categories provides a way to

effectively identify and aggregate ballistic missile defense operational 

costs. 

In our analysis, we identified eight defense mission categories related to 

ballistic missile defense such as “ballistic missile defense forces” and 

“theater missile defense”. Even though our analysis identified 135 ballistic 

missile defense program elements that were linked to these ballistic 

missile defense mission categories, our analysis also showed that these 

program elements did not provide a complete and accurate list for 

identifying and aggregating ballistic missile defense operational costs. For 

example, 88 of the 135 (65 percent) program elements linked to ballistic 

missile defense mission categories were not related to the current 

BMDS—for example, one of these was for Special Operations Command. 

Also, the 135 program elements identified did not include some programs 

that are part of the BMDS such as the upgraded early warning radar. In 

addition, the 135 program elements did not include many program 

elements that service officials said contain BMDS operational costs. 

Specifically, we documented 28 BMDS-related program elements from the 

services, such as those for sensors and radars supported by the Air Force, 

ground-based missile defense supported by the Army, and the Aegis 

ballistic missile defense radar supported by the Navy. When we compared 

this list of program elements to the 135 we identified using the FYDP 

defense mission categories, we found that 24 of the 28 service-provided 

program elements did not match any of the 135 identified via our analysis

of FYDP defense mission categories for ballistic missile defense. 

 30 The FYDP submitted with DOD’s fiscal year 2006 budget includes data through fiscal year 

2011. The FYDP contains thousands of program elements that are intended to capture the 

total cost of a program. 

Page 31 GAO-06-473 Ballistic Missile Defense
We discussed the results of our analysis with officials from the Office of 

Secretary of Defense, Comptroller and Program, Analysis and Evaluation, 

and they agreed that our methodology was reasonable. They also agreed 

that our analysis showed that complete and transparent ballistic missile 

defense operational costs are not visible in the FYDP. Since there is no 

structure in the FYDP to accurately identify and aggregate ballistic missile 

defense operational costs, the Comptroller’s office must request these data

from each service and the Missile Defense Agency. The data are added

together to determine an estimate of the total operational cost for the 

ballistic missile defense system. The Comptroller’s office estimated that 

the services’ operational costs for fiscal years 2004-2006 totaled 

$259 million. However, the officials acknowledged that these data may not 

have been gathered consistently across all these organizations, because 

there is no standardized methodology specifying which costs to include. 

The completeness and transparency of operational costs for ballistic 

missile defense system elements are impaired by four primary factors: 

(1) operational costs are included in many program elements and there is 

no mechanism to link and compile these costs, (2) the Missile Defense 

Agency is authorized to use research and development funds to pay for 

operational costs, (3) DOD has not included all known operational costs in 

its budget estimates, and (4) DOD has not yet identified all costs 

associated with the New Triad, of which the ballistic missile defense 

system is an important part. Officials from the Office of Secretary of 

Defense, Comptroller and Program, Analysis and Evaluation agreed that 

complete and transparent ballistic missile defense operational costs are 

not visible in the FYDP for the reasons cited above. 

First, operational costs are included in many program elements 

throughout the FYDP and there is no mechanism to link the FYDP 

program elements together so that total operational costs can be 

compiled. A further complication is that some of these program elements 

also include costs for items that are not related to ballistic missile defense. 

For example, one program element entitled Theater Missile Defense is 

defined as including costs for theater missiles of all classes, including 

tactical, cruise, and air-to-surface missiles. Another program element 

includes all costs for all the Navy’s destroyers, and does not distinguish 

the 15 destroyers that DOD will operate to perform the ballistic missile 

defense mission. Even though there is no FYDP structure to identify and

aggregate ballistic missile defense operational costs, there is no plan to 

modify the FYDP structure to allow identification of ballistic missile 

defense program elements, according to an official in the Office of the

Several Factors Impair the 

Completeness and 

Transparency of Ballistic 

Missile Defense 

Operational Costs 

Page 32 GAO-06-473 Ballistic Missile Defense
Secretary of Defense, Program, Analysis, and Evaluation, because they

have not received direction to do so.

Second, the Missile Defense Agency is authorized by statute to use 

research and development funds to pay for some operational costs.31

However, officials we spoke with from the Office of Secretary of Defense, 

Comptroller and Program, Analysis, and Evaluation said that this practice 

makes it much more difficult to derive an accurate estimate of operational 

costs, because the research and development funds come from a different 

appropriation and are not typically used to pay operational costs. These 

officials told us that operational costs are usually paid from the operations

and maintenance appropriation, not the research and development 

appropriation. 

Third, we reported in September 2005 that operational costs for fiscal 

years 2005-2011 totaled $1.7 billion but that DOD has not included all 

known operational costs for BMDS in its budget. Further, we reported that 

the Missile Defense Agency and the services disagreed as to which 

organization should pay operational costs for developmental assets, even

though these assets may be available for operational use.32 In discussing 

our analysis with officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 

Comptroller, and Program, Analysis, and Evaluation, the officials noted 

that DOD’s estimate of ballistic missile defense operational costs does not 

reflect total costs, because it does not include combatant commanders 

costs such as the costs for the new Strategic Command subcommand for 

missile defense. In addition, an official in the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense, Comptroller stated that their estimate of operational costs over 

fiscal years 2006-2011 is not complete because the services and the Missile 

Defense Agency are negotiating who will pay operational costs in the 

future. 

Fourth, as we previously reported, DOD has not identified all costs 

associated with the New Triad, of which ballistic missile defense is an 

important part. We reported that the current FYDP structure does not 

expressly identify and aggregate New Triad program elements that would 

 31 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Pub.L. No. 108-375, § 231 (2004); 

and National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub.L. No. 109-163, § 233. 

32 GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Actions Needed to Ensure Adequate Funding for Operation

and Sustainment of the Ballistic Missile Defense System, GAO-05-817 (Washington, D.C.: 

Sept. 6, 2005). 

Page 33 GAO-06-473 Ballistic Missile Defense
allow identification of New Triad spending. Since ballistic missile defense 

is a part of the New Triad, DOD would need to be able to identify these 

costs as part of the New Triad. In fact, the Commander of the U.S. 

Strategic Command suggested that creating a virtual major force program 

could be necessary for each of the New Triad legs because of the diversity 

and scope of New Triad capabilities.33

The lack of complete and transparent budget information about ballistic 

missile defense operational costs impairs the ability of DOD officials to 

make informed resource decisions. DOD officials agreed that complete 

and transparent data on ballistic missile defense operational costs are 

necessary to make informed funding and trade-off decisions among 

competing priorities. Without the ability to identify and assess total BMDS 

operational costs, neither DOD nor Congress has complete information to 

know whether DOD’s plans to field ballistic missile defense capabilities 

are affordable over time. Furthermore, if the funds budgeted for BMDS 

support turn out to be insufficient since not all costs are included, DOD 

will either have to take funds from other programs or spend less on missile 

defense and potentially accept risks in security, training, personnel, or 

other areas. This is particularly important when considering the Missile 

Defense Agency’s plans to deliver an increasing number of systems and 

units over fiscal years 2006 -2011. The Missile Defense Agency may face

increasing budget pressure because, although it will be supporting more 

BMDS elements, the agency’s budget for contractor logistic support is 

expected to remain relatively constant. Finally, we reported in 2005 that 

decision makers need complete data about the resources being allocated 

to the New Triad—of which ballistic missile defense is a part—in making 

trade-offs among efforts to develop capabilities. Without these cost data,

DOD will be limited in its ability to guide and direct its efforts to integrate 

New Triad capabilities and Congress will not have full visibility of the 

resources being allocated to these efforts.34

Preparing to perform the ballistic missile defense mission is highly 

complex, involves many different DOD organizations, and requires 

seamless integration across multiple combatant commands. At the same 

time that the warfighters are developing and refining their training, 

Lack of Complete and 

Transparent Budget 

Information Impairs 

Decision Making 

Conclusions 

 33 GAO-05-540. 

34 GAO-05-540. 

Page 34 GAO-06-473 Ballistic Missile Defense
operations, and security plans, the Missile Defense Agency continues to 

develop blocks of BMDS capabilities. Although DOD faces the twin 

challenges of simultaneously developing the system and beginning 

operations, comprehensive planning could alleviate users’ concerns before

declaring that either limited operations or each subsequent block of 

capability is operational. Although DOD has plans for additional tests that 

are designed to resolve technical performance issues, the absence of a 

comprehensive plan for operational issues creates uncertainty across DOD 

on what remains to be done and how remaining actions should be 

prioritized before the department declares BMDS operational. Without 

operational criteria, it may be difficult for the Secretary of Defense to 

objectively assess combatant commands’ and services’ preparations to 

conduct BMDS operations and the Secretary may not have a transparent 

basis for declaring BMDS operational, which will become more important 

as capabilities are added in subsequent blocks and Congress considers 

requests to fund operations. Until an organization is assigned 

responsibility for developing a comprehensive plan that includes 

operational criteria, DOD may be hindered in its ability to identify and 

prioritize actions across the department effectively and efficiently. 

Considering that DOD guidance generally includes this type of planning 

and operational criteria to be developed for new weapon systems such as 

radars or fighter aircraft, it is even more important to bring discipline into

the process for the highly complex and integrated BMDS. Considering the 

significant changes DOD plans for each block of BMDS, this disciplined 

approach is important to apply not only to the initial capabilities, but to 

each subsequent block. Without adequate planning, clear criteria, and 

identifying responsibility for ensuring necessary actions, it may be difficult

for DOD to identify and prioritize actions and assure itself or Congress 

that all of the necessary pieces will be in place before declaring either 

limited defense operations or subsequent blocks of capability operational. 

In addition, it will be difficult for DOD to determine whether the return on 

its significant development investment in BMDS can be realized. 

Complete and transparent information on expected costs for important 

missions (such as ballistic missile defense) and investment efforts (such as 

the New Triad) facilitates DOD and congressional decision making when 

allocating resources. Complete and reliable data are needed to assess and 

understand cost trends over time, which is particularly important as 

warfighters begin to use ballistic missile defense elements and as an 

increasing number of elements are fielded over fiscal years 2006-2011. 

However, because the FYDP is currently not structured to transparently 

identify and aggregate ballistic missile defense operational costs, DOD’s 

ability to make strategic investment decisions based on knowledge of 

Page 35 GAO-06-473 Ballistic Missile Defense
complete BMDS operational costs is impaired. In addition, the 

consequences of not having this information means that neither DOD nor 

Congress has the benefit of complete and adequate data to make fully 

informed trade-off decisions in a resource-constrained environment. As a 

result, the investment decisions made may not truly reflect the desired 

relative priority of ballistic missile defense within DOD’s overall defense 

strategy. 

We are making the following two recommendations for executive action.

First, to help DOD identify and prioritize actions across the department 

needed to declare limited defensive operations as well as each subsequent 

block of capability operational, and to dispel uncertainty and bring needed 

discipline to the process, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense 

take the following actions in consultation with the Commander, U.S. 

Strategic Command, the services, and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

• Develop operational criteria for each ballistic missile defense element and

the overall BMDS system for limited defensive operations and each 

subsequent block of capability. These criteria should be comparable to the 

operational criteria that are currently developed for new weapon systems. 

• Assign responsibility to specific organizations and hold these 

organizations accountable for developing the criteria and ensuring these 

criteria are met before operational capability is declared. 

• Develop a comprehensive plan specifying actions that must be completed 

with completion deadlines. The plan should cover the range of doctrine, 

organization, training, personnel, and facilities actions that are normally 

required to be developed and in place for new weapon systems, should 

integrate these actions across elements, and should address actions 

needed for the overall, integrated BMDS. 

Second, to provide decision makers in Congress and DOD with complete,

transparent data on the resources required to operate the ballistic missile 

defense system and to clearly identify costs for an important piece of the 

New Triad, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the 

Director, Program, Analysis, and Evaluation, in consultation with the 

Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and the services, to develop a 

structure within the FYDP to identify all ballistic missile defense 

operational costs, which can be included as part of an annual report on the 

Page 36 GAO-06-473 Ballistic Missile Defense
funding levels for New Triad activities that GAO recommended DOD 

provide annually to Congress.35

Given the significance of BMDS to national defense and the billions of 

dollars spent in developing this system, Congress should consider 

requiring the Secretary of Defense to develop: 

• A comprehensive plan (including operational criteria) specifying actions 

that must be completed by the services and combatant commands before 

declaring BMDS operational for limited defensive operations or 

subsequent blocks of capability. 

• A structure within the FYDP to identify all ballistic missile defense 

operational costs which can be included as part of an annual report on the 

funding levels for New Triad activities. 

In written comments on a draft of this report, the Department of Defense 

concurred or partially concurred with our recommendations. The 

department’s comments are reprinted in their entirety in appendix III. The 

department also provided technical comments, which we have 

incorporated as appropriate. 

DOD partially agreed with our recommendations to develop operational 

criteria and a comprehensive plan specifying actions that must be 

completed before declaring BMDS operational and also agreed with our 

recommendation to assign responsibility for doing so to a specific 

organization which would be held accountable for completing these tasks. 

However, while DOD’s response addressed the warfighters’ role in 

providing input to the Missile Defense Agency to guide the system’s 

technical development, it did not address the need for operational criteria 

prior to declaring the BMDS or elements of the system operational. 

Moreover, DOD’s comments do not indicate what, if any, process it plans 

to use to develop operational criteria for assessing combatant commands’ 

and services’ preparedness to conduct BMDS operations or whether it 

plans to assign responsibility. We continue to believe that the warfighters, 

specifically the combatant commands and services under the leadership of 

U.S. Strategic Command, should have the lead in developing and ensuring 

Matter for 

Congressional 

Consideration 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

 35 GAO, Military Transformation: Actions Needed by DOD to More Clearly Identify New 

Triad Spending and Develop a Long-term Investment Approach, GAO-05-540 

(Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2005). 

Page 37 GAO-06-473 Ballistic Missile Defense
operational criteria are met as opposed to the developers—the Missile 

Defense Agency and system development program offices. Without 

comprehensive planning and objective operational criteria, the services 

and the combatant commands may not be as well prepared to operate the 

complex, integrated BMDS as they are for other new weapon systems. 

Furthermore, such planning and criteria would provide an objective basis 

for assessing combatant commands’ and services’ preparedness to 

conduct BMDS operations and provide a transparent basis for declaring 

BMDS operational. In addition, without an organization assigned 

responsibility for developing a comprehensive plan which includes 

operational criteria, DOD may be hindered in its ability to identify and 

prioritize actions across the department effectively and efficiently. 

DOD also partially concurred with our recommendation to develop a 

structure within the FYDP to identify all ballistic missile defense 

operational costs that could be included as part of an annual report on 

New Triad funding that we had previously recommended DOD provide 

annually to Congress. Considering that there is no common methodology 

to identify and aggregate BMDS operational costs, we continue to believe

that corrective action is needed so that Congress and DOD have adequate 

information to assess whether DOD’s plans to field ballistic missile 

defense capabilities are affordable. Complete and transparent BMDS 

operational cost information is important to assess cost trends over time, 

particularly as an increasing number of BMDS elements are fielded during 

the next several years. Without this information, neither DOD nor 

Congress will have the benefit of complete and adequate data to make 

fully informed trade-off decisions within projected defense spending 

levels. With respect to DOD’s nonconcurrence on our previous 

recommendation to account for New Triad costs in the FYDP, we note that 

the Report of the House Armed Services Committee on the National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 directed the Secretary of 

Defense to modify the FYDP to identify and aggregate program elements 

associated with the New Triad which, as we state in this report, includes

ballistic missile defense. 

We continue to believe that the specific actions we recommended are 

needed for DOD to prepare for conducting BMDS operations and to assist 

in DOD and congressional oversight of ballistic missile defense 

operational costs. Because DOD did not indicate that it plans to implement 

our recommendations, we have added a matter for Congress to consider 

directing DOD to develop a comprehensive plan which includes 

operational criteria and to develop a structure within the FYDP to identify

all ballistic missile defense operational costs. 

Page 38 GAO-06-473 Ballistic Missile Defense
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the 

Commander, U.S. Strategic Command; the Commander, U.S. Northern 

Command; and the Director, Missile Defense Agency. We will make copies

available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at 

no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions, please call me on (202) 512-4402. 

Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public 

Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Staff members who 

made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix III. 

Janet A. St. Laurent 

Director, Defense Capabilities and Management 

Page 39 GAO-06-473 Ballistic Missile Defense
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has 

made progress in planning to operate the Ballistic Missile Defense System 

(BMDS), and to determine whether the Future Years Defense Program 

(FYDP) provides complete and transparent data on total ballistic missile 

defense operational costs, we conducted various analyses, reviewed key 

documentation, and interviewed relevant DOD officials. During this 

review, we focused on assessing issues DOD faces in planning to operate 

the BMDS such as operational criteria, training, security, and cost 

transparency. We did not evaluate DOD’s testing plans, research and 

development programs, or the technical effectiveness of individual 

elements as we have addressed these issues in other reports. Specifically, 

we have issued two reports on the status of BMDS that included 

assessments of program goals, testing plans, and progress in developing

each element.1

 Our March 2005 report found that system performance 

remains uncertain and unverified because DOD has not successfully 

conducted an end-to-end flight test using operationally representative 

hardware and software. 

To assess DOD’s progress in planning to operate the BMDS, we obtained

and reviewed relevant documents on ballistic missile defense operations

such as the National Security Presidential Directive 23 dated December 

16, 2002; the Unified Command Plan dated January 10, 2003; various 

combatant command contingency plans; BMDS Tactical Handbook; 

various Joint Staff orders; DOD, Joint Staff, U.S. Strategic Command, and 

service instructions and regulations; DOD memoranda providing guidance 

for implementing the ballistic missile defense program; Integrated Training

Working Group briefings; Missile Defense Agency briefings and documents 

explaining program status and plans; and briefings by DOD officials. We 

also observed an exercise that involved the services and combatant 

commands.

To identify areas where planning was incomplete, we compared what DOD 

had done with the planning principles for new weapon systems embodied 

 1

 GAO, Missile Defense: Actions Are Needed to Enhance Testing and Accountability, 

GAO-04-409 (Washington, D.C.: April 2004); GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Status of Ballistic

Missile Defense Program in 2004, GAO-05-243 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2005). 

Page 40 GAO-06-473 Ballistic Missile Defense
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

in DOD acquisition and requirements guidance2 and service instructions3

and training plans explained in DOD’s Joint Training System.4

 We then 

discussed the results of our comparisons with officials in the U.S. Strategic 

Command; the Army’s Space and Missile Defense Command; Office of the 

Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; Joint 

Staff; and Missile Defense Agency. 

To determine the extent to which the FYDP provides complete and 

transparent data on ballistic missile defense operational costs, we 

analyzed the FYDP structure to determine whether it was designed to 

readily identify the program elements that contain ballistic missile defense 

operational costs and assessed whether these FYDP program elements 

included all BMDS elements. In addition, we obtained and reviewed 

documentation at the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Army, 

Navy, and Air Force to identify program elements that would include 

ballistic missile defense operational costs. We met with DOD officials from 

the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Office of the 

Director, Program, Analysis, and Evaluation, and the Office of the 

Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to 

discuss our approach and they agreed it was reasonable. We assessed the 

reliability of the data by corroborating our list of defense mission 

categories and some program elements with knowledgeable agency 

officials. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for our 

purposes. 

In addition, other organizations we visited to gain an understanding of 

their roles in operating elements of the Ballistic Missile Defense System 

included the Joint Staff, U.S. Army Headquarters and Space and Missile 

Defense Command, the office of the Chief of Naval Operations’ Surface 

Warfare division, Air Force Headquarters and Space Command, the office

of the National Guard Bureau, the Army National Guard, and the Air 

National Guard. To document how various commands would employ 

BMDS in performing the ballistic missile defense mission, we met with 

 2

 DOD Instruction 5000.2, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, May 12, 2003; 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of the Staff Manual 3170.01B, Operation of the Joint 

Capabilities Integration and Development System, May 11, 2005. 

3

 Air Force Space Command Instruction 10-601, Declaration of Initial Operating

Capability and Full Operational Capability, Dec. 2, 1997. 

4

 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3500.01B, Joint Training Policy for the 

Armed Forces of the United States, Dec. 31, 1999. 

Page 41 GAO-06-473 Ballistic Missile Defense
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

officials from the U.S. Strategic Command in Omaha, Nebraska, and the

U.S. Northern Command in Colorado Springs, Colorado, and observed an 

exercise. 

We provided a draft of this report to DOD for their review and 

incorporated their comments where appropriate. Our review was 

conducted between January 2005 and February 2006 in accordance with 

generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Page 42 GAO-06-473 Ballistic Missile Defense
Appendix II: Comments from the Department Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense 

of Defense 

Page 43 GAO-06-473 Ballistic Missile Defense
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 44 GAO-06-473 Ballistic Missile Defense
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 45 GAO-06-473 Ballistic Missile Defense
Appendix III: GAO

A

 Contact and Staff 

cknowledgments 

Page 46 GAO-06-473

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Janet A. St. Laurent (202) 512-4402 

In addition to the individual named above, Gwendolyn R. Jaffe, Assistant 

Director, Brenda M. Waterfield, Pat L. Bohan, Amy J. Anderson, Jeffrey R. 

Hubbard, John E. Trubey, and Renee S. Brown made key contributions to 

this report. 

GAO Contact 

Acknowledgments 

Ballistic Missile Defense
Related GAO Products Related GAO Products 

Defense Acquisitions: Actions needed to Ensure Adequate Funding for 

Operation and Sustainment of the Ballistic Missile Defense System. 

GAO-05-817. Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2005. 

Military Transformation: Actions Needed by DOD to More Clearly 

Identify New Triad Spending and Develop a Long-term Investment 

Approach. GAO-05-962R. Washington, D.C.: August 4, 2005. 

Military Transformation: Actions Needed by DOD to More Clearly 

Identify New Triad Spending and Develop a Long-term Investment 

Approach. GAO-05-540. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2005. 

Defense Acquisitions: Status of Ballistic Missile Defense Program in 

2004. GAO-05-243. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2005. 

Future Years Defense Program: Actions Needed to Improve 

Transparency of DOD’s Projected Resource Needs. GAO-04-514. 

Washington, D.C.: May 7, 2004. 

Missile Defense: Actions Are Needed to Enhance Testing and

Accountability. GAO-04-409. Washington, D.C.: April 23, 2004.

Missile Defense: Actions Being Taken to Address Testing 

Recommendations, but Updated Assessment Needed. GAO-04-254. 

Washington, D.C.: February 26, 2004.

Missile Defense: Additional Knowledge Needed in Developing System for 

Intercepting Long-Range Missiles. GAO-03-600. Washington, D.C.: August 

21, 2003. 

Missile Defense: Alternate Approaches to Space Tracking and 

Surveillance System Need to Be Considered. GAO-03-597. Washington, 

D.C.: May 23, 2003. 

Missile Defense: Knowledge-Based Practices Are Being Adopted, but 

Risks Remain. GAO-03-441. Washington, D.C.: April 30, 2003.

Missile Defense: Knowledge-Based Decision Making Needed to Reduce 

Risks in Developing Airborne Laser. GAO-02-631. Washington, D.C.: July 

12, 2002. 

Page 47 GAO-06-473 Ballistic Missile Defense
Related GAO Products 

Missile Defense: Review of Results and Limitations of an Early National 

Missile Defense Flight Test. GAO-02-124. Washington, D.C.: February 28, 

2002. 

Missile Defense: Cost Increases Call for Analysis of How Many New 

Patriot Missiles to Buy. GAO/NSIAD-00-153. Washington, D.C.: June 29, 

2000. 

Missile Defense: Schedule for Navy Theater Wide Program Should Be 

Revised to Reduce Risk. GAO/NSIAD-00-131. Washington, D.C.: May 31,

2000. 

(350624) Page 48 GAO-06-473 Ballistic Missile Defense
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